a
UC-NRLF
SEXTUS EMPIBICUS
AND
GREEK SCEPTICISM
A Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the University of Bern
MARY MILLS PATRICK
CAMBRIDGE
DEIGHTON BELL & CO.
1899
fr~
PREFACE
THE following treatise on Sextus Empiricus and
Greek Scepticism has been prepared to supply
a need much felt in the English language by
students of Greek philosophy. For, while other
schools of Greek philosophy have been exhaust-
ively and critically discussed by English scholars,
there are few sources of information available to
the student who wishes to make himself familiar
with the teachings of Pyrrhonism. The aim has
been, accordingly, to give a concise presentation
of Pyrrhonism in relation to its historical develop-
ment and the scepticism of the Academy, with
critical references to the French and German
works existing on the subject. The time and
manner of the connection of Sextus Empiricus
with the Pyrrhonean School has also been dis-
cussed.
In the study of the works of Sextus, the Greek
text of Immanuel Bekker, Berlin, 1842, has been
used, with frequent consultation of the text of
J. A. Fabricius, 1718, which was taken directly
from the existing manuscripts of the works of
vi PREFACE.
Sextus. Eeferences to Diogenes Laertius and
other ancient works have been carefully verified.
The principal modern authors consulted are
the following:
Ritter, Oeschichte der Philosophic, 11 Auf., Hamburg,
1836—38.
Zeller, Philosophic der Gi^iechen, 111 Auf., Leipzig,
1879—89.
Lewes, History of Philosophy, Vol. I., London, 1866.
Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, IV. ed., tran.sl
by Morris, 1871.
Brochard, Les Sceptiques Grecs, Paris, 1877.
Brochard, PyrrJion et le Scepticism Primitive, No. 5,
Ribot's Revue Phil., Pai i
Saisset, Le Scepticism Aentsidfait-Pascal-Kant, Paris,
1867.
Chaignet, Histoire de la Psychologic des Grecs, Paris,
1887—90.
Haas, Leben des Sextus Empiricus, Burghausen, 1882.
Natorp, Forschungen zur d'^llckte des Erkenntnis-
problems bei den Alien, Berlin, 1884.
Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philos< /
Schriften, Leipzig, 1887—93.
Pappenheim, Erlduterung zu des Scxtu* Empiricus
Pyrrhoneischen Grundzugen, 11 i»l< MX i-. 1882.
Pappenheim, Die Tropen der Qreichiach* filter,
Berlin, IcSS.V
Pappenheim, LebensverhdU'n i*se des Sextus Empw*icus,
Berlin, 1887.
Pappenheim, Der angcblichc Heraclitismus des Skep-
tikers Ainesidemos, Berlin, 1887.
PREFACE. vii
Pappenheim, Der Sitz der Schule der Griechischen
Skeptiker, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic,
1, 1. S. 47, 1887.
Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus,
London, 1869.
My grateful acknowledgments are due to
Professor Dr. Ludwig Stein, Professor of Philo-
sophy in the University of Bern, for valuable
assistance in relation to the plan of the work,
advice in respect to the best authorities to be
consulted, and for its final revision.
BERN, November 5, 1897.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I.
PAOB
THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. . . 1
His profession. — The time when he lived. — The place
where he taught. — The character of his writings.
CHAPTER II.
THE POSITION AND AIM OF PYERHONIC SCEPTICISM . . 88
Its origin. — Its nomenclature. — The criterion of Pyr-
rhonism.— ^•rrox'n and arupa^la.
CHAPTER III.
THE TROPES OF PYRRHONIC SCEPTICISM 31
The ten Tropes of ^rox^.— The five Tropes of Agrippa.—
The two Tropes.— The eight Tropes against aetiology.
CHAPTER IV.
AENESIDEMUS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS . . 63
The statement of the problem. — The principal theories on
the subject.— Critical examination of the subject.
CHAPTER V.
AN ANALYSIS OF PYRRHONIC SCEPTICISM 81
Pyrrhonism and Pyrrho. — Pyrrhonism and the Academy.
— The strength and weakness of Pyrrhonism.
CHAPTER I.
The Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus.
Interest has revived in the works of Sextus Empiri-
cus in recent times, especially, one may say, since the
date of Herbart. There is much in the writings of
Sextus that finds a parallel in the methods of modern
philosophy. There is a common starting-point in the
study of the power and limitations of human thought.
There is a common desire to investigate the phenomena
of sense-perception, and the genetic relations of man to
the lower animals, and a common interest in the theory
of human knowledge.
While, however, some of the pages of Sextus' works
would form a possible introduction to certain lines of
modern philosophical thought, we cannot carry the
analogy farther, for Pyrrhonism as a whole lacked the
essential element of all philosophical progress, which is
a belief in the possibility of finding and establishing
the truth in the subjects investigated.
Before beginning a critical study of the writings of
Sextus Empiricus, and the light which they throw on
the development of Greek Scepticism, it is necessary to
make ourselves somewhat familiar with the environ-
ment in which he lived and wrote. We shall thus be
able to comprehend more fully the standpoint from
which he regarded philosophical questions.
Let us accordingly attempt to give some details of
his life, including his profession, the time when he lived,
1
'2 Sextua Empiricus and Oreek Scepticism.
tin- place of liis birth, tin- country in which he taught,
;in<l ' ral aim and character of 1. .s. Here,
however, we encount* difficulties, for although
we possess most of tin- writings of Sextus well pre-
. idonce whicli tiny provide on the points
mentioned is very slight. He does not give us bio-
graphical d tails in regard to himself, nor does he refer
to liis contemporaries in a way to afford any exact
knowledge of them. His name even furnishes us with
a problem impossible of solution. If tiled Je^ro? 6
by Diogenes Lacrtius1 : 'HpoSoTov Se Sujrcovce
CfjiTreiplKOS, OV K(U Tt\ SefCd TO)V
KOI a\\a tcd\\icTTa' S*!~TOV Sc &nJKOv<T
KvBfjvas, epTreipiKos KOI auro?. Although in this passage
ifl the second huut the
surname, w«- c.-innot uii<lcrstaiul t1 .ing other
than tliat Di« >--. -!i« •> c. msidered Sextus a physician of the
Empirical Sclioul. ()tli.-r evidence also is not war
that Sextos bore this surname I-'. • '-ius, in his edition
of the works of Sextus, quotes from the Tabetta de
• >rum of Lambecius the statement that
US was called Kmpl, 16 of his pO>'.
in nu.'dicine.2
Pseudo-Galen also refers to him as one of the
directors of the Empirical School, and calls him Se^ro^
6 e/jLTreipifcos.3 His name is often found in the manu-
scripts written with the surname, as for example at the
end of Loyic II.4 In other places it is found written
1 Diog. Laert. ix. 12, 116.
2 Fabricius Testimonia, p. 2.
3 Pseudo-Galen Isag. 4 ; Fabriciua Testimonia, p. 2.
4 Bekker J/aM. vin. 481.
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 3
without the surname, as Fabricius testifies, where
Sextus is mentioned as a Sceptic in connection with
Pyrrho.
The Sceptical School was long closely connected
with the Empirical School of medicine, and the later
Pyrrhoneans, when they were physicians, as was often
the case, belonged for the most part to this school.
Menedotus of Nicomedia is the first Sceptic, however,
who is formally spoken of as an Empirical physician,1
and his contemporary Theodas of Laodicea was also
an Empirical physician. The date of Menedotus and
Theodas is difficult to fix, but Brochard and Hass
agree that it was about 150 A.D.2 After the time of
these two physicians, who were also each in turn at
the head of the Sceptical School,3 there seems to
have been a definite alliance between Pyrrhonism and
Empiricism in medicine, and we have every reason to
believe that this alliance existed until the time of
Sextus.
The difficulty in regard to the name arises from
Sextus' own testimony. In the first book of the Hy-
potyposes he takes strong ground against the identity
of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism in medicine. Although
he introduces his objections with the admission that
" some say that they are the same," in recognition of
the close union that had existed between them, he goes
on to say that " Empiricism is neither Scepticism itself,
nor would it suit the Sceptic to take that sect upon
himself,4 for the reason that Empiricism maintains dog-
M matically the impossibility of knowledge, but he would
1 Diog. ix. 12, 115. 3 Diog. ix. 12, 116.
2 Brochard Op. cit. Livre iv. p. 311. 4 Hyp. I. 236.
4 Sextus Empiricu8 and Greek >m
prefer io IM-I..II- t.» tin- M<-tho.i'.
only medical scliool worthy of the Sceptic. "For this
alone of all tin medical sects, does not proceed ra>hly
it seems to me, in regard to unknown things, and
not presume to say whether they are comprehensible
or not, but it is guided by phenomena.1 It will thus
•hat (In- Methodical School of medicine has a
in relationship to Scepticism which is closer than
that of tin- oilier inediral 91 '
W. know from th uony of Sextus himself
that li«- wa.- a physician. In one case he uses the first
person for himself as a physician,3 and in another he
sp.-aks of Asclepius as "the founder of our science/'4
and all his illustrations >how a bn-adth and variety of
medical kno\. iiat only a physician could possess.
He published a im-dical work which he refers to once
as la-Tpiica v7ro/jLvyjfj,aTaf and again as efnreipiKa vTro/jLvq-
yLtara.0 Thrs.- paaBBgei probably refer to the same
work,7 which, unfortunately for the solution of the diffi-
cult question that we have in hand, is lost, and nothing
is known of its contents.
In apparent contradiction to his statement in II j-
potyposes I., that Scepticism and Empiricism are
opposed to each other, in that Empiricism denies the
possibility of knowledge, and Scepticism makes no
dogmatic statements of any kind, Sextus classes the
Sceptics and Empiricists together in another instance,
as regarding knowledge as impossible8 a\\' ol pev <f)ao-iv
1 Hyp. i. 237. 5 Adv. Math. vn. 202.
2 Hyp. i. 241. 6 Adv. Math. A. 61.
3 Hyp. ii. 238. : Zcller Up. cit. in. 43.
4 Adv. Math. A. 260. 8 ^rfr. ^aM. vin. 191.
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 5
CLVTO, fjirj Kara\a/jL/3dv€o-0ai,, &cr7rep ol CLTTO rfjs
larpol /cal ol CLTTO 7779 o-/cei|rea)5 (j)i\6do^)OL. In another
case, on the contrary, he contrasts the Sceptics sharply
with the Empiricists in regard to the aTroSe^?.1 ol Se
ep,7reipiKol avaipovo~iv, ol Se or/ceTrriKol eV eVo%^ Tavrrjv
Pappenheim thinks that Sextus belonged to the
Methodical School, both from his strong expression in
favor of that school in Hyp. I. 236, as above, and also
because many of his medical opinions, as found in
his works, agree with the teachings of the Methodical
School, more nearly than with those of the Empiricists.
Pappenheim also claims that we find no inconsistency
with this view in the passage given where Sextus
classes the Sceptics with the Empiricists, but considers
that statement an instance of carelessness in expressing
himself, on the part of Sextus.2
The position of Pappenheim is assailable for the
reason that in dealing with any problem regarding an
author on the basis of internal evidence, we have no
right to consider one of his statements worthy of
weight, and another one unworthy, on the supposition
that he expressed himself carelessly in the second
instance. Rather must we attempt to find his true
standpoint by fairly meeting all the difficulties offered
in apparently conflicting passages. This has been
attempted by Zeller, Brochard, Natorp and others, with
the general result that all things considered they think
without doubt that Sextus belonged to the Empirical
1 Adv. Math. vm. 328.
2 Lebensverhdltnisse des Sex. Em. 36.
6 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
School.1 His other references are too strong to allow
his fidelity to it to be doubted. He is called one of
the leaders of Empiricism by Pseudo-Galen, and his
only medical work bore the title ejjLireipiKa vTro^vri^a-ra.
The o]»inion of the writers above referred to is ih.v
ge which we hav<- quoted from the HypOtypQUQ
does not necessarily mean that Sextus was no*
Kmpirieist, hut as he was more of a Sceptic than a
physician, he gave preference to those doctrines that
were most c<»; with Scepticism, and accordingly
claimed that it was not absolutely necessary th
Sceptic phy-ician .should bean Empiricist. Natorp con-
siders that the different standpoint from which Sextus
judges the Empirical and M il Schools in his
dif'teient wo) ! Bunted f,,r on the supposition that
he was an Empiricist, but disagreed with that school
on the one point only." Natorp points out that Sextus
does not speak more favourably of the medical sUii
the Methodical School, but only compares the way in
which both schools regarded the question of the possi-
bility of knowledge, and thinks that S.-xtus could have
been an Empiricist as a physician notwithstanding his
condemnation of the attitude of the Empirical School
in relation to the theory of knowledge. This difference
between the two schools was a small one, and on a
subtle and unimportant point; in fact, a difference in
philosophical theory, and not in medical pra<"
While we would agree with the authors above
referred to, that Sextus very probably recognized the
1 Brochard Op. cit. Litre iv. 317 ; Zeller Op. cit. in. 15 ; Natorp Op.
cit. p. 155.
2 Natorp Op. cit. 157.
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 7
bond between the Empirical School of medicine and
Pyrrhonism, yet to make his possible connection with
that school the explanation of his name, gives him
more prominence as a physician than is consistent with
what we know of his career. The long continued union
of Empiricism and Scepticism would naturally support
the view that Sextus was, at least during the earlier
part of his life, a physician of that school, and yet it
may be that he was not named Empiricus for that
reason. There is one instance in ancient writiugs where
Empiricus is known as a simple proper name.1 It may
have been a proper name in Sextus' case, or there are
many other ways in which it could have originated, as
those who have studied the origin of names will readily
grant, perhaps indeed, from the title of the above-named
work, €/j,7reipifca vivo JJLVT) para. The chief argument for
this view of the case is that there were other leaders of
the Sceptical School, for whom we can claim far greater
influence as Empiricists than for Sextus, and for whom
the surname Empiricus would have been more appro-
priate, if it was given in consequence of prominence in
the Empirical School. Sextus is known to the world
as a Sceptic, and not as a physician. He was classed in
later times with Pyrrho, and his philosophical works
survived, while his medical writings did not, but are
chiefly known from his own mention of them. More-
over, the passage which we have quoted from the
Hypotyposes is too strong to allow us easily to believe
that Sextus remained all his life a member of the
Empirical School. He could hardly have said, "Nor
1 Pappenbeim Leb. Ver. Sex. Em. 6.
8 Sextus Eri>i >m.
\\MiiId it Miit tin- Sc.-ptic !•, it sect upon liitn-
ine belonged to it. His other
s to the Empirical School, of a more favorable
r, can be easily ex on the ground of the
long coiitinm --I connection which had existed between
tin- two schools. It i .{ii it.- possible to suppose that
us was an Empiricist a part of his life, and
wards found the Methodical School more to his liking,
.in 1 such a change would not in any way have affected
his stand as a physician.
In regard to the exact time when Sextus Empiri
I'm .•»!, we gain very little knowledge from internal
dence, and outside sources of information are eq
UIK •< Ttain. Diogenes Laertius must have been a gene-
ration younger than Sextus, as he mention -ciple
ot'S. ' 'iriiinus, as an Empii ^i.1 Tlic
tini.' of Diog usually i first half
of the third century A.D.,2 therefore Sextus cannot be
brought forward later than the beginning of the century.
is, liowever, directs his writings entirely against the
Dogmatics, by whom he distinctly states that he means
the Stoics,' and the influence of the Stoics began to
decline in the beginning of the third century A.D. A
fact often used as a help in fixing the date of Sext
his mention of Basilidcs the Stoic,4 d\\a /cal oi OTGH*OI,
ax? oi Trepl 7ov Bd(ri\€iS7]v. This Basil supposed
to be identical with one of the teachers of Marcus
Aurelius.5 This is accepted by Zeller in the second
edition of his Histwy of Philosophy, but not in the
1 Diog. ix. 12, 116. 4 Adv. Math. vin. 258.
• Ueberweg Hist, of Phil. p. 21. 5 Fabriciua Vita Sexti.
s Hyp. i. 65.
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 9
third, for the reason that Sextus, in all the work from
which this reference is taken, i.e. Math. vn. — XL, men-
tions no one besides Aenesidemus, who lived later than
the middle of the last century B.C.1 The Basilides-
referred to by Sextus may be one mentioned in a list
of twenty Stoics, in a fragment of Diogenes Laertius,
recently published in Berlin by Val Rose.2 Too much
importance has, however, been given to the relation of
the mention of Basilides the Stoic to the question of
the date of Sextus. Even if the Basilides referred to
by Sextus is granted to have been the teacher of Marcus
Aurelius, it only serves to show that Sextus lived either
at the same time with Marcus Aurelius or after him,
which is a conclusion that we must in any case reach
for other reasons.
The fact that has caused the greatest uncertainty in
regard to the date of Sextus is that Claudius Galen in
his works mentions several Sceptics who were also
physicians of the Empirical School,3 and often speaks
of Herodotus, supposed to be identical with the teacher
of Sextus given by Diogenes Laertius,4 but makes no
reference whatever to Sextus. As Galen's time passes
the limit of the second century A.D., we must either
infer that Sextus was not the well-known physician
that he was stated to be by Pseudo-Galen, and con-
sequently not known to Galen, or that Galen wrote
before Sextus became prominent as a Sceptic. This
silence on the part of Galen in regard to Sextus
increases the doubt, caused by Sextus7 own criticism
of the Empirical School of medicine, as to his having
1 Zeller Op. cit. in. 8. 3 Zeller, in. 7.
2 Brochard Op. cit. iv. 315. 4 Diog. xi. 12, 116.
Jo SeXttu Kinjf'trlcua and Greek Scepticism.
an KmpiriciM. The <iji' made more com-
plicated, as it is diflienlt to fix the identity of the
Herodotus so often referred to by Galen.1 As Galen
died ;il)niit -joo A.I), at the age of seventy,2 we should
fix tin- date <>i' Bextaa early iii tip; third century, and
that of Diogenes perhaps a little Inter than the middle,
were it not that early in tin- third century the Stoics
M to decline in influence, and could hardly have
vxcitr.l tin- w.-umth of ai displayed by Se
We must then suppose that Sextus wrote at the very
i o{ tin- second a and either that Galen
did not know him, or that Galen's books were pub-
li>hed before Sextus became prominent either as a
physician or as a Sceptic. The fact that he may
heen better known as the latter than as the former does
iifliciently account for (Jal.-n's >il«-nce, as other
tiofl are i 1 hy him of less importance than
. nd the latter, even if not as great a phy>
den asserts, was certainly both a Sc
and a phy>irian, and must have belonged to one of the
schools so thorou _ y Galen —
either the Knipiriral «»i the Methudic-al. Therefore, if
Sextua were a contemporary of Galen, he was so far
removed i'roin the eircle of Galen's acquaintances
hare made DO impression upon him, rith- i Coptic
01 a physician, a supposition that is very improbable
We must then fix the date of Sextus late in the second
century, and conclude that the climax of his public
Career was ivaehed after Galen had finished those of his
writings which are still extant.
