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SEVEN WEEKS' WAR
THE
SEVEN WEEKS' WAR
ITS ANTECEDENTS AND ITS INCIDENTS
BY
H. M. HOZIER, F.CS., F.G.S.,
I «
■»•
iBjtS£D UPON LETTERS REPRINTED BY PERMISSION FROM "THE TIMES."i
" Unaque hora, quadringentonim annonim opus quibus
A]ba steterat exctdio ac minis dedit."— LiVY.
SECOND EDITION
WITH NEW PREFACE AND MAPS
Eonlion anti I^cId gorlt:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1871.
[Tke Right of Tramlation is Reserved, ^
H7
LOXDOV,:
BRADBURY, EVANS, AND CO., PRIMTBRS, WHITBPRIAR&
HENRY M: Sn STEI»HEIi«
• •.• •• • •• • • •
(^
TO
COLONEL EDWARD BRUCE HAMLEY,
ROYAL ARTILLERY,
LATELY PROFESSOR OF MILITARY HISTORY, STRATEGY, AND
TACTICS AT THE STAPr COLLEGE,
NOW COMMANDANT OF THE STAFF COLLEGE,
THIS FAINT ATTEMPT TO CHRONICLE THE EVENTS
OF THE GERMAN WAR OF 1 866 IS
fjebicnteb
BY
A FORMER PUPIL
5Ce375
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.
The only claim to consideration that the following pages
can present is that for the most part they are the product of a
personal eye-witness of some of the most interesting incidents
of a war which, for rapidity and decisive results, may claim an
almost unrivalled position in history.
The Author has attempted to ascertain and to advance facts.
His object has been impartiality, Jiis aim truth. Criticism
from one so feebly competent to criticise would have been
entitled to no respect, and has therefore been avoided. A
few observations occasionally introduced are the results not of
original thought so much as of communication with some
whose positive abilities and experience entitle their opinions
to be attentively weighed.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
PREFATORY CHAPTER XV
BOOK I.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY
CHAPTER II.
FRUITLESSNESS OF THE CASTEIN CONVENTION .... 1 4
CHAPTER III.
COMMENCEMENT OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR . 18
CHAPTER IV.
Prussia's motion for reform of Germanic confederation . 30
CHAPTER V.
BREACH of convention OF GASTEIN 32
BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
FIRST BLOODLESS CONFLICT IN HOLSTEIN 40
CHAPTER II.
FINAL RUPTURE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA ... 44
CONTENTS,
CHAPTER III.
BREAK-UP OF THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION
PAGE
46
BOOK III.
CHAPTER I.
THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA .
52
CHAPTER II.
THE WAR STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA ,
93
CHAPTER III.
WAR STRENGTH OF THE REMAINING STATES OF GERMANY
100
CHAPTER IV.
WAR STRENGTH OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY
107
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.
PRELUDE OF THE WAR
112
CHAPTER IL
PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER
118
CHAPTER III.
PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HESSE-CASSEL
• .
. 122
CHAPTER IV.
PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY .
. •
124
CONTENTS. xi
BOOK V.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
THZATRE OF GERMAN WAR I34
CHAPTER II.
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS . . I45
CHAPTER III.
ACTION OF CITSCHIN 180
BOOK VI.
CHAPTER I.
PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS . 1 89
CHAPTER II.
PASSAGE OF THE RIGHT AND CENTRAL COLUMNS OF THE ARMY
OF SILESIA THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS .... I97
CHAPTER III.
ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA . . 207
BOOK VII.
CHAPTER I.
OPERATIONS PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRXtZ 221
CHAPTER II.
battle of kOniggratz 210
xii CONTENTS.
PAGE
CHAPTER III.
DEFSNCE OF SILESIA 266
BOOK VIII.
CHAPTER I.
OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN THEATRE OF THE GERMAN WAR . 268
CHAPTER II.
CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE 283
CHAPTER III.
THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE 302
CHAPTER IV.
THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE 313
CHAPTER V.
OCCUPATION OF FRANCONIA BY THE SECOND RESERVED CORPS 324
BOOK IX.
CHAPTER I.
PRUSSIAN ADVANCE FROM KONIGGRJlTZ TO BRttNN . , 3-^
CHAPTER IL
TOBITSCHAU 363
CHAPTER III.
FURTHER ADVANCE OF THE PI^USSIAN ARMIES PROM BRi^NN TO
THE DANUBE
379
CONTENTS. xiii
PAGE
CHAPTER IV.
THE TRUCE 4II
CHAPTER V.
PEACE WITH THE SOUTH-GERMAN STATES 467
CHAPTER VL
FORMATION OP THE NORTH-GERMAN CONFEDERATION . . 473
BOOK X.
CHAPTER I.
THE WAX IN ITALY 476
CHAPTER 11.
KAVAl. OPERATIONS . 49O
CHAPTER III.
PEACE BETWEEN ITALY AND AUSTRIA 498
APPENDIX 1 499
APPEKDI7 II «... 505
APPENDIX IIL 506
APPENDIX IT 519
APPElfDIX V. 520
LIST OF MAPS.
OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE MAINE . • . Tofocepa^e I
OPERATIONS FROM kOniggratz .... To face page 330
MAPS.
The main features of the campaign of 1866 can be easily
traced in any ordinary maps of Bohemia, Saxony or Moravia.
Those who wish to study the details of the war, will find the
maps published by the Prussian Staff at Berlin, in 1868, most
lucid and serviceable. They are to be found in any large
military library, and can be consulted at the Royal United
Service Institution.
PREFATORY CHAPTER.
The results of the war of 1866 in Germany were the
aggrandizement of Prussia, the formation of new Confedera-/j
tions and the disappearance of Austria as a Germanic power.
To the eight provinces of which Prussia consisted in the spring'
of 1866 were added Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Hanover, Schleswig-
Holstein and Xauenburg. These were incorporated in the
Prussian kingdom and raised its population to about 23,500,000.
At the same time arose under the leadership of Prussia the
new North German Confederation, the harbinger of an united
German Empire. It was sixty years almost to a day when the
treaty of Prague was signed in 1866, since the Emperor
Francis II. had announced to the Diet his resignation of the
Imperial Crown: By that act, due to the victories of Napoleon
I. over Germans, the oldest political institution in the world was**
extinguished, for this Empire was that which the nephew of ,'
Julius won for himself from the powers of the East at the/
battle of Acdum, and which had preserved almost unaltered}
through eighteen centuries of time and through the greatest)
changes in extent, in power, and in character, a title and pre*
tensions from which all meaning had long since departed.*
On the fall of Napoleon I. this Empire was to a certain extent
reconstituted by the treaty of Vienna as a Confederation of
thirty-nine States. This Confederacy was extinguished in the
war of i866y and the treaty of Prague established the Con-
federation of the North German States, and led to the reestab*
* Bryce, Holy Roman Empire.
1
xvi PREFATORY CHAPTER,
lishment of the Germanic Empire on a purer, more natural,
and more homogeneous basis than it had ever possessed from
the days of the Csesars. The treaty of Prague, however, was
but the stepping-stone, not the key-stone of German Unity.
North Germany numbering twenty-one States was indeed linked
by that treaty into a close connection with Prussia, who held
the undivided leadership, the command of the German armies,
and the power of peace and war north of the Maine. South
Germany did not hold itself together. Austria stood aloof^
and appeared resolved henceforth to meddle no more in
German af&u^. Bavaria, Wiirtemburg, and Baden remained
almost independent of each other, but each, on its own footing,
concluded important treaties with Prussia. By that between
Prussia and Bavaria, concluded on the 22nd August, 1866, these
two powers mutually guaranteed the integrity of their respective
territories with all the military forces at their disposal; and it
was also established, that in case of war the King of Prussia
should have the command-in-chief of the Bavarian army. The
treaties between Prussia, Baden, and Wiirtembuig, were of the
same tenour; they provided a strict military alliance and
submission of the armies in time of war to the King of
Prussia*
In Northern Germany, in the spring of 1867, ^ representative
assembly elected by universal suflfrage at the rate of one
member for every 100,000 of the population, met at Berlin in
February, and by the i6th April, had discussed and adopted a
constitutional charter by which the whole of the States of
North Germany were definitively united into a federal body.
This charter, entitled the Constitution of the North German
Confederation, consists of fifteen chapters, comprising seventy-
nine articles, with a preamble declaring that the Governments
of the States enumerated, formed themselves into a perpetual
Confederation for the protection of the territory and institutions
of the union, and for the guardianship of the wel^ire of the
German people. The twenty-one States incorporated in this
Confederation were, Prussia, Saxony, Mecklenburg-Schwerin,
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xvii
Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Weimar,
Saxe-Meiningen, Anhalt, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Altenburg,
Waldeck, Lippe-Detmold, Reuss-Schleiz, Reuss-Greiz, Schwarz-
burg-Sondershausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schaumburg-
Lippe, Hamburg, Liibeck, and Bremen. The executive power
of the Confederation was vested in the Sovereign of Prussia :
this ruler also, as the Lord President, managed the diplomatic
intercourse of the Confederation with foreign powers ; was the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, and had the
prerogative of nominating Ambassadors, of declaring war, and
of concluding peace. It was his duty to enforce the obser-
vance of federal laws, and to compel negligent or disobedient
members to fulfil their federal obligations, and to appoint all
officers and civil functionaries. The contributions of the
various States to the cost of the general administration of the
Confederation, was regulated in proportion to the numbers of
their population. The King of Prussia had also to appoint a
Chancellor of the Confederation who should preside over the
Federal Council. The Chancellor selected was naturally the
Count von Bismarck.
By the terms of the Constitution of the North German Con-
federation, the legislative power of the Union was vested in
two representative bodies. One of these bodies is elected by
the Governments of the Confederate States, and is termed the
Bundesrath, the other is elected by the population, and is termed
the Reichstag. In the Bundesrath sit deputies from the
Governments of each State of the Confederation ; the repre-
sentative <rf Prussia has seventeen votes, that of Saxony four,
and those from Mecklenbuig-Schwerin and Brunswick two each.
Besides smaller German estates and the tliree free-towns with
one vote each. All together forty-two votes. The Reichstag
is elected by universal sufl&age for the term of three years and
meets in annual session. To the Reichstag belongs the initia-
tive of legislative acts ; it is independent of the Bundesrath,
but the members of the latter have the privilege of being present
it its sittings to expose the views of their respective Governments.
xviii PREFATORY CHAPTER.
On account of the representations of the Emperor of the
French, Saxony was not, on the conclusion of the war of 1866,
so completely absorbed into the North German Confederation
as her more northern neighbours. The King of Saxony,
although a member of the Union, still retained the power of
nominating officers, civil and military, in his kingdom, and the
Saxon Army was not merged in that of the Confederation.
It was, however, to be held under the supreme orders of the
King of Prussia in case of war.
The conclusion of the war in 1866, and the treaty of Prague,
were due in a great measure to the Emperor of the French,
ivhose offer to mediate between the contending Powers, Austria
hastily accepted, probably erroneously, as Count Bismarck had
already made proposals for direct negotiations, in which no
mention of the pa)rment of a war indemnity was made. France
was, however, only too eager to mediate ; for French diplo-
matists for decades previous to 1870 held the creed, that the
privilege of France was to arrange, and mould, to her own
advantage, the domestic commotions of Germany. Prussia
could not without folly at the close of a victorious campaign,
risk all its glorious results by throwing down the gauntlet to
France, and raising up on the Rhine a new army of enemies,
while 'unfriendly divisions were still frowning on the banks of
the Danube and the Maine. She was perforce obliged to
consent to French mediation, and French mediation was not
disinterested. It was the aim and object of France to oppose
the unity of Germany, and to prevent the rise of a great and united
nation on her own border. For this reason she stipulated for the
semi-independence of Saxony, and caused a clause to be
inserted in the treaty of Prague by which Prussia consented
to cede to Denmark the northern portion of Schleswig. Austria,
who at the time of the negotiation of the treaty of Prague was
but the mouth-piece of France, stipulated when she retired
from the German Confederacy, that the remaining Southern
States should be formed into a Southern Confederacy. It was
thus hoped to prevent the ultimate fusion of the Southern
\
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xix
States with Northern Germany and Prussia, and to establish a
power in Germany which jealousy of Prussia and the bitter-
ness of defeat, might in an European conflict range upon the
side of Prussia's enemies. But the man who guided the foreign
policy of Prussia was competent to foil the diplomatists of
France. Confident of the difiiculties which would defer the
formation of the Southern Confederation, he assented to the
Austro-French proposal, organized the Northern Confederation,
which speedily acquired strength and consistency, and con-
cluded between each of the Southern States individually,
offensive and defensive alliances with Prussia. France, really
by an attitude of desire to interfere in the internal arrangement
of Germany, fiidlitated the conclusion of these treaties ; and
the &ct that on the 6th August, 1866, she demanded the
fortress of Mainz from Prussia under threat of war, though
known but to a few men, had doubtless an important effect.
The cession of the fortress was refused, and when it was seen
that Prussia was resolute the threat was not carried out, but
an excuse made, which averred that the demand was wrung
from the Emperor when labouring under illness. The French
army was then far from prepared for war, as it was not
thoroughly completed with men, nor armed with a breech-
loading weapon; and France failed to obtain after the war of
1866, territorial concessions from Germany, as signally as
when before that war she proffered to declare against Austria,
and attack her with 300,000 men, provided that Prussia would
cede territory on the left bank of the Rhine.
While after the campaign of 1866 the North German Con-
federation almost daily increased in power and united senti-
ment, no progress was made in the formation of a Southern
Bund. The States lying south of the Maine were too equal-
in size and resources. None was clearly preeminent, and to
none would the others consent to accord preeminence. An
attempt was made at a conference held at Nordlingen in 1868,
to form an agreement among the Southern States as to a very
minor question, — ^the management of the federal fortresses of
h 2
XX PREFATORY CHAPTER,
the South : yet even on this subject there was no concord, and
the conference separated with the sole result of showing that
it was almost impossible on any point to establish an harmo-
nious understanding between the States of Southern Germany.
At first, however, the relations between these States and Prussia
were not quite satisfactory, for there were political parties who
feared the preponderance of Prussia, and the probable absorp-
tion of the Southern States, but the attitude of France gradu-
ally forced the clear-sighted patriotism of the South to regard
Prussia with friendly eyes, and the deep-seated desire of
German unity swayed all except a few selfish and protectionist
' factions. Austria at first seemed inclined to harbour a desire
■ of vengeance for the defeat of 1866, and to look upou France
as a probable future ally. But the publication of the fact that
France had been willing to declare against her at the outbreak
■ of the German war, did much to modify that feeling, and to
turn her population, as well as her Government, to the neces-
sary task of internal, financial, and military reorganization.
The Prussian victories in 1866 were at the time looked upon
in France with jealousy and disfavour. The crowning triumph
of Koniggratz was regarded by the exciteable population of
that Empire as a direct step towards German unity, the aggran-
dizement of Prussia, and consequently as a menace to the
ascendancy and control which for years the French had tacitly
'claimed in the internal affairs of Germany. In 1866 the
claims of France to German territory were withdrawn; but in
1867 they were renewed in a form which, although less sum-
mary, still for a short time, threatened to disturb the peace of
Europe. By the treaty of Vienna in 1815, the Grand Duchy
of Luxemburg was given to the King of the Belgians, but at
the same time was included in the Germanic Confederation.
On the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands, it was
arranged by the treaty of London that Eastern Luxemburg and
Limburg, to which the federal obligations of Western Luxem-
burg were transferred, should be handed over to the King of
the Netherlands, while the King of the Belgians received fiill
PREFATORY CHAPTER, xxi
sovereignty over the western portion of Luxemburg. The
King of die Netherlands refused to accede to this treaty, but
after the French siege of Antwerp, Austria and Prussia, in
behalf of the Germanic Confederation, enforced the provisions
of the treaty, and the eastern portion of Luxemburg was
formally included in the Confederation. The town of Luxem-
burg was a most important fortress of Germany towards France,
and from 1815 to 1867 was garrisoned by a Prussian garrison.
In 1867, the King of Holland, Sovereign of Luxemburg, who
had been excluded from the North German Confederation
on its formation in 1866, made overtures for the sale of the
fortress and territory, to France. To these the Emperor
Napoleon lent a willing ear. The arrangement soon became
publicly known, and war between France and Prussia for the
moment seemed imminent. The public feeling of Germany
was allowed to become excited, although, had the leaders of
Prussia desired, it is almost certain, that at the beginning of
the complication, they could have yielded Luxemburg to France
without being forced into war by the pressure of public opinion.
Such was not, however, their desire ; war with France was the
readiest mode of completing German unity; and although
Count von Bismark did not push forward such a war, he did
not shrink from taking up the gauntlet if it were thrown down
to him. He accordingly refused to abandon the defence of a
fortress which had been confided to the guardianship of Prussia
for half a century, and which was really situated on German
ground, although not formally included in the North German
Confederation. Some day the real history of the exclusion of
Luxemburg from that Confederation in 1866 may be known.
On the other hand, the Emperor of the French having once
expressed his readiness to purchase Luxemburg, could not
withdraw, at the mere dictate of Prussia, without grievously
wounding the sensitive pride of the French people, and
raising into a storm the national jealousy of Prussia, which
had been hardly concealed since the battle of Koniggratz.
Thus rulers seemed about to be forced into a war, which
xxii PREFATORY CHAPTER,
neither desired, by the populations over which they ruled ;
and this fact may well be considered by that hysterical school
of politicians which maintains that wars are the work of rulers,
and that in Republican institutions lies the best guarantee of
enduring peace. To ward off the danger of war a conference
was arranged. It was proposed by the King of Holland,
sanctioned by the neutral Powers, and met in London under
the presidency of Lord Stanley, who was then the Minister for
Foreign Aifairs. As the result of its deliberations the duchy
was declared neutral, and its neutrality guaranteed by all the
Powers represented at the conference. Prussia withdrew her
garrison from the fortress, and the fortifications were to be
demolished. The concessions on the part of Prussia were not
very material, as the fortifications had been erected prior to
the introduction of rifled ordnance, and the great strength of
the fortress lies in its natural position. Still war was for the
moment averted, and many men believed that all difficulties
were arranged between these two powers, that Austria was
crippled, Russia unprepared, and that a lasting peace was
really about to dawn upon Europe.
Those who looked below the surface could, however, per-
ceive that France was but brooding over the insult which she
chose to conceive had been offered to her, by the fact that
Germany had shaken off her leading-strings, and that Germans
chose to manage their own aifairs without foreign interference.
Those could also see that, in the apparent calm, not only was
France pushing forward armaments and military organization,
but that Prussian administrators were quietly taking all neces-
sary precautions in case of war, and studiously followed move
with move. The war, which had been for long foreseen by
these, broke out indeed suddenly, and surprised the world at
large ; but a few men in England had carefully watched how,
in the spring of 1870, French agents were engaged in all our
southern markets buying com and forage. The excuses given
for enormous purchases of this description were, that the sea-
son had been so dry in France that no harvest was expected ;
PREFATORY CHArTER, xxiU
but this excuse was transparent, for had forage been so very
scarce in France, French dealers would not have cared, simul-
taneously with an enormous rise in the price of forage, to have
largely exported horses to France. At the same time, too, a
flotilla was secretly collected in the northern French ports
capable of transporting 40,000 men and 1 2,000 horses. These
things were, perhaps, known to and noticed by Prussian
agents, but the British Government, against which the arrange-
ments might have been equally directed, remained in a happy
ignorance of any danger of war, and on the outbreak of
hostilities, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his place in Par-
liament, stated that a few hours previously the British Foreign
Office believed that there was not a cloud on the political
horizon of Europe. Yet still, many Utopian Englishmen, in
the Cstce of these facts, contentedly argue that no preparations
for the invasion of our country could be made without the
Government being fully aware of them.
During the years between the treaty of Prague and the out-
break of war with France, the Prussian military organization
had been extended to the troops of all the Northern States.
The Prussian army, which fought in 1866, was increased by
three corps d'arm^ Of these the 9th was that of Schleswig-
Holstein, the loth that of Hanover, the nth that of Hesse.
The Grand Ducal Hessian, or 25th division, was placed in
intimate connection with the last corps, while the semi-inde-
pendent army of the kingdom of Saxony formed the 12th
corps of the Confederation. The broad principles of the
Prussian organization, as far as regarded infantry, were proved
so satisfactory in 1866, that they were extended after the Austrian
war without alteration to the'new corps d'arm^e. In the organi-
zation of the cavalry, however, which was largely increased, the
experience of 1866 dictated the necessity of a vital change.
Hitherto the Prussian regiments of cavalry had always con-
sisted of four squadrons in time of peace ; on the outbreak
of war the four squadrons took the field, and a depot was
formed to supply the necessary reinforcements of men and
xxiv PREFATORY CHAPTER.
horses. This system was found decidedly faulty during the
Austrian war, and after the treaty of Prague the Prussian
regiments were increased to five squadrons, of which four
take the field, and one remains as a depot to supply im-
mediately the quick necessities of horses and men. To this
change, and to the large increase of cavalry, is due, in no
slight degree, the wonderfiil successes of the Prussian armies in
1870 — 71; for, as the Emperor of the French himself stated,
the Prussian cavalry formed an impenetrable screen, through
which it was impossible for the enemy to discover the move-
ments of the main armies, while every movement of the French
armies was accurately and faithfully reported by the now-
famous Uhlans to the Prussian head-quarters. In the im-
portant arm artillery, the Prussians, directly after the cam-
paign of 1866, laid aside all muzzle-loading guns and adopted
for their whole field-artillery breech-loading steel pieces made
on Krupp*s system. Towards the end of 1869 some breech-
loading bronze guns were turned out, took part in the subse-
quent war, and were so satisfactory that it is probable the
whole field-artillery will be armed with bronze guns. The
system of Prussian Intendantur, which had given such excellent
earnest of efficiency in 1866, was naturally extended to the
newly-formed corps d'arm^e. The Intendantur of Prussia
must be clearly distinguished from the Intendance of France ;
the names are similar, but the systems are almost reverse : the
Prussian system was proved excellent in two great wars, the
French was paralysed under the first pressure of active service.
It is fortunate that our country has adopted much more the
Prussian than the French system of supply in the lately
established department of Control
When the French Empire was threatened with war on
account of the Luxemburg question in 1867, the nominal
strength of the army was 600,000 men ; but it was found that
it would have been impossible, after providing for depots and
necessary detachments, to place much more than 1 50,000 men
in line of battle. It was evident that the military system re-
PREFATORY CHAPTER, xxv
quired reorganization, and in 1868 the system of reorganization
elaborated by Marshal Niel became law. By this new system,
which was, as its predecessor, based upon conscription, the
forces of the empire were divided into three classes ; the active
amiy, the reserve, and the National Guard. The service under
the colours was fixed at five years, after which the soldier was
to enter the reserve for four years more. Young men who
were not drawn for the active army were to serve four years in
the reserve and five in the National Guard. This system was
inferior to the Prussian, because part of the reserve were not
trained at all in the regular army, and the service in the ranks
being five years instead of three, a smaller force of trained men
could be annually passed into the reserve. Another distinction
of great importance existed between the two military systems.
In Prussia no man required for military service could purchase
a substitute ; in France any one liable to military service, by
payment to the State of a sum of 2500 francs, was exempted,
and the State undertook with the money so paid to replace him
by another soldier. It is doubtful, however, whether the
fund thus created was judiciously administered, and it is be-
lieved that the real strength of the French battalions was con-
siderably inferior to the paper strength on the outbreak of the
war. Nor was the system as laid down literally carried out,
for it was objectionable to the people, and in such an excite-
able and feverish population, it was not advisable to train the
National Guard to a perfect knowledge of weapons and drill
The result was, that although the reorganization of 1868 theo-
retically placed more than 800,000 combatants at the disposal
of the Emperor, and raised the military forces of France to
more than 1,200,000* men, the army fit to take the field at
the commencement of the war mustered barely 400,000
soldiers. Of these 40,000 were at Cherbourg, preparing to
embark on the flotilla which had been collected at the northern
ports; 5,000 were at Rome, 10,000 in Algeria, 35,000 in
* Active Army, 400,000 men ; Reserve, 430,000 men ; National Guard,
4oS,ooo men.
xxvi PREFATORY CHAPTER.
Paris and at Chalons, 10,000 at Lyons, and about 30,000 at
Marseilles, Toulouse, Rochefort, L*Orient, Bordeaux, Toulon,
and in hospital. The force which could be sent towards the
Rhine mustered thus barely 270,000 men. It was divided into
eight corps and the Guards.
Against it there were ready to take the field on the German
side, as soon as the rapid mobilization of the army was com-
pleted, the twelve corps of the North German Confederation,
mustering at least 360,000 men, and the armies of Bavaria,
Wiirtemburg, Darmstadt, and Baden, which were under the
supreme command of the King of Prussia in virtue of the
separate treaties concluded after the campaign of 1866,
raised the field forces of that sovereign to over 500,000 com-
batants. These were well sustained by an effective and
organized system of depots and reserves, administered by an
elastic and proved machinery, and handled by abstemious and
well-trained officers. An iron discipline knit the Prussian
soldiery together, previous victories gave entire confidence in
the leaders, and a high sense of duty and self-denial pervaded
the ranks.
In the French army, on the other hand, there was much
enthusiasm and great gallantry, but discipline had been
allowed to lapse, the luxurious ideas which a rapid increase
of wealth had fostered, pervaded some portion of the officers,
while many of the others, raised from the ranks, were wanting
in the high military education which alone gives to a leader the
confidence of his followers, or fits him for the rapid decision
and quick judgment that are every hour necessary in war. In
armament the^ French troops were superior to the Prussians,
for they were provided with the Chassepot rifle, which, with
the common advantage of being a breech-loading arm, was
superior in range and accuracy to the needle-gun. The latter
had been early adopted by the Prussian government, which
had been averse to incur the inconveniencies of a change oi
armament, except to secure a very clearly-defined advantage,
and had apparently underrated the excellence of the Chassepot.
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxvu
Still the French advantage in this respect was more than com-
pensated for by the hurried and excited manner in which the
French troops, on more than one occasion, handled their
weapons. On the other hand the Prussian soldier was more
suitably equipped for European war than the French. Dis-
carding the cumbrous equipment necessary for the formation
of camps, or the refinements of cooking, the Prussian troops
were willing to trust during a campaign to the shelter which
\'illages nearly always afforded in Western Europe, or, in case
of necessity, to bivouac in the open air, while a small mess-tin
carried by each soldier sufficed for his culinary wants. The
French soldier, on the contrary, was weighed down with tenies
d'abri^ heavy cooking apparatus, and an enormous kit. These
were generally useless, frequently lost, always encumbrances ;
but an army accustomed to African or tropical war clings per-
tinaciously to the idea of canvas covering, fails to realize the
different conditions under which campaigns must be conducted
in Europe, and shudders at the idea of an exposure in war to
which every true sportsman will willingly consent for pleasure.
The French army was heavily equipped on the experience of
Africa, China, and Mexico, and it suffered heavily from this
cause among others in France.
The actual declaration of war showed that, nevertheless, the
men who administered the army and directed the policy of the
Empire, were of opinion that not only were the French forces
able to cope with the Prussian in the field, but that they could
be more rapidly placed upon the theatre of war.
In September, 1868, an insurrection broke out in the kingdom
of Spain, which, joined by General Prim and Marshal Serrano,
quickly developed into a revolution. At the end of that month
Queen Isabella fled from the country to Biarritz. At the be-
ginning of October Marshal Serrano entered Madrid at the
head of the revolutionary army, and a Provisional Government
was established, and General Prim named commander-in-chief
of the army. The Provisional Government, in concert with
the national representatives, decided that a constitutional
xxviii PREFATORY CHAPTER.
monarchy should be the future form of Spanish government ;
but there was some difficulty in finding any man eligible to
become King of Spain who would accept the position, and,
till such a man could be foimd, Marshal Serrano was elected
Regent of the Kingdom, with General Prim as his Prime
Minister. Several proposed monarchs had been named, but
the throne remained vacant till, in the summer of 1870, Gene-
ral Prim, in the name of the Spanish Ministry, offered the
Crown to the amiable and accomplished Prince Leopold of
HohenzoUem-Sigmaringen, eldest son of the reigning Prince
of Hohenzollem, who had in 1849 surrendered his sovereign
rights to the King of Prussia. This Prince, who had married
in 1 86 1 the sister of the King of Portugd, was in his thirty-
sixth year, and a Roman Catholic by religion. He accepted
the offer of the Crown, subject to the approval of the Cortes,
which was certain. The news of this acceptance was published
in Paris on the 5th July, and the greatest excitement arose, as
the nomination of Prince Leopold was there held to be the
handiwork of Count von Bismarck, who contemplated to create
in Spain a Prussian dependency which should threaten France
from the south of the P)n:enees. French ministers declared in the
Chambers that France could not tolerate such a result to nego-
tiations which they said had been kept secret from the Emperor
of the French, and seemed by their expressions to have already
made up their minds to war. It may be correctly true that
the negotiations with Prince Leopold were not officially notified
by the Spanish Government to the Emperor Napoleon ; but it
is known that the French ambassador at Madrid had known of
the probable election of this Prince for many months, and that
the surprise which the French Government professed on the
arrival of the official intimation was at the least disingenuous,
or due to the neglect of their own agent The public mind in
Paris, which had been secretly for a long time eager for war
with Prussia, was only too glad to seize upon the Hohenzollem
question and to urge the Imperial Government to hostilities ;
but the King of Prussia would not involve Europe in war for
PREFATORY CHAPTER, xxix
the sake of a family question ; and by his influence, it is said,
as head of the HohenzoUern family, and through the inter-
vention of England, the candidature of Prince Leopold for the
Spanish Crown was withdrawn, first by the Prince's father, and
afterwards by himself The danger of war seemed averted ;
but the desire for war ran high at Paris, and M. Benedetti, the
French ambassador at Berlin, was directed to wait upon the
King of Prussia, who was then at Ems, and obtain from him a
pledge that his Majesty would never at any future time accede
to the candidature of the Prince. This the King refused to
give, as he naturally reserved to himself freedom of action
under future circumstances. The French ambassador being
desirous of a further interview, the King sent an aide-de-camp
to tell him that he could add nothing to what he had already
said, and for further discussion referred him to Cmmt von
Bismarck. M. Benedetti naturally telegraphed the result of
this interview to his own Government By the French Govern-
ment the result of this interview was seized upon as an insult
offered by the King of Prussia to the French ambassador,
although the ambassador was ignorant himself of any insult.
The news was published in Paris, and the war excitement rose
to frenzy. The King of Prussia, on the other hand, tele-
graphed to Count von Bismarck the account of the interview
at Ems, who seemed quite ready to accept the French chal-
lenge, for he viewed the action of M. Benedetti as an insult to
the King of Prussia; as such it was announced in Berlin. The
mind of Germany was deeply incensed.*
The interview at Ems took place on the 13th July. On the
morning of the 14th a cabinet council was held at St Cloud
under the presidency of the Emperor, and the tw^o Chambers
expected a communication. None was however made; but
on the 15 th July a declaration was made in the Corps L^gis-
latif and Senate simultaneously of war against Prussia, which
was rapturously applauded in both houses.
• The Franco- Prussian War, edited by Captain H. M. Hozier, where
full deUdls of these various incidents will be found.
XXX PREFATORY CHAPTER,
The same day the King of Prussia travelling from Ems was
met by the Crown Prince at Brandenburg. They travelled
together to Berlin, where they were met at the railway station
by Herr von Thile, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, with the telegraphed account of the speech made that
day by M. Olivier, the French Prime Minister, in the Cham-
bers at Paris. The King, on reading the telegram, issued
orders to General von Roon and General von Moltke, who
had also come to receive his Majesty, that the whole army of
the North German Confederation should be at once mobihzed.
These officers drove direct from the station to their offices,
and that night orders for mobilization were telegraphed to
every part of the country. From the frontiers of Belgium to
the Vistula, from the Baltic to the mountains of Silesia, that
night the summons was sent out, and early next day the
reserve and Landwehr men of Prussia were swarming to join
their ranks. At the same time continuous trains of troops
were hurrpng towards Lorraine and Alsatia from all parts of
France ; troops were being conveyed from Algeria, and within
a few days the French army, available to take the field, was in
the vicinity of Metz and Strasburg.
The French Government at the outbreak of the campaign
had apparently hopes that some of the States of South Ger-
many would separate from Prussia and join with France in the
war. These hopes were speedily disappointed, for the whole
of the German Powers rallied round Prussia, and so perfect was
the machinery of mobilization and the railway transport of
troops, that in twenty days more than 500,000 men were
close down to the French frontier, and ready to advance to
battle. The 7th and 8th corps were already on the fi-ontier in
a little more than ten days, and the 3rd corps was flilly
equipped, completed, and ready to move in eight days.
During the twenty days which the German armies required
to mobilize the French lost all advantage which the hasty
declaration of war ought to have given. The army, instead of
having been ready before the declaration of war, was unpre-
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxxi
pared to advance, and instead of dashing boldly into Germany,
disturbing the mobilization of the various corps, and, perhaps,
subduing the South before the North could come to its aid,
lay inactive on the frontier, with detachments scattered from
Thionville and Sierk to Belfort, with strong reserves at Metz.
Had the war between France and Germany taken place before
the events of 1866, their remissness might have not cost the
French so dear ; but the consolidation of the North German
Confederation and the command-in-chief of the other German
araiies, which was vested in the King of Prussia, allowed the
mobilization of the whole German armies to be immediately
undertaken without any of the diplomatic negotiations which
would have been necessary before 1866.
In the first week of July the German armies concentrated
On the right was General Steinmetz with the ist Army in the
direction of Birkenfeld: this army was composed of the ist,
7th, and 8th Prussian corps. In the centre was Prince Fre-
derick Charles with the 2nd Army, composed of the 2nd, 3rd,
4th, 9th, loth corps, and the corps of the Prussian Guards, in
the neighbourhood of Kaiserslautem. This Prince had also
under his command the 12th, or Saxon corps. On the left
was the Crown Prince with the two Bavarian corps, the Wiir-
temburg division, the Baden division, and the 5th and nth
Prussian corps in the neighbourhood of Speyer. The 6th
corps was also moving up from Silesia to join the 3rd Army.
It showed excellent taste and tact on the part of the advisers
of the King of Prussia to counsel the Commander-in-Chief of
the whole German forces to place the amiable, popular, and
competent Crown Prince in command of the army in which
the South German troops were enrolled.
The Prussian plan of the campaign was that the three
annies should advance simultaneously in a south-easterly
direction; the Crown Prince marching to the east of the
Vosges mountains, the other two armies to the west of them.
If the French army concentrated to hold the Vosges against
the Crown Prince, the ist and 2nd Armies would threaten its
xxxii PREFATORY CHAPTER,
position in flank and rear; if, on the other hand, it concen-
trated against the ist and 2nd Armies, the Crown Prince,
bearing to his right, and pushing through the Vosges, would
in his turn threaten his flank and rear. As the Crown Prince
was to be engaged in a difficult and mountainous country, his
army was accompanied only by one cavalry division in addition
to the regiments of cavalry attached to infantry divisions. The
other divisions of cavalry were attached to Prince Frederic
Charles and General Steinmetz.
y On the 3rd JlrtJ^fthe general Prussian advance commenced.
•^ On the 4th, the French corps which occupied St. Avoid, a
small town on the road from Metz to the frontier line of the
Saar at Saarbruck, made a movement towards the latter place.
The Emperor and the Prince Imperial were present, and the
French soldiery thought that the advance had at last really
begun, and that they were upon the high road to Berlin. The
movement was not, however, pushed ; the supplies and pro-
visions necessary for a campaign were not yet even collected in
the rear of the army, and no proper system of issuing them to the
troops, if the latter advanced, was yet in working order;
the most necessary articles of field equipment were in some
cases wanting, for the centralized system of military adminis-
tration, which was the bane of the French army, prevented
any rapid distribution of stores at the outbreak of a war. The
French corps which advanced from St Avoid did not even
cross the frontier in force, but confined itself to throwing some
shells into the town of Saarbruck, and occupying the strong
position of the heights of Spicheren, in front of Forbach.
Meanwhile, the German troops were swiftly, though silently,
drawing down to the frontier, and in the early morning of the
6th the Crown Prince had massed his forces which he had
marched from Landau by way of Schweighofen behind the
dark woods that lie north of Weissenburg. Thence, soon
after daybreak, he sprang upon the unsuspecting troops of
General Douay, which formed the advanced guard of the
corps of Marshal Macmahon, and drove them back with great
PREFATORY CHAPTER, xxxiii
loss on the main body at Worth. The same day the right division
of the army of Prince Frederick Charies, who advanced by
Homburg and Zweibriicken, together with the left division of
General Steinmetz, stormed the heights of Spicheren, and
drove the French occupants of that position in full retreat
towards Metz.
On the 8th July, the Crown Prince, having marched by way
of Sulz sous For^ts, came upon Marshal Macmahon at Worth,
and after a severe battle there, in which the French leader
showed great tactical resource, overthrew him completely, and
the marshal retreated in great disorder on Nancy.
The battle of Worth virtually decided the campaign. The
heir to the crown of Prussia there tore from the brows of the
French army those laurels which a too credulous world had too
uncritically accorded to it, and proved beyond doubt, that the
army of France, however much animated with enthusiasm and
gallantry, was unable to withstand the stem onset of the
soldiery of Germany, directed with judgment and conducted
with skill.
Three days after the battle of Worth, the general advance of
the German armies was continued. General Steinmetz moved
by St Avoid, Prince Frederick Charles by way of Saar Union,
and the Crown Prince by Merzweiler, Ingweiler, and Saarburg.
At tfiis place the right of the army of the Crown Prince united
with the left of that of Prince Frederick Charles, and the
strategical junction of the German armies on French soil was
assured.
General Steinmetz then moved upon Metz, Prince Frederick
Charles on Pont-k-Mousson, and the Crown Prince on Nancy,
On the 14th, General Steinmetz came up with the French rear-
guard at Courcelles, and after a sharp action at that place
forced it to seek shelter under the guns and within the out-
works of the fortress of Metz. At the same time, Prince
Frederick Charles threw bridges over the Moselle ai Pont-k-
Mousson, Novdant, and Corny.
On the 1 5 thy he crossed the Moselle, and, with the heads of
XKxW PREFATORY CHAPTER.
the 3rd (Alvensieben) and loth (Voigt Rhetz) corps, occupied
Gorze and Nov^nt.
On the i6thy the Crown Prince reached Nancy, and halted
there, having detached a force to invest and besiege the fortress
of Strasburg.* General Steinmetz was in front of Metz, on the
eastern side. Marshal Bazaine, who commanded the whole
French army which ' had been assembled, partly by design,
partly by force of circumstance, within the forts of Metz, de-
signed to move from that fortress with all his available strength
towards Chilons. It was believed in the German camp that the
French retreat had commenced on the previous day, and that
some of the French army had already got beyond the striking dis-
tance of Prince Frederick Charles. On the morning of the i6th,
however, when the head of the 3rd Prussian corps debouched
from the defile of Gorze on the elevated plateau, which to the
west of Metz rises above the valley of the Moselle, with the in-
tention of pursuing or attacking in flank the retreating French, it
found the whole of Marshal Bazaine's army marching in retreat
from Metz towards Vionville, and that the heads of its columns
had not yet reached that place. General Stulpnagel, who com-
manded the leading Prussian division, immediately engaged
the army of Marshal Bazaine ; he wa§ supported by the 6th
division, which was following him, and these two divisions
checked the whole French army, until Prince Frederick
Charles brought up the loth corps to their aid. The Prince
threw the loth corps across the road by which the French
sought to retreat, and all through the long summer day a
terrific battle was fought near Vionville. The French leader
made one desperate attempt after another to break through ;
but the Prussian soldiers, though suffering frightful loss, sternly
stood their ground, and at nightfall the Germans still held the
road from Metz to Mars-la-Tour, and the French marshal was
forced to fall back on Gravelotte. The remaining corps of
Prince Frederick Charles were too far to the south to allow of
* The Baden Division, and the division of Landwehr of the Guard.
PREFATORY CHAPTER, jjjl^
their taking part in the battle of the i6th; but two German
corps, with two divisions of cavalry, which were aided late in
the evening by one division from General Steinmetz, held their
ground against the 180,000 men that were marching under
Marshal Bazaine.
On the 17 th, the whole of the army of Prince Frederick
Charles came up, and the bulk of the army of Steinmetz. The
Gemian troops took up a position extending from the head
of the Gorze defile to St Marie aux Chines, and the King
of Prussia arrived upon the field. Marshal Bazaine, after
falling back on Gravelotte on the i6th, took up a strong
position there, which on the 17th he partly entrenched. Here
on the 1 8th he was attacked by the German army, and after a
bloody battle was wholly cut off from the northern road to
Verdun, and driven into Metz.
The army of Prince Frederick Charles, under whose orders
General Steinmetz was now placed, immediately invested the
fortress and the army within it ; and in spite of bad weather,
sickness, hardship, and numerous sorties, prevented the enemy
from breaking out until the fortress and army capitulated on
the 28th October.
Aftef the battle of Worth, the disorganized remains of the
French troops which had been there defeated retreated in
confusion to Chilons. Here they were reorganized as rapidly
as possible by Marshal Macmahon, and were reinforced by all
the levies which could be hurried up to their aid. The Em-
peror in person, after leaving Metz, also retired to Chalons by
way of Verdun. Counsel was then taken in the French camp,
and it seems to have been decided that for military reasons
the anny should retreat upon Paris. But political circum-
stances would not permit the adoption of this course. On the
departure of the Emperor Napoleon for the war, the Empress
had been nominated Regent, and after the first disasters of the
campaign a cabinet had been formed, of which Count de Palikao
was president This cabinet did not venture to allow the Em-
peror to return to Paris except as victorious ; for popular feeling
e 2
xxxvl PREFATORY CHAPTER.
was running high, and a revolution might at any moment be
provoked. It was, therefore, underpressure of political circum-
stances, determined that the army at ChMons should make a
movement by way of Rheims, M^ziferes, and Sedan, with the
object of reaching Metz by way of Thionville, and of aiding
the escape of Marshal Bazaine from the toils cast around him
by Prince Frederick Charles. With many raw troops, and an
improvised transport, this was a desperate cast ; but the tardi-
ness of French movements was not then appreciated, the
rapidity of Prussian marching not yet thoroughly recognized,
and the stake to be won by success possibly justified the
hazard of the venture.
On the other side, as soon as the army of Marshal Bazaine
was securely invested in Metz by the army of Prince Frederick
Charles, the Crown Prince advanced in pursuit of Macmahon
towards Chilons, from Nancy, by way of Vaucoureurs and
Ligny. Avoiding the fortress of Toul, he left a force to
besiege it. When the Crown Prince reached I^igny, the King
arrived at Bar-le-Duc. Here it was ascertained by the advanced
cavalry of the Crown Prince, chiefly through the medium of
captured letters, that Marshal Macmahon was making a move-
ment from Chilons and Rheims, to gain the northern .line of
railway by M^zibres and Sedan in order to relieve Marshal
Bazaine.
The direction of march which had been ordered for St.
Dizier was immediately altered, and the Crown Prince began
to move by St. M^n^ould and Grand Pr^ on Sedan, with the
view of there falling upon the flank of the marching columns of
the French marshal.
When Metz was invested, the and, 4th, 5th, and 6th divi-
sions of cavalry were detached from the army of Prince Fre-
derick Charles, and attached to that of the Crown Prince. Now
the Guards, the Saxon corps, and the 4th corps were also
detached from the 2nd army, and formed into a fourth army,
which was placed under the command of the Crown Prince on
Saxony, and ordered to move from Metz by way of Verdun
PREFATORY CHAPTER, xxxvii
on Sedan, in order to head the French columns and check
their advance into Lorraine.
These movements brought on the battle of Sedan. On the
30th of August the Crown Prince of Saxony, moving down
the rig^t bank of the Meuse, surprised the French at Mouzon
and drove them back; for the French army, instead of making
forced marches of about twenty miles a day, on account of
want of discipline among the new levies and the failure of
transport arrangements, was only able to make about six. On
the same day the Crown Prince also engaged the heads of
Marshal Macmahon's columns at Beaumont and Donchery,
and drove them in.
The French retired upon Sedan, and took up a position
resting on that fortress, with their front upon the Meuse, and
their flanks refused towards the Belgian frontier. It was anti-
cipated in the German camp that they might possibly retreat
into Belgian territory. Accordingly, Count von Bismarck sent
a communication to the Belgian government to say, that if the
French crossed the frontier and were not disarmed, the German
troops would be forced to follow ; but the Belgian army had
been already placed on a war footing, and with detachments
was watching the frontier. These disarmed and made prisoner
any isolated bodies which either purposely or accidentally
entered armed upon Belgian soil.
On the ist September the armies of the Crown Princes of
Prassia and Saxony attacked, under the eyes of the King of
Prussia, the position which the French had taken up at Sedan.
The army of the Crown Prince of Saxony, crossing the Meuse
by bridges which it threw during the previous night, extended
its right towards the Belgian frontier, and drove in the French
left The Bavarian corps of the army of the Crown Prince
of Prussia assailed the French centre at Bazeilles, while the
Crown Prince, pushing the 5th and nth corps across the Meuse
lower down the stream, not only drove in the French right, but
extended his own flank so far as to touch the flank of the
Guards who formed the right of the Saxon battle, surrounded
xxxvui PREFATORY CHAPTER.
the French completely, and entirely cut ofif their retreat from
Belgium. At the very commencement of the battle Marshal
Macmahon was severely wounded, and the command devolved
upon General Wimpfen, who had only just arrived on the
theatre of war. All day the battle raged, the French foxight
gallantly — even desperately \ but, pressed upon by the better-
disciplined legions of Germany, they were pushed closer and
closer to the ramparts of Sedan, while their adversaries gained
a firm footing on all the heights which command and overlook
the basin in which the fortress is situated. At last, hemmed in,
surrounded, and exposed to the commanding fire of a numerous
and superior artillery, no resource was left to the French army
l?ut capitulation. A general of the Emperor's staff was sent
to the King of Prussia to propose terms for the army, and at
the same time the Emperor wrote a letter to the King, and
proposed to surrender his sword. The terms announced were
the unconditional surrender of the army and the fortress; but
the officers were allowed to retain their swords, and to give their
parole not to serve against Germany during the war. These
terms were agreed to next day, and the whole French army
was marched prisoner to Germany.
On the 2nd September the Emperor had an interview with
the King of Prussia and the Crown Prince, after which he went
by way of Belgium to the chateau of Wilhelmshohe, near
Cassel, where he remained a prisoner on parole imtil the ter-
mination of the war.
After the halt of a few days, necessary for the completion of
arrangements at Sedan, the armies of the Crown Princes, that
of Prussia on the left and of Saxony on the right, marched for
Paris by way of Attigny, Reims, Montmirail, and Coulom-
miers. There was no French army worthy of mention now in
the field. Bazaine was invested with the bulk of the army <rf
the Rhine in Metz; the Emperor and Macmahon were prisoners
on the road to Germany. The few troops who escaped from
the general catastrophe at Sedan, or had been on the way to
reinforce Marshal Macmahon, were hurried back to Paris to
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxxix
man the defences of the capital, which the cabinet had ahready
taken vigorous measures to provision.
As soon as the news of the capture of the Emperor and his
army became known at Paris, revolution broke out It might
have been more prudent had the French nation deferred a
change of government which must necessarily delay the pro-
gress of public business. It was not so. The change was
made in the very face of the enemy. M. Gambetta and M.
Jules Favre proclaimed the Republic in the Corps L^gislati£
The excited population, as if eager to drown the sense of
national calamity in the storm of domestic politics, shouted
rapturous applause. The imperial government was dissolved :
the members of the cabinet fled the country, and the Empress,
hastily escaping from the palace of the Tuileries into which the
mob broke, reached a sea-port, and was conveyed to England
in the yacht of an English private gendeman.
As there was no foe in the field to encounter, the German
araiies marched straight upon the capital At Coulonmiiers
they separated, that of the Crown Prince of Saxony moving
towards the north-east of Paris, that of the Prince of Prussia
towards the south-west The latter approached Versailles on
the 19th September, encountered the garrison of the city that
day at the strengthened posts of Villejuif, Chatillon, Plessis-
Piquet, and Clamart, and after a tolerably sharp action drove
it under the forts which surround the enceinte.
The 3rd and 4th armies then invested Paris, and encircled
the city of luxury and light within a band of iron and of fire,
which was not relaxed until the forts and guns of the defenders
were surrendered to Prussian custody.
On the instalment of the Republic in Paris, M. Gambetta was
appointed Minister of War, and General Trochu Governor of
the city. Every exertion was made to raise armies to resist
the invader, and if possible to drive him from French soil, and
the republican leaders were not lacking in energy. A large
force was raised within the city, which at the termination of
the siege mustered over 350,000 combatants. Conscripts were
xl PREFATORY CHAPTER,
raised, arms and ammunition imported from abroad, clothing
and stores purchased, and an army rapidly collected in the
south-west, which obtained the name of the Army of the Loire.
On the 19th of October the army in Paris was so far equipped
and organised that General Trochu attempted to make a sortie
and sally out of Paris ; but the troops of the Crown Prince
drove him back, and the siege continued. The Prussians at
first did not attempt any active operations, but were content
with strongly entrenching themselves, and trusting to hunger
to enforce the capitulation of the place.
Early in November the French Army of the Loire had
gained some consistency, and on the 9th of that month its van-
guard drove the Bavarians, who had been sent to observe it, out
of the city of Orleans. These fell back and took up a
position in the vicinity of Toury ; but had General d'Aurelles
de Paladine, who commanded the French army, been in a posi-
tion to immediately follow up his success, he might have raised
the siege of Paris, as the Crown Prince would have had to call
his troops together in order to oppose a French advance from
the south. But the troops of the French general were too
raw, and he was forced to wait in Orleans, where he threw up
strong intrenchments, to organize them. He thus lost his
opportunity.
Towards the end of October Metz capitulated, and the
army- of Marshal Bazaine was made prisoner. The army of
Prince Frederick Charles was thus released for active service
in the field His army was divided: the ist, 7th, and 8th
corps were placed under the command of General Manteuffel,
and sent to the north of France to repulse and break up
French troops, which were being raised under cover of the
various fortresses. Prince Frederick Charles himself, with the
3rd, 9th, and loth corps, moved rapidly fix)m Metz by way of
Fontainebleau towards Toury, and, joining the Duke of Meck-
lenburg, who commanded at that place, formed a screen
between the Prussian armies round Paris and the Army of the
Loire.
PREFATORY CHAPTER, xU
At first Prince Frederick Charies was retained in observa-
tion ; but the King decided towards the end of November that
he should assume the oflfensive and advance upon Orleans.
At the same time the French leaders came to a similar deter-
minatioa M. Gambetta ordered General d'Aurelles de Pala-
dine, who had now collected an army of 180,000 men, to
advance upon Paris, and at the same time the garrison of Paris
made a vigorous sortie towards the south. This sortie, which
was at first partially successful, was subsequently repulsed with
great loss, and all hopes of communicating with the Army of
the Loire from Paris had to be abandoned. The failure of
this sortie was not, however, known to General de Paladine ;
on the contrary, he believed that the Paris garrison had burst
through the investing line, and he hastened to its assistance.
On the 28th November he moved a considerable force from
his right flank on the village of Beaune-la-Rolande, where he
fell upon the left flank of Prince Frederick Charles. The
Hanoverians, who formed the garrison of Beaune, were for
some time severely pressed, and at one period almost sur-
rounded. They held firm, however, in the town, and repeated
efforts on the part of the French storming-columns failed to
carry the houses. In the afternoon Prince Frederick Charles
himself came up with the 3rd corps to their aid ; the French
assailants of the town were taken in flank and reverse, and
although they were commanded by General Bourbaki, were
driven off* with loss.
After his feilure to penetrate the Prussian position at Beaune-
la-Rolande, General de Paladine transferred the bulk of his
army during the next few days to his left flank, and attempted,
on the I St December to advance by the main road from
Orleans to Paris by way of Toury. A little to the north of
Arthenay his advanced guard fell in with the corps of the Duke
of Mecklenburg, and a severe action took place. Prince Fre-
derick Charles also moved in this direction, and the whole
forces of the two armies became engaged in front of Orleans.
The French were everywhere pressed back, their entrench-
X PREFATORY CHAPTER.
ments were stormed with the loss of many guns, and, after
several days' fighting, Orleans was occupied by the Prussians
on the 4th December.
The broken army of General de Paladine retired partly to
the south and partly down the Loire. The columns which
followed the latter route were under the command of General
Chanzy, who stood to fight, and sustained for three days
severe conflicts round Beaugency. He then retired towards
Le Mans : the army of the Loire was dispersed, and, the
covering army of Prince Frederick Charles took up a position
around Orleans.
While these events were taking place on the south-west of
Paris, Prussian generals on the other hand occupied Amiens,
and had repulsed the French troops in that direction. The
sieges of fortresses in Alsace were being prosecuted, and many
had surrendered. Prussian forces were also pushed towards
Dijon to watch some hostile masses which were gathering in
that direction.
The investment of Paris was steadily maintained, and pre-
parations made for more active measures. Batteries were dug
and armed, ammunition and ordnance brought up, and at the
end of December a bombardment of the forts and city com-
menced.
Shortly afterwards the French armies of the provinces made
another and a final attempt to relieve the metropolis. General
Chanzy advanced firom Le Mans, at the same time as General
Bourbaki, moving rapidly towards the fortress of Belfort in
Upper Alsatia, which was being besieged by a Prussian con-
tingent, appeared to desire to raise the siege of that place, and
then to strike against the great line of the Prussian communi-
cations with Germany.
At the same time as General Chanzy advanced fi-om Le
Mans, Prince Frederick Charles moved from Orleans with the
intention of attacking him at Le Mans. The heads of the two
armies, moving in opposite directions, came into collision
accidentally at Vendome. The French were defeated, and
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xliii
were pushed back, fighting hard, however, as they retreated.
After five days, however, of constant battle, they were pushed
through Le Mans, and that important strategical point captured
with laige supplies of food, anns, ammunition, rolling-stock,
artillery, and many prisoners.
The battle of Le Mans decided the fate of Paris. Provisions
had already been getting very short, and the bombardment,
although it did not appear to do much damage to the works,
harassed the garrison. It was perceived that assistance fi'om
without could no longer be hoped for ; for Bourbaki had been
headed towards Belfort and defeated by General Werder, and
General Manteuffel hurried across France to &11 upon his flank.
The greater part of the army of General Bourbaki was driven
across the Swiss ironder and disarmed, after having suffered
many privations and hardships. One more sortie was indeed
made by the garrison of Paris, but more apparently with the
idea of demonstrating the inutility of further resistance than
with any serious ideas of success. On the 27th January an
armistice was agreed to, which was prolonged in February, and
ultimately led to the peace signed between Prussia and France
at Frankfort in May, 187 1.
A short time before the conclusion of hostilities a most
important event in the history of the world took place at
Versailles. The battle of Sedan was the comer-stone of Ger-
man imity. After that victory diplomatic negotiations were
entered into between the Southern States and Prussia, which
resulted in the entrance of the former into the North-German
Confederation. But it was necessary for the solidity and
stability of this augmented fabric, that some guide and supe-
rior should be raised who should stand before the world as the
avowed and recognised head of the amalgamated German nation.
Who could be so fit to sustain so august a post as the warrior-
king — the Commander-in-Chief of the German forces, who had
led those forces firom victory to victory over the enemy of Ger-
man unity ? and where could his inauguration to the restored
and emblazoned dignity of Emperor of Germany be so well
xHv PREFATORY CHAPTER.
conducted as in the palace associated with the memory of the
rape of Strasburg and the commencement of a settled French
interference in Germany ?
On the 2ist January, 1871, King William of Prussia was
proclaimed Emperor of Germany in the palace of Versailles,
amid the cheers of the assembled German chieftains, and
within the sound of the guns engaged in the bombardment of
Paris.
This event was hailed throughout Germany as of equal im-
portance with the result of the war, and well it might be, for it
was the most certain guarantee of the future independence of
Germany. It is possible that France may again rise to a high
military position ; the enthusiasm and gallantry of her soldiery
may again carry her colours to her old frontier; she may become
more powerful in arms than her late rival, and may even tear
from Germany the left bank of the Rhine. This may be pos-
sible j but it is impossible that she ever again will be able to
exert that ascendancy and interference in the internal affairs of
the country which was more galling to the proud Germanic
people than loss of provinces or disastrous defeats. From that
the declaration of the Empire of United Germany has saved
Germany for ever, and that declaration could not have been
made in 187 1 but for the war which occurred in 1866.
Le»dm * Cimin4trr Jk^
••••••• . • • •
. • • •
• • ••
SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.
BOOK L
CHAPTER I.
** Who cares with foemen when we deal.
If craft or courage guide the steel ? '* — CONINGTON.
Although the animosity between Prussia and Austria which
led to the outbreak of hostilities in 1866 had been the gradual
growth of many years, the immediate causes of collision were
the consequences of the war waged by Germany against Den- 1
mark in 1864. The results of this contest were embodied in J
the Treaty of Vienna of that year, by which King Christian of
Denmark surrendered all his rights to the Elbe duchies of
Schleswig and Holstein, and the duchy of Lauenburg, in favour
of the Emperor of Austria and of the King of Prussia.*
The Danish war had been undertaken in the first instance
by the Germanic Confederation, in consequence of a decree of
Federal execution against the King of Denmark as Duke of
Holstein, and, in virtue of that duchy, a prince and member of
the Confederation. The Diet which passed this decree had
intended that the execution should be carried out by amalga-
mated detachments of such troops of all the States included in
the Confederation as might be determined by the Diet Some
of these troops actually marched into Holstein. But the occu-
pation of the Elbe duchies by troops of the Confederation, and
the consequent establishment of these districts as an inde-
* For translation of Treaty of Vienna of 30th October, 1864, see
Appendix I.
B
• • • • • .
• • • • . •
•
•
>"••••»• •• •••••• •
I
SEVEN^ WEEKS' WAR, [Book I.
pendent State, would not have suited the political purposes of
Prussia. The object of this Power was not so much to free
Holstein from the dominion of the Dane as to secure the
harbour of Kiel for the new fleet which was to be formed in
order to carry the black eagle of Braftdenbuig into a forward
place among the naval ensigns of the world : but the Diet was
determined to carry out the execution j and, if the troops of
the Federal powers were once allowed to declare Schleswig-
Holstein independent, the subjection of the duchies to the
domination of Prussia would require a display of force and a
violation of public opinion for which Count Bismark did not
at that time consider himself strong enough. To annex an
independent community, established under the auspices of the
Diet, with a popular and chosen prince, would have roused all
Germany. The policy of the Cabinet of Berlin demanded that
Schleswig-Holstein should not become independent yet.
Prussia was not, however, sufficiently confident in her strength
I to set aside at this time, with her own hand alone, the decrees
of the Diet To have done so would have raised a storm
. against which she had no reason to suppose that she could
* successfully bear up. England was excited, and the warlike
people of that country eager to rush to arms in the cause of the
father of the young Princess of Wales. France was discon-
tented with the insolence of the English Cabinet, but might
have accepted a balm for her wounded pride in a free permis-
sion to push her frontier up to the Rhine. Austria would have
/ opposed the aggrandizement of Prussia, and all Germany would
have at that time supported the great Power of the South in the
battle for the liberation of Holstein from the supremacy of the
Hohenzollems as eagerly as fi-om that of the House of Den-
\mark. The independence of Holstein, which could not be
opposed by open force, had to be thwarted by stratagem.
Prussia sought the alliance of Austria with a proposal that
those two great Powers should constitute themselves the
executors of the Federal decree, and put aside the troops of
the minor States. Austria agreed, and rues at this hour the
signature of that convention. Yet she had much cause of
excuse. To allow Prussia to step forward alone as the
champion of German national feeling would have been for
Chap. I.] SEVExV WEEKS' WAR, 3
Austria to resign for ever the supremacy of Germany into the
hands of her rival. Old traditions, chivalrous feeling, and
inherited memories, caused Austrians to look upon their Em-
I)eror as the head of Germany, the modem representative of j
the elected tenant of the Holy Roman Empire's crown and /
sceptre. Prussia was rapidly approaching to that supremacy with J
gigantic strides. Austria was already reduced to the position
of being the advocate of German division and of small States,
purely because amalgamation and union would have drawn the
scattered particles not towards herself, but within the boundaries
of her northern neighbour. To permit Prussia to act alone in
the matter of the Elbe duchies would have been to see her
certainly obtain an important territorial aggrandizement, and
also to lose the opportunity of creating another independent
minor German State, which, if not a source of strength to
Austria, might be a slight obstacle in the path of Prussia.
The war against Denmark was undertaken. The Danes,
terribly inferior in numbers, organization, equipment, arma-
ment, and wealth, after a most gallant resistance, lost their last
strongholds ; while a Western Power, which had certainly by
insinuations, if not by facts or words, encouraged the Cabinet
of Copenhagen into the delusion that other soldiers than Danes
would be opposed to the German invaders of Schleswig, calmly
looked on, and sacrificed in a few weeks the reputation which,
fortuitously won on the plains of Belgium, had lived through
half a century. The Danish war temiinated in the treaty
signed at Vienna on the 30th October, 1864, and the duchies
of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg were handed over to the
sovereigns of Austria and Prussia.
At this time the troops of Hanover and Saxony, which had
been ordered by the Diet to carry out the decree of Federal
execudon against the King of Denmark, were in Holstein. The
next step in the policy of the great German Powers was to rid
the Duchies of their presence. On the 29th November, 1864,
Austria and Prussia laid the treaty of peace with Denmark
before the Germanic Diet, and proposed that, since the decree
of Federal execution had been carried out, the presence of the
Hanoverians and Saxons was no longer necessary in the duchies,
and that both the troops and Civil Commissioners of these
B 2
4 SEVE.V WEEKS' WAR, [Book I.
States should be required to vacate their position. This motion
was opposed by the representative of Bavaria, and was negatived
by a majority of one vote. On the 30th November, however,
the representative of Prussia announced in the Diet that the
claims of the Prince of Augustenburg to the duchies would be
settled by treaties between Austria and Prussia, and that these
two Powers would enter into negotiations with the pretender
on the subject, but that, in the meantime, the Saxons and
Hanoverians must retire from the disputed ground, and that
notes had been sent by the Cabinet of Berlin to Dresden and
Hanover, to demand the withdrawal of the contingents of those
States. The representative of Hanover declared that his
government was ready to withdraw its troops : the deputy of
Saxony appealed to the decision of the Diet On the 5 th
December, 1864, the Diet passed the motion proposed by
Austria and Prussia, in opposition to a protest from the
Bavarian representative. In consequence the troops and Civil
Commissioners of Hanover and Saxony were recalled from the
duchies by their respective Courts, and Austria and Prussia
took upon themselves the military and civil administration of
I Schleswig-Holstein.
Prussia stationed in the duchies six regiments of infantry,
two of cavalry, and three batteries of artillery. Austria left
there only the brigade Kalik, which was composed of two
regiments of infantry, one battalion of rifles, two squadrons of
cavalry, and one battery of artiUery.*
The Austrian Government appointed Herr Von Lederer as
Civil Commissioner, who was shortly afterwards recalled to
Vienna, and replaced by Herr Von Hahlhuber. The Prussian
Civil Commissioner was Herr Von Zedlitz. The Hanoverian
and Saxon Commissioners gave over the government of the
duchies to the Commissioners of the great Powers on the 5 th
of December, who immediately entered upon their duties, and
established the seat of government at Schleswig. The expulsion
of the Civil Commissioners of the minor States, from the Elbe
duchies was the last act of the Schleswig-Holstein drama in
* The strength of the forces left would thus amount to about 12,000
Prussians and 5,200 Austrians, as troops left here were maintained oa a
peace establishment
Chap. L] SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.
which Austria co-operated with Prussia. From this time she^
drew near again to the smaller States, which were now em-
bittered against Prussia,
The administration of the duchies by the great Powers was
openly announced as only a temporary measure, and was re-
garded in this light by the whole world. Austria wished to give^ ^,
up what she considered only a temporary trusteeship as soon as a^
possible, and proposed to place the Duke of Augustenburg pro-
visionally at the head of the duchies, while the rival claims of
the Houses of Augustenburg and Oldenburg to permanent
occupation should be investigated. In Prussia, however, mean-
w^hile the lust for increase of territory had been developed. It
was discovered that the House of Brandenburg had itself claims '
to succession. In a despatch of the 13th December, Count
Bismark informed the Austrian Cabinet that Prussia could not
accept the proposal to place the Prince of Augustenburg at the
head of the duchies j and that such an act would forestall the
claims of other pretendants, and would be viewed with disfavour
by the Courts of Oldenburg, Hanover, and Russia \ that an j
annexation of the duchies to Prussia could not indeed be carried
out without the concurrence of Austria, but that such a step
would be very advantageous to the interests of Gennany in
general, and would not be antagonistic to those of Austria in
particular; while Prussia's geographical position made it her
special duty to insure the duchies against the recurrence of
revolutionary disturbances. In this despatch the Cabinet of
Berlin also proposed that in furtherance of this scheme the
military organization of the duchies should be assimilated to
that of Prussia, and that their maritime population should be
made available for recruiting the Prussian marines and navy.
By a despatch of the 21st December Count Mensdorf, the
Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered the above des-
patch from BerUn, and said that Austria had undertaken the
solution of the question in the interests of Germany ; that the
Austrian Cabinet was upon as friendly a footing with the Courts
oi Oldenburg, Hanover, and Russia, as was that of Prussia ;
that Hanover made no definite claims, but only expressed ideas
of doing so ; that the Austrian Cabinet would aliso investigate
the claims of Oldenburg ; but that Russia had lately declared
6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I.
that she would accept as authoritative only the decision of the
Germanic Confederation on the question of succession ; that \f
Prussia had wished to advance claims to the inheritance of the
/ duchies, she ought to have done so before she made the de-
\^ claration of the 28th May, in common with Austria, at the
Conference in London in favour of the Prince of Augustenburg.
As had already been remarked in Beriin through Count Karolyi,*
^];;>Austria could agree to an incorporation of the duchies in Prussia
only as an equivalent for an increase of her own German terri-
tory ; that if Count Bismark spoke of the obligations of his own
country, the Austrian Cabinet might say the same of itself; that
Austrian blood had not been spilt to destroy the balance of
power of the two great German States by a one-sided aggran-
dizement of Prussia. The despatch, in conclusion, let the
Prussian Government understand that it ought to place no
difficulties in the way of the rapid solution of this important
question.
The Austrian Government was now in error. This despatch
demonstrated that the avowed champion of the smaller States
was about to betray their cause for the sake of individual ad-
vantage, and threw a trump card into the hand of Count
Bismark. By some means this despatch was communicated to
'an Austrian newspaper, the Presse^ and appeared openly in
\ public print The Vienna police failed to discover from what
sources the editor of the Presse had been supplied with a copy
of the official document, but strong suspicions have ever since
prevailed that the publication was due to Prussian agency,
which had acted with the object of shaking the confidence of
the minor States in the leading Power. In effect, several of the
representatives of the smaller States sought from Count Mens-
dorf a declaration of what portion of territory the Austrian
Government had in view in making the demand for an equi-
valentf During the winter several addresses were got up by
Prussian partisans in the duchies, with the object of soliciting
the Cabinets of Beriin and Vienna to agree to the incorporation
of the duchies with the kingdom of Prussia. These were
• Austrian Ambassador at Berlin.
+ It is now supposed that the equivalent Austria wished to obtain was
the county of Glatz, in Prussian Silesia.
Chap. L] SEVEN WEEKST WAR, 7
Strongly negatived by protests directed to the Prussian House
of Commons, and were generally considered to be due more to
the electioneering tactics of Prussian agents than to any popular
desire for annexation. Such of the late parliamentary repre-
sentatives of the duchies as could meet together energetically
protested against the addresses as exponents of the national
will, but no means were taken for gauging the true desires of
the population. No parliamentary estates were assembled to
act as the mouth-piece of the influential and educated classes ;
no popular vote was allowed to declare the wishes of the people.
Either step might have shown that the standard of Prussia was
-waving over a nation which aspired to hoisting the flag of inde-
pendence.
Prussia, unable without a public violation of decency to
monopolise the Elbe duchies, appeared in the early spring of
1865 desirous to lay aside the idea of annexation, and, instead,
to pave the way for the accession of a prince to the govern-
ment of the country, who might be a feudatory at least of the
Court of Beriin. On the 21st of February, 1865, a despatch
was sent by the Prussian Ministry to the Cabinet of Vienna,
which professed to propose the measures which the Prussian
Cabinet desired to see carried out in the duchies for the security
of the interests of Prussia and of Germany, as well as what
restraints should be placed upon the future sovereign of Schles-
wig-Holstein, both in his own and the general interest The
substance of this despatch was,* that Prussia desired the
following guarantees from the new State of Schleswig-Holstein,
which was about to be established.
1. That this State should conclude a perpetual offensive and
defensive alliance with Prussia, by which Prussia would gua-
rantee the protection and defence of the duchies against every
hostile attack, while the whole naval and military power of the
duchies should form an integral portion of the Prussian fleet
and army.
2. The Prussian fleet — reinforced in the manner mentioned
in Article i — is to be entitled to the right of freely circulating
and being stationed in all Schleswig-Holstein waters ; and the
Prussian Government is to have the control on the Schleswig-
* For literal translation of this despatch see Appendix IL B.
8 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book J.
Holstein coasts of pilot dues, tonnage-dues, and lighthouse-
dues.
3. Schleswig-Holstein is to pay Prussia a tribute, which is to
be settled on an equitable basis, for the support of its army and
navy, of which Prussia will undertake the whole administration.
The Prussian Government will contract for the transport of
war material, &c., with the Schleswig-Holstein railways, on the
same terms as it does at present with the private* railway-
companies of Prussia.
4. The fortresses of the duchies are to be regulated according
to agreement between the Prussian and ducal Governments,
and, according to the requirements of the former, for general
military purposes.
5. The duties of the new sovereign of Schleswig-Holstein
with regard to the German Confederation remain the same as
those of the former for Holstein. Prussia will find the Holstein
Federal contingent out of parts of her army which do not form
her own contingent
6. Rendsburg, in accordance with the wishes of all con-
cerned, is to be declared a Federal fortress. Until that is done,
it is to be occupied by Prussia.
7. Inasmuch as Prussia takes upon herself the duties of the
military and maritime protection of the duchies, she requires
that certain territories should be given up to her for the cost of
fortifications, with full rights of sovereignty over thera The
territories required would be at least —
a. Sonderburg, with as much territory on both banks of the
Sound of Alsen as may be necessary for a naval harbour at
Hjorupshafi; and the security of the same.
b. The territory necessary for the security of the harbour of
Kiel, near the fort of Friedericsort
c. Territories at both mouths of the proposed North Sea
and Baltic Canal, and, besides, the right of free navigation
along this canal.
d. Schleswig-Holstein is to enter into the Zollverein,f and the
• Railways not in the hands of the Government.
+ The Zollverein, or General Customs Union, was entered into by most
of the German States under the guidance of Prussia. The object of this
union was to free the trade of Germany from the restrictions under which it
Chap. I.] SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, 9
administration of the railways and telegraphs of the duchies is
to be amalgamated with that of Prussia.
These propositions showed that the Government of Prussia
was determined to attempt to establish Prussian supremacy in
the Elbe duchies. The aims of the Cabinet of Berlin were
clear to the Austrian Government ; and Count Mensdorf, in
the name of the latter, by a despatch of the 5th March, 1865,
informed Count Bismark that a Duke of Schleswig-Holstein,
under such restrictions as would be entailed by an acceptance
of the Prussian proposals, could not enter the Confederation of \
German princes on terms of equality, and with the power of a
free vote in the Diet ; that the Prussian propositions were cal- ^
culated to forward the special interests of Prussia alone, but ;
that Austria and the whole Germanic Confederation had a /
claim to the disposition of Schleswig-Holstein. Austria in the^
same despatch, however, declared herself willing to concede
to Prussia the right of occupation of Kiel harbour, and
would agree to Rendsburg being declared a Federal fortress, to
the commencement of a North Sea and Baltic Canal, and to the
entrance of Schleswig-Holstein into the 2k)llverein. Further,
Austria would not go ; and she declared that treaties to settle
the details of the above concessions could be entered into with
profit only after the question of the sovereignty of the duchies
was decided. Austria also expressed a wish to terminate
negotiations from which there could be little hope that an
agreement would result
Prussia and Austria had both spoken out their designs. That I
of Prussia was now manifestly the annexation of Schleswig- '
Holstein, that of Austria to thwart, hinder, and prevent the
lay from the conflicting interests and custom-house regulations of so many
independent States. By the Zollverein Treaty, which was re-established
on the 1st January, 1854, tolls or customs were collected once for all at the
common frontier of the united States, and the produce divided among them
in equitable proportions. The Zollverein included Prussia, and all the
niinor German States except Holstein, Lauenburg, and the principality of
Lichtenstein. Austria was not included in the ZoUverein, but became con-
nected with it in 1853 by a commercial treaty with Prussia, by which both
sides contracted to do nothing to prevent the free circulation of articles of
trade in their respective territories, or the transit of any article of mer-
chandise, except tobacco, salt, gunpowder, playing-cards, and almanacs ;
the principal of these exceptions, tobacco, bemg a Government monopoly
in Austria, and not in the other States.
/
10 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book: I.
execution of Prussia's intention. Austria wished to cany out
the project of establishing the duchies as a separate German
State, under an independent prince, and thus to fulfil the object
with which the German war against Denmark had been under-
taken, and to satisfy the unanimous sympathy of Germany
evoked for that war. This was doubly Austria's interest, in
/ order to both impede the aggrandizement of her rival, and to
I raise up another small State, a fresh unit of German nationality,
i a fresh obstacle to the German unity which she had found could
\ not be effected imder her own supremacy. But the question
of the Elbe duchies could not have been laid to rest in this
condition, even if Austria and Prussia had both earnestly
desired such a consummation. The whole Germanic people
was nervously interested in its solution. In April, 1865, a
motion brought forward in the Diet at Frankfort by the re*
presentatives of Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse Darmstadt, which
proposed that Holstein should be given over to the Prince of
Augustenburg, was accepted by the majority.* This vote could,
under the circumstances, have no practical result, but it showed
that the current of feeling of the small States was setting
strongly against the threatened preponderance of Prussia, and
made Prussia feel that henceforth her policy must be antago-
nistic to, and subversive o^ the dynasties of the minor Germanic
States.
Another element of discord had been in* existence ever since
Austria and Prussia had undertaken the joint government of
the duchies, but it was not till the summer of 1865 that the
quarrels between the Commissioners of the two Powers be-
came so frequent and so stormy that they threatened to lead
to a German war, through which the results of the conflict of
1866 might have been anticipated by a year. The Austrian
Hahlhuber and the Prussian Zedlitz, engaged in a joint
government, and primed by their own Cabinets to supj>ort
diametrically opposite lines of policy, could not fail often and
seriously to disagree. The Austrian wished to encourage the
expression of popular feeling in the duchies, and to support
• This motion was brought forward on the 27th March, by Barons Von
der Pfordten, Beust, and Dalwigk, the representatives of Bavaria, Saxony,
and Hesse Darmstadt.
f
Chap. I.] SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. ii
the manifestation of popular sympathy for the Prince off
Augustenburg : the Prussian desired to repress all expressions j
of political feeling, except such as emanated from the partisans /
of incorporation with Prussia. These difficulties in the ad-
ministration of the German provinces at the mouth of Uie Elbe
were reflected in the society of Vienna and Berlin. Feelings
rose high, and an appeal to arms seemed more than probable,
when Prussia deemed it prudent to re-open negotiations with
Austria. The celebrated personal meeting of the sovereigns
of the two countries was arranged. The Emperor Francis
Joseph and King William met at the little town of Gastein, on
the banks of the Achen, about forty miles south of Salzburg,
and from their interview originated the Convention of Gastein,
which was concluded on the 14th, ratified on the 20th August,
1865.
This convention consisted of the following heads :
1. Both Powers, Prussia and Austria, reserved to themselves
the common sovereignty over the duchies Schleswig and
Holstein, but Austria taJces upon herself the provisional ad-
ministration of Holstein, Prussia takes upon herself that of
Schleswig.
2. Prussia and Austria will propose that a German fleet
should be established, and Kiel declared a Federal harbour.
Until the resolutions of the Germanic Confederation are carried
out the navies of Prussia and Austria are to use the harbour of
Kiel ; but Prussia is to have the command in that harbour, to
regulate the police there, and to acquire all territorial rights
necessary for the security of this harbour.
3. Austria and Prussia will propose at Frankfort* that Rends-
burg be declared a Federal fortress ; until Rendsburg is recog-
nised as a Federal fortress, it will be occupied by Austria and
Pnissia in common.
4. As long as the division of the administration of Schleswig
and Holstein between Austria and Prussia endures, Prussia is
to retain two high roads through Holstein, one from Liibeck to
Kiel, the other from Hamburg to Rendsburg.
5. Prussia, on her side, takes upon herself the care of a tele-
* The Parliament of the Germanic Confederation assembled at Frankfort
/
12 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book L
graphic communication and postal line to Kiel and to Rends-
burg, and also the construction of a direct railway from Liibeck
by Kiel through Holstein, without raising claims to sovereign
rights over the line.
6. Schleswig-Holstein is to enter the Zollverein.
7. The construction of the North Sea and Baltic Canal,
with the results naturally accruing therefrom, is given over to
Prussia.
8. With reference to the financial arrangements established
by the Treaty of Vienna of the 30th October, 1864, all remains
as of old. Only the duchy of Lauenburg is to pay no share in
the expenses of the war, and the tributes of Schleswig and
Holstein are to be divided in proportion to the amount of their
populations.
9. The Emperor of Austria gives up the duchy of Lauenburg,
with all rights as gained by the treaty of Vienna, to the King of
Prussia, who will pay for this 2,500,000 Danish dollars in the
Prussian silver currency, four weeks after the ratification of this
Convention.
Thus by the Convention of Gastein the administration of the
duchies was territorially divided between Prussia and Austria :
Prussia obtained certain proprietary and administrative rights
of great importance in Holstein ; and, what is most notable,
Austria sold her rights to the duchy of Lauenburg, which she
had acquired by conquest in common with Prussia, and thus
tacitly recognised the validity of the Austro-Prussian conquest
of the Danish duchies, and of the right of either Power to dis-
pose of the conquest as it might desire, were the concurrence of
the other obtained.
The Convention of Gastein was opposed on many sides.
The princes of the small Thuringian states of Weimar, Meinin-
gen, and Coburg protested against the clause by which Lauen-
burg was ceded to Prussia. The national party in Germany
expressed loud disapprobation of the severance of Schleswig
from Holstein. The French and English Ministers for Foreign
Affairs in confidential notes expressed unfavourable opinions of
the Convention. The Prussian House of Commons was loud
in its censure of the Convention, and of the Government which
by concluding it menaced a heavy demand from the Prussian
Chap. I.] SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 13
finances for the purchase of Lauenburg. The King ot Prassia,
however, paid for the ceded rights of Austria over the duchy
out of his own private purse ; the protestations of foreigners
were disregarded ; and, on the 15 th September, Lauenburg was
occupied by the Prussians.
In the few succeeding days the Prussian troops, except those
whose retention in that duchy had been specially agreed to,
withdrew from Holstein into Schleswig and Lauenburg. The
Austrian force which had been in the two duchies concentrated
itself in Holstein, under the conunand of General Gablenz, who
was made Governor of Holstein b> the Emperor Francis
Joseph. General Gablenz retained Herr Von Hahlhuber as
Civil Commissioner, but after a short time the latter was
replaced by Herr Von Hofman.
The King of Prussia nominated General Von Manteuflfel as
Governor of Schleswig, to whom Herr Von Zedlitz was attached
as Civil Commissioner.
CHAPTER 11.
FRUITLESSNESS OF THE GASTEIN CONVENTION.
The Convention of Gastein silenced that portion of the German
Press which had, during the summerof 1865, openly anticipated
a rupture between Prussia and Austria, and had indulged in
calculations as to which side Bavaria, Saxony, Hesse, and
\ Hanover would be forced to espouse. It seemed that civil war
\ between divisions of the Germanic people would be avoided ;
and for a time the two great Powers of Central Europe, by
acting cordially in common, led many men to believe that com-
munity of interests and unity of policy was secured between
them. Thus, when the Diet assembled at Frankfort declared
against the Convention of Gastein, the Governments of Austria
and Prussia alike sent warning notes to the Frankfort Senate.
Again, when in November, 1865, the representatives of Bavaria,
Saxony, and Hesse brought a motion before the Diet which
proposed that Austria and Prussia should now call an assembly
of the estates of Schleswig and Holstein, which might partici-
pate in the solution of the question of the duchies, Austria and
Prussia alike protested against this motion. Still, those who
looked forward into the future foresaw that there were latent
circumstances which foretold an approaching dissolution of the
cordiality of the great Powers. One of these circumstances was
the rising amity between Prussia and Italy ; but more impor
tant was the jealousy for supremacy in Germany which the
present position of affairs in the duchies was only too well cal-
culated to rouse to action.
Prussia published, in the beginning of October, 1865, the
opinion of the law officers of the Crown with respect to the
question of the duchies. This opinion was practically that all
Chap. II.] THE GASTRIN CONVENTION, 15
rights over the duchies originated in the Treaty of Vienna of
the 30th October, 1864, and that all rightful claims of the
House of Augustenburg to the crown of these provinces would
have been annulled by this treaty, even if such claim had
ever existed; but that, in fact, no rightful claim ever had
existed
The Austrian administration in Holstein, notwithstanding
this publication, allowed the rights of the Prince of Augusten-
burg to be continually treated of by the press, and at public
assemblies, as a matter on which no doubt could be entertained,
and suffered considerable agitation to take place in favour of
his rights. The Prussian administration in Schleswig, on the
other hand, allowed it to be understood that all such agitation
would be regarded as treasonable, since it was calculated to
thwart the aims of the temporary sovereign.
Nor was the Prussian Gk>vemment disposed to look on
calmly while the duchy of Holstein was permitted the right of
free opinion and free discussion, the tide of which invariably
seemed to set against the idea of incorporation with Prussia.
On the 30th January, 1866, Count Bismark despatched a note
to Vienna, in which he pointed out to the Austrian Cabinet
how the conduct of its administration in Holstein must infal-
libly complicate the general relations between the two Govern-
ments. This note was hardly despatched when a monster
meeting of the Schleswig- Holstein Unions* at Altona gave the
Prussian Minister occasion to despatch a second, which is of
peculiar interest
In this note Count Bismark recalled to mind the happy days
of Gastein and Salzburg, and expressed his belief, that Austria
would be united with Prussia, not only in a conviction of the
necessity of withstanding revolutionary ideas, but also in the
plan of the campaign against such ideas ; that affairs were now
assuming a very serious aspect ; that the bearing of the Govern-
ment of Holstein must be regarded as directly aggressive ; and
that the Austrian Government ought not to carry on against
Pmssia in the provinces the same agitation which it had united
with the Prussian to quell at Frankfort The note went on to
say that the Convention of Gastein had treated of the adminis-
• Vereine.
i6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I.
tration of the two duchies as only a provisional measure ; but
that Prussia had the right to advance that Austria, during the
epoch of the provisional government, should maintain in Hoi-
stein the status quo in which she had received the province, in
the same manner as Prussia felt herself bound to preserve this
status in Schleswig. The Prussian Government requested the
Austrian to ponder upon the matter, and then to negotiate.
Were a negative or evasive answer returned, Prussia would be
forced to adopt the conviction that Austria, prompted by a
traditional antagonism, no longer wished to act harmoniously
in union with her. This conviction would be painful, but
Prussia must finally see her way clearly. If it were made im-
possible for her to act in concert with Austria, she must obtain
full freedom for her own policy in order to contract closer
alliances in other directions for the advancement of her own
immediate interests.
The negative and evasive answer was returned in a note
from Count Mensdorf, on the 9th of February, in which this
■ Minister, in the name of Austria, declined the responsibility
for the national assemblies, because the duchies were only
, under a provisional government The Count added, that
Austria was well aware she did not occupy Holstein as an
acquisition, but that so long as the provisional government
might last, she considered herself perfectly free in the adminis-
tration of the duchy, and could admit no control from any
quarter.
This despatch from Vienna was the first step towards the
development in a crisis of the political circumstances which
now followed rapidly, one after the other. Austria saw in the
Prussian declaration a hidden threat of war, and an open
reference to an intended alliance with her mortal foe, Italy,
and believed that she was threatened with an imminent and
simultaneous attack on both her northern and southern
frontiers. This belief was strengthened by the apparent fact,
that a council was held at Berlin, on the 28th of February,
under the presidency of the King, to which the chief of the
staflf of the army. General Von Moltke, and the military
Governor of Schleswig, General Von Manteuffel, were sum-
moned. Austria accorded no faith to the most pacific assur-
Chap. II.] THE GASTRIN CONVENTION, 17
ances on the part of Prussia that these fears were groundless.
Nor was her confidence m the peaceful intentions of her rival
established by the denial of a rumour which had gained public
credence, and which asserted that the question discussed at
this council had been whether, under the aspect of political
circumstances, Prussia ought to prepare herself for the war
which might be the result of their development ; nor by the
assertion that no preparations for war of any kind had been
made in Prussia. Austria, anxious at the same time for her
position in Germany and Italy, full of mistrust and anger
against Prussia, badly directed and counselled, perhaps also
instigated by the embittered enemies of Prussia in Germany,
began early in the month of March her preparations not only
for a war, but also for a struggle of which the intended object
was to support the Germanic Confederation against Prussia.
CHAPTER III.
COMMENCEMENT OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR*
Open antagonism between Prussia and Austria was declared
^ by the exchange of notes which was mentioned towards the
end of the last chapter.
Prussia had acquired full freedom for her own policy by the
Austrian answer to her declaration of the 26th of January, and
men in Germany looked around anxiously to see what use
Count Bismark would make of this liberty. For a time the
wary Minister gave no signal of what he was about to do.
Many expected that, face to face with the strong military power
of Austria, and with the sentiment of all Germany hostile to
him, he would be obliged to treat with Vienna.
The solution of a conflict between different States depends
ultimately always upon strength. Prussia, therefore, naturally
desired to reinforce her strength, and to replace the alliance
which had been broken by some new alliance.
But where to turn for the new alliance ? In Germany there
was no hope of finding friends among the .Governments, for
these were all interested in the maintenance of small States,
>and naturally antagonistic to national community. Nor were
the people of Germany at this time at all disposed to regard
Count Bismark as their champion, or accept him as the leader
of a national party. The late quarrels between the Prussian
Minister and the Prussian Commons, the press prosecutions in
Prussian territory instigated by the Government over which he
presided, the conservative tendencies of his views on taxation,
marked him out more as the enemy than the harbinger of a
free national unity. The people of Germany were at this time
Chap III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 19
CO allies of the counsellor of the head of the House of Hohen-
zoUem.
As no alliance could be found in Germany, the Prussian
Minister looked abroad, and there saw^ in the south-western
fronder of the territories of the Kaiser, a natural ally to join
hand-in-hand with Prussia against Austria. This was the
newly formed, hardly consolidated kingdom of Italy. This
ally could boast no long list of victories borne on the banners
of its soldiery, its traditions did not reach seven years back, its
army was composed of raw levies ; but its people were feverish,
eager, and covetous to gain Venetia, and to inflict a blow upon
the detested Austrian.
Before the conclusion of the Convention of Gastein, in the
middle of the year 1865, when at that time a rupture of the
alliance between Austria and Prussia appeared possible, the
latter power had drawn near to the young kingdom of Italy,
and had entered into negotiations for the conclusion of a
commercial treaty between the ZoUverein and that kingdom.
The larger number of the minor States which belong to the
2^11verein* had not yet recognised the kingdom of Italy, and
their rulers had no desire now to do so, for the recognition of
a sole sovereign of the united peninsula would be tantamount
to a recognition of the advantage of the concentration of the
small States which had, previously to 1859, ^^^^ independent
portions of Italy, and of the superfluous character of their
reigning dynasties. On the other side, Italy would not enter
into negotiations with a Confederation of which most of the
component States still denied her tide-deeds of kingdom.
Prussia stepped in as mediator. Italy was happy to be recog-
nised The small States of the ZoUverein were forced into
agreement with the proposals of Prussia. Count Bismark
threatened to dissolve the ZoUverein. The mere threat drove
a probe into the mercantile classes of all Germany; the
interests of the monied aristocracy was brought to bear on the
Governments ; and on the 31st December, 1865, a commercial
treaty between the newly recognised kingdom of Italy and the
ZoUverein was signed
• Seep. SL
c J
/
ao SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. fBooK I.
When the prospect of a war between Prussia and Austria
arose in the spring of 1866, came Italy's opportunity to com-
plete the work which had been commenced at Magenta, to
-^ secure and unite to herself the only province which, still imder
\the rule of the foreigner, prevented her from being free from the
Alps to the Adriatic. Italy naturally drew as close to Prussia
Jeis she possibly could. Austria requires a long time to mobilize
her army, and had begun her preparations for war in the middle
of February. Public attention was directed to them by a
-^ council of war held at Vienna on the loth March, to which
Feldzeugmeister Benedek was summoned from Verona. At
this council the party in favour of war was strongly predomi-
nant ; and decided that Austria was strong enough to take the
field against Prussia and Italy at the same time, provided that
measures were taken to isolate Prussia in Germany, and to
draw the States of the Confederation to the Austrian side. At
this council too high an estimate appears to have been formed
of the strength of Austria, and far too low a calculation made
of the powers of Prussia ; for the opinion of the council seems
to have been that Austria could only emeige from such a war as
r a decisive victor. Italy was so detested, that all Austrians wished
for an Italian war ; and, with justice, among the Austrian
Isoldiery a proud contempt was entertained for the Italian army.
jit was considerd that Prussia, weakened by an internal political
/'conflict, could not unite her contending parties in a common
'foreign policy. Nor was a high opinion entertained of her
military resources and organization. The professional papers
and periodicals of Austria ingeniously demonstrated that
Prussia, however hardly pressed, could not place her normal
irmy on a complete war-footing, because trained men would
W wanting. The writers of these articles calculated that the
Jattalions of infantry could only be brought into the field with
a muster-roll of eight hundred men ; no consideration was paid
to the IwAndwehr, — in fact, doubts were in some cases thrown
upon the existence of Landwehr soldiers at all, and those who
believed in their existence entertained no doubts of their certain
disloyalty. It was also calculated that the Prussian army would
have to make such strong detachments for the garrisons of
fortresses that a very small force would be left for operations
Chap. III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, 2\
HI the field. These false calculations, the first step and perhaps
the most certain to the bitter defeat which ensued, were due to
defective information, and to the absence from the War Office
of Vienna of those detailed accounts of foreign military statis-
tics, deprived of which any country that undertakes a military
measure of any kind necessarily gropes in the dark. To isolate
Prussia from Germany, and to entangle her in a strife against
overwhelming numbers, the plan of Austria was to draw the ^
Germanic Confederation into a decisive action against Prussia, '^
in order that the Confederation might be implicated in the
question in dispute between Austria and Prussia concerning
Schleswig-Holstein. Austria was certain of gaining, by the vote
of the minor States, a majority in the Germanic Diet against
the aims and objects of Prussia, If Prussia bowed to the
decision of this majority, her position of power in the Con-
federation would for a long time be shaken, but if she refused
to accept this decision, then would arise a favourable opportu-
nity to declare Federal execution against Prussia, and to crush
her with the whole forces of the Confederation.
After this council of war, the Austrian preparations were
secretly pushed forward. The fortresses, especially Cracow,
were strengthened and prepared for defence, and the troops in
Bohemia were reinforced. These armaments and military
movements excited the attention of Prussia. Questions were
asked : Austria answered that the population of Bohemia had
broken out in riots against the Jews, and that the Imperial
Government was necessarily obliged to send troops into the
disturbed districts for the protection of its Jewish subjects.
The Prussians averred that, by a singular coincidence, the care
and protection of the Jewish subjects drew the troops sus-
piciously dose to the frontier, while the Jews chiefly resided in
Prague, the capital and almost the central point of the province
of Bohemia.
The Austrian army in a mobilization, before the war of i866,*
had to be increased from the 269,000 men, whom it mustered
• The Anstrian army, in consequence of the disastrous results of the
campaign of x866, has been reoiganized. The text alludes to the former
oiganization of the army.
22 SEVEN WEEKS^ WAR. [Book L
on a peace footing, to 620,000. It therefore required the
recall of over 350,000 men on furlough, or soldiers of reserve,
to complete its strength. This increase of force could only
conveniently be made in the recruiting districts of each regi-
ment, because the men who were called in for each regiment
must be clothed and armed by the fourth battalion, which was
always stationed in time of peace as a weak depot in the
recruiting district In March, 1866, the quarters of many
regiments of the Austrian army were changed, so as to bring
the battalions into the vicinity of their recruiting depots ; and
several regiments from Italy, Gallicia, and Hungary, which
could conveniently receive their full complement of men only
in Bohemia, Moravia, or Austrian Silesia, were moved into
those provinces. By these means the Austrian forces in
Bohemia were, by the end of March, reinforced by about
twenty battalions of infantry and several regiments of cavalry,
which were, however, to avoid suspicion, still retained upon a
peace footing ; while the purchase of horses, and the coraple*
tion of fourth battalions to full strength, commenced in various
parts of the Imperial dominions.
At the same time the Austrian Government took steps to
strengthen the fortresses in Italy, and to protect, in case of
war, the coasts of Istria and Dalmatia. In the same month an
extraordinary but very secret military activity commenced in
Wurtemberg and Saxony. All ideas of armament were officially
denied by Austria, but the Prussian agents did not fail to
observe their existence. The King of Prussia had already
taken action, and issued a decree by which the authors of any
attempts to subvert his own authority or that of the Emperor
of Austria in the Elbe duchies, were threatened with imprison-
ment This decree was published by General Von ManteufFel
in the duchy of Schleswig on the 13th March, and gave occasion
for the Austrian Ambassador at the Court of Berlin to ask
Count Bismark, on the i6th March, whether Prussia seriously
intended to break the Convention of Gastein. Count Bismark
answered No, and added that he could make no further answer
by word of mouth, as oral conversations were easily liable to
be misunderstood, and that, if the Austrian Ambassador desired
any further information on the subject, it would be better that
Chap. III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, 23
he should put his interrogations in writing. This was not,
however, done.
Directly after the council of war at Vienna, on the ioth\
March, Austria had taken steps to array the minor States
against Prussia, and to secure their co-operation. In a circular
despatch of the i6th March, the States of the Germanic Con-
federation which were inclined towards Austria were warned
of the warlike attitude of Prussia, and were cautioned to take
heed to the armament of their contingents and to their com-
pletion to war strength, since Austria had an intention to soon
bring before the Germanic Diet a motion for the mobilization
of the Federal army.
The movement of troops in Bohemia daily excited the appre-
hensions of Prussia. There still rankled in that country, the \
memory of 1850, when she, unprepared, suddenly found herself \
opposed to Austria fully armed, and was forced to submit to )
the terms dictated to her at Olmiitz. Count Bismark had,/
however, provided that no such fate should befall her in/
z866.
Although he knew well the position in which he stood with
regard to the minor States, he considered it advisable to force
from them a declaration of their policy. In a despatch of the
24th March he declared that, on account of the armaments of
Austria, Prussia was also at last obliged to take measures for
the protection of Silesia; for, although Austria at present
spoke in peaceful terms, it was to be feared that these would
alter as soon as her preparations for war were completed.
Prussia, he added, could not, however, remain content with
measures calculated for her momentary safety alone ; she must \
look into the future^ and seek there guarantees for that security '
which she had in vain anticipated from her alliance with
Austria. Prussia, of course, under these circumstances, looked s
in the first place towards the other German States ; but her ;
perception ever became clearer that the Germanic Confedera- ■
tion in its present form did not fulfil its aim, not even did it do
so when Austria and Prussia were united, much less would it
when these two Powers were disunited. If Prussia now were
attacked by Austria, she could not expect the support of the
Germanic Confederation : she could only rely upon the good-
24 SEVEN WEEKS' V^AR, [Book I.
will of the single States which had promised her their help
without reference to the bonds of the Confederation. In this
despatch, therefore, Prussia wished to ask with what feelings
she was regarded by individual States ; and, that she might
prove their sincerity towards her, she would in any case desire
a reform of the political and military constitution of the Con-
federation.
This despatch of Count Bismark, which was really only a
question to the minor States of how they would act in case of a
war between Prussia and Austria, was answered by their re-
spective Governments in almost identical terms. With one
accord they pointed to the Eleventh Article of the Charter of
Constitution of the Germanic Confederation, by which all
States members of the Confederation bound themselves never
to make war against each other, but to biing their differences
before the Germanic Diet, which was to be the mediator and
arbiter between the disputants. How worthless any such
article can be to restrain physical by moral force was never
more clearly demonstrated than in the late struggle, when the
Germanic Confederation was shivered to pieces in the shock of
battle of its contending members.
Prussia now saw it was time to make her preparations for
war. Austria had earlier begun to arm, but the more elastic
military organization of Prussia, the constant attention — sprung
from the knowledge of her statesmen that, sooner or later, a
German war would take place — which had for many years been
devoted to her army, more than compensated for the start of a
few weeks which Austria had gained.
By decrees of the 27th and 29th of March the first arma-
ments were ordered in the provinces most exposed to attack
from Austria. The battalions of the five divisions which garri-
soned the provinces contingent with the Austrian and Saxon
frontiers were placed on the highest peace footing, but not yet
increased to war strength. Five brigades of field artillery were,
however, fully completed ; and the armament of the fortresses of
Glatz, Cosel, Neisze, Toigau, Wittemberg, Spandau, and Mag-
deburg commenced. Prussia, confident in the rapidity with
which her whole army could be mobilized, was able to limit
herself to these purely defensive augmentations, which entailed
Chap. III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 25
an increase of only about 20,000 men to the army alwajrs
mamtained in time of peace. She deferred till the last neces-
sary moment the raising of the army to war strength, in order
as long as possible to leave the men, who must be called into
the ranks, to their trades, professions, and labours. Of this
increase of the army no secret was made ; the decree which
ordered it was openly published and commented upon in the
daily press.
On the 31st March, Count Mensdorf, the Austrian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, announced to the Cabinet of Berlin that all
movements of troops in Bohemia had really taken place only
in consequence of the riots against the Jews, and that the
Emperor Francis Joseph had never contemplated an attack on j
Prussia.
On the 6th April Prussia announced in answer that she had
not been the first to arm, and that now she only had taken
defensive measures. The Austrian Government replied on the
following day that no overwhelming concentration of troops had
taken place in Bohemia, in fact nothing to approach what the
Austrian organization could place in the field if a great war
were in prospect; that no extraordinary purchase of horses had
been made, and that the number of men who had been on
furlough recalled to the ranks was not worthy of mention ; that
any discussion as to priority of armament was rendered super-
fluous by the declaration of the Emperor, that he had never
contemplated an attack on Prussia; that the Cabinet of Vienna
desired only a similar declaration on the part of King William ;
and that, since no preparation for war had been made in
Austria, it was only necessary that Prussia should repeal the
armaments which had been decreed at the end of March.
On the isth April, Count Bismark sent a note to Vienna, in
which, without argument, he assumed that Austria had armed,
and had commenced to arm before Prussia, and expressed his '
opinion that Austria should be the first to commence to disarm, i
On the 1 8th Count Mensdorf replied, and promised that
Austria would move the troops quartered in Bohemia fi-om
those positions in which Prussia had considered that they were
intended for an attack upon Silesia.
Count Bismark, on the 21st April, remarked in reply that, on
26 SEVEN WEEKS' IVAR. [Book L
authentic news being received of the disarming of Austria,
Prussia would follow step by step in the same course. Scarcely,
however, had Austria named the 2Sth of April as the termina-
tion of all military proceedings which might be supposed to be
intended against Prussia, than the promise of disarmament was
stultified by the announcement that, although Austria would
disarm in Bohemia, she was compelled to take decisive measures
for the defence of Venetia against Italy.
Prussian partisans argue that the armament of Venetia was
an equal threat against Prussia as the armament of Bohemia,
but this was not necessarily the case. Six hundred thousand
Austrian soldiers south of the Danube would require as long a
time to be moved to Saxony as would suffice to mobilize the
whole Prussian army. But Prussia was allied with Italy, and
although she chose to fancy that Austrian troops in the Tyrol
might be intended to act upon the Elbe, in reality she saw in
them the means given to Austria to crush an army allied to
Prussia, after the defeat of which Austria might turn her undis-
tracted forces against her German enemies.
There is no doubt that Italy had already armed, and was
fully prepared to take advantage of the opportunity of a war
between Prussia and Austria to attack Venetia. The open
threat that Venetia would be assailed at the first favoiuable
moment would alone have been ground sufficient for Austria
to declare war against Italy, and to sweep away an army which
was avowedly maintained only to strike her in the hour of
trouble. On the 22nd April the soldiers of reserve and men
on furlough were called up for the regiments in Venetia, and
measures were taken to prepare for the field an army to act
against the Italians.
These steps called forth a despatch from Count Bismark, in
which Prussia took her new ally under her protectorate, and
demanded that Austria should not only disarm in Bohemia and
Moravia, but also in Venetia. To this Austria did not consent,
and Prussia made an advance in her armaments. This was
accelerated by the discovery that some of the minor States were
secretly treating at Bamberg, which aroused the suspicion that
a coalition was being formed against Prussia. On the 24th
April, the infantry of five Prussian corps d'arm^e, as well as the
Chap. III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 27
whole of the cavahy and artillery, were increased to war strength,
but as yet were not mobilized.*
On l^e 26th April, Austria again reverted to the Schleswig-
Holstein question, and proposed to submit the definitive deci-
sion of this question to the Germanic Confederation, and to
hand over the duchies to the Prince of Augustenburg. Both
these propositions were declined by Prussia on the 7 th May,
when Count Bismark remarked that the competency of the
Confederation to decide in these international questions could
not be recognised, and that the whole question could be most
simply and easily settled by coming to an understanding with
Austria,' for the reform of the Constitution of the Confederation
by the speedy assembly of a German Parliament, as had already
been proposed by Prussia on the 9th ApriLf
Matters were daily approaching a crisis, and Prussia was de-
termined to be ready for the conflict which would probably
soon break out The King of Prussia, on the 4th May, had
already ordered the five corps d*arm^e, which had. been aug-
mented to war strength, to be mobilized; and ordered the
soldiers of reserve of the other j: four corps d'armde to be called
in, so as to place these also upon a war strength. On the 7th
May, these four corps also received orders to be mobilized ; so
that now the whole of the war army, as provided for by the
r^ulations of the Prussian service, were called under arms.
The mobilization was effected with wonderful rapidity and pre-
cision. At the end of fourteen days, the 490,000 men who
formed the strength of this army stood on parade, armed,
clothed, equipped with all necessities for a campaign, and fully
provided with the necessary transport trains, provision and am-
munition columns, as well as field hospitals. The rapidity with
which these trains were provided might almost be accepted as
proof that, for several years, Prussia had foreseen that her policy
would not, for any great length of time, conduct her along the
paths of peace.
* The term mobilization is applied to the administrative acts which sup-
ply a collection of soldiers with the transport, commissariat, &c., which
render them fit to be moved into and act in the field.
+ See pa^e 30.
% See MUitaiy Organization, p. 61.
l« SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I.
On the 19th May, the concentration of the Prussian army
might have commenced, and actually by the end of May tbe
troops had taken up their positions in the frontier provinces, a
triumph for the Prussian machinery of mobilization. The rapi-
dity with which this army was called together, equipped, and
transported to its positions on the fix>ntier cannot be too highly
admired, especially when it is considered that more than
250,000 of the soldiers had been suddenly called in from the
reserve and Landwehr. Prussian authors, with complacency,
point to the army collected upon the frontier at the very begin-
ning of June, and indignantly demand how Europe can suppose
that Prussia incited the war, when, if she wished to make an
attack upon Austria, she could have done so at this moment
with such a great advantage. For, although the Austrian arma-
ments had been commenced ten weeks earlier than the Prus-
sians, they were still in a very backward state, and the Austrian
army was still far from ready to open the campaign. But was
Pmssia really so moderate as her advocates would have the
world believe ? Was it desire of peace or fear of feilure which
stayed her hand, and held her marshalled corps on the north of
the mountain frontier of Bohemia ? It may have been both,
but the results of the war show that the latter entered into the
calculations of those who planned the Prussian strategy. The
army was ready, and might have attacked Austria, but it would
in its advance have exposed its communications to the assault of
\ the minor States, and, until forces were prepared to queU these,
the main army could not assume the offensive. This appears
to have been the probable cause why the troops were not at
once concentrated, and pushed immediately into Bohemia.
As it was, at the very beginning the Prussian army confined
itself to taking up defensive positions to cover the provinces
most exposed to attack, especially towards Bohemia. The
Austrian Army of the North had commenced its concentration
in Bohemia on the 13th May, and Feldzeugmeister* Benedek
had there taken over the command-in-chief of it on the i8th.
The ist, 5th, and 6th Prussian corps d'arm^et were posted in
Silesia, the 2d and 3d corps in Lusatia, and the 4th corps round
• General of Artillery. f See p. 53,
Chap. III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 29
Erfurt The Guards corps was still left at Berlin, and the 7th
and 8th corps were retained in Westphalia and the Rhine pro-
vinces respectively.
Several of the minor States — ^such as Bavaria, Hesse Darm-
stadt, and Nassau — ^had also ordered their armies, and their
contingents of Federal troops, to be mobilized during the month
of May ; others — ^as Saxony, Electoral Hesse, Wurtemburg, and
Hanover — ^had commenced the augmentation of the military
peace establishments by the recall of men on furlough, or
soldiers of the reserve.
Italy had early in the year commenced preparations for an
attack against Veneda as soon as war might break out between
Austria and Prussia. At the beginning of May the Italian
amiaments assumed a more definite form; and, in order to
enlist more closely national feeling in the probable struggle, on
the 8th of that month a decree was published at Florence for
the fomiation of twenty volunteer battalions, to be placed under
the immediate conmiand of General Garibaldi All party con-
tests, all political animosities, in Italy were silenced. The whole
nation drew together for a common assault upon its traditional
enemy when he should be encumbered by the heavy pressure
of Prussia upon his northern fi-ontier. The crowds of volun- /
teers that flocked to Garibaldi's standard were so great that, at
the end of May, the number of battalions had to be doubled.
On this Austria raised a compulsory loan in Venetia of twelve
million gulden, which so embittered and excited Italian feeling
that it seemed doubtful whether King Victor Emanuel would
be able to keep his people in hand, or prevent excitable indi-
viduals from precipitating a contest for which the moment had
not yet arrived.
Thus the nations were making ready for war, each, with its
hand on its sword, moving heavy masses of troops to convenient
positions near the frontiers of its probable antagonist. Before
detailing the positions these masses assumed, or attempting to
show how they were guided into the shock of battle, it is neces-
sary to cast a glance over the diplomatic sparring which pre-
ceded the military conflict
CHAPTER IV.
Prussia's motion for reform of germanic confederation.
As was referred to in a previous chapter, Prussia brought for-
ward, on the 9th April, in the Germanic Diet a motion for the
reform of the Confederation. The essence of this motion con-
sisted in a desire that a German Parliament should be assembled
by means of universal and direct sufirage, in order to introduce
that unity into the central power which naturally must be
wanting to the Diet, — ^an assembly of delegates of the various
States, who acted in accordance with the instructions of their
Cabinets. Prussia desired that the day for the assembly of this
Parliament should be at once fixed ; and declared that when
this point was settled she would bring forward special motions.
She wished also to employ the time which must intervene before
the assembly of this Parliament in taking measures to secure
the accord of the other Governments to the measures which she
would bring forward.
The Prussian motion was not very agreeable to the other
Governments ; but it would not have been prudent to reject it
altogether. The constitution of the Administrative Assembly
of the Germanic Confederation was notoriously and avowedly
imperfect, and few men in Germany, either among sovereigns
or subjects, would not 'have rejoiced in its reform and re-
organization. But very few Germans desired that the ideas of
this reform, and the projects for its completion, should emanate
\^ from Prussia, and still less from Count Bismark.
The Diet, on the 21st April, decided that the motion should
be referred to a specially-chosen Committee. And on the 26th
this Committee was elected
The object of many of the German Governments was now
(
Chap. IV.] SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 31
to put off mdefinitely the calling together of the Parliament
Count Bismark, in a despatch of the 27th, recognised that this
was the aim of many, and expressed his opinion that the step
the Diet had already taken in referring the motion to a Com-
mittee could hardly have any other result than to postpone a
solution of the question untU the Greek Kalends. He said
that at this time growing animosities required the completion
of the work of reform ; and that on this work depended the
mamtenance of peace, and the dissolution of the uneasiness
which at present penetrated all minds.
On the nth May the President of the Prussian Cabmet
communicated confidentially to the Committee of the Diet the
ground-plan of the changes which he considered ought to be
made in the constitution of the Confederation. These were :
the completion of the central power by means of a German
Parliament, extension of the legislative competency of the new
central power, removal of all restrictions on trade and com-
merce of every sort which then separated the Germanic States
from one anodier, the organization of a common system for the
guardianship of German trade abroad, the foundation of a
Gemian navy, an improved establishment of the German land-
forces, so that their general efficiency might be improved, while
the expenses of individual States might be diminished. These
proposals were, doubdess, good and worthy of regard ; but
there were too many interests which would be affected by their
adoption to allow such measures to be immediately accepted
by the Diet Long time would have been required to pass a
motion entailing such great alterations through the Diet ; and
the demand of Count Bismark for a speedy reform of the
constitution of the Confederation, far firom removing, aggravated ^
the chances of war. While the steps for the reform of the
Federal Constitution dragged slowly along, the preparations for
war were rapidly developed, and, a few days after the despatch
of Count Bismark's confidential communication to the Com-
mittee of the Diet, the decree was issued for the mobilization
of the whole Prussian army.*
* Riistow, Der Krieg von 1866 in Deatschland
CHAPTER V.
BREACH OF CONVENTION OF GASTEIN.
•' Oh what a tangled web we weave,
When first we venture to deceive."
It was after Prussia proposed a reform of the Federal Con-
stitution that Austria re-opened the Schleswig-Holstein ques-
tion, after a long silence had been maintained on that subject
between the two great Powers.*
On the 26th April, Count Mensdorf sent a despatch to
Count Karolyi, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, the contents
of which were to be communicated to Count Bismark, which
earnestly pressed Prussia again to turn her attention to the
matter of the Elbe duchies. This despatch was naturally not
! agreeable to the Prussian Government, for in it Austria assumed
■ that Schleswig-Holstein should be given over to the Prince of
' Augustenbuig, which solution of the question would have been
the most unfavourable of all to the interests and intentions of
Prussia. In a letter of the ist May, Count Bismark expressed '
anew his views on the question to Baron Werther, the Prussian
Ambassador at Vienna, and endorsed the contents of this letter
by a note of the 7th May, in which he expressed the strong
desire of Prussia to hold fast to the Treaty of Vienna and the
Convention of Gastein, by which the introduction of any third
party, as for instance of the Germanic Confederation, into the
government of Schleswig-Holstein was prohibited. Count
Bismark ftirther declared that Prussia had no intention to re-
nounce the rights she had acquired over Schleswig-Holstein to
a third party without consideration for her own interests, or for
those of Germany in general : but that she was always ready
* See p. 15.
Chap. V.] BREACH OF CONVENTION OF CASTE IN 33
to treat with Austria as to the conditions on which she would
renounce the question of the rights to the duchies of the Elbe
which she had acquired by the Treaty of Vienna. In con-
clusion, the Prussian Minister added the wish that Austria
might act in harmony with Prussia in the question of the
reform of the Federal Constitution.
For the first time in the diplomatic proceedings Prussia had '
now openly repudiated the idea that her hold upon Schleswig
was temporary or provisional She now insisted upon the
right of conquest to that duchy, as sealed by the Peace of
Vienna of October, 1864.
To this despatch Austria returned no answer. The din of
armaments on all sides rose every day more loudly. All Ger-
many, Austria, and Italy were hunting on their harness, and
rapidly becoming great camps ; and men foresaw that almost
any attempt to secure peace would probably only precipitate a
conflict
Austria had, on the 4th May, entirely broken ofif negotiations
with Prussia on the subject of disarmament* Count Mensdorf
had declared that it was superfluous to argue the question of
priority of argument ; that it was impossible for Austria to >
disarm in Venetia, on account of the agitation in Italy ; and '
that Austria, by preparing to resist an attack on her south-
eastern frontier, was protecting not only her own individual
interests, but those of all Germany, and that no German State
should look askance at preparations made in such a cause.
The Government of Saxony was much disturbed by the
Pnissian interrogation as to why that country was arming, and
the concomitant demand that these armaments should cease.
Fearful of an attack. Saxony, on the 5th May, proposed a
motion in the Frankfort Diet, the object of which was that the
Diet should promptly decree, with reference to the proceedings
of the Prussian Government, that the internal peace of the
Confederation was to be preserved.
On the introduction of this motion, the Prussian representa-
tive declared that Prussia had no intention to attack Saxony,
and that all the armament which had taken place in his
♦ Sec pt 27.
34 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I.
country had only been prompted by purely defensive considera-
tions.
Nevertheless, on the 9th May, the Diet passed the Saxon
motion by a majority of ten over five votes.
The middle States, at the head of which stood Bavaria, under
this threatening aspect of affairs, earnestly desired to effect a
compromise. They felt that, since Prussia had not been the
only State to arm, it would be unfair if she only were required
to declare the object of her armament They therefore pro-
posed a motion in the Diet to the effect that all Governments
which had armed should be required to state their reasons for
having done so. This motion was passed on the 24th May,
and on the ist June the statements were to have been received.
The I St June was an important landmark in the development
of the diplomatic crisis ; but, before reviewing its incidents, it
is necessary to glance at external influences which were exerted
in the vain, and perhaps only apparent, endeavour to preserve
peace in Germany. While in Italy the whole population were
' clamorous for war ; while Prussia, the author and originator of
! the whole disturbance, by her disregard of the rights of the
j Prince in whose nominal cause she had taken up arms in 1864,
was pointing out her increased battalions as purely a defensive
police for the security of her territory; and while Uie war party
in Austria, eager to wipe out on the Mincio the memory of
Solferino, and proudly confident of the power of the military
empire to sweep away with one hand the feverish soldiery of
Victor Emanuel, while with the other it shattered the legions of
Prussia, urged the Cabinet of Vienna not to yield an item : Russia
and England, led and accompanied by France, entered upon the
diplomatic theatre. These three great Powers made a common
attempt to avert the war by despatching, on the 28th May,
almost identical notes to Austria, Prussia, Italy, and the
Germanic Confederation. In these notes it was proposed that
the five great Powers should join in a Conference, at which the
Germanic Confederation should also be represented, in order
to settle by treaty the three main questions which menaced the
peace of Europe. These questions were that of the Elbe
duchies, of the tranquillity of Italy, and of the reform of the
Federal Constitution of (Germany.
Chap V.] BREACH OF CONVENTION OF GASTEIN 35
The possibility of peace being maintained by these means
was from the beginning extremely doubtful : even in the event
of all the parties interested consenting to submit their causes to
this European jury. Almost the utmost that could be expected
from a Conference would be that the points of dispute might
be defined, and in this manner that the theatre of war might be
limited.
On the 29th May, Prussia accepted the proposal for the Con-
ference. Italy followed this example ; also the Germanic Con-
federation. Of what validity these acceptances were, may
however be calculated from the fact that at the time of the
acceptance the Confederation informed its representative, Herr
Von der Pfordten, that the project had already practically fallen
to the ground*
Austria was only willing to join the Conference on condition
that no territorial alterations should be there discussed. This
proviso was absolutely necessary for Austria. If territorial
changes were to be discussed, few could doubt but that a pro-
posal would be made for the cession of Venetia to Italy, and of
the Elbe duchies to Prussia. If these cessions took place,
Austria would lose as much without a blow, in her own dimi-l
nution and the aggrandizement of her German rival, as could at
that time have been anticipated from the most disastrous issue
of the imminent war. It does not appear that it was any desire
of war on the part of Austria which made her couple her ex-
pressions of readiness to join the Conference with this condi-
tion, which appears on the contrary to have been advanced from
a perhaps too honest desire to meet the wishes of the great
Powers.
To this communication of Austria the mediating Powers
replied that, in their opinion, the disputant Governments should
be allowed fiill freedom for the discussion, and if possible for
the solution, of every relevant question at the Conference.
Thus matters stood on the ist June, the day appointed by
the Federal Decree of the 24th May as that on which tlie
German Powers were to make their declarations concerning
their armaments.
^ Rustow, Der Krieg von 1866 in Deutschland tind Italien.
D 2
36 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book I.
The Diet was assembled at Frankfort The Austrian repre-
sentative rose, and declared that Austria could look back with a
calm conscience on her steady endeavours to preserve an unity
with Prussia in the question of the Elbe duchies. The Emperor
Francis Joseph had conceded the uttermost tittle that the dig-
nity of Austria and the rights of the Germanic Confederation
would allow. Prussia had made unjust proposals, and had ex-
pressed the intention of prosecuting and carrying out these pro-
posals by force. As Prussia had threatened, after the peace of
Vienna, to compel the Federal troops to evacuate Holstein, so
she had also threatened Austria concerning the question of the
duchies with force, and had relied on the support of foreign
opponents of the Imperial State. At the time of the Convention
of Gastein Prussia had renewed this attempt, because Austria
would not consent to administer Schleswig-Holstein according
to the policy of annexation. Threatened on two sides, Austria
had been compelled to place herself in an attitude of defence.
The preparations against Italy might rest unchallenged at
Frankfort Austria would recall her troops that had been raised
against Prussia, provided that the latter did not intend to make
an attack on Austrian territory, or on any State allied to
Austria, and would give security against the recurrence of the
danger of war. This security would depend for Germany, as
for Austria, on the fact that in Germany not force, but treaties
and right ruled, and that Prussia also^ although an European
Power, should respect the peace and the decrees of the Con-
federation, and further that the Schleswig-Holstein question
should be settled, not for the interest of an individual claimant,
but according to the rights of those provinces and Federal rule.
On the 24th August, 1865, Austria and Pnissia had promised to
communicate to the Confederation the result of their negotia-
tions in reference to Schleswig-Holstein. Austria now was ful-
filling this promise. That she must now declare that all her
endeavours to obtain a solution of the question of the duchies
which would be agreeable to the Confederation had been of no
avail, and that now, in the first place, Austria yielded up eveiy-
thing further on this point to the decree of the Confederation,
and in the second place had already ordered her Commissioner
in Holstein to assemble the Estates of that duchy in order to
Chap. V.] BREACH OF CONVENTION OF GASTEIN. 37
obtain an expression of the wishes of the people as to their
future fate.
Austria thus attempted to undo what she had assisted in
doing by the Treaty of Vienna and the convention of Gastein.
But, in order to make restitution for her disregard of right in
these two agreements, she was now obliged to break the Con-
vention of Gastein, in handing over to the Confederation, which
she had declared incompetent in this international question, the
decision of the future fate of the duchies. Her second step, by
which she ordered her Commissioner, Field Marshal Gablenz,
to convene the Holstein Estates, was also, if not an actual
breach of the Convention, a virtual one, because by the Con-
vention, although the administration of the duchies was divided,
the rights of the two sovereigns to the common supremacy were
still as much extant as ever.*
After the Austrian declaration, the representative of Prussia
at the Diet rose, and said that the mobilization of the Prussian
army had only taken place in consequence of the Austrian
armaments ; only if these armaments were annulled, and if at
the same time tiie other Germanic States which were allied
with Austria restored amicable relations between themselves
and Prussia, could Prussia herself disarm. On these condi-
tions she would disarm imihediately. Prussia had only taken
defensive measures. If the Germanic Confederation was not
in a position to give Prussia guarantees for the maintenance of
peace, if the members of the Confederation resisted those
reforms of the Federal Constitution which were universally
recognised as necessary, the Prussian Government must accept
the conclusion that the Confederation did not attain its object,
and could not fiilfil the most important of its aims, and that
with regard to further Federal revolutions, Prussia would act on
this conviction.
The Prussian representative further defended his Govern-
ment against the Austrian conception of the circumstances con-
nected with the Schleswig-Holstein question, and advanced in
support of his assertion the many declarations which Prussia
had made with reference to this question.
• Seepage il.
\
f
38 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book I.
The speeches of the two representatives of the great German
Powers were the main events of the assembly of the Diet of the
Germanic Confederation at Frankfort on the ist June, 1866.
The reports of these speeches were immediately telegraphed to
every town in Germany, and caused great excitement Men
foresaw that a war would result by the shock of which the
political circumstances and peculiar constitution of the Father-
land would be shaken to their very foundations ; but no one
almost supposed the outbreak of war to be so near. It was
believed that Austria was much superior as a military Power,
certainly at the outbreak of a war, to Prussia, but she was not
yet ready, and it could not be supposed that she would mrge
\ matters on till her preparations were complete. Nor did sage
men, who, wondering by what fatuous madness Count Bismark
was driving his Government into a one-sided struggle, looked
impartially upon the course of events, ever imagine that Prus-
sian temerity would be wild enough to anticipate the necessity
of defence through bearding a more than respected adversary
by commencing the attack.
Count Bismark saw, however, in the steps that Austria had
lately taken, in her summons to the Holstein Estates, and in
the publication of her intentions with regard to the Elbe
! duchies, the final severence of the Cabinet of Vienna from his
policy. No longer could Austria be persuaded to stand beside
him in a common slight against, or oppression of, the body of
ithe Germanic Confederation. Austria had resumed her posi-
I tion as the champion of the individuality of small States. The
spoilers had ultimately quarrelled over the allotment of their
prey. The Convention of Gastein was broken through and
trampled upon.
Against the breach of this Convention, Count Bismark sent
a protest to Vienna; but, in anticipation of the answer he
would receive to this protest, signed on the 4th June a despatch
to the Prussian plenipotentiaries at foreign Courts. This
despatch accused Austria of giving provocation to war ; and
attributed to the Austrian Government the intention of recruit-
ing its finances by forced contributions from Prussia, or by an
honourable bankruptcy.
Count Bismark at the same time took a step more likely to
Chap. V.] BREACH OF CONVENTION OF GASTEIN. 39
be productive of important results than either protests or pro-
tocols The concentration of the Prussian army was resumed.
The corps d'arm^e of the Guard was sent to Silesia, the eighth
corps d*arm^e and one division of the seventh corps were for-
warded by railway from the banks of the Rhine to the neigh-
bourhood of Halle.* In Berlin a reserve corps d'arm^e was
formed of the four regiments of the Landwehr of the Guard,
and of four other Landwehr regiments, while all available artil-
lery and cavalry was drawn together, organised, and mobilized
as quickly as possible.
* How it came that Prussia was able to leave the frontier of the Rhine
totally undefended during the campaign, when it was evident from the sub-
sequent demand made by France that the Government of the Tuileries had
a jealous eye upon Rheinland, has remained one of the mysteries of the
war. The explanation as far as vet can be discovered appears to be as
follows: — In 1 865 Count Bismark paid a visit to the Emperor of the
French at Biarritz, and there hinted broadly that in case France would
stand aloof, and allow Prussia to work her way in Germany, compensation
might be given. for France's tranquillity by the cession of the Rhine pro-
vinces. The Emperor, who expected, like every one else, that the con-
test would be, if not favourable to Austria, certainly long and doubtful,
anticipated that at a certain stage he would be able to step upon the theatre
of war, and demand, from whichever side he espoused, the possession of
the Rhine provinces of Prussia. He gave no distinct assurance to Count
Bismark of neutrality, but the Count left Biarritz with a tolerable certainty
that France would not interfere, at least at the commencement of a war, and
without giving any distinct promise to the Emperor of territorial compen-
sation. When the campaign terminated as abruptly as it did, the Emperor
of the French wished to claim the price of his neutrality, but Prussia was
then in a condition to enter on a campaign with France, whose armies were
not armed with breech-loaders, and refused to entertain any ideas of terri-
torial cession.
BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
FIRST BLOODLESS CONFLICT IN HOLSTEIN.
" The good old rule safficeth me,
The stem and simple plan —
Let those take who have the power,
And let those keep who can.*'
Notwithstanding the protests of Count Bismark, the
Austrian Civil Commissioner of Holstein, General Von Gablenz,
issued a decree on the 5th June, 1866, by which the Estates of
Holstein were summoned to meet on the i ith of that month at
Itzehoe. It was, however, known at Berlin (on the same day
as that on which the despatch to the plenipotentiaries of
Prussia at foreign Courts was signed) that Austria was about to
bring forward a motion in the Diet for Federal execution
against Prussia- Accordingly, on the 6th June, Prussia pub-
lished a more special protest against the assembly of the Hol-
stein Estates, as well as a declaration that Prussia would con-
sider such an encroachment on the Convention of Gastein as a
direct breach of that agreement, and that in consequence not
only was the Convention a dead letter, but that the common
occupation and administration of the duchies must be resumed
as before that Convention. Orders were accordingly despatched
from Berlin to General Manteuffel, the Prussian Commissioner
in Schleswig, that as soon as General Gablenz summoned the
Holstein Estates to meet, he should enter Holstein with his
Prussian troops in order to again resume the common adminis-
tration of the two duchies. Orders were given to General
Chap. I.] FIRST BLOODLESS CONFLICT IN HOLSTEIN 41
Manteuffel to avoid any conflict with the Austrian troops ; and
to assure General Gablenz that the inruption of Prussian troops
into the duchy over which he was appointed to represent the
Austrian Emperor, was undertaken quite in a friendly spirit.
General ManteufTel accordingly informed General Gablenz
beforehand of his intention of invading Holstein, and issued
this proclamation to the people of the duchy of Schleswig : —
** GoTTORP, June 7.
** iKHABrTANTS OF THE DuCHY OF SOHLESWIG, —
" Since my assumption of office here I have always acted towards you
with frankness. Never have I had anv reason to repent of that course, and
I now address myself to you again with the same frankness. The rights of
sovereignty which His Majesty my King and master has over the duchy of
Holstein have been endangered by proceedings with which you are all
acquainted. The most sacred interests of your country are placed in
jeopardy, for never have the Estates of either of the duchies been called
together except in view of an assembly of the general representation of an
undivided Schleswig- Holstein. I am charged by His Majesty the King
with the protection of those menaced rights, and for that reason I have to-
day ordered the entry of troops into Hobtein, as I have announced to the
Imperial Governor of the duchy of Holstein that this military measure has
only a purely defensive character.
