Seymour Vandeleur, the story of a British officer. Being a memoir of Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel Vandeleur, D.S.O., Scots guards and Irish guards, with a general description of his campaigns

■7\

SEYMOUR
VANDELEUR

^^jir?^;;^

LIEUTENANT VANDELEUR. D.S.O..
SCOTS GUARDS

As A BlMBASHl OF THE EGYPTIAN ArMV. OmDIRMAN. I Sy.'^

SEYMOUR
VANDELEUR

THE STORY OF A BRITISH OFFICER
BEING A MEMOIR OF BREVET-LIEU-
TENANT-COLONEL VANDELEUR, D.S.O.,
SCOTS GUARDS AND IRISH GUARDS,
WITH A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF HIS
CAMPAIGNS

BY COLONEL F. I. MAXSE

C.B., D.S.O., COLDSTREAM GUARDS
WITH WATER-COLOUR ILLUS-
TRATIONS BY NICO JUNGMANN

LONDON: THE NATIONAL REVIEW
OFFICE, 23 RYDER STREET, ST. JAMES'S MCMV

The Author begs to acknowledge permission

GIVEN BY the EDITOR OF THE "NATIONAL

Review" for certain chapters which ap-
peared IN that Review to be incorporated
IN this Volume

PRINTED AT THE BALLANTYNE PRESS.
LONDON; WATER-COLOURS REPRODUCED
BY THE MORTIMER - MBNPES PRESS

LLSS

■-1

-1

'^

TO
SEYMOUR VANDELEUR'S
BROTHER- OFFICERS

OF THE BRIGADE OF GUARDS
I DEDICATE THIS MEMOIR OF
THEIR COMRADE AND FRIEND
IN THE HOPE THAT IT MAY
REMIND THEM OF HIS STRENUOUS

^"^^ LIFE AND HELP OTHERS TO

FOLLOW IN HIS FOOTSTEPS
F. I. M.

211397

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

I. Early Life ^

II. The Story of Uganda 26

III. Soldiering in Uganda 46

IV. The Story of Nigeria 68
V. The Acquisition of British Nigeria 94

VI. England on the Nile 122

VII. The Egyptian Army at Work 146

VIII. On the Atbara 185

IX. Omdurman, September 1898 211

X. Another Year in the Sudan 239

XI. In the Boer War 254

XII. The End 282

ILLUSTRATIONS

Factn?
page

Lieutenant Vandeleur, D.S.O., Scots Guards Frontispiece

Cahiracon, Vandeleur's Home on the Shannon, Ireland 14

The Victoria Nyanza 34

Masai Warriors 48

Road-Making in a Uganda Forest 62

On the March in Nigeria 106

A Water-Wheel on the Nile 126

Lord Kitchener in 1890 156

A Soldier of the qth Sudanese 184
Maxwell's Brigade at the Commencement of the Action,

Battle of Omdurman, 1898 222

9TH Sudanese, Guard of Honour at Omdurman. 1898 250
The Boer Laager at Paard-eberg on the Morning of the

Surrender 264

" On Trek " in South Africa 274

Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Seymour Vandeleur, D.S.O., Irish

Guards, 1901 282

MAPS

i, somaliland 24

2. Uganda and East Africa 66

3. Nigeria and W. Africa 120

4. Plan " Battle of the Atbara " 208

5. Plan "Battle of Omdurman" 232

6. Egyptian Sudan, No. i 238

7. Egyptian Sudan, No. 2 252

8. Africa in 1884 Endo/book

9. Partition of Africa 1902 „

SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

CHAPTER I
EARLY LIFE

Cecil Foster Seymour Vandeleur^ the subject of this
memoir, known to his friends as Seymour Vandeleur,
was born in London on July ii, 1869, the eldest child
of Hector Stewart Vandeleur, Esq., of Kilrush and
Cahiracon in county Clare. His mother was a daughter
of William Orme Foster, Esq., of Apley Park, Shrop-
shire. His father is at present Lord-Lieutenant of
county Clare.

The Vandeleurs are of Norman origin and have been
settled in Ireland since 1660. They seem ever to have
been a race of soldiers and Seymour did but follow
the traditions of his family in his life of active service
abroad. Of his five great-uncles, four attained the
rank of general officer and figured conspicuously in
the campaigns of their day. Thus, General Sir John
Ormsby Vandeleur, K.C.B., born in 1763, commanded
a Light Cavalry brigade at Waterloo. General Paken-
ham Vandeleur fell at Delhi. Crofton, another brother,
died in Antigua. The fourth, also General Vandeleur,
held the command at Cape Town during the Kafir
War of 1801. Frederick, the fifth brother, did not
live to gain the distinction won by the others, for he
was killed in action while still a captain at the battle
of Vittoria.

2 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

In describing a life which still touches our own
times so closely and whose incidents are familiar to
many, it is better to avoid personal description and
allow the plain narrative of a soldier's service to tell
its own tale. Yet no life of this type of officer would
be complete which omitted to give some idea of his
character and personality, inasmuch as it was through
them that he achieved success.

His short, brilliant career was not the outcome of
lucky chance or outside influences : each step in rank,
every decoration, was the reward of hard work and
steady efficiency, tested in the only adequate way —
on active service under various commanders and in
various places. With him there were no spasmodic
efforts with alternate fits of idleness and energy :
from boyhood the trend of his life was even ; he
worked because it was his nature to work, and he
worked well because it was not in him to do things by
halves. His diary, begun at the age of fifteen while
at Eton and continued without the break of a day
until his death, gives an insight into his consistency
of purpose and a clue to his character such as no other
record could convey. Indeed, the zeal with which
he played and worked and the variety of his employ-
ments are sometimes bewildering, though he himself
obviously regarded them as a matter of course. Some
men have a craving for physical exercise which turns
their existence into a round of drudgery and their
minds into narrow grooves, without contributing to
their happiness ; others are much tied to indoor
pursuits, but Seymour never made " heavy weather "
over anything he undertook. His happy nature
prompted him to do things without expecting reward
or striving after effect ; work was as congenial as
play, play as absorbing as work, so much so that

EARLY LIFE 3

one is led to inquire what he himself reckoned as
leisure ?

I recollect well that in 1898 he took over command of
the depot of my battalion at Omdurman, whilst it was
absent on an expedition in which Vandeleur would
have been dehghted to join; it was, in fact, escorting
Major Marchand and his French " mission " from
Fashoda to the Abyssinian border. Meanwhile, work
at the depot entailed the drilling of Sudanese recruits
and a goodly dose of what may be termed the drudgery
of soldiering. Yet so heartily did he do it, though
actually an officer of another corps, that long after
he left the native officers and men would ask affec-
tionately after Bimbashi Vandeleur, and he would
write and inquire about them ; moreover, the sound
work he put into some 400 recruits was amply tested
when they subsequently joined for duty. It was this
power of throwing himself heart and soul into what
he was doing that made him a delightful companion
on service and a refreshing contrast to those who have
a habit of grumbling from the beginning to the end of
every campaign. His sense of humour and cheerful
pluck forebade him to indulge in the privilege of many
good Britishers — namely ** to grouse." Truly, thirty-
two years of such a life were worth more both to himself
and to those who loved him than the three-score and
ten allotted to some of us.

To return to his early years. Seymour at ten
began school life at Farnborough in the private estab-
lishment of the Rev. A. Morton. Three years later
he went to Eton, to the Rev. Edmund Warre's house,
and on Dr. Warre succeeding to the headmastership,
Seymour was transferred with others to the house of
the Rev. Stewart Donaldson, Mr. Impey being his
classical tutor. At Eton he seems to have been

4 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

thoroughly happy without entirely wasting his time.
Boys like him of energetic, manly tastes enjoy to the
full the varied occupations and interests of a big
school, and are popular with masters and boys
alike. In fact, he was just the sort of boy for Eton,
possessing sufficient strength of character to avoid
being spoiled, yet worthy ahke of its traditions and
associations.

Nevertheless, a careful study of his hfe does not
enable one to attribute his advancement to the training
or instruction he received at school, and the fact that
he was a public-school boy — as are most men of his
class — cannot be cited in favour of our system of educat-
ing average boys. Great Britain is apparently enter-
ing on a period of strenuous competition in all spheres
of enterprise and in all parts of the world, and it is
questionable whether the traditional education which
until now has qualified Englishmen to compete with
other Englishmen, will in future enable them also to
compete with better equipped Americans and Germans.
Our public-schools are not merely or even chiefly
" seats of learning," but surely the hours allotted to
study might at least be devoted to some useful purpose.
As to what is or is not useful, I would merely remark —
with the respect due to our appointed teachers — that
neither headmasters nor their assistants are really
qualified judges. They conscientiously teach up to
the standard in vogue, but even within its narrow
limits they are never taught the difficult art of impart-
ing elementary instruction. They are usually public-
school boys, nurtured on the old curriculum. From
school they pass through a university and take a
degree, after which they settle down for life to educate
boys for the various professions. I have no desire to
criticise individuals or a class, but can it be truthfully

EARLY LIFE 5

said that our slip-shod plan of selecting and training
schoolmasters does provide a suitable education for the
soldiers, lawyers, business-men, politicians, and civil-
servants of the British Empire ?

In truth, we have none of us received at school any
solid groundwork of practical instruction, and those
who desire to acquaint themselves with the world
in which they live have to pick up the elements of
history, geography and money matters after their
school-days are over. By this method we usually
remain amateurs in all the walks of life, unaccustomed
to sustained mental effort and constantly displaying
ignorance of rudimentary facts.

Our public schools, enthroned amidst the traditions
of past centuries, form each a society, a little world
of its own, in which the social grades, the unwritten
laws, the standards of public opinion are preserved
and upheld with the enthusiasm of youth. The result
is in many ways excellent, producing a high standard
of honour as between boy and boy, an innate sense of
justice, fair play and straight dealing, an esprit de
corps and a self-sacrifice for the common good, which
have richly endowed Englishmen in all parts of the
world. Such advantages are not lightly to be bartered
in exchange for mere knowledge ; but the drawback
lies in the fact that the school world is exclusive, that,
instead of being a means to an end, a threshold across
which to enter upon life, it degenerates into being an
end in itself. Many boys, and parents too, consider
school success in work or games as the ne plus ultra
of ambition and those who obtain it are surrounded
with so transcendant a glory, that they may well
believe themselves absolved from further effort. They
feel they can never be such " swells " again and are
content to rest on a past which ended at nineteen.

6 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Who has not known several such in his school-days ?
Brilliant demi-gods, whose after-life has been marked
by no ambition, whose abilities have never lifted them
above obscurity ? On the average boy, too, school
opinion makes a lasting impression, and he uncon-
sciously models himself on the hues thus laid down.
In our youth the best, the only thing was to be a
"public-school boy," and we remain pubHc-school boys
all our days. Look where you will, in the Army, in
Parliament, in the leading professions, in our railways,
and in our business houses, you will see a number of
^excellent amateurs struggUng ineffectually with techni-
cal problems. They make admirable subordinates and
shine most especially in their behaviour to native
populations in India, the Sudan, Egypt and other places.
But when it becomes necessary to excel in a particu-
lar line, to go one better, to get out of a groove and be
something of a speciahst, the Enghshman is disincUned
to leave the beaten track. Such ideas were dis-
countenanced in the old school-days as cranky and
tending to divide a boy from his fellows. He was
trained to be a gentleman, not an expert, and it does
not occur to him to try to be both. Moreover, he
lacks the necessary groundwork of modern history,
languages, geography and science, which are painfully
acquired after the age of twenty-five. So he sticks
to the school standard which was good enough for him
and his compeers. Thus it comes to pass that
mediocrity, if it but bear the accepted hall-mark,
passes muster amongst us and is promoted to positions
which demand capacity and special training. There
are of course exceptions ; men endowed with a
strength of character which breaks through tradition.
Such was Seymour Vandeleur, who became prominent
amongst his contemporaries not by reason of his public-

EARLY LIFE 7

school training, but independently and perhaps in
spite of it.

Be this as it may, Seymour threw himself with
energj^ into the life at Eton. He elected to be a
" dry bob," and was indefatigable, according to the
season of the year, at fives, cricket, and football, all
of which he played for his house. The diary contains
regular accounts of runs with the beagles and the sport
they showed. He was a keen volunteer, being pro-
moted sergeant in 1886, and complains with sadness
of the poor attendance of the corps at field-days ; in
fact, it was not then the fashion to be a volunteer.
He represented the school at rifle shooting as one of
the members of the team. His vigour at games and
cheerfulness on all occasions made him many friends,
several of whom passed into Sandhurst and joined the
Brigade of Guards with him. He was steady at book-
work, devoting fixed hours every day to " extras,"
and consequently passed straight from Eton into Sand-
hurst— fifty-second out of ninety candidates — without
going to any crammer. He was fond of reading,
especially military books, and naturally quick at pick-
ing up foreign languages in spite of inadequate school
teaching. His holidays were often spent in France,
and he took regular lessons from a Monsieur Cauvet,
who taught him enough French to enable him to enjoy
plays at the Theatre Fran9ais — no mean test. At
Dinard he took to sketching, a subject in which he was
afterwards most proficient. In Switzerland we find
him mountaineering ; and, as all pursuits were entered
into with enthusiasm and were encouraged by a father
and a mother who devoted themselves to his holidays, he
entered the Royal Mihtary College (Sandhurst) on Sep-
tember 1, 1887, with a larger stock of special and general
information than is usually found in our boys of eighteen.

8 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

The practical work at Sandhurst, particularly the
surveying and military sketching, was congenial, and
at the end of one year he passed out forty-fourth out
of 138, with special certificates in topography and
riding. From Sandhurst, too, dates his first acquaint-
ance with polo which ever afterwards remained his
favourite amusement. He played it wherever he
went, often in places where it had never been seen
before, such as Uganda, Nigeria and parts of the Sudan,
and when he could not get enough players for a game,
he would spend an hour knocking a ball about alone.
Within a few weeks of his first handhng a polo club
we find him playing for Sandhurst against the i8th
Hussars and getting handsomely defeated in the
attempt. But he soon developed a better game
and ended by playing in many first-class matches at
Hurlingham.

After Sandhurst, a happy spell of shooting and
hunting at Apley, his grandfather's place in Shropshire,
occupied him till February, 1889, when he joined the
2nd Battalion Scots Guards in Dublin, as a second
lieutenant. Now, there is a certain amount of mis-
conception prevalent regarding the so-called ordeal
of joining a regiment ; but it is in no sense a formidable
undertaking, as those who have had to go through
with it are well aware. A self-conscious boy who is
just beginning to be a man no doubt feels shy and
awkward, but this soon wears off, and my civilian
readers should dismiss from their minds any phantom
horrors which may have been conjured up. The
truth is, that the standard of general conduct and
military efficiency amongst the captains and subalterns
of the British Army is a high one ; in none is it higher
than in the Brigade of Guards ; and one purpose of
this memoir will be amply fulfilled if it should succeed

EARLY LIFE 9

in doing justice to a body of officers of whom Vandeleur
was but a type. All ranks have recently been assailed
by floods of amateur criticism, excusable and useful
as regards certain regrettable incidents in the conduct
of military affairs ; for the Army, like the nation, has
for years been run on amateur lines, the product of
our amateur schools, and will continue to be so run
until we " enter " boys as military cadets on some plan
similar to that recently adopted by the Admiralty.
But meanwhile, amidst the welter of indiscriminate
fault-finding, it is satisfactory to recognise that no
case has been established against the junior officers,
captains and subalterns, in actual command of men in
the field. The regimental officer was highly tested
in the late war ; he was not found wanting ; and his
men relied on him with confidence.

This good result, if closely examined, must chiefly
be attributed to the efficiency of the regimental system,
which is based less upon official regulations than upon
time-honoured traditions of duty and conduct.
Through long periods of peace and short periods of
war, in the various climates and garrisons of the
British Empire a high standard has been maintained,
not by repeating copybook maxims and attending to
grandmotherly effusions in the press, but by a system
of discipline which has had the merit of being effective
in its results. It is based upon a sound moral code
amongst the officers, handed down from generation
to generation, a code to which the newly-joined
subaltern must learn to conform. As a rule he is only
too anxious to do so and be admitted to full member-
ship of the society of his brother officers, for the un-
written laws of a mess are no hardship to a manly
young fellow. A certain number of boys are, however,
thrust into the Army without regard to their suit-

10 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

ability or qualifications for soldiering, and some
parents seem to think that the regimental code should
be modified in order to admit these square pegs into
round holes. For, strange as it may seem to those
who imagine that any youth will become a good officer,
I venture to say there are some temperaments to
whom it is positively wicked to entrust the lives of
good soldiers. Such men may be endowed with first-
rate ability for other work, though there is no use
for them in the Army, and it would certainly be a
kindness to remove them whilst still young to more
suitable spheres of occupation ; but their relatives
have endowed them with a so-called military educa-
tion, have paid for a military uniform and wish to
keep them in the Army, unless some serious offence
can be proved against them. Unfortunately, it is
extremely difficult to frame a specific charge against
a young officer who is not by nature suited to com-
mand even a corporal's guard ; and if several such
should congregate in a battalion, they form a coterie
amongst themselves, a clique of dissentients which
holds itself aloof from the accepted code and is
thoroughly bad for the discipline of the corps. Perhaps
the commanding officer, if he be a good judge of boys
and an exceptionally strong man, may be able to get
rid of the nuisance through the official channel ; but
he will find it no easy task unless he be supported by
his superiors and protected from pubhc annoyance
by the inefficient boy's relatives.

Surely, when we realise the general advantages of
permitting officers to enforce their own standard of
conduct and recollect how rarely they have abused
this privilege, we are led to the conclusion that, instead
of endeavouring to curtail their power of ejecting black
sheep, we should, in our wisdom, confer on regimental

EARLY LIFE ii

officers increased and authorised facilities for eliminat-
ing those who are unable to command the respect of
their men.

To Seymour Vandeleur at any rate, joining the
Scots Guards was an unmixed pleasure. He found
his Sandhurst friend, Cecil Lowther, just arrived, and
ten days later we find him installed at the Commanding
Officer's whist-table, an unheard-of proceeding in any
Continental army, yet a sufficient illustration of the
tone which pervades a good British battalion. During
the next five years he stuck closely to regimental duty
in Dublin, London, Pirbright and Windsor, and
realised that soldiering in these desirable quarters
entailed a deal of hard work ; for, during the first
three years of his service, an officer of the Guards is
kept steadily at duty without any relaxation in the
form of leave. The theory is that youth is the age for
education and improvement, but also the age in which
slovenly habits are easily acquired and perpetuated.
Consequently the youngest officers, without exception,
are taught all they can be taught and given no oppor-
tunities of being slack, either on or off duty. They
are kept continuously busy under the supervision of
the adjutant from early morn till late in the afternoon,
in the hope that the groove of doing their work
thoroughly and energetically may be persevered in
afterwards — an expectation which is fulfilled or not
according to the disposition of the individual. Shirk-
ing and loafing are alike tabooed.

When Vandeleur joined. Colonel the Hon. J.
Vanneck was commanding officer and Mr. Erskine
adjutant, of the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards. Attached
to the Left Flank company in February, Seymour
passed in company drill in March and entered on his
daily round of duty, going on guard at the Castle,

12 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

coming off guard to do a picquet, attending three
battalion parades daily and gradually learning the
interior economy of his company. June and July were
spent at musketry in the Curragh Camp ; in September
the battalion moved to Chelsea Barracks, London ;
and Vandeleur went on the Queen's Guard at St.
James's Palace for the first time — always a memorable
episode in a young Guardsman's soldiering, but one
which loses its charm after a four months' spell of
winter guard-mounting has entailed two nights out of
bed in each week — the intervening days being filled
in with picquets, drills, winter schemes, war games,
route-marches, lectures, judging distance practices
and " shouting " drill. A month of duty at the
Depot (Caterham) under Major Crabbe completed his
first year of service, during which his main relaxation
had been an occasional game of racquets at Prince's
Club.

Owing to his proficiency in military mapmaking,
he was selected to instruct a class of non-commissioned
officers in topography, and the first months of 1890
were spent at this work, usually on Epsom Downs, at
a season of the year when they can scarcely be called
a popular resort. In March he rode in the winning
team of the Brigade of Guards point-to-point race,
and during next summer enjoyed a full polo season
at Hurlingham, being now of a calibre to play in first-
class matches and with such crack players as the three
Peats, Toby Rawlinson, Lord Harrington, John
Watson, Major Peters and others. It was his habit
to buy ponies more or less in the rough, train them
to the game with infinite care and trouble, and with
excellent results. There were other and more excep-
tional amusements this summer, such as an ascent
in a balloon from the Military Exhibition with Lord

EARLY LIFE 13

Edward Cecil, of the Grenadiers, but the diary gives no
details of this expedition save that the balloon de-
scended harmlessly in a field near Chelmsford, and that
the half share of the costs amounted to £5 15s.

In August ensued the usual musketry course at
Pirbright Camp, after which the 2nd Battahon Scots
Guards moved to Windsor and Seymour obtained five
days' leave, his first holiday, every moment of which
was devoted to cub-hunting and partridge shooting.
Windsor offers facilities for a good deal of sport of a
kind, what with the Household Brigade Drag (to
which he occasionally acted as whip and had the usual
quota of falls), Mr. Garth's foxhounds, and the Queen's
staghounds, now suppressed ; but the winter of 1890
was unusually severe, the Thames being frozen over
for weeks, so skating took the place of hunting, and
the long days on guard at the Castle were spent in the
splendid library to which the officers have access.

The summer of 1891 saw a new departure in Vande-
leur's mihtary life, as he was selected to be trained at
Aldershot in the newly formed (provisional) Mounted
Infantry Regiment for three months, under Lieutenant-
Colonel (now General Sir Edward) Hutton ; he was
attached to the company composed of the Black
Watch, Seaforth, Cameron and Gordon Highlanders,
and amongst other officers in the regiment may be
mentioned poor Roddy Owen, who afterwards died
on service in the Dongola Expedition, and Mr. (now
Lieutenant-Colonel) Jenner, D.S.O. Here he was
kept busier than ever at Mounted Infantry work in
the camp at Bourley Bottom, scouting, long field days
and autumn manoeuvres, and it was always a satis-
faction to him to recollect, when employed during the
South African War in General Hutton's Mounted
Infantry Brigade, that he was in the first batch of

14 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

officers thus trained, and Sir Edward has several times
expressed the very high opinion he entertained of
Seymour Vandeleur.

Seymour was promoted Lieutenant in May 1892,
and was then ordered to go through the School of
Musketry at Hythe, where he spent most of the
summer and passed out with a special certificate.
Taking time by the forelock, and as though conscious
that future years would find him fully occupied, he
at once set to work to pass the examination for pro-
motion to the rank of captain and devoted a portion
of his winter leave to the necessary book- work. He
managed, however, during the autumn to attend the
cavalry manoeuvres at Frensham.

The year 1893 witnessed an ever-increasing desire
to learn about things in general and to acquire the
most varied accomplishments. Often in the course
of a single afternoon we discover Seymour passing
through the hands of three instructors ; Peall, the
great professional, gave him billiard lessons ; Saunders
of Prince's Club taught him tennis ; a corporal of
the Scots Guards band gave him flute lessons ; he
spent a month in Berlin with a tutor to brush up
colloquial German and then competed for an inter-
preter's certificate ; and no sooner was this examina-
tion completed than we see him tackling Spanish
with a Signor Veda. Meanwhile, May was spent at
Aldershot undergoing a veterinary class and examina-
tion. As all this extra work was undertaken in addition
to his regimental duty, we get a glimpse of Seymour's
firm resolve to qualify himself for whatever might be
required of him.

August and September were taken up with man-
oeuvres on a somewhat larger scale than had previously
been attempted, and a complete Guards brigade of four

CAHIKACON. VANDELEUK'S HOME ON THE SHANNON.

IRELAND

EARLY LIFE 15

battalions assembled at Frensham and operated on
Swanley Downs where, at the termination of hostilities,
15,000 men marched past Field-Marshal H.R.H. the
Duke of Connaught.

By this time a long-cherished plan had matured
itself in the minds of the two friends, Cecil Lowther
and Seymour Vandeleur, and they obtained four
months' leave of absence to travel in Somaliland and
shoot big game. Rarely were two companions more
suited to such an enterprise or more worthy of its
pleasures and opportunities. To Seymour it meant
more than a mere shooting trip, for he had made up
his mind not only to penetrate beyond the explored
country, but also to map the whole route ; he con-
sequently prepared himself for this work by taking
a course of lessons in the use of the sextant at the
Royal Geographical Society, and so greatly did
he profit by this instruction that on his return he
presented a map to the society, which is still the
main source of information for that part of Somah-
land.

The friends quitted London on December i, 1893,
en route for the Dark Continent, which was, with brief
intervals, to absorb the remainder of Seymour's Hfe.
Travelhng as rapidly as possible via Paris, Marseilles,
Port Said and Suez, they disembarked at Aden on
December 13. Here Lowther waited in order to
purchase provisions and bring on the baggage which
had started by the all-sea route, whilst Vandeleur
embarked on a coasting steamboat for Berbera (the
capital of British Somahland) where be began to
organise a camel caravan for the march into the interior.
Big changes, as we know, have been wrought in
Eastern lands since Europeans first discovered India,
but one reform has never been accompHshed, namely,

i6 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

to instil activity into stray native retainers. They
regard energy as a palpable blot on the character of
the white man and treat it with amiable tolerance.
Lowther found the same notion prevalent in Aden,
so they both learned the necessity of patience in Eastern
travel and the insufficiency of four months' leave.
The latter they provided for by telegraphing home for
an extra month.

At last, on January 5, 1894, all was ready, and the
caravan of thirty camels, four ponies, two donkeys,
four sheep and twenty-seven men set out for the
interior, across a barren desert called the Hand.*

The nineteen days' march from the coast can be
described in a few lines. The great charm of the journey
lay in its absolute isolation from anything resembling
a beaten track and the delightful uncertainty of what
might be in front. Each day presented fresh problems,
yet every detail had to be arranged without advice
from experienced hands. The tourist in Europe,
who fusses with telegrams to hotels to have his bed-
room retained and his dinner ordered, has no more
notion of the real pleasures of travel than a cuckoo
understands the rearing of a nest of young birds.
But a traveller with an African caravan learns and
enjoys many things. After a cool night, the early
rise, the bustle of packing tents and provisions on
unwilling camels, the hurried breakfast in the dark,
these unavoidable troubles vanish directly he mounts
his pony and rides forth in the delicious atmosphere
of Africa's early morn. Dawn has appeared, nature is
awakening, freshness is in the air and a hundred
buzzings and cooings proclaim the rising sun. Indeed,
'tis good to make the most of his rising, for by noon
he will have subdued us all, man, beast, trees, convert-

* See map facing page 24.

EARLY LIFE 17

ing nature into a sort of brazen image of stifled life
till evening.

Vandeleur and Lowther, during the daily march,
scoured the country on both flanks for game and
bagged some koodoo, oryx and dig-dig — the latter
a pretty little animal like a miniature deer. Thus they
hardened themselves for future work and accustomed
themselves to the ways of their respective shikaris.
The natives they met with were friendly but in dire
distress, owing to the lateness of the rains and the
frequency of Abyssinian raids from across the border ;
and as the caravan pushed further inland the servants
became somewhat alarmed, and the cook even sug-
gested he should be served out with a gun on the line
of march, " because he did not wish to be like a woman,
without a weapon." His whim was not gratified, and
he was requested to devote more attention to the menu,
of which the following is a common sample :

Diner du Jour.

Potage — Koodoo.

Poisson — Sardines f rites.

Rot — Boeuf corne (corned).

Entremet — Cabin Biscuit a F apricot jam.

Crossing the Hand entailed five days' marching with
water carried on camels ; the country consisted of a
" wilderness of small trees and thorn bushes, followed
by eight miles of open plain without a vestige of any-
thing on it but stones, and then again the same wilder-
ness of bushes ; and it will give you some idea of the
sort of country if I mention that, when we reached
the watering-place, only four camels could be watered
every hour, as water did not trickle through the sand
any faster."

However, when they got to the Awari pools they

i8 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

found them deep and full of water, and consequently
the resort of game from the drier districts in the neigh-
bourhood. In fact, on the very night of their arrival
a lion was heard roaring close to the zariba and tents
at 2 A.M., and was actually seen in an open space
on its way to water. Intense excitement prevailed
amongst the men and camels and at daybreak Lowther
and Vandeleur started off on its tracks.

" After walking three hours through wooded
country, checking at two or three bits of high grass
and brush, Nur (my shikari) and I were going through
a thick place, when we suddenly saw him thirty yards
to our left, looking at us. It took me a little time to
make sure of my aim, as the undergrowth was thick
and he was exactly the colour of the grass. I fired
with the .500 bore, and the bullet went in under his
eye, smashing up the left side of his head. He turned
over and I think this bullet really was enough. How-
ever, he made such a row I fired again, breaking his
neck. Lowther was about 150 yards to my left and
had rather an exciting moment, as he could not see
anything, though he heard the animal in the grass
after I shot. It was a really splendid male with lovely
mane, and our guide, the son of a local sheik, says this
particular lion has been weU known for a long time in
the district, and has killed thirty-four natives, including
one of his relatives. It measures just under ten feet
from end of tail to nose, and I am quite satisfied at
having come now, whatever else I may get or not, as
one might come year after year and not get one like
him."

This was his first lion, and the above is an extract
from a letter written home the same day. To celebrate
the occasion they split a bottle — no, a pint of cham-

EARLY LIFE 19

pagne at the evening meal. Again on January 28,
he wrote :

" This was a record day altogether. I left camp
at six and walked north-west for two hours and then
got on to some fresh rhinoceros tracks, which I followed
up for nearly five hours, sometimes going very fast
over open ground, and then creeping silently through
dense jungle. (I must first tell you that these rhi-
noceros feed at night, travelling immense distances,
and hide and sleep during the day in thick dark places
in the jungle, making their way through it in an
astonishing manner.) At length we heard a rustHng,
and there stood two of them, under a tree, not thirty
yards off ! I fired with the ten-bore, and away they
went hke lightning. We ran three or four hundi'ed
yards as fast as we could, blood being visible on the
ground ; and, after going through some high grass,
there they were to my dehght, standing in the open.
I fired at the wounded one and was glad to see him
sink gradually on his knees and turn over. I now-
noticed the other was much smaller and should have
let him off, but he turned nastily on me and, being too
big to be a pleasant customer, had to be settled too.
The first one turned out to be a ' whopper,' \\dth splendid
tusk, so I sent a pony for camels and carried his head
into camp, and you shall judge of his size for yourself
when we return. It is a great piece of luck, as it is
generally very difficult to get near them. On reaching
camp I found Lowther returned with two lionesses,
which he had tracked for some distance southwards
and shot with success. The excitement in camp at
night was great ; the men had a sort of war dance,
whilst we spht another pint."

It will not be necessary to follow day by day the

20 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

indefatigable and enthusiastic sportsmen during the
ups and downs of their month in this district, nor to
enter into the details of their bag, which totalled four
rhinoceros, seven lions and numerous smaller game.
After several failures, they found the plan of sitting
up for lions at night in a tiny zariba near a tied-up
donkey an unprofitable amusement, owing to the
numerous hyaenas and swarms of mosquitos. In fact,
so accustomed were they to the fruitless results of these
night watches that, on one dark night when Lowther
was really visited by five lions, he mistook them for
hyaenas and drove them away with stones and bad
language ! After this they gave up the tied donkey,
so dear to the heart of native sportsmen, and stalked
their game in broad daylight over miles and miles of
country, through thick bush and jungle and over
scrub-covered plains.