1 Pappenheim Lebetis. Ver. Sex. Em. 30.
• Zfllcr Urundriss der Get. der Phil. p. 260.
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 11
Sextus has a Latin name, but he was a Greek ; we
know this from his own statement.1 We also know that
lie must have been a Greek from the beauty and facility
•of his style, and from his acquaintance with Greek
dialects. The place of his birth can only, however, be
conjectured, from arguments indirectly derived from his
writings. His constant references throughout his works
to the minute customs of different nations ought to
.give us a clue to the solution of this question, but
strange to say they do not give us a decided one. Of
these references a large number, however, relate to the
customs of Libya, showing a minute knowledge in
regard to the political and religious customs of this
land that he displays in regard to no other country
•except Egypt.2 Fabricius thinks Libya was not his
birth place because of a reference which he makes to it
in the Hypotyposes — 0patc£)v Se KOI TairovXwv (Aifivnv
£e edvos roOro).3 This conclusion is, however, entirely
unfounded, as the explanation of Sextus simply shows
that the people whom he was then addressing were not
familiar with the nations of Libya. Suidas speaks of
two men called Sextus, one from Chseronea and one
from Libya, both of whom he calls Sceptics, and to one
of whom he attributes Sextus' books. All authorities
-agree in asserting that great confusion exists in the
works of Suidas ; and Fabricius, Zeller, and Pappenheim
place no weight upon this testimony of Suidas.4 Haas,
1 Adv. Math. A. 246; Hyp. i. 152; Hyp. in. 211, 214.
2 Haas Op. cit. p. 10.
3 Hyp. in. 213.
4 Pappenheim Lebens. Ver. Sex. Em. 5, 22 ; Zeller Op. cit. in. 39 ;
JFabricius Vita de Sextus.
12 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
however, contends1 that it is unreasonable to suppose
tli;it tliis confusion could go as far as to attribute the
writings of Sextus Kmpiricus to Sextus of Chaeronea,
and also ni.iki the latt'-r a Sceptic, and he considers it
f,n more reasonable to accept the testimony of Suidas,
coincides so well with the internal evidence of
Se\tu.>' writings in regard to his native land. !
in v< -rtheless evident, from his familiarity with the
customs, language, and laws of Athens, Alexandria and
Rome, that he must have resided at some time in each
of these cities.
Of all the problems connected with the historical
Is of the life of Sextus, the one that is the most
difficult <>l' solution, and also the most important for our
iit purpose of making a critical study of his teach-
ing, is to fix of tin- Sceptical School during the
time that he was in charge of it. The Hypotyposes are
lectures delivered in public in that period of his life.
Where then were they delivered ? "NV that the
Sceptical School must have had a long continued exis-
tence as a definite philosophical movement, although
some have contended otherwise. The fact of its exis-
tence as an organized direction of thought, is demon-
strated by its formulated teachings, and the list L
by Diogenes Laertius of its principal leaders,2 and
by references from the writings of Sextus. In the
first book of Hypotyposes he refers to Scepticism as
a distinct system of philosophy, /cat Trjv Sidtcpio-iv r^
(T/eev/rea)? CLTTO TMV irapaKei^evayv avrfj <f)i\o(ro(f)ia)v.3 He
speaks also of the older Sceptics,4 and the later Sceptics.5
i Haas Op. cit. p. 6. • Diog. XT. 12, 115, 116. s Hyp. i. 5.
4 Hyp. I. 36. 5 Hyp. i. 164.
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 13
Pyrrho, the founder of the school, taught in Elis, his
native village ; but even as early as the time of Timon,
his immediate follower, his teachings were somewhat
known in Alexandria, where Timon for a while resided.1
The immediate disciples of Timon, as given by Diogenes,
were not men known in Greece or mentioned in Greek
writings. Then we have the well-known testimony of
Aristocles the Peripatetic in regard to Aenesidemus, that
he taught Pyrrhonism in Alexandria2 — e^#e? teal irp^v
ev 'A\e£avSp€la TTJ tear' Alyvirrov Aivr)o-iSr]/j,6s TLS ava-
£p)7rvpelv fip^aro TOV vd\ov TOVTOV.
This was after the dogmatic tendency of the Academy
under Antiochus and his followers had driven Pyrrhon-
ism from the partial union with the Academy, which it
had experienced after the breaking up of the school under
the immediate successors of Timon. Aenesidemus taught
about the time of our era in Alexandria, and established
the school there anew ; and his followers are spoken of
in a way that presupposes their continuing in the same
place. There is every reason to think that the connec-
tion of Sextus with Alexandria was an intimate one,
not only because Alexandria had been for so long a
time the seat of Pyrrhonism, but also from internal
evidence from his writings and their subsequent his-
torical influence; and yet the Hypotyposes could not
have been delivered in Alexandria, as he often refers to
that place in comparison with the place where he was
then speaking. He says, furthermore, that he teaches
in the same place where his master taught.3
1 Chaignet Op. cit. 45.
2 Aristocles of Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiv. E. 446.
3 Hyp. m. 120.
14 Seoctus Empiricua and Greek Scepticism.
re on evOa 6 v(f>rjyrjrij<; 6 6/10? SieXeyero, evravda eye* vvv
SiaXeyofjiai. Therefore the school nn been re-
moved from Alexandria, in or before tin- time of the
xtus, to some otl re The Hypoty-
poses are from beginning to end a direct attack on the
Dogmatics; therefore must have taught ei
in some city where th« itic philosophy was strong,
or in some rival philosophical cent! Ihipotyposes
show also that the writer had access to some large
library. Al« •>; an dri a. Rome and Athens are the three
plaoefl the most probable for selection for such a
purpose. For whatever reason the seat of the school
was removed from Alexandria by the master of Sextus,
or by himselt, IK. in the place \ had so long been
united with the Knipirical School of medicine, Athens
AvoiiM B6( OMMri suitable city ••mntinu
in the land where Pyrrhonism first had its birth.
Sextus, however, in one instance, in referring to things
invisible because of their outward relations, says in
illustration, "as the city of Athens is invisible to us at
present."1 In other p lao he contrasts the Athen-
ians with the people whom he is addressing, equally
with the Alexaiulrians, thus puttm- At liens as well as
Alexandria out of the question.
Of the ditiVivnt writers on Sextus Empiricus, those
who have treated this part of the subject most critically
are Haas and Pappenheim. We will therefore consider,
somewhat at length, the results presented by the.s
authors. Haas thinks that the Hypotyposes were
delivered in Rome for the following reasons. Sextus"
1 Hyp. ii. 98.
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 15
lectures must have been given in some centre of philo-
sophical schools and of learning. He never opposes-
Roman relations to those of the place where he is
speaking, as he does in regard to Athens and Alexan-
dria. He uses the name "Romans" only three times,1
once comparing them to the Rhodians, once to the
Persians, and once in general to other nations.2 In the
first two of these references, the expression " among the
Romans" in the first part of the antithesis is followed
by the expression, "among us," in the. second part,
which Haas understands to be synonymous. The third
reference is in regard to a Roman law, and the use of
the word ' Roman ' does not at all show that Sextus was
not then in Rome. The character of the laws referred
to by Sextus as Trap' t]^lv shows that they were always
Roman laws, and his definition of law3 is especially a
definition of Roman law. This argument might, it
would seem, apply to any part of the Roman Empire,,
but Haas claims that the whole relation of law to
custom as treated of by Sextus, and all his statements
of customs forbidden at that time by law, point to
Rome as the place of his residence. Further, Haas
considers the Herodotus mentioned by Galen4 as a pro-
minent physician in Rome, to have been the predecessor
and master of Sextus, in whose place Sextus says that
he is teaching.5 Haas also thinks that Sextus' refuta-
tion of the identity of Pyrrhonism with Empiricism
evidently refers to a paragraph in Galen's Subfiguraiio
1 Haas Op. cit. p. 15.
2 Hyp. i. 149, 152; m. 211.
3 Hyp. i. 146.
4 Galen depuls. iv. 11 ; Bd. ym. 751. 5 Hyp. in. 120.
16 Sextus Empiricus a/nd <> ism.
Empirl<:<i,1 which would be natural ii' th»-
shortly after Galenas Sub. Em., and in the
place. Further, Hippolytus, \\li» wrote in or near
Rome very soon after the time of S upan-ntly
the J/t'/]»>ft'jp08e8, which would be more natural if
rote in the same place. According to Haas, every
thing in internal e and outward testimony,
points to Rome as having been the city where S
occupied his p«.Mi ion as the head of the Sceptical School.
Com in. 4 nuw to the position of Pappenheim on this
subject, we find that he takes very decided ground
at of the Sceptical School h, jn in
Rome, even for a short time, in his latest publication
••ling it.2 This opinion is the xesult of late Bi
on the part of Pappenhe-im, for in his work on the
Lcbensvcrhaltnisse des Sextus Empiiwus Berlin 1875,
he says, "Dass Herodotus in Rom lebte sagt Galen.
Vermuthlich auch Sextus." His reasons given in the
later article for not connecting the Sceptical School at
all with Rome are as follows. He finds no proof of the
influence of Scepticism in Rome, as Cicero remarks that
Pyrrhonism is extinct,3 and he also gives weight to the
well-known sarcastic saying of Seneca, Qc'ts est qui
Iradat praecepta l\/rrhoni# !4 While Haas claims
that Sextus would naturally seek one of the centres of
dogmatism, in order most effectively to combat it,
Pappenheim, on the contrary, contends that it would
have been foolishness on the part of Sextus to think of
1 Galen Sub. Em. 123 B— 126 D. (Basileae, 1542).
2 Pappenheim Sitz der Skeptischen Schule. Archiv fiir Getchichte der
Phil. 1888.
3 Cicero De Oral. in. 17, 62. 4 Seneca nat. qu. vn. 32.
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 17
starting the Sceptical School in Rome, where Stoicism
was the favored philosophy of the Roman Emperors;
and when either for the possible reason of strife between
the Empirical and Methodical Schools, or for some other
cause, the Pyrrhonean School was removed from Alex-
andria, Pappenheim claims that all testimony points to
the conclusion that it was founded in some city of the
East. The name of Sextus is never known in Roman
literature, but in the East, on the contrary, literature
speaks for centuries of Sextus and Pyrrho. The Hy-
poty poses, especially, were well-known in the East, and
references to Sextus are found there in philosophical
and religious dogmatic writings. The Emperor Julian
makes use of the works of Sextus, and he is frequently
quoted by the Church Fathers of the Eastern Church.1
Pappenheim accordingly concludes that the seat of
Pyrrhonism after the school was removed from Alex-
andria, was in some unknown city of the East.
In estimating the weight of these arguments, we
must accept with Pappenheim the close connection of
Pyrrhonism with Alexandria, and the subsequent influ-
ence which it exerted upon the literature of the East.
All historical relations tend to fix the permanent seat
of Pyrrhonism, after its separation from the Academy, in
Alexandria. There is nothing to point to its removal
from Alexandria before the time of Menodotus, who is
the teacher of Herodotus,2 and for many reasons to be
•considered the real teacher of Sextus. It was Menodo-
tus who perfected the Empirical doctrines, and who
brought about an official union between Scepticism and
1 Fabricius de Sexto Empirico Testimonia.
2 Diog. ix. 12, 116.
1^ Sextus Empiincux and (Ireck Scepticism.
Kmpiricism, arid who gave Pyrrhonism in -^reat measure,
tlie f'dii.t that it enjoyed in Alexandria, and who
appears to have been the most powerful influen-
the school, from the time of Aenesidemus to that of
Sextus. Furthermore, Sextus' familiaiity with Al-
drian customs bears the imprint of original knowledge,
and he cannot, as Zcller implies, be accepted as simply
quoting. One could hardly agree with Zoller,1
the familiarity sliown by Sextus with the customs of
both Alexandria and Rome in the Hypotyposes does
not necessarily show that he ever lived in either of
those places, because a lar^v part of his works are com-
pilations from other books; but on the contrary, the
careful reader of Sextus' works must find in all of them
much evidence <>f per-onal knowledge of Alexandria,
Athens and Rom,-.
A part of Sextus' books also may have been \vri
in Alexandria. Tlpbs <f>v(riKovs could have been written
in Alexandria- If the<e w. re also lectures. th<
taught in Alexandria as well as elsewhere. The history of
1 1 ure for the centuries immediately folio w-
iiiLT the time of Sextus, showing as it does in so many
instances the influence of Pyrrhonism, and a knowledge
of the HypotypOB68, furnishes us with an incontestable
proof that the school could not have been for a long
time removed from the East, and the absence of such
knowledge in Roman literature is also a strong argu-
ment against its long continuance in that city. It
would seem, however, from all the data at command.
1 Zcller Op. cit. in. p. 39.
2 Pappenheim Sitz dcr Skeptischen Schule ; Archiv fiir Geschichte der
Mil., 1888; Adv. Math. x. 15, 95.
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 19
that during the years that the Sceptical School was
removed from Alexandria, its head- quarters were
in Rome, and that the Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes were
delivered in Rome. Let us briefly consider the argu-
ments in favour of such a hypothesis. Scepticism was
not unknown in Rome. Pappenheim quotes the remark
of Cicero that Pyrrhonism was long since dead, and the
sarcasm of Seneca, Quis est qui tradat praecepta
Pyrrhonis? as an argument against the knowledge
of Pyrrhonism in Rome. We must remember, however,
that in Cicero's time Aenesidemus had not yet separated
himself from the Academy; or if we consider the
Lucius Tubero to whom Aenesidemus dedicated his
works, as the same Lucius Tubero who was the friend
of Cicero in his youth, and accordingly fix the date of
Aenesidemus about 50 B.C.,1 even then Aenesidemus'
work in Alexandria was too late to have necessarily been
known to Cicero, whose remark must have been referred
to the old school of Scepticism. Should we grant, how-
ever, that the statements of Cicero and Seneca prove
that in their time Pyrrhonism was extinct in Rome,
they certainly do not show that after their death it
could not have again revived, for the Hypotyposes
were delivered more than a century after the death of
Seneca. There are very few writers in Aenesidemus'
own time who showed any influence of his teachings.2
This influence was felt later, as Pyrrhonism became
better known. That Pyrrhonism received some atten-
tion in Rome before the time of Sextus is nevertheless
demonstrated by the teachings of Favorinus there.
1 Zeller Op. cit. in. 10. 2 Zeller Op. cit. p. 63.
ShnpfoicuB and Gh <$m.
Altliui. »iinus was known as an Academic
the title oi his principal work was ruv^ (f>i\oao<})oufjLevov<;
avT(Z TOW \6ya)v, &v apicfroi ol IIvpp(t)veioi.} Suidas
calls Favorinus a great author and learned in all science
and philosophy,1 aud Favorinus made Rome the centre
of his teaching and writin-. j 1 '. -d by Zeller
at MO- !.")<) A.D., therefore Pyrrhonism was known in
Rome shortly before the time of Sextus.
The whole tone of the Hypotyposes, with the
constant references to the Stoics as living present
opponents, shows thai tin >< ir.-tures must have been
delivered in one of the centres of Stoic !ex-
andria and Athens are out of the question, all testimony
points to Rome as having been the seat of the Pyrrho-
IH an School, for at least a part of the time that Sextus
was at its head. We would then accept the teacher of
Sextus, in v ace he says he taught, as the Hero-
dotus so often referred to by Galen3 who lived in Rome.
<[uent references to Asdepiades, whom he
mentions ten different times by name in his \\-orl.
speak in favour of Rome in the matter under discussion,
as Asdepiades made that city one of the centres of
medical culture. On the other hand, the fact that
there is no trace of the Hypotyposes in later Roman
literature, with the one exception of the works of Hip-
polytus, as opposed to the wide-spread knowledge of
them shown in the East for centuries, is incontestable
historical proof that the Sceptical School could not long
have had its seat at Rome. From the two passages
given above from Sextus' work against physics, he must
1 Zellor Op. cit. p. 67. 3 Galen vm. 751.
2 Brochard Op. cit. 329. 4 Bekker Index.
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 21
either have written that book in Alexandria, it would
seem, or have quoted those passages from some other
work. May we not then conclude, that Sextus was at
the head of the school in Home for a short time, where
it may have been removed temporarily, on account of
the difficulty with the Empiricists, implied in Hyp. I.
236-241, or in order to be better able to attack the
Stoics, but that he also taught in Alexandria, where the
real home of the school was certainly found ? There it
probably came to an end about fifty years after the time
of Sextus, and from that centre the Sceptical works of
Sextus had their wide-spread influence in the East.
The books of Sextus Empiricus furnish us with the
best and fullest presentation of ancient Scepticism
which has been preserved to modern times, and give
Sextus the position of one of the greatest men of the
Sceptical School. His works which are still extant are
the Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes in three volumes, and the
two works comprising eleven books which have been
united in later times under the title of ?rpo9 ^aOri^an-
KOVS, one of which is directed against the sciences in
general, and the other against the dogmatic philoso-
phers. The six books composing the first of these are
written respectively against grammarians, rhetoricians,
geometricians, arithmeticians, astronomers and music-
ians. The five books of the latter consist of two
against the logicians, two against physics, and one
against systems of morals. If the last short work of
the first book directed against the arithmeticians is com-
bined with the one preceding against the geometricians,
as it well could be, the two works together would be
divided into ten different parts; there is evidence to
-- Sextua Empiincua and Greek Scepticism.
show that in ancient times such a division was in
There were two other works of Sextus which are now
lost, tin- medical work before referred to, and a book
entitled Trepl yfrvxns. The character of the extant
works of Sextus is similar, as they are all directed
either against science or against the dogmatics, and
they all present the negative side of Pyrrhonism. The
nay of arguments comprising the subject-matter,
often repeated in the same and different forms, are
• •vidcntly taken largely from the Sceptical works which
Sextus had resource to, and are, in fact, a summing up
of all the wisdom of the S School. The style of
books is fluent, and the Greek reminds one of
Plutarch and Thucyd'uh's, and although Scxtus does
not claim originality, l,ut j,n •-•< -nts in all cases the ;
inents of the Sceptic, yet the illustrations and the
form in which the argument* are presented, often bear
the marks of his own thought, and are char
and there by a wealth of humor that has not been
sufficiently noticed in the critical works on Sextus. Of
all the anthers who have reviewed Sextus, Brochard is
the only one who seems to have understood and appre-
ciated his humorous side.