" Inhabitants of the Duchy of Schleswig, — I have learnt to know and
to esteem the spirit of order and legality with which you are animated, and
I now give you a proof of this esteem. At this moment Schleswig is being
almost denuded of troops. You will prove that the attitude which you
have hitherto maintained has not been induced by fear, but by the loyalty
of your character. But you, too, in your turn have learnt to know me, and
you know that I am faithfully and heartily devoted to the interests of this
country. You will with confidence accept my word. No doubt of the
power or of the will of Prussia could find root in your minds. Let us have
iaith in each other.
•* The Governor of the duchy of Schleswig,
" E. MANTEUFFEL,
* * Lieutenant- General^
' Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty the King of Prussia,^
t^
General Gablenz did not wait for the inruption at Kiel,
where his head-quarters had hitherto been, but suddenly left
that town, and concentrated the whole of his forces, which
consisted of the infantry brigade of Kalik and one regiment
of dragoons, at Altona. The Government of Holstein and
the Prince of Augustenburg followed him quickly.
On the morning of the 8th June the Prussian troops
42 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IL
crossed the Eider, without paying any attention to a protest
launched against their proceedings by General Gablenz, and
moved slowly southwards. General Manteuffel had under his
command in Schleswig two brigades of infantry and one
brigade of cavalry, and he crossed the frontier of Holstein
with all his disposable force. Austria was naturally unwilling
to resume the common administration of the two duchies as it
had existed previous to the Convention of Gastein, and accord-
ingly, by order of his Government, General Gablenz concen-
trated his troops in the south-western comer of the duchy.
General Manteuffel, who had marched into Holstein on the
8th June, on the nth prevented the assembly of the Holstein
Estates at Itzhoe by taking military possession of that town,
closing the House of Assembly, and placing a guard over the
door with fixed bayonets. General Gablenz, assailed by far
superior numbers, and unable to be of any more use in Hol-
stein, on the night between the nth and the 12th June with-
drew his troops to Hamburg, and thence despatched them by
railway through Hanover, Cassel, and Frankfort to the Austrian
army of the north in Bohemia- From this bloodless conflict in
Holstein arose the first Prussian victory, gained by the know-
ledge of the great rule of war, which teaches that to reap
success great numbers must be hurled upon the decisive point,
and that in order that these superior numbers may be forth-
coming, rapidity of concentration, organization, and locomo-
tion of troops are vitally required. This bloodless victory,
and the consequent evacuation of Holstein by the Austrians,
had an important effect on the subsequent incidents of the
war. The abandonment of Holstein added only five bat-
talions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and one battery
of artillery to the Austrian army in the field ; while the same
event left the whole of the Prussian division of General Man-
teufiel — ^which consisted of twelve battalions of infantry, eight
squadrons of cavalry, and six batteries of artillery — firee and at
the disposition of the Prussians for the further prosecution of
operations.
The assembly of the Holstein Estates, and the delivery of
the opinion of the southern Elbe duchy with regard to its
future fate, was prevented by the inroad of the Prussians. The
Chap. Lj FIRST BLOODLESS CONFLICT IN HOLSl'EIN, 43
Prince of Augustenburg departed from the province. The
Prussian Government appointed Herr Von Scheel-Plessen as
Supreme President of Schleswig-Holstein. Supreme President
is the title of the highest civil administrator of a Prussian
province. Scheel-Plessen entered upon the duties of his new
office on the nth June; while the non-consulted duchies
looked on sulkily upon the Prussian assertions of right The
duchies came under Prussian rule when Scheel-Plessen as-
sumed his office. This was all very arbitrary, forcible, and
dependent upon main strength, but the Prussian virtual an-
nexation of Schleswig-Holstein had one good effect. It
settled the question of the Elbe duchies; and, as far as
the Seven Weeks' War is concerned, neither reader nor author
will be again troubled with the intricate problem of the true
rights of succession to " Schleswig-Holstein sea-surrounded."
CHAPTER 11.
FINAL RUPTURE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.
On the nth June, 1866, an Extraordinaiy Assembly of the
Diet was summoned.
The representative of Austria advanced the proposition at
this sitting, that Prussia had broken the Convention of
\ Gastein, and threatened the peace of the Germanic Con-
federation, by marching her troops into Holstein. He
proposed in consequence for the restoration of peace, that
the whole of the army of the Confederation, with the excep
tion of the three corps d'arm^* which, by the Federal Con-
stitution, Prussia was bound to put into the field, should be
mobilized in such form of principal, contingents, and reserves
within fourteen days, that the troops should be able then to
march within fourteen hours.t That care was to be taken for
dep6t contingents, and that the appointment of a commander-
in-chief was to take place as soon as the decree was passed ;
and that the supervision of all these matters was to be given
, over to the Diet, which was to act in concert with the mih'tary
1 commissioner of the Germanic Confederation.
The representative of Prussia at the Diet declared that he
was not authorized to make any statement upon the motion
which had been brought forward, the purport of which was
entirely new to him.
The Austrian representative, who filled the post of President
of the Diet, urged an immediate decree in favour of the mo-
* The 4th, 5th, and 6th corps d'armee of the Federal army.
+ Could a British army be mobilized and be placed in such a state within
fourteen days as to be able to march in twenty-four- hours ? Yet this
rapidity of mobilization was not sufficient to oppose the Prussian or-
ganization.
Chap. U.] RUPTURE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA, 45
tion ; and the Assembly, although the representative of Meck-
lenburg brought to notice, that even on the most unimportant
questions, when for instance only the disbursement of one
hundred gulden* was under consideration, three sittings were
required, one for the introduction of the motion, one for the
discussion, and one for the final vote, the majority of the Diet
decreed that the final vote on the Austrian motion should be
taken on the 14th June. Whoever recalls to mind the many
years which the Diet consumed ere it passed the vote of
Federal execution against Denmark, can hardly doubt that the
deeds of Prussia had been replete with some peculiar enormity
in the eyes of the princes of the small states to arouse so
enthusiastic a zeal in such an usually torpid body as the
Germanic Diet
* Equal to about 10/.
CHAPTER III.
BREAK-UP OF THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION.
** Destruction hangs o*cr yon devoted wall,
And nodding Ilion waits th' impending fall."
Pope.
•* The history of mankind informs us that a single power is very seldom
broken by a confederacy." — Johnson.
Before the 14th June airived, Count Bismark sent a definite
and final project to the Governments of the various States
which were members of the Germanic Confederation. The
first article of this project of reform expressed "That the
territory of the Confederation was to consist of those States
which had hitherto been included in the Confederation, with
the exception of the dominions of the Emperor of Austria,
and of the King of the Netherlands." While, then, Austria
wished to enlist the Governments of the Germanic Confedera-
tion in war against Prussia, Prussia desired to exclude Austria
from the Confederation. As for the Government of the
Netherlands, it had wished for nothing more for a long time
than to be allowed to withdraw from the Confederation its two
duchies which were included within that political league.*
The next article treated of the Parliament, the common con-
cerns of Germany, and of the privileges of the new Confedera-
tion. The German war navy, with a common German budget,
with the Federal harbour of Kiel and of the Bay of the Jahde,
were proposed to be placed under the supreme command of
Prussia, while the land forces of the new Confederation were
to be divided into two Federal armies, an army of the north,
* The duchies of Luxembourg and Limburg.
Chap. III.] BREAK-UP OF THE CONFEDERATION. 47
and an army of the south. The King of Prussia was to be
commander-in-chief of the northern army, the King of Bavaria
that of the southern, both in peace and war. In peace the
commander-inK:hief of either army was to superintend the
efficient organization and administration of his own army ; and,
in urgent cases, he was to be able to call out his army within
the boundaries of his own part of the Federal territory, condi-
tionally with the subsequent approval of the Confederation.
For each of the two Federal armies there was to be a common
budgeL The administration of either army was to be con-
ducted under the superintendence of the commander-in-chief,
and to either army tiie States included in its portion of the
Federal territory were each to contribute their proportionate
quota of soldiers. Each Government was to pay the expenses
of its own contingent of the Federal army. All expenses of
the military budget were to fall on the military chest of that
army to which the budget was specially applied The relations
of the new Confederation with the empire of Austria were to
be settled by special treaties.
These were the principal points of the project of reform
proposed by Count Bismark on the loth June. This project
surprised the majority of the German States in a very un-
pleasant manner. The 14th June arrived, the day for the final
vote in the Diet upon the Austrian motion.
The representative of Prussia in the Diet protested against
the motion being entertained, and declared that both in form
and substance the motion was subversive of the ideas of the
Confederation.
The votes were, however, taken, and the Austrian represen-
tative carried his motion by a majority of nine over six votes.
The details of the voting were as follows : —
For the Austrian motion there voted, —
The first Curia, Austria.
The third, Bavaria.
The fourth, Saxony.
The fifth, Hanover.
The sixth, Wurtembuig.
The eighdi. Electoral Hesse (Hesse-Cassel).
The ninth, Hesse-Darmstadt
48 SEVEN- WEEKS' WAR. [Book II.
The sixteenth (Lichtenstein, Waldech, the two Reusze,
lippe, Lippe-Schaunburg, Hesse-Homburg).
Of the thirteenth Curia (Brunswick and Nassau), Nassau.
Of the twelfth Curia (Saxe Weimar, Saxe Altenbuig, Saxe
Coburg, and Saxe Meiningen), Saxe Meiningen.
Of the seventeenth Curia (the four free towns, Hambiirg,
Liibeck, Bremen, and Frankfort), Frankfort
Against the Austrian motion there voted, —
The seventh Curia, Baden.
The eleventh Curia, Luxembouig and Limburg (belonging
to the Netherlands).
The twelfth Curia, with the exception of Saxe Meiningen.
Of the thirteenth Curia, Brunswick.
The fourteenth Curia, the two Mecklenburghs.
The fifteenth Curia, Oldenburg, Anhalt, and the two
Schwiurzburgs.
The seventeenth Curia, with the exception of Frankfort
In this voting, Prussia did not give a voice, as her represen-
tative had protested against any entertainment of the motion,
and did not vote : and the tenth Curia, Holstein Lauenburg,
had no representative. The vote of the thirteenth Curia was
cancelled, because Brunswick voted against Nassau, and thus
there was no majority in this Curia.
Thus the residts were that the 7th, nth, 12th, 14th, 15th,
and 17th Curiae, therefore six Curiae, voted against Austria;
the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th, besides the representative
of Austria himself, for the Austrian motion. The vote of the
1 6th Curia was recorded in favour of the motion, but, as
appeared afterwards, accidentally. Each of the seven small
States which composed this Curia had an equal voice within
the Curia, and the vote of the Curia was that of the majority
of the component members. On the 14th June, the represen-
tative of this Curia who voted in the Diet, and who was the
delegate of Schaunburg-Lippe, declared that lippe-Deti^old,
Waldeck, and Reusz of the younger line, therefore tnree-
sevenths of the total, wished to vote against the Austrian
motion ; that he had not received full instructions from his own
Cjovemment, and must, consequently, give the vote of the
Curia for the Austrian motion. As soon as this was known,
Chap. III.] BREAK-UP OF THE CONFEDERATION, 49
however, the Government of Schaunbui^-Lippe notified to the
Prussian Government that it had also intended to vote against
the Austrian motion, and thus disowned the act of its own
delegate. It was then too late, for the vote had been given,
and the motion passed. But had the Government of Schaun-
burg-Lippe been a little more careful in sending definite
instructions to its representative, and had Prussia -voted, the
Austrian motion would have been thrown out by a majority of
eight over seven votes, and the event which plunged Central
Europe into immediate war might have been certainly post-
poned, possibly evaded. On such tiny circumstances do the
destbies of nations hang.
As the votes were actually recorded, the Austrian motion was
carried by a majority of nine over six voices.
After the Austrian representative, the president of the Diet,
had declared the result of the voting, nme votes for Austria
against six, the Prussian representative stated that it was now
his duty to publish to the Diet the resolutions of Prussia. The
Austrian morion was in itself a negation of the Federal Consti-
tution, and must necessarily be regarded by Prussia as a breach
of the community of the Confederation. The Federal Con-
stitution recognised Federal execution against members of the
Confederation only in particular cases, which were clearly
defined. These cases were entirely neglected in the Austrian
motion. The position which Austria had assumed with regard
to Holstein came in no manner under the protection of Federal
treaties. On this account Prussia had refused in any way to
take action on the Austrian motion, and not taken any precau-
tions to oppose the Austrian intention. According to the ideas
of Pmssia, the Diet would not have for a moment listened to
the Austrian proposals, but would have cast out tiie motion
without any second thought upon the matter. Since the Diet
liad, however, acted in a manner so contrary to all expectation ;
since Austria had been actually arming for three months, and
had called the other members of the Confederation to her aid,
and since hereby the Act of Confederation, the chief object of
which was to secure the internal tranquillity of Germany, was
entirely invalidated, Prussia must consider the rupture of the
C^ennanic Confederation as completed, and must view that
E
50 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book II.
Confederation as dissolved and abrogated. Prussia did not,
however, despise the national necessities for which that Con-
federation was instituted, nor did she wish to unsettle the unity
of the Germanic nationality; therefore she wished to declare
herself ready and desirous to form a new Confederation with
those States which might be willing to unite with her in a
Federal union on the basis of the reform proposed for the
Confederation on the loth June. In conclusion, the Prussian
delegate asserted the claims of his Government to a share of
all rights which sprang from the former Constitution, and,
having protested against the disbursement of any Federal
moneys without the consent of Prussia, quitted the as-
sembly.
The Germanic Confederation, established in 1 815, was broken
up at this moment. The declaration of internal war had vir-
tually been proclaimed among its members.
The first action of Prussia in consequence of the decree of
the Diet of the 14th June, was to send a summons to the three
States the territories of which lay within or close to the Prussian
provinces, and which had voted against Prussia on the 14th
June. These States were Hanover, Saxony, and the Electorate
of Hesse. This summons required that the Governments of
these States should immediately reduce their troops to the
peace establishment, which had existed on the ist March, and
should agree to join the new Prussian Federation on the basis
of the reform proposed on the loth June. If these Govern-
ments declared, within twelve hours, their agreement to these
demands, Prussia undertook to guarantee their sovereign rights
within the boundaries of the proposed Federation ; otherwise,
Prussia announced her intention to declare war.
The three Governments hesitated, and made no reply. On
the evening of the 15th June, Prussia declared war against
these three countries. No formal declaration of war was made
against Austria, but at a later date the intention to commence
hostilities was communicated to the Austrian outposts.
On the 17th June, the Austrian war manifesto was published;
on the 1 8th, the Prussian ; on the 20th, Italy, who had entered
into an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia, declared
war against Austria and Bavaria. Diplomacy had now done
Chap. III.] BREAK-UP OF THE CONFEDERATION, 51
its work, and the conflict was removed from the field of politics
to the theatre of war.
Subjoined, for facility of reference, is a tabular list of the
princi]>al features of the political prologue.
October 20M, 1864. Treaty of Vienna. y
August i/^hy 1865. Convention of Gastein.
March 12M, 1866. First preparations of Austria for war in
Bohemia and Moravia.
March ^oth, 1866. First preparations of Prussia.
Aprily 1866. Negotiations concerning these armaments.
April 23^/, 1866. Great armament of Austria in Venetia.
April 26thy 1866. Proposal of Austria to submit the ques-
tions in dispute to the Diet
May ithy 1866. Declaration of Prussia of the Diet to decide
in international questions, and suggestion of the desirability of
the reform of the Confederation.
Until May 28/i, i866. Armaments in all Germany and
Italy.
May 28/i, 1866. Proposal of a Conference by the three
great non-Germanic European Powers.
May 2gthf 1866. Prussian acceptance of this proposal
Jufu isty 1866. Austrian acceptance tmder conditions which
render the Conference impossible.
June ist, 1866. Submission of Schleswig-Holstein question
to the Diet
yune $thy 1866. Summons by General Gablenz for assembly
of Holstein Estates.
June lothy 1866. Prussian proposal for the reform of the
Fedeial Constitution.
yufte iithf 1S66. Austrian motion for the decree of Federal
execution against Prussia.
ywie 14/A, i366. Acceptance of the Austrian motion by the
Diet
June 15M, 1866. Declaration of war by Prussia against
Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and Saxony.
June 20th, 1866. Declaration of war by Italy against Austria
and Bavaria.
K2
•i
BOOK in."
CHAPTER I.
THE WAK STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA.t
Before it is possible to enter upon a review of the military
operations of the war, it is necessary to glance at the organiza-
tion, administration, and numbere of the forces which were at
the disposal of the belligerent Powers. The question of the
numerical strength of an army in the field is always an
extremely difficult one. Before a campaign, sometimes the
demands of strategy require that the strength of troops should
be exaggerated, sometimes the contrary. The casualties of
every skirmish, the sickness incident to every day's march and
every night's exposure, reduces the number of soldiers under
arms. Hazy distinctions between combatants and non-com-
batants, different modes of reckoning, the exclusion or inclusion
of artillery and administrative services in returns, the non-
completion of battalions up to their normal strength, all throw
great difficulties in the way of gaining an accurate appreciation
of the number of men engaged on either side in particular
actions. It appears, therefore, advisable to sketch here the
organization and regulated normal strength of the armies
engaged in the war, and to attempt, at necessary points in the
* It may be a relief to the general and not professional reader to be made
aware that an omission to read this Book, which is almost entirely techni-
cal, will not interrupt the continuity of the narrative.
+ In the prefatory chapter to the second edition, will be found a sketch of
the changes made in the Prussian military system between the termination of
the campaign of 1866 and the commencement of the late war with France.
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 53
narrative, to calculate and compute from the most trustworthy
authorities the actual numbers present on particular occasions.
The kingdom of Prussia before the war of 1866 had, with an
area of about 127,350 square miles, a population of over nine-
teen million souls. The yearly revenues, according to the
latest budgets, amounted to about 21,600,000/., and the
expenditure of the Government was always confined within
its income. The National Debt in 1864 amounted to about
42,000,000/. The State chest in 1862 contained, from the
surplus of estimated over actual annual expenditure, and from
some other minor sources, a sum of about 2,500,000/. The
financial economy of Prussia is superior to that of any nation
inJEurope. The army has lately cost in time of peace about,
6,300,000/. annually, the navy about 6,450,000/
The Prussian army which took the field in the war of 1866
consisted of eight corps d'arm^e of troops of the Line, and of
the corps d'arm^e of the Guard. Each corps d'arm^e is
organized with the intention of being a perfectly complete
little army of itself, so that without inconvenience it can be
detached from the main army at any time. Each corps d'arm^e
of the Line in time of war consists of two divisions of infantry,
one division of cavalry, sixteen batteries of artillery, and a
military train. Each division of infantry is composed of two
brigades, each of which has two regiments, and, as each
regiment contains three battalions, in a division of infantry
there are twelve battalions ; to every infantry division is also
attached one regiment of cavalry, of four squadrons, and one
division of artillery, of four batteries, making the total strength
of the force under the command of every infantry divisional
General twelve battalions, four squadrons, and four batteries.
A cavalry division consisted of two brigades, each containing
two regiments, and, as every regiment had four squadrons, the
division contained sixteen squadrons \ it had also two batteries
of horse artillery attached to it
The reserve of artillery consisted of one division of field
artillery, which formed four batteries, and of two batteries of
horse artillery, besides an artillery train for. the supply of
ammunition.
This gives the strength of a corps d'arm^e as twenty-four
54 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III.
battalions of infantry, twenty-four squadrons oi cavalry, and
sixteen batteries of artillery. Besides this, however, each corps
has one battalion of rifles and one battalion of engineers,
besides an engineer train for the transport of materials for
making bridges, and a large military train, which carries food,
hospitals, medicines, fuel for cooking, bakeries, and all the
other necessaries of not only life, but of the life of an army,
the members of which require not only the same feeding,
clothing, and warming as other members of the human race,
but who will not be denied bullets, powder, shot and shells,
saddlery for their horses, and who from the nature of their life
are more liable to require medicines, bandages, splints, and all
hospital accessories than other men.
If we do not consider the train when we are calculating the
number of combatants who actually fall in, in the line of battle,
every battalion may be considered to consist of 1,002 men.
Thus the force of infantry and engineers in a corps d'arm^
numbers over 26,000, and on account of men absent through
sickness may in round numbers be calculated at this figure.
Each squadron of cavalry may be calculated at 140 mounted
toen, which makes the whole cavalry force about 3,300 men.
Each division of four batteries of horse artillery brings into the
field 590 actual combatants, and each of field artillery the
same, so that the whole artillery force of a corps d'arm^e is
about 2,350 men. The actual number of combatants with a
corps d'arm^e is in this way seen to be 31,650 men, which may
be stated in broad numbers at 31,000. The Guard corps
d'arm^ differs chiefly from the Line corps in having one
additional rifle battalion, one additional Fusilier regiment, and
two additional cavalry regiments, which increase its strength
by about 5,150 actual combatants; the total number of com-
batants in this corps may be safely assumed as 36,000 men, in
round numbers.*
If we turn, however, to the list furnished by the military
authorities, we find that the army was said to consist of
335>ooo men, with 106,500 horses, of which only about 70,000
* This paragraph is still correct, except that the sqaadron now always
musters 150 mounted mea«
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 55
belonged to the cavalry and artillery, and that it was accom-
panied by a waggon train of 8,950 carriages, of which only
3,500 belonging to the artillery performed any service on the
field of battle.
What has then become of these 55,000 men, 36,500 horses,
and 5,450 carriages which form the difference between the
returns we find of an army on paper and the actual number of
men engaged on the field of battle ? This diflference represents
the moving power of the combatant branches \ it is this differ-
ence that feeds the warriors when they are well, that tends
them when wounded, and nurses them when struck down with
disease. Nor are these the only duties of the non-combatant
branches. An army on a campaign is a little world of itself,
and has all the requirements of ordinary men moving about
the world, besides having an enemy in its neighbourhood, who
attempts to oppose its progress in every way possible. When
the line of march leads to a river, over which there is either no
bridge or where the bridge has been destroyed, a bridge must
be immediately laid down, and, accordingly, a bridge train is
necessarily always present with the army. When a camp is
pitched, field balceries have to be immediately established to
feed the troops ; field telegraphs and field post-ofilices must be
established for the rapid transmission of intelligence. A large
staff must be provided for, which is the mainspring that sets all
the works in motion. And these are only ordinary wants, such
as any large picnic party on the same scale would require.
^Vhen we consider that 200 rounds of ammunition can easily
be fired away by each gun in a general action, that every
infantry soldier can on the same occasion dispose of 1 20 rounds
of ball cartridge, and that this must be all replaced imme-
diately ; that all this requires an enormous number of carriages,
with horses and drivers ; that outside of the line of battle there
must be medical men, their assistants, and nurses ; that within
it and under fire there must be ambulance waggons, and men
with stretchers to bear the wounded to them ; and that forty
per cent of the infantry alone in every year's campaign are
carried to the rear, we may understand how the large difference
between the number of actual fighting men and of men borne
upon paper is accounted for.
56 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IIL
We have seen that each corps d'armfe may be safely
estimated at 30,000 combatants, and that of the Guard at
36,000, without taking into consideration those large artillery
and engineer trains which would be requisite were the army to
undertake the siege of any considerable fortress. It only
remains now to consider whether this strength may always be
reckoned upon as constant ; and it appears that this may be
done in consequence of the admirable system of Prussian
organization. By this system, as soon as a corps d'arm^ is
put on a war footing, there is a depot battalion formed for
each regiment, a depdt company for each battalion of rifles, a
dep6t squadron for each cavalry regiment,* a depot division
for the artillery of each corps d'armee, a dep6t company for
each engineer battalion, and a depdt for the military train.
These depots remain in their barracks, and supply all
vacancies made in the ranks of the corps to which they belong.
Nor is it at all difficult for them to do so, because in con-
sequence of the system of recruiting pursued in this .country
these dep6ts do not consist entirely of raw recruits, but partly
of men who have served for some time in the army, and who
have, after leaving the regular ranks, been annually put
through a course of training.
In Prussia, with the exception of clergymen and a few
others, every man in the year in which he becomes twenty
years old is liable to military service for five years, three of
which he spends in the regular army and two in the reserve. On
completion of this service he is placed in the first levy of the
Landwehr for seven years, and afterwards in the second levy
of the Landwehr for seven years more. When it is necessary
to raise the regular army to a war footing, the reserve is first
draughted into the ranks, then the first levy of the Landwehr,
and afterwards, if necessary, the second levy.t If the Land-
wehr is exhausted the Landsturm is called out, and in this
case every man between sixteen and fifty is liable for service.
Each corps d'armee of the Line in time of peace is
* The depot squadron for each regiment of cavalry is now maintained in
time of peace,
t After 1866 the distinction between the two levies of Landwehr ceased.
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 57
quartered in one of the eight provinces of the kingdom ; its
recruits are obtained from that province, and its Landwehr are
the men in the province who have served five years and who
have been dismissed from actual service, but are subjected to
an annual course of training. The provinces to which the
different corps d'arm^e in 1866 belonged were: — i, Prussia
Proper; 2, Pomerania; 3, Brandenburg; 4, Prussian Saxony;
5, Posen; 6, Silesia; 7, Westphalia; 8, Rhine Provinces.
The Guards are recruited from men of a certain stature from
all the provinces, and the Landwehr of the Guard consists of
the men who have formerl)^ served in it
Prussia, after the successes of Frederick the Great, was
content to suppose that the military organization which had
served her so well in the Seven Years' War was perfect, and
required little or no modification to enable it to continue supe-
rior to that of other European Powers; but while she reposed
complacently on the laurels of Rossbach and Leuthen, mili-
tary science had rushed forwards, and she was rudely roused
from her repose by the crushing defeat of Jena. Under
enormous difficulties, and with the greatest secrecy, a new
organization was then introduced into the Prussian army.
The terms of peace dictated by Napoleon after the Jena
campaign allowed the Prussian army to consist of only
42,000 men, but no stipulation was made as to how long these
men should serve. In order to secure the means of striking
for independence on the first favourable opportunity, General
Schamhorst introduced the Krumper system, by which a
certain number of soldiers were always allowed to go home on
furlough after a few months' service, and recruits were brought
into the ranks in their place. Those drilled were in their turn
sent away on furlough and other recruits brought in for train-
ing. By means of this system at the beginning of 18 13 not
only could the existing regiments be filled up to proper war
strength, but fifty-one new battalions were raised firom pre-
pared soldiers. This force, however, was totally insufficient
for the great struggle against Napoleon ; so in February, 1813,
volunteer Jager detachments were formed which mustered
together about 10,000 men, and in March the raising of a
Landwehr was decreed, which in five months after the signa-
5S SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IIL
ture of the decree was able to take part in the war with a
strength of 120,000 men. Thus in August, 1813, Prussia
possessed an army of 250,000 men, of whom 170,000 men
were ready to take the field, while the remaining 80,000
formed reserve and depot troops and supplied garrisons. This
army fought in the war of independence, and formed the first
nucleus of the existing military organization of the kingdom, —
an oiganization which, dating fi'om a terrible misfortune, the
bitter experience of which has never been forgotten, has since
been constanly tended, improved, and reformed, and with carefiil
progress been brought to such a high pitch of excellence that
in 1866 it enabled the Prussian troops to march and conquer
with an almost miraculous rapidity, to eclipse in a few days the
glories of the Seven Years' War, to efi&ce the memory of Jena
by thundering on the attention of the startled world the
suddenly decisive victory of Sadowa, and to spring over the
ashes of Chlum into very possibly the foremost place among
the armies of the world,*
After Prussia had regained her position as a great Power it
was necessary that she should have an army of a strength
similar to that of the armies of other great Powers, and there-
fore with a muster-roll of about half a million of men. At this
time the other great Powers kept the greater part of their
soldiery in peace, as in war, in the ranks, and only allowed a
few trained veterans, who together amounted to about one-
fourth of the total strength of the army, to be absent on
furlough. But Prussia was then the smallest of the great
Powers, and had neither such a large population nor revenue
as the others. Thus, she had, in the first place, not sufficient
men ; in the second place, not enough money to maintain an
army on a similar system, and could in peace keep together
only a much smaller portion of her soldiery than her possible
enemies could. This portion of her army was organised on
the following system : — ^The country was required every year
to grant 40,000 recruits, each of whom served for three years
under the standards and for two years in the reserve 3 so the
• The events of 1870—71, have not belied this paxagraph, written in
1867.
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 59
Standing anny amounted to 120,000 men, and by calling in
the reserves could be raised immediately to 200,000 men.
Bat, to complete the requisite number of 500,000 soldiers,
300,000 more were necessary, and in time of peace the
kingdom could afford to maintain only very small depdts for
these additional troops. The war of independence had shown
that the Landwehr system, by which men were allowed to
retire from service, but still remained liable to be called up for
duty, was capable of effecting good service, and in case of
need of supplying the men who could not be kept in time of
peace in the regular army. Therefore this system was retained,
and by the decree of the 3rd of September, 18 14, the Prussian
army was organized definitively on the Landwehr system. By
this system every Prussian capable of bearing arms was with-
out exception liable to military duty, and to serve from his
20th to his 23rd year in the standing army, from his 23rd to
25th in the reserve, from his 25th to 32nd in the first levy of the
Landwehr, and from his 32nd to 39th in the second levy. The
Landsturm was to consist of all men capable of bearing arms
between seventeen and forty-nine years of age who did not
belong either to the standing army or to the Landwehr. From
the Landwehr battalions and squadrons were raised which
formed Landwehr regiments, and these were united for annual
exercise or service in brigades and divisions with regiments of
the Line. Landwehr men who had belonged to Jager bat-
talions, to the artillery, or to the engineer service, were not
formed into separate corps ; but in case of being called up
were to return into the ranks of the regiments in which they
had formerly served.
By this system, with an annual supply of 40,000 recruits,
Prussia was enabled to hold in readiness for war an army
which consisted of three distinct parts.
1. The standing army of 120,000 men, raised in war by the
recall of the reserves to 200,000 men, and with Landwehr-
Jagers, artillerymen, and pioneers, to 220,000 men.
2. The first levy of the Landwehr, including only infentry
and cavalry, of which, in peace, only small depots, numbering
together about 3,000 men, were maintained, but which, on the
mobilization of the army for war, supplied considerably over
6o SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book UL
150,000 men, even allowing liberally for deaths, sickness,
emigration, and other causes of reduction.
The standing army and the first levy, after detaching 30,000
men to strengthen the garrisons of fortresses, formed together
the field army of 340,000 men, and besides, from their surplus
men and recruits, could leave at home a force of depot troops
amounting to about 50,000 men.
3. The second levy of the Landwehr, firom which no
exercise or training was required in time of peace, but which
in war was called upon to fiimish 110,000 soldiers, who,
with the 30,000 above mentioned firom the standing army and
first levy, garrisoned the fortresses of the country, and could,
in case of urgent necessity, be supported by the LandstunxL
From these three sources — i, the field army; 2, depot
troops, formed by the standing army and first levy of the
Landwehr; 3, garrison troops, formed by the surplus of the
first levy, the second levy of Landwehr, and in case of need
firom the Landsturm — Prussia could for war raise 530,000 men,
of whom in time of peace hardly one-fourth were present with
the standards. The standing army during the time that this
organization remained intact consisted of forty-five infantry
regiments, ten light infantry battalions, thirty-eight cavalry
regiments, nine artillery regiments, and nine divisions of engi-
neers.
The great advantage of this system was that in peace it
necessitated but a small expense, and required but few men to
keep up an army which on the outbreak of war could be raised
quickly to a large force. As it was arranged after the War of
Independence it endured without alteration during the reigns
of Frederick William III. and Frederick William IV.
But in the campaigns which the Prussian army undertook in
1848 and 1849, and again when the army was mobilized in
1850 and 1859, the disadvantages of an organization so entirely
based upon the Landwehr system became apparent in a high
Jegree.
The energetic spirit with which the Prussian people rushed
to arms against Napoleon I. can only, under very peculiar
circumstances, agitate a whole nation, and make every indi-
vidual willing and anxious to sacrifice his personal comfort
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 6i
and convenience in order to respond to the call of his Govern*
ment, and serve with alacrity in the ranks of the army. Such
circumstances seldom occur, and are due either to the insup-
portable weight of a foreign domination — ^as was the case in
Prussia from 1807-12 — or to some strong patriotic stimulus
such as has knitted the people of the same country together
during the late campaign ; but this spirit is seldom found at
the outbreak of an ordinary war, engaged in for ordinary poli-
tical reasons.
It was found on the mobilization in 1848 that a great por-
tion of the Landwehr soldiers obeyed only unwillingly the call
to arms, because it interfered with their private occupations;
that they sometimes, weaned by long ease from military ideas,
showed a want of discipline, and that, thinking more for their
wives and families than for their duty to the State, they did not
always acquit themselves properly in action. Besides, there
was this disadvantage that the Landwehr — ^therefore, about half
of the field army, newly embodied— prevented the divisions
from being immediately prepared to take the field, a delay
which is terribly prejudicial to an army in these times, when
troops are forwarded to the theatre of war by the rapid means
of railway transport The officers and non-commissioned
officers of the Landwehr were also little used to their duties,
and at the very moment of mobilization a great number of
them were necessarily transferred to the Line, and others
brought from the regular army to supply their places. These
numerous alterations of their leaders at such an important time
were alone sufficient to impair materially the efficiency of the
troops.
Besides these disadvantages, the existing system had brought
about a great injustice in the distribution of military service, as
in 1 81 5 only 40,000 recruits were yearly called for to support
the standing army of 140,000 men, while in the meantime the
population had increased from 10,000,000 to 18,000,000; so
that about one-third of the lads who should proportionately
have entered the service were entirely free of duty, and those
who did enter were liable to be recalled to the ranks for a
longer period of their life than was really necessary; for if,
instead of 40,000 recruits, 63,000 were, as easily could be,
63 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IIL
called up every year, men, instead of being liable to be put into
the standing army on the outbreak of war for twelve years
(from twenty to thirty-two), need only be liable for seven years
(from twenty to twenty-seven). In direct ratio with the in-
crease of population the national revenues had also increased
from 50,000,000 to 93,000,000 thalers, and so admitted of an
increase of the standing army and of the military expenses.
There were thus three grounds for a reform in the Landwehr
system, and therefore King William I., while still Regent, in-
troduced in 1859 and i860 a re-organization of the army, which
up to 1865 formed a bone of contention between the Prussian
Ministry and the Radical party in the Lower House, but the
success of which in the war of 1866 completely silenced, if not
thoroughly convinced, even its tax-pa5dng opponents of its
wondeiful excellence and elasticity. By this re-organization of
1859, as it is usually called, the first levy of the Landwehr was
no longer, as a rule, to be sent into the field ; and to attain
this object the standing army, including the reserves, was to
be increased by as many men as the first levy of the Landwehr
formerly provided — ^in fact, to be nearly doubled. The time
of service in the Landwehr was diminished by two years, and
that in the reserve in return to be lengthened by two years.
The Landwehr still remaining in two levies, but composed only
of men from twenty-seven to thirty-eight years old, was, as a
rule, with its first levy alone to perform the duty which had
hitherto been performed by the second levy, — namely, to gar-
rison the fortresses. In case of necessity the Government still,
however, retained the power of calling up the second levy to
aid in this duty.
By this organization a recruit who joined the Prussian ser-
vice served for three years (from nineteen to twenty-two) * in
the regular army; for five years (from twenty-two to twenty-
seven) in the reserve ; and for eleven years (from twenty-seven
to thirty-eight) was liable to be called up for duty as a Land-
wehr man.
By this re-organization the total war strength of the field
* From the ist Januaiy of the year in which he became twenty years
old.
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 63
army was slightly increased, and its efficiency most materially
improved ; the war strength of the depot troops was, on ac-
count of the necessity of great rapidity in modem warfare, more
than doubled ; that of the garrison troops was improved, and
could now, by calling up the second levy, be made twice as
great as it was formerly. These reforms also allowed the
standing army to be increased by thirty-six regiments of in-
fantry, nine battalions for the fusilier regiments, ten cavalry
laments, and five divisions of garrison artillery. Sufficient
time had not yet elapsed on the outbreak of the Austrian war
for this re-organization to be thoroughly carried out, and still
eight of the ten cavalry regiments had not been formed, and
their place was supplied during that campaign by twelve Land-
wehr cavalry regiments, and as yet only one of the divisions of
garrison artillery had been formed.
During the campaign of 1866 the elasticity of this organiza-
tion was clearly manifested. In a wonderfully short time the
large armies which fought at Koniggratz were placed on a war
footing, and brought about 260,000 combatants into the very
field of batde, besides the necessary detachments which must
be made by a large army to cover communications, mask fort-
resses, and so on ; but the detachments made from the Prus-
sian army were very small compared to those which would
have to be separated from an army organized on a different
system ; for as the field army advanced the depot troops moved
up in rear, and formed both dep6ts and reserves for the first
line, while some of the garrison troops of Landwehr came up
fiom Prussia, and formed the garrisons of Saxony, Prague,
Pardubitz, and all the other points on the lines of communica-
tion. At the same time General Mulbe's corps, fomied for the
most part of reserve and depot soldiers, pushed up to Briinn,
and was hastening to take its place in the first line, when its
march was stopped by the conclusion of the long armistice.
While the armies of Prince Frederick Charles, the Crown
Prince, and General Herwarth were being supported in Bo-
hemia, Moravia, and Saxony, General Falkenstein, with a
number of Line regiments and a force of Landwehr, was driv-
ing the war forwards to the Main ; and the Prince of Mecklen-
burg, with the second reserve corps, was pushing on against
64 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III.
Bavaria. Nor was Prussian territory left without its garrisons :
Landwehr battalions were in Kosel, Neisse, Berlin, Torgau,
Magdeburg, Konigsbeig, and all the other garrison towns of
the country, while under their shelter recruits were being
drilled, and more Landwehr embodied to march forward into
the conquered countries. The armies which were on the
Marchfeld in front of Lundenburg and in Bavaria did not
form a thin front line, which, once broken or turned, would
have been driven back even to the Elbe ; their rear was guarded
and supported by large forces of strong and firm battalions,
lately embodied, but from their nature quickly trained, and
composed of well-grown old soldiers who were thirsting to be
sent against the enemy, and on whose well-knit frames disease
or the hardships of war could make little impression.
Though the part of the Prussian organization which refers
to the recruiting of the army and to the filling up of the ranks
in case of war has had a great deal to do with the success of
the Austrian campaign, on account of the facility and rapidity
with which by its means the army could be mobilized and
brought upon a war footing, the portion of the Prussian
organization which relates to the combination of the recruits
so obtained in pHable bodies, which can be easily handled,
easily moved, yet formed in such due proportions of the different
arms as to be capable of independent action, did not fail to
be appreciated most fully by those who, with its assistance,
gained such tremendous results. This portion of the military
organization of the Prussian army is so simple that almost
every man in the ranks can understand it Jealous of expense
in time of peace, it allows for a wide expansion, without
hurry and without confusion, on the outbreak of war. It pro-
vides for, at the same time, the broadest questions and the
most minute details, and is so clearly laid down and so pre-
cisely defined, yet at the same time admits of so much
elasticity, that the Prussian officers can find no words strong
enough to express their praise of it
England, in fact, in 1866, hardly wakened up to realize that
the Pnissian army then was very different from that which at
the beginning of this century was destroyed on the fatal day
of Jena, or that then it only resembled the army which
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 65
inarched so well to our aid at Waterloo, in patriotic feelmg
and in the rudiments of its organization. Prussia seems now
about to spring into the position she held one hundred years'
ago, when Frederick had made her the first military Power
in die world, and England was introducing her military system
into the germs of the army which marched through the Penin-
sula, and at Waterloo shattered the legions which Bliicher
annihilated. Would that England now would take some hints
for the organization of her army from the victors of Konig-
gratz, and would adopt the experience which has been won on
Uie plains of Bohemia, before military progress is forced
upon her by a disaster more fatal, perhaps, than that of
Klostersevem 1 ♦
In peace everything is always kept ready for the mobiliza-
tion of the army, every officer and every official knows during
peace what will be his post and what will be his duty the
moment the decree for the mobilization is issued, and the
moment that decree is flashed by telegraph to the most
distant stations every one sets about his necessary duty without
requiring any fiirther orders or any explanations.
When a war is imminent the Government decrees the
mobilization of the whole army, or of such a portion as may
be deeme^ necessary. In preparing for the Austrian cam-
paign, the whole field army and the first levy of Landwehr
were mobilized before the invasion of Saxony. A part of the
second Landwehr levy was also mobilized immediately the
troops of Prince Frederick Charles stepped across the Saxon
fi-ontier ; and on the day of the great battle near Koniggratz,
without any exertion, Prussia had over 600,000 men under
arms. Every commanding general mobilizes his own corps
d'arm^ ; the " Intendantur " the whole of the branches of the
administrative services ; the commandants of those fortresses
which are ordered to be placed in a state of defence take
their own measures for strengthening the fortifications and for
obtaining from the artillery depots tiie guns necessary for the
armament of their parapets. All orders are sent by telegraph,
• It is hardly necessary to notice that since this was written in 1867,
England has made a great advance in military improvement.
F
66 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IIL
or, where telegraphic communication does not exist, by
mounted orderlies. The mobilization of the whole army is
'soon complete in eveiy branch ; the infantry is ready in a
fortnight Arom the time the decree is signed
The process of the mobilization may be classed under the
following fire beads : — i, The filling in of the field troops to
their war strength ; 2, the formation of depdt troops ; 3, the
formation of garrison troops and the arming of the fortresses ;
4, the mobilization of the field administration ; 5, the farma-
tion of the head*quarter staffs, &c., who are to remain in the
different districts to supply the places of those who march to
the seat of war.
The completion of the rank and file of the field troops
to war strength was effected by drawing in some of the reserve
soldiers, who supply half the total war strength of the in-
fantry, one-third of that of the artillery, and one twenty-fifth
of that of the cavalry. The cavalry has, of course, on
account of being maintained in such force during peace, a
superabundance of reserve soldiers available on a mobiliza-
tion ; these, after the men required for the cavalry itself have
been drawn from them, are handed over to the artillery and
military train, so that these services thus obtain many valuable
soldiers, well accustomed to motmted duties. The reserve
soldiers who are to be enrolled have orders sent to them
through the commanding officer of the Landwehr of the
district in which they live, who can avail himself of the ser-
vices of the provincial and parochial civil authorities to
£sicilitate' the delivery of these orders. The men are, imme-
diately on the receipt of their orders, required to proceed to
the head-quarters of the Landwehr of the district, where they
are received, medically inspected, and forwarded to their regi-
ment, by an officer and some non-commissioned officers of the
regiment which draws its recruits from the district Officers
who are reqiiired to fill up vacancies in the regular army in a
mobilization are obtained by promoting some of the senior
non-commissioned officers. Landwehr officers obtain their
commissions much in the same way as do military officers in
England, but no Landwehr officer can be promoted to the
rank of captain unless he has been attached to a regular
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 67
raiment for two months' duty ; and no Landwehr officer can
be a field officer unless he has before served for some con-
siderable time in the regular anny. Many of the officers
of the Landwehr are officers still on the strength of the
r^ular anny, who are detached to the Landwehr on its
mobilization.
On a mobilization, the whole army required in 1866 about
88,000 horses more than it had in time of peace ; in order to
obtain these quickly the Government has the power, if it
cannot buy them readily from regular dealers, to take a certain
number from every district, paying for them a price which is
fixed by a mixed commission of military officers and of persons
appointed by the civil authorities of the district
Each regiment of field artillery forms nine ammunition
columns, in each of which are waggons to carry reserve am-
munition for infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the proportions
in which experience has shown that ammunition is usually
required In the field these ammunition waggons follow
directly in rear of the field army, but are kept entirely sepa-
rate fix>m the field batteries, the officers ot which are justly
supposed to have enough to do in action in superintending
Aeir own guns, without being hampered with the supply of
cartridges to the cavalry and infantry.
Every battalion of engineers forms a column of waggons
which carries tools for intrenching purposes, and also a heavy
pontoon train and a light field bridge train for which all is kept
ready during peace. If a portion of the army is mobilized
merely for practice, or goes into camp for great manoeuvres, as
is done nearly every summer during peace, one, or perhaps
two or three, engineer battalions make their trains mobile, in
order to practise the men and to accustom them to the use of
die mattrid. Arms and ammunifion which are required to
C(»nplete the war strength of regiments are supplied from the
artillery depdts. Officers are allowed soldier servants on a
more Hberal scale than in the English army, but no officers'
servants are mustered in the company ; they form, with all the
non-combatant men of each battalion of infantry, the train
which is attached to every battalion : this consists of the
officers' servants and the drivers of the regimental waggons ;
r 2
6S SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book III.
every one else borne on the muster-roll draws a trigger in
action, so that the muster-rolls actually show the number of
rank and file who are present, and do not include any of the
followers, who often never come up into the line of battle at
alL On service the captain of every company is mounted,
and is required to have two horses, to aid in the purchase
of which he is allowed a certain simi of money by the
State.
The strength cf an ordinary battalion on active service is
one field-ofiicer, four captains, four first lieutenants, nine second
lieutenants, one surgeon, one assistant-surgeon, one paymaster,
one quarter-master, 1002 non-commissioned ofl[icers and privates.
The train attached to this battalion is, besides officers' ser-
vants, the drivers of the ammunition waggon, which has six
horses; of the Montirung Wagcn^ which carries the pay-
master's books, money chest, and a certain amount of material
for the repair of arms and clothing, and is drawn by four
horses ; a hospital cart with two horses, an ofl[icers' baggage
waggon with four horses, and men to lead four pack-horses,
each of which carries on a pack-saddle the books of one
company.
The baggage of a cavalry regiment on service consists of
one medicine cart with two horses, one field forge with two
horses, four squadron waggons, each with two horses, one
oflftcers' baggage waggon, with four horses ; the total strength
of a cavalry regiment being 23 ofl[icers 659 men, of whom
600 fall in in the ranks, 713 horses, and seven carriages.
The nine ammunition columns which are formed by each
artillery regiment for the supply of ammunition to the artillery
and infantry of the corps d'arm^e to which the regiment
belongs are divided into two divisions, one of which consists
of five columns, and has a strength of two officers, 175 men,
174 horses, and 25 waggons; the second, consisting of four
columns, has two officers, 173 men, 170 horses, and 24 wag-
gons. This division is mgide to facilitate the despatch of the
two divisions separately to the ammunition dep6t to have the
waggons refilled after their first supply of cartridges has been
exhausted, or to allow one division to be detached with each
infantry division, in case of the corps d'arm^ being divided,
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 69
as was the case in this war with the third and fourth corps, in
which case four columns can conveniently be attached to each
infantiy division, and one column to the cavaliy division of the
corps.
The reserve anmiunition park from which these ammunition
columns are replenished, is also divided into two divisions,-
each of which has a strength of nine officers, 195 men, 264
carriages, and is further subdivided into eight columns of 33
waggons each. It is brought into the theatre of war either by
railway or water carriage, or by means of horses hired in the
country where the war b being conducted. It generally is one
or two da3rs' march in rear of the army. In the campaign of
1866 on the day of the great battle, the ammunition reserve
park of the army of Prince Frederick Charles was at Tumau,
to which place it had been brought by railway.
A siege train for attacking fortresses is not generally or-
ganized at the beginning of a war, unless the general plan of
the campaign should be likely to lead the army into a country
where fortresses exist, which could not be either neglected or
masked, and which must be. reduced. If a siege train is
organized, it is formed with especial reference to the fortresses
against which it is to act, and follows the army in the same
manner as the reserve ammunition park. At the beginning of
the 1866 campaign the Prussians had no siege train with the
army, but directly the battle of Sadowa had been won a siege
train was organized, perhaps to be employed against the for-
tresses on the Elbe, though such small places scarcely merited
such an attention from so large an army, perhaps for an attack
on Olmiitz, When the fortifications of Floridsdorf were found
looming in fi:ont of the advance on Vienna, the siege train was
ordered up to be ready for the attack of the Austrian works
covering the Danube, but it was halted as soon as the four
weeks' armistice was agreed upon. The want of siege trains
was, however, felt The garrison of Theresienstadt, a fortress
which had been totally neglected, sallied out and broke the
railway bridge on the line of communication between Prague
and Tumau. Had their communication been thus broken
during the active campaign, and not during the armistice, it
must have seriously inconvenienced the Prussians. Had
70 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III.
Theresienstadt been masked, the sally of the garrison would
have been probably prevented; but had it been properly
besieged, the garrison would have been kept within their
works, and the direct line of railway between Prague and
Dresden would have been at the service of the Prussian army
for almost its entire length.
It is thus that the Prussian army is formed in peace, that its
field forces can be made ready to march in a few days in case
of war, and that the troops in the field are supplied with the
powder and shot which give them the means of fighting. But,
Tart de vaincre est perdu sans Part de subsister. An organiza-
tion of even more importance lies still behind — ^the organization
of the means of supplying the warriors with food when in
health, with medicine and hospitals when diseased or wounded,
and for filling up the gaps which are opened in the ranks by
4)attle or pestilence ; an organization which has always been
found to be more difficult and to require more delicate
handling than even strategical combinations, or the arraying
of troops for battle.
The Prussian army could in 1866 enter the field with
342,000 men in its ranks ; but, as is well known, no army,
nor any collection of men, can maintain its normal strength for
a single day ; in such a host, even of young healthy men, ordi-
nary illness would immediately cause a few absentees firom
duty, much more so do the marches, the hardships, and the
fatigues to which a soldier is exposed on active service before
the first shot is fired. Then as soon as an action takes place,
a single day adds a long list to the hospital roll, and the eveix>
ing sees in the ranks many gaps whidi in the morning were
filled by strong soldiers, who are now lying torn and mangled
or dead on the field of battle. The dead are gone for ever ;
they are so much power lost out of the hand of the general ;
nor can an army wait till the wounded are cured and are again
able to draw a trigger "or to wield a sabre. Means must be
taken to supply the deficiencies as quickly as possible, and to
restore to the commander of the army the missing force which
has been expended in moving his own army through the first
steps of the campaign, or in resisting the motion of his ad-
versary. What is the amount of such deficiencies may be
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 71
estimated from Prussian statistics^ which have been compiled
^th great care, and frx>m the experience of many campaigns ;
these state officiaUy that at the end of a year's ^rar forty per
cent of the inflsuitiy of the field army, twenty per cent of the
cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and twelve per cent of the
military train would have been lost to the service, and have had
to be supplied anew.
It is for the formation of these supplies of men, and for for-
warding them to the active army, that depots are intended.
The depots of the Prussian army are formed as soon as the
mobilization takes place, and it is ordered that one half of the
men of each depdt should be soldiers of the reserve, who,
already acquainted with their drill, can be sent up to the front
on the first call ; the other half of each depot consists of recruits
who are raised in the ordinary way, and of all the men of the
raiments belonging to the field army which have not been per-
fectly drilled by the time their regiment marches to the seat of
war. The officers of the depots are either officers who are
detached from the regular army for this duty, or are officers
who have been previously wounded, and who cannot bear active
service, but can perform the easier duties of the depot, besides
young officers, who are being trained to their duty before join-
ing their regiments.
Between the re-oiganization of 1859 and the war of 1866,
the number of depdt troops kept up during a war was quite
doubled ; formerly every two infantry regiments had one depdt
battalion, and every two cavalry regiments one depot squadron.
When the army was re-organized, it was foreseen that this
amount of depdt troops would never be sufficient in case of a
war of any duration or severity, so by the new regulations each
infantry regiment had one depot battalion of 18 officers and
1,002 men; each rifle battalion, a depot company of 4 officers
and 201 men; each cavalry regiment, a depot squadron of 5
officers, 200 men, and 212 horses; each field artillery regi-
ment (96 guns), a depot division of one horse artillery battery,
and three field batteries, each of four guns, with 14 officers, 556
men, and 189 horses ; every engineer battalion, one depot com-
pany of 4 officers and 202 men ; every train battalion, a depot
division of two companies, which muster together 12 officers,
72 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III.
502 men, and 213 horses. All this was required to feed the
army in the field with supplies of men to take the places of
those who pass fi-om the regimental muster roll into the lists of
killed, died in hospital, or disabled ; for those who are only
slightly wounded return to their duty either in the depot or at
once to their battalions, as is most convenient from the situa-
tion of the hospital in which they have been.
As a rule, four weeks after the field army has marched, the
first supply of men is forwarded from the depots to the batta-
lions in the field. This first supply consists of one-eighth of the
calculated yearly loss which has been given above. On the first
day of every succeeding month a firesh supply is forwarded.
Each of these later supplies is one-twelfth of the total calculated
yearly loss. If a very bloody battle is fought, special supplies
are sent at once to make up the losses of the troops that have
been engaged.
The troops in depot are provided with all articles of equip-
ment with which they should take the field. When a detach-
ment is to be sent to the front, all who belong to one corps
d'arm^e are assembled together; the infantry soldiers are
formed into companies of 200 men each for the march, the
cavalry into squadrons of about 100 horsemen, and are taken
under the charge of officers to the field army, thus bringing to
the firont with them the necessary reserves of horses. The
places in the depots of those who have marched away are filled
up by recruiting.
An army, though of great strength and well provided with
supplies of men, cannot always be sure of taking the initiative,
and by an ofiensive campaign driving the war into an enemy's
country. There is no doubt that an offensive campaign is
much better for a country and much more likely to achieve
success than a defensive one : it was much better for the
Prussians in 1866 to cover Berlin in Bohemia than in Bran-
denburg, in 1870 in Alsatia than in Rhineland ; General
Benedek would have preferred to cover Vienna indirectly by
an attack on Prussian Silesia rather than in a defensive posi-
tion at Koniggratz ; Napoleon justly saw that the proper point
to defend Paris in 181 5 was not on the Marne, but in Belgium.
But political reasons or want of preparation often force an army
Chap. L] THE WAR STREXGTH OF PRUSSIA. 73
to be unable to assume the ofTensive, and with the loss of the
initiative make a present to the enemy of the first great advan-
tage in the war. In this case the theatre of war is carried into
its own territory, when an army requires fortresses to protect its
arsenals, dockyards, and its capital, to cover important strate-
gical points, or to afford a place where, in case of defeat or
disaster, it may be re-organized under the shelter of fortifica-
tions and heavy artillery. It was well seen in the war of 1866
that small fortresses do not delay the progress in the field of a
large invading army, which can afford to spare detachments to
prevent their garrisons from making sallies. Josephstadt and
Koniggratz did not delay the Prussian armies for a day,
though they are both strong places, and would possibly have
stood a long siege ; but they were both masked by detach-
ments, the loss of which from the line of battle was hardly felt
by the main body, and, though no trenches were opened and
no guns mounted against them, the great line of the Prussian
communications passed in safety within a few miles of their
paralysed garrisons.* It was also demonstrated by that war
that fortifications which inclose a town of any size are compa-
ratively useless, unless the defensive works are so far in front
of the houses as to preclude the possibility of the bombardment
of the city. Towns are now so rich, both in population and
wealth, that few Governments would dare to expose their sub-
jects to the loss of property and risk to life which a bombard-
ment must entail Prague, though surrounded by ramparts,
struck the Austrian colours without firing a shot, because the
Prussian guns would at the same time have played upon the
defenders of the parapets, the unprotected citizens, and the rich
storehouses of its merchants. The Spielberg at Briinn, if it
stood alone, might make a strong resistance to the passage of
an invader, but the white fiag of truce waving fi-om its fiagstaff,
instead of the war standard of Austria, greeted the Prussian
vanguard, because the Emperor could not have borne to hear
that its spires, its palaces, and large manufactories had crumbled
to the ground under Mecklenburg's artillery. But it would be
• In the same manner, in 1870, even Strasburg, Phalsburg, Bitche,
Tou], and Belfort did not, although besieged, delay the progress of the
invadeis.
74 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book IIL
rash to jump to the conclusion that fortresses, and even forti-
fied towns, are no longer of use in war. Fortresses are useful
as supports to the flanks of an anny : if Benedek had lain along
the river from Josephstadt to Koniggratz, the junction of the
two Prussian princes would have been long delayed, perhaps
prevented. The guns of Koniggratz materially checked the
pursuit of the Austrian legions defeated at Sadowa. What
Olmiitz did to save the army of the north from a total disorga-
nization, and to allow General Benedek, under its cover, to
make his preparations for the masterly move by which he
carried it to Vienna, is well known. Whenever a capital is
distinctly the objective point of an invader, as would be the
case if an enemy's army were ever to be allowed to land on the
shores of our own England, strong works round the city, but so
far in advance of the houses as would prevent their being
reached by the besieger's shells, become a necessity, between
and behind which the defenders anny, if worsted in a battle,
might be restored, and wait until the attacking troops had
shattered themselves against the intrenchments. And though
the earthworks at Floridsdorf had little to do with the sudden
cessation of hostilities, there can be no doubt that if Vienna
had been properly fortified on every side Austria might, with a
very fair chance, have struck another blow before she suffered
herself to be excluded from the Confederation of the German
people.*
As long as fortresses exist they require garrisons, but the
troops which are formed in Prussia on the breaking out of a
war are not intended, in case of an offensive campaign, only to
hang listlessly over the parapets of fortified places. When an
army pushes forward into a foreign country, it leaves behind it
long lines of road or railway over which pass the supplies of
food, clothing, medicines, and stores, which are vitally import-
ant to the existence of an army. With an unfriendly population,
and an enemy's cavalry ready always to seize an opportunity of
breaking in upon these lines of communication, of chaiging
down upon convoys, and destroying or burning their contents,
♦ The fortifications of Paris allowed time In 1870-71 for three separate
attempts to raise the siege of the capital.
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 75
and of thus deranging seriously what might be called the
household economy of the army, it is necessary, especially on
lines of railway, that strong garrisons should be maintained at
particular points, and that patrols should be furnished for
nearly the whole line. Towns have to be occupied in rear of
the front line, depots of stores have to be guarded and pro-
tected, convoys have to be escorted, telegraph lines watched,
the fortifications which may fall garrisoned. To detach troops
for the performance of all these duties dribbles away the
strength of an army : if the Prussian armies which crossed the
frontier into Bohemia and Moravia had been obliged to make
all these detachments, how many fighting men would have
mustered on the Marchfeld ? Very few. If these armies had
waited till troops were formed at home after the course of the
campaign had been seen, how long would it have required to
march to the Rossbach ? Probably the advanced guard would
have still been upon the Elbe when it was actually on the
Danube. To provide for these duties, and to allow the main
armies to push forward in almost unimpaired strength, Prussia
forms on the mobilization of the field army her so-called
garrison troops.*
In the formation of these garrison troops, there is a draw-
back fi-om the general excellence of the Prussian military
organization, which arises from the Landwehr system. The
men of the first levy of the Landwehr form, when alone called
out, as many battalions as do the united levies when nearly the
whole of the second levy is also called out In both cases
there are 116 battalions, which consist each of 402 men of the
first levy, and are only filled up to their full strength of 1,000
men by men of the second levy. On account of this arrange-
ment, if only the men of the first levy are required, a large
number of weak battalions are formed, which are more
expensive and more difficult to handle than would be a
smaller number of full battalions. It would appear much
simpler to have a certain number of battalions composed
entirely of men of the first levy, and the rest entirely of men
• These were even more necessary in France, where the bitterly hostile
feeling of the inhabitants and the Franc-Tireur organization required con«
stant watching.
76 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book III.
of the second levy ; but in Prussia this simplicity cannot be
obtained because it is considered advisable to have a Landwehr
battalion for every recruiting district, and only to enrol the men
of the district in their own battalion. If, however, treble the
population which inhabits one of the present recruiting districts
were included in one district, it would be quite easy to have
three battalions of Landwehr for each district, one completely
composed of men of the first levy, the second of the first men.
of the second, and the third of the later men of the second levy,
who now complete the battalions up to their full strength.*
In some respects, which are easily seen, the Prussian Land-
wehr resembles the British Militia, but there are two vital
differences between our organization and that of Prussia. The
first is, that in England when a militia regiment is formed it is
made up of men who are not old soldiers, and consequently, if
the regiment is for some years disembodied, all its late recruits
know nothing of their work except what they can pick up in
the short period of annual training ; so that in course of time,
if a regiment remains for many years without being embodied,
the mass of the ranks contain men who firom want of training
are unqualified to step on the very outbreak of a war into the
line of battle. In the second place, the Landwehr of the first
levy is as much an attendant and concomitant of an army in
the field as the park of reserve artillery, and it is this which
makes the Landwehr so valuable, because it thus takes up the
duties which otherwise would have to be performed by detach-
ments fi:om the active army. If the Prussian armies in the
Austrian campaign had been obliged to leave detachments in
Leipsic, Dresden, Prague, Pardubitz, and along the railway
from Gorlitz to Briinn, besides troops in Hanover, Hesse, and
on the lines of communications of the armies which were
fighting against the Bavarians, how many troops would have
formed the first lines of battle either on the Danube, or in the
theatre of war near the Main? It is probable that the number
of Landwehr men employed on foreign soil, in Saxony, and in
guarding and garrisoning the rear of the armies whdch were
concentrated between tlie Thaya and the Danube, would be
* This has to a certain extent been improved since 1S66.
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 77
under-estimated at 103,000, exclusive of the corps of the regular
army which was watching Olmiitz. If this estimate be at all
correct, the armies which were collecting, together 225,000
regular troops, for the attack upon Vienna, would, unless they
had had these Landwehr behind them, have been reduced to
under 125,000 men. In fact, an English army under the
same circumstances would have been shorn of almost half its
strength.
When a Prussian army with its unimpaired strength is pre-
paring to fight a battle in an enemy's country, when supplies of
men are already coming up in anticipation of the losses which
the action will cause, and when its lines of communication are
guarded and secured by the garrison troops in its rear, it
musters an enormous number of soldiers, who must every day
be provided with food, without which a man can neither fight,
march, nor live ; and not only must it provide for itself alone, but
also for the prisoners of the enemy who may fall into its hands,
—not only food, but hospitals, medicmes, and attendants for
the sick, surgeries, assistants, and appliances for the wounded,
and the means of conveying both sick and wounded from the
places where they fell helpless to convenient spots where they
may be tended and healed at a safe distance firom the danger
of battle, or of being taken in case of a sudden advance of the
enemy. It is extremely difficult fi-om mere figures to realize
what a gigantic undertaking it was to supply even food alone
to the armies which fought in the Austrian campaign — more
diflScult still to appreciate the difficulties in the late campaign
in France. The difficulties of such a task may be conceived if
we remember that the firont line of the Prtissian armies in front
of Vienna mustered nine times the number of British troops
with which Lord Raglan invaded the Crimea ; that close behind
this line lay General Miilbe's reserve corps, and a corps of the
Army of Silesia, which was watching Olmiitz, and that these
two corps alone were stronger by 4,000 men than all the
British, German, and Spanish troops that fought at Talavera;
that behind them again was a large mass of Landwehr ; that
during the siege of Sebastopol the British army was stationary,
and had the great advantage of sea transport to within a few
miles of its camps, while in the late campaigns the Prussian
78 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [BooKllL
anny had been moving forward at an enormously rapid rate*
and that the men to be fed in the front line alone numbered
about 250,000 in Austria* — a population as large as that of
the twelfth part of London. It would be a bold man who
would undertake to supply the twelfth part of the whole
population of London with to-morrow's food — a bolder still
who would undertake the task if this portion of the population
were about to move bodily to-morrow morning down to Rich-
mond, and would require to have the meat for their dinner
delivered to them the moment they arrived there, and who,
without railway transport, agreed to keep the same crowd daily
provided with food until moving at the same rate they arrived
at Plymouth; and yet a general has to do much more than
this in giving food to his men, — he has, besides the ordinary
difficulties of such a task, to calculate upon bad roads, weary
horses, breaking waggons, the attacks of an enemy's cavalry ;
he has not only to get the food to the troops, but in many cases
he has to provide it in the first place; he has to keep his
magazines constantly stocked, to increase the amount of
transport in exact proportion as his troops advance ; to feed
not only the fighting men, but all the men who are employed
in carrying provisions to the combatants, to find hay and com
for all the horses of the cavalry and for the horses of the
transport waggons, and to arrange beforehand so that every
man and horse shall halt for the night in dose proximity to a
large supply of good water. This is not the lightest nor the
least of a general's duties. It was the proud boast of England's
great soldier that "many could lead troops, he could feed
them." When the enemy is in front, and any moment may
bring on an action, a general has little time to turn his mind to
the organization of a system of supply. Then he must sift
intelligence, weigh information, divine his adversary's intentions
almost before they are formed, prepare a parry for every blow,
and speed a thrust into any opening joint of his antagonist's
harness. The means of supplying troops ought to be given
ready into the hands of. a general; they should be all arranged
and organised beforehand, so that he has but to see that they
are properly administered and made use of.
* In Fiance, towards the end of the siege of Paris, over Soo^ooa
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 79
The transport which follows a Prussian army in the field,
exclusive of the waggons of each battalion, the artillery and
engineer trains, and the field telegraph divisions, is divided
under two heads, both of which are under the control of the
Intendantur. The first but smaller portion is kept for the use
of the Commissariat branch, and is usually retained solely for
the supply of food to men. The second portion carries the
medicines and hospital necessaries for the sick and wounded,
together with the means of carrying disabled men, food for
horses, stores to supply magazines, and all mathrid except
munitions of war and regimental equipment
The first portion for use of the Commissaxiat branch consists
in the first place of a certain amount of waggons, which are in
time of peace always kept ready in case of war, and imme-
diately on the mobilization of the army are provided with
horses and drivers firom the military train, who are entirely
under the control of the Intendant-GeneraL Each army hais
an army intendant ; each corps has with its head-quarters an
army intendant, and an Intendantur officer is attached to each
division. These officers, with their subalterns and assistants,
form the first links of the chain by which a General draws food
to his troops. The provision columns of each corps d'arm^
which are always retained in peace ready to be mobilized,
consist of five provision columns, each of which has 2 officers,
98 men, 161 horses, and 32 waggons. If the corps d*arm^ is
broken up into divisions, a certain portion of these columns
accompanies each infantry division, the cavalry division, and
the reserve artillery. The 160 waggons which form these
columns carry three days' provisions for every man in the
corps d'arm^ ; as soon as the waggons which cany the first
day's supply are emptied, they are sent off to the magazines in
rear, replenished, and must be up again with the troops to
supply Uie fourth day's food, for in the two days' interval the
other waggons will have been emptied. As it is easier to cany
flour than bread in these waggons, each corps d'arm^ is
accompanied by a field bakery, which consists of i officer and
118 men, 27 horses, and 5 waggons, which are distributed
among the troops as may be most convenient; and as the
horses of both the provision columns and field bakeries have
8o SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III.
very hard work, a dep6t of 86 horses, with 48 spare drivers,
accompanies each corps d'arm^ These provision columns
thus tarry three days' provisions, but in a country where
supplies are not very abundant they can do nothing in the way
of collecting food ; their duty is simply to bring provisions from
the magazines where they are gathered together, and to carry
them to the troops. It is evident, therefore, that as the army
advances these magazines must advance also, and that means
must be provided for keeping the magazines full. The collec-
tion of food in such magazines entails an enormous amount of
transport; this transport is obtained by hiring waggons and
carts at home in the country where the war is being carried on,
or in the countries near it Waggons hired in the country are
also used for carrying forage for the horses of the cavalry and
artillery from the magazines to the front, for the provision
columns only carry food for the men.
When the army of Prince Frederick Charles advanced from
Saxony, it made its first marches as if in a totally desert country
as far as the supply of provisions was concerned, because the
Prussian Generals knew it was quite possible that the Austrians
might, in order to retard their progress, lay waste the country.
Immense magazines were accordingly collected at Gorlitz and
in Saxony, which, as the army advanced, were brought forward
by railway and by long trains of country waggons to places
where they could be conveniently reached by the provision
waggons and forage carts. These magazines were constantly
replenished both by food and forage brought by railway from
the interior of Prussia, or by requisitions levied on Saxony and
Bohemia of food and forage, for which the Commissariat paid
by cheques which the fortune of war afterwards allowed to be
defrayed from the war contributions paid by the Austrian and
Saxon Governments. Had the fate of arms been different, ot
course Saxony and Austria would have provided that these
cheques should be honoured by the Berlin Exchequer. When
it was found that the country was not laid waste, the provision
waggons in some cases were filled in the neighbourhood of the
troops by requisitions, but this was found not to be so good a
plan as to send them back to magazines where the provisions
were collected ready for them, because the time taken up in
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA, 8t
gathering together driblets of food and forage from each village,
and the great distances over which waggons had to move, im-
posed an enormous amount of work on both the men and horses.
Although the requisition system was very useful, it was only
r^arded as 2in auxiliary means of supply, for the armies moved
prepared every day t<J find that the country in front of them
might be devastated, and Prussia and Saxony were always
looked upon as the real sources of supplies; and this was
absolutely necessary, because it would have been impossible to
feed such a laige force as the Prussian armies presented by
requisitions alone, for requisitions cannot conveniently be made
at great distances from the direct line of communications, and
in a very short time the quarter of a million of men who were
in the front lin6 alone would have eat^n up eveiything in the
country around them if they had been dependent on that tract
of coimtry only fo^ supplies. Then, even if the troops could
have got food from more distant places, the villagers and
country people would have starved ; but it is the interest of a
general to make his requisitions so that they do not drive the
inhabitaiits to destitution, for terrible sickness always follows
in the train of want, and, if t)estilence breaks out among the
people of the country, it is certain immediately to appear in
the ranks of the invading army.*
The trains which accompany the medical department of a
corps d'arm^ into the field consist of three heavy hospital
trains, each of which has 14 surgeons, 114 men, 69 horses, and
1 1 waggons, and twelve light divisional hospital trains, each
with 13 surgeons, 74 men, 56 horses, and 11 waggons. Each
light train carries medicines, materials, instruments, and ambu-
lances for 200 sick. Each corps d'arm^e has, besides, three
detachments of sick-bearers, who, on the day of battle, are
divided among the troops ; each battalion has also sixteen men
appointed as assistant sick-bearers, who, with the regular sick-
bearers, carry the wounded to the rear ; no other man is ever
allowed to quit the ranks under fire. When a man is struck, he
is taken immediately a short distance out of fire to where the
* In the campaign in France, the system ot requisitions Was ultimately
abandoned. Stores which were wanted were purchased, and the cost re-
covered by money contributions levied on the occupied towns and districts.
G
$2 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III.
battalion surgeons are waiting ; they hastily bind up his wound,
he is then placed in an ambulance waggon and carried to the
light divisional field hospital, which is kept out of fire about a
couple of miles in the rear, The surgeons here perform any
necessary operation that is absolutely required, but men are
only kept here until a sufficient number arrive to fill a laige
ambulance waggon, which, as soon as filled, is sent off to the
heavy hospital trains which are established in the villages in the
rear. At the beginning of the battle of Sadowa the regimental
surgeons were occupied in every sheltered nook of ground
on the hill of Dub, the divisional hospitals were behind that
hill and in Milowitz, the heavy hospitals were in and about
Horitz. When the Austrians retreated and the Prussian troops
advanced, the divisional hospitals followed \ and, before the
Austrian guns had ceased firing, were established in Sadowa,
Chlum, and Lipa, and all the other villages in the field whither
the indefatigable sick-bearers were rapidly bringing in both
Austrian and Prussian wounded.
When the field army, the depot and garrison troops, and the
provisional and medical department trains have been mobilized,
the Prussian army is fit to take the field. The necessary com-
mandants and staffs of the districts where the dep6t troops are
stationed are composed either of officers detached from the
regular army or of invalid officers. When the army takes the
field, its movements must be directed not only so as to pursue
the original plan of the campaign, but also so as to keep pace
with the tsnem/s combinations, and the movements of its dif-
ferent parts must be guided by orders firom the directing generaL
The above is a sketch of the general system on which the
Prussian army is normally oiganized. How such an army is
worked in the field, how its resources are made available, and
how it achieves the objects for which it has been mobilized,
must depend in a great measure upon the skill of the General
to whose direction it is entrusted. What an army so oiganized
can effect when its motions are guided by a skilful hsmd, the
rapid victories of the late campaign have shown. When the
field army enters on the theatre of war, the organizer and ad-
ministrator has done with it ; his province is then to take care
that its recruits are forthcoming and its supplies are ready
Chap. LJ THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 83
when required. But when an army is handed over to the
general who is to use it, he has a right to expect that when he re-
ceives his divisions he shall also receive the means of manoeuvr-
ing them ; and when he assumes the command of his corps he
shall be provided with every appliance which can help hixh to
move them in the combination and unisoa without which dif-
ferent bodies of troops are not an army, but a series of scattered
detachments, which must be easily defeated in detail, or in
isolation taken prisoners by an 4ctive and energetic enemy.
After the plan of a campaign has been once decided upon, the
means by which a general moves his troops into positions
where they may act most advantageously, and from which they
may strike the heavy blows that will gain a speedy and profit-
able peace — for a peace is the ultimate object of all wars — may
be classed under the heads of Information, Intelligence, and
the Transmission of Orders. Information of the enemy's pre-
parations, of the number of troops be can put into the field, —
how those troops will be armed, organized, and administered, —
should be obtained by the Government of the country to which
the army belongs, and communicated to the general when he
takes the command of the army.
To acquire this information concerning foreign armies during
peace every country in Europe devotes a special department of
its War Office, which is ever busy collecting and compiling sta-
tistics of every foreign army, because, however friendly the
relations of any two countries may be, it can never be known
how long they may remain so. As soon as hostilities are immi-
nent, a War Office has little chance of obtaining much informa-
tion from inside the lines of the probable enemy ; then the
duty of collecting information devolves upon the general him-
self who must, by every means he can avail himself of, dis-
cover, as far as possible, every position and intention of his
adversary's troops. For this purpose, during war, spies are
generally employed. Spies have a dangerous task, and not an
honourable one; consequently, except in very rare and extreme
cases, officers will not accept the invidious duty, and it is often
extremely difficult to find persons who will consent to act as
spies sufficiently conversant with military ra^tters to make their
information worth having. Money is the great means of obtain^
o 2
84 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book III.
ing good spies ; needy adventurers and unscrupulous men wiU,
if well paid, do the work, and, for the sake of a sufficient sum,
run the risk of the certain death which awaits them if dis-
covered in disguise within the hostile outposts. Even if it
were accurately known how the Prussian information was de-
rived from within the Austrian lines during the 1866 campaign,
it would be too delicate a subject to enter upon ; but it may be
stated here, though such a statement is hardly necessary, that
all the absurd rumours circulated at the beginning of the cam-
paign, which implied that Austrian officers were guilty of the
hideous crime of betra)dng the movements of their army to the
enemy, were utterly without foundation, and were cruel libels
against brave men whoj however unfortunate in the result of
the war, won the admiration of every rank in the Prussian
army by their gallantry, chivalrous bearing, and courage, not
only on the field of battle, but in all the trying incidents to
which a disastrous campaign gives rise. It is not proper even
to express a guess as to how information was collected^ but the
Austrians dealt out death with no sparing hand among suspected
persons found within their lines, so probably they had cause to
imagine that there were spies in the midst of their troops.
The information collected from spies is not^ in most cases,
completely trustworthy. In the first place, the men who
undertake this duty are nearly always mercenary wretches^ who
wU sell friend and foe alike as best suits their own interests ;
in the second place^ spies are seldom sufficiently acquainted
with military matters not to exaggerate movements of slight
importance, and miss observing vital combinations. To test
the accuracy of their reports intelligence is collected by means
of reconnoitring officers, who, either alone or attended by a
few troopers, get as close as they can to the enemy's posts ;
observe as far as possible, without the use of disguise and ixi
full uniform, the positions of his troops ; and, when discovered
and pursued by his patrols, fight or ride to bring their intel-
ligence safe home to their own outposts. Intelligence is also
culled by every vedette and every advanced sentinel, but the
reconnoitring officer is the main soiurce. To reconnoitre well
requires not only a brave but a very able officer, with a quick
eye, a ready memory, and a great knowledge of the indications
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA, 85
which tell the presence of hostile troops, and allow an estimate
to be formed of the force in which they are. Two Prussian
officers of the staff of Prince Frederick Charles, the afternoon
before the battle of Koniggratz, boldly approached the
Austrian lines, observed the positions of the Austrian
troops, and, though both pursued and assaulted by cavalry,
got safe home, and brought to their General certain
intelligence which allowed him to frame the combinations
that resulted in the morrow's victory. When the reconnoitring
officer regains the shelter of his own outposts, he must either
personaUy bring or by sonie means send his intelligence as
quickly as possible to head-quarters. The plan usually pursued
m European armies has beep for the officer himself to ride quickly
to his General, and to be the first bearer of his intelligence.
When a General receives intelligence, he has to weigh it,
consider it, and often strike the balance between conflicting
information. He h^s then to move his own divisions in ac-
cordance with his deductions, and must send word to any
cooperating force of what be has heard, and what he is about
to do. Undoubtedly, the quickest way for a reconnoitring
officer to despatch his reports to his General, and for the
General to communicate with his own divisions and with his
colleagues, would be by electric telegraph; but it would be
almost impossible tor a reconnoitring officer to communicate
with head-quarters by electricity. Reconnoitring expeditions
are made qo suddenly and so uncertainly that, quick as the
Prussian field telegraph is laid down, this means of communi-
cation is hardly available with the outposts. Nor is the
electric telegraph easily used to communicate with every
division; it might be so used, but its application would
require a number of extra waggons to be attached to every
division, and would bring a confusing number of lines into the
office of the chief of the staff. During the late campaign
orders were sent to the divisional commanders by mounted
officers, who were attached to head-quarters for this special
purpose. Besides these officers a certain number of picked
troopers are selected from every cavalry regiment, and formed
into a special corps at the beginning of a campaign, and a
certain number attached to every General These troopers
86 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book III.
form the GeneraVs escort, and act as orderlies to cany unim-
portant messages. When an officer is sent with an important
order, one or two of these soldiers are sent with him, in case
of his being attacked to act as a defence as far as possible, to
yield up a horse to him in case of his own breaking down, or, in
case of his being killed, to carry the order themselves to its
destination, or, at any rate, to prevent its falling into the hands
of the enemy if the officer is wounded and likely to be taken.
During the campaign the communications between head*
quarters and divisions were kept up by means of mounted
officers ; but communications between the head-quarters of
each army and the King were maintained by means of the
field-telegraph. For this purpose a field-telegraph division is
attached to the head-quarters of each army. It consists of
three officers, one hundred and thirty-seven men, seventy-
three horses, and ten waggons. Two of the waggons contain
batteries and instruments, and are fitted up as operating
rooms; the other eight waggons each contain the wires and
means of putting them up over five miles of country ; thus
each division can, with its own materials, form telegraphic
communication over forty miles. These forty miles are, how-
ever, seldom all required, for the lines of the communications
of armies usually run along railways, and as far as possible the
permanent wires arc repaired by the men of the division, and
made use of for the telegraphic communication of the army.
Each division carries with it five miles of insulated wire for the
piupose of laying through rivers or lakes if these should come
in the way of the line. The wires are coiled inside each
waggon on rollers, from which they can be uncoiled as the
waggon moves along, or in bad ground the roller can be
transferred to a stretcher, which is carried between two men.
The poles are exceedingly light, and about ten feet high, so
that where the wire crosses roads it may pass clear over the
heads of mounted men. As it is equally culpable in war to
prevent communication by unfair means within the lines of an
army as it is to seek to obtain the same in disguise between
the enemy's sentries, any enemy not in uniform, or any one in
the enemy's pay who is detected cutting the telegraph wire, is
regarded as a spy, and treated accordingly.
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTit OF PRUSSIA.
8?
During the war of 1866 this organization had not been
entirely introduced into the Prussian army, and the arrange-
ments for the prosecution of the war consequently slightly
differed from those which would have been made if time had
allowed the regulated organization to have been thoroughly
introduced into the service.
It may be convenient to subjoin here a summary statement,
compiled carefully from the best authorities, of the organization
and strength of the Prussian army, which was employed for the
various purposes of the war.
Every Prussian who was twenty years old entered the army
as a soldier without distinction of rank or wealth. Time of
service was with the colours three years, in the reserve five
yearSy and in the Landwehr eleven years.
I.— INFANTRY.
a. GUAiux — 4 Regiments of Foot Guards
of three battalions each
4 Redments of Grenadiers of
the Guard . .
I Regiment of Fusiliers
s 12 batts* « 12,024 men
12
3
= 12,024 „
« 3,006 „
9 Regiments of the Guard « 27 batts. s 27,054 men
b. Li NE. —52 Regiments of Infantry ( 1 3—
32 and 41—72) of three
battalions, each . .
12 Regiments of Grenadiers
(I— 12). . . .
8 Regiments of Fusiliers
(33— 40)
72 Regiments of the Line . .
c Riflemen and Light Troops—
I Batt. of J^ers of the
Guard ....
I Batt. Schiitzen . . .
^ i» Jogc^ of the Line
156 batts. »> 156,312 men
36 „ = 36,072 „
24 „ = 24,048 „
216 battsi s 216,432 men
^ I batt. = 1,002 men
= 1 „ = 1,002 „
— 8 „ = 8,016 ,,
10
9»
of Riflemen
10
»»
= 10,020 men
The total Infantry
253 batts. = 253,506 men
The armament of the Infantry regiments was the needle-gun
with the ordinary bayonet ; that of the Fusilier regiments the
fusilier musket, whidi only differed from tiie ordinary needle-
88 SEVEN' WEEKS' WAR, [BookHL
gun in being rather shorter and lighter ; that of the Jagers the
needle-rifle with sword-bayonet
2.— CAVALRY.
a. Guard — l Regiment of Garde du
Corps of four squad^
Tons . . . . = 4 squad, » 6oo horsemen
1 Regiment of Cuins-
siers . . . . ss 4 ,, si 600
3 Regiments of Uhlans = 12 „ = 1,800
2 Regiments of Dragoons = 8 „ =« 1,200
I Regiment of Hussars . » 4 „ ■» 600
9f
»f
»f
It
f>
3 Re|;i|nents pf Cayalry
ofthe Guard . . = 32 squad. ■■ 4,800 hoxsemen
b. Line. — 8 R^ments of Cuirassiers » 32 squad. = 4«8oo horsemen
12 Regiments of Uhlans . » 48 „ = 7) 200
12 Regiments of Hussars
(of which eight had 4
squadrons, and four
hads . . . = 52 „ = 7f8oo
8 Regiments of Dragoons
(of which four had 4,
and four had 5 squa«
drons) . . = 36 „ « 5,400
»»
9»
40 Regiments of Cavalry of
the Line . . . b 168 squad. = 25,200 horsemen
Total of Cavalry . . = 200 squad. = 30,000 horsemen
The armament of the Cuirassier I'egiments was cuirass,
helmet, sabre, and pistol ; that of Uhlans, lance, sword, and
pistol ; of Dragoons and Hussars, sword and needle-carbine.
Cuirassiers and Uhlans were heavy, Dragoons and Hussars
light cavalry. The horses were all of Prussian breed, mostly
from good English sires and grandsires.
3.— ARTILLERY.
I. — I Brigade of Artillery ofthe Guard, three divisions of
field batteries, of which each consists of four
batteries of 6 guns* . . . . . » 72 guns
I Division of Horse Artillery of the Guard, consisting
of six batteries of 4 guns each . , . . s= 24 „
Total Field Artillery of the Guard . , , = 96 guns
^ Of these 4 batteries were armed with the rifled 6-pounder gun.
4 f| f» >f 4 »t
4 y, „ smooth 12 „
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA.
89
Brigades of Artillery of the Line = 144 batteries . =
Total of Field Artillery 162 batteries . . «
a Divisions of Garrison Artillery called out =18
batteries
4.— SPECIAL TROOPS.
I Battalion of Pioneers of the Guard .
8 }y ,• Line
19
9 Battalions of Pioneers "> 36 companies . . .
5.— MILITARY TRAIN.
I Battalion of Military Train of the Guard of two
companies
8 Battalions of Military Train of the Line ,
768 guns
864 guns
96 „
1,002 men
8,016 „
9,018 men
1,226 men
9.808 „
Total Military Train
11,034 men
DEPOT TROOPS.
Each regiment of Infantry on being mobilized formed a
dep6t battalion, each regiment of Cavalry a depot squadron,
each Jager battalion a depot company, each brigade of Ar-
tillery a depot division, each battalion of Pioneers a depot
company : —
81 depdt battalions of Infantry .
10 ,, companies of Jageis.
48 ,, s(^uadrons ....
9 „ divisions of Artillery (228 guns)
9 „ companies of pioneers .
Total of Dep6t troops .
81,162 men
2,500 „
7.200 „
7,400 „
2,250 „
= 100,512 men
Thus the strength of the Prussian regular army at the com-
mencement of the campaign was —
Infantry ....
Cavalry
Artillery . . . ,
Pioneers
Train . . .
Non-combatants with negi
ments, &c.
Dep6t troops .
Officers ....
253.504 men
30,000 „
35f'>oo „ with 864 guns
9,018 „
11,034 n
18,000 „
100,512 „ with 228 guns
13,000 „
Total about 473,600 men, witli 100,000 horses and 1,092 guns.
90 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book III.
The Landwehr, the first levy of which formed the troops
of reserve supports, and for garrison duties in support of the
regular army, and consisted of men between twenty-eight and
thirty-two years of age, was organized as follows : —
Infantry. — ^4 Regiments of Landwehr of ^
the Guard, each of three
battalions . . .
32 Regiments of Landwehr S Ii6batt = 118,900 men
battalions, each of three [
and eight independent
battalions . . . /
At first the majority of the battalions were formed 500
strong, and at a later period raised only to the strength of 800
men by calling up some of the second levy of the Landwehr,
so that the actual strength of the Landwehr did not reach
118,900 men. Of these one hundred and sixteen battalions,
twenty-four were amalgamated together in the first reserve
corps d'arm^e ; the remainder were used as garrisons for for-
tresses and for the maintenance of occupied territories.
The Cavalry of the first levy of the Landwehr consisted of
twelve regiments : —
I Heavy Cavalry Regiment of 4
squadrons = 4 squad. = 600 horsemen
5 Regiments of Uhlans . . . = 20 „ s= 3,000
I Regiment of Dragoons . . . = 4 „ = 600
5 Regiments of Hussars . . . = 20 „ s 3,000
7,200
During the course of the war seven more regi-
ments of four squadrons each were formed = 4,200
Total Landwehr Cavaliy . . =11,400
99
ft
The remainder of the Landivehr of the second levy, after
the battalions above mentioned had been filled up to war
strength, was only called out in special cases, and by par-
ticular orders. The men were then either sent to increase the
strength of the battalions under arms, or could be formed in
independent regiments, which could consist of one hundred
and sixteen battalions of Infantry, and one hundred and forty-
four squadrons of Cavalry.
The regiment of Infantry consisted of three battalions, each
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA, 91
of four companies. Each company consisted of two divisions.
The formation for parade was in three ranks; in action the
third rank men of die whole battalion acted as skirmishers, or
three of each company formed a third two-rank deep division
of the company.
Each squadron of Cavalry was formed of four divisions;
the formation was always in double rank.
The Prussian fleet, which till within the last few years has
never aspired to any very distinguished place amongst those of
the great maritime Powers, consisted at the beginning of the
war of eight screw corvettes, namely —
The Arcona
. 28
guns, 400 he
►rse-p
Gazelle .
. . 28
„ 400
Vincta
. . 28
M 400
Nymph .
. . 17
„ 200
Augusta
. 14
** 400
Victoria
. . 14
„ 400
Hertha
. 28
„ 400
Medusa
. . 17
» 200
of also eight gunboats of the flrst-class, each of which had
three guns, and was of 80 horse-power ; of fifteen gunboats of
the second class, each of which mounted two guns, and
was of 60 horse-power j of also four steam despatch-boats,
namely —
The Eagle ... 4 guns, 300 horse-power
Loreley . . . . 2 „ 120 „
Grief . . . . 2 „ p „
Grille . . . . 2 .. 160
»» **~ >»
of also two paddl&-wheel steamers —
Arminius ... 4 guns, 300 hone-power
Cheops • . • • 3 f» 3^^ »i
Thus the whole steam-fleet mustered altogether only 245
guns.
Of sailing-vessels Prussia possessed the frigates Gepin^ 48
guns ; Thetis, 36 ; and the Niobe^ 26 : the brigs J^ovcTj 16
guns; Mosquito, 16; Hela, 6: the schooners litis and
Leopard^ and the guard-ship Barharossa^ of 9 guns, as well
92 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [BookIIL
as thirty-four sloops of 2 guns each, and four yawls of i gun
each.
The persmnd of the fleet was formed of a ship's comple-
ment division of 1,882 men, among whom are included
officers, officials, and boys; of a dockyard division of 589
men; and of the marines (infantry and artilleiy), who num-
bered 952 men.
CHAPTER II.
THE WAR STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA.
Since its last war the Government of Austria has decided
upon a total re-organization of its army. It is therefore only
necessary here to show as briefly as possible the organization
of the Austrian army as it existed at the beginning of the
campaign, more with a view to deduce therefrom the actual
number engaged, than to take any special notice of a system
which the most bitter experience has proved to be grievously
faulty.*
The Ebipirfe of Austria had at the beginning of the war an
area of Hbout 294,000 square miles, and a population of about
35,000,000 inhabitants, of many nationalities, such as German,
Slave, Magyar, and Czech. Its annual receipts amounted to
48,850,000/., its annual expenditure to almost 52,100,000/., so
that every year there was a considerable deficit. To the
army and navy 11,700,000/. were annually devoted. The
national debt amounted in April 1864 to 309,600,000/, and
must since that time have increased by at least 20,000,000/.
The Austrian army consisted of —
80 In&ntry regiments of the Line (i — 80)
I Imperial lament
32 Battalions of Feldjagers (i — 32) .
14 Border Infantry regiments I — 14) .
(Grenz Infantene-regimenter)
I Border Infantry battalion (Titler) .
^ Infantry^
ija.
* The new organization of the Austrian army since 1866, has been
shown in some able letters which have appeared at intervals in the Times
cidring Uie last three years.
94
SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.
[Book III.
12 Cuirass regiments (i — 12) .
2 Regiments of Dragoons (i — 2^
14 Regiments of Hussars (i— 14)
13 Regiments of Ubians (i — 13)
12 Regiments of Artillery (i — 12)
1 Regiment of Coast Artillery .
2 Regiments of Engineers
6 Battalions of Pioneers .
10 Sanitary companies .
48 Transport squadrons
Besides other Administration troops
and departments.
10 Regiments of Gens-d'armes
A military police corps .
The Tyrolean Provincial corps
Againsal Provincial Rifle battalions
Volunteer Companies of Sharp
shooters iind Landsturm .
Cavalry.
Artillery.
Special Troop?.
Troops of
Admlnistratioxu
Troops for Pro-
vincial Defence.
Each regiment of Infantry of the Line consisted in peace of
four battalions and a depot The fourth battalion to which
the depot Was attached remained in peace ii) the district to
which the regiment belonged, and served as a depot battalion,
while the three first battalions were, as a rule, quartered in a
totally dijSerent province than that from which their recruits
were drawn. In time of war the depot was formed into a
depot division, and the fourth battaUon was sent into some
fortress as a garrison battalion, while the three first battalions
were sent ioto the field to join the army of manoeuvre.
E)ach battalion mustered, or ought to have mustered, in war,
1,018 combatants, divided among six companies. Every two
companies formed the so-called division : each company con-
sisted of two sub-divisions.
The Imperial regiment of Jagers had in war six battalions
and one depdt battalion. Each battalion mustered in six
companies 1,011 combatants, as did also each battalion of
Feldjagers.
The whole of the duty of the Military Borderers was
divided into three portions. The first levy formed the regular
border infantry regiments and the Titler battalion : the second,
the armed population, was only formed for service in its
Chap. IL] THE WAR STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA. 95
own particular province, and consisted of^ in all, 22,000
men. The third levy was only specially called upon in
cases of uigent necessity, and formed a force of about 28,000
men.
In war, each regiment of the Military Borderers of the first
l^vy consisted of three battalions, each of six companies. The
first eight regiments formed, at the outbreak of a war, one
battalion of four companies as a depot ; three others formed
an independent division for the same purpose. Of these
eleven regiments three battalions could be put into the field in
war; of the remaining three of the fourteen border regi-
ments two battalions could only be put in the field; the
Titler battalion sent one battalion into the field, so that
forty battalions of Military Borderers were with the field
army.
For the defence of fortresses there were left, after the army
of operation took the field, eighty-four battalions of infantry
r^ments, and eleven Border battalions, in all about 100,000
men.
The Tyrolean Provincial corps, as well as the Border troops
which did not join the army, were retained iq their own par*
ticular provinces.
The principal weapon of the Infantry of the Line and of
the Border regiments was a rifled musket on Lorenz's system,
with a bayonet The Jagers had a rather shorter musket, the
rifling of which had a slightly sharper twist than that of the
Line.
Cavalry, — The cuirass r^ments, which were originally
Cuirassiers, but had previously to the war of 1866 laid aside
the cuirass, formed the whole of the heavy cavalry. Each
cuirass regiment, with the exception of the eighth, the old
Dampier Cuirassiers (which, on account of privilege derived
as early as 16 19, had never been reduced, and still contained
six squadrons), consisted of five squadrons. Every light
cavalry regiment consisted of six squadrons. At the out-
break of the war each regiment of cavalry left one of its squad-
rons as a depot squadron at home. The squadron contained
one hundred and forty-nine mounted men. The whole cavalry
mustered 29,000 sabres.
96 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book III.
Artillery. — The field artillery consisted of twelve regiments,
of which nme were formed to accompany the corps d'annee
of infantry ; the remaining three were intended to form the
army artillery of reserve, and to be attached to the cavaliy
of reserve.
The regiment of cOast-artillery was divided into four bat-
talions, of which the first and second battalion had in war
each five active companies, two mountain batteries of eight
guns, and one dep6t company. The! third and fourth
battalions each had six active companies and one depot
company.
The heavy batteries of the field artillery were armed with
muzzle-loading rifled 8-pounder guns ; the light with muzzle-
loading rifled 4-pounder guns; the mountain batteries with
rifled 3-pounders. Garrison artillery of the latest pattem con-
sisted of rifled breach-loading guns, 6-, 12-, 24-, and 48-poun-
ders; but there are still many smooth-bored guns and howitzers
in the armaments of the fortresses.
An Austrian corps d*arm^e, as a rule, consisted of four
brigades of infantry, foiu- squadrons of cavalry (one attached
to each infantry brigade), four 4-pounder field batteries (one
attached to each infantry brigade), a reserve artillery, two com-
panies of engineers, and two companies of pioneers, with four
bridge-trains, besides administrative services. To an army
which would be formed by the amalgamation of several of
these corps d*arm^e, would be attached several brigades of
light cavalry, each of which consisted of two regiments;
therefore ten squadrons, and one 4-pounder battery of horse-
^tillery, some divisions of reserve cavalry, an army reserve of
artillery, a reserve of engineers, and all necessary adminis-
trative services.
Recruiting, — In each year in Austria from Sojooo to
85,000 recruits were called into the army. The time of
service was ten years, of which the last two were spent in
the reserve.
In the Infantry the recruit was kept from one to three
years with the colours, in the Cavalry seven or eight years,
in the Engineers and Artillery three years : he was, after his
period of actual presence with his corps expired, dismissed
Chap. II.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA. 97
to his home on furlough, and called out annually for military
exercise till he had accomplished eight years' service, when he
was transferred to the reserve.
In case of war the men on furlough were called in to fill up
the ranks of the army of operation, the men of the reserve to
join the dep6t and garrison corps.
The tactical unit in the Inifantry was the division of two
companies, in the Cavalry the squadron, in the Artillery the
battery of eight guns. It was laid down as a rule by the Aus-
trian regulations, that in action every division of troops was to
retain a dependent reserve.
The Austrian aimy was divided according to nationalities,
thus —
German. Poles. Hungarian. Italian. Siebenbtlrger. Borderers. Mixed.
Infantry. 23 regts. 13 23 7 7 7
Jagers . 27 batts. 4322 —
Cavalry. 12 regts. 13 11 — i 3 i
Artilleiy — regts. i — — — — X2
Subjoined is a summary, calculated from the best available
authorities, of the Austrian troops available for the army of
operation at the commencement of the war : —
I,— INFANTRY.
a. Line. — So Regiments of three battalions of three companies.
Peace Strength. War Strength.
I Battalion = 470 = 1,018
80 Regiments = 240 batts. = 244,480 combatants
b. Jagers. — One Imperial Jager regiment of six battalions of six com-
panies, and thirty-two Feldjager battalions of six companies.
I Battalion = 627 = i,oii combatants
38 Battalions = 3^,420 „
e, BORDE&ERS. -—Eleven Regiments of three battalions, three of two batta«
lions, and one independent battalion.
I Battalion = 956 combatants
40 Battalions =3 38,240 „
2.— CAVALRY.
13 Cuirass regiments of four squadrons . . ^ 7»i42
I extra squadron . . . «b 149
2 Regiments of Dragoons of nve squadrons , a i»490
14 „ Hussars of five squadrons . . a I0»430
13 ,, Uhlans of five squadrons of 114
horsemen . , . .&■ 7,410
26,621
K
98 SEVEN WEEKS' W4R, [Book IIL
3.— ARTILLERY.
Twelve regiments of Artillery and one regiment of coast
artillery. Of these twelve regiments, the nine which accom-
panied the corps d*arm^ of Infantry each consisted of —
6 4-pounder field*batteries of four and eight guns . = 40 guns *
2 8-pounder field-batteries of eight g^uns . . . = 16 „
2 4-pounder horse artillery batteries of eight guns . ■» 16 „
I rocket battery of eight guns t < . . . » 8 „
\ t^ I «""p»^« - « ..
I Regiment « 12 batteries . i < = 88
9 Regiments ^ 108 batteries . . ta 792
>9
The three regiments which were attached to the reserve and
cavalry divisions consisted of —
4 8-pounder field-batteries of eight guns , . . == 32 guns
5 4-pounder horse artillery batteries (one of four, foui'
of eight guns) » 40 „
I park I
4 ibrtress (
companies .<.... s= 4
»•
I Regiment « 10 batteries , . . = 76 ,,
3 Regiments » 30 batteries . . « 228 „
I regiment of coast artillery = 2 batteries of eight
guns - 16 „
Total number of guns . . . 1,036
4.— SPECIAL TROOPS.
2 Regiments of Engineers . . . = 6,172 men
6 Battalions of Pioneers . . . . s 5,022 „
Total strength of available combatants in the army of opera-
tion:—
Infantry . . . « . 321,140
Cavalry 26,621 -
Artillery . . . « . 24,601, with I}036 guns
Special troops • • < « 1 1, 194
383.556, with 1,036 guns
• • -• -
* Two 4-pounder field batteries have in peace only four guns, which in
war are combined into one battery of eight guns.
Chap. II.] THE WAR STRENGTH OP At/STRtA. 99
Austrian Navy, — ^Austria had don^ more for her naVy within
the few years which immediately preceded the war, than would
have been anticipated from the small extent of her sea-coast,
and her little interest in European commerce. The Austrian
navy mustered twenty-eight screw-vessels, namely —
1 line-of-batUe ship,
5 frigates,
7 armour-plated frigates,
2 torvettes^
7 second-class gunboats,
3 third-class gunboats^
3 schooners,
12 paddle-wheel steamers,
besides sixteen sailing-vessels, of which two were frigates, three
corvettes, three brigs. The above formed the Austrian fleet of
seagoing vessels ; but for the navigation of interior waters, and
for the defence of the coast, there were ten screw-steamers,
sixteen paddle-wheel steamers, and thirty-five guardships.
The steam fleet of seagoing ships numbered forty vessels,
which carried 651 guns, amounted to 11,475 horse-power, and
were manned by 7,772 men.
The sailing fleet of seagoing vessels, which was only practi-
cally valuable for purposes of transport, consisted of eighteen
vessels, with 225 guns, and 1,804 men.
The twenty-six vessels on the inner waters had together 72
guns, 1,511 horse-pOwer, and 961 sailors; while the thirty-five
guardships mounted 115 guns, and bore 1,060 sailors.
R 2
CHAPTER III.
WAR STRENGTH OF THE REMAINING STATES OF GERMANY.
Bavaria. — Population, 4,700,000; area, 34,750 square miles ;
revenue, 4,700,000/. ; national debt, 34,300,000/. In Bavaria
the time of military service was six years. It was allowed to
find substitutes for military service. The time of actual pre-
sence with the colours is twelve months in the first year, eight
in the second, three in the third, and fourteen days in the
fourth. Except for this time, the soldier was sent home on
furlough.*
The army consisted of— «
INFANTRY.
16 Regiments of three battalions of six companies,
I battalion » i»950 men
8 Battalions of Jagers » 668 „
Total . . 50,768 men
armed with Podewil*s muskets and sword-bayonetf
CAVALRY.
3 Regiments of Cairassiers )
6 Regiments of Light horse > I regt. of 4 squadrons = 591 horsemen
3 Regiments of Vblans )
12 Regiments . . ^ 7,620 horsemen
Cuirassiers armed with iron cuirass and helmet, straight sword,
and pistol; the other regiments with bent sabre and pistol;
Uhlans with lances.
* This organization was modified af^er the war of 1866, and will ptx>-
bably be even more modified in consequence of that of 1870 — 71.
t In 1870, partly armed with the Werder rifle.
Chap. III.] HTAJ^ STRENGTH OF REMAINING STATES, lol
ARTILLERY.
Four Regiments, of which —
Na I. and II. each 2 6-pounder batteries of 4 guns = 16 guAs
3 12- pounder batteries of 4 guns » 24
III. Horse Artillery, with 4 12- pounder batteries
of 6 guns =24
IV. 2 6-poiinder batteries of eight guns . . = 16 „
2 1 2-pounder batteries of eight guns . . . = 16 „
ft
>t
Total 96
»
The 6-pounders were rifled on the Prussian system j the 12-
pounders were smooth-bore.
Mngimtrs,-^ On^ regiment of eight companies, 1,380 men.
The army had divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions.
Tactical units were the company in two ranks, the squadron,
and the battery. The formation for battle of the Bavarian in-
fantry battalion was four Fusilier companies in line, and the
two light companies in column in rear of the wings.
Saxony, — Area, 6,775 square miles; population, 2,225,000;
revenue, 2,100,000/. ; debt, 9,600,000/. The time of service
in Saxony was six years in the Line and two years in the
reserve.
INFANTRY.
16 Battalions of four companies, i battalion ^ 9S3 men
4Battalionsof Jagersof 4CompanieS) I bat. = 999 .^
Total . . 19,752 men
axmed with Podewil's muskets and sword-bayonet
CAVALRY.
Total . . 3,217 men.
ARTILLERY.
I Regiment of field-batteries, with 22 6-pounder
rifled guns . . . . . . • s 22 guns
6 rifled 1 2-pounder batteries . . . . = 36 „
I Horse Artillery regiment of 2 batteries of 6 guns = 12 „
Total . . . . 70 f,
SPECIAL TROOPS.
One company of Engineers and two of Pioneers.
j^
102 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IIL
The army was divided into two divisions, each of which had
two brigades. One brigade consisted of two regiments and
one battalion of Jagers. Besides these divisions, there was a
cavahy division of two brigades, each of two regiments, and
a corps of artillery ; the infantry fought in three ranks, with
a reserve formation out of the third rank in rear of the
wings.
Hesse-Cassd. — ^Area, 4,350 square miles; population, 740,000;
revenue, 500,000/. ; debt, 1,400,000/.
Military service was universal, and for a period of ten years,
of which five years w^re spent in the Line and first levy of
reserve, five in the second levy. The time of actual pre-
sence with the ptandayds varied firom twenty-one to thirty-four
months.
INFANTRY.
2 Brigades of 2 regiments of 2 batts. of 4 companies =& 879 men
I Jager battalion ....... s 619 „
I Scntitzen . . . . . . . . ss 387 „
Total . 8,61^ men '
armed with the Prussian needle-gun.
CAVALRY.
Garde da corps (sword and pistol) . . ^ 264 horsemen
2 Regiments of Hussars (sword and carbine) = 521 „
Total . . i>3o6 horsemen
ARTILLERY.
I rifled 6-potmder battery . 6 guns
I smooth 6'pounder battery . 6 „
\ smooth i2-pounder battery . 4 „
I Horse Artillery 6-poander • 6 ,,
TotM - . • 92) „
ENGINEERS.
I company of Pioneers.
Hanover. — ^Area, 17,450 square miles; population, 1,890,000;
incoTQe, 3,750,000/.; debt, 7,200,000/.
Chap. III.] IVAX STRENGTH OF REMAINING STATES. 103
Recndting conducted by conscription : time of service seven
years, in the cavalry ten years.
INFANTRY.
Two divisions, esch of two brigades, each of two regiments and one
light battalion » 8 regiments, and four light battalions ■■ 18,000 men.
CAVALRY.
2 Cuirassier regiments . . = 1,000 horsemen
4 Dragoon „ . , , = 1,000 „
2 Hussar „ , . = 1,000 „
Total . . . 3,000 9,
ARTILLERY— so guns.
Wurtemburg, — ^Area, 8,875 sq. miles; population, 1,720,000;
revenue, 1,500,000/. ; debt, 7,500,000/.
The contingent of Wiirtemburg formed the first division of
the eighth corps of the Germanic Confederation.
Recruitmg conducted by conscription, but substitutes allowed^
Time of service twelve years, six of which were passed in the
Line, six in the Landwehr. Time of actual presence with the
standards about eighteen months.
INFANTRY.
I DiTision of 2 brigades of 4 regiments, each
of 2 battalions (4 companies)
16 Battalions (i battalion ■» 851 men) . . . a ][3,6i6 i^eji
2 Battalions of Jagen (i battalion ■- 849 men) » i>698 „
-r-r
Total 15,314
armed with Fodewil's musket
CAVALRY.
I Brigade of 4 regiments, each in 4 squadroqs
I Regiment i- 714 to 880 horsemen
To\2l . . . 3,271
of which one regiment acts as a d^pgt
104 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book II L
ARTILLERY.
!2 Horse Artillery 4-pounder batteries of 8 guns = i6 guns
2 light field 6-pounder batteries of 8 guns = i6
2 heavy field i2-pounder batteries of 6 guns s= 12
3 siege batteries
99
»>
Total 44
ENGINEERS.
210 men on a war footing.
Baden, — ^Area, 6,950 square miles j population, 1,400,000;
revenue, 1,700,000/. ; debt, 10,800,000/.
The contingent formed the second division of the eighth
corps of the army of the Gennanic Confederation.
INFANTRY.
5 Regiments of two battalions \
2 Fusilier Battalions. . • r ~ IO>745 ™^i^
I Battalion of Jagers • . )
armed with Podewil's musket
CAVALRY.
3 Regiments of Dragoons, each of 4 squadrons « 2, lOO horsemen.
ARTILLERY— 38 guns.
Hesse-Darmstadt, — Area, 3,800 square miles; population,
860,000 ; revenue, 950,000/. ; debt, 2,000,000/.
The army of Hesse-Darmstadt formed the third division of
the eighth corps of the Germanic Confederation.
INFANTRY.
Two brigades, each of two regiments, each of two battalions, each in five
companies.
8 Battalions (i battalion = 831 men) . . = 6,648 men
I Battalion of Jagers ■- 594 »•
Total 7»a4a „
armed with Podewil's musket
Chap. III.] WAJ^ STRENGTH OF REMAlNfNG STA TES, xo«;
CAVALRY.
I Brigade of 2 r^ments.
I Regiment = 648 horsemen.
Total . . 1,296 horsemen.
ARTILLERY.
I Horse Artillery battery, with four smooth and
2 rifled 6-pounder guns . . . . = 6 guns
3 Field-batteries of 6 guns = 18 „
(One 12 -pounder battery, one rifled 6 -pair
one smooth 6-pounder battery) ... —
Total 24 „
ENGINEERS— I company.
Nassau* — Area, 2,137 square miles; population, 460,000
inhabitants.
INFANTRY.
I Brigade of 2 regiments, each of 2 battalions.
I Battalion ^ i>033 °^cu.
4 Battalions . . . • . . = 4, 132 men
I Battalion of Jagers — S09
Total 4,941
t)
»
ARTILLERY.
I rifled 6-pounder battery of 8 guns . . . s 8 guns
I smooth-bore battery a 8 „
Total 16
•f
The contingents of the other minor states are so small that
it would be tedious to enter into their composition in detail.
The military of those which voted for the Austrian motion on
the 14th June in the Diet were : —
Saxe-Meiningen .... 2,000 men
Reusz Grez 400 „
Frankfort-on-Maine . . . 1,000 „
Total • • • • . 3,400
*f
io6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III.
Of those which voted against the Austrian motion : —
The Saxon Duchies . • . . 7,500 men
Mecklenburg 7f500 „
Oldenburg 3,SOO f»
Lubeck, Bremen, Hamburg . . 3,600 „
Anhalt 2,000 „
ThetwoLippes 1,200 „
Waldech 800 „
Reusz-Schleiz 700 „
The two Schwarzbuigs . . . . 1,800 „
Total 28,600
>t
Brunswick, Lembuig, and Luxembourg also voted against
Austria, but the two former put no contingents in the field ;
the contingent of the last took so much time in its mobiliza-
tion that it was not ready for employment imtil very nearly the
conclusion of peace.
CHAPTER IV.
WAR STRENGTH OP THE KINGDOM OF ITALY.*
The kingdom of Italy, had with an area of 116,750 square
miles a population of about 21,775,000 inhabitants. Since the
formation of this monarchy, in i860, its finances had never
been in anything but the most unsatisfactory condition.
Large armies and fleets had been maintained at a ruinous
expense, and have both proved their incapacity to accomplish
the purposes for which they were intended ; large numbers of
useless officials, who did no public work worthy of the name,
and served as impediments more than as facilities to the
transaction of business, were suffered to live idly on the
resources of the State. In the year 1864 the revenue of the
country amounted to 27,000,000/., the expenditure of the
Government to nearly 37,000,000/., and since that year this
annual deficit had remained about constant
In the year 1864 9,280,000/. were spent upon the army, and
2,500,000/. upon the navy.
The Italian army, according to the latest organization
previous to 1866, consisted of: —
INFANTRY.
8 Regiments of Grenadiers (Nos. I — 8).
72 Regiments of Infantrv of the Line (Nos. I — 72)^
5 Regiments of Bersagueri (Nos. I — 5).
The regiments of Grenadiers and of the Line differed only
in some slight details of clothing from each other. A regiment
* The kingdom of Italy is at present engaged in the reorganization of its
military forces, so that this chapter must be regarded solely as a record of
the past.
io» SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III.
of either consisted of the regimental staflf, four battalions, and
a dep6t.*
Each battalion consisted of four companies, and each on a
war footing mustered four officers and 149 men. Thyis the
effective strength of each regiment amounted to, with the staff,
81 officers and 2,453 men, or altogether 2,534 men; and the
eighty regiments of Grenadiets and of the Line amounted in all
to 202,720 combatants.
The depots remained at home to find and drill recruits, and
then forward them to the troops in the field. Each depot
consisted of 14 officers and 61 men.
Every regiment of Bersaglieri consisted of a staff, eight field
battalions, each of four companies and a dep6t division. The
companies of the Bersaglieri were of the same strength as
those of the Line. Thus the effective strength for war of each
regiment of Bersaglieri amounted to 152 officers and 4,872
men, or altogether to 5,024 men. The five regiments there-
fore would afford 25,120 combatants.
The Bersaglieri were armed with short rifles and sword
bayonets: the rest of the infantry with Minid rifles and
ordinary bayonets,
CAVALRY.
4- Regiments of Cavalry of the Line (heavy).
7 Regiments of Lancers.
7 Regiments of Light horse.
I Regiment of Guides.
With the exception of the regiment of Guides, all the
regiments of Cavalry had six field squadrons and a depot
squadron.
Each squadron on a war footing mustered 5 officers, 145
men, 112 horses. The regimental staff consisted of 11
officers, 7 men, and 18 horses. The regiment therefore
numbered 41 officers, 877 men, and 738 horses. A regiment
might accordingly be considered to bring about 700 sabres
into the field.
This would give for the effective force on a war footing of
the eighteen regiments (exclusive of the Guides) 12,600 sabres.
* According to the organization of 1865.
Chap. IV.] WAJ^ STRENGTH OF ITALY. 109
The dep6t of a regiment consisted of 14 officers and 59 men.
The regiment of Guides, which was chiefly intended to furnish
orderlies for general officers, consisted of seven squadrons, and
had altogether 60 officers, 1,074 ™en, and 858 horses. The
heavy Cavalry as well as the Lancers carried the lance,
ARTILLERY.
I Regiment of Pontoniers, who, in the Italian service as in the
French, are included among the Artillery.
3 Regiments of Garrison Artillery, Nos. 2, 3, 4.
I Regiments of Field Artillery, Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.
6 Companies of Artificers.
The regiment of Pontoniers had nine companies on a war
footing; each regiment of Field Artillery had sixteen field-
batteries and two depot batteries ; each regiment of Garrison
Artillery had sixteen companies and two depot companies.
Two batteries of the fifth regiment were Horse Artillery
batteries. Except these, the Italian army possessed no horse
artillery. From the five field regiments there could be placed
in the field eighty field-batteries, each of six guns, forming a
total artillery force of four hundred and eighty guns.
These guns were all rifled, and were divided into batteries
of 8-pounders or i6-pounders.
ENGINEERS,
Two regiments of Sappers. Each regiment on a war foot-
ing had eighteen field companies and two depot companies.
MILITARY TRAIN.
Three regiments. Each regiment had on a war footing
eight companies and one depot company. Each of the field
companies mustered 8 officers, 330 men, and 420 horses.
ADMINISTRATIVE TROOPS
were divided into seven companies, which contained all the
hospital attendants and commissariat soldiers.
no SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III.
The total strength of the Italian army in the field was
thus : —
Infantry 202,720
Bersaglieri 25,120, with 4S0 guns
Cavalry ...... 13,000
Organization, — In time of war the army was divided into
divisions. Each division consisted as a general rule, of: —
2 Brigades of Infantry, each of two regiments ;
2 Battalions of Bersaglieri ;
I Regiment of Light Cavalry ;
3 Batteries of Artillery (two 8-pomider batteries &nd one
1 6-pounder battery) ;
I Company of Sappers.
Such a division would quite bring into the field a force of
10,000 Infantry and 700 Cavalry, with 18 guns.
Several such divisions, generally three or four, were amal-
gamated into a corps d'armtfe, for which a special reserve was
then formed. This reserve consisted of one battalion of
Bersaglieri, four squadrons of Cavalry, and a 1 6-pounder
battery for each division, which were deducted firom the
strength of the division. A company of Sappers, and a com-
pany of Pioneers with a bridge train to throw a bridge over
three hundred yards, was added to a corps d'armtfe.
An army was formed by the conjunction of several corps
d'arm^e, and had an additional force of reserve Artillery and
Engineers, with a pontoon train capable of constructing a
bridge six hundred yards long. A division of reserve Cavalry
was formed out of the four Heavy Cavalry regiments, which
were divided into two brigades, and of the two Horse
Artillery batteries of the service.
Recruiting, — The recruiting of the" Italian army was con-
ducted by conscription ; substitutes were, however, allowed
About 50,000 recruits were levied annually before the war.
These were divided into two portions proportionately to the
vacancies in the ranks. The recruits of the first portion
served for eleven years, of which the first five were spent
under the standards \ those of the second portion were called
out and then dismissed, but were liable to military service for
a period of five years.
Chap. IV.] fVAJi STRENGTH OF ITALY, in
Besides the regular army, a National Guard existed in Italy.
This was of the character of a burgher guard, and existed for
the most part only upon paper. It was intended, however,
after 1866, to form, in case of war, a mobilized National
Guard of 220 battalions, mustering about 110,000 men, to act
as garrison troops.
There existed also a corps of Carabineers who did the duty
of a gendarmerie, and numbered over 20,000 men, but these
would rarely be ever available against an external enemy, as to
them were entrusted all the police duties of the Peninsula.
At the beginning of the war the Italian forces were
strengthened by the formation of volunteer corps to serve
under General Garibaldi ; of these there were forty-two bat-
talions. As with all irregular troops, it was extremely difficult
to discover what number these corps mustered, but they may
apparently be safely calculated as 35,000 men.
Italian Pled. — ^The Italian fleet consisted of: —
1 screw line-of-battle ship ;
13 screw frigates ;
7 steam frigates of the second class, of which six were iron-clad ;
2 sailing frigates of the second class ;
8 steam corvettes of the first rank, of which two were iron-dad ;
2 sailing corvettes ef the first rank ;
17 corvettes of the second and third rank ;
14 smaller vessels ;
8 screw gmiboats }
25 transport vessels.
The number of guns mounted on these vessels amounted to
1,524; the number of men employed in them was 14,000
officers, seamen, and engineers.
The Infantry of the Marine consisted of two regiments or-
ganized on the same principles as those of the Infantry of the
Line, and clothed and armed in the same manner as the
Bersaglieri.
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.
PRELUDE OF THE WAR.
The Germanic Confederation possessed five Federal fort-
resses, originally raised to protect Germany against an invasion
from France. These were Mainz, Luxembourg, Landau,
Rastadt, and Ulm. At the end of May the garrisons of Mainz
and Rastadt, in accordance with the constitution of the Con-
federation, were composed of a mixed force of Austrian and
Prussian and some other Federal troops. When it became
evident that war was likely to break out between the great
German Powers, Bavaria proposed in the Diet on the ist June,
that the Prussian and Austrian garrisons should be withdrawn
jfrom these fortresses, as well as firom the free town of Frank-
fort, which was occupied in a similar manner, and that the
guardianship of these places should be handed over partly to
the troops of the States in which these places were situated,
partly to the reserve division of the Federal army.
To prevent the bloodshed which would have in case of ^^fzx
ensued between the soldiers of these mixed garrisons, the
motion was unanimously accepted. It was determined tliat
Mainz should be held for the Confederation by troops of
Bavaria, Saxe Weimar, Saxe Meiningen, Anhalt, Schwarzbui^,
and the two Lippes ; Rastadt by those of Baden, Saxe Alten-
burg, Coburg Gotha, Waldech, and Reusz ; and that a Bavarian
division should remain in Frankfort
The Prussian and Austrian troops were, in accordance with
this resolution, withdrawn from the fortresses of the Confede-
ration. The Prussians were assembled under the command of
Chap. L] PRELUDE OF THE WAR. 113
General Von Beyer at Wetzlar. The Austridns Wert attached
to the 8th Federal corps, which was placed under the command
of Prince Alexander of Hesse^ att Austrian general who had
gained distinction at the battle of Mbntebello in 1859.
On the 14th June, when Prussia declared thfe Germanic Con-
federation dissolved, wa^ became inevitable. Prussia had at
this time concentrated het main atmies on the frontiers of
Saxony and in Silesid. In rear of these lay the hostile States of
Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, the troops of which might either
act against the communications of the JPrussian armies, or by
withdrawing south of the Maine uhite with the Bavarians and
Austrians, and swell the armies of these two Powers with their
contingents. In front of the right wing of the Prussian main
line lay the hostile kingdom of Saxony, which if left unoccu-
pied would have formed a convenient ground for the dcbouchi
from the Bohemian mountains of the Austrian columns, covered
by the Saxon army. In order to prevent the forces of the two
former States from causing annbyance to the rear of her armies,
and to seize the initiative in Saxony, Prussia took most rapid
measures.
The decree dgainst Prussia had been passed at Frankfort on
the 14th June.
A telegraphic sunmiohs was despatched to the three States of
Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and Hanover, which demanded that they
should immediately reduce their armies to the peace establish-
ment which had existed on the ist March, and should agree to
the Prussian project of the loth June for the reform of the
Germanic Confederation. If the three States agreed to this
demand, Prussist would undertake to guarantee to them their
sovereign rights J if they did not within twelve hours consent to
do so, war would be declared.
The Governments of these States did not reply. Prussia
declared War against them on the evening of the 15th June, and
on the 1 6th Prussian troops invaded their territories.
Position or Prussian Troops at the End of the First
Fortnight of June. — Prussia had commenced her prepara-
tions for war on the 27th March, when five divisions had been
placed on a war footing, five brigades of artillery been strength-
ened, and the fortresses in Silesia and the province of Saxony
114 SEVEN WEEKS' IVAR. [Book IV.
armed. The mobilization of the whole army had been decreed
on the 7th May, and on the 19th of that month the concentra-
tion of troops in Silesia, Lusatia, and Thuringia had begun.
On the I St June the corps d'armee of the Guard had been sent
to Silesia, and the 8th corps and 14th division despatched to
Halle : a reserve corps was at the same time formed at BerHn.
The main Prussian armies were composed of three principal
sections : —
isL The First Army, under the command of Frederick
Charles, which consisted of the and corps d'arm^e (Pomeranian),
3rd (Brandenburg), 4th (Saxony), and of a cavalry corps formed
of fifteen regiments. It lay round Heyerswerda and Gorlitz.
2nd. The Second Army, under the command of the Crown
Prince of Prussia, which consisted of the Guard corps, the ist
corps (Prussia), the 2nd (Poland), the 6th (Silesia), and of a
cavalry corps of seven regiments. It lay in Silesia,
3rd. The Army of the Elbe, under the command of General
Herwarth von Bittenfeld, which consisted of the 8th corps
(Rheinland), and the 14th division of the 7th corps (West-
phalia), as well as a cavalry corps of three regiments.
In rear of these was the reserve corps in Berlin, under the
command of General Miilbe, which consisted of two divisions
of Landwehr and six regiments of Landwehr cavalry. A third
division of Landwehr was also in course of formation at Berlin.
By the 1 5th June Prussia had prepared troops for the inva-
sion of Saxony, Hanover, and Cassel. The First Army and the
Army of the Elbe, which was stationed round Halle and
Torgau, were designed to act against Saxony. Hesse-Cassel
and Hanover were to be invaded by the then separated divi-
sions, which after the occupation of these States were united
under the cojnmand of General Vogel von Falckenstein, and
on the I St July named the Army of the Maine.
On the morning of the 15th June, the troops destined to act
against Hanover consisted of the division which General von
Manteulfel had mobilized in Schleswig, and with which he had
invaded Holstein. After the Austrians quitted the latter duchy
this division had been concentrated at Harburg, where it was
supported by a flotilla of Prussian gunboats on the Lower Elbe
^d on the coast of the North Sea. A second division was also
Chap. I.] PRELUDE OF THE WAR. wi
collected for the same purpose under General von Falckenstein,
near the fortress of Minden, in that portion of the Prussian
province of Westphalia which projected into the southern
boundary of the kingdom of Hanover. The greatest part of
this division was formed by the 13th division, one division of
the Westphalian corps d'arm^. The Prussian garrisons which
had been withdrawn from the Federal fortresses were united
with some other detachments, and formed into a division under
General Beyer, which numbered 17,000 men* It was posted at
Wetzlar, in the Prussian enclave, that was surrounded by the
territories of Hesse-Cassel and Nassau.
Positions of the Austrian Army at the End of the
First Fortnight of June. — Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek,
the hero of San Martino, assumed the Supreme command of
the Austrian Army of the North on the i8th May, and spread
the seven corps d'armde and five divisions of cavalry, of wKich
it was composed, between Cracow and the Elbe, along the
lines of railway which run through most parts of the Austrian
provinces. These seven corps were : —
The I St, under the command of Count Clam Gallas, which
was posted at Prague,
The 2nd, under Count Thun Hohenstadt, at Olmiitz.
The 3rd, under the Archduke Ernst, at Briinn,
The 4th, under Count Festetics, at Teschen.
The 6th, under Baron Ramming, at Olmiitz.
The 8th, under the Archduke Leopold, at Briinn.
The loth, under Count Huyn, afterwards under Count
Gablenz, with only nine battalions, at Bdmisch Triibau.
The cavalry divisions attached to this army were : —
The 1st light cavalry division (Baron Edelsheim), consisting
of six regiments and three batteries of horse artillery.
The 2nd light cavalry division (Prince Thurn and Taxis),
four regiments and two batteries.
ist reserve division of cavalry (Prince Schleswig-Holstein),
six regiments and two batteries.
2nd reserve division of cavalry (Von Zajtsek), six regiments
and two batteries.
3rd reserve division of cavalry (Count Coudenhove), six regi-
ments and two batteries.
I 3
Ii6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IV-
Positions of the Austrian Army of the South. — The
Austrian army of the South consisted of three corps d'arm^e, and
was under the command of the Archduke Albrecht One of
these held Eastern Venetia and Istria, while the other two were
posted in the fenowned Quadrilateral formed by the fortresses
of Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio, and Verona and
Legnano on the Adige.
The third corps d*arm^e, under the Archduke Ernst, served as
a general reserve, which might be either directed against Italy, or
sent into Bohemia, as circumstances required.
Positions of the Italian Army. — The Italian army was
divided into four Cdrps d'antl^e; llie first of these, under
Giovanni Durando, was stationed in the middle of June at
Lodi. It consisted of four divisions, and was intended to act
upon the Lake of Garda and the Uppet Mincio. The second
of these divisions, xmder Cuchiari, was at Cremona. It con-
sisted of three divisions, and was designed to act upon the
Lower Mincio, and against Mantua. The third, under Delia
Rocca, was posted in rear of the two fofmer on both sides of
the Po, with its head-quarters at Plac^enza. It contained four
divisions. The fourth, under Cialdini, consisted of five divi-
sions, and had its head-quarters at Bologna, where it was
intended to operate on the Lower Po arid Lower Adige.
The campaign on the Mincio did liot commence quite so
soon as hostilities in Gerniany. It is necessary, in order to
preserve the clearness of the nanative, to disregard the Italian
campaign until the course of events in Germany has been
tolerably developed. It is sufficient here to mention that Italy
declared war against Austria on the 20th June.
Army of Saxony. — The army of Saxony had been mobilized,
and was by the end of the first fortnight of June ready to take
the field. It was distributed through the kingdom of Saxony,
with its main body in Dresden and Pima,
Army of HANOVER.-^The army of Hanovei* was totally
unprepared for war, and was* for the most part peaceably
garrisoned in the neighbourhood of the town of Hanover.
Army of Bavaria — The Bavarian artny was concentrated,
in the middle of June, between Bamberg and Wiirzberg, under
Prince Charles of Bavaria, in three divisions of infantry, one
Chap. L] PRELUDE OF THE WAR. 117
reserve brigade of infantry, one corps of reserve cavalry,
containing eight regiments and two batteries, one corps of
reserve artillery of ten batteries.
Eighth Federal Corps. — The eighth corps of the Federal
army was formed at Frankfort, but ngt with great alacrity.
The GoT^emment of Baden was by no njeai^s eager to put its
troops into the field against Prussia, but was obliged to do so
for fear of the duchy being overrun by its powerful neighbours
in case of refusal to do so. When this corps was formed, it
occupied Frankfort, an4 was placed ynder the command of
Prince Alexander of Hesse. The troops which composed it
were : —
Those of Wiirtemburg, 14,000 men and 42 gnns.