Towards the end of February they were contem-
plating a speedy return to civilisation when they
received news from the coast that a reply to their
telegram for more leave had arrived, and an extension
to April 30 had been granted. This meant another
month of shooting in the best of the season, and great
was their joy thereat. Their stay in the Awari and
Milmil districts had been interesting from other points
of view than shooting — especially as at that time the
country was supposed to be under British jurisdiction.
The inhabitants were far from being in the enjoyment
of Pax Britannica, and were at the mercy of alternate
parties of Abyssinian and Ogaden Somali raiders.
The latter numbered about 300, and spent their time
looting camels and killing any villagers who resisted
their depredations. The Sheik of Milmil held a diffi-
cult " official " situation. He represented the British
Government, but was also in the pay of the Abyssinians

EARLY LIFE 21

for whom he levied tribute and collected sheep from
the members of his own tribe, and thus robbed his
people for the benefit of strangers and himself. Raids
and inter-tribal warfare were so prevalent that sheep
and camels were becoming scarce, so men were sub-
stituted in their stead, and the prisoners captured
were held up to ransom. In former days the tariff
for one man's ransom had been a hundred camels,
but competition and scarcity had reduced the value
of human hfe by about go per cent., and ten camels
was now held to be a fair price. The unfortunate
prisoners were chained in the villages till their tribe
produced the equivalent in camels ; and, when the
available chains were all in use, the following barbarous
device was instituted to expedite matters. Strips of
damp camel-hide were sewn tightly round a prisoner's
legs just above the ankle, and, as the hide gradually
dried up and contracted, the victim usually lost the
use of his legs within about a month. This was not
an edifying spectacle of the majesty of British law
and order, but our prestige was sufficiently acknow-
ledged to prevent Abyssinians and others from shooting
at British officers. One night a party of four Abys-
sinians (not hyaenas !) did surround Lowther, as he
sat in a zariba waiting for lions, and things looked
a bit nasty till they discovered they were dealing with
a white man and quietly departed. Indeed, there
occurred several minor incidents which required firm-
ness and tact on the part of the young officers to
prevent molestation. Yet, on the whole, they were
well treated ; the meat of the animals they killed
proved a great boon to some of the hungry inhabitants
and frequently procured them a friendly reception.

On quitting Milmil they preferred to trust their
own observation rather than native reports, regarding

22 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

localities for game and water and the distances to be
traversed ; so they made up their minds to skirt the
inner edge of the Hand in a north-westerly direction,
and march on the Abyssinian hills in the neighbour-
hood of Harar. They thus journeyed through a land
inhabited by tribes who had never beheld a white
man though nominally under British protection, and
they received several applications for assistance against
Abyssinian persecutors, which they wisely dechned to
entertain. Some years later the Haud and district
south of it was handed over to King Menelik by the
British Government.

The country presented a totally different aspect
as they ascended higher and higher up the southern
spurs of the mountains, and the scenery in places was
magnificent, with views away eastwards across an
open plain to Jigjiga, northward over wooded hills
towards Harar, and westward overlooking barren
lands which extended to the foot of the mountains
of Abyssinia. Turning gradually north and east they
descended into the Jigjiga vale, after the commence-
ment of the rains, and devoted many a lengthy tramp
to the fresh elephant tracks which they struck but
could make nothing of. The elephants were ap-
parently travelling rapidly through this country, and
when an elephant is " making his point " he does not
tarry by the wayside, so, as Seymour put it, *' the
covers were all drawn blank," except for lion, lesser
koodoo and smaller game.

It was now time to think of the return journey to
the coast, and, on studying the map which he had
carefully constructed from daily notes, Seymour
decided to march straight for Hargeisa near the
Khamsa district, thus completing a circle of several
hundred miles' length round the northern Haud and

EARLY LIFE 23

into the interior. To his intense satisfaction on arriv-
ing at Hargeisa he found his map* closed on this point
almost without error, and was thus amply rewarded
for the tedious work of marking up his daily course
and taking correct noonday observations, in spite of
the sun's high altitude.

They received news at Hargeisa of a serious accident
having befallen Lord Delamere, who, with his friend
Mr. Mure, was shooting beyond the Hand. A wounded
lion charged him ; he missed it with both barrels ;
and the brute seized his foot as he fell backwards.
His two shikaris, with magnificent courage, hurled
themselves on the lion's back, and distracted its atten-
tion from Lord Delamere. Their devotion saved his
life, but all three were severely mauled, though they
afterwards completely recovered from their injuries.
Reassured by a satisfactory message regarding this
accident, our friends found time for several more days'
shooting, and the following is Seymour's graphic
account of their last exploit in Somaliland :

" Soon after marching from Arror to return to the
coast we found tracks in the plain, and half a mile or
so further on, whilst we were all walking together and
not the least expecting it, a lioness — the remaining
Arror one — broke cover from some bush in front and
made off. Lowther and I ran on as hard as we could :
I saw him take a tremendous toss over a hole and land,
digging his rifle into the ground. The pace was too
good to stop to inquire, and he came on again at once.
I think we must have covered four or five miles over
the plain in the shortest time on record, the lioness
being still some way in front.

" My syce (groom) * Aden,' who had gone back for

* His map is reproduced facing page 24.

24 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

a pony, arrived at full gallop, taking one good cropper
also ; he went on in front and rounded up the beast
in some scrub most gallantly, all by himself on the
pony, just before she reached cover the other side of
the plain. She made for him no less than ten times.
We heard him shouting at her and came up as quick
as we could, Lowther on the right of the bushes and I
on the left. I caught sight of her head in the bush
and fired, missing her. She went off with a growl to
the right, and Lowther had two or three shots, hitting
her once high up in the shoulder.

" I thought there were going to be * ructions,' and,
sure enough, out she came, and went straight for
Lowther, and his two shikaris^ who were standing in
the open, sixty or seventy yards off. She did not see
me, as I was behind a small bush, and passed me at
about ten yards, going top speed. I did my best to stop
her, but aimed a little too far in front and hit her in
the shoulder, under Lowther's shot. This did not hurt
her much, though it made an awful mess of her shoulder,
and must have stopped her spring. On she went,
straight for Lowther, but he stepped aside into a thorn
bush, and killed her dead with a shot in the spine just
as she seized his second shikari by the wrist. It was
lucky killing her on the spot. The shikari is not much
injured. Nur and I were nearly shot by Lowther's
other man, who blazed away several times through a
cloud of dust after the lioness was dead."

This dramatic incident fittingly closed the SomaH-
land shooting trip, during which the total bag com-
prised thirteen lions, four rhinoceros, three big koodoo,
thirteen lesser koodoo, five hartebeest and numerous
oryx, aul, gerenuk and digdig. The expedition had
also developed the spirit of self-rehance and initiative —

EARLY LIFE 25

both of them useful quahties in an officer. The map
which Vandeleur compiled from his own data is repro-
duced on the opposite page and, as the country traversed
afterwards became the scene of some fighting with the
Somahland Mullah, the survey was of use some years
later. Meanwhile the President of the Royal Geogra-
phical Society was so well satisfied with the accuracy
of the work that he wrote Vandeleur a letter of hearty
congratulation and mentioned the circumstance in his
annual address to the Society.

The two young officers rejoined the Scots Guards
for duty in April, but Vandeleur was so bitten with the
life and opportunities which are granted to energetic
men in Africa that he volunteered for a period of
service with the Uganda Rifles. His application was
granted, and on August 10, 1894, at the age of twenty-
five, he set out from London on a career of usefulness
which was to lead him over thousands of miles of the
African continent and bring him distinction wherever
he went. One of the secrets of his success was the care
he took to study at the Royal Geographical Society's
library the work of previous explorers and soldiers
in each country he visited. He also took with him
every obtainable book which treated of the problems
he was to deal with, and read them on the journey out.
In this way he acquired a remarkable knowledge of
Africa, especially its geography and history, and then
used his opportunities to supplement, instead of
merely repeating, the experiences of others.

On the same principle I propose to devote a chapter
to the story of Uganda, before I introduce the reader
to the duties which Vandeleur and others performed
in that interesting kingdom.

CHAPTER II

THE STORY OF UGANDA

See map facing page 66

The country for which Seymour Vandeleur was now
bound and in which he was to gain a first experience
of active service, was, in 1894, a new province of the
British Empire. Although much had been written
about Uganda and East Africa in the newspapers
and periodicals of the day, it was mostly of a contro-
versial nature, for at that date our people were not ahve
to the necessity of British expansion on the African
continent. Men's minds were being swayed by two
diametrically opposed views, propounded respectively
by the enterprising and the over-cautious ; those who
had penetrated beyond the coast-line and seen for
themselves the great possibilities of equatorial Africa
endeavoured to persuade our politicians to undertake
a forward movement ; whereas those who habitually
stayed at home and conducted the ordinary affairs of
the British Isles persuaded themselves and others to
discredit all travellers' tales and to refuse " supplies "
for enterprises which might entail future responsibility.
Several years were thus spent in hesitation, during
which France and Germany were actively acquiring
" colonies " which we had originally discovered : the
average Cabinet Minister, of both political parties,
considered the African continent a " bore " and an
interruption to the accepted game of party politics ;

THE STORY OF UGANDA 27

the average newspaper reader, confused by unfamiliar
African names and by the heat engendered between
rival controversalists, was unable to form a decided
opinion.

What was specially wanted by those who were
inchned to consider an old problem from a new point
of view was definite information regarding the chmates,
populations and products of these countries ; the
controversalists were found to lay stress only on those
points which best illustrated their particular arguments,
and thus made it more difficult for a man who had
never been in Africa to understand the problem.

At that time Mr. Chamberlain had not yet initiated
his countrymen into his statesmanhke pohcy of develop-
ing backward dependencies on sound business hues.
Nigeria was but a dim possibiUty, an unrecognised
Mohammedan Empire. A hostile South Africa
threatened the very existence of Greater Britain. The
British Empire itself had been but recently *' dis-
covered." But fortunately there appeared in 1892 the
now well-known work, entitled "England in Egypt,"
by Sir Alfred Milner. This book ran into five editions
in eighteen months and revealed to men of all parties
how a bankrupt and undeveloped country had become
prosperous and solvent under steady control by
British officials. The facts and figures were so lucidly
put, the difficulties encountered and the way they
were overcome so fairly stated, that even partisans
of the Little England school were bound to admit
that Lord Cromer was accomplishing a great work on
the banks of the Nile. From warm approval arose an
honourable desire to persevere in the work and extend
its benefits to the Sudan, and it thus gradually dawned
on our minds that British rule could be a real blessing
to African races, in spite of the drawback of our being

28 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

obliged first to establish it with the aid of maxim
guns.

Now, the ancient kingdom of Uganda, at the time
of Vandeleur's arrival, had not yet been blessed by
the process of being " Egyptianised " [administered
by native officials controlled by a handful of honest
Englishmen], though that has since followed in due
course. Nor was very much known about its history
and general conditions except from the reports of ex-
plorers, who hurried through the various territories of
East Africa. But in the year 1902 appeared an admir-
able work, " The Uganda Protectorate," by Sir Harry
Johnston. From it and other sources I now propose
to set forth such facts as may help the reader to an
understanding of what had taken place in this province
prior to the year 1894. We will, therefore, first embark
on a short resume of what is known of the native history
and origin of the people, describe in a few words the
work of the first white men who explored the country ;
and then follow in detail the doings of Vandeleur
during his year and a half in Uganda and Unyoro.

The Protectorate lies around the northern shores
of the Victoria Nyanza, and extends from them in a
westerly and northerly direction to the Great Congo
Forest, to Lake Albert, to the vast marshes south of
Fashoda (Egyptian Sudan), and to the shores of Lake
Rudolph, on the Abyssinian border. This region,
which is governed from the administrative capital,
Entebbe, on the Victoria Nyanza, contains a greater
variety of climates and a more diversified landscape
than are to be found in all the countries which adjoin
the Mediterranean seaboard : it is inhabited by popu-
lations who vary from one another in appearance,
habits, language and spiritual development as greatly
as vary the mountaineers of Switzerland and the peas-

THE STORY OF UGANDA 29

ants of Italy from the fishermen of Malta and the
grandees of Spain, while animal and vegetable life
is simply bewildering in its profusion. The mountains
of Ruwenzori (20,000 ft. high) contain glaciers which
rival those of the Alps ; the dismal swamps of the
Nile Valley cover ten thousand square miles of land ;
and between such extremes the type of inhabitant and
species of plant is necessarily of the greatest variety.
There are large areas within the temperate zone, at alti-
tudes between six and seven thousand feet, where a mag-
nificent country and healthy climate will some day afford
a home to perhaps half a million white inhabitants from
Europe; although the first settlers may suffer from
fevers and other hardships, these will in course of time
be overcome by industry and applied knowledge. For
it may be fairly claimed as a scientific fact that the
lengthened residence of white inhabitants tends to
sanitate a virgin soil and banish injurious microbes
from it : it is on record that fevers and agues were rife
in Great Britain when this country was as undrained
as are the uplands of Uganda ; and the experience of
India has shown that whereas in the eighteenth century
British soldiers died like flies, in the nineteenth we
maintained an army of 72,000 white men there in
healthy conditions.

Sir Harry Johnston* in his careful study of the
natives (they beheld a white man for the first time in
1862) gives cogent reasons for believing that the abo-
riginal inhabitants were the pygmies, whose descend-
ants still lurk in parts of the Great Congo Forest and

* To readers who would investigate the numerous charms and
drawbacks of a residence in Uganda, Sir H. Johnston's entertaining
descriptions may be warmly recommended — see his " Uganda Protec-
torate" (two vols.), published by Hutchinson & Co., Paternoster Row,
in 1902, and profusely illustrated.

30 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

other remote spots. These dwarfs appear to be as
closely related to the chimpanzee monkey as it is
possible for human beings to be, and the affinity is
so far recognised by the chimpanzee of the present
day that there are stories current of pygmy women
being carried away by male monkeys and destroyed
by their jealous wives.

In course of time the original monkey-like pygmies
were absorbed by intermarriage into a race of black
people, which apparently spread itself over the whole
of equatorial Africa. The theory is that these negroes
were driven by famine and the encroaching sands of
the Sahara desert from the north-west corner of the
continent : and there is little doubt that at a remote
period of the past the Sahara was a fertile and thickly
populated land, instead of the howhng wilderness of
sand which it has since become. But there are no
indications by which we can compute even the approxi-
mate date of this displacement of pygmies by negroes,
and all that can be averred is that it must have occurred
in the dim ages before the rise of Ancient Egypt. What
is very interesting is that certain small colonies of
pygmies have survived into the twentieth century,
and that we have got into personal relations with them.

The centuries succeeded one another, and in course
of time Egypt and Abyssinia became the abode of a
semi-white population of Caucasian extraction, which
settled down amidst the local blacks and intermarried
with them. A superior race was thus produced on
the banks of the Nile, designated Ancient Egyptians,
and in the mountains of Abyssinia, called Galas. By
the light of recent research we are able to trace the
history of the Ancient Egyptians back through sixty
centuries from the present time, and there is evidence
to show that the Galas, who still preserve a distinct

THE STORY OF UGANDA 31

nationality, are descended from the same stock. There
is also good reason to believe that an offshoot of these
Galas moved southwards to the Victoria Nyanza
by way of Lake Rudolf, and settled themselves as
masters over the mixed race of negroes and pygmies
already alluded to. Such is the conjecture which may
be hazarded as to the origin of the kingdom of Uganda
and the aristocracy which rules it, and it may be
interesting to mention here in a few words such evi-
dence as is available to support the theory. On the
Ancient Egyptian bas-reliefs are depicted a type of
man which exactly resembles the pygmies already
mentioned, and resembles no other Hving type : these
same old bas-rehefs also reproduce the chimpanzees
of equatorial Africa with marked fidelity ; and it is
not assuming too much to suppose that the powerful
dynasties, which ruled Egypt sixty centuries ago and
under whose rule science and commerce flourished
in a high degree, were capable of sending expeditions
up the Nile in search of knowledge and trade. There
is indeed no doubt that the builders of the Great Pyra-
mids and Temples of Egypt were well acquainted with
the Nile sources and with many other things which were
rediscovered in the nineteenth century. At any rate
the domestic animals and the few imported plants which
now flourish in Uganda can be distinctly traced to
Egyptian originals ; the remarkable long-horned cattle
of the lake regions might have stood last year for their
portraits on the Egyptian frescoes ; the musical
instruments, especially the harps, of the Bahima
aristocracy of Uganda, are exactly Hke those engraven
on the ancient monuments : the idea of the " planked "
canoe seems also to have been borrowed from the same
source, in spite of the fact that the rivers and lakes of
central Africa require boats of different construction

32 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

to those employed on the Nile below Assouan ; and
finally we can see for ourselves the close resemblance
between the faces and complexions of the Bahima
of Uganda and the present Fellaheen of Egypt, the type
so accurately sculptured on the temples.

In course of time the purer blooded Bahima women,
perhaps owing to the change of climate, ceased to bear
children, and the original Gala blood was grafted on
the indigenous black stock. This blend of pygmy,
negro and Gala evolved in course of time a race of men
who organised Uganda and the adjacent States into
powerful kingdoms. The race enjoyed a life of culture
and progress in comparison with the existence of the
naked folk around them — steeped in the degradations
of the stone ages. The known genealogy of the Uganda
sovereigns includes thirty-seven consecutive rulers,
and we may fairly assume that the kingdom and its
neighbours have been settled communities for over
five centuries under dynasties of Gala origin.

But though superior to their neighbours let it not
be supposed that law and order predominated ; on
the contrary, massacres of every sort were the rule
rather than the exception, and it is quite likely that
whilst Agincourt (1415) was claiming a death-roll of
over 11,000 men killed, an equally bloody though
unrecorded battle may have been taking place between
Uganda and Unyoro. Such contests were the rule
with short intervals until Pax Britannica put a stop
to them at the end of the nineteenth century.

However, one sign of the superiority of the Baganda
compared with their neighbours was their habit from
time immemorial of clothing themselves in long
garments made with great skill from the bark of the
birch tree — an art which they must have acquired for
themselves, as they had, up to 1850, no knowledge of

THE STORY OF UGANDA 33

the outer world beyond a vague legend of their Abys-
sinian descent. To them the universe was comprised
within the region bordered by the Great Congo Forest,
the Nile marshlands, the heights of Mount Elgon, the
Nandi and Mau plateaus, and Lake Tanganika ; nor
had even a whisper of their existence reached Europe
until after Queen Victoria had been twenty years on
the throne. We now know that during the first half
of the nineteenth century some enterprising Muskat
Arabs traded in saiHng-boats between British India
and the Zanzibar coast ; that some of them pushed
caravans into the interior in pursuit of new markets
for their goods ; and that in this manner they dis-
covered Lake Nyassa and the country of Unyamwezi —
known to Herodotus (b.c. 450), by hearsay, as the Land
of the Moon, now situated in German East Africa. The
Arabs appear to have reached the south-eastern shores
of the Victoria Nyanza during the forties and there
heard rumours of negro kingdoms to the north but,

" the first stranger from the outer world to penetrate
into Uganda was a Beluch soldier from Zanzibar,
named Isa, who fled from his creditors, first to the
Arab trading settlements, and finally to the court of
Suna, King of Uganda, where he arrived about 1849-
1850. His handsome face and abundant hair and
beard won him royal favour. Known as The Hairy
One, he became a power in Uganda, and possessed a
harem of three hundred women. Through Isa the
Beluch, Uganda first heard of a world of Arabs and
white men beyond their own borders. Suna sent word
to the Arab traders inviting them to his court. Sheikh
Snay bin Amir was the first to accept. In 1852 this
Arab trader stood in the presence of the most powerful
king of the best-organised East African State then

c

34 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

existing, untouched by Arab or European influence.
He remained some time with Suna, gave him much
information about the world outside the Victoria
Nyanza, and even beyond the coast of Africa. From
him Suna and the Baganda had confirmation of the
stories of Isa. They learned that there really were
white men. The Bahima who had formed the aris-
tocracies and dynasties of these regions remembered in
their traditions a time when they were of much lighter
complexion and of longer hair than they possessed
since their lingering with the negresses of the subject
races. They were much struck by these stories of
white men, and regarded them as the stock from w^hich
they themselves had sprung. They therefore mani-
fested a certain fear lest the white men from the lands
of their forefathers might be coming to conquer these
fertile countries from the grasp of their blackened
descendants. Snay bin Amir brought back with him
full accounts of this organised and civilised negro
kingdom. This news spread rapidly amongst the
trading Arabs of the Zanzibar hinterland, and came
to the ears of the German missionary, Krapf, who with
Rebmann was doing much to bring to our knowledge
the names and features of inner East Africa."*

In consequence of these reports Captain (afterwards
Sir Richard) Burton proceeded to the discovery of
Lake Tanganika, accompanied by Captain Speke ;
and the latter, with more enterprise than Burton,
headed an ill-equipped expedition and discovered the
great lake which he named Victoria Nyanza. Speke
at the same time gathered certain information about
Uganda and Unyoro, which prompted him a few
years later, accompanied by Grant, to undertake a

* " Uganda Protectorate."

<:
<

z

O

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THE STORY OF UGANDA 35

famous journey. They made their way without diffi-
culty to the Victoria Nyanza, then round its western
shore, and thus reached Uganda in 1862. Suna was
dead and his son, Mutesa, had been five years on the
throne. He received Speke and Grant with great
cordiahty and took such a Hvely interest in their
desire to discover the sources of the Nile that he
volunteered to show them the spot where that river
issues out of the Victoria Nyanza at the Ripon Falls.
This was accordingly done, and Speke was so favour-
ably impressed by the hospitality of the black king
and the intelligence and veracity of the Baganda
generally that he planned his further route upon the
information they gave him. Subsequent exploration
has confirmed what the Baganda told Speke, who
followed the Nile downstream, cut off a bend of the
river which otherwise would have led him into the
Albert Nyanza, and reached Gondokoro without
discovering that lake. There he met Baker and his
plucky wife travelling in the opposite direction whilst
he continued his homeward journey down the Nile
to Khartoum. Speke seems throughout his travels
to have possessed a happy gift of rightly understanding
the geography of the areas he crossed, though critics
declared he took too much for granted. His assump-
tions were subjected to some destructive criticism,
especially by his rival Burton, whose hostile pen
reduced the Victoria Nyanza to an unwholesome
marsh and supported Livingstone's wild theory of the
sources of the Nile. So Speke was unrewarded by the
British Government, though later research has re-
established his reputation and private enterprise has
erected a memorial to him in Hyde Park. His com-
panion Grant was given a C.B. in recognition of some
small services rendered in connection with the abortive

36 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Abyssinian expedition, and a Knighthood was very
properly bestowed on Baker, who discovered the lake
which Speke just missed.

Baker's explorations in Unyoro should be read at
first hand in his fascinating volume "Ismailia "; he and
his wife were nearly killed by order of the king of that
country, who was by no means so friendly as the
Uganda king had shown himself to Speke and Grant.
During the dozen years which followed the events
just narrated European interest in the Nile sources
was concentrated on livingstone's theories and work
in the Congo country. He clung obstinately to the
idea that the sources of the River Congo were the
sources of the Nile, and, after being gallantly rescued
by the new explorer, Mr. (afterwards Sir Henry) Stanley,
at once returned to Lake Bangweolo, where he died.

The impression left on men's minds by the antago-
nistic theories of Burton, Speke, Baker and Living-
stone, was one of apathetic indifference until Stanley
appeared on the scene. No one in the history of modern
exploration in Africa has surpassed this great man
in the qualities of courage, intelligence and tenacity
of purpose ; and it is sincerely to be hoped that the
petty controversies which for a time raged round his
name are by now forgotten. We are gradually learning
that the kid-gloved gentry who have so much to say
about everything in these islands are not the sort who
usually conduct great enterprises to successful issue
in Africa or elsewhere ; and Stanley will be remem-
bered for what he did, not for what was said of him.
He was employed by the proprietors of the New York
Herald and the London Daily Telegraph to solve the
problems which were in doubt — was there really a
Victoria Nyanza ? and, if so, did the Nile flow out of
it ? Were there several lakes or only some marshes ?

THE STORY OF UGANDA 37

Were the headstreams of the Nile identical with those
of the Congo ? Such were the questions which the
two newspaper proprietors sent Stanley to solve, and
he did solve them. That a geographical problem of
such magnitude should be settled through the enter-
prise of two daily newspapers is an honourable record
in the liistory of journalism.

Stanley followed Speke's old road through Unyam-
wezi to the Victoria Nyanza, where he put together
a boat and circumnavigated the inland sea.

" In 1875 he reached Uganda, to be received by
the same Mutesa who had received Speke.^ Mutesa
was puzzled about religious matters. Stanley's con-
versations inclined him favourably towards Christianity.
At this opportune moment there arrived in Uganda
one of Gordon's messengers, or (if one may say so
without unpleasantness) spies — Linant de Belief onds,
a Belgian, who in reality had come to see whether
Uganda was worth the conquering, and whether it
was too tough a job to tackle. Stanley resolved to
write his famous letter to the Daily Telegraph inviting
English missionaries to proceed to the evangelisation
of Uganda. He had no means of sending this letter
back to Europe save by way of the Nile, and Linant
de Bellefonds volunteered to take it. As the unfortu-
nate Belgian was traveUing down the Nile in the vicinity
of Gondokoro, his expedition was attacked by the
Bari, who had suffered great wrongs at the hands of
Nubian slave-traders. Linant de Bellefonds was
murdered and his corpse thrown on the bank, to he
there rotting in the sun. An Egyptian expedition,
sent to inquire into the cause of this attack and to
punish the Bari, recovered Linant de Bellefonds' body,

* " Uganda Protectorate."

5>^ -% r^rv

^97

38 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

and removed therefrom the long knee-boots which he
was wearing at the time of his death. In one of the
boots — he had tucked it between boot and leg at the
time of the attack — was found Stanley's famous letter
to the missionaries. This was sent on to Gordon
Pasha at Khartoum and forwarded by him to the
Daily Telegraph, with an explanation of the circum-
stances under which it had been found.

" The letter, when published, met with an immediate
response. Before many months were over (perhaps
less than a year after Stanley had issued the appeal
from far Uganda,) the first party of Anglican mis-
sionaries of the Church Missionary Society had started
in two sections for Uganda. One half went by way of
Zanzibar, the other went up the Nile. Both met in
Uganda, and the establishments of the Church Mission-
ary Society, which were destined after extraordinary
vicissitudes to result in an immensely successful
propaganda, commenced their work in 1877. Truly
Stanley's letter, the blood-stained sheet of paper found
in the boot of the murdered de Bellefonds, was big with
fateful results for the kingdom of Uganda.

'' The excitement caused by this bold step on the
part of the Anglican propaganda roused attention at
Rome, or rather, struck the imagination and intelli-
gence of a remarkable prelate of the Roman Catholic
Church — Bishop (afterwards Cardinal) Lavigerie who,
as Bishop of Algiers, had founded the Mission of the
White Fathers, a body of ardent missionaries who
were to imitate the Arabs in their dress, to lead in
many respects an Arab life and thus convert Northern
Africa and the inhabitants of the Sahara to the Chris-
tian faith. The views of Cardinal Lavigerie were
perhaps, consciously or unconsciously, as much political
as religious, and he yearned to acquire fresh territory.

THE STORY OF UGANDA 39

not only for his Church, but for his own nation, France.
Resolved that the British missionaries should not have
it all their own way in Central Africa, he despatched
his White Fathers to the Victoria Nyanza and Uganda
on the one hand, to the Zanzibar coast and Tanganika
on the other."

The White Fathers of course came into rivalry,
both religious and political, with the Anglican mission-
aries already established, and on one occasion had a
quarrel at Divine worship — when King Mutesa is
reported to have exclaimed : " Go ! And, when you
white men have decided on the true religion, it will be
time enough to come and teach it to us."

He died in 1884 and was succeeded by his son
Mwanga, a youth of such vicious tastes that even the
Mohammedans, who are not too particular, joined
with the native Christians to expel him. Mwanga
fled across the lake, took refuge wdth the White Fathers,
declared himself a Catholic convert, and by this means
regained his throne some years later.

Meanwhile a more direct route from the coast was
discovered by Joseph Thomson who, starting from
Mombasa with an expedition organised by the Royal
Geographical Society, made his way to the north-east
corner of the Victoria Nyanza. He discovered the
snow mountain Kenya, Lake Baringo and Mount
Elgon and traversed the country through which the
railway now runs. During these years Great Britain
was fortunately represented at the Court of the Sultan
of Zanzibar by Sir John Kirk, who was ahve to the
probable future value of the countries we are dealing
with. He exerted his influence to keep the coast
and its hinterland towards the great lakes open to
Arab and British enterprise, although he was unable

40 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

to remove the apathy which appears inherent in British
Governments, he persuaded the Royal Society and
British Association to combine to send a scientific
expedition to Mount Kihmanjaro. This expedition
was commanded by Mr. (now Sir Harry) Johnston,
who conchided " treaties which very nearly brought
the whole of that mountain within the British sphere
and which at any rate were the basis from which the
Imperial British East Africa Company sprang."

By this time the partition of Africa amongst the
great Powers of Europe was in full swing, and Great
Britain, in spite of the enterprise of her sons in their
individual capacity, was being left completely out of
the scramble, because the politicians by whom we were
ruled were unaware that foreign Governments had
deliberately set to work to acquire and enclose vast
slices of the continent. This is not the place to discuss
the general policy of successive Governments on the
question ; nor what might have been the result of
more forethought on their part. The general impres-
sion left on the mind of a student is that British
Cabinets had no policy at all, but allowed matters to
drift and muddle along until some influential news-
paper vehemently goaded them into action. Then
a spasmodic effort, usually too late, was made on behalf
of our legitimate interests ; and thus Uganda, Nigeria,
the Sudan, Nyassaland and the Transvaal each in
turn, and each without due forethought, became for
a brief period a " Vital British Interest."

There were already many international jealousies
regarding the allotment of East Africa. Our friends
the Germans viewed with considerable jealousy any
transference of the Egyptian Sudan or Uganda to
the British sphere of influence. When Stanley was
about to start on his famous journey in relief

THE STORY OF UGANDA 41

of Emin Pasha on the Upper Nile, the Germans
positively refused permission for his expedition to pass
through their territory. As the route via Mombasa
and Uganda was at that time unsafe, Stanley was
obliged to take the Congo route to Equatoria. He
brought away Emin, discovered Ruwenzori and Lake
Albert Edward and in a measure increased the British
claims to consider these territories within a British
sphere of influence : but his expedition suffered
ghastly hardships in consequence of the German
attitude.

In June, 1890, an Anglo-German Convention fixed
the boundaries of the respective spheres of influence,
and the British East Africa Company, under Sir
WiUiam Mackinnon, pushed its officials inland to make
treaties with the chiefs of the country within the
British sphere. That a convention signed by the
highest authorities in London and Berlin was necessary
and timely will be denied by no one who has made
himself acquainted with the incident of Dr. Karl
Peters. He was a go-ahead German traveller, not
employed by his Government, but ready for any enter-
prise during his travels. In 1889 Mr. F. J. Jackson,
an official, was to the north of the Victoria Nyanza
engaged in negotiations with the King of Uganda
regarding a British Protectorate. The negotiations
came to nothing, so he went to Mount Elgon, leaving
his standing camp and servants to await his return
in the British sphere. Meanwhile a bundle of letters
arrived for Mr. Jackson from the coast. At this
juncture Dr. Karl Peters marched into the camp,
obtained the letters, opened and read them, and at
once determined to steal a march on Jackson by going
himself to Uganda and forestalling the British Protec-
torate over that country. He so far succeeded that

42 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

he drew up a treaty with the aid of the French CathoUc
priests and procured for Germany a Protectorate over
Uganda. This treaty was afterwards disavowed by
the German Government and had no effect. One
does not blame the attempt of a German to secure a
German Protectorate — an enterprise quite as defensible
as the similar attempts of Englishmen ; but that
the opening and reading of another man's corre-
spondence is unscrupulous, few will be found to deny.