We shall now proceed to the consideration of the
general position and aim of Pyrrhonism.
1 Diog. ix. 12, lie.
CHAPTER II.
The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism.
The first volume of the Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes
gives the most complete statement found in any of the
works of Sextus Empiricus of the teachings of Pyrrho-
nism and its relation to other schools of philosophy.
The chief source of the subject-matter presented is a
work of the same name by Aenesidemus,1 either directly
used by Sextus, or ^through the writings of those who
followed Aenesidemus. The comprehensive title Hvppdt-
veioi vTTOTVTrdcKjeis was very probably used in general to
designate courses of lectures given by the leaders of the
Sceptical School.
In the opening chapters of the Hypotyposes Sextus
undertakes to define the position and aim of Pyrrho-
nism.2 In introducing his subject he treats briefly of
the differences between philosophical schools, dividing
them into three classes ; those which claim that they
have found the truth, like the schools of Aristotle and
Epicurus and the Stoics; those which deny the possibility
of finding it, like that of the Academicians ; and those
that still seek it, like the Sceptical School. The accu-
sation against the Academicians, that they denied the
possibility of finding the truth, was one that the Sceptics
were very fond of making. We shall discuss the justice
of it later, simply remarking here, that to affirm the
1 Diog. ix. 11, 78. 2 Hyp. i. 3, 4.
h'iit,iricw* tmd Gh
•• incomprehensibility <>{ the uukn ..as a form of
expression that, tin- Pyrrhonists them-
tiinc.^ 1" into, notwithstanding their ca.
avoidance of dogmatic itatementfc1
After defining tin- three kind* ul' philosophy as
KiatiCj ill*- Academic ami the Sceptic, Sextu
minds his hearers tliat he does not speak dogmatically
in anything that he says, but that he intends simply to
Sceptical arguments historically, and as
th« -y appear to him. He characterizes his treatment of
'ihject as general rather than critical, including a
statt niriit of the character of Scepticism, its idea, its
principles, its manner of iva its criterion and
aim, and a piv.M-ntation of thu Tropes, or aspects of
doubt, and the Sceptical formulae and the distinction
bet\\. schools of philo-
sophy.2
The result of all the gradual changes which I
development of thought had brought about in the out-
ward relations of the Sceptical School, was to increase
the earnestness of the claim of the Sceptics to be simply
followers of Pyrrho, the great founder of the movement.
in discussing the names given to the Sceptics, Sex t us
precedence very decidedly to the title " Pyrrho-
nean," because Pyrrho appears the best representative
of Scepticism, aud more prominent than all who before
him occupied themselves with it.3
It was a question much discussed among philoso-
phers in ancient times, whether Pyrrhonism should be
considered a philosophical sect or not. Thus we find
1 Adv. Math. viii. 191. 3 Hyp. i. 5, 6. 3 Eyp. i. 7.
The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism. 25
that Hippobotus in his work entitled Trepl aipevewv,
written shortly before our era, does not include Pyrrho-
nism among the other sects.1 Diogenes himself, after
some hesitation remarking that many do not consider
it a sect, finally decides to call it so.2
Sextus in discussing this subject calls Scepticism an
aycoyrj, or a movement, rather than a a2p€<rt?, saying
that Scepticism is not a sect, if that word implies a
systematic arrangement of dogmas, for the Sceptic has
no dogmas. If, however, a sect may mean simply the
following of a certain system of reasoning according to
what appears to be true, then Scepticism is a sect.3
From a quotation given later on by Sextus from
Aenesidemus, we know that the latter used the term
dya)<yij* Sextus gives also the other titles, so well known
as having been applied to Scepticism, namely, fyrrjTLfcij,
€<f)€KTiici]j and aTroprjriKr]? The Svvajjus6 of Scepticism
is to oppose the things of sense and intellect in every
possible way to each other, and through the equal
weight of things opposed, or laoaOiveiaj to reach first
the state of suspension of judgement, and afterwards
ataraxia, or " repose and tranquillity of soul."7 The pur-
pose of Scepticism is then the hope of ataraxia, and its
origin was in the troubled state of mind induced by the
inequality of things, and uncertainty in regard to the
truth. Therefore, says Sextus, men of the greatest
talent began the Sceptical system by placing in opposi-
tion to every argument an equal one, thus leading to a
1 Diog. Pro. 19. 5 Hyp. i. 7; Diog. ix. 11, 70.
2 Diog. Pro. 20. 6 Hyp. i. 8.
3 Hyp. i. 16, 17. 7 Hyp. i. 10.
4 Hyp. i. 210.
iW Sextus Kn>i>'ricu8 and Greek Scepticism.
philosophical system without a do^ma, for • tic
Haims that h«- has no dogma.1 The Scept
supposed to state a decided opinion, but only to say
what appears to him. Even the Sceptical formulae,
such as "Nothing more/'2 or "I decide nothing/'3 or
""All is false," include themselves with other things.
The only statements that the Sceptic can make, are in
regard to his own sensations. He cannot deny that he
is warm or cold or hungry.
;tas n -plies to the charge that the Sceptics deny
phenomena by refuting it.4 Tli ic does not deny
phenomena. beo*CI86 they are the only criteria by which
he < an regulate his actions. "We call the criterion of
the Sceptical Seh<>ol tli« ]»henomenon, meaning by this
name tlie idea of it."5 Phenoir, the only things
which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his ]
by them. They are, however, subjective. Sextus di>-
tinctly affirms that sensations are the phenomena,* and
that they lie in susceptibility and voluntary feeling,
and that they constitute the appearances of obje<
We see from this that Sextus makes the only reality to
consist in subjective experience, but he does not follow
this to its logical conclusion, and doubt the existence of
anything outside of mind. He rather takes for granted
that there is a something unknown outside, about which
the Sceptic can make no assertions. Phenomena are
the criteria according to which the Sceptic orders his
daily life, as he cannot be entirely inactive, and they
1 Hyp. i. 12. 5 Hyp. i. 19.
2 Hyp. i. 14. 6 Hyp. i. 22; Diog. ix. 11, 105.
* Hyp. i. 14. ' Hyp. i. 22.
* Hyp. i. 19.
The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism. 27
affect life in four different ways. They constitute the
guidance of nature, the impulse of feeling; they give
rise to the traditions of customs and laws, and make
the teaching of the arts important.1 According to the
tradition of laws and customs, piety is a good in daily
life, but it is not in itself an abstract good. The Sceptic
•of Sextus' time also inculcated the teaching of the arts,
as indeed must be the case with professing physicians,
as most of the leading Sceptics were. Sextus says,
"" We are not without energy in the arts which we
undertake."2 This was a positive tendency which no
philosophy, however negative, could escape, and the
Sceptic tried to avoid inconsistency in this respect, by
separating his philosophy from his theory of life. His
philosophy controlled his opinions, and his life was
governed by phenomena.
The aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things
which pertain to opinion, and moderation in the things
which life imposes.3 In other words, we find here the
same natural desire of the human being to rise above
and beyond the limitations which pain and passion
impose, which is expressed in other forms, and under
other names, in other schools of philosophy. The
method, however, by which ataraxia or peace of mind
could be reached, was peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a
state of psychological equilibrium, which results from
the equality of the weight of different arguments that
are opposed to each other, and the consequent impossi-
bility of affirming in regard to either one, that it is
correct.4 The discovery of ataraxia was, in the first
1 Hyp. i. 23. 2 Hyp. i. 24. 3 Hyp. i. 25. 4 Hyp. i. 26.
28 Sextus Empiricua and Greek &•» ],f'irlfim.
instance, apparently accidental, for while the So
withhold his opinion, unable to decide what things were
true, and what things were false, ataraxia fortunately
followed.1 After he had begun to philosophize, with a
<• to discriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate
the true from the false2 during the time of eVo;^;, or
suspension of judgement, ataraxia followed as if by
chance, as the shadow follows the body.3
The Sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of
opinion, does not entirely escape from suffering from
n-ations. He is not wholly undisturbed, for h« is
sometimes cold and hungry, and so on.4 He claims,
nevertheless:, that he suffers less than the dogmatist,,
who is beset with two kinds of suffering, one from the
feelings themselves, and also from the conviction that
they are by nature an evil." To the Sceptic nothing is
in itself either an evil or a good, and so he thinks that
"he escapes from difficult r."6 For instance, he
who considers riches a good in themselves, is unhappy
in the loss of them, and in possession of thom is in fear
of losing them, while the Sceptic, remembering the
Sceptical saying " No more," is untroubled in whatever
condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is no
more an evil than the possession of them is a good.7
For he who considers anything good or bad by nature
is always troubled, and when that which seemed good is
not present with him, he thinks that he is tortured by
that which is by nature bad, and follows after what he
1 Hyp. i. 26. « Hyp. i. 30.
2 Diog. ix. 11, 107. 5 Hyp. i. 30.
3 Hyp. i. 29. • Hpy. i. 30 ; Diog. ix. 11, 61.
7 Adv. Math. xi. 146—160.
The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism. 29
thinks to be good. Having acquired it, however, he is
not at rest, for his reason tells him that a sudden change
may deprive him of this thing that he considers a good.1
The Sceptic, however, endeavours neither to avoid nor
seek anything eagerly.2
Ataraxia came to the Sceptic as success in painting
the foam on a horse's mouth came to Apelles the painter.
After many attempts to do this, and many failures, he
gave up in despair, and threw the sponge at the picture
that he had used to wipe the colors from the painting
with. As soon as it touched 'the picture it produced a
representation of the foam.3 Thus the Sceptics were
never able to attain to ataraxia by examining the
anomaly between the phenomena and the things of
thought, but it came to them of its own accord just
when they despaired of finding it.
The intellectual preparation for producing ataraxia,
consists in placing arguments in opposition to each
other, both in regard to phenomena, and to things of the
intellect. By placing the phenomenal in opposition to
the phenomenal, the intellectual to the intellectual, and
the phenomenal to the intellectual, and vice versa, the
present to the present, past, and future, one will find
that no argument exists that is incontrovertible. It is
not necessary to accept any statement whatever as true,
and consequently a state of eVo^r; may always be main-
tained.4 Although ataraxia concerns things of the
opinion, and must be preceded by the intellectual pro-
cess described above, it is not itself a function of the
intellect, or any subtle kind of reasoning, but seems to
1 Hyp. i. 27. 2 Hyp. i. 28. 3 Hyp. i. 28, 29. * Hyp. i. 32—35.
30 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
!)•• rather a unique form of moral perfection, leading to
happiness, or is itse If happiness.
It was the aim of Scepticism to know nothing, and
to assert nothing in regard to any subject, but at the
same time not to affirm that knowledge on all subjects
is impossible, and consequently to have the attitude of
still seeking. The standpoint of Pyrrhonism was ma-
n nalistic. We find from the teachings of Sextus that
he affirmed the non-existence of the soul,1 or the ego,
and denied absolute < tt altogether.2 The intro-
ductory statements of Diogenes regarding Pyrrhonism
\\ould ai^ree with this standpo
There is no criterion of truth in Scepticism. We
cannot prove that the phenomena represent objects, or
find out what the relation of phenomena to objects is.
Tin -re is no criterion to tell us which one is true of all
the different representations of the same object, and of
all tL ties of sensation that arise through the
many phases of relativity of the conditions which con-
trol the character uf the phenomena.
iy effort to find the truth can deal only with
phenomena, and absolute reality can never be known.
1 .I'lr. Math. \ ,;>. ii. 32. * Adv. Math. xi. 140.
3 Diog. ix. 11,61.
CHAPTER III.
The Sceptical Tropes.
The exposition of the Tropes of Pyrrhonism consti-
tutes historically and philosophically the most important
part of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. These Tropes
represent the sum total of the wisdom of the older
Sceptical School, and were held in high respect for
centuries, not only by the Pyrrhoneans, but also by many
outside the narrow limits of that School. In the first
book of the Hypotyposes Sextus gives two classes of
Tropes, those of eVo^ and the eight Tropes of Aeneside-
mus against Aetiology.
The Tropes of eVo^ are arranged in groups of ten,
five and two, according to the period of the Sceptical
School to which they belong ; the first of these groups
is historically the most important, or the Ten Tropes of
67ro%?;, as these are far more closely connected with the
general development of Scepticism, than the later ones.
By the name T^OTTO? or Trope, the Sceptic understood a
manner of thought, or form of argument, or standpoint
of judgement. It was a term common in Greek philo-
sophy, used in this sense, from the time of Aristotle.1
The Stoics, however, used the word with a different
meaning from that attributed to it by the Sceptics.'2
Stephanus and Fabricius translate it by the Latin word
modus,3 and rpovro? also is often used interchangeably
1 Pappenheim Erlauterung Pyrrh. Grundzugen, p. 35.
2 Diog. i. 76 ; Adv. Math. vm. 227. 3 Fabricius, Cap. xiv. 7.
32 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
with the word \6yos by Sextus, ]) Laertius, ;in<l
others; sometimes also as synonymous with TOTTO?/
and TUTro? is found in the oldest edition of Sextus.2
Diogenes defines the word as the standpoint, or manner
of argument, by which the Sceptics arrived at the
condition of doubt, in consequence of the equality of
probabilities, ami lie calls the Tropes, the ten Tropes of
doubt.3 All writers on Pyrrhonism after the time of
Aenesidenius give the Tropes the principal place in
their treatment of the subject. Sextus occupies two
thirds of the first book of the Hypotyposes in stating
and disciisMni;- tin-in ; and about one fourth of his pre-
sentation of Scepticism is devoted to the Tropes by
Diogenes. In addition to these two authors, Aristocles
the Peripatetic refers to them in his attack on Sceptic-
i.Mii.4 Favorinus wrote a book entitled Pyrrhonean
Tropes, and Plutarch one called The Ten (TQTOL)
Topes of P/y/'/Ao/' Both of these latter works are lost.
All authorities unite in attributing to Aenesidemus
the work of systematizing and presenting to the world
the ten Tropes of eVo^- He was the first to conceive
the project of opposing an organized philosophical
system of Pyrrhonism to the dogmatism of his contem-
poraries.6 Moreover, the fact that Diogenes introduces
the Tropes into his life of Pyrrho, does not necessarily
imply that he considered Pyrrho their author, for
* Hyp. i. 36.
2 Fabricius on Hyp. i. 36 ; Cap. xiv. G.
3 Diog. ix. 11, 79—108.
* Aristocles Etueb. praep. et\ x. 14, 18.
* Fabricius on Hyp. i. 36.
6 Compare Saisset Op. tit. p. 78.
The Sceptical Tropes. 33
Diogenes invariably combines the teachings of the follow-
ers of a movement with those of the founders themselves ;
he gives these Tropes after speaking of Aenesidemus'
work entitled Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes, and appar-
ently quotes from this book, in giving at least a part
of his presentation of Pyrrhonism, either directly or
through the works of others. Nietzsche proposes a
correction of the text of Diogenes IX. II., 79, which
would make him quote the Tropes from a book by
Theodosius,1 author of a commentary on the works of
Theodas. No writer of antiquity claims for the Tropes
an older source than the books of Aenesidemus, to
whom Aristocles also attributes them.2 They are not
mentioned in Diogenes' life of Timon, the immediate
disciple of Pyrrho. Cicero has no knowledge of them,
and does not refer to them in his discussion of Scepticism.
Aenesidemus was undoubtedly the first to formulate
these Tropes, but many things tend to show that they
resulted, in reality, from the gradual classification of
the results of the teachings of Pyrrho, in the subsequent
development of thought from his own time to that of
Aenesidemus. The ideas contained in the Tropes were
not original with Aenesidemus, but are more closely
connected with the thought of earlier times. The
decidedly empirical character of the Tropes proves this
connection, for the eight Tropes of Aetiology, which
were original with Aenesidemus, bear a far stronger
dialectic stamp, thus showing a more decided dialectic
influence of the Academy than is found in the Tropes
Many of the illustrations given of the Tropes
1 Brochard Op. cit. 254, Note 4.
2 Aristocles Eus. praep. ev. xiv. 18. 8.
'•/">• Empi/ricus "ud Greek Scepticism.
also, ratify to ;i time of greater antiquity than tliat of
A .us. The name Trope was well known in
ancient thins, and the number ten reminds us of the
ten opfH^m-j; principles of Pythagoras, and the ten
IGS of Aristotle, the fourth of which was the same
Tii- eighth Trope. The terminology, however, with
very few exceptions, points to a later period than t
of Pyrrho. Zeller points out a number of expressions
in both Diogenes' and Sextus' exposition of the Tropes,
which could not date back farther than the time of
Aen> i i nuis.1 One of the most striking features of
tin- \\hole presentation of the Tropes, especially as given
by Sextus, is their mosaic character, stamping them not
as th \\ork of one person, but as a growth, and also an
agglutinous growth, lacking very decidedly the sym-
iii« -try of thought that the work of one mind would ha
shown.