Those of Baden, 12,090 men and 38 guns.
The troops of Hes^e-Darmstadt, 10,090 men ^4 94 guns.
The Nassau brigade, 5,000 men.
An Austrian division, formed from th^ garrisons which had
withdrawn from the Federal fortresses, ^4 mustered 12,000
men.
The total strength of this corps was in round numbers fifty-
three thousand infantry, thirly-jtbree sc^uadrons, and one hundred
and fourteen gunSr
CHAPTER 11.
PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION Of HANOVER.
On the evening of the 15th June, Prussia declared war agamst
Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony. The two former States,
unless their armies were quickly disabled, could hinder
effectually the Prussian communications between Berlin and
the Rhenish provinces. An Austrian occupation of Saxony
would have much facilitated operations against the open
province of Brandenburgh and against Berlin, while it would
have seriously impeded a Prussian advance into Bohemia,
Against these States, then, it was necessary, that Prussia should
act with immediate energy, in order, if possible, to disarm,
certainly to occupy, them before she could turn her attention
against her principal enemy Austria, and the States allied
thereto. By excellent combinations punctually carried out this
result was obtained. In the course of a few days three of the
most important middle States of Germany were completely
overrun by Prussian troops : and their sovereigns driven from
their capitals and countries as if by a thunderbolt.
The Prussian invasion of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel was
effected by combined movements from different points far
apart : the enterprise was accordingly attended with consider-
able difficulty. It was very undesirable to weaken the main
Prussian armies on the frontiers of Saxony and Silesia by the
smallest detachments. Orders were accordingly sent to General
Falckenstein, who was in Westphalia, to invade these States
with both his divisions, and to occupy them. Goben's division
was to be directed from Minden on Hanover, to which town
that of General Manteuffel from Harburg was also to march.
Beyer s division was ordered at the same time to invade Hesse-
Chap. II.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER. 119
Cassel from Wetzlar. The Hanoverian army was not yet
mobilized, that of Cassel was but a weak contingent^ so that it
was calculated that it would be quite possible^ with these three
Prussian divisions, to bring superior numbers to bear upon any
decisive point It was however necessary, in order to cany
out these combinations, to withdraw all the troops from
Holstein, where demonstrations in favour of the Prince of
Augustenburg might cause trouble. In order to insure tran-
quillity in that duchy, several Landwehr battalions were
despatched to Altona and Lauenburg, as soon as the invasion
of Hanover was resolved upon. Wetzlar was evacuated, but
the 8th Federal corps at Frankfort was not yet sufficientiy
organized to cause any apprehension, as for several days it
would be unable to make a movement forward.
The rapid progress of affairs and the Prussian declaration of
war on the 15th had caused great excitement in Hanover.
When the Austrian troops, round which the army of Hanover
might have rallied, had been withdrawn from Holstein, all idea
of defending the capital of that kingdom had been given up ;
and on war being declared, it was determined to save the army
by a movement towards the south, where it might unite with
the Bavarians. This movement was made on the night of the
15th, chiefly by railway to Gottingen, but with such hurry that
many important articles of equipment were forgotten: such
were the reserve ammunition and the field dispenslkries. On
the morning of the i6th. King George of Hanover followed his
troops and collected them round Gottingen. General Falcken-
stein broke up from Minden at daybreak on the i6th, and on
the 17th, at five o'clock in the afternoon, the first Prussian
troops, after two forced marches, entered the town of Hanover.
The railways from Hanover northwards towards Liineburg,
eastwards to Brunswick, and westwards to Minden, as well as
the line behind the retreating army of King George, had been
broken up by the Hanoverians. The main body of the division
of General Manteuffel had a long portion of railway to restore,
and was obliged to wait the resumption of transport along the
line, so that it did not reach Liinebutg until the evening of the
1 8th.
Here two battalions of the 25th regiment were placed oA
I20 SEVEN weeks:" war. [Book IV.
the railway, and pushed up to the capital : the remainder of
the division reached the town on the next evening.
i8M. — ^The government of the country was immediately
taken under Prussian superintendence, and no opposition
could be made by a population which was surprised, and
totally unfit to defend itself, as its members were untrained to
the use of arms.
At the same time the Prussian navy had commenced opera-
tions. A battalion of the 25th regiment was, at ten o'clock
on the evening of the 17th June, placed on board of the two
transport vessels, Lordey and CydopSy which belonged to the
Prussian squadron on the Lower Elbe, and on a private
steamer which belonged to a merchant of Harbuig. The
vessel steamed down the Elbe, and, at one o'clock on the
morning of the i8th, arrived at Twietenfelt Here the bat-
talion was disembarked, and imme4iatf ly moved against the
small fortress of Stade.
At its head marched a detachment of seamen from the
transport fleet, who were destined to act as pioneers. About
three o'clock in the morning, the small column reached the
neighbourhood of Stade. It was observed by a Hanoverian
cavalry outpost, which immediately galloped back to alarm the
unsuspecting garrison. The Prussians pursued as quickly as
they could ; but when they reached the place, th^ gates were
already closed.
The sailor-pioneers rushed forward to the gate, and smote upon
it heavily with their a^^es. After ^ few vigorous blows it gave
way a little. The axes were more vigorously plied, and in a
few minutes the door fell with a crash across the roadway.
Over the obstacle the Pnissian infantry dashed into the town,
and were received by shots directed from a few of the garrison
who had located themselves in some of the houses. These
shots did little execution, and the Prussians pushed on towards
the market-place. Here some forming detachments of Hano-
verians opened fire upon them, and a slight skirmish ensued.
This was terminated by the commandant of the place, who,
finding his men outnumbered, and in immediate danger of
being surrounded and captured, ordered them to cease firing,
^nd demanded a parley. This was granted by the Prussian
Chap. II.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER, 121
commander; in a few minutes terms of capitulation were
agreed upon, and Stade by the fortune of war ceased to be a
fortress of the King of Hanover.
On the 19th June, Fort William and the batteries on the
Weser, which were evacuated on the appearance of the Prus-
sian flotilla, were occupied ; and two days later, in a similar
manner, Emden and the coast batteries on the Ems fell
into the hands of the invaders. Thus on the 22nd June,
the Prussians were in possession of the whole of Hanover
with the single exception of the southern enclave of Got-
tingen.
In consequence of these vigorous and energetic measures,
all the Hanoverian provisions of weapons and ammunition for
the war fell into the hands of the Prussians, as well as the
whole field equipment for the army in the way of waggons and
materid. These gains amounted to sixty cannon, ten thousand
new rifled small arms, eight hundred waggons, and a large
quantity of gunpowder. These losses were of great detriment
to the Hanoverian cause, and gave into the hands of Prussia
instruments of offence which her generals knew full well how
to turn to account
The Hanoverian army halted at Gottingen, — paralysed, it
was unable to move, and had to be organized. Had it been
in a fit state of preparation for war, it might on the i6th or
17th have reached Cassel, and by the Cassel and Bebra rail-
way effected a retreat in safety to the south. As it was, how-
ever, on account of the tardy measures and want of foresight
of the Hanoverian Ministry, the brave soldiery of which it
was composed were forced, after a display of great gallantry,
valour, and devotion, to succumb to a catastrophe which wUl
be treated of in another portion of this history.
CHAPTER III.
PRUSSIAN OCCXn>ATION OF HESSE-CASSEI*
The Electoral Prince of Hesse-Cassel was fortunate enough
to save his army from falling into the hands of the enemy, but
could not prevent the invasion of his country. The troops ot
Cassel, on the receipt of the Prussian declaration of war, imme-
diately prepared to retire from Cassel. towards the Maine. On
the 1 6th the retreat was commenced; and that day, chiefly by
means of the railway, they reached the neighbourhood of Fulda,
This movement could not be prevented by the Prussians, for
the nearest Prussian troops were those at Wetzlar, and the
railway between Cassel and Marburg had been broken up. On
the 19th June the army of Hesse-Cassel reached Hanau, and
secured its communication with the eighth corps of the Federal
army at Frankfort *
The territory of Hesse-Cassel did not, however, escape an
invasion. On the night of the 1 5th June, General Beyer con-
centrated his troops, which numbered 17,000 combatants, on
the frontier of Hesse-Cassel at Gieszen, and began his march
into Hessian territory on the morning of the i6th at two o'clock.
At Gieszen he published a proclamation, in which he announced
to the people that Prussia had been obliged to declare wcor
against the Elector, but that the war was only to be carried on
against the Government, not against the country, which, on the
contrary, was about to behold the da^vn of better days and more
fortunate circumstances.
On the 16th Beyer's advanced guard reached Marburg. The
Prussian pushed through this town, and during the next two
days urged his troops by forced marches towards Cassel. He
sent a detachment to his right against the railway which leads
Chap. III.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION' OF HESSE-CASSEL, 123
from Cassel by Bebra to Hersfeld and Eisenach, and broke up
the line at Melsungen. His object in this was to prevent the
retreat to the south of any Hessian troops which might still be
in the north of the electorate. He was, however, too late to
attain this object, as Cassel had been cleared of its garrison on
the night of the i6th, and it was already at Hanau.
On the evening and during the night of the 19th the Prussian
troops passed into Cassel, the capital of the electorate, which is
about eighty miles, or five long ordinary marches, from Wetzlar.
The Elector had not gone away with his troops, but had re-
mained at his castle of Wilhelmshohe, which was long renowned
for the orgies held there by Jerome, King of Westphalia. On
the night of the 22nd the Prussian envoy. General von Roder,
made fresh propositions to him. Of these the principal was
that the Elector should agree to the Prussian project for the
reform of the Germanic Confederation. The latter did not,
however, feel able to comply with the Prussian demands, and
on the 22 nd was taken as a State prisoner to the Prussian
fortress of Stettin on the Oder, where a portion of the old
castle of the Dukes of Pomerania was given up to him as a
residence. Shortly afterwards cholera broke out at Stettin, and
permission was given him to go to Konigsbeig, in East Prussia;
of this permission, however, he made no use. Hesse-Cassel
was now in the power of the Prussians. A more important
result of the invasion was that the Prussian General Beyer was
established in the rear of the Hanoverian army at Gottingen,
which, without preparation, commissariat, military train, or
reserve ammunition, was thus exposed to attack by a force
nearly as large as its own, in its flank if it attempted to move
southwards, in its rear if it turned to bay and faced its pursuers
from the north. The Hanoverian army was already practically
disarmed, paralysed, and prisoners.
CHAPTER IV.
PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY.
The troops designed for the invasion of Saxony were the
army of the Elbe and the First Army. The former was to
advance from the north, the latter from the east On the
evening of the 15th June, when the Saxon Government had
rejected the Prussian ultimatum, and received the declaration
of war, the retreat of the Saxon army commenced, in order to
gain Bohemia by way of Bodenbach, and there to unite with
the Austrians. The funds from the treasury and the royal plate
had already been packed up, and the waggons in which they
had been placed accompanied the army.
Means were also adopted to impede as much as possible the
advance of the Prussian troops. Saxon pioneers were set to
work upon the railways which lead from the frontier upon
Dresden. Of such railways there are two, that which follows
the valley of the Elbe and joins the Leipsic line at Rieza and
that which from Gorlitz le^s by Bautzen upon the capital of
Saxony. At nightfall the Saxon pioneers commenced their
work, but in the dark, and under constant apprehension of being
broken in upon by the Prussian advanced guards, they made
but little progress. The rails were taken up, but were neither
carried away, nor twisted, nor broken so as not to be again
immediately available. At eleven o'clock at night the wooden
bridge which carries the railway branches to Leipsic and
Chemnitz across the Elbe, near Riea^ was set on fire by means
of petroleum. Its destruction was not accomplished, for only
two piers were burnt, and the whole bridge was again made
passable within a few days.
While the work of destruction went slowly on in Saxony that
Chap. IV.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY. 125
night, heavy masses of Prussian troops were drawing together,
and dosing down to the very frontier line of that kingdom.
Between Gorlitz and the border on the west, Prince Frederick
Charles marshalled three strong corps d'armfe. On the north
General Herwarth von Bittenfeld divided his force into three
columns, which were to advance by Strehla, Dahlen, and
Wurzen, on the left bank of the Elbe. During the few dark
hours of the short summer night, the last preparations for the
invasion were made. The main bodies were collected together
about midnight, and the soldiers piled arms to rest and wait for
dawn. Few slept j a dull and heavy murmur continually rose
from the crowded columns, and told the subdued but deep
excitement which pervaded the hearts of the men ; and this
excitement was not without a cause, for the soldiers thought
that the Austrian was in Dresden, and that there would be a
battle on the morrow. At last the first faint streaks of dawn
appeared ; the troops eagerly fell into their ranks, and before
the sun had risen the advanced guards were pushing briskly
over Saxon ground.
The pioneers engaged upon the railway fled before the in-
vaders' columns, fortunate to avoid being taken. Bittenfeld,
from the north, reached Rieza about nine o'clock^ and occupied
that town in force. Two pontoon bridges were thrown across
the Elbe below the town, a portion of the troops crossed, and
marched on to Grossenhain, while the rest were directed up the
left bank of the river, towards Meissen. ^ Hardly had Bitten-
feld's troops established themselves in Rieza, when a detach-
ment of the field railway corps came up, who immediately
commenced the restoration of the lines which had been re-
moved, while pioneers were set to repair the burnt portions of
the bridge.
In the meantime, the columns of the First Army were ad-
vancing in Lusatia. A detachment entered the town of Lobau,
which was found without any garrison. The railway bridge
here was not blown up, though it had been mined. The lines
were, however, torn up, and laid in confusion on the way ; but
the Prussians employed the country people immediately to
restore the railway. Bautzen was also occupied. Here the
line had again been torn up, but was quickly repaired. But
126 SEVEN WEEKS IVAR, [Book I\".
Prince Frederick diaries moved cautiously, for the passes of
Reichenberg and Gabel were on his left To cover his com-
munication with Gorlitz, and to shield his left flank, he pushed
a strong detachment along the Zittau road to a point a little
beyond Ostritz.
On the 17 th a detachment was thrown out on the right to
feel Bittenfeld's left, and the Prince pushed troops to Bisschofs-
werda, on the Dresden road, while Bittenfeld's advanced guard
occupied Meissen. On the i8th a simultaneous advance was
made on the capital. The advancing columns met with no
opposition, and that afternoon the Prussian colours were hoisted
over Dresden.
The Prussian outposts were then pushed forward without
encountering any opposition up to the frontier of Bohemia.
Leipzic and Chemnitz were occupied, and tlie line of railway
between Leipzic and Plauen, as well as that between Dresden
and Chemnitz, secured by Prussian troops. On the 20th June
the whole of Saxony was in the undisturbed possession of the
troops of Prince Frederick Charles and of Herwarth, except
where the Saxon standard floated above the virgin fortress of
Konigstein.
At the time of the inruption into Saxony, Prince Frederick
Charles of Prussia issued this address to the inhabitants : —
"His Majesty the King of Prussia, my most gracious master, having been
compelled to declare war against the King of Saxony, a portion of the troops
under my command have to-day crossed the frontier between Prussian and
Saxon Lusatia.
" We are not at war with the people and country of Saxony, but only
with the Government, which by its inveterate hostility has forced us to take
up arms.
"Private property will be everywhere respected by my troops, who are
also directed to protect every peaceful citizen from injury.
" I intreat you to repose confidence in our intentions, and to be assured
that my soldiers, by strict discipline and good fellowship, will alleviate the
hardships of war as much as possible. Provisions will never be exacted
without a due receipt for them.
" FREDERICK CHARLES, Gmcral of Cavalry.
"Head Quarters, GOrlitz, June 16, 1866."
The administration of the country was undertaken by Royal
Commissioners ; but the Saxon officials and organs of adminis-
tration were retained. A kindly feeling soon sprang up between
Chap. IV.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY.
IJ7
the soldiery and the inhabiunts, although dicre were occasional
disturbances with the officials, chiefly with regard to the war
contribudons of fuel and forage which the country was required
to fiimish. The excellent discipline of the Prussian soldiery
showed itself conspicuously in Saxony. The fears and pre-
judices of the inhabitants subsided more and more every hour,
and the Prussians within a few days regarded themselves and
were regarded as if in a friendly country.
At this time, as a security against the chances of an Austrian
attack, and as a support for further operations, the reserve corps
of General Miilbe was ordered up from Berlin to Dresden.
The positions of the armies about to be engaged in hostilities
were, on 30th June, after the occupation of Saxony, as shown
in the subjoined sketch : —
I
POSITION OF TROOPS O
The Prussian dash into Saxony was a great military success.
It gave Prince Frederick Charles the advantage of being able
to attack the Austrians on a narrow front, if they should issue
from the passes of the mountains, instead of being obliged to
fight them on their own terms in an open country, as would
128 SEVEN WEEJCSr WAR. [Book IV.
have been the case had they been allowed to occupy this
kingdom. At that moment the Prussian patrols and pickets
were pushed close up to the Austrian frontier, the issue of the
narrow defile which the Elbe cleaves in the Iron Mountains
was secured, the Saxon troops had retired into Bohemia, and
without pulling a trigger the Prussian army had, by the rapid
action of its chief, gained as great advantages as could have
been looked for from a victorious battle in this part of the
theatre of war. There was only one point in Saxony where
Saxon troops were still found, and where the Saxon standard
was still hoisted. The little fortress of Konigstein, situated on
an isolated sandstone cliff on the left bank of the Elbe, about
nine miles from the Austrian frontier, was still occupied by a
Saxon garrison. Inaccessible, from the steepness of the rock
on which it stands, and at a considerable distance from the
surrounding heights, this fortress has never been reduced.
From the hill of LiUenstein, which stands on the opposite side
of the river, and has a command OVer the fortress of more than
150 feet, Napoleon attempted to bombard Konigstein, but his
artillery was not heavy enough to send shot over the 3,000
yards which separate the summit of the two hills. With their
rifled cannon the Prussian artillery could now easily, from the
hill of Lilienstein or from that of Paffenstein on the opposite
side, haVe engaged the guns of the fort oti equal terms ; but
the Prussian commander did not deem it worth while to drag
artillery to the top of these steep hills in order to force the
capitulation of the small garrison of 1,200 men, who, in the
event of Saxony remaining in his possession, must fall into his
hands, and, in case of his being obliged to retire, could add so
little to the force of his enemies. Konigstein, guarded by its
escarpments and impossibility of approach, was still allowed to
retain its reputation for impregnability.
In most of the villages and hamlets of Saxony, certainly in
all those which lay on roads leading to the frontier, Prussian
soldiers were billeted ; cavalry and artillery horses filled the
farmsteadings of the border farmers, atld field gUns atid artillery
carriages were parked on many a village green. But the Saxons
had no complaints to make, and, as far as could be judged from
appearances, seemed highly to approve the occupation of their
Chaf. IV.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY. 129
county by the Prussian army. The Saxon peasantry and the
soldiers were on the most friendly terms, and a stranger who
did not know the Prussian uniform, in passing through the
villages, would have supposed that the troops were quartered
among the people of their own country. As soon as the
Prussian vanguards crossed the frontier, Prince Frederick
Charles issued a most stringent order, in which he insisted
upon the troops showing every respect for private property and
for the comfort of the inhabitants. This order was strictly
strictly observed both by officers and men. The kind-hearted
soldiers brought with them none of those horrors which too often
follow in the train of an army which occupies a strange country.
On the contrary, had it not been for the swords and bayonets
of patrols which glittered in the sun along every road, the scene
was one of perfect peace. In some places the men were help-
ing the peasantry to carry the hay harvest, in others they might
be seen working in the cottage gardens, and nearly always
were spending money in the village shops; the bare-legged
country urchins got taken up for rides on the cavalry or
artillery horses as they went to be watered, or were invited,
half afraid, to peep into the muzzle of a rifled gun ; only when,
with the contempt bred by the familiarity, some too adventurous
youngster tried to introduce a handful of cornflowers into the
mouth of a piece of ordnance, was he warned off the precincts
of the battery by the reluctant sentry.*
The Prussian military authorities took care to make the in-
conveniences of the existing state of affairs sit as lightly as
possible on the inhabitants of the coimtry in which the troops
where quartered. Passenger traffic on the railways of Saxony
was soon resumed, except where the broken bridge of Rieza
caused a gap. Telegraphic messages were received at the
bureaux, and were certainly and regularly delivered.
The successful occupation of the kingdom of Saxony gave
the Prussian leader also great moral, material, and strategical
advantages. His adversaries had seen the energy and vigour
with which the Prussian blows were delivered. Two armies
were established on hostile territory, which facilitated the supply
* It must be remembered that this was a war of Germans against
Germans.
K
13© SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IV.
of provisions to these laige masses of troops. The theatre of
war for the armies was also transferred to foreign soil. But the
main advantages were gained in reference to the whole theatre
of the war throughout Germany. The wide semicircle in which
the Prussian army had been spread along the Saxon and
Bohemian frontiers, was much contracted by the advances of
Prince Frederick Charles and Herwarth. The communication
between the individual armies was much facilitated by the pos-
session of the Saxon railways, and an invasion of Bohemia was
rendered possible, because the frontier passes of the mountains
were secured ; while in the case of its being necessary to act on
the defensive, the £rz-Gebirge and the Lusatian hills afforded
much superior military positions to any along the quite open
frontier between Saxony and Prussia.
The invasion of Saxony brought immediately conditions of
open war between Prussia and Austria. Saxony appealed to
the Diet at Frankfort, from which Prussia and several other
States had since 14th June withdrawn their representatives.
The remaining members of the Diet decreed, on tiie 1 6th June,
that Austria and Bavaria should give aid against Prussia ; not
only to Saxony, but also to Hanover and Hesse-CasseL Austria
declared herself ready to devote all her military forces to the
support of the States which had been invaded by Prussian
troops. This declaration was regarded by Prussia as an open
and official announcement of a declaration of war. That
Austria also intended it to be such was shown by the publi-
cation, on the 17th June, of this war manifesto of the
Emperor : —
"TO MY PEOPLES.
" While engaged in a work of peace, which was undertaken for the pnr-
pose of laying the foundation for a Constitution which should augment the
unity and power of the empire, and at the same time secure to my several
countries and peoples free internal development, my duties as a Sovereign
have obliged me to place my whole army under arms.
" On the frontiers of my empire, in the south and in the north, stand the
armies of two enemies who have allied with the intention of breaking the
power of Austria as a great European State.
'* To neither of those enemies have I given cause for war. I call on an
Omniscient God to bear witness that I have always considered it my first,
my most sacred duty, to do all in my power to secure for my peoples the
blessings of peace.
<< One of the hostile Powers requires no excuse. Having a loiaging to
Chap. IV.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION' OF SAXONY. 131
depriTe me of parts of my empire, a favoarable opportunity is for him a
sufficient cause for going to war.
" Allied with the Prussian troops, which are now up in arms against us,
a part of my faithful and valorous army two years ago went to the shores of
the North Sea. I entered into an alliance with Prussia for the purpose of
upholding rights secured by treaties, to protect an imperilled German race,
to confine within the narrowest possible limits an unavoidable war, and by
means of an intimate connexion of the two central European Powers— whose
principal duty it is to maintain the peace of Europe — to obtain a lasting
guarantee for the peace of my empire, of Germany, and of Europe.
'* Conquests 1 have never sought for. Unselfish in my alliance with
Prussia^ 1 did not, in the Vienna Treaty of Peace, seek to obtain any ad-
vantage for myself. Austria is not to blame for the series of unfortunate
complications which could not have arisen had Prussia been equally disin-
terested and equally mindful of her Federal duties. Those complications
were brought about for the furtherance of selfish purposes, and, con-
sequently, could not be done away with by my Government in a peace-
ful way.
"The state of affairs became more and more serious.
"Even when it was notorious that the two hostile States were making
prepaxations for war, and that there was an understanding which could only
be based on an intention to make in common an attack on my empire, I,
being mindfiil of my duties as a Sovereign, remained in a state of profound
peace, as I was willing to make all those concessions which were compatible
with the welfare and honour of my peoples. But when I saw that further
delay would not only render it difficult to ward off the intended blow,
but also imperil the safety of the monarchy, I was obliged to resolve on
maldng those heavy sacnfices which are inseparable from preparations
for war.
" The assurances given bv my Government of my love of peace, and the
repeated declarations which were made of my readiness to disarm at the
same time with Prussia, were replied to by propositions which could not be
accepted without sacrificing the honour and safety of the monarchy.
Prussia not only insisted on complete disarmament in the northern pro-
vinces of the empire, but also in those parts of it which touch on Italy,
where a hostile army was standing, for whose love of peace no guarantee
could either be given or offered.
** The negotiations with Prussia in respect to the Elbe duchies clearly
proved that a settlement of the question in a way compatible with the disunity
of Austria, and with the rights and interests of Germany and the duchies,
could not be brought about, as Prussia was violent and intent on conquest.
The negotiations were therefore broken off, the whole affair was referred to
the Bund, and at the same time the legal representatives of Holstein were
convoked.
"The danger of war induced the three powers— France, England, and
Russia — to invite my Government to participate in General Conferences,
the object of which was to be {sein solUe) the maintenance of peace. My
Government, in accordance with my views, and, if possible, to secure the
blessing of peace for my peoples, did not refuse to share in the Conferences,
but made their acceptance dependent on the confirmation of the supposition
that the public law of Europe and the existing treaties were to form the
basis of the attempt at mediation, and that the powers represented would
not seek to uphold special interests which could only be prejudicial to the
balance of power in Europe and to the rights of Austria. The fact that the
attempt to mediate failed because these natural suppositions were made is a
K a
132 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IV.
proof that the Conferences could not have led to the maintenance of
peace.
" The recent events clearly prove that Prussia substitutes open violence
for right and justice.
'* The rights and the honour of Austria, the rights and the honour of the
whole German nation, are no longer a barrier against the inordinate ambi-
tion of Prussia. Prussian troops have entered Holstein ; the Estates con-
voked by the Imperial Stadtholder have been violently dissolved ; the
Government of Holstein, which the Treaty of Vienna gives to Austria and
Prussia in common, has been claimed for Prussia alone ; and the
Austrian garrison has been obliged to give way to a force ten times as
strong as itself.
" When the German Bund, which saw in the measure no infraction of
the Federal Iaws> accepted the Austrian proposition to 'mobilize' the
Federal troops, Prussia, who prides herself on being the defender of the
interests of Germany, resolved to complete the work she had b^un.
Violently severing the tie which unites the German races, Prussia announced
her secession from the Bund, required from the German Governments the
acceptance of a so-called project of Reform, which in reality is a division of
Germany, and now she employs military force against those Sovereigns who
have faithfully discharged their Federal duties.
"The most pernicious of wars, a war of Germans against Germans, has
become inevitable, and I now summon before the tribunal of history, before
the tribunal of an eternal and all-powerful God, those persons who have
brought it about, and make them responsible for the misfortunes which may
fall on individuals, families, districts, and countries.
" I begin the war with confidence, arising from the knowledge that my
cause is a just one, and with the consciousness of the power which is pos-
sessed by a great empire when the Prince and the people have one and the
same thought— that the rights of their country must be stedfastly upheld.
My heart beats high at the sight of my gallant and well-appointed anny^
the bulwark against which the force of the enemies of Austria will be broken
^-and of my faithful peoples, who are full of loyal confidence and self devo-
tion. The pure fire of patriotic enthusiasm bums with equal strength and
steadiness in all parts of my vast empire. Joyfully do the furlough men and
reserves take their places in the ranks of the army ; numerous volunteeis
present themselves ; the whole of the able-bodied population of the countries
which are most exposed are preparing to take the field, and everything that
can possibly be done to assist the army and provide for its necessities is
willingly done. All the inhabitants of my kingdoms and countries have one
and the same feeling — the feeling that they belong to one and the same
nation, that unity gives strength, and that a gross violation of justice has
been committed.
** It is doubly painful to me that the settlement of the questions relative
to the internal constitution of the Empire has not yet made so much pro-
gress that I, at this important moment, can assemble around my throne
the representatives of all my peoples. Although I am now deprived of
this support, my duty as a Sovereign has become clearer, and my reso-
lution stronger, that for all future time my empire shall have the bene-
fit of it.
** We shall not be alone in the struggle which is about to take place.
The Princes and peoples of Germany know that their liberty and indepen-
dence are menaced by a Power which listens but to the dictates of egotism,
and is under the influence of an ungovernable craving after aggrandizement,
and they also know that in Austria they have an upholder of the freedom.
Chap. IV.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY, 133
power, and integrity of the whole of the German Fatherland. We and ou-
Gennan brethren have taken up arms in defence of the most precious rights
of nations. We have been forced so to do, and we neither can nor will disx
arm until the internal development of my empire and of the German States
which are allied with it has been secured, and also their power and influence
in Europe.
'* My hopes are not based on unity of purpose, on power alone, I con6de
in an sdmighty and just God, whom my house from its venr foundations has
faithfully served, a God who never forsakes those who righteously put their
trust in Him. To Him I pray for assistance and success, and I call on my
peoples to join me in that prayer.
" Given in my residence and metropolis of Vienna, on this 17th of Tune,
1866.
"FRANCIS JOSEPH (M.P.)."
On the same day the following general order was also issued
to the Austrian Army of the North by Feldzeugmeistei
Benedek : —
" Head Quarters, OLHth%
" Soldiers,— We are on the eve of grave and sanguinary events. As in
1859, you are collected in great numbers around our flag. Soldiers, we
have now to repair in the eyes of the world the fiiults of that period ;
vrt have to punish an arrogant and faithless enemy. I have the full and
entire conviction that you are aware of and are worthy of this mission.
Have also confidence in me, and be assured that on my part I will exert my
best efforts to bring this campaign to a speedy and glorious termination.
We are now faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the Line
and partly of Landwehr. The first comprises young men not accustomed
to pnvations and fatigues, and who have never yet made an important cam-
paign ; the latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, which,
rather than fight against us, would prefer the downfall of their Government.
In consequence of a long course of years of peace, the enemy does not pos-
sess a single general who has had an opportunity of learning his duties on
the field of battle. Veterans of the Mincio and of Palestro, I hope that
with tried leaders you will not allow the slightest advantage to such an adver-
sary. On the day of battle the infantry will adopt its lightest campaign
accoutrement, and will leave behind their knapsacks and camping materialt
in order that they may be able to throw themselves with rapidity and
promptitude upon the heavily-laden enemy. Each soldier will receive his
flask filled with wine and water, and a ration of bread and meat easily to
be carried. The officers wiU discontinue the use of their wide scarves, and
all the useless insignia of their ranks, which but renders them too distin-
guishable in action. Every man, without distinction of name or position,
shall be promoted whenever he shall distinguish himself on the field of
battle. The bands will place themselves in rear of the front of the
respective positions, and will play heroic pieces for the warlike ^ance.
The enemy has for some time vaunted the excellence of their fire-arms,
but, soldiers, I do not think that will be of much avail to them. We
will give them no time, but we will attack them with the bayonet and
with crossed muskets. When, with God's help, we shall have beaten
and compelled to retreat our enemies, we wiU pursue them without in-
termission, and you shall then find repose upon the enemy's soil, and
those compensations which a glorious and victorious army has a right
to demand "
BOOK V.
I
CHAPTER I.
THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR,
Whoever casts a glance upon the map of Central Europe
must at once observe the range of mountains which, starting
from the Black Forest, passes through Germany from west to
east, separates the basin of the Danube from the plain through
which the Weser, the Elbe, and the Oder glide to the German
and Baltic seas, and terminates in the chain of the Carpathian
Hills. This range about midway divides into t\i'o branches
near the source of the Saale, which again join together near the
east of the county of Glatz, and enclose in the so-formed quad-
rilateral the kingdom of Bohemia. On the north of Uiese
mountains lie the kingdoms of Saxony and Prussia ; on the
south the territories ruled by the Emperor of Austria. Bohemia,
although a dependency of the Austrian empire, is geographically
separated from the valley of the Danube, in which lie the ma-
jority of the provinces of the Kaiser, by the hills of the Bohe-
mian Forest and the mountains of Moravia. The advanced
post of Austria towards the north, it stands as a strong bastion
against an invasion of the empire from that direction, and is
also a most valuable base of operations from which to hurl
troops against the valleys of the Elbe or the Oder. It was this
position of Bohemia which caused the destruction of Napoleon
in 1813, when Prussia and Russia held the Elbe, and Austria
from Bohemia menaced his right flank. If he quitted his
central position at Dresden to march on the Elbe, the Austrians
issued from Bohemia, and cut off his communication with the
Chap. L] THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR, \ 135
■V,
Rhine ; if he advanced against Bohemia, as soon as he passed
the northern mountains of that province the allies debouched
from the line of the Elbe, and separated him from France. It
was a consequence of the natural configuration of Bohemia that,
after having prevented the junction of his enemies by the vic-
tory of Dresden, the great Napoleon was surrounded at Leipsic.
In the midsummer of 1866, Bohemia was again about to
play an important part in a European war. Austrian troops
were collected there. Beyond the Erz-Gebirge, or Iron Moun-
tains, and the Riesen-Gebirge, or Giant Hills, which form the
Bohemian frontier on the north, lies in the first place the king-
dom of Saxony, but beyond this again are the southern pro-
vinces of Prussia, from which two Prussian armies available for
service in the field had now advanced. In the event of war,
Saxony appeared likely to be the first battle-field, if the Aus-
trian general should assmne the offensive. But in a life-and-
death struggle between the great German Powers it was impos-
sible that the theatre of war could be restricted to one tiny
kingdom; the area of operations on the contrary extended
nearly throughout the district which spreads from the sea on
the north to the Danube on the south, from the Rhine on the
west to the Vistula on the east.
This is a district not unacquainted with war. After the last
attempt to overthrow an established monarchy in England it
was the scene of that Seven Years* strife through whose baptism
of blood Prussia advanced into the hierarchy of the great
Powers of Europe. It was repeatedly trodden under foot by
the conquering legions of the First Emperor of the French, and
it was in its very centre that the battle was fought which led to
the first overthrow of his power. Its wide extent is inhabited
by two distinct races, and is the seat of two antagonistic creeds.
The Teutonic r^ce prevails in the north, and the generally
established religion is Protestant ; the Slavonic blood predomi-
nates in the south, owns the Catholic faith, and politically was
under the sway of the Kaiser.
The basin of the Elbe is the central geographical division of
Germany. This basin is divided into two ; that of the Upper
Elbe forms a plateau surrounded by mountains, and is the
kingdom of Bohemia ; that of the Lower contains Saxony and
136 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V.
the central provinces of Prussia. The upper basin is in general
ill cultivated, and little has been done to develop its resources.
It possesses, however, forests, considerable iron mines, and
breeds horses which are valuable in war. Its roads, except one
or two main chaussees^ are few, mountainous, and bad ; but it is
a country easily defensible, for its forests, mountains, and rivers
present at every point obstacles to an invading army. Hie
lower basin of this river is, on the other hand^ a country of
plains, marshes, and small lakes: not very fertile, but well
cultivated, thickly populated, and opened up by a multitude of
roads. The Elbe, entering it from a close defile between the
mountains of Northern Bohemia, runs through its whole length,
passing by the fortress of Konigstein, Dresden, the capital of
Saxony, and the fortified town of Wittenberg. This river,
within Prussian territory, supported by the fortresses of Torgau
and Magdeburg, forms a strong line of defence against an army
advancing on Berlin from the west, but one which can easily
be turned from Bohemia.
The basin of the Oder, bounded on the south by the moun-
tains which overhang Biaunau, Glatz, and Troppau, contains
on the upper course of the river the province of Prussian
Silesia. The river itself forms an angle near Breslau, which
allows of its being used as a line of defence for the eastern
districts of the kingdom of Prussia against an attack fi*om either
the south or west This line is supported by the fortresses of
Glogau, Kiistrin, and Stettin. The country through which the
Oder flows is in general fiat, marshy, and woody ; the land is
fertile only in pasture, but is well cultivated, and inhabited by
an active and industrious population.
The basin of the Weser, in which lies the western portion of
the kingdom of Hanover, is bounded on the south by the
mountains of the Thuringian Forest and the Hartz, and is in
geheral sandy and covered with thickets ; its principal riches
are flocks and herds. The Danube, the southernmost of the
four rivers which were introduced into the theatre of war in
Central Germany, runs through a plain which lies on the south
side of the Bohemian and Moravian mountains.
Starting from the confluence of the Main nvnth the Rhine at
Mayence, following upwards the valley of the former river,
Chap. L] THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR, 137
skirting the southern slopes of the Thuringian Forest, passing
along the summits of the £rz-Gebirge, the Riesen-Gebiige, and
the mountains of Moravia, and terminating at the southernmost
point of Upper Silesia, runs the line which geographically
divides Northern from Southern Germany. This line now
divided from one another the territories occupied by the troops
of the two great parties into which the Germanic Confederation
was rapidly splitting. By the sudden razzia made by her troops
into Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony, and by surrounding
the Hanoverian troops, Prussia secured free communication
between her Rhenish provinces and Berlin, disarmed the hostile
forces in her re^^, and divided the whole of Germany into two
distinct areas for military operations.
These northern and southern areas, separated by the central
geographical line of Germany, were now in the possession of
the troops of the northern and southern antagonists respectively.
The Prussian occupation of Saxony had also the effect of
separating the troops of the southern league quartered on the
east of the line of the Saale from those assembled on the west,
and divided Germany into an eastern and western theatre
of war.
On the western theatre the Prussian troops which had in-
vaded Hanover and Hesse-Cassel were ranged against the
Hanoverians, the Bavarians, the troops of Cassel, and those of
the eighth Federal corps.
On the eastern theatre the main armies of Prussia were
drawn up against that of Austria with its Saxon allies, where
they occupied, positions in Saxony and Silesia on the one side,
on Bohemia and Moravia on the other. Between Bohemia
and Saxony lie the chains of the Iron and Giant Mountains ;
between Moravia and Silesia, a part of the Giant chain, the
mountains of Schweidnitz, and the Sudetic hills. These moun-
tains as a rule are steep towards Prussia, and slope more
gently towards Bohemia. They consist of several parallel
ridges, and are of very unequal heights, sometimes falling as
low as a thousand feet, sometimes, raising their peaks high
into the air, they tower over spurs themselves fifteen hundred
feet high. On the west of Bohemia the Fichtel Mountains
divide the passes which lead from North Germany into Bohemia
138
SEVElf WEEKS' WAR.
[BOOK V.
'from those which by the sources of the SaaJe lead in the
neighbourhood of Hof and Eger into Bavaria. This feet added
to the importance and to the value of the Prussian occupation
of Saxony, for the presence of the troops of Prince Frederick
Charles in that kingdom, if it did not entirely prevent, certain^
threw great difficulties in the way of a junction between the
Austrians and Bavarians, and placed the Prussians in about
the advantageous position of having broken the line of the
armies of the South German Stales.
The south-western frontier of Bohemia is formed by the hills
of the Bohemian Forest; the south-eastern by the mountains of
Moravia, The eastern theatre of operations lay between the
mountains which separate Bohemia and Mora\-ia from Saxony
and Prussia and the Danube.
In this theatre two main lines of railway exist, and show the
lines along which the troops on either side would draw together,
Chap. I.] THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR. 139
in order to repel an offensive movement of the enemy. The
northern line is that which runs from Oderberg, by Oppeln,
Brieg, Breslau, and Gorlitz to Dresden and Leipzic; the
southern is that which leads from Prerau by Olmiitz and Pai-
dubitz to Prague. These Imes at three pomts are joined to
each other by lines from Dresden to Prague, from Lobau to
Tiimau, and from Oderberg to Prerau.
Within Bohemia lies the important quadrilateral of railways
between Prague, Tiimau, Josephstadt, and Pardubitz, from
which lines lead to Leipzic, Dresden, Berlin, Gorlitz, Breslau,
Cracow, Vienna, Pilsen, Niiremberg, and Regensburg, and
which, in consequence, forms a highly advantageous position
for the concentration of troops.
The fortresses enclosed in this theatre are, on the Austrian
side, Cracow on the Vistula, Olmutz on the March, Joseph-
stadt and Koniggratz on the Upper Elbe, Prague on the
Moldau, and Theresienstadt on the Eger. On the Prussian
side are Kosel on the Oder, Neisse on the Neisse, Glatz,
Schweidnitz,. and Torgau, on the Elbe. From Schweidnitz,
which is oif little importance as a fortress, to Torgau, the
distance is about one hundred and fifty miles.
After the Piussian occupation of Saxony, the main armies of
the two great Powers were separated by the moimtains along
which run the northern frontier lines of Bohemia and Moravia.
The Prussian army consisted of three principal parts, which all
received orders from the King as commander-in-chief of all
the forces, and numbered, inclusive of the reserve corps of
General Miilbe in Dresden, about 280,000 combatants, with
900 guns.
The Austrian army, on die south of the mountains, mustered
about 245,000 combatants, with 600 guns, to which was added
the Saxon army, that had retired into Bohemia, with a force of
25,000 combatants, and 60 guns.
Plan of Operations. — ^The Austrian army was not in such
a forward state of preparation for taking the field as the Prus-
sian. Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek had not apparently
anticipated such extreme rapidity and energy of movement as
was exhibited by the Prussians, and had before the outbreak of
I40 SEVEH WEEKS' WAR. [Book V.
hostilities announced his intention of assuming the offensive,
and of invading Prussian territory, when he had given most
humane and praiseworthy directions to his own troops for their
beWviour in the enemy's country. An Austrian invasion of
Prussia may be effected by either of two routes : the first leads
over the Lusatian mountains to Bautzen and Gorlitz to Bezlin;
the second by the valley of the Oder into Silesia. An offensive
movement by the first route would have given the Austrians
the advantage of seizing Saxony, and of covering the passage
of the Bavarians by the passes of the Saale to Wittenberg,
where the whole of the invading army might have been united.
The other route did not offer these advantages, and in it lay as
obstacles the Prussian fortresses of Glatz, Neisse, and Kosel.
The rapid invasion of Saxony by Prussia, and the consequent
retreat of the Saxons, appears to have determined the Austrian
commander to relinquish any attempt of crossing the moun-
tains into that kingdom. His army was concentrated round
Briinn and Olmiitz ; he could not draw it together in time to
seize the passes into Saxony ; and he appears to have then
determined to act upon the defensive, and to hold one portion
of the Prussian troops in check, while he threw himself with
strong force on the others issuing from the mountain passes, in
order to crush them in detail. To secure a favourable position
for this operation, he concentrated his army towards Joseph-
stadt. He sent one corps d'arm^e with the Saxon troops to
cover the issues of the passes firom Saxony, there to check the
armies of Prince Frederick Charles. With his forces from
Josephstadt he intended to hold the Crown Prince in issuing
from the mountains, and to reinforce Clam Gallas to cmsh
Prince Frederick Charles at Gitschin. On the 19th June the
Austrian movements with this aim commenced : that day the
head-quarters of Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek were moved
from Olmiitz to Bohmisch Triiban, and on the 23rd June his
army occupied the following positions : —
The I St corps, the Saxons, the brigade Kalik, and the ist
light cavalry division, were posted under the supreme command
of Count Clam Gallas, amounting altogether to nine brigades,
with 60,000 men, on the left bank of the Iser, between Weiss-
wasser, Miinchengratz, and Tiimau, in order here to check the
J
Chap. I.] THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR. 141
enemy advancing from the north-west. The 4th and 8th corps,
and I St division of reserve cavalry, were at Josephstadt \ the
loth and 6th corps were pushed forward to the Silesian frontier
on the north-east of Josephstadt ; the 3rd corps and the 2nd and
3rd divisions of reserve cavalry were held in reserve north of
Pardubitz ; the 2nd corps and the 2nd light cavalry division
formed the extreme right of the Austrian line at Bohmisch
* tJULO
Triiban. By this disposition of his troops, Feldzeugmeister
Benedek held a force much superior to that of the Crown
Prince, immediately opposite to the defiles leading to Silesia,
and covered the ground on which all the roads from Saxony
and lower Silesia unite together in Bohemia, so that he actually
stood in front of the point where the armies of Prince Frederick
Charles and of the Crown Prince must unite.
Prussian Plan of Operations. — How and why Prussia
assumed the offensive in Saxony has been already seen. To
increase the advantages gained by the possession of this king-
dom, it was extremely desirable to push forward into Bohemia,
and thus diminish, by a concentration forwards, the extent of
the arc covered by the different armies. Political and financial
reasons also required a speedy termination of the war. It was
determined in the Prussian councils to assume the offensive.
An invasion of the Austrian dominions from the positions of
the Prussian armies could be effected in two ways : by the first
the armies could cross the north-eastern and north-western
frontiers of Bohemia, and be directed to unite in the north of
142 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V.
Bohemia. By the second plan the Elbe Army and the Fiist
Army could have been ordered to cross the frontier, and to
move on Prague, while the Second made an offensive move-
ment against Olmiitz. The latter plan was considered too
dangerous ; by its prosecution the communications between the
two armies would have been entirely broken ; and if Benedek
had ignored the Second Army he could have fallen with much
superior forces on Prince Frederick Charles, and overthrown
him, when the distance from Olmiitz to Vienna would not have
been less than that from Josephstadt to Berlin. The first plan
was accordingly adopted ; and in order to carry it out, it was
determined that the Army of the Elbe, acting as the extreme
right wing of the Prussian advance, should move from Dres-
den by Neustadt, and over the mountains by the passes of
Schluckenau or GabeL The First Army, which formed die
centre of the invading forces, was to move with the cavalry
corps from Zittau, Gorlitz, and Lobau, by the passes of Krottau
Friedland and Neustadtl or Reichenbeig. The Second Army,
as the lefl wing, was to move from Landshut and the county
of Glatz through the passes near Schatzlar or Trautenau, and
through the pass of Nachod or Skalitz.
The First Army and the Army of the Elbe were to unite
near the Iser, and to gain together the left bank of that river
towards Gitschin. The Second was to gain the right bank of
the Elbe. When these points were gained, the two armies
would be in close communication, and could act in conjunction
along the line of railway leading by Pardubitz and Brtinn to
Vienna.
The distance from Schluckenau to the county of Glatz, along
which the Prussian front extended, is about one hundred miles.
The Army of the Elbe and the First Army, which were to
move through passes only about thirty or thirty-five miles
distant from each other, could unite on the Iser in four
' marches, and immediately assail the enemy with four and a
half corps d'armde, if the Austrians attempted to make an
offensive movement towards Silesia, The circumstances of the
country, and the strategical situation, threw more difficulties in
the way of the Second Army during its defiling through the
mountains, and tliere was considerable danger that it might be
Chap. I.] THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR, 143
attacked while still isolated. On this account the Army of
Silesia was made stronger by one corps d'armde than the First
Army, and was to commence its movements four days later, so
as to allow the Austrian attention to have been distracted by
the presence of Prince Frederick Charles in Bohemia, and to
permit of the complete junction of the First Army and of the
Army of the Elbe on the Iser.
To hold the Austrian commander as long as possible in un-
certainty as to the points at which the army of the Crown
Prince was about to break into Bohemia, and, if possible, to
make him remove his guards from the passes by which the
descent was really to be effected, a false demonstration was
made by the Second Army. This army had been concentrated
round Landshut and Waldenburg, but on the 15th June, the
Crown Prince, leaving only one corps d'arm^e in its original
position, moved two of his remaining three corps thirty miles
to the south-east, and there placed them in position near Neisse,
sent at the same time the Guards to Brieg, and shifted his own
head-quarters to the fortress of Neisse, in order to make the
Austrians believe that the Army of Silesia intended to await
attack in a defensive position near the fortress, or to break out
southwards from that point upon Olmiitz.
The possession of Saxony and of the passes over the Iron
Mountains, enabled the defence of that kingdom to be en-
trusted to the single reserve corps of General Miilbe. In case,
however, that Austrian raids might be made into Saxony, or to
oppose the Bavarians in case they might attempt by way of
Hof into that country, fortifications were thrown up round
Dresden.
On the left wing of the Prussian base of operations. Lower
And Middle Silesia were covered from an Austrian attack by the
nature of the Prussian offensive movement as well as by the
fortresses of Glatz and Neisse. That portion of Silesia, how-
ever, above Oppeln, which penetrates into Austrian territory,
was exposed to hostile attacks from Oderberg and from Galicia.
In order not to weaken the armies of operations by detaching
troops to protect this portion of the province, new and peculiar
means were adopted. Two scouting parties were formed which
were to support each other ; and in case of formidable attack,
144 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V.
to withdraw into the fortress of KoseL One of these was
under General Knoblesdorf, and consisted oi three battalions
of infantry, some battalions of Landwehr, a regiment of cavaliy
of the Line, and one battery. Its head-quarters were at
Ratibor. The other consisted of Landwehr only, and mustered
six battalions, two regiments of cavalry, two companies of
Jagers, and one battery. It was commanded by Count Stol-
berg, and stationed at Nicolai. These parties were not only
intended to watch the frontier and oppose an irruption by the
Austrians, but were also to annoy the enemy beyond the fron-
tier, and to break up hi^ railway communications. As a con-
sequence of these arrangements, a lively war of detachments
was soon developed along .the Upper Silesian frontier, the
details of which aflford many interesting records of personal
adventure, and the results of which demonstrated that the
Prussian possesses in rapidity, subtlety, and endurance, all the
qualities necessary for the accidents of petty warfare. Each
detachment protected well its own position of the frontier, and
only at a few points did the enemy succeed in effecting
momentary sallies : they kept the Austrian troops in Western
Galicia in check, and did considerable damage to their enemy.
In one instance they destroyed the railway from Oswiecin to
Oderberg so thoroughly, that the communication from Cracow
to Bohemia as well as to Vienna was completely broken.
CHAPTER 11.
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS.
On the 23rd June the Army of the Elbe and the First Anny
were to cross the Bohemian frontier. When it is considered
that not only the concentration and advance of the troops had
to be arranged after the occupation of Saxony, but also the
supply of provisions and ammunition, the establishment of
hospitals, and the bringing up of reserves, it seems wonderful
that these two armies could have been ready in so few days to
take the field.
The southern boundary of Saxon Lusatia runs forward for a
distance of about fifteen English miles within the general line
of the Bohemian frontier of Austria. In the salient angle of
Saxony formed by this peculiar tracing of the border line stands
within Saxon territory the frontier town of Zittau. This town
covers the issue of the passes which lead from Reichenberg and
Friedland in Bohemia, through the mountains into Lusatia,
and commands the railway which by the pass of Reichenberg
runs fix>m Tiimau to Bautzen. About six miles to the north-
east of Zittau and about seventeen south-west of Gorlitz the
village of Hirschfeld is situated on the Neisse, at a point where
this river receives a small aflluent called the Kipper. To this
village the head-quarters of the First Army were moved on the
22nd June. Directly to the south were clearly seen the bold
swelling masses of the Bohemian mountains, which here rise
higher than in any part of the chain except where the Schnee-
koppe looms over the passes whicji lead into Silesia. The
bre^ in the mountain line which shows the defile through
which passes the road to Reichenberg could be distinctly seen
from here. Many eyes were often turned towards the gap in
146 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V.
the clear relief of the hills against the sky, and many sought to
know whether Prince Frederick Charies had come south to
force that pass, or expected the Austrians to issue from it But
those who had that day marched along the seventeen miles of
dusty road from Gorlitz could have little doubt with what
object the First Army had advanced ; the amount of transport
which stretched in almost a continuous line for twelve miles of
the way, told clearly that it was attached to an army destined
for more than the mere defence of a frontier.
Prince Frederick Charles on the 22nd broke up his quarters
at Gorlitz, drew the First Army together, and launched it by
the two roads which lead through Zittau and Seidenberg re-
spectively, towards the Austrian frontier. The head-quarter
staff left Gorlitz about three in the afternoon, and pushed along
a road crowded with marching troops and military carriages to
Hirschfeld. The road from Gorlitz to that place was covered
with an almost unbroken stream of infantry regiments, batteries
of artillery, cavalry detachments, military carriages, and a long
line of country waggons as supplementary transport, while the
thick cloud of dust, which rose about a mile and a half to the
left, showed that an equally strong column was pushing forward
by the Seidenberg road. The heat was great, and the dust,
rising in dense clouds from beneadi the feet of the men and
horses, or wheels of the carriages, hung heavily upon the march-
ing columns ; but the men stepped out cheerily, for they were
anxious to advance, and they did not seem to suflFer from
fatigue. The regiments marched in with drums and fifes play-
ing, ranks closed up, no stragglers, and the men keeping step
so well that, but for the dust on their clothes and appointments,
they might have been imagined to be going for instead of
returning from a march.
The chausste leading from Gorlitz to Zittau is broad enough
to allow four carriages to pass. The march was excellently
arranged ; there was no confusion, and no halts had to be made
except those which were necessary to aUow the men to rest
The carriages of the military train were scrupulously kept to
one side of the road, so as to leave the rest clear for die troops.
Its own baggage marched in the rear of each battalion, but it
was not much ; only one waggon with the reserve ammunition.
Chap. IL] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY, 147
a cart for the officers* baggage, three or four packhorses to
carry the paymaster's books, and the doctors' medicine carts.
The soldiers marched strongly; their faces were % lit up with
excitement, for they knew that every pace brought them
nearer to the enemy, and they longed for battle. The country
people on the road or working by the wayside exchanged kind
words with the men, and expressed many good wishes for their
success, and did so with sincerity, for the Prussian soldiers who
had been billeted in the Saxon hamlets had made themselves
great favourites with the villagers.
Never was a march better conducted. The standing crops
which fringed the road for almost its entire length were in no
single place either trampled down or passed through. The
road was crowded and dusty, but the men never left it, and,
if there was a halt where com grew by the wayside, no soldier
went further from the line of march than to sit on the narrow
fringe of grass which separates the chaussee from the cultivated
ground, and in no case were the field, intruded upon. The staff
officers, too, with a wise provision for the comfort of the troops,
and with a careful regard for the farmers, had arranged that
halts of long duration should be made by alternate regiments
at places where the hay had been cut and carried home, and
the short grass could, without itself suffering any harm, afford
relief to the heated feet of the soldiers.
The road about a mile south of Gorlitz descends a steep hill,
formed by the spur of the Landeskrone, which runs down to
the edge of the Neisse, and on which the town of Gorlitz is
built It then runs along the valley as far as Ostritz ; on the
right are wide unenclosed fields covered with rich crops, which
terminate on the low line of hills that fringes the valley towards
the west ; on the left runs the slow stream of the Neisse,
shrouded in willows; beyond the river a chain of gentle ele-
vations separates its valley from that formed by the Rolte
rivulet, up which runs the road from Gorlitz by Seidenberg to
Friedland. A mile south of Ostritz a chain of hills, standing
directly across the road, forms a defile through which the river
winds with a narrowed stream, the road bends to the right, and
goes over a hill thickly covered witli fir-trees, but soon descends
again, and at Hirschfeld rejoins the course of the river. Two
L 2
148 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V.
good military positions for an army retreating on Gorlitz are
afforded on this road — that behind Hirschfeld, where in front
of the hill a rivulet crosses the way ; and a second where, in
front of Gorlitz, the road dips down into the valley.
The Prussian troops were on the night of the 22nd in force
in Zittau and Seidenberg, and the troops were placed along the
road which connects those two towns. Head-quarters were
established in a very picturesque, but not over-clean, Saxon
village. Prince Frederick Charles and his staff occupied the
village inn ; the square in front, half market-place, half green,
was crowded with the carriages of the military train. Soldiers
were billeted in every cottage, and chargers stood in every
stable. The little hamlet was a continual scene of busy tur-
moil ; horses were being attended to, arms were being cleaned,
and the men were making ready for to-morrow's march ; while
now and then a distant trumpet on the left told that the even-
ing watches were being set by the troops that lay towards the
frontier.
The resources of this little village were sorely taxed by the
sudden inroad of hungry men ; the common room of the inn
was filled with a multitude of soldiers hungry with a long day's
march. Each man bought a large piece of bread and a junk
of meat, and retiring to a side table, or bench, cut it up with
his pocket-knife, and made a hearty meal. The regimental
officers fared no better than their men. The campaign had
already begun, and a great deal of the outward distinctions of
ranks had been, as is always the case, shaken off, but the real
discipline was unimpaired.
The health of the army was excellent ; the sick only averaged
2 J per cent, which would be a remarkably small number even
in a period of profound peace. The sanitary arrangements
were so good that there seemed to be every chance of this
small proportion of illness being maintained.
The surgeons, hospital attendants, and sick-bearers wore on
their lefl arm a white band with a red cross, as a mark of their
profession and their neutrality.
No declaration of war against Austria was made by Prussia ;
but on the morning of the 23rd, at daybreak, Prince Frederick
Charles sent one of his aides-de-camp, Major von Rauch, to
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY, 149
announce to the commander of the nearest Austrian post that
he in the course of the day intended to pass the Bohemian
frontier. Von Rauch, as is usual in such cases, accompanied
by a trumpeter, whom he caused constantly to sound, and
himself waving a white handkerchief, fell in with one of the
Austrian patrols, which was furnished by Radetzky's hussars.
The patrol fired on the staff officer, fortunately without effect ;
he boldly rode up to it, and on explaining the object of his
visit, was conducted blindfold to the commandant of the ad-
vanced post, which was Reichenberg ; this officer, of course,
apologized for the mistake which his patrol had made, and
the aide-de-camp, after a 'long and early ride, was escorted back
to within a short distance of the Saxon frontier, where he soon
met the advancing columns of his own army.
Prince Frederick Charles, late on the night of the 22nd, issued
the following General Order to the First Army : —
" Head Quarters, GOrlitz, June 22.
" Soldiers ! — Austria, faithless and regardless of treaties, has for some
time, without declaring war, not respected the Prussian frontier in Upper
Silesia. I therefore, likewise, without a declaration of war, might have
Passed the frontier of Bohemia. I have not done so. I have caused a
public declaration to be sent, and now we enter the territory of the enemy
in order to defend our own country.
"Let our undertaking rest with God. Let us leave our affairs in the
°ands of Him who rules the hearts of men, who decides the fate of natioiLs,
jnd the issue of battles. As it stands written in Holy Writ — *Let your
hearts beat to God, and your hands on the enemy.*
**In this war are concerned — ^you know it — the maintenance of Prussia's
most sacred rights, and the very existence of our dear native land. Her
«iemies have declared their intention to dismember and to destroy her.
Shall the streams of blood which your fathers and mine poured out imder
Frederick the Great, in the War of Independence, and which we ourselves
latterly shed at Diippel and Alsen, have been spilt in vain ? Never ! We will
^intain Prussia as she is, and by victories make her stronger and mightier.
We would be worthy of our fathers.
. ** We rely on the God of our fathers, who will be mighty in us, and will
bless the arms of Prussia.
"So, forward with our old battle cry, * With God for King and
' atberland ! Long live the King ! *
"FREDERICK CHARLES, General of Cavalry.''
On the morning of the 23rd the Prussian armies crossed the
frontier of the Austrian territories. General Herwarth von
Kttenfeld, with the Army of the Elbe, marched by the high
150 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book V.
road from Schluckenau to Rumburg. Prince Frederick Charles,
with the 4th corps d'arm^e, followed by the 2nd corps, and the
cavalry corps^ advanced along the road and railway leading
from Zittau to Reichenberg, while the 3rd corps moved from
Seidenberg and Marklissa over the passes of Schonwald and
Neustadtl on Friedland.
The troops were early under arms, and fell into their ranks a
little after daybreak, under a steady downfall of drizzling rain.
They had to march many miles from their billets to the places
where they were to form columns for the advance, but they
stepped out well over the slippery grass and sloppy roads, and
were all ranged in proper order close to the Austrian frontier,
but still on Saxon ground, a litde after 7. At 6 the Com-
mander-in-chief lefl his last night*s quarters at Hirschfeld, and
by the Zittau road reached the frontier a little before 8. The
frontier is marked on the road by a tollhouse, in front of which
a long bar supplies the place of a gate. This bar balances near
its end furthest from the tollhouse on a pivot, and, by means
of a weight at the end of its shorter arm, can be raised almost
perpendicularly upwards when the road is to be left open for a
free passage. On this bar are painted the alternate black and
gold stripes which are the distinctive colours of Austria. The
bar was raised that day, but not quite in a vertical position ;
high enough to allow a man on horseback to ride under it, it
still sloped over the road. It was here that Prince Frederick
Charles took up his position to watch his troops march over
the border. He had hardly arrived there before he gave the
necessary orders, and in a few moments the Uhlans, who
formed the advanced guard of the regiments that marched by
this line, were over the frontier. Then followed the infantry.
As the leading ranks of each battalion arrived at the first point
on the road from which they caught sight of the Austrian
colours that showed the frontier, they raised a cheer, which
was quickly caught up by those in the rear, and was repeated
again and again till, when the men came up to the tollhouse
and saw their soldier Prince standing on the border line, it
swelled into a roar of rapturous delight, which only ceased to
be replaced by a martial song that was caught up by each
battalion as it poured into Bohemia. Their chief himself stood
Chap. IL] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 151
by the roadside calm and collected ; but he gazed proudly on
the passing sections, and well he might, for never did an army
cross an enemy's frontier better equipped, better cared for, or
with a higher courage than that which marched out of Saxony
that day« Ever and anon he would call from a passing bat-
talion some officer or soldier who had before served under him,
and with a kindly inquiry or cheerful word, won a heart, for
soldiers love officers who take an interest in diem. Everywhere
the Prince was greeted by the troops with loud cries of joy; as
he rode along the way by which the regiments were marching
they cheered him continuously. At one point his reception was
peculiarly remarkable. A Pomeranian regiment (the 2nd),
which had served under him when he was a divisional general,
had piled its arms for a halt, and the men were lying down by
the side of the road to rest Suddenly the word was passed
among them that the Prince was coming; with one accord
they sprang as if by magic to their feet, made two long lines
along the road through which he might pass, and gave him such
a cheer as only old soldiers can.
The concentration of the troops and the advance into
Bohemia were most excellently managed. This same army
had exactly a week before entered Saxony, prepared to fight in
that country ; within that time Saxony had been entirely occu-
pied, and within six days the majority of the troops were again
concentrated, and began their march into Austria. The advance
was conducted in this way: — The troops the previous night
were concentrated on the frontier; on the morning of the 23rd,
on the right, Herwarth von Bittenfeld pushed forward two
columns from Dresden by Schluckenau and Rumburg ; Prince
Frederick Charles advanced frx>m Saxony ; his troops marched
in five columns; the column on the right followed the high
road from Zittau ; the right centre column marched along the
railway lying to the left of that road; the centre column
followed a road to the left of the railway. The left centre
column marched by the Seidenberg road, and the left column
by the Marklissa road east of this highway. Thus on a broad
front, and by several roads all within a distance which would
allow the different corps to concentrate in a very few hours,
the army moved to the front well in hand and without incon-
152 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V.
venience to the troops. The march within Austrian territory
was distinguished by the same regard for private property that
was so scrupulously observed in Saxony. The Austrian villagers
at first looked on the irruption of the army of the northern
Germans half in fear, half in curiosity, but soon they came to
be on speaking terms with the soldiers, and then were quickly
seen supplying them with drinking water and doing them other
good services.
The Castle of Grafenstein, in which the head quarters were
fixed on the night of the 23rd, is the property of Count Clam
Gallas, who commanded the first Austrian corps in Bohemia ;
it is beautifully situated on the top of a hill, covered with thick
foliage, which rises abruptly from the low ground of the valley
of the Neisse. The Count had not left much furniture for the
use of his unexpected guests, as nearly all the moveables were
sent away some time before to Vienna, but a stock of mattresses
were found in the house which the servants good-naturedly lent
to the temporary occupants, and a Prince of Prussia and his
staff were accommodated in the rooms of an officer who was
waiting to fight a battle with their army beyond the mountains.
Two of Radetzky's hussars were taken prisoners ; they were
out with a patrol and came into collision with a patrol ot the
Prussian regiment of Magdeburg hussars ; in the skirmish the
horses of these two Austrians were shot, and the men were
taken. They were tlie first prisoners of the war. The rapid
concentration of the Prussian army produced some feats in
marching, which were quite extraordinary for troops who had
only just taken the field. The 5th Pomeranian hussars
marched three days successively for long distances, and on
the 22nd made fifty English miles; they were again on the
line of march on the 24th, with horses in excellent condition,
and the men looking as if they had only just turned out of
barracks.
The Prussians were now on the northern slopes of the
mountains, and one day's march would, without opposition,
take them through the passes. The highest hills were now so
close that with a glass the stems of the fir-trees which clothed
them could be easily distinguished. The road to Reiclienberg
lay straight and open before thenL The march of the 23rd
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY, 153
was different from that of the preceding day ; it was a march
which showed that the enemy might be found in front The
heavy baggage and reserve commissariat transport was all a
day's march in rear ; the only carriages which were present in
the column of route were the guns and waggons of the artil-
lery, the hospital carnages, and the few waggons which are
necessary to regiments when actually about to fight.
The advanced posts, on the evening of the 23rd, were pushed
forwards about seven miles; there were vigilant patrols and
pickets out, and all was provided for against a surprise. These
precautions are of course always necessary with an army in the
field ; in the present case their utility was not put to the test,
for the Austrians were not in force in the neighbourhood.
Count Clam Gallas, to whom the Austrian commander had
entrasted the guidance of the Austrian and Saxon troops on
the Iser, had only pushed patrols of light cavalry up to and
beyond Reichenbeig. Several skirmishes took place between
them and the Prussian hussars, dragoons, and lancers, who
formed the advanced scouts in front of each column, in which
the Austrian cavalry was generally outnumbered and obliged to
retire.
It rained steadily all the night of the 23rd, and the morning
brought no improvement in the weather, but the troops were in
high sphits, and appeared to care nothing for the wet On the
24th the army of Prince Frederick Charles marched by three
roads : the left column by way of Eisniedel on Reichenberg ;
the centre by Kratzkau on the same town ; while General von
Bittenfeld came from the mountains, and moved upon Gabel.
Some of the regiments halted at Reichenbeig, and were billeted
in the town for the night; others were pushed through and
took up positions in front Many battalions had to bivouac
that evening; but, although the ground was moist and damp
from incessant rain, the weather was warm, and the troops did
not take much harm from their first night in the open. The
srmy was now drawn together and concentrated round Reich-
enberg ; for General von Bittenfeld at Gabel was only twelve
miles to the right On the night of the 24th, the Prussian
advanced posts near Kratzkau could see the light of the
Austrian bivouac fires, and the next morning the Magdeburg
154 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book V.
hussars who cleared the way for the army had a skirmish with
some of Radetzky's Austrian hussars. Shots were exchanged,
two of the Prussians were wounded and five of the Austrians
were wounded, with two killed. A combat was expected at
Reichenberg. Three Austrian cavalry regiments, Lichtenstein's
hussars, Radetzky's hussars, and the hussars- of the regiment of
Hesse-Cassel, were known to be in front of the Prussian
advance, and it was anticipated that in the fine strategical posi-
tion of Reichenberg the Austrians might stand to fight \ for this
town covers the junction of roads which leads over the moun-
tains by Gabel, Grottau, Friedland, and from Hirschberg. But
the Austrian cavalry retired through the town, and it was
occupied about ten o'clock by the Prussian advanced guard ;
and Prince Frederick Charles, without a blow, gained the
south side of the mountains, and commanded the issues of the
passes.
The march of the 24th, although over a hill country, was not
over a severe road, for the summit of the mountain chain dips
so deeply into the gorge which forms the defile of Reichenberg,
that the road through the pass both ascends and descends with
a moderate gradient ; on either side of the way the mountains
rise high, but not steep, for the whole character of this range is
more rounded and swelling than bold and sharp. As the army
passed between the hills in the early morning, the tops were
shrouded in a dense mist, which occasionally lifted high enough
to show the lower parts of the dense fir woods which clothe
the upper mountain sides, but never to afford a glimpse of their
summits. The rain fell heavily and without ceasing; it battered
down the grain which grew in the fields by the wayside, and
filled the mountain watercourses with rushing mud-coloured
streams ; there was no wind to give it a slanting direction, and
it came straight down on the men's helmets, only to roll off in
large drops upon their backs and shoulders, but it did not seem
to depress the spirits of the troops ; they stepped along cheerily,
marching as well as they did the first day they left their garri-
sons, and many of the soldiers said that they preferred the wet
weather to heat All along the line of march the commander
of the army was loudly cheered.
When Prince Frederick Charles reached the market-place of
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 155
Reichenbeig, he halted to await the arrival of the troops who
had marched by the Friedland road. The town looked dull,
for as it was Sunday the shops were all shut, and at first the
Bohemians seemed inclined to remain in their houses ; but the
bands of the marching regiments roused their curiosity, and they
soon collected and lined the street in dense crowds to see the
troops go by. The soldiers who had arrived early and had been
dismissed from their ranks joined in the crowd, and a common
language soon made them great friends with the townspeople.
Many tales are told of the dreadful devastation to which a
country is subjected by the plunderers of an invading army.
So far as the Prussian army had yet advanced into Bohemia the
soldiers had treated the Austrians with the greatest kindness ;
as in the British service, everything that a soldier wished to buy
must be scrupulously paid for, and there seemed to be no desire
among the men that it should be otherwise ; in fact, the troops
were much more plundered than plunderers, for the cigar mer-
chants and public-house keepers were driving a most prosperous
trade, and took very good care that they themselves did not
suffer, for the soldiers were unaccustomed to Austrian currency,
and had to pay an equivalent of Prussian coin.
Reichenberg was, on the morning of the 24th, occupied by the
Prussians about ten o'clock. Before evening nearly the whole
army, attended by artillery and waggons, marched through the
narrow winding streets of a town which to these artificial disad-
vantages for free locomotion adds the natural one of being built
upon a steep hill ; still there was no confusion in the marching
columns, and, although the troops had to move by different
streets and were sometimes obliged to march in and out of the
town by country lanes and narrow paths, no column took a
false direction or made an unnecessary halt ; yet the Quarter-
master-General von Stiilpnagel had only a few minutes allowed
him in which he could arrange his plans.
The column which had marched by the Friedland route was
brought through the market-place and past the Commander-in-
chief. This corps was composed of men of the province of
Brandenburg ; they were taller than the average of the Prussian
infantry, but were not so thick and stout, and did not look so
strong as the sturdy Pomeranians; but they had intelligent
j::*
156 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book W
faces, and could readily be seen to be, as they were, men of an
education superior to that which is usually found in the ranks.
The regiment of the late King led ; the men bore his cj^her on
their shoulder cords, instead of a number. The whole corps
marched magnificendy. After a wet day and a long journey
they came up the hill of Reichenberg with ranks closed up,
with as perfect a step as on a holiday parade, and went swing-
ing along as if they could not know fatigue ; yet they were
heavily encumbered, for every man carried his knapsack, the
weight of which tells severely against a soldier's marching, and
might, in a country where transport is plentiful, be carried for
him. After the late King's regiment came the 64th, Prince
Frederick Charles's own : the faces of the soldiers showed that
they recognised their colonel, and they went past him without
cheering, for in the town the men marched as on parade, but
with that appearance which is more pleasing to a soldier than
any acclamations.
The head-quarters were established in the Schloss or Castle
of Reichenberg, another of the properties of Count Clam Gallas,
who thus twice became the involuntary host of Prince Frederick
Charles. Here a curious scene was afforded : the castle stands
on a hill, overlooks the picturesque town, and commands a
beautiful view of the plains and mountains beyond it The
side of this hill below the castle was covered with carefully-
tended turf, and luxuriant shrubberies. The place seemed only
fit to be the quiet home of a country gentleman, but up and
down its gravelled avenue chargers were being led ready sad-
dled for the aides-de-camp, who were waiting to carry out the
evening orders ; military train horses were being led to water,
soldiers, in stable dress, were hurrying about, mounted dragoons
were in attendance as orderlies, and near the door of the castle
stood the horse of the officer of Uhlans, who had brought in
the last report from the outposts.
On the afternoon of the 24th, the Tburingian regiment of
Uhlans, who are much the same as lancers, took up outpost
duty, and one squadron of them had a skirmish with some of
Radetzky's hussars. The hussars were led by a staff officer,
who came too near the Prussian infantry picket, and the deadly
Heedle-gun shot the first officer who fell a victim to this war.
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMV. 157
The hussars and Uhlans mutually chaiiged each other, and in
the me/Se which ensued, two Prussian officers and seventeen
men were wounded. The Austrian loss was not ascertained.
The possession of Reichenberg allowed Prince Frederick
Charles to open railway communication with the Silesian and
Saxon lines, which was of great importance in the supply of the
amiy's necessities. The railway from Reichenberg to Zittau
was almost immediately restored, for to each Prussian army was
attached a corps of pioneers, architects, and railway officials,
who followed Uie advancing army, laid down the lines torn up
by the enemy, and rapidly reorganized the working of the line
for the purposes of military transport
Two other excellent institutions of the Prussian army were
quickly established, and put in working order at every halting-
place ; they were the Field Telegraph and the Field Post-office.
As soon as it was determined where head-quarters were to be
fixed for the night, the field telegraph division started off to the
nearest permanent telegraph station where the line could be
fixed in working order ; from this starting point they carried a
single line along the side of the shortest road to the head-
quarter house, and generally by the time the chief of the staflf
amved at his quarters he found his telegraph ready, by which
he could get information or send his orders. The field post-
office was established also at head-quarters, but had branch
offices at the head-quarters of each corps d'armde ; it carried
the private letters of soldiers and officers, as well as official
tlespatches, and sent out a mail nearly daily. This was a
greater convenience than the field telegraph, but the latter was
one of the neatest appliances of modem science to the art of
^ar which it is possible to conceive. The whole of its ap-
paratus was carried in some light waggons ; one contained the
hatteries and needles, and was used as a small room in which
the telegraphist worked ; the other waggons carried the poles
and wires, with the implements for putting them up. The
wires Were coiled round revolving discs, which were fitted in
the waggon, so that the wire could be passed as the waggon
^ent along, or the disc could be transferred to a stretcher ear-
ned between two men, so that it might be laid oflf the road in
places where it was desirable to cut oflf comers. The detach-
tsS SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book V.
ment who laid the lines were all instructed in repairing damage
done to the permanent wires. When it is remembered that on
the morning of the 23rd the Austrians were close up to the
frontier, and that at midday the Castle of Grafenstein, five miles
firom the nearest permanent station, was in direct telegraphic
communication with Berlin, some idea can be formed of the
advantages which this apparatus gives to an army in the field
The head-quarters of the First Army halted at Reichenberg
on the 25th, to allow the cavalry that came by the Friedland
road which had covered the march of the column to come in.
During the day the outposts were pushed forward, but the
Austrians were not felt
Count Clam Gallas had drawn his army together on the
south of the line of Iser, round Miinchengratz. The Poschacher
brigade, supported by the light cavalry, was posted as his
advanced guard on the northern side of the river, and was
pushed forward along the road to Reichenberg. This was the
same Austrian brigade which had in Schleswig, in 1864, on
account of the sturdy manner in which it stormed and oc-
cupied the Konigsberg, gained the name of the " iron
brigade." It was now destined to commence the contest
against its former allies in the
COMBAT OF LIEBENAU.
The Austrian brigade occupied the hills south of the village
of Liebenau, about half way between Reichenberg and Tiimau,
and had pushed detachments into the village itself.
The road from Reichenberg to Tiimau crosses a range of
hills which separates the valley of the Upper Neisse fi'om the
country beyond, and drops down from this range by some
sharp zigzags to the valley in which lies the village of Liebenau.
This village is built on the banks of a stream which forms a
defile through a second range of hills lying between Liebenau
and Tiimau. This rivulet, in the part of its course above the
village of Liebenau, mns at right angles to the defile, and forais
a valley between the two hills which lie north of Liebenau
towards Reichenberg, and those which lie to the south towards
Tiimau. The railway from Liebenau to Tiimau passes through
J
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 159
the defile formed by the stream which rans through the village ;
but the road turns to the left and ascends the southern range,
passing near the top between a steep cutting through rocks.
This cutting is about 100 yards in length, and here the road is
only about 30 feet wide. The hills are on their side covered
with thick plantations of fir trees; but when the traveller
leaving Liebenau has by the road gained the summit of the
range which lies south of the village, he finds before him a wild
plateau extending for about two miles in the direction of
Tiimau. This plateau was this morning covered with high-
standing crops of wheat and barley, already whitening for the
harvest The road runs through the corn-fields, and at the end
of the plateau drops down by a gentle slope into the valley ot
the Iser. From the brow of this slope Tiimau can be seen
lying on the river towards the left front The Schloss of
Sichrow, standing on the very edge of the Liebenau defile, is
directly on the right, and the view to the front is bounded by
the fir-clad and fantastically rocky hills which form the southern
boundary of the valley of tfie Iser, while on the left the church
of Gentschowitz stands raised on a knoll above the general
plain, and looking down upon the orchards and cottages of the
little hamlet which clusters round its foot
Between the bottom of the slope which falls firom this flat
plain into the valley and the Iser, and about half way between
the foot of the hill and the river itself, there runs a low range
of hills, having an elevation considerably inferior to that of the
plateau. On this lower range, immediately surrounded by
orchards, but in the midst of a wide-stretching com land, Ues
the village of Kositz.
On the evening of the 25th the Prussian advanced posts
were pushed forward to the tops of the range of hills which
bound the valley of Liebenau on the north. The next morn-
ing General von Home, who with the 8th division held the
outposts, had advanced early to occupy Liebenau. As his
advanced guard entered the village, the Austrian rear-guard
were discovered tearing up the pavement, in order to form a
barricade across the narrow street through which the high road
runs. On the approach of the advanced guard they retired to
the hill over which the road to Tiimau passes south of the
i6o SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book V.
village. Here the Austrians took up position; their artil-
lery, placed on the brow of the hill, looked down upon the
village of Liebenau, which Home had just occupied, and their
cavalry covered the guns. But they were not in force. They
had little infantry, and their main strength appeared to be only
four regiments of cavalry, with two batteries of horse artillery.
Home's division passed through the village, and began to
ascend the hill, while General von Hann came down to
Liebenau with the Pmssian cavalry, and the field artillery took
up a position on the hills which bound the Liebenau valley on
the north. Thus the guns of the Austrians were on the
southern, those of the Prussians on the northern range, which
form the valley of Liebenau ; the valley between them is about
600 yards wide, and there seemed to be an opportunity for a
smart combat Down in Liebanau, between the opposed
batteries, were the wings of Home's divisions, and columns
were already issuing from the village, making their way along
both the railway and the chaussee^ while the skirmishers were
getting among the short spruce firs that clothe the hill beside
the road.
A little before nine o'clock Prince Frederick Charles and his
staff came upon the hill where the artillery was placed. It was
almost exactly the same hour when a flash of fire, with a heavy
puff of white smoke on the Austrian hill, showed that their
artillery had opened, and a rifle shell came whistling over the
heads of Home's division. The Prussian artillery answered,
and for a few minutes the hills echoed with the noise of their
rapid discharges ; while the smoke, drifting but slowly on the
lazy breeze, hid from sight the opposite guns, though the quick
reports and the whistling of the shells told that they were not
idle. But the Pmssian guns were too numerous. Home's
division was pushing up the hill, and the Austrian artillery had
to retire. Then the Pmssian cavalry pushed forward by the
road, and in a short time, eight fine cavalry regiments were
formed on the northem edge of the plateau. The Thuringian
Uhlans, the Uhlans of the Prince of Hohenlohe, and the
dragoons of the Prince of Mecklenburg were extended to the
left, while the Brandenburg hussars of Ziethen, conspicuous by
their red uniform, were nearer the road. On the right of the
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY, i6i
cavalry was the horse artilleiy, and Prince Frederick Charies,
himself a cavalry officer, was in the front
The retreat of the Austrians could be traced by the broad
paths trampled down in the com, and every now and then they
halted, their artillery came into action, and two or three rounds
were fired at the forming lines. When Prince Frederick Charles
had completed his dispositions he ordered the advance, and the
troops pressed forward. The cavalry and artillery moved on
the plateau, while Home's infantry, on the right, made for the
Schloss of Sichrow and the woods around it The cavalry
pushed on quickly, and the guns moved well with it, but every
now and then halted and came into action. The Austrians,
inferior in numbers and already retiring, could not hope to
stand against the force thus displayed, and they drew quickly
over the plateau, making for the hills of Kositz. Three regi-
ments of cavalry were launched after them, and went dashing
through the com, but did not reach the retiring troops before
the latter had quitted the plateau, and then the woods and
broken ground on the side of the slopes impeded their progress.
As soon as the Austrians gained the Kositz hills their artillery
opened, and poured shells briskly into the advancing lines, but
the gliding motion of the advancing troops and the undulating
ground deceived their aim, for only about twenty casualties
occurred When the Prussian guns gained the southem brow
of the plateau, they opened on the Austrian batteries ; a smart
cannonade ensued, but the Austrians were ultimately silenced
Yet they did well, for they made good their retreat ; but had
not the Pmssian horse been detained by having to pass through
the narrow street of Liebenau, the field artillery which that day
fired into the Pmssian ranks would probably have gone as a
trophy to Berlin.
It is evident that the Austrian commander had not calcu-
lated on the rapid advance of General von Home. His
dispositions for the defence of the Liebenau position were
incomplete ; the street of Liebenau was not rendered imprac-
ticable, for the workmen were disturbed by the Pmssian ad-
vance guard, and in the cutting which the road leading from
the village passes through at the top of the hill leading on to
the plateau, although the trees which stood by the wayside had
i62 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book V.
been cut down, they were not fonned into abattis^ nor was the
cutting blocked by waggons or any barricade. The Austrians
retreated across the Iser, and broke the bridge of Tiimau, but
the Prussians after the combat occupied that town with Home's
division, while the main body of the anny bivouacked on the
plateau, and one division occupied Gablenz, which lies five
miles to the north-east
On the same day the 14th division, which belonged to the
Army of the Elbe, occupied Bohmisch Aicha, and assured free
commmiication between Prince Frederick Charies and General
Herwarth von Bittenfeld.
The plateau that looks down on Liebenau was sadly changed
in the coarse of the day. The com was trampled down by the
feet of horses and the wheels of artilleiy ; dead horses lay
dotted here and there over the plain, while large holes in the
ground showed where shells had struck and burst But these
marks were not frequent, for the Austrian shells often pene-
trated into the earth without bursting, and several were dag out
by the soldiers in the aflemoon. Nor was the practice of their
artillery good. The Ziethen hussars, whose red uniforms drew
their fire, were at one time exposed to a heavy cannonade ;
but though above fifty shells struck the ground around them,
not one fell among their ranks, not at that time had they a man
touched.
The result of the combat of Liebenau was not over-valued in
the Prussian army ; the officers on that side did not despise
their enemy, and they fully recognised the fact that it was to
superior numbers that the Austrians yielded. They had great
confidence in their chief and in the needle-gun and their rifled
cannon, but they had no vain assurance. They knew that
the Austrian army was a good one, and they determined to
omit nothing that their skill or science could suggest to let
their troops meet it on the best of terms.
The Austrians retired to Podoll in order to hold that im-
portant point, where not only the road to Miinchengratz but
also the railway between Tiimau, Kralup, and Prague crosses
the Iser.
General Home, after the action of Liebenau, pushed forward
to the Iser and occupied Tiimau, the junction of the railway
Chap. IL] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 163
from Reichenberg with that to Prague. After a bridge of
pontoons had been thrown across the river here in order to
replace the one broken by the Austrians, he determined to
occupy the bridges of Podoll five miles below Tiimau. The
movement by which he effected this brought on the
ACTION OF PODOLL.
The railway and high road which lead down the valley of
the Iser from Tiimau to Miinchengratz run for a distance of
about five miles from the former town on the north side of the
river, but on reaching the village of Podoll cross to the south
bank by two bridges, which are about aoo yards distant from
each oAer, that of the railway being on the right, and that by
which the road crosses on the left of a person, looking towards
Miinchengratz. The railway bridge is constructed of iron ;
that which carries the road across the stream is made of wood,
and lies on a level with the causeway, which is raised on an
embankment about ten feet above the fiat meadows lying
alongside it The Iser is at Podoll near upon 100 yards wide,
and runs with a deep but fast stream between steep banks,
which only rise about four feet above the level of the water.
By the side of the road and on the banks of the stream grow
large willow-trees, planted at equal distances from each other,
and at about ten yards apart. Three roads lead from the
plateau of Sichrow to the high road that runs down the valley
of the Iser. That on the east, a country road, which leaves
the plateau near the Schloss of Sichrow and joins the highway
near tlie village of Swierzin, almost at an equal distance between
Tiimau and Podoll ; in the centre the chauss'ee from Liebenau
strikes into the high road halfway between Swierzin and
Tiimau, and the road from Gentschowitz on the west joins it
close to this town.
On the afternoon of the 26th, Prince Frederick Charles threw
a light pontoon bridge over the river a Httle below the broken
bridge of Tiimau, and occupied the town with a small force
without opposition. Part of Home's division marched at the
same time by the country road on the east, occupied the
village of Swierzin, and pushed its advanced guard towards
M 2
i64 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book V.
PodolL The troops directed on this point consisted of two
companies of the 4th Jager battalion, the 2nd and fusilier
battalions of the 31st regiment, and the ist battalion of the
71st. The Jagers, who were leading, got to within three-
quarters of a mile of Podoll-bridge before they came into
collision with Austrian outposts, but here they found the
enemy, and a sharp action ensued, for the Austrians had six
battalions in the village, and meant to hold the place and cover
the passage of the river.
It was about 8 o'clock, and the dusk of the evening was
rapidly closing in, when the Jagers first felt their enemy. On
the right-hand side of the road, about half a mile before the
bridge, stands the first house of the village. It is a large square
farm-house, with windows without glass, but with heavy gratings.
The Austrians had occupied it in force, and their outlying
pickets, as they retired before the advancing Prussians, formed
line across the road beside it. As soon as the Jagers came
within sight the garrison of the farmhouse and the formed-up
pickets opened a bitter fire upon them. From the grated win-
dows and from the line of soldiers in the road there came one
rapid volley, which told severely on the Prussian riflemen, but
these went quickly to work, and had fired about three times
before the Austrians, armed only with muzzle-loading rifles,
were able to reply. Then the noise of musketry rose high,
occasionally swelling into a heavy roar, but sometimes falling
oflf so that the ear could distinguish the separate reports. But
this did not last Major von Hagen, commanding the 2nd
battalion of the 31st, which was following the Jagers on the
first sound of the firing, had put his troops into double quick
time, and was soon up to reinforce the riflemen. It was now
nearly dark, and the flashes of the rifles, the reports of the
shots, and the shouts of the combatants were almost the only
indications of the positions of the troops ; yet it could be seen
that the rapid fire of the needle-gun was telling on the Austrian
line in the road, and the advancing cheers of the Prussians
showing that they were gaining ground. Then while the
exchange of shots was still proceeding rapidly between the
window-gratings of the farm-house and the Prussian firing
parties, who had extended into a cornfield on the right of the
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY, 165
highway, there was a sudden pause in the firing on the road,
for the Jagers, supported by the 31st, had made a dash, and
were bearing the Austrians back beyond the farm-house to
where the cottages of the village closed on each side of the
road, and where the defenders had hastily thrown some hewn
down willow-trees as a barricade across the way.
Then the tumult of the fight increased. Darkness had com-
pletely closed in, and the moon had not yet risen j the Prussians
pressed up to the barricade, the Austrians stoutly stood their
ground behind it, and, three paces distant, assailants and de-
fenders poured their fire into each other's breasts. Little could
be seen, though the flashes of the discharges cast a fitful light
over the surging masses ; but in the pauses of the firing the
voices of the officers were heard encouraging their men, and
half-stifled shrieks or gurgling cries told that the bullets were
traly aimed. This was too severe to endure. The Prussians,
firing much more quickly, and in the narrow street, where
neither side could show their whole strength, not feeling the
inferiority of numbers, succeeded in tearing away the barricade,
and slowly pressed their adversaries back along the village
street Yet the Austrians fought bravely, and their plans for
the defence of the houses had been skilfiilly though hastily
made ; fi-om every window muskets flashed out fire, and sent
bullets into the thick ranks of the advancing Prussians, while on
each balcony behind a wooden barricade Jagers crouched to
take their deadly aim ; but in the street the soldiers, huddled
together and encumbered with clumsy ramrods, were unable to
load with ease, and could return no adequate fire to that of the
Prussians, while these, from the advantage of a better arm,
poured their quick volleys into an almost defenceless
crowd.
As the battle in the street was pushed inch by inch towards
the Iser, the Austrians, in every house which the foremost
ranks of the Prussians passed, were cut off" from their retreat,
and were sooner or later made prisoners, for the houses of the
village do not join on to each other, but are detached by spaces
of a few yards, and there is no communication from one house
to the other except by the open street The whole of the
Prussian force was now up, and extending between the houses
i66 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V.
which the first combatants had passed by, cut off the escape of
their garrisons, and exchanged shots with the defenders.
With shrieks and shouts, amid the crashing of broken win-
dows, the heavy sounds of falling beams, and the perpetual
rattle of the fire-arms, the battle was heavily pressed down the
narrow street, and about half-past eleven the moon came up
clear and full to show the Austrian rearmost ranks turning
viciously to bar the Prussians from the bridge. The moonlight,
reflected in the stream, told the assailants that they were near
the object of their labour, and showed the Austrians that now
or never the enemy must be hurled back. Both sides threw
out skirmishers along the river bank, and the moon gave them
light to direct their aim across the stream ; while on the first
plank of the bridge the Austrians turned to bay, and the Prus-
sians pausing some short paces fi'om them, the combatants
gazed at each other for a few moments. Then they began a
fiercer fight than ever. The discharges were more frequent,
and in the narrower way the bullets told with more severe effect.
Herr von Drygalski, leading the fusilier battalion of the 31st,
a lieutenant-colonel of only two days* standing, went down with
two bullets in his forehead, and a captain at his side was shot
in both legs ; many men fell, and the grey horse of a Prussian
field-officer, with a ball in his heart, fell heavily against the
wall, kicking amid the ranks; but he was soon quieted for
ever, and at that moment men regarded but little such wounds
as could be inflicted by an iron-shod hoof, even in the agonies
of death. The Austrians stood gallantly, and made an attempt
to set fire to the bridge ; but the difference of their armament
again told upon them here ; and it is said that, galled by their
hard fortune, they charged with the bayonet, but that the
Prussians also took kindly to the steel, and this charge caused
no change in the fortune of the fight : certain it is that the
defenders were ultimately obliged to retire across the bridge.
While this combat was proceeding slowly along the street,
another fight was carried on upon the railway almost with an
equal progress, and with an almost similar result. A party of
the Austrians fell back from the point where shots were first
exchanged, and where the railway crosses the road, along
the line. They were pushed by some Prussian detaclmients,
Chap. H.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 167
but neither side was here in strong force, and the principal
fighting was done upon the road ; but here, too, the needle-
gun showed its advantage over the old-fashioned weapons of
the Auslrians, for the latter fell in the proportion of six to one
Prussian. The railway bridge was not broken, but the lines
were torn up bj the retiring troops, and the line was not pas-
sable by trains. The Prussians pushed over both bridges after
the retreatijQg Austrians ; the latter threw a strong detachment
into a large unfinished house, which stood by the chamshj
about a quarter of a mile beyond the bridge, and again made a
stand, but not of long duration ; they had lost many killed,
wounded, and prisoners ; many of their officers were dead or
taken ; but they stood till they could gather in all the strag-
glers who had escaped from the houses of the village, and,
harassed by the pursuing Prussians, drew off sullenly by the
main road to Miinchengrats. Thus terminated a contest which,
fought upon both sides with the greatest vigour and determi-
nation, yet lesuked in a clear victory for the Prussians ; for,
when the last dropping shots ceased, about four o'clock in the
morning, there were no Austrian solders within three miles of
Podoll-bridge except the wounded and the taken. There was
no ajtilleiy engaged on either side ; it was purely an infantry
action, and the Prussians derived in it great advantage from
the superiority of their arms over that of their opponents, not
only in the rapidity, but in the direction of their fire, for a man
with an arm on the nipple of which he has to place a cap,
naturally raises the muzzle in the air, and in the hurry and
excitement of action often forgets to lower it, and only sends
his bullet over the heads of the opposite ranks, while the
tidier armed with a breech-loading musket keeps his muzzle
down, and if in haste he fires it off without raising the butt to
his shoulder, his shot still takes effect, though often low, and a
proof of this is that very many of the Austrian prisoners were
wounded in the legs.
The road to PodoU was next morning crowded with hospital
waggons and ambulance cars bringing in the wounded ; every
cottage in the way was converted into a temporary hospital,
^nd the litde village of Swierzin was entirely filled with stricken
men- The sick-bearers, one of the most useful corps which
i68 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V.
any army possesses, were at work from the very beginning Of
the action. As the combatants passed on these noble-minded
men, regardless of the bullets and careless of personal danger,
removed with equal hand both friend and enemy who were left
writhing on the road, and carried them carefully to the rear,
where the medical officers made no distinction in their care for
both Austrian and Prussian. Not only was it those whose
special dut)' is the care of the wounded who alone were doing
their best to ease the sufferings of those who had suffered in
the combat ; soldiers not on duty might be seen canying water
for prisoners of both sides alike, and gladly affording any com-
fort which it was in their power to give to those who overnight
had been firing against their own hearts ! Nor is this wonder-
ful ; for after the flush of the battle was over, and the din of
the musketry had died away, the men of the Prussian army
could not forget that one common language linked them to
their adversaries, and that, after all, it was probably German
blood which, flowing from an Austrian breast, trickled over the
white livery of the House of Hapsburg.
In the village the utmost disorder gave evidence of the se-
verity of the contest Austrian knapsacks, shakos, clothes,
and arms were scattered about in wild confusion. Dead horses
lay in the ditches by the roadside. White coats and cloaks,
which had been thrown off in the hurry of the fight, lay scat-
tered along the road ; the trees which had formed the Austrian
barricade were still on the side of the street, and many held a
bullet The cottages had been ransacked of their furniture,
and their beams and roof-trees had been torn down to form
defences for the doors and windows 3 while along the street
and upon the banks of the river lay objects which in the dis-
tance look like bundles of untidy uniform, but which on nearer
approach were seen to be the bodies of slain soldiers. Some-
times they lay in groups of twos or threes, twisted together as
if they had gripped one another in their mortal agony, and
sometimes single figures lay on their backs, staring with livid
countenance and half-closed hazy eyes, straight up against the
hot morning sun. The dark-blue uniform with red facings of
Prussia, and the white with light-blue of Austria, laid side by
side, but the numbers of the latter much preponderated, and
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY, 169
on one part of the railway three Prussian corpses opposite
nineteen Austrian formed a grisly trophy of the superiority of
the needle-gun.
Close on 500 unwounded Austrian prisoners were next
morning marched up to head-quarters, and the Austrian loss
in killed and wounded was very considerable. The Prussians
lost two officers dead, and seven or eight wounded. The
medical officers officially reported that the proportion of
wounded Austrians to wounded Prussians was as five to one.
Thus the needle-gun told both on the battle-field and in the
hospital.
On the 27th the head-quarters of the First Army halted at
the Castle of Sichrow. There had been no skirmishing ; but
white smoke curling up from beyond some fir woods beside the
Iser told that the bridge of Mohelnitz, about five miles below
Podoll, which the Austrians had set on fire to obstruct pursuit,
was burning steadily.
The results of the actions of Liebenau and Podoll were, that
two of the important passages of the Iser, those of Tiimau and
Podoll, fell into the hands of the First Prussian Army. That
of Miinchengratz still was in the hands of the Austrians, but
was soon also to be seized from their grasp. The Army of the
Elbe had advanced on the 23rd by Schluckenau, and on the
26th the fourteenth division, under the command of General
Mundter, had been pushed to Bomisch Aicha in order to feel
Prince Frederick Charles's right
Count Clam Gallas had only opposed a few hussar regi-
ments to the advance of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, so
that this general met with no serious opposition in issuing
from the mountains. On the 27 th, the day after the night
action of Podoll, his eighth corps, which was advancing from
Gabel by Niemes, in the direction of Miinchengratz, first fell
in with any serious hostile force. The Prussian advanced guard,
consisting of two squadrons and two battalions of Scholer's
brigade, which, followed by the whole 8th corps, was on the
inarch from Hayda, pushed forward on a reconnaissance as far
*s Hiihnerwasser.
The Austrians, bound only to furnish intelligence, and
ordered not to engage seriously, retreated, after a slight
I70 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book V.
skinnish to Munchengratz, and evacuated the right bank of the
Iser, thus permitting a full communication to be opened
between the Army of the Elbe and that of Prince Frederick
Charles. The two armies were able on the following day to
advance in concert, so as to take possession of the whole line
of the Iser.
Count Clam Gallas, after the skirmish at Hiihnerwasser,
withdrew the greater part of his force to the left bank of the
Iser, occupied Miinchengratz in force, and made preparations
for the destruction of the bridge over the river on the west of
the town. The Prussian plan to seize that place brought
on the
ACTION OF MCtNCHENGRATZ.
On the 27th Prince Frederick Charles halted in the position
of Sichrow, and made his dispositions for his ftirther advance.
The seventh division had occupied Tiimau, where the engi-
neers had quickly thrown a pontoon bridge over the Iser, to
replace the permanent one, which had been burnt by the
retiring Austrian cavalry. The eighth division, under General
Home, occupied the village and bridge of PodoU ; the sixth
division, under General Manstein, moved forward to the
support of Home. The main body of the army was on the
plateau of Sichrow, and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld,
after a sharp skirmish, in which he took many prisoners,
seized Hiihnerwasser.
The road and railway which lead from Tiimau to Jung
Bunzlau cross the Iser near together at the village of PodoU,
and run beside each other on the southern side of the river to
a point about three miles below Miinchengratz; about a
quarter of a mile below PodoU the hiUs which form the
plateau of Sichrow, tuming southwards, come close to the
northem bank of the Iser, and form a chain of heights which
descend with a steep slope to the water's edge. The hills
which form the southern boundary of the valley of the Iser
rise to a height of about 500 feet in the Muskey Berg, which,
running parallel to the road for a mile of its length from its
extremity nearest PodoU, then trends southwards and strikes
the road from Miinchengratz to Unter Bautzen at the vUlage
Chap. IL] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY.
171
of Bossin. The Muskey Berg presents towards the river on
its upper part a rocky, precipitous front ; below this the dkbris
^en from the rocks has accumulated and formed a slope,
which, although steep, would, were it not for the precipice
above, be still practicable for light infantry. This lower slope
is covered with a dense forest of fir trees ; the summit of the
hill is in general a flat plateau, clothed with greensward, but
near the edge of the precipice fir trees are thickly planted,
and form a belt along the summit, with an average breadth of
loo paces, while, conspicuous near the place where the hill
line turns towards Bossin, stands a high solitary cone rising
loo feet above the plateau, bare of trees, but covered with
green grass. Opposite this high cone of the Muskey Berg,
and close to the river, but still on the southern bank, lies the
isolated hill of the Kaczowberg. It is considerably lower than
the Muskey Berg range, and is not wooded. Its length is
about 500 yards, and its longitudinal direction is at right
angles to that of the stream. The distance between the
172 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book V.
summits of the Muskey Berg and the Kaczowberg is about
two miles, and through the valley between these two hills run
the road and railway from PodoU to Miinchengratz. Between
these hills the valley is a dead flat plain. It was at the time of
the action richly cultivated, intersected by rows of fruit trees,
and covered with wheat, barley, clover, and potato patches.
No hedges divided the different farms, but brooks and ditches
made the ground very difficult for the action of cavalry. Look-
ing from the bridge of PodoU along the valley towards Miin-
chengratz, the Muskey Berg lies to the left front, the Kaczow-
berg to the right front ; between them are seen in the distance
the Schloss and spires of the town, but furtlier view is stopped
by a low range of elevations, topped by dwarf plantations,
which lie between the roads from Miinchengratz to Fursten-
briick, and from Miinchengratz to Jung Bunzlau, and runs
from the village of Bossin to that of Wessely.
The Austrians had thrown up a redoubt and a battery for
eight guns on the Kaczowberg; the latter would have enfi-
laded the Podoll road, but no guns were in it, for the Prussian
advance had been rapid, and there was not time to arm the
work. Still, it was expected that the enemy would stand here,
and the Prussian commander advanced prepared to fight He
intended to strike for no meagre victory. He formed a plan
by which to capture the whole opposing force; but, though
skilfully designed and punctually executed, his adversary did
not stand quite long enough to allow of its complete develop-
ment, for the Austrian commander sacrificed his position and
the town of Miinchengratz, after a sharp combat, but without
a regular battle.
The Prussian leader calculated that if he made a demonstra-
tion of a careless march towards Miinchengratz by the high
road and railway, the Austrians who might be on the Muskey
Berg would lie there quiet till the heads of his columns had
passed their position, in order that their artillery might take
the marching troops in reverse, and that he might himself in
the meantime turn their position. By the same bait he also
hoped to hold his adversaries on the Kaczowberg until their
retreat was cut off. To effect this double object the 7th
division was to move from Tumau by a road on the south side
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY, 173
of the Iser, which at the village of Wschen crosses the road
from Podoll to Sobotka, at Zdiar. It was then to take the
Austrians on the Muskey Berg in rear, for this hill slopes
gently on its reverse side towards a rivulet which forms the
little lake of Zdiar. The division was afterwards to push on
over the hill and strike the road from Miinchengratz to Fiir-
stenbriick, between the village of Bossin and the former place.
On the right bank of the river General Herwarth was to
advance from Hiihnerwasser on Miinchengratz, cross the Iser,
and occupy the town, throwing out at the same time the
fourteenth division to his left, which by Mohelnitz and Lauke-
witz should take in reverse the defenders of the Kaczowberg.
The divisions of Home and Manstein were to push down
the main road from Podoll, while strong reserves closed
down to PodolL A division of infantry was to cross at
Hubelow and attack the Kaczowberg in front, while a division
of cavalry kept the communications open between the divisions
on the right bank of the river. A strong division of cavalry
was also sent from Tiimau to scour the country towards Jicin,
in the direction of Josephstadt
About eight o'dock on the morning of the 28th, Prince
Frederick Charles, with General von Voigt-Rhetz, his chief of
the staff, and General Stiilpnagel, his Quartermaster-General,
came down to the bridge of Podoll, and almost immediately
the Jagers, who formed the advance guard of Home's division,
crossed the bridge, but not before an opening cannonade in
the direction of Miinchengratz told that Bittenfeld was already
engaged. On a hill upon the northern bank there was a con-
venient spot from which to see the whole theatre of the
combat, and here the Prussian staff went to watch the course
of the action.
There was not a cloud upon the sky, and the sun poured down
a tremendous heat ; thick clouds of dust rose from the columns
on the road, but this line was only followed by the artillery, the
train, and the main body of the regiment As the Jagers
passed the bridge they threw out skirmishers to the right and
left, who went in a long wavy line pushing through the stand-
ing com. The cavalry scouts clustered thickly on the flanks
of the skirmishers, and horsemen in more solid formation
174 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book V.
followed in their rear. It was a fine sight ; the long line of
rifles extending almost across the valley, felt carefully through
tlie crops. The Uhlans, with their tall lances and fantastic
pennants, hovered about the flank, and the heavy masses on
the road pushed on steadily behind the centre of the light troops.
But attention was called towards Miinchengratz, where the
progress of Bittenfeld's attack could be traced by the puffs of
white smoke which rose from the discharges of the artilleiy.
The Prussian cannonade was seen to be slowly advancing, and
that of the Austrian to be retiring, while a heavy cloud of black
smoke rising close beside the town showed that the Austrians
had retired from the right bank of the river and had burnt the
bridge. For a short time the fight was stationary, but in about
a quarter of an hour a bright flash of flame and a much heavier
smoke rising from the Austrian line told that an ammunition
waggon had exploded. Their battery then ceased firing, and
rapidly retired, while a quick advance of the Prussian can-
nonade showed that Bittenfeld*s pioneers had quickly thrown
. their bridge, and that his corps was across the Iser. But the
Austrians did not go far, for in a short time they were again
in action in the direction of the Jung Bunzlau road, and one
battery was drawing off* towards Fiirstenbriick. It then seemed
that Bittenfeld had halted ; the cannonade ceased in this direc-
tion. The view of the Muskey Berg from the position occupied
by the staff" is extremely beautiful, but it was not the sandstone
cliff's of the opposite mountain, nor even the advancing
Prussians in the plain, that General Voigt-Rhetz, the chief of
Prince Frederick Charles's staff*, was so carefully scanning with
his glass, — he saw a group on the highest point of the cone of
the Muskey Berg which looked like a general's staff", and he
smiled quietly as he saw his adversaries getting entangled in
the toils which had been so carefully woven for them. The
heads of the Prussian columns were some way past the hill,
and were pushing steadily towards Miinchengratz, when the
well-known puff" of smoke rising from the dark firs on the
Muskey Berg plateau showed that the Austrians had opened
fire upon them. The battery on the hill did not appear to be
of more than four guns, and at first they fired slowly, nor did
they do much execution. Their shells, projected from so great
Chap. IL] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY, 175
a height, went straight into the ground, and did not ricochet
among the troops; but they were well aimed, and in most
cases burst at the proper moment, and every now and then a
man went down. As soon as the Austrian guns opened fire
the troops in the road were turned into the fields, and moved
on in open order ; the train waggons were also hurried on to
the softer ground, and halted separately where best concealed.
Four Prussian batteries quickly opened fire, but the Austrian
guns stood high, and the height of the hill deceived their aim ;
at first their shells feU short, but soon they got the range ; still
the fir-trees and rocks protected the Austrian gunners, and the
batteries in the plain seemed to do little execution.
Orders were soon sent to them to cease firing, for the enemy's
guns did not much harass the marching troops, and other
means were taken for clearing the hill A squadron of Uhlans
was directed to pass dose along the foot of the Muskey Berg,
so that the guns on the plateau could not be depressed sufiH-
ciently to hurt them, and were to gain a steep path which leads
to the summit between the highest point and Bossin, while an
infantry brigade was to support the movement ; but before this
plan could be carried into execution the seventh division was
heard engaged on the reverse side, and the Austrian battery
quickly limbered up and retired. The guns were not inter-
cepted by the seventh division, but here General Franzecky
made 600 prisoners from the infantry which was on the hill to
support the battery. While the seventh division was still
engaged behind the Muskey Berg, four Austrian guns appeared
on the summit of the hill, between Bossin and Wessely, and
opened fire against the Prussian columns, who were now again
advancing over the plain. But Franzecky was pushing towards
them, and his artillery threatened to enfilade them, so that they
soon had to retire. The seventh division then struck the road
between Miinchengratz and Bossin, and attacked the latter
village. Bittenfeld had already pushed towards it from Miin-
chengratz, and supported this attack. The first round of
Franzecky's artillery set fire to a house, which began to bum
fiercely, and the flames were soon communicated to the next,
for most of the cottages in this country are built of wood,
^Wch, dried in the hot summer sun, readily takes fire. After
176 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book V.
a sharp skirmish the Austrians were driven from the village and
retired in the direction of Fiirstenbriick, and they left here 200
prisoners, and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld had already-
captured 200. The Austrian soldiers who had been taken
chiefly belonged to Italian regiments, and showed no disposi-
tion to fight ; twenty-five of them in one mass laid down their
arms to Lieutenant von Billow, who, being one of Prince
Frederick Charles's aides-de-camp, was returning from deliver-
ing an order, and saw these men separated from their regiment.
He collected about half-a-dozen train soldiers and rode up to
them, when they surrendered without offering any resistance.
The Austrians made no attempt to hold the Kaczowberg.
The only points they attempted to defend were the Muskey
Berg, Miinchengratz, and the village of Bossin. They lost at
least a thousand prisoners, and about three hundred killed and
wounded.
With the occupation of the village of Bossin ended the
combat of Miinchengratz, in which by a series of strategical
movements, with little fighting, and slight loss — ^for the Prus-
sian killed, wounded, and missing did not number 100 —
Prince Frederick Charles gained about twjslve miles of countr>%
and took 1,000 prisoners, turned the strong position of the
Kaczowberg, and effected his secure junction with the corps
of General Bittenfeld.
The head-quarters of the Army of the Elbe and of the
First Army were established at Miinchengratz. The majority
of the inhabitants had fled from the town; the army had
outmarched its provision trains, and there was nothing to be
bought in the place. On account of actual necessity the
soldiers were allowed to take what eatables they could find in
the place, but little had been left, for the Austrian army was
there the night before, and their commissariat appears to have
been as miserably corrupt as it was in the Italian campaign.
The prisoners reported that they had had nothing to eat for
two days, and begged for a morsel of bread ; but the Prussian
army was hard set itself for provisions, and there was but
little to give away. Nor were the Austrian hospital arrange-
ments such as they ought to have been. Twenty-six wounded
men were found here when the Prussians marched in, lying in
ChaI'. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARAfV. 177
a cottage on a floor covered with blood, untended, with their
wounds undressed, and saying that they had had no nourish-
ment for forty-eight hours; no surgeon had remained with
them, nor was their condition reported to the Prussian com-
mander; fortunately they were discovered accidentally by a
Prussian staff officer. Hospital necessaries were scarce, but
Prussian medical men were sent to attend them, and applica-
tion was made to the magistracy of Miinchengratz to supply
linen with which to dress their wounds. These are reported
to have refused to assist in alleviating the sufferings of their
fellow-countrymen, who were shot down in defending the very
passage to their own town, till Count Stohlberg, a Prussian
officer of Cuirassiers, roused by their barbarity, drew his sword
on the Buigomaster, and threatened him with death unless the
wants of the wounded men were attended to, when the
necessary materials came forth. The Prussian troops were
very weary. They had marched and fought that day (the
28th) over a long distance and in a heavy country. There
was little water away from the river, and the soldiers had
suffered much from thirst; but they marched nobly. Few
stragglers were ever seen, except those who had fellen fainting
out of the ranks, and were lying half stupified by the roadside ;
but none lay long without succour, for the Krankmtrdger, or
sick-bearers, hovered with their water-bottles round the flanks
and in the rear of the marching as weU as of the fighting
battalions, and gave a willing aid to all that needed it
The army of Prince Frederick Charles was now concen-
trated round Miinchengratz ; two divisions were near or in
Bossin : a large force covered the left at Zehrow and south of
Tiimau, and threw its outposts towards Sobotka. The force
in front of Prince Frederick Charles was the Austrian first
corps d'arm^, the brigade Kalik, which had lately returned
from Holstein, and the cavalry division of General Edelsheim.
To these the Saxon army was joined, and the whole allied
force was under the command of Prince Albert, Crown Prince
of Saxony.
By the actions of Liebenau, Hiihnerwasser, Podoll, and
Miinchengratz, the whole line of the Iser was won by the
Prussians, and a great strategical advantage gained, 'the
,78 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, L^ook V.
distance from the Second Army which had on the 27th com-
menced its advance from Silesia, was still, however, great ; for
from thirty to thirty-five miles lay between the left wing of
Prince Frederick Charles and the extreme right wing of the
Crown Prince : difficulties still existed which had to be over-
come before the junction of the two armies could be effected.
Count Clam Gailas, on being driven from the line of the Iser,
retired to Gitschin, and there took up a defensive position.
Before tracing the means which Prince Frederick Charles
adopted to dislodge him from this point, it is desirable to cast
a glance over the preceding actions.
The actions of Liebenau and Hiihnerwasser were fought by
the Austrians merely as reconnaissances, and may be passed
over in silence. But why did Count Clam Gailas neglect to
defend Tiimau at all, and hold PodoU with only a single
brigade? It was undoubtedly his object to hold the line of
the Iser and to there check his enemy for as long a time as
possible. Miinchengratz is, at the most, but twelve miles
distant from Tiimau ; he had 60,000 men at his disposal, and
could therefore have well held the whole line had he thrown
up the necessary intrenchments. It seems, however, that the
Austrian general committed the great error of despising his
enemy. Had he ranged part of his army on the plateau
south of Tiimau and PodoU, broken the bridges at these
places, and thrown up earthworks to impede the passage of
the river, and at the same time collected the other part or his
force at Miinchengratz, and there made similar defensive pre-
parations, the line of the Iser might, indeed, still have been
forced by the Prussians, but only by the employment of their
whole strength ; and, probably, only after the lapse of a
considerable amount of time. Had it been forced, the
Austrian retreat from both points to Sobotka would have
been secure. Had it not, the Pmssians would have been
compelled to seek for a passage ftirther to the north at
Eisenbrod or Semil, and to have made a flank march in a
country which in that direction is broken into ravines and
hollows by the spurs of the Giant Mountains. It might be
urged against such dispositions that by breaking the bridges
Count Clam Gailas would have deprived himself of all chance
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY, 179
of assuming the offensive in case of a favourable opportunity.
His duty and object, however, was not to crush but to detain
Prince Frederick Charles: the defeat of the Prussian First
Army was to have been effected by the arrival of Feldzeug-
meister Benedek himself with overwhelming forces, before or
after having disposed of the Crown Prince.
The Austrian position on the Muskey Berg was tactically
strong, but strategically weak. By the surrender of Tiimau,
Count Clam Gallas exposed the right flank of that position,
and allowed his retreat to Gitschin to be threatened.
N 2
CHAPTER III.
ACTION OF GITSCHIN.
The fourth Prussian corps, consisting of the seventh and
eighth divisions, had been sharply engaged at PodoU and
Miinchengratz, and was allowed to halt at the latter place on
the 29th June. That evening it marched as the reserve of the
First Army, which moved from the Iser towards Gitschin by
three roads — the left from TUmau by Rowensko, the centre
from PodoU by Sobotka, the right from Miinchengratz by
Ober Bautzen on Sobotka, while the Army pf the Elbe moved
on the right wing of the First Army by Unter Bautzen and
Libau.
On the evening of the 28th, the fifth division was pushed
forward from Tiimau as far as Rowensko, on the road to
Gitschin, where it halted for the night, with the sixth division
a short distance in rear of it The same evening the third
division, with the fourth in rear, was pushed to Zehrow, on the
road fix)m PodoU to Sobotka ; and its advanced guard, con-
sisting of the 14th regiment and two companies of the second
Jager battalion, in the course of the night occupied the defile
of Podkost, after a sharp skirmish.
On the afternoon of the 29th, the fifth division broke up
from Rowensko at two o'clock, and advanced towards Gitschin.
The third division, which had a longer march before it, left
Zehrow for the same place at mid-day.
The distance from Tiimau to Gitschin is about fifteen miles ;
from Miinchengratz to the same town about twenty miles; and
PodoU to Podkost about six miles.
Four roads lead from the town of Gitschin, almost towards
the four points 01 the compass ; that of the north to Tiimau,
CiiAP. III.] ACTION OF GITSCIinV, i8l
of the west to Sobotka, of the south to Kosteltz, and of the
east, but bending southwards, to Horitz. From the Kosteltz
road to the Tiimau road runs, about three miles' distance from
Gitschin, a semicircular range of steep broken hills ; on their
slopes and summits spruce and silver firs grow in thick woods
which occasionally reach down into the cultivated ground.
Here and there upon these hills are patches of corn or clover
land, while at various intervals there are little villages, which
generally consist of ten or twelve large wooden cottages
separated from each other, and standing in orchards. Near
the foot of the range of hills the ground is much broken up
by shallow ravines and gullies.
The Austrian first corps and the Saxons held an excellent
position along this range of hills, the right flank of which
rested on Eisenstadt, and the left on the Anna Berg, a pro-
minent elevation on the south side of the Sobotka road. In
the centre were the heights of Brada, which had been strength-
ened. The reserve was drawn up between these hills and the
town of Gitschin.
Where the road from Sobotka passes through the hills they
dip down so as to form a narrow pass, and the fir forests on
each side run down close to the road. On the Sobotka side
of the woods there is a ravine about loo feet deep, but with
banks not so steep but that the road can descend and ascend
them in a direct line. A quarter of a mile from this ravine,
and nearer Gitschin, the road drops again into a similar
hollow, but here the forest has retired from the side of the
chaussie, and the ground is covered with standing crops, among
which firuit trees are thickly studded. At about the same
distance fiirther on towards the town, a third break in the
ground causes another sharp undulation of the roadway. On
the Gitschin side of this hollow ground, partly on the bank,
but more on the brow of the slope, and on the more level
country beyond, stands the little village of Lochow, forming
a clump of houses with low walls, but having high thatched
roofs, which just rise above the tops of the orchard trees that
cluster closely among and around the cottages. A quarter of
a mile beyond the village lies the last break in the ground, for
beyond this a flat plain stretches to the little river whichj
1 82 - SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book V.
passing the town of Gitschin on its Lochow side, falls into the
Iser near Tiiroau. This last ravine is rather deeper and wider
than the others ; at the bottom there is a rivulet, which the
road, after descending the Lochow bank, crosses by a low
stone bridge, and then runs straight up the opposite side of the
nullah, as it might be termed in Indian phrase^ to gain the
level plain.
The 2nd corps of General von Schmitt, which marched from
the neighbourhood of Podoll, struck at Sobotka the road from
Miinchengratz to Gitschin. General von Schmitt there changed
the direction of his march to the left, and advanced towards
Gitschin. He moved with his two divisions at some distance
apart ; that of General von Werder, or the 3rd division, led
the way. Von Werder's advanced guard consisted of the 2nd
battalion of Jagers and the 3rd battalion of the 42nd regiment.
In the rear of these followed the three battalions of the
regiment of the late King of Prussia (the 2nd), the two
remaining battalions of the 42nd, and one battalion of the
14th regiment, with one six-pounder and two four-pounder
field batteries.
A strong Austrian force held the wood behind the first
ravine, with its sharp-shooters behind the trunks of the fir-trees,
with the view of compensating for the inferiority of their rifle
to the Prussian needle-gun. Behind each marksman two
soldiers were placed, whose only duty was to load their rifles
and hand them to the picked men to whom the firing was
entrusted. The Austrian artillery was placed behind the wood,
so that it could bring a cross-fire on the opening in firont
through which the chausske passes^ and strike heavily on the
Sobotka bank of the ravine and the open country beyond. As
the Prussian advanced guard approached the ravine, the
Austrian batteries opened fire upon them, and the marksmen
from behind the trees also soon commenced a biting fire. The
Jagers and the men of the 42nd quickly spread out as skir-
mishers, and, regardless of the withering fire to which they
themselves were exposed, showered bullets from their quickly-
loaded arms against the defenders of the wood, while some of
their artillery, quickly brought into action, tried to silence the
Austrian guns. But the fight was unequal, the sharpshooters
Chap. III.] ACTION OF GITSCUm. 183
behind the trees could rarely be seen, and the fire of the
Prussians did not tell much upon their concealed enemies;
nor were their guns in sufficient force to engage successfully
the more numerous Austrian pieces. The Jagers from among
the trees were aiming well ; the men of the 42nd were ficdling
fast, and it seemed that the defenders would be able to hold
the wood. But the rest of the Prussian division was coming
up ; more artillery was already in action ; and the Austrian
gunners began to fire with less effect The regiment of the
King of Prussia soon arrived. The Prussian soldiers, unable
to make much impression with their fire on the riflemen in the
trees, were already anxious to come to close quarters, and then
General von Werder sent his men forward to take the woods
with the bayonet They were carried, but not without loss,
for the Austrians retired from tree to tree, and only when
pressed beyond the last skirt of the wood retired under cover
of their guns and reserves to take up a position on the further
brow of the next ravine. The musketry fire recommenced.
The opponents stood on either bank of the hollow, and poured
volley after volley into each other's ranks, while the artillery,
from positions on the flanks of both lines, sent their shells
truly among their adversary's infantry. But here the needle-
gun had more success, for the Austrians stood up clear against
the sky, and soon the white uniforms began to go down
quickly. No troops so ill-armed could have stood before the
murderous fire which the Prussians directed against the opposite
line. The Austrians did all that men could do; but, after
losing fearfully, were obliged to fall back, and take up their
third position in the village of Lochow, and on the Anna Berg.
The 42nd regiment and the second Jager battalion were sent
against the Anna Berg, while the 2nd and the 14th attacked the
village.
It was now about seven o'clock in the evening ; the combat
had already lasted almost two hours, but here it was renewed
more fiercely than ever. The Prussians, encouraged by their
success — brave soldiers and bravely led — eagerly came to the
attack. With hearts as big, and with officers as devoted, the
Austrians stood with a desperate calmness to receive them. On
both sides the fighting was hard; but at any distance the
l84 SEVEN weeks:* WAR, [Book V.
Austrian rifle had no chance against the needle-gun, and at
close quarters the boyish soldiers of the Kaiser could not cope
with the broad-shouldered men of Pomerania, who form die
corps d'arm^e, one division of which was here engaged. Yet
for three-quarters of an hour the little village of Lochow was
held, and the continuous rattle of the rifles and the heavy
cannonade of the guns remaining almost stationary told the
determination of the assault and the stoutness of the defence.
But the Austrians were slowly forced from house to house and
from orchard to orchard, and had to retreat to their last
vantage ground on the top of the Gitschin bank of the fourth
ravine.
And here both sides re-engaged in the fight with the utmost
fury. The defenders felt that this was their last standing point,
and on its maintenance depended the possession of Gitschin ;
the assailants knew that success here would almost certainly
bring them to the object of all their exertions. The Prussian
line soon formed on the top of the opposite bank to that held
by the Austrians, and then began to fire rapidly against the
brow where the Austrians stood. The latter returned the fire,
but from necessity more slowly; still their guns smote the
Prussian troops heavily, and the shells bursting in front of the
assailants' line, caused many casualties. But the Pomeranians
were highly excited, and it is said that a heavy mass of the
Prussians dashed down the road and rushed up the opposite
slope with their rifles at the charge. A fierce struggle ensued.
The strong men of Pomerania pressed hard against their
lighter opponents, and pushed them beyond the brow of the
slope on to the level plain ; yet the lithe and active Austrians
fought hard, and strove to drive their bayonets into the faces
of their taller antagonists; but strength and weight told, for
their more powerfiil adversaries urged them back foot by foot
till a gap was clearly opened in the defenders' line. The
musketry bullets had also told sharply on the Saxons and
Austrians, and they were obliged to retire. They drew oflf
across the plain towards Gitschin, but not in rout ; slowly and
sullenly the Saxon rear-guard drew back, suffering awful loss in
the open plain, where the needle-gun had a fair range; but
they fought for every yard of ground, ever turning to send
Chap. III.] ACTION OF GITSCHIN 185
among the advancing Prussians shots which were often truly
aimed, but which formed no sufficient return for the showers of
bullets which were rained upon themselves. For long the
plain was the scene of the advancing combat, and it was not
until near midnight that General von Werder occupied Gitschin.
In the town the Austrians did not stand; they held some
houses at the entrance for a short time, but these were carried,
and then they retired rapidly towards the south. In their
haste they left their hospitals, and here, as in Lochow, Von
Werder*s division took a large number of prisoners.
But this was not the only combat that evening. On the
northern side of Gitschin the Austrian position extended
beyond the Tiimau road, to cover the town against the
Prussians advancing from the direction of Tiimau. The range
of hills which runs round the north-western side of Gitschin
drops with a steep slope down to the Tiimau road, near the
village of Brada, and sends out a much lower prolongation of
the range which mns at right angles to the direction of the
road, and beyond it, as far as the river that passes by Gitschin
and joins the Iser near Tiimau. Over this lower spur the road
runs, and on its summit lies on the Prussian right of the road,
and close to it, the village of Podultz ; while further to the
right and on the top of the high hills is the village of Brada,
standing about 300 yards fiirther southwards than Podultz.
The 5th division, under General Tiimpling, on the afternoon
of the 29th, advanced from Rowensko, and about half-past four
o'clock came within 2,000 yards of the village of Podultz. His
division consisted of the 8th, 12th, 18th, and 48th regiments,
with four batteries of artillery. As the Prussians advanced
they saw the village of Podultz close to the road, and on their
right, standing on the top of the gentle ascent by which the
road rises to the top of the lower spur, on the other side of the
road, and about three hundred yards from it nearer to the
advancing division by two hundred 3rards than Podultz, the
village of Diletz lying in the plain ; while high on their right
they could see the chimneys of Brada above the thick fir wood
which, lying on the hill side, in front of that village, runs down
nearly to Podultz, and trace by the different colour of the
foliage the groimd occupied by its orchards.
i86 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book V.
The three villages and the fir wood were held by Austrian
and Saxon troops, supported by seven batteries of artillery,
which were placed both on the spur and on Brada hill, while
behind the spur were hidden three of Austria's finest cavalry
regiments — tlie hussars of Radetzky, of Lichtenstein, and of the
Austrian regiment of the King of Prussia. In front of the
village of Brada and of the fir wood an abattis was constructed
which ran down the steep slope nearly as far as Podultz. As
soon as the Prussians came within range the Austrian batteries
opened upon them ; the Prussian guns replied, and under the
cover of their artillery the columns advanced to the attack of
the position. The 8th and 48th regiments advanced against the
village of Diletz, which was garrisoned by the ist, 2nd, 3rd, and
4th Saxon battalions, and where, as the prisoners reported, the
Crown Prince of Saxony himself took part in the fight The
Fusilier battalion of the 48th engaged the garrison of the
village, while the rest of the regiment with the 8th turned
towards Eisenstadt, but were sharply attacked by an Austrian
column, and driven back to Zames. Both columns were
exposed to a very hot fire. After a severe struggle both
villages were carried, though that of Podultz, set on fire by a
shell, was burning when the Prussians occupied it Then
General Edelsheim, who commanded the Austrian cavalry,
with a desperate valour attacked the burning village, but the
horses would not face the flames,, and the Prussian infantry
from behind the blazing houses fired on the disordered squad-
rons and killed many troopers. After taking Podultz the 12 th
and 1 8th regiments pushed past Brada, leaving it to their right,
and made for the Lochow road, in order to cut off the retreat
of the Austriaus, who were retiring from Lochow on Gitschin.
The Austrian cavalry charged tlie advancing Prussians, but the
latter received them without forming square, and the horsemen
recoiled broken by their steady fire. The Austrian troops in
Brada and the Saxons and Austrians in Diletz were quite
separated by the capture of the village of Podultz, and the
former were almost entirely taken ; the latter were cut off from
retreat in large numbers, for Von Werder was pressing towards
Gitschin, the roads were crowded, and the little river formed
on the right of the broken allies a wide extent of marshy ground,
Chap. III.] ACTION OF GITSCHIN. 187
which it was almost impossible to cross. The loss of the
Saxons between Diletz and Gitschin was tremendous; they
fell thickly, and the ground was covered with corpses. The
Prussians suffered much, but they fought most bravely, and,
with only four regiments and half as many guns as their
opponents, carried a very strong position held by a much
superior force; for the Prussians had in the field but 16,000
men, and the allied strength in the first line was estimated at
30,000. Under a crushing fire they advanced to the attack
of Podultz and Diletz, and the vacancies in the muster-roll show
how fearfully they suffered; but every man who fell on the
Prussian side was trebly avenged, and a long broad track of
fallen enemies marked the line of march of the four regiments
who fought near Diletz. But though the Austrian position was
strong, it was badly occupied. The troops on the hill of Brada
seem to have been so enclosed in their defensive works that
they could make no counter attack on the Prussian columns
engaged at Podultz, nor could they attack in fiank the 12th
and 1 8th regiments as they passed. Many officers fell on both
sides. General Tiimpling, who commanded the Prussian
division, was wounded, fortunately not severely.