During the year 1890 Captain (now General Sir
Frederick) Lugard went up as the accredited agent of
the Company and most thoroughly did he justify his
selection for the post. He was met on arrival in
Uganda by a serious situation, needing firmness and
promptitude to deal with it. The native government
of the country was at a standstill, owing to the ini-
quities of Mwanga. Civil war was raging between the
Anglicans and Catholics, and this was further com-
plicated by frequent incursions of Mohammedans.
Lugard first ensured his position by arranging a treaty
with Mwanga, declaring Uganda to be under the pro-
tection of the Chartered Company. He then very
wisely built a fort near the capital, and it was no sooner
finished that it was attacked by Mwanga's adherents.
He repulsed this attack, but also realised that nothing
could be done by him or any one else without a reliable
military force at his back. He therefore resolved on
the bold project of proceeding to the west of Lake
Albert and taking over all the remaining Sudanese
soldiers of Emin's province. In this he was com-
pletely successful, and obtained some 400 professional
soldiers who were independent of local factions, and
thus laid the foundation of the force which enabled
us later on to start British rule in the country. These
Sudanese became the Uganda Rifles which performed

THE STORY OF UGANDA 43

such useful service during a number of years and
ultimately became merged into the King's African
Rifles, lately on active service in Somaliland. By
thus retrieving the scattered bands of Sudanese, under
their own officers, Lugard imported an element of
power which only needed careful control and judicious
handling to be the effective instrument of civilised
government. To have left them to roam the country
and prey upon its inhabitants would have produced
great disorders in the near future, and the fact that
these troops mutinied in 1897, under great provocation,
should not detract from our appreciation of Lugard' s
decision to employ them. He could do nothing
without some military force : to have used the
Protestant converts against the Cathohcs, or the
Mohammedan Baganda against their Christian fellow
countrymen, would have been a direct encouragement
to civil war : and at the period we are considering
it would not have been possible to transport an Indian
battahon to the interior. It was Lugard who really
made Uganda a possible British possession, and did
it with inconceivably small resources. It is well to
emphasise his feat, and to recollect that England does
not always recognise the sons who serve her best. His
personal influence over the natives had been such that
when Mr. Grogan made his journey from the Cape
to Cairo in 1899, he found he could get the natives
of Toro to do anything for him because he knew
Kapelh, the local name for Lugard. " They asked
all kinds of questions about Kapelli, and wanted to
know why he had never come back, and had the
Enghsh deserted their country after promising to
protect them ? To have left a name in Africa that
opens all hearts is the finest monument to his exploits
that a man can have."

44 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Lugard was not only successful in laying the first
firm foundation upon which a British administration
of the country could be started ; but he also succeeded
in the far more difficult task of persuading Mr. Glad-
stone's Cabinet to consider the whole East African
problem from an Imperial point of view. It is true
that this Cabinet did not definitely establish a pro-
tectorate ; but it refused to abandon what had been
gained for the Empire, and consented to send out a
Commission, under Sir Gerald Portal, to " report and
advise."

Now, the question really at stake, when shorn of
its various side-issues, was whether the British Govern-
ment or the Chartered Company should build a railway
from the coast to the Victoria Nyanza ? for this railway
must inevitably be built whether Uganda remained a
commercial sphere of influence or became a protec-
torate. To attempt to hold and administer on a
permanent basis a country to which every load
must be carried 800 miles on men's heads was out
of the question ; in fact we shall see when we deal in
detail with Vandeleur's work how hazardous the task
was during the years the railway was in course of
construction.

Sir Gerald Portal's Commission of Inquiry practi-
cally took over the government of Uganda ; Sir Gerald
himself unfortunately died of typhoid, and Colonel
(now Major-General Sir Henry) Col vile acted as Com-
missioner and concluded the treaty which created the
Uganda Protectorate.

]\Ieanwhile, the Chartered Company decided that
it could not afford to build the railway ; it therefore
announced its intention of surrendering its Charter
and retiring from East Africa. After much hesitation
and delay, the Imperial Government resolved to take

THE STORY OF UGANDA 45

over the country and construct the railway at British
expense. Those of us who are convinced that in
Uganda we have laid solid foundations upon which
in due time a great Negro State will arise, must applaud
this decision ; the initial cost has been heavy for rail-
way construction and civil and mihtary adminstration
and there is up to the present no return on the outlay ;
in fact a further small annual expenditure by Great
Britain will be necessary for ten years. The figures
had better be faced, and they are faced by Sir Harry
Johnston in his chapter on commercial prospects.
He computes the total amount of money which will
have been spent by the British taxpayer in East Africa
and Uganda between the years 1894 and 191 1 at the
round sum of £10,500,000. For this sum he is con-
vinced that we shall have started a great Negro State,
or a series of smaller Negro States on a self-supporting
basis ; and he most properly urges that, as they
become prosperous under our rule and through the
agency of our railway, the capital sum expended on
them should be consolidated into a national debt upon
which interest should be paid to the mother country.
If, as is quite hkely, both Uganda and East Africa
develop into wealthy communities they could easily
shoulder the debt which has been contracted on their
behalf by Great Britain, and thus a great impetus
will be given to the statesmanhke policy of pledging
British credit to develop other backward possessions.

CHAPTER III

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA

See map facing page 66

The intention in the last chapter was to place before
the reader some account of the chief events in the
history of Uganda up to the moment when Lieutenant
Seymour Vandeleur and other officers began their task
on behalf of the British Government. Strictly speak-
ing, the name " Uganda " belongs only to one of the
dozen nations within our sphere in East Africa ; where-
as " Uganda Protectorate " is the official title of the
several provinces (including Unyoro) which cluster
around the shores of the great lakes. That part of the
country through which the railway passes from the
coast of the Indian Ocean to the Victoria Nyanza is
called the " East African Protectorate." These two
British protectorates are under separate administra-
tions, now controlled by the Colonial Office in London.
When Colonel Colvile was appointed Commissioner
a certain number of young officers were selected to go
out and command the Sudanese soldiery under him,
and Seymour Vandeleur was one of them. He reached
Mombasa on September 6, 1894, in company with
Mr. Jackson and Captain Ashburnham, 6oth Rifles.
The walls of the fort, thirty feet high and dating back
to 1594, still mounted the ancient guns which remind
the world of Portugal's adventurous colonists of the
sixteenth century. A steam launch landed the party

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 47

at a spot ten miles up the river, where they prepared
for their eight hundred miles tramp to the Victoria
Nyanza. It was the middle of the dry season and the
necessity of carrying water for the caravan of four
hundred porters for the journey across the Taru Desert
added considerably to the difficulties of the march.

On September 25, they reached a station of the
Scottish Industrial Mission, a dehghtful spot 3070 feet
above sea level, where they perceived what a Scotsman
can do to a swamp in Africa. By artificial means it
had been transformed into a clear stream of water
flowing through a garden growing all kinds of plants
and vegetables. Dr. Charters was the head of this
station, and his friend Mr. Colquhoun was paying him
a visit. Accordingly next day these two gentlemen
accompanied Vandeleur's caravan six miles along their
forward march, said good-bye and branched off to
their shooting camp which had been arranged for
previously. From that day to this they were never
again seen or heard of, dead or alive. Numerous causes
have been hazarded to account for their disappearance,
such as hons, dearth of water, Masai warriors ; but the
matter still remains a mystery, and the curious thing
is that Dr. Charters was perfectly well acquainted with
the country and had been to the same spot to shoot
on a former occasion. The caravan under Mr. Jack-
son's leadership proceeded on its way, and on October 5
arrived at a station named Machakos, 5400 feet above
the sea and situated in the highlands of East Africa,
where the days are clouded and cool and it is a pleasure
to live.

At last they descended into the district bordering
the Victoria Nyanza, and Vandeleur beheld for the
first time the blue waters of the great inland sea which
it had long been his ambition to reach. The country

48 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

was rich in magnificent banana plantations and a
numerous population clothed in bark cloth. The
journey of 800 miles came to an end on November 28,
when they reached Entebbe, the headquarters of the
Administration and reported themselves to Colonel
Colvile, who had built a charming house on a cliff
overhanging the lake.

At the date of Vandeleur's arrival the mail from
London to Entebbe took over three months : it now
takes less than one. Here he met Major (now Colonel)
Cunningham, C.B., D.S.O. who became his command-
ing officer and remained his intimate friend during the
rest of his life. They were to be much thrown together;
first on active service in Uganda, next in Nigeria and
finally in South Africa. Their first duty was to pro-
ceed to Unyoro and undertake a reconnaissance
across Lake Albert and down the Nile to its furthest
navigable point.

Fever was prevalent amongst the Europeans at
this time and Vandeleur had frequent bouts of it ;
Cunningham was also down, but he pluckily decided
to march on December 19, and they accordingly
started for Unyoro, taking their ponies with them.
These horses were the first to make the journey and
it was doubtful whether they would reach the end of it.
Swamps were the main difficulty, for at that time
they were not crossed by the causeways and bridges
which have since been constructed under British
supervision. Vandeleur's pony most frequently got
into trouble, as it lost its head, plunged madly into the
reeds and sank up to its neck in water. But even to
a man who does not lose his head, the Unyoro road
presented features which one would not select for an
afternoon stroll. Now clutching hold of the papyrus
at the side, now stepping from one lump of vegetation

/

/

MASAI WARRIORS
British East Africa

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 49

to another, one tries in vain to save oneself from sink-
ing deeper into the quagmire of mud and water. Yet
in spite of these gymnastics under a tropical sun,
perhaps in consequence of them, both Cunningham
and Vandeleur were quite fit.

At the end of three days they reached Fort Ray-
mond, where Captain Dunning, D.S.O., commanded ;
and eight days later (January i, 1895) arrived at Fort
Hoima, the headquarters in Unyoro, where they stayed
only a week. As they proceeded towards Lake Albert
the country became more open until suddenly from
the edge of a precipitous escarpment 1200 feet high
they beheld the great sheet of water, bordered by a
strip of yellow sand.

The diminutive expedition embarked in a twenty-
foot steel boat which had been carried in sections by
porters from the coast ; the two officers, eight Sudanese
and eight Zanzibaris with tents, baggage, one maxim,
the sail and eight oars, filled up the boat, so that cross-
ing the lake in a squall required careful trimming.
After reaching the western shore in safety and skirting
it for a whole day, they came to the village of Amat,
where Lake Albert narrows to 600 yards and becomes
the White Nile. The following day was spent in rowing
and sailing down the river, which soon became so
rapid that the boat drifted at a goodly pace and its
occupants realised that they would be in a nasty
predicament if attacked and compelled to retreat
against the stream. At Wadelai they encamped on
the site of Emin Pasha's old fort, now completely
overgrown by vegetation. Dervishes were reported
at the Dufile cataracts, and it would have been a sad
day for Cunningham and Vandeleur if they had been
captured and sent to Omdurman to join Slatin Pasha
and the other prisoners of the Khalifa, especially as

D

50 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

there was at that time no prospect of a British advance
into the Sudan !

On January 14 the old fort at Dufile was reached,
situated above the Cataract, with parapet and ditches
still distinctly traced and some lemon trees and cotton
bushes the only remaining signs of Egyptian occupa-
tion. Cunningham and Vandeleur were the first white
men to revisit this spot since its abandonment in
November, 1888. In that month the Dervishes pene-
trated into the station after three days' fighting and
a successful night attack, as described by Cassati (an
Italian), who was present. Cunningham concluded
a treaty with the local chief, who reported the Dervishes
to be in possession of the country beyond the rapids ;
and the British flag was hoisted on both banks of the
Nile. It now^ flies on the right bank only.

The expedition had reached the furthest navigable
point. Below the Cataract the river is a seething
torrent, fifty yards broad, be^^ond which foaming rapids
succeed one another at intervals to Lado, 120 miles
from Dufile. From Lado to Khartoum are 900 miles
of open water-way, now navigated by modern steamers
under the British and Egyptian flags. After verifying
native reports of the Dervish strength and surveying
the course of the Nile, the two officers had accom-
plished all that was expected of them ; they accordingly
returned to Unyoro in order to take up more pressing
work in that province.

In one way Vandeleur was fortunate in the date
of his arrival on the waters of the Upper Nile, which
were destined during the five ensuing years to be
opened up from the north, south and west. At the
date of his journey the Khalifa was still in full power
at Omdurman and the people of Great Britain had
hardly realised that there was work to be done on

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 51

the African continent. It was Vandeleur's privilege
to take an active part in all this work, but he was
also a thinker ; and this is what he wrote in 1897 (the
date is important) concerning the Upper Nile :

"It is towards Fashoda that French expeditions
are now hurrying, both from the French Congo on the
west, a journey of 2000 miles via the Ubangi and
Mbomu rivers, and from Abyssinia on the east. Two
years ago (1895) Semio, an advanced post on the
Mbomu river, was occupied ; and latterly a further
advance has been made across the watershed between
the Congo and the Nile, to Dem Zibehr, a distance
of 180 miles, and a small post established at Tambura
(under M. Liotard) on the Sue river 170 miles to the
east, without opposition on the part of the natives.
The post is, of course, isolated, and necessary supplies
have to be transported all this long distance from the
base, but the fact remains that the French are now
on the watershed of the Nile, and they need find no
difficulty — except in the matter of transport and food
— in establishing themselves at Meshra-el-Rek, even if
they have not reached that place already. Junker
journeyed from the latter place to Dem Zibehr by Jur
Ghattas in nineteen days, through the country inhabited
by the Dinkas. It is reported that a large and well-
armed expedition, composed of men of the Foreign
Legion and tirailleurs Senegalais, all starting from
Semio under Captain Marchand — supported by four
other officers — is to co-operate with that under M.
Liotard at Dem Zibehr, and is carrying a small steel
gun-boat with it. The difficulties in the way of trans-
porting such a vessel a distance of over 300 miles are
very great, as we have seen in trying to transport a
steamer in sections to the Victoria Nvanza from the

52 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

east coast. Although the Bahr-el-Ghazal province
is peopled by some of the most warlike races in the
Sudan and supplies the best recruits for the Sudanese
battalions, there is no cohesion among them and they
recognise no single ruler or head. This fact will make
the French advance easier, as no organised opposition
on a large scale will be met with. The majority of
the natives are not fanatical Mohammedans. The
other expedition from the east, under the Marquis de
Bonchamps who is taking with him an escort of armed
Abyssinians, had, in July 1897, reached Gore, close
to the place where Captain Bott6go was killed four
months before, joining here an expedition under
another Frenchman, Captain Clochette, who has since
died. They went on from here to the Didessa river,
which flows into the Blue Nile. Besides experiencing
transport difficulties they were beginnng to suffer
from desertions on the part of their men.

" One can but admire the enterprise of these French
officers in leading their perilous expeditions ; but what
does it all mean, and why should the French be pushing
on with such speed into what is clearly regarded as the
Anglo-Egyptian sphere of influence in the Nile valley,
remote as it is from their own territories in Africa ? "

The above quotation, which so prophetically fore-
told what was actually to happen at Fashoda in
August, 1898, is taken from Vandeleur's book, '' Cam-
paigning on the Upper Nile and Niger" ; there is, how-
ever, reason to believe that he had put the case even
more plainly in his original manuscript, the proofs
of which were submitted to the Foreign Office before
publication. But what has been quoted above is after
all sufficient to show that our Foreign Office had ample
warning of impending events ; and it is futile to plead

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 53

on its behalf that there was no reUable evidence of the
aggression with which the French menaced us on the
Upper Nile. But a deaf ear was turned to the warning,
with the result that 130 black soldiers under Major
Marchand caused the British Empire to mobilise its
fleets and prepare for war in all parts of the world, no in-
significant performance for a major of marines and a
handful of blacks. The French gave way directly they
realised that our Government and people meant busi-
ness in the Fashoda incident, but why, one asks, did
not the French Government realise beforehand that
we should stand firm and hold by our rights on the
Nile?

The reply seems to be that British Governments
had shirked imperial responsibilities for so many years
that the French had every reason to believe we should
give way on the Nile, as we had done at other places.
European nations were all equally surprised at the firm-
ness we displayed after we found Marchand at Fashoda.
It was a revelation to them to see us give up pusil-
lanimity and maintain our rights ; and yet it is surely
the business of a wise diplomacy to enlighten continen-
tal Cabinets as to the questions we deem vital to our
interests, and to do this before instead of after the
mobilisation of the Channel Fleet. On the other hand
it may fairly be claimed that our menace of war had
a more potent effect than any diplomatic representa-
tion';.

However that may be, let us at any rate recognise
that the French officers in Africa did not muddle along
and trust everything to chance. Every detail of their
adventurous scheme was carefully thought out and
arranged for : it took them about three years to
organise the expedition from the west coast and the
expedition from the east coast which were to meet

54 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

at the confluence of the Sobat river and the Nile. The
expedition from Abyssinia was numerous and well
armed, but Menelik refused to entrust it to any com-
mander but an Abyssinian. Two Frenchmen and an
officer of the Russian Guards accompanied it and gave
advice ; but the Ras commanded, and being a true
son of the highlands, he would have nothing to do with
boats of any sort. The Abyssinians consequently
suffered frightful hardships in the Sobat marshes and
many died in the unaccustomed climate ; nevertheless
they reached the junction of the Nile and Sobat in
July, 1898, and planted the Abyssinian flag. But
the Ras was furious because he did not find Marchand
and the French waiting for him at the rendezvous, as
had been promised, so he at once retired to Abyssinia,
in spite of the entreaties of his three European friends.
All they could do under such circumstances was to
write a letter explaining the cause of their retreat,
place it in a bottle, and tie the bottle to a long pole
which they erected at the place of rendezvous. The
Abyssinians would not consent to wait even one day
for their allies. Only ten days later Marchand arrived
from the west, found the letter in the bottle tied to
the pole and at once sent Captain Baratier in the
steamer Faidherbe up the Sobat to bring back the
Abyssinians. But the current was strong, progress
against it was slow, and the Abyssinians had been in
a desperate hurry to get home. Owing to the marshes
along the Sobat they moved at a considerable distance
from the river ; so, though Baratier accomplished a
remarkable journey of 250 miles up-stream, he never
came in touch with those he was seeking. This was
a bitter disappointment to Marchand, as the scheme
of uniting French and Abyssinian territory on the Nile
was the essential feature of his plan for severing the

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 55

Eg3/ptian Sudan from Uganda and cutting the Cape
to Cairo line for ever.

It may perhaps interest my readers to know that,
as soon as Marchand quitted our territory in 1898, I
traced the routes both of the Abyssinians and of
Baratier up the Sobat and am in possession of a
" letter of protection " bestowed by the French officer
on one local chief and of a silk Abyssinian flag which
was forced on another chief. This digression into the
Fashoda incident, and the admirable forethought
which Vandeleur brought to bear on it before the event,
will illustrate better than pages of biography how
intimately he was acquainted with events in Equatorial
Africa. We will now return to the year 1895 and to the
practical work in which he was engaged.

On reaching the fort at Hoima, news arrived that
Kabarega, King of Unyoro, was on the warpath with
1200 men, raiding the country for slaves and loot ;
and that one or two Arab caravans were importing
arms and ammunition for various predatory local
chiefs. The curious thing was that the natives were
generally in league with these caravans, although the
result of importing arms was invariably to cause
slave-raids on a large scale, with the usual loss of hfe
and liberty to themselves ! Even in kingdoms Hke
Unyoro and Uganda, which had been more or less
organised for centuries, the people had no collective
interests : one tribe would attack its neighbour solely
because it felt strong enough to ensure success : a
village would likewise prey upon another village of
the same tribe. Amid this welter of strife there could
be no mutual confidence between man and man, nor
an organised party hostile to slavery : it was only when
some exceptionally capable man arose in the shape of
a king or witch-doctor that the natives banded them-

56 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

selves together for concerted action : and this was
usually brought about with the object of enslaving
the neighbourhood. Such were the normal conditions
of society previous to the advent of Englishmen, and
the numerous expeditions sent against Kabarega and
others arose from the necessity of stopping slave raids.
In these expeditions the backbone consisted of the
Sudanese soldiers, organised into companies under
their own native officers. To this backbone of regulars
were added temporary local levies ; the whole force
being controlled by a handful of young British officers.
There was an immense amount of work to be done
in many parts of a wide territory, entailing arduous
marches in single file along faint tracks, through
tropical forests and across frequent swamps : the
British officers were too few, and these few were too
frequently changed. Owing to the difficulty of convey-
ing goods from the coast, the troops were generally
without clothing and often in arrears of pay and
yet were not allowed to loot.

The expedition against Kabarega started in two
columns on February 20, 1895, with the maxim gun
detachment commanded by Vandeleur and was com-
posed of four and a half companies of Sudanese and
some 2000 irregular Baganda and Bunyoro levies.
It marched through Northern Unyoro to the Victoria
Nile and encamped on an island opposite the enemy's
position. The river was here iioo yards broad, and
the masses of " sudd " on either side rendered the
crossing difficult. Every opening in the vegetation
on the enemy's bank was defended by stockades and
entrenchments, and these had to be attacked from the
island, under cover of a maxim gun fusillade.

The attack was timed for dawn on March 2, and the
intervening days were devoted to the construction of

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 57

a raised platform at the edge of the water, on which
the maxims were posted. It was a cold misty dawn
when the five canoes carrying the Sudanese under
Cunningham, Dunning and Ashburnham pushed out
and proceeded along a narrow channel in the weeds
to the edge of the open water, where they were to wait
for daylight. Meanwhile Vandeleur was straining
his eyes from the platform to get a glimpse of the
opposite shore. At last the air cleared, the canoes
paddled out into the stream and the maxims opened
fire ; but the enemy were prepared. They opened a
heavy fusillade on the advancing canoes, upset two of
them, and completely repulsed the attack. Cunning-
ham and Dunning were severely wounded ; Ashburn-
ham had a narrow escape from a bullet in his helmet ;
several of the men were killed and wounded. The
care of the wounded officers being now the main
consideration, it was decided to withdraw to Hoima.
Dunning, shot through the chest, was in a critical
condition, but there was no medical man to attend on
him, and all that was known of the nearest available
doctor was that he had " started from the coast in
November," and might, therefore, by now have reached
Hoima.

The melancholy procession accordingly quitted the
feverish camp on the island, escorting the wounded
officers through undergrowth and swamps which sorely
impeded the bearers, and constantly harassed by
natives flushed with victory.

" On March 9 [wrote Vandeleur] a black came up
in haste to the front of the column to fetch me, and on
going back a short way I found poor Dunning quite
unconscious. His litter had been placed on the
ground, and the bearers were standing round in a

58 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

helpless manner. I made every effort to restore him,
but in vain, and at length the sad conviction stole over
me that he was dead. I had striven hard not to believe
that this was the case, and must confess to giving way
altogether, in grief of the loss of a brave and gallant
comrade and realising the utter sadness of such a
death in this far-off savage land. . . . Ashburnham
and I were anxious about Cunningham, and he was
not informed of Dunning's death till, on reaching
Hoima, the fact could no longer be concealed. Here,
to our dismay, there was still no doctor, and Dr.
Mackinnon did not arrive till March 30. However,
Cunningham, with rest and care, improved gradually
and was soon able to get about on crutches."

Such are the risks which British officers incur on distant
expeditions, when the proverbial " corporal's guard "
is called upon to secure a province. To criticise is
easy, but we should recollect that, unless during three
centuries we had secured provinces with corporal's
guards, we should now have but few provinces in the
Empire.

Every effort was made to collect a stronger force
and, by April 20, Cunningham was well enough to take
command of the following men assembled at Mruli,
on the Victoria Nile : six companies Sudanese (500
men) ; 20,000 Baganda, under the Katikiro (general
of the Uganda army) ; two Hotchkiss guns, three
maxim guns, and the following British officers —
Ternan, Ashburnham, Madocks, Vandeleur, Dr. Mac-
kinnon.

Kabarega and his men had moved further east,
and were in larger numbers in the Wakedi country
opposite Mruli, spending busy nights in digging en-
trenchments and hammering at stockades on the

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 59

cliffs of the Nile bank. By day our maxims harassed
them continually from across the river. On the 22nd
Mr. Grant arrived with a fleet of canoes and delivered
a successful attack, covered by a heavy fire from the
Hotchkiss and maxims. The canoes crossed the river
to the barrier of " sudd/' where their occupants waded
ashore and carried the stockade by storm. This
decided the day, and in a few moments the enemy
could be seen flying over the hill, pursued by the
Baganda. They had fought well, as the dead found
in the trenches, forty-three in number, showed.

The next three days were occupied by the force in
crossing over the Nile, with the exception of a detach-
ment under Ashburnham, sent along the left bank to
prevent Kabarega from crossing back into Unyoro. The
main body advanced along the right bank, supported by
the canoes, one of which, called the flag-ship, was hewn
out of a single tree and easily held fifty men and a
maxim. Kabarega retreated through the Wakedi
country, whose inhabitants are a primitive and naked
people, armed with spears, bows and poisoned arrows,
a race of small men, formidable on account of their
boldness and agility. They are famed for night
attacks, in which they had frequently routed our allies
the Baganda in times past and they inspired consider-
able dread. However, our policy was one of friendliness
to the Wakedi, with whom we had no quarrel, and
strict orders were issued that their villages were not
to be molested ; but their hostihty to the Baganda
prompted them to spear both men and women from
the cover of the high grass, and their agility enabled
them to escape unhurt ; consequently, the Baganda
could not always be restrained from retaliating on the
villages.

The pursuit of Kabarega by a ponderous column

6o SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

surrounded by unfriendly Wakedi evidently had but
slight chances of success, so Cunningham sent forward
a flying column of two companies Sudanese, one maxim,
7000 Baganda under Madocks and Vandeleur. This
force started in the lightest possible order ; marched
at a rapid pace the whole of one day, and was off again
at dawn the following morning ; the tracks of the
enemy's cattle became fresher each hour ; there even
seemed a chance of coming up with Kabarega's main
body. The pace grew faster and faster, and the
Baganda scouts were hke hounds in full cry. Un-
luckily, a halt at noon was absolutely necessary to
enable the porters carrying ammunition to come up,
as the Wakedi threatened to rush the rear. At 3 p.m.
an immense quantity of cattle were captured, with a
loss to us of ten killed and wounded. But the pace
had been too fast, our men were too tired to move
further that day, and so Kabarega eluded pursuit.
A zariba was formed and watch kept against a night
attack by the Wakedi, to whom the captured cattle
formed an overwhelming temptation. Next day the
flying column rejoined the main body in safety.

The result of the campaign was that forts and
administrative posts were established in northern
Unyoro and along the Victoria Nile ; that some 250
women and children, w^ho had been raided in past
years, were restored to their homes ; and that Kaba-
rega, though he eluded capture, suffered a severe loss
of cattle, was driven from the country and his sphere
of iniquity considerably diminished. He had finally
to be dealt with by another expedition a few years
later.

Vandeleur returned to Hoima, and found they had
been having exciting times, as the following entries
in the diar}^ of Mr. Foster, will show :

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 6i

" April 19. — Lion visited camp during night and
carried off woman.

" April 20. — Lion came again and took another
woman.

" April 21. — Lion carried off a man. Seen by
patrols and fired at. He visited cattle-house and was
wounded by guard.

" April 22. — Section went out to look for lion and
found him near river. Badly wounded, but very
fierce ! Was killed and brought to camp.

" April 24. — Another lion (probably lioness) visited
camp during night and carried off child. Was seen
by patrols and fired at.

" April 25. — Lioness came again and went to
cattle-house, where guard fired at and wounded her.
One of the shots struck house at considerable distance
and entered thigh of woman, where it still remains.
Woman apparently httle the worse.

" May 3. — Askari (soldier) broke out of camp at
night in drunken state and fired six shots at sentries.
Attempts made to capture him, but without success."

And yet some people think life in Africa must be
so dull !

Vandeleur's stay in this exciting spot was brief,
as in two days he was sent on an expedition, this time
in command. Disturbances had been rife in Southern
Unyoro owing to Arab caravans bringing arms and
gunpowder into the country in exchange for slaves
and ivory. Cunningham was down with blackwater
fever, so Vandeleur was ordered off with two com-
panies Sudanese, one maxim and the Baganda irregu-
lars ; total, 250 men. The httle force pushed forward
as quickly as pouring rain and difficult tracks allowed.
The country was entirely unmapped and it was not

62 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

easy to obtain information as to the whereabouts of
the Arab station — the objective of the expedition.
By good luck, however, it was located on the further
side of two big swamps and a river. These crossed,
a road led to the station, and owing to the high grass
surrounding it, Vandeleur and his men surprised and
captured it successfully. Eighteen prisoners were
taken and several slaves, besides a quantity of cloth,
ivory, silks, guns and gunpowder, but the leaders
themselves escaped into the bush.

It is curious that this station had existed so long
without being discovered and shows the difficulty of
ascertaining what goes on in this wilderness of high
elephant grass and river swamps. Kalfan, the leading
Arab, had been in Unyoro two years and employed a
number of subordinates who conducted caravans to
and from the coast through German territory. It
must have been a lucrative trade, as the price of slaves
was not high. One woman said she had been bought
for three goats, with an extra goat thrown in for
her child. Another woman had been sold for a
load of beads, and others for guns. Apparently there
was a demand for fat ladies, as there were four Baganda
slaves of such mountainous proportions that they could
hardly move about.

On the return journey Vandeleur resolved to follow
a different road and was rewarded with a piece of
great good fortune. His scouts warned him that a
caravan was approaching, having chosen this very
route in order to avoid him, and sure enough the Arab
leaders, strolling at the head of their men, walked
straight into the arms of an ambush concealed in the
high grass. Some escaped ; but the leaders, many
prisoners and all the loot of the caravan fell into the
hands of Vandeleur's delighted Sudanese. As a result

KOAD MAKING IN UGANDA FORESTS
Crossing a Swamp

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 63

of this expedition the local chiefs came in to make their
peace with the British, communications were opened
and confidence restored, and by July i, Vandeleur was
back at Hoima with his captured loot, prisoners and
slaves. His men were granted two months' pay as a
gratuity for their services ; he himself received a letter
of warm congratulation from the headquarters of the
Protectorate, and his reputation as a successful leader
of men was established in Uganda.

Shortly afterwards he received orders to march
with a detachment of Sudanese to fake part in an
impending expedition against the Nandi tribe, and he
thus quitted Unyoro for ever.

During his nine months' stay there he collected
the material for the first authentic map of the
country ; and so excellent and accurate was his geo-
graphical work that he was subsequently awarded
the Murchison Grant by the Royal Geographical
Society, one of the highest compliments which could be
paid to an officer who was not an engineer by trade,
and whose duties were as numerous as Vandeleur's.

Space forbids any but a cursory description of the
Nandi expedition, the troops for which consisted of
400 Sudanese, a maxim, and a contingent of 30 Baganda.
Such a force proved inadequate to the task imposed
on it, as the country was mountainous and it was
impossible to ascertain anything concerning it, for the
surrounding natives held the Nandi in such dread that
they refused to act as guides. A desultory and harass-
ing campaign was the result ; the little expedition
advanced far into the mountains, finally attaining an
altitude of 9000 feet ; only on two occasions did the
Nandi attack in strength, but sniping was a matter of
daily occurrence, and every night the force packed itself
into a zariba, the sentries calling out the numbers of

64 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

their posts monotonously and incessantly throughout
the night to ensure keeping awake. The officers
learned afterwards from prisoners that this precaution
had saved them from night attacks, a method of
warfare especially favoured by the Nandi.

One day, when the expedition had chmbed over
several mountains without seeing an enemy, heavy
firing in front announced that the patrol was engaged.

" The column prepared for action ; and none too
soon. Only a few natives were visible on the ridge,
and it was with astonishment we saw a crowd of about
500 coming over the top of the hill at great speed,
apparently well organised and formed in three sides
of a square, above which a dense thicket of long-
bladed spears flashed in the sunlight. Wheeling to
the left by a common impulse, on they came, in spite
of the maxim, and charged down with great dash on
our force, which closed up to face the attack. It was
a critical moment, but the Sudanese stood firm, and
as the mass of natives approached our heavy fire
began to tell. Nearer and nearer they came and it
almost seemed that they would overwhelm my com-
pany, which had to bear the brunt of the attack ; but
at last, wavering before the leaden hail which they had
never before experienced, their ranks broke and they
scattered in all directions, leaving many of their num-
ber on the ground. It was a splendid charge, and, if
continued for thirty yards more, would have been a
successful one. Fourteen of our men were killed.
This charge was a revelation to us after fighting the
cautious Bunyoro and Arabs, and at once accounted
for the reputation and prestige which the Nandi en-
joyed amongst other East African tribes. They are
a fine-looking race, very black, strong and muscular."