At the time of the separation of Pyrrhonism from the
A'-adriny, no other force was as strong in giving life to
the school as the systematic treatment by Aenesidemus
of the Ten Tropes of eVo^r?. The reason of this is
evident. It was not that the ideas of the Sceptical
Trop - wore original with Aenesidemus, but because a
> 1 . ti 1 1 n . >r atement of belief is always a far more powerful
influence than principles which are vaguely understood
and accepted. There is always, however, the danger to
the Sceptic, in making a statement even of the prin-
ciples of Scepticism, that the psychological result would
be a dogmatic tendency of mind, as we shall see later
the case, even with Aenesidemus himself. That
1 Zeller Op. tit. p. I
The Sceptical Tropes. 35
the Sceptical School could not escape the accusation of
dogmatizing, from the Dogmatics, even in stating the
grounds of their Scepticism, we know from Diogenes.1
To avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten Tropes,
Sextus makes the frequent assertion that he does not
affirm things to be absolutely true, but states them as
they appear to him, and that they may be otherwise
from what he has said.2
Sextus tells us that " Certain Tropes, ten in number,
for producing the state of eVo^r; have been handed
down from the older Sceptics."3 He refers to them in
another work as the "Tropes of Aenesidemus."4 There
is no evidence that the substance of these Tropes was
changed after the time of Aenesidemus, although many
of the illustrations given by Sextus must have been of
a later date, added during the two centuries that elapsed
between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus. In
giving these Tropes Sextus does not claim to offer a
systematic methodical classification, and closes his list
of them, in their original concise form, with the remark,
" We make this order ourselves."5 The order is given
differently by Diogenes, and also by Favorinus.6 The
Trope which Sextus gives as the tenth is the fifth
given by Diogenes, the seventh by Sextus is the eighth
given by Diogenes, the fifth by Sextus, the seventh
by Diogenes, the tenth by Diogenes, the eighth by
Sextus. Diogenes says that the one he gives as the
ninth Favorinus calls the eighth, and Sextus and
Aenesidemus the tenth. This statement does not
1 Diog. ix. 11, 102. 4 Adv. Math. vn. 345.
2 Hyp. i. 4, 24. 5 Hyp. i. 38.
3 Hyp. 1.36. * Diog. ix. 11. 87.
36 Sextiw Empiricus and QreA N //'
correspond with the list of the Tropes which Sextus
gives, proving that Diogenes took some other text
that of Sextus as his authority.1 The difference in the
order of the Tropes shows, also, that the order was not
considered a matter of gn-at importance. Then
marked contrast in the spirit of the two presentations
of the Tropes given by Sextus and Diogenes. The
former gives them not only as an orator, but as one who
feels that he is defending his own cause, and the school
of which he is th- against mortal enemies, while
Diogenes relates them as an historian.
Pappenht im tries to pro ve2 that Aenesidem us origin-
ally gave only nine Tropes in his Pyrrhonean Hypoty-
poses, as Aristocles mentions only nine in referring to
the Tropes of Aenesidemus, and that the tenth was
added later. Had this been the case, however, the fact
would surely have been mentioned either by Diogenes
or Sextus, who both refer to the ten Tropes of Aene-
sidcinus.
The Tropes claim to prove that the character of
phenomena is so relative and changeable, that certain
knowledge cannot be based upon them, and as we have
shown, there is no other criterion of knowledge for the
So-ptir than phenomena.3 All of the Tropes, except
the tenth, are connected with sense-perception, and re-
late to the difference of the results obtained through
tin senses under different circumstances. They may
be divided into two classes, i.e., those based upon differ-
ences of our physical organism, and those based upon
1 Diog. ix. 11, 87.
2 Pappenhcim, Die Tropen der Griechen, p. 23.
s Hyp. i. 22.
The Sceptical Tropes. 37
external differences. To the first class belong the first,
second, third and fourth ; to the second class, th'e fifth,
sixth, seventh and eighth, and also the ninth. The
eighth, or that of relation, is applied objectively both
by Sextus and Diogenes in their treatment of the Tropes,
and is not used for objects of thought alone, but princi-
pally to show the relation of outward objects to each
other. The tenth is the only one which has a moral
significance, and it has also a higher subjective value
than the others ; it takes its arguments from an entirely
different sphere of thought, and deals with metaphysical
and religious contradictions in opinion, and with the
question of good and evil. That this Trope is one of
the oldest, we know from its distinct mention in connec-
tion with the foundation theories of Pyrrho, by Dio-
genes.1 In treating of the subjective reasons for doubt
as to the character of external reality, the Sceptics were
very near the denial of all outward reality, a point, how-
ever, which they never quite reached.
There is evidently much of Sextus' own thought mixed
with the illustrations of the Tropes, but it is impossible
to separate the original parts from the material that
was the common property of the Sceptical School.
Many of these illustrations show, however, perfect famil-
iarity with the scientific and medical teachings of the
time. Before entering upon his exposition of the Tropes,
Sextus gives them in the short concise form in which
they must first have existed2 —
(i) Based upon the variety of animals,
(ii) Based upon the differences between men.
1 Diog. ix. 11, 61. 2 Hyp. i. 36—38.
38 Sextua Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
(iii) Based upon differences in the constitution of
the sense organs.
(iv) Based upon circumstances.
(v) Based upon position, distance and place.
(vi) Based upon mixtures.
(vii) Based upon the quantities and constitutions
of objects.
(viii) Relation.
(ix) Based upon frequency or rarity of occurences.
(x) Based upon systems, customs and laws,
mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions.
Although Sextus is careful not to dogmatise regard-
ing the arrangement of the Tropes, yet there is in his
clu-silication of them a regular gradation, from the argu-
ments based upon differences in animals to those in
man, first considering the latter in relation to the phy>i-
cal constitution, and then to circumstances outside of
us, and finally the treatment of metaphysical and moral
differences.
The First Trope.1 That the same mental repre-
sentations are not found in different animals, may be
inferred from their differences in constitution resulting
from their different origins, and from the variety in
their organs of sense. Sextus takes up the five senses
in order, giving illustrations to prove the relative results
of the mental representations in all of them, as for
example the subjectivity of color2 and sound.3 All
knowledge of objects through the senses is relative an.l
not absolute. Sextus does not, accordingly, confine the
impossibility of certain knowledge to the qualities that
1 Hyp. I. 40—61. 2 Hyp. i. 44—46. 3 Hyp. i. 50.
The Sceptical Tropes. 39
Locke regards as secondary, but includes also the prim-
ary ones in this statement.1 The form and shape of
objects as they appear to us may be changed by pressure
on the eyeball. Furthermore, the character of reflect-
v ions in mirrors depend entirely on their shape, as the
images in concave mirrors are very different from those
in convex ones; and so in the same way as the eyes
of animals are of different shapes, and supplied with
y different fluids, the ideas of dogs, fishes, men and grass-
hoppers must be very different.2
In discussing the mental representations of animals
of different grades of intelligence, Sextus shows a very
good comprehension of the philogenetic development of
the organs of sense, and draws the final conclusion that
external objects are regarded differently by animals,
according to their difference in constitution.3 These
differences in the ideas which different animals have of
the same objects are demonstrated by their different
tastes, as the things desired by some are fatal to others.4
The practical illustrations given of this result show a
familiarity with natural history, and cognizance of the
tastes and habits of many animals,5 but were probably
few of them original with Sextus, unless perhaps in
their application ; that this train of reasoning was the
common property of the Sceptic School, we know from
the fact that Diogenes begins his exposition of the first
Trope in a way similar to that of Sextus.6 His illustra-
tions are, however, few and meagre compared with those ,
of Sextus, and the scientific facts used by both of them
1 Hyp. i. 47. 4 Hyp. T. 55.
2 Hyp. i. 49. 6 Hyp. i. 55—59.
3 Hyp. i. 54. 6 Diog. ix. 11, 79—80.
40 Sextu8 Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
may mostly be found in other authors of anti^'
milar way.1 Tin,- logical result of tin- r
to explain the first Trope, is that we cannot com-
bhe i<leas of the animals with each other, nor with
our .\vn ; nor can we prove that our ideas are more t
worthy than those of the animals.2 As therefore an
examination of ideas is impossible, any decided opinion
about their trustworthiness is also impossible, and this
Trope leads to the suspension of judgment regarding
external objects, or to eVo
After reaching this conclusion, Sextus introduces a
long chapter to prove that animals can reason. There
is no reference to this in Diogenes, but there is other
uony to show that it was a favourite line of argu-
ment \\itli the Sceptics.4 Sextus, however, says that
his course of reasoning is different from that of
of the Sceptics on the subject,6 as they usually applied
their arguments to all animals, while he selected only
on. namely the dog.6 This chapter is full of sar
attacks on the Dogmatics, and contains the special
allusion to the Stoics as the greatest opponents of the
Sceptics, which has been before referred to.7
Sextus claims with a greater freedom of diction than
in some apparently less original chapters, and with a
wealth of special illustrations, that the dog is superior
to man in acuteness of perception,8 that he has the
power of choice, and possesses an art, that of hunting,9
1 Pappenheira Erlauterung Pyrr. Grundz&ge Par. 41.
3 Hyp. i. 69. 6 Hyp. i. 62—63.
3 Hyp. i. 61. ' Hyp. i. 65.
4 Hyp. i. 238. 8 Hyp. I. 64.
5 Compare Brochard Op. tit. 256. 9 Hyp. i. 66.
The Sceptical Tropes. 41
and, also, is not deprived of virtue,1 as the true nature of
virtue is to show justice to all, which the dog does by
guarding loyally those who are kind to him, and keep-
ing off those who do evil.2 The reasoning power of this
animal is proved by the story taken from Chrysippus, of
the dog that came to a meeting of three roads in follow-
ing a scent. After seeking the scent in vain in two
of the roads, he takes the third road without scenting
it, as a result of a quick process of thought, which proves
that he shares in the famous dialectic of Chrysippus,3
the five forms of avair^iKToi \6yoi, of which the dog
chooses the fifth. Either A or B or (7, not A or B,
therefore C.
The dog and other irrational animals may also
possess spoken language, as the only proof that we have
to the contrary, is the fact that we cannot understand
the sounds that they make.4 We have an example in
this chapter of the humor of Sextus, who after enlarging
on the perfect character of the dog, remarks, "For which
reason it seems to me some philosophers have honoured
themselves with the name of this animal,"5 thus making
a sarcastic allusion to the Cynics, especially Antisthenes.6
The Second Trope. Passing on to the second Trope,
Sextus aims to prove that even if we leave the differen-
ces of the mental images of animals out of the discussion,
there is not a sufficient unanimity in the mental images
of human beings to allow us to base any assertions upon
them in regard to the character of external objects.7
1 Hyp. i. 67. 5 Hyp. i. 72.
2 Hyp. i. 67. 6 Diog. vi. 1, 13.
3 Hyp. i. 69 ; Hyp. n. 156 ; Diog. vn. 1, 79. ? Hyp. i. 79.
4 Hyp. i. 74.
42 Sextua Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
He had previously announced that hu intended to
oppose the phenomenal to the intellectual " in any way
whatever,"1 so he begins here by referring to the two
parts of which man is said to be composed, the soul and
the body, and proceeds to diacuaa the differences among
men in sense-perception and in opinion.2 Most of the
illustrations given of differences in sense-perception are
medical ones; of the more general of these I will note
the only two which are also given by Diogenes in his ex-
position of this Trope,3 viz., Demophon, Alexander's table
waiter, who shivered in the sun, and Andron the Argive,
who was so free from thirst that he travelled through
the desert of Libya without seeking a drink. Some
have reasoned from the presence of the first of these
illustrations in the exposition of the Tropes, that a part
of this material at least goes back to the time of Pyrrbo,
as Pyrrho from his intimacy with Alexander, when he
accompanied him to India, had abundant opportunities
to observe the peculiarities of his servant Demophon.4
The illustration of Andron the Argive is taken from
Aristotle, according to Diogenes.5
Passing on to differences of opinion, we have another
example of the sarcastic humor of Sextus, as he rei<
the <f>v(Tt,oyva)/Jiovi,K7J croQia? as the authority for believing
that the body is a type of the soul. As the bodies of
men differ, so the souls also probably differ. The differ-
ences of mind among men is not referred to by Diogenes,
except in the general statement that they choose
1 Hyp. i. 8. 2 Hyp. i. 80. 3 Diog. ix. 11, 80—81.
4 Compare Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive. Revue phil., Paris 1885,
No. 5; Victor Brochard, p. 521.
5 Diog. ix. 11, 81. 6 Hyp. i. 85.
The Sceptical Tropes. 43
different professions ; while Sextus elaborates this point,
speaking of the great differences in opposing schools of
philosophy, and in the objects of choice and avoidance,
and sources of pleasure for different men.1 The poets
well understand this marked difference in human
desires, as Homer says,
" One man enjoys this, another enjoys that."
Sextus also quotes the beautiful lines of Pindar,2
" One delights in getting honours and crowns through stormfooted
horses,
Others in passing life in rooms rich in gold,
Another safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the
sea."
The Third Trope. The third Trope limits the argu-
ment to the sense-perceptions of one man, a Dogmatic, if
preferred, or to one whom the Dogmatics consider wise,3
and states that as the ideas given by the different sense
organs differ radically in a way that does not admit of
their being compared with each other, they furnish no
reliable testimony regarding the nature of objects.4
" Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to pre-
sent itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant
brown and sweet." The apple was evidently the ordin-
ary example given for this Trope, for Diogenes uses the
same, but in a much more condensed form, and not with
equal understanding of the results to be deduced from
it.5 The consequence of the incompatibility of the men-
tal representations produced through the several sense
1 Hyp. i. 87—89. * Hyp. i. 86. 3 Hyp. i. 90.
4 Hyp. i. 94. 5 Diog. ix. 11, 81.
44 Sextua Empiricua and Greek Scepticism.
US by the apple, may be the acceptance of either of
the three following propositions: (i) That only those
quail* t in the apple which we perceive, (ii)
Th;it more than these exist, (iii) That even those per-
ceived d<> not exist.1 Accordingly, any experience which
can give rise to such different views regarding outward
objects, cannot be relied upon as a testimony concerning
them.
The non-homogeneous nature of the mental images
connected with the different sense organs, as presented
by Si-xtus, reminds us of the discussion of the same
subject by Berkeley in his 7heoi*y of Vi#<
Sextus says that a man born with less than the usual
number of senses, would form altogether different ideas
of the external world than those who have the usual
number, and as our ideas of objects depend on our
mental images, a greater number of sense organs would
give us still different ideas of outward reality.2 The
strong argument of the Stoics against such reasoning as
this, was their doctrine of pre-established harmony be-
twren nature and the soul, so that when a representation
is produced in us of a real object, a KaraXijTmicrj
fyavraa-ia? by this representation the soul grasps a real
existence. There is a \6yos in us which is of the same
kind, o-vyyevos, or in relation to all nature. This argu-
ment of pre-established harmony between the faculties
of the soul and the objects of nature, is the one that
has been used in all ages to combat philosophical teach-
ing that denies that we apprehend the external world
as it is. It was used against Kant by his opponents,
1 Hyp. i. 99. - Hyp. i. 96—97. 3 Adv. Math. vn. 93.
The Sceptical Tropes. 45
who thought in this way to refute his teachings.1 The
Sceptics could not, of course, accept a theory of nature
that included the soul and the external world in one
harmonious whole, but Sextus in his discussion of the
third Trope does not refute this argument as fully as he
does later in his work against logic.2 He simply states
here that philosophers themselves cannot agree as to
what nature is, and furthermore, that a philosopher
himself is a part of the discord, and to be judged, rather
than being capable of judging, and that no conclusion
can be reached by those who are themselves an element
of the uncertainty.3
The Fourth Trope. This Trope limits the argu-
ment to each separate sense, and the effect is considered
of the condition of body and mind upon sense-perception
in relation to the several sense-organs.4 The physical
states which modify sense-perception are health and
illness, sleeping and waking, youth and age, hunger and
satiety, drunkenness and sobriety. All of these condi-
tions of the body entirely change the character of the
mental images, producing different judgments of the
color, taste, and temperature of objects, and of the cha-
racter of sounds. A man who is asleep is in a different
world from one awake, the existence of both worlds
being relative to the condition of waking and sleeping.5
The subjective states which Sextus mentions here
as modifying the character of the mental representations
are hating or loving, courage or fear, sorrow or joy, and
sanity or insanity.6 No man is ever twice in exactly
1 Ueberweg Op. cit. 195. * Hyp. i. 100.
2 Adv. Math. vii. 354. 5 Hyp. i. 104.
3 Hyp. i. 98—99. « Hyp. i. 100.
4f> Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
urn- condition of body or mind, and never abl« to
v tin- diii« ronces of his ideas as a sum total, for
those of the present moment only are subject to careful
inspection.1 Furthermore, no one is free from tin/ in-
fluence of all conditions of body or mind, so that he can
be unbiassed to judge his ideas, and no criterion can be
established that can be shown to be true, but on the
(•(.ntiary, whatever course is pursued on the subject,
both the criterion and the proof will be thrown into the
circulus in probando, for the truth of each rests on
the other.2
Diogenes gives in part the same illustrations of this
Trope, but in a much more condensed form. The marked
characteristic of this train of reasoning is the attempt
to prove that abnormal conditions are also natural. In
referring at first to the opposing states of body and
mind, which so change the character of sense-perception,
Sextus classifies them according to the popular usage
as Kara <f>vcriv and irapa (frvaiv. This distinction was an
important one, even with Aristotle, and was especially
developed by the Stoics3 in a broader sense than
referring merely to health and sickness. The Stoics,
however, considered only normal conditions as being
according to nature. Srxtus, on the contrary, declares
that abnormal states are also conditions according to
nature,4 and just as those who are in health are in a
state that is natural to those who are in health, so also
those not in health are in a state that is natural to
those not in health, and in some respects according to
nature. Existence, then, and non-existence are not
* Hyp. i. 112. * Hyp. 1.117. 3 Diog. vn. 1, 86. 4 Hyp. i. 103.
The Sceptical Tropes. 47
absolute, but relative, and the world of sleep as really
exists for those who are asleep as the things that exist
in waking exist, although they do not exist in sleep.1
One mental representation, therefore, cannot be judged
by another, which is also in a state of relation to exist-
ing physical and mental conditions. Diogenes states
this principle even more decidedly in his exposition of
this Trope. "The insane are not in a condition opposed
to nature ; why they more than we ? For we also see
the sun as if it were stationary."2 Furthermore, in
different periods of life ideas differ. Children are fond
of balls and hoops, while those in their prime prefer
other things, and the aged still others.3 The wisdom
contained in this Trope in reference to the relative
value of the things most sought after is not original
with Sextus, but is found in the more earnest ethical
teachings of older writers. Sextus does not, however,
draw any moral conclusions from this reasoning, but
only uses it as an argument for ITTO^TJ.