The field of Diletz was thickly strewn with killed and
wounded. Here the Prussians lay more thickly than at
Lochow, for the more numerous artillery of the defenders
ploughed with terrible effect through the dense columns of the
assailants as they advanced to the attack. But between Diletz
and Gitschin the ground was covered with broken arms, knap-
sacks, shakos, and fallen men, who were mostly either Saxons
or Austrians, for here the needle-gun was more used than
artillery.
The Prussians took about 7,000 prisoners in the two combats,
niany officers, and the Austrian loss in killed and wounded was
about 3,000, so that the actions of that evening withdrew
10,000 soldiers from under the Austrian colours.
The Prussian head-quarters were moved to Gitschin. The
town had been almost entirely deserted by the inhabitants, the
streets were filled with military carriages and marching troops,
while a Prussian garrison bivouacked under the colonnade
which runs all round the market-place.
l88 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book V.
On the afternoon of the 30th, the strategic object of the
movements of the two Prussian armies was achieved, for com-
munications were opened in Bohemia between Prince Frederick
Charles and the Crown Prince. A regiment of dragoons sent
from Gitschin that day to feel for the Second Army found the
advanced troops of the Crown Prince at Amau, and sent back
intelligence that he had secured the passages of the Upper
Elbe at Amau and Koniginhof. The Ziethen regiment of
hussars in the front defeated an Austrian regiment, and cap-
tured a convoy of about fifty waggons on the same day.
Count Clam Gallas sent to Benedek to announce the defeat
of his force at Gitschin, his incapability of any longer holding
the First Prussian Army in check, and that he was retreating
hastily on Koniggratz. This report reached the Austrian com-
mander-in-chief early on the morning of the 30th, and had an
important effect on the dispositions which he was making
against the army of the Crown Prince. It is now necessary
to trace the course by which the Second Army gained the posi-
tion in which its outposts were found by the cavalry of Prince
Frederick Charles on the 30th June.
BOOK VL
CHAPTER I.
PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS.
The First Army and the Army of the Elbe, united under the
command of Prince Frederick Charles, on the 30th June,
opened communication in Bohemia with the Second Army,
which had marched through the mountains from Prussian
Silesia, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia.
It is necessary now to follow the steps by which the Crown
Prince brought his army successfully through the passes of the
Suderic Hills.
The Crown Prince had been appointed Commander-in-chief
of the Second Army on the 19th May, and on the 2nd June was
also named Military Governor of Prussian Silesia. On the 4th
June he moved his head-quarters from Berlin to that province.
The Second Army consisted of the corps of the Guards, and the
first, fifth, and sixth corps d*arm^ of the Line.
When the Crown Prince assumed the command in Silesia, he
fixed his head-quarters at the Castle of Fiirstenstein. At
this time the fifth corps lay round Landshut, the sixth round
Waldenburg, the cavaby division round Striegau, and the first
corps, which was on the line of march from Gorlitz, was moving
to Hirschberg and Schonau. The independent corps, under
General Knobelsdorf and Count Stolberg,* had pushed detach-
ments close up to the Austrian frontier. The fortresses of Glatz,
Neisse, Cosel, and Glogau were armed, and new fortifications
were thrown up round Schweidnitz.
* See page 144.
190 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book VI.
As has been already noticed, the Army of Silesia in the
course of the second week of June, in order to deceive the
Austrian commander, and to secure the safety of Prussian
Silesia against a hostile invasion, took up a defensive position,
on the loth of that month, near the fortress of Neisse, behind
the line of the river of that name. At the same time the corps
of the Guards joined the Second Army from Berlin, and was
posted at Brieg, but left one division to watch the passes of the
mountains on the west of the county of Glatz, and to keep
open the communications with the First Army, which was near
Gorlitz.*
At this time six of the Austrian corps which Feldzeugmeister
Benedek held at his disposal were posted in Austrian Silesia
and in Moravia. Political events developed themselves rapidly.
The decree of the Diet, the declaration of war by Prussia
against Saxony, and the irruption of General Herwarth von
Bittenfeld and of Prince Frederick Charles into that country,
followed each other in quick succession. The Saxon army
retired into Bohemia, and the Austrian troops began moving
towards Josephstadt.
On the evening of the 19th of June, the Crown Prince re-
ceived orders from the King, through General von Moltke, the
chief of the staff of the army, to leave only one corps on the
Neisse, to move the first corps to Landshut, and to station the
two other corps in such positions that they might be ready,
either in conjunction with the first corps, to move into Bo-
hemia, in order to effect a junction with the First Army, or, if
it were necessary, to be equally ready to strengthen the corps
on the Neisse.
As the Austrian troops kept moving into Bohemia, it became
hourly more probable that the Prussian Second Army would be
required to cross the mountains into that province. In order to
lead the Austrian staff to believe that this movement was not
contemplated, the sixth corps was drawn entirely to the left
bank of the Neisse, and received orders that it should, immedi-
ately on the outbreak of hostilities, make a strong demonstra-
tion against the Austrian frontier in that direction. Officers
* Seep. 124.
Chap. L] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 191
were at the same time sent to prepare quarters for all the corps
on the right bank of the Oder, as if a general movement in that
direction was intended
On the evening of the 20th June, a further order came from
the King, which directed the Crown Prince to send intimation
in writing to the commanders of the several Austrian outposts,
that Prussia considered Austria's bearing at Frankfort as a
virtual declaration of war.
As soon as the existence of war between the two great
Powers was actually recognised, the Crown Prince issued the
following general order to his troops : —
" Neisse, TOth June,
"Soldiers op the Second Army !— You have heard the wonk of
our King and Commander-in-chief I The attempts of his Majesty to
preserve peace to our country have proved fruitless. With a heavy heart,
but with strong confidence in the spirit and valour of his army, the King
has determined to do battle for the honour and independence of Prussia,
and for a new organization of Germany on a powerful basis. I, placed by
the grace and confidence of my royal father at your head, am proud, as the
first servant of our King, to risk with you my blood and property for the
most sacred rights of our native country. Soldiers 1 for the first time for
fifty years a worthy foeman is opposed to our army. Confident in your
prowess, and in our excellent and proved arms, it behoves us to conquer
the same enemy as our greatest King defeated with a small army. And
now, forward with the old Prussian battle-cry — * With God, for King and
Fatherland.*
(Signed) "FRIEDERICH WILHELM."
On the 22nd of June the Crown Prince received from the
King the order to prepare to assume the offensive in Bohemia,
in order to join the First Army in the direction of Gitschin.
This order had been anticipated by the Crown Prince. On
the previous day he had sent a letter by post, to request per-
mission from the King to move towards his right At the same
time he expressed a wish to be allowed to send the sixth corps,
which had been ordered to remain near Neisse, into the county
of Glatz. By this disposition the sixth corps would both be
available for the defence of its native province, Silesia, and, if
necessary, could more easily be joined to the main army than
from its previous position.
On the 23rd June the Crown Prince received by telegraph
permission to move the sixth corps as he desired. He had,
192 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book VI.
however, on the 22nd, already acted before receiving this per-
mission. That day he sent the sixth corps from Neisse in the
direction of Olmiitz. This corps crossed the Austrian frontier,
and moved through the highland border districts of Friedberg,
Freywalde, and Zuchmantel, while the soldiers everywhere
spread the news that they formed the advanced guard of the
entire army of the Crown Prince. Some slight skirmishes
between the advanced guardsr and some Austrian hussars
. ensued without much damage to either side. In consequence
of this demonstration, however, Feldzeugmeister Benedek held
the second and third Austrian corps between Hohenmauth and
Bomisch Triibau in such a position that they could not be
opposed to the Prussian columns at the point where the latter
readly crossed the frontier. On this day, the 22nd June, the
head-quarters of the Crown Prince remained at Neisse ; the
fifth corps was in the neighbourhood of Ottmachau ; the corps
of the Guards was drawn together round Miinsterberg ; the
first corps was at Landshut, the sixth corps, as already stated,
over the Austrian frontier, and engaged in its demonstration
against Austrian Silesia.
The Second Army was now moved into positions which
would facilitate its irruption into Bohemia ; and on the 25th
June, its one hundred and twenty-five thousand warriors were
posted, so that the first corps was at Sciiomberg, the Guards at
Schlegel, the fifth corps between Glatz and Reinerz, the first
brigade of the sixth corps at Glatz, and the remainder of the
sixth corps at Patschkau, the cavalry division at Waldenburg.
On the same day the Crown Prince changed his head-quarters
from Neisse by way of Camenz to Eckersdorf,
The staff of the Crown Prince knew that the Austrian first
corps and the army of Saxony were engaged against Prince
Frederick Charles, and that the second Austrian corps had
pushed forward towards the county of Glatz. It was, therefore,
correctly argued, that only fom* Austrian corps could be opposed
to the Prussians in issuing from the mountains ; but «ven under
these circumstances the march of the Army of Silesia through
the passes was exposed to great difficulties, and to considerable
danger.
The county of Glatz forms a salient bastion of hills in the
Chap. I.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA, 193
highland frontier between Prussian Silesia and Bohemia.
From Glatz four great roads lead into the Imperial dominions :
the first on the north-west by Wiinschelburg to Braunau, the
second on the west by Reinerz to Nachod and Josephstadt,
the third on the south by Mittelwalde to Gabel and Wilden-
schwert, the fourth on the south-east by Wilhelmsthal to
Altstadt On .the east of the county of Glatz, a road runs
from Neisse by Ziegenhals and Wiirbenthal in the direction of
Olmiitz, and on the west of the county a road runs from
Landshut by Liebau to Trautenau and Josephstadt The
passage of the frontier by the Second Army had necessarily
to be effected by one of the six frontier passes. The strategical
intention of effecting a junction as soon as possible in Bohemia
with the First Army, determined the selection of the three
roads to Trautenau, Braunau, and Nachod, the directions of
which also afforded to the Army of Silesia the advantage of
being able to make its advance in three columns, which could
afford to each other mutual assistance in case of any one being
attacked by the enemy.
The roads on either flank were good. That by Reinerz and
Nachod led through a defile five miles in length, and it was
only beyond Nachod that troops who marched through it
could deploy. The pass to Braunau in the centre had the
advantage that the Bohemian frontier at this point advanced
for a space of twenty miles. In consequence of this geogra-
phical configuration it was the least liable to be blocked or
broken up by the enemy, and the troops that marched by it
were the least likely to be impeded in their formation after
debouching. They would consequently be available to sup-
port either of the flank columns in case of opposition being
made to their issue from the mountains. After passing the
mountains, the junction of the Army of Silesia with that of
Prince Frederick Charles could only be effected by a flank
move to the right. In order to facilitate this subsequent
movement, the plan of the passage of the army of tlie Crown
Prince was determined as follows: — ^The right wing, which
consisted of the first corps, was to move, followed by the
cavalry division, from Landshut by Liebau on Trautenau.
The fifth corps on the left was to occupy the pass of Nachod.
194 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI.
The corps of the Guards in the centre was to m^ve by i*ie
intermediate road from Wiinschelburg on Eraunau, in order to
act as a reserve to either of the flank corps, or if necessary to
occupy the pass of E)rpel. The sixth corps was to remain for
a short time on the south of the fortress of Neisse, but as soon
as possible was to be withdrawn from this position and to be
advanced to Reinerz to support the fifth corps. The pro-
tection of Upper Silesia was handed over to the detachments
under Count Stolberg and General Knobelsdorf. After passing
the mountains the whole army was to make a wheel to its left,
pivoted on Nachod and Skalitz, to seize the railway from
Josephstadt to Tiimau, and along that line gain its junction
with the First Army.
To carry out the preliminaries of this plan, on the evening of
the 26th June the first Prussian corps was stationed at Landshut
with its advanced guard at Liebau. The guards occupied
MUnsterberg with advanced posts at Frankenstein and Silber-
berg. The fifth corps was at Ottmachau with its advanced
guard at Lewin. The main body of the sixth corps was near
Zuchmantel.
The Austrian commander thought that he had secured the
kft wing of his whole army by the first Austrian corps and the
Saxons under Count Clam Gallas, and on the 26th June held
his remaining forces in the following positions: — The tenth
Austrian corps was at Pilnikau, the fourth at Koniginhof, the
sixth moved that day from Opocna to Skalitz, the eighth was
in the rear of Josephstadt, the second further south in reserve,
and the third round Bomisch Triibau.
It is naturally difiicult to say what was the intention of
Feldzeugmeister Benedek : if, however, he had the idea of at
any time assuming the offensive, he ought to have with might
and main attacked the heads of the Prussian columns with
overwhelming masses as they issued from the mountains. He
was bound at any cost to prevent the passage of the fifth
corps, which was the pivot of the Prussian army, and on the
same terms to defeat the first corps and the Guards before
they could reach the line of the Aupa, It must have been on
the defeat of the army of the Crown Prince that he depended
to be able to assume the offensive with superior numbers
Chap. I.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA, 195
against the First Prassian Army and the Army of the
Elbe.
Early in the afternoon of the 26th of June, the first
Prussian corps was concentrated near Liebau, the corps
of the Guards round Wiinschelburg, and the fifth corps at
Lewin.
That evening the heads of the columns of the Guards pushed
across the frontier at Tunschendorf and Johannisberg, under
the direction of the Crown Prince in person. The troops
cheered loudly as they stepped upon Austrian ground. Some
detachments of the third regiment of Uhlans of the Guard
had a little beyond the frontier a skirmish with some of the
Austriafi Windischgratz dragoons and Mexican Uhlans, in
which the Prussians had the advantage. Certainly Austrian
prisoners and captured horses were brought into the Prussian
head-quarters, and the cavalry of the Second Army acquired
the idea that it was fully equal if not superior to the horsemen
opposed to it. The Guards bivouacked that night between
Politz and Braunau.
On the left wing, the fifth corps the same evening was
pushed forward towards the frontier in the direction of Nachod.
The bridge over the little river Metau, which forms here the
boundary line, had been broken ; and as the Prussian scouts
approached the river, two Austrian vedettes with two infantry
sentries could be made out hidden behind some willow-trees
at the Bohemian end of the bridge. These were dislodged by
a few Prussian Jagers, who forded the river and pushed on in
pursuit At a toll-house about four hundred yards further on
they were checked by the fire of two Austrian field-guns, and
were driven back to the river, where the Prussian pioneers
were already engaged in the repair of the broken bridge. Two
Prussian guns were quickly brought up, and after a few shots
being exchanged the Austrian pieces withdrew, with their
escort of two squadrons of cavalry and about ninety foot
soldiers. General Lowenfeld, who commanded the leading
division of the fifth Prussian corps, sent his Jagers in pursuit,
and secured without opposition the town of Nachod, and the
strong castle which about three-quarters of a mile from the
Metau covers the issue of the pass, and could have been easily
o 2
196 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VI.
held, by a handful of detennined men^ for at least two days
against the whole Prussian army.
After these preliminary movements on the 26th, on the 27th
commenced the series of brilliant operations by which the
army of the Crown Prince wrestled its way through the
mountains.
CHAPTER 11.
PASSAGE OF THE RIGHT AND CENTRAL COLUMNS OF THE
ARMY OF SILESIA THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS.
The first corps» which formed the right column of the army
of the Crown Prince, was under the command of General von
Bonin. This officer ordered his advanced guard to advance
from Liebau at four o'clock on the morning of the 27 th, and to
follow the road by Golden-Oels to Trautenau. At the latter
town it was to halt until the main body arrived at Parschnitz
in the road between Schomberg and Albendorf, then it was to
move forward upon Amau. The reserves of in&mtry and
of artillery were to follow the advanced guard, the reserve of
cavalry the main body.
The march commenced Hostile dragoons were descried in
front of the heads of the columns, but did not yet attack. Tht
main body first came up to the advanced guard, which had
halted at Parschnitz at eight o'clock, about ten, when the
latter was ordered to move forward, and soon commenced
THE FIRST ACTION OF TRAUTENAU.
The town of Trautenau lies on the river Aupa, in a basin
almost surrounded by mountains : by the river the ground is
wet and marshy, on the hill-sides it is rough and broken, so
that it is nowhere particularly favourable for the action of
cavalry or artillery.
The great heat made the Prussian troops suffer much from
fatigue and thirst on their march, and they were weary when
they reached the town of Trautenau. But the Austrians were
in the town, and (General von Bonin was forced to attack them,
as his road to join the Crown Prince, who was with the left
198 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VL
column, led through Trautenau. The head of the advanced
guard broke down the barricade on the bridge over the Aupa.
The infantry iight soon began in the streets, and the Austrians
were pushed back gradually from house to house. But the
Austrians reinforced their troops, and then maintained their
position, till the Prussians, calling up more battalions, again
got a little the better of the combat Both sides suffered
heavily, and the Prussians gained ground but slowly, for from
every house and from every comer hidden marksmen poured
bullets into the ranks of the battalions that tried to push along
the streets. When aU the Prussian reinforcements had arrived,
a general attack was made, and the Austrians were pushed out
of the houses into the open country beyond. The Prussians
pursued and followed step by step their slowly-retreating
enemies. Beyond the town one of Austria's most celebrated
cavalry regiments, the Windischgratz dragoons, stood waiting
to sweep the Prussian battalions from the open ground if they
issued from the shelter of the houses. These dragoons have
long held a high reputation, and, for a record ot brave deeds
done by the regiment, alone in the Austrian army wear no
moustache. The Prussian infantry could not advance, and it
seemed that the houses of Trautenau had been won in vain.
But assistance was at hand. The ist regiment of the Prussian
dragoons came trotting along the main street, deployed into
line almost as they debouched from the town, and with their
horses well in hand, and their sword-points low, bore in a
steady canter straight down upon the Austrian cavalry ; these
did not wait inactive to receive the attack, but rushed forward
to meet their foes ; no shots were exchanged, not a saddle was
emptied till the close. When within a few yards of each other,
both sides raised a cheer, and, welcoming the hug of battle,
the two lines rushed upon each other. Horse pressed against
horse, knee against knee, swords went up quick and came
down heavily on head-piece or on shoulder, points were given
and received, blows quickly parried were returned with lightning
speed; here an Austrian was borne to the ground, there a
Prussian was sent reeling from his seat, and for a few minutes
the mass of combatants swayed slowly backwards and fonn'ards.
But then, as if some mighty shell had burst among them, the
Chap. 11] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA, 199
Austrian soldiers flew scattered from the meieej and the Prus-
sians riding hard after them drove them from the field, but
themselves being under the fire of small arms suffered a heavy
loss.
The Austrian infantry, which consisted of Mondel's brigade
of the tenth Austrian corps, formed on a hill called the Capel-
lenberg, which afforded a strong position beyond the town.
This hill could only be scaled by the assailant infantry with
great difficulty. Notwithstanding the unfavourable nature of
the ground, and the strong resistance of the defenders, the
right wing of the Prussian advanced guard under Colonel
Koblinski, which consisted of two battalions of the 4Tst regi-
ment and a company of Jagers, gained the Capellenberg be*
tween twelve and one o'clock* The Austrians retired a short
distance. The Prussian commander ordered eight battalions
to advance from Parschnitz, cross the Aupa, and attack the
right flank of the Austrian position. These battalions had
great difficulties to encounter : the wooded hills close to the
Aupa could only be traversed in extended order, an4 as soon
as the open ground was gained they suffered much firom some
hostile skirmishers concealed in the standing com.
Notwithstanding these disadvantageous circumstances, they
gained ground. About three o'clock the advanced guard seized
the village of Hohenbruck, south of Trautenau, and the brigade
on the left wing occupied the heights on the west of the road
from Trautenau to Rognitz. It was now three o'clock, the
Austrians had retired, and General von Bonin considered that
the action was over.
The retreat of the Austrians had, however, been but a
tactical manoeuvre, and for once in the history of war a tactical
retreat resulted in an advantage to the general who had made
it, though even in this case the gain was only of a temporary
nature. About half-past three o'clock the action began again.
General Gablenz, who commanded the tenth Austrian corps,
bad advanced from Pilnikau with his whole force, and at that
hour made a heavy attack on the Prussian • troops, who were
already weary with a hot march and a lengthened combat
General Gablenz directed some of his battalions against the
Prussian front, and with others made a movement against
200 SEVEN' WEEKS' WAR, [Book VL
General Benin's left flank. At half-past four o'clock the Aus-
trians recovered Hohenbruck, and at five the Prussian troops
commenced their retreat
In order to cover this movement General Bamekow, with
the 43rd Prussian regiment, occupied the commanding hills
and plantations which lie on the north of the Capellenberg,
supported by the 3rd regiment of Grenadiers, which was posted
on the hills l)dng further back. The 43rd stopped the Aus-
trian pursuit, though with great loss to its own strength, for an
hour and a half, but they had to be withdrawn a little after six
o'clock. The grenadiers again brought the Austrians up, and
stayed their advance until all the Prussian troops had gained
an unpursued retreat
General von Bonin had intended to hold the line of the
Aupa on the north of Trautenau, but General Gablenz pressed
upon him, and he was forced to continue his retreat to the
same position as he had occupied on the morning of the day
of the action, keeping his rear-guard at Golden-Oels, about
three miles from Trautenau.
The cavalry division of the army, which was to have fol-
lowed the first corps through the mountains as soon as the
defile was cleared, remained at Schomberg.
The first Prussian corps lost in this action, in killed and
wounded, sixty-three officers and twelve hundred and fourteen
men ; the Austrian tenth corps, according to Austrian returns,
lost one hundred and ninety-six officers and five thousand five
hundred and thirty-six men ; a terrible disparity in numbers !
The Austrian infantry, with a muzzle-loading arm, had indeed'
gained a victory over an enemy equipped with a breech-loading
weapon, but at such a sacrifice as made success almost as costly
as defeat.
General Gablenz did not pursue beyond Trautenau. He
kept his advanced guard there for the night, and bivouacked
at Neu-Rognitz. His corps was considerably shaken by its
victory, of which it was soon to be deprived by the fortune of
war.
The corps of the Guards had crossed the Bohemian frontier
at Steinethal on the evening of the 26th, and had pushed
forward the second division by Braunau, as far as Weckelsdorl
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 201
On the 27th June this corps was to move in a south-westerly
direction, in order to open the communication between the
first corps, which was advancing against Trautenau on the
right, and the fifth corps at Nachod on the left At mid-day
the first division of the Guards was to march on Eypel. At
Qualitch, the general commanding this division hearing the
heavy firing at Trautenau halted, and sent an offer of assistance
to General von Bonin. Then the Prussian infantry of the
first corps, advancing on the road beyond Trautenau, were
everywhere pressing the Austrians back, when a staff-oflficer
came up to the conmiander of the first corps, and told him
that the Prussian Guard was ready to come to his assistance.
General von Bonin thought his victor}- abeady secure, and
declined the proffered aid. For another four hours he did not
want it, for the Prussians kept advancing slowly, steadily,
pressing the Austrians back, but at four o'clock large reinforce-
ments of artillery came up upon the Austrian side, and General
von Bonin ordered his retreat
The first division 'of the Guard corps, ignorant of the failure
of the first corps at Trautenau, continued its march, and in he
evening reached the neighbourhood of Eypel, on the Aupa,
while the second division moved to Kosteletz, about five miles
to the south-east of that place. The reserve artillery and heavy
cavalry were still one day's march in rear. The Prince of
Wiirtemburg, who commanded the Guards, received in the
night intelligence fi:om the Crown Prince, and instructions to
move to its relief— of the result of the action at Trautenau,
and he immediately gave orders that at daybreak the next
morning his corps should cross the Aupa, attack the corps of
General Gablenz, and thus disengage the first Prussian corps,
and restore the broken communication with General von
Bonin. According to the disposition of the Prince of Wiirtem-
burg, the first division of the Prussian Guard was to advance
by Eypel, in a westerly direction, and the second division to
move firom Kosteletz to Eypel, to serve as a support to the
first division. The first division, under General Hiller, defiled
over the Aupa at Eypel on the 28th June, at five in the morn-
ing, and threw out cavalry patrols in the direction of both
Trautenau and Koniginhofl These patrols- discovered that
202 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VL
General Gablenz was bivouacked with the main body of his
corps at Neu-Rognitz, about two miles south of Trautenau,
and that he held the latter town with a strong advanced guard.
His position was therefore pointed northward against the first
Prussian corps, and his right flank was now threatened by the
advance of the Guards from EypeL The Prussian patrols also
discovered that the baggage of the corps of General Gablenz
was drawing off towards Koniginhof, but was stiU five miles
distant from that town. Under these favourable strategical
conditions, the first division of the Guards received orders
immediately to advance by Standenz, to attack the enemy in
the direction of Koniginhof, while the second division, as a
reserve, was advanced beyond the defile of Eypel. At the
same time two battalions of the Franz Grenadiers were sent
forward towards the north-west against Trautenau, in order to
cover the right wing of the advance. These dispositions led
to the
ACTION OF SOOR.
General Gablenz desired to change his front to the right, in
consequence of finding his right wing thus threatened. To
cover this evolution he ranged his whole artillery, covered by
Knobel's brigade, on the hills between Neu-Rognitz and
Burgersdorfl In this he succeeded, and extended his right
wing to Prausnitz, where he gave his hand to Fleischhacker's
brigade of the fourth Austrian corps, which had been sent to
his assistance. The advance of the two Prussian grenadier
battalions against Alt-Rognitz threatened, however, to cut oflf
from him the brigade which he had posted in TrautenaiL
The Prussian advanced guard, under Colonel Kessel, which
consisted of four battalions of the Fusiliers, one company of
the Jagers of the Guard, two companies of the pioneers of the
Guard, the fourth squadron of the hussars of the Guard, and
one 4-pounder battery, came upon the Austrian position before
the whole of General Gablenz's guns were formed. It was,
however, received by a hot fire from twenty-four pieces, which
had already .taken up their position. The single Prussian
battery engaged these guns wiih considerable rashness, while
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 203
the infantry attacked the plantations west of Standenz, and
drove the Austrian position slightly in.
Soon the guns of General Gablenz were all in position, and
sixty-four pieces opened a withering fire on the six Prussian
guns, which, however, held their ground, though with great
loss. While the Fusiliers and the Jagers of the advanced
guard sought to gain some ground, some of the battalions of
the Prussian main body, under General Alvensleben, came up,
and hurried into the action wherever they were most required.
Next arrived the first and second battalions of the Fusiliers,
and the second company of the Jagers of the Guard, who
moved in the direction of Burgersdorf and Alt-Rognitz. After
these followed the second regiment of Grenadiers, and with
them came a very welcome field-battery, which immediately
opened fire to support the only Prussian battery as yet in
action. Burgersdorf and the plantations near it were now
captured by the Prussians, and at that moment the rest of the
Prussian infantry and the remainder of the artillery came into
play. The action then became general. The Prussian infantry
advanced, and stormed the rising ground on which the Austrian
battalions stood, but at an awful sacrifice; men fell every
moment, and officers went down so quickly that hardly a
company reached the summit commanded by its captain. But
the Guards pressed on, and the Austrians had to retire from
position to position, while the Prussians advanced steadily,
urging them backwards. The Austrian corps of Gablenz was
then defeated, for the troops could not rally under the fire of
the needle-gun, and every battalion which retreated was routed.
The two Prussian battalions which had been detached
towards Trautenau to cover the right wing had been during
this time heavily engaged. As they moved towards Trautenau,
some columns were seen advancing towards them. It was
uncertain at first whether these were some of the troops of the
first Prussian corps, or some of the Austrians firom Trautenau.
The doubt was soon dispelled. As they approached, it became
clear that, while three of the Austrian brigades of the corps of
General Gablenz were resisting the front of the Prussian attack,
^lie remaining brigade, that of Grivicics, had been ordered
to sally from Trautenau against the Prussian right wing, and
204 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VI.
to it the advancing columns belonged — a movement which,
but for the precautions of the Prince of Wiirtembuig, would
have had an important influence on the action. The two
Prussian battalions withstood the attack of this brigade with
the greatest courage. The greater part of the officers and
one-third of the soldiers of these battalions were laid on the
field, either dead or dying, but they held their ground until
the second division of the Guards, which had been held in.
reserve, could hurry up to their assistance. This division
coming up, drove the brigade of Grivicics back into Trautenau,
cut it off from the main body of Gablenz's corps, stormed the
town, and captured there a stand of colours and over three
thousand prisoners.
General Gablenz withdrew the rest of his corps along the
road to Koniginhof The Prussians were too much fatigued
to pursue in force : and the Austrian brigade of Fleischhacker,
which belonged to the fourth corps, was allowed to pass the
night at Soor unmolested as a rear-guard, while the first division
of the Prussian Guards bivouacked opposite to it at Burgers-
dorC The next morning this brigade also retired at daybreak,
towards Koniginhof The Guards had but eleven hundred men
in killed and wounded in this action. The Austrians left
behind them five thousand prisoners, three standards, and ten
guns.
By the successful issue of this action the communication
with the first corps which had been broken on the 27th by its
failure at Trautenau, was completely re-established.
On the morning of the 29th, the Crown Prince caused the
first corps, which had been defeated at Trautenau on the 27th,
to march past before him through that town, where the victory
of the Guards on the 28th had opened a free passage
for it
The Guards on the 29th moved fix)m Burgersdorf and Trau-
tenau, on Koniginhof and Rettendorf. Early in the morning
of that day, one of the regiments in issuing from Burgersdorf
had a skirmish with some detachments of scattered Austrians
who had been cut off from their corps, and passed the night in
the woods.
As the advanced guard of the first division of the Guards
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 205
approached Koniginhof, it again fell in with the army, and a
combat ensued which terminated in the
CAPTURE OF KONIGINHOF.
The advanced guard of the first division of the Guards, con-
sisting of four battalions of Fusiliers, two companies of Jagers,
and two field batteries, broke up firom Burgersdorf at mid-day
on the 29th, and were ordered to advance and occupy the
town of Koniginhof. The brigade of Fleischhacker, which
belonged to the fourth Austrian coips, was posted as garrison
of the place, and had drawn up several infantry columns,
covered by skirmishers, in the corn-fields on the north of the
town. The Prussian riflemen quickly engaged them : the slow
shots of the muzzle-loading arms did little execution against
the rapid discharges of the needle-gun, and these advanced
columns were soon driven to seek shelter in flight The
defence of the houses was entrusted to the Austrian regiment
of Coranini, and here took place a hot contest, for this gallant
corps defended each yard of every street, and each window of
every house. The Fusiliers of the Prussian Guards pressed on,
overthrew their opponents in the streets, and, dashing past the
loopholed houses, occupied the bridge over the Elbe. The
majority of the defenders were still in the town, and were com-
pletely surrounded Nothing was left to them but to lay down
their arms. The Prussians here captured four hundred prisoners
and two standards.
The weak remnant of the Coranini regiment retreated to
Miletin. The Prussian Guards were concentrated in the
neighbourhood of Koniginhof, and the first Prussian corps
advanced to Pilnikau.
Feldzeugmeister Benedek had in the meantime drawn the
second Austrian corps to the vicinity of Josephstadt It
arrived, however, too late to aid in a defence of the line of the
Elbe at Koniginhof. That important point for the passage of
the river was already in the possession of the Prussian Guards,
when, on the 30th June, Count Thum appeared with his corps
on the heights south of the Elbe, at Koniginhof. This Austrian
general could do nothing more than open an ineffectual can-
nonade against the Prussian corps of the Guards, on the 30th
2o6 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book VL
June. That day one division of the latter corps bivouacked
near Gradlitz, on the left bank of the Elbe, about two miles
out of Koniginhof, and the same day the first Prussian corps
advanced to Amau, on the river, about seven miles to the
north of the same place.
It is now necessary to trace tjie passage of the left column of
the Crown Prince's army through the mountains, and to show
how, on the 30th June, it was able to eflfect a junction with the
right and central columns on the banks of the Elbe.
CHAPTER III.
ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA.
To the fifth Prassian corps, which formed the head of the
left column of the army of the Crown Prince, and which he
himself most closely directed, was the most difficult task given.
Only one narrow road leads from the county of Glatz to
Nachod, which beyond the Bohemian frontier runs in a \i'inding
course near the town of Nachod, through a difficult defile. A
corps d'armde, with all its trains and baggage advancing by
one road, forms a column of march twenty miles long. If
only the combatants themselves and the most necessary train,
such as ammunition columns and field hospitals, form the
columns, it still will stretch over ten miles ; so that if the head
of the column is attacked as it issues from a defile where the
troops cannot move off the road, the rearmost battalion will
not be able to support the most advanced until four hours have
passed
In order to ensure the safe issue from the mountain passes,
the advanced guard of the fifth corps, under General von
Lowenfeld, was pushed forward as far as Nachod on the even-
ing of the 26th June. The Austrians held the defile with a
veiy weak force, and did not stand obstinately in the Castle of
Nachod, so that the Prussian advanced guard occupied that
strong post with very slight opposition. General Ramming,
who had been posted with the sixth Austrian corps and a
portion of the first division of reserve cavalry at Opocna, about
ten miles to the south of Nachod, marched on the 26th towards
Skalitz, by order of Feldzeugmeister Benedek. He was in-
tended next day to fall upon the head of the Prussian fifth
corps as it issued from the pass, and drive it back into the
io8 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VI
defile. At the same time the eighth Austrian corps under the
command of the Archduke Leopold was posted on the railway
to Josephstadt, in order to act as a reserve to General Ram-
ming. The next day the advanced guard of the Prussian fifth
corps brought on the
ACTION OF NACHOD.
On the 27th, the same day that the first corps was defeated at
Trautenau, as the advanced guard of the fifth Prussian corps
d*armde was, about ten o'clock in the morning, moving out of
Nachod towards Skalitz, in order to take up a position covering
the strategical point where the roads to Josephstadt and Neustadt
branch, its patrols observed heavy Austrian columns advancing
by the road from Neustadt, and two Austrian cuirass regiments
drew up across the road to bar the way against the Prussian in-
fantry. These were supported by two Austrian infantry brigades,
while a third stood in liie rear as a reserve. The Prussians were
then in a dangerous position, for the road through the defile of
Nachod behind them was choked with the carriages of the
artillery, and only a few battalions and two squadrons had
gained the open ground. General von Lowenfeld, who com-
manded the advanced guard, threw his infantry into a wood
which was beside the road, where, protected by the trees to a
certain extent from the shells of the Austrian guns, they main-
tained their position until their artillery had cleared the defile.
At the same time the small body of Prussian cavalry who were
with the infantry charged straight down the road against the
centre of the line of the cuirass regiments. The Austrians
numbered eight times as many sabres as the Prussians, and
their cavalry bore the highest reputation in Europe. All
expected to see the Prussians hurled back, broken and de*
stroyed, by their collision with the Austrian line, but the result
was far different ; the Prussian squadrons thundered down the
road, and seemed merely by the speed at which they were
galloping to cut clean through the centre of the line of
Cuirassiers; but, though they were thus successful in their
first onslaught, they were quickly assailed in fiank and rear by
overwhelming numbers, and with difl[iculty escaped without
being cut to pieces. Many, however, managed to shake them-
Chap. III.] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN. 209
selves free from the mUke^ and, galloping back, rallied under
the protection of the fire of their infantry in the wood ; but the
Austrians pressed forward, and they had to retire; and it
seemed that the issue of the defile would be lost, for Austrian
infantry were quickly coming up, and were preparing to attack
the wood held by the Prussians. At the first intelligence of
the advance of the enemy the Crown Prince in person hurried
up to the front Then upon Lowenfeld's battalions depended
not only the safe passage of the fifth corps through the defile,
but also tlie preservation of the whole of the artillery, for so
crowded with carriages was the road that, had the Austrians
pressed on, every gun and waggon must have fallen into their
hands. But the infantry proved worthy of the trust placed in
them, and notliing availed to dislodge them from the trees,
though the shells went whistling in quick succession through
the trunks, and the splinters carried away the branches above
the heads of the soldiers, and tore up the turf beneath their
feet
The Crown Prince was in Nachod when the firing com-
menced, but he pushed his way with difficulty through the
crowded defile, and came to his advanced guard in order him-
self to be with his soldiers in their time of trial. Behind him
followed as quickly as possible the battalions of the main body
of the corps, and the guns of the artillery were also pushed for-
ward ; but the road was long and crowded, and both regiments
and guns made their way with difiiculty. In the meantime
the Austrians pressed hard upon the little band in the wood,
and seemed as though they would pass it by, and close the
defile with their columns. But before they could do so the
battalions of the main body gained the end of the defile, and
the Prussian guns began to come quickly forward, for waggons
and all encumbrances had been pushed off the road into the
ditches to facilitate the free passage of the troops going into
action. The newly-arrived troops reinforced those in the wood,
and the artillery replied to the Austrian batteries ; but at noon
the batde was still stationary, and the Prussians had not advanced
their position since the beginning of the fight, for the Austrian
cavalry stood prepared to charge the Prussian infantry if it
attempted to move forward on the open ground. The Crown
2to SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VL
Prince knew that on breaking that cavalry line depended the
passage of the fifth corps into Bohemia, and he sent against
it the eighth Prussian regiment of dragoons, and the first
Uhlan regimentr It was as exciting moment The Prussians,
nerved by the importance of the issue of their charge, and with
the eyes of their infantry upon them, sprang forward readily :
the Austrian horsemen, proud of their high renown, and eager
to wipe out the memory of the former skirmish, also bounded
forward as soon as they saw the Prussians approaching. The
two lines met about half way, for one moment formed a tangled
struggling crowd, and then the Prussian Uhlans, with their
lance-points low and heads bent down, were seen pursuing.
The most famous cavalry in Europe had been overthrown.
Before and during this charge both divisions of the fifth
Prussian corps had cleared the defile, and scarcely had the
effect of the cavalry charge been seen than General Steinmetz,
who commanded the whole corps, determined to assume the
offensive. Then, in rear of their cavalry, the Prussian infantry
and artillery dashed forward. Some of the battalions turning
aside, marched against the village of Wisokow, already in flames
from a Prussian shell, with their bayonets at the charge. Among
the burning houses the Austrians waited for them : a sharp
struggle ensued, but the village was carried, and the Austrians
were driven out of it
In the meantime the Austrian heavy horsemen had rallied,
and again returned to the charge. This time they advanced
with skill as well as courage, and bore down on the flank of the
Uhlans ; but their approach was seen, and before they reached
the Prussian line it had quickly changed its front, and met the
advancing squadrons face to face. Again the Austrians re-
coiled, but now without a chance of rallying ; they were broken
and scattered, and the Uhlans, spreading out in pursuit, went
dashing in small knots over the plain after them, and captured
two guns from their horse artillery. This cavalry charge de-
cided the fortune of the day, and the Austrians retired, pressed
by the Prussian infantry. General Steinmetz, who commanded
the fifth corps, which was here engaged, led forward all his
troops, leaving only three battalions of the royal regiment in
reserve, and pushed the enemy bacL But his men, after a long
Chap. III.] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN. 211
march and a severe action, were too fatigued to pursue in mass,
so they were halted, and the cavahy and one or two battalions
alone followed up the pursuit; but they did well, for they
brought back 2,000 prisoners and three guns, besides the two
taken by the Uhlans ; and these were not the only trophies, for
three sets of infantry colours were taken by the Prussians, and
the standards of the Austrian cuirassiers fell into the hands of
the Uhlans. The Crown Prince thanked General Steinmetz on
the field in the name of the King for the victory, and well the
general and his troops merited the compliment, for all the
first part of the action was fought with twenty-two battalions
against twenty-nine, and with an inferior force of cavalry and
artillery.
This victory cost the Prussians a loss of nine hundred men
killed and wounded ; among the latter were the two generals,
Von OUech and Von Wunck. The fifth Prussian corps, not-
withstanding that on the 27 th it had marched over fifteen miles
through a narrow defile, and been engaged in action for eight
hours, was still so strong and so confident that General Stein-
metz resolved to resume the attack the ensuing day without loss
of time.
General Ramming, who had deservedly the reputation of
being one of the most able and talented generals of the Impe-
rial army, after having engaged the Prussians at Nachod, with
his whole force retreated to Skalitz on the evening of the 27 th.
On arriving at that place he sent a despatch to the head-
quarters of the army, in which he requested that the eighth
Austrian corps, which was posted at Josephstadt, might be
allowed to assist him with two brigades. Feldzeugmeister
Benedek thereupon ordered that the eighth corps should
advance to Skalitz, and be prepared to engage in the first
line, while that of General Ramming should form its reserve.
Both corps were placed under the command of the Archduke
l^opold. One brigade of the Prussian sixth corps, which was
to follow the fifth corps through the defile of Nachod, had
reached Nachod on the evening of the 27 th, and was ready
that day to advance with General Steinmetz. General Stein-
metz determined to advance. At the same time the Austrian
general replaced the sixth corps by the eighth corps at Skalitz,
p 2
212 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI.
in order to oppose the Prussians and drive them bacL Hence
arose the
ACTION OF SKALITZ.
The Austrians were soon forced to quit all hopes of the offen-
sive, and to assume the defensive energetically in front of
Skalitz, on the road and railway, which are flanked on the
north and south by two woods. The country was entirely un-
favourable for the action of cavalry. Either side brought up as
much force as possible. The battle swayed hither and thither,
but ultimately the superior strength and armament of the Prus-
sian soldier told against his weaker antagonist
On the north of the railway the 37 th and 58th Prussian rai-
ments and 4th dragoons with three batteries advanced ; while
on the south the King's own regiment, though exposed to a
terrible fire of artillery, gained the wood on the south of the
town, and here succeeded in sustaining the assaults of far
superior numbers, until the 6th, 46th, and 52nd and 47th regi-
ments could come up to its aid, and join with it in an attack on
Skalitz.
This attack was made about 3 p.m. On the north side of the
town the 6th and 52nd regiments advanced, and along the
high road the 7th, 37th, 58th, and 47th regiments.
The Austrian position was forced, and the Archduke Leopold
compelled to fall back to a strong position behind the Aupa,
where he intended to hold his ground, supported by his nume-
rous artillery. This position was however also carried by the
Prussians, who there took many prisoners, and by it they gdned
the command of the defile of the Aupa.
General Steinmetz, by this victory, captured four thousand
, prisoners, eight guns, and several stands of colours. On this
day, the 28th, depended whether the Army of Silesia would
effect its issue from the mountains, or fail in the attempt. The
corps of the Guards was engaged at Trautenau, the fifth corps
at Skalitz. The Crown Prince, in person, could not be present
at either action. He was obliged to choose a position between
the two, whence he could proceed to any point where his pre-
sence might be necessary. He accordingly posted himself on a
hill near Kosteletz, where the heavy cavalry of the Guard took
Chap. III.] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN, 213
up its position on coming through the hills, and where it was
joined at a later period of the day by the reserve artillery of the
Guard. The time passed heavily on that hill of Kosteletz.
The thunder of cannon rose ever louder from Skalitz on the
south, and from the direction of Trautenau on the north. With
anxious ears the Commander-in-chief and his staff listened to
the progress of the cannonade, and with eager eyes scanned
the positions of the eddying clouds of white smoke which rose
from the engaged artillery. It was the intention of the Crown
Prince, if an unfavourable report of the progress of the action
on either side was brought to him, to repair to that point, and
in person to encourage his pressed troops. But every orderly
officer, every aide-de-camp, brought the intelligence that the
battles in both places were going well for the Prussians.
At last, between three and four o'clock, the Commander-in-
chief received the positive report from General Steinmetz that
he had stormed Skalitz, and driven back two of the enemy's
corps. No longer had the Crown Prince to give a thought to
this side. He immediately started for Eypel, in order to be
present at the action in which the Guards were engaged. At
this place the news reached him that the Guard had also victo-
riously achieved its task, and not only had forced the defile
from Eypel, but had also opened the pass from Trautenau*
Here, then, were the three issues from the mountains, the
defiles of Trautenau, Eypel, and Nachod, popularly called the
gates of Bohemia, in the secure possession of the Second Prus-
sian Army, and the junction of the hitherto separated corps
almost certain to be effected on the following day. To accom-
plish the junction of his united army with that of Prince
Frederick Charles, the Crown Prince ordered the advance the
next morning to be made as far as the Elbe.
The quarters of the Crown Prince on the night of the 28th
were fixed at Eypel, where he heard for the first time that the
first corps had only returned on the 27th from Trautenau to
their former bivouac, and were fit to advance again on the 29th,
having halted there on the 28th. The report of General von
Benin had not before reached head -quarters, and all that was
heard of the first corps was that it had not assisted the Guards
in the action of the 28th.
214 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VL
The Crown Prince immediately ordered General von Benin
to advance at daybreak on the 29th, from Trautenau to Pil-
nikau.
On the 29th June, General Steinmetz, with the fifth and
sixth corps, was to advance from Skalitz in a westerly direction,
towards Koniginhof, as far as Gradlitz, in order to approach
the other corps of the Crown Prince, so that the whole Army of
Silesia might be united on the Elbe before commencing general
operations in concert with the First Army. Fresh forces of the
enemy opposed this march, and took post in a situation which
caused the
ACTION OF SCHWEINSCHADEL.
The Austrian troops, which here opposed the advance of the
Prussian fifth corps, were those of the fourth corps, under the
command of General Festetics, whom Feldzeugmeister Benedek
had sent forward from Jaromirz, after he had withdrawn the 6th
and the 8th corps. Of this corps there were present only three
brigades, for one brigade had been detached to Koniginhof,
where on the same day it was engaged in an action against the
leading battalions of the Prussian Guard, as has been already
noticed. General Steinmetz attacked, and after an action of
three hours, which consisted of little more than a cannonade,
the Austrians were driven back, and retreated under the guns
of the fortress of Josephstadt, which opened hotly upon the ad-
vancing Prussians. General Festetics made his retreat in good
time, in order not to suffer a loss similar to that which had
befallen the other Austrian corps which had been engaged at
Trautenau and Skalitz. Early as he retired, however, he lost
eight hundred prisoners.
General Steinmetz, after pushing the retreating Austrians
close up to Josephstadt, did not venture to press fiuther in
this direction, as by pursuing such a course he would have
been exposed to be cut off and isolated from the other corps of
the Crown Prince. He detached, accordingly, one brigade, to
observe tlie garrison of Josephstadt, and moved the remainder
of his corps to Gradlitz, about two miles east of Koniginhof, in
order to concentrate with the rest of the Army of Silesia, He
arrived there on the night of the 29th June, and took up a
Chap. Ill] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN. 215
position near the division of the Guards, which was already
stationed there.
The sixth Prassiaa corps, which followed the fifth corps by
the defile of Nachod, firom the county of Glatz, had only sent
forward one brigade to aid the corps of General Stemmetz in
the actions of the 28th and 29th Juae. It reached Gradlitz,
however, late on the 30th June, so that now three corps of the
Army of Silesia were concentrated in the vicinity of Koniginhof.
The first corps had reached Amau, where there is also a bridge
over the Elbe, about seven miles to the north of Koniginho£
Thus the army of the down Prince, four days after its inroad
into Bohemia, had successfully united its divided columns of
advance, and had made itself master of the line of the Elbe
from Amau to near Josephstadt Four Austrian corps had
been repulsed, three of which were decidedly defeated, and
had lost ten thousand prisoners, twenty guns, five colours, and
two standards to the Crown Prince.
On the 30th of June a cavalry regiment, sent out from
Gitschin by Prince Frederick Charles, fell in with the outposts
of the corps of the Crown Prince at Amau. Communi-
cations between the two main armies were now established
in Bohemia, and their secure junction almost certain. For the
sake of simplicity, it may be here advisable to give briefly a
general sketch of the steps taken each day by the two armies
from the time oi their crossing the Austrian frontier to bring
about their common concentration.
SUMMARY OF THE ADVANCE OF THE THREE PRUSSIAN ARMIES
INTO BOHEMIA FOR CONCENTRATION.
On the 23rd June, the army of Prince Frederick Charles
advanced in three columns firom Zittau, Gorlitz, and Laubau,
towards Reichenberg.
The same day the Army of the Elbe advanced fix)m
Saxony.
On the 24th, Prince Frederick Charles occupied Reichen-
berg, and concentrated his three columns, which had passed
through the mountains.
On the 26th, the advanced guard of the fifth corps (Army of
2i6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VL.
Silesia) seized Nachod in the evening, and the Guards crossed
the frontier of Bohemia by the Wunschelburg road.
The same evening Prince Frederick Charles secured the
passage of the Iser at Tiimau and Pod oil, and the Army of the
Elbe occupied Hayda and B5hmisch Aicha.
On the 27th, the first corps of the Crown Prince's army
seized Trautenau, but was defeated and driven back by
General Gablenz.
The fifth corps of the Crown Prince's army defeated General
Ramming in the action of Nachod.
The Army of the Elbe, after a skirmish, occupied Hiihner-
wasser.
On the 28th, the Army of the Elbe and JPrince Frederick
Charles defeated the corps of Count Clam Gallas at Miinchen-
gratz, and secured the line of the Iser.
The Guards, under the Crown Prince, defeated General
Gablenz at Soor, and cleared the issue from the Trautenau
defile for the first corps.
The fifth corps defeated the Archduke Leopold at Skalitz.
On the 29th, the Guard corps stormed Koniginhof ; and the
fifth Prussian corps drove General Festetics firom Schwein-
schadeL The Crown Prince concentrated his army on the left
bank of the Elbe.
The army of Prince Frederick Charles that night stormed
Gitschin.
On the 30th, communications were opened between the
army of Prince Frederick Charles round Gitschin and the first
corps of the army of the Crown Prince at Arnau.
OBSERVATIONS.
For some reason, political or military, Benedek did not
assume the offensive. He threw this advantage into the hands
of his adversaries. It is supposed that political causes and
the request of the Germanic Confederation prevented the
Austrian general from taking this line of action, and carrying
the war into Saxony.
After having determined to fight on the defensive, he in-
tended to check one portion of his enemy's armies with a
Chap III.] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN. 217
detachment, while with superior forces he threw himself upon
the other. The lines of operation of the Prussian armies, con-
vergent from separate bases, gave him a favourable opportunity
to reap successful results from such a course. He could either
send a detachment to hold Prince Frederick Charles while he
assailed the Crown Prince, or could hold the latter while with
the mass of his army he threw himself upon the former. To
hold the Crown Prince, however, while he attacked Frederick
Charles was much more hazardous than to adopt the alternate
line. The Crown Prince, if he beat the detachment left to
bar his way, could sweep down upon the Austrian communi-
cations with Vienna ere Benedek had laid his grasp upon the
First Prussian Army. If this had been his intention, he
should have held the Castle of Nachod and the passes at
Trautenau and EypeL If, on the other hand, he intended to
delay Frederick Charles, the line of the Iser should have been
tenaciously held between Tiimau and Miinchengratz. None
of these things were done. Inferior forces of the Austrians
were exposed at almost all points to superior forces of the
Prussians; while the masses, which cast at the proper
moment to either side would have turned the scale, oscillated
vaguely backwards and forwards under vacillatory or contra-
dictory orders.
On the evening of the 26th June Benedek knew that the
Crown Prince was on the frontier, and that Prince Frederick
Charles was close to the Iser. His corps at this time were
stationed, the tenth at Pilnikau, the fourth at Koniginhof, the
sixth near Skalitz, while of the three others, two were south of
Josephstadt and one as far off as Bohmisch Triibau. On the
27th, after Tiimau on the Iser had been evacuated without a
blow by Clam Gallas, and the passage of that stream at PodoU
stormed by Frederick Charles, Benedek appears to have made
no movement to support with his reserves his corps at Nachod
or Trautenau against the Crown Prince, or to send reinforce-
ments to Clam Gallas.
On the 28th, the Crown Prince determined to retrieve the
misfortune of his right on the previous day, by energetically
attacking the position of the Austrian corps; while at the
same time the fifth corps, supported by the sixth, should move
2i8 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VI.
against Skalitz. Benedek had had only two corps engaged on
the previous day. One of these had been defeated at Nachod.
and driven back to Skalitz, but had by no means been routed.
The other had well held its own and had repulsed its
assailants. As yet the Austrian commander had lost nothing
so important that he might not hope, by vigorous action on
the 28th, to gain a decided success, and with one blow to turn
the fortune of the campaign, and the destiny of Austria.
The first Prussian corps was not on the morning of the 28th
sufficiently recovered from its repulse on the previous day to
engage at all. The fifth corps was able to engage, but was
supported only by one brigade of the sixth, because the three
remaining brigades of that corps were still in the defile through
the mountains.
Thus, the Crown Prince had only the two divisions of the
Guard corps, the fifth corps, and one brigade of the sixth
corps ready to go into action on the morning of the 28th,
in all about 67,000 men.
General Benedek ought to have known on the 27 th by day-
break, that he had nothing to fear in the direction of Olmiitz,
for the demonstration of the sixth Prussian corps made in that
direction on the previous day had been withdrawn. He could
therefore on the 27 th have moved the third corps from Boh-
misch Triibau to Josephstadt that day, and would then have
had six corps, about 150,000 men, ready to push into action
energetically on the morning of the 28th, and with them to
drive the Crown Prince back into the defiles. This great
opportunity, however, was missed. The sixth Austrian corps
at Skalitz was indeed reinforced by the eighth ; but the tenth
corps was left without reinforcements at Trautenau, so that,
although he had a force at hand double that of his adver-
sary, on the morning of the 28th only three corps, about
70,000 men, were placed in position to come under fire.
It is natural to inquire why Benedek did not employ on the
28th the three corps which did not come into action that day.
The reason, as far as can be gathered, appears to be, that
Benedek made the vital error of attempting to check the
Crown Prince when he was already past the defiles, and in a
position to threaten the Austrian communications, with a
Chap. III.] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN. 219
detachment, wh3e he directed his principal blow against
Prince Frederick Charies. At this time the distance between
the two Prussian armies was about forty miles. They were
too far separated to afford each other mutual assistance. The
distance from Benedek*s headquarters* to the Iser was nearly
fifty miles ; that from the same place to Skalitz, about eight
miles ; to Trautenau about twenty. At the two latter places
the Crown Prince was thrusting against the Austrian detach-
ments. The Prussian Second Army was thus at less than
half the distance from the mass of Benedek's troops than was
the First Army. It was also in a more favourable position to
sweep down on a vital point of Benedek's line of communica-
tion with Vienna than was the First Clearly every exertion
should have been made to crush the Crown Prince on the
28th. The Feldzeugmeister, however, designed to hold the
Crown Prince by three corps while he made his great attempt
against Prince Frederick Charles. Orders were sent to the
commanders of the corps at Trautenau and Skalitz, not to
compromise themselves in a serious action, but to retreat
slowly, if pressed by superior numbers. These orders were
neglected. If they had been observed, it is doubtful whether
the Crown Prince would not have pushed them back, and con-
centrated his army on the Austrian communications, before
Benedek had time to strike down Prince Frederick Charles,
and return with his main force to support his troops in front
of the Second Army. The result of the neglect of the orders
of the Commander-in-Chief was, however, that the three
Austrian corps engaged on the 28th near Josephstadt were
severely mutilated for further operations. Intending to sup-
port Clam Gallas and the Saxons before he knew of the
unfortunate issue of the combats of Nachod and Skalitz,
Benedek mstructed them to stand firm at Gitschin; and
promised to support them with his third corps on the 29th,
and ultimately with other corps. This despatch was received
at the Saxon head-quarters about mid-day on the 29th. The
Saxons and Clam GaJlas took up a strong position to fight at
Gitschin. When they were aheady engaged, and had com-
* Josephstadt
aio SEVEN WEEKS' WAJR. [Book VI.
promised themselves in a serious action with the leading
divisions of Prince Frederick Charles, a second despatch ar-
rived from Benedek. This had been written after the results
of Trautenau and Skalitz on the 28th were known to him. In
it he ordered the Crown Prince of Saxony to fall back slowly
before Prince Frederick Charles, while he himself collected
his forces on the heights above Koniginhof to oppose the
Second Army. By the crushing defeat at Gitschin, the left
flank of this position was laid open to the Prussian First
Army, and the Austrian commander was reduced to make
fresh dispositions, unable any longer to prevent the junction
of the two Prussian armies on the ground upon which at the
outbreak of hostilities he himself stood. Thus, by a neglect
to strike boldly on his nearest adversary, Benedek sacrificed
all the advantages which he had possessed from a central
situation, and the separate lines of operation of his antagonists.
To the superior armament of the Prussians a degree of im-
portance has rather hastily been awarded, which seems not to
be wholly merited. The needle-gun came into action imder
certainly favourable circumstances. At Podoll the Prussians
armed with breech-loaders fired upon the troops of Clam
Gallas while the latter were crowded together in the narrow
street of a village. At Nachod the soldiers of Steinmetz fired
from the cover of a wood upon their Austrian assailants in the
open. In both cases the rapid discharges told fearfriUy upon
the men who were armed with the more slowly loaded
weapons. The consequence was that the Prussians gained a
great moral victory at the very beginning. They found con-
fidence, their opponents lost heart. Yet in the subsequent
operations the difference of armament had little physical
effect, Superior strategical capabilities, superior organization,
and greater activity seemed to have been more powerful in
gaining the junction of the Prussian armies than superior
armament Yet the Prussian leaders hazarded much by their
two convergent lines of operation. The result is but another
proof of the old maxim that " in war he is the victor who
makes the fewest errors."
BOOK VII.
CHAPTER I.
OPERATIONS PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ,
After his unsuccessful attempts at Soor and Skalitz on the
28th, to prevent the issue of the columns of the Crown Prince
from the mountains, Feldzeugmeister Benedek determined to
take up a strong position on the right bank of the Upper
Elbe, in order to prevent the passage of that river by the
Army of Silesia.
The Elbe, which runs in a course nearly directly from
north to south between Josephstadt and Koniggratz, forms
almost a right angle at Uie former fortress. Its upper course
above that place lies from north-west to east Parallel to the
stream, and about one mile from it, a chain of hills thickly
wooded with fir-trees rises with a steep ascent, and forms the
southern bank of the valley. About half-way up the hillside
runs the railway which leads from Josephstadt to Tiimau. It
was along these heights that the Austrian commander designed
to draw up his troops, in such a manner as to bar the
passage of the Upper Elbe against the Crown Prince, and
to command the bridges of Amau, Koniginhof, and Schurz.
The right wing of the troops under the immediate command
of Benedek rested on the fortress of Josephstadt, and his
position extended along the heights towards Daubrowitz, while
his extreme left was formed and covered by the first corps and
the Saxons under Count Clam Gallas at Gitschin. In Konig-
inhof he left one brigade, and at Schweinschadel three brigades
of his fourth corps, in order to check the advance of the
222 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII.
Crown Prince while he was making his dispositions. These
troops were, as has been already said, driven in by the Prus-
sians on the 29th, when they retired and formed a portion of
the new Austrian line near Josephstadt.
On the night of the 29th Prince Frederick Charles stormed
Gitschin, and defeated Count Clam Gallas, who retired in
disorder towards Koniggratz. The loss of Gitschin exposed
the left flank of Benedek's intended position. As soon as he
heard the news of Count Clam Gallas's failure on the morning
of the 30th, he was obliged to make new arrangements to
oppose the advance of the enemy towards Vienna.
Of his eight corps, five — ^namely, the first corps, the Saxons,
the sixth, eighth, and tenth — ^had been decidedly beaten, and
had suffered great loss both in men and morale. The fourth
corps had also been under fire and suffered, though to a much
less serious extent. Two corps only remained to the Austrian
commander which were thoroughly intact He had no hope
of any supports, reserves, or reinforcements. His lefl flank
was exposed, and no course remained open to him except to
retire before he was cut off from his line of communication
with Vienna, and to accept battle from his adversary in a chosen
and prepared position. The Austrian army had suffered a loss
of about forty thousand men since the opening of the campaign
in its attempts to prevent the junction of the Prussian armies.
Notwithstanding this, its bravery and power of endurance
were still great High hopes were entertained that Benedek's
generalship would retrieve all previous failures by a decisive
victory.
The Austrian commander felt himself unequal to assume the
offensive. He was forced to seek a defensive position, and
could ohoose one in either of two entirely distinct manners.
If he desired a purely defensive position he might withdraw
behind the Elbe, and take up the line of that river between
the fortresses of Josephstadt and Koniggratz ; or, what would
perhaps have been better, he might have concentrated his army
behind the Adler, between Koniggratz and Hohenbruck.
Here his left flank would have been secured by the fortress,
his right by the Adler, and he would have covered a safe
retreat and source of supply in the railway between Pardubitz
Chap. I.] PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ, 223
and Bohmisch TriibaiL On the other side he might choose a
defensive position, where he would still retain the power of
assuming the ofifensive. This appears to have been his object
He hoped in a great battle to repair the misfortunes of the
last few days, and then on his side to advance as an assailant
Whether he would have done better to have taken up an
entirely defensive position until the confidence of his army was
restored is a question which few could decide. He has been
blamed for not doing so, but in war success is generally
regarded as the sole criterion of merit Fortune declared
against Benedek. He did not reap success.
On the afternoon of the 30th June, he issued orders for the
whole army to retire towards Koniggratz, and to concentrate
in front of that fortress. This retreat along crowded country
roads was attended with considerable difficulty, and it was not
till the night of the 2nd July that his whole force was assembled
in front of Koniggratz, where it took up a position between
that town and the little river Bistritz.
On the Prussian side four divisions of the First Army, and
part of that of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, had not yet
been under fire. Of the Second Army three brigades had not
as yet pulled a trigger. The first corps had had time to recruit
itself after its defeat at Trautenau, and the remainder of the
troops were flushed with victory, high of courage, and eager
for battle. In order to complete effectually the junction
between the army of the Crown Prince, which on the 30th
June had concentrated on the left of the Upper Elbe, with that
of Prince Frederick Charles, which, with the Army of the Elbe
as its right wing, was halted that day round Gitschin, the
Second Army would require to make a wheel to its left, pivoted
on Gradlitz. To carry out this movement, on the ist July the
first corps, which formed the right wing of the Army of Silesia,
advanced from Amau to Ober Prausnitz, and threw its ad-
vanced guard forward to Zelejow on the road to Miletin. The
cavalry division took post at Neustadd. The first division of
the Guards occupied Koniginhof, while its advanced guard
seized the plateau of Daubrowitz, on the bank of the Elbe.
The second division of the Guards, the reserve artillery, and
the heavy cavalry of fhe Guard halted at Rettendorf, while the
224 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII.
fifth and sixth corps concentrated round Gradlitz. The head-
quarters of the Crown Prince were in Koniginhof. The
Prussian generals thought that Feldzeugmeister Benedek would
accept battle on the left bank of the Elbe, with his flanks
resting on the fortresses of Josephstadt and Koniggratz, which
lie ten miles apart along the river, and with his front covered
by the stream ; or that, if he did not do so, he would cross the
Elbe at Pardubitz, and take up a position there behind the
river.
Under this idea two and a half Prussian corps were held on
the left bank of the Elbe both to observe the fortress of
Josephstadt and to be prepared vigorously to oppose any
attack made from behind the cover of that fortress against the
line of communication of the Crown Prince with Silesia.
Prince Frederick Charles, on the ist July, pushed forward
from Gitschin. The Army of the Elbe formed his right wing,
and occupied Smidar and Hoch Wessely. The sixth division,
with the fifth in its rear, occupied Miletin ; the seventh and
eighth, Horitz; the third and fourth, with the cavalry corps
and the reserve artillery corps, were bivouacked along the road
from Gitschin to Horitz. The head-quarters of the Prince
were at Kammenitz.
The small chateau and village of Kamiiiienitz lie on the
northern slope of an isolated hill, which stands on the left-hand
side of the road from Gitschin to Horitz, about half-way be-
tween the two towns. The head-quarters of Prince Frederick
Charles were moved here on the evening of the ist July from
Gitschin.
From the hill south of the village of Kammenitz a wide
view could be obtained of the undulating plain which, richly
cultivated and studded with villages and fir-woods, stretches
southwards for nearly thirty miles. Near to Kammenitz, the
smoke of the bivouac fires and the glitter of the sunlight on
the piled arms marked the position of the Prussian troops, but
no Austrian outposts could be made out During the march
of that day a sudden thunderstorm came on, and the rain fell
heavily for an hour; the road, crowded with thousands of
waggons and military carriages, ran into ruts under the exces-
sive transport, and the convoys of Austrian wounded, who had
Chap. I.] PRECEDMG THE BATtLM OP KONlCCtJiATZ, izj
been perfofce deserted by their retreating friends, jolted pain-*
fully along towards the hospitals which had been established at
Gitschin* The maimed soldiers suffered much, for every time
the waggons rocked some wound was opened afresh, or some
bandage came undone, but they bore it patiently, and their
guardians did all they could to alleviate their sufferings. The
different coloured facings of the wounded told that many
Austrian regimentd had been engaged in the late combats, for
the uniforms of the different infantry regiments could be distin-
guished, besides those of hussars and riflemen.
On the night of the ist the main body of the First Army
lay between Kanunenitz and Horitz. General von Bittenfeld
had occupied Smidar on the fight flank, and Jung Bunzlau* was
also occupied in the same direction. The head of the columns
of the Second Army had crossed the Upper Elbe, a^ the
whole Prussian force was free iot operations in Bohemia, >br
the Hanoverians had laid dowti their arms near Erfurth, and
there wefe now no hostile troops in Northern Germany.t
The inhabitants of the towns had mostly fled on the approach
of the Prussian army, but the country villagers, unable to afford
to pay for transport, had been obliged to remain in their
houses* Nor did tliey suffer by doing so, for the Prussian
soldiers behaved well, and there was no plundering where the
inhabitants remained. In the towns where there was no one
to sell, the commissariat was obliged to take the necessaries of
life, for the marches had been long, the roads had been
crowded with troops, and the provision trains had not always
been able to keep up with the army. But the soldiers never
used force to supply their wants. Forage for the horses was
taken from the bams of the large landed proprietors, who had
deserted their castles and chateaux ; but the men paid for what
they had from the peasantry : unable to speak the Bohemian
language, they by signs made their wants understood, and the
peasantry, as far as lay in their power, supplied them readily,
for none were found so ignorant as not to appreciate Prussian
coin* The villagers were invariably kindly treated; no
* On the railway between Munchengratz and Pragae4
t Soe/<^//«
0
326 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIT.
cottages had been ransacked, their poultry yards had been
respected, their cattle had not been taken away from them,
and, though the women of this province are beautiful, no
Bohemian girl had cause to rue the invasion of her country.
Yet the inhabitants of a land where a war is carried on must
always suffer ; troops must move through the standing com,
cavalry and artillery must trample down the crops; hamlets
must be occupied, defended, and assaulted, and a shell, in-
tended to fall among fighting men, must often unintentionally
set fire to a cottage, which, blazing fiercely, communicates the
flames to others, and thus a whole hamlet is often destroyed.
Then the ejected cottagers have little hope of anything but
starvation, for a vast army with its many hundred thousand
mouths eats up everything in the country, and can spare little
after its own necessities are supplied to give away in charity.
The proprietors of the burnt houses sometimes wandered about
the fields dejected and desponding, sometimes stood staring
vacantly at the cinders and charred timbers which marked the
place where a few days ago stood their homes ; the little money
that was given to them by kind-hearted officers might keep ofF
the pangs of hunger for a short time, but was no compensation
for the heavy losses they had sustained, for oflen their cottage
and their cowhouse and a litde field was all their wealth, and
since these were gone and their crop destroyed, they had
nothing. The young men even in the country districts had
nearly all fled south, frightened by a report that the Prussians
w^ould make them join the ranks; for this report there was
never a foundation, for no recruits had been demanded or
received in the countries occupied by the armies.
Brilliant success had attended the skilful plans laid for the
prosecution of this campaign by the Prussian leaders. The
army of Prince Frederick Charles had fought five severe
combats without a reverse, and had secured a favourable posi-
tion in which to fight a great battle. The Crown Prince fought
severe actions on the 27th, 28th, and 29th, and had now
secured his junction with Prince Frederick Charles, bringing
with him as trophies of his victories 15,000 prisoners, 24
captured guns, six stands of colours, and two standards.
The places where there had been fighting did not long retain
Chap. I.] PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 227
the more ghastly signs of the combat; the wounded were
always removed as quickly as the krankentrager could work,
and though broken boughs, burnt houses, and down-trodden
com marked for a few days the places where the hostile troops
had been engaged, the broken arms and castaway knapsacks
wer^ soon removed, and the graves dotted among the fields,
each with a wooden cross at the head, alone told the spots
where soldiers had fallen. And these, too, soon disappeared,
for the sun and the rain rapidly diminished the mounds of
newly-turned earth, and it will soon be impossible to distinguish
the positions of the graves from the other parts of the fields.
But this will matter little to those who sleep below. The
wounded merited greater commiseration. The hospital re-
sources of the Prussian army had been tasked to the utmostj
for more wounded prisoners had been taken than could have
been anticipated. Every available house and the churches in
Gitschin had been converted into hospitals, but still there was
more room required ; nor would the few remaining inhabitants
help to assist the wounded Austrian soldiers ; in vain did the
Prussian staff entreat, imprecate, and threaten; the towns-
people who were still at Gitschin would not evQn carry some of
the coffee which they had in abundance to give to the wounded,
and these fi*om the scarcity of provisions in the army fared
badly. As the news spread abroad in the country that the
Prussians did not pillage and murder, the people began to
return to their houses, but they all appeared to be totally
callous to the sufferings of their fellow-countrymen. The
Austrian medical men and hospital attendants who were
captured at Gitschin worked hard, and were aided powerfully
by the Prussian officers, but they had few materials with which
to supply the wants of so many; and though none went
totally unprovided for, and none were entirely neglected, a
little trouble on the part of the inhabitants would have tended
inaterially to the comfort and cure of many.
The inhabitants pleaded as an excuse that the Austrian
soldiery had treated them badly, and had pillaged ; but this
did not seem true, for the houses bore no signs of having been
plundered, and if plundering had been allowed in the Austrian
amiy the prisoners would, not have had to complain of want oC
Q a
228 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book VIL
food. Railway traffic was already opened to Miinchengratz,
but the army had now left the line of railway, many miles of
road separating it from the nearest station ; and in those miles
of road lay the difficulty of supplying the troops with pro-
visions. The railway trains easily brought enough to any
station, but at this time the roads were required for the march-
ing columns, and everything had to give way for the passage of
the troops.
The army carried no tents ; sometimes at night the soldiers
were billeted in villages, but more often slept in the open air.
As soon as a regiment arrived at the place where it was to pass
the night, the rifles were piled four together resting against each
other, and the knapsacks were taken off and laid on the ground
beside them. The tnen quickly lighted their fires and began
cooking their rations ; a couple of stones or a few bricks formed
their field stoves, and their whole cooking apparatus consisted
of the one tin can which they carry with them. This serves
for both boiling the water for coffee and for making their meat
into a thick soup, which they seem to prefer to roasted food.
As soon as it got dark each man ky down to sleep wrapped in
his cloak with his knapsack for a pillow, and the muffied figures
lay as regularly in the bivouac as they stood in the ranks on
parade. The officers lay separate in groups of two or three,
and in rear of the battalion the horses were picketed and
champed at their bits uneasily all night long, and seldom
seemed to lie down. When a village was occupied a rush was
made to secure mattresses, but these were only used by the
luxurious. The men, as a rule, appeared to prefer straw, and
if they could get plenty of it were quite content to sleep in the
open air. General and staff officers usually contrived to get
into houses, and then there was a heavy drain on the sleeping
accommodation of the establishment One had a pillow,
another a mattress^ a third a couple of blankets, and beds were
made on the floor on the most advanced shake-down principles,
but all slept soundly, for the day's work was long and tiring,
and the march generally begun at early morning. The pro-
prietors of most of the large houses had not only left them, but
had taken most of their furniture with them, so that the tem-
porary occupants were entirely dependent on what little had
Chap. I.] PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 229
been left behind, and had to make it up by by borrowing from
the nearest cottages.
On the 30th June the King left Berlin, and on the afternoon
of the ist July arrived at Gitschin, where in person he assumed
the supreme command of the three Prussian armies in Bohemia,
It was decided by him that the troops should halt on the 2nd
July, to recover from the great fatigues they had lately under-
gone.
A council of war was ordered to assemble at Gitschin, to
which Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince were
summoned. It was decided that on the 3rd the First Army
should send a reconnaissance towards Koniggratz, that the
Second should send a strong detachment towards Josephstadt,
and if possible cut that fortress off from communication with
the army of Feldzeugmeister Benedek \ while the remainder of
the troops halted in their actual positions.
These plans were, however, entirely altered within a few
hours.
CHAPTER 11.
BATTLE OF KuNIGGRATZ.
When Prince Frederick Charles left Kammenitz on the
morning of Monday, the 2nd July, to attend the council of
war summoned by the King to meet at Gitschin, he sent out
two officers to reconnoitre beyond Horitz; both fell in with
Austrian troops, and had to fight and ride hard to bring their
information home safely. Major Von Ungar, who went in the
direction of Koniggratz, escorted by a few dragoons, came
upon a large force of Austrian cavalry and Jagers before he got
to the little river Bistritz, over which the road from Horitz to
Koniggratz crosses, about half way between those two towns.
A squadron of cavalry made an immediate dash to catch him,
and he and his dragoons had to ride for their lives ; the
Austria ns pursued, and those best mounted came up to the
Prussians, but not in sufficient numbers to stop them, and
after a running skirmish, in which Von Ungar received a lance
thrust in the side which carried away most of his coat, but
hardly grazed the skin, this reconnoitring party safely gained
the outposts of their own army. More on the Prussian right
the other reconnoitring officer also found the Austrians in force,
and was obliged to retire rapidly. From the reports of these
officers, and from other information which Prince Frederick
Charles received at Kammenitz on his return from the council
of war held at Gitschin, he inferred that the Austrian com-
mander had the intention of advancing the next day from the
Bistritz, with the object of attacking the First Prussian Army
with superior force, before its junction with that of the CroiMi
Prince was practically effected.
Prince Frederick Charles, in order to secure a favourable
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 231
position in which to accept this probable attack, resolved
immediately to move his army forward beyond Horitz, and
sent orders to General Von Bittenfeld to advance with the
aimy of the Elbe to Neu Bidsow, and be prepared thence to
fall upon the left wing of the Austrian cohimn of advance, while
he himself assailed its leading divisions; At the same time he
sent Lieutenant Von Normand with a letter to the Crown
Prince, asking him to push forward in the morning from
Miletin with one corps, and attack the right flank of the
Austrians while he himself engaged them in front. There was
some fear that the Austrian cavalry patrols and detachments
-which were prowling about would intercept the aide-de-camp
and stop the letter, but Von Normand succeeded in avoiding
them, and got safely to the Crown Prince's head-quarters at
one o'clock on the morning of the 3rd, and rejoined Prince
Frederick Charles at four to report the success of his mission,
and to bring to the leader of the First Army an assurance of
the co-operation of the Second. Had this aide-de-camp been
taken prisoner or killed on his way to Miletin, his loss would
have probably influenced the whole campaign, for on that letter
depended in a great measure the issue of the battle.
The commander of the First Army sent at the same time his
chief of the staff. General Von Voigt Rhetz, to acquaint the
King at Gitschin with the steps he was prepared to take, and
to solicit his approval of them. The King expressed his
entire approbation of the plan of Prince Frederick Charles,
and sent an officer of his own staff" to order the Crown Prince
to advance in the morning against the Austrian right, not with
one corps alone, but with all his available forces. An officer of
the King's staff" was also sent to General Herwarth von Bitten-
feld, with an endorsement of the order already signed by Prince
Frederick Charles.
Long before midnight the troops were all in motion, and at
half-past one in the morning the general staff left Kammenitz.
The moon occasionally shone out brightly, but was generally
hidden behind clouds, and then could be distinctly seen the
decaying bivouac fires in the places which had been occupied
by the troops along the road. These fires looked like large
will-o'-the-wisps as their flames flickered about in the wind, and
«32 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII.
Stretched for many a mile, for there were 100,000 soldiers with
the First Army alone, and the bivouacs of so great a force
spread over a wide extent of country. Day gradually began to
break, but with the first symptoms of dawn a drizzling rain
came on, which lasted until late in the afternoon. The wind
increased and blew coldly upon the soldiers, for they were
short of both sleep and food, while frequent gusts bore down
to the ground the water-laden com in the wide fields alongside
the way.
The main road from Horitz to Koniggratz sinks into a deep
hollow near the village of Milowitz. On the side of this
hollow fiirthest from Horitz, is placed near the road the village
of that name, and on the left of the road, on the same bank,
stands a thick fir wood. A little after midnight the army of
Prince Frederick Charles was entirely concealed in this hollow,
ready to issue from its ambush and attack the Austrians if they
should advance.* Soon after dawn, a person standing between
the village of Milowitz and the further hill of Dub could see no
armed men, except a few Prussian vedettes posted along the
Dub ridge, whose lances stood in relief above the summit,
against the murky sky. A few dismounted officers were
standing below a fruit-tree in front of Milowitz, with their
horses held by some orderlies behind them. These were
Prince Frederick Charles and his staff. All was still, except
when the neigh of a horse, or a loud word of command as the
last divisions formed, rose mysteriously from the hollow of
Milowitz.
Until nearly four o'clock the army remained concealed.
No Austrian scouts came pricking over the hill of Dub, no
enemy's skirmishers were detected in the com by the side of
the high road. Prince Frederick Charles began to fear that the
Austrian comnoander meant to slip away from the encounter,
and to steal behind the Elbe, where his right flank would
be covered by Josephstadt, from the assault of the army of
Silesia.
* The eighth division and cavalry, with the fifth and sixth divisions in
rear, were on the left of the road, while the third and fourth divisions
were behind the villages of Bristau and Stracow respectively, in the same
hollow.
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONICGRATZ. 233
To hold the Austrian army in front of the Elbe was abso-
lutely necessary for the success of the Prussian plans, and
Prince Frederick Charles resolved, with his own army alone, to
engage the whole of Benedek's forces, and clinging to the
Austrian commander, to hold him on the Bistritz until the
Prussian flank attacks could be developed. A few short words
passed from the commander of the First Army to the chief
of his staff; a few aides-de-camp, mounting silently, rode
quietly away ; and, as it were by the utterance of a magician's
spell, one hundred thousand Prussian warriors springing into
sight as if from the bowels of the armed earth, swept over the
southern edge of the Milowitz ravine, towards the hill of Dub.
The head of the eighth division was on the main road to
Koniggratz, while the third and fourth divisions spread through
the com lands on its right The fifth and sixth divisions fol-
lowed the eighth in reserve. A brigade of cavalry served on
the left of the eighth division to connect the main army with
the seventh division imder Franzecky, which had been sent
straight from Miletin to Cerekwitz, in order to cover the left
flank of the First Army.
About four o'clock in the morning of the 3rd July, the army
began to advance, and marched slowly up the gentle hill which
leads from Milowitz to the village of Dub, two miles nearer
Koniggratz. The com lay heavy and tangled from the rain,
upon the ground ; the skirmishers pushed through it* nimbly,
but the battalions which followed behind in crowded columns
toiled heavily through the down-beaten crops, and the artillery
horses had to strain hard on their traces to get the wheels of
the gun-carriages through the sticky soil. At six the whole
army was close up to Dub, but it was not allowed to go upon
the summit of the slope, for the ridge on which Dub stands had
hidden all its motions, and the Austrians could see nothing of
the troops collected behind the crest Perhaps they thought
that no Prussians were near them, except ordinary advanced
posts ; for the cavalry vedettes which had been pushed forward
thus far over night remained on the top of the ridge, as if nothing
^ere gomg on behind them.
From the top of the slight elevation on which the village of
Dub stands, the ground slopes gently down to the river Bistritz,
234 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII.
which the road crosses at the village of Sadowa, a mile and a
quarter from Dub. From Sadowa the ground again rises
beyond the Bistritz,and to the little village of Chlum, conspicuous
by its church tower standing at the top of the gentle hlD, a
mile and a half beyond Sadowa. A person standing that morn-
ing on the top of the ridge saw Sadowa below him, built of
wooden cottages, surrounded by orchards, and could distinguish
among its houses several water-mills, but these were not at work,
for all the inhabitants of the village had been sent away, and a
white coat here and there among the cottages was not a pea-
sant's blouse, but was the uniform of an Austrian soldier ; tfiree
quarters of a mile down the Bistritz a big red-brick house, with
a high brick chimney near it, looked like a manufactory, and
some large wooden buildings alongside it were unmistakeably
warehouses ; close to these a few wooden cottages, probably
meant for the workmen employed at the manufactory, completed
the village of Dohalitz.
A little more than three quarters of a mile still further do^n
tlie Bistritz stood the village of Mokrovous, — like most Bohe-
mian country villages, built of pine-wood cottages enclustered
in orchard trees. The Chateau of Dohalicka stands midway
between Dohalitz and Mokrovous, on a knoll overhanging the
river. Behind Dohalitz, and between that village and the high-
road which runs through Sadowa, there lies a large thick wood ;
many of the trees had been cut down about ten feet above the
ground, and the cut down branches had been t^visted together
between the standing trunks of the trees which were nearest to
the river, to make an entrance into the wood from the front
extremely difficult On the open slope between Dohalitz and
Dohalicka along the ground there seemed to run a dark dotted
line of stumpy bushes, but the telescope showed that these were
guns, and that this battery alone contained about sixty pieces.
Four miles down the Bistritz, from Sadowa could be seen the
house-tops of Nechanitz, above which rose the dark fir-woods
that clustered round the Castle of Hradek. Looking to the
left, up the course of the Bistritz, the ground was open between
the orchards of Sadowa and the trees which grow round
Benatek, a little village about two miles above Sadowu, except
where, midway between these villages, a broad belt of fir-wood
Chap. IL] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 235
runs for three-quarters of a mile. Above and beyond these
villages and woods on the course of the river, the spire of Chlum
was seen ; below it a few houses, gardens, and patches of fir-
wood ; and a little to the left, rather down the hill, the cottages
of the hamlet of Cistowes, and on the side of the main road
the orchards, and the house-tops of Lipa.
On the extreme left, at the foot of the hills, lay the larger
village of Horenowes, above whidh stood on the bare plateau
what appeared to be a large single tree.*
TJie air was thick and hazy, the rain came down steadily,
and the wind blew bitterly cold, while the infantry and artillery
were waiting behind the brow of the hill near Dub. At seven
o'clock Prince Frederick Charles pushed forward some of his
cavalry and horse artiller}'. They moved down the slope
towards the Bistritz at a gentle trot, slipping about on the
greasy ground, but keeping most beautiful lines; the lance flags
of the Uhlans, wet with the rain, flapping heavily against the
staves. At the bottom of the hill the trumpets sounded, and in
making their movements to gain the bridge the squadrons began
wheeling and hovering about the side of the river, as if they
courted the fire of the enemy. Then the Austrian guns opened
upon them from a battery placed in a field near the village at
which the main road crosses the Bistritz, and the battle of
Koniggratz began.
Feldzeugmeister Benedek had drawn up the Austrian army
to accept battle in this position seen from the Dub hill. His
centre lay in front of Chlum, where the hills attain their greatest
height; in his front was the marshy stream of the Bistritz.
Batteries had been thrown up in some positions favourable for
bringing a heavy artillery fire to bear against his assailants, and
the ranges of diffierent distances from these batteries marked by
poles and barked trees. Little was spared to bring the artillery,
the best arm of the Austrian service, into action with every
advantage.t The villages were also barricaded and prepared
* The supposed solitary tree was in reality two trees, but was taken to be
one by both Prussian armies, and from the fortress of Koniggrfttz.
+ The great Joss of Austrian guns was due to the horses and limbers being
sent under cover of the hill out of fire. When the Prussians advanced only
tile lightest guns could be saved, and nearly one third of the Austrian pieces
engaged fell into the hands of the victors.
236 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VIL
with abattis for infantry defence, but not sufficiently. The right
flank of the Austrian position was covered to a certain extent
by the Trotina brook, which flows through a deep marshy
ravine into the Elbe, but little had been done by the engineer
to aid in opposing the passage of this naturally strong feature.
The left wing was supported by the wood and castle of Hradek,
while the left centre was strengthened by possession of the
villages of Problus and Prim. Feldzeugmeister Benedek had
formed his army in the following order of battle : —
The Saxons on the left wing held Problus, with an advanced
guard in Nechanitz ; in rear of them stood the eighth corps,
the first light cavalry division, and the second division of reser\'e
cavalry at Prim.
In the centre, the tenth corps was posted round Langenhof,
the third corps round Cistowes, and the fourth corps at Mas-
lowed, with a detachment in Benatek.
On the right wing, the second corps and the second division
of light cavalry were at Sendrasctz, while on the extreme right
flank the Schwarz-gelb brigade held the Trotina.
As reserves, the first corps was posted on the left of the main
road near Rosnitz, the sixth corps on the right of the road on
the south of Rosberitz ; in rear of these were the first and third
divisions of reserve cavalry.
The first shot was fired about half-past seven. The Prussian
horse artillery, close down to the river, replied to the Austrian
guns, but neither side fired heavily, and for half an hour the
cannonade consisted of but little more than single shots. At a
quarter before eight the King of Prussia arrived on the field,
and very soon after the horse artillery were reinforced by other
field batteries, and the Prussian gunners began firing their shells
quickly into the Austrian position. As soon as the Prussian fire
actively commenced Austrian guns seemed to appear, as if by
magic, in every point of the position; from every road, from every
village, from the orchard of Mokrovous, on the Prussian right, to
the orchard of Benatek, on their left, came flashes of fire and
whizzing rifle shells, which, bursting with a sharp crack, sent
their splinters rattling among the guns, gunners, carriages, and
horses, often killing a man or horse, sometimes dismoundng a
gun, but always ploughing up the eartli, and scattering the mud
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 237
in the men's faces. But the Austrians did not confine them-
selves to firing on the artillery alone, for they threw their shells
up the slope opposite to them towards Dub, and one shell
came slap into a squadron of Uhlans, who were close beside
the King ; burying itself with a heavy thud in the ground, it
blew up columns of mud some twenty feet in the air, and,
bursting a moment after, reduced the squadron by four files.
As soon as the cannonade in front became serious, the gims
of the seventh division began to bombard the village of
Benatek, on the Austrian right. The Austrians returned shot
for shot, and neither side either gained or lost ground. In the
centre, too, the battle was very even ; the Prussians pushed
battery after battery into the action, and kept up a tremendous
fire on the Austrian guns, but these returned it, and sometimes
with interest, for the Austrian artillery oflUcers knew their
ground, and every shell fell true ; many officers and men fell,
and many horses were killed or wounded. More Kranken-
tragers were sent down to the batteries, and always returned
carrying on stretchers men whose wounds had been hastily
bound up under fire, but who seemed to be too much stunned
to suffer much from pain.
Gradually the Prussian cannonade appeared to get stronger,
and the Austrian batteries between Dohalitz and Dohalicka
retired higher up the hill, but the guns at Mokrovous still stood
fast, and tlie Prussians had not yet crossed the Bistritz ; many
guns were now turned on Mokrovous, and at ten o'clock the
battery there was also obliged to retire a little.
While this cannonade had been going on, some of the in-
fantry had been moved down towards the river, where they took
shelter from the fire under a convenient undulation of ground.
The eighth division came down on the left-hand side of the
causeway, and, under the cover of the rising in the ground,
formed its columns for the attack of the village of Sadowa ;
while the third and fourth divisions, on the right-hand side of
the road prepared to storm Dohalitz and Mokrovous. A little
before their preparations were complete the village of Benatek,
on the Austrians' right, caught fire, and the seventh division
made a dash to secure it, but the Austrians were not driven out
by the flames, and here for the first time in the battle was there
238 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII.
hand-to-hand fighting. The 27 th regiment led the attack, and
rushed into the orchards of the village ; the burning houses
separated the combatants; they poured volley after volley at
each other through the flames ; but the Prussians found means
to get round the burning houses, and, taking the defenders in
reverse, forced them to retire with the loss of many prisoners.
It was ten o'clock when Prince Frederick Charles sent
General Stiilpnagel to order the attack on Sadowa, Dohalitz,
and Mokrovous. The columns advanced covered by skir-
mishers, and reached the river bank without much loss, but
from there they had to fight every inch of their way. The
Austrian infantry held the bridges and villages in force, and
fired fast upon them as they approached. The Prussians could
advance but slowly along the narrow ways and against the
defences of the houses, and the volleys sweeping through the
ranks seemed to tear the soldiers down. The Prussians fired
much more quickly than their opponents, but they could not
see to take their aim ; the houses, trees, and smoke firom the
Austrian discliarges shrouded the villages. Sheltered by these,
the Austrian Jagers fired blindly where they could tell by hear-
ing that the attacking columns were, and the shots told tremen-
dously on the Prussians in their close formations ; but the
latter improved their positions, although slowly, and by dint of
sheer courage and perseverance, for they lost men at every yard
of their advance, and in some places almost paved the way
with wounded. Then, to help the infantry, the Prussian
artillery turned its fire, regardless of the enemy's batteries, on
the villages, and made tremendous havoc among the houses.
Mokrovous and Dohalitz both caught fire, and the shells fell
quickly and with fearful effect among the defenders of the
flaming hamlets ; the Austrian guns also played upon the
attacking infantry, but at this time these were sheltered from
their fire by the houses and trees between.
In and around the villages die fighting continued for nearly
an hour; then the Austrian infantry, who had been there,
driven out by a rush of the Prussians, retired, but only a little
way up the slope into a line with their batteries. The wood
above Sadowa was strongly held, and that between Sadowa and
Benatek, teeming with riflemen, stood to bar the way of the
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 239
seventh division. But General Franzecky, who commanded
this division, was not to be easily stopped, and he sent his
infantry at the wood, and turned his artillery on the Austrian
batteries. The seventh division began firing into the trees, but
found they could not make any impression, for the defenders
were concealed, and musketry fire was useless against them.
PYanzecky let them go, and they dashed in with the bayonet
The Austrians would not retire, but waited for the struggle,
and in the wood above Benatek was fought out one of the
fiercest combats which the war has seen. But the wood was
carried. The Austrian line of advanced posts was now driven
in on the Bistritz, but its commander had fonned his main
line of battle a little higher up the hill, round Lipa, still hold-
ing the wood which lies above Sadowa,
Then the Prussian artillery was sent across the Bistritz, and
began to fire upon the new Austrian position. At the same
time the smoke of General Herwarth's advance was gradually
seen moving towards the Austrian left He had at Nechanitz
found the brigade of Saxon troops which formed the advanced
front of the corps at Problus, with some Austrian cavalry, and
was driving them towards Problus and Prim, himself following
in such a direction that it appeared he would turn the Austrian
left flank. But the Austrian commander seemed determined
to hold his position, and heavy masses of infantry and cavalry
could be seen on the upper part of the slope.
By eleven o'clock the eighth division of the Prussian infantry
had taken the village of Sadowa, the fourth that of Dohalitz,
and the third that of Dohalicka. The eighth division was now
sent against the wood, which, above these places, runs along
the side of the Sadowa and Lipa road, while the third and
fourth divisions attempted to bear the battle up the hill towards
Lipa, and to attack the left flank of the wood. The Prussians
advanced against the nearest trees, but did not at first make
much impression, for the Austrians being here again concealed,
the fire of the needle-gun did not tell, and a whole battery
placed at the far end of the wood fired through the trees, and
told on their ranks with awful effect But the assailants fought
on, at last broke down the obstacles at the entrance, and then
dashed in. The fighting continued from tree to tree, and the
240 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VIL
Austrians made many a rush to recover the lost position of the
wood, but in this close fighting their boyish troops went down
easily before the the strong men of the eighth division ; but
when the defenders drew back a little, and their artillery played
into the trees, the Prussians suffered fearfully, and about half-
way up in the wood the fight became stationary.
For two hours more it continued so ; in vain Home, who
commanded the eighth division, strove to push along the road
or through the trees to storm the battery beyond. The fire
was too terrible, and his men became gradually exhausted.
A few minutes after the Prussians had occupied the villages
along the Bistritz, Feldzeugmeister Benedek was informed that
the sixth Prussian corps belonging to the army of the Crown
Prince was threatening his right flank. He sent orders that
this attack should be checked or detained, and appears to have
calculated that the Crown Prince could be held in check until
he had time to inflict a severe blow upon the army of Prince
Frederick Charles. With this aim he made his preparations
for a counter-attack between Problus and Lipa, which was to
be made as soon as his artillery had shaken the Prussian line
sufficiently. Sixty-four guns were stationed between Lipa and
Streselitz to fire on the tiiird and fourth Prussian division, and
some of the reserves of cavalry and infantry were moved up to
positions favourable for making the counter-attack.
At this time the Austrian artillery were making splendid
practice, and about one o'clock, the whole battle line of the
Prussians could gain no mofe ground, and was obliged to fight
hard to retain the position it had won. At one time it seemed
as if it would be lost, for guns had been dismounted by the
Austrian fire, and in the wooded ground the needle-gun had no
fair field, and the infantry fight was very equal
Then Prince Frederick Charles sent the fifth and sLxth
divisions forward. They laid down their helmets and knapsacks
on the ground, and advanced to the river. The King was
now near to the Bistritz, and the troops cheered him loudly as
they marched into the battle. They went over the Sadowa
bridge, disappeared into the wood, and soon the increased
noise of the musketry told they had begun to fight ; but the
Austrian gunners sent salvo after salvo among them, and they
CiiAP. IL] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ, 241
did not push the battle forwards more than a few hundred
yards, for they fell back themselves, and they could not reach
the enemy. Not only did the fragments of the shells fly about
among them, scattering death and awful gashes among their
ranks, but the portions of the trees, torn by the artiller}' fire,
flew thickly about, huge ragged splinters that caused even more
frightful wounds.
Herwarth, too, was checked upon the right The smoke of
his musketry and artillery, which had hidierto been pushing
forward steadily, stood still.
He had marched with his three divisions from Smidar to
Nechanitz, and had made himself master of this village at the
same time as the divisions of Prince Frederick Charles had
occupied the hamlets further up the Bistritz. The Saxon
artillery withdrew to the heights by Problus and Prim, and to
an intrenchment beside the Hradek wood. Then here also
the batde came to a standstill. It required a long time to
bring the artillery over the Bistritz, for the Saxons had broken
the bridge at Nechanitz, no ford could be found, and the banks
of the river were too marshy to allow of the guns being dragged
through the stream.
About one o'clock Herwarth's pioneers had repaired the
bridge, and his artillery had been brought across the river. He
then directed the fourteenth division, commanded by General
Miinster, against Problus through Lubno as his left wing. In
his centre he sent the fifteenth division, under General Canstein,
against Prim, while the sixteenth division, under General Etzel,
made a wide sweep to the right, in order to turn the left of the
Austrian position at the Castle of Hradek. Problus and Prim
were strengthened with barricades and abattis. The Saxons
and the eighth Austrian corps fought nobly. A hot battle
ensued here, which lasted till past three o'clock.
Affairs did not apparently go more favourably for the
Prussians in the centre. The whole of the First Array was
severely engaged, with the exception of eight batteries of
artillery and the cavalry which was still held in reserve. The
reserve artillery of Prince Frederick Charles was sent a little
distance up the Bistritz, in order to bring a fire against the
flank of the Sadowa wood, to search out the defenders, and if
242 SEVEN WEEKS' IVAR, [Book VII.
possible to dismount the guns in the batteries in front of Lipa.
But, noCmthstanding, the Austrians clung obstinately to the
trees.
Franzecky's men, cut to pieces^ could not be sent forward to
attack the Sadowa wood, for they would have exposed them-
selves to be taken in rear by the artillery on the right of the
Austrian line formed in front of Lipa. The First Army
was certainly checked in its advance. The Prussian com-
manders began to look anxiously ta the left for the coming of
the Crown Prince. Some Austrian guns near Lipa were seen
to be firing towards the Prussian left, amd it was hoped they
might be directed against the advanced guard of the Second
Army, but at three o'clock there were no signs of Prussian
columns advancing against Lipa. The generals became mani-
festly uneasy, and they drew Home's division out of the
Sadowa wood. Cavalry was also- formed up^ so that it would
be available either for the pursuit of the Austrians, or for re-
tarding their pursuit
When Prince Frederick Charles sent the night before the
battle to request the co-operation of the Crown Prince, the
latter sent back an answer that he would be on the field at two
o'clock. More than faithful to hi» promise, he was there with
two corps at half-past twelve, anMi his artillery was engaged
with the batteries on the Austrian right at that hour. But the
fire from the Austrian batteries was so- terrible that he could
not attack with his infantry tiH something had been done
towards silencing the enemy's guns. The generals directing
the first attack could see nothing of the Crown Prince's in-
fantry, as they were hidden in the undulations of the ground.
The aide-de-camp despatched from the Second Army to tell the
King that the Crown Prince was engaged had to make a long
detour^ and did not reach the generals directing the front attack
till late in the afternoon. Hence arose great uneasiness in the
front, for from the direction of the Austrian guns they might
have been firing against the seventh division, which formed the
left of the front attack, and as nothing could be seen of the
Crown Prince's troops it began to be feared that he had been
stopped by some accident As time went on anxiety increased,
for it was felt that the Austrian position was too strong to be
Chaf. IL] battle of KONIGGRATZ. 243
taken by a front attack alone. Glasses were anxiously directed
to the left, but the day being wet there was no dust to show
where columns marched, and nothing could be seen to indicate
the advance of the Second Army against the Austrian right.
The King himself gazed stedfastly through his glass, looking in
vain through the misty air. No glimpse could be caught of
Prussian riflemen on the slope to the left of Lipa, and no bat-
talions could be seen ; the guns also were out of sight, for they
were on the reverse side of the Lipa ridge, or were hidden from
the position of the staff by the wood that runs from Benatek
up the slope towards Lipa.
The anxiety of the Prussian generals at Sadowa was, how-
ever, groundless. While they were still unaware that the Crown
Prince was upon the field of battle, some of his soldiers were
already in the very heart of the Austrians' position, and holding
their ground against repeated attempts by superior numbers to
dislodge them.
Advance of the Crown Prince. — On receiving the request*
from Prince Frederick Charles to move against the Austrians'
right, and the subsequent order from the King to the same
effect, the Crown Prince issued orders to the troops to march
early on the 3rd July. His orders were not sent out till
nearly five in the morning, but before seven the heads of his
columns had begun to move. On his left wing the sixth corps
crossed the Elbe above Jaromir, and marched in two columns
towards the Trotinka. The twelfth division, under General
Proudzinsky, which moved down the Elbe close to the river,
was fired upon by the fortress of Josephstadt, and had to leave
one brigade to observe the garrison of that place. On the
right wing the first corps, followed by the cavalry division, was
ordered to march in two columns by Zabres and Grosz-Trotin
to Grosz-Biirglitz. In the centre, the corps of the Guards was
to move from Koniginhof on Jericek and Lhota. The fifth
corps was to follow the sixth corps as a reserve, and to march
two hours later from the Elbe to Choteborek. All baggage
and train were to be left behind.
The Crown Prince knew nothing of the Austrian position.
Where he should find the Austrian flank, in what force, and
how defended, were questions which he and his chief of the
R 2
244 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIL
staff could only answer on the actual field of battle, and on the
spur of the moment The rain had ahready fallen heavily for
some time when the Second Army commenced its march. The
Crown Prince witnessed the passage of the Elbe at Koniginhof
by a portion of the Guards, and then hastened fonvard with his
staff to place himself at the head of the column. The steep
roads leading up the high bank of the valley of the Elbe to the
plateau of Daubrowitz, slippery and heavy with the rain, tried
severely the strength of both men and horses.
Directly after passing Daubrowitz the Commander-in-chief of
the Second Army saw from smoke arising from a cannonade,
and from burning houses in the direction of Sadowa, that the
First Army was already engaged. The wind was blowing
towards the battle, so that he could not hear the cannonade,
and could not tell in which direction it was moving. He
directed the head of his column upon Choteborek. The view
extended with every step forward, and it soon became apparent
that a great battle was being waged. At a quarter-past eleven
the Crown Prince had reached the chain of hills to the west of
Choteborek with the first division of the corps of the Guards
close behind him. In firont of Choteborek the ground formed
a low trough about two miles wide, in which there were many
soft and marshy places. Beyond this trough lay the hill of
Horenowes, conspicuous with its single tree, and at its foot the
village of that name. Beyond this hill the view was shut out,
but on its western side the eye could range clearly down the
valley of the Bistritz, where it was easy to distinguish the situa-
tions of the antagonistic lines of battle by the smoke of a great
number of batteries in action, and by the flames of several
burning villages. It could be seen that the seventh division,
which formed the left wing of the First Army, was fighting an
unequal battle in firont of Benatek, and was already in need of
support
Towards Grosz-Biirglitz and Welchow, where the two wings
of the Second Army were to debouch, heavy woods shut out
the view. It was certain, however, that if these two corps, in
execution of the orders which had been given them, had
reached those places, the further march of the Second Army
would conduct it against the right flank and partly into the
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KOmCCRATZ. 2aS
rear of the enemy's position. Already the army of the Crown'
Prince occupied a similar position with regard to the First
Army, as that of Bliicher to the British line on the day of
Waterloo.
The Crown Prince despatched officers to ascertain the real
positions of the first and sixth corps. Hardly had they left his
side when a report came in from General Von Mutius with the
intelligence that the sixth corps had already reached Welchow,
and in consequence of the heavy cannonade he had ordered it
to push on in the direction of the firing. It was this advance
which, reported to Benedek, was his first intimation of the
advent of the Crown Prince, and which he ordered to be held
in check by his second corps. Fortune had ordained that the
sixth corps should have been casually prepared to advance,
because, in consequence of the order which it had received to
make a reconnaissance against Josephstadt, it had already
crossed the Elbe when the second order for an advance beyond
Josephstadt reached it
In a short time the fifth corps was also reported by General
Steinmetz to be approaching Choteborek. No news had come
in fi-om the first corps, but it was known that on account of its
longer march its arrival could hardly yet be expected.
The Crown Prince determined, with the first division of the
Guards, which he held available, to seize the hill of Horenowes.
In order to do so, he was obliged to advance across the marshy
hollow, where his troops would be exposed, without any cover,
to the fire of the Austrian guns, which would have plenty of
time to collect on the hill in large quantities while the Prussians
were traversing the low ground. To save his men as much as
possible, the regiments were ordered to spread out and to
march singly on the Horenowes hill, where their chief pointed
out the conspicuous trees as their goal
It was a remarkable circumstance that the columns of the
Guards could descry no Austrian patrols or outposts to oppose
their path. One battery of artillery alone could be seen upon
the Horenowes hilL It was clear that the advance of the
Guards would turn the line of Austrian gims, which, posted
between Horenowes and Maslowed, were playing on Fran^ecky,
and would take some pressure off his struggling division. Ab
246 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book VII.
the Guards advanced, these guns were seen to change their
position, and at half-past eleven forty Austrian pieces were
ranged beside the single tree, to fire against the advancing
columns of the Second Army. At ten minutes to twelve the
first shell was discharged from these batteries against the
Prussian Guards.
The advanced guard of the first division of the Prussian
Guards, under General Alvensleben, had bivouacked the pre-
vious night at Daubrowitz. It had pushed on in the morning
by Burglitz and Zizelowes, and had debouched from the latter
plac6 in the direction of Horenowes, at a quarter-past eleven.
A quarter of an hour later, five 4-pounder batteries of the
Guard opened fire against an Austrian battery, and compelled
it to quit its position between Horenowes and Benatek. A
6 -pounder Prussian battery at the same time opened upon the
Austrian artillery, which was beginning to form on the east of
Horenowes, while the infantry advanced by Wrchwitz, for the
attack of that village. The other troops of the division followed
up this attack by way of Jericek.
The second division of the Guard had lain the previous
night at Rettendorf, considerably in rear of the first division.
Its march had been consequently delayed, and the reserve
artillery of the Guard corps, as weU as the heavy cavalry of the
Guard, arrived at the scene of action before this division. Its
direction was by Choteborek to Lhota.
At eleven o'clock the reserve artillery of the Guard was
marching on the left rear of the first division. The ground
heavy with rain, and the high com which wound itself round
the wheels of the guns, tired the horses excessively. In front
of Jericek, six batteries opened fire, to signal by their noise to
the First Army that tlie Crown Prince was near at hand. But
this salvo was not distinguished by the staff of Prince Frederick
Charles amidst the general din of battle, and, as the range was
very great, little harm was done to the Austrians by it
By the time that General Alvensleben advanced against
Horenowes, the sixth corps had, on the left, commenced an
assault against Racicz. Of this corps, one brigade of the
twelfth division, consisting of six battalions, four squadrons,
and two batteries, under General Proudzynski, led the way by
Chap. IL] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 247
•
Roznow and Nesnasow. When the eleventh division, con*
listing of twelve battalions, eight squadrons, and four batteries,
under General Zastrow, reached Welchow, the former had only
encountered a few detachments of Austrian cavalry. General
Mutius then ordered it to keep the enemy in sight, and in its
further advance to communicate with the eleventh division,
which he directed against the heights of Horenowes. A report
was now brought to that general that it was urgently desirable
that he should send some artillery as quickly as possible to
support Franzecky's division. Four batteries immediately
pushed forward at a trot, covered by the 4th regiment of hussars,
crossed the Trotinka at Luzan, and at half-past eleven opened
upon the Austrian artillery stationed on the east of Horenowes.
The two brigades of the eleventh division in the meantime
advanced in kckd<M^ left in front, and supported by the 8th
Dragoons crossed the Trotinka with gveat difficulty to the
south-east of Luzan, and advanced under a heavy artillery fire
to the attack of Racicz.
The twelfth division directed its march against Smiritz
by Roznow, while a squadron of its cavalry regiment,
whidi had been pushed forward in the direction of Smiritz,
reported that there were Austrian regiments of cavalry in
its front
On the approach of the first division of the Guard to Horen-
owes, and of the eleventh division to Racicz, and when both
wings of the position of their artillery began to be thiieatened,
the Austrians commenced evacuating their position, and had
entirely withdrawn from it by one o'clock. By the same hour
the villages of Horenowes and Racicz fell into the hands of
their assailants, after short contests. The greater portion of
the troops which had garrisoned these places retired in the
direction of Sendrasitz, while the first division of the Guard
pressed forward to the trees on the east of Horenowes, and the
eleventh division pressed upon the retreating Austrians on the
south of Racicz.
The small resistance which the army of the Crown Prince
here met with appears to be due to the fact that when General
Franzecky carried the village of Benatek, the Austrian fourth
corps moved forward to oppose him, drove the battle back, and
248 SEVEN WEEK^ WAR, [Book VIL
remained engaged with his division in the Maslowed wood.
The Austrian second corps was thus alone exposed to
the onset of the whole of the Crown Prince's army, and
was pushed back by its attack to Sendrasitz. These two
Austrian movements caused a gap in Benedek's line of
battle, through which the Prussian Guards penetrating, seized
Chlum, the key of his position, and turned the fortune of
the day.
On the advance of the Prussian Guards to Horenowes some
Austrian battalions took up a position on the hill east of
Maslowed. The Guards immediately marched against this
hill, and carried it without meeting with any serious resistance.
The village of Maslowed, which lay to their right, was evacu-
ated, and half a company of Prussian riflemen occupied it
without drawing a trigger. The sixth corps in the meantime
engaged the main body of the second Austrian corps, which
had furnished the garrisons for Horenowes and Racicz, at
Trotina, Sendrasitz, and Nedelitz, and finally forced it to with-
draw across the Elbe at Lochenitz. By this contest, which was
of quite an independent nature, the left wing of the Prussian
Guard was covered while it took the direction of the village of
Chlum, guided by the church tower, which forms the highest
landmark in the field. In this way the Prussian Guard marched
a distance of about two thousand paces along the rear of the posi-
tion of the fourth Austrian corps, which was now being pushed
back by Franzecky in the Maslowed wood. An Austrian brigade
showed itself between Maslowed and Lipa, the Prussian ad-
vanced guard formed up to its own right and attacked it ;
while the main body, under Colonel Von Obemitz, pushed on
to Chlum, and the fusilier regiment, under Colonel Von Kessel,
threw itself into Rosberitz.
The first Prussians who arrived in Chlum saw on the reverse
side of the hill, between themselves and the fortress of Konig-
gratz, the whole of the Austrian reserves, mustering about 40,000
men. Between them and their comrades of the First Army
were the Austrian corps engaged near Lipa, and in the Sadowa
wood. Twelve battalions of the Prussian Guards was the
whole force at hand to hold the key of the battle against the
whole reserve of the enemy.
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 249
A fierce battle soon began round Rosberitz and Chlum,
which were seized by the Prussian Guard at a quarter before
three o'clock. At five minutes before three an aide-de-camp
reported to Feldzeugmeister Benedek, who was between
Chlum and Lipa, that the Prussians had occupied the former
village. The Austrian commander could not credit this
unexpected intelligence, and hastened himself in person to
ascertain its truth. On approaching Chlum he was received
by a withering volley, which told with severe efiect upon
his staff, and convinced him of the veracity of the report
He immediately hastened to send up some reserves to retake
the place.
About three o'clock the Army of the Elbe carried Problus,
and Feldzeugmeister Benedek was obliged to send two brigades
of the nearest Austrian corps, the first, to reinforce his front
while he directed one brigade against Chlum, and one against
Problus. At the same time the Saxon artillery of the reserve,
which was on the further side of the highway fi-om Rosberitz,
opened with terrible effect on the Prussians in that village,
and prepared the way for an attack by the sixth Austrian
corps.
The position of the Prussian Guard became every moment
more critical. The few battalions in Rosberitz could not hold
their ground, and were driven out of the village, having lost
among other officers Prince Anton of Hohenzollem. The
reserve artillery of the Pnissian Guard under the Prince of
Hohenlohe laboured up to the aid of the battalions in Chlum,
and, coming into action, smote heavily upon the thick masses
of the Austrian reserves which were preparing to attack the
houses. Three times they attacked, twice they almost reached
the orchard and churchyard, but were received at a few paces
distance by such a volley from the needle-guns that nearly the
whole of the attacking force was either killed or wounded. By
the time of the third attack the advanced guard of the reserve
division of the Prussian Guard had come up to the support of
the battalions who were already in occupation. The third
attack was repulsed, and at the same moment the battle was
won. The first Prussian corps and the fifth corps, with the
cavaliy of the Second Army, was pressing up towards Chlum
250 SEVEN WEEKS WAR. [Book VIL
and Rosberitz, bringing a reserve of 50,000 fresh soldiers into
the heart of Benedek's position ; while the main body of the
second division of the Guards dashed against the wood of
Lipa, and the batteries of Chlum.
As yet the Prussian generals at Sadowa were in ignorance of
the progress of the Crown Prince, for his other divisions were
on the reverse side of the hill of Chlum, and the attack of the
second division of the Guard could alone be seen from the
front. First a swarm of black dots stealing across the fields
showed the advance of the skirmishers, and the Austrian
sharpshooters, who had been lying among the com, could
be seen running* before them to gain the shelter of their
own Unes; dose behind the skirmishers followed the heavy
columns of infantry, looking like small black squares gliding
along the sides of the hill. The Austrian guns played sharply
on them, but they pushed forward without wavering till within
a short distance of the batteries ; then a few rapid volleys of
musketry sent up a cloud of smoke, which, hanging heavily in
the misty air, shut out the view ; but the sudden silence of the
Austrian guns told that the Prussians had closed, and that the
batteries had been stormed. The ground leading up to them
was steep, and the gunners sent round after round into the
storming columns, till the leading ranks were close to the
muzzles of the guns; the riflemen who were ensconced in
intrenchments beside the batteries, to defend them, sent biting
volleys into their assailants ; but, caring nought for the fire of
the infantry or the steepness of the ground, the Prussians dashed
straight at the guns, and both gunners and slvarpshooters had to
turn and fly. Then the deadly needle-gun opened its fire on
the fugitives, and with such precision that the ground was
covered with dead or wounded Austrians lying thick together.
In one place forty corpses lay on less than an acre of ground,
and the wounded appeared to be to the dead as three to one.
The Austrian defeat was now inevitable. As soon as the
Crown Prince sent his infantry against the Lipa wood, the
First Army sprang forward, and, with loud cheers and drums
beating, went dashing up the hill. The Sadowa road was
cleared as if by magic, and the battalions went straight against
the Austrian batteries. No heed was given to take the guns in
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 251
flank ; the soldiers felt certain of victory, and sought it by the
shortest road Though disordered by the broken ground, and
out of breath with the rapid ascent, so quickly did they advance
that the Austrian gunners had no time to limber up, but were
forced to desert their pieces and seek safety for themselves and
their horses in flight. Most of the guns which had been placed
in batteries were taken, but those which acted as field artillery,
admirably handled, were quickly withdrawn, and were already
fast forming on a further ridge by Rosnitz to cover the retreat
of the infantry.
The Prussians paused but a few moments among the taken
guns and then rushed on in pursuit The summit of the ridge
was quickly gained, and there before them they saw the whole
hollow ground between them and Rosnitz filled with running
white uniforms. The victorious battalions commenced a rapid
fire upon them, and men dropped quickly from the flying ranks,
rolling over and over as they fell on the sloping ground. The
sixth corps, which the Crown Prince had directed more against
the Austrian rear, caught the fugitives in flank, and raked the
ninning ranks with their fire. The Prussian artillery was also
quickly up, unlimbered, and came into action on the summit of
the ridge, and sent its shells bursting with a horrible precision
among the heads of the flying soldiers. And yet the Austrians
kept their formation, and never let their retreat become a rout
Such a retreat under such circumstances is as creditable to the
valour of the Austrian soldiers as a battle won.
The Prassian cavalry, unable to leave the road till it got to
nearly the top of the hill, on account of the woods by the side
of the way, was not up till the Austrian in&ntry had got half
way across the hollow which separates Chlum from the further
ridge of Rosnitz, and there the Austrian batteries had taken up
their position and began to play upon the pursuing troops.
Then, for a few minutes. Prince Frederick Charles, who was
leading the hussars and dragoons, had to leave them to make
his general dispositions for attacking the new position taken up
by the Austrian artillery, and the cavalry immediately got out
of hand. By single squadrons, by single troops, and even only
in knots of a few horsemen, they rushed with wild impetuosity
at different points of the retreating infantry; but the Austrian
252 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII.
guns sent shells rapidly among them, and the infantry, though
running, still kept its formation, and turned, when they came
too close, to stand and deliver volleys which emptied many a
saddle. Nor were the Austrian cavalry off the field, though
they could not face the tremendous fire of the Prussians to
charge and cover the retreat of their infantry; but when
attacked by the enemy's cavalry, and when thus the guns
could not fire upon them, they fought hard, and sacrificed them-
selves to cover the retreat Then, as the squadrons of the 3rd
regiment of Prussian dragoons were rushing forward to chaise
some battalions firing near the village of Wsester, an Austrian
cuirass brigade, led by an Englishman in the Austrian service
of the name of Beales, charged them in flank. They drove the
Prussians back, and, smiting them heavily with their ponderous
swords, nearly destroyed the dragoons ; but Hohenlohe's Prus-
sian Uhlans, seeing their comrades worsted, charged with their
lances couched against the Austrians' flank, and compelled
them to retire. Pressed hard by the lancers they fell back^
fighting hard, but then Ziethen's hussars charged them in the
rear. A fierce combat ensued ; the Austrian horsemen struck
strongly about them, fighting for their lives ; but the lancers
drove their lances into their horses, while the hussars, light and
active, closed in upon them, and only ten Austrians are re-
ported to have escaped unwounded from the milke. Beales
himself was borne wounded to the ground. But the Austrian
artillery was not long able to hold its new position ; the fire of
the Prussian guns and the dispositions which were being made
to attack it compelled it to retire. It then drew off" slowly, but
on every successive ridge came into action, and fired against
the pursuers to check them, and gain for its own infantry time
for retreat Some Prussian horse artillery and cavalry followed
it, and till after nightfall the pursuit went thundering towards
the Elbe, and drew the fire of the heavy guns of the fortress.
The Austrian cavalry retired to Pardubitz, and the remainder
of the army by seven or eight bridges, thrown across the river
between that place and Koniggratz, got beyond the stream by
night without severe loss.
The Prussian cavalry slowly followed in pursuit along both
joads. The wounded who were lying on the ground shrieked
CiiAP. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ, 253
with fear when they saw the cavalry galloping down towards
them, but Prince Frederick Charles took care that they should
be avoided, and at one time checked the pursuit in order to
move his squadrons around, and not go through, a patch of
standing com, where many wounded Austrians had taken
refuge. These, when they saw the lancers coming, thought
they were going to be msissacred, and cried piteously, waving
white handkerchiefs as a sign of truce ; but they had no cause
to fear. Large numbers of prisoners were taken, for the
pursuit was continued to the Elbe, and it was not till nine
o'clock that all firing had ceased, though the main body of
the army halted about seven. As the Princes returned, the
battalions cheered them for their victory; but they left the
pursuit of their enemies and the cheers of their own victorious
troops to look after the hospital accommodation provided for
the wounded. These lay in immense numbers in the field;
the dead too laid thick, but all they required was done on the
morrow. Every cottage in the neighbourhood that had not
been burnt was full of wounded. Austrians and Prussians lay
side by side, but the Krankentrager were still out, and all were
not collected till late the next morning. Conspicuous in the
hospitals, working diligently in their voluntary labour, were the
Knights of St John of Jerasalem. This Order of Knighthood,
renewed lately for the succour of the weak and suffering, had
sent here a large hospital establishment, under the direction of
Count Theodore Stolberg. From the voluntary contributions
of the knights, hospitals were maintained in the nearest towns
and in the field, all necessary hospital stores were carried, by
the Order, and means of transport accompanied the army,
hospital nurses were provided, and by their aid many wounded
were carefully attended to who could not have been looked
after by the ordinary arrangements.
The battle of Koniggratz was a great victory for the Prus-
sians, though its full advantages were not known by them until
the following day. One hundred and seventy-four guns, twenty
thousand prisoners, and eleven standards, fell into the hands of
the conquerors; the total loss of the Austrian army by the
disaster of the 3rd July amounted to almost forty thousand
men, while that of the Prussians was not ten thousand. The
254 seven: WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII.
morale of the Austrian anny was destroyed, and their infantry
found that in open column they could not stand against the
better-armed Prussians. The Austrians had hoped to be able
to close with the bayonet, and so amend the effects of the fiie
of the needle-gun ; but the idea of the superiority in the use of
the bayonet in which the Austrian army prided itself, is one of
those vanities which are common to every nation, and this war
proved that at close quarters the stronger men of Prussia in-
variably overcame the lighter and smaller Austrians. The
Austrian and Saxon troops engaged amounted to about two
hundred thousand men, with six hundred guns.* The Prussian
army in the field mustered in round numbers two hundred and
sixty thousand combatants, with eight hundred and sixteen
guns, but of them the fifdi corps, one brigade of the sixth
corps, and all but the advanced guard of the first corps, in all
about sixty thousand men, never fired a shot Thus the number
of casualties were about one thirteenth of the number of men
actually engaged.f
The highest proportionate loss of the Prussian army fell upon
Franzecky's division, which lost two thousand out of a little
over fourteen thousand men. The greatest loss on the Austrian
side was incurred by the troops who attempted to retake Chlum,
and by those who had to retire out of the Lipa and Sadowa
woods after the Crown Prince had developed his attack. The
artillery on both sides appeared to fail in causing such numerous
casualties as might have been anticipated from so large a number
of rifled guns. Nor did the infantry fire tell except at close
quarters. Whether this was due to the inferior shooting power
of the needle-gun or to the practical disadvantage of aiming
under fire seems to be uncertain.
The number of cartridges fired by the Prussian army in the
battle barely exceeded one per man on the ground. Hardly
* This estimate of the Austrian force is based on an able letter written
fix)m Olmiitz after the battle by the special correspondent of the Tirms, in
which that writer states that Benedek had then collected one hundred and
sixty thousand of the defeated army at Olmiitz. This with the Austrian loss
would give the above figure.
f The following list of the proportion of casualties to combatants, in
some of the most famous battles of the last two centuries, is extracted from
a careful essay written for the professional papers of the Royal Engineers by
Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke, R. £. :
Chap. II. J
BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ,
25S
Kame of Battle.
Malplaquet. 1709
Hohen
Fricdberg
Prague .
Rosbacfa
Breslau .
Ussa. .
Zomsdorf
Hoch Kirch
Marengo
Austerlitz
Jena • .
Preussic
Eylau .
Friedland
Talavera
Wagram
Salamanca
Borodino
Leipsic .
Vittoria .
Waterloo
Magenta
Solferino
Numbers.
745
757
757
757
757
758
758
800
805
806
807
807
809
809
812
812
813
813
815
859
859
On each side.
70,000 P. )
70,000 A. )
64,000?. )
74,000 A. J
J 22,000 P. I
j 55,oooA. \
\ 25,000 p. )
} 60,000 A. (
j 36,000 p. j
( 8o,oooA. (
( 32,000 P.
j 50,000 R.
J 50,000 A.
I 30,000 P.
j 28, 127 F. I
\ 30, 850 A. j
j 90,000 F.
)8o,oooR.&A.
! 100,000 F. )
100,000 P. {
85,000 F.
75,oooR.
80,000 F.
50, 000 R.
J 52,000 E.&S.
I 50,000 F.
J 150,000 F. i
1 130,000 A !
J 125,000 F. )
j 125,000 R. (
K 150,000 F.
( 280,000 Allies
i 70,000 E. &c.
j 27,000 F.
) 67,600 E. &a
) 68,900 F.
i48,09oF.&S. )
) 61,640 A. (
135.234F.&S. I
Toul.
Killed and Wounded.
163,124 A.
180,000
140,000
138,000
77,000
85,000
ii6,ooo*
82,000
80,000
58.977t
170,0004:
20O,00O§
160,000
130,000
102,000
280,000
90,000
250,000
430,000
97,000
136,500
109,730
298,358*
Number.
18,250 Allies.
7,000
Proportion
to total
Forces.
\ 30,050
/ 25,000
J 10,000
17,000
5i928
7,200
24,000
8,000 E. )
22,800 F. II J
80,000
50,000 IT I
not known. (
10,000
14,000 )
not known. (
4,000 I
14.4' S I
i
i
itoi
\
\
i
\
• •
• •
h.
* az,ooo Austrian prisoners mianng.
t TOfOoo Austrian prisoners.
\ ladudet some prisooert.
f r,ooo French and 3,000 Austrian prisoners. ^
f ao,ooo Prussian prisoners. | Includes missing.
** 8,770 AlUes and 9^290 Auitnans missing.
2s6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI I.
any soldier fired so many as ninety, and few more than sixty.*
The average number of rounds fired by the artillery of Prince
Frederick Charles's army, was forty-two per gun, and no gun of
that army fired more than eighty rounds. In the artillery of
the Guard, the thirteen batteries engaged fired one thousand
seven hundred and eighty-seven rounds, being an average of
twenty-three per gun ; one battery fired eighty-one rounds per
gun.
On the evening of the battle, an officer of the Ziethen hussars,
who were forward in the pursuit, rode as far as the gates of
Koniggratz, and, finding there were no sentries outside, rode in ;
the guard, immediately on seeing him in his Prussian unifonn,
turned out and seized him, when, with a ready presence, he
declared he had come to demand the capitulation of the fortress.
He was conducted to the commandant, and made the same
demand to him, adding that the town would be bombarded if
not surrendered within an hour; the commandant, unconscious
that he was not dealing with a legitimate messenger, courteously
refiised to capitulate ; but the hussar was conducted out of the
town, passed through the guard at the entrance, and got off
safely without being made a prisoner.
That night the Prussian army bivouacked on the field, where
the main body remained the next day in order to allow the
troops time to rest after their great fatigues.
The appearance of the field of battle the next morning
showed the severity of the fight The wounded had all been
removed, but few of the dead had been buried, for the number
of wounded was so great that every man who could be spared
from duty was required to look after them. All night long the
Krankentrager had been at work, and had been assisted by a
large number of soldiers. Every village near the field of battle
had all its standing houses converted into hospitals, and all the
surgeons in the army had been busy all night long. In the
woods and in the broken ground the bodies of Austrians and
Prussians were tolerably equal in number, generally lying in
groups of four or five of either nation together, marking the
* At the battle of Borodino, one of the most sanguinary contests on
record (see preceding page), the French are said to have fired 1,400,000
cartridges, which would be at the rate of about 10 per man.
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 257
spot where a shell had burst \ but in the open ground and down
the reverse side of the Chlum hill the Austrians lay terribly
thick, and hardly a Prussian uniform was to be seen. Wherever
the Austrians fought unprotected by cover, and wherever the
Prussian riflemen, armed with needle-guns, could see their
enemies, the disproportion of the dead became immediately
apparent The com was trodden down all over the field as flat
as if it was straw laid on a stable floor, and the ground was
ploughed up and dug into holes with shells.
On the top of the hill of Chlum, and near the village, stood
a large number of the captured guns, with all their waggons and
carriages beside them, and on the slope away from Sadowa the
rest were placed under the charge of the corps of the Guard.
Everywhere about the field, fatigue parties were digging large
trenches in which the Austrian and Prussian killed were laid
side by side, clothed in their uniforms. No other tombstone
was put to mark each grave than a plain wooden cross, on
which was written the number of each regiment that lay below.
The officers were placed in single graves near the men. But
here and there a few were seen silently carrying some comrade
to a more retired spot. On one part of the field a Prussian
general with his staff* was burying his son, who had fallen in the
attack on the Austrian right Close by, the wife of a private
soldier who had found her husband's body on the field had had
it buried by some soldiers, had hung some oak branches on the
little wooden cross at the head, and was sitting on the freshly-
turned earth, sobbing her heart out, with his shattered helmet
in her lap. She had followed his regiment, in order to be near
him, from the beginning of the campaign, through all the long
marches the army had made.
The less severely wounded were moved to Horitz, from
which, on the approach of the Prussians, the inhabitants had
nearly all fled. The vacated houses were converted into hos-
pitals, and at nearly every window and every door men were
hanging about listlessly, with heads or arms bound up, with a
half stupefied look, as if they had not yet recovered from the
stunning effects of the blow which had disabled them. Many
were Austrians, and prisoners of war ; but the greatest liberty
seemed to be accorded to them, for they were allowed to
258 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book VII.
wander about the streets, and to mix freely with the Prussian
soldiers.
Long columns of unwounded prisoners were being marched
continually through the town on their way to the rear. The
Austrians looked dejected and unhappy, yet marched stolidly
and silently along ; but the prisoners from the Italian regiments
laughed and talked cheerily, and on them their imprisonment
sat lightly.