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 65

Two nights afterwards they attempted a desperate
night attack, which hkewise failed, the flame from
the rifles causing more panic to the Nandi than their
heavy losses the day before. After this they attempted
no further attacks, but operations dragged on profit-
lessly enough for another month and when, on New
Year's Day, 1896, the expedition returned to Uganda,
it left the Nandi cowed, but by no means subdued.
In fact so intolerable did their depredations become,
much after the fashion of the Scottish Highlanders
of old, that in 1900 a strong force was sent to subdue
them. After six months' fighting had taught them
our power, they sued for peace, became our good friends
and some of their " young bloods " are now members
of the Uganda Constabulary, the guardians of law
and order.

Vandeleur had now but a few months to spend in
East Africa, for in April he embarked for England at
Mombasa. Reviewing his work it may truthfully
be said that he never spent an idle moment, that
at twenty-six he had laid the foundation of a good
military reputation and that his services were highly
appreciated by his superiors.

As regards himself the years spent in Uganda
marked out the trend of his after life. Africa laid her
hold on him as she does on other men, and hence-
forward service abroad became the one thing worth
living for. It was not merely from love of fighting
or from a vague feeling that soldiering at home was
not good enough that he was drawn away. The
African country, the natives, the work and all the
circumstances of life in a land of spacious areas
attracted him.

He was delighted to return to home ties and friends
and his regiment and regarded such times as a holiday,

E

66 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

but his real interest lay elsewhere. Indeed, he did
his best to pass straight from Uganda to another sphere
of African warfare. The Dongola Expedition was
about to start, and Seymour broke his journey at
Cairo in the hope of obtaining employment in it.
There were, however, no vacancies, so he lost his com-
fortable P. & O. berth for nothing, and had to put up
with a disagreeable passage in the cabin of a cargo
boat. During the next few months he thought of
going out to the Matabele War, but was again dis-
appointed, so began reading for the Staff College
and — with Egypt still in his mind — embarked on the
study of Arabic.

Despite these pre-occupations, Seymour thoroughly
enjoj^ed his London season and cultivated new friends
some of whom, like himself, had their thoughts centred
on African topics. His stock of information was already
considerable and, though very modest about it, he
was not too self-conscious to discuss things with men of
greater experience. He was elected a Fellow of the
Royal Geographical Society, became a regular atten-
dant at their meetings and read a paper on Uganda.
At Liverpool he also gave a lecture to the British Asso-
ciation on his journey down the Nile to Dufile.

His maps of the Nandi country and Unyoro
attracted attention at the War Office and were adopted
by the Intelligence Department as the official surveys
of those territories, giving Vandeleur much hard work
to complete them. After he rejoined his battalion
in London a reward for his services reached him in the
shape of the D.S.O. — a decoration which was not then
so much worn as it is now. He received the announce-
ment with unbounded delight and records in his diary
a few days later that he was on the Queen's Guard
with Captain Pulteney and " feels sure that it is the

4

UGANDA & EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE.

, -i^/naitjf^ ^ Zi^ut'VtaideleursMarch-ijvred
«a <iiSi'.„, I ■ dolted.Unes,6f-Sai;tSMtir2SfJrf.m96.

J

Stan/brt£s Geog'- Eatai^ Lorudon.

SOLDIERING IN UGANDA 67

first time that two D.S.O.s have been on guard
together."

He received the decoration from the hands of the
Queen at Windsor just at the time when the wish of
his heart was granted, in that he obtained Sir George
Goldie's offer of six months' special service in the Niger
Protectorate. Thus he set forth again at the end of
November, within seven months of his return to
England.

However, before we follow his footsteps any further
it will be advisable to acquaint ourselves with the story
of Nigeria.

CHAPTER IV

THE STORY OF NIGERIA

See map of Africa at end of hook

The intention of this chapter is to afford the reader
some insight into the general history of the States of
the interior of northern Africa, and especially of those
which are called British Nigeria. To make the subject
clear, we are necessarily taken far back into past
centuries and moved to chronicle the enterprises of
energetic men whose names are unfamiliar to English-
men, unless they happen to be acquainted with African
history. It is a story full of adventure and curious
incident, and one which is hkely to attract more and
more attention in these islands, now that Great Britain
has occupied her share of the Continent and become
responsible for many millions of its inhabitants. Under
a wise government Nigeria's future prosperity is likely
to be prodigious : its history, meanwhile, is wondrously
interesting.

We should, however, bear in mind that the modern
term " Nigeria " is a European colloquialism which
bears but slight resemblance to the native subdivision
of the country, though it is an apt expression to desig-
nate the region over which King Edward VII. rules.
Its frontiers have been arbitrarily arranged between
ourselves and France and Germany, and they neces-
sarily cut in twain ancient native kingdoms and
settled areas which happen to lie on the border. For
the sake of a peaceful solution to the European partition

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 69

of Africa, we must abide by our treaties and train our
subjects to acquiesce in their altered landmarks, which,
on the whole, are not likely to prove a difficulty.

A glance at the maps of Africa will put the reader
in possession of the respective French, German, and
British spheres, to which we need not again refer in
retaihng the local history. He will see, too, the whole
course of the Niger river, rising behind the coast
mountains of Sierra Leone, sweeping in a magnificent
semi-circle through populous regions, and (with its
only important tributary, the Benue) traversing
3000 miles of Africa on its journey to the Atlantic.
Yet this mighty river was first seen by the Scotsman,
Mungo Park, in 1796, and first traced to its mouth by
Richard Lander in 1830 — so carefully were its hundred
mouths concealed in mangrove swamps and intricate
channels.

But, although authentic confirmation of the exist-
ence of the Niger only came to us a hundred years ago,
the river had been discovered by the Roman explorer
Juhus Maternus, who crossed the Sahara Desert at
the beginning of the Christian era ; he was followed in
37 A.D. by the Roman General C. Suetonius Paulus,
who wrote a description of negroland which is quoted
by Pliny. These explorers had no incentive beyond
their individual enterprise, no financial backing save
that of a few personal friends and their labours con-
sequently bore no permanent results ; for, to success-
fully explore and map a continent requires for its
accompHshment a great deal more than the geographer's
curiosity or the traveller's desire to collect incredible
tales.

With the disappearance of the Roman Empire
and the events which followed we are not concerned,
but the eighth century saw a revolutionising change
in the conditions of northern Africa, brought about

70 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

by the first Arab conquest and the spread of a revealed
religion. In 640 a.d. a certain Amru Ibn el Aasse
invaded Egypt with 4000 Arabs ; and, following them,
wave upon wave of Moslem immigrants poured into the
northern coastlands, bearing aloft the torch of Islam,
inculcating a new spiritual life, introducing everywhere
progressive methods of agriculture, commerce, trade,
industries and, above all, instituting a system of
government which proved suitable to the backward
state of the country. Europe was swept out of the
continent, including the remnants of that remarkable
crowd of 80,000 Goths who crossed over from Spain
under Genseric in 480 a.d. and settled about Carthage,
where they maintained themselves against Rome for
a century.

These Arab conquerors were no mere land-grabbers
and plunderers ; they set systematically to work to
regenerate the country and henceforth identified
their interests with it. Cities were built and the natives
raised above their condition under the decayed Empire
of Rome. Thus they altered the destiny of the in-
digenous populations, founded states, developed a
commercial activity more extensive than that of
ancient Carthage, introduced the camel into Africa,
instituted regular caravan routes across the continent
and protected them, so that merchandise could, for the
first time, be transported for journeys of a thousand
miles by land. To assert that they converted and ruled
by the sword alone is to misrepresent a shrewd race
of governors. Education and industrial development
were features of their administrative system, without
which it could not have lasted during nine centuries.
Every village had one or more schools where Arabic
reading and writing were taught to the offspring of
the Arabs as well as to the children of the soil, and

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 71

where the Mohamedan laws of the Koran were ex-
pounded and learnt by heart. These Arabs were a
prolific race and did not disdain marriage with the
women of the country, so class distinctions became
gradually attenuated and therefore less irksome to the
governed ; slaves and eunuchs could, and frequently
did rise to positions of power and responsibility.

Arab geographers explored the continent in every
direction ; historians recorded the reigns of the kings
and emperors of the more powerful dynasties. Streams
of pilgrims poured across the continent to Mecca, and
kept up a continuous intercourse between the various
States through which they passed. When we look
back and consider the times and the general state of
the world in the Middle Ages, and reflect upon the
inaccessibility of interior Africa and the difficulties
the Arabs encountered, we must admit that they
accompUshed a great work of civilisation in the regions
they ruled.

It would appear from the records that the religion
of Mohamed first crossed the Sahara in the tenth
century, and by the end of the fourteenth had taken
root among the indigenous negroes of the Niger region
where it continues to spread in our own times. Some
of the Arab explorers were men of considerable mental
attainments and understood the science of geography,
such as El Bekri, who lived at the time of our William
the Conqueror, and Idrissi (1154), to whose maps and
writings we are indebted for a first ghmpse of the
country about Lake Chad and the various races of
Nigeria.

In 1352, a man who rejoiced in the name of Ibn
Batuta of Tangier was commissioned by the Sultan
of Morocco to undertake an expedition. This remark-
able explorer journeyed from Fez to Timbuktu,

72 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

descended the Niger to Gogo, pushed southwards and
eastwards across the whole continent, emerged near
Zanzibar and returned to Morocco through the eastern
Sudan. Unfortunately his book of travels has not been
preserved, with the exception of a portion found in
Cairo, though it is hoped that careful research may
ultimately discover a copy. Another envoy of the
court of Morocco to the Sudanese kings was Hassan
el Wasas, known in Europe as Leo Africanus, whose
" Description of Africa," written in Arabic in 1526,
has been translated into Latin, Italian, French and
English. There were numbers of other historians and
explorers at work, but sufficient indication has been
given to show how widespread was Arab influence
and how extensive the territory it embraced. It
probably attained its highest development in the six-
teenth century, since when it has been either stationary
or retrograde.

All along the Mediterranean coast the fiery zeal
of the followers of the Prophet compelled Berbers,
Romans, Greeks, Goths and others to merge their
distinctions and become Moslems or perish, but in
the course of centuries this ruthless fanaticism died
down, and a milder procedure than that of exter-
minating the recalcitrant was employed in propounding
the faith to the tribes of negroes further south. Progress
was slower, and to this day many of these tribes remain
pagan, but the ruling families of negroland embraced
the religion of the Koran with avidity ; it was suited
to their stage of mental development, it appealed to
their highest instincts, it added dignity to their lives,
and many of them became zealous missionaries of
Islam amongst their unconverted brethren.

Negroland suffered no such incursion of Arab
hordes as occurred in the north. Nature in the form

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 73

of the Sahara interposed a belt of a thousand miles
of desert between the fertile shore of the Mediterranean
and the still more productive districts of the Sudan ;
the desert stretched across the continent from the Red
Sea to the Atlantic and was the determining factor
in moulding the destiny of Nigeria. In this connection
it is instructive to look along the 13th degree of north
latitude, which roughly divides the region of efficient
rain from that of scanty rain, and therefore indicates
the temperate rain-zone of northern Africa. It divides
populations whose wealth consists of cattle, from those
whose wealth is camels ; it has an average elevation
above the sea of 1000 to 2000 feet ; and has been the
scene of the greatest Arab activity, from the tenth
century down to the Baggara empire of the Dervishes,
which recently held the Egyptian Sudan in an iron
grip.

If we except the Abyssinian highlands (6000 feet
average), there are on this thirteenth parallel a series
of powerful negro- Arab States, adjoining one another
across the full breadth of the continent. These ancient
kingdoms are named : (i) Senaar (on the Blue Nile) ;
(2) Kordofan (near the White Nile) ; (3) Darfur (in
the British sphere) ; (4) Wadai (in the French sphere) ;
(5) Bagirmi (in the French sphere) ; (6) Bornu {British) ;
(7) Sokoto (British) ; (8) Gando {British) ; (9) The
Songhay Empire {French) ; (10) The Melle [Mandingo]
Empire {French) ; (11) Bambara {French) ; and (12)
Senegambia {French). Of these Senaar at one time
was an enlightened and powerful nation of blacks,
Darfur can produce a hst of reignmg Sultans which
carry us back to the remote past ; Wadai was, and still
is the home of an unconquered Mohamedan people;
Bornu, now decadent, was formerly the seat of an
empire which governed the whole region around Lake

74 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Chad ; Sokoto and Gando are two divisions of the empire
of the Fulani and Hausas, which ruled the Western
Sudan through the nineteenth century ; the Songhay
Empire attained its zenith in the sixteenth century ;
the Melle Empire in the fourteenth century. All these
states, and others beside them, have enjoyed wide
dominion or dwindled into mere vassals, according to
the individual capacity of their sultans and viziers,
their success in suppressing turbulent factions within
and beating off the incursions of envious neighbours
from without. As soon as a community became
prosperous under an enhghtened ruler, it also became
a tempting prize to some member of his unruly family,
or to a neighbouring sultan, and sooner or later fell
a prey either to internal revolution or external attack.
Thus it comes about that the continent is strewn with
the remains of destroyed cities, each surrounded by
signs of a once prosperous agriculture, but now the
home of nothing but jackals, for it is a traditional
custom with Mohamedan princes not to rebuild a
fallen city.

Having briefly considered the general trend of the
Arab conquest of the whole Sudan, we will turn our
attention to those states with which we have recently
become more intimately connected, namely Sokoto,
Gando and Bornu, which lie within the borders of
Nigeria and are administered by British officials.

Sokoto and Gando are really two unnecessary sub-
divisions of the Hausa States, which until recently
formed part of the Fulani Empire and deserve special
attention. The Hausa race is said to have originated
in the oasis of Air in the midst of the Sahara, whence
in the eighth century it was driven south in the course
of the Arab invasion. Under the leadership of seven
capable brothers, the offspring of a certain Berber

THE STORY OF NIGERL\ 75

mother, this black tribe spread itself eastwards and
westwards along the southern margin of the desert
and founded seven states, which prospered owing to
the fertility of the soil, the industry of the population
and the policy pursued by the seven brothers. In
course of time the Hausas so increased that seven
additional provinces were added, and these are jocosely
called the upstart states by the inhabitants of the more
ancient settlements. Hausaland was visited and de-
scribed by Leo Africanus at the end of the fifteenth
century, when only its rulers professed the Mohamedan
faith : the bulk of the people were then snake-worship-
pers, and remained pagans, with a slight admixture
of Islamic rites, until the beginning of the nineteenth
century. It is, in fact, a point of interest in their
history that they so long escaped conversion to the
ruling rehgion, especially as they inhabited a country
which lay alongside one of the principal highways of
Arab migration. However, when at last they were
converted by the Fulani, they embraced Mohame-
danism with complete satisfaction, and have remained
its devoted adherents ever since. Their religion had
a most vivif3ang effect on the race, as it has invariably
had on the negroids of Africa, whose too susceptible
natures require the restraint of a fixed ritual and the
discipline of a strict code of laws.

The Hausa is distinctly the business-man of Africa ;
his looms and dye-pits produce the chief articles of
internal trade and are often in use as currency in
adjusting a deal or setthng a bargain ; his language is
the language of commerce throughout the Western
Sudan. He has no political ambitions and is not a
governing personahty, being of a cheerful, happy-
go-lucky disposition, good-humouredly contemptuous
of liis pagan customers but without desiring to convert

76 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

them. To quote Mr. Morel : " His manufacturing skill
is not only remarkable for Africa ; it puts Europe to
the blush. For closeness, durabihty and firmness of
texture, the products of his looms and dye-pits eclipse
anything that Manchester can produce. In a land of
reputed indolence, his activity is as conspicuous as his
enterprise. He makes an ideal commercial traveller,
peddling his wares over enormous distances, and
seldom failing to secure a considerable profit on his
transactions." It is unfortunate that the original
history of Hausaland, which was written in Arabic
characters and included the period from the sixteenth
to the nineteenth centuries, was deliberately destroyed
by the conquering Fulani in order to effectually
obliterate all evidence of Hausa independence.

But who are these Fulani of whom we so frequently
read ?

The answer to this question takes us back through
the centuries to the story of the remote past of ancient
Egypt, and the year 2136 B.C., a story which is full
of interest, but can only be briefly sketched in these
pages.* In the year named several hordes of Asiatic
shepherds invaded the land of Egypt and drove into
the fertile valley of the Nile their herds of hump-backed
cattle and blob-tailed, roman-nosed sheep. Whether
they abandoned their Asiatic homes through drought
or by reason of land-hunger in an over-populated
area is unknown, at any rate their incursion was
stoutly resisted by the local inhabitants, and a long
and sanguinary conflict arose in the land, converting
the nomadic shepherds into warriors and statesmen
fighting for their existence. In the end the invaders
established their supremacy, and are recorded in history

* It is very well told in " Affaiis of West Africa," by E. D. Morel.
Heineraann. 1902.

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 'j^

as the " Shepherd Kings " whose dynasty endured for
five centuries. They appear to have ruled with wisdom
what was undoubtedly the greatest state of the then
civilised world.

However, in the year 1636 B.C. they were over-
thrown by the ancient Theban dynasty, and had again
to migrate with their herds in search of pastures new.
They struck southwards up the Nile into the Sudan
[" The land of the blacks/'] and wandered, some along
the Blue Nile into the Abyssinian mountains where
they became the ancestors of the Galas and Bahima
of Uganda, some others away westwards across the
continent to the Niger. Here they scattered and
resumed the nomadic life, chiefly in the districts about
the sources of the Senegal and Gambia rivers, where
their herds found suitable pasturage. In all their
wanderings amidst inferior races and strange surround-
ings they retained their pride of race, their faith in the
bull-worship of their ancestors, their stories of ancient
Hebrew laws and customs, handed down from genera-
tion to generation. More important still, they kept
their Asiatic blood pure by never permitting their
daughters to wed any but men of their own race,
though the men also took wives from the aboriginal
populations amongst whom they dwelt.

This remarkable people must have reached West
Africa long before the dawn of the Christian era,
yet they retain to this day the characteristics of their
nomad ancestry, and are known in the Sudan as the
Fulani (plural). They are loosely scattered in small
groups over a vast area, dwelling with their flocks
and herds amongst pagan or Mohamedan tribes as
the case may be, ruling over some, subject to others,
strict followers of the Prophet in general, though
pagans in a very few inaccessible districts. Their

78 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

conversion to Mohamedanism occurred in the sixteenth
century.

As regards appearance the pure-bred Fulani are
still of an Eastern type, their copper-coloured skin,
straight hair, clean-cut features and well-developed
skulls differing widely from those of the African races.
The women may be described as quite good-looking.
The numerous mixed progeny of Fulani men and
negresses has introduced a strain of blood which has
been of advantage to the lower races throughout the
land. Everywhere the Fulani are distinguishable
by their fine linen, haughty manners, cleanly habits
and irreproachable orthodoxy.

In 1802, after centuries of mild subjection to
pagans, the Fulani of Hausaland started a revolt
which had far-reaching consequences. Inspired by a
religious enthusiast named Othman Dan Fodio, the
scattered groups of herdsmen assembled beneath the
banner of Islam, attacked and subjugated all the
Hausa States and founded an empire which extended
from Lake Chad to Senegal. They so communicated
the fervour of their intense rehgious feelings to their
converts that a Christian missionary has recently
admitted that " To the Hausa what is in the Koran
is of God, and what is not in the Koran is not worth
knowing." Othman, the leader of this remarkable
movement, died in 1817 in a fit of religious mania,
and was succeeded by his sons, of whom only Sultan
Bello was a capable man. The Fulani Empire, deca-
dent and latterly pernicious, made way in 1903 for
British rule under Sir Frederick Lugard.

We will next turn our attention to the beginnings
of European enterprise in West Africa.

Dismissing the unverified story put forward by
certain French writers to prove that a colony of hardy

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 79

Dieppe fishermen was established on the Guinea Coast
in the fourteenth century, we commence the narrative
in 1456, when certain of Prince Henry of Portugal's
patient adventurers discovered the mouths of the
Senegal and Gambia rivers. They returned with
vague stories of the fabulous wealth of Timbuktu.
A chartered company was started in Lisbon which on
its first venture imported a cargo of 200 slaves,
and the Portuguese commenced the traffic in black
humanity which was carried on uninterruptedly during
four centuries : to them belongs the distinction of
being the first European nation to begin it and the
last to leave it off. They built forts along the West
Coast and endeavoured to open up trade with the far
interior, but there is no authentic record of their having
established more than a precarious intercourse with the
natives through whom they bargained for slaves.
Being first in possession and jealous of interference
by rivals, they bent their energies chiefly to strengthen-
ing their monopoly, and were so far successful as to
retain it for a century.

But sooner or later a monopoly which has to be
fought for by armed trading ships is sure to be con-
tested by adventurous outsiders, and we accordingly
find that in 1550 (a few years before Queen Elizabeth
ascended our throne) a guild of London merchants
fitted out a small fleet and sent it to the Guinea Coast
under the command of Captain Thomas Windham,
a younger son of Sir Thomas Windham, the direct
ancestor of the present Wyndhams of Petworth House,
Sussex. He was noted as a successful navigator, and
was therefore put in charge of this first British trading
voyage to the West Coast, his quest being gold. He
made three separate voyages, and on one of them
brought home '* 150 lbs. of gold," which at present

8o SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

prices would mean a sum of £7000. In his journal
he records in 1552 : " Here, by the way, it is to be
observed that the Portuguese were much offended with
this our new trade into Barbary ; and both in our
voyage the year before and also in this, gave out
in England, through the merchants, that if they took
us in those parts they would use us as their mortal
enemies."

Undaunted by threats, a certain John Lok under-
took a couple of years later a trading voyage which he
described in minute detail. He owned three ships
and some smaller boats, and took two months to reach
the Gold Coast. He found the natives wiUing to
bargain, and, in exchange for cloth and other articles,
brought back a valuable cargo — 400 lbs. of gold, 36
cwt. of pepper and 250 tusks of ivory, some of which
weighed 90 lbs. each — so Master Lok's voyage was a
success, in spite of Portuguese opposition and without
a cargo of slaves. Others, especially Towrson, followed
this trade with vigour and profit ; but to Sir John
Hawkins belongs the discredit of being the first English-
man to embark a cargo of slaves, which he sold in
America, notwithstanding an indignant remonstrance
from Queen EHzabeth. The year of the defeat of the
Spanish Armada (1588) saw the first British Chartered
Company launched, and about the same time there
occurred a minor scramble amongst the European
Powers for stations on the West Coast, a scramble
which continued spasmodically through the seven-
teenth century. Spain crushed Portugal and laid
claim to her colonies ; the Dutch threw off the
yoke of Spain and seized them ; the Danes engaged
with alacrity in what was termed the " new " (i.e.
slave) trade ; the Germans founded their Brandenberg
Company ; the French laid the foundation of their

THE STORY OF NIGERL\ 8i

extensive West African Empire. Each of the rivals
built forts along the coast, the French under the Sieur
Brue being more enterprising towards the interior
than all the others combined. The British Company
seems to have neglected its opportunity and was more
or less a failure. Each set of traders held parchments
engrossed in magnificent language, signed by their
respective sovereigns, granting to each the " monopoly
of all trade from Morocco to the Cape of Good Hope
and beyond;" the consequent jealousy, confusion and
lawlessness were indescribable. Here was the buc-
caneers' opportunity, at a period when big events were
taking place in other parts of the world, and misdeeds
on the Gold Coast remained unrecorded and unpunished ;
how can we be surprised if the reports of the white man's
behaviour, which reached the interior through native
slave-raiders, disgusted Mohamedan missionaries, and
made them curse the white man and his gin ?

Thus the seventeenth century closes with the over-
sea slave trade in full swing, it being a far more lucra-
tive business than gold, ivory or pepper. The planta-
tions of America and the West Indies were growing
apace, their demand for labour annually increased,
so that during the eighteenth century we find the
French, Dutch and British struggling for supremacy
along the West Coast. Of these, the French from
the Senegal River continued to display the greater
interest in the warlike races which interposed between
themselves and Timbuktu ; the British were estab-
lished on the Gambia, and held seventeen forts on the
Gold Coast, but these were mostly reduplicated by
rival Dutch estabhshments, with here and there an
additional French or Portuguese fort ; so there was
no monopoly for any nation in the slave trade.

Should my readers be incUned to surmise that these

F

82 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

rival forts were centres from which radiated the civilis-
ing influence of the Christian into the recesses of the
Dark Continent, let him peruse some of the eighteenth-
century literature on this subject and the illusion
will soon be dispelled. The Hfe and habits of the
Mohamedans were shining lights of virtue compared
with that of the white men. A conservative estimate
puts the number of negroes shipped across the Atlantic
in the year 1748 at the total of 97,000 ; another
computes at 200,000 the number of blacks annually
exported during each year of the last decade of the
eighteenth century, and it has been calculated that
at least seven millions crossed the seas between 1700
and 1800. Those who are acquainted with the rate
of mortaUty which must occur in the raiding of an
inland village for slaves, in the caravan journey to
the coast and in the holds of saihng-ships, will reahse
that, for every slave safely landed ten or more were
sacrificed, and that this draft of blacks represented
a serious drain on the country. In the end there was
an awakening of the British conscience ; the voice of
declamation rose loud in the land ; and Abolition w^as
carried in 1807, followed by similar enactments in all
other civilised countries by 1815.

Looking \vith dispassionate eyes on the hot con-
troversies of those days, we perceive that AboHtion
was a necessity, not from mere sentimentahsm, nor
because the planters were unkind to their slaves as
was often falsely alleged, nor even because slavery
is reckoned "immoral;" but because the demand
for negroes inflicted an atrocious injury on the nations
of Africa and made progress on that Continent im-
possible. Moreover, the cheap liquor and gunpowder
which were exchanged for slaves were gradually sap-
ping the energies of the coastwise populations.

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 83

The abolition of over-sea slavery happens also to
coincide with the era of legitimate exploration.

If individual heroism, magnificent courage, an
indomitable will and an optimism which no adversity
could disappoint, are the emblems of a great explorer,
then Mungo Park ranks amongst the highest. His
achievements should be read in his biography by
Joseph Thomson, the hfe of an explorer by another
explorer, because only such an author can convince
one of the hardships which Mungo Park endured.
In 1795 he started from the Gambia River with a couple
of native servants, two donkeys and a horse, plunged
into the unknown interior, and emerged in 1799 after
exploring 300 miles of the middle Niger. He was
ill equipped for such an expedition, which had been
the death of many a brave man before him.

" Think of Park, and picture to yourself the position
of a lonely European wandering about inland Western
Africa in a thick blue fustian coat, with gilt buttons,
keeping his precious notes in the crown of a top-hat,
and kicked, buffeted, spat upon, treated with con-
tumely, subjected to every insult, over and over again
a slave, exposed for hours at a time in a burning sun
without water, often on the verge of starvation, racked
by disease, and in so miserable a plight upon many
occasions that death would have been a welcome relief
— yet triumphing over everything, and finally return-
ing, notes and all, to his own land."*

Undaunted, he set out again in 1804, at the request
of the British Government, and navigated more than
a thousand miles of the Niger in a rickety boat which
he built himself, meeting his death at the hands of the
natives in the rapids of Busa.

* " Affairs of West Africa "

84 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

For some years after this fatality all endeavours
to reach the Niger from the West Coast failed, and
resulted in the death of the explorers from disease and
hardships. It was therefore decided to make an
attempt from the Mediterranean, to follow the route
of the Arab conquerors and utilise if possible the native
caravan trade as a means of crossing the Sahara from
Tripoli. Accordingly three Englishmen, Clapperton,
Denham and Oudney (a naval captain, a major, and
a doctor) started in 1821, under the auspicies of the
British Government. Every sort of difficulty was put
in their way by the local merchants, who suspected
them as trading rivals ; they took six months to journey
from Tripoli to Fezzan, where they were further delayed
seven months more before they could commence the
desert march : it was therefore with great deUght that
they beheld the gleaming waters of Lake Chad in
February 1823. Having at last penetrated into
negroland, they were much gratified by the warm
welcome extended to them by the reigning Sultan of
Bornu.

" It was in a sense a new world which the explorers
had entered, a world of absorbing interest, where
Eastern magnificence and display mingled with the
naked barbarism of Africa ; where semi-arabised
potentates went a-warring with mail-clad knights,
and powerful barons brought their contingent of re-
tainers to assist their liege-lord in his campaigns of
plunder and conquest. The travellers had left nine-
teenth-century England, had plunged into the desert
and had emerged therefrom amid a feudaUsm which
recalled the Middle Ages. . . . They were the first
white men to reach the Chad, to discover the Shari,
to explore Bornu, Sokoto and part of Kanem, and

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 85

to describe, however indifferently, the wonderful
social fabric, the picturesque civilisation, teeming with
energy and industrialism, which existed, and exists
in the upper portion of the Niger basin."*

Clapperton alone survived to tell the tale of his
journey through the beautiful country, adorned with
plantations of cotton, tobacco and indigo, rows of
date palms, magnificent herds of cattle, and to describe
the industry of the Hausa inhabitants, their proficiency
in weaving, dyeing and churning, their aptitude as
traders ; and to expatiate on the qualities of the ruling
Fulani, who encouraged industry and protected trade
routes with such success that the city of Kano became
the greatest emporium of Central Africa. Such was
the impression produced on the rough-and-ready
sailor, who was too ready to accept the Fulani version
of the prosperity which he beheld. If, however, we
wish to possess a scientific knowledge of the country
and peoples of Nigeria, we may turn from the glowing
descriptions of Captain Clapperton to the five thought-
ful volumes in which Dr. Barth, a cultivated, genial
German, recorded his wanderings from 1850 to 1855.

The expedition which he joined was organised by
Lord Palmerston, with Dr. Richardson as its leader,
for the purpose of promoting commercial intercourse
with the states which Clapperton had visited. Barth
was the lecturer at the University of BerHn on
Comparative Geography and Colonial Commerce ; he
had lately published his " Wanderings Round the
Mediterranean," which comprised a journey through
Barbary in the company of Arabs ; and he was per-
mitted to join Richardson's expedition, provided he
was wiUing to contribute £200 towards his personal

* " Affairs of West Africa."

86 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

expenses. But Richardson died of fever in Bornu,
in March, 185 1, so, in the words of Barth, " Her
Majesty's Government honoured me with their con-
fidence, and, in authorising me to carry out the objects
of the expedition, placed sufficient means at my
disposal for the purpose. The position in which I
was thus placed must be my excuse for undertaking,
after the successful accomphshment of my labours,
the difficult task of relating them in a language not
my own." Such was the modest preface in which
he introduced to the British public the delightful
pages which convey a truer insight into the condition
of the Sudan than can be gained from any other source.
Barth was qualified by temperament and years of
previous study for the task he undertook ; his ac-
quaintance with the history of Africa and his famiharity
with the traditions of its religions placed him on a
footing of equaUty wdth the educated Mohamedans
whom he met ; his sincerity and straight dealing
disarmed the intrigues of suspicious fanatics ; and
wherever he tarried he made friends who were \villing
to forward him on his travels and glad to see him when
he returned. He was a naturalist, a linguist and a
scientific geographer.

Throughout his volumes one is struck by his intelli-
gent observations on men and things. There are no
cheap reflections, no endeavours to " make up " a
book ; his triumphant enthusiasm at each discovery
of importance is obviously genuine ; and his disappoint-
ment when obliged to stay in some native town with
nothing to do is best expressed in his words : " The
little information which I had been able to gather at
this place was not sufficient to give my restless spirit
its proper nourishment, and I felt, therefore, mentally
depressed."

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 87

Starting from Tripoli, Earth's itinerary comprised
Fezzan, Agades, Zinder, Kano, Bornu, Adamawa,
Bagirmi, Logon, Sokoto, Gando, Say, Timbuktu, Gogo,
Lake Chad, Kanem, and Bilma ; it occupied five
consecutive years ; and as the States and cities which
he visited and studied have since been more or less
occupied by France, England, or Germany, Earth's
are the only unprejudiced notes we shall ever have
of Nigeria under native rule. He had no political
interests to subserve ; in fact, he made it a stipulation
of his engagement that the mission should be non-
political ; yet the lesson which every chapter of his
book emphasises is that, in spite of the picturesque and,
in a few instances, capable government of the Sultans
and viziers, the state of the country was bad, life and
property were insecure, the stability of all institu-
tions was precarious, slave-raiding was universal and
wealthy communities were continually the prey of
plunderers and freebooters. Even within the few
years of his personal experience he several times attests
the total ruin of prosperous towns and districts in
which he had been hospitably entertained on previous
occasions. Native rulers deplored with him the exist-
ence of this state of things, but neither the enUgthened
Vizier of Bornu nor the Fulani Sultans of Sokoto and
Gando had the will or the power to correct the evil,
or even to mitigate its effects. Each princeling —
and princelings are numerous throughout Nigeria
— maintained himself, his court and his wealth as
best he could from year to year, without concerning
himself with the welfare of the general community.
There was evident prosperity in many parts, because
Nature had so bountifully endowed these lands and
the Hausa population was really industrious ; but,
on the other hand, the benefits to be derived from the

88 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

gifts of Nature and the works of man were frequently
sacrificed by the incompetence and weakness of the
governing families.