The Fifth Trope. This Trope leaves the discussion
of the dependence of the ideas upon the physical nature,
and takes up the influence of the environment upon
them. It makes the difference in ideas depend upon the
position, distance, and place of objects, thus taking
apparently their real existence for granted. Things
change their form and shape according to the distance
from which they are observed, and the position in which
they stand.4
The same light or tone alters decidedly in different
surroundings. Perspective in paintings depends on the
1 H#p. i. 104. 2Diog. ix. 11, 82. 3 Hyp. 1. 106. * Hyp. i. 118.
48 Sextus Empimcus and Greek Scepticism.
angle at which the picture is suspended.1 With Dio-
genes this Trope is the seventh,2 and his exposition of
it is similar, but as usual, shorter. Both Sextus and
Diogenes give the illustration3 of the neck of the dove
differing in color in different degrees of inclination, an
illustration used by Protagoras also to prove the rela-
tivity of perception by the senses. "The black neck
of the dove in the shade appears black, but in the light
sunny and purple/'4 Since, then, all phenomena are
regarded in a certain place, and from a certain distance,
and according to a certain position, each of which rela-
tions makes a great difference with the mental images,
we shall be obliged also by this Trope to come to the
reserving of the opinion.5
The Sixth Trope. This Trope leads to eVo^/; re-
garding the nature of objects, because no object can
ever be presented to the organs of sense directly, but
must always be perceived through some medium, or in
some mixture.6 This mixture may be an outward one,
connected with the temperature, or the rarity of the
air, or the water7 surrounding an object, or it may be a
mixture resulting from the different humors of the
sense-organs.8 A man with the jaundice, for example,
sees colors differently from one who is in health. The
illustration of the jaundice is a favorite one with the
Sceptics. Diogenes uses it several times in his pre-
sentation of Scepticism, and it occurs in Sextus' writings
^ Hyp. i. 120. - Diog. ix. 11, 85.
s Hyp. i. 120; Diog. ix. 11, 56.
4 SchoL zu Arist. 60, 18, ed. Brandis ; Pappen. Er. Pyrr. Grundziige,
p. 54.
6 Hyp. i. 121. * Hyp. i. 124. 7 Hyp. i. 125. 8 Hyp. i. 126.
The Sceptical Tropes. 49
in all, as an illustration, in eight different places.1 The
condition of the organ of the rjyejAovucov, or the ruling
faculty, may also cause mixtures. Pappenheim thinks
that we have here Kant's idea of a priori, only on a
materialistic foundation.2 A careful consideration of
the passage, however, shows us that Sextus' thought
is more in harmony with the discoveries of modern
psychiatry than with the philosophy of Kant. If the
sentence, I'cro)? Se /cal avrrj (f) Stdvoia) eV^tu^/az; TLVCL
IS lav TTOielrai, TT/DO? TO, VTTO rwv alcrOrjo'ecov dva<yye\-
\b[jL€va? stood alone, without further explanation, it
might well refer to a priori laws of thought, but the
explanation which follows beginning with " because "
makes that impossible.4 " Because in each of the places
where the Dogmatics think that the ruling faculty is,
we see present certain humors, which are the cause of
mixtures." Sextus does not advance any opinion as to
the place of the ruling faculty in the body, which is,
according to the Stoics, the principal part of the soul,
where ideas, desires, and reasoning originate,5 but
simply refers to the two theories of the Dogmatics,
which claim on the one hand that it is in the brain,
and on the other that it is in the heart.6 This subject
he deals with more fully in his woik against logic.7 As,
however, he bases his argument, in discussing possible
intellectual mixtures in illustration of the sixth Trope,
entirely on the condition of the organ of the intellect, it
is evident that his theory of the soul was a materialistic
one.
1 See Index to Bekker's edition of Sextus.
2 Papp. Er. Pyr. Gr. p. 55. 5 Diog. vn. 1, 159.
3 Hyp. i. 128. 6 Hyp. i. 128.
4 Hyp. i. 128. 7 Adv. Math. vn. 313.
4
r>o Sextua Empiricua and Greek Scepticism.
The Seventh Trope. This Trope, based upon tin-
quantities and compositions of objects, is illustrated by
examples of different kinds of food, drink, and medicine,
showing the different effects according to the quantity
taken, as the harmfulness and the usefulness of i
things depend on their quantity. Things act differently
upon the senses if applied in small or large quant
as filings of metal or horn, and separate grains of sand,
have a different color and touch from the same taken
in the form of a solid.1 The result is that ideas vary
according to the composition of the object, and this
Trope also brings to confusion the existence of outward
objects, and leads us to reserve our opinion in regard
to them.2 This Trope is illustrated by Diogenes with
iig brevity.3
The Elyhth Trope. The Trope based upon relation
contain- afl Sextus rightly remarks, the substance of
the other nine,4 for the general statement of the rela-
tivity of knowledge includes the other statements made.
Thr prominence which Sextus gave this Trope in his
introduction to the ten Tropes leads one to expect here
new illustrations and added5 arguments for eVo^. We
find, however, neither of these, but simply a statement
that all things are in relation in one of two ways, either
directly, or as being a part of a difference. These two
kinds of relation are given by Protagoras, and might
have been used to good purpose in the introduction to
the Tropes, or at the end, to prove that all the others
were really subordinate to the eighth. The reasoning
1 Hyp. i. 129—131. * Hyp. i. 39.
2 Hyp. i. 134. 5 Hyp. i. 135—140.
3 Diog. ix. 11, 86.
The Sceptical Tropes. 51
is, however, simply applied to the relation of objects to
each other, and nothing is added that is not found else-
where as an argument for eVo^.1 This Trope is the
tenth by Diogenes, and he strengthens his reasoning
in regard to it, by a statement that Sextus does not
directly make, i.e., that everything is in relation to the
understanding.2
The Ninth Trope. This is based upon the frequency
and rarity of events, and refers to some of the phenomena
of nature, such as the rising of the sun, and the sea, as
no longer a source of astonishment, while a comet or an
earthquake are wonders to those not accustomed to
them.3 The value of objects also depends on their
rarity, as for example the value of gold.4 Furthermore,
things may be valuable at one time, and at another not
so, according to the frequency and rarity of the occur-
rence.5 Therefore this Trope also leads to eVo%^. Dio-
genes gives only two illustrations to this Trope, that of
the sun and the earthquake.6
The Tenth Trope. We have already remarked on
the difference in the character of the tenth Trope, deal-
ing as it does, not with the ideas of objects, like the
other nine Tropes, but with philosophical and religious
opinions, and questions of right and wrong. It was the
well-known aim of the Sceptics to submit to the laws
and customs of the land where they were found, and
to conform to certain moral teachings and religious
ceremonies; this they .did without either affirming or
1 Hyp. i. 135—140. 4 Hyp. i. 143.
3 Diog. ix. 11, 88. s Hypt T. 144.
p. i. 141—142. « Diog. ix. 11, 87.
."•I' Sextus Empiricu8 and Greek Scepticism.
denying the truth of the principles upon which these
teu< -1 lin^s were based,1 and also without any passion or
strong feeling in regard to them,- as nothing in it
can be proved to be good or evil. The tenth Trope,
accordingly, brings forward contradictions in customs,
laws, and the beliefs of different lands, to show that ih.-y
are also changeable and relative, and not of absolute
worth. The foundation-thought of this Trope is gi
twice by Diogenes, once as we have before stated in his
introduction to the life of Pyrrlio, and also as on<
the Trope.- it is apparently one of the oldest of
the Tropes, it would naturally be much used in
in- with the Stoics, whose philosophy had such a \v
ethical significance, and must also have held an imj>
ant place in the &c< -)iii« -il School in all metaphysical
and philosophical discussions. The definition5 in the
beumnini; of Sextus' exposition of this Trope Fabri<
thinks waa taken from Aristotle, of schools, In ins,
mythical lx li> t> and dogmatic opinions,6 and the defini-
tion which Diogenes gives of law in his life of Plat<
similar. Pappenheim, however, thinks they were taken
from i: ), perhape irom Chrysippus.8 The argu-
( ment is based upon the ditterences in development of
J thought, as affecting the nit of judgment in
I philosophy, in morals, and religion, the results of which
\ we find in the widely opposing schools of philosophy, in
I the variety in religious belief, and in the laws and cus-
toms of different countries. Therefore the decisions
•'.;?. 1.24. 5 llyp.i. 113-147.
• Hyp. in. 235. 6 Fabricius, Cap. iv. H.
3 Diog. ix. 11, 61. ' Diog. in. 86.
4 Diog. ix. 11, 83. & Pappenheim Gr. Pyrr. Grundzilge, p. 50.
The Sceptical Tropes. 53
reached in the world of thought leave us equally -m\
doubt regarding the absolute value of any standards,/
with those obtained through sense-perception, and the\
universal conflict of opinion regarding all questions of ''
philosophy and ethics leads us also according to this
Trope to the reserving of the opinion.1 This Trope is ;
the fifth as given by Diogenes, who placed it directly
after the first four which relate more especially to human
development,2 while Sextus uses it as the final one,
perhaps thinking that an argument based upon the
higher powers of man deserves the last place, or is the
summation of the other arguments.
Following the exposition of the ten Tropes of the
older Sceptics, Sextus gives the five Tropes which he
attributes to the " later Sceptics."3 Sextus nowhere
mentions the author of these Tropes. Diogenes, how-
ever, attributes them to Agrippa, a man of whom we
know nothing except his mention of him. He was
evidently one of the followers of Aenesidemus, and a
scholar of influence in the Sceptical School, who must
have himself had disciples, as Diogenes says, ol rrrepl
'AypiTTTrav* add to these tropes other five tropes, using
the plural verb. Another Sceptic, also mentioned by
Diogenes, and a man unknown from other sources,
named some of his books after Agrippa.5 Agrippa is not
given by Diogenes in the list of the leaders of the
Sceptical School, but6 his influence in the development
of the thought of the School must have been great, as
the transition from the ten Tropes of the "older
1 Hij2). I. 163. 4 Diog. ix. 11, 88.
2 Diog. ix. 11. 83. 5 Diog. ix. 11, 106.
3 Hyp. i. 164. 6 Diog. ix. 12, 115—116.
54 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
Sceptics " to the five attributed to Agrippa is a marked
one, and shows the entrance into the school of a logical
power before unknown in it. The latter are not a re-
duction of the Tropes of Aenesidemus, but are written
from an entirely different standpoint. The ten Tropes
are empirical, and aim to furnish objective proofs of the
foundation theories of Pyrrhonism, while the five are
/I "~ - ~ • _!•--
I rather rules of thought leading to logical proof, and are
dialectic in their character. \Y<- find this distinction
illustrated by the different way in which the Trope of
relativity is treated in the two groups. In the first it
points to an objective relativity, but with Agrippa to a
general subjective logical principle. The originality of
the Tropes of Agrippa does not lie in their substance
matter, but in their formulation and use in the Sceptical
School. These methods of proof were, of course, not new,
but were well known to Aristotle, and were used by
the Sceptical Academy, and probably also by Timon,1
while the TT/HK TI goes back at least to Protagoras.
The five Tropes are as follows.
(i) The one based upon discord.
(ii) The regressus in infinit
(iii) Relation.
(iv) The hypothetical,
(v) The circulus in probando.
Two of these are taken from the old list, the first
and the third, and Sextus says that the five Tropes are
intended to supplement the ten Tropes, and to show
the audacity of the Dogmatics in a variety of ways.2
The order of these Tropes is the same with Diogenes as
Compare Natorp. Op. cit. p. 302.
* Hyp. i. 177.
I
The Sceptical Tropes. 55
with Sextus, but the definitions of them differ sufficiently
to show that the two authors took their material from
different sources. According to the first one everything
in question is either sensible or intellectual, and in at-
tempting to judge it either in life, practically, or " among
philosophers," a position is developed from which it is
impossible to reach a conclusion.1 According to the
second, every proof requires another proof, and so on to
* infinity, and there is no standpoint from which to begin
the reasoning.2 According to the third, all perceptions
are relative, as the object is colored by the condition of
the judge, and the influence of other things around it.3
According to the fourth, it is impossible to escape from
the regressus in infinitum by making a hypothesis the
starting point, as the Dogmatics attempt to do.4 And
the fifth, or the circulus in probando, arises when that
which should be the proof needs to be sustained by the
thing to be proved.
Sextus claims that all things can be included in
these Tropes, whether sensible or intellectual.5 For
whether, as some say, only the things of sense are true,
or as others claim, only those of the understanding, or
as still others contend, some things both of sense and
understanding are true, a discord must arise that is
impossible to be judged, for it cannot be judged by the
sensible, nor by the intellectual, for the things of the
intellect themselves require a proof; accordingly, the
result of all reasoning must be either hypothetical, or
fall into the regressus in infinitum or the circulus in
1 Hyp. i. 165. 4 Hyp. i. 168.
2 Hyp. i. 166. 5 Hyp. i. 169.
3 Hyp. i. 167.
Sextus l^i" i>> I'icus and Greek Scepticism.
The reference above to some who B
only tip tilings of sense are true, is to E] and
Pr< ; to some that only the things of thoi;
true, toDemocritusainl Plato; and to those that clain
some of both to be true,to the Stoics arid thePeripateti
The tin- < IK \\ Tropes added by Agrippa have notlr
to do with sense-perception, but bear entirely upon
; possibility of reasoning, as demanded by the science of
lo.i^ic, in contrast to the earlier ones which related almost
/ entin-ly, with the exception of the tenth, to mat-
objects. Sextus claims that these five Tropes also 1
to the on of judgment,3 but their logical result
iie dogmatic denial of all possibility of know-
ledge. showing as Hirzel has well demonstrated,
more the influence of the New Academy than the spirit
. of the Sceptical School.4 It was the standpoint of the
older Sceptics, that although the search for the truth
had not yet succeeded, yet they were still seekers, and
to be faithful to this old aim of
Pynhoni-ts. He calls himself a seeker,5 and in re-
proaching the New Academy for affirming that know-
ledge is impossible, Sextus says, " Moreover, we say that
our ideas are equal as regards trustworthiness and un-
trust\vorthiness."G The ten Tropes claim to establish
doubt only in regard to a knowledge of the truth, but
the five J]rjapej_oX_Agrippa aim to logically prove the
impossibility of knowledge. It is very strange that
Sextus does not see this decided contrast in the attitude
1 Hyp. i. 170—171.
2 Adv. Math. vin. 185—186; vm. 56; vn. 369.
*lfyp.i. 177. 5 Eyp. i. 3, 7.
4 Hirzel Op. cit. p. 131. « Hyp. i. -
The Sceptical Tropes. 57
of the two s'ets of Tropes, and expresses his approval of
those of Agrippa, and makes more frequent use of the
fifth of these, 6 &<zXX7?Xo9, in his subsequent reasoning
than of any other argument.1
We find here in the Sceptical School, shortly after
the time of Aenesidemus, the same tendency to dogmatic
teaching, that — so far as the dim and shadowy history of
the last years of the New Academy can be unravelled,
and the separation of Pyrrhonism can be understood, at
the time that the Academy passed over into eclecticism —
was one of the causes of that separation.
It is true that the Tropes of Agrippa show great
progress in the development of thought. They furnish
an organisation of the School far superior to what went
before, placing the reasoning on the firm basis of the
laws of logic, and simplifying the amount of material to
be used. In a certain sense Saisset is correct in saying
that Agrippa contributed more than any other in com-
pleting the organisation of Scepticism,2 but it is not
correct when we consider the true spirit of Scepticism
with which the Tropes of Agrippa were not in harmony.
It was through the very progress shown in the pro-
duction of these Tropes that the school finally lost the
strength of its position.
Not content with having reduced the number of the
Tropes from ten to five, others tried to limit the number
still further to two.3 Sextus gives us no hint of the
authorship of the two Tropes. Hitter attributes them
to Menodotus and his followers, and Zeller agrees with
1 See Index of Bekker's edition of Sextus' works.
2 Saisset Op. cit. p. 237. 3 Hyp. i. 178.
58 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
that opinion,1 while Saisset thinks that Agrippa was
• the author of these,2 which ifl a strange theory to
propound, as some of the material of the five is repeated
in the two, and the same man could certainly not appear
as an advocate of five, and at the same time of T
Tropes.
The two Tropes are founded on the principle that
anything must be known through itself or through
something else. It cannot be known througl
because of the discord existing between all things of
senses and intellect, nor can it be known through soi
thing else, as then cither the regressus in infinitum or
the cl realm in probando follow.8 Diogenes Laertius
j does not refer to these two Tropes.
In regard to all these Tropes of the suspension of
judgment, SexttUi has well remarked in his introduction
to them, that they are included in the eighth, or that
of relation.4
The Tropes of Aetiology. The eight Tropes against
causality belong chronologically before the live Tropes
of Agrippa, in the history of the development of scepti-
cal thought. They have a much closer connection with
the spirit of Scepticism than the Tropes of Agrippa,
including, as they do, the fundamental thought of
Pyrrhonism, i.e., that the phenomena do not reveal the
unknown.
The Sceptics did not deny the phenomena, but they
' denied that the phenomena are signs capable of being
/ interpreted, or of revealing the reality of causes. It is
1 Zeller m. 38 ; Hitter iv. 277. 3 Uyp. I. 178 -179.
2 Saisset Op. eit. p. 231. * Hyp. i. 39.
The Sceptical Tropes. 59
impossible by a research of the signs to find out the
unknown, or the explanation of things, as the Stoics
and Epicureans claim. The theory of Aenesidemus
which lies at the foundation of his eight Tropes against
aetiology, is given to us by Photius as follows i1 " There
are no visible signs of the unknown, and those who be-
lieve in its existence are the victims of a vain illusion."
This statement of Aenesidemus is confirmed by a fuller
explanation of it given later on by Sextus.2 If pheno-
mena are not signs of the unknown there is no causality,
and a refutation of causality is a proof of the impossi-
bility of science, as all science is the science of causes,
the power of studying causes from effects, or as Sextus
calls them, phenomena.
It is very noticeable to any one who reads the refu-
tation of causality by Aenesidemus, as given by Sextus,3
that there is no reference to the strongest argument of
modern Scepticism, since the time of Hume, against
causality, namely that the origin of the idea of causality
cannot be so accounted for as to justify our relying upon
it as a form of cognition.4
The eight Tropes are directed against the possibility
of knowledge of nature, which Aenesidemus contested
against in all his Tropes, the ten as well as the eight.5
They are written from a materialistic standpoint.
These Tropes are given with illustrations by Fabricius
as follows :
I. Since aetiology in general refers to things that are
unseen, it does not give testimony that is incontestable
1 Myriob. 170 B. 12. 4 Ueberweg Op. cit. p. 217.
2 Adv. Math. vin. 207. 5 Hyp. I. 98.
a Hyp. i. 180—186.
<50 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
:anl to phenomena. For example, tin; Pythagor-
eans explain tin- distance of the planets by a musical
proportion.
II. From many equally plausible reasons which
might be given for tin- same thing, one only is arbitrarily
chosen, afl some explain the inundation of the Nile by
a fall of snow at its source, while there could be other
•s. afl rain, or wind, or the action of the sun.
III. Things take place in an orderly manner, but
the causes presented do not show any order, as for ex-
ample, the motion of the stars is explained by
mutual pressure, which does not take into account the
order th is among them.