Here and there an Austrian officer, prisoner on parole,
strolled moodily about, stopping every now and then to return
the courteous salutations of the Prussian officers who passed by.
To ease the anxiety of their friends at home, they wrote letters
to announce that they were not killed, but taken, and these
were sent with a flag of truce to the Austrian lines. The
greatest courtesy and kindness were shown by the Prussian
officers to their unfortunate prisoners, and every attempt was
made to make them feel their position as little as possible.
Several Austrian officers wounded mortally on the field re-
quested Prussian officers to send their last message to their
families, requests which it is needless to say were readily com-
plied with.
Field-Marshal Gablenz came to Horitz the day after the
battle from the Austrian head-quarters, to ask for an armistice
as a preliminary to peace. It was impossible that Prussia could
grant an armistice at this moment, when the Austrian army was
still in the field, and any pause in the operations of the cam-
paign would be used to collect troops from the Italian frontier
and from the distant provinces of the empire in order to oppose
the Prussian armies. Nor could peace be concluded by Prussia
without the concurrence of Italy, for a treaty existed between
the Cabinets of Berlin and Florence, by which neither could
make peace without the sanction of the other.
The Field-Marshal accordingly returned to his own lines
without obtaining any result firom his mission.
The actual junction of the two armies of the Crown Prince
and of Prince Frederick Charles was effected on the battle-field
of Koniggratz, and the Austrians had now lost the chance they
had of falling upon each army separately.
As the consequence of the defeat of Koniggratz, Austria on
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONJGGRATZ. «59
the 4th July ceded Venetia to the Emperor of the French, who
was nominally to hold the province, although it was virtually
then, and practically in the following October, given to the
kingdom of Italy.
obserVatioiIs on the battle of koniggrAtz.
The details of a great battle are, as a general rule, less per-
fectly known the more closely the time at which they are
criticised approaches to the date of the action. While the men
are still living on whom disclosures would draw an inconvenient
censure, the government of a country which has suffered a
great reverse in war is naturally unwilling to gratify the curiosity
of the world by the publication of information which can
only be certainly found in its own official archives. Without
such information it is impossible to make any observations on
the causes or conduct of incidents in war with an assured cer-
tainty. It is necessary to attempt to lift the veil which shrouds
such events during the lifetimes of the principal actors with
only a hesitating and a faltering touch, and to acknowledge
that any conclusions based upon a crude knowledge of facts are
enunciated with diffidence. If correct they are fortuitous, if
incorrect their fallacies will be exposed by future information.
The position taken up by Feldzeugmeister Benedek in front
of Koniggratz has been severely criticised It does not, how-
ever, appear that the river in his rear was any disadvantage to
him, although his army was defeated, and had its flank turned
by a strong force. The Austrian commander took the pre-
caution to throw bridges over the river. With plenty of bridges
a river in rear of a position became an advantage. After the
retreating army had withdrawn across the stream, the bridges
were broken, and the river became an obstacle to the pursuit
Special as well as general conditions also came into play. The
pursuing Prussians could not approach with impunity the heads
of the Austrian bridges. The heavy guns of the fortress scoured
the banks of the river both up and down stream, and, with
superior weight of metal and length of range, were able to cover
the passage of the Austrians. The position was otherwise
acknowledged on all sides to be a good one, carefully chosen ^
8 2
96o SEVEN" WEEK^ WAR, [Book VII.
and though the villages were not completely barricaded and
loopholed, this omission was probably due to the extreme
rapidity of the movements of Prince Frederick Charles. A
great disadvantage was the fact that the presence of two oppo-
nent armies acting from divergent bases against the Austrian
position caused, as all such conditions always must cause,
Feldzeugmeister Benedek to fight with his army drawn along
two sides of an angle. One side was from Prim to Maslowed,
the other from Maslowed to Lochenitz. By such a formation
a defeat or even a repulse of either wing must necessarily allow
the successful enemy to penetrate into the rear of the other.
Or a success and advance of one or both wings must leave a
gap at the salient angle.
Two questions have attracted more notice with reference to
the battle than others. These are, first — ^Why did Benedek
allow the Crown Prince to come down so heavily upon his
right flank ? and secondly, How did the first division of the
Prussian Guard manage to get into Chlum unobserved ? The
answer to the first question appears to be that the Austrian
general was deceived as to the position of the Crown Prince.*
On the 30th June he knew that the Crown Prince was on the
Elbe, because fi-om the heights above Koniginhof the Prussians
were that day cannonaded by an Austrian battery. Between
the 30th and the 2nd, the Crown Prince pushed troops across
the river at Amau and Koniginhof, and directed the heads of
their columns towards Miletin. On the afternoon of the 2nd,
two of Prince Frederick Charles's divisions occupied Miletin.
Late on the night of the 2nd, one of these divisions of Prince
Frederick Charles's army was ordered to move to Milowitz,
while the other moved to Cerekwitz. It seems probable that
these movements were reported to Benedek by his spies, but
erroneously. It would appear that he was told that the main
body of the Crown Prince's army had joined Frederick Charles
at Miletin, and that the mass of the united armies on the night
of the 2nd was moving towards its own right to make a con-
centrated attack against Benedek's left near Nechanitz, with
the object of driving in his left, and of cutting him off from
* This theory is entirely b.ised on hypothesis, and must be accepted only
ibr what it is worth.
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. l6t
Pardubitz and the railway to Vienna. The spies would not
fail to notice that some of the Crown Prince's troops were still
at Koniginhof, and near Gradlitz. Their presence there would
be accounted for by the supposition that they were left to watch
Josephstadt, to hold the line of the Elbe, and prevent a raid
against the Crown Prince's line of communication with Silesia
until he had changed that line for the one by which Frederick
Charles communicated with Saxony. This ideal cause of the
Austrian conduct on the 3rd July appears to be borne out by
the following general order which, as it is said, Benedek issued
late on the night of the 2nd : so late that it only reached his
second corps on the Trottina at foxir o'clock on the morning of
the day of the battle. This order would seem to have been
dictated when the Feldzeugmeister heard that the Prussians
were moving to their own right from Miletin. It was as follows : —
" The Saxon corps will occupy the heights of Popowitz and
Tresowitz, the left wing slightly refused and covered by its own
cavalry. To the left of this corps and somewhat to the rear>
the first light cavalry division will take post, on the extreme
left flank of Problus and Prim. On the right of the Saxons the
tenth corps ivill take its position ; on the right of the tenth the
third will occupy the heights of Chlum and Lipa. The eighth
corps will serve as immediate support to the Saxons. The
troops not named above are only to hold themselves in readi-
ness while the attack is confined to the left wing. Should the
hostile attack assume greater dimensions, the whole army will
be formed in order of battle.
" The fourth corps will then move up on the right of the
third to the heights between Chlum and Nedelitz ; and on the
extreme right flank next to the fourth the second will take post.
" The second light cavalry division will take post in rear of
Nedelitz, and there remain in readiness. The sixth corps will
take post on the heights near Wsetar ; the first near Rosnitz.
Both these corps will be in concentrated formation. The first
and third cavalry divisions will take post at Sweti. In the
event of a general attack the first and sixth corps, the five
cavalry divisions, and the reserve artillery of the army, which
will be posted in rear of the first and sixth corps, are to serve
as the reserve of the army.
262 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [BoOK VII.
**The retreat, if necessary, will be made by the high road to
Hohenmauth, without disturbing the fortress of Koniggratz.
" The second and fourth corps must at once cause pontoon
bridges to be thrown across the Elbe. The second corps ytiW
throw two between Lochenitz and Predmeritz. The first corps
will also throw a bridge."
As a digression it may be noticed in passing that these
bridges mentioned in this order were ready by mid-day. The
organization of the Austrian army cannot have been so very
bad as some are now fain to suppose.
By the general tenor of this order, it appears that the Feld-
zeugmeister fully expected to be attacked on his left, for much
the same reason as Wellington at Waterloo fully expected to be
assailed on his right The part of the order which relates to
the fourth and second corps shows that he contemplated the
possibility of an attack on his right ; but not from a very large
force. Probably the reports of the spies induced him to believe
that the first corps and the Guards at least of the army of the
Crown Prince had joined Prince Frederick Charles, and that
only two corps, or sixty thousand men, were at the most on the
Elbe. He knew that the two main bodies of these latter two
corps must defile over the river, and march fifteen miles over
very bad roads and an extremely difficult country, before they
could feel his right In the meantime he might have disposed of
the adversaries in his front The conduct of the Austrian general
during the action seems also to confirm this. Had he known
that at ten o'clock Prince Frederick Charles sent only four divi-
sions across the Bistritz, he would hardly have failed to bear
down upon them with greatly superior numbers, and crush
them at once, before the arrival of their assistants. From the
time of the attack on Benatek until the arrival of the Crown
Prince, Franzecky was exposed across the Bistritz, separated by
a wide interval from Home's division in the Sadowa wood
The country favourable for the action of cavalry. Franzecky
had with him only one regiment of hussars. The Prussian
reserve cavalry could not have crossed the stream, on account
of its marshy banks, to his assistance. Twenty thousand
Austrian horsemen were at Benedek*s command. He held them
inactive. Yet the hero of San Martino was not the man to miss
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGHATZ. 263
to Strike a blow if he thought he could do so with safety. He
must have imagined Franzecky much stronger than he really
was. Probably the Austrian staff imagined that the Crown
Prince's corps, which here joined Frederick Charles, were the
assailants of Benatek. If there is any ground for the above
supposition, how much must the conclusion reflect upon the
Austrian system of reconnaissances and patrols. From the
high bank above Koniginhof, a staff officer Ijdng hidden in the
fir-wood could, almost with the naked eye, have counted every
Prussian gun, every Prussian soldier that the Crown Prince
moved towards Miletin. The eyes of the Austrian army on
more than one occasion during the campaign failed. Their
patrol system was very much inferior to that of the Prussians.
Its inferiority seems to have been due to the want of military
education among the officers to whom patrols were entrusted.
In the Prussian army special officers of high intelligence were
always chosen to reconnoitre. Properly so, for the task is no
easy one. An eye unskilled, or a mind untutored, can see
little, where a tried observer detects important movements. A
line of country, or a few led horses, will tell the officer who is
accustomed to such duty more than heavy columns or trains of
artillery will disclose to the unthinking novice. The Prussian
system never failed, never allowed a surprise. The Austrians
were repeatedly surprised, and taken unprepared. Yet the out-
post system of the latter during the Italian war of 1859 merited
the praise of the Emperor of the French, and was by him pointed
out to his own army as a model of superiority.* The military
development of Prussia had not yet been fully appreciated.
Another fact which may aid to corroborate the theory ad-
vanced above, is the telegram in which Feldzeugmeister
Benedek first announced to Vienna the loss of the battle In
this he said that some of the enemy's troops, under cover of the
mist, established themselves on his flank, and so caused the
defeat Probably at that time he thought that the troops
that got into Chlum were a detachment from those engaged at
Benatek. If the Austrian general had suspected any attack
from the direction of Koniginhof, he would surely have watched
* General Order of the Emperor after the Battle of Solferino,
364 . SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book YIL
the country in that direction with his cavalry, but the troops of
the Crown Prince did not fall in with a single patrol till they
actually came into collision with the Austrian line of
battle.
How the Prussian Guards were allowed to get into Chlum
appears inexplicable. From the top of Chlum Church tower
the whole country can be clearly seen as far as the top of the
high bank of the Elbe. A staff-officer posted there, even
through the mist, which was not so heavy as is generally
supposed, could have easily seen any movements of troops as
far as Choteborek. A person near Sadowa could see quite
distinctly Herwarth's attack at Hradek, and, except during occa-
sional squalls, there was no limit to the view over the surround-
ing country except where the configuration of the ground or the
heavy smoke overcame the sight From the top of Chlum
Church there was a clear view over all the neighbouring hills,
and the top of the spire generally stood out clear over the
heavy curtain of hanging smoke which, above the heads of the
combatants, fringed the side of the Lipa hill from Benatek to
Nechanitz. So litde apprehensive, however, was Benedek of
an attack on his right, that he stationed no officer in the tower;
and himself took up a position above Lipa, where any view
towards the north was entirely shut out by the hill and houses
of Chlum. No report appears to have reached him of the
advance of the Guards, yet they were engaged at Horenowes,
and passed through Maslowed. From that village, without
opposition, they marched along the rear of the Austrian line,
apparently unobserved, until they flung themselves into Chlum
and Rosberitz. It seems that the fourth corps to whom the
defence of the ground between Maslowed and Nedelitz was en-
trusted, seeing their comrades heavily engaged with Franzecky
in the Maslowed wood, turned to their aid, and pressing for-
wards towards Benatek quitted their proper ground. A short
time afterwards the second Austrian corps was defeated by the
Prussian eleventh division, and retreated towards its bridge at
Lochenitz. The advance of the fourth corps, and the retreat
of the second, left a clear gap in the Austrian line, through
which the Prussian Guards marched unmolested, and without a
shot seized the key of the position. Once installed they could
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGCRATZ, 265
not be ejected, and the battle was practically lost to the
Austrians.
The Prussian pursuit was tardy, and not pushed. The men
were fatigued, and night was coming on. The Austrian cavalry
was moving sullenly towards Pardubitz. The Prussian cavalry
of the First Army had suffered severely. The Elbe lay between
the retreating Austrians and the victorious Prussians. The
victory, although fortuitously decisive, was not improved to such
advantage as it might have been.
CHAPTER III.
DEFENCE OF SILESIA.
Before proceeding to review the events which have in the
meantime been taking place in the western theatre of war, it is
requisite to cast a glance upon the operations of the two
Prussian corps which had been left to guard the province of
Silesia. On the concentration of the Austrian army in
Bohemia, a corps of 6,000 men, under General Trentinaglia,
had been left at Cracow. Two Prussian independent corps
had, as was already noticed, been stationed at Ratibor and
Nicolai, to shield south-eastern Silesia, against a probable
attack from this corps. The former was commanded by
General Knobelsdorf, and consisted of the 62nd regiment of
infantry, the 2nd regiment of Uhlans, a few battalions of
Landwehr, and one battery. The latter, under General Count
Stolberg, was formed of Landwehr alone, and mustered six
battalions, two regiments of cavalry, two companies of Jagers,
and one battery.
The corps of Knobelsdorf was to defend the Moravian
frontier, that of Stolberg the Gallician ; and both, in case of
attack by overwhelming numbers, were to fall back under the
protection of the fortress of KoseL
On the 2 1 St June, Stolberg*s corps obtained its first im-
portant although bloodless success. That day it marched
rapidly, many of the men being conveyed in waggons to
Pruchna, blew up the railway viaduct there, and so destroyed
the communication between General Trentinaglia and the main
Austrian army.
On the 24th and 26th June, as well as on the intermediate
days, several Austrian parties made demonstrations of crossing
Chap III.] DEFENCE OF SILESIA, 267
the frontier near Oswiecin. Large bodies of troops appeared
to be in the act of concentration at that place, and General
Stolberg determined to assure himself of the actual strength of
the Austrians there by a reconnaissance in force.
To aid this, General Knobelsdorf sent a part of his troops to
Myslowitz, to cover the rear of Stolberg's corps while it
marched on Oswiecin,
At the latter place. General Stolberg found a considerably
superior force of the enemy. He seized the buildings of the
railway station, placed them hastily in a state of defence, and
determined by making a long halt here to force the Austrians to
develop their full force
After he had achieved this object, General Stolberg retired
to his position near Nicolai. The detachment at Myslowitz
had at the same time to sustain an action there, and fulfilled
completely its pxurpose of holding the enemy back from
Oswiecia
On the 30th June, Stolberg's detachment was so weakened
by the withdrawal of his Landwehr battalions, which were
called up in order to aid in the formation of a fourth battalion
to every regiment, that it could no longer hold its own against
the superior Austrian force near Myslowitz. It retired accord-
ingly nearer to Ratibor, in the direction of Plesz, and undertook
from here, in connexion with General Knobelsdorf, expeditions
into Moravia against Teschen, Biala, and Skotchau, annoyed the
Austrians considerably, and made the inhabitants of Moravia
regard the war with aversion.
BOOK VIII.
CHAPTER L
OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN THEATRE OF THE GERMAN WAR.
As has been already shown in a preceding chapter,* the
Prussian troops which had invaded Hanover and Hesse-Cassel
occupied on the 19th June the following positions : — The
divisions of General Goeben and General Manteuffel were in
the town of Hanover, and that of General Beyer in CasseL Of
the allies of Austria the Hanoverian army was at Gottingen,
the Bavarian in the neighbourhood of Wiirzburg and Bambei^,
the eighth Federal corps in the vicinity of Frankfort. The latter
consisted of the troops of Wiirtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt,
Nassau, and Hesse-Cassel, to which an Austrian division was
added. We have seen under what disadvantages the Hanoverian
army left Hanover, and commenced its southward march. Its
formation and preparations began only at Gottingen, and they
were necessarily conducted under every untoward circumstance.
The soldiers of the reserve, and those who had been absent on
furlough, nobly responded to the call of their King, and made
their way through the country which was in Prussian posses-
sion, and sometimes even through the lines of the enemy, to
join the ranks at Gottingen. By their firm determination to
reach their regiments they afforded an earnest of the gallantry
and courage which they afterwards displayed upon the field of
battle. By the arrival of these men, the army at Gottingen
mustered about twenty thousand combatants, with fifty guns.
Southern Germany expected great deeds of the Bavarian
♦ See page 118.
Chap. L] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR, 269
army. It might have thrown serious difficulties in the way of
the Prussian successes, had not an uncertainty and vacillation
pervaded all its operations. Prince Charles of Bavaria, the
Commander-in-Chief, under whose orders the eighth Federal
Corps was also afterwards placed, seems to have conducted his
campaign without a definite strategical object, and without
energy in its prosecution. Against him in command of the
Prussian Army of the Maine* was a geneml gifted with prudence
and clear foresight, who pursued his aim with an iron vigour.
The Bavarian is a smart soldier in time of peace, and conducts
himself well in battle : but the ranks of Bavaria do not contain
such intelligence as do those of Prussia, for men drawn for
military service are allowed to provide substitutes, so that only
the poorer and less educated classes of society furnish recmits
for the army.
The eighth Federal corps did not assemble either with zeal
or rapidity. The troops of the Grand Duke of Baden not
only came very late to the place of concentration, but when
actually in the field were handled in a manner which gave rise
to grave suspicions of the affection of their government for the
South-German cause. The kernel of this miscellaneous corps
was formed by an Austrian division composed of the troops
which had been withdrawn from the fortresses of Rastadt,
Mayence, and Frankfort. Even if the princes of the small
states which furnished their contingents to the eighth corps had
made clear to themselves the end or object of the war which
they had undertaken, their reasons for the quarrel had not
penetrated the lower ranks of their armies. The troops had no
idea, no knowledge, of the causes for which they were to shed
their blood, and markedly in this respect contrasted with the
Pmssian soldiery, which held that the honour, integrity, and
even existence of its fatherland was in jeopardy.
The Federal troops did not fail in bravery, but no enthusiasm
thrilled through their ranks. Individual bodies were doubtless
animated by a high courage, and in many cases displayed a
heroic devotion to their leaders and their princes. But the
• This name was only given on the ist of July to the Prussian divisions
amalgamated together under the command of General Vogel von Falcken-
stein.
270 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII.
mass did not work evenly ; a want of harmony existed amon.i;
its heterogeneous units, which, in combination with the clouded
plans of its chiefs, facilitated the task of General von Falcken-
stein. There was also dissension in the councils of the leaders.
Prince Alexander tiot only habitually disagreed with his supe-
rior. Prince Charles, and so originated causes of disaster \ but
himself was often engaged in paltry squabbles with the
lieutenants who commanded the different contingents.
CATASTROPHfi OF THE HANOVERIAN ARMV.
The Hanoverian army had marched from its capital almost
totally unprepared to undertake a campaign. It stood in dire
need of several days* rest in order to be organized, and to
allow time for the formation of a transport train, as well as for
the clothing and armament of the soldiers of reserve who had
been recalled to the ranks, and for the horsing of part of the
artillery. On this account it was forced to halt until the 20th
June at Gottingen, and the favourable moment for its unmo-
lested march to unite with the troops of Bavaria was allow^ed
to slip away.
On the iQtli June, by the successful occupation of Cassel by
Prussian troops, the ultimate retreat of the Hanoverians was
first endangered. On the same day the Prussian General von
Falckenstein set out from Hanover with Goeben's division in
pursuit of them. The Hanoverian army had gained a start of
almost seventy miles on General von Falckenstein, which was
of the more importance, inasmuch as the latter could not make
use of the railroads, which had been torn up and broken.
The King of Hanover determined to move in a south-
easterly direction, and to attempt to reach Bavaria by passing
through Prussian territory on the road which leads by Heiligen-
stadt and Langensalza, and then by Gotha or Eisenach, or to
unite with the Bavarians in the neighbourhood of Fulda, The
roads in this direction through the mountains of the Thuringian
Forest are very convenient, and by no means difficult Had
the march been pushed on with certainty and rapidity, there
seems to have been no reason why it should not have been
successful in its issue. The portion of the Prussian province
Chap. I.] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 271
of Saxony through which the line of march lay from Heiligen-
stadt to Langensalza was entirely denuded of Prussian troops.
The only force to oppose the progress of the retreating "army
on this road was the contingent of Saxe-Coburg Gotha, at
Gotha. This consisted, however, of only two battalions. It
seems, therefore, that the direction proposed for their route
offered considerable chances of success, if on the one side the
Hanoverians had forced their marches, and on the other the
Bavarians had pushed forward by Coburg in strength, in order
to eflfect a junction with their threatened allies. But neither
the Hanoverian nor Bavarian leaders acted energetically.
The Prussian staff, on the contrary, took most prompt
measures to cut off the Hanoverian retreat, and to occupy the
principal points on their line of march with troops. The Duke
of Cobuig had declared openly and decidedly on the side of
Prussia, and his troops were in consequence at the service of
the Prussian Government On the 20th June, Colonel von
Fabeck, the commandant of the Coburg contingent, received a
telegraphic order from Berlin to post himself with his two
battalions at Eisenach, because it was expected that the
Hanoverians would there first attempt to break through. Three
battalions of Landwehr, one squadron of Landwehr cavalry, and
a battery of four guns, were sent from the garrison of Erfurt to
reinforce him. A battalion of the fourth regiment of the
Prussian Guard, which had reached Leipsic on the 19th, was
also despatched to his aid, a detachment of which, on the 20th,
rendered the railway tunnel near Eisenach, impassable.
At the same time General Beyer, pushing forwards from
Cassel towards Eisenach, occupied the passages of the river
Werra, between AUendorf and that place.
The idea of uniting with the Bavarians, by moving from
Heiligenstadt by Eschewege and Fulda, was under these cir-
cumstances, given up by the King of Planover. On the 20th
of June such is said to have been his intention, and on that
day he moved his advanced guard from Gottingen to Heiligen-
stadt On the 2 1 St he ordered his whole army to move upon
Gotha, and crossed the Prussian frontier with his troops, after
taking leave of his people by means of a proclamation, in
which he mournfully expressed his hope soon to return vie-
272 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII.
torious at the head of his army, to the land which he was then
temporarily forced to quit
General Arentschild, on entering Prussian territory near
Heiligenstadt, issued a proclamation in which he disavowed
any intention of treating the country in a hostile manner, and
declared that he only desired to be allowed to march through
without interruption. The Hanoverian army, dependent for
its subsistence upon requisitions, moved but slowly. On the
22nd it occupied Miihlhausen, and on the 23rd Grosz-Gottem.
From this place advanced guards were pushed forward on the
one side towards Erfurt, on the other to the railway between
Eisenach and Gotha. The latter found that this line was
already occupied by the Prussians. On the 24th the Hano-
verian army reached Langensalza.
In the meantime Colonel Fabeck, the commander of the
Coburg contingent, quitting his position at Eisenach, ap-
proached Gotha, and occupied the road by which the Hano-
verians might have broken through in this direction. A second
squadron of Landwehr cavalry and a depdt battalion were sent
from Erfurt to reinforce him ; and a second battalion of the
fourth regiment of the infantry of the Prussian Guard \i'as
hurried up from Berlin. One battalion of this regiment oc-
cupied Weimar, and the other Eisenach,
On the 24th June, the force opposed to the Hanoverians at
Gotha consisted only of six weak battalions, two squadrons,
and four guns. There can hardly be any question but that, if
the King of Hanover had marched rapidly on Gotha that day,
Colonel von Fabeck would have been quite unable to hold his
position. But the Hanoverian leaders failed to take advantage
of this last opportunity. The King rejected a proposal made
by Colonel von Fabeck, that his army should capitulate ; but
applied to the Duke of Coburg, and asked him to act as a
mediator with the Prussian Government. The Hanoverians
desired a free passage to Bavaria, and were in return willing to
pledge themselves to take no share in the war in Germany
during six months. The Duke of Coburg insisted that this
time should be extended to a year, to which the Hanoverians
assented, and the Duke telegraphed a report of the negotiations
to Berlin.
Chap. I.] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR, 273
Had the Hanoverians obtained these terms, their intention
was to move into Italy, and there to act on the Austrian side
against the Italians, — z, course of action which would have
recalled to memory the past times in which the Electors of
Hanover sent so many of their subjects to combat in the cause
of the republic of Venice.
The King of Prussia, immediately on the receipt of the tele-
gram of the Duke of Coburg, despatched his Adjutant-General,
General von Alvensleben, to Gotha, to treat with the King of
Hanover. In the meantime an armistice was agreed upon,
which was to expire on the morning of the 25th. This ar-
mistice was violated, doubtlessly by some misunderstanding,
on the night of the 24th, by the Hanoverians, who advanced
to the Gotha and Eisenach railway, and broke up the line near
Frotestadt. General von Alvensleben sent a proposal from
Gotha to the King of Hanover that he should capitulate. To
this no answer was returned ; but the King expressed a wish
that General von Alvensleben should repair to his camp, in
order to treat with him. This wish was complied with early on
the 25th, when an extension of the armistice was agreed upon,
and General von Alvensleben hurried back to Berlin for further
instructions. It was not at this time the interest of the Prussians
to push matters to extremities. Their troops were widely
scattered, and the small force at Gotha was unequal to engage
tlie Hanoverian army with any chance of success. The
Hanoverians seem to have been ignorant of how small a body
alone barred the way to Bavaria, and to have hoped that time
might be afforded for aid to reach them. On the night of the
24th a messenger was sent to the Bavarian head-quarters at
Bamberg to report the situation of the Hanoverian army, and
to solicit speedy assistance. To this request Prince Charles
only replied that an army of nineteen thousand men ought to
be able to cut its way through. In consequence of this opinion
only one Bavarian brigade of light cavalry was advanced on
the 25th of June to Meiningen, in the valley of the Werra,
while a few Bavarian detachments were pushed forward along
the high road as far as Vacha.
This procedure of Prince Charles of Bavaria was alone suffi-
cient to condemn him as a general He held his army inactive,
T
274 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VIII.
when, by a bold advance, not only could he have insured the
safety of the Hanoverians, but could in all probability have
captured the whole of his enemy's troops at Gotha. Thus he
would have saved nineteen thousand allies, have captured six
thousand of his adversary's men, have turned the scale of war
by twenty-five thousand combatants, have preserved to his own
cause a skilled and highly trained army, proud of high and
ancient military reputation, which the faults of politicians had
placed in a most precarious and unfortunate position.
On the 25 th Prussian troops were closing in upon the de-
voted Hanoverians; but telegraphic orders were forwarded
from Berlin to all their commanders not to engage in hostilities
until ten o'clock on the morning of the 26th. Colonel von
Doring was despatched to Langensalza by the Prussian
Government, with full powers to treat with the King of
Hanover ; he proposed an alliance with Prussia, on the basis
of the recognition of the Prussian project for reform of the
Germanic Confederation, and of the disbandment by Hanover
of its army. To these terms King George would not agree ;
deserted by his allies, to them he was still faithful, and still
expected that the Bavarians must come to his aid. He refused
to entertain any proposition for the capitulation of his array,
and demanded a free and unimpeded passage into Bavaria. In
the meantime, while the King treated, the Bavarians remained
inactive, and while the Hanoverian army was fatigued by
marching and countermarching within its lines, the troops of
Prussia closed round it. On the 25th June the Prussian
divisions of Goeben and Beyer reached Eisenach. The same
day General Flies, who had been despatched by General
Manteuffel with five battalions and two batteries, reached
Gotha by means of the railway which runs through Magdeburg
and Halle. On the same evening the Prussian troops at Gotha
were reinforced by two battalions of the 20th regiment oi
Landwehr, and a dep6t battalion from the garrison of Afagde-
buig. General Flies immediately assumed the command of the
Prussian and Coburg troops at Gotha, and pushed his advanced
guard that evening to Warza, half-way between Gotha and
Langensalza.
Round this place the Hanoverian army lay. The opportunity
Chap. I.] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 275
of forcing its way into Bavaria, while the two battalions of
Coburg were alone at Gotha, had been lost By the morning
of the 26th, forty-two thousancf Prussians were placed on the
south, west, and north, within a day's march of its position, and
all hopes of escape into Bavaria, or of aid from its southern
allies, appeared to be vain.
On the 26th the armistice expired at ten o'clock in the
morning, but the Prussian Commander-in-chief did not imme-
diately commence hostilities. His dispositions were not yet
perfected. That day the Hanoverian army drew more closely
together, either with the object of accepting battle, or, as some
say, with the intention of moving by Tennstedt, and endeavour-
ing to join the Bavarians by a circuitous route.
That evening the Hanoverians took up a position between
the villages of Thamsbriick, Merxleben, and the town of Lan-
gensalza. None of these places were well suited for defence,
and no artificial fortifications were thrown up on the southern
side of the position, where General Flies lay. On the northern
side a few insignificant earthworks and one battery were erected,
to guard the rear and right flank of the army against the Prus-
sian corps under General ManteufTel, which lay in the direction
of Miihlhausen. The soldiers were weary with marching and
privations, but eager to join battle with the Prussians, who of
late years had spoken in a disparaging and patronising tone of
the Hanoverian army, which, since the battle of Langensalza,
has been exchanged for one of high respect and admiration.
There had been a false alarm in the Hanoverian lines of an
advance by the enemy in the night between the 26th and 27th
June; but an attack was not expected on the 27th. This day
had been appointed by Royal command to be observed as a
solemn day of fast and humiliation throughout Prussia, and the
Hanoverian leaders appear to have imagined that on this
account the Prussian generals would not attack. In this they
were deceived, for before evening there had been fought the
bloody
BATTLE OF LAKGENSALZA.
The Prussian troops on the morning of the 27th occupied
the following positions : — The division of General Manteuffel
T 2
276 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII.
was at Muhlhausen ; that of General Beyer at Eisenach ; that
of General Goeben had one of its brigades, that of General
Wrangel, pushed forwards towards the north-west of Langen-
salza, and the other brigade, that of General Kummer, at
Gotha ; while the corps of General Flies was concentrated on
the south of Langensalza, at Warza. General Flies, who com-
manded five battalions of infantry of the Prussian line, one
depot battalion, two battalions of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-
Gotha, and hv^ battalions of Landwehr, with three squadrons,
in all about twelve thousand men,* with twenty-two guns,
advanced from Warza, and attacked the Hanoverian position
on that forenoon. General Flies has been censured by mili-
tary critics for making this attack so early, while, as will be
seen in the sequel, his colleagues were still too far distant to
render him assistance during the action which he thus precipi-
tated. He has not, however, failed to find defenders of the
course he pursued. It has been urged that the object of his
attack was to hold the Hanoverian army on the Unstrut, and
if this were his only object he was successful Hanoverian
sources of information, however, hardly allude to the supposi-
tion that King George was about to move to Tennstedt ; and,
unless General Flies had strong reasons for belie\'ing that his
adversary meditated the immediate execution of such a move-
ment, he was hardly justified in exposing himself to an unne-
cessary chance of disaster. It has also been said that General
Manteuifel on the north was to fire two cannon as a signal to
General Flies tliat he was ready to attack, and that the Hano-
verians, having discovered this arrangement, gave the signal at
an early hour from their own batteries. The Hanoverians,
• 3 Battalions, nth Regiment | ^^^^ ^^ Battalion) . . 5,000
2 „ Saxe Coburg-Gotha (900 per Battalion) . 1,800
Dcp6t Battalion 71st Regiment (400 per Battalion) . . 400
2 Battalions, 20th Landwehr Regiment )
2 „ 32nd „ „ > (Soo per Battalion) 4,000
I Battalion, 27th „ ,, )
3 Squadrons (150 horsemen each) 450
11,650
Gunners • • • • . 600
12,250
Chap. I.] WESTERN THE A TRE OF WAR, 277
however, assert that their artillery only fired its first shot after
General Flies's infantry attack had been well developed.
The position occupied by the Hanoverian army on the
morning of the 27th lay along the sloping side of the line of
hills which rises from the left bank of the river Unstrut The
right wing and centre rested on the villages of Thamsbriick
and Merxleben ; the left wing between the villages of Nagel-
stadt and Merxleben. The third brigade (Von Biilow) formed
the right wing; the fourth brigade (Von Bothmer) the left;
while in the centre was posted the first brigade (Von de
Knesebeck), which at the beginning of the action was held in
rear of the general line. The village of Merxleben, and the
ground in front of it, was occupied by the second brigade (De
Vaux), which had its outposts pushed as far as Henningsleben,
along the road to Warza. The artillery and cavalry of the
reserve were posted behind Merxleben, near the road to Sund-
hausen, where the scanty depots of ammunition and stores
were established. The front of the position was covered by
the river, which with its steep banks impeded at first- the Prus-
sian attack, but afterwards was an obstacle to the offensive
advance and counter-attack of the Hanoverians.
At about nine o'clock on the morning of the 27 th, the two
Coburg battalions which formed the advanced guard of General
Flies's column reached Henningsleben, and attacked the Hano-
verian outposts there. These withdrew to Langensalza, occa-
sionally checking their pursuers by the fire of their skirmishers.
One Hanoverian battalion remained for a short time in Lan-
gensalza, but then the whole Hanoverian troops, which had
been pushed along the Gotha road, withdrew across the Unstrut
to Merxleben, and the Prussians occupied Langensalza before
ten o'clock.
General Flies then made his arrangements for an attack on
the main Hanoverian position. His artillery was very inferior
numerically to that of the enemy, so he relied chiefly on his
infantry fire. He sent a small column to make a feint against
Thamsbriick, while he advanced two regiments of infantry
against Merxleben, and detached a column of Landwehr to his
right, in order to outflank, if possible, and turn the Hano-
verian left.
278 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book VII I.
On the Hanoverian side the first gun was fired between ten
and eleven, from a battery of rifled 6-pounders attached to the
second brigade, and posted on the left of Merxleben. The
first brigade was immediately pushed forward to the support of
the second brigade, and took up its position on the right of
that village.
By a singular error, the Hanoverians failed to hold a wood
and bathing-establishment close to the river, on the right bank,
opposite Merxleben. Into these the Prussian regiments advanc-
ing against the village threw themselves. Sheltered by the
cover, they opened a biting musketry fire against the Hano-
verian gunners and troops near the village, which lasted till the
end of the battle, caused great loss in the Hanoverian ranks,
and made an issue fi-om the village and a passage of the bridge
most difficult and dangerous. The first gun-shot of the Hano-
verians was quickly followed by others, and in a few minutes
the whole of the Prussian and the greater part of the Hanoverian
pieces were engaged, when the roar of the guns, the explosions
of bursting shells, and the rapid crackling of small arms^ rose
loud in the rough harmony of war.
The Prussian column on the right pressed forward against
the Hanoverians' left, seemed to be bearing against their line of
retreat, and threatened to turn their flank* The Hanoverian
leader seized the opportunity, and resolved to attack with vigour
the wide-spread Prussian line.
The first brigade in the centre, with the third brigade on its
right wing, advanced at mid-day from Merxleben. The fourth
brigade on the left wing moved forward at the same time against
the Prussian right, but here the banks of the river were steeper,
and the time occupied in descending and ascending the banks,
as well as in wading through the stream, prevented more of this
brigade than one battalion of rifles from at first taking a share
in the onset The rest of the Hanoverian troops, however,
supported by their artillery, pressed steadily forward, and bore
down upon the Prussians, who retreated. Many prisoners were
taken, but not without severe loss to the assailants, who
soon occupied the wood and bathing-establishment beside the
river.
The Prussians then drew off" from every point, and a favoiur-
Chap. I.] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 279
able opportunity occurred for a vigorous pursuit But the dis-
advantage of a river in front of a position now became apparent
The cavahy could not ford the stream, nor approach it closely,
on account of the boggy nature of its banks, and had to depend
upon the bridges at Thamsbriick, Merxleben, and Nagelstadt
The Duke of Cambridge's regiment of dragoons issued from the
latter vilhge, and dashed forward quickly, but unsupported,
against the Prussian line of retreat, and took several prisoners.
As soon as the heavy cavalry of the reserve had threaded its
way across the bridge of Merxleben, it also rushed upon the
retreating Prussians. Two squares wer^ broken by it, and
many prisoners made, while Captain von Einein, with his
squadron of cuirassiers, captured a Prussian battery. But the
horsemen of Hanover suffered fearfully from the deadly rapidity
of the needle-gun, and Von Einein fell in the midst of his cap-
tured cannon.
The cavalry pursued the Prussians as far as Henningsleben,
but a further pursuit, or an advance of the infantry even so far,
was impossible, on account of the fatigue of both men and
horses, and the scarcity of provisions and ammunition.
About five o'clock the pursuit terminated, and the Hano-
verians, masters of the field of battle, posted their outlying
pickets on the south of Langensalza,
The total loss of the Hanoverians in killed and wounded
was one thousand three hundred and ninety two. The
Prussians lost nine hundred and twelve prisoners, and probably
about the same number as their enemies in killed and wounded.
It is said that the Hanoverian infantry engaged did not number
more than ten thousand men, because the recruits were sent to
the rear, and during the day one thousand men were employed
in throwing up earthworks. The Hanoverian cavalry consisted
of twenty-four squadrons, of which eighteen certainly took part
in the pursuit, and must have mustered at least nineteen
hundred sabres. The artillery in action on that side consisted
of forty-two guns. The Prussian force, as has been shown
before, numbered about twelve thousand combatants, with
twenty-two guns. It is extremely questionable how far General
Flies was justified tmder these circumstances in precipitating
an action*
28o SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book VIII.
The battle of Langensalza was of little avail to the gallant
army which had won it The troops of Hanover were now
too intricately involved in the meshes of Falckenstein's
strategy.
This general, on the 28th, closed in his divisions, and drew
them tightly round the beleaguered Hanoverians, who, by the
action of Langensalza, had repulsed but not cut through their
assailants. The division of General Manteufiel and the brigade
POSITIONS ON THE MORNING OF THE 29TH.
Brigade JVrartgtl
{.BatUtedi)
n {RoiAm-ffeiiifigfn)
{AU'Goiiem)
□ Div, Manteuffei
Vnstrui J?,
HaiuveriaHS
{Ltuigftualaa)
a
rn Flies
Div, Btytr
Kummers Brigudi to Wn
(Cotha)
of General Wrangel were pushed into the Hanoverian rear, and
took up positions at Alt-Gottem, Rothen-Heiligen, and Boll-
stedt The division of General Beyer was advanced from
Eisenach to Hayna. General Flies was at Warza, and the
brigade of General Kummer at Gotha was held ready to move
Chap. L] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR, 281
by railway to Weimar, in order to head King George, in case
he should march to the eastward on the left bank of the
Unstrut Forty thousand hostile combatants were knitted
round the unfortunate monarch and his starving but devoted
troops.
When these positions of the Prussians were reported to the
King, he determined to avoid a holocaust of his soldiery. An
action could hardly have been successful \ it must have been
desperate. The terms of capitulation which had been formerly
proposed by Prussia, were agreed to on the evening of the 29th.
Arms, carnages, and military stores were handed over to the
Prussians: the Hanoverian soldiers were dismissed to their
homes : the officers were allowed to retain their horses and
their swords, on condition of not again serving against Prussia
during the war. The King himself and the Crown Prince
were allowed to depart whither they pleased, except within the
boundaries of Hanover.
Political errors, and the supineness of Prince Charles of
Bavaria, had at one stroke of the pen made a whole army
captive, and blotted out from the roll of independent states
one of the most renowned of continental principalities.
This disaster of the Hanoverian army was due in a less
degree to the uncertain action of its leaders than to the
improvidence of its administrators, and the blmdness of the
political guardians of its country. Still there is no doubt
that, on the days preceding the 25th June, the army of King
George could easily have forced its way through the small
knot of its enemies at Gotha, and have secured a safe re-
treat, provided only that it had been directed to march
boldly forward. Its subsequent conduct at Langensalza com-
pels us to believe that its organization at this time must
have been sufficiently advanced to allow it to take this course.
For the reasons that it did not do so its military directors
must be responsible.
Yet, whoever is to blame for the calamitous results of its
expiring campaign, none can regard, without a feeling of
sympathy and emotion, the last struggles of a proud and
high-minded soldiery, who bore up ineffectually for days
against privation, hardship, and superior numbers ; who even
28a SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VUL
hoped against hope ; who rallied round their king in the hour
of his misfortune, and strove to carry him, by the pressure
of their bayonets, through the clustering bands of hostile com-
batants. Hanoverians may well look with a mournful satis-
faction on Langensalza. British soldiers may justly feel a
generous pride in the last campaign of an army which mingled
its blood with that of their ancestors on the battle-fields of
Spain and Belgium, and not unworthily rank the name of the
batde which closes the last page of Hanoverian history with
Salamanca, Talavera, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo.
CHAPTER 11.
CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE.
When Prussia determined upon war, she resolved to throw
herself with her main force upon Austria, since that Power was
the leader and backbone of the coalition against her. With the
intention of crushing the Austrian army in Bohemia and
Moravia, the whole of the regular corps d'arm^e of the Prussian
service were directed upon those countries. Westphalia and
the Rhenish provinces were denuded of their regular troops,
which were marched to the Austrian frontier. To protect the
western provinces of Prussia from the allies of Austria, to over-
run Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, and then to act against the
allies of Austria in the south-west of Germany, was the task
entrusted to General Vogel von Falckenstein. He was pro-
vided with an army hastily collected together from the Elbe
duchies, and from the garrisons of the neighbouring
fortresses.
With this army, General von Falckenstein had to be pre-
pared to take the field against the Bavarians and the seventh
corps of the kite Germanic Confederation. Previous to en-
gaging with these adversaries, he was forced to occupy Hanover
and Hesse-Cassel, and to pursue and disarm the Hanoverian
troops. These preliminaries cost the Prussian general the loss
of fourteen days of valuable time, and allowed the eighth
Federal corps to assemble its heterogeneous constituents, and
organize them round Frankfort. There can be no doubt but
that if, on the i8th or 19th June, General Falckenstein had
been able to concentrate his divisions near Wetzlar, and to
have marched immediately upon Frankfort, he would have
entirely prevented the collection of the troops of Baden, Wur-
2S4 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VIIL
tembeig, and Hesse, and have annihilated in detail their
separated divisions.
On the other hand, fortune favoured Falckenstein, inasmuch
as that during this fortnight the main armies of his opponents
remained inactive, and, with the exception of some petty
demonstrations, began to develop no energy until quite the end
of June, when he himself, after the capitulation of the Hano-
verians, was free to turn his unrestricted attention to them, and
had concentrated his whole army at Gotha and Eisenach.
The army thus assembled under General von Falckenstein
consisted of three divisions. These were the division of
Lieutenant-General von Goeben, which consisted of the 13th,
53rd, 15th and S5th regiments of infantry, with the 8th regi-
ment of hussars, and 4th regiment of cuirassiers. It mustered
in all, at this time, about thirteen thousand men, with twenty-
four guns, and was divided into two brigades, one commanded
by General Kummer, the other by General WrangeL One
division was the division of General von Beyer, which had
been formed from the garrisons of the Federal fortresses of
Mayence, Rastadt, Luxemburg, and Frankfort-on-Maine, and
consisted of the 19th, 20th, 30th, 32nd, 34th, 39th and 70th
regiments of infantry, with the 9th regiment of hussars, — ^alto-
gether twenty-one thousand five hundred men, with forty-two
guns. Another the division of General von ManteufTel, which
had formerly garrisoned the duchy of Schleswig ; it consisted
of the 25th, 36th, I ith, and 59th regiments of infantry, and the
5th and 9th dragoons, — in all thirteen thousand men, with
thirty guns. The command of this division was shortly after-
wards given to General von Flies. To the Army of the Maine
were also attached two battalions of the duchy of Saxe-Coburg,
one of Oldenburg, and one of Lippe-Detmold, which num-
bered together about two thousand five hundred combatants.
General von Falckenstein had thus under his orders as nearly
as possible fifty thousand men, with ninety-six guns.* The
battalions of Landwehr and the depdt troops which had fought
* Later five fourth battalions, a newly-raised rifle battalion, and three
newly-raised Landwehr cavalry regiments, as well as the Oldenburg- Han-
seatic brigade, consibting of seven baitalions, six squadrons, and two batteries,
reinforced this army.
Chap. TT.J CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 285
at Langensalza were not retained with the army, but were dis-
missed to rejoin the garrisons of those fortresses from which
they had been taken.
Opposed to the Prussian Army of the Maine stood, after the
capitulation of the Hanoverians, the seventh and eighth corps
of the Germanic Confederation. The seventh Federal corps
consisted of the army of Bavaria, which was under the com-
mand of Prince Charles of Bavaria, who was also Commander-
in-chief of the two corps. The Bavarian army was divided
into three divisions, each of which consisted of two brigades.
A brigade was formed of two regiments of infantry of the Line,
each of three battalions ; a battalion of light infantry, a regi-
ment of cavalry, and a battery of artillery. There was also a
reserve brigade of infantry, which consisted of five Line regi-
ments and two battalions of rifles. The reserve cavalry con-
sisted of six regiments, the reserve artillery of two batteries.
The first division was under the command of General Stephan,
the second under General Feder, the third under General
Zoller. The infantry of the reserve was commanded by
General Hartmann, the cavalry by a prince of the House of
Thum and Taxis. The whole army numbered over fifty
thousand sabres and bayonets, with one hundred and thirty-six
gun&* The chief of the staff of Prince Charles was General
von der Tann, who was a tried commander of a division.
The Bavarian army in the middle of June was posted along
the northern frontier of its own kingdom in positions intended
to cover that country from an invasion from the north or east
Its head-quarters were at Bamberg, its extreme right wing at
Ho^ and its extreme left wing near the confluence of the
* Each battalion of the Line mustered on paper 950 men ; each rifle
battalion 668 ; and each regiment of cavalry 591 horsemen. This would
give a total of 58,036 combatants ; but from this number several deductions
have to be made for sickness and incomplete battalions. The number
stated in the text has been carefully compiled from the comparison of nuiny
authorities. Theoreticallv, Bavaria possessed a large force of Landwehr ; but
as the cadres of the Lanawehr battalions were not maintained in peace, and
no arrangements made for their clothing or armament in case of the out-
break of a war, these auxiliary troops never paraded during the earlier
operations of the war, except upon paper ; and only once during the whole
of the campaign, near Bayreuth, did a detachment of these troops take a
part in any action.
286 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VIIL
Franconian Saale with the Maine, between Schweinfurt and
Gemiinden.
The eighth Federal corps, under the command of Prince
Alexander of Hesse, consisted of the Federal contingents of
Wiirtcmberg, Baden, Hesse, and a combined division ; which
included the Austrian auxiliary brigade and the troops of
Nassau. The whole corps mustered forty-nine thousand eight
hundred sabres and bayonets, with one hundred and thirty-four
guns.* Prince Alexander assumed the command of this corps
• The Order of Battle of this eighth Federal corps was : —
1st (Wiirtemberg) Division. — Lieutenant-General von Hardegg.
1st Infantry Brigade (ist and 5th Regiments and 3rd Jager Battalion).
— Major-General von Baumbach.
2nd Infantry Brigade (2nd and 7th Regiments and 3rd Jager Battalion).
— Major-General von Fischer.
3Td Infantry Brigade (3rd and 8th R^;iments and ist Jager Battalion).
— Major-General Hegelmeier.
Cavalry Brigade (ist, 3rd, and 4th Regiments). — Major-General
Count von Scheler.
ArtillerVf Six Batteries of Eight Guns.
2nd (Baden) Division. — Prince William of Baden.
Infantry. — Commander, Lieutenant-General Waag.
1st Brigade (Grenadier and 5th Regiments and a Jager Battalion).—
Major-General von la Roche.
2nd Bngade (2nd and 3rd Regiments and Fusilier Battalion}.—
Colonel von Neubronn.
Cavalry, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Dragoons.
Artillery, Five Batteries of Six Guns.
3rd (Hesse-Darmstadt) Divison. — Lieutenant-General von Perglas.
1st Brigade (ist and 2nd Regiments and one Jager Company). — ^Majoi^
General Frey.
2nd Brigade (3rd and 4th Regiments and one Jager Company). — Major-
General von Stockhausen.
A Battalion of Sharpshooters was attached to the Division.
Cavalry Brigade (two Regiments of Light Horse). — Prince Louis of
Hesse. ^
Artillery, Four Batteries of Six Guns.
4th (Combined) Division. — Lieutenant-Field-Marshal Count Neipperg.
Austrian Brigade,— Major-General Hohn.
Three Battalions of the i6th Infantry Regiment (Italians).
One Battalion of the 49th „ • „
One „ „ 2i8t „ „
One „ „ 74th „ „
The 3Sth Jager Battalion.
Two Batteries of Eight Guns.
Nassau Brigade (ist and 2nd Regiments and a Jiiger Battalion).—
Major-General Roth.
Artillery, two Batteries of Eight Guns.
To this division were attached two squadrons of the Hussars of Hesse-
CasseL
Chap. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE, 287
on the 1 8th June, and established his head-quarters at Darm-
stadt
The Elector of Hesse- Cassel had sent his troops to the south
as soon as the Prussians invaded his territory. By a decree of
the Diet of the 22nd June, they were placed under the orders
of the commander of the eighth Federal corps. On account
of their rapid retreat from Cassel, their preparations for war
were interrupted, and little could as yet be expected from them
in the open field. On the 29th June, when Prince Alexander
received orders for an advance of his corps, he directed the
Hesse-Cassel contingent, on this account, to retire to Mainz,
there to cover the Rhine, and the country in the immediate
vicinity of that fortress. Two squadrons of hussars alone he
retained as the divisional cavalry of his fourth division. These,
as well as the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt, were ready for
action. The troops of Wiirtemberg and Baden still wanted
time ; those of Baden particularly : for their duchy entered
only unwillingly into the war against Prussia. Wiirtemberg
had sent an infantry brigade, a regiment of cavalry, and two
batteries on the 1 7th June, to Frankfort These were intended
to unite with the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt already assembling
there, and to form a guard for the Rump Diet which still held
its sittings at that town.
The next Wiirtemberg brigade joined the corps only on the
28th June, the last brigade on the 5th July. On the 17th June
the Gk)vemment called up its furlough and reserve soldiers, and
organized its division. The first Baden brigade reached Frank-
fort on the 2Sth June, where the Austrian brigade had arrived
only a few days before. The rest of the troops and the trans-
port trains did not come in till the 8th July. The 9th July can
be considered to have been the first day on which the eighth
FederaJ corps was first ready to take the field. While these
minor Governments were still assembling their small contin-
gents, the troops of Prussia had long been in possession of
Saxony and Hesse, had caused the surrender of the Hanoverian
army, and already inflicted a crushing defeat on the main forces
of Austria,
The Bavarian army lay along the Maine, with its first division
towards Hof, its fourth towards Gemiinden. The Bavarian
288 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII.
Government was anxious to make an advance upon Berlin, by
way of Hof ; but the general strategical movements of all the
allies of Austria were, in virtue of a convention concluded
between Austria and Bavaria on the 14th June, directed from
Vienna, The directing genius decided against any offensive
movement in a north-easterly direction : and insisted strongly
on a junction of the Bavarian and eighth Federal corps between
Wiirzburg and Frankfort, in order to then move against the
Prussian provinces, on the north-west The aim of Austria was
to compel Prussia to detach strong bodies from her troops
engaged with Benedek, and so to weaken her main army. The
Bavarian and eighth corps when united were to have the name
of the West German Federal Army.
On the 2 1 St June, Prince Charles of Bavaria heard that the
Hanoverians had moved from Gottingen. On the 23rd he
knew certainly that they had marched to Miihlhausen and
Langensalza. On the 25 th for the first time he made any
movement of importance. On that day the Bavarian army was
set in motion towards the north. That evening the advanced
guard of the first cavalry brigade entered Meiningen : the main
body reached that town in the night between the 26th and
27th. Communications with the Hanoverians had been cut offj
and Prince Charles, uncertain of their exact position, on the
28th had ordered his columns to move towards Fulda. News
reached him, however, of the commencement of the battle of
Langensalza, and, changing the direction of his march, he
moved towards Gotha. The same evening a despatch arrived
from Vienna which urged a rapid advance of the Bavarians.
Forced marches were ordered, and the troops, to raise their
enthusiasm, received double pay for the first two days. On the
29th, the first division, followed by the second, reached Hil-
burghausen ; the fourth, followed by the third, pushed past
Meiningen. It was only when the advanced guards had reached
Zella, in the Thuringian Forest, that they received counter-
orders : for Count Ingelheim, the Austrian ambassador at the
court of King George, had arrived with the intelligence that
the Hanoverians had laid down their arms. Thus the forced
marching of two days had been lost, and the Bavarian army had
commenced its campaign without residt or gloiy, on account of
Chap. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 2S9
too tardy an assumption of the initiative. On the 29th the
riflemen and light horsemen who formed the advanced guard
of the first division reached Schleusingen ; on the 30th the
main column entered that place. The forced marches of the
29th and 30th had fatigued the troops. The constant succes-
sion of orders and counter-orders had wearied them, for they
saw that all their exertions were neutralized by altered com-
mands, or by changes in the direction of th« line of march.
Before the commencement of actual war their confidence in
their leaders had waned, for the men saw no grounds for the
fatigues laid upon them. The capitulation of the Hanoverians
dispirited them, the more so as it was popularly attributed to
the vacillation, the cowardice, sometimes indeed to the
treachery, of the Bavarian army. Still the Prince hoped to
unite with the eighth Federal corps by a fiank march to his left,
along the roads which lead by Giessen to Hiinfeld, and by
Hildem to Fulda. The success of this movement was however
prevented, as will be afterwards seen, by the sudden appearance
of the Prussians.
The eighth Federal corps had, by the 27th June, assembled
about 39,000 men, with eighty guns.* Since another Wiirtem-
bexg brigade, another cavalry regiment, and two more batteries
were expected to come in on the following day, it considered
itself strong enough to assume the offensive, and the following
orders were issued for the 28th June : — The troops of Hesse-
Darmstadt were to form the advanced guard, with two brigades
of infantry, two rifled 6-pounder batteries, a regiment of cavalry,
and a bridge train. The first and fourth divisions formed the
main body : each consisted of two brigades of infantry ; the
first division had three batteries of artillery and a regiment of
cavalry attached to it ; the second had two batteries of artillery,
a regiment of cavalry, and two squadrons of Hesse-Cassel
hussars attached. The reserve consisted of five battalions of
the Bavarian brigade of La Roche, six regiments of cavalry, and
* 1st Division, 5,200 Infantiy, with 1,100 Cavalry and 16 Guns.
2nd „ 4,500 „ 240 „ 6 „
3rd „ 10,000 „ 2,600 „ 24 „
4th „ 12,000 „ 1,000 „ 32 „
U
aoo ^EVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VHL
thirty-four guns, of which sixteen were rifled. The advanced
guard on the 29th June took up a position around Friedberg,
about eighteen miles north of Frankfort, with its right on the
river Nidda, On the 30th the Commander-in-chief broke up
his head-quarters at Frankfort, and ordered a general advance.
He intended to move upon Alsfeld, a town which, on the
Schwalen, still in the territory of Hesse-Darmstadt, lies dose to
the frontier of Hesse-CasseL Prince Alexander considered
himself secure from any attack on his left flank by Prussian
detachments from the Rhine provinces^ because of the troops
of Hesse-Cassel in Mainz. The division of Baden on the ist
July occupied Giessen, and paid a short visit to the Prussian
town of Wetzlar, and on the 2nd July Prince Alexander held a
position from Giessen eastwards to Griinberg, on the road to
Alsfeld.
Here he received a despatch from Prince Charles of Bavaria,
which had been sent from Meiningen on the evening of the 30th
June. This altered the direction of the march of the eighth
Federal corps.
It does not appear clear whether Prince Alexander, in his
design of an advance to Alsfeld, was acting in comfdiance with
an order from Prince Charles of Bai^a, or whether on his own
responsibility he moved forward to cover the territory of Hesse-
Cassel from invasion. The direction of the movement shows,
however, that he who ordered it, be he who he may, was singu-
larly ill-furnished with intelligence of his enemy's movements.
By making for Alsfeld Prince Alexander not only would have
exposed his right flank and his line of communication to the
head of Falckenstein's columns, but would have increased the
difficulties of his junction with Prince Charles. As it was, at
the time that Prince Charles sent to change the line of march
of the eighth corps, these difficulties were already formidable
enough. An interval of between eighty and ninety miles sepa-
rated the two bodies : and not only did the valley of the Fulda
as \i'en as that of the Werra intervene, but rugged hills rose
between them, such as the Vogels-Berg and the Hohe Rhon.
It did not need such a keen general as Falcken stein to perceive
the advantages he would derive if he drove the Prussian army
as a mighty wedge between these separated corps, and hurled
Chap. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 291
himself with full force on the nearest ere the other could arrive
to its assistance. In his own immediate command Prince
Charles showed vacillation and uncertainty. He did not strive
with all energy to liberate the Hanoverians, and unite them
with his own force. Nor when he found himself too late to
achieve this object did he take rapid measiures for a concentra-
tion with the eighth corps. On the contrary, instead of making
towards his left, he drew away to his right, apparently with the
object of crossing another difficult mountain country, the Thu-
ringian forest, and placing that obstacle also between himself
and his allies, while he left the valley of the Werra open to his
antagonist as a groove down which to drive the wedge that
should separate the Bavarians entirely from Prince Alexander.
On the evening of the 30th June he for the first time appears
to have decided upon a concentrative movement He then
issued orders that both corps should seek to unite at Fulda.
To accomplish this, the Bavarians were to move in a westerly,
the Federals in an easterly, direction. The latter began to
move with this object on the 3rd July. Prince Alexander
moved with his first and third division that day to Ulrichstein,
a small town on the northern issues of the Vogels-Berg. With
his second division he occupied Giessen and Wetzlar to secure
his line of communication with Frankfort, and sent his fourth
division to Friedberg. His cavalry was sent out to scour the
country towards Alsfeld and Marburg. He evidently expected
his enemy by the railway fi^om Marburg, and took these pre-
cautions to cover his flank march. On the 4th July head-
quarters remained inactive at Uhichstein, and some patrols
alone pushed forward Here again was a lack of energy and
clear-sightedness. Portions of any army which are separated,
and desire to concentrate in the presence of an enemy, should
exert all their powers to do so, and not waste a single hour, far
less halt on the second day of the march.
How false these news were became soon apparent. On the
4th July news came to the head-quarters of Prince Alexander,
that strong Prussian columns were moving on Fulda firom
Hunfeld and Gerza, towns which lie between the Werra and
the Fulda. An advance of the eighth corps prepared for
battle, and with all precautions, was ordered for the next day.
u 2
292 SEVEN WEEKS' IVAJi. [Book VUI.
During this, however, the Prussian and Bavarian troops had
come into contact
General Falckenstein had, after the capitulation of the Hano-
verians on the 29th of June, concentrated on the ist July his
three divisions at Eisenach. To this united corps was given
the name of the Army of the Maine. On the 2nd July,
Falckenstein took the main road which leads from Eisenach by
Fulda to Frankfort, and reached Marksahl that day. His inten-
tion was to press the Bavarians eastwards. These occupied a
position at that time with their main body near Meiningen, on
the west of the Werra. Two divisions were posted on that river,
near Schmalkalden, to cover the passage of that stream against
a Prussian corps which was expected from Erfurt. The cavalry
was intended to open conununications with the eighth corps in
the direction of Fulda.
On the night of the 2nd July, the same night that the troops
of Prince Frederick Charles in Bohemia were moving towards
the - field of Koniggratz, a Bavarian reconnoitring party fell in
with one of Falckenstein's patrols. On the 3rd July the Prus-
sian reconnoitring officers brought in reports that the Bavarians
were in force round Wiesenthal, on the river Felde. It was
clear to Falckenstein that this position was held by the heads
of the Bavarian columns which were moving to unite with the
eighth corps. The Prussian general could not afford to permit
the enemy to lie in a position so close and threatening to the
left fJank of his advance. He ordered General Goeben to push
them back on the following morning, by forming to his left, and
attacking the villages on the Felde in front, while General
Manteuffel's division should move up the stream, and assail
them on the right flank. The third division, that of General
Beyer, was in the meantime to push its march towards Fulda.
ACTION OF WIESENTHAL.
The Bavarian general, on the 3rd of July, having obtained
information of the vicinity of the Prussians, concentrated his
army. That evening he occupied the villages of Wiesenthal,
Neidhartshausen, Zella, and Diedorf, with considerable strength.
His main body bivouacked round Rossdorf, and in rear of that
village.
Chap. II.] CAMPAIGN^ ON THE MAINE. 293
At five o'clock in the morning of the 4th July, General
Goeben sent WrangeFs brigade against Wiesenthal, and Kum-
mer's against Neidhartshausen. The latter village, as well as
the neighbouring heights, were found strongly occupied by the
enemy. They were carried only after a long and hard battle,
the scene of which was marked by numbers of Prussians killed
and wounded. Towards noon the Bavarian detachments which
had been driven from Neidhartshausen and Zella received rein-
forcements. Prince Charles determined to hold Diedorf. He
ordered a brigade to advance beyond this village, and take up
a position on the hills on the further side. The Prussians
opened a heavy fire of artillery and small arms from Zella upon
the advancing Bavarians. Under this fire the latter could
not gain ground, and no change in the positions of the
com'batants took place at this point, until the termination of
the action.
In the meantime a severe combat had been fought at Wie-
senthal At the same time that General Kummer left D^rm-
bach, he detached two battalions to his left, which were to
occupy the defile of Lindenau, while WrangeFs brigade ad-
vanced against Wiesenthal. WrangeFs advanced guard con-
sisted of a squadron of cavalry and a battalion of infantry,
which moved along the road in column of companies. Hardly
had it reached the high ground in front of the village, when it
was sharply assailed by a well-directed fire of bullets and shot
The heavy rain prevented the men from seeing clearly what
was in their front, but they pressed on, and the enemy was
pushed back into the barricaded village, and up the hills on its
southern side. Before the Prussian advanced guard reached
Wiesenthal the rain cleared up. The Bavarians could be seen
hurrying to evacuate the place, and taking up a position with
four battalions, a battery, and several squadrons at the foot of
the Nebelsberg. The Pnssian battalion from Lindenau had
arrived on the south flank of Wiesenthal Another battalion
came up with that of the advanced guard, and the Prussians
occupied the village. The Prussian artillery also arrived, and
came into action with great effect against a Bavarian battery
posted on the south-west of Wiesenthal At the same time the
needle-gun told severely on the Bavarian battalions at the foot
294 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VUL
of the Nebelsbeig. Three of these retired into the woods
which cover the sumlnit of that hill, while the fourth took post
behind the rising ground. Swarms of Prussian skirmishers
swept swiftly across the plain in front, and made themselves
masters of the edge of the wood. But the Bavarians held fast
to the trees inside, and would not be ousted. Two fresh
batteries of Bavarian artillery, and several new battalions, were
seen hurrying up from Rossdorf. At this moment it was sup-
posed that Manteuffel's cannonade was heard opening in the
direction of Nomshausen. This was in truth but the echo of
the engaged artillery. But the Prussian columns hurried
forward, and dashed with the bayonet against the wood-crested
hill. The Bavarians awaited the charge, and their riflemen
made serious impressions upon the advancing masses. But the
men of Westphalia rushed on. After a short, sharp struggle,
the hill was carried ; and the Bavarians fled down the reverse
slope, leaving hundreds .of corpses, grisly sacrifices to the
needle-gun, to mark the line of their flight General Goeben
had achieved his object He halted his troops, and prepared
to rejoin Falckenstein. Leaving a rear-guard of one battalion,
three squadrons, and a battery to cover his movement, and the
removal of the killed and wounded, he withdrew his two bri-
gades to Dermbach. The Bavarian march to unite with the
eighth corps had been checked; and Falckenstein had lodged
his leading column securely between the separated portions of
his adversary's army. The Bavarians in the night, finding their
road barred, retired^ to seek a junction with Prince Alexander
by some other route. They did not, however, move over the
western spurs of the Hohe Rhon, in the direction of Briickenau,
whence they might have stretched a hand to Prince Alexander,
■ who on the night between the sth and 6th July was only seven
miles from Fulda. They preferred to move by the woods on
the eastern side of the mountains towards the Franconian Saale
and Kissingen. Thus they made a movement which separated
them from their alties, instead of bringing the two corps close
together. Prince Alexander had sent an officer to the Bavarian
camp. He was present on the 4th July at the action of Wie-
senthal, and returned to the head-quarters of the eighth Federal
corps with a report of the failure of the Bavarians. On the
Chap. IL] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 29S
receipt of this intelligence, Prince Alexander appears to have
abandoned all hope of effecting a junction with Prince Charies
north of the Maine. He faced about, and moved back to
Frankfort, a town which, until its subsequent occupation by the
Prussians, appears always to have had a singular attraction for
the eighth Federal corps.
On the 4th July, the same day that General Goeben pressed
the Bavarians back at Wiesenthal, the leading division of
Falckenstein's army had a singular skirmish in the direction of
Hiinfeld. As General Beyer, who commanded the Prussian
advanced guard, approached that town, he found two squadrons
of Bavarian cavalry in front of him. Two guns accompanied
these squadrons, which opened fire on the advancing Prussians.
The weather was wet, and a clammy mist held the smoke of
the cannon, so that it hung like a weighty cloud over the
mouths of the pieces. A Prussian battery opened in reply.
The first shot so surprised the Bavarians, who had not anti-
cipated that there was artillery with the advanced guard,
that the cuirassiers turned about, and sought safety in a wild
flight They left one of their guns, which in their haste had
not time to be limbered up. Beyer pressed forward, and found
Hiinfeld evacuated by the enemy. Indeed it is said that these
cuirassiers, who had been pushed forward by Prince Alexander
to open communications with Prince Charles, were so dismayed
by one well-aimed cannon-shot, that many of them did not
draw rein till they reached Wurzburg.
Prince Alexander withdrew towards Frankfort Falckenstein
pushed forward on the 6th ; he occupied Fulda with Beyer's
division, while Goeben and Manteuffel encamped on the north
towards Hiinfeld. The object of the Prussian advance was
obtained. On the 5th July the Bavarians and the eighth
Federal corps were separated from each other by only thirty
miles ; on the 7th seventy miles lay between them.
Prince Alexander left the Wiirtemberg division to hold the
passes of the Vogels-Berg towards Giessen. l^e Bavarians,
after the action of Wiesenthal, drew back and took up a
position in the neighbourhood of Kissingen, on the Franconian
Saale.
General Falckenstein, on the 7th, united his whole army at
296 SEVEN WEEKSr WAR. [Book VIII.
Fulda. He had the choice of attacking either of his separated
enemies. To pursue the eighth Federal corps by Giessen,
would probably allow it to unite with the Bavarians by moving
up the Maine. To advance directly upon Frankfort with the
Bavarians on the Saale in his flank and rear, and with the
defiles of Gelnhausen, occupied by the eighth corps, in his
front, would be extremely hazardous.
Prince Charles was also considered the more formidable an-
tagonist, and the one upon whom it was the more necessary to
inflict a heavy blow.
On the 8th July General Falckenstein commenced his march
from Fulda. He did not turn towards Gelnhausen, as was
expected in the Bavarian camp, but moved against the position
of Prince Charles. On the 9th the Prussian army reached
Briickenau, and orders were given for a flank march to the left,
over the Hohe Rhon, against the Bavarians on the Saale.
Beyei^s division moved as the right wing along the road to
Hammelburg ; Goeben advanced in the centre towards Kis-
singen ; and Manteuffel on the left upon Waldaschach. On
the morning of the loth July, at nine o'clock, Beyer's division,
which had received very doubtful intelligence of the presence
of the Bavarians in Hammelburg, began its march towards that
town. About eleven the head of the advanced guard fell in
with the first patrols of the enemy's cavalry in front of Unter
Erthal, a small village on the road from Briickenau, about two
miles south of Hammelburg. These retired on the Prussian
advance, but unmasked a rifled battery, posted beyond the
houses. A Prussian field-battery quickly unlimbered and came
into action. Under cover of its fire an infantry regiment made
a dash at the bridge by which the road from Briickeiiau crosses
the Thulba stream. The bridge was not seriously defended,
and after a short cannonade the Bavarians drew back to
Hammelburg. At mid-day three Prussian batteries topped the
Hobels Berg, and after a few rounds from the guns the infantry
rushed down with loud cheers to carry the houses. This was,
however, not an easy task. The Bavarian General ZoUer held
the town with something over three thousand men ; he de-
termined to bar the passage of the Saale. The odds were too
unequal The Prussians numbered about fifteen thousand men.
Chap. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 297
Yet the Bavarians clung with a high courage to the houses, and
opened a biting fire of small arms on the assailants. Their
artillery, too, supported well the infantry defence.
Two Prussian infantry regiments threw out skirmishers, and
attempted to put down the fire of the Bavarian riflemen. But
these were protected by the cover of the houses ; and the
defenders' artillery firom the hill of Saalch splintered its shells
among the ranks of the Prussian sharpshooters. The fight did
not gain ground for about an hour. After that interval two
more Prussian regiments and two additional batteries came
into play. Heavily the Prussian pieces threw their metal upon
the Bavarian guns at Saalch. The fire of the latter grew
weaker and weaker. They were rapidly being silenced by
superior force. Some houses, kindled by the Prussian shells,
at the same time caught fire, and the town began to bum
fiercely in three places. Still the Bavarians clung to the bridge,
and stood their ground, careless equally of the flames and of
the heavy cannonade. Beyer sent forward his Jagers to storm
the place. No longer could the defenders endure the assault.
The quick bullets of the needle-gun rained in showers among
the burning buildings, scattering fire and death among the
garrison* The defence had to be abandoned; and the
Bavarians, pursued by salvos of artillery, drew off* to the south-
east, and Uie Prussians gained the passage of the Saale at
Hammelbuig.
On tjie same day as General Beyer fought the action of
Hammelburg on the right, Falckenstein's central column was
heavily engaged with the main body of the Bavarians at the
celebrated bathing-place of Kissingen. On the 5th July eighty
Bavarian troopers, flying flrom Hiinfeld, passed in hot haste
through the town. The visitors and the inhabitants were much
alarmed, but the Burgomaster quieted them by a promise that
he would give twenty-four hours' warning if the place was in
danger of being attacked by the Prussians. This assurance had
more weight, because even on the 8th July Bavarian staff*-
oflicers sauntered about the Kurgarten as quietly as if in a
time of the most profound peace. Some of the troops which
had been quartered in Kissingen and its neighbourhood were
on the 9th sent to Hammelbuig. All appeared still, and yet
298 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VIIL
the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages were already flying
from their homes to avoid the Prussians. The Bavarian in-
telligence department does not appear to have been well
managed. By mid-day on the 9th it was too late for the
Burgomaster to give his warning tliat the Prussians were al-
ready near. The Bavarians concentrated about twenty thousand
men, and took up their position. The visitors and inhabitants
could not now retire, a^d had to remain to be the involuntary
witnesses of an action. Those who lived in the Hotel Sauner,
which lies on the right bank of the Saale, were allowed to move
into the less exposed part of the town. None were permitted
to quit the place for fear of their conveying intelligence of the
Bavarian dispositions to the enemy. The wooden bridge over
the Saale, as well as the two iron ones, were destroyed, but of
one iroii one in front of the Alten Berg the supports were left
It was through the assistance of these that- the Prussians gained
the first passage of the river ; for they knew the localities well,
as many of their stafif-officers had frequently visited the &shion-
able watering-place of Kissingen. The stone bridge was
barricaded hastily as well as possible, and its approach pro-
tected by two i2-pounder guns. Five battalions, with twelve
guns, held the town itself The Bavarians had chosen a very
strong position ; they held the houses next to the bridge as well
as the bank of the Saale beyond the bridge. Their artillery
was posted on the Stadt Berg, but not on the important Finster
Berg. A battery on the latter hill would have prevented the
Prussians from gaining the passage of the river from the Alten
Berg. Behind the village of Haussen guns were also in. posi-
tion. All the bridges outside of Kissingen were destroyed,
and all points fieivourable for defence occupied by in£euitry.
General 2k>ller commanded the Bavarians.
On the joth July, at early morning, Prussian hussars ap-
peared. Columns were soon afterwards descried on the roads
towards Klaushof and Gantz on the west of Kissingen ; and a
battery came into position on a hill between Oantz and the
river. At half-past seven in the morning, the Bavarian guns
near \Yinkels and the two 12-pounders at the bridge opened
on the leading Prussian columns, which consisted of General
Kummer's brigade. Kummer's artillery replied, and in a short
Chap. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE, 299
time the rattle of musketry, mingling with the heavier booming
of the guns, told that he was sharply engaged.
The main body of Goeben's division had in the meantime
reached Schlimhoff. Here it received orders to detach three
battalions by Poppenroth and Klaushof, who were to attack
Friedericshall under the command of Colonel Goltz. When
General WrangeFs brigade approached Kissingen, it received
orders to advance on the right wing of Kummer's brigade, to
seize the Alten Berg, and if possible, by extending to its right,
to outflank the Bavarian position. A squadron was sent at the
same time to reconnoitre the ground beyond Garitz. A bat-
talion was despatched as an advanced guard against the Alten
Berg; and a battery of artillery came into action on the
northern spur of that hill. The Alten Berg was quickly cleared
of Bavarian riflemen by the Prussian Jagers. A Company
under Captain von Busdie was then sent against the bridge on
the south of Kissingen, which the Bavarians had partially de-
stroyed, but where the piers had been left standing. Tables,
forms, and timber were seized from some neighbouring houses,
and with secrecy and rapidity the broken bridge was so far
restored that before mid^lay. men could cross it in single file.
Von Busche led his company over the stream, and then directed
bis men against a road on the fiirther side, from the cover of
which the enem3r's marksmen annoyed them considerably. This
company was followed by a second, and as quickly as possible
a whole battalion was thrown across the stream. The battalion
gained the wood on the south-east of Kissingen ; here a column
was formed, and under cover of many skirmishers advanced
against the town. More men were pushed across the repaired
bridge^ and soon two and a half Prussian battalions were en-
gaged in a street fight among the houses. The remaining
portion of Wrangel's brigade was at this time .directed in
support of Kummer against the principal bridge. Infantry
and artillery fire caused the Prussians severe losses, but
they pushed on towards the barricade. Their artillery out-
numbered that of the defending force, and, protected by it, the
battalions carried the bridge.
The army of Bavaria boasted to have had at that time a
hundred and twenty-six cannon. Of these only twelve came
30O SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book VIII.
into action at Kissingen, five at Hammelburg. The rest were
uselessly scattered along the bank of the Saale, between tliese
two places.
The passage of the stream by the Pmssians decided the
action. They secured the Finster Berg and the Bodenlaube,
with the old castle of that name, and pushed forward with loud
cheers into the heart of the town. Here the Bavarian light
infantry fought hard, and, suffering heavy sacrifices themselves,
inflicted grievous loss on the Prussians. The Kuigarten, held
by three hundred riflemen, were stormed three times by
Wrangel's men without success. It was carried on the fourth
assault A young lieutenant, who commanded the Bavarians,
with the whole of his men, refused quarter, and died in the
place they had held so well At a little after three the whole
town was carried.
The Bavarians did not yet renounce the combat The
corps which retreated firom Kissingen took up a position on
the hill east of the town, and renewed the battle. WiangeFs
brigade received orders to clear the hills south of the road
which leads to Nudlingen, of the enemy. This was to be
eflected by the fusilier battalion and the second battalion of
the 55th regiment The first battalion of the same regiment
cleared the way, and, extended as skirmishers, ad\'anced along
the road. The other troops followed in reserve. The Bava-
rians had taken up a position on both sides of the road, and
greeted the Prussians with an artillery fire firom the Sinn Berg.
They fought well, and not till seven o'clock did Wrangel
occupy Winkels. The Bavarians were supposed to be .retiring,
and WrangeVs troops were about to bivouac, when a report
came in from the 19th, which had occupied the outposts, that
the Bavarians were advancing in force. Two battalions of the
55th, a i2-pounder battery, and a squadron of hussars, were
immediately sent to reinforce the outlying troops, while two
companies of the 55th were sent into the hills on the right to
menace the left flank of the enemy's advance. The battery
and squadron advanced at a trot General Wrangel in person
went to the outposts, and was receiving the reports from the
commanding officer of the 19th, when some rifle bullets came
from the southern hill into the closed columns of the regiment
Chap. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE, 301
The Bavarians, under Prince Charles himself, had come down
with nine fresh battalions of their first division. They had
seized the hills which lie oa^ the north of the road, and were
pressing rapidly forward under the cover of their artillery.
The Prussian cavalry and battery, as well as the 19th regi-
ment, were pushed back. The 55th, coming up, threw them-
selves into a hollow road, and, under the protection of their
fire, the retreat was for a time checked Prince Charles urged
on, however, superior forces, and those, too, had to retire.
The Prussians now took up a position on the heights south-
east of Winkels, where two batteries came into play. The
retreating battalions halted here, and the fight stood stilL One
battalion of the 19th regiment and two companies of the
soldiers of Lippe were sent by Wrangel into the hills on the
north of the road, while the second battalion of the 55th was
pushed up there on its southern side. As soon as these flanking
troops had gained their positions, the whole brigade advanced
in double-quick time, with drums beating. The charge suc-
ceeded, though the loss was great The Bavarians were driven
back. The Prussians regained their former position, and
Prince Charles reUnquished his attack.
The Prussian left column, which was formed by Manteuflfers
division, on the loth July also secured the passage at Waldas-
chach, about five miles above Kissingen, and at Haussen.
At neither place did the Bavarians make any obstinate stand.
The Bavarians appear to have been surprised on the Saale.
The Prussian march, previous to the battle of Kissingen, was
so rapid that they did not expect an attack till the following
day. In consequence, their whole force was not concentrated
on the river. The troops which held Kissingen and Hammel-
burg were unsupported, while those which should have acted
as their reserves were too far distant to be of any service. The
latter, on the other hand, arrived so late that their comrades
had already been defeated, and they themselves, instead of
acting as reinforcements, met with only a similar fate to those
first engaged. The Bavarian staff were unprepared. ITiey
had no maps of the country, except one which the chief of the
staff, General von der Tann, borrowed from a native of one of
the small towns near the field.
CHAPTER III.
THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE.
When Prince Alexander of Hesse turned to retreat on the
Sth July, he might still, by a rapid march along the road which
leads from Lauterbach to Briickenau, have made an attempt
to unite with the Bavarians before they were attacked at
Kissingen by the Prussians. This course he appears, however,
to have considered too hazardous. He retired to Frankfort,
and on the 9th July concentrated his troops round that town.
His first division was at Frankfort: the second in some villages
north of the town, on the river Nidda ; the third division at
Bergen, and the fourth at Bockenheim. The reserved cavalry
was towards Friedberg ; the reserve artillery across the river,
in Offenbach. The two banks of the Maine were connected
by a bridge, which leads from Frankfort to Offenbach.
Frequent alarms made it evident how little stedfast confi-
dence pervaded the Federal corps of Prince Alexander. The
news of the victory won by the Prussians at Koniggratz was
widely circulated through the ranks by the Frankfort journals.
Every moment reports were rife that Prussian columns were
advancing towards Frankfort from Wetzlar, or Giessen ; and
once an officer, by spreading the alarm, caused a whole division
to lose its nighfs rest, and to take up a position in order of
battle.
At this time the eighth Federal corps was not practically fit
to take the field. Such confiision reigned in the fortress of
Mainz, that whole regiments marched into the town and took
up quarters on their own account, without any report being
made to the commandant. Newly appointed officers, surgeons,
and hospital assistants, had to seek for theit regiments without
Chap. III.] THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 303
being able to obtain accurate intelligence of their whereabouts
from any one. No firm union existed between the different
divisions of the eighth coips. The corps had not been con-
centrated for twenty-four years, and the divisions were totally
different in uniform, administration, and oiganization. The
hussars of Hesse-Cassel were dressed and accoutred so simi-
larly to Prussian cavalry, that the Austrians fired upon them at
Aschaffenburg. The small arms were of different calibres.
The four field batteries of the third division were equipped on
four different systems.
The day after the victory of Kissingen, General Falckenstein
could turn his attention against this heterogeneous mass without
fear of any assault on his rear by the Bavarians. The latter
retired in such haste, after the battle of Kissingen, towards the
Maine, that ManteuffeFs division, which was sent in pursuit,
could not feel them. On the nth July, General Falckenstein
ordered Beyer's division to march by way of Hammelbui^ and
Gelnhausen on Hanau. This it accomplished, without, as was
anticipated, falling in with the Wiirtemberg division at Geln-
hausen. The latter only held this place till the 14th July, and
then retired in great haste, without throwing any obstade in
the way of the advancing Prussians, either by breaking the
bridges, or by any other means. The division of General
Goeben was directed at the same time through the defile of the
Spessart upon Aschaffenburg. Here the passes were not held
nor barricaded. Notwithstanding the presence in this district
of large numbers of foresters, no abattis or entanglements were
placed across the road. None of the almost unassailable
heights were occupied, either to prevent the direct progress of
the Prussians, or to threaten their line of march in flank. The
railway which was still serviceable was not used to convey the
small number of riflemen and guns, which at Gemiinden, as at
many other points, would have thrown great difficulty in
Goeben's way. Manteuffel's division followed Goeben's, and
scoured the country in the direction of Wiirzburg.
Between Gemiinden and Aschaffenburg, the river Maine
makes a deep bend to the south. Into the bow thus formed,
the mountainous region of the Spessart protrudes, through
which the road and railway lead directly westward from Ge-
304 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book VIII.
miinden to the latter town. On the 13th July, the leading
brigade of Goeben's division, that of Wrangel, was approaching
Hayn, when a report came in from the squadron of hussars,
which was clearing the way, that some of the enemy's cavalry
and infantry were advancing towards that place from Laufach,
a station on the railroad nearer to Frankfort than Hayn. It was
soon discovered that these were troops of Hesse-Darmstadt
The fusilier battalion of the 55th regiment was pushed forward
to gain the top of the defile, up which the brigade was then
moving. It advanced in columns of companies and, without
difficulty, pushed back two hostile battalions which it en-
countered. The village of Laufach was taken, and the rail-
way station occupied, while three battalions and a squadron
were sent forward to seize a cutting beyond the station, and
to relieve the fusiliers. The relief had not been fully carried
out when the enemy, with eight or nine battalions and two
batteries assumed die offensive. The assailants mustered
about eight thousand men. The battalion ot the 55th threw
itself into a churchyard surrounded by walls, and placed
itself on the defensive. The village of Frohnhofen in front
was occupied by three companies, supported by six com-
panies posted on tlie hills on the right, and seven on those
on the left of the railway. The remaining troops of the
brigade took up a position in front of the station, as a
reserve. The enemy attacked all points \ so that, by degrees,
nine companies had to be sent up to Frohnhofen. The most
severe attack was made on the right wing. General Wrangel
was obliged to send his two remaining battalions and a battery
to this point All his available troops were now engaged, and
the fight for some time was very even. At last, however, all
the assaults of the Hessians were repulsed, and a counter
attack made by three battalions and a squadron supported by
the fire of a 12-pounder battery had great success. The Hes-
sians drew off from all points towards Aschaffenburg, and left
more than one hundred prisoners, as well as the greater portion
of five hundred killed and wounded, in the hands of the victors.
The latter also captured the majority of the knapsacks of their
assailants, who had taken them off at the beginning of the
action, and on retreating left them lying on the ground. The
Chap. III.] THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 305
advantage of the needle-gun in a defensive position, was well
demonstrated at Laufath. Whole ranks of corpses of its
enemies lay in front of the position, and until early morning
wounded men were found. On the Prussian side the loss was
very small, in all hardly twenty men, and one officer.
The Commander-in-chief of the eighth corps was this day
uncertain whether he should defend Frankfort His troops
were in scattered positions, and instead of a large concentrated
mass of troops, only small detachments were pushed out to
meet the enemy. The division sent in haste to Frohnhofen,
only brought one of its four field batteries into action, and
used only one or two squadrons of its whole cavalry to attack
the Prussians. The two brigades of infantry came in haste
without rations, and after one another under fire. There was
no Commander-in-chief, the leader of each brigade acted for
himself, and led his troops by the most direct road against the
enemy with great valour, but with little judgment. The blame
for all these errors is apparently due to General von Perglas,
the commander of the Darmstadt division, who allowed his
troops to advance in closed masses unprotected by artillery
against a wood in which the Prussians, well covered, had firmly
planted themselves. The advantages of ground, disposition,
and leading were all on the side of the Prussians, who gained
their success, although very weary firom a long march, without
any exertions worthy of mention. They had quickly, but so
skilfully availed themselves of each local advantage and cover
for the defence of their line l>y infantry and artillery fire, that
all the reckless bravery of the Hessians had no other result
than to inflict upon themselves very severe losses. Among
these were a regimental commander, a major of the staff, and
thirty killed or wounded company officers. After the action of
the 13th July, Wrangel's brigade bivouacked at Laufach, with a
strong advanced post of three battalions round Frohnhofen.
On the 14th, at seven in the. morning, the further march on
Aschaffenburg was to commence. The care of the enemy's
wounded on the previous day, the collection of scattered arms,
and waiting for the return of the patrols which had been sent
out at dawn, delayed the start for half an hour. The reports
of the latter told that the enemy was retreating fi'om Hosbach.
3o6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIIL
A squadron of hussars was sent forward to occupy that village.
The infantry of Wrangel's brigade followed along the main road
with flankers pushed out far on the right and left. On the hill
of Weiberhofen, Wrangel's brigade fell in with that of General
Kummer, which had moved by a route on the south of the
railway. A report soon was brought in that the enemy was
advancing strong detachments from Hosbach. Colonel von
der Goltz, the commander of the vanguard, was immediately
ordered to take up a position on the heights south of the main
road, under cover of which the brigade formed for battle in the
valley. General Kummer was ordered with his brigade to move
along the railway towards Aschaflfenbuig. General Goeben
was in command of the two united brigades. The advance
guard had hardly formed when a further report announced that
the enemy was drawing back. General Goeben then ordered
a general advance. He moved AVrangers brigade along the
road, Rummer's on the railway embankment; at the same
time he drew a hussar and cuirassier regiment from the reserve,
and covered his right flank by moving them through the open
fields on the south of the road. Hosbach was found unoccu-
pied by the enemy, as was also Goldbach. On the fiu-ther side
of the latter village the infantry fire opened. The 15th and
'55th Prussian regiments pushed forward to the wooded bank
of the Laufach stream. The Federal troops here consisted of
the Austrian division under General Count Neipperg, formed
of troops which had originally garrisoned Mainz, Rastadt, and
Frankfort There were also some of the Hesse-Darmstadt
troops here. The infantry fire of the Federal soldiers caused
the Prussians little loss ; but an Austrian battery, posted on a
hill south of Aschaffenburg, and admirably served, annoyed
them much. The Prussian artillery could find no favourable
position from which to attack this battery with clear advantage,
and the Austrian guns for some time had the best of the
action. At last three battalions of the 15th Prussian regiment
were pushed along the stream nearer to the village of Daurm,
and made themselves masters of a hill on which stood a tower
surrounded by a wall Protected by this, the infantry succeeded
by its musketry fire in forcing the enemy's artillery to retire. The
advance of some Federal cavalry was also stopped by the same
Chap. III.] THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 307
means before the squadrons could attack. As soon as the Aus-
trian battery drew back, a general advance was made against
Aschaffenburg, which is surrounded with ^ high wall that
offered the Austrians cover, and a convenient opportunity for
defence. The Prussian artillery coming into action on the top
of a hill soon showed itself superior to that of the Austrians.
After long firing in the environs of the town, and the gardens
which lay in front of the walls, the Prussians advanced to
storm, and although they were received with repeated salvos,
forced their enemy out of his strong position without suffering
very severe loss. At the railway station there was a sharp
combat, but at no other point was the resistance very deter-
mined. The town of Aschaffenburg has only two gates. In
consequence, as the retreating Austrians were hurrying towards
the bridge over the Maine a block occurred. The Prussians
pushing forward, entered the city with the rearmost ranks of
the enemy, and made two thousand prisoners. These were for
the most part Italians, who defended themselves without much
energy. General Goeben occupied the bridge by which the
railway to Darmstadt crosses the Maine, with three battalions,
two squadrons, and a battery. These pushed reconnaissances
towards Frankfort The rest of his troops he cantonned in the
town of Aschaffenburg.
The losses of the Prussians in the capture of the town were
not severe. Those of the Federal troops were considerable \
as there were many killed and wounded, besides the large
number of prisoners. A large quantity of material of war fell
also into the hands of the conquerors. A regiment of hussars
of Hesse- Cassel, which Prince Alexander had attached to his
Austrian division, lost five officers and one hundred and eight
non-commissioned officers and men, in its attempt to cover
the retreat of the infantry through the streets.
While General Goeben advanced towards Aschaffenburg, and
gained there the passage of the Maine, General Beyer's division
pushed towards Frankfort, by way of Gelnhausen, The easily
defensible passage of the Kinzig, near this town, was found
unoccupied by the Federal troops, and on the 17 th, Beyer
reached the neighbourhood of Hanau without ever having seen
an enemy.
z 2
3o8 SEVEN WEEKSr WAR. [Book VIII.
During the action of Aschaffenburg, Prince Alexander,
instead of supporting his Austrian division, which was engaged
there, remained with the mass of his troops inactive at Seiligen-
stadt Yet he could by vigorous action have been much
superior in numbers to Goeben at the former town, have saved
the passage of the river, and perhaps pushing Goeben and
Manteuffel backwards, by bearing on their right, have urged
them into the bend of the Maine, and severed them from
Beyer and their line of communication with the north. This
page of the history of the campaign of the leader of the Federal
corps is but a repetition of the perpetual tale of opportunities
lost and advantages neglected. The advantage of positions
was always on the side of the Federal corps, yet these advan-
tages were sacrificed, always with loss to the Federal side, to
which the casualties in the Prussian ranks by no means corre-
sponded. The lives of soldiers were to all appearance trifled
away and wasted, by strategical ignorance and absence of
energy on the part of their leader.
The immediate result of the victorious advance of the Prus-
sian army of the Maine was the evacuation of Frankfort and
the line of the Maine, by the eighth Federal corps, and its
occupation by the Prussians. On the i6th July, General
Falckenstein entered the town at the head of Goeben's division,
and was able to report to the King that all the lands north of
the Maine were in Prussian possession. General Falckenstein
had within fourteen days defeated two armies, of which each
was as strong as his own, in two great, and several minor
actions ; and, in a country by no means very advantageous for
the offensive, had manoeuvred so as to separate his two adver-
saries, who on the 5th July were within thirty miles of each
other, by a distance of sixty miles.
The following is a summary of the operations north of the
Maine : —
Bavarians, — From the 15th to 25th June, halted near
Schweinfurt In the meantime the Hanoverians were sur-
rounded, and obliged to capitulate.
On the 25th June they made various movements, with the
object of effecting a junction with the eighth Federal corps.
On the 1 2th July they again returned to Schweinfurt, after
Chap. III.] THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 309
having been pushed away from their allies by Falckenstein, at
Wiesenthal and Kissingen.
The Eighth Federal Carps. — From the 15th June to the 12th
July occupied strategical positions round Frankfort
On the 5th July it made a partial march on Fulda. Some
of its cavalry fell in with some Prussian patrols, and it retreated
rapidly to the Maine.
On the 13th and 14th July the actions of Laufach and
Aschaifenburg were fought, while Prince Alexander lay at
Seiligenstadt
On the 14th July Prince Alexander concentrated rearwards,
on the south of the Maine.
On the 13th July, when the Prussians reached Laufach, not
more than thirty miles from Frankfort, the residuaiy members
of the mutilated Germanic Diet retired from the ancient city
on the Maine, where of old the rulers of the Holy Roman
Empire were elected and crowned. Their business had, since
the outbreak of hostilities, been chiefly confined to making
protests against Prussia. The days when the Confederation
could enforce its decrees were, however, past, and the Diet had
found a very different patient of Federal execution from the
Dane. Its protests were now all spent shot A few of the
deputies, however, still held together, and styled themselves, in
diplomatic language, the Diet and Confederation of Germany.
These, on the 13th July, quitted Frankfort with the docu-
ments from the Archives of the Bund, and journeyed to
Augsburg, where the black, red and gold flag of the Gennanic
Confederation was hoisted over the inn of the sign of the Three
Moors.
The last Bavarian battalion left Frankfort on the 14th, and
the head-quarters of the eighth Federal corps were established
that night at Dieburg, a station on the railway between
Aschafifenburg and Darmstadt
On the 15 th, Prince Alexander drew near to the south, and
concentrated his corps on the Odenwald. This day his light
cavalry opened conmiunications with Prince Charles's corps at
Wiirzburg, by the left bank of the Maine, and the road through
Holtenbeig and Werbek.
On the 15th, the Senate of Frankfort published a proclama-
3IO SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII.
tion to the inhabitants, in which it was announced that the Diet
which usually held its sittings in the free city, had temporarily
withdrawn ; that the city would act as an open town, and that
there appeared to be no danger of any injury to the lives or
property of any of the inhabitants. The construction of earth-
works, which had been commenced by the Federal troops, was
abandoned, and all was prepared for the advent of the Prussian
conquerors. At Darmstadt the Russian flag was hoisted on the
palace of the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, who in person
started for Munich.
WrangeVs brigade, after the capture of Aschaffenburg, was
pushed forward by forced marches to Hanau. About five
o'clock on the evening of the i6th July, the first Prussians
arrived near Frankfort, brought in a train from Aschaffenburg.
They got out of the carriages a short distance from the city
gates, and took up a position on the Hanau road. This ad-
vanced guard consisted of a regiment of cuirassiers and a
regiment of hussars. At seven a patrol of the hussars, led by
an officer, halted before the city gate. In another quarter of
an hour the head of the vanguard, consisting of one squadron
of cuirassiers and the remaining hussars, passed in. The popu-
lace were for the most part sullenly silent. A few insulting
cries to the Prussians were occasionally heard from some of the
windows, but the soldiers took no notice of them. In a few
minutes the Generals Vogel von Falckenstein, Goeben, Wran-
gel, and Tresckow, surrounded by the officers of the staff, rode
in at the head of the main body. The bands of the regiments
played Prussian national airs. Before ten o'clock the whole
line of march had entered. The telegraph and post-offices
were occupied. The railway station was garrisoned, and guards
established over all the principal buildings. The free town of
Frankfort was virtually annexed to the Prussian monarchy.
On the 17th July, the remainder of Falckenstein's troops
entered the town, and some troops were pushed forwards south
of the city, who captured a Hessian bridge train.
General Vogel von Falckenstein established his head-quarters
in Frankfort, and published a proclamation in which he an-
nounced that he had assumed temporarily the government of
the duchy of Nassau, the town and territory of Frankfort, and
Chap. III.] THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 311
the portions of Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt, which his troops
had occupied The civil functionaries of these districts were
retained in their posts, but were directed to receive no order
except from the Prussian Commander-in-chief. Several of the
Frankfort papers which had always been distinguished for strong
anti-Prussian feeling were suppressed. The eleven armed
unions* which had existed in the city, were abolished ; and the
functions of the senate and college of burghers established by
a general order. Six millions of gulden t were demanded from
the town as a war contribution, and after much grumbling paid
by the citizens. When, afterwards, on the 20th July, a second
additional contribution of twenty millions of gulden f was de-
manded, an universal cry of indignation and horror was raised.
In the meantime, General von Roeder had been appointed
Governor of the town, to whom the Burgomaster represented,
on the 23rd July, that the town had ahready furnished six
millions of gulden, and about two millions of rations, and re-
quested to appeal against the subsequent contribution to the
King of Prussia. So much did this misfortune of his city weigh
on the Burgomaster that the same night he committed suicide.
The town sent a deputation to Berlin which treated so eflfectually,
and was so powerfully supported by the opinions of the foreign
press, that the contribution was not insisted upon by the King.
Frankfort shortly afterwards was united definitely to Prussia,
when the first contribution of six millions was not actually
returned to the citizens, but was retained by the Government
to be expended in public works for the benefit of the city.
General Falckenstein, at Frankfort, issued the following
general order to his troops : —
•* Soldiers of the Army of the Maine I — On the 14th of this
month at AschafTenburg, we have fulfilled the second portion of our task.
On that day the right bank of the Maine, as far as our arms reached, was
cleared of the enemy. Before we advance to new deeds, it behoves me
to express to you all my recognition of the manner in which you have made
the numerous exertions necessary for our success. Yet it is not that alone
which I have to praise. It is your valour, and the energy with which, in
six great and several smaller actions, you have hurled yourselves upon the
enemy, knitted victory to vour banners, and made thou«!ands of your adver-
saries prisoners. You defeated the Bavarians in two brilliant engagements
at Wiesenthal, and Zella on the 4th of this month, crossed the Rhon moun-
* Vereine. t £600,000. % £2,ooo,ooa
313 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book Vlir.
tains in order again to spring upon the Bavarian Army at the foar different
points of Hammelbur^g, Xissingen, Hausen, and Waldaschach : everywhere
you were victorious. So soon as the third day after the bloody storming of
kissingen, the same division had crossed to the Spessart to engage the
eighth Federal corps. The victory of the thirteenth division over the divi-
sion of Darmstadt at Laufach, and the capture of AschafTenburg from the
united Federal and Austrian troops on the 14th, were the earnings of its
bravery and its toils. On the i6tb Frankfort was occupied by it I must
express to this division my sp)ecial thanks. Fortunate to be generally at
the head of the corps, and so the first to come into collision with the enemy,
it showed itself as worthy of this honourable post, as did the intelligence
and energy of its leader to take advantage of his opportunities.
•* Head-Quarters, "VON FALCKENSTEIN,
" Frankfort, 14th July, 1866. •* Commander-in-Chitf of the Army
CHAPTER IV.
THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OP THE MAINE.
The day that General von Falckenstein published his
general order to the troops, the Army of the Maine lost its
commander. The difficult state of affairs in Bohemia, caused
by the animosities of political parties, which, till the Prussian
invasion, had been kept down by the strong hand of the
Austrian Government, had, on the removal of that pressure,
sprung forth into full life. The importance of the communica-
tions of the main Prussian armies with the provinces of Saxony
and Silesia, which were threatened by the three fortresses of
Theresienstadt, Josephstadt, and Koniggratz, led the King of
Prussia to appoint General Falckenstein as military Governor-
General of that province.
Lieutenant-General von Manteuffel assumed the command
of the Army of the Maine in Falckenstein's place. The divi-
sion which General Manteuffel had commanded was placed
under General Flies. On the i8th July Wiesbaden was occu-
pied by the Prussians ; and on the 20th Kummef s brigade was
pushed southwards as an advanced guard and entered Darm-
stadt, but the main body of the army halted at Frankfort until
the 2 1 St While he waited at Frankfort General Manteuffel
received reinforcements. These consisted of three battalions,
three squadrons, and two batteries of Oldenburg, two battalions
of Hamburg, one of Liibeck, one of Waldeck, which was de-
tached to watch the fortress of Mainz, one of Bremen, one of
Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen. Besides these contingents of the
allies of Prussia, he also received five fourth battalions of
Prussian troops, which remained as the garrison of Frankfort,
the ninth Jager battalion, and three reserve regiments of Land-
314 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VIIL
wehr cavalry, — ^in all fifteen battalions, twelve squadrons, and
twelve guns, which mustered over twelve thousand combatants.
Of these, five thousand men were left to hold the line of the
Maine at Frankfort, Hanau, and Aschaffenburg. The re-
mainder raised the active army to a strength of sixty thousand
combatants.
At the same time a second reserve corps was formed at
Leipsic and placed under the command of the Grand Duke of
Mecklenburg-Schwerin. It consisted of the division of Meck-
lenburg-Schwerin, which numbered four battalions of infantry,
one battalion of Jagers, four squadrons, and two 6-pounder
batteries, and of a combined Prussian division, which was placed
under the command of General Home, who had formerly com-
manded the eighth division of the army of Prince Frederick
Charles. Home's combined division consisted of the fourth
regiment of the Pmssian Guard, the fourth battalions of five
regiments of the line, two battalions of An halt, two regiments
of Landwehr cavalry, and eight batteries. This second reserve
corps mustered in all about twenty-three thousand combatants.
It was intended to enter Bavaria by way of Hof, and either to
act against the re^r of the united Bavarian and Federal corps,
while engaged with General Manteuffel, or to force the Bavarian
army to form firont towards the east, and prevent Prince Charles
of Bavaria from acting in concert with Prince Alexander against
Manteuffel.
By the 21st July, the railway fi"om Frankfort to Cassel had
been repaired by the railway detachment of the Army of the
Maine, and was available throughout its whole length, not only
for military transport, but also for private traffic On that day,
the main body of the Army of the Maine quitted Frankfort,
and moved towards the south. Beyer's division at the same
time advanced from Hanau by Aschaffenburg to the south.
The Bavarians had not occupied the road from Wiirzburg to
the passage of the Maine at Heidenfeld. The eighth Federal
corps was reported to be in retreat through the Odenwald, by
Hochst and Moltenberg. Further information told that the
Bavarians were concentrated, and in position near Wiirzburg.
It then appeared probable that part of the eighth Federal corps
intended to hold the defiles of the Odenwald, and the line of
Chap IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE, 315
the Neckar, while the remainder of its troops joined the
Bavarians near the Tauber. To take advantage of two roads,
in order to move quickly, and if possible to press upon Prince
Alexander before he was firmly linked with the Bavarians, and
to shield his right fiank against any detachments lurking in the
Odenwald, General Manteuffel moved Goeben's division by
Darmstadt on Konieg, while Flies and Beyer pushed up the
valley of the Maine by Wurth. At the same time he sent a
strong reconnaissance up the right bank of the river against
Heidenfeld. Frankfort and Aschaffenburg were firmly oc-
cupied.
On the 23rd July, the Army of the Maine occupied a posi-
tion near Moltenberg and Amorbach. Along its whole front
it could firmly feel the eighth Federal corps. It was found
that the enemy was in force on the Tauber, and that his
advanced posts were pushed over the river as far as Hundheim.
On the 24th two actions took place on the Tauber, an affluent
of the Maine, which falls into the latter stream below
WertheinL General Manteuffel moved against the Tauber in
three colunms. On the left Flies's division advanced on
Wertheim. The two columns on the right were under
General Goeben. Of these, that on the left consisted of the
Oldenberg brigade and the battalion of Bremen, which moved
upon Werbach against the division of Baden. That on the
right, consisting of the remaining troops of Gk)eben's division,
with Wrangel's brigade in firont, marched on Tauberbischofs-
heinL Beyer's division was moved on Dermbach as the
reserve. At Tauberbischofsheim the Wurtemberg division,
under General Hardegg was posted, to hold the place itself,
and then issue from the valley on the road towards Wiirzburg,
in case of an attack by the Prussians. The artillery fire of the
advanced guard brigade of Goeben's divisions caused great
loss among the defenders, and soon forced them to retire from
the village. General Hardegg withdrew his troops, but en-
deavoured to hold the Prussians in the houses, and to prevent
the advance of their batteries. By blowing up the bridge over
the Tauber, he for a time prevented the progress of the
Prussian artillery. After a hot combat, which lasted three
hours, the Wurtembergers were relieved by the fourth division
3i6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIIL
of the eighth Federal corps. The action increased in fury,
but ultimately the Prussians gained the passage of the Tauber
at Bischofsheim, and pushed their outposts a short distance
along the road to Wiirzburg.
The action at Werbach afforded the brigade composed of
the Oldenburgers and the battalion of Bremen, its first oppor-
tunity to display its efficiency. As soon as the Prussian ad-
vanced guard, which attacked Bischofsheim, met with oppo-
sition, this brigade was pushed against Werbach. The enemy
evacuated Hochhausen, which lies on the left bank of the
river, without firing a shot, but set himself stolidly to oppose
the passage of the stream at Werbach. The attacking troops
had marched for twelve hours on the 23rd July, and on the
24th had been moving from ^yt^ o'clock in the morning until
two in the afternoon. They found their opponents in a good
position, from which they themselves were exposed to a heavy
cannonade. The Oldenburg artillery opened, and with such
a good effect, that it soon got the fire of the opposite batteries
under. These did not make good practice : the loss they
inflicted was most trivial. The infantiy, which had been
hidden behind some rising ground, and in a wood, then ad-
vanced to the attack of the village of Werbach, threading their
way through the intricate vineyards which clothed the slope
down to the Tauber. After a short time spent in skirmishing,
the Oldenburgers rushed to the assault, part forcing their way
over the barricades, part wading through the water of the
stream, which rose breast high against them. Their losses
were heavy, but their rush successful They carried the
houses, and drove the defenders clean through the village, and
themselves covered by the houses, commenced a murderous
fire on the retreating columns. The combat at Werbach not
only secured to General Manteuffel the passage of the stream
at that point, but had a more important result The division
of Baden retreated so far after its failure here, that the position
in which tlie Federal corps had determined to fight on the
Tauber on the following day had to be evacuated.
At Wertheim, General Flies forced back the Hessians, whom
he found posted there, and secured the passage of the Tauber
at this point also.
Chap. IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE. 317
The commander of the eighth Federal corps, when he per-
ceived that he could no longer hold the line of the Tauber, fell
back to Gerscheim, a village half way between Tauberbischofs-
heim and Wiirzburg, and about seven miles from either place.
Here he •determined, on some wooded heights, to await the
Prussians. In the meantime the Bavarian army, following the
road from Wiirzburg to Aschaifenburg, closed towards the
eighth corps, and taking post on the north at Helrostadt,
and Utingen, formed with it a long line of battle, in rear of
which lay Wiirzbuig and the Maine.
Genend Manteuffel was obliged to attack the allied corps in
this position, altliough they were numerically much superior to
him. He formed the intention of strengthening his right, and
pivoting himself on Wertheim, to act with vigour against the
allied left He hoped thus to push his adversaries off the
road to Wiirzburg, and to force them into the elbow which
the Maine forms north of that place. There cut off from their
communications, and with the river in their rear, they would
have had almost no resource except that of capitulating.
On the 25 th, the Prussian Commander-in-chief drew forward
Beyer's division, which had hitherto remained in reserve in
rear of his lefl wing, and placed it between those of Goeben
and Flies. The Army of the Maine now formed a line of
battle about ten miles long, but only Goeben and Beyer were
to attack on the 25 th. Flies was to hold himself at Wertheim
as the pivot of the army. Goeben was to attack the eighth
Federal corps; Beyer the Bavarians. General Rummer's
brigade, on the 25th, marched as the advanced guard of
Goeben's division. When that officer had passed a wood lying
a short distance in front of Gerscheim, he made out the enemy
— ^W^iirtembergers, Nassauers, and Austrians drawn up on the
north of the road in order of battle. Their superiority in
artillery was very considerable ; they had eight batteries, six
regiments of cavaliy, and about seventy thousand infantry,
while Kummer had only six battalions, four squadrons, and
two batteries. Wrangel's brigade had marched towards the
right, in order to act against the enemy's left flank. The
Oldenburg brigade, with the reserve, were behind, but at so
great a distance that their arrival on the ground could not be
3i8 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book VUI.
calculated upon for an hour. Nevertheless General Kummer
determined at once to attack. His two batteries came into
position, some infantry occupied the wood beside him, the
rest of the foot soldiers and the cavalry formed in order of
battle, and his artillery opened fire. The enemy replied from
forty pieces, and after a cannonade which lasted three-quarters
of an hour, compelled the Prussian guns to retire. Prince
Alexander of Hesse immediately sent some infantry against
the wood, but the Prussians held the trees firmly, and from the
cover slaughtered their assailants with their quickly-loaded
arm. At this time the Oldenburg brigade and the reserves
came up, and Wrangel was seen advancing against the enemy s
left. The artillery fire of the alUes told little on the Prussian
troops, and caused but slight loss in proportion to the number
of guns engaged. WrangeFs appearance on his left, and
Rummer's steady hold of the wood, made the enemy begin
slowly to retire. The Oldenburg artillery joined to Kummer's
two batteries, fired heavily upon their slowly retreating
columns. The allied batteries, halting at every favourable
spot, came into action, and it was not till nightfall that the
cannonade ceased. By that time the Prussians had occupied
and passed beyond Gerscheim. On the same day, Beyer ad-
vanced against the Bavarians, who were in position near
Helmstadt, by way of Bottingheim and Neubrunn. In front
of Bottingheim he fell in with some cavalry patrols. At
Neubrunn some infantry made its appearance. This was the
advanced guard of the Bavarian main body, which was about
to advance against VVerbach. This infantry Beyer attacked
sharply, and drove back towards Helmstadt In rear of
Neubrunn the retiring Bavarians were reinforced, and halted in
a swelling plateau, much dotted over with plantations. The
battle now began in earnest The Prussian advanced
guard moving towards Madelhofen found an unoccupied
plantation on the Bavarian left Pivoted on this it wheeled up
to its left, and moved against Helmstadt At the same time
Beyer's main body moved straight upon that village. The
Bavarians could not maintain themselves in that place, but
their artillery, which drew oflf towards Utingen, took up a
position beyond Helmstadt, from which their guns rained a
Chap. IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE. 319
hot fire of shells upon the heads of the Prussian columns.
The Prussian artillery, covered by numerous skirmishers in the
plantations, engaged the Bavarian guns. About three hours
after the beginning of the fight the enemy's artillery drew off to
Utingen, and so left the road to Madelhofen, the most direct
route to Wiirzburg open to Beyer's left wing. The Prussian
di\asion then made a concentrated attack against a wood near
Madelhofen, under cover of which heavy masses of Bavarian
infantry were preparing for an attack towards Neubrunn. At
the same time, Beyer's two regiments of cavalry dashed against
the Bavarian horse, which in front of the wood were covering
the formation. A severe hand to hand combat took place.
The Bavarian horsemen were finally, however, overcome, and
forced to quit the field. While the cavalry were engaged,
some of the Prussian infantry pushed the Bavarian battalions
back to Waldbrunn. The whole of Beyer's division then
moved against the plantations near Madelhofen and
Waldbrunn, but the enemy drew off so quickly that Beyer con-
cluded the action had terminated, and ordered his troops to
bivouac.
It was not so, however. Hardly had the Prussian regiments
taken up their positions for the night, than an attack opened
upon their left rear in the direction of Helmstadt A part of
the Bavarian army had, unperceived, advanced in this direction
from Utingen, and now opened a second action with a heavy
cannonade. Beyer quickly changed his front left back, forming
a reserve of the two regiments which had previously been upon
his right His artillery, as soon as it had taken up its new
p>osition, opened fire against the line of Bavarian guns, which
was continually pushing more and more in the direction of
Neubrunn, in order to outflank the Prussian position. This
fire, however, did little towards silencing the Bavarian batteries.
The Prussian reserve, which had a long distance to travel, was
far firom the left wing. Every moment the attack of the
enem/s infantry might be expected. Matters seemed very
critical But the Bavarians did not attack. After a time his
reserve reached Beyer's left He then ordered a general
advance, which was successful. Prince Charles of Bavaria was
forced back to Roszbrunn, where he halted General Beyer
3i8 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII.
calculated upon for an hour. Nevertheless General Kummer
determined at once to attack. His two batteries came into
position, some infantry occupied tlie wood beside him, the
rest of the foot soldiers and the cavalry formed in order of
battle, and his artillery opened fire. The enemy replied from
forty pieces, and after a cannonade which lasted three-quarters
of an hour, compelled the Prussian guns to retire. Prince
Alexander of Hesse immediately sent some infantry against
the wood, but the Prussians held the trees firmly, and firom the
cover slaughtered their assailants with their quickly-loaded
arm. At this time the Oldenburg brigade and the reserves
came up, and Wrangel was seen advancing against the enemy's
left. The artillery fire of the allies told little on the Prussian
troops, and caused but slight loss in proportion to the number
of guns engaged. Wrangel's appearance on his left, and
Kummer*s steady hold of the wood, made the enemy begin
slowly to retire. The Oldenburg artillery joined to Rummer's
two batteries, fired heavily upon their slowly retreating
columns. The allied batteries, halting at every favourable
spot, came into action, and it was not till nightfall that the
cannonade ceased. By that time the Prussians had occupied
and passed beyond Gerscheim. On the same day, Beyer ad-
vanced against the Bavarians, who were in position near
Helmstadt, by way of Bottingheim and Neubrunn. In firont
of Bottingheim he fell in with some cavalry patrols. At
Neubrunn some infantry made its appearance. This was the
advanced guard of the Bavarian main body, which was about
to advance against VVerbach. This infantry Beyer attacked
sharply, and drove back towards Helmstadt In rear of
Neubrunn the retiring Bavarians were reinforced, and halted in
a swelling plateau, much dotted over with plantations. The
battle now began in earnest The Prussian advanced
guard moving towards Madelhofen found an unoccupied
plantation on the Bavarian left Pivoted on this it wheeled up
to its left, and moved against Helmstadt At the same time
Beyer's main body moved straight upon that village. The
Bavarians could not maintain themselves in that place, but
their artillery, which drew off towards Utingen, took up a
position beyond Helmstadt, from which their guns rained a
Chap. IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE. 319
hot fire of shells upon the heads of the Prussian columns.
The Prussian artillery, covered by numerous skirmishers in the
plantations, engaged the Bavarian guns. About three hours
after the beginning of the fight the enera/s artillery drew off to
Utingen, and so left the road to Madelhofen, the most direct
route to Wiirzburg open to Beyer's left wing. The Prussian
division then made a concentrated attack against a wood near
Madelhofen, under cover of which heavy masses of Bavarian
infantry were preparing for an attack towards Neubrunn. At
the same time, Beyer's two regiments of cavalry dashed against
the Bavarian horse, which in front of the wood were covering
the formation. A severe hand to hand combat took place.
The Bavarian horsemen were finally, however, overcome, and
forced to quit the field. While the cavalry were engaged,
some of the Prussian infantry pushed the Bavarian battalions
back to Waldbrunn. The whole of Beyer's division then
moved against the plantations near Madelhofen and
Waldbrunn, but the enemy drew off so quickly that Beyer con-
cluded the action had terminated, and ordered his troops to
bivouac.
It was not so, however. Hardly had the Prussian regiments
taken up their positions for the night, than an attack opened
upon their left rear in the direction of Helmstadt A part of
the Bavarian army had, unperceived, advanced in this direction
from Utingen, and now opened a second action with a heavy
cannonade. Beyer quickly changed his front left back, forming
a reserve of the two regiments which had previously been upon
his right His artillery, as soon as it had taken up its new
position, opened fire against the line of Bavarian guns, which
was continually pushing more and more in the direction of
Neubrunn, in order to outflank the Prussian position. This
fire, however, did little towards silencing the Bavarian batteries.
The Prussian reserve, which had a long distance to travel, was
far from the left wing. Every moment the attack of the
cnem/s infantry might be expected. Matters seemed very
critical But the Bavarians did not attack. After a time his
reserve reached Beyer's left. He then ordered a general
advance, which was successful. Prince Charles of Bavaria was
forced back to Roszbrunn, where he halted. General Beyer
320 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VIII.
bivouacked near Helmstadt Goeben's division halted for the
night on the road between Gerscheim and Wiirzburg, with its
outposts at Kist. When Prince Charles's attack against Beyer,
near Helmstadt, was developed, General Flies moved forward
from Wertheim to support Beyer. He did not arrive on the
field before the termination of the battie, but he took a position
for the night at Utingen, and patrolled towards Roszbrunn.
This action cost the Prussians about three hundred and
fifty officers and men, who were placed hors de combat. The
Bavarians lost seventeen officers and two hundred and thirty-
nine men killed and wounded, besides three hundred and
sixty-three prisoners, who for the most part were wounded.
Prince Alexander, on the evening of the 25 th, withdrew his
corps to Wiirzburg, and took up a position under shelter of the
fortress. Prince Charles appears to have received no informa-
tion of this retreat, for on the morning of the 26th, he not only
held his position at Roszbrunn, where his rear and his
communication with Wiirzburg were already threatened by
Goeben, but he also advanced against Utingen to attack Flies.
He must in so doing have believed that the eighth Federal
corps still covered his left, and held the road fix)m Tauber-
bischofsheim to Wiirzburg.
As soon as the Bavarian attack on Flies was announced by
their cannonade, Beyer detached some of his regiments to act
against Prince Charles's flank. This attack, supported vigorously
by a simultaneous advance of Flies against his fi-ont, forced the
Bavarian commander to retire ; not, however, without inflicting
very severe injury on the Prussians.
Goeben, on the 26th, pushed his advanced guard towards
Wiirzburg, and soon discovered by his pajrols that Prince
Charles, after leaving only a few light troops in fix)nt of the
town, and a strong garrison in the houses on the left bank of
the river, had drawn the mass of his troops across the Maine,
and posted them in the town on the right bank, and in the
citadel.
On the 28th, the Bavarian and the eighth Federal corps
concentrated, and took up a position at Rottendorf, a village
which Ues in the angle of the Maine, five miles east of Wiirz-
buig. General Manteuflel that day drew his whole anuy
Chap. IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE. 321
together in front of Wiirzburg, with Goeben's division in
advance, so that Kummer's brigade was opposite Marienberg,
Wrangel's on its right, and the Oldenburg contingent on its
left. Kummer pushed his skirmishers close up to Marienberg,
and with them forced the enemy to quit some earthworks which
they had begun to throw up. The whole artillery of the army
of the Maine was then posted on the right and left of the road,
and opened a cannonade on the houses, to which the enemy's
guns actively replied. The arsenal and the castle of Marien-
beig were set on flames, after which the batteries ceased firing.
The day after that cannonade a flag of truce was sent from the
Bavarians to General Manteuflel, who announced that an
armistice had been concluded between the King of Prussia
and the Bavarian Government The cessation of hostilities
rescued the allied army from a very precarious position in the
elbow of the Maine, where it was all but cut off" from the
territories which it had been intended to defend.
General Manteuflel had gained a free scope for action ove/
the whole of Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and Baden, because the
river Maine was placed between those countries and the troops
of Prince Charles. This general, to defend those countries,
would have required to cross a swift river in face of a strong
and already victorious enemy, no easy task for an army which
had afready lost confidence in its leader.
OBSERVATIONS.
The most interesting manoeuvre of the Prussian Army of the
Maine, after it had occupied Frankfort, was the movement by
which General Manteuffiel advanced against the Tauber. The
army marched southwards in the formation A. As soon as
certain information was received that the enemy was on the
Tauber, the division wheeled to the left, and stood opposed to
the enemy in the formation B. The right wing (2), Flies'
division, had then Goeben's division (i) as a reserve, and could
with great strength urge the enemy back towards the Maine,
while Beyer's division at Wertheim prevented him from pushing
out in that direction. As long as General Manteuffiel could
prevent the allies from marching up the Tauber he held an
advantage over them, for the second reserve corps was coming
Y
3M
SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.
[Book VIII.
down to Number^ against their rear. If the enemy did move
up the Tauber in spite of his dispositions, General Manteuffel,
by wheeling division C to the right, restored the order of
march, in which he had advanced from Frankfort, for further
operations.
It is difficult to perceive with what object Prince Charles,
after the action on the Tauber, withdrew in the direction of
Wurzburg, and afterwards took up a position in the bend of the
Maine. He could hardly have wished here to fight a pitched
battle, while General Manteuflfel on one side of him, and the
second Prussian reserve corps on the other, were not separated
by more than sixty miles, and when he left the initiative of
attack in the hands of his adversaries. Nor could he have the
intention of conveying his troops by railway by way of Bam-
berg, Niimberg, and Regensburg to Vienna. His road in that
direction was threatened, and before he could have moved half
his army, the remainder would have been waylaid by the second
reserve corps.
The strength of the Bavarian and eighth Federal corps,
which mustered together at least one hundred thousand men^
was frittered away in isolated conflicts, instead of being con-
centrated for a great battle. Such conflicts could have liad no
Chap. IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE. 323
important result, even if they had been successful. On the
Tauber, the eighth corps fought alone, unsupported by the
Bavarians. On the 25tl^ the whole right wing of the Bavarians
came under fire, only in the evening, for the first time ; and
there was no harmony of either conduct or action between the
Bavarians and the troops of the eighth corps. On the 26 th,
Prince Charles made an offensive movement without any
support from Prince Alexander, and apparently without any
idea that the latter had withdrawn to Wiirzburg.
Y 2
CHAPTER V.
OCCUPATION OF FRANCONIA BY 'THE SECOND RESERVE CORPS.
On the i8th July the Grand Duke Frederick Franz of Meck-
lenbuig-Schiverin assumed the command of the second Prussian
reserve corps at Leipsic On the same day he ordered this
corps to move upon Hof, in Bavaria, On the 23rd, the third
battalion of the fourth regiment of the Guard crossed the
Bavarian frontier, and captured a detachment of sixty-five
Bavarian infantry. This battalion was pushed by forced marches
from Leipsic to Werdau, thence by railway to Plauen. At the
latter place waggons were raised by requisition firom the country
people, and the battalion conveyed in them by night to within,
two miles of Hof Two companies rushed into the town,
while the others, making a circuitous march, sought to gain the
exit on the further side, and thus to surround and capture the
whole of the Bavarian garrison. The greater part of these,
however, made their escape by a railway train which happened
to be ready, and an outlying detachment of sixty-five non-
commissioned officers and men were alone taken prisoners.
On the 24th July, the head-quarters of the Grand Duke of
Mecklenburg reached Hof. Here he published a proclamation
to the inhabitants of Upper Franconia, in which he informed
them that his invasion of their country was only directed
against their Government, and that private property and
interests would be perfectly respected by his troops. In con-
sequence, he was able to draw from the inhabitants the means
of supplying his men with rations.
The head of the Prussian advanced guard reached on the
28th, the provincial capital Baireulh. The Bavarian garrison
of this town had been withdrawn by telegraphic orders fi"om
Chap, v.] OCCUPATION OF FRANC ONI A, 325
Munich : and wisely so. Its numbers were far too small to
have fought an action with any chance of success, and any
resistance against the invaders could only have served to
imperil the lives and property of the inhabitants. Niirnberg
had also, from fear of the fate with which it was threatened,
solicited the Bavarian Government to allow it to be declared
an open town.
On the 29th July, the Grand Duke in person reached
Baireuth, and there reviewed his troops. Bavaria, which had
always aspired to a special consideration in the Germanic
Confederation, because she claimed to be the leader of the
Middle States, displayed no military force at all proportionate
to her pretensions. No force worthy the name opposed this
invasion of Franconia. One only of four brigades of reserve
which were in course of formation, but, as yet, were hardly
clothed in uniform, badly equipped and miserably organized,
had been despatched from Munich towards the Saxon frontier.
For any efficient protection of the country it was much too
weak, and the Landwehr, which had so much been vaunted by
the Bavarian press, as a strong defensive organization, barely
existed upon paper, and was practically of no account The
second reserve corps advanced unmolested, as if in time of
profound peace, and was received by the people always with
friendship, sometimes with tokens of lively sympathy. The
Bavarian brigade of reserve retired to Kemnath. A false tele-
graphic despatch, which announced that an armistice had been
concluded between Prussia and Bavaria, led the reserve battalion
of the regiment of the Bavarian guard to again advance, on the
28th, towards Baireuth. This advance was made without any
precaution. As soon as it approached near the town it was
told by the Prussian officer who commanded the advanced
guard of the second reserve corps that the intelligence of an
armistice was unfounded. It did not, however, by a forced
march, attempt to withdraw itself beyond the reach of danger,
but retired to St Johann's, barely three miles from Baireuth,
and there calmly took up its quarters for the night As could
hardly otherwise happen, it was there fallen upon, and fled
during the night to Seidenburg, and on the 29th to Seibotten-
reuth. Here it was overtaken by the fusilier battalion of the
326 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIIL
4th regiment of the Prussian Guard, which, in company with
some Mecklenburg cavalry and Jagers, had been despatched
from Baireuth in pursuit, and was totally routed. Of the nine
hundred and fifty men, of whom the battalion had been com-
posed, hardly five hundred succeeded in escaping firom their
pursuers, and, by the sacrifice of their knapsacks and many of
their arms, gaining a railway station between Seibottenreuth and
Niimberg. This was the only opportunity which the second
reserve corps had of being engaged.
On the 31st July, the Prussian advanced guard moving
forwards occupied the ancient city of Numberg, firom which
the dynasty of the HohenzoUems was originally transferred to
Brandenburg. On the first August, the main body reached the
same place. Here the Grand Duke of Mecklenbiug was only
separated firom Wiirzburg by a distance of sixty miles, and
could insure his junction with General Manteuflfel without any
danger fi-om the eighth Federal corps or the Bavarian army.
Other reinforcements were also on the way to General
Manteuffel, for on the 27th July the first Prussian reserve
corps had been despatched from Bohemia, by way of Pilsen,
into Bavaria, and had already occupied Weiden and Waldsassen.
The armistice, however, which commenced on the 2nd of
August, and which had been granted by Manteuflfel, on the
30th July, to Prince Alexander and Prince Charles, put an end
to all further operations, and, in all probability, prevented both
the army and the capital of Bavaria firom falling into the hands
of the Prussians.
The Prussian troops were everywhere victoriously pressing
forward, and every day their enemies were more paralysed, and
daily the total disruption of the Germanic Confederation
became more complete.
On the 28th July, Baden received a new Ministry, which
declared that, after the 31st July, the grand duchy would no
longer consider itself as belonging to the late ConfederatioiL
The grand ducal representative at the spectral phantom of the
Diet was recalled, and the fortress of Rastadt was declared to
belong to the Baden Government The troops of Weimar,
which formed its garrison, were dismissed to their homes.
On the I St August, Heidelberg and Mannheim, Ludwighofen,
Chap. V.] OCCUPATION OF FRANCO NI A. zri
Mergentheim, and Erlangen, were occupied by Prussian detach-
ments. The South-German Governments lost all hope, and
sought by negotiations for an armistice. Lines of demarcation
between the armies were agreed upon, and the war on the
western theatre was finally put an end to by settled conventions.