Of the first negro state seen by Barth he says the
vegetation and crops were abundant, the villages
neat and prosperous, cotton weaving was common,
" the whole country had an interesting and cheerful
appearance, villages succeeding each other with only
short intervals of thick underwood, manifesting every-
where the unmistakable marks of the comfortable,
pleasant sort of life led by the natives . . . the dwel-
lings shaded with spreading trees and enlivened with
groups of children, goats, fowls, pigeons and, where
a little wealth had been accumulated, a horse or a
pack-ox. The inhabitants were of cheerful tempera-
ments, bent upon enjoying life, rather given to women,
dance and song, but without any disgusting excess."
This state had not yet been conquered by the Fulani
when Barth traversed it in the company of a caravan
of 3700 camels carrying salt to Kano. On nearing the
capital, "almost all the people who met us saluted us
most kindly and cheerfully ; and I was particularly
amused by the following form of salutation : God bless
you : gently, gently : how strange ! Only a few proud
Fulani very unlike their brethren in the West, passed
us without a salute . . . the villages are here scattered
about in the most agreeable and convenient way, as
farming villages ought always to be, but which is
practicable only in a country in a state of security."
He estimated the population of Kano city at 30,000,
of whom 4000 were Fulani, and did not think that
the latter governed this particular city oppressively,
though the possession of wealth and comfort during
two generations had impaired their characteristics
and made them cowardly and incapable of protecting

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 89

the villages at a distance from the city. The city
walls and fortifications (kept in the best repair) enclosed
an immense area of ground, in order that a supply of
corn for the inhabitants might be grown during a long
siege ; the market was immensely crowded, the export
of cotton cloth, dyed with indigo, being prodigious.
"If we consider that this industry is not carried on
here, as in Europe, in immense establishments, degrad-
ing man to the meanest condition of Hfe, but that it
gives employment and support, to famihes without
compelling them to sacrifice their domestic habits,
we must presume that Kano ought to be one of the
happiest countries in the world ; and so it is as long
as its governor, too often lazy and indolent, is able
to defend its inhabitants from the cupidity of their
neighbours."

From the principal city in Hausaland to Kuka, the
capital of Bornu, the journey was made along paths from
village to village, as there is no such thing as a direct
road. On the border of these two empires predatory
excursions were the order of the day, and, as Barth
happened to make the journey twice, he records :

" We had a most interesting and cheerful scene of
African life in the open, straggHng village of Kahmari,
where numerous herds of cattle were being watered
at the wells ; but how melancholy, how mournful
became the recollection of the busy, animated scene
which I then witnessed when, three years and a half
later, as I travelled again through this district, the
whole village, which presented such a spectacle of
happiness and well-being, had disappeared, and an
insecure wilderness, greatly infested by robbers, had
succeeded to the abode of man."

The difference of type between the Hausa and the

90 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

black of Bornu became marked as Barth crossed the
frontier, the former being of Hvely spirit and cheerful
countenance, the latter melancholy and brutal, with
broad face, wide nostrils and large bones. Yet in a
bygone age Bornu held the headship of an immense
empire, including Kanem, Bagirmi and other states ;
and its Sultans still maintained the outward show of
barbaric splendour which Clapperton described. But,
as Barth relates, it was in the fifties in full decadence.
" The condition of the finest part of the country is a
disgrace to its present rulers, who have nothing to do
but transfer thither a few hundreds of their lazy slaves
and establish them in a fortified place, whereupon the
natives would immediately gather round them and
change this fine country from an impenetrable jungle
into rich fields, producing not only grain, but also
immense quantities of cotton and indigo."

Arrived in Kuka, Barth was well received by the
Vizier, allotted a spacious abode near the palace and
introduced to the learned men of the place, with whose
help he obtained access to the chronicles of the Kings
dating from the ninth century. Thus he succeeded
in sending to Europe a copy of the abridgment of the
whole history of Bornu from the earUest times down
to Ibrahim, the last offspring of the royal family, who
was on the throne when the previous English expedi-
tion visited Kuka. From this it appears that in the
thirteenth century the Prince of Kanem wielded the
strength of a vigorous empire and extended his in-
fluence to the Dongola province of Egypt. His reign
was succeeded by civil wars and regicides, which ended
in the seat of power being transferred to Bornu by the
conquering tribe, who reduced Kanem to a pro\dnce.
On the whole the sixteenth century was the most glorious
period of the Bornu empire, adorned as it was by two

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 91

capable Sultans. Then followed a quiet period during
which pious and peaceful kings occupied the throne,
and old age seemed gradually to gain on the kingdom ;
the last blow feU when the Fulani occupied the centre
of the country in 1809, and a stranger of Arab descent
founded a new dynasty.

About the Vizier (Prime Minister) in 185 1 Barth has
much to say. He was a charming, cultivated and amiable
gentleman, but so fond of the other sex that he possessed
a harem of between three and four hundred slaves.

" In assembling this immense number of female
companions for the entertainment of his leisure hours
he adopted a scientific principle ; in fact, a credulous
person might suppose that he regarded his harem only
from a scientific point of view, as a sort of ethnological
museum — doubtless of a peculiarly interesting kind —
which he had brought together in order to impress
upon his memory the distinguishing features of each
tribe. I have often observed that, in speaking with
him of the different tribes of negroland, he was at times
struck with the novelty of a name, lamenting that he
had not yet had a specimen of that tribe in his harem,
and giving orders at once to his servants to endeavour
to procure a perfect sample of the missing kind. I
must also say that, notwithstanding the great number
and variety of the women who shared his attention,
he seemed to take a hearty interest in each of them :
at least, I remember that he grieved most sincerely
for the loss of one who died in the winter of 1851.
Poor Haj Beshir ! He was put to death in the last
month of 1853, leaving seventy-three sons ahve, not
counting the daughters and the number of children
which may be supposed to die in such an establishment
without reaching maturity."

92 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

That is one side of Arab life, in the days of its
decadence ; but if we desire to be impartial, we shall
not pass judgment on this phase without also consider-
ing what conditions Arab civihsation replaced ; and
above all we shall guard against the error of applying
to negro states the standards of twentieth century
England. Conceive then the sort of hfe led by the
weltering masses of Central Africa during the cen-
turies previous to Arab conquests ; how they lived,
propagated and died, shut off from any sort of elevating
influence, unlettered, absorbed in the worship of a
disgusting local fetishism, practising horrible forms of
human sacrifices and rejoicing in such unmentionable
cruelties as only a witch-doctor can invent. That such
was roughly the state of negroland before its religious
awakening may be inferred from our knowledge of
those tribes amongst whom Mohamedanism is to this
day unknown. The author has dwelt amidst such
tribes, and knows that the picture as drawn above is
not exaggerated. But, having accorded a full measure
of praise to the Mohamedan conquerors who lifted
the Sudan from disorganised confusion to comparative
civihsation, it must be remembered that their aspira-
tions were and are strictly limited, and that they are
not capable of further progress alone.

Meanwhile the days of the white slaver's iniquities
are passed, and the days of Mohamedan potentates
are numbered. For the nineteenth century wit-
nessed a complete change in the attitude of mind of
the white man towards the blacks ; and thus it may
come to pass that the European will in the future
atone for the injury which he inflicted in former times.
In India, Egypt, and the Egyptian Sudan, Great
Britain is accomplishing a splendid work of regeneration.
Its benefits are now extended to Nigeria, where an

THE STORY OF NIGERIA 93

even greater success may be predicted. For the rule
of the British Administrator promotes the interests
of the governed to a far greater extent than anything
previously dreamed of by any native prince during
the centuries which have gone before.

We will now deal with the acquisition of Nigeria
by the British, and describe Vandeleur's share in the
work of a successful expedition.

CHAPTER V

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA

See map facing page 120

The story of our West African colonies during the
decade 1884 to 1895 cannot be studied without a feeling
of pained wonder at the blindness of British Cabinets
and of hearty admiration at the foresight and wisdom
of the Governments of France and Germany and now
that the story is ten years old and nearly forgotten it
may not be out of place to review our mistakes and
realise the necessity of vigilant watchfulness in other
remote parts — as for instance in the Far East — before
it is too late.

In the previous chapter a sketch of Sudan history
was outlined from the ninth century to 1855, when it
was visited by Barth under the auspices of Lord
Palmerston. He travelled through the country and
recorded his observations in a readable book, which
was nevertheless left unread by the Ministers respon-
sible for British interests in those parts. Their igno-
rance of the Sudan, with such a mass of verified
evidence available, affords but a feeble excuse for the
apathy which deprived us of many rich provinces, and we
may well ask why British Ministers should be unaware
of what was well known to French and German states-
men ? In order to realise how much our colonies
were neglected it is only necessary to study maps
which show European possessions in Africa in 1884

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 95

and 1902 respectively.* They illustrate more com-
pletely than pages of letterpress the results of the
scramble for Africa between the years in question, and
are specially instructive as regards the West Coast,
where Great Britain sat still and looked on whilst
France filched from her the hinterlands of her colonies
of Gambia, Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, and Ger-
many ousted her from the Cameroons.

It would be foolish to reproach these two Powers ;
their actions were legitimate and reflected credit on
the statesmen who conceived and the officials who
carried out their poHcy. The oft-repeated statement
that they are incapable of managing negro colonies
is not borne out by facts. The truth is that, whilst
we in England were wrangling over Home Rule for
Ireland, the French and Germans were actually estab-
lishing their rule in Africa. They accomphshed a
task which we neglected, in spite of our prior occupancy
and boasted Imperialism, and are fully entitled to
the reward of their labours and the success of their
enterprise. With admirable foresight and courage
French officers undertook the exploration of a conti-
nent, made treaties with hundreds of native rulers,
now subjects of the Repubhc, extended her frontiers
in all directions, took care to establish themselves
at the back of each of our West African possessions,
and this in spite of our salaried local governors, who
were aware of the encroachments, but were not per-
mitted to interfere for fear of hurting foreign sus-
ceptibilities. Practically nothing was done to safe-
guard our interests during this period of laissez /aire,
so fatal to the traditions of a governing race, so costly
when the consequences are recognised and have to be
remedied.

* See two maps at end of book.

96 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

In 1865 a "strong" Committee of the House of
Commons unanimously resolved " that all further
British extension of territory or assumption of govern-
ment or new treaty offering protection to native tribes
would be inexpedient," and this policy held the field
for years. It was dictated not by feelings of mag-
nanimity or humanity, but " through craven fears
of being great," and was a direct encouragement
to foreign aggression — especially German — about which
a few remarks will not be out of place in these pages.
Prince Bismarck at first treated our Government with
forbearance and scrupulous consideration when he
commenced to found a German colony in South West
Africa, but he grew tired of our unbusinesslike methods
and peevish complaints, and adopted a different pro-
cedure with regard to his second venture; indeed,
the story of his acquisition of the Cameroons deserves
to be told as a sample of British ineptitude. The
Cameroon Mountains (13,000 feet high) happen to
possess the only salubrious climate near the West
Coast of Africa, and other ranges of high altitude
and fertility are found in the interior of the province.
In 1864 Burton raised the British flag unofficially
over a portion of these hills, foreseeing the future value
of a climate so suitable for European habitation.
Mission and trading stations were estabhshed, but
not formally acknowledged by our Government,
though they proved of such benefit to the neighbouring
tribes that the chiefs along the coast petitioned to be
included in the British settlement. Their prayers
remained unanswered when sent through the Consul,
so at last, in 1879, ^^^ ^^ the Cameroon Kings ventured
to write the following letter direct to Queen Victoria :

" We, your servants, have joined together, and

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 97

thought it better to write you a nice long letter which
will tell you about our wishes. We wish to have your
laws in our territories. We want to have every fashion
altered ; also we will do according to your Consul's
word. Plenty wars here in our country. Plenty
murder, and plenty idol-worshippers. Perhaps these
lines of our writing will look to you as an idle tale. We
have spoken to the Enghsh Consul plenty times about
having an Enghsh Government here. We never have
answer from you, so we wish to write to you ourselves.
When we know about Calabar River, how they have
Enghsh laws in their towns, and how they have put
away their superstitions, oh, we shall be very glad
to be like Calabar River."

The British residents, had they been consulted,
could have proved that the peace of the Calabar River
and the insecurity of the rest of the country accounted
for the Kings' desire for a change, yet four years elapsed
and it was not till 1883 that the Foreign and Colonial
Offices decided to place the Cameroons under the
British flag, and even after this decision had been
reached months were allowed to slip before action
was taken. On May 16, 1884, Consul Hewett was
instructed to proclaim the formal annexation, but this
official proved no swifter than his superiors, and was
beaten on the post by a German under the following
circumstances. On April 20, or a month before the
British Colonial Office gave any instructions. Lord
Granville received a communication from the German
Embassy in London which ought to have aroused the
energy of a Secretary of State who had quite recently
been deprived of South West Africa by Bismarck.
He was informed that Dr. Nachtigal had been " com-
missioned to visit the West Coast of Africa in a gun-

G

98 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

boat, and conduct negotiations connected with certain
questions on behalf of Germany " ; and he was further
requested " to cause the authorities in the British
possessions to be furnished with suitable instructions."
In reply an assurance was given that the British
Colonial authorities would be enjoined to give all
possible assistance to the German envoy. Accordingly
the Mowe, with Dr. Nachtigal on board, accompanied
by the Elizabeth, anchored off the Los Islands (British)
and proceeded past the Gold Coast (British) to Togo-
land, where the German flag was hoisted on July 2.
Togoland has since become one of the most flourishing
little colonies in Africa, and proves beyond doubt
that Germans are not incapable of founding a paying
colony.

After this easy success the Mowe steamed on to the
Cameroons, where everything had been prepared by
the four German traders settled in the place. At mid-
night meetings, arranged with the native Kings, who
were tired of waiting for their reply from Great Britain,
treaties were negotiated and signed handing over the
whole country to German protection, and Consul
Hewett, who had been the reverse of prompt, arrived
on the scene five days after the German flag had been
hoisted conspicuously over what was all but a British
colony. Under German management the Cameroons
have since developed into a valuable possession, with
a hinterland extending to Lake Chad, deliberately
cutting off British extension towards the Nile. The
event was hailed with paroxysms of delight in Ger-
many, whilst in England futile reproaches were heaped
upon the Gladstone Ministry for its indifference to
British interests. But, after all, the Cabinet only
reflected the prevaihng spirit in the Houses of Parha-
ment, a spirit which|had sat down under Majuba three

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 99

years previously, and which Bismarck had gauged
before he sent Dr. Nachtigal out in the Mowe. In the
end Bismarck paid £4000 for our Cameroons Mission
Station of forty years' growth, whereas we pocketed
a humihation, condoned a piece of sharp practice and
meekly acknowledged German sovereignty.

From such an episode it is pleasant to turn to the
neighbouring province of Nigeria, and dwell upon the
services rendered to his country by one man — Sir
George Goldie — who, fortunately for England, was free
from the blighting control of a British Cabinet. Even
as Cecil Rhodes added Rhodesia to our Empire, Goldie
gave us Nigeria, and of the two Nigeria is the more
valuable, and was the more difficult to acquire. George
Taubman Goldie, born in the Isle of Man, son of the
Speaker of the House of Keys, was educated at Wool-
wich, and held a commission for a short time in the
Royal Engineers. He subsequently took to travelling
in Africa, and first visited the Niger in 1877. With
true insight he perceived the potential value of this
great river and devoted his life and abilities to securing
it for his country.

It had been explored by MacGregor Laird in 1832,
by British gunboats in 1841 and by Baikie in 1854,
but the withdrawal of the parliamentary grant and
the destruction of Lokoja by the natives caused the
abandonment of all enterprise in this region, and Goldie
only found a few rival traders conducting a precarious
business, without intelligence or knowledge of the
markets of Hausaland. His first step was to induce
the British to amalgamate their interests and form
themselves into a trading company, which under his
management became in two years a concern with a
capital of £125,000, and was pressing for a royal
charter. This was refused on the ground of insuffi-

100 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

ciency of capital, so Goldie set to work to increase
the amount to £1,000,000, and at last in 1886 the
charter was granted, together with governing rights
over Hausaland and Bornu. In 1887 the K.C.M.G.
was bestowed upon this able administrator, and he
became a viceroy in fact, though not in name, a viceroy
whose dominion must needs be created from the founda-
tions upwards, in the face of persistent rivals backed
by the purses and diplomacy of two European Powers.
The measure of his success compared v/ith that of our
other coast colonies can be seen on the map and judged
from the annual reports on this tit-bit of Northern
Africa ; the story of how he accomplished his ends
has not yet been given to the public. All that we
know of this strong and patient man during his twenty
years' task on the Niger is that he succeeded. French
officers openly occupied several of his outlying dis-
tricts ; German civilians, such as Herr Flegel, accepted
British hospitality in order to steal a march on their
entertainers and occupy territory behind their backs ;
but Goldie triumphed over all, and on January i,
1900, handed to the British Government the provinces
which he acquired. The difficulties he surmounted
in London, Berlin and Paris, without mentioning
those in Africa, would fill a whole volume, but he alone
could write it with accuracy.

Meanwhile, owing to the fact that Vandeleur was
employed during the most important military expedi-
tion conducted by Sir George, we possess a detailed
description of the operations and are afforded a gumpse
of how he set about his work. I refer to the first
expedition against the Fulani, which resulted in our
dominion over Hausaland. It illustrates how fore-
thought should be applied to soldiering, in order to
accomplish great ends with small means ; it was a

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA loi

conspicuous success, though it might have been merely
a " regrettable incident ; " and I propose to relate its
story as recorded by Vandeleur, who took a prominent
part in it. In October 1896, Sir George Goldie's
plans were matured and he was in London, selecting
officers for active service in Nigeria. Vandeleur,
recently returned from Uganda with a good record,
was just the sort of man he wanted, so the formalities
were quickly got through and, overjoyed at this unex-
pected prospect of more fighting, the young Guardsman
embarked at Liverpool with other special service
officers on November 28. Amongst them were his
friends Major Cunningham and Leutenant Cecil
Pereira of the Coldstream Guards. He had on this
occasion an additional motive for the keen interest
he always took in a campaign in that Sir George had
recommended him to the Times as its correspondent
with the expedition.

The voyage was eventless and dreary, a monotonous
succession of stoppages and delays at various West
African ports, and it was not until December 26 that
the ss. Coomassie dropped anchor in the For^ados
River, the most westerly branch of the Niger delta.
The whole coast is here intersected by creeks, back-
waters and tiny channels, choked and veiled by endless
mangrove swamps, through which the Niger oozes
and trickles to the sea in an ignominious fashion.

The expedition was due to start from the head-
quarters of Northern Nigeria, at the beginning of
January 1897, so the officers on the Coomassie were
but just in time. They found a steam launch waiting
to convey them up the river to Lokoja, an important
town built at the junction of the Niger and Benue,
the mihtary headquarters of the Protectorate. The
place was full of Ufe and activity in view of the coming

102 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

campaign, and numerous stern-wheeled steamers were
moored to the river bank receiving their suppUes of
rations and reserve ammunition, though nothing as
regards equipment and organisation had been left
to chance or to the last moment. Sir George Goldie
had bent his energies towards perfecting the organisa-
tion of a fighting force during several years, offering
us an example of how brains and money can be econo-
mically applied to military policy, and a contrast
to the makeshifts of British Cabinets, drifting into war
yet preaching peace.

Here Vandeleur learned the objective of the ex-
pedition, which had hitherto been kept a profound
secret even from the officers engaged. It was to be
directed against the powerful State of Nupe, situated
on both banks of the Niger north of Lokoja, a depen-
dency of the Fulani Empire. The Emir of Nupe,
himself a Fulah, had sent emissaries from his capital,
Bida, to the neighbouring Emir of Ilorin and the King
of Busa, to persuade them to join forces with him in
order to turn the white men out of the country. The
King of Busa declined, preferring to hold to his treaty
with the British company, and had even gone so far as
to denounce the conspiracy to Sir George Goldie. The
latter saw that a trial of strength between the Moha-
medan rulers and himself was at last inevitable — it had
been pending for eighteen years — and wisely decided
to prove in a decisive manner who should be master.

Hitherto the company, although it had engaged
in trade with the natives and forestalled French enter-
prise by concluding treaties with the Sultans of Sokoto
and Bornu, in reality held its position in the anterior
on mere sufferance. European merchandise was wel-
comed, but British ideas on the subject of slave-
raiding were abhorrent to Mohamedan potentates.

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 103

To hope that such princehngs would perceive the error
of their ways and proceed to reform their methods at
the bidding of a missionary was an idea which might
do duty on an Exeter Hall platform, though nowhere
else. The ripe experience of the Governor of Nigeria
taught him that progress was impossible till the Fulani
had been conquered in at least one battle.

With the means at command it was a daring
venture, and when the intention leaked out at home
the value of secrecy in England as well as in Nigeria
was amply illustrated. Experts (so-called) prophesied
the speedy annihilation of the expedition, Little
Englanders shouted for its recall, and the press teemed
with the kind of advice which produced the abandon-
ment of Gordon in the Sudan and the policy of scuttle
whenever any enterprise seemed to involve a risk.
Such counsel would have been but too congenial to
the Colonial Secretaries of a few years previously, but
fell unheeded on the ears of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain,
who fully grasped the duty of accepting some risk in
order to further a British interest, and took upon his
shoulders the responsibility of backing Sir George's
enterprise. Goldie's critics were so far in the right
that absolute disaster awaited him if he miscalculated
the fighting capabiUty of his enemy or the reliabihty
of his own troops. His forces consisted of Hausas
trained and led by British officers. They had been
carefully drilled and disciphned for several years,
and had distinguished themselves in small encounters
with slave-raiders, but had not before met their co-
rehgionists in pitched battle. They were now to be
pitted against overwhelming "numbers of the very
Fulani who had conquered and ruled Hausaland
without question for a century. They were therefore,
to say the least, untried soldiers, though their British

104 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

officers were staking their lives as a guarantee of their
competency.

Meanwhile the Emir of Nupe, equally confident in
the superiority of his numerous cavalry, had sent
6000 men under his chief general, the Markum Mohamed,
to Kabba with the object of striking a blow direct
at Lokoja.* His main army he kept at Bida for the
defence of the capital and thus divided his force into
two parts, separated by the broad Niger and a hundred
miles of difficult country. The Governor, informed
of this move, decided to interpose his tiny force
between the two Nupe armies, defeat the smaller
first, and then by rapid marching throw himself against
the main body at Bida. The idea was simple, bold and
stragetically sound, but the utmost secrecy and
despatch were required to carry it out and prevent a
junction of the two armies before they could be dealt
with separately. Goldie also took care to patrol the
Niger with gunboats and launches, to prevent all com-
munication across the river and to frustrate the
intended alliance of Nupe and Ilorin. In this, as in
other campaigns, the decision having been made and
the means provided, mobility became an essential
factor in the problem.

The force at his disposal consisted of thirty British
officers and non-commissioned officers, and 513 Hausas
and Yorubas, commanded by Major Arnold, a young
cavalry officer who had devoted his energies to the
training and organising of the troops. The flotilla was
entrusted to Mr. Wallace, the Agent-General of the
Company, a civilian with twenty years' experience of
the country, while Sir George Goldie accompanied the
troops and directed the plan of campaign. The expe-
dition started by land and water on January 6, 1897.

* See map facing page 120.

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 105

The land force was organised in seven companies,
each a complete unit, with a maxim attached to it.
Seymour Vandeleur commanded the maxim of No. 5
Company, manned as were the rest by Hausas. The
artillery consisted of two Whitworth B.L. guns (a
twelve- and a nine-pounder) and five seven-pounder
light guns, carried by native porters and served in
action by three Royal Artillery officers and 59 Hausa
gunners. This force, in addition to its offensive
operations, had to safeguard the march of 900 carriers,
loaded with three weeks' supply of food and ammuni-
tion. Owing to the bush and scrub, the first few
marches had to be conducted in single file, thus reduc-
ing the speed of the column to that of its slowest
porter. Two companies formed the advance guard
and went on daily to prepare the next night's camping
ground ; the remainder undertook the duty of escort
to the procession of carriers which from its length and
slowness was vulnerable to attack by cavalry, though
luckily nothing of the kind was attempted. Each even-
ing strands of wire were stretched round the bivouac
at forty yards distance to guard against night attacks,
and " surprise " lights were hung up at intervals.
These, on being fired, burned clearly for sufficient time
to enable the maxims to be turned on the threatened
point. The men slept with their rifles close beside
them.

The British officers were mounted on wiry little
ponies from the interior, and were each allowed a
native servant, but their baggage was of the hghtest
description. Two mallams (priests) accompanied the
troops ; prayers were repeated thrice daily ; Mohame-
dan observances were strictly respected — thus no
Fulani could truthfully assert that the white man
was perverting the pious Hausa.

io6 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

It was hot even for tropical Africa as the column
marched in a northerly direction to place itself astride
the road between Kabba and Bida, a position which
was reached without opposition on January ii, at a
village called Sura, where a zariba was built to accom-
modate the bulk of the porters under the protection
of one company, commanded by Pereira. The remain-
der of the force started in the lightest possible order
to surprise the Markum's camp at Kabba. Three days
of forced marches through beautiful country brought
them to the outer walls of the town, but only to learn
that the Nupe army had just broken up its camp and
marched north-west to rejoin the main body at Bida.
It was a bitter disappointment to the troops, who were
spoiling for a fight, but Sir George relied on Mr.
Wallace's system of steamer patrols to prevent the
Markum's army from crossing the Niger ; moreover
the time could not be considered as altogether wasted.
During the marches the men had learned to trust their
officers, and confidence, mobility and discipline had
improved daily.

The inhabitants of Kabba rejoiced at their deliver-
ance from oppression and none was more demonstra-
tive than the old chief, who had been in receipt of a
subsidy from the Fulani for collecting slaves among
his own people. With true native caution, however,
he refused all tangible assistance to the British, and
would not even sell them horses, of which they stood
greatly in need. As in his experience no institution
had hitherto been permanent, why should he now
believe that the Fulani would not return in a week
or two ? A picturesque review of the troops was held
under the walls of the town, Fulah power was declared
at an end, and the country formally taken over ; the
enemy's deserted camp was burned, and by the i6th

AIM.'^OIZ »^I

^ii

ON TH1-: MARCH IN NIGKKIA

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 107

the Hying column rejoined its supplies, and was enjoy-
ing a day of rest, for the long hot marches were begin-
ning to tell on both officers and men.

The scenery had hitherto offered every variety
of scrub, grassy plain, thick forest and rocky hills ;
the country was fertile, dotted with villages and
patches of cultivation, chiefly of dhurra (maize), yams,
plantain and cotton. A good deal of primitive industry
was carried on, especially the weaving of cotton into
cloth on ingenious native looms. Here and there,
however, sad spectacles of ruin and desolation marked
the track of a party of Nupe slave-raiders, of whom
the inhabitants showed the greatest terror, though they
welcomed the British with confidence. On turning
northward a long and trying march led the column
over the Jakpana Hills, which here form the watershed
between the Middle Niger and Lagos. Owing to absence
of water these hills had to be crossed without a halt,
and the lava rocks burning under a tropical sun caused
suffering to the bare-footed porters.

At last, however, the river again came into view
and, passing through villages surrounded by exten-
sive cultivation, the force rejoined the flotilla at
Egbon and learned that the gunboats had pre-
vented any contingent of the enemy from crossing the
stream.

Thus, in spite of a minor disappointment at Kabba,
the original plan held good, and preparations were
made for the advance on Bida, distant twenty-five
miles from the river. After the crossing, an unford-
able creek running parallel to the Niger was no in-
superable obstacle, as with the aid of some canoes
and a steel boat the troops were safely ferried across,
but a swamp just beyond proved a more serious diffi-
culty and indeed nearly wrecked the success of the

io8 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

expedition. The two heavy guns now became the prob-
lem of the day. To leave them behind might involve
failure to breach the walls of Bida, to drag them by
manual labour through a swamp in face of an enemy
involved delay and necessitated an undesirable sub-
division of the small force. Meanwhile, information
derived from captured natives pointed to desperate
fighting by the Nupes in defence of their capital. It
was decided after consideration to run a risk and tem-
porarily divide the force, so Cunningham was sent
on with two companies, including Vandeleur's, whilst
the remainder escorted the guns and porters.

Pushing rapidly forward the advance guard, ac-
companied by Sir George Goldie, made a long march
into a country which changed its character, cultivation
gi\ang place to open undulating downs with gentle
folds and here and there a village or farmstead nestling
amongst some trees. It seemed admirably adapted to
the enemy's cavalry tactics. After crossing a wide
ravine and ascending a slope, the advance-guard
suddenly beheld the Nupe army drawn up in its
thousands on a wide front, flanked by large bodies
of white-robed horsemen. Major Arnold now came up
with a reinforcement of two companies and decided to
continue the advance in order to distract the enemy's
attention from our line of carriers and slow-moving
guns in rear. The little body of Hausas in their khaki
uniforms and red tarbooshes carried out the movement
with deliberation and coolness under a galling fire
from the enemy's advanced marksmen, who disputed
every yard of the ground. But their volleys and maxim
fire told with effect on the Nupes, who gave ground as
the force moved steadily forward to the summit of
an undulating ridge where a halt was called. Here
a full view of Bida city two thousand yards off burst

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 109

upon them and they knew that a decisive hour in the
destiny of Nigeria was at hand.

The scene was worthy of the occasion and deeply
impressed Vandeleur and the few British officers who
were present. The town, containing from 70,000 to
100,000 inhabitants, stretched as far as the eye could
reach, a mass of lofty thatched roofs and clay walls
encircled by a massive crenalated outer wall on which
stood a throng of citizens, the spectators of a struggle
which should decide whether British or Fulani were to
be their future masters. In front, brilliantly robed
Emirs trotted at the head of their retainers, horse and
foot, and the air resounded with the roar and din of
an army drawn up for battle.

Clearly the little knot of 250 Hausas on the ridge,
who, be it remembered, constituted half the entire
force, could not venture on an attack, nor could they
remain where they were without water. Meanwhile,
in spite of occasional outbursts from our Maxims,
the enemy interpreted the halt as a confession of weak-
ness, an invitation to attack. They therefore started
a forward move in extended line with enveloping
flanks. But the British officers, keenly on the watch,
formed the well-drilled companies, by word of command,
into square at the double, and then slowly retired in
steady ranks to avoid being cut off from the ravine.

Instantly the whole Nupe army raised a mighty
shout of enthusiasm and bore down upon the square,
surrounding it on all sides. The moment was critical ;
the smallest mistake, the sHghtest panic would have
brought eager Fulani horsemen charging into our
ranks in their thousands, and the day would have
ended in a massacre by superior numbers. But the
officers kept cool, their men shot steadily at every halt,
the square showed no signs of wavering. The Nupe

no SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

footmen aimed so high that their bullets for the most
part whizzed harmlessly overhead, but the active horse-
men on the point of charging home came so dangerously
near that frequent halts were necessary to open maxim
and seven-pounder fire, in order to clear the path for
further retreat. Slowly, gradually and surely the square
fought its way back towards the ravine, brushing aside
the more adventurous horsemen, keeping others on
the flanks at a respectful distance and facing at each
halt the threatened rush of the footmen. Of all
tactical operations none is more trying than a retire-
ment in the face of a fanatical enemy, none a severer
test of nerve and discipline ; and it was with intense
relief that at last Arnold and his officers approached
their bivouac at the ravine and found its supplies
and reserve ammunition intact. Here they could halt
near water and defy attack.