IV. The unseen things are supposed to take place
in the same way as phenomena, as vision is exp!
in the same way as the appearance of images in a dark
room.
V. Most philosophers present theories of aetiology
which agree with their own individual hypotheses about
the elements, but not with common and accepted ideas,
as to explain the world by atoms like Epicurus, by
homoeomeriae like Anaxagoras, or by matter and form
like Aristotle.
VI. Theories are accepted which agree with indi-
vidual hypotheses, and others equally probable are
passed by, as Aristotle's explanation of comets, that
they are a collection of vapors near the earth, because
that coincided with his theory of the universe.
VII. Theories of aetiology are presented which
conflict not only with individual hypotheses, but also
The Sceptical Tropes. 61
with phenomena, as to admit like Epicurus an inclina-
tion or desire of the soul, which was incompatible with
the necessity which he advocated.
VIII. The inscrutable is explained by things
equally inscrutable, as the rising of sap in plants is ex-
plained by the attraction of a sponge for water, a fact
contested by some.1
Diogenes does not mention these Tropes in this
form, but he gives a resumtf of the general arguments
of the Sceptics against aetiology,2 which has less in
common with the eight Tropes of Aenesidemus, than
with the presentation of the subject by Sextus later,3
when he multiplies his proofs exceedingly to show
jjLTjSev elvai CLITIOV. Although the Tropes of Aeneside-
mus have a dialectic rather than an objective character,
it would not seem that he made the distinction, which is
so prominent with Sextus,between the signs vTro/jLvrjo-Ti/cd
arid evSeiKTiicd* especially as Diogenes sums up his argu-
ment on the subject with the general assertion, ^r^fjuelov
OVK elvai? and proceeds to introduce the logical con-
sequence of the denial of aetiology. The summing up
of the Tropes of Aenesidemus is given as follows, in the
Hypoty poses, by Sextus : — " A cause in harmony with all
the sects of philosophy, and with Scepticism, and with
phenomena, is perhaps not possible, for the phenomena
and the unknown altogether disagree."6
It is interesting to remark in connection with the
seventh of these Tropes, that Aenesidemus asserts that
1 Hyp. i. 180—186; Fabricius, Cap. xvn. 180 z.
2 Diog. ix. 11, 96—98. « Adv. Math. vm. 151.
3 Hyp. in. 24—28. 5 Diog. ix. 11, 96.
6 Hyp. i. 185.
62 Sextua Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
causality has only a subjective value, which from his
/ materialistic standpoint was an argument against its
) real existence, and the same argument is used by Kant
to prove that causality is a necessary condition of
thought.1
Chaignet characterises the Tropes of Aenesidemus as
false and sophistical,2 but as Maccoll has well said, they
are remarkable for their judicious and strong criticism,
and are directed against the false method of observing
facts through the light of preconceived opinion.3 They
have, however, a stronger critical side than sceptical,
and show the positive tendency of the thought of
Aenesidemus.
1 Compare Maccoll Op. cit. p. 77. 2 Chaignet Op. cit. 507.
3 Maccoll Op. cit. p. 88.
CHAPTER IV.
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraditus.
A paragraph in the First Book of the Hypotyposes
which has given rise to much speculation and many
different theories, is the comparison which Sextus makes
of Scepticism with the philosophy of Heraclitus.1 In
this paragraph the statement is made that Aenesidemus
and his followers, ol irepl TOV Aiinjo-tSrjfiov, said that
Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus,
because the doctrine that contradictory predicates
appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the
way to the one that contradictory predicates are in
reality applicable to the same thing.2 ol irepl rbv
AlvrjaiSrjfjLOV €\eyov 6$bv elvai, rrjv (7K67m/crjv dycojrjp
€7rl TTJV ^HpaKKeireiov faXoo-ocfrlaVj &<m TrpoyyetTai rov
rdvavrla irepl TO avTo VTrdp^eiv TO rdvavria Trepl TO
avrb tyalveadai,. As the Sceptics say that contradictory
predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing,
the Heraclitans come from this to the more positive
doctrine that they are in reality so.3
This connection which Aenesidemus is said to have
affirmed between Scepticism and the philosophy of
Heraclitus is earnestly combated by Sextus, who de-
clares that the fact that contradictory predicates appear
to be applicable to the same thing is not a dogma of
the Sceptics, but a fact which presents itself to all men,
and not to the Sceptics only. No one for instance,
1 Hyp. i. 210. 2 Hyp. i. 210. 3 gyp. i. 210.
64 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
whether be be a Sceptic or not, would dare to suy th
honey does nut et to those in health, and bir
to those who liave the jaundice, so that Hei
begins from a preconception common to all men, as to
us also, and perhaps to the other schools of philosophy
as well.1 As the st concerning the appearance
of contradictory predicates in regard to the same th:
ifl not an exclusively >c«-ptical one, then Sc. i is
n<» more a path to tip- philosophy of Heraclitus th
to other schools of philosophy, or to life, as all use
common subject matter. " But we are afraid that the
Sceptical School not only does not help towards the
knowledge of the philosophy of Heraclitus, but even
hinders that result. Since the Sceptic accuses Heraclitus
of having ra>ldy dogmatised, presenting on the one
hand the doe-trine of ' conflagration ' and on the other
that 'contradictory predicates are in reality applicable
to the same thing.' " 2 " It is absurd, then, to say that
this conflicting school is a path to the sect with which it
conflicts. It is therefore absurd to say that the Scepti
School is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus."3
This is not the only place in the writings of Sextus
which states that Aenesidemus at some time of his life
was an advocate of the doctrines of Heraclitus. In no
instance, however, where Sextus refers to this remark-
able fact, does he offer any explanation of it, or express
any bitterness against Aenesidemus, whom he always
speaks of with respect as a leader of the Sceptical
School. We are thus furnished with one of the most
difficult problems of ancient Scepticism, the problem
1 Hyp. i. 211. a Hyp. i. 212. 3 Hyp. i. 212.
\Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 65
of reconciling the apparent advocacy of Aenesidemus
of the teachings of Heraclitus with his position in the
Sceptical School.
A comparison with eadh other of the references
made by Sextus and other writers to the teachings of
Aenesidemus, and a consideration of the result, gives us
two pictures of Aenesidemus which conflict most de-
cidedly with each other. We have on the one hand,
the man who was the first to give Pyrrhonism a position
as an influential school, and the first to collect and pre-
sent to the world the results of preceding Sceptical
thought. He was the compiler of the ten Tropes of
eVo^, and perhaps in part their author, and the author
of the eight Tropes against aetiology.1 He develops his
Scepticism from the standpoint that neither the senses
nor the intellect can give us any certain knowledge of
reality.2 He denied the possibility of studying pheno-
mena as signs of the unknown.3 He denied all possi-
bility of truth, and the reality of motion, origin and
decay. There was according to his teaching no plea-
sure or happiness, and no wisdom or supreme good.
He denied the possibility of finding out the nature of
things, or of proving the existence of the gods, and
finally he declared that no ethical aim is possible.
The picture on the other hand, presented to us by
Sextus and Tertullian, is that of a man with a system of
beliefs and dogmas, which lead, he says, to the philosophy
of Heraclitus. In strange contradiction to his assertion of
the impossibility of all knowledge, he advocates a theory
1 Hyp. i. 180. 2 Photius 170, B. 12.
* Adv. Math. via. 40.
(ii; Sextns Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
that, the original substance is air,1 which is most
tainly a dogma, although indeed a deviation from the
teachings of Heraclitus, of which Sex t us seemed uncon-
scious, as he says, TO re ov Kara -rov 'HpdicKeiTov arjp
ecrriV) co? (fryvlv 6 Aivfjfft&fjfAOV, Aenesidemu
i also regarding number and time and unity of
the ori<_rinal world-^tuff.2 He fteemfl to have d<>
further about motion,3 and about the soul.4
It S« xtus' language is taken according to it> a
meal find ourselves here in tl -nee of a
which would be naturally held by a
follower of the Stoic-Heraclitan physics,6 and absol
inexplicable from the nan who advocated
! a Scepticism as Aenesidemus. Sextus in thf
irition
against the Idea that Scepticism could form th«- path to
the j)hilo>o|)hy of ir«-r;»clitus, but he does not ex}
surprise or indignation against Aenesidemus persoi
or orVer any explanation of the apparent contradic1
and while his wrr -und in references to him as a
•ted leader of tlte Sceptical School, he sometimes
srenis to include him with the Dogmatic-, n,
him with the Soypart/cwv (piXocrofav.7 In fact, the task
of presenting any consistent hi>t«»ry of the develop]
of thought through which Aenesidemus }>
a puzzling one, that Brochard brilliantly remarks that
•»ly the best attitud. towards it would be
to follow the advice of Aenesidemus himself -pend
1 Adv. Math. x. 233. 6 Compare Zellor Op. cit. in. p. 33.
Vath. ix. 337; x. 216. 6 Hyp. I. 210— J
3 Adv. Mitti. x. 38. V. Math. vm. 8; x. 215.
* Atlr. Math. vn. 349.
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 67
one's judgment altogether regarding it. Is it possible
to suppose that so sharp and subtle a thinker as Aene-
sidemus held at the same time such opposing opinions ?
The conjecture that he was first a Heraclitan Stoic,
and later a Sceptic, which might be possible, does not
offer any explanation of Sextus' statement, that he
regarded Scepticism as a path to the philosophy of
Heraclitus. Nor would it be logical to think that after
establishing the Sceptical School in renewed influence
arid power, he reverted to the Heraclitan theories as
they were modified by the Stoics. These same theories
were the cause of his separation from the Academy, for
his chief accusation against the Academy was that it
was adopting the dogmatism of the Stoics.1 The matter
is complicated by the fact that Tertullian also attributes
to Aenesidemus anthropological and physical teachings
that agree with the Stoical Heraclitan doctrines. It is
not strange that in view of these contradictory assertions
in regard to the same man, some have suggested the
possibility that they referred to two different men of
the same name, a supposition, however, that no one has
been able to authoritatively vindicate.
Let us consider briefly some of the explanations
which have been attempted of the apparent heresy of
Aenesidemus towards the Sceptical School. We will
begin with the most ingenious, that of Pappenheim.2
Pappenheim claims that Sextus was not referring
to Aenesidemus himself in these statements which he
joins with his name. In the most important of these,
1 Compare Zeller Op. cit. in. p. 16.
2 Die angebliche Heraclitismus des Skeptikers Ainesidemos, Berlin 1889.
68 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
the one quoted from the Hypotyposes,1 which repr«
AeneademtUI as daimin^ that Scepticism is the path to
the philosophy of Hcraclitus, the expression used is
ol Trepl -rov Alvrjo'io'rj/jLov, and in many of the other places
where Sextus refers to the dogmatic statements of
Aenesidemus, the expression is either ol Trepl rov Alirq-
aiSrjfjLov, or Alvrja-iSrjfjLo^ tca0' *H pdfc\en ov, while when
us quotes Aenesidemus to sustain Scepticism, he
his nairn- alone.
Pappenhrim thinks that S -onflict was not
with the dead Aenesi<h>nm<, who had lived two cen-
turies before him, but with his own contempor
He also seeks to prove that Sextus could not have gained
his knowledge of these sayings of Aenesidemus from any
of AeiHsidi mus' own writings, as neither by the ancients,
nor by later writers, was any book spoken of which could
well have contained them. Neither Aristocles nor Dio-
genes mentions any such book.
Papponheim also makes much of the arinmu-nt that
Sextus in no instance seems conscious of inconsistency
on the part of Aenesidemus, even when most earnestly
combating his alleged teachings, but in referring to
him personally he always speaks of him with great
respect.
Pappenheim suggests, accordingly, that the polemic
of Sext us was against contemporaries, those who accepted
the philosophy of Heraclitus in consequence of, or in
some connection with, the teachings of Aenesidemus.
He entirely ignores the fact that there is no trace of
any such school or sect in history, calling themselves
» Hyp. i. 210—212.
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 69
followers of " Aenesidemus according to Heraclitus," but
still thinks it possible that such a movement existed in
Alexandria at the time of Sextus, where so many dif-
ferent sects were found. Sextus uses Aenesidemus'
name in four different ways:— alone, ol irepl TOP Aive<riSrj-
fAoV) Aiwrjo-iSq/jLos Kaff 'HpdfcXeirov, and in one instance
ol 7T€pl TOV Alvrj(riSi]fjLov fcad' (Hpdic\eiTOV.1
Pappenheim advances the theory that some of these
contemporaries against whom Sextus directed his argu-
ments had written a book entitled Awfi<ri&THMK Kaff
'Hpd/cXeirov, to prove the harmony between Aenesi-
demus and Heraclitus, and that it was from this book
that Sextus quoted the dogmatic statements which he
introduced with that formula. He claims, further, that
the passage quoted from Hypotyposes I. even, is directed
against contemporaries, who founded their system of
proofs of the harmony between Aenesidemus and Herac-
litus on the connection of the celebrated formula which
was such a favourite with the Sceptics: "Contrary
predicates appear to apply to the same thing," with the
apparent deduction from this, that " Contrary predicates
in reality apply to the same thing." Sextus wishes, ac-
cording to Pappenheim, to prove to these contemporaries
that they had misunderstood Aenesidemus, and Sextus
does not report Aenesidemus to be a Dogmatic, nor to
have taught the doctrines of Heraclitus; neither has
he misunderstood Aenesidemus, nor consequently mis-
represented him ; but on the contrary, these dogmatic
quotations have nothing to do with Aenesidemus, but
refer altogether to contemporaries who pretended to be
1 Adv. Math. vm. 8.
70 xra.
Sceptics while tl: pted the tenrhinirs t>i H
BeztUl naturally warmly combats this tendency,
as he \vishe< to preserve Pyrrhonism pure.
Brochard advocates a change of opinion on f
of Aenesidemus as an explanation of tlie difficulty in
'ion.1 He starts from the Disposition, the reason-
ableness of which we shall consider later, that Aene-
sidemus had pa.-srd through one change of opinion
already when he severed his connection with the New
Academy; and to the two phases of hit life, which such
a ( hange has already made us familiar with, he adds a
third. Aenesidemus would not be the first who has
accepted different !>• -li< -f> at different periods of his life,
and Hrnrhard claims that such a development in the
opinions of Aenesidemus is logical. He does not accuse
Aenesidemus of having, as might seem from the pern>al
of Sextus, suddenly changed his basis, but rather of
having gradually come to accept much in the teachings
of Heraclitns. Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism
only to the extent of pretending to know something
of absolute reality. The Sceptic says, "Contradi
predicates are apparently applicable to the same ti
and Aenesidemus accepts the Heraclitan result — " Con-
tradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the
same thing." From Sextus' report, Aenesidemus would
seem to have renounced his position as a Sceptic in
saying that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of
Heraclitus. He does not, however, renounce Sceptici>m,
but he finds it incomplete. In deliberating concerning
the appearance of contradictory predicate! in regard to
1 Hrochard Op. cit. 272.
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 71
the same object, he would naturally ask, " Whence come
these contradictory appearances ? " After having doubted
all things, he wished to know wherefore he doubts. The
system of Heraclitus offers a solution, and he accepts it.
Contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in the
soul because they are an expression of reality.
As a Sceptic he claims that knowledge is impossible,
and he does not find that the statement of Heraclitus
disproves this, but rather that it supports his theory.
He had denied the existence of science. He still does
so, but now he knows why he denies it. Brochard asks
why it is any more impossible that Aenesidemus should
have been a follower of Heraclitus than that Protagoras
was so, as Protagoras was after all a Sceptic. In con-
clusion, Brochard claims that the dogmatic theories
attributed to Aenesidemus relate to the doctrine of the
truth of contradictory predicates, which seemed to him
a logical explanation of the foundation theories of
Scepticism. It is right to call him a Sceptic, for he
was so, and that sincerely ; and he deserves his rank
as one of the chiefs of the Sceptical School.
Coming now to the opinion of Zeller,1 we find that
he advocates a misconception of Aenesidemus on the
part of Sextus. The whole difficulty is removed, Zeller
thinks, by the simple fact that Sextus had not under-
stood Aenesidemus ; and as Tertullian and Sextus agree
in this misconception of the views of Aenesidemus, they
must have been misled by consulting a common author
in regard to Aenesidemus, who confused what Aene-
sidemus said of Heraclitus with his own opinion. Zeller
1 Zeller Op. cit. Ill, pp. 31 — 35; Grundriss der Geschichteder Griechis-
chen Phil. p. 263.
7 '2 tieztux Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
maintains that the expression so often repeated by
Suxtus — Aivr)(rib7)iJLOS naff 'HpatcKeirov — shows that
some one of Aenesidemus' books contained a report of
Heraclitus1 doctrines, as Aenesidemus was in the habit
of quoting as many authorities as possible to sustain
his Scepticism. To justify his quotations from Herac-
litus, he had possibly given a short abstract of Heraclitus'
teachings ; and the misconception advocated by Zeller,
and found both in Tertullian and Sextus, refers rather
to the spirit than to the words quoted from Aeneside-
ii) ns. and is a misconception due to some earlier author,
who had given a false impression of the meaning of
Aenesidemus in quoting what Aenesidemus wrote about
Heraclitus. That is to say, Heraclitus was classed by
Aenesidemua only among those who prepared th»-
for Scepticism, just as Diogenes1 mentions many philo-
sophers in that way ; and that Soranus2 and Sextus both
ha.l the same misunderstanding can only be explained
by a mistake on the part of the authority whom they
consulted.
This explanation, however, makes Sextus a very
stupid man. Aenesidemus' books were well known,
and Sextus would most certainly take the trouble to
read them. His reputation as an historian would not
sustain such an accusation, as Diogenes calls his books
TO, Setca TWV cnceTTTiicwv KOI a\\a tcd\\i<TTa* Further-
more, that Sextus used Aenesidemus' own books we
know from the direct quotation from them in regard to
Plato,4 which he combines with the ideas of Menodotus5
and his own.
1 Diog. Laert. ix. 11, 71—74. - Tertullian. 3 Diog. ix. 12, 116.
» Hyp. i. 222. 5 Following the Greek of Bekker.
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 73
Sextus' references to Aenesidemus in connection
with Heraclitus are very numerous, and it is absurd
to suppose that he would have trusted entirely to some
one who reported him for authority on such a subject.