Bavaria at first gained merely a purely military suspension oi
hostilities, but Herr von der Pfordten, who had been despatched
to the King of Prussia at Nikolsburg,* by the Bavarian Govern-
ment, obtained one for three weeks, which was to date from the
28th July. Within that time peace was concluded at Berlin.
Before the definite conclusion of the armistice, the Prussian
troops had occupied the Bavarian territory at three points, they
had also crossed the firontiers of Baden and of Wiirtemberg.
Darmstadt had long held a Prussian garrison. Wiirzburg, as
one of the conditions of the suspension of hostilities, received
a Prussian corps of four thousand men on the 2nd August ;
the fortress on the Marienberg alone remained in the hands of
the Bavarians. On the ist August, General von Manteuffel,
at Wiirzburg, concluded an armistice with General von
Hardegg, for Wiirtemberg ; on the same day he also concluded
one for Hesse-Darmstadt, and on the 3rd a plenipotentiary
from Baden came to Wiirzburg, and there obtained one from
Manteuffel for the Grand Duchy. The head-quarters of the
Army of the Maine were established at Wiirzburg during the
truce, where they remained until the 22nd August
The King of Prussia despatched, on the ist August, the
following telegram to the Army of the Maine, through General
Manteuffel :
** I chaige you to express to the troops of the Army of the Maine my
entire satisfaction with their valour and behaviour. I thank the generals,
the officers, and all the soldiery. With me the armies in Bohemia, Mora-
via, and Austria send to Uieir Prussian and German comrades greeting and
good-wilL"
At the same time the order of " Pour le M^rite " was sent
by the King, with an autograph letter to the Grand Duke of
Mecklenburg.
* See page 400.
328 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book VIII.
The end of the struggle was notified by General von Man-
teuflfel to his army, in the following general order : —
"Head Quarters, WCrzburo,
^*Auguft2ndt 1866.
" Soldiers of the Army or the Maine ! — By the victories of the
arms of Prussia, the enemy has been compelled to seek for an armistice.
His Majesty the King has granted it. I do not speak to you of the hard-
ships which you have cheerfully suffered, nor of the bravery with which you
have everywhere fought. But I recall to your memory the days of actions
aud the results of your victories. After that, under your skilful and
esteemed leader, General von Falckenstein, you had seized Hanover, Hesse-
Cassel, and all the broad territories as far as Frankfort-on-the-Malne ; had
compelled the Hanoverian army to capitulate ; had defeated the Bavarians
on the 14th July at Zella and Weisenthal, on the loth July at Hammelbui^,
Kissingen, Friedericshall,. Hansen, and Waldaschach ; on the I Hh July
the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt at Oerlenbach ; on the 13th these again at
Laufach, and on the 14th the Austrians at Aschaffenburg, you made your
victorious entry into Frankfort After a short rest, again you sought the
foe ; on the 23rd you defeated the troops of Baden at Hundheim ; on the
24th, the Austrian, WiLrtemberg, Hesse- Darmstadt, and Nassau division at
Tauberbischofsheim, and the troops of Baden at Werbach ; on the 25th,
the whole concentrated eighth Federal Corps at Gerscheim, and the Bava-
rians at Helmstadt, the latter on the 26th, also at Roszbriinn ; and to-day»
after twenty victorous greater or minor combats, have entered Wiirzburg as
conquerors. The resmt of those victories is that not only the countries
north of the Maine have been won, but that the power of your arms has
smitten heavily on Hesse-Darmstadt, and deep into Baden and Wiirtem-
bejqg, and has freed a portion of our land, which could not be directly
protected by our army from the presence of an enemy. The Wiirtem-
beigers had occupied HohenzoUem, and had driven away our officials.
They must now quit that principality ;* the black and white flag waves again
over the town of HohenzoUem. I must express my thanks to the generals,
commanders, officers, and to all the rank and file. I also thank the militaiir
surgeons for their unremitting and self-sacrificing care of the wounded, both
under fire and in the hospital, as well as to the non-combatant departments
for their successful administration of the army's supplies. Soldiers of the
Army of the Maine I I know that you are thankful to God, and I expect
that during the armistice your recognised manliness and careful behaviour
towards the inhabitants of the country will be worthy of the Prussiaa
name.'*
The relics of the Diet quickly approached dissolution. On
the I St of August the small knot of diplomatists which at the
hotel of the Three Moors, at Augsburg, still assumed the
functions of that august body, were deserted by the ambas-
sadors of England, France, Spain and Belgium; while the
Russian representative remained at Augsburg only on accoxmt
* The principalities of HohenzoUem.
Chap. V.] OCCUPA TION OF FRANCONIA, 329
of illness. The sitting of the 4th August acknowledged the
end of the last shadow of the Germanic Confederation. Prince
Charles of Bavaria reported the conclusion of an armistice
with Prussia by the governments of Austria, Bavaria, Wiirtem-
bei^, and the Grand Duchy of Hesse; and reported at the
same time, that he resigned the command-in-chief of the
western Federal army, which had been bestowed on him by
the decree of the Diet of the 27th June.
Brunswick had very tardily placed its troops on a war
footing, but by the beginning of August they were attached
to the second Prussian reserve corps. That State a short
time previously declared its withdrawal from the Confedera-
tion.
The remaining members of the Diet annulled the protests
which had been made against Prussia, and decreed that no
obstacle should be offered to the North-German troops in the
Federal fortresses in retiring to their homes.
On the 28th July, the troops 01 Saxe-Meiningen had already
been permitted by the Governor of Mainz to leave that
fortress, which, in virtue of the subsequent treaties of peace,
was occupied by and given over entirely to Prussia on the
26th August
This decree was the last act of the Diet of the Germanic
Confederation, which was constructed after the fall of the
first French Empire. By it, it practically published its own
death warrant
BOOK IX.
CHAPTER I.
PRUSSIAN ADVANCE FROM KONIGGRATZ TO BRONN.
Feldzeugmeister von Benedek had headed in person the
troops with which he attempted to retake Chlum after the
Prussian Guards had possessed themselves of that village, and
so turned the scale of the battle of Koniggiatz. After his
three attacks on the burning houses and the garrisoned church-
yard had been repulsed, he saw that all was lost, and himself
in vain attempted to find a soldier's grave on the field of
battle, and with his blood to wash out the memory of his
misfortune. The rapid advance of the whole Prussian army
forced the Austrians speedily to retreat During the night of
the 3rd of July, in great disorder, having but half of its
artillery, with its staff separated and scattered, the defeated
army pushed across the crowded bridges over the Elbe, and
wearily dragged itself in the direction of Hohenmanth. Bene-
dek himself retreated to Holitz, on the road to this place, and
there on the morning of the 4th, made the best arrangement
he could for the safety of his troops. Their losses in men,
material^ and guns rendered it impossible for him to think of
any new dispositions until they were thoroughly re-organized.
To carry out such a re-organization he must seek a place of
shelter, and the cover he desired was to be found under the
guns, and behind the intrenchments of Olmutz. With the
exception of the tenth corps, which had suffered most severely,
and which he therefore despatched by railway directly to Vienna^
»WWii—
Chap. L] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 331
he ordered the remainder of his army to move on the intrenched
camp at Olmiitz, while he left his first light cavalry division to
watch the road from Pardubitz to Iglau, and his second to
delay the enemy, if possible, on that from Pardubitz to Briinn.
On the 4th July he also sent Field Marshal Gablenz, one of
the most able of the Austrian generals, to the Prussian head-
quarters, in order to treat for a suspension of hostilities, as a
preliminary to the conclusion of peace. This was a new
proof of the desperate condition of the Austrian army.
Gablenz reported himself on the 4th July at mid-day, at the
outposts of the Crown Prince's army, and received permission
to go to the King's head-quarters. He was blindfolded in
passing through the army, as is the custom of war, and accom-
panied by a Prussian officer, was conducted to Horitz. When
he reached that town the King was absent, as he had gone
to visit his troops on the field of battle. General Gablenz
was taken to meet him, and fell in with the King between
Sadowa and Chlum, who at first took him for a wounded
Austrian general, and was about to condole with him, but
being informed of his mission, ordered the bandage to be
removed, and requested the Austrian general to return with
him to Horitz. Here Gablenz expressed Benedek's desire of
an armistice, but no truce could be granted, for Prussia and
Italy were mutually bound to agree to no suspension of hos-
tilities without a common agreement General Gablenz re-
turned unsuccessful to the Austrian head-quarters.
Equally unsuccessfully did the Austrian Government endea-
vour to make a separate peace with Italy. It determined,
however, to leave only garrisons in the fortresses of the
Venetian quadrilateral, and to transfer all the remaining troops
of the Army of the South firom the Mincio to the Danube, to
shield its capital against its northern enemy.
The Prussian army the night of the battle of Koniggratz,
bivouacked on the field. The following afternoon it began to
move forward, to seize the passages over the Elbe. The
Second Army on the left was directed upon Pardubitz. It
left behind it the sixth corps d'armde to watch the fortresses
of Josephstadt and Koniggratz. No siege against these places
was undertaken. Yet the town of Koniggratz was nearly
332 SEVEN' WEEKS' WAR, ^ [Book IX.
destroyed On the 5th July, the day after the Prussian armies
had marched from the vicinity of the fortress, the commander
of the troops left to mask the place, opened a cannonade on
the town from some of the Austrian guns, which had been
captured in the battle. The shells burst among the dry houses,
and the place would soon have been in flames had not a gun
from one of the bastions opened with singular effect upon
the Prussian gunners and compelled them to withdraw.
The army of Prince Frederick Charles, and that of Herwarth,
were both directed upon Przelautsch. At the same time the
division of Landwehr of the Guard, which had followed in
rear of the main armies, was despatched to Prague, the capital
of Bohemia. The Austrian garrison did not attempt to defend
this town, and the Imperial lieutenant transferred the seat of
the government of the province to Pilsen. The Prussian
soldiery here found a very welcome booty in twenty-seven
millions of cigars, which, as tobacco in Austria is a govern-
ment monopoly, were confiscated for the benefit of the Prus-
sian troops. On the 8th July, this division reached the
ancient town on the Moldau, and hoisted the Prussian flag
upon^the Hradschin, the palace of the kings of Bohemia.
On the I ith, General Miilbe took the command of the place,
having moved the first Prussian reserve corps from Saxony
into Bohemia.
The first division of the Landwehr of the Line remained in
Saxony, to which later a newly-formed second division was
added. The detachments made from the Prussian main
armies for masking fortresses, and escorts of prisoners, as well
as the losses in battle and from sickness, were replaced by a
portion of eighty-one new battalions, which had been lately
formed out of the troops left at the regimental depots. The
first line armies, when they moved from the Elbe, were of the
same, or rather superior, strength to those which ten days
before had crossed the Bohemian frontier.
In consequence of the battle of Koniggratz, Feldzeugmeister
Benedek resigned the command of the Austrian Army of the
North, and the Archduke Albrecht, the victor of Custozza, was
appointed to the supreme command of thewhole army. Until
its arrival on the Danube, however, Benedek commanded the
Chap. IJ ADVANCE TO BRUNN, 333
•
Army of the North. Count Clam Gallas had been ordered to
give up his command after Gitschin, and the chief of the staft,
Field Marshal Baron Henikstein, had, before the 3rd July,
been ordered to cede his post to Major-General Paumgarten,
who had hitherto commanded in Gallicia. The latter reached
the army the evening before the battle of Koniggratz, but did
not interfere with the dispositions of his predecessor.
One feeling alone « existed in the army of Benedek. He
possessed the admiration of his officers, and the love of his
men. This affection towards him only increased in the hour
of his misfortune in the camp. But the populace of Vienna
blindly raged against him, and failing to perceive the negli-
gence and errors of the ministers and administrators who had
sent the army into the field in its unprepared condition, in-
veighed in unmeasured terms against the unfortunate general
who had commanded it
On the evening of the 4th July, the armies broke up from
the bivouac they had occupied near the field of battle of
Koniggratz, and advanced towards the Elbe.
On the Sth, they crossed the river ; the First Army, under
Prince Frederick Charles, at Przelautsch ; the Second, under
the Crown Prince, at Pardubitz. The march was begun the
previous evening. After going a short way the troops halted
for the night, and slept by the side of the road. Early on the
morning of the 5th they again set forward, and reached the
Elbe late in the afternoon. The villages along the road had
been mostly deserted, for the inhabitants had fled south with
the retreating Austrian army. The houses looked desolate,
with their doors and windows wide open, and shutters flapping
mournfully in the wind, while there still remained in the street
in front vestiges of the hasty packing up of such articles as
could be carried away. A stray dog or two were seen here
and there, which still stood on the threshold and barked at
the soldiers as they marched by ; but even these were rare, and
often the poultry had invaded the dwelling rooms, and were
roosting among the furniture. For twenty-five miles the army
marched through a luxuriantly fertile country, but almost en-
tirely deserted ; sometimes one or two peasants stood by the
side of the road staring vacantly at the passing troops, or a
334 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
-few women might be found in a village who, half frightened by
the sight of the soldiers, supplied them with the drinking water
which they everywhere requested. But the people had no
cause to fear; they would have done better to remain, for
some of the troops had to be billeted in the houses along the
road, and when the inhabitants were not present, the soldiers
took what they required, and there was no one to receive pay-
ment for what they consumed. The children did not seem so
timid ; they were present along the roads in large numbers, for
the cherries were just ripening, and they took advantage of the
panic among their elders to make a raid on the trees which
grew in long strips by the side of the way. With them the
soldiers soon became great friends. The boys ran along the
battalions with their caps full of the fruit, and got coppers in
exchange for handfuls of it ; the sellers, exulting in the pockets-
ful of coin they soon collected, seemed to have no scruples as
to whose property it rightfully was, but laughed with delight at
this unexpected result of the war.
But for the most part the country in front of the army was
still and silent No church clocks sounded, for their guardians
had fled. There was no one to wind them up, and the hands
stood motionless on the dials. No horses neighed, for they
had all been taken to carry away the flying inhabitants, or per-
haps to aid in dragging off the retreating Austrian guns. The
flowers before the wayside shrines of the Madonna were dried
up and withered, for the votaries who were wont to renew them
had fled, fearful of the invading army. The cattle had been
driven away, and the pastures were vacant. Broad belts of
com, trodden flat to the ground, showed the lines along which
the Austrian battalions had hurried, and here and there lay a
knapsack or ammunition pouch which some fatigued fugitive
had cast away as an impediment to his flight
But where the army marched all was bustle and noise ; the
infantry tramped monotonously along the roads, while the
cavalry spread in bending lines through the fields, and behind
the combatants toiled long trains of waggons, which carried the
stores of this large army. Along every road and every lane
foot soldiers marched, and cavalry occupied the intervals be-
tween the heads of the columns — all pointing southwards,
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRVNN. 335
towards the Elbe. For miles on either side could be seen the
clouds of dust raised by the marching troops ; in some places
it rose from trees and woods, in others from among houses,
or from the hard straight roads leading through the wide com
land, where the hot July sun poured its rays straight down
upon the soldiers' heads and made them suffer much from heat
and thirst
As the foremost troops neared the Elbe all ears listened
eagerly for the sound of cannon, for it was thought that if the
Austrians could bring their troops under fire again they would
oppose the passage of the river, and whether they did so or
not would be accepted as a criterion of how much they had
suffered by the defeat at Koniggratz. The heads of the columns
steadily advanced nearer and nearer to the line of willows
which marked the course of the stream. No cannon sounded,
no rifle even was discharged, and it seemed that the advanced
guard must have passed unopposed. At last the news came
back that the passage was secured, and that there were no signs
of the enemy on the opposite bank. Soon the troops closed
down to the river and filed across the wooden bridge which,
with four arches, spans the muddy stream ; and the black and
yellow stripes on its parapets were the only visible signs that
the Prussian army was in the dominions of the Emperor of
Austria.
Prince Frederick Charles occupied Przelautsch about six on
the evening of the 5th, and almost at the same time the Crown
Prince entered Pardubitz. The line of the Elbe was now
secured as a basis for future operations, and the Austrian rail-
way communication between Vienna and Prague was cut At
the laiter town there were said to be only four Austrian bat-
talions, and it was expected to be evacuated by them and
occupied by the Prussians within a few days.
As was the case. Then, notwithstanding the fortresses of
Konigstein in Saxony, and Josephstadt, Koniggratz, and The-
resienstadt in Bohemia, the Prussian armies, after making some
necessary repairs, obtained railway communication from Pardu-
bitz and Przelautsch by way of Prague and Reichenberg with
their own country, which was of great importance to them in
their further advance.
336 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book IX.
The towns of Przelautsch and Pardubitz were entirely filled
with Prussian soldiers. On every door was written in chalk the
name of the regiment and company to which the house was
allotted, and the number of men which it was to accommodate.
The numbers appeared enormous for the size of the house, fifty
or sixty men were sometimes billeted in a small house with four
rooms, but the soldiers managed well enough so long as they
could get straw to lie upon; but here there was a great scarcity
of that, and the men had to sleep as they could, on the floors
or in the gardens. The greatest difficulty prevailed in getting
any accommodation for horses ; all the stables were occupied
by the horses of generals, and inferior officers would fedn have
had sheds, cowhouses, or any place with a cover, for the
weather looked lowering, and it seemed that it would probably
rain, but all the sheds were occupied by the troops, and most
of the horses had to spend the night in the streets.
But there were advantages here which compensated for more
than a little overcrowding. Large Austrian stores of bread,
beer, and cigars had been found, and the soldiers were de-
lighted to think that they would again have their radons of
tobacco served out to them, which they had not had since they
left Saxony; for to a German soldier tobacco is almost as
necessary as meat, but transport had not been found for
tobacco with the army, as there had been lately a difficulty in
bringing up even food.
The head-quarters of the armies halted on the 6th July in the
same position as they took up the previous evening. The First
Army at Przelautsch. The Crown Prince with the Second
Army was at Pardubitz, whither the King himself went the
same evening. Detachments were pushed along the railway
towards Prague. On the morning of the 6th, an advanced
guard was pushed out to feel the country south of the Elbe. It
consisted of light cavalry, horse artillery, and some infantry.
The Weissenfels hussars led the way, followed by the hussars
of Ziethen, and the 3rd dragoons, whose squadrons were veiy
weak, for their ranks had been terribly thinned by the battle of
Koniggratz. As soon as the columns got out of the town the
hussars spread themselves out over the fields by the side of the
road, and studded the country with horsemen. Some went
Chap. I.] ADVAXCE TO BRUXX. 337
pushing through the com, otliers galloped forward to gain
every piece of rising ground, and from the summit to scan the
country beyond. Every wood was carefully beaten, and every
village inspected by the nimble horsemen before the main body
approached, for Austrian marksmen might be lurking among the
trees, or cavalry might lie in ambush behind the houses. But
no signs of an enemy could be found ; and, although at every
moment they expected to hear the sharp crack of a rifle and the
puff of blue smoke which would tell that an outlying post had
been disturbed, they pursued their way unmolested, and it was
evident that the Austrians had retreated far south or east.
But, though the head-quarters halted at Przelautsch and Par-
dubitz, the 6th was a busy day there. All the sickly and weak
were draughted out of the ranks, and were sentenced to be left
behind — a sure sign that long and severe marches were ex-
pected, and that it was intended that the army should move
free of all possible encumbrance. In vain did those who were
selected to be left behind protest that they were the strongest
men in the regiment, and call upon their comrades to bear
witness to their marching powers. The doctors were good-
naturedly obdurate, and the men selected had to bear the dis-
appointment of not going forward with the army, being solaced
with the assurance that they should rejoin as soon as possible.
Those destined to be left behind were far from numerous —
indeed, their number was surprisingly small, for the army had
been making long marches and bivouacking out nearly every
night in most changeable weather.
Although the Austrians had been obliged to leave the rail-
way, they had taken care to make it of as little use as possible
to its subsequent possessors. All the engines and carriages had
been sent away, and until Prague was occupied none could be
brought by the Prussians to supply their place. So the line
stood idle, and the station had a desolate look, made only more
remarkable by the one or two officials of the indefatigable tele-
graph corps, who had occupied one of the rooms, and were at
their work there early that morning flashing despatches and
reports to the King's staff, and receiving rapid answers which
were to direct the marches of the troops.
A number of Austrian baggage waggons had after Konig-
z
338 SEVEN WEEICS' WAR, [Book IX.
griitz fallen into the hands of the conquerors, and, after being
employed in helping to carry the wounded from the field on the
6th, joined in the long lines of carriages which followed the
Prussian armies. They were easily distinguished in the line of
march by their light yellow colour, which contrasted strongly
with the dark blue with which all the Prussian military carriages
are painted. Every hour showed how much more severely the
Austrians had felt their defeat at Koniggratz than was at first
supposed in the Prussian army. The unopposed passage of the
Elbe, the mission of Marshal Gablenz, the abandonment of the
country south of Przelautsch, were successive proofs of the com-
pleteness of the Prussian victory. The morale of the army had
now risen high, and the soldiers were convinced that the Aus-
trian troops could not stand against them — a feeling which was
no contemptible augury of future victories. But, though the
soldiers were confident in themselves, their arms, and their
leaders, their confidence never stepped beyond just bounds;
they were tender and kind to the wounded and prisoners, not
only by attending to their wants, but by showing them much
consideration, and never exulting over the victory in their pre-
sence, which could hardly be expected from men serving in the
ranks. But the Prussian system of recruiting enlists in the
army as privates men of high education and refined feelings,
and these easily influence their comrades, who are naturally
warm-hearted, to act kindly and charitably to the unfortunate.
On the 7th July the Prussian armies advanced from the
Elbe. The Crown Prince moved from Pardubitz along the
railway -towards Brandeis, with the object of pushing towards
Olmiitz. Prince Frederick Charles, leaning slightly in the
same direction, made for the road which leads from Pardubitz
by Chrudim to Briinn. On the 7th he reached Hermanmestetz.
The army of the Elbe marched on the road which leads hoia
Przelautsch to Iglau and Znaym.
The march of the 7 th was very different from that of the 5 th.
The panic among the country people caused by the defeat of
the Austrians at the battle of Koniggratz did not extend into
the country lying south of the Elbe, and here the inhabitants
had not left their houses. All was busy and full of life, peasants
ivere working in the fields, women and children were abundant
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 339
in the villages, and the soldiers, who seemed to be supplied
plentifully with money by their friends at home, for their pay
is small, bought eggs, butter, milk, and poultry as they passed
along, but in many cases they had little return for their money,
for eggs are difficult to carry in crowded ranks, and butter is
inclined to melt when stowed away in a knapsack, so that
many found when they reached the halting place that their
prudence in providing themselves with eatables was vain, and
that they were disappointed of the luxuries they had meant to
enjoy with their mid-day meal.
The march was little on the high road, but chiefly by country
lanes, over ground covered with short, crisp grass, past water-
mills sunk in the hollows by little streams, and through villages
whose wide open greens covered with geese and ducks reminded
one of England. From the top of every rise the country before
the army could be seen stretching away in a wide rolling plain,
and bounded by the dark blue line of mountains which, thirty
miles distant, separates Bohemia from Moravia. The com
was rapidly ripening ; but the day was cool, yet without rain,
and the troops, marching easily, did not care to avail them-
selves of the water along the road, which was abundant, and
which would have been so grateful on many former marches.
The town of Hermanmestetz is thoroughly Bohemian ; few
of even the better class of inhabitants could speak German.
The signboards of the shops and inns were written only in
Bohemian, and not in German also, as is generally the case
further north. As soon as the troops marched in and were
dismissed from their parades, a rush was made at the shops.
The soldiers crowded in at the doors and up to the counters,
calling loudly for tobacco and cigars. These were not to be
had in any quantity, but coffee was plentiful at first, though the
whole in the town was soon bought Then arose difficulties
about money, for the soldiers did not yet thoroughly under-
stand the Austrian coinage, and the shopkeepers tried to take
the utmost advantage of their ignorance ; but the men protested
loudly against flagrant cases of imposition, and, amid a great
deal of noise and loud talking, the bargains were concluded
generally considerably to the advantage of the dealer.
Every taproom was filled by an importunate crowd eager for
z 2
340 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book IX.
food, beer, and wine; knapsacks were piled on the benches,
rifles stood thickly in the comers, and their owners pressed
round the bar, each trying by dint of noise to secure the
services of the landlord for himself. But though they were
hungry and thirsty, the soldiers were always good-humoured.
Differences of opinion often arose as to the comparative value
of kreutzers and silber groschen ; but when the dispute ran
high the landlord called in the assistance of his wife, and then
almost invariably the soldier had to retire worsted from the
contest, exposing discontentedly to his comrades the small
handful of little coins he had received in change for a dollar.
As soon as it became dark all noise ceased and all bustle was
stilled. The men disappeared to go to sleep. Some lay in the
houses on straw, others in sheds, many in the gardens, for the
house accommodation was not sufficient for them, and many
seemed wisely to prefer the summer air to a crowded room.
Thus the town, before so noisy, grew perfectly still, and no
sound was heard except the monotonous step of a sentry or
the uneasy neigh of some restive horse ; but the arms piled,
with the bayonets fixed, beside each house, with the knapsacks
laid close to the butts packed and ready to be instantly taken
up, told that the soldiers were ready, and that the least alarm
would fill the streets with armed men ready to march.
The King came to Pardubitz on the morning of the 7 th, held
a meeting of the principal generals, and probably the future
plan of the campaign was then discussed. It was still un-
certain whether the two armies were making for the line of
railway which runs by Briinn to Vienna, or whether they were
moving towards Olmutz.
The King remained on the 8th at Pardubitz, w^here it was
determined that the Second Army should move against Olmutz
with the first corps d'arm^e and the cavalry corps leading.
This advanced guard was if possible to feel the enemy, and
discover what amount of his army Benedek still held in the
intrenched camp and what troops he had sent to the south. A
serious attack on the fortress was not, however, contemplated.
Any retreat of the Second Army, which might become neces-
sar}', was to be made, not in the direction of the First Army,
but on the county of Glatz, with which the Second Army now
Ch\p. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN', 34^
formed a line of communication. The First and Second
Armies, on the 8th, moved forwards in a south-easterly direc-
tion ; the Crown Prince, with the Second Army, marched that
morning in the direction of Marisch Triibau, and halted for the
night somewhere short of that town. The First Army, under
Prince Frederick Charles, was that evening scattered round
Chrast; the 8th division, under General Home, was in the
town itself, the main body along the road towards Marisch
Triibau ; the yth was a little to the south at Zumberg ; the 6th
at Kamenitz, a village still further to the south; and the
cavalry, marching by roads more to the southwards still, covered
the right flank of the army. General Herwarth von Bittenfeld,
with his corps, was moving on Iglau. Eight battalions had
been detached to Prague, and that town was occupied on the
morning of this day, the 8th.
Marshal Gablenz passed through the outposts again the
same morning, an<i went to Pardubitz to see the King, as a
commissioner from the Austrian Government, to treat for a
suspension of hostilities. He was received by General von
Moltke, but his proposals could not be entertained, and his
second mission was equally unsuccessful as his first He
submitted that a suspension of hostilities should be concluded,
which should last for at least eight weeks and for at most eight
months; that during this truce the troops of both nations
should retain their actual positions, and a girdle of two miles in
width between the outposts be observed as neutral ground. In
return the Austrian commissioner proposed that the fortresses
of Josephstadt and Koniggratz should be handed over to the
Prussians, but without their garrisons and materiel of war. It
was not in the interest of the Prussian army after a hardly won
victory, and, in its favourable circumstances, to grant such an
armistice, especially as it appeared certain that Austria did not
wish to definitely conclude a peace, but only to gain time to
bring up her Army of the South from Italy. The passage of
Marshal Gablenz through the divisions led to many reports of
the speedy termination of the war, which were more or less
credited
In the meantime, amid rumours of probable peace, the army
still continued its steady advance, and its march was conducted
342 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
with the same precautions and the same circumspection as if
the campaign was only beginning, and as if an unbroken enemy
was in front, ready to take advantage of the slightest error.
Advanced guards were sent forward, who carefully felt the way
for the marching columns, sending scouts to the top of every
rise, who, standing out sharp against the sky, peered into the
distance ; riflemen moved in dotted lines through the fields at
an even pace with the troops marching on the road, and trod
through the com as carefully as if they were sportsmen beating
a covert, or, slipping into a thicket, now appeared, now dis-
appeared in the foliage much like hounds drawing for a fox.
The troops on the road pushed along as steadily and perse-
veringly as on the first day they entered Saxony. The infantry,
with their trousers turned up and boots often drawn on outside
them, trudged along merrily, and seemed little to feel the
heavy yellow cowskin knapsacks and mess tins for cooking
which they carried on their backs. Their helmets had suffered
in the campaign more than any other part of their equipment ;
many had lost the spike on the top, carried away by a bullet or
the splinter of a shell at the battle of Koniggratz. Some
looked as if they had been knocked off in the hurry of action,
and had been marched over heavily by the ranks behind. The
belts showed a want of pipeclay, and the boots had lost all
traces of blacking ; but the barrels of the rifles and the blades
of the bayonets were all bright and clean, and shone out cold
and gray against the dark blue uniforms. The artillery horses,
a little thin, and with rather prominent ribs, from hard work
and scarce forage, stepped briskly out, and almost without
stretching their traces the straight, steel-barrelled guns rolled
along behind them, looking on the road a mere plaything to be
drawn by six horses; but when the ground was heavy from
falling rain, as on the morning before Koniggratz, it needed
nearly all the strength of the team to get a gun over the fields
uphill, and then horses were often wanting, for their bodies,
larger than those of men, were more liable to be stnick by
shells or bullets, and many were killed or badly wounded as
soon as a battery went under fire. After the great battle, the
positions that had been occupied by the field batteries on either
side could be traced by the numbers of dead horses lying where
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUXN. 343
the limbers and waggons had stood. Often twenty or thirty
lay dead in a line near together along the front of the battery,
and others limped about near them, and though always moving
never tried to go away from their dead companions. They,
too, were soon stretched upon the ground, for the Kranken-
trager, looking for the sick, mercifully placed a carbine behind
the ear of every wounded animal, and quickly put it out of
pain. The mass of the cavalry scoured the country to the
south of the main army, keeping watch and ward over its right
flank, but here and there a few turned up in the line of march,
generally a detachment of some troopers guarding waggons*
These detachments were of all kinds of horsemen, — cuirassiers
with their white flannel coats braced tightly in by the cuirass,
and with heavy-looking high jack-boots, were followed quickly
by some few men of the Ziethen hussars, with short crimson
jackets, or oy some of the Weimar light cavalry, with their
light blue and silver uniforms looking none the worse for
exposure, while every column was headed by Uhlans, the
black and white flags of whose lances waved with an almost
funereal aspect above their smart caps and gay red or yellow
facings.
The army marched in several columns, and from every rise
could be seen the different lines creeping like long blue ser-
pents over the country. Dipping into hollows, twisting through
villages, twining among trees, appearing and disappearing
through woods and thickets, they stretched for many a long
mile from front to rear. Always looking steadily ahead, they
pushed on with the men's faces against the sun, and seemed to
be bending towards the fortress of Olmiitz, under the walls of
which the Austrians were reported to have an intrenched
camp, where there were said to be over 100,000 fighting men,
vnXh 400 pieces of artillery ensconced in fortifications. Col-
lected here, the Austrian troops, it was said, meant to bar the
road southwards from the Prussians ; if these passed on dis-
regarding them, to issue out, and, seizing the communications
of the army, cut off* firom it all its supplies of ammunition and
food from the north.
Again, on the 8th, the line of March lay through a country
rich and abundant in supplies, and from which the natives had
344 S^VEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book IX.
not fled away ; and again the columns moved through country
lanes, in some places shadowed in by fruit trees, in others
leading over breezy uplands where the limestone rocks cropped
up close to the surface of the ground, and left but a scanty-
soil to nourish the short grass which grew thick upon it Here
and there the rocks cropped out of the ground and rose up
some twenty feet high, forming grotesquely-shaped natural
grottoes, round which clumps of tall silver fir clustered, and
at the foot of the trees, spread in great profusion, wild roses,
sweetbriar, foxglove, and nightshade. All the farm-houses and
cottages were built of brick, thickly coated with clean white
plaster, and in the smallest hamlet there was always a church
with a steeple surmounted by the large globe-like top, often
gilt, which seems peculiar to Sclavonic countries. No wooden
cottages were to be seen here, for the people are richer than
those north of the Elbe, and the army left behind it, when it
crossed that river, the pine-wood huts, so many of which had
been lately destroyed by the flames kindled by the fire of the
artillery. The houses, both outside and inside, were beauti-
fully clean ; the furniture was of plain deal, without paint,
scoured to a whiteness which is unknown in Northern Bohe-
mia ; the brass handles of the drawers and the steel and iron
round the fire-places shone* bright fi'om much polishing, and
reflected back distorted images of the soldiers, who, in their
dusty clothes and heavy boots, dirty from marching, looked
much out of place in the houses in which they were billeted.
The inhabitants sighed sadly over the war, for their crops had
been injured; soldiers of both armies had been billeted in
their houses, for the Austrians retreated through this part of
the country two days before ; and some of them had sons or
brothers in the Austrian service. But there was no ill-will
between them and the Prussian soldiers. Indeed, the latter
were always so good-natured that it would have been difllicult
even for churls to quarrel with them, and such the natives of
the valley of the Elbe are not They would have preferred
peace to war; they suffered deeply in ha\ing their houses
turned into barracks, their corn-fields into bivouacs, their
barns and outhouses into stables for war horses ; but they did
not blame the soldiers for injuries for the cause of which the
Chap. I.] ADVAXCE TO BRUXX. 345
latter were as innocent as the inhabitants themselves ; they
gave the men what they could; nor did the villagers and
peasants attempt to impose upon the soldiers, though the town
shopkeepers, more keenly alive to their own interests, gene-
rally managed to make a profit out of the difference of the
Prussian and Austrian coinage.
The head-quarters of the First Army were on the night of
the 8th established in a monastery at Chrast The priests
were still there, but gave up the greater part of the house to
Prince Frederick Charles and his staff. Military waggons and
horses were picketed inside the usually quiet monastery close ;
soldier servants went whisthng up and down the corridors and
among the cells, saddle-bags and valises were bundled upstairs,
and the monastery would soon have been very like a barrack
were it not that the priests kept flitting about, good-naturedly
proffering food and drink to both officers and soldiers ; for,
although they looked on both as the enemies of their
countr}', and, perhaps, even of their Church, they knew
that the army had marched far and fast, and they practised
that charity which should be the connecting link among all
Christian creeds.
From the church close by the monastery, as a centre, the
little town spreads out, its white houses glisteniilg brightly in
the sun, along four streets, almost at right angles to each
other. Between and behind the houses lay little gardens, in
which grew most English greenhouse flowers; vines were
trained in trellis-work against the walls, and beyond the
fields stretched away, covered with heavy crops ripening for
harvest ; and between the cornfields lay long belts of gaudy-
coloured poppies, which are cultivated in this country in great
quantities. The churcK bell sounding slowly, probably for
vespers, for the day was Sunday, and a few women, with
shawls in Bohemian fashion thrown over their bare heads,
disappearing into the church door, and just seen within
crossing themselves with the holy water, would have made
the whole scene one of perfect peace; but the piles of
bayonets by every door, the perpetual soldiers bustling along
the streets, the cantonniers who had established their itinerant
stalls close outside the church door, and were squabbling with
346 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
soldiers over the value of black cigars or schnapps, told that
this smiling little town was . the head-quarters of an army
which had just marched from a battle-field, and was pressing
forward again to force its enemy to battle ; for the policy of
the Prussian army was now to cling to the heels of the
retreating Austrians and to force them to fight before they had
time to re-organize their forces. On the 9th July the whole
force was again moved towards the south-east. That night
the King's head-quarters were at Hohenmauth; the head-
quarters of Prince Frederick Charles, commanding the centre,
were at the village of Reichenberg, about twenty-five miles
south-east of Pardubitz. The Crown Prince, with the head-
quarters of the Second Army, halted for the night at Leito-
mischl, one march to the east of the First Army; and the
Army of the Elbe was pursuing its way, at an even pace with
the two others, under General von Bittenfeld, along the road
which leads to Iglau. No intelligence had yet been received
of the occupation of Prague, although it was considered cer-
tain that Prussian troops must have occupied that town.
Tidings of the capital of Bohemia being actually possessed
were eagerly looked for, not only by those who took a stra-
tegical interest in the campaign, but by all who wished to
receive private supplies from Berlin ; for till the railway com-
munication was established parcels could hardly be expected
to arrive ; and tobacco and cigars, which rank in Germany
almost on a par with food, were very scarce, and a fresh
supply was eagerly desired. This day's was a short march,
but the most unpleasant one which the army had yet had. A
drizzling rain fell in the early morning, and a cold wind was
blowing, which drove their wet clothes against the soldiers*
bodies, and made them shiver even as they marched; but
towards mid-day the rain ceased, and the sun burst through
the clouds, so that the men got dry ; but heavy rain again fell
in the afternoon, and the bivouac at night was moist and
uncomfortable. Again this day the country was found fertile,
and the inhabitants still in their houses ; all received kindly
the soldiers who came into the cottages along the line of
march to buy food or tobacco, and some even expressed a
desire to become Prussians, stating as a reason that they
Chap. I.] ADVAXCE TO BRUNN, 347
should pay less taxes than under the Austrian rule; but
whether this wish was sincere, or only elicited by the presence
of the Prussian troops and from a desire of flattering their
national pride, is open to question.
■ At this time Feldzeugmeister Benedek was working hard to
reorganize the relics of the Austrian Army of the North at
Olmiitz, Although over sixty years old, he displayed a
capacity for labour, both in the saddle and at the desk, which
would have shamed many a younger man. He was at this
time ordered to despatch the mass of his army by rail to
Vienna, where it was to be united to the Austrian army from
Italy, under the command of the Archduke Albrecht*
Count Mensdorf was despatched from Vienna directly, after
the defeat at Koniggratz, to the head-quarters of the Army of
the North, in order there to inquire into the circumstances of
that disaster. The consequences of his mission were that a
military commission was later assembled at Weiner Neustadt,
before which Count Clam Gallas and Generals Henikstein,
Krismanics, and Benedek himself were summoned to appear.
General von John was appointed Chief of the Staff to the
Archduke Albrecht The Austrian Government wished, by
bringing up its Army of the South, to oppose a force to the
advance of the Prussians, but the troops from Italy did not
arrive quickly enough. It was only on the 12th July that
the first detachment of nine thousand men arrived at Vienna.
From the time of the battle of Koniggratz, the Prussian
armies had lost all traces of the Austrians until the 8th July,
when some of the Crown Prince's advanced troops fell in with
an outpost of the enemy before Zwittau, near the junction of
the two branches of rail which lead from Olmiitz and Briinn to
Bohmisch Triibau. After a slight skirmish the Austrians fell
back, and on the 9th the Crown Prince occupied Mahrisch
Triibau and Zwittau, two towns of Moravia. That evening the
first corps d'armde halted at Zwittau, the Guards at Wilden-
schwert, the fifth corps at Landskron.
The first intelligence which the Prussians received of the
retreat of the Austrian army had made it appear probable that
• Letters from the correspondents of the Times with the Austrian army.
348 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX,
Benedek had withdrawn the greater portion of it to Briinn, on
the direct Hne to Vienna. Now the whole of his movements
were cleared up. An Austrian field post happened to be
captured in front of Mahrisch Triibau, and many interesting
private letters found in it, which established the demoralized
condition of Benedek's army, as well as a copy of the orders of
that general for the marches of his corps, and the movements
of his administrative services. It was thus discovered that
only the tenth Austrian corps and the heavy cavalry of the
Prince of Schleswig-Holstein had been sent to Briinn, and
that the rest of the Army of the North was seeking shelter
under the guns of Olmiitz until it should be in a fit condition
to attack the Prussians. A few days later the Austrian cavalry
retaliated, and captured a Prussian field post, in which a
despatch was found that gave them some valuable information
with regard to the Prussian movements.
On the loth July, the King of Prussia moved his head-
quarters to Zwittau. This day it was known to the Prussians
that the Austrian Army of the South had commenced its
journey to Vienna from Olmiitz by railway. The transport of
this army was conducted as quickly as possible, and between
the 7 th and the 13th Benedek despatched three corps — ^the
3rd, 4th, and 6th — ^to the capital.* When it was ascertained
that the Austrian army was moving to the south, the march of
the Crown Prince was directed towards Prerau, that he might
there cut the railway communication between Olmiitz and Vienna.
On the loth, a long march of twenty-five miles brought the
head-quarters of the First Army to the litde town of Neustadt,
which lies about fifty miles to the northwest of Briinn. It was
a wet morning; the clouds hung low, and a drizzling rain
made the soft country road deep for the infantry and heavy for
the artillery and baggage waggons, for this day the army did
not move on one of the main chaussees^ but by one of the
lesser roads which lead through the highland country dividing
Bohemia from Moravia. As the road ascended, the scenery
* On no point is there so much popular misunderstanding as on the
transport of troops by rail in war. The experience of the German cam-
paign proves that 10,000 men, equipped for the field, is the most that
can be safely calculated upon to be moved per day on a single railv^'ay.
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN, 349
became more and more bleak and cold ; the com was in the
higher parts quite short and green, and in some places not in
ear ; cultivation was only on patches of ground, and where the
land was not tilled the grass grew short and bare. Cold, hard-
looking rocks projected everywhere from the soil ; the surface
of the ground was thickly strewn with large stones, among
which a few stunted larch-trees looked as though they had to
struggle hard to obtain soil sufficient for even their roots.
Above the road on the hill-sides grow dense forests of spruce
and silver fir, the tops of which were for the most part shrouded
in a thick mist The dwellings along the lin^ of march were
in keeping with the aspect of the country — low, dirty, and
untidy, without any gardens, and, generally standing alone on
the bleak hill-side, they seemed fitting habitations for the
squalid and starved-looking inhabitants who lounged in their
doorways, watching with a lazy curiosity the soldiers marching
on the road. The men, thin and with sharply-drawn features,
seemed to have no work to do, but leant lazily against the
doorposts smoking long black pipes; the women, with feet
bare and garments scanty, shivered beside them, holding
in their arms a dirty infant, or combing out their tangled
hair.
The foot-soldiers trudged sullenly along; the march was
long for them, and the road bad, but they kept up a good pace
the whole way, and there were no stragglers. But they had
had enough of wet, though, in defiance of the rain, they
marched with their cloaks rolled up, mainly to keep them dry
for the night bivouac, and longed for dry weather or a harder
road The horses of the artillery laboured heavily, but got the
guns and ponderous waggons, weighty with ammunition and
corn-sacks full of forage piled up on them, up the quickly-
recurring bits of steep ascent in the road. At every sharp rise
the drivers flogged and spurred, the gunners pushed behind,
and, though the horses stumbled and often nearly fell,, and the
traces were stretched so tight that they looked as if they must
break, no accident occurred, and every artillery carriage arrived
safely, at its destination. The baggage-waggons did not fare
so well. Less strongly horsed and not so well driven, they all
dropped far behind the troops, and a few remained stranded
350 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
on the side of the way with a broken axle-tree or a shivered
wheel.
Near the little town of Swratka the frontier of Moravia was
passed, but the road that descends from it still ran along the
hill country of the frontier, and only came down into a valley
near Neustadt to rise again at the beginning of the morrow's
march. Within Moravia the country, though perhaps even
less fertile, was more pleasing. All pretence of cultivation had
been given up, for trees grew down close to the road, and
where there was not wood the ground was wet and marshy,
and showed no signs of ever having been drained ; and the
horses of the cavalry who scouted in front of the columns
floundered along, sinking in it above their fetlocks.
The monotony of the march was relieved by a spirited
cavalry skirmish in the little town of Saar, which is about six
miles to the west of Neustadt. On the previous night the
Austrian hussars of the regiment of Hesse-Cassel held Saar.
The Prussian cavalry was to proceed on the loth to Gammy,
about a mile in front of Saar, and the 9th regiment of Uhlans
formed its advanced guard on the march. The Austrians
intended to march the same day to the rear towards Briinn,
and the hussars were actually assembling for parade previous
to the march when the first patrols of the Prussian Uhlans came
rattling into the town. The Austrians were collecting together
from all the different houses and farmyards; mounted men,
filing out of bams and strawhouses, were riding slowly to-
wards their rendezvous in the market-place; men who had
not yet mounted were leading their horses, strolling carelessly
alongside them, when, by some fault of their sentinels, they were
surprised by the Prussians. The Uhlans were much inferior
in number at first, but their supports were coming up behind
them, and this disadvantage was compensated for by the
Austrians being taken unawares. The Uhlans quickly ad-
vanced, but did not charge before one Austrian squadron had
time to form, and only while most of the men of the remaining
divisions were quickly falling into their ranks, though some
were cut off from the rendezvous by the Prussians advancing
beyond the doors from which they were issuing, and were
afterwards made prisoners.
CHAP. L] ADVANCE TO BRUiWW 351
In the market-place an exciting contest at once began. The
celebrated cavalry of Austria were attacked by the rather de-
preciated horsemen of Prussia, and the lance, the " queen of
weapons,*' as its admirers love to term it, was being engaged in
real battle against the sword. The first Prussian soldiers who
rode into the town were very few in number, and they could
not attack before some more came up. This delay of a few
minutes gave the hussars a short time to hurry together from
the other parts of the town, and by the time the Uhlans
received their reinforcements the Austrians were nearly formed.
As soon as their supports came up the lancers formed a line
across the street, advanced a few yards at a walk, then trotted
for a short distance, their horses' feet pattering on the stones,
the men's swords jingling, their accoutrements rattling, and
their lances borne upright, with the black and white flags
streaming over their heads ; but when near the opening into
the broader street, which is called the Market-place, a short,
sharp word of command, a quick, stem note from the trumpet,
the lance-points came down and were sticking out in front of
the horses' shoulders, the horses broke into a steady gallop, and
the lance-flags fluttered rapidly from the motion through the
air, as the horsemen, with bridle-hands low and bodies bent
forward, lightly gripped the staves, and drove the points
straight to the front.
But when the Prussians began to gallop, the Austrians were
also in motion. With a looser formation and a greater speed
they came on, their blue pelisses, trimmed with fur and em-
broidered with yellow, flowing freely from their left shoulders,
leaving their sword-arms disencumbere.d. Their heads, well
up, carried the single eagle's feather in every cap straight in the
air ', their swords were raised, bright and sharp, ready to strike,
as their wiry little horses, pressed tight by the knees of the
riders, came bounding along, and dashed against the Prussian
ranks as if they would leap over the points of the lances. The
Uhlans swayed heavily under the shock of the collision ; but,
recovering again, pressed on, though only at a walk. In front
of them were mounted men, striking with their swords, parrying
the lance-thrusts, but unable to reach the lancer; but the
ground was also covered with men and horses, struggling
352 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
together to rise; loose horses were galloping away; dis-
mounted hussars in their blue uniforms and long boots were
hurrying off to try to catch their chargers or to avoid the lance-
points. The Uhlan line appeared unbroken, but the hussars
were almost dispersed. They had dashed up against the firmer
Prussian ranks, and they had recoiled, shivered, scattered, and
broken as a wave is broken that dashes against a difil In the
it'N moments that the ranks were locked together, it seems
that the horsemen were so closely jammed against each other
that lance or sword was hardly used. The hussars escaped the
points in rushing in, but their speed took them so close to the
lancers* breasts that they had not even room to use their
swords. Then the Prussians, stouter and taller men, mounted
on heavier horses, mostly bred from English sires, pressed hard
on the light frames and the smaller horses of the hussars, and
by mere weight and physical strength bore them back, and
forced them from their seats to the ground ; or sometimes, so
rude was the shock, sent horse and man bounding backwards,
to come down with a clatter on the pavement
The few Austrians who remained mounted fought for a short
time to stop the Prussian advance, but they could make no im-
pression on the lancers. Wherever a hussar made a dash to
close three points bristled couched against his chest or his
horse's breast, for the Austrians were now in inferior numbers
in the streets to the Prussians, and the narrowness of the way
would not allow them to retire for their reserves to charge. So
the Prussians pressed steadily forward in an imailnerable line,
and the Austrians, impotent to stop them, had to fall back
before them. Before they had gone far through the town, fight-
ing this irregular combat more Prussian cavalry came up behind
the Uhlans, and the Austrians began to draw off. The lancers
pushed after them, but the hussars got away, and at the end of
the town the pursuit ceased. One officer and twenty-two non-
commissioned officers and privates taken prisoners, with nearly
forty captured horses, fell into the hands of the Uhlans, as the
trophies of this skirmish. Some of the prisoners were wounded;
a few hussars killed, and two or three Prussians were left dead
upon the ground.
One or two of the privates taken prisoners were Germans,
Ch^p. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 353
but by far the greater number were Hungarians — smart, soldier-
like looking fellows, of a wiry build ; they looked the very per-
fection of light horsemen, but were no match in a mtUe for the
tall, strong cavalry soldiers of Prussia, who seemed with one
hand to be able to wring them from their saddles, and hurl them
to the ground.
The inhabitants of Neustadt reported that there was ah
Austrian cavalry division of four regiments at Ostrau, a village
about six miles south of Saar, and it seemed clear from the
reports of the prisoners that there was a strong cavalry force in
front of the advancing Prussians. On the loth July five hun-
dred Italians, deserters from the Austrian service, surrendered
themselves to General von Bittenfeld, the commander of the
Army of the Elbe, and volunteered to serve during the war in
the Prussian army ; but the King had no need of foreign troops,
and very naturally declined the proffered services of men who
had been faithless to one cause, and ordered that they should
be sent to Italy, where they might perhaps have an opportunity
of proving their patriotism on the Mincio.
The same day aU the Saxon prisoners who had been taken
during the campaign were released and sent to their homes, on
condition of taking an oath not to serve against Prussia during
the war. They all took the oath, and went to Saxony ; but
many seemed to quit their prisons with regret, for they had no
money, and they feared that there would be no work to be
found in their own country ; but this fear ought not to have
been well-grounded, for the harvest in Saxony was close at
hand, and the crops there had not been trampled down by
battles or bivouacs.
The weather .on the nth was better than that of the previous
day. The sun shone out warm, and lighted up the dark groves
of fir-wood which hung above the road, and shining on the
trunks of the silver firs relieved the monotonous dark green of
the foliage. The road was very hilly, and in some places bad,
but it was drying quickly under the influence of the sun, and
the soldiers marched cheerfully, careless of the depressing
weather which had lately been the rule. The way still lay
through the Moravian highlands, but the increased heat of the
sun, the presence of oak and ash among the firs, the yellower
A A
354 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
crops and more abundant grass showed that the army was gra-
dually working down towards the valley of the Schwarzawa :
but the country did not become more plain, nor did the rivulcti
tumble down alongside the road in less frequent miniature
cataracts ; on the contrary, the ground was more broken up in
hills and valleys. The former were not high, nor did they run
in any chain, or in any order ; sometimes they rose as huge,
isolated, rounded masses, the tops of which were shrouded in
fir plantations, while abutting mica rocks projecting from their
sides reflected brightly the rays of the sun ; sometimes they ran
in tortuous ridges, breaking suddenly into a steep ravine, to
allow the passage of a watercourse ; or throwing up some huge
masses of rock which, sparkling in the sunlight, contrasted
strongly with the dark leaves of the surrounding trees, seemed
to form natural castles to defend the road. In such a country
a few riflemen might have delayed seriously the march of the
army, but the advanced guard had patrolled the paths through
all die woods, had sent scouts to the top of every hill, had
looked down into every ravine, and, though the Austrian
cavalry was known to be between them and Briinn, they
marched on to Tischnowitz without finding an Austrian Jager,
or meeting with any opposition to their progress.
Fifteen miles from Neustadt, where it had halted the night
before, the Head-quarter Staff turned aside from the road, fol-
lowed a rough country lane for two miles, and then plunged by
a rugged, winding path into a deep ravine formed by one of
the feeders of the Schwarzawa. On the side of the ravine over
which the path led through a thick wood, perched high on a
prominent rock, and rising above fir-trees, stood the old Schloss
of Bernstein, where it had been considered advisable to fix
head-quarters for the night. The battlements and loop-holed
walls of the old castle strongly lighted up by the sun, the steep
ravine below sunk in shade, the helmets of the escort, the line
of armed and mounted men, formed a scene which savoured
more of romance than of modem war.
The Prince Frederick Charles and his staff turned down the
twisting path, crossed the river by a wooden bridge close to a
water-mill, and, by a more easy ascent on the other side, gained
the gate, which still bore the marks of where a portcullis had
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN, 355
been. But in the yard within every-day life was rudely recalled.
The spare horses of the officers had already arrived, and in-
dignant grooms were anathematising fiercely because they could
get no stabling for their charges ; the steep road forbade the
approach of the forage waggons, and neither hay nor com
were to be found in the antiquated building. The appearance
of the Commander-in-Chief for a few moments hushed the*
clamour, but when he rode on each aggrieved domestic made a
rush at his master, and loudly poured forth the tale of his
sorrows. A compromise was effected, for hay and com had
been provided at a farmhouse near at hand ; and when the
servants were assured that the horses should have food, they
bore with resignation that they must be all night without cover.
But attention Mras soon called away from both the scenery
and the horses by the arrival of an Uhlan officer from the
advanced guard, who rode up the yard at a gallop, and,
jumping off his horse before the Commander-in-Chief, with his
hand to his forehead, dehvered a hurried report
The advanced guard had found the enemy's cavalry in strong
force at Tischnowitz, and the Duke of Mecklenburg had sent
him to Prince Frederick Charles to report the fact and receive
his orders. The orders were soon written, and Major von
Capprivi, a staff-officer, who has a high reputation in this army,
was entrusted to deliver them to the commander of the
advanced guard
Major Capprivi's horse was tired with a long march, and
Tischnowitz lay fifteen miles ofif, but he had no choice but to
carry the order, and in a few minutes he was ready to start.
With him went three officers, who had been employed as aides-
de-camp at head-quarters, but whose regiments were in the
advanced guard, and who went to join them for the action
which was expected. Revolvers were inspected, and the
priming carefully looked to, for Austrian patrols were expected
to be on the road, and it was just possible that the little band
might have to ride for their Hves. But they started in high
spirits, for the excitement of probable battle nerved them, and
two hours of a sharp trot brought them to Tischnowitz.
Here, in a small town on the banks of the Schwarzawa, the
Austrian cavalry had taken up their position. The road leading
A A 2
3S6 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book IX.
to the town goes straight along the valley, and keeping a direct
course is obliged some three or four times to cross by wooden
bridges the channel of the stream, which is here about fifiy
feet wide. When the Duke of Mecklenburg, with the advanced
guard, was approaching Tischnowitz, he perceived that the
enemy was in the town, and in strong force of cavalry with
artillery in the plain beyond, where he occupied a position
which could not be turned by cavalry on account of the rugged
nature of the hills on either flank. But the Austrians, besides
the horsemen in the town and on the far side, had thrown out
three squadrons in the direction of Tischnowitz, of which the
centre one was in the road and between the bridges, and the
right and left were thrown into the corn-fields on either side.
The Prussian troopers, few in number, who formed the advance
of the advanced guard, had ridden forward toward the bridges,
and had almost begun to cross the first before they perceived
the hostile cavalry. Then they found that both their flanks
were exposed to attack, and that the squadron in the road in
front of them was getting ready to charge. The Prussian
advanced guard was fi^om the 2nd regiment of dragoons of the
Guard ; the Austrian squadrons were lancers, and it seemed
that the skirmish of the previous day between sword and lanc%
would be repeated with the weapons in opposite hands.
But the lieutenant commanding the small Prussian advanced
guard, seeing that he was too weak to force his way, and
fearing to be surrounded and cut off, retreated a short distance
to where a slight rise in the ground gave him a certain advan-
tage of position, and there drawing up his little force awaited
an attack, but with no intention of meeting it with the sword.
While his men were yet retiring, they were unbuckling their
carbines, and before they had turned to stand, their quickly-
loaded arms, constructed on the same principle as the needle-
gun, were ready to fire. And not too soon, for the Austrians
had begun to advance quickly, and were defiling over the
bridge, prepared to form line and charge, when a sudden volley
from the Prussian carbines made them pull up sharp, half
surprised, half frightened to find that a carbine could be of any
use, except to make noise or smoke, in the hands of a mounted
man. But the Prussians did not wait to observe the discom-
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 357
fiture of their enemies ; their officer only noticed that they were
in too strong force to be allowed to get near his much smaller
band, and again he retreated a little distance ; and so quick
were the dragoons with their loading that their carbines were
almost ready to fire again before they turned to retire. The
Austrians again formed to charge, and again before they had
settled into their stride a rapid volley stopped their career.
Again the Prussians retired, and again faced about ready to
fire another volley. Again the Austrians came on, and again
the fire of the dragoons stopped them short ; but this was the
last time, for the whole of the first squadron of the dragoons
were now up, and had formed line beside the few who had
hitherto prevented the advance of the lancers.
Then the dragoons advanced to charge, and the Austrians,
glad to exchange the chance of close quarters for the fire of
the carbines, came forward to meet them. Both sides advanced
steadily : the lancers, with their spears in rest, came on in an
apparently impenetrable line; but the dragoons, with their
sword-points to the fi'ont and their horses well in hand, bore
steadily down upon them, in the last few yards let their horses
go, and dashed in through the points of the lances. Their
commander. Major von Shack, went down, grievously wounded,
but his men thought of his fall only to avenge it, and rushed
in so close to the lancers that their spears were useless, smiting
them heavily with their keen bright swords. A few moments
only the mtlSe lasted ; then the lancers, turning, flew towards
the town. The dragoons pursued, but their officer kept them
well in hand,, and they did not lose their order. When the
street was gained the lancers turned again, the swordsmen
thundered down upon them, and by sheer weight and strength
of blows bore them backwards along the street The fight was
long and hard. The men, too close together to use their
weapons, grappled with one another; the horses, frightened
and enraged, snorted, plunged, reared, and struck out But
the Prussians had superior weight and strength, and pressed
their antagonists back along the streets to a wider space in the
centre of the town, where a high image of the Madonna,
carved in stone, looked down upon the fray. Here an Austrian
officer, hurled from his saddle by a tall Prussian dragoon, had
358 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
his brains dashed out against the foot of the monument, and
another Austrian, bent backwards over the cantle of his saddle,
had his spine broken by the strength of his assailant The
light Austrian men and horses had no chance in this close con-
flict, and soon they were obliged to turn, and fled down the
street to where their supports were drawn up behind the town.
Here there was a strong force of Austrian cavalry, and a
battery of horse artillery was placed so as to sweep the road.
But the cavalry drew off" without waiting for an attack, and the
artillery retired without firing a shot; which can only be
accounted for by believing, as the country people said, that
there was no ammunition with the guns. The Prussian
supports came up and pushed two miles beyond the town, but
the Austrians had drawn ofl" too quickly to again allow an
engagement; and the outposts were placed here for the night
Then the Duke of Mecklenburg made his arrangements for his
advance to Briinn the next morning ; and when he had given a
general sketch of his plans, Major von Capprivi and Captain
von Bergmann, the staff officer attached to the advanced
guard, retired to a back room in the small country inn of
Tischnowitz, and, by the light of a single tallow candle,
discussed till late into the night, and sketched upon their maps,
the details of the occupation of the capital of Moravia.
The march was ordered for four o'clock in the morning, for
it was expected that the Austrian cavalry would defend the
approach to the town, and it was intended to surprise them
before they had made their dispositions. It was after midnight
that the two staff" officers threw themselves on some trusses of
straw to catch a few short hours of sleep before the commence-
ment of an operation which might perhaps have been one of
the most decisive of the campaign, for tlie plans were skilfully
laid, and it seemed that if the Austrians attempted to stand in
front of the town a great part of their cavalry would have been
captured. All that the staff" appeared to fear was that the
cavalry would draw off" through the town before daylight, and
too early for the dispositions for their capture to be carried out
— for the infantry who were required to invest the further side
of Briinn had marched far in the day, and were too tired to be
sent forward before daybreak.
Chap. L] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 359
At three o'clock on the morning of the 12th July, the
soldiers of the advanced gnard of the First Prussian Army
were roused from their billets, and began making their prepara-
tions for the march. Horses were saddled ; the cloaks in
which the men had been sleeping were rolled up and buckled
on the pommels, girths and bridle reins carefully inspected, and
the troopers, before they mounted, drew their hands along the
edges of their swords to test the sharpness of their weapons.
The officers looked to the loading of their revolvers, and
buckled their pistols round their waists, so that they might be
easily got at in case of need ; and it was expected that they
would be required, for three divisions of Austrian cavalry were
reported to be between the small town where the advanced
guard halted the previous night and Briinn^ and the Duke of
Mecklenburg had only three cavalry regiments with him.
At a quarter before four, before the sun was up, the troops
began marching out of Tischnowitz, and in three-quarters of an
hour formed up before the little village of Hradschau, which
the most advanced outposts had occupied during the former
night Here the Duke of Mecklenburg called his principal
officers round him, and told them that he expected to find
three divisions of the enemy's cavalry, forming together a force
of twelve regiments, in front of him ; but that his orders were
to occupy Briinn if possible, and that he intended to advance
immediately. The troops were then formed in the order in
which they were to move behind a ridge of rising ground, over
which the Briinn road rises and falls, about a quarter of a mile
beyond Hradschau. The 2nd dragoons of the Guard led;
they were followed by the Ziethen Hussars and a battery of
horse artillery ; then came a battalion of Jagers, followed by
the rest of the infantry and artillery, and a regiment of lancers
closed the rear.
As soon as the formation was complete, the dragoons sent
out their scouts, and in a few minutes the top of the ridge was
studded with mounted men who showed out clear against the
morning sky. Every horseman carried his carbine in his right
hand, ready to fire ; but the staff hstened in vain for the sharp
crack which would tell that the enemy was in sight ; and the
scouts, after peering forward for a few moments, dipped down
36o SEVEN WE Ears* WAR, [Book IX.
behind the ridge, and were hidden. Then the dragoons ad-
vanced along the road. When their leading troops gained the
top of the ascent they spread out right and left, and pushed
across the fields that lay on either side of the way. The
hussars, in column of troops, followed along the highway,
raising a cloud of dust which almost hid them, and from its
midst rose the steady patter of horses* feet and the jingle of
steel which mark the march of cavalry. The guns rumbled
behind, with rammers and sponges ready for action, and limber-
boxes, unlocked, each closely followed by its moimted gunners,
prepared to spring down and twist the muzzle round towards
the front. Carefully beating through the com, and covering
every piece of rising ground, the dragoons steadily advanced ;
but no sign of an enemy was seen, and the advanced scouts
reached the village of Tschepen without finding traces of even
a last night's bivouac
Here the road ran through a narrow defile, with high banks
covered with plantations, and the houses of the village standing
across the pass would have formed a strong position for the
Austrians to hold. On approaching the village the cavalry was
halted, and the riflemen were sent for to beat through the wood
and push in among the houses. The halt was not long, for in
a few minutes the Jagers came up quickly with a long swinging
stride, passed by the cavalry, and burst like a pack of hounds
into the village and up the sides of the slopes. Now and then
a dark green uniform appeared among the trees only to dis-
appear again ; and here and there among the houses the sun-
light glancing back fi-om a rifle barrel, ever further advanced,
showed that the skirmishers were working forward, but the
sound of no shot came back, and it was clear that the village
was deserted. The cavalry and guns then moved on, and filed
along the narrow street ; but the Jagers were still kept in fi-ont,
for the defile did not end till the village of Gurein was passed.
The dragoons then spread out again, and went peeping in-
quisitively into every hollow, ferreting out the inhabitants of
the cottages to give information, and stopping every peasant
who seemed to be in too pressing a hurry to get away in the
direction in which the Austrian cavalry was supposed to lie.
The country people asserted with one accord that the Aus-
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 361
trians had retired through Briinn the night before or early that
morning, and there were no troops in front of the town j that
a few dragoons and lancers had bivouacked the previous even-
ing just outside Briinn, but had passed through at daybreak,
and were already far on the road to Vienna.
The road ran over successive ridges, each of which would
have been an advantageous standing-point for the Austrians
had they meant to oppose the Prussian advance into the town.
As position after position was covered by the scouts without
iinding the enemy, and as the stories of the country people
were always the same, the staff began to believe that the
Austrian cavalry had really retired, and that their troops would
seize the place without opposition. The road from Tischno-
witz strikes the high road from Zwittau to Briinn about six
miles before reaching the latter town, and when this point was
passed it seemed almost sure that the way was clear, and that
the Austrians had drawn off; and here this assurance received
a further confirmation, for at this point a dragoon came in
bringing with him two travellers, who had in the morning left
Briinn for Zwittau, and had been stopped on their way by the
foremost Prussian patrol Glad to exchange their information
for permission to proceed on their journey, they willingly told
that the town was deserted by troops, and that all the Austrians
had retired early in the morning.
But the march was continued, notwithstanding these reports,
with even greater precaution; the scouts were as alert as
before, and the main body moved through the com land by
the side of the road, prepared to form line of battle. About
eight o'clock the leading troops ascended a gentle slope,
from the top of which the capital of Moravia could be seen
lying four miles before them. Here a halt was called, and the
staflf-ofiicers went forward a litde way to reconnoitre.
The sun shone brightly on the spires of the churches and
on the roofs of the houses, but no swords or spear-heads
glittered in its light ; and on the fort of the Spielberg, on the
western side of the town, no guns could be seen, and no
sentinels stood upon the ramparts. White flags of truce were
flying from every steeple and from every tower, and, instead of
the Austrian colours, a white sheet waved from the flagstaff of
362 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX,
the fort It was evident that the town had surrendered. In
a few minutes a deputation from the magistracy arrived to
announce officially that the town was deserted by the Austrian
troops, and praying that it might not be given up to pillage.
The Duke of Mecklenburg willingly promised tliat the pro-
perty of the inhabitants should be secure to them, for there
had been no intention to allow plundering.
Then, after an hour's halt, the troops again advanced, and
soon got between two lines of villas which stand outside the
town on each side of the road. The scouts came cantering
in, and, drawing together on the road, formed an advanced
guard, behind which the Duke of Mecklenburg and his staff
rode. Before the actual town was reached, a deputation — the
burgomaster and magistrates — were seen coming to meet the
troops in cabs with white flags flying from them, and each
with a broad band of white round his arm. As soon as they
saw the stafl" they sprang out of their carriages, and, with hats
in hand, came forward bowing, with many prayers for the
preservation of their city from pillage. They had much
wealth in the city, and they feared for their property.
The Prussian commander answered them courteously, but
told them that his men had marched early and had no pro-
visions, and that, therefore, he should be much obliged to
them to furnish dinner for 8,000 soldiers, and forage for 2,500
horses. The magistrates started back to the town to procure
the rations.
When the deputation was dismissed the troops again ad-
vanced I'he line of spectators became thicker along the side
of the road, crowds of inhabitants along the side of the way
courted the smiles of the soldiers, white flags hung from every
window, and the inmates of many houses, with a mockery of
enthusiasm, had hung out green boughs and wreaths of leaves
to welcome the invaders of their country.
The dragoons were sent on in advance, and went clattering
through the town to occupy the bridges on the further side ;
Jagers swung swiftly forward to seize the railway station, the
post-office, and the telegraph bureau; and the rest of the
infantry marched in with music playing, seized the Spielbeig,
and took possession of the capital of Moravia
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 363
Prince Frederick Charies came in late in the afternoon at
the head of General Manstein's division. When he reached
the Platz he halted, and drew on one side to see his men
march past him. The soldiers had been on the road since two
o'clock in the morning, but the regiments marched as if they
had not come two miles. With steady tramp and all in step,
with unbroken ranks and battalions undiminished by stragglers,
they marched into the town. Dusty and worn boots alone
showed that they had come across Bohemia, fought a great
battle, and had been marching lately over twenty-five miles a
day ; for they had halted outside to brush their clothes, and
they came in with cloaks well folded, knapsacks as well put on,
and arms as clean, as if they had been in garrison at home.
The 60th, a regiment renowned for its marching, well sustained
its reputation; the men, shoulder to shoulder, close as if linked
together, moved forward like a solid wall, and notwithstanding
their fatigue, for they had come over thirty miles, stepped in
such perfect cadence from front to rear of the regiment that
only one footfall was heard upon the pavement The 24th,
tall men and well-built, came along with heads well up and
rifles carried as if they could not know fatigue, and were quite
unaware that they bore a heavy knapsack on their shoulders.
The other regiments also marched bravely, and their chief
looked that day as proud of his troops as when he stood
among them victorious on the summit of the Sadowa hill;
and well he might, for the Prussian army had given proof of
an endurance of fatigue and of a power of marching which
have rarely been equalled in the annals of war; for the
marches had not been made by small detachments or over
open ground, but by large masses, along deep and heavy
roads, encumbered with artillery and crowded with car-
riages.
The head-quarters of the First Army halted at Briinn on the
13th July. The troops had marched their shoes off their feet,
and no repairs could be made during the late rapid marches ;
the horses of the cavalry wanted rest and shoeing, the sad-
dlery required looking to, reserves of ammunition had to be
brought up, and it was necessary to establish depots and hos-
pitals* The advanced guard was, however, pushing on that
364 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book EC
morning to Medritz, about six miles beyond the town, on the
road to Vienna. All daylong the remaining troops of the
First Army were marching in. Regiment after regiment, with
band playing and drums beating, tramped steadily along the
pavement, drawing behind its long line of glittering bayonets
the heavy waggons which cany reserve cartridges and hospital
stores, and always follow close in rear of the battalions. The
townspeople had quite recovered from the panic caused by the
approach of the Prussians. All the shops were open, the
manufactories were at work, the market-place was studded with
country women who sat among the piled arms or on the poles
of the artillery carriages, making up nosegays or selling fruit,
for which there was a great demand among the soldiers. These,
for many days, had tasted little but black bread and commis-
sariat meat, carried straight to the camp cooking-fire from the
newly-killed ox ; for, in order to save transport, the bullocks
for food were marched in rear of the regiments, and on arriving
at the halting-place were killed, to be immediately cooked and
eaten. But here the men had good food, for the magistracy
was held responsible that they should be supplied with their
rations.
Every hotel, every restaurant, every caf^, was crowded with
officers, who, having laid aside their dusty marching clothes,
were dressed in uniforms as bright as would be worn in
Berlin ; but unshaven beards, close-cropped hair, and the
absence of epaulettes, showed that they were still on a
campaign.
Soldiers with cleaned and pipe-clayed belt, well-brushed
coats, and smart white trousers, which had been carried, by
some wonderful means, unsullied in the recesses of their
knapsacks, crowded the streets, filled the beershops, and drove
bargains with the proprietors of the tobacco and pipe stalls.
The lower class of inhabitants mixed freely among the sol-
diers, and under their guidance inspected, half timidly, half
curiously, the wonderful needle-gun of which they had heard
so much, and numbers of which, piled four together, were
standing in long lines in the market-place.
Newspapers containing Imperial decrees dated from Vienna
were freely hawked about the street One of these told
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN, 365
officially that Field Marshal the Archduke Albrecht had been
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the whole Austrian army,
with Field Marshal von John as his Chief of the Staff; and
another, that Austria was about to open a loan of 200,000,000
guldens. Cabs pushed about the town, through the crowded
streets, conveying impatient staflf officers, who had to find
quarters for some general, or billets for some regiment which
was just arriving — ^no easy task, for nearly the whole infantry
of the First Army was in Briinn, and though the magistracy,
anxious to please the Prussians, crowded the men upon the
householders, accommodation was scarce. Every house had
twenty or twenty-five soldiers quartered upon it, but they did
not give the inmates much trouble, for a couple of rooms with
a few trusses of straw, and the use of the kitchen fire to cook
their food, was all they wanted ; and they did not stay much
in their billets, but wandered about the town or sat in the
beerhouses smoking with quiet enjoyment the long wooden
pipes which, from want of tobacco, had been useless for some
time past, but which had seldom been forgotten or left behind
on the line of march, while some wrote long letters to their
friends at home, and sent oflf to wives or mothers in Prussia
all that they could save from their small pay.
The King arrived that afternoon, and established his head-
quarters in the town-hall. With him came Count Bismark and
die Minister of War. Few people had collected to see him
enter the town, and the populace made no demonstration of
any kind ; the magistrates received him with politeness, each
with the white and red badge of neutrality bound broad roimd
the left arm.
Many rumours of an armistice were flying about, for M.
Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, was there, and it
was known that the Emperor of the French was bringing his
influence to bear upon the Prussian Court in favour of peace.
Count Bismark was for some time closeted with the Ambas-
sador in an upper room of the town-hall, where, undisturbed
by the hum which rose fi"om the crowded streets, they were
supposed to be discussing the conditions oi an armistice. The
latest Austrian newspapers said that the Kaiser had deter-
mined that no attempt should be made to defend the capital
366 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
itself, for it was thought better to let the town be occupied
peaceably by an enemy than be exposed to the possibility of
a bombardment But though at this time it might have been
intended that the Austrian troops should abandon Vienna,
preparations were being made to continue the war. The army
from the Italian frontier was being brought up towards the
Danube, to add 120,000 men to the troops at present round
the capital
WTiile the army halted here, reserve troops were being ad-
vanced into Bohemia to secure the communications with
Saxony, and to keep order in lear of the armies, where the
peasantry, having possessed themselves with weapons from the
fields of battle, had begun to plunder convoys and to attack
small escorts or patrols. The first reserve corps occupied
Bohemia. Prague and Pardubitz were garrisoned in force,
and the second reserve corps had been organized at Leipzig to
act against the flank of the Bavarians. General von Falcken-
stein was named Prussian Commandant of Bohemia, and
General Manteuffel took his place in the command of the
Army of the Maine.
But many considered that all these precautions were useless,
and that the army would never move south of Briinn.
The visit of the French Ambassador, quickly reported from
billet to billet, fell as a cold chill on the enthusiasm of the
troops, for they longed to go to Vienna, and conclude the
campaign by an entrance into the capital. But they also
wished for the end of the war, and longed for home, so they
hated the idea of delay, and anticipated with disgust an
armistice, by the conditions of which the army might be re-
tained at Briinn for a considerable time. A flag of truce was
sent that day to the Austrian advanced guard, which lay
beyond Medritz, and the staff officer who went with it carried
a letter to be given to the Austrian Commander-in-Chief The
contents of the letter were known only in the King's head-
quarters, but popular rumour did not fail to assert that the flag
of truce carried with it a despatch to open negotiations which
would conclude a peace.
The railway communication with Saxony was all but restored,
and was actually opened on the 15 th.
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 367
When Prague was occupied by the Prussian troops on the
8th, thirty locomotive engines and some thousand railway
carriages were found at the railway station, and with this
supply of rolling stock the railway was soon opened for mili-
tary purposes between Prague and Briinn. A broken bridge
between Miinchengratz and Jung-Bunzlau required several
days for its repair, and still prevented communication with
Berlin, but as soon as this viaduct was restored the army was
able to receive supplies by the route of Tiimau, Prague, and
Pardubitz. The line was long, because the shorter route
through Josephstadt and Koniggratz was closed by those for-
tresses, and the guns of Theresienstadt prevented the line
to Dresden from being used; but communication by it re-
quired much less time than by the rough roads over which the
convoys had hitherto to travel, and as soon as it was open
supplies arrived much more quickly than while they were
carried for many long miles over rough hill roads, along which
the waggons jolted slowly and painfully.
The Army of the Elbe, after the battle of Koniggratz,
formed the right wing of the general advance of the Prussians
from Przelautsch and Pardubitz. It followed the most direct
road southwards, and on the loth July reached Iglau, and
there crossed the boundary line between Bohemia and Moravia.
Here it found detachments of General Edelsheim's cavalry in
its front, but they retired without making any resistance to its
advance. The capture of the imperial manufactory of cigars
at Iglau supplied Herwarth's soldiers with plentiful rations of
tobacco, the want of which is so much missed by German
troops. In the neighbourhood of Iglau Herwarth captured
one hundred transport waggons. He then moved forwards in
the direction of Znaym.
CHAPTER 11.
TOBITSCHAU.
When the Archduke Albrecht assumed the command of ali
the Austrian troops in the field, he could not retain Benedek's
army in Olmiitz, unless he consented to sacrifice Vienna with-
out a blow, for it was not strong enough to delay the advance
of the Prussians by acting against their flank and communi-
cations. He might have determined to occupy the line of the
March with the Army of the North and the troops from Italy,
but he had not time to take up a strong position here before
the Prussians would be upon him. The line of this river was
also badly suited for a defensive position, as an army l>'ing
along it would have had a range of mountains, that of the
Lower Carpathians, in its rear. An occupation of the line of
the Waag, with his left wing supported on Komom, his centre
at Leopoldstadt, and his Army of the North posted along the
hills on the left bank of that river, which entirely command
the plain on the right bank, while his Army of the South held
the Danube near Vienna, would have afforded the Archduke
many advantages. The Prussians could not have advanced
against Vienna without exposing their flanks and communi-
cations to the Army of the North, nor could they have moved
against this army without placing themselves in unfavourable
circumstances. They would have been obliged to cross the
March and the Lower Carpathians, to fight a battie where they
would have had a river and a line of hills in front of them, a
chain of mountains and a river in their rear. It appears,
however, that the Archduke feared that the Prussians, by
seizing the passes of the Carpathians, might have neutralized
the action of his Army of the North, and have pushed on
Chap. II.] TOBITSCHAU. 369
against the capital, for he determined take up the line of the
Danube from Krems to Pressburg, with his centre resting on
the fortifications of Florisdorf, in front of Vienna. Yet a
battle lost here would have yielded up all Hungary to his
enemy, and have placed Austria entirely at the mercy of
Prussia. Benedek was ordered to send his army from Olniiitz
to Vienna, and by the 14th July he had despatched his third,
fourth, and sixth corps by railway to the capital On the 15 th,
while more of his troops were actually upon the line, the
railway conmiunication between Olmiitz and Vienna was cut
near Lundenbuig, by the cavalry of the advanced guard of
Prince Charles, which had been pushed forward from Briinn.*
Benedek could send no more troops by rail ; he resolved, with
the first, second, and eighth corps, which still remained at
Olmiitz, to march by road to the Danube. One brigade of the
eighth corps, followed by a large proportion of artillery, moved
by way of Tobitschau and Kremser, on the right bank of the
March. The main body, accompanied by Benedek in person,
moved on the left bank of the March, by way of Prerau ; while
a garrison of twenty-five thousand men was left in Olmiitz.
This movement of the Austrian general brought on the
ACTION OF TOBITSCHAIT.
The army of the Crown Prince, after leaving Pardubitz, was
directed, as has been already seen, in the direction of Olmiitz.
On the 14th July, the advanced guard of the first corps
d'arm^e reached Prossnitz, about twelve miles to the southward
of Olmiitz. This advanced guard consisted of General
Buddenbrock's brigade, which had been reinforced by some
additional artillery, and was accompanied by the first regiment
of hussars. Near Prossnitz some detachments of hostile
cavalry made their appearance, advancing from Wrahartz.
These were Saxon dragoons, which, after a slight skirmish, the
Prussian hussars drove back to Kralitz and Biskupitz, on the
river Blatta. On the 12th the Crown Prince determined to
leave only one corps to mask Olmiitz and the Austrian
• See page 384.
B B
370 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
entrenched camp. With his other corps he resolved to lean
towards his right, and keep open his communications with
Prince Frederick Charles. On this day the Guards were at
Konitz, the fifth corps at Plumenau. Orders were issued that
on the 15 th the cavalry reserve by way of Plin, and the first
corps from Prossnitz, should make an attack on Prerau, and
there cut the railway between Olmiitz and Lundenbuig. Thus
on the 15th, while the main body of the Crown Prince's army
was moving southwards by Urtschitz and Ottaslawitz, General
Malotki's brigade of the first corps, consisting of six battalions
and a 4-pounder battery, was at daybreak to march to the east
of Plumenau, to seize Tobitschau and Traubeck, thus to
secure the passages over the Blatta, the March, and the
Beczwa, and to hold them until General Hartman's division of
reserve cavalry could reach Prerau, destroy the railway
and return. From Plumenau, by way of Prossnitz, to
Hnibschitz is ten miles. Malotki reached the heights of
Hrubschitz soon after six o'clock in the morning. From this
position he could see a part of the road from Olmiitz to Tobit-
schau, and on it a heavy Austrian column moving towards the
latter place. This was Rothkirch's brigade, in rear of which
Benedek, either ignorant of the proximity of the Prussians, or
anxious to have a strong force of artillery to cover his left
flank, had caused a considerable portion of his artillery train to
march.* At this time the Prussians were ignorant of what
Austrian force still remained at Olmiitz, although it was calcu-
lated, as was afterwards proved correctly, that forty thousand
men could have been moved to Vienna before the railway was
broken.
The Austrian troops in firont of Malotki, under Rothkirch's
command, consisted of the 25 th Hungarian regiment, the 7 th
Hungarian regiment, and one Jager battalion: in ^1, seven
battalions^ which were accompanied by a squadron of Uhlans
and three field batteries.
* The accounts of the object with which Rothkirch's brigade moved along
this road are varied. Some say that he was intended to occupy a position
on the rivers which unite near Tobitschau, in order to cover the march of
the main body. Others that Benedek moved him along this route ignorant
that the Crown Prince was so close at hand, and committed the artillery
train on it because of its being the better road.
Chap. II.] TOBITSCHAU. 371
Malotki deployed his brigade on the east of Hrubschitz to-
wards Wiklitzer Hof and Klopotowitz, with the 44th regiment in
the first line, the 4th in the second, and poste<J his artillery' on
the left flank of his infantry, just south of Klopotowitz.
The Austrian general brought up twenty-four guns to the-
hills between the Blatta and the March, and smote with them
upon the Prussian flank.
These guns were engaged, but at much disadvantage, by the
Prussian battery which was attached to Malotki's brigade.
After a short time, however. General Hartman's division of
Prussian cavalry arrived on the ground, and reinforced
Malotki's guns with two batteries of horse artillery, which took
up a position more to the north, and gradually advancing to
the Blatta, in about an hour's time succeeded in somewhat
silencing the Austrian pieces.
Already, before the artillery on either side had opened fire,
the 44th regiment, which formed the first line of Malotki's in-
fantry, began to advance. The fusilier battalion of this regiment
moved against Wiklitzer Hof, the second battalion on its left
towards Klopotowitz, and the third battalion between the two
others. Without coming into collision with the enemy, these
battalions gained the western bank of the Blatta. The river
was so deep and broad in consequence of the late heavy rain
that it could only be crossed at Wiklitzer Hof, where there
were two bridges. Had the enemy occupied these passages,
the advance of the brigade would have been exceedingly
diflicult, perhaps prevented altogether. The fusilier battalion of
the 44th, which fiist passed the stream, came on the further side
upon two Austrian companies, which had been thrown out to
cover Rothkirch's right flank. These, on account of some undu-
lations in the ground, had as yet seen nothing of the Prussian
advance. They now threw themselves into a small plantation
which lay on the south of Tobitschau, and a musketry fight com-
menced between them and the fusiliers, during which the first
and second battalions of the 44th deployed to the left of
the fusiliers. Each battalion threw two companies forward in
skirmishing order, and retained its two others as reserves in
close column of companies. The 4th regiment, which formed
Malotki's second line, crossed the stream after the 44th, with
B B 2
372 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book IX.
its fusilier battalion leading. Two companies of this battalion
were directed to occupy Tobitschau, seize the passage over the
March, and to bear upon the Austrian left flank. The rest of
the regiment followed the first line.
The niiain body of the brigade then made an attack against
the plantation, but was received with such a heavy fire of
artillery and musketry that it reeled under the iron storm. It
paused a few moments to steady itself, then, covered by
skirmishers, sprang forwards upon the trees. The Austrians,
against overpowering numbers, stood their ground with won-
derful determination, and it was not till bayonets had been
crossed, that they quitted the cover. The Prussians halted to
rally at the further edge of the wood, while the Austrians drew
slowly back along the road towards Olmiitz, but lined the
ditches in the fields by the wayside with sharpshooters.
All the Austrian battalions had meanwhile formed, and
Rothkirch advanced them for a counter-attack, by which he
hoped to recover the wood, and drive the Prussians again over
the Blatta. The Prussians awaited their approach till they
came within one hundred yards of the trees. Then the needle-
gun opened with its deadly rapidity, and with rapid and per-
petual volleys broke down the heads of the assailant columns.
The Austrian battalions were crushed beneath the greeting
and in partial confusion drew back. The Prussians rallied,
and followed them as they retired to some open ground near
the village of Wierowan, beside the road to Olmiitz.
During the whole of this combat, the Austrian artillery had
played upon the Prussian left flank. General Malotki directed
two hundred of the 4th regiment to attack the guns in skir-
mishing order. The biting fire of the sharpshooters, coupled
with the salvoes of the Prussian batteries on the west of the
Blatta, forced the enemy's pieces to withdraw to a more con-
venient distance, and Malotki could make his preparations for
a further advance.
In the meantime, Hartman's cavalry had not been idle. At
the same time as Malotki advanced, on his lefl flank a Prussian
detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Kehler, who commanded
the I St Royal hussars, was pushed forward from Prossnitz, by-
way of Wrahowitz, towards the village of Dub on the MarclL
Chap. II.] TOBITSCHAU, 373
This detachment consisted of the ist Royal hussars, a 4-
poimder battery, and one battalion of the 5th Prussian regiment
of the Line. East of Wrahowitz, it fell in with the Austrian
flanking parties. As these were apparently in much superior
force, it retired behind the Wallowa, and from the right bank
of this stream its artillery opened a fire which at least detained
some of the Austrian artillery accompanying Rothkirch's brigade
in this direction.
On the morning of the 15th July, after Malotki's brigade
had marched on Wiklitzer Hof, Hartman's cavalry division of
three brigades took post near and behind it, about Klopotowitz
and Biskupitz. Hartman's three brigades were, the light
brigade of Landwehr cavalry, consisting of the 2nd regiment
of Landwehr hussars and the ist regiment of Landwehr
Uhlans, a light brigade of the Line, consisting of the 2nd
Royal hussars and the loth Uhlans, and a heavy, or cuirassier
brigade, consisting of the ist and 5th regiments of cuirassiers.
As Malotki pressed upon the Austrian brigade, and it began
to retire from the direction of Tobitschau towards Wierowan,
Hartman, in order to harass its retreat, formed the design of
passing his cuirassier brigade, which formed his extreme left,
over the Blatta, and with it acting against the Austrian right
flank. Some officers sent to reconnoitre found that the bridge
over the river near Biskupitz was neither held nor had been
destroyed by the enemy.
When the 5th cuirassiers had crossed the bridge and had
gained the further bank, it perceived the Austrian artillery train
on the road between Olmutz and Tobitschau, which, on
account of the action going on near the latter place, had been
halted north of Rakodau, and appeared to be without any
escort
Colonel Bredow, who commanded the 5 th cuirassiers, sought
permission from General Hartman to attack the artillery train.
This permission was accorded to him, not, however, till the
Austrian artillery had noticed the Prussian cavalry. The
gunners unlimbered, and opened upon the horsemen with
shell, but at a long range, for they saw not the 5 th cuirassiers,
who were on their own side the stream, but the ist, who were
still near Biskupitz.
374 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
Bredow, under cover of some undulating ground, formed his
regiment in ichelon of squadrons, for the attack of the guns.
The first squadron he kept towards his right to cover the flank
of his attack from any Austrian cavahy which might lie in that
direction, the second and fourth squadrons he directed full
against the front of the battery, and supported the second with
the third as a reserve.
The squadrons moved forward in perfect lines, slowly and
steadily at first, seeming to glide over the field, gradually
increasing their pace, regardless of the tremendous fire directed
upon them, which emptied some saddles. When within a few
hundred paces of the battery they broke into a steady gallop,
which increased in rapidity at every stride that brought the
horses nearer to the Austrian line. All the time of their
advance the gunners poured round after round into them,
striving with desperate energy to sweep them away before they
could gain the mouths of the cannons. Rapid flashes of flame
breaking firom the mouths of the guns accompanied the dis-
charge of the shells, which were being blurted forth with a
nervous haste through the thick clouds of snooke that hung
heavily before the muzzles. The flank squadrons^ bending a
little away from their comrades, made for either end of the
line of guns, in expectation of finding there some supportmg
cavalry. The two centre ones went straight as an arrow against
the guns themselves, and hurled themselves through the
intervals between them upon the gunners. Then the firing
ceased in a moment, and the smoke began to drift slowly
away, but all noise was not hushed ; shrieks from men cut
down by the broad blades of the cuirassiers, cries for quarter,
the rapid tramp of snorting and excited horses, the rattle of
steel, shouts, cheers, and imprecations from the excited com-
batants, rose up to heaven in a wild medley, along with the
prayers which were being offered up by another armed host not
many miles distant at Briinn, where on this Sunday the army
of Prince Frederick Charles was engaged in a solemn thanks-
giving for their hitherto victorious career. Eighteen guns,
seven waggons, and one hundred and sixty-eight horses, with
one hundred and seventy prisoners, fell into the hands of the
Prussian force — a noble prize to be won by a single regiment
Chap. IL] TOBITSCHAU, 375
It lost only twelve men and eight horses, for the swelling
ground and rapid motion of the gliding squadrons baulked the
aim of the gunners, who mostly pointed their pieces too high,
and sent their shells over the heads of the charging horsemen.
Of the eighteen captured guns seventeen were conveyed to
Prossnitz. One was too much disabled to be moved.
While the Prussian cuirassiers were engaged in drawing the
captured guns to a safe place, a squadron of hostile cavalry
deployed from Nenakowitz. Colonel Bredow placed himself
at the head of his first squadron, and charged to cover the
retreat of his regiment's spoils. This squadron dashed with a
heavy surge upon the hostile ranks. The lighter Austrian
horsemen, borne down and scattered by their ponderous shock,
broke in wild confusion, could not rally, and were driven far
beyond Nenakowitz.
The Austrian infantry still held Wierowan, and was thus in
rear and flank of the cuirassiers, who, under the fire of musketry,
could not hold their position on the plateau in front of
the Blatta, and were obliged for a time to retire towards
Klopotowitz.
The village of Wierowan was, however, soon carried by the
Prussian infantry, as well as that of Rakodau, which lay behind
it. Both places were occupied, and one of the Prussian
batteries crossing the Blatta opened upon the retreating
Austrians, who drew oflf towards Dub. About mid-day the
combat terminated at this point. But while this action had
been going on northwards of Tobitschau, the Prussians had
reaped other successes in the direction of Traubeck. The two
fusilier companies of the 4th regiment, which soon after the
commencement of the action had been directed upon Tobit-
schau, at that place fell in with three Austrian companies.
These they drove out of the town, after a short though sharp
engagement, and captured from them several prisoners. Another
battalion and the two remaining companies of their own
battalion were then sent by Malotki to support the Prussian
advance in this direction. They advanced towards Traubeck,
and occupied that place without any serious opposition,
although some stray detachments of the Austrians were in its
immediate vicinity. Under the cover of the garrison of Trau-
376 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
beck, a detachment of Hartman's cavalry advanced against
Prerau. This detachment consisted of three squadrons of the
second Royal hussars, the regiment of Landwehr hussars, a
squadron of Polish Uhlans, and a battery of horse artillery,
and was accompanied by a company of fusiliers, who were
quickly mounted on some waggons near at hand. Before
Hartman could develop his attack towards Prerau, an Austrian
column was seen advancing from Olmiitz towards Dub. It
consisted of six battalions, a battery, and some squadrons.
These had been despatched by the commandant of the fortress
to support Rothkirch's brigade in the neighbourhood of Tobit-
schau. At the same time as these Austrian reinforcements
approached the scene of action, Prussian supports were also
coming up. General von Bonin, who commanded the first
Prussian corps d'arm^e, and had ordered Malotki's advance, at
the commencement of the engagement, not knowing in what
strength the Austrians were, had sent his aides-de-camp to
order the remaining brigades of his corps to move on Tobit-
schau. The commanders of these brigades, hearing the
cannonade, had of their own accord moved in the direction of
the sound, and the advanced guard, formed of Bamekow's
brigade, which mustered six battalions and a battery, had
already reached Biskupitz when the Austrian reinforcements
from Olmiitz came into sight Biskupitz lies about a mile to
the west of Wierowan. The rifled battery of Bamekow's
brigade immediately came into action, and fired against the
right flank of the Austrian advance. At the same time a
battery for which Bonin had sent came up, and, joining the
battery Malotki had previously with him, took up a position on
the west of the main road. The Austrian guns advanced to
Dub, and there near the church came into action to cover the
deployment of their infantry. But the quick handling of the
Prussian guns and the advance of Bamekow were too formid-
able for the sallying troops, and they, without engaging with
Malotki, retired again to the fortress.
About five o'clock in the afternoon General Hartman, with
his detachment of cavalry, approached Prerau. He found a
good ford through the Beczwa near Wichowitz, and passed the
stream by means of it, leaving his company of fusiliers to
Chap. II.] TOBITSCHAU. 377
secure the passage. With his horsemen ne passed on towards
Dluhonitz and Roketnitz. As soon as he had crossed the
railway he discovered an Austrian battalion on the west of
Dluhonitz, and other detachments of hostile infantry could be
made out partially concealed in the ripe com. General Hart-
man deployed his cavalry. In the first line he placed the
Landwehr hussars and the squadron of Uhlans with the battery
on their left flank, covered by the fourth squadron of Royal
hussars. The second and third squadrons of the latter regiment
formed his second line. As soon as the battery had shaken
the detachments of Austrian infantry, Hartman attacked them.
In vain the Austrians attempted to form company squares ; the
horsemen were too quick for them, got among them before
their formation was complete, and made a large number of
prisoners, but however without very severe loss to themselves.
During this attack a large number of Austrian baggage
waggons were hurrying along the road from Roketnitz towards
Prerau. Hartman sent his three leading squadrons, under
Colonel Glasenapp, against the road to cut off the baggage
trains, and sent away his prisoners with an escort to Tobitschau.
The drivers of the baggage waggons, perceiving the threatened
attack, began to overturn the carts in the ditches alongside
the way. In the meantime some Austrian artillery had come
into action on the hills north of Roketnitz, which told with
effect on the Prussian troops. At the same time five squadrons
of an Austrian cuirass regiment appeared on the left flank of
the Prussians, while five squadrons of Austrian hussars also
dashed into the field to protect Feldzeugmeister von Benedek,
who with his staff had been mixed up with the escort of the
baggage train, and had been personally engaged in the meUe
with the Prussian cavalry.
Colonel Glasenapp tried to retire, but the Austrian Haller
hussars came down upon him, and he was forced to turn to
face them. The attack on both sides could only, on account
of the standing com, be made at a trot. The hand-to-hand
combat which ensued endured for some ten minutes. Man
pressed against man — horse against horse ; swords and revolvers
were freely used, Glasenapp himself went down, and many of
his troopers beside him were borne to earth. At last the relics
378 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book IX.
of his squadrons shook themselves free from the rough embrace
of their assailants, and managed to gain a retreat As far as
possible in the time they could spare they broke the railway
and the telegraph ; and then, recrossing the Beczwa, took up a
position on its western bank. The Austrian cavalry did not
pursue. Benedeky threatened on his right flank by the approach
of the Crown Prince's army, pushed by forced marches towards
Vienna, and Rothkirch's brigade, which had been engaged at
Tobitschau, retreated by Kobe, and followed him along the
Prerau road When the Austrian general reached Hradschin
he heard that the railway at Lundenburg had been cut by
Prince Frederick Charles. He then crossed the Carpathians,
and by a flank march down the valley of the Waag, gained
Pressburg by way of Tymau. Here, on the 21st July, he
placed the leading divisions of his army in direct communica-
tion with that of the Archduke Albrecht, which was round
Vienna.
On the 17th the army of the Crown Prince occupied Prerau,
which by that time was entirely deserted by the Austrians.
This was the result of the action of Tobitschau, which cost the
Austrians about Ave hundred killed and wounded, five hundred
prisoners, and seventeen guns; the Prussians about three
hundred killed, wounded, and missing.
The army of the Crown Prince, after the action of Tobit-
schau, left tJie fifth corps d'armde to watch Olmiitz, and moved
in two columns upon Briinn^ which place it reached on the
19th July.
CHAPTER III.
FURTHER ADVANCE OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMIES FROM BRONN
TO THE DANUBE.
While the Crown Prince had moved in the direction of
Prerau, Prince Frederick Charles had occupied Briinn on the
12th July. Here the First Army halted on the 15th..
All the 14th the possibilities and probabilities of an armistice
and of a subsequent peace were discussed warmly by the
officers and soldiers of the Prussian army at Briinn. In every
restaurant and in every taproom, over bottles of champagne or
flagons of beer, amid the light blue smoke of cigars and the
dark clouds of strong tobacco, there was only this one subject
of conversation. All kinds of theories were broached ; knots
of officers discussed it quietly in the hotels and in their quarters,
crowds of soldiers in the streets stopped every orderly to
question him as to his knowledge of passing events, or collected
round some comrade supposed to have good information, to
hear him dilate upon the intentions of the Emperor of the
French, or the private views of the Kaiser. But those who
really knew what was to happen preserved a profound silence,
and nothing was authentically known beyond the precincts of
the headquarter-house, and there only to a very few.
In the meantime the advanced guard was ordered to march
forward the next morning as far as Moschau, twenty miles
from Briinn, on the road to Vienna, and the greater part of the
troops who were at Briinn that night were at the same time to
move in that direction. But the King remained in the
Moravian capital, and the headquarters of Prince Frederick
Charles also halted there another day. The town was still
thronged by a multitude of Prussian soldiers, who wandered
38o SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
about idly, looking into the shop windows, or trying to read
the notices placarded on the walls in the Moravian dialect
Prussian sentries were mounted on the main guard, and looked
out of place by the side of the sentry boxes and door posts
painted with the black and gold colours of Austria. In front
of the Rathhaus, where the King was lodged, a Prussian guard
and numerous sentries had taken the place of the civil watch,
who usually stand at the gate of the meeting-house of the
Town Council In front, in the Platz, artillery carriages were
closely parked, and were surrounded by the piled arms of a
regiment which, billeted in the houses round, had here its place
for assembly. Thick crowds of the inhabitants, with soldiers
sprinkled among them, stood to listen to the music of a
regimental band which, standing between the* gate of the
Rathhaus and the guns, was playing Prussian airs. Country
women with bright coloured handkerchiefs over their heads,
and dressed in highly tinted muslins, wandered about the
crowd, selling from their baskets gingerbread and sweetmeats
to the people and the soldiers equally. The theatre was
crowded with uniforms, knots of officers were smoking at every
hotel door, and the whole town was alive with a lazy activity,
except where the closed railway station looked down upon the
bare line and its deserted warehouses. There were sentinels
now upon the Spielberg, and Prussian colours floated from its
flagstaff. Numbers of soldiers were leaning against the parapets
talking with earnestness, for they were deep in discussion of
the probabilities of peace, and questioned every one who came
into the fort as to the latest news, half afraid to hear that an
armistice was already concluded, and that they would never
see the capital of Austria. Nor were the privates alone ill
pleased with the prospect of so speedy a peace ; the officers
wished for the glory of marching into Vienna, and of ending
the campaign by the occupation of the enemy's capital ; high
and low seemed to think that this would only be the just
reward of their hard work ; and while the younger ones only
looked forward to the excitement of entering a large town, and
hoped for a little more fighting and higher promotion, those
who had planned and carried out the strategy of the campaign
regarded tiie visit of M. Benedetti to head-quarters much in the
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE, 381
same light as that in which a skilful chess-player about to
check-mate his adversary's king would view the intrusion of an
officious stranger, who suddenly stopped the game by sweeping
the men off the board and putting Uiem into his pocket
The order for the march of the troops on the following
morning gave rise to hopes that a further advance was actually
decided upon.
By the evening of the 14th it was known that the negotia-
tions for an armistice had failed The Prussians sent to the
Austrians the conditions on which they would agree to a
cessation of hostilities, and at the same time stated that no
alteration in the terms would be permitted. One of these
conditions was that the Prussian army should occupy the line
of the Thaya, and consequentiy have possession of the railway
station at Lundenburg. The Austrians sent back a proposal
that an armistice should be granted for three days, and during
this time that the Prussian army should remain in its actual
position. As the acceptance of this proposal would have
allowed time for the Austrian army at Olmiitz to be withdrawn
to the neighbourhood of Vienna, and to be placed across the
line of march of the Prussians towards the capital, it seemed
clear that the intention of the Austrians was not to conclude
peace, but only to gain time for the concentration of their
troops. Negotiations were in consequence broken off, and the
inarch southward was ordered to be continued.
All was again activity and excitement in the Prussian army ;
the whole of the troops who were at Briinn on the 14th, with
the exception of one division, marched out on the morning of
the 15th, and pushed forwards towards Thaya. The men, re-
freshed by their halt, equipped anew with supplies of the articles
which had been worn out or lost during the late marches and
actions, went forth in high spirits, for they thought that now
they were certain to reach Vienna. They had no doubt of the
result of a battle, if one should have to be fought on the way to
the Austrian capital, and their fears that peace might be con-
cluded had been allayed by the news of the failure of the nego-
tiations; for it was known early on the 15th, that the armistice
had not been agreed to, and the intelligence spread quickly
from company to company, and from regiment to regiment.
382 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
General von Moltke retired to his quarters, and was closeted
with his maps, making new plans for the further progress of the
campaign, and for the occupation of Vienna. This skilful
strategist, who had been the chief director of the movements
by which the three Prussian armies, starting from different
points, were collected at the necessary hour on the field of
Koniggratz, never, except at that battle, appeared in the front
of the armies. Some distance in the rear, sitting calmly at his
desk, he traced on the map the course of his troops, and, by
means of the field telegraph, flashed his orders to the different
generals in more immediate command, with such skill and fore-
sight that not a movement failed, and every combination was
made at exactiy the right moment. A quick, light-blue eye, a
high forehead, and a well-set figure, mark him an intellectual
and energetic man, but though quick in action he is so prudent
in discourse and so guarded in his speech, that from this quality
and his wide knowledge of European languages he is known in
the Prussian army as the man who is silent in seven tongues.
Careful and laborious, he worked out with his own hand, and
himself calculated, almost every detail of the operations in
which he took Europe by surprise from the lightning rapidity
of his strokes and the tremendous consequences of his disposi-
tions, before which the Austrian army withered away almost
before it was gathered together, and which have won for him
from his countrymen the title of the first strategist in Europe.
But though General von Moltke in so short a time deservedly
obtained such a high reputation in Prussia, the soldiers and
officers of the two armies thought almost as highly of the
Princes who have carried out so ably the plans which were
formed by tlie Chief of the Royal Staff. Prince Frederick
Charles, with all the dash and fire of a cavalry officer, can
equally well lead his squadrons to pursue the broken enemy,
and direct with patience his infantry and artillery in an attack
against a firm and steady line ; but his qualities as a general do
not shine out more in the exciting duties of the battle-field than
they do in the more tedious and laborious work which is
necessary for the comfort of his soldiers in quarters or on the
line of march. lie has a singular power of making his troops
care little for fatigue and hardship; on the line of march he is
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 383
always with them, and often, from his knowledge of how to deal
with his men, can, by a few happy words, dose up the strag-
gling ranks of a weary battalion, and send the men forward
cheering loudly. In the bivouac, often in person, he inspected
the rations and heard the applications of the men for favours or
indulgences, and few applied in vain to their Commander-in-
chief He had both the confidence and love of his troops, who
regarded him as a skilful leader and a powerful friend.
The Crown Prince, by a series of victories in three succes-
sive days, established his title to be considered a general In
the Second Army he was looked upon with the same affection
and confidence as Prince Frederick Charles is in the First. By
the men of Silesia he was particularly beloved ; for he, as a
colonel, commanded a regiment at Breslau, and became well
known then to the whole province. Careless of trouble, ever
anxious for the welfare of his troops, he visited, personally,
billets and hospitals, and took the most kindly interest in eveiy
individual soldier. But in the hour of need he did not spare hiis
troops, for his affection for them sprang from a sense of duty
and from no mere desire of popularity. The march from
Miletin to Koniggratz, and the attack on the Austrian right in
that battle which crushed Marshal Benedek's army and shook
the Austrian d3masty, say more for his eneigy in action than
could be written in any words.
With such leaders and so well led, with a better arm than
their enemies, with every mechanical contrivance which modem
science could suggest adapted to aid the operations of the army,
it is little wonder that the stout-hearted and long-enduring
Prussian soldiers proved victorious on every occasion on which
they went into action.
The head-quarters of the First Army were ordered to move
forward on the i6th, to Pawlowitz, a small village twenty-five
miles from Briinn. The advanced guard, on the 15th, moved
upon Moschau ; the whole of the army, except one division,
which stayed another day here to guard the King's head-
quarters, marched to the vicinity of Medritz, and the campaign
already recommenced with energy.
M. Benedettiy unsuccessful in his attempt to procure an
armistice through the mediation of France, left the Prussian
384 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book IX.
head-quarters on the afternoon of the 15th. He was accom-
panied by Count Colleredo, an Austrian officer, who had come
in with a flag of truce, and a Prussian staff-officer went with him
to take him through the outposts, for he went to Vienna,
The Prussians had now quite got their blood up; in the army it
was regarded as an established fact that the conditions proposed
by Austria for an armistice were intended only to gain time to
move the army of Feldzeugmeister Benedek from Olmiitz to
the south, and their national feelings were wounded by the idea
that the Austrians should imagine that they could be so easily
duped. On the afternoon of the 15 th, the patrols of the cavalry
of the Prussian advanced guard pushed forward as far as the
railway station of Coding, which lies on the line that leads from
Olmiitz to Lundenburg. When the leading horsemen came in
sight of the railway they could distinguish two trains, one close
behind the other, with engines puffing and snorting violently,
as if drawing a heavy load, steaming slowly in the direction
of Lundenburg. There could be little doubt that in these
trains were portions of the Austrian army from Olmiitz, which
were on the way to Vienna. To prevent any more troops from
being taken south by this line, it was immediately resolved to
break up the line. Some troopers dismounted, a few pickaxes,
spades, and axes were found in the neighbouring cottages, and
the men on foot quickly set to work, while the others held
their horses. There was no Austrian cavalry to guard the line,
no infantry picket in the station-house, and tlie demohtion of
the line by which alone General Benedek could hope to reunite
his army to protect the capital of the empire began without any
opposition. Blows fell heavily on the rails and on the sleepers,
the rails were wrenched out of their places, thrown upon one
side, and in a i^yf minutes the line was useless for railway
traffic The work was hardly completed when another train
came in sight, but before it came up to where the rails were
taken away the engine-driver saw the Prussian cavalry, reversed
his engine, and the train drew up short, and after a moment's
pause began to back slowly in the direction from which it
came.
The great problem now for the Prussian staff was to discover
how much of their northern army the Austrians had been able
Chap. III.J ADVANCE TO THE DAXUBE. 385
to move to Vienna, and how many troops were still in the camp
before Olmiitz. From the experience of this war many facts
have been ascertained relative to the railway transport of troops
which were now useful in assisting this calculation. When the
Prussians were concentrating their army for the invasion of
Saxony they found that it required 100 trains to move a corps
d'arm^e of 30,000 combatants with all its train and baggage,
and that it Was rarely possible to despatch more than twelve
trains a day — so that it required nearly ten days for the move-
ment of a corps. The Austrians, during the concentration of
their army, despatched fifteen trains a day ; but at that time
they are supposed to have moved with baggage and train com-
plete. On such a pressing occasion as the present, they pro-
bably might let the troops move with almost no baggage and
little train, and might have managed to despatch twenty trains
per day, for they had most of the rolling stock which used to
run upon the line between Vienna and Tiimau by Josephstadt»
and on this calculation 40,000 men could be moved in about
six days. This calculation was subsequently found to be
correct
Another fact concerning railway transport dictated by com-
mon sense has been fully confirmed by the experience of the
German war. Railways in an enemy's country have been proved
to be of no use for the transport of the troops of the invader
during his advance ; the army acting on the defensive always
breaks them up, and they cannot be repaired quickly enough
to allow of troops being moved by them. But for the carriage
of provisions and stores they are invaluable.* The more
quickly an advancing army can lay down the rails the more
quickly can it move forward, and the more free are its motions,
for the line of railway is the great artery which leading from the
heart supplies the extremities of the army with means of life and
action. In laying down the broken lines the band of workmen
who accompany the Prussian army were singularly rapid and
successful, but quick as they were they were not yet quick
enough, for the army transport was conducted by road for
some days, even after Prague was occupied, and no enemy on
• This has been amply verified by the late campaign in France.
• c c
386 SEVEN WEEKS' WAli. [BooK IX.
the line stopped the passage of convoys. A broken bridge,
even though the breach was but only a few yards wide, caused
a dead stoppage in the locomotion, and the time required to
shift stores from a train on one side of the impediment to that
on the other was very great. An engineer who would find
means of constructing rapidly field bridges which would bear
the weight of a railway train, would cause an advance in the
art of war. The road transport of the Prussian army was very
well organized, but long distances, rapid marches, hilly roads,
and accidents, were too much in some cases for even its powers.
With each army corps there were five provision columns, in
every column there were thirty-two waggons, each drawn by five
horses, some spare horses being also supplied to the column to
replace animals which may fall lame or get galled by the saddle
or collar. These five columns were under the control of the
Intendantur, and were never used for any other purpose than
the supply of food for the soldiers ; the forage for the horses
was carried in waggons hired in the country where the war was
being carried on, which were also placed under the control of
the Commissariat.
Stores of clothing and arms were carried as much as possible
by railway, and were brought to the army from the nearest
practicable railway station by trains of waggons, which were
also under the control of the Intendant-General ; but each bat-
talion carried with it, besides a medicine cart, a waggon for
spare ammunition, and an officers* baggage waggon, a waggon
which held materials for the repair of clothes and shoes, and
which were thus always present with the troops, so that the old
proverb that "a stitch in time saves nine" might be, as far as
possible, acted upon.
For the transport of ammunition the commanding ofilcer of
artillery was entirely responsible; and it was conducted by
means of trains of waggons, which were under his sole control
There were nine ammunition trains with each corps d'arm^e.
Each train consisted of thirty-three waggons, and was individually
organized so as to carry ammunition for infantry, cavalry,
4-pounder, 6-pounder, and 12-pounder guns.
A long, hot march, over a road covered deep with dust,
lldiich rose in thick stifling clouds from under the horses* feet,
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 387
and deposited gritty particles in every pore of the skin, brought
the head-quarters of Prince Frederick Charles to Pawlowitz,
which is about six miles south-west of the town of Auspitz, and
about twelve north-east of the railway junction at Lundenburg.
This day the army entered a country where the low, rounded
hills were covered with vineyards, and from which, as a conse-
quence, trees had almost disappeared. Down by the courses
of the streams there were a few pollard willows dotted along
the narrow belts of sward which fringed the banks, and some
clumps of fir-trees could be made out, stuck like black patches
against the blue sides of the Pollauer-Gebirge, which stands up
high above the surrounding country; but everywhere else
nothing could be seen except, on the lower ground nearer
the water-courses, long stretches of unbroken corn-land, backed
on either side by the undulating mounds rather than hills on
which the vines twined round their poles, planted in straight
lines with a monotonous regularity. The aspect of the little
town showed its proximity to the Hungarian frontier. The
men, dressed in white trousers gathered tight in below the
knees, and contained by a long black boot, with their black
jackets trimmed with a bright edging and braided almost like a
hussar's peHsse, and with their low broad-brimmed black hat,
round which a red riband was bound with the ends hanging
down, looked rather like stage peasants, and had little resem-
blance to the heavy bloused vine-dressers that are seen on the
banks of the Rhine. The women, with their short bright-
coloured skirts, white bodices, and handkerchiefs for the head,
kept up the theatrical appearance of the population. The
houses were low and small, and not nearly so large as the
stable which, without exception, was an adjunct to every
cottage.
On the night of the i6th the First Army had its advanced
guard at Lundenburg, and the Duke of Mecklenburg, who
commanded it, threw some detachments across the Thaya by
means of a pontoon bridge, for the Austrians had destroyed all
the bridges which led across the river. General Manstein also
threw a pontoon bridge near Wistemitz, and led the sixth divi-
sion across at that point, and two other divisions crossed the
stream a little higher up. The cavalry was at Feldsburg ; and
c c 2
388 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book IX.
the eighth division was at Coding, en the line to Olmiitz. The
rest of the army was round Pawlowitz.
On the 15th July, the same day that Prince Frederick
Charles pushed forward his troops from Briinn and with his
advanced guard cut the railway from Olmiitz to Vienna, near
, Lundenburg, and that the Crown Prince's cavalry after the
action of Tobitschau cut the same railway near Prerau, Her-
warth, with the Army of the Elbe, occupied Zna3nn, and secured
there the passage of the Tbaya, the boundary between Moravia
and the Crown lands of Austria.
On the 1 6th, Herwarth was to have pushed his left wing
down the Thaya, to assist in cutting the railway. As its ad-
vanced guard approached the road from Nikolsburg to Vienna,
it received intelligence that Prince Frederick Charles had
already secured the railway, and that Manstein's division of
his army was moving along that road. Herwarth, on the
receipt of this intelligence, drew his left back to the Znaym
road, and pursued his way along it towards the Danube. At
Jetzelsdorf the advanced guard of Herwarth's centre, which
had been pushed along this road, fell in with the Austrian
cavalry of Wallis*s brigade. A slight skirmish took place
between Wallis*s horsemen and the first Prussian light cavalry
division, after which Wall is drew his troops off, and the Prus-
sians occupied Hollabrun, thirty miles south of Vienna. EtzeVs
division was at the same time directed in a south-westerly
direction on Krems, where the Austrians, on its approach,
blew up the bridge over the Danube. On the 20th July, Her-
warth's outposts were pushed forward to Stockerau, within
fifteen miles of Vienna. From the hills near Weikersdorf, the
advanced guard first saw the Imperial city, which could be dis-
tinguished easily from afar off by the tall spire of the Cathedral
of St. Stephen, and the tower of the Castle of Schonbrunn,
glittering in the sloping rays of the evening sun. In the
foreground, on the Marchfeld, lay the famous villages of
Wagram, Aspern, and Eszling, in the midst of rich corn-land
and fields of bright poppies, which from the distance looked
like pieces of dazzling mosaic let into a golden pavement,
fringed by the silver band of the Danube studded widi emerald
islets. Near the stream were the swelling undulations of the
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE, 389
Bisamberg, and beyond the river were seen the purple high-
lands of Austria, with the heavy masses of the Wiener Wald,
while the dark blue Carpathians bounded the prospect towards
Hungary. Such a view was a fitting reward for Koniggratz. No
Prussian army, not even that of the Great Frederick, had ever
gazed upon the same.
Late on the night of the i6th, it was ascertained that the
Austrians had sent forty trains from Olmiitz to the neighbour-
hood of Vienna before the railroad between those towns was
broken up by the Prussian cavalry on the isth. The last six
trains were known to have been filled with Saxon troops. It
was tolerably certain that all the trains contained infantry only,
and that the proper complement of cavalry and artillery to
accompany these foot soldiers had in all probability marched
by road. This being the case, every train was estimated to
have carried 1,000 men, so that the Austrian army round
Vienna had been reinforced by 34,000 Austrian and 6,000
Saxon infantry, and very likely also by some cavalry and
artillery.
Under these circumstances the head-quarters of the First
Army were on the morning of the 17th moved forward to the
important railway junction of Lundenburg; the cavalry was
retained for the morning at Feldsbei*g ; the Army of the Elbe
and some portions of the First Army were on the right flank,
and the advanced guard was pushed forward a short distance
on the road to Vienna. But at the same time the eighth
division, which had been detached to the left bank of the
March, marched by way of Coding, and occupied Holitsch.
From that point this detachment was held able either to
combine with the rest of the army in a movement upon
Vienna, or to be pushed forward further into Hungary as an
advanced portion of the First Army ; for the previous night in-
formation was received by Prince Frederick Charles which
showed that the Austrians had been moving troops fi-om the
country round Vienna towards Pesth, and it was possible that
the regiments taken from Olmiitz might have been also sent
into Hungary by Preszburg, in order there to concentrate an
army for future operations. If the Austrians had concen-
trated in Hungary, it is probable that Prince Frederick Charles
390 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
would have been sent across the Carpathians to act against
them there.
The 1 7th was a fearfully hot, burning summer day, not a bit
of shade was to be found on the road by which the army
marched, except where sometimes the way ran close by the
side of the Thaya, and a few pollard willows which fringed
the edges afforded a rtoment*s relief from the scorching rays of
the sun, but not from the dust which rose in a thick, heavy
cloud from the soft deep powder on the road every time a man
stepped on it, or a horse, restive from the attacks of innu-
merable flies, stamped savagely upon the ground. The bright,
thick groves of poplars, intermingled with oak, springing from
beautifully soft and velvety turf which fringed the further bank
of the river, tantalized the troops by their proximity.
At Lundenburg the midday sun was pouring down on the
wide, unpaved, dusty streets, and glaring while houses. Von
Tiimpling's division lay here that day, and the soldiers wandered
about slowly, seeking for anything to drink, or for shade from
the rays of the sun. Every house was a billet, and the atmos-
phere of the close, small rooms was stifling, while the sun
poured hotly in through the small "wnndows, and made the
insides of the houses almost as hot and more disagreeable than
the open. Several of the houses had no roofs, the thatch bore
signs of having been recently torn off, and was thrown away to
some distance ; the bare timbers stood out against the cloud-
less sky, and some rough, rugged openings made in the walls,
which looked as if an unskilful mason had been trying to
break down the walls, were in reality loop-holes ; for in the
evening of the 1 5th the Austrians held Lundenburg, and meant
to fight to keep it.
Here that day were collected Mondel's infantry brigade,
consisting of the 12th battalion of Jagers, the loth regiment of
foot (Mazuchelli's), and the 24th regiment of foot (Duke of
Parma's), with some artillery and some of the cavalry of
General Edelsheim's division. They had orders to hold the
town to the last extremity, and they began to make some of
the houses into temporary fortresses. The inhabitants, afraid
of coming involuntarily under fire, mostly fled, and left their
town, expecting never to return and see its houses standing ;
Chap. IIL] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE, 39t
but before the preparations for defence were concluded the
Prussian cavalry had broken up the line at Coding, and the
railway junction of Lundenburg had lost its military value;
Before, however, the Austrians evacuated the town, Lieutenant
von Radowitz, who had been sent by Prince Frederick Charles
to take M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador, as far as the
Austrian outposts, arrived with the Minister at Lundenburg.
The Austrians would not allow the Prussian officer to return
at once to his head -quarters, for fear that he might carry back
with him intelligence that the place was being given up, but
thought it necessary that he should follow the Ambassador to
Weibendorf ; so he was put into the railway and taken to that
station. As soon as he arrived there he got leave to return,
but, only able to come by road and in a country waggon, he
did not reach Pawlowitz, the head-quarters of Prince Frederick
Charles, till the evening of the i6th. So far the Austrians
were successful, for they managed to detain the staff-officer;
but long before his arrival at Pawlowitz, Prince Frederick
Charles knew of the evacuation of Lundenburg ; and the staff-
officer, by being taken south among the Austrian troops, sjiw a
great deal which could never have been known at the Prussian
head-quarters, had he not been forced to make his involuntary
railway journey in the direction of Vienna,
General von Manstein had occupied Nikolsburg with his
division, after crossing the muddy Thaya by a pontoon bridge,
which he had to throw across the stream to replace one that
had been destroyed by the retreating [Austrians. It was
anticipated that the boggy banks and unsound sides of the
river would cause a good deal of difficulty in throwing the
bridge 5 but if there were difficulties Manstein overcame them,
and said nothing about thenu But this is no proof that his
passage, although unopposed by the enemy, was an easy one,
as he was renowned in the army for a quiet determination
combined with a high daring, and gave many proofs of both as
well in the war with Denmark as in the Bohemian campaign.
A short halt in the hot, bare town of Lundenburg, and then
the march was continued to Feldsberg, through the beautifully
wooded park of the Prince of Lichtenstein. The cavalry corps
moved forward in the evening, and there were no troops in
392 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
Feldsber^on the evening of the 17th, except the head-quarter
staff, for whom the Prince's large castle afforded plenty of
accommodation, and a few battalions who were billeted in the
town for the night The Httle town nestles round the foot of
the castle in a dip in the ground, beyond it to the south rises a
gentle rounded elevation, and beyond that lay nothing but flat
plains as far as the Danube.
Nothing, on the evening of the 17th, was known of the
direction of the morrow's march ; at nine o'clock at night, no
orders had yet come from the King, and it was all uncertain
whether the First Army was to move on Florisdorf or Hungary.
There was a general impression that there would be fighting
in a few days. The troops looked forward to the possibility of
meeting the enemy with the most perfect confidence of success,
and they had every reason to do so on account of both their
generals and their arms. It cannot, however, be denied that
the army had a most difhcult, and perhaps even dangerous,
operation before it if it meant to go to Vienna, had the
Austrians held fast by Florisdorf and the Bisambeig. The
passage of a river is always a dangerous undertaking, and as
the Austrian army from Italy was in Vienna, and garrisoned
the intrenchments in front of the Danube, while a strong force
of troops brought from Hungary, whither Benedek was also
hurrying, was at Preszburg, the Prussian generals had a piece of
work before them difficult of execution.
On the morning of the i8th the sun shone bright and warm
on the Schloss and town of Feldsberg. The day seemed
likely to be as hot as the previous, and consequently the march
was ordered for the evening. But about two o'clock a sudden
change occurred in the weather. The sky became in a few
moments covered with clouds, and an extraordinaiy darkness
set in. Up to windward a thick, dense black cloud could be
seen bearing down steadily towards the castle ; but not on the
sky alone, for like a great volume of heavy smoke it seemed
rising from the earth, and filled the air for miles. Nearer and
nearer it came. When it got within a quarter of a mile a
sudden tempest of wind, which seemed bearing this cloud be-
hind it, burst upon the place. The trees swayed about, rocked
by the strong continuous gust, branches were torn off, sheaves
Chap III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 393
of corn were torn up, and taken through the air, the Indian corn
and standing crops in the fields were swept down almost level
with the ground, and the heavy cloud of dust, which looked in
the distance like smoke, was driven about by the wind and
whirled up and down in a most fantastic manner. For a few
minutes only this tornado lasted, and then was followed by a
tremendous downpour of rain, which fell for about half an
hour ; but so dry and parched was the ground that though the
water came down in torrents it was sucked in in a moment,
and when the rain ceased not a puddle stood upon the surface
of the thirsty earth.
But the rain laid the dust, and the march was more agreeable
than it had been for some days past The way lay down
the valley of the March, which divides the Crown lands of
Austria from Hungary. Flat wide-stretching plains lay on the
right, in parts covered with standing barley or Indian com j in
parts black and bleak where the soil had already been turned
up and prepared to take the seed for the second crop ; and
here and there, where tlie com had been cut, the sheaves,
which had been carried hither and thither by the afternoon's
tempesty were strewn about in confusion. On the left the
sluggish March twisted about in many channels through
numerous marshy islets, on which short willows grew densely
springing up from sedgy ground, which is covered with beds of
tall bulrushes or tangled water plants. Further on the left the
blue ridge of the Carpathians stood out against the sombre
sky, lighted up here and there by some rays from the watery
sun, which, sinking rapidly, had before going down lighted up
in the west one small portion of the cloudy sky.
The road lay close along the railway, upon which the officials
of the field telegraph division, the principal instmment of the
success of the campaign, were riding, carefully inspecting the
wires. Every post was looked at, every joint inspected with a
careful scmtiny ; but as long as the diligent inspectors could be
seen, no break was found which called for the assistance of
their workmen, who followed alongside with their waggons
filled with tools and materials to repair a flaw, and that night
telegraphic communication was open between Prince Frederick
Charles at Hohenau and the King at Nikolsbuig. And it was
394 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
required, for the approach to the Danube required new combi-
nations, and again the whole forces of the field were about to
be removed in unison by orders flashed from the head-quarters
of the King.
When the staff reached Radensburg, a little village about
two miles from Hohenau, a Vienna droschky was seen drawn
up on one side of the road, with two gentlemen in plain
clothes and wideawake hats standing beside it, chatting quietly
with a group of Prussian officers who had their billets in a road-
side public-house. A little flag beside the coachmen showed
that the travellers who had come by the carriage were engaged
in some neutral duty, and a footman dressed in livery, with a
broad lace band round his cap, who stood with the handle of
the carriage door in his hand, showed by his dress that he was
the servant of some high official A nearer approach showed
that the travellers were M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador
at Berlin, and his secretary, who had gone to Vienna after the
unsuccessful attempts to procure an armistice at Briinn, and
were now on their way back to the King's head-quarters, which
had been established on the 17th at Nikolsburg, in the old
castle of Prince Dietrichstein. The King of Prussia during
his stay here slept in the same room which Napoleon had
occupied in 1805 after the battle of Austerlitz, and before his
entry into Vienna on the 9th December.
Prince Frederick Charles dismounted from his horse, and in
the middle of the road held a long conversation with the
Ambassador. Perhaps they were discussing on that rainy
evening, in the middle of tiie country road, questions which
might affect the destinies of Europe— perhaps they were only
having a friendly chat Numbers of suppositions were broached
by the officers of the staff*, but no one except the two who
engaged in that conversation know what passed, for all others
drew out of ear-shot as soon as the Ambassador approached
the Prince.
The officers of the staff" were not so delighted to see the
bearer of news which might possibly lead to an armistice as
they would have been to receive him if he had come in a
private capacity, for they feared that negotiations might stop
the campaign before it found its just conclusion in the occupa^
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 395
tion of Vienna, and with the feelings of true soldiers they had
little sympathy with the diplomacy which might arrest the pro-
gress of their armies.
The marches of the i8th were short, for the armies were
drawing together, perhaps for the attack of the Austrian
intrenched position at Florisdorf, perhaps to force the passage
of the Danube at some other point, and the army had to move
slowly in order to give General Herwarth time to close towards
it from the right, and to let the Army of Silesia come up into
line. On the 19th Prince Frederick Charles's head-quarters
were established at Duernkruth ; his advanced guard, with part
of the seventh division, that afternoon reached and occupied
the railway junction at Gansemdorf, where the lines of Presz-
burg and Vienna unite. Another portion of the seventh
division occupied the passage of the March at Marchegg. The
cavalry corps under the command of Prince Albrecht was
round the little town of Anger, about five miles north of
Gansemdorf The light infantry division was across the March,
and on the road which leads from Holitsch down the left bank
of that river billeted in and about St. Johann and Malarzka,
while the rest of the army was clustered round the head-quarters
of its Commander-in-chief.
The Crown Prince in person this day reached Briinn, but his
army was pushing rapidly forward, and the Guards had already
arrived at Lundenburg ; he had left a force to mask Olmiitz,
but the garrison of that place was not watched by this detach-
ment alone, for Knobelsdorfs troops from Silesia were being
pushed on to aid in preventing the occupants of the great
fortress of Moravia from making any demonstration against the
Prussian line of communications.