It was now 2.30 p.m. ; the advance-guard had been
marching and fighting since dawn ; the men were
hungry and tired, but were still threatened by a host
of twenty to thirty thousand of the enemy, and rest
was not possible. The seven-pounders had fortunately
arrived at the front and were busily employed in pre-
venting the cavalry from working round the flanks
to the immediate rear, a task which they successfully
accomplished, though their accuracy was moderate
and their range limited. However, their moral
effect was far greater than their execution, and
Arnold felt strong enough to detach two of his com-
panies to the rear, in order to reinforce the escort
of the heavy guns, on which the success of the ex-
pedition depended. They were not yet in sight and
nothing had been heard of them, but soon after 4 p.m.
the nine-pounder was dragged into camp, and matters
assumed a brighter aspect.

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA iii

The first shell, aimed with precision at long range,
landed among a clump of horsemen in a village and
scattered them in all directions, amidst loud cheers
from the camp. After a few more shells of a similar
kind the enemy with one accord drew off to Bida,
carrying their dead and wounded with them. It was
an unexpected but welcome rehef, which the British
officers only understood next day when they learnt
that one of the first shells burst amongst the Agaie
division, alUes of the Emir of Bida, kilhng their chief
and so disheartening the contingent that it departed
homewards the same night.

It was dusk when the advance-guard sat down
to a meal after tv/elve hours' fighting, and quite dark
before the remainder of the force escorting the twelve-
pounder reached camp, amid cheering and bugle-
playing. This gun, by means of a compass-bearing,
was aimed in the dark at the city of Bida, elevated
to its extreme range (5400 yards) and fired — more as
a rehef to the feelings of the officers and a defiance
to the enemy than for any practical purpose. As
luck would have it, this single shell fell in the to\vn
and burst near the palace, causing considerable com-
motion and alarm. Thus did the heavy artillery
compensate for the risk involved in the subdivision
of the force during twelve hours of critical work.

When morning broke, after a night spent in firing
rockets to keep the enemy at a distance, the force,
including loaded carriers and heavy guns, crossed
the ravine and formed into square on the slope beyond
— porters in the centre, heavy guns in the front face,
maxims at the corners. Slowly this unwieldy square
crept forward, tightly packed, a solid mass of men
occupying a tiny space of ground. The Fulani cavalry
swept round to threaten the rear, but this time the

112 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

British were a compact force with no rearguard, and
had the added prestige of advancing to the attack.
The fighting was in fact a repetition of that of the
previous day, and would be tedious to describe in
detail. Riflemen in bushes and horsemen in the open
delayed the square, but it reached the ridge with a few
casualties, including Sir George's servant shot dead
at his side, and beheld the Nupe army drawn up on
the opposite slope. The guns came into action and
soon cleared the ground, masses of the enemy retiring
into the town by its several gates in order to line the
wall, others sheering off to some high ground to the
west. So the force moved on to within half a mile
of the city, took up a defensive position on a rising
piece of ground near some water, and commenced the
bombardment. About this time the Emir of Bida
was wounded in the arm as he stood near the western
gate in a crowd of horsemen, and the moral effect of
our shells spread dismay amongst the enemy ; moreover,
the thatched roofs of Bida, scorched dry by a tropical
sun, were soon blazing in all directions. Thus the
fighting men on the outer wall who had opened a well-
sustained fire were now hotly engaged with our volleys,
maxims and guns, and were also threatened by a con-
flagration in rear. They wavered, and finally aban-
doned the defence of the city. By midday the whole
Nupe army was in full retreat through the town,
dispersing into the country beyond, and the place stood
at the mercy of the conquerors.

Camp was pitched outside, a meal cooked, and later
in the day the officers marched their troops through the
city, when they realised for the first time its immense
extent (three miles by two and a half) and were fully
impressed with the danger which street fighting would
have entailed, accompanied as it always is by loss of

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 113

discipline and temptations to loot, which no African
troops can resist. The moral effect of the heavy guns
had obviated a costly assault on the outer wall and
hand-to-hand scuffles in the streets.

After one day's halt to rest the troops and en-
courage the inhabitants to resume their usual occupa-
tions, the force took up quarters in the palace in the
heart of the city, and proclamations were issued
declaring Fulani rule and slavery at an end. The
British flag was hoisted over the place, reconnais-
sances were undertaken into the surrounding country,
and soon the trading population learned that they
would be more secure under our rule even though the
old currency, slaves, was abohshed. Some members
of the reigning family came in to surrender, and finally
the Markum was appointed Emir with power to rule
the State under British supervision. Thus the whole
of Nupe was freed from oppression, confidence was
restored, commerce encouraged and the last report
of the country's progress shows how beneficial the
expulsion of the old rulers has proved. Having estab-
lished a native government to replace the old one
the expedition returned to the Niger.

Writers on mihtary operations are sometimes
obhged — by way of illustration — to institute com-
parisons between one campaign and another, and
to draw deductions therefrom. In this connection
the Bida expedition has been hkened " to the historic
battle of Plassey, whereon the foundation of the
Indian Empire was laid " ; but I do not propose
to enter upon this subject beyond suggesting that the
inferences to be drawn are obvious. Brains and
forethought, unhampered by circumlocution, planned
and carried out the whole thing. The criticism that
the enemy possessed no field-guns, that he ought to

114 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

have rushed the ravine camp early during the first
day's fight, that he could have successfully attacked
the column on its hundred miles' march from Kabba
to Bida is true enough. But in judging of the event
one must give weight to many considerations, including
the past history of the country, the numbers engaged
on both sides, the difficulties of transport and the
results achieved. The object of war is neither to kill
as many enemies as possible nor to telegraph home a
big butcher's bill in one's own force, as is sometimes
supposed. At Bida our losses were Lieutenant Thom-
son and seven men killed, nine men wounded, and one
seven-pounder captured by the enemy. In addition
Captains Hatton and Anderson and Lieutenants Thorpe,
Parker and Musters (he died on the homeward journey)
were invaUded to England. Thus the achievement
was out of proportion to the loss, though the enemy
suffered heavily during the first day's fight. From
start to finish the expedition occupied one month.

A commander of native troops may be judged from
the point of view of a strategist, a tactician or a humani-
tarian ; but in any case he must be successful. Now
the campaign under review was a small masterpiece
of strategy; it included a tactical success gained
by five hundred men against twenty thousand ; it
advanced the cause of humanity by freeing a wide area
from slave-raids ; and it ultimately added Hausaland
to the British Empire. Surely no Englishman, save
those who habitually cry down the British Empire,
will complain of such a result !

But before we quit Nigeria to follow Vandeleur's
career into other parts, some mention must be made
of another expedition in which he was engaged against
an important Fulah State named Ilorin, situated
sixty miles to the south of the Niger at Jebba (one

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 115

hundred miles up stream from Bida). It will have been
gathered from what has been said that the Company,
with its headquarters at the confluence of two rivers,
had, until 1897, been essentially a trading company,
with command of the navigable waters but no real
authority inland. Based on its steamers and gunboats,
the time had come for its land force to carry forward
the enterprise, and put the company into touch with
the commercial cities of the interior. But it was
impossible to bring this about so long as the Fulani
impeded all intercourse and clung obstinately to the
practice of levying a tribute of slaves. With such
magnificent highways of trade as the Niger and Benue
flowing through regions inhabited by such intelligent
traders as the Hausas, it will always be a remarkable
fact that the desirability of sea-power was never grasped
by the native mind, and that the navigable rivers
were looked upon as obstacles to, rather than pro-
moters of, commerce. In a land where the art of
weaving and dyeing rivalled Manchester's best efforts,
the art of boat-building had not progressed beyond
the dug-out canoe of the ancient Briton.

The British introduced a new conception by depend-
ing on river-power. Now, with increasing prosperity
and the fear of German and French encroachment —
a French force actually occupied Busa (250 miles within
the British frontier as laid down by treaty) during the
Bida campaign — the time had come to take action
on land. Bida in January, was the first step, Ilorin
a month later was the second ; together they con-
solidated the whole region south of the Middle Niger,
and on the north opened a road to Hausaland and the
Fulani Empire — the road which in 1903 enabled Sir
Frederick Lugard to complete the conquest of Nigeria.

We will therefore close this chapter with an account

ii6 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

of the Ilorin expedition, derived from Vandeleur's
copious materials. During previous years the Governor
had made several ineffectual attempts to arrive at a
friendly understanding with this Fulah Emir, and
on one occasion offered to ride to the capital and
personally settle the frontiers beyond which slave-
raids into Lagos would no longer be permitted. But
the weak Emir, though half inchned to agree to the
proposal, was overruled by his own military chiefs,
called Beloguns, who could not conceive the possibility
of defeat by the British and were unwilling to forego
their privilege of making expeditions, involving no
risk to themselves, against neighbouring pagans.
In the hope, however, that the sharp lesson just read
to the more powerful State of Nupe might modify
the overweening confidence of the Beloguns and their
thousand horse and five thousand foot. Sir George
sent messengers to explain the altered situation and
press for a peaceful settlement of the frontier. But
the military caste in Ilorin, not unlike similar bodies
in other parts of the world, held foreign peoples in
supreme contempt and had to suffer the consequent
humiliation.

Meanwhile our expedition, consisting of fifteen
officers, 340 men, two seven-pounders, and four maxims,
proceeded in steamers up the Niger, and was continu-
ously cheered by the riverside villagers, who kept
running along the banks in a state of wild excitement,
dancing and singing to testify their joy at the defeat
of the Fulani.

At Jebba, the limit of uninterrupted navigation,
the force landed and marched inland towards Ilorin —
at first through a waterless, sandy tract, which re-
minded Vandeleur of the Haud of Somaliland, and
afterwards through a beautiful park-like district where

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 117

rolling plains dotted with timber kept an agricultural
population in ease and comfort. From the villages,
partially hidden beneath luxurious banana groves,
the peasants looked out upon the column with
curiosity. As the city was gradually approached
the rivers and streams became numerous, the villages
larger and more frequent, and the whole scene presented
an appearance of rich fertility ; but here the inhabitants,
influenced by their Fulani masters, began to display
unmistakable symptoms of hostihty. They could be
seen peering from behind trees and houses, refusing
to acknowledge the friendly shouts of our guides, and,
by their general behaviour, warning our experienced
officers to be ready for a fight. No shot was fired by
either side, though numbers of white-robed cavalry
dogged the march of the column, but three miles from
Ilorin city the aspect of affairs became so threatening
that Arnold halted the advance-guard, and ordered
square to be formed as successive detachments came
up.

This precaution was but just in time, for a body of
300 to 400 horsemen, following on the heels of our rear-
guard, charged home just as the last detachment
formed up into the square. On they came, and Vande-
leur could not but admire their daring courage as,
headed by a Belogun, they made straight for the
serried line of bayonets, brandishing their spears over
their heads. But here, as at Bida, our Kansas behaved
with the coolness born of disciphne and success, and
justified the confidence of their officers in what proved
an exciting moment. Without flinching they received
the charge of horse with a steady volley, which emptied
many a saddle and caused the enemy to swerve round
both flanks of the square. The flanks at once opened
fire, completed the rout, and proved, if proof be

ii8 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

needed, that the most gallant and expert horsemen
cannot hope to contend with disciplined riflemen.
Yet this failure of the horse in no way disconcerted the
tactics of the Belogun who had been told off to attack
with the men on foot, and the action became general
all round the square.

Passing over details our musketry cleared away
the more adventuresome natives and enabled the force
to advance towards the river whose passage the
florins were concentrating to dispute. Here fighting
of a desultory kind continued till evening, but the
enemy did not again venture upon an attack, and at
nightfall fell back to a position in rear. Accordingly
camp was formed by the river, as it was too late to
enter the city and, moreover, it was hoped that by
giving time for the news of the day's fighting to spread,
further bloodshed might be avoided on the morrow.
The little force lay down to rest on the battlefield,
under a brilliant moon on a cold night, illumined
by fiery rockets discharged from the square and a huge
circle of grass fires lighted by the natives. Every
precaution against a night surprise was taken, as the
enemy was still busy and had dragged out an old cannon
which threw a projectile that moved like a frightened
rabbit over sandy ground. Men also came down to
shout imprecations and threats at the picquet, and
about midnight a false alarm caused the troops to
stand to arms, except one officer who slept soundly
through the noise.

Next morning, under cover of a mist, our men
resumed their advance towards the town, and, when the
sun rose, opened with seven-pounders on the enemy's
last position outside its walls. Their demorahsation
was then seen to be complete, for they began to bolt
in driblets, and a little later the white flag was dis-

THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 119

played over a gateway as a signal of submission. A
halt was called, firing ceased on both sides and later
in the day our victorious troops paraded in Ilorin
and estabhshed themselves on the market square.

The city was found to be larger than Bida though
of similar character, and our first duty was to restore
order and stop looting by runaway slaves. The Emir
and four Beloguns had fled to a neighbouring village
with a few adherents in a sorry phght ; hearing of their
condition. Sir George sent to try and induce them to
come in and surrender unconditionally. His embassy
was successful, and the Emir and Beloguns, mounted
on their horses covered with picturesque saddle cloths,
and followed by their personal attendants, were
ushered ceremoniously into the square where the
troops were drawn up beneath the British flag. Here
they threw themselves on their knees before the
Governor in an attitude of utter submission— being
evidently apprehensive of what might be their fate.
Still the fact of their coming in when they might easily
have escaped showed a degree of confidence in British
methods which they would not have displayed to their
own co-rehgionists, and was satisfactory evidence
of our prestige. The treaty to be signed was at once
read out and carefully explained. It recognised Ilorin
as being henceforth subject to Great Britain instead
of to Sokoto ; it enacted that gin and rum were to be
immediately destroyed wherever found ; it stipulated
that war was never to be undertaken without the
previous consent of the Governor ; and it reinstated
the Emir as the British representative. The whole
party was obviously relieved when these clauses were
understood, and wilHngly afhxed their signatures in
Arabic. After the ceremony the Governor had a
private interview with the Emir who retired with

120 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

dignity and pleasure at so easily escaping from an
unpleasant situation.

It thus came about that a State was lifted from the
slough of mediaeval oppression and enrolled with the
other thriving provinces of our Empire.

The return trip down the Niger was enlivened by
some shooting in a burnt-up and rather gameless
country. An expedition planned against the Potani,
a tribe on the banks of the river, proved unnecessary
owing to the submission of their ruler, so Vandeleur
and the other special service officers embarked for
England in March. Their way lay through Lisbon
and Madrid, where they visited the picture galleries
and saw " a sickening bull-fight." Recognition for
his services awaited Seymour at home. He was highly
commended in official despatches, and although only
twenty-seven and still a subaltern, was noted for
future promotion to the rank of Brevet-Major directly
he became a captain.

The scene of his activities now shifted to different
surroundings. He was appointed aide-de-camp to
Major-General Lord Methuen commanding the Home
District. Inspections and reviews were the order of the
day coupled with the military arrangements for the
Diamond Jubilee Procession. That memorable event
was no holiday for those concerned with its success,
and with his personal acquaintance of Empire-making
the assembly of the Queen's subjects from all parts
had more meaning for Vandeleur than for most. Nay,
he furnished a practical illustration of the brotherhood
of Empire, for at an inspection of Colonial troops
he recognised several Hausas with whom he had served
in Nigeria and among them a man of his own gun
detachment.

A pleasant autumn was spent in Norway where his

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THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH NIGERIA 121

father hired a river abounding in sea-trout. Reindeer-
stalking was also to be had, so Seymour got together
a camp kit and started on a three days' expedition.
After eleven hours of such walking and mountaineering
as he had never known before he brought down two
buck, one with a very fine head.

As regards the military future Vandeleur was fully
determined to secure the first vacancy in the Egyptian
Army, in fact Major-General Hunter had promised
his help in the matter. For this reason he refused
what might otherwise have been an attractive offer
of the post of Deputy-Assistant Commissioner in the
Central African Protectorate. Meanwhile he devoted
himself to bringing out a book on his experiences in
Uganda and Nigeria, and he was hard at work on it
when, on Christmas Eve, 1897, a telegram arrived
offering him service in the Egyptian Army if he could
start at once. Twenty-four hours later he left Charing
Cross for Cairo, and by dint of incessant writing on
board the mail boat he was able to send back the
finished manuscript of his volume from Port Said.
It was published under the title " Campaigning on
the Upper Nile and Niger," and was very favourably
received.

There is no doubt that he intended, had he lived,
to publish his further military experiences, and those
who now have the task to perform can fully reahse
how far more interesting they would have been from
his own pen.

CHAPTER VI

ENGLAND ON THE NILE

[See general map of Egypt and the Egyptian Sudani]

Considerations of space and the limited scope of this
volume unfortunately forbid an excursion into the
fascinating study of ancient Egypt and the curious
history of the dwellers by the banks of the Middle Nile.
Their story has not yet been written in popular form
and those who seek acquaintance with it must mean-
while grope for the facts in works whichjare difficult
to understand without personal experience of the Nile
valley. Other lands alter, but the Sudan remains a
region of ingrained conservatism, pervaded by a dis-
tinct flavour of the Old Testament, where Enghsh
officials who have acquired some fluency in Arabic
come daily in contact with customs, modes of thought
and turns of expression which remind them of the Bible
history they learnt in their childhood. Even the
journey of Herodotus, Father of historians, who
travelled with an army up the Nile (457 B.C.) might
have been written in our own time, so little have the
circumstances or the people altered.

But apart from the history of the Sudan in the
remote past and the later tales of Sir Samuel Baker
and other explorers of the Nile sources, it is advisable
that we refresh our memories regarding some of the
more recent occurrences connected with the countr}^ ;
otherwise it will be difficult to reahse the cause of Lord

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 123

Kitchener's campaigns or to follow with intelUgence the
reason for his operations. Indeed, these occurrences
and causes were famihar to Vandeleur, and were so
frequently discussed by him during the war, that, if I
were to omit them and merely record the doings of this
officer on active service I should not present a faithful
picture of his hfe. His work contributed to the success
of the wider issues involved, and, had he hved to record
his personal experiences, his book would have com-
manded a special interest by reason of the author's
grasp of the situation as a whole. Thus, if I am able
in this narrative, to clearly outline the main events I
shall be accomphshing that which Vandeleur himself
would have done with pleasure.

The Egyptian Sudan with which we are concerned is
that portion of the continent which extends southwards
from the Assouan Cataract to Fashoda* on the Upper
Nile ; it embraces the northern deserts between the
Red Sea httoral and Darfur, and the luxuriant vegeta-
tion of the southern districts lying betwixt the moun-
tains of Abyssinia and the swamps of the Bahr-el-Gazal
— a huge extent of country, fertile beyond conception
for hundreds of miles along the borders of mighty rivers,
barren and remorseless over vast areas of desert and
scrub. To imagine that its inhabitants are mere
savages, fit victims for maxim guns or missionary
enterprise, as may happen to suit the taste of the English
pubhc, would be an error ; yet this false impression was
prevalent during the operations of our army in the field.
Men had no leisure to devote to the history or condition
of the inhabitants, and thus imbibed during the cam-
paign certain prejudices which it is desirable to dispel
regarding a people far removed from savagery ; indeed,
both Arabs and Blacks are members of an old-estab-

* Fashoda has been renamed Kodok.

124 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

lished social order which deserves to be studied and
improved, but not aboHshed.

Here, as in Nigeria and other States of northern
Africa, the Mohamedan rehgion has been for centuries
the dominating influence ; but in the Egyptian Sudan,
perhaps owing to its proximity to Mecca, the rehgious
note has been more accentuated, the fanaticism more
merciless and the sword has claimed a greater number of
victims. Consequently, in spite of nearer access both by
sea and land, the country has developed neither native
industry nor manufacture. It has produced no trade
emporium such as Kano in the west and has never
utilised its natural resources like Hausaland. Its chief
product has been a prodigious crop of Mohamedan
teachers and sects, which have in turn worked upon the
susceptibilities of emotional and warlike races, fanning
their behef in the supernatural, until it may fairly be said
that no fable can be too grotesque to obtain credence
on the banks of the Nile. Men of such temperament
have elsewhere been welded into nations under strong
and capable rulers and have then borne an honourable
record in history. But until to-day the Sudan has been
consistently misgoverned whether by local sheiks or
foreign invaders ; each man's hand has been hfted
against his neighbour, tribe warring against tribe, yet
knowing no better than to endure extortion from the
strong and injustice from those in authority. Between
the exactions of the Khedive's subordinates and the
raids of free-booting slave-dealers, a man's Ufe and
property were of small account. Yet this gloomy
picture had its bright side and was frequently relieved
by deeds of heroism, by magnificent loyalty to local
chiefs, by devotion to tribal and family ties and by
enthusiastic self-sacrifice. Indeed, to those who will
study below the surface of a sea of bloodshed, the key-

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 125

note of the people's character will be found in an
emotional romanticism of the type of our Middle Ages —
a period of chivalrous deeds stained by barbarous crimes.
The Middle Ages of the Sudan lasted through the nine-
teenth century, during which the tribes were subjected
to much provocation. They bore with apathy from
1821 to 1881 the burden of conquest by Egyptian
pashas and occupation by Egyptian garrisons, in addi-
tion to the customary exactions of their own sheiks.
In at last freeing themselves from this foreign yoke,
they enjoyed for four brief years a delirious period of
intoxicating hcence under the Mahdi, slaying 40,000
helpless Egyptian soldiers and one great Englishman —
Charles Gordon : they successfully resisted invasion by
three British mihtary expeditions, which strewed the
desert sands with fallen tribesmen but effected no
useful purpose whatsoever.

Then followed a period best described as " stemng
in their own juice " — juice brewed by the strong for
consumption by the weak — a period which commenced
with the death of the Mahdi in 1885, and ended at the
battle of Omdurman in 1898. During those fourteen
dreary years the Sudan was crushed beneath the heel of
Baggara tyranny under the one-man rule of the Khalifa
AbduUahi, who reduced the population by murder,
famine and perpetual fighting from 8,525,000 to
1^870,500.* Whole tribes were wiped out to secure the
supremacy of the Baggara ; wide fertile lands reverted
to desert because man would not sow what he might not
reap : and thus did the survivors suffer for their brief,
hcentious riot under the victorious Mahdi. The last
act of the bloody drama will be described when we deal
with Lord Kitchener's campaigns which brought peace
to the country ; but meanwhile can any one doubt that

* Lord Cromer's ofl&cial report, 1904.

126 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

the Sudan requires complete rest for two or more genera-
tions, under the protection of the first Uberal rulers it
has ever known ? With twenty years' experience to
guide our judgment we at last perceive that the problem
of Egypt and the problem of the Sudan were after all
.but one — namely the problem of the Nile — and that
England's constant endeavour to sub-divide the whole
and curtail her responsibility has been a failure. She
may have been wise, from her own point of view, to
take only one step at a time, but the great river, flowing
placidly over three thousand miles of land, heeds not the
makeshifts of timorous man. The Nile has proved more
potent than the statecraft of nations, has united peoples
whom rulers have attempted to separate and has
quietly rejected the theory that several masters can
peacefully control its waters. This axiom is writ large
across the pages of its ancient and modern history and
has been illustrated by events in our own time ; is it
then too much to ask of British statesmen that they
shall acknowledge its truth and firmly maintain the
guardianship which England so unwillingly undertook,
but so successfully carried out on the banks of the
historic river ?

The story of England in Egypt has developed into
England on the Nile and may now be briefly told.

In 1 88 1 the Mahdi arose to reform the laws and
eliminate the incompetent pashas who ruled at Khar-
toum : in the following year the Egyptian army
revolted under Arabi and destroyed the Khedive's
authority in Egypt itself. Though almost simulta-
neous, the two insurrections had nothing in common
beyond the frenzied desire of all men for emancipation
from the same rotten government, yet, but for England,
the fighting hosts of the Mahdi would undoubtedly have
swept down the Nile and destroyed Arabi and his undis-

A W ATKK-W HKI.L ON IHE NILE

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 127

ciplined soldiers. That this was the real intention of
the Mahdi and his Khalifa can be proved over and over
again by contemporary documents and by studying
Wad el Negumi's gallant invasion of Egypt, which
ended disastrously for him at the battle of Toski (1889).
In fact Arabi's party contained no germ of sufficient
strength or capacity to organise a native force fit to
protect the native soil, and, if England — heeding the
cry of Egypt for the Egyptians — had refrained from
occupying Cairo in 1882, she would afterwards have
heard the barbarous yell, Egypt for the Mahdi, enforced
by Dervish swords throughout the Delta. Fortunately,
however, England was firmly seated at Cairo in 1889
and put an end to the Dervish invasion which Egypt
under Arabi could certainly not have accompUshed.

In connection with the disaffection which we have
said was the cause of revolt throughout the land, it may
be pointed out that, whereas in civilised states public
opinion is believed to control the government, in back-
ward countries prosperity depends on strong individuals
at the centre. In eastern parlance, the ruler is the
father and mother of the people. Oppression by a
capable man like the great Khedive Mehemet Ah will be
patiently endured whilst the people are fairly prosperous
and foreign exactions are prohibited. He had emanci-
pated Egypt from the Turkish rule first established
in the twelfth century, and had governed with inteUi-
gent efficiency and strength from 181 1 to 1848. In
the twenties he had sent his son to conquer the Sudan
which he exploited with success. But under feeble
successors there arose a horde of foreigners and petty
officials who preyed upon all departments of the State.
The Khedive was no longer master in his own house,
and the dry-rot at the core gradually extended through-
out the body pohtic, until the richest country in the

128 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

world for its size fell gradually into the depths of
ruin, misery and rebeUion. In fact the plight of the
Egyptians was comparatively worse than that of the
Sudanese tribes. For, when we consider the notorious
patience of the fellaheen peasantry and realise that
even such men were goaded into insurrection by petty
oppression, we obtain some measure of the worthless-
ness of the Cairo government and some explanation of
the prosperity which was developed as soon as it was
replaced by British officials.

Meanwhile the government of the pashas, faced
with a crisis throughout the land, clung to power in
helpless bewilderment and had not the sense to realise
the peril of a situation which they had themselves
created. The promoters of the revolts both in the
Sudan and Egypt were successful beyond their wildest
dreams ; the usual excesses were, of course, committed
during the period of excitement, and chaos reigned
supreme from Fashoda to Alexandria. Every journalist
in Europe thoughtlessly cried out that something must
be done !

Yet so little were the circumstances understood at
the time, that we find British statesmen gravely sug-
gesting that the " unspeakable " Turk whom they
wished to deport " bag and baggage " out of Europe in
1877, should in 1882 undertake a civilising mission on
behalf of the Great Powers in the Nile valley ! Their
serious endeavour in this direction had also its humorous
side, inasmuch as they went out of their way to inform
Turkey that she must pay for her troops if any of them
should be sent into Egypt ! The tempting offer was
politely declined by the Sultan.

Ob\dously, prompt action could alone save the
situation, yet Lord Granville, Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, seemed to think that mere words would

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 129

suffice. He accordingly engaged in prolonged negotia-
tions first with France, then with Turkey, then again
with France, and finally, with all the Great Powers,
trying to induce some of them to restore order in Egypt.
They all refused to do it themselves or to help us do it,
and Lord Granville's futile despatches remain as a
pitiable record of British statesmanship. Fortunately,
Queen Victoria from the first displayed the wise political
instinct for which she was famous and insisted that
the only solution promising happy results would be
" undivided English control." This pohcy was at last
adopted. The campaign under Lord Wolseley was
completely successful, and Cairo was occupied after
an engagement at Tel-el-Kebir in 1882. The con-
sequences were far-reaching, in spite of our Premier's
reiterated pledges to evacuate the country, pledges
which nobody asked for or expected, but which were
nevertheless repeated by his successor. Truly plain
men have reason for sometimes doubting whether the
country's business is managed with ordinary fore-
sight !

But if there remain a faithful few who still believe
that the Cabinet of 1880 to 1885 was capable of direct-
ing the business of an oversea Empire, they will surely
find conversion in those chapters of Mr. John Morley's
Life of Gladstone which deal with Egyptian and Sudanese
affairs. Mr. Morley is not only a sympathetic bio-
grapher but also Mr, Gladstone's warmest political
admirer, yet even his literary skill is unable to mask
the ineptitude of that Statesman's Egyptian policy or
his inability to carry out such policy as he had. First
he did not want to go to Egypt, then he sent 25,000
men to occupy the country : having done this he longed
to withdraw, but was afraid to do it ; having consented
to stay temporarily in Egypt, he was quite determined

130 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

not to be responsible for any part of the Sudan mess :
no sooner was this announced than he despatched
Charles Gordon and three extravagantly managed
expeditions to Suakin and Dongola, costing over
£10,000,000 of British money and ending in utter
failure, not through the defeat of the soldiers but owing
to the fact that, in spite of reiterated warnings that
high Nile is the season for ascending the river, British
Ministers could not make up their minds to start their
expedition till the flood was already sinking. They
were, therefore, too late to rescue their own envoy,
Gordon, at Khartoum.

Thus within the short space of two years (1882-4)
they blundered in their attempts to avoid an expedition
and blundered again whenever they feverishly deter-
mined to send one. Their one success was the occupa-
tion of Cairo, which restored prosperity to Egypt, yet
this was the very thing they were thoroughly ashamed
of and anxious to abandon. Looking back on the
several episodes of this quite recent history one is
tempted to ask whether our home administration was
after all more competent to deal with the situation than
the Egyptian pashas whom it superseded ?

By the summer of 1885, having failed to relieve the
garrisons, having failed to suppress Osman Digna at
Suakin, and still muttering threats of scuttling out of
Egypt, British Ministers retired from the scene of their
costly and humiliating labours, and handed over the
conduct of affairs to the man on the spot — Sir Evelyn
Baring, now Lord Cromer.

It was a lucky chance for the Empire that nobody
then knew that Lord Cromer was a strong man, other-
wise he would not have been selected for an independent
post at Cairo. Courageous men are not usually trusted
by vacillating ministers, as was proved by the treat-

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 131

ment accorded to Sir Bartle Frere — dismissed from
his post in South Africa by the Cabinet which appointed
Baring to Egypt. But the probabihty is that the
Government, having lost popularity with the electorate,
became heartily sick of its own mess on the Nile, and
thankfully handed it over to some one else. Be this
as it may. Lord Cromer's twenty years' patient states-
manship at Cairo has compensated for the bungUng of
some of his masters in London.

Thwarted at every turn by the provoking restric-
tions entailed by a British protectorate which was not
a protectorate, but only a temporary occupation, he,
nevertheless, managed to rescue the nation from bank-
ruptcy by restoring its prosperity. He augmented the
revenues by increasing the country's productiveness ;
nursed a native army through infancy to manhood ;
created huge reservoirs for storing and distributing the
fertilising flood-water of the Nile to parched deserts ;
economised on Egyptian budgets an annual sum
(£320,000) sufficient to start the Sudan on its new
career of prosperity; and at last brought even the
most inveterate enemies of the British occupation to
acknowledge its value and cease carping at its con-
tinuance. The story is no fairy tale, but can be read
in England in Egypt by Sir Alfred Milner, and in the
twenty-four solid blue-books which deal with the sub-
ject. It affords a striking example of what the best
sort of Englishmen can do, when beyond the sterilising
influence of party politics.

From the above brief survey of the general situation
let us turn to the work accomphshed by our officers.

By the end of 1885 all troops were withdrawn from
the Sudan and the country handed over to the tender
mercies of the Khalifa. The reformed Egyptian army
took over the defence of the frontiers at Wadi Haifa

132 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

and Suakin, and commenced that prolonged training
for war which enabled it subsequently to defeat the
Dervishes in numerous unrecorded skirmishes and in
the important actions which reconquered the Sudan.
The old Egyptian army, the one which was defeated
under Arabi, under Hicks and under Baker, was almost
unequalled for cowardice and incapacity ; the new
army under Grenfell and Kitchener, composed of the
same human material, grew to be a model of efficiency
in war. It attracted to its ranks every British sub-
altern and captain who was eager to learn soldiering
or ambitious to see active service, and the result of their
efforts may be judged by the contrast afforded in the
two following official documents :

(i) Extract from General Valentine Baker's tele-
gram describing the action near El Teb in February
1884: " Marched yesterday morning with three thou-
sand five hundred men towards Tokar. . . . On
square being only threatened by small force of enemy,
certainly less than a thousand strong, Egyptian troops
threw down their arms and ran, allowing themselves
to be killed without slightest resistance. More than
two thousand killed. All material lost."