Even were it possible that Sextus did not refer directly
to the works of Aenesidemus, which we do not admit,
even then, there had been many writers in the Sceptical
School since the time of Aenesidemus, and they certainly
could not all have misrepresented him. We must re-
member that Sextus was at the head of the School, and
had access to all of its literature. His honor would not
allow of such a mistake, and if he had indeed made it,
his contemporaries must surely have discovered it before
Diogenes characterised his books as K<i\\icrTa. Whatever
may be said against the accuracy of Sextus as a general
historian of philosophy, especially in regard to the older
schools, he cannot certainly be accused of ignorance
respecting the school of which he was at that time
the head.
The opinion of Hitter on this subject is that Aene-
sidemus must have been a Dogmatic.1 Saisset contends2
that Aenesidemus really passed from the philosophy of
Heraclitus to that of Pyrrho, and made the statement
that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heracli-
tus to defend his change of view, although in his case
the change had been just the opposite to the one he
defends. Saisset propounds as a law in the history of
philosophy a fact which he claims to be true, that
Scepticism always follows sensationalism, for which he
gives two examples, Pyrrho, who was first a disciple of
1 Hitter, Op, cit. p. 280. Book IV. 2 Saisset, Op. cit. p. 206.
74
Democritns, an. I 1 1 nine, who <»f Locke.
It is not necessary to discuss the absurdity of such a
law, which someon*- has well remarked would invoi i
a priori construction of history. There is no apparent
;i for Saiss.-t's conjecture in regard to Aene.>id« -mus,
for it is exactly the opposite of what Sextus has reported.
Strange to say, Saisset him.-elf remarks in another place
that we owe religious respect to any text, and tl
should he tin- first Irnv of criticism to render this.1 Such
'•t to the text of Sextus, as he him<«-lt' fcdvo
puts Saisset's explanation of the subject under dis-
cussion out of the question.
Hirzel and Natorp do not find such a marked
contradiction in the two views presented of the theories
of Aenesidemus, nor do they think that Sextus has
misrepresented them* They rather maintain, that in
declaring the coexistence of contradictory predicates
regarding the same object, Aenesidemus does not cease
to be a Sceptic, for he did not believe that the predicates
are applicable in a dogmatic sense of the word, but are
only applicable in appearance, that is, applicable to
phenomena. The Heraclitism of Aenesidemus would
be then only in appearance, as he understood the
statement, that " Contradictory predicates are in reality
applicable to the same thing," only in the phenomenal
sense.2 Hirzel says in addition, that contradictory
predicates are in reality applicable to those phenomena
which are the same for all, and consequently true, for
Aenesidemus considered those phenomena true that
are the same for all:'1 As Protagoras, the disciple of
1 Saisset Op. cit. p. 206. * Natorp Op. cit. 115. 122.
3 Adv. Math. vin. 8 ; Hirzel Op. cit. p. 96.
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 75
Heraclitus, declared the relative character of sensations,
that things exist only for us, and that their nature
depends on our perception of them ; so, in the pheno-
menal sense, Aenesidemus accepts the apparent fact
that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the
same thing.
This explanation entirely overlooks the fact that we
have to do with the word vTrdpxew, in the statement
that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same
thing ; while in the passage quoted where Aenesidemus
declares common phenomena to be true ones, we have
the word aXrjdrj, so that this explanation of the diffi-
culty would advocate a very strange use of the word
All of these different views of the possible solution
of this perplexing problem are worthy of respect, as the
opinion of men who have given much thought to this
and other closely related subjects. While we may not
altogether agree with any one of them, they neverthe-
less furnish many suggestions, which are very valuable
in helping to construct a theory on the subject that
shall satisfactorily explain the difficulties, and present a
consistent view of the attitude of Aenesidemus.
First, in regard to the Greek expression ol irepl in
connection with proper names, upon which Pappenheim
bases so much of his argument. All Greek scholars
would agree that the expression does not apply usually
only to the disciples of any teacher, but ol irepl rbv
AlvrjatSTj/juov, for instance, includes Aenesidemus with his
followers, and is literally translated, "Aenesidemus and
his followers." It is noticeable, however, in the writings
of Sextus that he uses the expression ol irepl often for
7(> Sextm Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
the name of the founder of a school alone, as Pappen-
heim himself admits.1 We find examples of this in th«-
mention of Plato and Democritus and Arcesilaus, as
01 Trepl TOV TIXaTtova Kai A^jjuoKpiTov2 and ol Trepl TOP
'Apx€<ri\aw* and accordingly we have no right to infer
that his use of the name Aenesidemus in this way has
an exceptional Muniiicance. It may mean Aenesidemus
alone, or it mav Minify Aenesidemus in connection with
his followers.
In reply to Zeller's position, that Sextus and Ter-
tullian have misunderstood Aenesidemus, and quote
from some common author who misrepi him,
we would admit that such a misunderstanding miuht
be possible where Sextus gives long explanations of
Hnaclitus' teachings, beginning witli quoting Aene-
sidemus, and eontinuing in such a way that it is not
always possible to distinguish just the part that is
attributed to Aenesidemus; but such a misunderstand-
ing certainly cannot be asserted in regard to the direct
statement that Aenesidemus regarded Scepticism as the
path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, for tho reasons
previously given. Neither would we agree with
Brochard, whose solution of the difficulty is on the
whole the most logical, i.e., that Aenesidemus had neces-
sarily already passed through two phases of philosophical
belief. It is possible to admit a gradual evolution of
thought in Aenesidemus without supposing in either
case a change of basis. His withdrawal from the
Academy is an argument against, rather than in favor
1 Pappenheirn Op. cit. p. 21. - Adv. Math. vm. 6.
3 Adv. Math. vn. 150.
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 77
of, a change on his part, and was caused by the well-
known change in the attitude of the Academy.
Many of the teachings of the Sceptical School were
taken directly from the Academy, belonging to those
doctrines advocated in the Academy before the eclectic
dogmatic tendency introduced by Antiochus. In fact,
Sextus himself claims a close relation between the
Middle Academy and Pyrrhonism.1 Aenesidemus,
although he was a Sceptic, belonged to the Academy,
and on leaving it became, as it were, a pioneer in
Pyrrhonism, and cannot be judged in the same way
as we should judge a Sceptic of Sextus' time.
It seems a self-evident fact that during the two
centuries which elapsed between the time of Aeneside-
mus and Sextus, the standpoint of judgment in the
Sceptical School had greatly changed. An example
illustrating this change we find in a comparison of the
presentation of Scepticism by Diogenes with that of
Sextus. The author whom Diogenes follows, probably
one of the Sceptical writers, considers Xenophanes, Zeno,
and Democritus, Sceptics, and also Plato,2 while Sextus,
in regard to all of these men, opposes the idea t"hat they
were Sceptics.3 Diogenes also calls Heraclitus a Sceptic,
and even Homer,4 and quotes sceptical sayings from
the Seven Wise Men ; 5 he includes in the list of Scep-
tics, Archilochus, Euripides, Empedocles, and Hippoc-
rates/ and, furthermore, says that Theodosius, probably
one of the younger Sceptics, objected to the name
1 Hyp. i. 232. * Diog. ix. 11, 71.
» Diog. ix. 11, 17—72. * Diog. ix. 11, 71.
3 Hyp. i. 213—214; i. 223—225. 6 Diog. ix. 11, 71—73.
78 Sextua Empii'icua and Greek Scepticism.
' Pyrrhonean ' on the ground that Pyrrho was not the
first Sceptic.1
We have given the testimony from ninny sources,
to the effect that before the time of Sextus the Empiri-
cal School of Medicine was considered identical with
Scepticism, although not so by Sextus himself. From
all of these things we may infer a narrowing of the limits
of Pyrrhonism in the time of Sextus.
Let us accept with Brochard tin development of
thought seen in Aenesidemus from the beginning to
tin- (nd of his career, without agreeing with him that
Aeneaidemus ever consciously changed his basis. He
in the Academy. He left the Academy
on that account, and he n mained a Sceptic to the end,
in so far U a man ran be a Sceptic, and take the
positive .-land that Aenrsidrnius did.
Two things might account for his apparent dog-
matism—
(i) The eclectic spirit of his time.
(ii) The psychological effect upon himself of this
careful systemisation of the Sceptical teachings.
Let us consider the first of these causes. Aeneside-
mus, although not the first of the later Sceptics, was.
apparently the first to separate himself from the
A on demy. He was the founder of a new movement,
the attempt to revive the older Scepticism as taught by
Pyrrho and Timon, and separate it from the dogmatic
teachings of the Stoics which were so greatly affecting
the Scepticism of the New Academy. It wa> the spirit
of his time to seek to sustain all philosophical teaching
1 Diog. ix. n. TO.
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 79
by the authority of as many as possible of the older
philosophers, and he could hardly escape the tendency
which his training in the Academy had unconsciously
given him. Therefore we find him trying to prove that
the philosophy of Heraclitus follows from Scepticism. It
is not necessary either to explain the matter, as both
Hirzel and Natorp so ingeniously attempt to do, by
claiming that the truth of contradictory predicates which
Aenesidemus accepted from Heraclitus referred only to
phenomena. The history of philosophy gives us abun-
dant proof of the impossibility of absolute Scepticism,
and Aenesidemus furnishes us with one example of many
of this impossibility, and of the dogmatism that must
exist in connection with all thought. In the case of
Aenesidemus, who evidently gave the best efforts of his
life to establish the Sceptical School, the dogmatism was
probably unconscious. That he remained to the end
a Sceptic is shown by the fact that he was known as
such to posterity. Nowhere do we find a change of
basis referred to in regard to him, and Sextus, in
refuting the mistakes which he attributes to Aene-
sidemus, does it, as it were, to point out something of
which Aenesidemus had been unconscious.
Let us consider here the second cause of Aeneside-
mus' Dogmatism, the psychological effect upon himself
of formulating Sceptical beliefs. The work that he did
for the Sceptical School was a positive one. It occupied
years of his life, and stamped itself upon his mental
development. In formulating Scepticism, and in ad-
vocating it against the many enemies of the School,
and amidst all the excitement of the disruption from
the Academy, and of establishing a new School, it was
so Seotfus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
inevitable that, liis mind .should take a dogmatic
denry. He remained a Sceptic as IK.' had always been,
but must liave grown dogmatic in his attitude tov.
the Sceptical formulae, and was thus able to adopt some
<>!' the teachings of Ileraclitus, unconscious of their
inconsistency.
Where should we find a modern writer who is c
it in all his statements? Could we read the works
of Aenesidemus, we might better understand the con-
nection between the apparently contradictory ideas in
his teaching, but the incn: Q statement i
probably remain. It is necessary to remember the
position of Aenesidemus in breaking away from the
Academy and in founding a new school, the full
ficance of which he could not foresee. There must
iarily be some crudenen in pioneer \v« some
failure to see the bearing of all its parts, and a compiler
like Sextus could point out the inconsistencies which
the two centuries since the time of Aenesidemu-
made plain. Aenesidemus was too positive a char
dmit of absolute Sceptical consistency. He was
nevertheless the greatest thinker the Sceptical School
had known since the age of Pyrrho, its founder. In
claiming a union between Pyrrhonism and the philo-
sophy of Heraclitus, he recognised also the pre-Socnatic
tendency of the Sceptical School. The name of Soc
was all powerful in the Academy, but Aenesidemus com-
prehended the fact that the true spirit of Pyrrhonism
was of earlier origin than the Academic Scepsis.
CHAPTER V.
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism.
The distinct philosophical movement of which Pyrrho
was the author bore his name for five centuries after his
death. It had an acknowledged existence as a philo-
sophical tendency, if indeed not a sect, for a great part
of that time. Yet, when we carefully analyse the
relation of Pyrrhonism, as presented to us by Sextus,
to the teachings of Pyrrho himself, in so far as they
can be known, we find many things in Pyrrhonism for
which Pyrrho was not responsible.
The foundation elements of the movement, the spirit
of Empirical doubt that lay underneath and caused its
development in certain directions rather than others,
are due to Pyrrho. The methods of the school, however,
were very foreign to anything found in the life or teach-
ings of Pyriho. Pyrrho was eminently a moralist. He
was also to a great degree an ascetic, and he lived his
philosophy, giving it thus a positive side wanting in the
Pyrrhonism presented to us by Sextus. Timon represents
him as desiring to escape from the tedious philosophical
discussions of his time —
& yepov & Ilvppwv, TTW? r) Trb6ev etcSvcnv evpes
Bo^&v re /cepo^poavvrj^ re O-
M* Sextua Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
,'ind a^ain be of his modest and tranquil life —
TOVTO pot,, (!) TIvppwv, ipelperai rj-rop dfcovcrac
7TW9 TTOT' avrjp eV ayets Travra f
fjiovvo? SavQptoTTOicri deov rpojrov rj
alel a<f>povTio-Ta)<; fcal iutivfaw* Kara ravra
i]Sv\6jov
Pyri-li.) wished more than anything rl>«: to live in
peace, and his dislike of the Sophists2 may well hav»/
made him try to avoid dialectic; while, on the contrary,
in tli<- Pyrrhonean School of InU-r timrs discussion was
one of the principal ni«-thuds of contest, at I
the time of Agrippa. Pyrrhonism seems to have been
nriiiinally a theory of life, like the philosophy of Socrates,
to whom Pyrrho is often compared;' and Pyrrho, like
ites, lived his philosophy. Our knowledge of
Pyrrho is gained from Aristocles, Sextus Empiricus,
and Diogeoes, and from the Academic traditions L:
1)\ ( iioera Diogenes gives us details of his lite which
he attributes to Antigonus of Carystius, who lived about
tin- time of Pyrrho.4 Pyrrho was a disciple and adi
of Democritus,5 some of whose teachings bore a lasting
influence over the subsequent development of Pyrrho-
nism. He accompanied Alexander the Great to India,
where he remained as a member of his suite for
time, and the philosophical ideas of India were not
without influence on his teachings. Oriental philosophy
1 Diog. ix. 11, 65. Given from Mullach's edition of Timon by
m primitive, p. .52").
• Diog. ix. 11, 69. * Diog. ix. 11, 02.
3 Lewes Op. cit. p. 460. » Diog. ix. 11.
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 83
was not unknown in Greece long before the time of
Pyrrho, but his personal contact with the Magi and the
Gymnosophists of the far East, apparently impressed
upon his mind teachings for which he was not unpre-
pared by his previous study and natural disposition.
In his indifference to worldly goods we find a strong
trace of the Buddhistic teaching regarding the vanity
of human life. He showed also a similar hopelessness
in regard to the possibility of finding a satisfactory
philosophy, or absolute truth. He evidently returned
from India with the conviction that truth was not to
be attained.1
After the death of Alexander and Pyrrho's return
to Greece, he lived quietly with his sister at Elis, and
Diogenes says that he was consistent in his life, asserting
and denying nothing, but in everything withholding his
opinion, as nothing in itself is good or shameful, just or
unjust.2 He was not a victim of false pride, but sold
animals in the market place, and, if necessary, washed
the utensils himself.3 He lived in equality of spirit,
and practised his teachings with serenity. If one went
out while he was talking he paid no attention, but went
calmly on with his remarks.4 He liked to live alone,
and to travel alone, and on one occasion, being knocked
about in a vessel by a storm at sea, he did not lose his
imperturbability, but pointed to a swine calmly eating
on board, and said that the wise man should have as
much calmness of soul as that. He endured difficult
surgical operations with indifference,5 and when his
1 Compare Maccoll Op. cit. 4 Diog. ix. 11, 63.
2 Diog. ix. 11, 61, 62. 5 Diog. ix. 11, 67.
3 Diog. ix. 11, 66
84 Sextua Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
friend Anaxarchus was once unfortunate enough to fall
into a morass, he went calmly by without stopping to
help him, for which consistency of conduct Anaxarchus
afterwards praised him. There are two instances given
by Diogenes when he lost control of himself; once in
getting angry with his sister, and once in trying to save
himself when chased by a dog. When accused of incon-
sistency, he said it was difficult to entirely give up one's
Imm.'inity.1 He was greatly venerated by the people
among whom he lived, who made him high priest, and
on his account exempted all philosophers from taxation,2
and after his death erected a statue to his memory.
These facts testify to his moral character, and also to
fulfil the functions of high priest a certain amount of
dogmatism must liav. been necessary.
According to Diogenes, " We cannot know," said Pyr-
l rho, " what things are in themselves, either by sensation
1 or by judgment, and, as we cannot distinguish the true
/ from the false, therefore we should live impassively, and
without an opinion/' The term eVo^?;, so characteristic
/ of Pyrrhonism, goes back, according to Diogenes, to the
I time of Pyrrho.3 Nothing is, in itself, one thing more
than another, but all experience is related to pheno-
mena, and no knowledge is possible through the senses.4
Pyrrho's aim was arapagta and his life furnished a
marked example of the spirit of indifference, for which
the expression cnrdOeia is better suited than the later
one, arapa^ia. The description of his life with his sister
confirms this, where the term aSiafopla is used to
1 Diog. ix. 11, 66. 3 Diog. ix. 11, 61.
2 Diog. ix. 11, 64. « Diog. ix. 11, 61—62.
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 85
describe his conduct.1 He founded his Scepticism on
the equivalence of opposing arguments.2
The picture given of Pyrrho by Cicero is entirely
different from that of Diogenes, and contrasts decidedly
with it.3 Cicero knows Pyrrho as a severe moralist, not
as a Sceptic. Both authors attribute to Pyrrho the
doctrine of indifference and apathy, but, according to
Cicero, Pyrrho taught of virtue, honesty, and the
summum bonum, while Diogenes plainly tells us that
he considered nothing as good in itself, "and of all things
nothing as true."4 Cicero does not once allude to Pyrrho-
nean doubt. We see on the one hand, in Cicero's idea
of Pyrrho, the influence of the Academy, perhaps even
of Antiochus himself,5 which probably colored the
representations given of Pyrrho ; but, on the other hand,
there is much in Diogenes' account of Pyrrho's life and
teachings, and in the writings of Timon, which shows us
the positive side of Pyrrho. Pyrrho, in denying the
possibility of all knowledge, made that rather a motive
for indifference in the relations of life, than the founda-
tion thought of a philosophical system. His teaching
has a decided ethical side, showing in that respect the
strong influence of Democritus over him, who, like
Pyrrho, made happiness to consist in a state of feeling.6
The one motive of all of Pyrrho's teaching is a positive
one, the desire for happiness.