It was quite evident from the movements of the Prussian
troops that some great operation was meditated, and it was but
natural to suppose that the present combinations were being
made with the design of striking a heavy blow against the
capital of the Austrian empire.
The Prussian cavalry was being collected together into one
mass, and when united formed an enormous number of sabres,
of which it was expected that some use would be made within
the next few days; for from Ganserndorf to the Danube
39^ SEVEN WEEKS' WAR [Book IX.
stretches the wide flat plain of the Marclifeld, on which the
Austrian cavalry might have a fair field for action, and where
it might strive to regain the world-wide reputation which was so
rudely shaken by the charges of the Prussian squadrons in the
earlier parts of the war. The Austrians had, in retreating,
destroyed the bridges across the March, in order to prevent
communication between the Prussian columns which might
advance on either bank of the stream. That of Anger had
been burnt, and a few charred piles peeping above the water
were all that showed where the bridge stood j but the Prussian
engineers had already replaced it by another bridge, made out
of such materials as came readily to hand, and had thrown
another, supported upon trestles, at Duemkruth, so that by
these means infantry and artillery could cross from one side of
the river to the other, and many fords had been found of which
the cavalry could make use.
On the morning of the 19th, Count Hasler, an officer of the
staff, rode forward beyond the outposts on the northern bank
of the Danube to destroy the telegraph which communicates
between Vienna and Preszburg. At Gansemdorf he found two
cuirassiers, who formed his working party, and picked up a
hatchet near a roadside house, which formed the whole of the
tools required. When the point at which the wires were to be
broken was reached, the chief difficulty of the undertaking was
found, for the lines ran along the tops of a succession of bare
slippery poles, up which it was very difficult to dimb. Several
attempts were made to ascend up the pole, but just as the piece
of bent iron which supported the porcelain knob round which
the lowest wire was turned for a support was reached, arms and
legs gave way and the man came sliding down the dry polished
wood. At last one of the cuirassiers, making use of his
comrade's shoulders as a starting point, began on better terms
than before, and got his hand upon the bent iron ; then to haul
himself up to the top was comparatively easy; and as he had
got the hatchet between his teeth he began to deliver some
smart, quick blows upon the uppermost wire. A few strokes
severed it, and the two portions of the broken line, parting
from each other, came surging down to the ground. The same
process was repeated with the others, and in a few minutes, all
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 397
the wires being broken, the man threw his hatchet to the
ground, saying, " There, they won't be able now to telegraph
from Vienna to Preszburg," and came sliding down the post.
There was no need to break up the railway, for the Austrians
had already blown up the bridge over the March ; and if they
had not, the Prussian advanced guard had arrived at Gansem-
dorf, and their outposts were pushed in advance of the railway
junction.
Rumours of peace were flying about the camp all the 19th ;
some people asserted that a three days* armistice had been
agreed upon, and that this was the reason that the marches
were so short, but that M. Benedetti had terms to propose
from the Kaiser. Nothing certain with regard to a cessation
of hostilities was yet decided upon, and the shortness of the
marches can be accounted for by the necessity of allowing
time for the Army of the Elbe to make its lateral movement,
and for that of the Crown Prince to come up close to the First
Army.
In the army, at this time, no one except those in high
command had any idea of whither the next advance would
lead : some supposed that the whole Prussian force was to be
dashed against the parapets and heavily-armed embrasures of
Florisdorf j others that a sudden raid was to be made by a
large force into Hungary to beat up the quarters of the Kaiser
at Pesth, whither the Imperial family had retired from Vienna.
But all feared the results of M. Benedetti's mission, and were
much afraid that diplomacy would stand in the way of an entry
into the capital of Austria, and would deprive the army of what
they considered would be only a just and fitting termination to
their rapid but glorious campaign.
A welcome capture had been made by the Commissariat of
the First Army by the occupation of Coding, the place near
which the cavalry of the advanced guard broke up the railway
between Olmutz and Lundenburg on the 15th. Immense
magazines of Austrian stores had been found there, and among
other valuable commodities about 50,000/. worth of cigars,
intended for issue to the Austrian troops, which were confiscated
for the use of the Prussians, and, in consequence, the soldiers
received liberal supplies. They were most grateful, for in the
398 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
German armies tobacco is considered almost necessar}' to
existence, and in importance as a ration ranks only second to
bread or meat
Head-quarters were established on the igth at Duemkruth,
in a small white Schloss, which afforded the most limited
accommodation even for the small number of officers who
comprised the head-quarter staff. Few, very few, indeed, had
beds ; colonels and subalterns lay side by side on mattresses
or trusses of straw upon the floor; a few specially favoured
had sofas. Among these was Count Stolberg, the President of
the Prussian House of Lords, who was with the army as a
Knight of St. John of Jerusalem. But all were very cheerful
and happy, and would have been perfectly well pleased with
everything, except that the younger officers expressed loud
wishes that M. Benedetti was anywhere except in the King's
head-quarters, for they feared that his presence meant peace,
and they wanted more fighting, more promotion, and more
glory, and were extremely anxious to march into Vienna.
And, although their elders did not express their opinions, it
was tolerably evident that in their eyes also the prospect of an
immediate peace was looked upon as anything but a blessing.
On the further side of the March, which lay about half a mile
from the head quarter Schloss, wide pasture lands, dotted with
clumps of willow-trees, stretched over a fiat plain, which was
raised but a few feet above the level of the water in the river
towards the Carpathian Mountains, that rise about fifteen miles
to the east. This plain was covered with droves of horses,
pigs, and large white cattle, with broad outstretched horns
about as large as those of buffaloes. These droves were tended
by boys, clad some in proper Hungarian costume, but more
frequently in a white flannel cloak, which, hanging from their
shoulders down to their ankles, formed their only covering.
But, wild though the country might be, the Prussian generals
viewed it with favour, for it was generally clear and open, and
would be a fair field for their needle-guns and rifle artillery.
Over this plain, on the lefl bank of the March, the eighth
Prussian division scoured the whole country between the stream
and the mountains.
But it did not seem probable that these weapons would be
Chap, III.] ADVAXCE TO THE DANUBE. 399
required till the Prussians advanced on Vienna. No Austrians
were reported in front of the outposts, and it appeared that the
Archduke Albrecht intended to wait in his works at Fiorisdorf
until the Prussians either attacked him there, or attempted the
passage of the Danube at some other point In the meantime,
while the needle-gun was not in active use, its merits formed an
endless topic of conversation in the army. Of course, its success
had made it a great favourite, and the Prussians, both men and
officers, considered the victories which were won at Gitschin
and PodoU by its means to have established its claim to be re-
garded as the best weapon in existence. It has certainly been
most satisfactorily proved that the z^ndnadd-gewehr is better
than the Austrian muzzle-loader, but we had a pretty good idea
before this war took place that any breech-loader would be a
better arm for infantry than any muzzle-loader ; and though the
great slaughter of the Austrians in the actions of this campaign
brought the fact more forcibly before our notice, nothing has
been elicited in the late war to prove that the needle-gun is
better or even equal to many breech-loading rifles that have
been invented more lately. The success of the needle-gun has
established the superiority of the breech-loading over the
muzzle-loading principle; but there are many breech-loaders
better adapted for all the purposes of warfare than the needle-
gun, and any nation which may arm its troops with a servile
imitation of the Prussian arm may probably find that the next
European war will show the trouble to have been in vain, and
the expenses of the armament thrown away.*
Many attempts were made on the afternoon of the 19th to
see the Stephanenthurm of Vienna, but the tower could not be
seen ; for, although the country is in general flat, many swelling
undulations of ground lay between Duemkruth and the capital,
which impeded the view. Even from the railway embankment
at Ganserndorf it could not be made out, for a rising ground
covered with com lay directly between the village and the city,
and a man standing on the embankment was not raised high
enough to see over the swell Nor could a glimpse be caught
♦ In 1870-71 the chassepot was universally ackno^vledged to be a better
weapon than the needle-gun.
400 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
of the position of Florisdorf, or even of the Bisamberg, which
was also reported to be intrenched, and defended by heavy
artillery. The Prussian advance had been so rapid that it was
almost impossible to realise that the army was within thirty
miles of the Austrian capital, and the troops of the First Array
would have been glad of some visible proof which would assure
them of its proximity ; but as yet they could have none, and
many thought that perhaps the first palpable proof of their
near approach to Vienna might be the reports of the Austrian
guns, which were to dispute the passage of the Danube,
On the evening of the 21st July the Cabinet of Vienna
expressed itself willing to enter upon a suspension of hostilities
for five days, on the basis of the Prussian proposals, and on
the evening of the 22nd an armistice for that time was agreed
upon at Nikolsburg. It came into effect at noon on the 22nd,
and was to expire at mid-day on the following Friday, the
27th. But an action was fought on the morning of the 22nd,
by the seventh and eighth divisions, who moved at daybreak
that day on Preszburg, by the left bank of the March. The
eighth division had moved down the left bank of that river
from Coding by way of St. Johann and Malaczka in Hungary,
and on the 21st had neared Stampfen, On the 21st the seventh
division crossed the March, at Marchegg, under General Fran-
zecky, who was placed in command of all the troops on the
left bank of the stream. Prince Frederick Charles knew that
on the 22nd General Benedek would throw his leading divisions
over the Danube at Preszburg. If then he could seize that
place, the remainder of the Feldzeugmeister's troops would
have to make a dttour by Komom before arriving at Vienna.
The Commander-in-chief of the First Army, not being av^are
that any decision had been arrived at relative to the suspension
of hostilities, on hearing on the night of the 21st that the
Austrians were in position to bar the way near the village of
Bystenitz, was forced to order General Franzecky to attack
them, and so a combat was commenced.
On the evening of the 21st the seventh and eighth divisions,
under the orders of General Franzecky, were bivouacked on
the road which leads down the left side of the March from
Coding to Preszburg, and occupied a position on that road
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE, 401
between the villages of Stampfen and Bystenitz, with their
advanced guard pushed forward a little in front of the latter
village. The Quartermaster-General of the First Army, General
Stiilpnagel, attended by Count Hasler, of the general staff, had
that afternoon been making a reconnaissance of the Austrian
positions on the north of the Danube, and arrived in the
evening at the bivouacs of Franzecky's divisions. It was soon
found that the Austrians held the village of Blumenau, which
lies on the same road, about five miles nearer Preszburg, in
strong force ; and as it was extremely desirable to secure the
town of Preszburg as quickly as possible, Count Hasler was
despatched to Ebenthal to request Prince Frederick Charles's
permission for an attack to be made on Blumenau. The
staff-officer reached head-quarters towards midnight At this
time Prince Frederick Charles was ignorant that an armistice
would be agreed to, and he sent back the desired permission.
A little after midnight Count Hasler left the head-quarters of
the First Army at Ebenthal, and started on his return journey,
carrying this important order, on which so much might depend.
Thirty miles of bad road lay between Ebenthal and Bystenitz ;
the night was very dark, there was no moon, and clouds shut
out even the dim light which the stars might have afforded ;
but the staff-officer pushed his horse resolutely over the March
by the repaired bridge at Anger, along twisting country lanes,
past wide ditches and morasses, reached Bystenitz safely at the
first streaks of dawn, and communicated the Prince's message
to General Franzecky. Franzecky at once made his disposi-
tions for attack. At the same time Prince Frederick Charles
sent orders to General Hann to support Franzecky with his
division of cavalry.
The road from Bystenitz to Blmnenau, which is a distance
of about five English miles, runs close below the extreme
westerly spurs of the Lower Carpathians, which rise high on
the left of a traveller journeying from the former to the latter
place. The ground on the right until the road strikes the
railway from Gansemdorf to Preszburg is flat and level. The
mountains on the left are broken by steep and rough ravines,
down which run little rivulets, making their way with perpetual
cascades towards the March or the Danube; between the
D D
402 SEVEiV WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
courses of these rivulets the spurs of the mountains swell out
in bluff undulations into the plain through which runs the
river March. The ground on the mountain sides is every-
where rough and broken, large stones are scattered over it, and
in many places jagged lumps of rock start out of the soil and
form natural fortresses to oppose the passage of troops up the
hills. A dense forest of oak and pine trees, which, from being
untended, have grown close together, and intertwined their
branches so as to form a network of dark-green foliage, through
which a man can hardly penetrate, grows upon the sides of the
ravines and the less steep spiurs of the mountains, and runs up
the sides of the hills all the way from Bystenitz to Preszbuig.
The roads through the wood are few and at long distances
apart ; none are practicable for any troops except foot soldiers,
and only for these when moving with a very narrow front At
Blumenau the road leads to the left, and runs straight to
Preszburg through a defile in the hills, being crossed near to
this village by the railway which leads from Gansemdoif
to Preszburg, and which, after crossing the road, runs along
the left-hand side of the latter through the same defile. On
the side of the road and railway opposite to Blumenau, and
about three-quarters of a mile to the right, lies the little village
of Kaltenbrun, situated on rough, broken hills called the
Theben-Berger, which are thickly clothed with fir woods, and
fill up the whole triangle enclosed between the railway, the
March, and the Danube. About three miles from Blumenau,
nearer Preszburg, the road and railway, side by side, pass over
a little rivulet which supplies the stream to turn the wheels of
two watermills — one situated upon each side of the way ; above
these mills on the left-hand side rises a portion of hill rather
higher than the surrounding spurs and less thickly covered
with forest, called the Gamsen-Berg ; a footpath which leaves
the high road at Bystenitz leads up the mountain side to the
left of the road, and after a steep and rugged ascent descends
equally roughly, and again joins the main road behind the
watermills coming down begide the Gamsen-Berg.
The Austrian position was shrouded by the woods and by
the broken ground, but a reconnaissance, made with consider,
able difficulty, showed that they were in great force. Their
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE, 403
centre held the villages of Blumenau and Kaltenbrun and the
ground between, the left was in the fir woods on the Theben-
Berger stretching toward the March. Their right extended
from the village of Blumenau about half a mile up the lower
spurs of the Carpathians. The position was strong and formid-
able, the ground was extremely favourable to the defenders,
and gave jio open field for the play of the needle-gun j but
Franzecky not only determined to carry the position, but also
had the bold design of cutting off firom Preszburg and capturing
the greater part of the defending force and all their artillery,
and in all human probability he would have done so had not
the good fortune of Austria brought the combat to a prematiure
close.
General Bose was directed to take two regiments, the 21st
and 71st, each of three battalions, making a total force of
under 5,000 men — ^for these regiments had had their ranks
thinned by the war — by the mountain path leading from Bys-
tenitz, and gain the rear of the enemy near the Gamsen-Berg,
so as to cut off their retreat to Preszburg, while Franzecky him-
self determined, with the remainder of his troops, to attack the
position in firont About half-past four in the morning Bose's
men began their march, and, disappearing into the wood to the
left, began their ascent of the difficult mountain path. Their
way was long and rugged, so that time had to be allowed them
to gain the Gamsen-Berg, and it was not till after six that Fran-
zecky gave the signal for the advance of the troops on the main
road.
Then the advance guard began to move briskly forward, and
the rest of the little army followed in battle array. Skirmishers
pushed forward through the fields on the left, pushing up close
to the wood on the mountain side ; their supports moved in
small clumps here and there behind them ; a larger body
marched along the road, and behind them, spread out right
and left, came the heavy columns of the infantry and the broad-
fronted batteries of guns. On the right of the road a squadron
of the loth hussars glided with the cheery noise of clinking
sabres and ringing steel over the meadows and flat stubble
field, pushing forwards to feel their way — scouts, who, carbine in
hand, spread, a thin curtain of horsemen, before the main body.
D D 2
404 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
Scarcely had the troops begun to move when the morning sun
burst brightly from the clouds over the Carpathians, and fell
upon the bright swords of the cavalry, the glittering bayonets
and rifles of the infantry, and even managed to draw a twink-
ling reflection from the darkly-browned steel of the artillery
guns. The Prussian soldiers greeted it with joy, for their
frames were chilled with their night's bivouac, and they marched
in the full confidence that before it set it would have lighted
them to another victory. Slowly and steadily the columns
moved ; the men were very silent, for they all felt that stem
subdued excitement which always appears to pervade eveiy
breast when a battle is close at hand ; and the sound of the
measured tread of the battalions, and the heavy nimble of the
guns, rose into the air almost unbroken. The advanced guard,
consisting of the 72nd regiment, approached to within three
thousand paces of the point where the railway, marked by its
long line of spectral telegraph posts, could be seen closing into
the road from the right, and where the dark green fir-woods
behind it showed that there was the Austrian position ; but no
signs of the enemy could be seen, except two squadrons erf
lancers, one considerably in rear of the other, which stood
on the level ground to the right of the road in front of the rail-
way, motionless as statues, with the pennons of their lances
faintly fluttering in the breeze. Then suddenly the well-known
cloud of white smoke, which shows where a gun has been fired,
rose from the raised ground between Blumenau and Kalten-
brun, and a whizzing whistling shell rushed through the air,
over the heads of the hussars on the right of the road. The
Prussian guns came quickly into action, and opened on the
spot where the cloud of smoke had risen, and where, in a few
moments, repeated flashes of fire and many more clouds ot
heavy hanging smoke announced that a strong Austrian batten*
had its post. While the artillery fight was going on, the dark
green hussars on the right began to move quickly forward, and
rushed in full career against the foremost squadron of Austrian
lancers. These did not stand motionless now. Slowly at first,
and then more quickly, they began to advance against the
hussars; and when the two squadrons came within a few
hundred yards of each other, both urged their horses
CHAP. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 405
to their utmost speed, and with a mighty clatter dashed
together.
The rough embrace lasted but for a moment; then the
lancers scattered and fled, for the hussars were stronger and
better mounted, and their mere weight smashed the lancers'
ranks. These pursued a short distance, capturing several pri-
soners ; but they could not follow far, for the other squadron
of lancers looked threatening, and the hussars had no reserves
near at hand The cavalry combat, though so short, was severe ;
many men were down on both sides, and Major von Hymen,
commanding the hussars, had the whole side of his face laid
open, but refused to quit the field, and commanded his squadron
throughout the day.
In the meantime the cannonade increased in the centre, more
Prussian guns were brought into action, and more Austrian
pieces were firing between Blumenau and Kaltenbrun ; and at
eight o'clock, when the action had lasted about an hour, forty
Austrian and thirty-six Prussian guns were pounding against
each other. Casualties began to increase ; one Prussian bat-
tery in particular was rapidly being unhorsed, for the Austrians
were making good practice, and their shells were generally
bursting at the proper moment
Half an hour later an officer arrived firom Prince Frederick
Charles to announce that an armistice was agreed upon, and
that it was to commence at mid-day ; but Franzecky could not
stop the fight, for Bose was with his brigade committed in the
mountains, and if the grand firont attack ceased he would pro-
bably before noon be captured. But no infantry was sent for-
ward, and the combat was confined to artillery fire alone for
more than two hours.
Then Franzecky, fearing for Bose, determined to attack the
Austrian position with energy, and made his dispositions for a
general advance. General Gordon, with four battalions, was
ordered to move by a mountain path, which, leaving the road
near where the artillery was at present, runs lower down the
hills than the way taken by Bose, and comes out on the road
again near Blumenau ; when he felt the Austrian right, he was
to attack it with vigour and occupy the village of Blumenau.
At the same time, two battalions were sent against the fir-
406 SEVEN WEEK'S WAR. [Book IX,
woods near Kaltenbrun to attack the Austrian left, and, if
possible, to seize that village, while the main body and the
artillery were to move straight against the front
The guns were limbered up; the two battalions began
moving over the plain towards the wood of Kaltenbrun ;
Gordon was already on the hill-side, and the main body
advanced for about one thousand paces, when the guns, again
unlimbered, came into action, and renewed their fire on the
Austrian batteries. About eleven o'clock the two battalions
came within easy distance of the wood near Kaltenbrun, and
were received by a biting fire from the Austrian sharpshooters
among the trees, while to the rear of the guns between Blu-
menau and Kaltenbrun they could see heavy masses of infantry
ready to resist the front attack. The Prussian battalions
immediately opened out and began to fire against the infantiy
in the wood ; but the trees hid their antagonists, and they did
not seem to cause much diminution of the fire from the forest
In the meantime a message came from Bose to say that he
had debouched on the Gamsen-Berg, and had there met the
celebrated Austrian Schwarz and Gelh brigade. A severe fight
took place here ; the Austrians poured volley after volley into
the head of Bose's column as it attempted to come out of the
trees, and so tangled was the jungle that the Prussian marks-
men could hardly force through it in order to spread out on
either side and open fire against the Austrians. But after a
time they succeeded in penetrating through the thick trunks
and interwoven branches, and the Prussians debouched and
deployed on the Gamsen-Berg. Still the fight went on, but
the Austrians were driven back step by step, and at last Bose
seized the water-mills and planted his brigade across the road
and railway to Preszburg, sending a messenger to General
Franzecky to say that the enemy's retreat was cut off, and that
now the front attack might be pressed hard. It was the receipt
of this message that caused Franzecky to order the general
advance, but before the combat could be finished the laiurels
that he would have gained by the capture of the enemy, which
would have certainly been the result of his skilful dispositions,
were snatched from his grasp.
Time was getting on; and before the front attack was
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 407
developed, the sun, standing high up in the heavens and
directly south, showed that mid-day had arrived. In a few
minutes an Austrian officer came out from the Blumenau posi-
tion with a flag of trace, and advanced towards the Prassian
lines. He was met by a Prassian officer, to whom he reported
that an armistice had been agreed upon, to date from mid-day,
and that it was already past the hour. In a few minutes the
signal to cease firing was sounded along the Prassian ranks,
and the combat was broken off. The sudden silence was
curious and abrapt ; there were none of the dropping shots or
single occasional reports in which a cannonade generally dies
away ; in a moment the roar of the artillery and the patter of
small arms ceased, and a curious hum of conversation rose
from the astonished soldiers.
At first the Austrians would not believe that their retreat was
cut off, and that they had been in such imminent danger of
being captured, for no report had been sent up from the rear,
and they still thought that they commanded the road to Presz-
burg. But they were soon convinced that they were really
surrounded, when, on sending back, it was found that Prassian
troops were drawn up across the only line of retreat for their
artillery.
The Austrians lost in the combat between five hundred and
six hundred men, of whom one hundred were taken prisoners,
and over three hundred were wounded. The Prassian loss
was reported only one hundred killed and wounded.
To speculate on what would have been is generally unprofit-
able, especially so in war ; but as the Austrians fiilly acknow-
ledge that they were only saved by a lucky fortune from a
terrible disaster, it may not be too much for impartial observers
to believe that the action was virtually gained by the Prassians,
and that if it had continued all the Austrian artillery must have
been taken, and probably the greater part of their infantry
captured ; for there is no road except the one occupied by
Bose by which the guns could have been withdrawn from Blu-
menau ; and though there is a rough country lane by which
men on foot could from Kaltenbran reach the banks of the
Danube, it is extremely doubtful if the Prassians would not
have been in Preszburg before the Austrian infantry could
4o8 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
have gained that line by this roundabout route, and then their
capture was certain.
The number of men engaged on each side was about equal
The Prussians had two divisions, which together consisted of
twenty-five battalions, in the field, with forty-eight guns, but
twelve of these were always in reserve. The Austrians had the
ist, 2nd, and 4th brigades of their second corps d'arm^ and
Mendel's brigade of the tenth corps engaged, and had forty
guns.
Had this action been allowed to proceed, and had it been
a victory for the Prussians, it would have been won, not by the
needle-gun so much as by the brilliant dispositions made by
General Franzecky for turning his enemy's right flank. This
was confessed by an Austrian oflicer, who, talking to a Prussian
officer after the armistice was declared, said, " Your needle-
gun may be a terrible weapon, and we know by experience how
well it shoots; but it has not been so bad for us as your
generals, who have a most diabolical power of manoeuvring."
Directly the action was over, General Stiilpnagel and Count
Hasler rode into Preszburg to settle with the commandant of
that place the line of demarcation which should be observed
by the troops during the armistice. The Prussian troops were
all in front of the line that was agreed upon, and ought, accord-
ing to the strict letter of the law, to have withdrawn at once,
but it was late in the day when the line was fixed. The
Austrian officer consented that for the night the Prussians should
remain where they were, and retire to their new ground in. the
morning.
Then occurred a curious scene. The men of Bose's Prussian
brigade, who had been planted across tlie Preszburg road, and
a few hours before had been standing ready, rifle in hand, to
fire upon the retreating Austrian battalions, were surrounded
by groups of those very Austrian soldiers whom they had been
waiting to destroy. The men of the two nations mingled
together, exchanged tobacco, drank out of each other's flasks,
talked and laughed over the war in groups equally composed
of blue and white uniforms, cooked their rations at the same
fires, and that night Austrian and Prussian battalions lay down
bivouacked close together, without fear and in perfect security.
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE, 409
On the morrow all along tlie line of the front of the Prussian
anny the divisions took up the positions they were to occupy
during the temporary peace.
Early on the morning of the 22nd, commissioners from the
Austrian and Prussian armies had a meeting at a small village
between Gansemdorf and the Danube, in order to decide upon
a line which should, during the armistice, form the boundary
between the troops of the two nations. The Prussian commis-
sioners were General von Podbielsky, of the King's head-
quarter staff, and Major von Capprivi, of the stafif of Prince
Frederick Charles; their colleagues from the Austrian camp
were General von John and some of his assistants in the
Austrian head-quarter staff. After some hours of consultation
the line of demarcation was decided upon. It started on the
Prussian right at Krems, on the Danube ; followed the north
bank of the river down as far as Stockerau ; from that town
ran up the curve of the Gollsbach rivulet to the neighbourhood
of Fellabrun; then, by taking a lin^ to the village of Weinsteig,
it struck the Rossbach rivulet close to that village, followed this
stream as far as Leopoldsdorf, then ran along the road between
that village and Lasse, and was then drawn along an imaginary
straight hne to the railway bridge over the March, near March-
egg. On the left side of the March a straight line from the
railway bridge carried it to the village of Bistritz, whence it
followed the eastern edge of the Fahren Wald till it struck the
main road from Skalitz to Tymau. It was further agreed that
commanders of detachments and of troops left to mask fort-
resses should decide with the commanders of the troops
opposite to them upon the lines of demarcation to be observed
in the vicinity of their own commands.
The Prussian cavalry corps, under the command of Prince
Albrecht, was pushed forward to the line of the Roszbach, and
had its head-quarters in the neighbourhood of Deutsch Wagram,
whence the fortifications of Florisdorf could be seen, but their
details could not be made out.
While the action of Blumenau was actually being fought.
General Degenfeld and Count Karolyi, the former Austrian
Ambassador at Berlin, crossed the space between the outposts
on the other side of the March, and went to the King's head-
410 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. ' [Book IX.
quarters, empowered by the Austrian Government to conclude
a treaty of peace.
At the time of the suspension of hostilities, the Prussian
armies on the Marchfeld and between Vienna and Bhinn
consisted of the three corps of Prince Frederick Charles, the
cavalry corps of Prince Albrecht, three divisions under General
Herwarth, and three and a half corps under the Crown Prince.
These formed a force of about two hundred and sixty-five
thousand combatants. Behind these lay the first reserve corps
under General Miilbe at Briinn, half a corps from the Crown
Prince's army in firont of Olmiitz, and near the same fortress
KnobelsdorTs corps, forming together an additional force of
about fifty-five thousand men. The corps of Knobelsdorf had
occupied the Austrian town of Troppau on the 9th July, and
had then been pushed forward to observe Olmiitz and garrison
the line of railway to Briinn. Count Stolberg was left in
Silesia with about ten thousand men to watch the Austrian
detachments in Gallicia, The division of Landwehr of the
Guard was in Prague. Detachments of Landwehr held Saxony,
and garrisoned the capital and fortresses of Prussia.
On the western theatre of war, ManteufFel had sixty thousand
men in the field. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had about
twenty-five thousand. Five thousand men held Frankfort and
Hanau, and Landwehr garrisoned Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, and
Hanover. In all, Prussia had at the lowest computation five
hundred and twenty thousand fighting men in the field — ^a
stupendous force to be supplied by a country which with its
allies did not possess a population of twenty million inhabitants.
Besides these, there were depot and garrison troops retained in
the provinces, which numbered at least one hundred thousand
additional soldiers.
CHAPTER IV.
THE TRUCE.
During the armistice of five days, the Prussian troops
remained in the Marchfeld
On the morning of the 23rd, the troops who had been the
previous day engaged in the combat of Blumenau marched
back to their positions on their own side of the line of demar-
cation which was to be observed by the Prussians during the
armistice. Between this line and that up to which the Austrian
outposts were pushed forward extended a narrow belt of neutral
ground, on which the soldiers of either side were forbidden to
tread, and where the labourers were cutting the corn and
carrying in the harvest as peaceably and diligently as if there
was no enemy in their country, and no Prussian vedettes were
posted along the course of the Roszbach. The troops, not
ungrateful for a little idleness after their hard work, lay billeted
in the villages between Ebenthal and the line of demarcation,
knapsacks were unpacked, and their motley contents laid out
on the banks by the roadside to be dried and aired in the sun.
The artillery ammunition went under a careful inspection;
groups of soldier-tailors sitting together under the trees patched
up holes made in uniforms either by the wear and tear of the
campaign, or by the too near approach of a bullet or the
splinter of a shell Everywhere through the cantonments there
was a listless, idle air of careless comfort and rest, such as can
only be thoroughly appreciated by those who have been
marching and fighting for weeks past under a burning sun or
heavy soaking rain ; except where the sentinel paced up and
down before some cottage improvised into a guardhouse, where
the regimental colours were deposited, or where the vedette
412 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book IX.
sat mounted, with pistol in hand, peering as carefully towards
Florisdorf and the Danube as if there were no truce agreed
upon, and as if he expected every moment to have to give the
signal of the approach of the enemy's columns. No one who
bore any look of being a spy was allowed to pass either out of
the lines or into them, and so suspicious were the sentries that
the country people going out to or returning from work had to
give satisfactory accounts of themselves before they were
allowed to pass. The Austrians were equally careful on their
side, so that no communication could take place with Vienna ;
and the Stephanenthurm, which looked down on the city where
so many would like to go if only for an hour, only tantalized
those who could see it from the line of outposts, and drew forth
many exclamations of impatience from those who fretted and
fumed at being tied down to the flat plain of the Marchfeld,
in the very sight of the capital, where many little luxuries which
were greatly missed and wanted in the army could so easily
have been purchased.
In the meantime the military authorities were not idle in
their preparations for the continuance of the campaign, in case
the diplomatists, who were working in mysterious silence at
Nikolsburg, should fail to come to terms upon the conditions
of peace. The railway was crowded with trains all the way
from Gorlitz to Limdenburg, which were bringing up reserves,
heavy guns, stores, pontoons, and all the other materials which
would be required for the passage of the Danube. The armis-
tice had not done the Prussians much harm, even if the war
should have broken out afresh, except by stopping the action
of Blumenau, for they would probably have had to pause in
the middle of active operations to await the arrival of their siege
guns and their bridge material, even if there had been no
suspension of hostilities ; and the five days which gave rest to
the battalions in the front of the army also afforded time to get
forward the immense train of boats, pontoons, and planks
which the engineers would have required if they had been
called upon to throw bridges across the broad, rapid stream
which flows between the Marchfeld and Vienna, although the
Danube is not so difficult to cross as most rivers with an
equal amount of water, for it is broken up into many channels,
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 413
enclosing numerous islands which much aid the construction
of a bridge.
Now in the different billets many stories were related of
individual prowess and personal bravery during the campaign.
There was not a battalion or a squadron which had not its
special hero, about whom some particular anecdote was re-
corded ; no two opinions were stated concerning the organiza^
tion and equipment of the different branches of the army
from those who have had the most practical proofs of the
working of them, by being dependent upon them in the real
work of war. There were no grumblers ; and though the staff
officers, who observed carefully every incident of the cam-
paign, with a view to profit by its experience for further im-
provement and for further progress, had noted many things
which were changed or adopted as soon as peace gave time
and opportunity, the regimental officers were well content
with everything, and were ready to stand or fall by their con-
viction that the Prussian army was the most smoothly-worked
piece of machinery in the whole world. It was curious to find
from those who had taken part in the cavalry fighting that the
epaulette, which has of late been discarded in many armies as
a useless incumbrance, had again risen into high favour.
None of the Prussian cavalry wore their epaulettes on service
except the Uhlans, but some officers of these regiments spoke
most highly of the good service the little plates ^of shoulder
armour had done in warding off sword cuts. The cuirass, too,
proved more useful in close encounter than most people would
have given it credit for, and was in more than one case the
instrument of saving a man's life, and yet the Prussian cuiras
ses are thin, ill made, and ill fitted in comparison with those
of the British Household Cavalry. Still, there was a strong
party against this defensive armour, for many in the army held
that its use does not repay the extra weight it puts upon the
horse, but this party was for the present silenced by the great
success which tiie 5 th regirnent of cuirassiers, attached to the
Crown Prince's army, had lately been in the combat near
Tobitschau, where it took seventeen guns.
The needle-gun was of course an immense favourite, and the
Prussian officers justly held that an army provided with a
414 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
muzzle-loading arm can never hope to stand up to their troops
in the shock of open battle; but their conclusion that the
needle-gun is the best possible breech-loader was founded on
nothing more than the fact that it is superior to a muzzle*
loading rifle, and they advanced no good grounds for sup-
posing that no breech-loader has been invented since the
introduction of the needle-gun into the Prussian service, which
can be superior to the arm that did such fearful execution
in the Austrian ranks at Podoll, and in the actions before
Gitschin.
The Prussians entered upon the campaign with their horse
artillery armed with smooth-bore 12-pounder guns. They
had long before the armistice bitterly repented this error, and
will take care to remedy it before they are embroiled in another
war. The whole of their field artillery is to be armed with
steel breech-loading rifled gims constructed on Krupp*s system
— ^good ordnance doubtless, but the Prussian guns did not
appear in action to make such good practice as the Armstrong
guns did in China, when the English gunners were stiU un-
accustomed to them, and as yet looked upon all breech-loading
ordnance with considerable suspicion.*
The Prussians on the 24th commenced massing troops
towards the left of their position, with the view of being able
to make an immediate dash on Preszburg on the afternoon
of the 27th, if peace should not be concluded during the time
that the armistice lasted ; but most in camp looked upon this
concentration as a needless precaution, for it was considered
that peace was perfectly certain. But neither the stafi* nor the
outposts were prevented by this feeling of certainty from using
all precautions from being taken unawares; the railway still
teemed with trains loaded heavily with troops and stores.
No news could be obtained of how the negotiations were
going on at Nikolsburg, for the diplomatists preserved the
correct diplomatic silence, and took care that the profanum
7Ju/gus should gain no clue either to the progress or probable
result of the discussions held at their mysterious meetings.
* In 1870-71, a portion of the Prussian field artillery was anned with
bronze breech-loading guns, and probably in future all the guns for the
field artillery will be made of bronze.
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 415
Rumours, of course, were rife, and all of them prophesied
peace; some went so far as to assert that the treaty would
actually be signed on Thursday, the 26th ; but how flax such
reports were to be trusted could not be established, as popular
opinion was now swayed about in the most extraordinary way.
The sudden glance of a Minister, or the wearied look of a
Plenipotentiary, was interpreted according to the inclination of
the observer, and had some deep meaning attached to it, pos-
sibly very remote from what it might really signify.
Nothing was doing at head-quarters, so a party of officers of
the staff was made to visit the outposts, partly for the sake of
something to do, partly in hopes of being able to catch some
glimpses of the fortifications round Florisdorf, which are rapidly
becoming famous. A ride of fifteen miles over the flat, wide-
spreading Marchfeld, carpeted with meadows, clovef-fields, and
broad belts of stubble, from which most of the com had been
removed, past dark woods of fir and lighter copses of dark oak,
took them to Wagranu More than once some one exclaimed,
" What a beautiful battle-field for cavalry 1 '* as they rode for
miles over ground unbroken by fences or brooks, and in which
the only obstacles to the free gallop of horses were a few small
ditches, and here and there a tiny bank.
The village of Wagram, celebrated by the battle won here by
the first Napoleon, contains a chapel where are collected many
of the arms that were found on the field after that great fight
A strange feeling of awe comes upon one when brought face to
face with these truest monuments of the great conflict waged
here by the mighty dead ; and the loud talk and laughter of
€:areless soldiers fresh from a field of battle, and reckless of how
soon they might march to another, were hushed, not more by
the sanctity of the place than by an almost involuntary reve-
rence for the visible memorials of the great battle and of the
warriors who fell in it. But disappointment has also its place
in the mind ; for how clumsy, how old-^hioned, according to
otir ideas, look those old flint muskets and heavy swords with
which but a few years back the fate of Europe was decided !
Could the question fail ? Shall we to our successors in the next
generation appear to have known so little of what science has
in such a short time developed, and to have been so ignorant
41 6 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book IX.
of mechanical appliances, which, when once unfolded, appear
so simple and so palpable ? And another thought came into
every mind, which struck home to the heart ; for it told that m
a few short years those who had fought at Koniggratz and sur-
vived the long summer da/s slaughter on the Sadowa hill
would individually be equally lost to memory as those who fell
at Wagram — their names mostly unknown, their private deeds
unrecorded by any historian.
About two hundred yards south of the village of Wagram lies
the watercourse of the Roszbach rivulet. This world-known
brook is about ten feet wide and fifteen feet deep. With sharp
sides cut almost straight down, and the earth thrown up on
either bank to form dykes which prevent its winter floods fi-om
inundating the surrounding country, it looks more like a huge
artificial drain than like a natural ri\'ulet. Along its banks
grow rows of pollard willows, closely planted together, which
formed a gratefiil shade fi-om the burning July sun. The road
which leads to Florisdorf crosses the brook by a slight wooden
bridge which could be destroyed in a few minutes by the
pioneers of a single battalion. On the Wagram side of the
bridge were two vedettes fi'om Hohenlohe's fine regiment of
Uhlans, crouching for shade under the willow-trees, but steadily
gazing out towards Florisdorf, though not an Austrian vedette
could be seen, for they were all hidden by trees.
But, though no enemy was in sight, a view was there which
well repaid the long ride, and which even the soldiers, accus-
tomed as they had been to marching through fine scenery, were
admiring to each other. On the right lay the rounded hill of
the Bisamberg, studded with vineyards, corn-fields, and woods,
among which vain search with glasses was made to discover any
signs of the hostile batteries. Beyond the Bisambeig could be
seen the narrow gorge fi'om which the Danube issues, and
fiirther still the rough rugged recess of the hills above Kloster-
neuberg, rising steeply up from the water's edge, with their
summits capped with heavy masses of dark green foliage, and
their sides sprinkled over with fir-trees. A little to the left?
and at the foot of the hills, the city of Vienna lay sparkling in
the sun ; the tops of the steeples and the roofs of the houses
glittered in the bright flood of light, but not too powerfiiUy, for
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 417
the air between Wagram and the town seemed converted by
the heat into a heavy transparent ether, which spread a halo
round the city. In the foreground, a little to the left, a high
church spire, surrounded by tall poplar-trees, showed the situa-
tion of the village of Florisdorf ; but no intrenchments could
be seen, no working parties could be discovered ; they were all
hidden by a long gentle wave of the ground, which would not
have been noticed except because it excluded from the view.
Far away on the left front spread the Marchfeld, beyond
which could be seen the dim blue line of hills which gird the
valley south of the Danube, while directly to the left the dark
Carpathians towered up to the sky, and the gap between the
Theben-Berger and the main ridge showed where the road ran
to Preszbuig, and pointed, out the situation of the village of
Blumenau, the scene of the combat of the 22nd.
After a long and fruitless search among the poplar-trees for
any signs of intrenchments, during which heaps of earth were
pointed out as redoubts, which may have been or may not, the
officers turned to ride down the Roszbach. The brook was
almost entirely dry; here and there for a few yards a thin
sheet of water a few inches deep covered the soft muddy
bottom, and gave a refuge to flocks of mud-bedaubed ducks,
but in general the mud which forms the sole of the watercourse
lay exposed to the sun, and was dried and broken into cracks
and fissures, which ran into each other, forming a tracery not
unlike hieroglyphic writing. All along the brook were constant
vedettes, all hidden in the willows on the bank, which the
conditions of the armistice had declared to be for the present
Prussian ground The sound of horses' feet coming along
drew the sentries out of their ambush far enough to let them
be seen, but as soon they saw the uniforms of the Prussian
staff-officers they resumed their steady stare to the front, retiring
into the shade, and let the officers pass them as if they were
not aware of our existence ; for outlying sentinels pay no
compliments in the presence of the enemy.
The Prussian armies were by the 25 th drawn close together,
and, concentrated in one huge mass, lay like a crouching lion,
ready to spring upon the Danube, should the negotiations for
peace fail, and the orders for an advance be flashed by tele-
£ E
4i8 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX,
graph jfrom Nikolsburg to the different commanders. The
First Army, under Prince Frederick Charles, was close up to
the Roszbach and the line of demarcation, with a strong corps
on the left bank of the March to guard its flank or form its
advanced guard as might be required, in case the signal should
be given to move forward. General Herwarth, with the Army
of the Elbe, was on the right, perhaps with the object of
crossing the river at a lower point of its course. The Crown
Prince was in rear of the first, ready to move in any direction
which occasion might require.
On the 27 th, at mid-day, the armistice would expire, and, in
case that it should not be prolonged, or preliminaries of peace
were not agreed upon by that hour, the Prussian troops were
on the 26th held in readiness to m^irch at the shortest notice.
If an advance had been made, there can be no doubt, firom the
positions of the different divisions, that the great attack against
the line of the Danube would have been made towards Presz-
burg ; probably, at the same time, a demonstration might have
been made towards the Prussian right, and a false attack
directed on Florisdorf, in order to retain the garrison in their
fortifications. The action of the 22nd, which at the moment
of certain victory for the Prussians was interrupted by the
armistice, had shown the Austrians where the chief attack
could be made, and the Prussians thought that by the 27 th the
position of Blumenau would in all likelihood have been arti-
ficially strengthened, and the road by which Bose advanced
and gained the rear of the villages would certainly be watched
on a future occasion. Yet, though there could be no hope of
succeeding so suddenly as on the 22nd in gaining the command
of the defile which leads to Preszbuig, and though there was
no chance, as would probably have been the case if the
previous Sunday's action had continued, of driving the enemy
so quickly through the town as to prevent him from destroying
the bridge, the advantages to be gained fi-om attempting to pass
the Danube at Preszburg were so great, that an attempt would
probably have been made to force the defile and to secure that
town. The fortifications of Florisdorf, a part of which could
be seen from the church-tower of Wagram, shut out the access
to such a broad piece of the river bank that veiy different
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 419
measures had to be taken for securing the passage than would
have been most expedient^ if no intrenchments had covered the
approach across the flat plain from Wagram and Aspem. The
portion of the works which could be seen through the clear air
from the church spire embraced four redoubts on the Bisam-
berg hill, and three on the flat ground between the Bisamberg
and Florisdorf ; there was also another work on the hill to
guard the left flank of the position, which lying more towards
the river could not be seen from Wagram.
The Prussian cavalry had gained much from the rest afforded
by the armistice ; fatigued by long marches through the Mo-
ravian highlands, and stinted for forage, it had a sufficiently
long period of repose when the army halted at Briinn to restore
it to the splendid condition in which it entered upon the
campaign ; but the long rest in the Marchfeld had done it an
immensity of good, though even here forage had not been
plentiful Notwithstanding small rations, the horses had
profited by their rest, for time had been given to replace their
worn-out shoes, and to afford relief to chafed backs caused by
the late long marches. The troopers were in high spirits, for
they had overcome the famed Austrian cavalry in several
encounters, and now claimed a higher reputation than that
which for several years past had been accorded to their
antagonists. The failures of the Austrian cavalry in their
encounters with the stroi^er and better-mounted horsemen of
Prussia had not so much astonished the thinking officers of this
army as had the singularly little use which General Benedek
had made of his light horse. Although operations had been
conducted in its own country, where every information con-
cerning the Prussian movements could have been readily
obtained from the inhabitants, the Austrian cavalry had made
no raids against the flank or rear of the advancing army, had
cut off no ammunition or provision trains, had broken up no
railway communication behind the marching columns, had
destroyed no telegraph lines between the front and the base of
supplies, had made no sudden or night attacks against the
outposts so as to make the weary infantry stand to their arms
and lose their night's rest, and, instead of hovering round the
front and flanks to irritate and annoy the pickets^ had been
£ £ 2
420 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
rarely seen or fallen in with except when it had been marched
down upon and beaten up by the Prussian advanced guards.
Yet the Prussian cavalry had in many cases lost severely in
the campaign, especially the 3rd regiment of Dragoons. This
regiment suffered fearfully from its rough hustle with the
Austrian cuirassiers at Koniggratz, and now mustered but half
the men and horses with which it entered upon the campaign.
More than half the officers and quite half the men who followed
across the Bohemian frontier the standard which has been
cherished in their regiment since the year 1704 are now lying
under the earth of Lipa, or were in the hospitals of Tiimau
and Gorlitz, for this was the regiment which dashed against
the heavy mass of cuirass horsemen who sacrificed themselves
to cover the retreat of the Austrian battalions, and it supported
its character for dashing courage at a tremendous cost Very
many of both the officers and men who were not now in the
ranks were victims to terrible sword cuts, which, coming down
upon the shoulder, cut clean through the shoulder-blade, and
often deep down into the body — awful memorials of the strength
of arm of the Austrian horsemen. Much did the officers of
this regiment complain of the absence of epaulettes, which
they estimated would, by defending the shoulder, have saved
half the men they had left behind them — a complaint which
was to some extent borne out by the fact that the ultimate
overthrow of the cuirass regiments of Austria was due to the
arrival of some of Hohenlohe*s Uhlans, who took them in
flank. Then, though the heavy horsemen turned upon Hohen-
lohe's men, their swords were shivered upon the brass plates
which lay upon the shoulders of the Uhlans, for these, unlike
the rank and file of the rest of the Prussian cavalrj^ carried
epaulettes, and though the blows were aimed at the head, the
smaller object was nearly always missed, and the sharp edge
descended only to be dinted or broken upon the protected
shoulder, while the Uhlans, with their lances held short in
hand, searched out with their spear-heads unguarded portions
of their antagonists' bodies, or, dealing heavy blows with the
butt ends of their staves, pressed through the thick ranks of the
heavy horsemen, marking their track with great heaps of dead,
dying, or wounded. On the evening of the 26th, there was
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 421
still no definite news from Nikolsburg, but every rumour which
arrived from headquarters pointed more and more to peace ;
still the army was held in readiness to move, and the officiers
(Tordonnance^ or " gallopers " as they would be termed in the
vernacular of Aldershot, were ordered to be prepared to start
with orders to the different divisions at three in the morning.
The preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon at Nikols-
burg on the evening of the 26th, and the war was certainly at
an end as far as Austria and the North German States were
concerned. Late on the night of the 26th, a courier arrived
from the King's head-quarters at Nikolsburg, bringing a letter
from General von Moltke to Prince Frederick Charles, which
gave no details and no information as to the conditions of the
peace, but said simply that a glorious peace had been arranged.
The news spread in a moment, and suddenly all was changed.
In the evening information was being obtained about the
strength of the Austrian position at Florisdorf, the preparations
to guard' the defile which leads to Preszburg, the nature of the
bridges over the Danube, or the chance of Edelsheim's cavabry
coming forward to break a lance in the Marchfeld. On the
morning of the 27th, these things were held of no account; no
one would have cared to hear accurately where every battalion
and every gun was posted in the Austrian lines ; the number
of Edelsheim's sabres and of the Archduke Albrecht's corps
were alike disregarded ; no one would have cared to hear how
many of the regiments firom Italy were actually in Vienna, and
the intrenchments of Florisdorf were considered a matter of
history. These who the previous night seemed to have ng
thought but of battle, promotion, and an entry into Vienna,
could speak on the 27th of nothing but home, and hardly
thought of anything except their speedy return to Prussia.
Now and then a faint discussion arose on the subject of the
conditions of peace, but so little was known in the army,
and so many reports were flying about, that these soon sub-
sided, and gave place to conversations about home and home
friends.
Though peace had been actually decided upon, no one con-
nected with the army was able to go across the two miles of
neutral ground which separate the Prussian from the Austrian
422 SEVEN WEEKS WAR. [Book IX.
outposts, so that there was almost no communication with
Vienna.
The great desire of marching into the Austrian capital had
melted away under the genial influence of certain peace, and
there had sprung up instead a feeling of satisfaction that it was
not necessary to humiliate Austria so far ; for of a sudden all
the affection for their old comrades of the Danish war, which
had lain latent in the hearts of the Prussian soldiers during the
campaign, had again burst forth into life, and there were pre-
valent in this army almost a kindly pity for the misfortunes of
those who but on the yesterday were regarded as deadly ene-
mies. The soft, stout hearts of the Prussians were easily turned
from anger to sympathy, as was so often shown by their tender
treatment of the Austrian wounded. During the armistice
there was a feeling of suspicion that the Austrian diplomatists
would be shifty, and break off the negotiations as soon as their
troops were concentrated. This feeling, combined with a
desire of mere glory, made the armistice very unpopular; but
now that it had been proved that the Austrians were really
honest, and that peace was really to be concluded, the memory
of all the old grudges was obliterated, and had been replaced by
a rapidly increasing feeling of friendship. If an Austrian officer
had now come into the Prussian lines he would have been
received by the officers with the same open-hearted hospitality
which they show to their own comrades; the day before he
would have been treated with the most polite courtesy.
The troops were in excellent condition, both as to health
and spirits, and quite prepared to march back to the frontier
at the same rate as they advanced.
On the evening of the 26th the preliminaries of peace* were
signed at Nikolsburg between Prussia and Austria ; the terms
which were agreed to were — that Austria should go out of the
Germanic Confederation, should pay a contribution towards
Prussia's expenses in the late war, and should offer no oppo-
sition to the steps which Prussia might take with r^ard to
Northern Germany: these steps were, to annex Hanover,
Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and the portion of Hesse-Darmstadt which
• Sec page 449.
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 423
lies on the north bank of the Maine ; to secure the reversion
of Brunswick on the death of the present Duke, who has no
children, to force Saxony to enter into the new North German
Confederation headed by Prussia, and to hold the entire mili-
taty and diplomatic leadership in that Confederation. The
war contribution to be paid by Austria was fixed at 40,000,000
thalerSy of which 15,000,000 were to be paid up, 15,000,000
were credited to Austria for the Schleswig-Holstein expenses,
5,000,000 for the support of the Prussian armies in Bohemia
and Moravia, and 5,000,000 were to be paid at a future date to
be afterwards settled The Prussian armies were on the 2nd
of August to retire to the north of the Thaya, but were to
occupy Bohemia and Moravia till the signature of the final
treaty of peace, and to hold Austrian Silesia until the war con-
tribution was paid.
To allow time for the preparation and determination of the
definitive treaty of peace, an armistice for five weeks was
concluded, to commence on the 2nd August, to which day the
five days' suspension of hostilities was extended. The conven-
tion for the armistice determined as follows : —
That the line of demarcation during the armistice should
run from Eyer by Pilsen, Neuhaus, Zlabings to the Thaya :
then follow the course of that stream to its junction with the
March, along the March to Napajedl, and in a straight line
from Napajedl to Oderberg, on the Prussian frontier.
Round each of the Austrian fortresses lying within the terri-
tories occupied by the Prussians a space was to be left, in
order that the fortress might draw provisions therefrom. Round
Olmiitz this space was to be ten miles, round Josephstadt,
Theresienstadt, and Koniggratz five miles.
The Prussians were to have the free use of all land and
water communications within the ground occupied by their
armies, and to have the right of transport by the railway from
Prerau to Bdhmisch-Triibau, which runs past the fortress of
Olmiitz.
The Austrian troops were not to advance from their actual
positions until the Prussian troops were entirely beyond the
Thaya. ^
The sick, who were lefl by the Prussians with doctors and
424 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
attendants in their actual positions, were to be supplied by the
Austrian Government, and no impediment was to be made to
their removal to their homes as soon as possible by the
Prussian Government
The Prussian troops were to be rationed from the territories
occupied. No money contributions were to be raised.
Negotiations were to be opened at Prague for the definitive
conclusion of peace.
By some unfortunate misunderstanding, the garrison of
Theresienstadt on the 28th July, although peace was agreed
upon on the 26th, sallied from their fortress, destroyed the
railway bridge near Kralup, north of Prague, broke the tele-
graph wires near the same spot, and captured two Prussian
officers, two officials, and fifty soldiers. When the comnaan-
dant of Theresienstadt directed this sally, he was unaware that
the preliminaries of peace had been agreed to ; but his in-
opportune vigour caused a great deal of inconvenience to the
Prussian army, for the destruction of the bridge broke the line
of communication with Tiimau, which was a large depot of
stores. During the armistice, too, some Austrian hussars,
unconscious of the existence of a truce, made an attack on a
park of reserve artillery at Znaym, and did some damage, for,
on account of the conclusion of the armistice, the guards bad
not taken precautions against a surprise.
On the evening of the 27 th, preliminaries of peace were
also agreed upon with Bavaria. The Bavarian Ambassador,
Herr von der Pfordten, had been for some days at Nikolsbuig
unable to obtain an audience of Count Bismark, and only in
the afternoon of the 27 th secured a few moments' conversation
with the Prussian Prime Minister. The tenns of peace were
quickly stated : the cession of all Bavarian territory north of
the Maine to Prussia, and the payment of a war contribution.
The Bavarian demurred, pleaded he had no instructions to
give up territory, and wished to enter into diplomatic negotia-
tions in a more orthodox manner, for to the Ambassadcv
trained in the rules of his art it seemed almost sacrilege to turn
over provinces in a meeting of only some moments' duration,
and to scratch out frontier lines with one or two dashing strokes
of a hurried pen; but the plenipotentiaries of Prussia, Count
Chap. IV.J THE TRUCE. 42S
Bismark and General von Moltke, would listen to no proposi-
tions and hear no objections, they required an immediate
assent ; the representative of the Court of Munich did not feel
justified in agreeing to such conditions, the meeting abruptly
terminated, and orders were telegraphed to General ManteufFel
to press the war in Bavaria. News came in from that country
of Prussian successes ; the Armies of the Elbe, of Prince
Frederick Charles, and of the Crown Prince were ready to
hurry off detachments to the theatre of war south of the Maine,
the cause of the decaying Bund was evidently hopeless, every
day of indecision must heighten the war contribution ; so in
the evening the Bavarian Ambassador was fain to declare his
agreement to the terms dictated. Orders were then tele-
graphed to General Manteuffel to arrest the progress of his
army, and preliminaries for a peace were signed.
On the 27 th, after the preliminary treaty with Austria had
been signed, the King, much to the satisfaction of the officers
at Nikolsbuig, who in this case certainly represented the pub-
lic opinion of the whole army, conferred on General von
Moltke the Order of the Black Eagle, the highest of the
decorations of Prussia, not more as a sign of approval of the
skill with which the General had carried through the negotiations,
than of the strategy he had displayed in the conduct of the
campaign.
The army was delighted with the terms of the peace ; all
the hardship, all the danger of the campaign were quite for-
gotten— all desire of war and regret that peace had been made
so soon had utterly vanished, giving way to feelings of con-
gratulation and happiness, because few men really thought
that the dreams of a United Germany and of a common
Fatherland for the whole Teutonic race were now visionary
speculations, but were results which must follow sooner or later
from this campaign. Count Bismark was immensely popular
in the army ;• he was regarded as the author and origin of this
success, so rapid, so complete, that no Prussian dared to hope
for half such a triumph when the troops dashed into Saxony
nearly seven weeks before.
A review was ordered in the Marchfeld for the 31st, but
only of the main body of the First Army and of the cavalry
426 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
corps. The Second Army and the Army of the Elbe were
already preparing to march back over the Thaya, and as soon
as the roads were clear the army of Prince Frederick Charles
was to follow. The greater part of the Crown Prince's aitny
was to hold Austrian Silesia and Moravia, while the First
Army afnd the Army of the Elbe occupied Bohemia. There
was one dark shadow cast over the troops, although it was
almost disregarded amid the universal joy caused by the
glorious terms of peace which had been obtained. The
cholera had broken out in the camp, several men and officers
were already down with it, and great fears were entertained
that the hot weather might cause it to increase. The cases at
first were not very numerous, but they were not confined to
one particular regiment, or one particular locality, which
makes it appear as though the disease were lurking all through
the lines, ready to burst forth everywhere if a day hotter than
usual or a slight failure of good water should occur. The
medical men, however, spoke confidentiy of their power to
keep the pestilence under, and it was hoped that when the
troops turned their faces homewards they might shake it off by
change of quarters, and suffer no more when well away from
the flat land which borders on the Danube. But it pursued
them as they moved, and during the whole of the remaining
time which the Prussian army remained on Austrian territory
it suffered much firom disease.
By the 29th the Prussian army began to withdraw firom the
duchy of Austria; the Crown- Prince's army was already
moving back towards Austrian Silesia, passing through Mo-
ravia. The second corps d'arm^e of the First Army had
commenced its movement towards Prague, and the rest of the
First Army was also to begin its retrograde march on the ist
August, after it had been reviewed by the King in the March-
feld on the 31st July. General Miilbe, who had come with
his reserve corps fi'om Prague to Briinn before the preli-
minaries of peace were agreed upon, was retracing his steps.
It could not be expected that the return march would be
nearly so rapid as that of the advance. There was no enemy
now in the front to be turned or hurriedly pushed back, so
the troops moved by easy stages until they reached the posi-
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. a^I
tions they had to occupy till the treaty of peace was finally
signed
The troops were not at all sorry to be called upon to march
again ; they had had more than enough rest after the quick
inarches of the advance, and began now to find time hang
rather heavy on their hands. Even smoking gets tiresome
when it has been indulged in for almost a week continuously
without the interruption of parades or inspections. Helmet
tops had been polished and repolished, needle-guns had had
their complicated mechanism taken to pieces, cleaned, and
put together again, swords and bayonets had been burnished
over and over again, accoutrements and appointments had
been inspected closely and more closely, almost in the hope
of finding some rent or hole which might have to be repaired,
aJl for the sake of something to do. But all the occupation
which their accoutrements could afford to the men had been
exhausted, and now they were reduced to strolling about list-
lessly, or hanging over the fences which surround the gardens
of the cottages where they were billeted, sucking gravely at
their long wooden pipes. Now and then a soldier might be
seen starting off to cut Indian com for the cow of the villager
on whom he was billeted, but he was seldom allowed to enjoy
alone his temporary occupation ; a group of comrades, eager
for employment, joined him, and in consequence the basket,
the filling of which might have given one man work for a
couple of hours, was crammed full in a few minutes by the
thick group of voluntary labourers. The village children
alone were perfecdy satisfied with the existing state of afiairs ;
they, unlike their elders, had no misgivings about heavy taxes
which they would be required to pay for the expenses of the
Austrian anny or the war contribution to Prussia ; unlike the
soldiers, they were not far away fi^om fiiends and homes, to
whom, now that the legitimate work of the campaign was over,
these were eager to return ; careless of to-morrow, they were
only delighted to have so many playfellows, for the great
strong men, who had been but the other day pursuing the
flying Austrian battalions firom Koniggratz, were now content
to let the children beat them, pull their hair, or sometimes
run about with their newly cleaned swords trailing in the dust.
428 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
and were well pleased afterwards to instruct the urchins in the
arts of converting a lump of deal into a boat, or a stick of
sycamore wood into a whistle.
A little after nine o'clock on the morning of the 31st Julv,
1866, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th infantry divisions and the
cavalry corps of the First Prussian Anny were drawn up on
the Marchfeld, within fifteen miles of Vienna, to be reviewed
by the King of Prussia. The troops were formed in four lines,
facing towards the south, where, through the haze which always
on a warm day overhangs a large city, could be indistinctly
seen the tall Stephanenthurm that marked the situation of the
Austrian capital; their left rested close to the village of
Gansemdorf, whence the lines stretched for a distance of a
mile and a half over a slightly undulated plain, from which the
crops had already been removed, in the direction of Auersthal,
but did not extend so far as that village. The two front lines
were formed of heavy battalions of infantry, each clumped
together in close columns of companies, standing out a dark
blue square against the yellow stubble; a hundred yards
behind the battalion stood a long line of the cavalry corps
under the command of Prince Albrecht, forming, with the
cavalry regiments attached to the infantry, a force of close
upon TO, 000 sabres and lances. On the right stood the heavy
brigade of General Pfuel, consisting of the two cuirassier
regiments of the Emperor of Russia and of the Duke of
Coburg, tall strong men, mounted on massive horses, with
their yellow helmets and armour glittering in the hot sunshine
like burnished gold ; next on the left stood Rheinhaben's
brigade formed from cavalry of the Guard, one regiment of
dragoons in light blue uniforms with red facings, and shining
black japanned helmets ; and two of Uhlans, the black and
white flags of whose lances formed a strong contrast to the
bright red facings and lancer caps over which they waved.
Next to the Guard brigade was drawn up the brigade of Duke
William of Mecklenburg, which had formed the advanced
guard of the First Army since it crossed the Elbe at Przelautsch,
and which did such tremendous havoc among the Austrian
cuirassiers at the end of the battle of Koniggratz. The
regiments in this brigade are the red hussars of Ziethen, the
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 4^9
celebrated yellow Uhlans commanded by Prince Hohenlohe,
and the 2nd dragoons of the Guard, one of whose squadrons
rode down the Austrian lancers at Tischnowitz. In the next
brigade stood the thinned squadrons of the 3rd dragoons, who
lost more than half their numbers at the great battle, side by
side with the light blue and silver clad Thuringian hussars,
who also suffered much in the same charge as the 3rd
dragoons. The left of the cavalry brigade was formed by
Goltz's heavy brigade, the Queen's own cuirassiers, and the
9th Uhlans, the regiment in whose hands the lance asserted its
supremacy over the sword in the cavalry combat at Saar. In
the fourth line, some two hundred yards in the rear of the
cavalry, were drawn up the ambulance waggons, ammunition
waggons, field telegraph division, a long line of light blue
carriages with companies of side bearers, and engineers
here and there between them, while on the left lay the
batteries of the reserve artillery. Between the batteries
of infantry and the long line of horsemen stood the field
batteries attached to the infantry divisions, each division in a
closed column of four batteries, with a cavalry regiment
beside it
About half-past nine Prince Frederick Charles galloped on
to the ground and took the command of the whole force. The
troops were not quite formed up when he arrived, and in a
short time they had all taken up their positions. Officers were
sent to look out for the approach of the King, and the cavalry
dismounted and stood beside their horses, the infantry piled their
arms and rested beside them to await his arrival In about
half an hour an officer who had been acting as scout towards
the right was seen coming at full gallop towards the Prince, but
the purport of his message was understood — ^he had no need to
deliver it. Before he had reached the Commander-in-chief the
sharp words of command calling the battalions and squadrons
to " attention " were passing quickly along the line, and in two
or three minutes the troopers were in their saddles, the com-
panies were reformed, the gunners sprang to their posts beside
their guns, and the whole army stood silent and motionless ;
the bayonets bristled stiff among the serried ranks of the
infantry, the lance-staves and swords formed a perfect un-
430 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
bending line along the whole cavalry division, the troopers sat
as still as statues, for the horses had been perfectly quieted by
the campaign, and the only moving things among the wide-
spread hosts were the standards of the infantry, and the
pennons of the Uhlans.
A little knot of horsemen appeared over the brow of a gentle
undulation, and came quickly towards the centre of the line ; a
tall man with grey hair and moustache, in the uniform of a
general officer, rode in front When he came nearly opposite
the centre of the army, the sword-point of Prince Frederick
Charles was lowered quickly towards the ground. At this
signal every officer's sword went down, with a rapid clatter
every musket came to the " present,*' the lance-staves and glit-
tering sword-blades of the cavalry stood straight up at the
"cany,*' while every band struck up the Prussian national
hymn to salute the King. He bowed down to his horse's
neck to return not only the salute, but the loud cheer which
went up from the ordered crowd, and which drowned the music
almost as soon as it began to sound. For a few minutes this
lasted, and then it died away, giving place to the last few notes
of the bands. All was again silent The King moved to the
right of the foremost line, and rode along it, stopping here and
there to speak to soldiers who had specially distinguished
themselves, or to shake hands with the commanding officers.
Every battalion cheered him as he walked along its front, pausing
to address to each a few words of praise for some particular
action during the campaign. Along the second line, the
cavalry, and the carriages in the rear he also rode, before he
took up his position for the army to march past hint
The first troops that went by were those of the fifth division,
commanded by General Tiimpling, who fought and won, from
a superior Austrian force strongly posted, the action of Brada,
near Gitschin. The whole of the Prussian infantry had well
proved during the war its power of marching long distances on
bad roads and in unfavourable weather, and that day the
battalions who were reviewed on the Marchfeld amply demon-
strated that this power can co-exist with the most beautiful
exactness of parade movements. With a long swinging stride
the men passed by, keeping perfect line, and stepping together
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 43i
in such exact time that they could not have done better if,
instead of campaigning and bivouacking, they had spent the
last two months at marching drill. In the centre of each
battalion was carried the standard, often riddled with bullet-
holes, sometimes so torn away that only a few patches of
tattered silk were left hanging on the bare pole. In the fifth
division were the 8th, 12th, i8th, and 48th regiments, all
below their proper strength, for the losses at Gitschin had not
yet been replaced, as the reinforcements which were coming
up were stopped as soon as peace was agreed upon. After the
infantry came the 3rd regiment of Uhlans, which was attached
to this division. The perfect marching of the foot soldiers
seemed to be contagious, for the squadrons moved in such even
hnes that as they passed the horseman on the flank utterly hid
all the rest from view. Then came the batteries, two abreast,
dark and business-like, with the guns uncovered, and the
rammers ready, as if pressing forward into action.
The sixth division, under General Manstein, followed the
fifUi, in the same order; it consisted of the 24th, 64th, 60th,
and 35th regiments, all marching with the same steady step,
and in equally perfect lines as those who had gone before them.
Well they looked and well they went ; stout, broad-shouldered
men, well grown in years, with thick beards and moustaches,
who swung along quickly, without a thought about the heavy
yellow knapsack which hung upon their backs. After them
followed a dark-green battalion of Jagers, linked shoulder to
shoulder in four wall-like lines, marching as if they were
always in this close formation, though really they have been
used in nothing but skirmishing order during the war. The
cavalry of this division, the well-known black dragoons of
Brandenburg, with their light-blue tunics and dark velvet collars,
from which they get . their name, formed a bright contrast in
colour to the dark-green riflemen, but moved with unwavering
squadrons, which showed perfectly trained horses and skilled
horsemen.
Franzeck/s division came next, the heroes of Benatek and
of the attack against the Austrian right on the Bistriz, where
they left so many of their comrades. Behind this general
marched the 26th, 66th, 67th, and 97th regiments, the last
432 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
showing by its diminished front the severity of the fire to which
it was so long exposed in the hardly-contested wood above
Benatek, and the sharp fighting of a later date near Blumenau.
With this division passed the dark-green and gold Magdeburg
hussars, one squadron of which made the successful chaige
against the Austrian Uhlans in front of Kaltenbrun.
The last infantry regiment which marched past was the 8th,
formerly commanded by General Home, but, since that general
had gone to take the command of the whole of the infantry of
the first reserve corps, under General Schoeler. It was a
brigade of this division which fought by night the first infantry
combat of the campaign in the narrow street of PodoU, where
it suffered severely. This division also stormed the village of
Sadowa on the morning of the 3rd of July, and spent the
greater part of the day in the wood above, exposed to both
artillery and musketry fire. The companies looked weak, for
their ranks had been thinned by much fighting ; but the men
who had come through it went past their King with a proud
bearing, more like fresh troops going upon ser\'ice than like men
who had just finished a campaign. All looked splendid, all
called forth admiration, and a loud murmur of delight went up
from the groups of oflftcers behind the King as the tall Jagers
of Magdeburg passed in unbending line before them. These
men, recruited from the Hartz mountains, and bred up to a
forest life, are the very beau idkd of light infantry soldiers ; tall,
muscular, and wiry, quick of sight, and rare marksmen. They
are so cool under fire and so certain of their aim, that it is
asserted that, like the English archer of old, the Magdeburg
Jager carries a foeman's life in every bullet in his cartouche.
When the infantry had passed away, the cavaliy in a long
column of squadrons filed before the King, and in the column
was seen every class of cavalry soldier which exists in the
Prussian service : heavy, broad-shouldered cuirassiers, clothed
in white uniforms, with high black boots, mounted on tall,
strong horses, which tramped along under the weight of their
armour-clad riders, raising clouds of dust, which half obscured
the dazzling reflection of the sun from the helmets and cuirasses;
tall and lithe Uhlans, carrying with an easy balance their long
lances, of which the bannered points rose in an even line above
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 433
their heads ; light dragoons — ^for in this service all the dragoons
are light cavalry, armed with sword and carbine ; and lighter
still, bright-coloured, rakish-looking hussars, active little men,
on strong, short-legged horses, decked out with gaudy trap-
pings, which gave them an almost Oriental appearance. In
rear of the cavalry the reserve artillery rolled slowly past,
followed by the hospital trains, now empty, and with the
stretchers, which used to be carried by the Krankentragers,
now folded up and strapped upon the carriages ; but ugly red
stains upon the curtains of the ambulance waggons showed
that all had been lately used. Last of all came the very useful
field tel^;raph detachment, nine carriages, carrying means for
laying down instantly and for using thirty miles of wire. When
all had passed, the King called the commanding officers round
him, and said : —
'* Gentlemen, — ^I cannot speak to all the soldiers under your command
— ^they are too many ; but to you, for all, I must express my thanks tor the
conduct and behaviour of this army during the campaign, which your exer-
tions have brought to such a glorious conclusion, t sludi not enter into the
details of the gallant conduct of your troops at the battle of Koniggratz,
where for hours you stood under the whole artillery fire of the Austrian
army, and resisted successfully all the attempts of the enemy to crush you,
and thus break the centre of the line of our battle. I cannot speak as I
should wish of Sichrow, Miinchengratz, PodoU, and Gitschin. I can but
embrace mv nephew, your commander, as the representative of you all. I
can but tell you that I thank you, and that your King and your Fatherland
feel that you have nobly done your duty. I am sure there is nothing I
could say which could be more pleasing to Prussian soldiers."
Loud cheers greeted the conclusion of this speech, when the
King turned his horse, and rode away.
On the morning of the 31st, Prince Charles, the father of
Prince Frederick Charles and Prince Adalbert, received the
Order of Merit fix)m the King, the same Order as the Crown
Prince received on the battle-field of Koniggratz. General von
Voigt-Rhetz was appointed Governor of Hanover, and many
other officers and soldiers received military honours. Prince
Frederick Charles received nothing, for there was nothing left
to give him; he had already won every decoration which it was
in the power of the monarch to bestow ; but he was well con-
tentedy for the troops under his command had won a reputa-
F F
434 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book IX.
tion, not only for courage, discipline, and endurance, but also
for tenderness to their wounded enemies and for a kindly con-
sideration for the peaceful inhabitants of the conquered coun-
tries, which must endure as long as history lives. The King's
speech closed the last scene of the war of 1866.
The King started for Berlin immediately, and the troops of
the First Army, who were reviewed on the 31st, began their
northward march the following morning. During the occupa-
tion of the Austrian provinces the head-quarters of Prince
Frederick Charles were ordered to be established at Prague,
and his army to lie between that city and the Thaya, with the
Army of the Elbe on its west and the Second Army on its
north and east. On the morning of the first of August, the
last of the Prussian troops broke up from their positions on the
Marchfeld, and began to retrace their steps towards the north.
There was no need now to advance prepared to form up for
battle, no scouts were required to steal along in front of the
columns, skirmishers were not required to beat through the
woods and search the villages alongside of the line of march,
the staff-officers did not need to ride forward to gaze anxiously
through their field-glasses for indications of an enemy, so the
troops were allowed to march easily and carelessly along, and
as far as possible the marches were arranged so that the infantry
might move by separate roads from the cavalry and artillery,
and press forward at their own pace, unincommoded by horse-
men or waggons. Though only two-thirds of the First Army
remained to be reviewed by the King on the 31st, and the rest
were already several marches before them, it was wonderful to
see what an extent of country was occupied by the same troops
when moving which two days before were clumped together on
the small strip of ground near Gansemdorf Along every road
and every lane poured long columns: here battalions of in-
fantry, formed of soldiers swinging along carelessly in loose
formation and with open ranks, generally singing in loud chorus
the Prussian equivalent to ** Home, sweet home,'* " Mein
schones Heimath's Land;" there, long glittering lines of
cuirassiers twisted and twined between willow-trees and vine-
yards, standing out with their burnished armour bright and
dear against the green foliage of the copses or thickly-planted
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 435
vines ; further off the march of a regiment of Uhlans could be
detected by the tall spears and iSuttering pennons which rose
above a swelling piece of ground or a plantation of dwarfed
oak \ while a heavy, rumbling noise, toned down by distance,
through which rose faintly the voices of the singing soldiers,
told that the batteries were moving along the main road to
Nikolsburg. Every village was teeming with soldiers, who
were quartered in every house;, but, though the inhabitants
were often inconvenienced by having to find the requisite
accommodation for the men, they were very friendly, though
they did not scruple openly to say they were extremely glad it
was the last time they would be obliged to be the involuntary
hosts of the multitudes of foreigners who, however agreeable
and friendly, still took up a great deal of room. The villages
of this part of the country had a harder time than those of
Bohemia and Moravia, inasmuch as for many days the whole
of the Prussian armies had been concentrated between Nikols-
burg and the Roszbach, but by some wonderful means every
village now had plenty of food and wine to sell to hungry and
thirsty officers and soldiers — ^a marvellous fact, for they had
been long shut out from Vienna, whence the inhabitants said
they drew all their usual supphes ; but as this was a good wine
country, and poultry and eggs do not generally come out of
capital cities, it is just possible that these statements might
have been advanced as an excuse for the high prices by means
of which they were doing their best to wring from the pockets
of the passing Prussians a set-off against the heavy taxes they
exj>ected to be levied by the Austrian Government to pay the
expenses of the war. Still, the villagers and the soldiers were
on excellent terms; and as the troops were parading on the
ist, to march away, there was a good deal of hand-shaking and
loud protestations of mutual esteem and good-wilL The inha*
bitants made no complaints against the troops, and had no
grounds to make any. The soldiers spoke well of their enter-
tainers, though there was a theory in the ranks that the won-
derful abundance of wine was only a direct consequence of the
admirable supply of water which the valley of the March boasts,
and some of the men could detail graphically the different
gradations of colour, from purple to very light red, which their
F F 2
436 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
daily beverage underwent during the period tA the Prussian
occupation of the district
On the afternoon of the ist, the head-quarters erf" the First
Army were all ready to march in the direction of Iglau, en
route for Prague, where they were to be established until the
conclusion of peace, or until such an apparently improbable
event should occur as the expiration of the armistice without
the conclusion of a treaty. When all was ready, horses
saddled, saddle-bags packed, and every preparation had been
made to evacuate Ebenthal, a tdegram arrived ordering
Prince Frederick Charles to march to Lundenburg, and thence
to proceed by rail with some of his troops to the capital
of Bohemia. The field post-office and some of the baggage
had already moved off and were well on their way to a village
named Peirawerth, which would have been the first halting-
place had the original route been adhered to. It was useless
to recall them, so orders were sent to them to move to Zister-
dorf, where the staff joined them on the morning of the 2nd,
after a short march over the undulating country which lies
between the March and the great highway from Nikolsburg to
Vienna. The land was now bare of its com crops, for the
harvest was already nearly over, and stretched away in a rolling
plain of bare stubble land, broken here and there by bright
green patches of vineyard, which contrasted refreshingly with
the monotonous yellow, or by clumps of pollard willows or
stunted oaks, which cluster round the little water-courses in
the hollows. A miserable little town at the best of times, off
the main road, hot, white and dusty, Zisterdorf that day looked
worse than usual ; it had been for some time occupied by
troops, who had left untidy souvenirs of the encampments of
horses in the market-place and streets in the shape of remnants
of down-trodden straw and fodder. Every house had been
more or less tenanted by soldiers, and the traces of their visit
were still extant in the crushed bundles of straw which formed
their sleeping-places, and* now lay in most of the rooms disre-
garded by the dirty inhabitants, and afforded a copious supply
of waifs and strays to be carried by the feet of every one who
went out of the house along the passages and into the unpaved
street, where the marks of the numerous waggons which had
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 437
passed through the town were preserved in deep rough ruts
sunk far into the mud, which had since been hardened by the
heat of the sun. But men who were turning homewards from
the end of a successful campaign faced cheerfully even the
dirty rooms and straw-covered floors of this worst class of
German village ; so the staff-officers did not grumble, but made
up their minds to it, and looked forward to Prague as a happy
haven, where clean beds would at last be found.*
A march of twenty-five miles brought the head-quarters of
the First Army on the 3rd August to the village of Eisgrub,
where they were established in the chiteau of Prince Lichten-
stein, said to be the most beautiful country-seat in the terri-
tories of the Kaiser. The chSteau inside consisted of long
series of wide halls, high corridors, and magnificent rooms,
decorated and adorned with oak carving of rare workmanship,
and precious suits of ancient armour, where stood furniture of
exquisite finish and taste, and the walls of which were hung
with glorious old pictures recording the noble deeds done by
the house of Lichtenstein. Outside stretched away into the
far distance long vistas of pleasure-grounds, the green turf of
which was thickly studded with clumps of fiill-grown cedars,
tulip-trees, and coppice-beech, grouped among other more
* It may not be uninteresting for any one who happens to have that rare
piece of property, a good map of this part of the country, to see how the
different divisions of this army were billeted, as it serves as an example of
the manner in which divisions have been quartered during the advance, and
shows what extent of country each body of troops occupies in its nightly
quarters when moving. The fifth infantry division occupied Laab, Hot-
lein, Ruhhof, Rothenseehof, Neudorf, Neusiedl, Hanitthal, Reiselbrechts-
<lorf, Wiilzershofen. The sixth divbion was in Gross Teijar, Erdbei'g,
Klein, Grillowitz, Waltrowitz, Klein Olkowitz, Zulb, Klietemanns, Raissen-
briick, Josewitz, Isefeld, Malberg, Zwingendorf, Derhhof, Carlhof; the
seventh division, in Guttenfeld, Bartelsbriinn, Schaflerhof, Stuttenhof,
Pr«:raa, Wildendiimbach, Poltenhof, Ruffersdorf, Kirchstatden, Zabem,
Falkenstein, Pugsbriinn, Stutzenhofen, Gutenbriinn, Offenthal, Schwen-
warth; the eighth division, in Nikolsburg, Voitelsbriinn, Drasenhofen,
Tunstkirchen, Steinabrun, Garrenthal, Haithof, Feldsberg, Kisgrub,
Kettdek, Pilgram, Evrett, Mitlowitz. The reserve artillery was parked
in Gnissbach, Neuhof, Sihoenau, Grafendorf, Auschanhof^ TroUersdorf,
Neusiedl, Pardorf, Illemnitz, Bergen, Dannowitz, Weistenitz, Gulden-
furth. It may be seen from this what an extent of country even a small
portion of this army required, for the above list does not include the
quarters of the cavalry corps, but of only four infantry divisions, with their
res>erve artillery.
438 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
common but not less beautiful trees, with so high a skill that
all trace of art was concealed, and Nature was courted so
skilfully as to be outrivalled. The river Thaya, which flows
through the grounds, was by hidden means constrained to form
wide lakes or narrow winding creeks of dark blue water, which
in some places washed with a tiny wave raised by the gentle
summer breeze against sloping banks of emerald turf, sometimes
lay calm and still under the shelter of the woods, reflecting the
light green weeping willows which overshadowed it, and floated
their lowest leaves upon the surface. Where the trees did not
occupy the ground, bright beds of carefully-tended flowers,
jets of water springing from quaintly constructed fountains,
orange-trees loaded with bright yellow fruit, flowering shrubs
covered with full blossoms, and bushes of nearly full-blown
roses of every shade and hue, threw just the proper amount of
life into the picture to prevent it from being melancholy, and
make it sublime. Never had it been more admired than on
this day. Men who had come over down-trodden corn-fields,
destroyed villages, woods cut away for palisades or abattis, and
trees torn down and shivered by tempests of shells, required
no knowledge of landscape gardening, no wisdom in architec-
ture, to make them heartfelt admirers of the peaceful prospect
here ; they saw its beauty, and felt it. Prince Lichtenstein
himself could not have been more satisfied than his unknown
guests that his property lay where no skirmish had to be
fought, no defence made in his chateau, and no attack directed
against it
The head-quarters of the Crown Prince had been here for
twelve days before the place was occupied by Prince Frederick
Charles, but no traces had been left of the former tenants,
either in the house itself or the adjoining grounds. Troops
had been in and around Eisgrub for more than a fortnight, yet
no trees had been broken, no grass cut up by horses* feet, no
flower-beds trampled down ; all the servants and inhabitants,
with two exceptions, were well pleased with the Prussians, and
were perfectly satisfied that the soldiers they had been told
were little better than barbarians were very easy-going quiet
sort of people after all. The two exceptions were the chief
butler and the head gamekeeper. The former had a great
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE 439
grievance — the whole of the wine in the cellar of Feldsberg, a
neighbouring property which also belongs to the Lichtenstein
family, had been " required " by the Prussian commissariat It
was in vain to urge that some of it had been thirty years in
bottle, that it would not bear carriage, or even that the key of
the cellar had been lost The commissariat officers would take
no denial ; if keys were not forthcoming, doors could be broken
open ; as for the not standing carriage, the troops would take
their chance of that, and probably the great age of the wine
would compensate for any deterioration it might undergo by
shaking. Finding all excuses unavailing, the unwilling func-
tionary had to yield up his keys, and in silent agony to see
what he had watched with an almost fatherly care for many
years, and had been intended for the consumption of far more
delicate connoisseurs, carried out of the cellars by working
parties of soldiers, stowed away in rough provision waggons,
and carted off to be served out as rations to Prussian troops.
What comfort was it to him that he was assured the wine would
be paid for when the war was over ? No money could buy
such vintages again, and even if it could, the present generation
could barely hope to drink it.
The second complainant, the gamekeeper, was more in-
dignant than sorrowful ; it appeared that a number of soldiers
belonging to some regiment of the Second Army quartered near
Eisgrub organized a battue on their own account, and with
their needle-guns succeeded in killing a large number of the
deer which were in the park. " But," as he said triumphantly,
"we forwarded a complaint to the Crown Prince himself" This
step, by the tone in which it was announced, seems to be sup-
posed to have resulted in some terrible punishment being
inflicted on the nefarious sportsmen who expended Prussian
Government ammunition on imofFending stags, instead of
against the enemies of their country ; but what was actually
the fate of these violators of the game laws, or whether, as the
gamekeeper evidently thinks, the Commander-in-chief of the
Second Army carried out some such penalty against the delin-
quents as those which were enacted by the laws of William the
Conqueror against similar offenders, has not been recorded It
is certain that a body of military police remained as watchers
440 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
of the deer park during the rest of the time that the Anny of
Silesia was here, and that after the appeal to its commander no
zundnadei-gtwehr prevented the deer from roaming about in
undisturbed safety.
On the 2nd August the King's head-quarters moved to
Prague ; the next day he went to Berlin, whither he was
accompanied by the Crown Prince, to be present at the open-
ing of the Prussian Chambers. The troops of the First Army
were about Eisgrub that night, the next day most of them
crossed the Thaya. The head-quarters of Prince Frederick
Charles left Lundenburg on the morning of the 4th, and by
that evening every Prussian soldier was out of the Crown lands
of Austria, There was great reason to rejoice that the army
was now free to move its position, and was not tied down by
the necessities of war to the Duchy of Austria, for cholera had
within the last few days broken out among the inhabitants with
great violence. In Lundenburg the people were said to be
dying at the rate of ten an hour; tliis appeared to be the
exaggerated report of the frightened inhabitants, but there is
no doubt that the pestilence was very prevalent, and was
causing much mortality among the country people. The
Prussian troops had suffered, but not to a very great extent,
and more cases had been cured than had proved fatal. It was
hoped that change of quarters, rest, and plenty of food would
soon free the troops of the disease ; but it was feared that it
would rage among the natives, who had little to eat, and could
hope for little from the vintage, for the late frost in this spring
nipped the early vines, and almost ruined the crop of grapes.
On the morning of the 5th August, at four o'clock, the head-
quarters of the First Prussian Army broke up from Eisgrub, by
a short march ' reached Lundenburg station, and thence by
railway to Prague, where Prince Frederick Charles remained
until peace was definitely signed, and no possibility remained
of his army being required again for the present Although
only one battalion of Jagers formed the escort of the train
which brought the Prince and his staff, yet the number of
carriages required to convey the whole of the heads of depart
ments who moved with head-quarters, their servants and horses
was very great ; and on account of the numerous curves in the
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 44i
line, the long train was only able to jolt so slowly along that,
although it left Lundenbuig at half-past six in the morning, it
did not arrive at Prague till midnight. Slow and tedious as
the journey was, and much as at the time the impatient officers
grumbled, they had good cause to be grateful for the tardiness
with which it was driven, for the next morning intelligence was
received which told that a train, following a few hours after, in
trying to go faster, met with a terrible accident On account
of the great amount of military traffic on the line, which had
lately formed the artery of communication and supplies for the
three united Prussian armies, railway carriages had been
brought from Saxony and even Prussia to supply the necessary
transport. These carriages for the most part ran on three
pairs of wheels, instead of on two, as do those which in time of
peace run along this line, and which for the most part the
Austrians drew back with them when they retreated. The
Saxon carriages, built for straighter lines and gentler curves,
were very liable on such a line as that which from Briinn twists
and winds up the valley to Prerau to run off the rails. It was
thus that the accident occurred. One of the six-wheeled car-
riages flew off the rails, turned over, and formed a barricade,
against which and each other the twelve succeeding ones were
shivered. Five men were killed, and eight were seriously hurt ;
many horses suffered, and seven belonging to the King were
killed. This unfortunate accident affords a moral, inasmuch
that it shows that not only must the permanent way be entire
and safe, but the rolling stock used must be suited to the par*
ticular line, if railways are required to afford in time of war not
only powerful but also rapid means of transport.
The railway journey was from the front to far in the rear of
the great Prussian armies. At Lundenburg, and for some
distance north, all the roads which could be seen from the line
were swarming with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, winding
slowly along in a northerly direction ; further on were reserve
store trains, ammunition columns, heavy artillery, and all the
numerous waggons which must follow in the rear of a great
host of fighting men ; at Briinn was a garrison of Miilbe*s re-
serve corps, the soldiers of which crowded the station to catch
a glimpse of the Commander-in-chief of the First Army \ here
,^^.
442 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
too, were the officers of the staff of the Crown Prince, who
were waiting here till they received definite orders as to their
further journey from their commander, who had been hurried
to Berlin to take part in the opening of the Chambers. Further
north, beside roads and near villages, could be seen dark blue
heavy waggons, packed in regular order, which formed the rear-
most line of the reserve artillery and ammunition trains, and
fiirther north still the stations and towns were garrisoned by
regiments of Landwehr.
Nothing could be more striking to Englishmen, who had
long been accustomed to hear the Prussian army described as a
sort of hurried levy of untrained militiamen, than the appear-
ance of these troops. Fine and strong as were the men who
fought in the foremost ranks during the campaign, Prussia had
in reserve behind them troops formed of soldiers equally tall,
equally strong, older and better grown, in these Landwehr
levies. Most of the privates are men of good situation in life,
for, after completing their terms of service in the Line, they go
into business or professions, and generally have secured com-
fortable incomes ; but at the call of their country they quit
their affairs, and return to serve in the ranks, and bring with
them to their soldier's duty an education and intelligence which
can be found in the armies of no other country in Europe \
nor, as can be seen from the garrison of this place, have they
in private life forgotten one item of their former military train,
ing. They are grand troops, the very beau ideal of a soldiery ;
and they are well led, for their officers, nearly all of noble
birth, are men who have formerly served in the army, and who
in time of peace live upon their estates in the same districts as
the soldiers they command in war are drawn from \ so that
these Landwehr levies unite with their superior education and
intelligence a chivalrous affection for their chief, such as cha-
racterised the privates of the bands who fought so gallantly for
the House of Stuart
The Landwehr soon began to move back into Prussia, and
were disbanded to return to their homes ; their places were
taken by the troops of the armies, which had been engaged in
the field, and which occupied the greater part of Bohemia and
Moravia until the conclusion of the definite treaty of peace.
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 443
The city of Prague was not visibly affected by the presence
of a Prussian garrison. The shops were all open ; trade went
on even more briskly than usual, for the Landwehr officers
were generally rich, and spent their money freely ; but it must
have taken the citizens some time to recover from the officers
and soldiers of the garrison the money they had to contribute
for the expenses of, the occupation of their town by the
Prussians.
Prince Albrecht, the commander of the cavalry corps,
reached Prague on the loth of August, but he did not bring his
troops with him, for they had been scattered through the
country to facilitate the supply of the large amount of pro-
visions and forage which so many horsemen daily required.
The infantry of the armies of Prince Frederick Charles, the
Crown Prince, and the Army of the Elbe, were also scattered
through Bohemia and Moravia in small divisions, which took
up the positions they held until the plenipotentiaries who were
assembhng at Prague had affixed their signatures to the
definitive treaty of peace.
Some of the infantry corps of the Guard were stationed at
Prague for a few days, but only as a temporary measure.
On the loth August a brigade of cavalry of the Guard
corps marched through the town on their way to the north, for
the whole of this corps was to be scattered among the villages
between Prague and Theresienstadt This brigade consisted
of the garde du corps, the cuirassiers of the Guard, and a bat-
tery of the horse artillery of the Guard; it was the heavy
brigade of the Guard cavalry, and corresponds in the Prussian
service to our Household cavalry. The garde du corps were
dressed in the same way as our cuirassiers ; their men, though
not so tall as the soldiers of the Life-guards, looked as if they
rode heavier upon their horses, for they carried, even upon
active service, the long black boot, and were encumbered with
an enormous kit. Their uniform was white, their cuirasses and
helmets of a burnished golden colour ; the men looked strong,
solid, and healthy; the horses were thin, but in wonderful con-
dition, considering that they had within seven weeks marched
from Prussian Silesia to the banks of the Danube and back to
Prague. The Guard cuirassiers, who followed, were dressed
1
444 SEVEN WEEKS* WAR, [Book IX.
in the same manner as the garde du corps, except that they had
blue facings instead of scarlet^ and wore the ordinary cavalry
overall The long squadrons of bright bay horses looked ex-
ceedingly well, and even the most prejudiced advocate of light
cavalry, and nothing but light cavalry, if he had that day seen
Prince Albrecht*s heavy horsemen returning from their cam-
paign, must have owned that the days in which heavy cavalry
are of use in war are not yet numbered. The experience of
this campaign has taught that needle-guns and rifled artillery
have no more driven cavalry, and even very heavy cavalry,
from the field of battle than they have from the theatre of war;
but it has been found that, in the shock of closing squadrons,
small men and light horses must go down before the powerful
onset of stouter assailants. The Prussians found that, in future,
cavalry must be formed and equipped so as to allow strong
troopers to be brought into the field ; but strong troopers ride
heavily, and heavy loads tell fearfully on horses on the line of
march ; so, to secure power in the charge with rapidity of move-
ment, the dead weight which cavalry horses now carry must be
reduced almost to nothing, and the horse must be required to
bear little more than the rider, his arms, his cloak, and a light
saddle. Valises will have to be carried in waggons in rear of
the regiments, or left at some convenient place whence they
can be forwarded to the front by railway or water transport
when the army halts. In this war the Prussian cavalry gained
a glorious and unexpected reputation from its conduct in the
field ; but its horses suffered much from marching, especially
in crossing the highland country which lies on the frontiers of
Bohemia and Moravia. The cavalry felt the effects of the
rapid movements more than the infantry; yet the Prussian
foot-soldier marched under almost every disadvantage which
dress could inflict His helmet was horrible, both as to com-
fort and appearance, his clothes were uncomfortable, the
trousers without gaiters hung clammily against the calf on a
rainy day, or collected inside them a layer of mud which
rubbed uneasily against the ankle. The inconvenience of the
dress was shown whenever a battalion started to march ; the
first thing the soldier did was to divest himself of his helmet,
and sling it from his waist-belt, where it dangled uncomfortably
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 445
against his legs ; he unbuttoned his coat, and after a few days'
experience scarcely ever omitted to stuff the lower parts of his
trousers into his boots, which thus afforded a gaiter with the
advantage of requiring neither buttons nor straps, as do those
in use in most armies. Prussian officers themselves acknow-
ledged that the dress of their army could not be compared
to that of the Austrians either for efficiency or appearance. It
only shows what splendid stuff the Prussian troops are made
of when they performed such prodigies of marching as marked
their victorious course under these disadvantages, and also
weighed down by their heavy knapsacks, which, although of a
better construction than those of most armies, were hardly
required, and though present were seldom looked into in the
actual campaign. Railways and improved roads have made
great alterations in the necessities of a warrior, both by short-
ening the duration of campaigns and facilitating transport
Europe will never again see any decently-organized army
waiting many weeks for the arrival of a siege train, for the
carriage of which all available transport is required, so that
from want of means of sending stores forward the troops in
the front are shivering in tattered clothes and suffering pain-
fully from unbooted feet. Soldiers need no longer be weighed
down by heavy loads upon their backs, held back from their
real use- -marching and fighting — to be converted into beasts
of burden. A. spare shirt, a change of shoes, and a pot
of grease, is about all that a foot-soldier need canry with him,
besides his arms, anununition, and some food.
On the mcMning of the 17th, the greater part of the first
division of the infantry of the Guard marched into the town,
and marched past before Prince Frederick Charles. Some of
the division had arrived a few days before, but only that day
made their formal entrance with their comrades, who early
that morning reached the suburbs. In an open space about a
mile and a half without the ramparts the whole of the troops
who were to march in were assembled about eight o'clock, and
a little after began moving towards the Ross Thor. There
they filed through the gate, halted at the top of the market-
place for a few moments to forai their columns, passed before
the Prince, and disappeared into the narrow winding streets
446 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX.
beyond, some to take up billets for a few days in the town,
others to pass through and move to their positions in the vil-
lages further north. The scarlet and gold squadrons of the
Guard hussars led the way, the most smartly-equipped regiment
in the Prussian service, whose officers wear the Hessian boot,
the true leg-dress of the cavalry soldier. Behind them came
the first infantry regiment of the Guard, with their white facings
and silver ornaments ; this is the celebrated regiment of Pots-
dam grenadiers, to fill the ranks of which with enormous men
Frederick William I. culled giants out of every country in
Europe, and made every Pmssian Embassy, from London to
Vienna, a recruiting-office. The men are not quite so tall now
as those handed down to Frederick the Great ; but still they
worthily support the title of grenadiers, for no private in the
battalions was less than six feet high, and the stature of the
greater part exceeded that figure. The companies were weak,
for many of the tall soldiers who marched with their eagles
from Prussia sleep at Chlum beside the chief who led them
forth, General Hiller ; many were in hospital with wounds, and
not a few had been left behind on account of sickness ; for the
cholera had been among those who passed through the action
of Trautenau and came scatheless out of the battle of Konig-
gratz. Then came the fusiliers of the Guard, not quite so big
as those who had gone before, but on the average taller men
than the English Footguards. Behind these marched the dark
green sections of the Jagers of the Guard, whose recruits are
picked from all the foresters and gamekeepers of Prussia —
marksmen of unerring aim, skirmishers of high intelligence,
who know fiill well how to avail themselves of every stump and
hillock, and how, lurking behind shelter, themselves in safety,
with every bullet to bring down an enemy.
A gap of some hundred yards separated the Jagers from the
second brigade, first in which came the 2nd regiment, men and
officers marching in forage caps. There was not a helmet to
be seen in their ranks, for on going into action at Trautenau
this regiment to a man threw away then: heavy helmets, and
thus rid themselves for the campaign of a cumbrous head-dress
in a manner which did not draw forth such unqualified approval
from the military authorities as did their conduct on the line of
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 447
march or under fire. Behind the foot soldiers came the artil-
lery of the division, followed by the provision columns and
ambulance waggons, whose fine-drawn horses told of many a
heavy pull over the rugged roads of Bohemia and Moravia.
The parade marching of the infantry of the Prussian Guard
has been renowned ever since its recruits were so harshly drilled
by the stem soldier who first formed it. Since that time great
alterations have been made both in the tactics and treatment
of the men ; the Prussian grenadiers no longer move in the
field in the stiff unbending formation which regarded soldiers
only as machines. But while the Prussians have lately adopted
a system of manoeuvres for field service which unites immense
elasticity with great rapidity of movement, they have not failed
to observe that the foundation of all tactical pliability lies in
previous solidity and precision ; that troops who cannot move
well on parade rarely can be of much use in service, and that
before infantry soldiers can dash about as skirmishers they must
be able to move accurately in more solid formation. This was
well shown by the Guards who marched into Prague on the
17 th August As the battalions passed the Prince not a line
wavered, not an opening was seen between the shoulders of
the men; solid and compact, the companies swept rapidly
along in lines as even as if they had been ruled, while
every foot fell in measured cadence to describe a step of equal
length.
The 1 8th was the birthday of the Emperor of Austria. Not-
withstanding the presence of the Prussian garrison, it was
celebrated with all due honours by the civil guard of the town.
Early in the morning the town guards paraded, and marched
through the street with sprigs of oak leaf in their hats, music
playing, and swords drawn, while numbers of Prussian soldiers
off duty crowded the foot pavements to gaze at them, and
Prussian guards turned out to present arms to the Austrian
standard of the ancient city of Prague, which was carried in
their midst. Ailer the civil guard had marched through the
principal streets, the fire engines followed, decked with flags
and preceded by a band. The Prussian authorities made no
objection to the celebration of the day; in fact, they encou-
raged it, for they made a point of allowing everything to go on
44S SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
in the Austrian towns they occupied as if no foreign troops
were present, and no Prussian sentries stood upon the ramparts
or occupied the guard houses. In consequence there was good
feeling between the soldiers and the townspeople, between
whom there arose many personal friendships, though the latter
did not scruple, even openly, to say that, though they found
the Prussians much more pleasant than they could have ex-
pected any enemies to be, they would not be sorry when their
visit was over, and Prague was again garrisoned by the white
uniforms of the Kaiser.
On the 19th, some more of the Guard corps marched into
the town, while those that arrived two days before marched out
to die north to occupy positions nearer Theresienstadt, and to
make room for the new arrivals. The troops that came in
were the yellow Uhlans of the Guard and the Elizabeth regi-
ment. The infantry arrived very dusty, for they had a long
march in the morning ; but they went through the streets up to
the Pulver Thurm, near which Prince Frederick Charles was
waiting to receive them, with the same even front and steady
tramp as the grenadiers who came in two days before, and
swept past the Commander-in-chief of the First Army in the
unwavering lines which always characterize a Prussian parade.
The men of this regiment, destined for lighter duties, were not
so tall or stout as those of the first brigade, but they were still
large men, with great depth and breadth of chest, and, though
dusty, looked anything but tired from the hot march. The
cavalry, like all lancers, looked smart, and, except that the
horses were thinner than when they left Berlin, and that some
of the squadron did not show then: proper strength, exhibited
small signs of having just come off a campaign. The people
of Prague were so much accustomed now to the perpetual
arrival of troops that few generally collected to see a regiment
march in, but on this day, as the troops arrived just as mass
was over and the congregations were pouring out of the
churches, a considerable crowd stopped to gaze upon the
Prussian guardsmen, who marched along between the thronged
pavements, overtopping like giants the staring Bohemians.
Some Austrian officers who were prisoners on parole, several
having their arms in slings, on account of wounds received at
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 449
Miinchengratz or Sadowa, could not conceal their admiration
of the Prussian troops. For a time they gazed silently ; but as
company after company swept along, their countenances
brightened up, and as the last battalion came they could no
longer refrain from expressing in words their surprise and
wonder that soldiers could be so perfectly trained within a
period of three years* service. Fine as the men were who
marched into Prague, many held that they did not come up to
the Landwehr levies. The latter are older men and better
filled out, and their ranks contain those whose education has
been supplemented by application to trades or professions; and
Landwehr men are not men who have been hastily recruited
and rawly trained, they have all served for three years in the
regular ranks, they are all true soldiers, and soldiers of such a
sort as every general and every statesman would wish to see
available for the service of his country.
The definitive treaty of peace was signed between Austria
and Prussia at the Blue Star Hotel at Prague, on the 23rd
August Austria was represented by Baron Brenner, Prussia
by Baron Werther^ as Count Bismarck had gone to Berhn at
the same time as the King, to be present at the opening of the
Chambers on the 5th August.
The treaty of peace definitively signed, was as follows : —
•* In the name of the Holy and Indivisible Trinity.
*• His Majesty the King of Prussia and His Majesty the Emperor of
Austria, animated by a desire of restoring the blessinirs of peace to their
dominions, have resolved to convert the Preliminaries signed at Nikolsbuig
on the 26th of July, 1866, into a definitive Treaty of Peace.
•' To this end their Majesties have appointed their plenipotentiaries as
follows: —
•* His Majesty the King of Prussia : —
*• His Kammerherr, Effective Privy Councillor and Plenipotentiary,
Charles Baron von Werther, Grand Cross of the Royal Prussian Order
of the Red Eagle with Oak-leaves, and of the Imperial Austrian Order of
Leopold; and,
•* His Majesty the Emperor of Austria : —
**His Effective Privy Councillor and Kammerherr, Ambassador Extra-
ordinary and Plenipotentiary, Adolph Marie Baron von Brentier Tilsach, of
the Imperial Austrian Order of Leopold, and Knight of the Royal Prussian
Order of the Red Eagle, First Class, &c.
** Who have met in Conference at Prague, and having exchanged their
poTvers, drawn up in good and proper form, have agreed to tlie following
Articles :
••Article i.— For the future there shall be lasting peace and friendship
G G
450 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
Ijetween His Majesty the King of Prussia and His Majesty the Emperor of
Austria, as well as between their heirs and descendants, their Stales and
subjects.
** Article 2. — That the 6th Article of the Preliminaries of Peace signed
at NikoUburg on the 26th of July of this year may be carried out ; and in-
asmuch as His Majesty the Emperor of the French, by his authorised emis-
sary to His Majesty the King of Prussia, officially declared at Nikolsburg on
the 29th of the same month of July, gu^en ce qui concerns U Gouvemenicnt
de rEmperet^r la Vhtise est acquise k VltalU pour lui Hre remise h la paix^
His Majesty the Emperor of Austria on his part conforms to this declaration,
and gives his consent to the union of the Lombardo- Venetian Kingdom with
the Kingdom of Italy, without imposing any other condition than the liqui-
dation of those debts which have been acknowledged charges on the terri-
tories now resigned, in conformity with the Treaty of Zurich.
** Article 3. — ^The prisoners of war shall be at once released on both
sides.
** Article 4. — His Majesty the Emperor of Austria recognises the dis-
solution of the late German Bund, and gives his consent to a new formation
of Germany, in which the Imperial State of Austria shall take no part.
Moreover, His Majesty promises to recognise the closer Federal relations
which His Majesty the King of Prussia is about to establish north of the
line of the Maine, and also agrees that the German States to the south
of this line shall form an union, the national connection of which with
the Northern Confederacy is reserved for a more defined agreement be-
tween both parties, and which is to maintain an international independent
existence.
** Article 5. — His Majesty the Emperor of Austria transfers to His
Majesty the King of Prussia all the rights he acquired under the Peace of
Vienna on the 30th of October, 1864, to the Duchies of Holstein and
Schleswig, with the understanding that the people of the northern district
of Schleswig, if, by free vote they express a wish to be united to Demnark,
shall be ceded to Denmark accordingly.
"Article 6. — At the desire of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria,
His Majesty the King of Prussia declares himself willing, on the approach-
ing changes in Germany, to allow the territory of the Kingdom of Saxony
to remain within its present limits, reserving to himself the right of settling
in a separate Treaty of Peace with the King of Saxony the share to be con-
tributed by Saxony towards the expenses of the war, and the position hence-
forth to be held by the Kingdom of Saxony within the North German Con-
federation. On the other hand. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria
promises to recognise the changes about to be made in North Germany by
His Majesty the King of Prussia, territorial changes included.
"Article 7.— In order to settle the property of the late Bund a Com-
mission shall meet at Frankfort-on-the- Maine within, at most, six creeks
after the ratification of the present Treaty, at which all formal claims and
demands upon the German Bund are to be made, and to be lic^uidated
within six months. Prussia and Austria will be represented in this Com-
mission, and all the States belonging to the late Bund are allowed the same
privilege.
"Articles. — Austria is at liberty to take from the forts of the late
Bund all that belongs to the Empire, and from the moveable property of the
Bund the proportionate share of Austria, or otherwise to dispose thereoC
This provision extends to all the moveable property of the Bund.
"Article 9. — The civil officers, servants and pensioners of the Bund
C(
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 451
will receive the pensions already accorded in due proportion, but the Royal
Prussian Government undertakes to manage the pensions and allowances
hitherto paid from the Treasury of the Bund to the officers of the late
Schleswig-Holstein army and their families.
"Article la — The allowance of the pensions granted by the Imperial
Austrian Government in Holstein is agreed upon« The sum of 449,500
dollars Danish in 4 per cent Danish bonds now lodged in the hands
of the Imperial Austrian Government, and belonging to the Holstein
Treasury, will be repaid immediately after the ratification of this Treaty.
No adherent of the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, and no subject
oi their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, is
to be prosecuted, troubled, or in any way molested in his person or his
property on account of his political position during recent events and the
recent war.
** Article ii, — In order to defray a portion of the expenses incurred by
Prussia on account of the war, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria pro-
mises to pay to His Majesty the King of Prussia the sum of 40,000,000
Prussian dollars. From this sum, however, the amount of the costs of war
which, by virtue of the 12th Article of the before-mentioned Treaty of
Vienna of the 30th of October, 1864, His Majesty the Emperor claims irom
the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and which are valued at 15,000,000
Prussian dollars, together with 5,000,000 Prussian dollars as an equivalent •
for the free maintenance of the Prussian army in the Austrian States which
it occupied till the conclusion of the peace, is to be deducted, so that only
20/xx>,ooo Prussian dollars remain to be paid. Of this sum half is to be
paid on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, the other half three
weeks afterwards.
** Article 12. — ^The evacuation of the Austrian territories now occupied
by the Royal Prussian troops will be completed within three weeks after the
exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty. From the day of such exchanse
the Prussian General Governments will confine their operations to purdy
military matters. The details with respect to the manner in which this
evacuation is to be effected are settled in a separate protocol, which forms
an appendix to this Treaty.
** Article 13. — All treaties and agreements made by the high contract-
ing parties before the war are herebv revived in full force, so far as they are
not invalidated by the dissolution of the German Bund. More especially
the General Convention between the States of the German Confederation on
the loth of February, 1831, together with more recent resolutions thereto
appertaining, will remain in full force as between Prussia and Austria. The
Imperial Austrian Government declares, however, that the Coinage I'reaty
of the 24th of February, 1857, is deprived of its chief value for Austria by
the dissolution of the German Bund, and the Royal Prussian Government
declares itself ready to join with Austria and the other interested parties in
the neg^otiations that may arise on the abolition of this Treaty. The high
contracting parties likewise agree that as soon as possible they will enter
into negotiations for a revision of the Commercial Treaty of the nth of
April, 1865, with a view to a further alleviation of burdens on both sides.
In the meanwhile, the said Treaty is restored to its full force, with this pro-
vision, that both the high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right
to cancel it after six months' notice.
G Ga
452 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
** Article 14.— The ratifications of the present Treatyshall be exchanged
at Prague within a week, or, if possible, within a shorter period.
** In witness whereof^ &c.
"WERTHER.
"BRENNER.
" Prague, August 2yd^ 1866."
The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged on the 29th
August at Prague.
On the 28th, Prince Frederick Charles broke up his head-
quarters at Prague, and the whole of the Prussian troops who
had been lying in Bohemia and Moravia during the progress of
the negotiations for peace between Prussia and Austria com-
menced their march back towards the Prussian frontier. The
men were not sorry to leave Bohemia, for the cholera had been
among them during their stay in that country, and many had
fallen victims to it
On the evening of the 26th, General von Lengsfcld, the
commander of the artillery of the First Army, was carried off
after two days' illness — the third Prussian general who had
died from cholera since the commencement of the armistice.
As a consequence of the exchange of the ratifications of
peace, the Prussian troops began to vacate Austrian territory,
and by the 18th of August there was not a spiked helmet or a
needle-gun in Bohemia or Moravia. The Guards, the third,
fifth, and sixth corps d'armde marched by road; the other
corps were moved by railway. The first corps moved by Oder-
berg, the second by Gorlitz, the fourth from Briinn by Prague,
the eighth by Niimberg and Aschaffenburg, the fourteenth
division by Gera and Cassel to Hanover, the second reserve
corps by Hof. The Army of the Maine held its position until
peace was concluded with Hesse-Darmstadt.
A Prussian garrison had already occupied Mayence, the ke3rs
of the fortress having been handed over by the Bavarians, who
were in garrison there, as soon as peace was concluded between
Prussia and Bavaria.* What right Bavaria had to deliver up
the fortress, which her troops avowedly only held as represen-
tatives of the forces of the Bund, no one can tell ; but as no
German Power was in a position to remonstrate, and as France,
• See page 467.
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 453
who was more concerned than any other European Power in
the fate of Mayence, appeared to consent, though not quite
tacitly, to the arrangement, the Prussian colours waved without
molestation over the fortifications which guard the mouth of
the valley of the Maine.*
On the 27 th the imwounded prisoners who had been cap-
tured during the campaign were exchanged at Oderberg. The
Prussians liberated 523 Austrian officers and 35,036 non-com-
missioned officers and men ; but this was not the total muster-
roll of the Austrian prisoners who fell into the hands of the
enemy, for 13,000 woimded who could not yet be removed still
remained in Prussian hospitals. Austria gave back about 450
Prussian unwounded non-commissioned officers and men, and
about 120 wounded were unable to be moved. There were
also seven Prussian officers liberated. On the same day about
5,000 prisoners, who had been taken from the Bavarian and
Hesse-Cassel troops, were released.
Count Bismark, who was formerly a major of cuirassiers
was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel ; but this pro-
motion was not his reward for the part he has taken in late
events ; it occurred only in the natural order of things. The
head-quarters of Prince Frederick Charles moved by rail to the
Prussian capital.
Berlin was very empty : the usual garrison and the crowds of
officers who generally fill the streets were all away with the
army. Over many doors were painted up the red crosses which
marked that within subscriptions were received for the military
hospitals and wounded. At the doors of the public offices, and
at those of several shops and hotels, little padlock-boxes painted
with the black and white stripes of the Prussian colours, and
labelled " Fiir die Verwund'ete," invited the alms of those who
loitered or who passed by. Here and there a convalescent
soldier was seen, with his hand bandaged up or his arm in a
sling. Preparations were, however, being made for the
triumphal entry of the army, when the lamentations of the
maimed and the wailings of widows and orphan children were
to be drowned in the clash of military bands, and the applause
* On the 6th August, France demanded Mayence from Prussia, but
afterwards withdrew the demand.
454 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [BooK IX.
of the crowd. Would not the money that this festival cost
have been better expended on the families of those who died,
and on the men who had been rendered unable to work for
their livelihood, in fighting the battles which had given so much
glory and so many broad miles to Prussia ? Military pensions
were very low. Widows with helpless children and disabled
men who could labour no longer for bread could hardly regard
one day's acclamations from an excited populace as a compen-
sation for a life-long misery.
In the first sitting of the Special Committee of the Prussian
House of Deputies on the loan demanded, which was held on
the 29th August) the total cost of the war was stated by
Government to amount to 88,000,000 thalers. The single
items were as follows : — i. Mobilization of eleven corps
d'arm^e at 42,000 men each, 25,500,000 thalers. 2. Current
expenditure of the war till the end of August, 33,800,000
thalers. 3. Demobilization of the troops, 1,700,000 thalers.
4. Re-supplying the depots of arms and clothing after the war,
27,000,000 thalers. To the total of 88,000,000 resulting from
the above must be added 20,000,000 to defray the cost of
keeping the army on a war footing till January i, 1867. The
liabilities incurred mostly remained to be liquidated, having
hitherto been met only by 20,000,000 of cash ^ken firom the
reserve fund, 4,343,000 thalers obtained by the sale of railway
stock, and some 12,000 thalers of surplus moneys from the
finance administration of 1865. Large quantities of victuals
and other stores were fiimished by Prussian and foreign
subjects, but the former, though legally obliged to contribute
gratis horses, com, &c. while the war lasted, had to be paid
within a year of its close. The amount of this and other debts
contracted by the Government for railway transport, &c was
not specially mentioned in the reports published. About one-
half of the costs were covered by the sums exacted from the
defeated States, estimated at a total of 45,143,000 thalers.
Surely the Prussian successes have been cheaply acquired, if
about 43,000,000 thalers, with 20,000,000 more to insure the
maintenance of peace during the next three months, were all
that had to be actually invested. To pay off debts and
replenish the Exchequer, a loan of 60,000,000 thalers was
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 455
demanded by the Government The Ministers also asked to
be empowered to sell some 30,000,000 thalers' worth of rail-
way shares belonging to lines hitherto in part the property of
Government, but lately disposed of for the above-mentioned
sum. Of the money thus realized 27,500,000 thalers were to
be added to the reserve fund to raise it to the normal height
of 40,000,000 thalers, while the remainder was to be employed
on two iron-plated vessels, which were being constructed and
already partly paid for. Another interesting item of future
expenditure occasioned by the war was formed by the con-
templated purchase of one more iron-plated vessel for
2,800,000 thalers, and the strengthening of fortresses at a cost
of 3,500,000 thalers. . To meet these sums the Finance
Minister had 4,000,000 thalers, the contribution levied on
Frankfort, in hand, and hoped to realize 2,557,000 thalers
more from the sale of horses on the demobilization of the
army.
On the 20th and 21st September, the Prussian fetes, to cele-
brate the return of the army, took place at Berlin. All the
evening of the 19th and till late in the dark hours of the
morning of the 20th workmen were busy by torchlight finishing
the preparations for the festival, and at sunrise on the 20th the
whole of Berlin was decked in holiday garb. From every
spire, steeple, and dome, from the heavy tower of the Cathedral
and rounded cupola of the Royal Schloss, from every housetop
and balcony, waived or fluttered a thick, rustling crowd of
banners, streamers, and gonfalons. In most of the side streets
lines stretched from house to house across the way supported
flags, which swayed backward and forwards above the heads of
the restless, ever-moving crowd which thronged the avenues
leading to the Linden, while in the Linden itself every house
was decorated with festoons of evergreen and laurel, and
showed prominently from some balcony or window the black
and white colours of Prussia, often coupled with the crimson
and white of the town of Berlin, which, fluttering in the light
breeze and the bright sunlight, gave an appearance of intense
lightness and life to the heavy masses of building which fringe
the street. In the centre, where between the two paved
carriage-roads the avenue of the lindens runs from the Branden-
4S6 SEVEN WEEKS WAR, [Book IX,
burg Gate to the open space in front of the Royal Palace, the
captured guns were ranged in double line below the trees, with
their muzzles pointed inwards towards each other, but with a
wide space of some fifteen yards' interval between them,
through which the troops that were to make their triumphal
entry were to pass. Round the bright yellow barrels of the
brass ordnance were wreathed garlands of green leaves, which
were in many cases prolonged so as to cover the spokes of the
wheels or the yellow-painted trails. In line with tiie guns and
the intervals between them were erected trophies, some repre-
senting golden cannon grouped together in artistic confusion,
others swords, bayonets, helmets, and muskets, but all bearing
groups of the special flags of the different provinces of the
kingdom, surmounted by a black and white banner, which
carried in its centre the double eagle of Prussia. From lamp-
post to lamp-post, themselves hidden in masses of foliage, from
trophy to trophy, stretched garlands of evergreens, so that
from the top of the avenue near the Brandenburg Gate to the
equestrian statue of Frederick the Great, opposite the Palace,
one long wreath of laurel fringed the way by which the home-
returning warriors were to advance to the open space in front
of Bliicher's statue, where they were to march past the King.
The Brandenburg Gate itself was converted into a temporary
arch of triumph. On its summit stood a line of flagstaffs,
from which waved long standards that floated heavily even in
the brisk breeze above the head of the bronze figure of Victory
which adorned the summit, while on either face heavy drape-
ries of bright-coloured bunting hid beneath their well-arranged
folds the stonework and the preparations for the evening's
illuminations. Before daylight people began to assemble in
the street, and to take up places firom which the march of the
troops could be advantageously seen, and by nine o'clock a
double line of spectators fringed the Linden Avenue, while the
pavement of the street, which, being a little higher, gave an
advantageous position, was thickly crowded. Most of the
windows were well filled, but the number of lookers-on was
not so great as might have been expected, and neither the
streets nor the houses were so thickly occupied as were those
in London on the entrance of the Princess of Wales before her
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 457
marriage. Still, the number of people that collected to see
the entrance was very large, and large tribunes which had been
erected in the Pariser Platz, just within the Brandenburg Gate,
were thickly crowded with ladies.
A little before eleven, the hour arranged for the troops to
enter the town, the King left the Palace, and, followed by his
staff, rode up the avenue towards the Brandenburg Gate,
outside of which he was to meet the troops. He was enthu-
siastically greeted, and a loud swell of shouts of welcome traced
his path till he disappeared through the gate. The Queen and
the Crown Princess, with the Royal children, followed in a
carriage, and met with a similar reception from the people, and
in other carriages, which were equally cheered, the Queen
Dowager, the Princess Frederick Charles, and the Princess of
the Netherlands, who all drove out to the place where the
soldiers assembled before their entrance into the town. Out-
side the gate the King was received by the troops with due
honours and some ringing cheers, which had hardly died away
before he had passed along the line, quickly followed by the
carriages which contained the ladies of the Court, and then
took up his post in front of the troops. The Une of march
was rapidly formed, and the head of the column began moving
towards the Brandenburg Gate, while the Royal carriages
turned and drove quickly back again down to the Linden
Avenue, where their occupants were again loudly greeted, so
that the ladies might from the windows of the Crown Prince's
palace witness the parade in front of Bliicher's statue.
A few minutes after the carriages had passed down, the head
of the triumphal column began to wind in at the gate, led by
Field Marshal Count Wrangel, behind whom came a large
mass of staif-officers and the mihtaiy attaches to the various
Embassies. After a short interval rode General von Roon,
the Minister of War, and General von Moltke, the Chief of
the Staff of the King. The greeting accorded to these two,
the organizer and the director of the movements of the army,
was loud and long, as also that to the two Generals who
immediately followed them, Von Voigt-Rhetz and Blumenthal,
who had been the Chiefs of the Staff of the First and Second
Armies during the campaign. Behind these generals came
4S8 SEVEN' WEEKS' IVAR. [Book IX.
their adjutants, assistants, and aides-de-camp, and the whole
of the staff-officers of the two araiies. There was then a pause,
and an interval of some hundreds of yards in the column, for
the King had halted inside the gate to receive an address from
the magistracy of the town, and it was some minutes before he
himself appeared. But when he came, and close behind him
the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles were seen
riding side by side, the enthusiasm of the people rose high.
Hats were taken off and waived in the air, handkerchiefs
fluttered from every window, and the cheering went up from
the crowded street, and was echoed by the houses with that
mighty roar which rises from a great multitude when its heart
is touched. Behind the Commanders-in-Chief of the First and
Second Armies rode Prince Charles, the commander of the
whole artillery, Prince Aibrecht, the leader of the cavalry
crops of the First Army, Prince Alexander, and Prince
Adalbert
The troops followed, preceded by a small detachment carry-
ing the standards taken in the war, which were borne this day
through Berlin by the men who had taken them in battle.
Close behind came the Potsdam regiment of Guards, with the
Prince of Wiirtemberg at its head, but the usual fine marching
of this splendid regiment was spoilt by the narrowness of way
along which it moved, and by the anxiety of the soldiers to
exchange greetings with their friends in the crowd, a lack of
discipline which to-day was excused. Nor did the big men of
this regiment present the same imposing appearance as usual,
for most spectators saw them from windows raised above the
street, the result of which was to give even these large men a
dwarfed appearance, and it was only by comparing them with
the lines of people through whom they passed that one could
actually realize their true stature. Behind these followed the
3rd infantry regiment of the Guard. These two regiments
formed the first brigade of the Guard, and were commanded by
General Alvensleben. The second brigade consisted of the
fusihers of the Guard and of the 2nd infantry regiment The
latter marched into Berlin without helmets, for the cumbersome
head-dresses of which they undertook to relieve themselves at
the action of Trautenau had not yet been replaced ; but the
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 459
people cheered them enthusiastically, for they were the heroes
of Rosberitz, and the regiment which left so many of its soldiers
round the spot where General Hiller fell
The next brigade was composed of the Jagers of the Guard
— riflemen recruited from all the foresters and gamekeepers of
Prussia, renowned marksmen, who had done much hard duty
during the campaign, and reaped their reward in the loud
applause of the people of Berlin — and of a battalion of the
Guard of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. The entrance of
this battalion was a compliment on the part of the Prussian
Government to Mecklenburg in return for the loyal manner in
which that State stood by Prussia before and during the war,
and the people ratified the compliment by the loud greeting
they gave to these troops as they passed down the Linden by
bursts of cheering, which were renewed again and again.
After the infantry dame the scarlet and gold regiment of
hussars of the Guard, followed by small detachments which
represented the 12th light blue and silver Weissenfels hussars,
who suffered so severely at Koniggratz, the 3rd dragoons, who
were nearly cut to pieces by their rough mUee with the Austrian
cuirass brigade at the same battle, and the Magdeburg hussars,
who cleared the way for the Prussian infantry at Blumenau ;
after these the artillery, in a long column, which marched with
two guns abreast, decorated with flowers and garlands. As
the troops came out of the Linden Avenue and entered the
wide, open space in front of the Palace, they formed upon a
broader front, and marched past the King, who took his place
in front of the statue of Bliicher, with his stafl* around him,
when by an accidental but curious coincidence General Moltke
as placed below the statue of Gneisenau, the Chief of the Staff
in the War of Independence. Here the whole of the force
passed before the Sovereign, and then filed across the bridge
over the Spree, and their glittering bayonets and shining helmet
spikes disappeared into the streets beyond, still cheered by the
crowds in the street and houses until the last were lost sight o£
By one o'clock the whole of the troops had passed, and the
people quickly separated to go to their homes, for every citizen
of Berlin entertained a detachment of the men who made their
entry — the rich larger, the poorer smaller numbers, but all some.
46o SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
A fall of rain during the night of the 20th laid the dust, which
the previous day blew unpleasantly about the streets. A cloudy
morning allowed the people who took up their places early to
see the entry of the second portion of the troops who inarched
publicly into the town to pass the hours of waiting without
being incommoded by the glare which the day before was
dazzling to the eyes, and after a time became almost painful
Those who had wished to obtain good places from which to see
the troops pass did not this morning take up their positions so
very early as they did the day before, since it was foimd that
the crowd was not so great as might have been expected, and
many discovered that they had taken a needless precaution by
being in the Linden before daybreak. The consequence was
that the people were more animated, since they were not already
weary before the proceedings commenced. The enthusiasm
was greater, the cheering was louder, and there was generally
an appearance of more vivacity, enjoyment, and relish on the
part of both the populace and the soldiery.
The arrangements and general decorations were much the
same as on the previous day. The ground between the Bran-
denburg Gate and the Schloss, or old Palace of Berlin, which
is now not inhabited by the Sovereign, but used for official and
state occasions, was divided into four portions. The first was
the Pariser Platz, which lies just inside the Brandenburg Gate,
and was used as the place of the formal greeting of the King
by the magistracy and a detachment of fifty-five young ladies,
who presented an address in poetry. The second portion was
the Linden Avenue, in the centre of the Linden Street, down
which the troops marched, and which in the Berlin triumph
played the same part as the Via Sacra in those of Ancient
Rome. The third portion was the open space which extends
from the statue of Frederick the Great to the bridge over the
Spree, in which the troops marched past the King ; and the
fourth was the open place and garden in front of the Schloss,
which was used for the celebration of the Te Deufity which this
afternoon was sung after the last of the troops had marched
past. On each side of the Pariser Platz tribunes were raised
for spectators, which were entirely draped with the red and
white colours of the town of Berlin. Behind these, numerous
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 461
masts were raised, which bore gonfalons of the black and white
Prussian colours, with silver-coloured shields deviced with the
eagle of Prussia or the bear of Berlin. On either side of the
entrance to the Linden Avenue from the Pariser Platz tall
trophies were erected, which bore groups of alternate Prussian
and Berlin flags, raised above pedestals formed of gilt cannon.
Along either side of the Linden Avenue were raised on
pedestals, hidden in masses of garlands of laurels and oak
leaves, gilt bronze figures of Victory, each of which bore upon
a shield with azure ground the name and date of one of the
actions of the war, inscribed in golden letters ; round these
shields were bronze borders, on the top of which was placed
the Prussian eagle, while above the head of the figure drooped
the national flag, supported on either side by the more cheerful
colours of the metropolis. The height from the ground to the
top of the flagstaff over each figure was thirty-two feet The
names of the battles inscribed on these shields were: — ^June 26,
Liebenau, Tiimau, Podoll; June 27, Nachod ; June 27, Lang-
ensalza; June 27, Oswiecin; June 27, Hiinerwasser; June 28,
Miinchengratz ; June 28, Soor; June 28, Trautenau ; June 28,
Skalitz; June 29, Gitschin; June 29, Koniginhof; June 29,
Jaromier, Schweinschadel ; July 3, Koniggratz ; July 4, Derm-
bach; July 5, Hiinfeld; July 5, Zell; July 10, Waldaschach,
Hausen; July 10, Hammelburg, Friedericshall ; July 10, Kis-
singen; July 13, Laufach; July 14, Aschaffenburg ; July 15,
Tobitschau; July 22, Blumenau; July 23, Hof; July 24,
Tauber-Bischofsheim ; July 24, Werbach, Hochhausen ; July
25, Neubrunn, Helmstadt; July 25, Gerchshein; July 26,
Roszbrunn; July 28, Wiirzburg; July 28, Baireuth.