(2) Extract from Special Army Order (War Ofiice,
September 1898) regarding Battle of Omdurman,
signed by Field Marshall Viscount Wolseley, Com-
mander-in-Chief: "The rank and file in the army of
his Highness the Khedive showed a spirit which reflects
the greatest credit on those officers and non-com-
missioned officers who have so raised the standard of
their discipline and military efficiency that they are
now worthy to fight alongside European troops ; they
exhibited not only steadiness in action, but remarkable
endurance during two years of prolonged and most
arduous labour. ..."

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 133

The above extracts speak for themselves and would
require no further words of explanation were it not that
certain critics have suggested that, as the Sudanese
battalions of the Egyptian army bore the brunt of
the recent fighting, the fellaheen remain untested.
Now, I am encouraged to record my own testimony on
the point by the circumstance that during the cam-
paign I served exclusively ^vith Sudanese troops, and
may, therefore, be considered impartial towards the
fellaheen. Vandeleur, too, served in a Sudanese
battalion, and had a similar opinion regarding the
fellaheen. He held that, though the Sudanese might
be considered the flower of the army, the fellaheen
cavalry, artillery and infantry were absolutely trust-
worthy troops ; and numerous examples of their
quality can be brought forward to support this state-
ment. There were no Sudanese artillery or cavalry
yet the conduct of the fellaheen throughout the dan-
gerous reconnaissances which they constantly under-
took during four years of warfare places them high in
the estimation of soldiers. Again the 2nd (fellaheen)
BattaHon formed an integral part of Macdonald's
brigade which happened, at the Battle of Omdurman,
to come in for the most desperate of all the fights of
the campaign. This battahon had previously been
noted for strict discipline, and, on the day of its trial,
manoeuvred and fired with steadiness under the shock
of two tremendous charges, delivered in quick succes-
sion from different directions and repelled them both
without flinching. Vandeleur who was present during
the episode bore testimony to the behaviour of the
fellaheen who were warmly praised by General Mac-
donald himself.

Yet how can it happen that in only fourteen years
men's characters can be so essentially altered and im-

134 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

proved as to justify the enconiums which I have quoted
above ? It seems almost more marvellous than some
of the other mysteries of Egypt, and yet is perfectly
true. Men are made or marred by the treatment to
which they are subjected. Let us disclose what that
treatment had been in Egypt.

No one will pretend that the fellah is by nature a
fighting animal, but he is, nevertheless, capable of being
trained to light by officers whom he respects and believes
in, and who themselves come of a fighting race. In the
old army such officers were rare, but on the few occa-
sions when they commanded the fellah he fought with
pluck as at El Obeid (1883). As a rule, he was ill-
used and flogged for petty offences ; his pay was inter-
cepted ; he was not taught the business of a soldier
but generally worked as a slave ; his barracks were
insanitary, his food poor and no provision was ever
made for sick or wounded ; the legal terms of his enlist-
ment were disregarded, and he was never allowed to go
home on furlough. To be sent to the Sudan meant
practically penal servitude for life, and so it was con-
sidered by the man and his family. Indeed, so de-
graded was the profession of arms that it would be
difficult to devise a more certain system of destroying
the spirit of any man, or knocking the manliness out
of any soldier.

The officers, drawn from the class which supplies
Egypt with a bureaucracy and boasts a leaven of
Turkish blood, were, in no sense, leaders of men. They
possessed some intelligence and were fairly well edu-
cated, but had no idea of discipline amongst themselves
or confidence in one another. They were consumed
with the spirit of intrigue, through which alone lay
the avenue to promotion and lucrative posts. It did
not occur to them either to share in or alleviate the

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 135

privations of their men : nor were they under any
obhgation to accept unnecessary risks either in the
hour of battle or the gloom of a cholera camp. In
fact, one of the best days for Egypt occurred when the
Khedive signed the laconic decree " the army is here-
by disbanded." That was in 1882.

The young British officers who subsequently under-
took to organise and command the squadrons, bat-
teries and battalions of the new army started the
machine with a totally different conception of duty
and military service to any which had hitherto pre-
vailed. Indeed, the change was so bewildering to the
native officers and men, that at first the task seemed
hopeless. However, with stubborn insular determina-
tion they persevered on their own lines, without com-
promise, and without appearing to see any difficulty.
Exact pay was handed out to the men on fixed dates ;
good barracks, solid food and clean clothing were pro-
vided ; the discipHne was strict and carefuUy enforced ;
promotion went solely by merit and no intrigue could
avail to alter a selection ; furloughs were granted each
year, and the men went home to their squalid villages
smart in appearance and with plenty of money in their
pockets. They were no longer ashamed of themselves
or their calling. When their term of six years' service
expired they left the colours to become local poUce
men. Then came years of active ser\dce, first on the
lines of communication of Lord Wolseley's Nile expedi-
tion, then on the frontier, continuously in touch with
Dervishes, unsupported by other troops — with eyes
always turned towards the desert and the enemy
beyond. At intervals, the Dervishes would attack
patrols, or raid villages, and a skirmish would take
place, a more or less serious affair, but always a useful
experience to an army in training. Two pitched

136 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

battles, at Ginnis in 1885 and Toski in 1889, attested
the progress of the force. The fellaheen soldier began
to feel he was a man, in fact became one. He at last
understood his British officers, those curious foreigners
who insisted on every one doing his duty without shirk-
ing, and who did it themselves ! In action there they
were always in front, never excited : in cholera camp,
still they were present working like slaves to stamp out
the pestilence : always cheerful and approachable, yet
maintaining their position as officers and the respect
due to their rank.

The fellah did not take to fighting for fighting's
sake but he no longer feared to go into action, and, in
fact, was sure he would win whenever he fought. A
story is told of one battalion that the men were more
terrified at the wrath of their commanding officer, if
one man wavered, than ever they were of a Baggara's
spear. Thus the private soldier responded to proper
treatment, the Egyptian officer grumbled but did his
duty, and the army grew into a formidable force
— 16,000 men of splendid physique. It also helped
to popularise the British occupation throughout the
villages of Egypt.

But if British officers have done much for the
Egyptian army it is also plain to any one who served
in it, that the Egyptian army has done a great deal for
British officers. Indeed, it would be almost as difficult
to exaggerate, as it certainly is to measure, the benefit
our officers derived from service in the Khedive's forces
— provided they served for a sufficient period to correct
the narrow militarism inculcated at home. We have
said that the treatment accorded to the soldiery of the
old army was likely to knock the manliness even out of
a Samurai, and that a reversal of such methods quickly
restored the men's pluck. Just in a similar way the

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 137

home training of the British officer before the Boer war
was calculated to stifle the most precious qualities an
officer can possess — namely, resourcefulness and initia-
tive— qualities which were rekindled and developed
directly he joined the Egyptian army.

I am not suggesting that our subalterns, who have
much to learn especially as regards discipline and duty
during the first years of their service, should be accorded
free scope for misdirected initiative or ill-judged experi-
ments ; but surely captains of companies and com-
manding officers of battalions should not be sacrificed
to a passion for uniformity which converts them into
mechanical automatons, registering the innumerable
decrees contained in the thirty-five volumes of regula-
tions which compose every commanding officer's
library ? Some were too sensible to devote much time
to learning up, in peace, regulations which no one
could possibly carry out in war, and such were reported
as slack by the average staff officer, who was all-
powerful and most meddlesome. Though the Alder-
shot, Curragh and other brigades were, undoubtedly,
commanded by able men, it is well known that some
of the battalions were practically commanded by the
brigade-major, who was encouraged to interfere to an
intolerable degree with the commanding officers' work,
in order to produce the desired uniformity and insist
on the brigadiers' special fads being attended to in
season and out of season.

Throughout the army at home the zeal of the regi-
mental officer was thus confined within the narrowest
sphere ; all his actions were strictly laid down ; to
deviate to the right or left, or to reverse the order of
the prescribed routine was wrong; whether practising
a stereotyped attack or digging a regulation shelter-
trench, drilling a company or shooting at a target,

138 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

every detail was printed in the books, as well as the
exact words to be used by the instructor. Nothing
was left to the intelligence of the individual, and on
re-reading some of the text-books one is obliged to
confess that officers were by regulation debarred from
exercising either intelligence or common sense. Under
such a blighting regime, how could regimental officers
be expected to develop either initiative or resourceful-
ness ? Their only means of escape from a dreary
groove lay in hunting, polo and other games, or in
going away on leave as often as they could.

Our later experience is that if you give the British
officer sensible work to do he will usually do it extremely
well and it was on this principle that the Egyptian
army was started and run. To join it after some years
of garrison duty at home was like walking into fresh
air after a journey on the old underground railway.
We have seen how the fellah was raised from the level
of a coward to fight in line with European troops,
and it is equally easy to understand how his officer
resumed in the Sudan qualities which had been stifled
in the United Kingdom.

A young captain or subaltern on joining at Cairo
usually has a personal interview of five minutes with
the Sirdar, during which he is quietly told that he is to
start for the Sudan in a couple of days, that on reaching
his battalion he should pick up all he can about every-
thing going on at the front, and that his most necessary
accomplishment will be a colloquial acquaintance with
the Arabic language, without which nobody can be of
much use. His rank is bimbashi (major), and his duties
are \' various. He is not given any book of regulations,
and, if he asks for one, is informed that some of the
English text-books have been translated into Arabic
for the use of the army, but that they have long been

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 139

out of print — though second-hand ones are sometimes
obtainable. Accordingly the budding bimbashi, per-
haps a little shocked at the thought of the regulations
being out of print and his exact itinerary not being
detailed in writing, starts on his long journey to the
Sudan by railway, steamboat, camel, and sailing-boat.
In course of time he reaches his battalion, usually
without his baggage, with the vaguest idea of the where-
abouts of his horse and camel and in the mental con-
dition commonly attributed to a lost sheep. But he
has already learned one thing thoroughly, namely,
that if he does not look after himself and his belongings
no one else will do it for him. Thus his new training
is well begun, and his days of military dry-nursing are
over.

On reporting himself at the front the bimbashi is
plunged into a battalion of Arabic-speaking officers,
non-commissioned officers and men, of whom none but
the commanding officer, the interpreter and three
bimbashis can speak or understand the English langu-
age. He is introduced to a form of drill similar to that
of the British army, but with words of command
delivered in Turkish and explanations given in Arabic.
He ascertains from his brother bimbashis that, by
working hard for six months, he can acquire sufficient
fluency in the new language for all practical purposes.
So instead of attempting to learn a Turco-Arabic drill-
book like a parrot, he perceives that he must confine
himself to essentials and first master such simple words
of command as he may require if the battalion should
be sent into action within a week. In fact, he realises
that he must reverse the method commonly adopted
of beginning at the beginning, and it dawns upon his
mind — now emancipated from the detail of the goose-
step and the firing exercise by numbers — that drill

140 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

rightly understood and intelligently applied is a factor
in winning battles. He is so much the richer by the
acquisition of this new idea that his attitude towards
the whole art of soldiering takes a practical turn, and
he sees real reasons for things which have hitherto
seemed tiresome and useless. From this moment his
work becomes interesting, and, at the end of six months'
probation, he feels he is a better officer and is in daily
contact with better officers, because the initiative of
each individual has produced the habit of responsible
work throughout the force. As time passes, the new
bimbashi is employed on numerous jobs, all essential
to the continued progress of the campaign, with which
he now identifies his own efforts. Whether it be hauling
steamers up cataracts, furnishing escorts to gunboat
patrols, acting as station-master, postmaster, or supply
officer, commanding a squadron, battery, camelry, or
a fort, as brigade-major or staff officer — wherever
British supervision is required there the bimbashi is to
be seen, directing native officers and men, and dis-
charging duties which in European armies are often
entrusted to generals. With such varied and continu-
ous employments during the intervals between import-
ant actions, is it surprising that, compared with his
brother in England, he becomes a handy-man and a
distinct personage — useful in peace and invaluable in
war ?

If, on the other hand, a bimbashi should fail to
profit by the opportunities thus offered, his place
can easily be filled by one of the numerous candidates
who are longing to take it. The work is hard, the
sun hot, fevers are weakening, relaxations are few, but
the service is popular, promotion is quick, the pay
adequate, and the rewards ample. Moreover, since
peace rules in the land, numerous responsible posts are

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 141

open to bimbashis, and the service has not lost all the
attractions which it held for the ambitious at the time
of the campaigns.

If in the foregoing pages I have been able to refresh
the reader's memory as to the salient features of the
general situation and the conditions under which
British officers serve the Khedive, it may be easier in
future chapters to tell the tale of Lord Kitchener's
operations and describe the part taken in them by
Bimbashi Vandeleur. Meanwhile, those of my readers
who care for dates will doubtless read the following
synopsis, whereas those who dislike them may pass on
to the story beyond —

1798, July 21. — Battle of the Pyramids and defeat
of the Mameluks by Napoleon.

1798, Aug. I. — Battle of the Nile and defeat of the
French fleet by Nelson.

1801, March 8. — Battle of Aboukir : French evac-
uate Egypt. British occupy Cairo.

1803. — Egypt evacuated by British.

181 1. — Mehemet Ali, an Albanian, massacres the
Mameluks in Cairo citadel, and usurps the Pashalik of
Egypt from Turkey. He founds a family which still
holds the sovereignty. During the years which follow
he organises a fighting army, which is so successful
under Ibrahim that it constantly defeats large Turkish
forces in Syria, and on two occasions has Constanti-
nople at its mercy, but refrains from capturing this
capital.

1820. — Mehemet Ali sends his son to conquer and
hold the Sudan.

1838. — Mehemet Ah himself visits the Sudan, and
organises conquering military expeditions up the White
Nile, Blue Nile, and into Kordofan. He converts the

142 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Sudan into a place d'armes, imports quantities of war
material and raises large local forces.

N.B. — His object was to consolidate an independent
Sudan Empire for his family, in the event of their being
deprived of Egypt ; and the policy of arming the Sudan
continued till 1882. Khartoum was the capital.

1842. — Mehemet Ali builds the Barrage, below
Cairo.

1849. — Death of Mehemet Ali — a great man, born
the same year as Napoleon and Wellington.

1869. — Opening of the Suez Canal. Sir Samuel
Baker appointed Governor-General of the Sudan.

1874. — Colonel C. G. Gordon appointed Governor-
General of the Sudan.

1875. — Ismail Pasha, Khedive, one of the most
extravagant rulers ever known, gradually ruins the
finances of Egypt. When unable to raise further
loans, he sells his holding in the Suez Canal Company to
England for £4,000,000 (now worth £20,000,000).
Conquest of Darfur by Zobair.

1876. — Major Evelyn Baring (now Lord Cromer) is
appointed a member of an international Commission
of Inquiry into the Khedive's debts, and Egypt is
found to be on the brink of financial ruin.

1879. — Gordon's Governor-Generalship of the
Sudan terminates. The Khedive Ismail is deposed
and replaced by his son, Tewfik Pasha — at the in-
stigation of England.

1881. — The Mahdi declares himself at Abba Island,
W^hite Nile.

iSSi, Atig. — His followers massacre 200 Egyptian
soldiers sent from Khartoum to arrest him.

1881, Dec. 9. — Mahdi defeats 1400 Egyptians near
Fashoda and captures their arms.

1882. — The Mahdi's insurrection gradually spreads.

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 143

1882, July II. — Bombardment of Alexandria by
British fleet, owing to Arabi's revolt against the
Khedive.

1882, Sept. 13. — Battle of Tel-el-Kebir, followed by
occupation of Cairo by British under Wolseley, and
restoration of Khedive.

1883, Jan. 17. — Mahdi takes the field in person and
captures El Obeid after protracted siege.

1883, Feh. — Ten thousand of Arabi's soldiers are
sent to the Sudan as reinforcements by the Egyptian
Government.

1883, March. — Colonel Hicks, late of the Indian
Army, arrives in Khartoum as Chief of the Staff.

1883, Sept. — Hicks advances into Kordofan wdth
9000 men and 20 guns, to attack the Mahdi.

1883, Nov. 5. — Hicks' force annihilated at Shekan,
near El Obeid.

1883, Dec. — Slatin taken prisoner in Darfur,
N.B. — By end of 1883 the Mahdi had captured at

least 20,000 rifles, 19 guns and quantities of ammunition.

1884, Jan. 16. — Gordon sent by Gladstone to
evacuate the Sudan garrisons — Egyptian soldiers —
namely, the remnant of the original 40,000 quartered
in the Sudan.

1884, Feh. 4. — Colonel V. Baker, sent to relieve
Tokar with 3500 Egyptians and six guns, is completely
defeated at El Teb by Osman Digna.

1884, Feh. 18. — Gordon reaches Khartoum, tele-
graphs to British Government that he " cannot
evacuate and will not abandon the garrison," and
asks for the assistance of Zobair. This is refused on
moral grounds, because Zobair Pasha was once a
slaver !

1884, Feh. 29. — British force of 3000 defeats Osman
Digna at El Teb.

144 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

1884, March 13. — Same force again defeats him
at Tamaai, but is subsequently withdrawn to Suakin,
which it holds.

1884, March 19. — Gordon at Khartoum cut off and
invested.

1884, May 26. — Mahdi captures Berber, and the
question is definitely put — Will England send a rehef
expedition or not ? The Nile will rise in July. The
British Government takes no action.

1884, Aug. 7. — Lord Hartington, Secretary of State
for War, obtains a vote of credit, with a view to eventual
relief of Gordon — " if necessary."

1884, Sept. 10. — First portion of Relief Expedition
leaves England.

1884, Oct. 21. — Expedition leaves Wadi Haifa.

1885, Jan. 17. — Battle of Abu Klea — Mahdists
break into British square, but are beaten off.

1885, Jan. 20. — Desert Column arrives at Gubat
on the Nile, near Metemma, and is met by Gordon's
four steamers next day.

1885, Jan. 24. — These steamers embark a small
force for Khartoum.

1885, Jan. 26. — Khartoum falls and Gordon is
killed.

1885, Jan. 28. — Steamers sight Khartoum — too late!

N.B. — By its capture the Dervishes become pos-
sessed of quantities of rifles and munitions of war.

1885, Feb. 14. — Retreat of Desert Column from
Gubat to Dongola.

1885, Feb. 17. — Contract for construction of a rail-
way from Suakin to Berber signed by British Govern-
ment.

1885, Feb. 20. — Another Suakin Field Force organ-
ised— about fifteen thousand men, British and Indian
— to protect this railway.

ENGLAND ON THE NILE 145

1885, March 13. — Railway construction com-
menced.

1885, March 22. — McNeill's zariba — Arabs break
into it.

1885, May 17. — Suakin Field Force withdrawn and
railway abandoned.

1885, June. — Death of the Mahdi, and succession
of the Khahfa.

1885, July 5. — Dongola evacuated. Frontier
handed over to Egyptian Army.

1885, Dec. 30. — Battle of Ginnis. (Stephenson).

1889, Aug. 3. — Battle of Toski, near Wadi Haifa —
Dervish invasion of Egypt defeated by Grenfell (Sirdar).

1895, Feb. 20. — Slatin escapes from Omdurman.

1896, March i. — Battle of x\dowa — defeat of
Itahans by Abyssinians.

1896, March 20. — Dongola Expedition starts.
(Kitchener, Sirdar).

1896, Sept. 23. — Dongola occupied.

1897, Aug. 7. — Battle of Abu Hamed. (Hunter.)

1898, April 8.— Battle of the Atbara. (Kitchener.)

1898, Sept. 2. — Battle of Omdurman. (Kitchener.)

1899, Nov. 24. — Battle of El Gedid and death of
the Khalifa. (Wingate.)

1900, Jan. I. — Railway completed from Wadi
Haifa to Khartoum.

1902, Nov. 8. — Gordon's College at Khartoum
opened by Kitchener.

1905. — Peace and plenty in the Sudan — see Lord
Cromer's last Official Report.

K

CHAPTER VII

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK

See map facing page 238

Whenever military errors are committed the general
public is usually led to believe that the fault lies with
the " stupid officer " on the spot. Yet there have been
occasions in which the officer on the spot has saved the
civilian in the Cabirtet from the consequences of his
ignorance, as the Egyptian Army was now to prove.

In March 1896, a Cabinet Council was summoned
at short notice to deliberate upon an unexpected event.
The Prime Minister addressing his colleagues in a room
at the Foreign Office, announced that a grave situation
had arisen in one of the new colonies of the Kingdom of
Italy. There was, unfortunately, truth in the public
telegrams describing an Italian defeat in Abyssinia.
King Menelek's army had, undoubtedly, gained a
decisive victory over a considerable Italian force at
Adowa, capturing some hundreds of prisoners. The
probable fate of these wretched Europeans was horrible
to contemplate, and England would willingly extend to
Italy a helping hand in the north-east corner of Africa,
where this regrettable occurrence took place. At
Cairo we had a small British garrison, but Cairo being
a considerable distance from Adowa, it would be diffi-
cult for this garrison to render effective assistance.
Under these circumstances, could any means be devised
of helping Italy, without incurring undue risk ourselves ?

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 147

At this point several ministers shifted uneasily in
their chairs, putting on their spectacles and removing
them nervously. One of the younger members begged
that a map might be brought to assist them in their
deliberations, and a messenger departed to fetch it. He
returned with an atlas printed in 1882, that being the
latest edition available. After some difficulty Cairo
was found on one page and Abyssinia on another, but
the intervening regions were nowhere shown. How-
ever, on looking at the small general map of Africa,
some one remarked that Cairo did not after all appear
very far distant from Abyssinia, and those who had
been uneasy were reassured !

Meanwhile, a Cabinet Minister who had lately
travelled up the Nile to Wadi Haifa sent to his office for
a bigger, modern map. On arrival it covered the table
in the middle of the room, though it only represented
the Nile valley from Cairo to Khartoum. At the men-
tion of Khartoum there was an awkward pause and
one or two murmurs of apprehension* — so the Prime
Minister quickly pointed out that there was no inten-
tion of undertaking the reconquest of the Sudan, but
that a demonstration on the northern frontier of the
Khalifa's empire might cause that potentate to refrain
from attacking our Itahan friends' garrison at Kassala,
which was at that moment threatened. This, though
still somewhat alarming, sounded less dangerous,
especially as the Prime Minister, who meant to have
his way, proceeded to state that the Egyptian Army
had a force at Wadi Haifa, and that it might be pos-
sible for this force to advance a httle distance south.

The heads now bent over the map to discover where

* One member of the Cabinet had been Secretary of State for War
in Mr. Gladstone's administration, during which all the military
failures in the Sudan occurred.

148 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

the Egyptian Army had a post, and the Minister who
had seen it explained to his colleagues how efficient
the garrison was. Moreover, the name Wadi Haifa
was printed in large, block letters which gave it a solid
look. Southwards the names, Akasha, Firkeh, Kosheh,
(in small type,) looked comparatively insignificant, and
as if a small force could easily occupy one of them, so
each was suggested in turn. But the Minister who had
been up the Nile and knew what he was talking about
put his finger on the big block letters — dongola —
and suggested that, if any advance at all were advisable,
the occupation of Dongola might have some influence
on the Khalifa, whereas to occupy a small mud village
whose inhabitants the Dervishes had already exter-
minated could have no effect.

However the Cabinet dispersed without coming to
any decision, beyond a request to the Commander-in-
Chief to write a minute on the feasibilit}^ of an advance
— not an expedition — to an unnamed spot south of
Wadi Haifa. A few of England's councillors left the
room with a vague recollection of some unfamiliar
African names which had been referred to on the map,
and one aged politician in particular was so bewildered
that when, in the street, a reporter of his acquaintance
hurriedly asked him what the meeting had been con-
cerned with, he could remember nothing but the word
" Dongola," which he murmured unconsciously.

That afternoon the Commander-in-Chief sat at his
desk composing a minute which he knew would be
futile, when suddenly his ear caught sound of the word
" Dongola " — shouted by newsboys down in the street.
By spending a halfpenny he learned that the subject
of his minute had been settled without him, and that
he might spare himself further effort that day.

In the evening to all parts of the British Empire the

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 149

various press-associations telegraphed the welcome
report that the long-delayed Nile expedition was to
start, and that Dongola would be its objective — nor
was this the first time a hesitating administration has
had its hand forced by a smart reporter possessing the
gift of intelHgent anticipation.*

The news was everywhere received with approba-
tion, and the Cabinet had to decide whether it should
be categorically denied or confirmed. Much depended
upon the views held by Lord Cromer, the strong man
directing the destiny of Egypt and by the Sirdar, Sir
Herbert Kitchener, neither of whom were expecting
any call to arms. Had they flinched, as lesser men
might have done, from undertaking a campaign at the
season of lowest Nile and with no opportunity of pre-
paring for desert warfare on a large scale, it is probable
that the reconquest of the Sudan would have been
indefinitely postponed. Had either of them begged for
a short space of time — that valuable factor which
British Cabinets never accord to British generals before
either plunging or drifting into war — the opportunity
might have been lost. They, therefore, telegraphed to
London that the Egyptian army could move south-
wards at once and the premature newspaper reports
were accordingly confirmed. By March 20 — that is
within three weeks of the Italian defeat at Adowa, and
within a week of any advance being thought of — Major
John CoUinson had covered eighty-five miles to Akasha,
in command of the 13th Sudanese battahon, with two
squadrons of cavalry, one company of camelry, one.
battery of artillery and a couple of machine guns.
Thus the gauntlet was boldly flung down on the desert

* Note the contrast between this and the arrangements made by
Bismarck and Moltke ior the invasions of Schleswig-Holstein 1864,
Austria 1866, France 1870 ; and by the Japanese in Manchuria 1904.

150 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

sand within a single day's march of 3000 Dervishes at
Firkeh, and the reconquest of the Sudan had com-
menced. So ready was the Egyptian Army for active
service that the troops at Wadi Haifa started at dawn on
the day following their first orders to move.

The advance guard thus thrust forward confined
itself to fortifying a defensive position, patrolling in
all directions and protecting convoys from the base,
whilst the master-mind of the Sirdar bent itself to the
task of rapidly building up at Akasha an army and its
stores, destined to recapture the Dongola Province and
hold it against any probable attack.

During this necessary pause for preparation, let
us glance at the problem confronting the General and
the methods he adopted to solve it.

The expression Nile valley is conveniently used to
denote the wide belt of country crossed by the river on
its long journey from the Victoria Nyanza to the Medi-
terranean Sea, but is by no means descriptive of the
scene, because no valley is visible to the eye, nor does
the landscape bear the remotest resemblance to valleys
such as those of the Rhine or the Thames. The
scenery has a beauty and colouring of its own which
cannot be likened or compared with that of other lands.
In the mid-day sun the chiselled lines of rocky hill strike
hard and clear against a steel-blue sky without a cloud.
At sunset all is softened by the vivid colours in the west,
and a weird calm broods over the landscape. The Nile
itself, when not in flood, resembles a giant canal
humbly flowing at the bottom of a vast ditch, flanked
by perpendicular banks of sun-baked mud : the top of
these banks is level with the surrounding country, yet
the masts of vessels sailing over the water are unseen,
and the maxim at the mast-head of a gunboat cannot
be aimed at distant objects. But at full-flood the

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 151

canal has grown into a tumultuous tide of surging water,
brim-full to the bank's top and almost even with the
desert. The gunboat, seen from a distance, now
towers above the land and looks as if it were steaming
across country. The canal-like appearance of the
river is further heightened by the action of the so-
called "cataracts," which are really miles and miles of
rocky boulders and islands, obstructing the waterway
and holding up the water-level — like rough-hewn locks
devised by mighty Titans. Without them, the Nile
would have such a rapid fall that it would either run
dry or degenerate into a string of pools during half the
year ; and on the flood would become an unmanageable
torrent. For this peculiar river, which is wider and
deeper at Khartoum than at Cairo and flows unfed
by rain or tributary stream during the last 1500
miles of its course, rises twenty-six feet in a couple
of months, and submerges the cataracts deep below
its surface — so great is the rainfall at its distant
sources. From Abyssinian mountains 2000 miles from
Cairo, and from equatorial lakes and marshes 3000
miles to the south, the abundant waters travel down
the canal through parched lands and deserts, every-
where producing in August, September and October
the annual marvel of the flood, which men have
watched and worshipped since the dawn of their
earliest history. To ignore this prodigy of nature when
engaged on a campaign or in the pursuit of agriculture,
is as fatal as to neglect the seasons of the solar year in
other lands. It spells disaster. Yet it was through
neglect of this obvious factor that the first Sudan
expeditions organised in London ended in failure
whereas those directed from Cairo succeeded, and that
the failures cost England many millions of pounds,
whereas the successes cost her only £800,000 spent on

152 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

railways. The truth is that for the invasion of the
Sudan a knowledge of how and when to work boats up
dangerous cataracts is of infinitely greater value than
the information supplied in military text-books.

Right methods were, therefore, only employed after
the Consul-General at Cairo had rescued the govern-
ment of Egypt from the hands of politicians in England,
and when the direction of the forces engaged in Sudan
operations was placed in the hands of officers who
studied their job on the spot and discarded without
fear military notions which experience proved to be
fads. It is no exaggeration to assert that any of the
Sirdar's battahons could at any time have marched out
from its quarters on the frontier to engage in a battle
like Abu Klea or one of the numerous British engage-
ments around Suakim. A Dervish Emir, if he sees a
tempting opportunity, will almost invariably launch an
attack, and the art of fighting him consists in giving
him no such opening until it suits the invading force to
be attacked with a chance of victory, yielding results
worth fighting for. To blunder forward in ignorance of
the whereabouts of the enemy and be " unexpectedly
attacked " in the scrub is not a manoeuvre calculated to
defeat Dervishes. Such battles may be won by the
valour and discipline of junior officers and their men, but
do not display much acquaintance with the business of
war. They are usually followed by necessary retreats
to obtain water and supplies, and have to be constantly
repeated until one side or the other is worn out. Now,
Sir Herbert Kitchener's conception of Sudan warfare
was of a different type. In the first place he armed
himself during peace with an intelligence department,
under Major Wingate, which devoted its whole energies
year in and year out to collecting and studying every
scrap of news regarding what occurred at Omdurman

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 153

and the provinces of the KhaUfa's dominion. Through
this agency, which was materially strengthened by the
escape of Slatin Pasha from Omdurman, the general
was well posted with accurate information about his
enemy.

His quick advance to iVkasha was, therefore, not a
blind move in a southerly direction in obedience to
orders from London, but a deliberate plan for getting
into touch with a substantial Dervish force at Firkeh
and reconnoitring it at leisure, whilst the Egyptian
army mobilised in rear and became gradually perfected
in the thousand and one details which just make the
difference between brigades trained by their own officers
and a haphazard assemblage of armed units. If only
the Dervishes at Firkeh could be kept in play for a few
months, even at the risk of their being meanwhile
reinforced, it would be possible to utilise the whole
army in the forward move to Dongola — backed by a
railway to be constructed round 200 miles of con-
secutive cataracts, and strengthened at high Nile
by gunboats which would then be able to ascend the
river. For it must be borne in mind that above Wadi
Haifa the river's course is obstructed by rocks and
boulders of the most forbidding granite, which extend
all the way to the navigable water of the Dongola
province. They constitute the most formidable series
of cataracts encountered along the whole course of the
Nile, and are bordered by vast uninhabited deserts of
sand and rocky hills — locally termed the " belly of
rocks." Akasha, a small deserted village situated on
the river's bank in the midst of this barren land, became
on the arrival of the advanced guard, the point of
concentration of the scattered corps of the Egyptian
army. From Suakin, Cairo, Assouan and Wadi
Haifa, squadrons, batteries and battalions trickled into

154 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Akasha, and for three months the Uttle place loomed
large in the eyes of all who take an interest in the affairs
of our Empire. After the first week the advanced guard
was increased to a brigade of all arms commanded by a
Major ; it subsequently grew into a division of three
brigades commanded by a Colonel under forty years of
age. To supply such a force in this wilderness and
southwards was the problem of the hour, a problem,
too, which must be solved on economical lines. No one
understood better than the thoughtful soldier who con-
ducted operations that the future prosecution of the
campaign depended on its being both cheaply managed
and successfully fought. He could afford neither to
waste money nor hazard a military reverse, nor even to
indulge in a regrettable incident. Thirteen years of
experience had taught him that most of our failures
had been due to starting too late, and being con-
sequently in too great a hurry.