The essence of Pyrrhonism as given by Tiruon is as
follows : 7 Man desires to be happy. To realise his
1 Diog. ix. 11. 66. 5 Compare Natorp Op. cit. p. 71.
2 Diog. IJL. 11. 106. 6 Zeller Grundriss der Griechischen Phil. p. 70.
3 De oral. Ill, 62. 7 Aristocles ap. Eusebium Praep. Ev. xiv. 18.
4 Diog. ix. 11, 61.
•S(i SeoctUB tiiHi/n'icua and Greek Scepticism.
desire he must consider three things:
(i) What is the nature of thing
(ii) How should man conduct himself in relation to
them?
(iii) What is the result to him of this relation ?
The nature of things is unknown. Our relation to
them must be one of suspension of judgment, without
activity, desire, or belief, — that is, an entirely negative
relation. The result is that state of having no opi;
called tVo^//, which is followed in turn by arapagia.
lrfhe problem of philosophy is here proposed very
nearly in the terms of Kant, but not with the positive
motive, like that of the great philosopher of Germany,
of evolving a system to present the truth. Yet the im-
portance of these questions shows the originality of
Pyrrho. The earnestness of Pyrrho is further >ho\vn by
an example given by Diogenes. Once on being found
talking to himself alone, he said, when asked the reason,
that he was meditating how to become a good man
(XPT/O-TO?),2 thus showing an entirely different spirit
from anything found in Sextus' books. The explanation
of his life and teachings is to be found largely in his
own disposition. Such an attitude of indifference must
belong to a placid nature, and cannot be entirely the
result of a philosophical system, and, while it can be
aimed at, it can never be perfectly imitated. One of
his disciples recognised this, and said that it was neces-
sary to have the disposition of Pyrrho in order to hold his
doctrines.3 Diogenes tells us that he was the first to
advance any formulae of Scepticism,4 but they must
1 Compare Maccoll Op.cit. p. 21. 3 Diog. ix. 11, 70, 64.
2 Diog. ix. 11, 64. 4 Dio-. ix. 11, 69; ix. 11, 61.
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 87
have been very elementary, as Pyrrho himself wrote
nothing. We find no trace of formulated Tropes in
Pyrrho's teachings, yet it is probable that he indicated
some of the contradictions in sensation, and possibly the
Tropes in some rudimentary form. Of the large number
of sceptical formulae, or (fxovai, the three which seem to
have the oldest connection with Scepticism are the avri-
\o7/a, the ovBev dp/£a>, and the ov pa\\ov.1 We know
from Diogenes that Protagoras is the authority for saying
that in regard to everything there are two opposing
arguments.2 The saying " to determine nothing " is
quoted from Timon's Python by Diogenes,3 and the
other two mentioned are also attributed to him by
Aristocles.4 We have also in the ov paXkov a direct
connection with Democritus, although the difference in
the meaning which he attributed to it is shown by
Sextus.5 So while the expression is the same, the
explanation of it given by Pyrrho must have been
different. It would seem probable that Pyrrho used
all of these three sayings, from the account of Diogenes,
and that even then they gave rise to the accusation of
the Dogmatics, that simply by possessing such sayings
the Sceptics dogmatised,6 for the refutation of this used
by Sextus occurs in the old account of the sayings,
namely, that these formulae include also themselves
in the meaning, as a cathartic removes itself together
with other harmful objects.7
In comparing the later Pyrrhonism with the teach-
ings of Pyrrho, we would sharply contrast the moral
1 Hyp. i. 202 ; Diog. ix. 8, 51 ; Photius Bekker's ed. 280 H.
2 Photius Bekker's ed. 280 H. 3 Hyp. i. 197; Diog. ix. 11. 76.
4 Aristocles ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev. xiv.18. 5 Hyp. i. 213.
6 Diog. ix. 11, 68—76. 7 Diog. ix. 11, 76; Hyp. i. 206.
88 Sextua Empii-icus and Greek Scepticism.
attitude of the two. With Pyrrho equilibrium of soul
a means to be applied to his positive theory of life;
with tin- later Pyrrhoneans it was the end to be attained.
We would attribute, however, the empirical tendency
shown during the whole history of Pyrrhonism to Pyrrho
M ita "rininator. He WfU) an empirical philosopher, and
the result of his influence in this respect, as seen in the
subsequent development of the school, stands in m;i
contrast to tin- dial«rti<- spirit of the Academic Scepsis.
The empirieism of the school is shown in its scientific
lore, in the fact that so many of the Sceptics were
physicians, and in the character of the ten Tropes of
eVo^?;. We may safely affirm that tin- foundation
principles of Pyrrhonism are due to Pyrrho, and the
originality which gave the school its power. The
elaborated arguments, however, and the details of its
formulae belong to later times.
Con ii n_; now to the relation of Pyrrhonism to the
Academy, the connection between the two is difficult
to exactly determine, between the time of Pyrrho and
that of Aenesidemus. Scepticism in the Academy
however, never absolutely identical with Pyrrhonism,
although at certain periods of the history of the Aca-
demy the difference was slight. We can trace throughout
the evolution of doubt, as shown to us in Pyrrhonism.,
and in Academic Scepticism, the different results which
followed the difference in origin of the two movements,
and these differences followed according to general laws
of development of thought. Arcesilaus, who introduced
doubt into the Academy, claimed to return to the dia-
lectic of Socrates, and suppressing the lectures,1 which
1 Compare Maccoll Op. tit. p. 36.
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 89
were the method of teaching in the later schools of
philosophy, introduced discussions instead, as being
more decidedly a Socratic method. Although, accord-
ing to Sextus, he was the one leader of the Academy
whose Scepticism most nearly approached that of
-^Pyrrhonism,1 yet underneath his whole teaching lay
that dialectic principle so thoroughly in opposition to
the empiricism of Pyrrho. The belief of Socrates and
Plato in the existence of absolute truth never entirely
lost its influence over the Academy, but was like a
hidden germ, destined to reappear after Scepticism had
passed away. It finally led the Academy back to Dog-
matism, and prepared the way for the Eclecticism with
which it disappeared from history.
The history of Pyrrhonism and that of Academic
Scepticism were for a time contemporaneous. The im-
mediate follower of Pyrrho, Timon, called by Sextus the
" prophet of Pyrrho,"2 was a contemporary of Arcesilaus.
That he did not consider the Scepticism of the Academy
identical with Pyrrhonism is proved from the fact that
he did not himself join the Academy, but was, on the
contrary, far from doing so. That he regarded Arcesilaus
as a Dogmatic is evident from his writings.3 One day,
on seeing the chief of the Academy approaching, he
cried out, " What are you doing here among us who are
free?"4 After the death of Timon, the Pyrrhonean
School had no representative till the time of Ptolemy
of Gyrene,5 and Greek Scepticism was represented by
the Academy. That Pyrrho had a strong influence
over Arcesilaus, the founder of the Middle Academy,
1 Hyp. i. 232. 2 Adv. Math. I. 53. 3 Diog. iv. 6, 33, 34.
4 Diog. ix. 12, 114. 5 Diog. ix. 12, 115.
DO >^<£tu8 Empirics and Greek Scepticism.
is evident1 ; but there was also never a time when the
Academy entirely broke away from all the teachings of
Plato, even in their deepest doubt.2 It is true that
Arcesilaus removed, nominally as well as in spirit, some
of the dialogues of Plato from the Academy, but only
those that bore a dogmatic character, while those that
presented a more d»vide<l mode of questioning,
without reaching any decided result, men regarded as
authority for Scepticism.
Sextus docs not deny that Arce.silaus was almost a
Pyrrhonean, but he claims that his Pyrrhonism was
only apparent, and not real, and was used as a cloak to
hide his loyalty to the teachings of Plato.3 As Ariston
said of him,4 "Plato before, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in
the middle." Sextus also characterises the method of
Arcesilaus as dialectic,5 and we know from Cicero that
it was his pride to pretend to return to the dialectic of
Socrates.
It is interesting to note that Sextus, in his refuta-
tion of the position that the Academy is the same as
Pyrrhonism, takes up the entire development of Aca-
demic thought from the time of Plato till that of
Antiochus, and does not limit the argument to Scep-
ticism under Arcesilaus. The claim made by some
that the two schools were the same, is stated by him,6
and the word 'some' probably refers to members of
both schools at different periods of their history. Sextus
recognises three Academies, although he remarks that
some make even a further division, calling that of Philo
1 Diog. iv. 6, 33. 4 Diog. iv. 6, 33.
2 Diog. iv. 6, 32. 5 Hyp. I. 234.
3 Hyp. i. 234. 6 Hyp. I. 220.
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 91
and Charmides, the fourth, and that of Antiochus and
his followers, the fifth.
That many in the Academy, and even outside of it,
regarded Plato as a Sceptic, and an authority for sub-
sequent Scepticism, we find both from Sextus and
Diogenes.1 As Lewes justly remarks, one could well
find authority for Scepticism in the works of Plato, as
indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sum
total of his teachings was considered. The spirit of
Plato's teachings was dogmatic, as Sextus most de-
cidedly recognises, and as Aenesidemus and Menodotus2
recognised before him.3 Sextus himself shows us that
Plato's idealism and ethical teachings can have nothing
in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts the
desirability of the virtuous life, and the existence of
Providence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards
them as probable, he gives preference to one set of
ideas over another, and departs from the sceptical
character. Sextus characterises the sceptical side of
Plato's writings as mental gymnastics,4 which do not
authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirms that
Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknown
things to others in trustworthiness. The ethical differ-
ence underlying the teachings of the Academy and
Pyrrhonism, Sextus was very quick to see, and although
it is very probable that the part of the Hypotyposes
which defines the difference between the Academy and
Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the introduc-
tion to Aenesidemus' works, yefc Sextus certainly gives
these statements the strong stamp of his approval. He
1 Hyp. i. 221 ; Diog. ix. 11, 72. 3 Hyp. i. 222.
2 Bekker's edition of Hyp. i. 222. 4 Hyp. i. 223.
!):! >SV./-///..s EmpirlcuH and Greek Scepticism.
coi idem us the Academy because of the theory that good
and evil exist, or if this cannot be decidedlv proved, yet
that it is more probable that what is railed good <
than the contrary.1
The whole Academic teaching of probabilities con-
tradicted the standpoint of the Sceptics — that our ideas
are equal as regards trustworthiness and untrustworthi-
ness,2 for the Academicians declared that some ideas
are probable and some improbable, and they make a
difference even in those ideas that they call probable.
Sextus claims that there are three fundamental
grounds of difference between Pyrrhonism and the
Academy. The first is the doctrine of probability
which the Academicians accept in regard to the supe-
rior trust worth in- me ideas over others.8 The
second is the different way in which the two schools
follow their teachers. The Pyrrhoneans follow without
striving or strong effort, or even strong inclination, as a
child follows his teacher, while the Academicians follow
with sympathy and assent, as Carneades and Clito-
machus affirm.4 The third difference is in the aim, for
the Academicians follow what is probable in life. The
Sceptics follow nothing, but live according to laws,
customs, and natural feelings undogmatu -ally.5
The difference between the later teaching of the
Academy and Pyrrhonism is evident, and Sextus treats
of it briefly, as not requiring discussion,6 as Philo taught
that the nature of facts is incomprehensible, and Antio-
chus transferred the Stoa to the Academy. It is therefore
1 Hyp. i. 226. * Hyp. i. 230.
2 Hyp. i. 227. 5 Hyp. i. 231.
3 Hyp. i. 229. • Hyp. i. 235.
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 93
evident, from the comparison which we have made,
that we do not find in the Academy, with which Scep-
ticism after the death of Timon was so long united, the
exact continuance of Pyrrhonism. The philosophical
enmity of the two contemporaries, Timon and Arcesilaus,
the Academician who had most in common with Pyr-
rhonism, is an expression of the fundamental incom-
patibility between the two schools.
During all the chequered history of the Academy
the dormant idealism was there, underlying the outward
development. Although during the time of Arcesilaus
and Carneades the difference was so slight as to seem
a mere matter of form of expression, yet the different
foundations on which the two schools stood was always
recognisable. On the one hand there was the germ of
idealism which was destined to awake to a new life,
and on the other, the attempt at absolute negation
which was to result in the final extinction of Pyrrho-
nism. We find in both, it is true, especially in the
time of Arcesilaus, the aim of eVo^.1 Both placed
great weight on IcroaOeveia^ or the equal value of
opposing arguments.2 The foundation of the GTro^rj
was, however, different in the two cases. Arcesilaus
founded his on dialectic, while Pyrrho's was empirical.
The Pyrrhonean believed that ideas give us no
knowledge of the outer world ; the Academic Sceptic
believed that we cannot distinguish between true and
false ideas, so such knowledge is impossible. The
Pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist in ideas
because of their contradictory nature, and consequently
1 Hyp. i. 232. 2 Diog. ix. 73; Hyp. n. 130; in, 65.
91 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
the existence of all truth, fjirj&ev elvat, rfj aXr^Bela eVl
TrdvTcav^sThe Academic Sceptic granted that the
_truth was possibly contained in ideas, but affirn
_that it could never be known to us. The Pyrrhonean§__
prided themselves on still being seekers for although^
ordinary ideas are too contradictory knowle
of the outer world, they did not deny that >ueh know-
ledge might be possible, but simply susp«-nd«-d the
j i \ dgment regarding it. To the Pyrrhonean the re-
correspond <-<l to tin- method. All ideas thus tar known
revealed nothing of the truth, therefore he still
Tii- A( i i( mician tried logically to prove that the truth
is impossible to find. It is the relation of the dialec-
tician to the empiricist, and the two varieties of
• •xplained by their difference in ori;_
' In Pyrrhonism there was no con>ti uctive element. In
the Academic Scepsis such an element was found
throughout all its hi.Mory in tin- theory of Probability.
Arcesilaus himself laid great stress upon this doctrine,
ich Sextus caret ull\ !y inconsist-
ent with Pyrrhonism. Arcesilaus plainly teaches that,
having suspended one's judgment in regard to m;r
of knowledge, one should control his choices, his refu
and his actions by the probable.3
After Antiochus introduced Eclecticism into the
Academy, Pyrrhonism was the only representative of
(Jreek Scepticism, and it flourished for over two cen-
turies after our era, and then also disappeared, no more
;lar philosophical school.
1 Diog. ix. 11, 61. -Hyp. 1.229.
- Ma, ,
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 95
Having considered at length the essence of Pyrrho-
nism as presented by Sextus Empiricus, it now remains
to briefly note the characteristics that formed its strength
and weakness, and the causes of its final downfall.
Herbart says that every philosopher is a Sceptic in the
beginning, bat every Sceptic remains always in the
beginning. This remark may well be applied to Pyr-
rhonism. We find in its teachings many fundamental
philosophical truths which might have formed the be-
ginning of great philosophical progress, but wh^ch^were
never developed to any positive results. The teachings
of Pyrrhonism were some of them well fitted to prepare
the way to idealism. The great idea of the relativity of
Vorstellungen is made very prominent by the ten Tropes
of eVo^r/. Aenesidemus, in his eight Tropes against
aetiology, shows the absurdity of the doctrine of causality
when upheld on materialistic grounds. That was to him
final, errel OVK ecrrai ainov. He could not divine that
although the result which he presented was logical, it
only led to a higher truth. It was reserved for the
greatest of modern philosophers to reveal to the world
that causality is a condition, and a necessary condition,
of thought. When Aenesidemus proved by his seventh
Trope that causality is subjective, he regarded it as fatal
to the doctrine ; yet this conclusion was a marked step
in advance in critical philosophy, although Aesesidemus-
could not himself see it in all its bearings. The great
difference between Aenesidemus and Kant is the differ-
ence between the materialist and the believer in sub-
jective reality. Both agreed in the unknown nature of
the Ding an sich, but this was to the Pyrrhonist the end
of all his philosophy ; to Kant, however, the beginning.
!H> Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
Pyrrhonism has rendered, notwithstandii . ats
of fatal weakness, marked service to the world in science,
philosophy, ethics, and religion. It quickened scientific
thought by emphasising empirical methods of invc
%gation, and 1>\ all results i'ound'-d without
sufficient data upon false hypotheses. If, instea
denying the possibility of all sciei of the
.want of a criterion of the truth of phenomena, the"
Fyrrhonists had comprehended the possibility of a
science of phenomena, they mi^ht have l.-d the world""
in scientific progress.1
jn th« IS to thought that t:
y j)n dogmatic beliefs occasioned. Pyrrhonism brought
together all the must prominent theories of the old
schools of philosophy to test tin
their contradictious, and this very process of critici-m
often d< •uioii.xti -ated the power oTthe truth which they
stained.
Sextus Empiricus was often charged by the Church
Fathers with corrupting religious belief, and yet the
st service which Pyrrhonism has rendered the
world was in religious and ethical lines. This sen
did not, naturally, consist in destroying belief in al.
lute truth, as the Sceptic professed to do, but in preparing
the way to find it. The bold attacks of Scepticism on
all truth led men to investigate ethical and religious
teachings, to examine the grounds of their belief, and
to put in practical use the right of reason and free
discussion.
Scepticism was the antecedent of freedom of con-
science and rational criticism,2 and the absolute right of
1 Compare Lewes Op. cit. p. 463. 2 Compare Cbaignet Op. cit. p. 460.
—
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 97
scientific thought. The Sceptics, however, reaped none
of the benefits of their own system. They remained, as
it were, always on the threshold of possible progress.
With the keys to great discoveries in their hands, the
doors of philosophical and scientific advancement were
for ever closed to them by the limitations of their own
system. The inherent weakness of Pyrrhonism lay in its . ;
psychological inconsistency and in its negative character.
I think that weTmay safely say that Pyrrhonism was the
most consistent system of Scepticism ever offered to the
world, and yet it proves most decidedly that complete
Scepticism is psychologically impossible. A man may
give up his belief in one set of ideas, and, if they are
ideas that are popularly accepted, he will be called a
Sceptic, as was the case with Hume. He must, however,
replace these ideas by others equally positive, and then
he is no longer a Sceptic, but a Dogmatic, for he believes
in something.
We have shown that the greatest thinkers of Pyrrho-
nism, Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Agrippa, were not
examples of absolute Scepticism, and although Sextus
Empiricus realised what consistency demanded in this
respect, and affirmed on almost every page that he was
asserting nothing, yet there is not a paragraph of his
books in which he does not, after all, dogmatise on some
subject. Complete Scepticism is contrary to the funda-
mental laws of language, as all use of verbs involves
some affirmation. The Pyrrhonists realised this, and
therefore some of them wrote nothing, like Pyrrho,
their leader, and others advocated afyacria1 as one of
the doctrines of their system.
1 Hyp. i. 192.
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