In the alternate spaces between these figures stood on each
side of the avenue square pedestals ten feet high, each crowned
with a gilt eagle with wings outspread. On the sides of these
pedestals were inscribed, as a memorial of the manner in which
Berlin heard of the successes of the army, the telegrams re-
ceived from the seat of war which told of each victory. In the
space of each of these pedestals and the trophies on either side
bearing the names of the battles were placed two candelabra,
each ten feet high, formed of a bronze stalk, standing on a
triangular pedestal swathed with laurel wreaths, and terminating
462 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
at the summit in a gilt basin, which was used in the illumina-
tion for burning coloured lights. All these trophies, pedestals,
and candelabra were connected together by festoons of green
foliage, which drooped down so as almost to kiss the bright
barrels of the captured guns, which were placed between the
works of art, and were themselves wreadied with garlands.
Two hundred and eight guns, one hundred and four on each
side, stood in the Linden Avenue, with their muzzles still
begrimed with powder, in a line with the pedestals and figures,
and their trails just inside the lines of linden trees which give
the name to the street More cannon might have been exhi-
bited as spoils of the war, for many more were taken; but it
was resolved that only those which were captured in open
battle should be here, and those which were seized in arsenals
or fortified places that fell into the hands of the victors were
not brought out for this festival Only at the places where
cross streets cut the Linden Avenue were these festoons inter-
rupted. At the four comers of eajch crossing four tall obelisks
were raised on triangular bases, which were wound round with
spirals of foliage and decorated with the flags of the provinces
and allies of Prussia, while from the top of each the national
standard floated fifty feet above the ground. On each comer
of the triangular pedestal was placed a golden eagle, and dia-
gonally from obelisk to obelisk festoons were stretched, from
which hung shields carrying the arms of Pmssia and Berlin on
either side.
From the end of the Linden Avenue to the bridge over the
river the open space was left clear for the marching past of the
troops, but tall masts were raised on either side, from the sum-
mits of which long streamers fluttered, and festoons were led
from one to the other. On either parapet of the bridge four
marble statues of Victory were placed, behind which hung flags
and drapery, supported by masts raised from rafts anchored in
the river.
The large square in front of the Schloss beyond the bridge
was surrounded with black and white painted poles, each of
which carried the Hohenzollem shield, surmounted by a banner.
In the centre was placed the altar for the public TeDeum. A
square pedestal, four feet high and forty-eight feet long, sup-
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 4^3
ported at each comer a figure of tlie Angel of Peace, with a
palm branch in her hand, and in the centre of each side a
statue of Victory distributing laurel crowns, while between the
figures flights of low and easy steps, covered with rich carpet-
ing, were placed for the officiating priests. Further steps led
from the pedestals to the altar-place, which was raised seven
feet higher, and, surrounded by golden candelabra, supported
the altar, draped in velvet, above which stood the golden cross,
heavy ^dth mouldings of exquisite workmanship.
Behind the altar, between it and the heavy pile of the dome-
topped Schloss, rose a towering statue of Borussia, the classical
cognomen of Prussia. With eagle-crowned helmet on her
head, the sceptre with the iron cross grasped in her left hand,
and her right stretching forth the crown of victory, the figure
was placed there as a token to signify that their country con-
sidered that her warriors had done well. On either side stood
tall trophies of drooped flags and intermingled arms, the
pedestals of which bore the names of the most glorious deeds
of Prussian arms in the last two centuries. Emblazoned in
letters of gold beside Koniggratz, Kissingen, and Skalitz, were
Fehrbellin, 1675; Stralsund, 1678; Hohenfiiedberg, 1745;
Prague, 1757; Rossbach, 1757; Leuthen, 1757; Zomdorf,
1758; Leipzig, 1813 ; Paris, 1814; Belle-Alliance, 1815. On
either side these trophies were ranged figures of the Electors
of Brandenburg and Kings of Prussia ; under each was written
his motto, war-cry, or favourite expression, with the date of his
accession and death. Some of the most striking of these were
those of Albrecht AchiUes, 1470 — 1486, ** Nowhere is it more
glorious to die than on the field of battle ;" of Friederich
Wilhelm,i64o— 1688, "Mit Gott;" and Friederich Wilhelm
III., 1797 — 1840, "My time in trouble, my hope in God.''
A few minutes before eleven, the King, at the head of his
staff, and closely followed by the Crown Prince and Prince
Frederick Charles, passed quickly up the Linden towards the
Brandenburg Gate. A long, rolling cheer marked his approach,
which swelled into a louder and louder shout as he came
nearer; from every window handkerchiefs were waved and
Prussian colours fluttered, while in the street below every head
was uncovered, and the exultant people, with all the strength
464 SEVEN' WEEKSr WAR, [Book IX.
of their hundred thousand voices, roared out their greeting to
their Sovereign. The King stopped for a few minutes in the
Pariser Platz, and spoke to the wounded, who, still not re-
covered sufficiently to march in the ranks, were seated in front
of the tribunes on either side, then went through the Branden-
burg Gate, to place himself at the head of the troops and lead
them into the town. The carriages of the ladies of the Royal
family followed soon after, and met with an equally enthusiastic
reception as the King himself, both as they went up toward the
Brandenburg Gate and on their return after a short inspection
of the troops outside the town. Soon the Count Wrangel, who
again led the column, came down the avenue, and was greeted
very warmly. After him^the King's staff followed in the same
order as before, last of whom rode side by side the triumvirate
to whom so much of Prussians success was due — Bismarck,
Roon, and Moltke, to-day all three generals, for the Prime
Minister was promoted to that rank the previous day. A con-
siderable space separated the staff from the King himself, for
he had to hear again to-day the address of the magistracy which
he had already received on the former day, and to listen to the
poetical welcome delivered by the chief of the detachment of
fifty-one young ladies. AVhen he came he was welcomed as
loudly, or even more so, than before, more loudly than the day
before, for the people were less fatigued by waiting, and were
not annoyed by the dust which blew about among them yester-
day. From the time the King came down the avenue with the
Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles close behind him
one incessant shout was maintained until the whole of the
troops had passed, which sometimes rose very loud, sometimes
slightly fell, but never died away entirely.
The troops which marched in this day were the brigades of
the Guards which did not come in before, and some detach-
ments as representatives of Line regiments. All were greeted
loudly, especially the 2nd dragoons of the Guard, who defeated
the Austrian cavalry at Tischnowitz. To those, however, who
had seen the same troops in the field, or directly after the
campaign, their appearance was disappointing. The soldiers
marched carelessly, and did not preserve either the even for-
mation or the measured swinging stride which distinguishes
Chap. IV.] TffE TRUCE. 463
the Prassian infantry on its usual parades. The day seemed
to be regarded only as a holiday and festival, and much more
attention was paid to friends in the houses, or alongside the
avenue, than to the maintenance of that perfect order in the
ranks which is generally so rigidly observed.
After the troops had marched by the King, a portion of
them were formed up in the square in front of the Schloss
around the altar. The King, the Prince, the staff, and the
generals came to the same place, and in the name of the army
and nation yielded up their hearts in thanksgiving to Heaven,
while hundreds of priests burst forth into the noblest of all
songs of praise to the Lord of Hosts and the God of Vic-
tories.
On the evening of the 21st, the King assembled twelve
hundred of the generals and principal officers who had served
in the campaign at dinner in the Schloss. In the later part of
the evening the town was illuminated. Directly after dark the
whole city was lighted up. The Schloss was surrounded by
rows of lamps, which stood out bright against the heavy and
indistinct background of the massive building, while circlets of
coloured lights, high up in the dome, seemed as if suspended
in the air without support Opposite the Schloss bright blue
lights burnt, and, raised high upon lofty poles, glistened like
stars of dazzling brightness above the Museum. These cast a
fitful and almost mysterious glow upon the restless crowds, who,
notwithstanding the rain, which began to fall early in the after-
noon, thronged every street, and clustered in thick swarms
around the fountain in front of the Museum, where gas jets,
introduced among the pipes, from which the water played,
glistened through the sparkling cascade. Every house was
illuminated. On public buildings and in many private resi-
dences were fiery copies of the national arms, or names of
victories inscribed in flame. Down the Linden Avenue and
round the statue of Frederick the Great large basins raised on
bronze stalks contained blazing flambeaux, which blew about
wildly in the breeze. In many places words of wehome to
the returning soldiers or mottoes recording victory were
traced in lamps, which burnt with coloured flames, but no-
where was to be seen a single signal of congratulation for
H K
466 SEVEN WEEKST WAR. [Book IX.
the return of peace. Every fiery inscription, every device of
flame, told the fierce joy of the people for victory and conquest,
and to the minds of many men foreboded that thirst for fiurther
war and for military glory was taking a strong seat in the heart
of Prussia. Where the exterior of the houses was not decked
with lamps, or where burning gas did not trace the outlines of
the national eagle or the names of victories, inside of the
windows were fringes of candles. Everywhere there was light
No window was dark, no house not illuminated, except where
the Austrian or some of the neutral Embassies broke, by a gap
of darkness, the brilhant aspect of a lighted street There
were few carriages. The people moved through the city a
restless, feverish crowd, from which rose a loud continuous
hum of approbation and of triumph, that here and there swelled
into a cheer before the residence of a Minister or the Palace ol
the King.
A long list of promotions and military advancements was
published that day, and it was also notified that a cross of
bronze cast from the metal of the captured cannon was to be
given to every officer and soldier who had passed through the
campaign.
An amnesty, dated the 20th June, was published the same
morning, which remitted any punishments not yet completed,
or any fines which had been decreed by courts of justice
against persons convicted of offences under the 87 th to 93rd
paragraphs of the statute-book inclusive, and under the 97th
to 103rd, or under the law for the control of the press.
In the evening special performances were given in all the
theatres in honour of the triumphant termination of the war.
Prologues were delivered which detailed the glorious deeds of
the army,^and the plays, which were written for the occasion,
dwelt upon the actions and personal adventures of the late
campaign, and recalled the memories of the concluding wars
of the first French Empire.
J
CHAPTER V.
PEACE WITH THE SOUTH-GERMAN STATES.
On the 2nd August, armistices between Prussia and Bavaria,
Baden, Wiirtemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt, were established,
which were to endure until the 22 nd August The terms of
these armistices were similar to those made with Austria ; by
them stipulations were also made for the delivery of the fortress
of Mainz to the Prussians, and for the unimpeded departure
of the South-German contingents from the other Federal
fortresses.
By the 22nd August, peace was definitely concluded between
Prussia and the Governments of all those countries except that
of Darmstadt
The treaty of peace with Bavaria was signed at Berlin on the
22nd of August, by Count Bismarck and Herr von Savigny
for Prussia, by Herr von der Pfordten and Count Bray Stein-
burg for Bavaria. By it Bavaria agreed to pay Prussia thirty
million gulden as a war contribution in three instalments, the
last instalment to be paid within six months of the exchange of
the ratifications ; to abolish the shipping dues on the Rhine
and Maine ; and to give up the telegraph stations on the north
of the Maine to Prussia. The ratifications were exchanged
within twelve days-
Peace with Wiirtemburg was concluded at Berlin on the
13th August The text of this treaty was as follows : —
** Their Majesties the King of Wiirtemberg and the King of Prussia,
actuated by the desire of securing to their subjects the blessings of peace,
h&ye determined to come to an agreement as to the clauses of a Treaty of
Peace to be concluded between them. For this purpose their Majesties
have appointed as plenipotentiaries — The King of Wiirtemberg, his Mmister
for Foreign Affairs, Baron Karl von Varnbuler, Grand Cross, &c ; and his
U H 3
46f SEVEN weeks:' WAR. [Book IX.
War Minister, Lieutenant-General Oscar von Hardegg, Grand Cross, &c. ;
and the King of Prussia, his President of the Council and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Count Otto von Bismarck-Schonliausen, Knight of the
Black Eagle, &c., and his Privy Councillor, Chamberlain and Ambassador
Karl Friedrich von Savigny, Gfand Cross, &c. These plenipotentiaries
having exchanged powers and found them sufficient, have agreed upon the
following clauses : —
** I. Peace and friendship shall henceforth subsist for ever between His
Majesty the King of Wiirtemberg and His Majesty the King of Prussia,
their heirs and successors, their States and subjects.
** 2. His Majesty the King of Wiirtemberg engages to pay His Majesty
the King of Prussia the sum of 8,000,000 il. within two months, towards
covering part of the costs incurred by Prussia in the war. By payment of
this sum the King of Wiirtemberg fulfils the compensation obll^tions un-
dertaken by him in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the armistice convention, signed
August I, 1S66, at Kisingen and Wurtzburg.
"3. As pledge for the payment of this s«m the King of Wiirtemberg
will deposit 34 and 4 per cent. Wiirtemberg State bonds to the amount of
the sum to be guaranteed. The bonds to be deposited will be calculated at
the quotations of the day, and the guarantee sum will be increased by 10 per
cent, accordingly.
** 4. His Majesty the King of Wiirtemberg retains the right of paying the
above-mentioned compensation in part, or wholly at an earlier date, at a
discount of 5 per cent, per annum.
** 5. Immediately after the guarantee being given, ,in accordance with
Article 3, or after payment of me war contribution has been made, the King
of Prussia will withdraw his troops from Wiirtembeig territory. The pro-
visionment of the troops daring their withdrawal shall be according to the
hitherto existing Federal dietary scale.
••6. The apportionment of Federal property belonging to the former
Germanic Confederation is reserved for a special agreement.
"7. The high contracting parties will enter into negotiations for the
settlement of the Zollverein relations immediately after tlie conclusion of
peace. In the mean time the Zollverein Union Treaty of May 16, 1S55,
and the conventions connected therewith, which have been rendered inope-
rative by the outbreak of the war, shall again come into operation from the
day the ratifications of this present treaty are exchanged, with the under-
standing that it remains reserved to either of the high contracting parties to
allow them to lapse after a notification of six months.
" 8, Immediately after the restoration of peace in Germany the high con-
tracting parties will cause the assembly of Commissioners to agree upon
bases ^culated to further passenger and goods* traffic upon the railways as
greatly as possible, especially to regulate the relations of competition in a
suitable manner and to oppose the efforts of individual companies disadvan-
tageous to the public interests of traffic While the high contracting parties
are agreed that the establishment of every new railway line conducive to the
public advantage is to be permitted and supported as fully as possible, they
wnll also have the principles demanded in this respect by the general inten:$ts
laid down by the aforesaid Commissioners.
"9. His Majesty the King of Wiirtemberg recognises the arrangements
made by the preliminary treaty concluded between Prussia and Austria at
Nikolsburg on the 20th of July, 1866, and acceeded thereto upon his part
also, so far as they affect the future of Germany.
10. The ratification of this present treaty shall take place at latest by
»•
Chap. V.] PEACE WITH THE SOUTH-GERMAN STATES. 469
the 2i8t of August of this year. In token whereof the above-named pleni-
potentiaries have executed the same this day in duplicate, and appended
their signatures and seals.
*' Done at Beiiin this 13th of August, 1866.
•• VARNBULER, ** HARDEGG.
" VON BISMARCK, « SAVIGNY."
Peace with Baden was concluded at Berlin on the 17 th
August The first, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth articles
were the same as those of the treaty with Wiirtemberg ; the
tenth and eleventh the same as the ninth and tenth of that
with Wiirtemberg, By the second, third, aiid fourth articles,
Baden agreed to pay Prassia six million gulden within two
months, as a war contribution. By the ninth article, Baden
agreed to abolish the shipping dues on the Rhine.
Peace with Hesse-Darmstadt was only concluded on the 3rd
September, to which day the armistice was extended. The
text of this treaty was, exclusive of the prologue, as follows : —
*' I. Peace and friendship shall exist betweea the Graad Duke of Hesse,
and on the Rhine, &c, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, their heirs
and successors, for eternal time.
*'2. The Grand Duke of Hesse engages to pay to the Kiag of Prussia
within two months the sum of 3,000,000 florins, to cover a part of the ex-
penses caused to Prussia by the war. By the payment of this sum the Grand
Duke is released from his obligation to pay the war contribtttioa which he
undertook by the Treaty of Armistice on the 1st of August, 1S66.
*' 3. The Grand Duke provides guarantees for tke payment of this money
by depositing bonds of the Grand Ducal Loan, when the 4 per cenL bonds
will be accepted at 80 and the 3 per cent, at 70.
" 4. The Grand Duke has the right to pay the above contribution either
in whole or in part at an earlier date, and if he does so will be allowed a
discount at the rate of 5 per cent, per annum.
" 5. Immediately after the deposit of the guarantees mentioned in
Article 3, the King of Prussia will withdraw his troops from the Grand
Ducal territory. The supplying of the troops in their reCuni march
will be conducted in accordance with the supply regulations of the late
Bund.
** 6. The regulations for the disposal of common property which belonged
to the late Bund are reserved for special agreement.
*'7. The high contracting powers will enter into negotiations directly
after the conclusion of peace for the reform of the Zollverein Treaty. In
the meantime the Zollverein Treaty of the i6thof May, 1865, and the agree-
ments connected with it, will come again into force on the day of the ex«
change of the ratifications of the present tre.ity. Each party reserves the
right to annul the same after six months' notice.
*' 8. All other treaties and stipulations concluded between the high con-
tracting Powers previous to the war come again into force.
*' 9. The high contracting powers will, immediately after the establish-
470 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX.
ment of peace in Germany, cause Commissioners to meet, in order to esta*
blish rules to facilitate as much as possible the railway transport of pas-
sengers and goods between the two States, and to oppose the pernicious
effects of individual administration in favour of common interests ; and as
the high contracting powers are agreed that the establishment of a new
railway commimication based on their common interests should be allowed,
and, as far as possible, furthered, they will cause the plans thereof to be
settled by the above-mentioned commissioners.
** la The Grand Ducal Government declares itself agreed to the conven-
tions which Prussia has made with the princely House of Taxis for the
abolition of the Thum and Taxis postal monopoly. In consequence the
whole postal administration of the Grand Duchy of Hesse is to be given
over to Prussia.
** 1 1. The Grand Ducal Government binds itself to allow no other than
a Prussian telegraph station in Mayence. In like manner the Grand
Ducal Government cedes to Prussia unlimited power to construct and to
use telegraph lines and telegraph stations in the other districts of the Grand
Duchy.
** 12. The Grand Ducal Government will completely discontinue to levy
navigation tolls on the Rhine, and also navigation dues (Tariff B in the
Convention of the 31st of March, 1 831), as also dues for lading (Supplemen*
tary Articles to the Convention of the 31st of March, 183 1), from the
day on which the same measure shall be adopted by the other German
States on the banks of the Rhine. The high contracting parties under-
take to do the same with regard to the stifi existing navigation tolls on
the Maine.
"13. The Grand Duke of Hesse recognises the Definitions of the Pre-
liminary Treaty concluded between Prussia and Austria at Nikolsbuig, on
the 26th July, 1866, and also on his part enters into the same as £Eur as the
future of Germany is concerned.
"14, His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Hesse cedes to the King
of Prussia with all rights of sovereignty and dominion — (i) the country of
Hesse-Hombuig, inclusive of the district of Meisenheim, but exclusive of
the two demesnes Hotensleben and Oebisfelde belonging to Homburg,
which lie in the Prussian province of Saxony. (2) The following portions
of territory which belong to the province of Oberhessen : — (i.) the district
of Biedonkofp ; (ii.) the district of Vohl, including the enclaves Eimelrod
Horinghausen ; (iii.) the north-western part of the district of Giessen, which
includes Frankenbach, Krumbach, Konigsburg, Fellingshausen, Biber,
Haina, Rodheim, Waldgirmes, Nauheim, and Hermannstein, with the
ground within their landmarks ; (iv.) the district of Rodelheim ; (v.) the
part of the district of Nieder-Urfel which is under the Grand Ducal
Sovereignty.
*'" 15. The Grand Duke of Hesse enters into the North German Confede-
ration on the basis of the reform project of the loth June, 1866, with all
his territory lying north of the Maine, while he binds himself to cause the
elections to Parliament to be in proportion to the numbers of the popula-
tion. The Grand Ducal contingent from the territory separated in conse-
quence of this and belonging to the Northern Confoieration passes under
the supreme command of the King of Prussia.
"15. The King of Prussia cedes to the Grand Duke of Hesse, in lieu of
the territorial cessions in the province of Oberhessen the following districts,
with all rights of sovereignty and dominion—
Chap. V.] PEACE WITH THE SOUTH-GERMAN STATES. 47I
«
(I.) The formerly Hesse-Cassel district Katzenberg, with the places
Ohmes, Wolkenrodc, Ruhlkirchen, Leibekdorf.
**(!!•) The formerly Hesse-Cassel district Nauhelm, with all rights of
property, the bath establishments and salt works in Nauheim, as well as the
places Dorheim, Nauheim, Schwalheim, and Rodchen.
"(III.) The district of Reichelsheim which lies to the east of the above,
and formerly belonged to Nassau, with the places Reichelsheim and Dor-
nassenheim.
•* (iv.) The enclave of Trais on the Lunda, which formerly belonged to
Hesse-Cassel.
•*(v.) The woodland demesne formerly belonging to Hesse-Cassel
which lies between the Grand Ducal districts of Altenstadt and Bonstadt.
*• (vi.) The districts of Dortelweil and Nieder-Erlenbach, which formerly
belonged to Frankfort.
"(VII.) The district of Massenheim, which formerly belonged to Hesse
CasseL
•* (VIII.) The district of Haarheim, which formerly belonged to Nassau.
*'(ix.) The portion of the Idistrict of Mittel-Griindau, of about 1,700
acres, which formerly belongea to Hesse-Cassel.
** These districts enter into the province of Oberhessen. In the next
place, the district of Rumpenheim, which formerly belonged to Hesse-
Cassel, lying on the left bank of the Maine, is teded to the Grand Duke,
with all rights. The descriptions of the boundary lines lie over.
*' 16. Agreements between the contracting Powers with reference to the
archives, officials, military stores, &&, of the ceded districts will be con-
cluded by special commissioners.
"17. The books, manuscripts, and other articles which were in the
libraiy of the Cathedral of Cologne previously to the year 1794, and are
now in the Grand Ducal museum and library, are to be handed over to the
King of Prussia that they may be restored to Cologne, to which the different
volumes and articles belong. There shall be one Commissioner of either
side, who in case of dispute are to choose ip$u:h an impartial referee, to whom
the case shall be referred.
" 18. The Grand Ducal Government agrees to prolong the present con-
tract between a number of bathing-house proprietors in the town of Kreuz-
nach and the Grand Ducal salt work of Karl Theodor Hulle, for the supply
of lixivium and salt water at the present rate, until the Prussian Government
shall find itself able to acquire this salt work.
** The Grand Ducal Government will also lay down pipes for the supply
of this to Kreuznach.
" 19. The ratification of the present Treaty shall take place at the latest
on the 15th of September.
(Signed) ** DALWIGK " BISMARCK.
" HOFMAN " SAVIGN Y. "
A supplementary convention with reference to Articles 14
and 15 was to the following purpose : —
"I. Prussia enters into all rights hitherto possessed by the Hessian
Government in the ceded districts, and pays pensions in the hitherto
existing way. Officials and servants are guaranteed to be allowed to
remain in their present situations if they will enter the Prussian service ; if
472 SEVEN WEEKS' WAJi. [Book IX.
they, however, return to the Hessian within three months after the close of
this treaty, they are to be paid up to the time of their return by the Hessian
Government. The same rule applies to the districts ceded to Hesse^ which
formerly belonged to Nassau and CasseL Soldiers who are of the rank of
officers in the ceded districts shall be sent to their homes ; and their time of
service in the Hessian army will be reckoned as if in the Prussian service.
Officers and military officials ranking as officers are to be allowed to choose
into which service they will enter.
'* 2. The Commissioners chosen by Article 1 6 of the Treaty will settle all
matters of detail which are connected with the present negotiations.
" 3. All the inhabitants of the ceded districts are to be allowed full
freedom to settle in whichever country they choose for a year after the
exchange of the ratifications.
"4. In the cession of the country of Hesse- Homburg, the pictmies,
library, and such things in the Ducal Castle are not included, as likewise
the orangery. These all remain the private property of the Grand Ducal
House.
** 5. At the same time as the Prussian troops withdraw, tlie civil officers
in the lands at present occupied will cease to act, and the Grand Ducal
officials will return to their duty.
*' 6. It is imderstood that the same regulations for the post and telegraph
services as are to come into force in the province of Oberhessen, from its
feeing included in the Bund, are by this Treaty to be extended to the pro-
vinces of Stachenburg and Rheinhessen, which are south of the Maine.
" 7. All prisoners of war are to be exchanged in eight days after the rati-
fication of this Treaty.
** 8. In reference to the right of garrisoning Mayence, which is to remain
to Prussia, the same arrangements are to hold good between the Prussian
garrison and the territorial Government as did between the former garrison
of Bund troops and the territorial Government.
** 9. All telegraphic offices in Mayence must be entirely in the hands of
the Prussian Government The railway telegraphs will not be disturbed
unless in cases of absolute necessity for the security of the fortress.
** 10. The Grand Ducal Government is ready to surrender the direction
of the administration of the Main-Weser Railway from the Hesse-Cassel
frontier to Giessen into the hands of the Prussian Government, provided
that the latter will give to the former a yearly account of its receipts.
** II. If the Prussian Government wishes to send troops returning from
Bohemia or Bavaria by the Schwandorf to Wiirzburg line, the Grand Ducal
Government will transport them, and will be paid for the same by the Prus-
sian Government.
** 12. No subject of the Grand Duke or of the King of Prussia is to be
annoyed or disturbed in person or property on account of his conduct during
the time of the war.
" 13. In reference to Article 18 of the Treaty, it is understood that this
article only holds good till the year 1892, if the said saltwork is not acquired
by Prussia before that year.
'* 14. The ratifications of this convention are to be exchanged at the same
time and place as those of the above Treaty.
CHAPTER VI.
FORMATION OF THE NORTH-GERMAN CONFEDERATION.
After the war the Prussian Government determined to
annex the territories of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and
the free town of Frankfort On the 17 th August, Count
Bismarck introduced a bill into the Prussian House of Deputies
for this annexation, which was carried by two hundred and
seventy-three votes, in a house of three hundred members ; and
these territories became provinces of the Prussian monarchy.
By the treaties with Austria, made before and after the war,
Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenberg were also united to
Prussia. The area of Prussia, which before the war was
127,350 square miles was increased to 160,000. Her popula-
tion was raised from 19,000,000 to 23,000,000 inhabitants.
In August the Governments of Prussia, Mecklenburg-
Schwerin, Mecklenburg- Strelitz, Saxe -Weimar, Oldenburg,
Brunswick, Sachsen-Altenburg, Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt,
Schwarzburg - Sondershausen, Schwarzburg - Rodolstadt, Wal-
deck, Reusz (of the younger line), Schaumburg-Lipp^, Lipp^,
Liibeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, concluded an offensive and
defensive treaty for the maintenance of the independence and
integrity as well as of the internal and external security of their
States, and undertook a common defence of their territory,
which they guaranteed by this treaty.
"2. The aims of the Confederation shall be definitely laid down by a
Confederate Constitution on the basis of the Prussian outlines of the loth ot
June, 1866, with the co-operation of a common Parliament wliich is to be
called together.
*' 3. All existing treaties and agreements between the Confederates are to
remain in full force, as far as they are not expressly modified by the present
Federation.
474 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. . [Book IX.
•* 4. The troops of the Confederates are to be under the supreme command
of the King of Prussia. The duties during war will be arranged by special
settlements.
" 5. The Confederate Governments will appoint votes to be taken on the
basis of the elective law of the Empire of April 12, 1849, for deputies to
the Parliament, and will call the latter together in common with Prussia.
They shall also send Plenipotentiaries to Berlin, in order to settle the Bill
of Confederation in accordance with the outlines of the loth of June,
1866, which is to be laid before the Parliament for its consideration and
approval.
'*6. The duration of this agreement is until the formation of the new
Confederation, and is settled for one year if the new Confederation is not
concluded before the expiration of a year.
** 7. The above Treaty of agreement shall be ratified and the ratifications
exchanged as soon as possible, at the latest within three weeks of the date
of its conclusion, at Berlin."
The only States north of the Maine which, on the conclusion
of this treaty, were not united to Prussia in the North-German
confederacy, were Reusz (of the older line), Saxe-Meiningen,
and the Kingdom of Saxony. The Regent, Princess Caroline
of Reusz, soon, however, concluded the same treaty with
Prussia.
On the 20th September, Duke Bemhard of Saxe-Meiningen,
who did not approve of the new order of things, abdicated,
and tlie new Duke, George, declared himself ready to enter the
Confederation.
After a long delay, peace was finally concluded between
Prussia and Saxony, on the 21st of October. By this treaty,
Saxony entered the North-German Confederation. The Saxon
troops were to form an integral portion of the Nortli-German
army, under the supreme command of the King of Prussia.
Saxony was to pay a war contribution of ten millions of thalers,*
in three instalments j the last instalment was to be paid on the
30th April, 1867 ; one miUion, however, was to be remitted, in
consideration of Saxony giving up to Prussia so much of the
railway between Gorlitz and Dresden as ran on Prussian
ground. A direct railway was to be constructed from Leipsic
to Zeitz. All the Saxon telegraphs were to be given up to
Prussia* The salt monopoly in Saxony was to be abolished
The fortress of Konigstein was to be given over to Prussia;
Dresden was to be held by a garrison half Prussian half Saxon,
X
Chap. VI.] NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 475
the latter not to muster more than three thousand men. The
commandant was to be appointed by the King of Prussia, the
second in command by the King of Saxony.
The conclusion of the treaty of peace with Saxony was
virtually the last act in the formation of the North-German
Confederacy. The ParUament had afterwards to agree formally
to the setdement of the Confederation, as it did in the early
months of 1867, but practically, Northern Germany was united
into one confederate power under the sceptre of the House of
HohenzoUem by the end of October, i866.
BOOK X.
CHAPTER I.
THE WAR IN ITALY.
When Prussia declared that she regarded the Austrian pro-
ceedings at Frankfort as a declaration of war, King Victor
Emmanuel, in consequence of his alliance with the Govern-
ment of Berlin, declared war against Austria. On the 20th
of June, General La Marmora, the chief of the Staff of the
Itahan army, sent an intimation to the commandant of Mantua
that hostilities would commence on the 23rd. The Archduke
Albrecht accepted the intimation, and made ready for action.
The theatre of war* in which the troops of Italy and those
of the Austrian Army of the South were about to engage has
formed one of the ordinary battle-fields of Europe. Its com-
munications with Vienna lay along two lines. The railway
which from the capital by way of Trieste runs through Goerz,
Udine, Treviso, and Padua to Verona, connects Vienna with
the Quadrilateral : and the line by Salzbui^, Innsbriich,
Botzen, and Roveredo, although not completed between
Innsbriich and Botzen, afforded a subsidiary line for the supply
of troops camped under the protection of the fortresses. The
Quadrilateral itself consisted of tlie strongly intrenched camp
of Verona, on the Adige, the smaller and less important
fortress of Legnano, on the same river, the lately strengthened
fortifications of Peschiera at the issue of the Mincio from the
• This theatre of war has been so frequently and so lately the scene of
memorable campaigns, and so many good maps of it exist, that it is thought
unnecessary to supply one.
Chap. I.] THE WAR IN ITALY, 477
Lago di Garda, and the fortress of Mantua, which lies further
down the Mincio, with its citadel and Fort St George on the
left bank, and its minor works on the right banks of the
stream. The fortified Borgo Forte supports the line of the
Mincio in front of the confluence of that river with the Po,
while Venice, with many adjacent forts, protected the rear of
the Quadrilateral towards the sea.
The Italians, in acting against the Quadrilateral with their
army concentrated, could either advance across the Mincio and
rush headlong against its parapets and embrasures, or, by
ad\'ancing from the Lower Po, push towards Padua to cut the
main line of communication with Vienna. General La Marmora
had a very difficult problem to solve, and was not fortunate in
the conditions he introduced into its solution. His information
as to the Austrian designs was manifestly exceedingly faulty,
while that of the Archduke Albrecht was excellent The Italian
general was bound to assume the offensive, for political reasons.
Neglecting a plan for his campaign which had been forwarded
from Berlin,* he adopted one which, as is believed, had been
determined upon in case of the prosecution of the war of 1859,
by a mixed council of French and Italian officers. The main
attack was to be made against the Mincio and the Adige by
the principal army, under the personal command of King
Victor Emmanuel Each corps of this army was reinforced by
one division, so as to consist of four divisions. These corps
were the first corps of General Durando, consisting of the
divisions of Cerale, Pianelli, Sirtori, and Brignone ; the second
corps, under Cucchiari, consisting of the divisions of Angioletti,
Longoni, Coeenz, and Nunziante ; the third corps, under Delia
Rocca, consisting of the divisions of Cugia, Govone, Bixio, and
the Crown Prince Humbert. If, as has been before observed,
each division may be reckoned at twelve thousand men, with
eighteen guns, the whole army, including the division of reserve
* The plan of campaign forwarded from Berlin is supposed to have been
the product of Genenil von Moltke, and to have been as follows : — A corps
of Italians of about one hundred thousand men was to cross the Lower Po
to the east of the Mincio, and take up a strong position between Mantua and
Legnano, and by their presence hold the Austrian army within the Quadri-
lateral, while the remainder of the Italian army, by aid of the fleet, disem-
barked in the neighbourhood of Trieste, and pushed directly upon Vienna.
1
478 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book X.
cavalry, mustered about one hundred and forty-six thousand
men, with two hundred and twenty-eight guns. The Italian
staff from its information concluded that the Archduke Albrecht
would await an attack behind the Adige, and determined to
cross the Mincio, and occupy within the Quadrilateral the
ground not held by the Austrians. After taking up this position,
and so separating the fortresses from one another, the main
army was to give a hand across the Adige to General Cialdini,
who with his corps was to cross the Lower Po from the direction
of Ferrara. General Garibaldi, with his volunteers, was to
support the movement on the left by attacks on the passes
which lead from Northern Lombardy into the Tyrol. On the
day immediately succeeding the declaration of war, the main
body of the King's army was moved towards the Mincio. On
the 22nd June, the day before hostilities were to commence,
the head-quarters of the first corps were at Cavriana, those of
the third at Gazzoldo, those of the second at Castelluccio. On
the night between the 22nd and 23rd, the King in person
moved to Goito.
The passage of the Mincio was intended to take place at
seven o'clock on the morning of the 23rd, by the division of
reserve cavalry, the whole of the third corps, and Cerale's,
Sirtori's, and Brignone's divisions of the first corps, — altogether
about eighty-seven thousand combatants, with one hundred and
thirty-eight guns. To cover this advance, Pianelli's division of
the first corps was to remain on the right bank of the Mincio,
and watch the garrison at Peschiera. Cosenz's division of the
second corps and one brigade of Nunziante's division were
detached towards Mantua ; the other brigade of Nunziante's
division was posted on the right bank of the Po, to keep
open the communications with Cialdini, and to observe
Borgoforte.
Angioletti's and Longoni's divisions of the second corps
were to remain near Castelluccio, and if they received no
further orders, to cross the Mincio on the 24th and support the
other two corps, which on that day were to be in position
between the Mincio and the Adige.
On the morning of the 23rd the passage of the Mincio by
the Italians commenced. Cerale's division crossed at Monzam-
Chap. I. ] THE WAR IN ITALY, 479
bano, Sirtori's at Borghetto and Valeggio, and Brignone's at
Molino di Volta, between Volta and Pozzolo. The reserve
division of cavalry passed at Goito, and was followed by the
four divisions of the third corps. The two divisions of Bixio
and of Prince Humbert were pushed to Belvedere and Rover-
beUa, the divisions of Govone and Cugia encamped near
Pozzolo and Massimbona. The three divisions of the first
corps bivouacked near the points where they had crossed the
stream on the left bank of the Mincio.
The reserve cavalry pushed patrols to Villafranca, which fell
in with a few weak detachments of Austrian cavalry, but no
other signs of the enemy were perceived.
A coronet of heights lies on the south side of the Lago di
Garda, upon the left bank of the Mincio, which, on the south,
between Valeggio and Somma Campagna, sinks into the plain
of Villafranca, on the east, between Somma Campagna and
Santa Giustina, drops towards Verona and the valley of the
\dige. Since the very slight nature of the enemy's detach-
ments discovered by the cavalry confirmed the Italian head-
quarter staff in the idea that the Archduke Albrecht did not
intend to hold the ground between the Mincio and the Adige,
but to await an attack behind the latter stream, it was resolved
to occupy these hills, and, on the 24th, to take up a position
on the heights between Valeggio, Castelnovo, and Somma
Campagna.
The orders issued for the Italian advance of the 24th June
were, that the first corps should leave the division of Pianelli
on the right bank of the Mincio, and should move the head-
quarters of its main body to Castelnovo. There Cerale's
division was to assume a position facing towards Peschiera,
while those of Sirtori and Brignone at Santa Giustina and Sona
should form front towards Pastrengo and Verona, The line
taken up by the first corps was to be prolonged through
Somma Campagna and Villafranca by the third corps, and to
Quademi and Mozzecane by the division of the reserve
cavalry. The divisions of Angioletti and Longoni were to
cross the Mincio at Goito, and take post at Marmirolo and
Reverbella, as reserves. Orders were also issued that a field
bridge was to be thrown at Torre di Goito, above Goito, and
48o SEVEN WEEKS* WAR. [Book X.
that the field-bridge at Molino di Volta, as well as the perma-
nent bridges at Monzambano, Borghetto, and Goito, should be
covered by bridge-heads.
Confident of his information, and without scouring the
country with his cavalry, General La Marmora ordered the
advance of the 24th to be made only according to the ordinaiy
habit of route marching. The troops did not breakfast before
starting, proper rations were not served out to them, and the
provision trains followed the columns. No preparation appears
to have been made for combat Scouts do not seem to have
been sent out to observe the roads fi*om the fortresses, and the
soldiers of the infantry were loaded with their knapsacks under
the broiling sun of Italian midsummer. This negligence and
temerity met with its just reward.
The Archduke Albrecht had as field troops under his
command, the fifth Austrian corps d'arm^e, led by Prince
Liechtenstein, the seventh corps, under Field Marshal Maroicic
di Madonna del Monte, the ninth corps, under General
Hartung, and a division of reserve infantry formed out of
fourth and border battalions under General Rodich. After
a short time "Rodich replaced Prince Liechtenstein in the
command of the fifth corps, and General Rupprecht received
the command of the reserve division.
As soon as tjie Prussians entered Holstein, the Austrian
commander in Italy concentrated his troops between Pastrengo
and San Bonifacio,* so that they could be united with facility
on either bank of the Adige, in case of necessity for action.
After deductions for necessary detachments, the Archduke had
three brigades of each corps, and a strong brigade of the
reserve division ready for battle. His force was thus ten
brigades, mustering about sixty thousand combatants, which
the cavalry raised to sixty-two thousand five hundred. To
these, two hundred and seventy guns were attached.
At the time that Italy declared war, the reserve. division was
posted at Pastrengo as the right Austrian wing, the seventh
corps at San Bonifacio as the left wing, the fifth and ninth
corps were concentrated at Verona. A few brigades were
* A station on the railway between Verona and Vicenza, and about mid-
way between those towns.
Chap. L] THE WAR IN ITALY, ^\
pushed forwards towards the line of the Lower Po, to watch
Cialdini. A light cavalry brigade, pushed forward towards
the Mincio to watch the army of King Victor Emmanuel,
received orders, in case the latter crossed that river, to fall back,
without committing itself to any serious action, by way of
Villafranca.
This brigade of cavalry withdrew on the 22nd, as soon as
the Italians seriously showed that they intended to cross the
Mincio, to Villafranca. On the 23rd, when the Italians crossed
it, they withdrew further, with no more resistance than the
exchange of a few cannon shots near Dossobuono, and that
evening took post under the forts of Verona.
On the afternoon of the 23rd, a staff-officer, who had been
sent to Somma Campagna, reported to the Archduke Albrecht
that the heights near that place were not yet occupied by the
Italians, but that heavy clouds of dust could be seen to the
south moving towards the Adige.
Archduke Albrecht, who had before thought that the Italians
after crossing the Mincio, would move directly upon Isola della
Scala to join Cialdini on the Lower Po, was confirmed in his
idea by this report from Somma Campagna. He concluded
that King Victor Emmanuel was moving, by way of Isola, to
Albaredo on the Adige, there to throw a bridge and cross that
river. From Goito to Albaredo the distance is over thirty
miles. The Archduke calculated that the Italians could not
reach Albaredo before the evening of the 24th, and that, as
they must dien throw a bridge, they could only with difficulty
commence the passage of the Adige on the morning of the
25 th. The Archduke calculated that on the 23rd he could
occupy the heights by Sona and Somma Campagna, and
could, on the morning of the 24th, attack with strong force the
Italian flank near Villafranca, while his reserves could at the
same time be at Castel d'Azzano.
Acting with this idea, on the afternoon of the 23rd, the
Archduke removed one brigade of his reserve division to
Sandra, whence it pushed detachments towards Castelnovo.
The fifth corps, under General Rodich, was at the same time
to move to Sona, and send its advanced guard to Zerbare in
the direction of Custozza and Valeggio. The ninth corps,
I I
4S* SEVEIV WEEKS' WAR. [Book X.
which had to make a march of fifteen miles from San Boni-
facio, could only reach Verona on the evening of the 23rd, and
was therefore ordered to be held as the reserve. The cavalry
attached to the different corps d'arm^ was formed into an
independent cavalry brigade, so that the Archduke now had
two brigades of that arm. On the night between the 23rd and
24th, the Austrian head-quarters were moved to San Massimo,
and orders were issued that on the 24th, at early morning, the
line between Sandra, Santa Giustina, Sona, and Somma Cam-
pagna should be occupied, and that then a wheel to the left
should be made on Somma Campagna, as a pivot, which would
bring the troops on a line from Castelnovo by San Giorgio and
Zerbare to Somma Campagna. This movement was to be
covered by the two cavalry brigades, which were to advance
by Ganfardine and Dossobuono towards Custozza and ViUa-
firanca.
The dispositions on both sides thus rendered a collision be-
tween the two armies imminent, and brought on the
BATTLE OF CUSTOZZA.
In the night between the 23rd and 24th, a heavy fall of rain
took place, which laid the dust, and made the air cool on the
following day.
At three o'clock in the morning of the 24th, the sixth
Austrian corps moved on Somma Campagna, the fifth corps,
leaving a detachment in Sona, n\oved on San Giotgio; the
reserve division from Sandra, on Castelnovo. The advanced
guards of all three corps were pushed fiirther forward, and the
cavalry brigades spread themselves in the plain, on the left of
the ninth corps. These advanced guards fell in with those of
the divisions of King Victor Emmanuel, which were moving in
the opposite direction, first with those of the reserve cavalry
division and that of Prince Humbert, which were moving from
Villafranca on Dossobuono and Ganfardine, then on that of
Bixio, which followed on the left of Prince Humbert, as well
as on that of Cugia's division, which was moving on Staffalo,
and which was supported by the divisions of Govone and Brig-
none. The above-named Italian divisions were engaged on
Chap. I ] THE WAR IN ITALY, 483
the eastern bank of the Tione. On the western bank of that
stream the advanced guard of Cerale's division fell in with the
Austrian reserve division near Alzarea, and under the pressure
of superior force was compelled to retire to Oliosi, where Cerale
made a determined stand. The Archduke Albrecht reinforced
his reserve division by Piref s brigade of the fifth corps, from
the eastern side of the Tione, while Moring and Bauer's brigade
of the same corps advanced against San Rocco di Palazzuolo.
The communication between his fifth and ninth corps was
secured by the advanced guard of the seventh corps, which
was marching from Sona by Zerbare. After a hot fight, in
which great bravery was displayed by both sides, Oliosi caught
fire, and Cerale was forced to retreat about one o'clock, to
Monte Vento. Cerale himself was wounded, and General
Villarey, the commander of one of his brigades, was killed.
At Monte Vento, Sirtori*s division, which had advanced from
Valeggio to Santa Lucia, on the Tione, covered the right wing
of Cerale's troops, yet without effect, for the Austrians stormed
Monte Vento and drove out Cerale, who was forced to retreat
on Valeggio. He was not, however, pursued. General Pia-
nelli, who had been left on the right bank of the Mincio, near
Monzambano, hearing that Cerale was hard pressed at Oliosi,
on his own responsibility led one brigade of his division across
the river, and threatened the right fiank of the Austrian ad-
vance against Monte Vento.
As soon as Monte Vento was evacuated by the Italians,
Bauer's and Moring*s brigades advanced against Sirtori, at
Santa Lucia. The Italian general quitted his position here
because he was not supported on his left, and retreated about
three o'clock to Valeggio. The Austrian reserve division had
in the meantime advanced against Salionze and Monzambano.
By this hour the lefl wing of the Italian army had been com-
pletely driven from the field, but the battle still was maintained
on the eastern bank of the Tione. In this part of the field
the Austrian ninth corps had received orders to halt near
Somma Campagna, when Cugia, about eight o'clock, advanced
by way of Madonna della Croce. General Hartung occupied
Berettara and Casa del Sole in force. He soon received orders
to advance on Custozza, when he fell in with Cugia's division,
112
i
484 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book X.
which was supported on the right by that of Prince Humbert
The latter was exposed to frequent attacks of the Austrian
cavalry, and was often obliged to throw its battalions into
square, in one of which the Prince himself found shelter from
the enemy's horsemen.
On Cugia's left Brignone was engaged. The latter division
was led into action by General La Marmora himself. At
Monte Godio it was attacked by the Austrian brigade of
Sardier, supported by two other brigades of the seventh
Austrian corps. Shortly after mid-day, and after two com-
manders of his brigades, Gozzani and Prince Amadeus, had
been wounded, Brignone was forced to retreat to Custozza.
Govone's division was pushed forward in his place.
After Cerale had been driven from Monte Vento, and Sirtori
had retired from Santa Lucia, the seventh Austrian corps, sufH
ported by the left brigade of the fifth corps, which had now
nothing before it, pressed hard on Govone at Bagolino, and
took this place from him. Cugia, now outflanked on his left,
was forced to quit Madonna della Croce, and at five o'clock
the retreat of the Italian army was general. Slowly the third
corps retired beyond Custozza, with its left wing on Prabiano,
its right on Villafranca. It was not till seven o'clock in the
evening that the Austrians occupied the heights of Custozza.
Bixio's division and the reserve cavalry covered the retreat
across the plain, where some detachments of the second corps
also came into action.
The two divisions of Angioletti and Longoni, of the second
corps, were to have marched from Castelluccio early on the
24th, and crossing the Mincio at Goito, have moved on Villa-
franca, where they could easily have arrived by ten o'clock in
the morning. They did not, however, march at daybreak, and
when General La Marmora, who during the action, for some
unexplained reason, instead of sending a staff-ofiicer rode to
Goito to send these troops forward, he found there, between
three and four o'clock, only a weak advanced guard of those
divisions. This was sent forward towards Villafranca, and took
a slight part in covering the retreat, but the main body of the
second corps had not moved from Castelluccio.
The Italian retreat was made, without any orders firom the
Chap. L] THE WAR IN ITALY, 485
Commander-in-chief, by order of the commanders of divisions.
Pianelli's division, after repelling a sally against it by the garri-
son of Peschiera, retired on Monzambano, Cerale's and Sirtori's
on Valeggio, Brignone's on Molino di Volta. Of the third
corps Govone and Cugia retired to Valeggio, Prince Humbert
and Bixio to Goito. The first corps recrossed the river on the
afternoon and evening of the 24th; the third corps and the
cavalry in the night The third corps rallied at Volta, the
cavalry between Goito and Cerlango. The bridge of Valeggio
was destroyed.
The army of King Victor Emmanuel was withdrawn behind
the Oglio. Cialdini, who, on the news of the battle of Custozza,
did not cross the Lower Po, moved towards his left, and posted
his troops near Mirandola and Modena, so as to be in close
communication with the army of the King.
The Austrians lost nine hundred and sixty killed, three thou-
sand six hundred and ninety wounded, and nearly one thousand
prisoners, who were for the most part captured by Pianelli.
The Italians lost seven hundred and twenty killed, three thou-
sand one hundred and twelve wounded, and four thousand
three hundred and fifteen missing.
A pause in the operations was necessary to allow the Italian
army time to recover fi:om the disaster of Custozza. On the
30th, detachments of the Austrian cavalry crossed the Mincio,
and pushed as far as the Chiese, but the Archduke Albrecht
bad no intention or design of invading Lombardy.
The volunteers under General Garibaldi amounted to about
six thousand men. They were divided upon three lines. The
main body was collected by the 20th Jime, in front of Rocca
d'Ans, a small detachment was placed near Edolo, on the road
which leads through the pass of the Monte Tonale into the
Tyrol, another detachment near Bormio on the road which
leads over the Stelvio.
On the 22nd June, Garibaldi's main body crossed the frontier
near Storo, but found the population of Uie Tyrol entirely op-
posed to them, and staunchly loyal to the House of Hapsburg.
On the 25th, a sharp combat took place at the frontier bridge
of Cassarobach, in which the Italians were worsted. They
retired towards Bogolino. Near this town they were attacked
486 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book X.
by an Austrian detachment on the 3rd July, and again suffered
a reverse. In this engagement General Garibaldi was wounded.
The Austrians crossed the frontier by the Tonal and Stelvio
roads with small detachments, and several skirmishes took place
in these directions between the 23rd June and 3rd July.
As soon as after the battle of Koniggratz Venetia was offered
by the Government of Vienna to the Emperor of the French,
the fifth and ninth Austrian corps were withdrawn from Italy,
and forwarded to the Danube. There then remained in Venetia,
besides the garrisons of the fortress, only one Austrian corps,
and in the Tyrol a weak detachment under General Kuhn.
The Italian army rested for a space after the battle of Cus-
tozza, but an advance was rendered necessary by the alliance
with Prussia. The disaster of Custozza had caused both the
country and the army to lose confidence in La Marmora. The
command-in-chief was given to General Cialdini, who was
ordered to cross the Lower Po, and push troops^ against the
Tyrol and into Eastern Venetia.
On the evening of the 7th July, Cialdini, leaving a division
to watch Borgoforte, and another near Ferrara, concentrated
seven divisions near Carbonara and Felonica, and that evening
threw some detachments of light troops across the Po at Massa.
On the night of the 8th, three bridges of boats were thrown
across the stream at Carbanarola, Sermide, and Felonica, and
on the 9th the army crossed at these points, covered from any
attack by the marshes which in this direction lie between the
Po and the Adige. After having passed the Po under cover
of this natural obstacle, Cialdini made a flank march to his
right, gained the high road which leads from Ferrara by
Rovigo to Padua, and opened his communication with Ferrara
by military bridges thrown across the river to replace the road
and railway bridges which, on the night of the 9th, the
Austrians blew up, as well as the works of Rovigo. On the
loth Cialdini's head-quarters arrived at Rovigo, and on the
14th, after securing the passage of the Adige at Monselice, his
advanced guard occupied Padua.
The division which Cialdini left under Nunziante, in front of
Borgoforte, besieged that place. The batteries were armed by
the 1 6th and opened on the 17th. On the night of the i8th,
Cha?. L] the war in ITAL K 487
the place was evacaated by the Austrian garrison, which retired
to Mantua, and was occupied by the Italians, who captured
there seventy guns, and magazines of all kinds.
As the progress of events in the north pointed to the con-
clusion of an annistice, the terms of which would compel, in
all probability, the troops on both sides to remain in their
actual positions, the Italians determined to gain as much
ground as possible before diplomacy might cause their army to
halt.
Cialdini, on the 19th, had with him about seventy thousand
men, and an expeditionary force to reinforce him was being
prepared, which would bring into the field about seventy
thousand additional combatants. The Austrian troops in
Italy which could take the field mustered little over thirty
thousand men. That day, the Italian general commenced his
advance from Padua. To Vicenza, which on the 15th had
been entered by a weak advanced detachment, one division
was sent ; the remainder of the army moved to the left bank of
the Brenta. The right wing marched to Mestre, to cut Venicq
off on the land side, while the fleet, as was intended, should
attack it from the sea. The centre was directed along the
railway which leads by Treviso and Udine to the Isonzo ; the
left wing was to act against the Tyrol. The reserve, which
was being brought rapidly forward, was to hold the line of the
Adige. Medici's division was to move on Primolano and
through the Sugana valley upon Trent, while Garibaldi, with
his volunteers, was to act from the west against the same
place.
As Cialdini advanced, the Austrian field troops under General
Maroicic withdrew from the Quadrilateral, and retired gradually
behind the Piave, the Livenza, the Tagliamento, and finally,
behind the Isonzo. On the 22nd, they evacuated Udine,
which, on the 24th, was occupied by the Italians, with two
corps. No resistance was made by the Austrians until the
Italian advanced guard, on the 25th, passed beyond Palmanovo,
when a sharp skirmish took place with the Austrian rear-guard.
As a truce had, however, been concluded on the 25 th, it led to
no results. In the meantime, Cialdini had pushed detachments
by Schio towards Roveredo and by Belluno, as far as Avronzo,
488 SEVEN PEEKS' WAR. [Book X.
on his left, while on his right his troops were dose up to
Venice and Chioggia. A truce was agreed upon on the 22nd,
which was extended from week to week, until on the 12th
August an armistice was concluded. The line of thi? Indrio
was fixed as the line of demarcation between the troops on
either side.
As soon as the armistice between Prussia and Austria had
been agreed to upon the 22nd July, the Austrian troops which
had been transferred from Venetia to the Danube were sent
back to the Isonzo, but on account of the subsequent j>eace
were not called upon to act
In the meantime operations had been carried on against the
Southern Tyrol. On the 20th July, Medici received orders at
Vigo d'Arzere to push through the Val Sugana upon Trent
He reached Bassancron the 2ist9 with about twelve thousand
men and eighteen guns: the same evening he pushed his
advanced guard to Carpano. Hence he detached a regiment
to his right and one to his left to turn the works which the
Austrians had thrown up at Primolano, to cover the junction of
the roads to Feltre and Trent On the 22nd^ with his main
body he marched against these works, which the Austrians
evacuated as soon as they heard of their being threatened to be
turned. On the 23rd, Medici found the bridge over the
Strigno barricaded, but not defended, and, after a slight
opposition, that evening entered Borga On the 24th he
pushed his advanced guards to Pergine and Vigolo. That day
General Kuhn telegraphed to Verona for reinforcements, and
on the 25 th received from that place about eight thousand
men. With them and the four thousand he had near Trent, he
determined to fall upon Medici, and push him back.
On the 25th a slight combat took place between some of
Kuhn's outposts and the Italian advanced guard near Sorda ;
but nothing further occmred on account of the receipt of the
intelligence of the conclusion of the armistice. Garibaldi had
made some movements from the west against the Tyrol, but
without great success. On the 14th, after crossing the frontier,
he fixed his head-quarters at Storo. On the 19th he captured
the small fort of Ampola. The Austrians made several attacks
against the Italian volunteers, who tried to secure the roads
Chap. I,] THE WAR IM ITALY, • 489
leading through the mountains. This irregular warfare led to
no great successes on either side. Though Garibaldi attempted
to gain as much ground as possible, he did not occupy much
at the . time of the conclusion of the armistice. By ^at date
he held the valley of the Chiese for a length of only ten miles
from the Italian frontier, and in the Val di Conzei, one of his
regiments was advianced two miles to the north of Riva. On
the pass over Monte Tonale the Italians were repulsed by an
Austrian detachment, and never effected a lodgment beyond
the frontier.
CHAPTER II.
NAVAL OPERATIONS.
Of the Italian fleet great things were expected. The long
coast-line of Italy, and the mercantile habits of the natives of
many of her sea-board towns, had for a long succession of years
been calculated to foster seamen, and to lay the foundation for
an efficient navy. The result of the war caused bitter disap-
pointment to the Italian people.
The Italian fleet was assembled at Tarento in the middle of
May, and the command of it given to Admiral Persano. He
divided it into three squadrons. The first squadron, under
the immediate command of Persano himself, consisted of the
iron-clad vessels Re d*Italia, Re di Portagallo, San Martino,
Ancona, Maria Pia, Castelfidardo, and Affondatore ; a flotilla
of five gunboats was attached to this active squadron. The
second, or auxiliary squadron, was formed of unplated vessels.
In it were the frigates Maria Adelaide, Duca di Genova,
Vittorio Emanuele, Gaeta, Principe Umberto, Carlo Alberto,
Garibaldi, and the corvettes Clotilda, Etna, San Giovanni, and
Guiscardo. The third squadron consisted of three battering
vessels and two gunboats; and the transport squadron in-
cluded fifteen vessels, which could convey in all about twenty
thousand men across the Adriatic
On the declaration of war the fleets sailed from Tarento to
Ancona, and cast anchor there on the 25th of June.
Here Persano heard of tlie disaster of Custozza, and re-
solved to wait until the new plan for the operations of the land
army had been decided upon, leaving one vessel, the Esplo-
ratore, to cruise outside of the harbour.
On the 27 th the Austrian fleet, under the command of
Chap. II.] NAVAL OPERATIONS. 491
Admiral Tegethoff, appeared in front of Ancona. Some shots
were exchanged between the Exploratore and the leading
Austrian vessel, the Elisabeth, but no further engagement took
place, for, before Persano could weigh anchor and come out to
fight, the Austrian fleet retired.
For a length of time Persano remained inactive in Ancona.
When Cialdini advanced into Venetia, he was, however,
ordered to act, and he determined to attack Lissa.
The island of Lissa lies in the Adriatic, some thirty miles
south of Spalato. Between it and the main land lie the islands
of Lesina, Brazza, and Solta. Between Lissa and Lesina
there is a strait of a breadth of about fifteen miles. In Lissa
there are two ports, those of San Giorgio and of Comisa.
On the 1 6th July Persano weighed from Ancona, The fleet
which accompanied him consisted of twenty-eight vessels, of
which eleven were iron-plated, four were screw-frigates, two
paddle-wheel corvettes, one a screw corvette, four despatch-
boats, four gunboats, one hospital ship, and one store ship.
The frigate Garibaldi remained at Ancona on account of ne-
cessary repairs. Messages were sent to all vessels at Tarento
or Brindisi to sail towards Lissa, especially to the ram, the
Aflbndatore.
On the evening of the 17th, Persano issued orders that
Admiral Vacca, with three iron-clad vessels and a corvette,
should bombard Comisa; that the main force, consisting of
eight iron-clads, a corvette, and despatch-boat, should assail
San Giorgio ; and that Admiral Albini, with four wooden
frigates and a despatch-boat, should eflect a landing at the port
of Manego on the south side of the island, in rear of the works
of San Giorgio. Two vessels were to cruise on the north and
east of Lissa during these operations, in order to give timely
warning of the approach of the Austrian fleet.
On the morning of the i8th, Vacca began to bombard the
works of Comisa, He soon found, however, that his guns
could not attain suflicient elevation to do much damage. He
gave up the attack, and sailed for Port Manego. Albini at
Manego, for similar reasons as Vacca, could not eflect a land-
ing, and Vacca sailed to join Persano. The latter had begun
to bombard San Giorgio at eleven in the rooming ; by three
492 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book X.
o'clock, when Vacca arrived, he had blown up two magazines,
and silenced several of the Austrian batteries. He could not,
however, succeed in sending his ships into the harbour, and
the prosecution of the attack was postponed till the next day.
On the evening of the i8th the whole of Persano's fleet was
assembled in front of San Giorgio, and in the night it was
joined by the ram Affondatore and three wooden vessels.
That evening Persano heard that the Austrian fleet was leaving
Fasana to attack him. He calculated, however, that it could
not approach lissa before nightfall on the 19th, and deter-
mined to make a second attack upon the island on that day,
and issued in consequence the following orders : —
Albini, with the squadron of wooden ships and the gun-
boats, was to attempt a landing at Port Carobert, south of San
Giorgio. The ironclads, Terribile and Varese, were to bom-
bard Comisa, in order to prevent the garrison there from rein-
forcing that of San Giorgio. The floating battery, the For-
midabile, was to enter the harbour of San Giorgio, and silence
the batteries inside. Vacca, with the Principe de Carignano,
Castelfidardo, and Ancona, was to support the Formidabile;
the Re di Portagallo and the Palestro were to bombard the
outside batteries ; while Persano himself, with the Re d'ltalia,
the San Martino, and the Maria Pia, were to prevent opposition
being oflered to Albini's landing.
The attack was postponed from hour to hour in case Teget-
hoff" might arrive; but when, in the afternoon, the cruisers
signalled that no smoke was to be made out on the horizon,
the attack began.
The Formidabile entered the harbour, and, taking post
four hundred yards distant from the Austrian batteries at the
extreme end, opened fire. A battery on the northern side told
severely upon her, and Persano ordered the Affondatore to open
upon this battery through the mouth of the harbour. This was
done, but without much effect
Vacca formed his three ironclads in single line, steamed
into the harbour, and opened on the batteries inside ; but
he could not efficiently Support the Formidabile, both because
she herself covered the Austrian batteries, and on account
of the difficulty of manoeuvring in the narrow space within
Chap. II.] NAVAL OPERATIONS. 493
the harbour, which is only about one hundred fathoms
wide.
He was soon forced to quit the harbour, and was followed
by the Formidabile, which had lost sixty men, and suffered
considerably. The latter was sent the same evening to An-
cona for repairs.
The landing was equally unsuccessful. The wind blew
fresh from the south-east, and the boats could with difficulty
approach the beach on account of the surf.
On the night of the 19th, the ironclads were assembled in
order of battle outside of the harbour of San Giorgio. Early
the next morning the Piemonte joined Persano, who had now
in all, thirty-four vessels under his command. On the 20th
at daybreak the weather was stormy; yet Persano ordered
another attempt to land. The ironclads, Terribile and
Varese, bombarded Comisa. Albini and Sandri, with the
wooden vessels and the gunboats, supported the landing at
Port Carobert. The Re di Portagallo and the Castelfidardo
were engaged in some repairs to their machinery ; the ironclads
remained under steam in front of San Giorgio, awaiting
orders.
The surf ran so high that the landing could not be
effected, and it was about to be abandoned, when one of the
cruisers bore hastily down through the rainy mist, and sig-
nalled that the enemy was approaching from the north. Teget-
hoff with the Austrian fleet was at hand, to raise the attack
upon the island.
BATTLE OF LISSA.
On the 17th July, Admiral Tegethoff at Fasana heard by
telegram of the Itahan fleet being near Lissa. He concluded
that its appearance there was but a demonstration to draw him
away from the coast of Istria. On the 19th, however, fresh tele-
grams assured him that the attack on the island was serious. He
determined to proceed there. His fleet was in three divisions.
The first division, consisting of the ironclads Archduke Fer-
dinand Max, Hapsburg, Kaiser Max, Don Juan d'Austria,
Prince Eugene, Salamander, and Drache, was under the im-
494 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book X.
mediate command of Tegethoff. The second division, con-
sisting of the large wooden vessels Kaiser Novara, Prince
Schwarzenberg, Count Radetzky, Adria, Danube, and Arch-
duke Frederick, was led by Commodore Petz. The third
division consisted of the smaller wooden vessels, Hum, Dal-
mat, Reka, Seahound, Streiter, Velebich, and Wall. Each
division of the fleet consisted thus of seven vessels. To it
four despatch boats were attached, the Kaiserin Elisabeth,
Andreas Hofer, Stadini, and Greif Tegethoff had with
him thus twenty-five vessels, mounting about five hundred
guns.
The Austrian admiral left the roads of Fasana about mid-
day on the 19th of June. On the morning of the 20th his
despatch boats reported a Vessel of the enemy in sight The
wind was blowing strong fi"om the north-west At first
Tegethoff steered a course from the north-west to south-
east, parallel to the Istrian coast, but off Zirona and Solta he
altered his course to one directly from north to south.
Persano, as soon as he heard of the Austrian approach,
ordered his vessels to form line of battle. The Terribile and
Varese were in front of Comisa, so that he had only ten iron-
clads. The Italian wooden vessels never came into action at
all, except by firing some long-range shots.
About nine o'clock the Italian ironclads, formed in single
line, were steering almost from west-south-west to east-north-
east in three divisions. The first division consisted of the
Maria Pia, the Varese, which arrived about this time, and the
Re di Portagallo ; it was under the command of Ribotty.
The second group consisted of the San Martino, Palestro,
Affondatore, and Persano's flag-ship, the Re dTtalia. The
third group, under the command of Vacca, consisted of the
Ancona, the Castelfidardo, and Principe di Carignano. The
Maria Pia was at the head of the column ; the Carignano was
the stemmost vessel When the Austrian fleet came nearer,
Persano signalled each ship to go about, so that the
Carignano led, and the column took a course firom west to
east
Persano, at the same time, moved in person firom the Re
dTtalia to the Affondatore, which he ordered to take up a
Chap. IL] NAVAL OPERATIONS, 49*5
position on the flank of the column furthest from the Austrian
attack. When Admiral TegethofF could clearly make out the
Italian fleet, it was steering from west to east He bore down
upon it in the following order : — His twenty-one vessels were
arranged in three divisions of seven ships each. The first
division consisted of ironclads ; the two other divisions of
wooden vessels. The line of ironclads led, with the admiral's
flag-ship slightly in advance, from which the other vessels,
falling a littie astern, formed a wedge-like order. The seven
heaviest wooden vessels followed the ironclads, and were
themselves followed by the lighter vessels in a similar for-
mation.
Tegethoff bore down upon the gap between Vacca's three
vessels and the central Italian group, and drove his own flag-
ship, the Ferdinand Max, straight upon the Re dltalia, which
he rammed several times, and sank. Only a small portion of
the crew were saved. The Palestro attempted to aid the
Re d'ltalia, but Tegethoff" turning upon her, ruined her steer-
ing apparatus. At the same time she was attacked by other
ironclads, and quickly caught fire. She fell away before the
wind ; the fire could not be got under, and with aJl her ship's
company, except sixteen men, she blew up. Thus of the
Italian central division two vessels were lost, while the Affbn-
datore remained inactive, apart fi-om the battle. The third
vessel of this division, attacked by the seven Austrian iron-
clads, as well as by three wooden vessels, was severely handled,
and forced to retreat
The Italian division under Vacca had, with a north-easterly
course, sailed along the flank of the Austrian ironclads as they
advanced, and exchanged some broadsides with them. When
his leading ship, the Carignano, was clear of T^ethoff"'s iron-
clads, Vacca ordered a change of direction, and brought his
three vessels in line between the second and third Austrian
divisions. His fire told severely on both, especially on the
Kaiser, the flagship of the Austrian second division.
The Italian division under Ribotty, when it saw the central
division engaged, altering its course, moved against the Austrian
wooden ships, and thus brought them between two fires.
Ribotty fiercely attacked the Kaiser, commanded by Commodore
496 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book X.
Petz. Petz, using his wooden vessel as a ram, ran with full
steam against the Re di Portagallo, and lay then alongside of
her. At the same time he was attacked by the Maria Pia, and
his vessel suffered fearfully.
Tegethoff, by this time, had disposed of the Italian central
division, and he brought his ironclads back to aid his wooden
vessels. Under their protection the Kaiser got away, and was
taken to Lissa. A close and fierce battle began now between
the whole of the Austrian vessels and the six Italian ironclads,
during which the Italian wooden squadron and the Aifondatore
looked on from the distance. The smoke was so thick that
either side could with difficulty tell their own vessels \ and soon
the necessity of hauling off was felt
Tegethoff signalled to his fleet to form in three colunms,
with a north-easterly course ; the ironclads formed the northern-
most line, nearest to the Italians. By this manoeuvre the
Austrian fleet was brought in front of the strait between Lissa
and Lesina. Vacca, under the impression that Persano had
gone down in the Re dTtalia, ordered the Italian ironclads to
assemble, and with them in a single line steered slowly towards
the west, waiting for the Palestro. She soon blew up. It was
now about two o'clock, and the action had lasted about four
hours. At this time Persano, with the Affondatore, joined
Vacca's squadron, placed her at the head of the line, and
ordered the other vessels to follow her movements. These
movements appear to have consisted in no more than a steady
pursuit of a westerly course to the harbour of Ancona. By
the battle of Lissa the Italians lost two ironclads, the Re
dTtalia and the Palestro. The Affondatore sunk at Ancona,
after reaching harbour. For three days the Italian people
were led to believe that a victory had been won at Lissa.
The mortification of the defeat which then became known
was thereby increased Persano was summoned before the
Senate, and was deprived of all command in the Italian
navy.
One remark appears patent, even to those who are quite
unskilled in naval matters, that in this sea-fight Tegethoff
led his fleet, Persano only directed his. Another, that the
Italian admiral, with superior forces at his command,
Chap. IL] NAVAL OPERATIONS. 497
allowed an inferior force of his own vessels to be attacked
and defeated at the decisive moment by a smaller force of his
adversary.
On the 2ist, the Austrian admiral returned, without a missing
vessel, to the roads of Fasana.
K K
CHAPTER III.
PEACE BETWEEN ITALY AND AUSTRIA.
The armistice concluded between Austria and Italy was to
last from mid-day on the 13th August to the 9th September.
In the meantime, negotiations for peace were opened at
Vienna ; and on the 3rd October a definite treaty was signed.
By it Austria recognised the kingdom of Italy, and the cession
to it of Venetia by the Emperor of the French. The ratifica-
tions were exchanged as soon as possible. The Austrian
Commissioner-General, Moring, formally gave over Venetia to
the French Commissioner, General Leboeuf, when a plebiscite
took place. The annexation to the kingdom of Victor
Emmanuel was almost unanimously voted by the people of
Venetia, and Italy became one great country, united under the
sceptre of the House of Piedmont, and free of any foreign
dominion, from the Alps to the Adriatic.
APPENDIX I.
Peace concluded at Vienna on the 30/A October^ 1864, between
Austria (Emperor Francis Joseph I.) and Prussia
(King William I.) on the one side^ and Denmark (King
Christian IX.) on the other.
Introduction. — In the name of the Most Holy and Inseparable
Trinity, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor ot
Austria, and His Majesty the King of Denmark, are decided to convert
the Preliminaries signed on the 1st August into a definitive Treaty of Peace*
To this end are named as Plenipotentiaries, Baron Charles von Werther,
authorised Minister at the Austrian Court, &c., and Mr. Louis von Balen,
present Privy Cotmcillor, by His Majesty the King of Prussia ; Bernhardt
Count von Rediberg, Knight of the Golden Fleece (until 27th October,
Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs), and Baron Adolph von Brenner
Felsech, Ambassador Extraordinary to the Danish Court, by His Majesty
the Emperor of Austria ; Mr. Quaade, Minister without rortfolio, &c.y
and Mr. Theodor von Kaufinann, Colonel in the General Staff, &c., by His
Majesty the King of Denmark. These met together at the Vienna Confer-
ence, and having exchanged their powers of action, and proved them in due
order, are agreed on the folloyring articles: —
Article i. — Majr peace and friendship exist from this time forth
between their Majesties the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, and
the Kin|^ of Denmark, and between their heirs and successors, their states
and subjects.
Article 2. — All stipulations and agreements which existed between the
contracting Powers before the war shall again come into force, in so far
as they have not become annvilled or modified by the sense of the present
treaty.
Article 3. — His Majesty the King of Denmark gives up all rights in
the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg, in favour of their
Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, and binds him-
self to acknowledge any arrangements relative to these duchies which their
aforenamed Majesties may make.
Article 4. — The abdication of the duchy of Schleswig includes all those
islands belonging to it, as well as the territory situate on the continent To
facilitate the determination of boundary, and to avoid the inconveniences
which arise from the position of the Jutland territories, which are circum-
scribed with those of Schleswig, His Majesty the King of Denmark gives up
to their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria those
K K 2
500 APPENDIX L
Jutland possessions lying south of the southern boundaiy of the Ribe
district, as well as the Jutland territoiy of Mogel-Tondem, the Island oi
Amrum, the Jutland share of the Tohr, Sylb, and Roms Isles. In exchange,
their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria concede an
equivalent portion of Schleswig, which includes territories serving to secure
the connexion of the above-mentioned district of Ribe, with the remainder
of Jutland, and mark the boundary between Jutland and Schleswig, on the
Koldnig side, which portion shall be separated from the duchy oi Schles-
wig, and incorporated with the kingdom of Denmark.
Article 5. — The new boundary between the kingdom of Denmark and
the duchy of Schleswig will proceed from the centre of the mouth of the
Bay of Heilsminde, on the little belt, and after passing this bay, will follow
the present southern limits of the Heyl, Weystrup, and Taps parishes, as
fzx as the course of the river, which is on the south of Geylbjerg and
Bronore. It will then follow the course of this river from its mouth in the
Fovs Aa, the extent of the southern limits of the parishes of Peddis and
Vandrup, and the west boundary of the latter, as far as Konge Aa, to
the norm of Holte. From this point the valley of Konge Aa willrepresent
the limits as far as the eastern boundary of the parish of Hjort-Lund. From
this point the boundary line will follow this east limit and its prolongation,
as far as the jutting angle to the north of the valley of Abbekjar, and lastly
the eastern boundary of the village, on to Gyels Aa. From there the east
boundary of Seem parish, and the south borders of the Seem, Ribe, and
Wester- Wedstedt parishes, will represent the new limits, which will run in
the North Sea, at equal distance between the islands of Mano and Romo.
In consequence of this new determination of boundary, the common title to
rights and possessions, as well those which relate to the secular as the eccle-
siastical, and which till now have existed on the islands and in the various
parishes of die district, will be declared null. Therefore the new sovereign
powers will have full right in every relation to the territories separated by
the new boundaries.
Article 6. — An international commission, composed of the representa-
tives of these high contracting Powers, will, immediately after the exchange
of the ratifications of the present treaty, be authorised to undertake the
drawing of the new boundaries, according to the stipulations of the above
article. This commission will also have to divide the restoration expenses
for the new hi^h road from Ribe to Tondem, even to the extension of the
mutual territones through which it runs. Lastly, the same commission will
lead the Presidentship in the division of the institutions and capitals which
till this time belong«l in common to the districts or parishes now severed
by the new boundaries.
Article 7. — The arrangements of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd Articles of
the Treaty of the 3rd May, 1 81 5, between Austria and Russia, which re-
presents an essential part of the arrangements relating to mixed possessors,
to the rights which these may exert, and neighbourly relations, with r^aid
to the possessions separated by the boundary line, will find their application
to the possessors, a;^ well as to the possessions, which are to be found in
Schleswig as in Jutland, in the cases given in the above-mentioned arrange*
ments.
Article 8. — ^To arrive at a just division of the Danish monarch/s public
debt, according to the proportion of the population in the kingdom and
duclues concerned, and at the same time to ameliorate the insuperable diffi-
culties which a detailed liquidation of the mutual claims and pretensions
would call forth, the high contracting Powers have fixed the debt of the
APPENDIX L 501
Danish nx)narchy with which the duchies will be burdened at the round sum
of 20,000,000 thalers (Danish currency).
Article 9. — ^The share of the public debt to the Danish monarchy,
which according to the above Article is to fell on the duchies, shall, under
the guarantee of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor ot
Austria, reckon as to the debt of the above-mentioned duchies to the
kingdom of Denmark, after the expiration of a year, or earlier if it be pos-
sible, from the time of the definitive organization of the duchies. For the
payment of this debt the duchies can avail themselves, whollv or in part,
of one or other of the following means: — i. Payment in silver currency,
75 thalers (Prussian) equal to 100 thalers (Danish) ; 2. Parent to the
Danish Treasury, by indissoluble bonds at 4 per cent, on the internal debt
of the Danish monarchy; 3. Payment to the Danish Treasury, in new
Treasury bonds, given out by the duchies, and the value of which shall be
determined in Prussian thalers (30 to the pound), or in Hamburg marks.
These will be liquidated by a half-yearly annuity of 5 per cent upon the
original amount of the debt, of which 2 per cent, represents the interest ad-
ju^[ed to the debt for each term, while the rest will serve to pay it off.
The above-mentioned payment of the half-yearly annuity will be made
through the public coffers of the duchies, or through the bankers of Berlin
and Hamburg. The bonds named under 2 and 3 will be accepted by the
Danish Treasury at their nominal value.
Article 10. — Up to the time when the duchies definitively receive the
sum, which according to the 8th Article of the present Treaty is that which
the Danish monarchy has to pay as its share of^ the mutual debt, they will
-^f 2 per cent, on the settled sum, that is 580,000 thalers, Danish currency.
This payment will be so effected that the interest and the account settle-
ment of the Danish debt, which to the present has been assigned to the
public offices of the duchies, shall, as before, be paid by them. These pay-
ments will be made every half year, and in case they do not reach the
above-mentioned sums, the duchies will pay off the remainder in cash to the
Danish Finance Administration ; if the reverse, the overplus is to be like-
wise repaid to them in cash. The liquidation will take place between Den-
mark and the highest managing authorities of the duchies, commissioned for
the purpose, according to the stipulated manner of the present list, or even
quarterly, if it be considered necessary on both sides. The first settlement
snail be for the especial purpose of arranging the interest and accotmt
payment of the Danish monarchy, which were made after the 2nd December,
1863.
Article ii. — ^The sums which represent the so-called Holstein-Plousche
equivalent, the remainder of the compensation for the former possessions of
the Duke of Augustenburg, including the debt of precedence with which it
is burdened, and the Government bonds of Schleswig and Holstein, shall
fall exclusively to the duchies.
Article 12. -—The Governments of Prussia and Austria will repay them-
selves the expenses of the war through the duchies.
Article 13.— His Majesty the JGng of Denmark binds himself, imme-
diately after the ratification of the present treaty, to give up, with their
freights, all the merchant ships of Prussia, Austria, and Germany, which
have been taken during the war, also the cargoes belonging to Prussian,
Austrian, or German subjects, which have been taken from neutral vessels ;
lastly, all vessels which Denmark had taken with a warlike design from the
abdicated duchies. These objects shall be given back in the same condi-
tion in which they really are up to the time of restoration. In case the
502 APPENDIX L
objects to be returned no longer exist, the worth shall be g;lven in restitation ;
and should the value have considerably diminished since their seizure, the
owner shall receive a proportionate remuneration. It is also acknowledged
as binding to make amends to the owners and crews of the ships, and to the
owners of the cargoes, for all outlay and direct loss which are proved to
have fallen on them through the seizure of the vessels ; also for the port
duties, quarantine duties, law expenses, costs of maintenance, and expenses
of sending back the ships and crews. Concerning the vessels which cannot
be restored, the value of these at the time of seizure will be accepted as re-
muneration. Concerning the average freights, or those objects which exist
no more, the indemnification will be fixed according to the value which
they would have borne at the place of their destination, at the time when
the vessel would have reached it, according to probable calculation. Their
Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria vHU also give up
the merchant ships which have been taken by their troops and men-of-war,
with their freights, as far as these are the properties of pnvate individuals. If
the restoration cannot be made in naturd, the indemnincation will be settled
according to the above-mentioned principles. At the same time their
Majesties bind themselves to bring to a settlement the sum total of the war
contributions which were receiv^ in advance b^ their troops in Jutland.
This sum will be deducted from the indenmification which was to be paid
by Denmark, according to the principles of the present act. Their Majesties
the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Denmark,
will name a special commission to fix the sum total of the indemnifications.
This commission will assemble at Copenhagen, at latest six weeks after the
ratification of tiie present Treaty, and will endeavour to complete their task
in three months. If at the end of this term they have arrived at no under-
standing about the claims brought before them, those which are not yet
arranged shall be submitted to a court of separation (Schneide), To this
end their Majesties the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, and the
King of Denmark, will agree on the choice of a judge (of separation ?). The
indemnifications will be paid, at latest, one month after their definitive
appointment
Article 14. — The Danish Government remains burdened with all sains
which are paid through the subjects of the duchies, conununities, pubUc in-
stitutions, and corporations, to the Danish pay offices, as cautions, deposits,
and consignments. Moreover shall be restored to the duchies — I. The
deposit fixed for the payment of the Holstein Bank certificates ; 2. The
funds appointed for the pnson building ; 3. The fire insurance funds ; 4.
The Savmgs* Bank ; 5. The capital proceeding from legacies belonging to
the parishes or public institutions of tne duchies; 6. Bank reserves from the
special receipts of the duchies, which were hondjidem the public coffers, at
the commencement of the Germanic execution and occupation of these
lands. An international commission shall be authorized to liquidate the
amount of the above-mentioned sums, deducting the expenses which the
special administration required. The collection of antiquities at Flens-
buzg, relating to the history of Schleswig, and which during the late
occurrences have been for the most part dispersed, shall, by the assistance
of the Danish Government, be again gathered together. Likewise shall
those Danish subjects, communities, public institutions, and corporations
which have paid sums of money into the public coffers of the duchies, as
cautions, deposits, or consignments, be most promptly satisfied by the new
Government.
Article 15.— The pensions which depend oa the spedal budgets, be it
APPENDIX L 503
01 the kingdom of Denmark or of the duchies, shall in future be paid by the
conntxy concerned, and the holders of them shall be free to choose their
domicile, either in the kingdom or in the duchies. All other pensions, civil
as -well as military (including the pensions of the functionaries of the •civil
list of His late Majesty King Frederick VII., of His late Royal Highness
Prince Ferdinand, of Her kite Royal Highness the Margravine Charlotte
of Hesse, nie Princess of Denmark), and the pensions which till now have
been paid through the Privy Purse, will be divided between the kingdom
and duchies, according; to tne proportion of their population. To this end,
a list of all these pensions will soon after be drawn up, the value of the life
rents converted mto capital, and all the pensioners invited to declare
whether in future they desire to receive their pensions in the kingdom or
the duchies. Should it happen that, in consequence of this declaration,
the proportion between the two parts, that is, between that which falls to
the duchies and that which remains as a charge on the kingdom, should
not be according to the proportionate population, the difference shall be
equalized by the parties concerned. Tne pensions which are assigned to
the General Widows' Pay-office, and tlie Pension-fund of the subordinate
military, will for the future, as formerly, be paid as far as the funds reach*
As regards the additional sums which the State will have to advance to
these Smds, the duchies will be charged with a share, according to the pro*
portion of their population. The share of the Income and Life Insurance
Institution, founded at Copenhagen in 1848, which the individual rights
belonging to the duchies have attained, they shall expressly retain. An
international commission, composed of representatives of both sides, shall
assemble at Copenhagen, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications
of the present Treaty, and regulate smgly the stipulations of this article.
Article 16. — The Royal Government of Denmark undertakes the pay-
ment of the following royal annuities : Her Majesty the Dowager Queen
Ou'oline Amelia ; Her Royal Highness the Hereditary Princess Caroline ;
Her Royal Highness the Duchess Wilhelmina von GlUcksburg ; Her
Serene Highness the Princess Caroline Charlotte Marianne of Mecklen-
burg-Strelitz ; Her Serene Highness the Dowager Duchess Louise Caroline
von Gliicksburg ; His Highness the Prince of Hesse ; and their Serene
Highnesses the Princesses Charlotte Victoria, and Amelia of Schleswig-
Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg. The share of these payments which
according to the proportion of the population falls to the duchies will be
repaid to the Danish Government by the administration of the duchies.
The selected commissioners mentioned in the preceding article will also be
charged to fix the arrangements for the performance of the present article.
Article 17. — ^The new Government of the duchies undertakes the
rights and obligations of all contracts and objects of public interest (es-
pecially those which concern the abdicated country) which have been con-
cluded, conformable to the law of the administration of His Majesty the
King of Denmark. It is, of course, understood that all obligations resulting
from contracts which the Danish Government had concluded, in reference
to the war and the Germanic execution, are not included in the preceding
determinations. The new Cjovemment of the duchies will respect every
right or title of individuals or civilians, legally acquired in the duchies.
In case of dispute, the Law Courts will find their matters under this
category.
Article 18. — The native subjects of the relinquished countries serving
in the Danish army or navy have the right to be immediately exempted
£x>m military service, and to return to their homes. It is understood that
504 APPENDIX I.
those among them who remain in the service of His Majesty the King of
Denmark need not therefore be in fear, either in reference to their peisons
or their estates. The same rights and guarantees will be mutually assured
to the civil functionaries bom in Denmark or the duchies, and who hare
the intention either to give up or retain the offices they hold, either in
Denmark or the duchies.
Article 19. — ^The subjects domiciled in the countries relinquished
under the present Treaty have, during an interval of six years (reckoned
from the day of the exchange of the ratifications), by means of a preliminaiy
declaration before the authorized jurisdiction, full and entire freedom to
carry out their moveable possessions free from all tax, and to retire with
their fiunilies into the states of His Danish Majesty, in which case tliey will
retain the quality of Danish subjects. At the same time they are permitted
to keep their estates in the abdicated countries. The same freedom is also
mutually allowed to Danish subjects and individuals bom in the duchies,
who are established in the states of His Majesty the King of Denmaik.
The subjects who make use of these arrangements need suffer no inquietude,
either for their persons or with reference to the properties situate in both
states, on account of their choice of either one side or the other. The
above-mentioned respite of six years is also available to those belonging
either to the kingdom of Denmark or to the ceded country, who are staying
out of the territories of the King of Denmark, or of the duchies at the time
of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty. The nearest
Danish Embassy, or any high provincial jurisdiction of the kingdom or the
duchies, will receive their declaration* The naturalization in ue kingdom
of Denmark, as in the duchies, belongs to any individual who has possessed
it up to the time of the ratification of this Treaty.
Article 20. — The titles of possession, the acts of administration and
civil justice, which relate to the ceded countries, and which are in the
archives of the kingdom of Denmark, shall be surrendered to the
Commissioners of the new Government of the duchies as soon as
possible. All those divisions of the archives at Copenhagen, which be-
longed to the ceded country, and which were taken from their archives,
shall be given up. The Danish Govemment and the new Government ot
the duchies mutually bind themselves to divide all documents and manu-
scripts which bear reference to the common concerns of Denmark and the
duchies, on the demand of the high administrative jurisdiction. The trade
and navigation of Denmark and the ceded duchies shall enjoy the rights and
privileges of the most favoured nations, and indeed, until a special. Treaty
settles the conditions, the exemptions and facilities relating to the transit
duty, which, according to Article 2 of the Treaty of the 14th May, 1857,
is allowed to the goods which are conveyed on the highways ana canals
which unite, or will unite, the North Sea and the East Sea, will find their
application to all goods which the kingdom or the duchies convey, what-
ever mode of communication it be.
Article 21.— The evacuation of Jutland by the allied troops will be
accomplished in as short a time as possible, at latest in the course of three
weeks after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty. The
extra arrangements concerning the evacuation are fixed in a Protocol ap-
pended to the present Treaty.
Article 22. — And to contribute all in their power to the tranquillity
of every mind, the high contracting Powers declare and promise that no
person who is compromised on the occasion of the late events, because of
His position and political opinions, shall be at all persecuted, molested| or
APPENDIX II. 505
alanned, either in his person or with reference to his possessions, whatever
be his rank or situation.
Article 23. — The present Treaty will be ratified, and the ratifications
will be exchanged in Vienna, within three weeks, or sooner. In witness
whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed it with their arm^
Passed at Vienna the 30th October, in the Year of Grace 1864.
Werther,
Balen.
Rechberg.
Brenner,
QUAADE.
Kaufmann.
[Here follows, as Appendix, a Protocol, which decides the manner in
wluch the evacuation of Jutland shall take place within three weeks. Then
also a second Protocol of the same 30th October, which says : * * Immediately
after the exchange of the ratifications of the above-mentioned Treaties, His
Majesty the King of Denmark will issue proclamations to the inhabitants of
the ceded countries, to notify the change which has taken place in their
situation and to release them from their oath of fidelity."]
APPENDIX II.
1865. February 21. — Prussian Despatch to the Austrian -Ministry, pro-
nouncing the conditions the fulfilment of which is demanded by the Prus-
sian Cabinet in the duchies of Schleswig Holstein, for the safe position of
the German interests. There are six Articles.
1st. — Lasting and indissoluble defensive and ofTensive alliance of the
duchies with I^sia. To make this feasible, Prussia binds herself to give
protection and defence to the duchies against all attacks, in return the
future Duke will place the whole defensive power of the duchies at the
disposition of the King of Prussia, to apply it in the army and navy to the
protection and interest of both countries. The whole military disposition
of the duchies shall be placed on Prussian footing. It shall l>e yidded to
the Prussian Government, to appoint the quarters of the duchy troops,
either in Prussia, or the duchies ; the troops shall take the oath of afie-
giance to the King. The same principles apply to the navy.
2nd. — The Federal obligation of the sovereign of the duchies remains
unaltered. He will organise his Federal contingent from the Holstein-
Prussian troops not belonging to the Prussian Federal contingent.
3rd* — ^Renosbuig shall be a Federal Fortress, and remain occupied by
the Prussians as hitherto.
4th. — On behalf of the protection of the duchies, the following territories,
with full sovereignty, shall be resigned : (a) The town of Sonderburg, Math
corresponding dominions, on both sides of the Alsen Sound, {b) The
fortress of Friedricksort, with corresponding dominions, for the protection
of KieL (c) The ground necessary for the establishment of fortifications at
the mouths of the canal joining the East and North Seas. Prussia demands
that the levelling of the canal, the guidance of the structure, and the
supreme direction, shall be given up to her.
5o6 APPENDIX 211.
5th. — The duchies, with their entire dominions, shall assent to the Pnis>
sian tariff system (Prussian tariff union).
6th. — The postal and telegraph afiiurs of the duchies shall be united with
those of Prussia. The surrender of the duchies to the future sovereign will
follow on the fixing and performance of the above conditions. Be they not
executed, Prussia will again enter on the rights appertaining to her finom
the Peace of Vienna, and will reserve to herself the monetary winding up
{GHtendnutchung) of her other appertaining pretensions with regard to the
duchies.
The Austrian Cabinet answered this despatch on the 5th March* It
declared that each one of the Prussian demands contradicted either the
Federal law, or the independence of the new Federal state. The Austrian
Minister, Count Mensdorff, had however, directly from the beginning set
up the principle in r^;ard to constituting the duchies, that the new Federal
state should be independent, and that the regulation of its future relations
to Prussia should take place within the limits of the Federal l^idation.
As soon as these two demands shall be fulfilled, Austria wiU willingly agree
to those arrangements, which Prussia may judge necessary for the preserva-
tion of her interests in the formation of the new state.
APPENDIX III.
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY.
Commander-in-Chief His Majesty the King.
Chiefof the Staff General von Moltke.
Inspector-General of Artillery . . Lieutenant-General von Hindersin.
Inspector-General of Blngineers . ,, von Wasserchleben.
FIRST ARMY.
Commander-in-Chief H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles,
General of Cavalry.
Chief of the Staff Lieutenant-General von Voigts-Rhetz.
Quartermaster-General .... Major-General von StiilpnageL
Commandant of Artillery ... „ von Lengsfeld.
,y Pioneers ... „ von Keiser.
SECOND CORPS D'ARM^E.
General Commanding .... Lieutenant-General von Schmidt.
Chief of the Staff Major-General von Kamecke.
Commandant of Artillery ... „ Hurrelbrink.
„ Pioneers . . . Lieutenant-Colonel Leuthaus.
Commandant of 3rd Division . . Lieutenant-General von Werder.
„ 5th Brigade . . Major- General von Januschovsky
(2nd and 42nd Re^ments).
„ 6th Brigade . . Major-General von Winterfeld (14th
and 54th Regiments).
Blucher's Hussars, No. 5.
APPENDIX III. 507
Commandant of 4th Division • . Lieutenant-Geneial von Herwarth.
,y 7th Brigade • . Major-General von Schlabemdorf (9th
and 49th R<^giments).
,y 8th Brigade . . Major-General von Hanneken (21st
and 61 St Regiments).
Pomeranian Uhlans, No. 4.
2nd Jager Battalion.
THIRD CORPS D'ARMiS.
General Commanding . . . . None,
Commandant of 5th Division . Lieutenant-General von Tiimpling.
,y 9th Brigade . Majoi^General von Schimmehnan (8th
and 48th Regiments).
„ loth Brigade • Major-General von Kaminsky (12th
and 1 8th Regiments).
1st Brandenburg Uhlans, No. 3.
Commandant of 6th Division . Lieutenant-General von Manstein.
„ I ith Brigade . Major-General von Gusdorf (35th and
00th Regiments).
,» I2th Brigade • Major-General von Kotze (24th and
04th Regiments).
Brandenburg Dragoons, No. 2.
3rd Jager Battalion.
FOURTH CORPS D'ARM^S.
General Commanding . • . None,
Commandant of 7th Division . Lieutenant-General von Fnmzecky.
„ 13th Brigade . Major-General von SchwarzhofT (26th
and 66th Regiments).
„ 14th Brigade . Major-General von Gordon (27th and
67th Regiments).
Magdeburg Hussars, No 10.
Commandant of 8th Division . Lieutenant-General von Home.
„ 15th Brigade . Major-General von Bose (31st and 71st
Regiments).
„ i6th Brigade • Colonel von Schmidt (72nd and 4th
Jager Battalions).
Thuringian Uhlans' No. 6.
CAVALRY CORPS OF THE FIRST ARMY.
H.R.H. Prince Albrecht, General of Cavalry.
Commandant of 1st Cavalry Division. — Major-General von Alvensleben,
Commandant of ist Heavy Brigade. — Major-General H.R.H
Prince Albrecht.
Garde de Corps.
Cuirassiers of the Guard.
Commandant of 2nd Heavy Brigade.— Major-General von Fliiel.
(Brandenburg Cuirassiers, No. 6.
Magdeburg Cuirassiers, No. 7.
So8
APPENDIX III,
Commandant of Light Brigade. — Major-General yon Rhembaben.
1st Dragoons of the Guard.
1st Uhlans
2nd
»>
«> » 99
Commandant of 2nd Cavabry Divi-
sion Major-Genend Hann von Wejhem.
Commandant of 2nd Light Brigade ,, Duke Williun of
Mecldenbeig.
2nd Dragoons of the Guard.
Brandenbuzg Hussars, No. 3.
2nd Brandenburg Uhlans, No. 1 1.
Commandant of 3rd Light Brigade. — Major-General von Groeben.
Neumark Dragoons, No. 3.
Thuringian Hussars, No. 12.
Commandant of 3rd Heavy Brigade.— Major-General von Der Goltz.
Queen's Own Cuirassiers, No. 2.
Second Pomeranian Uhlans, No. 9.
SECOND ARMY.
Commander-in-Chief •
Chief of the Staff
Quartermaster-General .
Commandant of Artillery
Engineers
>>
H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
Major-General von Blumenthal.
von Stosch.
von JacobL
von Schweinitz.
»>
>>
9>
FIRST CORPS d'ARM&E.
General von Bonin.
Chief of Staff Lieutenant-Colonel von Borries.
Commandant of Artillery .
„ Engineers
Commandant of 1st Division
1st Brigade
i>
11
2nd Brigade
. Colonel Knotke.
. Lieutenant Colonel Weber.
. Lieutenant-General von Groszman.
. Major-General von Pape (ist and 41st
Regiments).
. Major-General von Bamekow (3td and
43rd Raiments).
Lithuanian Dragoons, No. i.
Commandant of 2nd Division . Lieutenant-General von Clausewitz.
,, 3rd Brigade . Major-General von Malotki (4th and
44th Regiments).
„ 4th Brigade . Major-General von Buddenbrock (5th
and 45th Regiments.
1st Royal Hussars, No. I,
ist Jager Battalion.
Conmiandant of Reserve Brigade of Cavalry of First Corps. — Colonel
von Bredow.
East Prussian Cuirassiers, No. 3.
East Prussian Uhlans, No. 8,
Lithuanian Uhlans, No. 12.
APPENDIX III.
509
FIFTH CORPS d'aRM:^.
General Commanding •
Chief of the Staff
Commandant of Artillery
yy £ngineers •
Commandant of 9th Division
17th Brigade
»»
>f
l8th Brigade
General von SteinmetZi
Colonel von Wittich,
von Karwel.
von Kleist
Major-General von LowenfeId«
Major-General von Ollech (37th and
58th Raiments).
Major-General von Horn (7th Regt.).
1st Silesian Dragoons, No. 4.
Commandant of loth Divison . Major-General von Kirchbach.
„ 19th Brigade "" '
If
»f
20th Brigade
von Tiedeman (6th and
46th Regiments)*
Colonel von Wittig (47th and 52nd
R^;iroents).
2nd Royal Hussars, No. 2.
5th Jager Battalion.
SIXTH CORPS D^ARMiE.
General Commanding •
Chief of the Staff.
Commandant of Artillery.
I, engineers •
Commandant of 1 1 th Division
2 1st Brigade
General von Mutius.
Colonel von Sperling.
Major-General von Herkt
Colonel Schulz.
99
»
22nd Brigade
• Lieutenant-General von Zastrow.
• Major-General von Hahnenfeld (loth
and 50th Regiments).
• Colonel von Hofiboan (38th and 51st
Raiments).
2nd Silesian Dragoons, Na 8.
Commandant of 12th Division . Lieutenant-Geneial von Prodzinsky.
,1 24th Brigade • Colonel von Krauach (22nd and 23rd
Regiments).
2nd Silesian Hussars, No. 6,
6th Jager Battalion.
N.B.— Two in&ntry regiments of the 12th Division were detached, the
63rd to garrison Neisse, the 62nd to the command of General von Knobels-
dorf, who protected Silesia at Ratibor, and to whom the Silesian Uhlans
were attached.
GUARD CORPS.
General Commanding •
Chief of the Staff
Commandant of Artillery
Engineers
»»
Commandant of ist Division of the
Guard
Commandant of 1st Brigade •
Prince August of Wiiitembei]^
Colonel von Dannenberg.
Major-General von jColomier*
Colonel Bichler,
Lieut -General Hiller von Giittringen.
Colonel von Obemitz (1st and 3rd
Guards).
510 APPENDIX IIL
Commandant of 2nd Brigade • Major-General von Alvensleboi (2nd
Guards and Guard Fusiliers).
Hussars of the Guard. *
Jagers of the Guard.
^nd Division of ike Guard,
Commandant of 3rd Brigade • Major-General von Budritzki (Grena-
diers of Kaiser Alexander, and 5rd
Grenadiers of the Guard.
„ 4th Brigade • Major-General von Loen (Grenadiers
of Kaiser Franz, and 4th Grenadiers
of the Guard).
3rd Uhlans of the Guard.
Sharpshooter Battalion of the Guard.
N.B. — The 4th Regiment of the Guard was retained at Berlin, and sent
later to the Second Reserve Corps.
RESERVE CAVALRY OF THE SECOND ARMY.
Divisional Commander . . Major-General von Hartmann.
Commandant of 9th C. Brigade . Major-General 'von Witzlet>en (West
Prussian Cuirassiers, No. 5, Polisih.
Uhlans, No. 10).
loth C. Brigade . Major-General von Schoen (West
Prussian Uhlans, No. l).
nth C. Brigade . Major-General von Verstell (Silesian
Ctiirassiers, Na I, Silesian Hussars,
No. 4).
1 2th C. Brigade . Major-General von KaUcreuth.
2nd Landwehr Hussars.
1st Landwehr Uhlans.
ARMY OF THE ELBE.
Commander-in-Chief ' . . . General von Herwarth.
Chief of the Staff . . . Colonel von Schlotheinu
Commandant of Artillery . . „ von Roimiski.
„ Engineers . . Lieutenant-Colonel von Forell.
Commandant of 14th Division . Lieutenant-General von Miinster.
„ 27th Brigade . Major-General von Schwarzkoppen
(16 and 56th Regiments).
„ 28th „ . Major-General von Hiller (17th and
57th Regiments).
Westphalian Dragoons, No. 7.
«
Commandant of 15th Division . Lieutenant-General von Canstein.
„ 29th Brigade Colonel von StUckradt (40th and 65th
Regiments).
», 30th Brigade Colonel von Clasenapp (28th and 68th
Regiments).
Royal Hussars, No. 7.
If
»i
t*
APPENDIX III. 5X1
Commandant of 16th Bivision • Lieutenant-General von EtzeL
„ 31st Brigade • Major-General von Scholer (29th and
69th Regiments).
y, 32nd „ . (sistandSthJager Battalion).
2nd Westphalian Hussars, No. 1 1.
RESSRVB CAVALRY*
Rhenish Cuirassiers, No. 8.
Rhenish Uhlans, No. 7.
Westphalian Uhlans, No. 5.
FIRST RESERVE CORPS.
Lieutenant-General von Miilbe.
Landwehr Division of the Guard, — ^General von Bentheim.
1st Brigade of Guard Landwehr (ist and 2nd Guard Landwehr
Regiments).
2nd Brigade of Guard Landwehr (ist and 2nd Guard Grenadier
Landwehr Regiments).
\st LandweJir Division, — General Rosenbeig.
1st Landwehr Brigade (9th and 21st Landwehr Regiments).
2nd „ „ 113th and 15th „ „ ).
2nd Landwehr Division,
1st Landwehr Brigade (2nd and 12th Landwehr Regiments).
2nd „ „ {24th and 31st „ „ ).
Landwehr Cavalry Division, — Major-General Dohna.
6th Landwehr Cavalry Regiment.
I Battery.
ARMY OF THE MAINE.
Commander-in-Chief . • . General Vogel von Falckenstein.
Chief of the Staff • • « Colonel von Kraatz-Koschlau.
A* iph Division, — Lieutenant-General von Goeben.
Commandant of 25th Brigade . Major-General von Kummer (13th and
53rd Regiments).
„ 26th „ • Major-General von Wrangel (15th and
55th Regiments).
Westphalian Cuirassiers, No. 4.
Ist Westphalian Hussars, No. &
B» Combined Division, — Major-General von Bejrer.
19th, 20th, 30th, 32nd, 34th, 39th, and 70th R^ments.
N.B.— The 30th and 70th were detached to garrison Hesse-Cassel.
2nd Rhenish Hussars, No. 9.
C, Combined Division (formerly in Holstein).,
Lieutenant-General von ManteufTel.
Commandant of ist Com. Brigade Major-General von Freyhold (25th
and 36th Regiments).
„ 2nd „ „ (nth and 59th Regiments^.
SU APPENDIX III.
Commandant of Cavalry Brigade . Miyor-General von Flies (Rhenish
Dragoons, No. 9, Magdeburg
Dragoons, No. 6).
Two Battalions of Cobuzg-Gotha,
One Battalion of Lippe. ^
Five Fourth Battalions,
^th Jager Battalion.
Three newly-raised Regiments of Landwehr Cavalry.
Oldenburg, Hanseatic Brigade (nine Battalions, three Squadrons, two
Batteries).
SECOND RESERVE CORPS.
Commander-in-Chief. — His Royal Highness the Duke of
Mecklenburg-Schwerin.
a. Mecklenberg Division (five battalions, four Squadrons, two Batteries)*
b. Combined Prussian Division (sixteen Battalions).
c. Two Anhalt Battalions.
Two Reserve Regiments of Landwehr Cavalry.
Eight Batteries.
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE IMPERIAL AUSTRIAN ARMY
OF THE NORTH.
General-in-Chief . . . . Feldzeugmeister Ritter von Benedek.
Chief of the Staff «... Lieutenant Field-Marshal von Henik-
stein.
Director of Artillery . . • Lieutenant Field- Marshal Archduke
William.
„ Engineers . . . Colonel von PidolL
FIRST CORPS D'aRM^E.
General Commanding . . . General of Cavalry, Count Clam
Gallas.
Assistant General Count Gondrecourt
Chief of the Staff • . . . Colonel von Litzelhofen.
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Poschacher*
1 8th Field JSger Battalion.
30th Infantry Regiment (Martini).
34th Infantry (King William of Prussia).
Commandant of Bri^de. — Colonel Count Leiningen.
32nd Field Jager Battalion.
33rd Infantry Regiment (Giulay).
38th Infiuitry Regiment (Haugwitz),
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Piret.
29th Field Jiiger Battalion.
18th Infantry Regiment (Constantin).
45th „ „ (Sigismund).
APPENDIX Iff, 513
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Ringelsheim.
26th Jttger Battalion.
43nd Infantry Regiment (Hanover).
73rd Infantry Regiment (Mensdorif).
To each Brigade one squadron of the Nikolaus Regiment of Hussars
(No. 2), and one 4-pounder Field Battery, were attached.
N.B. — To the Corps were besides attached one Sanitary Company, two
Field Ambulances, five Companies of Pioneers, four Companies of Engi-
neers, two 4-pounder and two 8-pounder Field Batteries, one 4-pounder
and one 8-pounder Horse Artillery Battery, and a Rocket Battery.
«
SECOND CORPS D'ARM^E.
General Commanding . . Lieutenant Field-Marshal Couiit
Thun- Hohenstadt.
Assistant Major- General von Philippovich
Chief of the Staff . . . . Colonel von Dopfner.
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Thorn.
2nd Field Jager Battalion.
40th Infantry Regiment (Roszbach).
69th „ „ (Jellachich).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Henriquez.
9th Field Jager Battalion.
14th Infantry Regiment (Hesse).
27th „ „ (Belgium).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General* von Salfrau.
nth Field Jager Battalion.
64th Infantry Regiment (Saxe- Weimar).
80th ,, ,, (Holstein).
Commandant of Brigade. — Prince Wlirtemberg.
20th Field Jiiger Battalion.
47th Infantry Regiment (Hartung).
57th „ ,, (Mecklenburg).
To each Brigade one squadron of the Imperial Uhlans (No. 6), and one
4-pounder Field Battery, were attached.
To the Corps were attached the same as to the First Corps.
THIRD CORPS D'aRM&E.
(icneral Commanding .... Lieutenant Field-Marshal Archduk<f
Ernst.
Assistant Major-General von Baumgarten.
Chief of the Staff Colonel Baron Catty.
Commandant of Brigade. — Major General Kalik.
22nd Field JSger Battalion.
35th Infantry Regiment (KhevenhuUer).
72nd ,, „ (Ramming).
N. B. — This Brigade, which had garrisoned Holstein on the outbreak of
hostilities, was attached to the First Corps d'Annee.
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Appiano.
4th Field JSger Battalion.
46th Infantry Regiment (Meinin^en).
62nd „ „ (Archduke Henry).
L I.
514 APPENDIX III.
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Benedek.
1st Field Jager Battalion.
52nd Infantry Regiment (Archduke Franz Karl).
78th Infantry Regiment (Sokcsevics).
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Kirchsberg.
3rd Field Jager Battalion.
44th Infantry Regiment (Archduke Albrecht).
49th Infantry Regiment (Hesz).
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Prohaszka.
13th Border Infantry Regiment.
Four Battalions of the 55th Regiment.
To each Brigade were attached one squadron of the Lichtenstein Uhla:i:r
(No. 9) and one 4-pounder Field Battery.
To the Corps were attached the same as to the First Corps.
FOURTH CORPS D'aRM^E.
General Commanding .... Lieutenant Field-Marshal Count
Festetics.
Assistant Major-General von Mollinary.
Chief of the Staff Colonel von Gorz.
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Kopal.
27th Field Jftger Battalion.
1 2th Infantry Regiment (Archduke William).
26th Iiifantry Regiment (Michael).
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Fleischhacker.
13th Field Jager Battalion.
6th Infantry Regiment (Coronini).
6 1 St „ „ (Prince of Russia).
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Poekh.
8th Field Jager Battalion.
37th Infiuitry Regiment (Archduke Joseph^.
51st Infantry Regiment (Archduke Charles Ferdinand).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Archduke Joseph.
30th Field Jager Battalion.
67th Infantry Regiment (Schmerling).
68th „ ,, (Steininger).
To each Brigade one squadron of the 7th Hussars and one 4-pountlcr
P'ield Battery were attached.
To the Corps the same were attached as to the First Corps.
SIXTH CORPS D'ARMKE.
General Commanding .... Lieutenant Field-Marshal BamD
Rammmg.
Assistant Major-General von Rochmdster.
Chief of the Staff Colonel Friilich.
Commandant of Brigade.— Colonel von Waldstatten.
6th Field J^er Battalion.
9th Infantry Regiment (Hartmann).
*l9th ,, „ (FraiikX
APPENDIX III, 5?5
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Hcrtwegh.
25th Field Jager Battalion.
41st Infantry Regiment (Kellner).
56th „ „ (Gorizutti).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Rosenwei^.
17th Field Jager Battalion.
4th In&ntiy Regiment (Deutschmeister).
55th „ „ (Bianchi).
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Jonak.
14th Field Jager Battalion.
20th Infantry Regiment (Prussia).
60th „ „ (Wasa).
To each Brigade one squadron of the loth Uhlans and one 4-poundcr
Field Battery were attached.
Besides were attached to the Corps one Sanitary Company, two Field
Ambulances, one battalion of Engineers, one battalion of Pioneers, two
4-pounder and two 8-pounder Field Batteries, two 8-pounder batteries of
Horse Artillery, and a Rocket Battery.
EIGHTH CORPS D^ARM^E.
General Commanding .... Archduke Leopold.
Assistant Major-General Weber.
Chief of the Staff Lieutenant-Colonel von Majnone.
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Fragner.
5th Field Jfiger Battalion.
15th Infantry R^ment (Nassau).
77th „ „ (Archduke of Tuscany).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General von Docteur.
31st Field Jiiger Battalion.
8th Infantry Regiment (Archduke Louis).
74th „ „ (NobUi).
Commandant of Brigade. — General Count Rothkirk.
25th Infantry Regiment (Mamula).
71st „ „ (Leopold of Tuscany).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Brandenstein.
24th Field Jager Battalion.
2 1 St Infantry Regiment (Reischacfa).
23rd „ „ (Este).
To each Brigade one squadron of the Archduke Charleses Uhlans (Na 3)
and one 4-pounder Battery were attached.
Besides were attached to the Corps the same as to the First Corps.
TENTH CORPS D'aRM^E.
General Commanding .... Lieutenant Field -Marshal von Gablenz.
Assistant Baron Roller.
Chief of the Staff Colonel Bourgignone.
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Mondel.
I2th Field JSjger Battalion,
loth Infantry Regiment (Mazuchelli).
24th ,, „ (Parma).
5l6 APPENDIX JJL
Cominandant of Brigade. — Colonel GrivicicR.
i6th Field Jager Battalion.
2nd Infantry Regiment (Alexander). ,
23rd „ „ (Airoldi).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General von Knebel.
2Sth Field Jager Battalion.
1st Infantry Regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph^
3rd „ „ (Arcnduke Charles).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General WimpfTen.
13th Infantry Regiment (Bamberg).
58th „ „ (Archduke Stephen^.
To each Brigade were attached one squadron of the tst Uhlans and one
4-pounder Field Battery.
The same were attached to the Corps as to the First Corps, except that
^his Corps had only one 4-pounder Field Battery.
First Light Cavalry Divisiotu — Major-General Baron Edelsheim.
Chief of Stafil — Major Waldestatten.
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Appel.
2nd Dragoons (Windischgratz).
9th Hussars (Liechtenstein;.
>Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Wall is.
1st Dragoons (Savoy).
lOth Hussars (King of Prussia).
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Fratricievics.
;th Hussars (Radetzky).
Eth ,, (Hesse-Cassel).
Stcond Light Cavalry Division. — Major-General Prince Tlium and Taxis.
Chief of the Staff. — Colonel Rodako\'S2ky.
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Bellegarde.
4th Hussars (Eseh).
I2th „ (Haller).
Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Westphalen.
6th Hussars (Wiirtemberg).
nth „ (Palffy).
First Resfrve Division of Cavalry. — Lieutenant Field-Marshal Prince
Schleswig-Holstein.
Commandant of Brigade. — Major General Prince Solms.
4th Cuirass Regiment (Ferdinand).
6th ,, „ (Hesse).
8th Uhlans (Emperor Max.).
APPENDIX IIL 517
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Schindlocker.
9th Cuirass Regiment (Stadion).
nth Cuirass Regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph).
4th Uhlans ( „ „ ).
Sixond Reserve Dhiston of Cavalry, — Major General von Zajtsek.
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Borberg.
3rd Cuirass Regiment (Saxony).
7th f, ,, (Brunswick).
2nd Uhlans (Schwarzenbeig).
Commandant of Brigade. — General Count Soltyk.
1st Cuirass Regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph).
5th Cuirass Regiment (Nicolas).
5th Uhlans (Walmoden).
Third Reserve Division of Cavalry, — Major-General Count Coudcnhove.
Commandant of Brigade. — Prince Windischgratz.
2nd Cuirass Regiment (Wrangel).
8th ,» „ (Prince of Prussia).
7th Uhlans (Archduke Charles Louis).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-Geneial Mengen.
loth Cuirass Regiment (Bavaria).
1 2th „ „ (Horvath).
nth Uhlans (Alexander).
To each Cavalry Brigade was attached one battery of Horse Artillery.
IMPERIAL AUSTRIAN ARMY OF THE SOUTH.
General-in-Chief Field-Marshal Archduke Albrecht.
Chief of the Staff Major-General von John.
FIFTH CORPS D*ARMBE.
Major-General Rodich.
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Daun.
19th Field Jager Battalion.
38th Infieuitry R^ment (Benedek).
70th „ „ (Also-Szopor).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Moring.
2 1 St Field Jager Battalion.
53rd Infantry Regiment (Archduke Leopold Louis).
54th „ „ (Grueber).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Piret.
5th Imperial Jager Battalion.
50th Iniantry R^ment (Baden).
75th „ ,, (Crenneville).
5 IS APPEXDJX III.
SEVENTH CORPS D*AJtMi£.
Lieutenant Field-Marshal Marivid di Madonna del Monte.
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Enunerich Ton Tbuni and
Taxis.
7th Field Jager Battalion.
39th Infiiintry Regiment (Tlnm).
43rd „ „ (Alemann).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Scudier.
loth Field Jager Battalion.
19th Infimtry Regiment (Crown Prince Rodolf).
4Sth ,y ,, (Archduke Ernest Charles).
Commandant of Brigade.— Major-General Hammerstein.
4th Imperial Jager Battalion.
66th Infantry Regiment (Grand Duke of Tuscany).
76th ,, „ (Paumgarten).
Commandant of Brigade.—
6th Imperial Jager Battalion,
nth Infantry Regiment (Crown Prince of Saxony).
59th „ „ (Archduke Rainer).
NINTH CORPS D'ARM^
Commandant of Brigade. — Major>General Weckbecher.
23nl Field Jager Battalion.
63rd Infantry Regiment (Netherlands).
65th „ ,, (Archduke Louis Victor).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-Genend Appiano.
15th Field Jager Battalion.
5th Infantry Regiment (Wetzlar).
7th „ „ (Maroidc).
Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General GaaL
3rd Imperial Jager Battalion.
31st Infantry R^ment (Meckleiiburg-Strelitz).
39th „ „ (Don Migud).
Besides these, to the Army of the South were attached the 1st and 2nd
Imperial Jiiger Battalions, and the 17th Hohenlohe), 22nd (Wimpffen),
36th (Degenfeld) Infantry Regiments.
The Cavalry consisted of the 12th and 13th Uhlans, and the 1st, 3rd,
I ith, and 14th Hussars, the Artillery of the 5th and 7th Regiments.
N.B. — The Border Rqjiiments garrisoned the fortresses and the
Littorale.
APPENDIX IV.
PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE AGREED UPON BETWEEN
THE TWO GREAT BELLIGERENT POWERS.
" Thbir Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, after
declaring that they are animated by a desire to restore to their peoples the
blessings of peace, appoint as their Plenipotentiaries—
•* His Apostolic Majesty— Count Karolyi and Baron de Brenner; and
the King of Prussia — Count Bismarck, who have agreed upon the following
points : —
**The int^rity of the Austrian monarchy, with the exception of Venetia,
shall be maintained.
** The King of Prussia shall withdraw his troops from the Austrian terri-
tory as soon as a peace shall have been signed.
•*The Emperor of Austria recognises the dissolution of the Germanic
Confederation as it heretofore existed, and accepts the new organization of
Germany without the participation of Austria ; ne undertakes to recognise
the closer Federal relations {die ettgem Bundesbande) which the King of
Prussia shall establish to the north of the line of the Maine ; he also accepts
the formation by the States of the South of a separate Confederation, and
that the national connexion with the North shall be reserved for future
arrangement between the two Confederations.
*• His Apostolic Majesty transfers to the King of Prussia all the rights
which he had acquired by the Treaty of Vienna of the 30th of October
over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, with the reservation that the
population of Northern Schleswig, if they should express such a desire by
a free vote, should be re-united to Denmark.
** The war indemnity is fixed at forty million thalers. From this sum
fifteen millions shall be deducted as the equivalent of the amount which the
Emperor of Austria, by virtue of the Treaty of 1864, would still be entitled
to cudm from the Elbe Duchies, and five millions as the equivalent of the
provisioning of the Prussian troops which still continue to occupy the
Austrian provinces until the conclusion of peace. There will, therefore,
remain a sum of twenty million thalers to be paid in specie.
*• The King of Prussia, at the request of Austria, consents to allow the
kingdom of Saxony to retain its present territorial limits, but he reserves to
himself the power of settling, by a special treaty to be concluded with the
King of Saxony, the question of the war indemnities as well as the future
position which Saxony shall hold in the Northern Confederation.
" The Emperor of Austria will recognise the new territorial arrange-
ments efTectea by the King of Prussia in the north of Germany, and also
any territorial changes which he may complete.
''The King of Prussia engages to obtain the adhesion of his ally of Italy
to the preliminaries of peace and to the armistice as soon as the Emperor
of the French shall have declared that the kingdom of Venetia b at the dis-
position of the King of Italy.
520 APPENDIX V,
'* The Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, af^er the exchange of
ratifications of the present preliminaries has been completed, shall appoint
Plenipotentiaries, who shall meet at a place to be hereafter selected, in
order to conclude a peace upon the bases of the present preliminary con-
vention, and to n^otiate upon questions of detail.
'* For these purposes, after having agreed upon the present preliminaries,
the high contracting parties shall conclude this armistice between the
Austrian and Saxon military forces on the one part, and the Prussian
military forces on the other part.
'* The conditions of this armistice shall be settled immediately.
'* The armistice shall commence from August 2nd, and the present sus-
pension of arms shall be prolonged until that date.
'* There shall also be concluded at the present state of the negotiations
an armistice with Bavaria, and General Baron de Manteuffel shall be
required to conclude armistices, to commence also from the date of August
2nd, upon the bases of the military status quo, with Baden, Wiirtembcn;,
and Hesse-Darmstadt, as soon as these states shall require."
APPENDIX V.
Much was said and written at the time of the armistice on the state o^
the Prussian hospitals. While the head -quarters of the fine army lay at
Prague, the utter stagnation of affairs and a favourable opportunity mduced
the author to pay a visit to the line by which the Crown Prince advanced
with the Second Army from Silesia to the battle of Kdniggiatz. The
train glided without stopping past the station of Koniggnitz, which is a
short distance from the advanced works of the fortress, and where a guard
of the Austrian garrison were standing beside their piled arms, past Joseph-,
stadt, close under the guns of the bastions, and between the main body of
the place and an outwork on which an Austrian sentrv was pacing along
the rampart, and Austrian soldiers were lying listlessly beside the big guns
looming out of the embrasures. The line o^ndlway was itself, by the condi-
tions of the armistice, available for Prussian transport, but no Prussian was
allowed to get out of the train either at Josephstadt or Koniggnitz, nor did
the trains stop at either place unless some one unconnected with the
Prussian army wished to be put down or to get in, in which case a momen-
tary halt was made at the station. On arriving at Koniginhof, we found
a large number of hospital tents filled with men who had been wounded at
Nachod, Skalitz, or the great battle. Prussian and Austrian soldiers lay
side by side, all under the care of Prussian surgeons, but tended and nursed
by a large number of Prussian ladies, and by many sisters of charity. Many
of the Austrian soldiers were Poles, many Italians who spoke no Gennan,
but relied upon the Prussian ladies to act as interpreters between them and
the surgeons. Many of the men were on the road to rapid recovery, and
were able to talk cheerfully and smoke, while with a piece of green bough
they brushed away the flies which in this warm climate clustered thickly in
the hospital tent, and tried to fix themselves upon the healing wounds. In
one tent lay two or three who were considered hopeless cases ; one poor
fellow, an Austrian artilleryman, who had lost both l^p, lay upon his
mattrass, moving his head feebly with a. restless motion. **He must die,"
APPENDIX V, 521
whispered the surgeon ; ** he cannot get over it.'* Bnt going forward he
stooped over the much- suffering man, patted his forehead, and spoke some
words of consolation to him. As the doctor turned to leave the bedside,
the man, who seemed to derive some hope from his presence, began to moan
feebly, bnt a lady who was sitting near him came over to him, smoothed
his pillow, and by* few kind words tjuirted him, and induced him to try to
go to sleep. The si4ferer, with a child's obedience, closed his ejies, uhile
his nurse sat down by his bed-head, ready to frighten away any fly that
might threaten to disturb the fitful slumbers of the patient.
In another tent were a number of convalescents, with bright eyes, very
different from those which, dull and h«y, betokened more dangerous cases.
Here Baroness Seydlitz was serving out plentiful portions of cigars and
tobacco, which were eagerly accepted by the men who were still unable to
leave their beds, and whose thinned white hands told how much pain and
illness can be caused even by the tiny bullets of the needle-gun. This
noble lady had two sons in the Prussian army, both of whom had
served during the campaign. At the banning of the war she was made
superintendent of oneoT the many companies of Prussian ladies who formed
themselves into charitable bands for nursing the wounded, and was now
with her division of benefactresses stationed in tVe hospital tents of Ko-
niginhof. Fortunately, her sons had passed unscathed through the actions ;
but if every wounded soldier who x^me under her care had been her own
child she could not have shown more solicitude for them than she did. The
Prussian wounded had made us acquainted with their love and estimation
for her before we found her in the hospital tent, and every S clave, Pole, or
Italian-Austrian, when asked who had given him any little luxury which
we saw by his bed-head, knew enough German to answer, ** Du guU Fran
von Seydlitz.'*'*
General von Lowenfeld, who was passing through Koniginhof on his way
to review the battle-field of Nachod, where he with six battalions repulsed
the fierce attacks of the Austrians until his supports arrived, was visiting
the hospitals, and with a wonderful power, not only of language but dialect,
was talking kindly to every patient Many of the Austrians who ^ere
lying in the shaded tents of IGiniginhdf had fallen under his own guns or
the deadly fire of his own infantr)' at Nachod or Skalitz, but they bore no ill-
will to the Prussian general The Prussian Krankentriigers, Prus<dan sur-
geons, and Prussian ladies had removed any animosity which they might at
first not unnaturally have felt to not only an enemy bilt a conqueror. All
were asked how long they had lain on the field of battle ; some four hours,
some ten, some said thirty-six ; one now merry Austrian boy, about
eighteen years old, told us thi^t he had been wounded in the ^iasIowed
\Vood during the battle of KtfniggratK, and had lain there lost and
hidden in the trees, and suffering fearfully from thirst and hunger, until
found at the end of three days by some Prussian soldiers. An amputated
foot showed that he had been badly >vT»unded, but it is probable that smffering
exaggerated to his mind the length of time he lay upon the ground, for
the woods were searched by the Prussian Krankentragers the day after
the battle, though it is quite possible that in such thick foliage a wounded
man may have lain long undetected, and perhaps been missed altogether.
No one who did not see the country in which the battles of the war were
fought would realize the enormous exertions made by the Prussian Krank-
entriigers to bring in wounded men. It must be remembered that every
piece of rising ground was covered with thick wood or high standing corn ;
M M
SZ2 APPENDIX V.
that dov^Ti by the watercourses the long grass and the bulrushes rose
tall iu all their summer luxuriance. The wounded invariably, if pos&able,
crawled under cover after Koniggratz, and sought by the brooks for waier
to quench their thirst, or in the trees and crops for shelter ; the Krank-
eniragers had to beat carefully over every yard of ground which lies
between Horonowitz and Nechanitz, between the Bistritz and the Elbe— a
space of nearly forty-five square miles, over which they had to search for and
carry to the ambulances many thousands of wounded men, Austrians and
Prussians alike ; and there are but l,9CX> of these men with the whole
Prussian armies.
The usual answer to the question, ** Who first relieved you after the
battle ? " was that a Prussian soldier had given the speaker something to
drink out of his water-bottle directly after the action had ceased, and
that, after some time, two Prussian soldiers with a stretcher had lifted
him up and carried him to the divisional hospital A drive down the
valley of the Kibe towards the mountains brought us to the Castle of
Nachod, which lies at the entrance of the Nachc^l Pass, and about lialf
a mile nearer to the main ridge than the hill upon which the action
was fought. From every large country house waved the white flag with
its red cross, which showed that the building was being used as a hospital,
and that under its roof wounded men were being coaxed slowly to recove^.
The Castle of Nachod, itself standing on a high spur of the mountain
chain, and overlooking most beautihil scenery, was occupied by Soo
wounded, under the voluntary superintendence of the Prince of Salm-
Horstmar, who had left his beautiful property of Rheingraf to work for
chanty in the hospitals of wounded soldiers. Long lines of beds stretched
on both sides of the oak banqueting halls and the tapestried chambeis of
the castle — beds occupied by suffering but patient men ; Prussian ladies in
black dresses were gliding about, noiselessly carrying medicines or medical
comforts to their grateful patients ; Sisters of Mercy were sitting by the
bedsides reading to the listening occupant, or propping up a feverish head
on a snowy white pillow ; while in the corridois outside noble ladies, both
in the dresses of the Prussian lady volunteers and in those of Sisters of
Mercy, were preparing food for the sick, or tearing up linen and soiling
cotton wool to assist the surgeons. Most of the patients were doing
wonderfully well. The fine mountain air and the tender care of the nurses
had a cheering effect upon them, which led them on to recovery.
Many officers were in separate rooms, most of them Austrians, brave
men who, undaunted even by pain, expressed their opinion that their
defeat was due to the needle-gun alone, and showed no want of desire to
fight the war over again with equal arms. All, fortunately, so nearly well
that a few weeks more restored them to their regiments.
There were still tenants of the Castle hospital at Nachod and of tlie tents
of Koniginhof long after peace had been signed, and after the Prussian
armies had marched out of Bohemia ; but it was quite wonderful how many
of the men who were wounded at Nachod and Skalitz had already been
dismissed from hospital. After the action of Nachod, 3,000 wounded were
brought into the castle and town of Nachod alone, besides many who were
withdrawn by the retreating Austrians to Skalitz and Koniginhof, and
afterwards fell into the hands of the Prussians. Of the 3,000 brought to
Nachod, 800 still remained ; but the rest had been sent away as convalescent,
for but few had died, defeating the cares of their nurses. The soldiers still
in hospital could not find words to express their gratitude to the ladii^}
APPENDIX V, 523
both Catholic and Protestant, who had been their constant attendants night
and day, since they were lifted from the stretchers of the Krankentragers
into their beds in the hospitals. Many of the recoveries must also be
attributed to their care, for they, as all women by a bed of sickness, had a
power to soothe suffering men which no surgeons or professional hospital
attendants ever seemed to attain to.
THE END.
BRADBURY, BVANS, AND CO., PRINTERS, WHITBPRIARS.
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ALL BOOKS ARE SUBJECT TO RECALL 7 DAYS
AFTER DATE CHECKED OUT.
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