For immediate necessities 5000 camels were pur-
chased to work convoys between railhead at Sarras
and Akasha. But camels are an expensive and
perishable form of transport, requiring constant
consideration in the matter of food and rest. The
Sirdar, therefore, decided to reconstruct the old torn-
up railway, started but never completed by Ishmail
Pasha in the days of Egypt's unchecked extravagance.
Railway work was begun forthwith, and a long chapter
might pleasantly be devoted to the romance of building
the Sudan Military Railway, were it not that our brief
resume can only spare it a few sentences. The Sirdar's
idea was to build it on military lines with labour con-
trolled by young bimbashis from the Royal Engineers
and, as the campaign progressed, it developed into a great
achievement. Long before any of the experts at home
had grasped the necessities of the situation. Sir Herbert

THE ECxYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 155

Kitchener had made his plans, worked out their
cost and begun to order his material. When it was
discovered that the section between Wadi Haifa and
Dongola Province involved nearly 200 miles of line,
the War Office offered to send out a full Colonel and
the usual staff for such an undertaking. But the
Sirdar pointed out that a subaltern on the spot,
Bimbashi Girouard, fully satisfied his requirements
and that this young officer preferred to build the hne
without the " usual " staff. In the sequel Girouard
and a dozen brother subalterns constructed and
operated 780 miles of railway under difficult and
entirely novel conditions, and may fairly claim to
have conquered the Sudan on an iron horse.

By the first week in June the situation was as
follows, and all was ready for the first battle of the
campaign. Suakim, Tokar and their neighbourhood
were safely held by a brigade of the Indian army.
Egypt was protected by a brigade of British troops.
Wadi Haifa was garrisoned by a battalion of British
infantry. The new railway was completed to within
one day's camel-march of Akasha, where 9000 men
were concentrated with ample supplies within striking
distance of the enemy.

Meanwhile the Dervishes at Firkeh had not been
idle, nor was the KhaUfa at Omdurman unaware of the
impending attack. But they knew not what to think
of our prolonged delay, and finally put it down to
hesitation and fear. Fifty notable Emirs commanded
the various detachments at Firkeh whom they disposed
in a fortified position of some strength — intending to
issue forth and attack at the first favourable oppor-
tunity. Almost daily they reconnoitred the outpost
hne which surrounded Akasha and frequently had
brushes with Egyptian patrols. They had plenty of

156 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

spies in and about the Egyptian camp in the shape of
camel-drivers and villagers on adjacent Nile islands.
But as week after week passed without any aggressive
action the Dervishes were lulled into a false sense of
security. The Egyptian cavalry, admirably led by
Bimbashi Broadwood, meanwhile reconnoitred the
enemy's stronghold without ever offering themselves
as a target for overwhelming attack. So the Emirs
openly boasted in their camp that the "infidel Kafirs"
were too terrified to hazard a fight with the chosen
warriors of the Khahfa, whilst in truth the Sirdar was
preparing his blow and acquiring exact knowledge upon
which to base his action.

On June 6, 1896, keeping his intentions secret until
the last moment, Kitchener suddenly issued detailed
orders to all units to make a night march on Firkeh and
assault it at dawn. A complete surprise was aimed at, but
being a most difficult thing to achieve, any commander
is lucky if he brings off a partial surprise only. In this
instance fortune favoured the scheme — for at three in
the afternoon, when the force was actually parading
in camp for its night march, Osman Azrak, the chief
Dervish Emir, lay in observation on a hill near our out-
posts. As he watched, clouds of dust — a common
feature of the country — obscured the view, and after
waiting a little he retired with his horsemen and re-
ported at Firkeh that the Turks lay quiet as usual !

For the night march the Sirdar distributed the
troops in two columns which were to move by different
routes and attack simultaneously, if possible. The
small column, some 2000 strong, all mounted on
camels or horses, included a battery of horse
artillery, seven squadrons of cavalry, eight companies
of camel-corps and a battalion of Sudanese infantry
riding transport camels for the occasion. This column,

LORD KITCHENER IN 1890

From a Portrait by H. Herkomer in the Possession
OF P. Ralli. Eso.

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 157

commanded by Major Burn-Murdoch, moved from
Akasha just before sunset and took a desert road
leading round the enemy's position. Its orders were
to occupy certain hills behind the Dervish flank by
4.30 A.M., and then to wait and co-operate with the
main attack. The larger column under the personal
command of the Sirdar was composed of two field
batteries, one maxim battery and a division of infantry,
the latter under Colonel Hunter, whose Brigadiers
were Majors Maxwell, MacDonald and Lewis. It
marched off about 4 p.m. along the river track which
leads direct to Firkeh village, fourteen miles — a
narrow and difficult path for an army to follow in the
dark. The moon rose late, and the nine infantry
battalions tramped silently through the darkness,
strung out along a narrow track, at one time stumbling
over rocks and boulders, at others ankle-deep in soft
sand. Not a sound was audible save the crunch of
boots and the occasional rattle of a rifle against the
accoutrements, as the men pressed eagerly onwards.
To their right the swish of the river, forcing its way
through rockstrewn cataracts, muffled all noises into
one monotonous murmur. To their left high hills of
granite throwing out spurs to the river's edge caused
delays to the column as it passed them in single file.
The darkness was intense, but by midnight the force
was concentrated and lay down to rest on a level and
sandy plain — within four miles of its objective. At
2.30 it moved on by moonlight and trickled man by
man through a gorge, while in front the way seemed
barred by a mountain mass rising 900 feet above the
river and leaving the narrowest of defiles from which
the battalions must debouch within shot of the enemy's
advanced post. Suddenly in the stillness of the night
drums were heard beating a mile to the front. The

158 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Dervishes must be on the alert ! Would they charge
the head of the column in the defile ? But the sound
died down. It had been but the usual call to morning
prayer in the Dervish dem. Had not Osman Azrak
with his own eyes seen the infidels quiet in their camp,
just as they had been any day these two months past ?
Onwards pressed the column till dawn . Then rapidly
the leading battalion, loth Sudanese, deployed into
line across the defile — the keen active blacks grinning
with pleasure at the prospect of a fight, every man
intently watching for the first sign of the hated Baggara,
yet drilled to listen and wait for the orders of his
officers. This fine battahon, which had recently been
engaged in a brush with Osman Digna at Suakin, was
from commanding officer to recruit a remarkable blend
of civilised discipline and primitive manhood, a living
example of the virtues of England grafted to the valour
of Equatoria. It pushed on in line over ground broken
by scrub, high grass and stunted trees ; paused for
the remainder of Lewis's brigade to deploy on either
side, and to give time to MacDonald's brigade, still
hemmed between mountain and river, to prolong the
line to the left. Daylight now appeared ; the moment
for swift action was at hand ; yet no further sound or
sign revealed the enemy's presence. Quick orders
from the Sirdar at the front hurried MacDonald round
the base of the mountain, which trended away from
the river and gave place to a dry kor in which to deploy
out of sight — with open ground in front. Maxwell's
brigade too was hustled through the defile as minutes
were precious. Suddenly a single shot rang out high up
on the mountain side. It was the Dervish outpost's
first alarm. Other shots quickly followed as the out-
post fell back. The rocky ridge in front opened fire.
The loth replied with crashes of volley firing. Awa}^

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 159

in the distance beyond the Dervishes the Sirdar heard
the report of his horse artillery in action, and knew that
his two columns would combine. It was 5.30 a.m.
The simultaneous attack had begun. The surprise
of the enemy was complete.

With the opening of a battle, a commander's task
is temporarily ended. The art of generalship is to
dispose troops within touch of their enemy in such
tactically superior positions and at such a tactically
favourable moment that— if their fighting qualities are
superior to those of the opponent — the victory shall be
decisive and far-reaching. The attack once launched
must be left to the initiative of subordinate officers and
the valour of the men. In this instance the brigadiers
were men of forty, the commanders of battahons men
of about thirty-three and the bimbashis still younger.
Their battle-leading, dictated by common sense and
experience, gave the Dervishes not one chance in a
hundred. Nevertheless the enemy, stubborn and
defiant in spite of his flank being turned before the
action began, fought \\dth the old courage of his race —
neither giving nor expecting quarter.

When MacDonald had deployed, he and Lewis
pushed home their attacks — the former against the
Dervish right the latter against their left, posted at the
village of Firkeh on the river bank. Maxwell — held in
reserve — soon pressed forward to cover the gap between
these two brigades. A field battery and the maxims
found good positions on a slope of Firkeh mountain,
whence they fired over the heads of the attacking
infantry. The desert column had strict orders to keep
out of the line of fire of our main attack and therefore
confined its action to long-range shooting of a useful
character.

The scheme of the night march and deployment at

i6o SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

daylight had been so carefully planned and carried out
that the actual fighting was short, sharp and decisive.
The scene of action, in which men contended like tiny
ants in a wilderness of lonely desert, resembled a toy
arena, as the men in khaki advanced and the white-
robed Dervishes hurried from village and camp to man
their walls and trenches. The fortified position — a
mile and a half long — extended across level ground by
the Nile to a rocky ridge in the desert. From loop-
holed walls, houses and breastworks, a spluttering fire
of Remington rifles was directed on the Egyptian and
Sudanese battalions as they advanced to the assault.

While Lewis's brigade swung to the right to attack
the village and engage in close fighting with its
defenders, MacDonald and his Sudanese were charged
by a gallant band of Baggara horse, who all perished in
their attempt. Wheeling his left well forward so as to
envelop the Dervish flank MacDonald assaulted the
ridge with great dash, shooting and bayoneting its
brave defenders and driving them out of their breast-
works to another ridge in rear. Pressing impetuously
forward the Sudanese drove the enemy down one hill
and up another, always swinging their left forward, until
at the end of the action the brigade faced the river and
hemmed the flying enemy against its shore. Some
escaped by swimming, others sought cover below the
bank ; all in the open were routed or killed. Mean-
while Lewis carried the village, Maxwell occupied the
enemy's dem or camp, and the Desert Column took up
the pursuit with cavalry, horse artillery and camel-
corps, a pursuit which was continued to Fereig, sixty-five
miles distant, during.the following days. By 7.30 a.m.
the general action was over, though a number of Arabs
still maintained a desperate resistance in the houses and
courtyards. So the long straggling village had to be

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK i6i

cleared by the three brigades — some loo corpses being
afterwards counted in one group of buildings. The
enemy's casualties numbered 780 dead, 500 wounded,
and 600 prisoners. The Sirdar's list amounted to one
British officer wounded and 103 of other ranks killed
and wounded. Such was indeed a small price to pay
for a decisive and complete victory, and on this account
some critics have concluded that the action was unim-
portant. But surely the value of a victory should be
measured, not by the length of the casualty list, but by
the ultimate effect of defeat on the conquered and the
advantages reaped by the victors.

At Firkeh the Dervish " Empire " sustained a blow
which paralysed its military enterprise for a year,
whilst the Egyptian army gathered self-confidence and
prestige. Had the victory been less decisive or had the
Dervishes been able to claim a minor success, there is
no doubt that further desperate fighting would have
been necessary before peace could have been restored to
the Dongola province, and few who recollect the circum-
stances of the moment can afiirm that Sir Herbert
Kitchener would have been the man entrusted with
the supreme command of the forces subsequently sent
to reconquer the Sudan. Through his victory at
Firkeh, he gained the approval of the Home Govern-
ment ; the Egyptian army showed it could win British
battles without aid from British troops and the
operations continued to be directed by the youthful
general and his officers, instead of by older men and
inexperienced troops from home stations. Moreover
the British public became keenly interested in the
further prosecution of the war and none heeded the
various croakers who in England always side with
England's enemies and foretell disaster to every British
enterprise.

L

i62 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

After burying the dead and enlisting the prisoners
into the Sudanese battahons, the Sirdar distributed
the force in several camps south of Firkeh and busied
himself with preparations for the forward move, which
would place him upon an open reach of the river and in
military' occupation of the province of Dongola. It
was an anxious period of hard work in the hottest
months of the year and in the hottest part of the
Sudan. Moreover the good fortune which had hitherto
attended the undertaking seemed to desert it and
everything went contrary. Before operations could
be resumed railway construction must be completed to
the advanced base at Kosheh : gunboats and sailing-
boats had to be passed up the cataracts on the rising
Nile : and food and stores accumulated at the front.
The labour for these undertakings and the directing
control must be provided by the army and its officers.
Unfortunately the Nile rose late and delayed the work :
instead of the usual north winds, which enable sailing
boats to ascend the rapids, it blew for forty consecutive
days from the south : the desert which for half a
century had known no rain was deluged by violent
cyclonic storms and several miles of railway embank-
ment were washed completely away, leaving the rails
hanging in festoons amidst the wreckage : worst of all
an epidemic of cholera broke out in Egypt, ascended the
Nile and attacked the army in a virulent form. Each
of these misfortunes was exceptional and peculiar to
1896, yet all descended upon the troops during July
and August and nearly wrecked the expedition. It
required the Sirdar's highest powers of rapid organisa-
tion and decision to deal with each occurrence in turn,
and he displayed his quality in a marked degree — as
will never be forgotten by those who saw him at work.

The epidemic killed off 919 out of 1218 attacked, and

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 163

the usual horrors of a cholera camp were present day
and night. The bimbashis and their men struggled
with gunboats and sailing-boats in the river, at railway
construction and repairs in the desert, and with the
nightmare of a deadly disease. If the Dervishes had
not been so thoroughly beaten, what an opportunity
for counter-attacks !

However, by dint of perseverance on the part of the
army and a cool head on the shoulders of its commander,
difficulties were overcome as they arose. Four gun-
boats and three steamers were hauled by manual labour
up the worst cataracts ; a refreshing wind from the
north at last enabled the flotilla of sailing-boats to stem
the swift current of the Nile ; the railway was repaired
by supreme efforts in seven days, and was then com-
pleted to Kosheh, where stores for some months were
collected. The British battalion at Wadi Haifa was
moved to the front ; a fourth brigade (Fellaheen)
under i\Iajor David was added to Colonel Hunter's
division ; on September 12 all was ready for the march
on Dongola, and the trials of officers and men were
forgotten in the exhilaration of the advance.

Meanwhile the Dervishes under Wad Bishara — a
young Emir and a line specimen of the Arab fighting
chief — had been reinforced from Omdurman and
numbered nearly 8000 regulars, besides a contingent of
local tribesmen of little or no military value. That this
Emir and his men meant fighting there can be no doubt,
for Wad Bishara had shown his mettle in many an
action in Darfur where he held supreme command until
replaced by the Khalifa's cousin, Mahmud. But the
defeat at Firkeh had somewhat diminished that absolute
certainty of victory, without which Moslem soldiers are
not seen at their best. In civilised forces, such as the
Egyptian and Indian armies, discipline, esprit de corps

i64 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

and mutual confidence make fanaticism unnecessary ;
but, in armies where discipline depends on personal
influence, fanaticism of one sort or another is essential
to success. The Dervishes have always been brave
fighters, prepared to die in battle for their cause and
ready to sell their lives dearly when cornered, but
long years of easy victories over inferior enemies
followed by the unrestrained pillage of the conquered
had deadened the spiritual power of their early fanatic-
ism. In the days of the Mahdi it was glorious to die
in battle for the sake of religion and to free the land
from alien tyrants. It was a different thing to fight as
a mercenary in the army of a despotic Khalifa. Yet so
great is the warlike instinct of the tribes of the Sudan,
that, if only the Dervishes could score a single success
against the Egyptians, Wad Bishara and the Sirdar
both knew that they would at once become a formidable
military force. The tactics of these two commanders
were therefore simple and straightforward. The Sirdar
meant to give his enemy no opportunity of winning
even a minor action : Wad Bishara, after stemming
the flight from Firkeh, was determined not to suffer a
second defeat, but hoped to fall upon some detachment
of Egyptians and quicken the spirit of his men by a
taste of victory. He accordingly moved northwards
from Dongola with his whole force, crossed the Nile
and occupied a position at Kerma, a hundred miles
south of Kosheh on the same side of the river. From
thence he sent out strong patrols, which cut the tele-
graph wire behind Kitchener's leading brigade and
fought our cavalry without decisive results. Mean-
while, instead of using their superior mobility, the
Dervishes sat passively in this position, whilst the
invading army concentrated within seven miles of
them, ready for another destructive swoop like that of

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 165

Firkeh: but Wad Bishara, more alert and better
informed than Osman Azrak, had an alternative plan,
and, as soon as he reaUsed that he could neither stop
the main advance nor overwhelm a detachment, he
suddenly withdrew across the river and placed its
flooded waters between himself and destruction.
Meanwhile the Sirdar's force was ordered to deploy
at sunrise and assault Kerma. At that hour it ac-
cordingly advanced majestically to the attack, but
the carefully planned manoeuvre proved abortive,
because the Dervishes had abandoned their intrench-
ments that night. A mile beyond, at Hafir on the
further bank, a small steamer — sad rehc of Gordon's
ingenuit}^ — and a fleet of boats indicated what had
happened, so the Egyptian advance was continued till
the two forces faced one another, with only the Nile
between them. At 6.30 a.m. the infantry, disappointed
of its prey, sat down to watch as spectators a naval
action between our three gunboats — the fourth had
been sunk on a rock in the cataracts — and a fortified
village. The Dervish position occupied three-quarters
of a mile of the bank and was cunningly devised to
shelter its defenders and afford them a good field of
fire towards the river. Entrenchments, thick mud
walls, houses and pits covered the bank. Five brass
guns in gun-pits were mounted close to the water's
edge ; a number of riflemen had chmbed the tall palm-
trees which waved overhead and, concealed by the
foliage, commanded the decks of boats. At intervals
the coloured flags of the principal Emirs, blazoned with
texts from the Koran, bid defiance to the invaders, and,
in the desert beyond, the broad-bladed spears of the
Baggara horse flashed in the sun as the riders brandished
their arms.

Directly the gunboats were ready for action, the

i66 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

horse battery opened fire, and was answered by a
splutter of musketry along the whole line of intrench-
ments, indicating that they were thickly occupied from
end to end. Then, one by one the three gunboats
struggled against the current to within range of the
Dervishes and became targets for a formidable fire,
which splashed like hail all over them and cut the
water around them into foam. From the palm-tops
the fire was especially galling, as it searched the decks
and enfiladed the slight shields of both maxims and
guns. One Dervish shell penetrated the Abu Klea at
the water-line and entered the magazine, but did not
explode. Several shells struck the Metemma. Com-
mander Colville, R.N., on the Tamai, was severely
wounded in the wrist, and casualties occurred on all the
boats. Their practice on the entrenchments sent clouds
of dust into the air and did some execution, but without
subduing the enemy's fire. The bold riflemen in the
tree-tops were frequently dropped like young rooks on
a spring day, but the Dervish fire scarcely slackened,
and the gunboats had to turn tail amidst the jeers of
the Arabs and run down-stream to make good their
injuries. Again they moved up-stream and renewed
the attack with no better success. At the end of three
hours' engagement hardly any progress had been made,
and it was obvious to the Sirdar that other tactics must
be adopted. He accordingly directed the gunboats
once more to run the gauntlet, but to proceed at full
steam in line abreast without attempting to reply to
the Dervishes, and to run on thirty-five miles to the
town of Dongola and attack the enemy's base and line
of communications.

This movement was prepared and supported by long
range infantry volleys across the river and by the fire
of all the batteries at 1300 yards. It proved more

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 167

effective, though it did not completely subdue the
Dervishes. The palm-tree riflemen were dislodged,
the five brass guns were silenced, the Arab steamer
sunk, and, under cover of these results, the gunboats
steamed past the entrenchments. At eleven o'clock
the action subsided into desultory firing which lasted
throughout the hot day — a reminder to the opposing
armies that neither side could yet claim a victory. The
Egyptian losses were insignificant. Wad Bishara had
200 dead and many wounded. He himself was hurt
by a splinter and was nervous about his line of re-
treat since the gunboats had gone south. During the
night he attempted to revictual his force from the
stores of grain which lay in his boats by the bank, but
the moon in the Sudan is bright — brighter than else-
where— and the watchful Egyptian gunners drove away
all who tried to carry provisions to the shore. Wad
Bishara was therefore obliged to evacuate Hafir, abandon
his boats and beat a hasty retreat on Dongola. By day-
light the place was forsaken, and the villagers were
easily persuaded to bring over the boats to the Sirdar.
He at once commenced crossing the river \\ath his
whole force, and it is evidence of the efficient methods
of the Egyptian army that by means of only two small
steamers and fifty captured boats 14,000 men, 24 guns,
3000 horses, mules and camels, and five days' supplies
for all concerned were ferried across a wide and rapid
river in thirty hours, with only one casualty — a lamed
horse. Yet there were no special landing facilities on
either bank, and the animals had to be lifted b}^ men
into boats, their legs tied together to prevent kicking.
It is by similar feats over material obstacles that an
organising brain gains victories for its side — victories
which perhaps only the student of military history
recognises and admires.

i68 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

The remainder of this year's campaign (1896) can
be related in a few words. Having got the Dervishes
fairly on the run and obtained naval command of a
clear waterway at either high or low Nile, the Sirdar
pressed his advantage without hesitation. Even before
the troops had all crossed, the leading brigades were
heading for Dongola which the gunboats had busily
bombarded.

Would Bishara stand and fight ? was the question
every man was asking : and it is certain that the Emir
himself was as anxious as any one in either force to
hazard a battle. Indeed he constantly harassed the
Egyptian outposts six miles from Dongola during their
halt. But Wad Bishara was dealing with occurrences
beyond his control and with an enemy who gave him
few openings. For on the following morning at 4.30
the Sirdar was again moving to the attack and, after
the sun rose and Ughted up the level sands of the
desert, the two armies were again facing one another.
The Egyptian force extended for two miles across the
plain, a thin line of marching men, strengthened at
intervals by supports, followed by transport camels
and a reserve, with one flank on the river and the other
in the desert protected by mounted troops. The
Dervishes, less numerous but more imposing, stood in
groups outside the town hesitating whether to charge
home or take to flight. But a nearer view of the
approaching battalions, moving slowly and steadily in
disciplined ranks, quickened their decision, and the
Dervish force retreated southwards without firing a
shot. There was to be no more fighting in the Dongola
province, for the riflemen retired round the bends of
the river three hundred and fifty miles to Abu Hamed,
whilst the horsemen made across the desert to Metemma
and Omdurman. The Egyptian army was everywhere

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 169

received with enthusiasm by the remnant of the local
population, and agricultural prosperity was restored
very soon after the occupation.

In England a military success in the Sudan, after so
many years of disappointment and failure, was hailed
with dehght. Colonel Sir Herbert Kitchener was
promoted a major-general, as were also Colonels Hunter
and Rundle, a generous list of promotions and decora-
tions bestowed fitting rewards on the junior officers
who had created a fighting force out of unpromising
material, and the thoughts of the British nation
turned wistfully to Khartoum and the half-forgotten
tale of the abandonment of Gordon.

The news carried to Omdurman by Wad Bishara

and Osman Azrak created an alarm which can only

be explained on the hypothesis that these Emirs

exaggerated the power of the Egyptian army in order

to make out a case for their loss of a province. They

reported that they had been closely pursued across the

desert and that the invaders would shortly appear

before the gates of the capital. The story caused a

panic in the city whose 300,000 inhabitants had believed

the Khalifa to be the supreme ruler of the world, and

business came to a standstill. Hitherto the various

Dervish armies had been everywhere successful, save

in their failure to invade Egypt — a failure unknown to

the mass of the people. They had repeatedly massacred

thousands of Egyptian soldiers under the Mahdi : had

conquered Kordofan, Darfur and the country beyond

Fashoda : had three times compelled British forces

to evacuate the Sudan : and had defeated the armies

of Abyssinia led in person by King John, whose head

was exposed in Omdurman as a trophy of \dctory.

Now that the Abyssinians had defeated the ItaUans,

the Khalifa was arranging an expedition to turn the

170 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

latter out of Kassala. Thus the capital was wholly
unprepared for anything in the nature of a reverse,
and its population was not of a character to bear
a shock with equanimity, for the inhabitants of
this peculiar town were in no way indigenous to its
soil, but had been collected from various districts for
the glorification of the Baggara and as hostages for
the behaviour of distant provinces. Whenever the
Khalifa suspected the loyalty of a tribe — and each was
in turn suspected — his system was to round up a
number of its chief families and drive them to the
capital with their portable property, to dwell under
his eye in a suburb built by themselves and their
slaves. None could leave Omdurman without his
permission, imder penalty of death.

In this manner the city grew from the hamlet in
which the Mahdi first pitched his camp into a huge
agglomeration of solid houses, covering an immense
area, each quarter subdivided into sections, tribe by
tribe — to facilitate control by the central authority.
As the tribes from time immemorial had been at feud
with one another, they were unlikely to combine for
any common purpose, and by playing off one against
the other and occasionally executing a leader, the
despot maintained a rough kind of discipline with
consummate ability. According to his lights the
Khalifa was undoubtedly a ruler of men, who federated
a mass of warring elements into a nation and governed
it without a rival during difficult times. His methods,
though effective, were deplorable, and his despotism
proved sterile ; but in future years we perhaps shall
realise that, in spite of the evil he wrought, he uncon-
sciously paved the way for the higher standard of
government which England is now developing on the
Nile.

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 171

With characteristic power and an intuitive under-
standing of the people he addressed, Abdullahi stood up
in the pulpit of the open mosque square to arrest the
panic and explain away the news from Dongola. He
announced that his mighty armies would at once be
recalled from distant provinces for the defence of the
city, that the insolent invaders would be lured into the
heart of the Sudan and wiped off the face of the earth.
He had seen in a dream the yellow plains of Kerreri
whitened by their bones. Had not the accursed white
men once before reached Metemma, only to be driven
back by the chosen warriors of Mohammed ? Let no
man doubt him. The intrigues of the discontented
would be punished with death and the faithful would
live for ever in God.

His words were received with a shout of triumph,
and thus by the mere weight of his personality he
overawed the timid, encouraged the fanatical and
restored his own prestige. Moreover he hit upon a plan
of campaign which was probably the best under the
circumstances, though other bones than those of his
enemy were destined to whiten the plains of Kerreri,
near Omdurman.

Accordingly he recalled Mahmud and his 14,000
men from Darfur and sent them to Metemma ; by
degees he concentrated at the capital various forces
from outlying districts until his army numbered nearly
80,000 men, mostly Sudanese blacks commanded by
Baggara arabs ; he strengthened Abu Hamed and
Berber by small contingents, and ordered local levies
to be added to their garrisons ; he commanded Osman
Digna and his Suakin adherents to concentrate at
Adarama on the Atbara River. These plans and move-
ments took several months to carry out and were
meanwhile duly reported to the Sirdar by the agents

172 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

of his sleepless intelligence department. Our infantry
garrisons and gunboats in tlie newly acquired Dongola
province were kept alert by frequent rumours of
impending attacks, and the cavalry and camel-corps
ceaselessly patrolled the wells of the surrounding
deserts. During this lull in the operations the rail-
way was extended to Kerma which it reached in April
1897, and another line was boldly projected across
233 miles of desert from Wadi Haifa towards Abu
Hamed, held by a Dervish garrison under Mohamed-el-
Zain.

When the Sirdar, on his own responsibility, deter-
mined to construct this desert line, he made a decision
on which the future success or failure of the campaign
mainly depended, and the reader is invited to study
the map facing page 238 in order that he may realise
the nature of the problem and the reasons which in-
duced Kitchener to adopt a plan which others openly
condemned. Subsequent events have proved the
soundness of his judgment, but, at the time, experts
both at home and on the spot had no hesitation in
denouncing the desert railway as the scheme of a
lunatic. As an alternative, they suggested one of
three lines of advance for the Egyptian army, each
necessitating a railway and each designed to establish
our force on a navigable reach of the Nile between Abu
Hamed and Khartoum. Of these the most popular
and expensive was the line from Suakim to Berber.
That it would take many years to build in no way
daunted its ardent advocates, who were doubtless
thinking more of future dividends than of immediate
military necessities. Next in importance were those
who favoured the theory of linking up all the navigable
reaches of the river by railways round the cataracts,
and wanted a railway from Merawi to Abu Hamed.

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 173

The third alternative was a hne from Korti to Metemma
across the Bayuda desert. But Kitchener considered
that the advocates of these and other Unes miscalcu-
lated the essential difficulties of building railways
within striking distance of an enemy and the time
required for the work. No railway could be built until
its proposed terminus was held by an Egyptian garrison
and its whole length protected by adequate forces.
Construction trains on a single line cannot carry the
supplies of an army as well as masses of railway plant ;
and large forces cannot subsist in deserts on camel
transport. In fact it was not possible to construct
the railway without a large force or to advance a large
force \^ithout a railway, and it was because the Sirdar
understood this simple proposition that he selected a
Hne which obviated both difficulties.

Between Wadi Haifa and Abu Hamed the Nile makes
an enormous bend and struggles through two long
series of cataracts. Sir Herbert Kitchener therefore
decided on a line of advance which would cut across
this bend, as the string cuts the arc of a bow, and would
also permit of the main portion of his railway being
completed at a safe distance from the enemy's raiding
parties. No defending force would be required to
guard the line ; Abu Hamed, the terminus, was within
striking distance of the Egyptian army at Merawi and
withal too distant from the main Dervish posts to be
quickly reinforced. The opponents of this scheme
declared that only a madman could propose to supply
water by train to 2000 plate-layers in mid-desert, and
that the further the railway advanced, the more
impossible would the task become. But the problem
depended on just the kind of calculation in which
Kitchener excelled. He worked out the figures to his
own satisfaction, and, in spite of remonstrance, started

174 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

construction at Wadi Haifa in January 1897, so as
to be ready to move at the rise of the Nile. It was a
daring resolve, daringly carried out and amply justified
by results.

Whilst construction was in progress and the Nile
stood at its lowest, a pause occurred in the prosecution
of the campaign, and both sides had ample time to
prepare for the eventual struggle. Meanwhile the
tribes and numerous tribelets which unfortunately
dwelt between the opposing armies suffered every
hardship which Dervish malignity could inflict, and
the Jaalin Arabs — who boast a descent direct from the
Prophet Mohamed — were massacred, man, woman
and child, to the number of 3000, merely because they
favoured the invaders. This butchery occurred at
Metemma in July and was the work of Mahmud's
army, by direct order of the tyrant of Omdurman.
Similar methods, on a smaller scale, were practised
by Mohamed-el-Zain, the Baggara chief of Abu
Hamed, against the dwellers in the cataracts between
himself and our Merawi garrison, and his horsemen on
one occasion cut off the rear-guard of an Egyptian
patrol, wounding the British bimbashi and killing
fourteen of his men.

But Mohamed-el-Zain' s day of reckoning was at
hand — for the railway at last reached to within
100 miles of his post, the Nile was rising in the
cataracts and the moment for a blow was approaching.
The task of capturing Abu Hamed was entrusted to
Major-General Hunter and a brigade of all arms, con-
sisting of twenty-five picked cavalry scouts, a battery
of small guns, four battalions of infantry and 1314
transport camels — in all 2500 combatants with eighteen
days' supplies. The little force was inspected by the
Sirdar on July 28, on the bank of the Nile opposite

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 175

Merawi and began its forced march the following day,
under the greatest secrecy.*

The problem confronting Hunter was to defeat
Mohamed-el-Zain before he could be reinforced, and
to hold Abu Hamed against future attacks. The dis-
tance to be covered was 145 miles through difficult
and unknown country, and rapidity of movement was
essential to success. The risk to his detached force
lay in the possibility that the 700 Dervishes at Abu
Hamed might be reinforced by others from Berber
(1200 men) or Metemma (10,000 men) of whom the
latter, by merely floating down the Nile in boats, could
reach Abu Hamed ten days after Hunter's departure
from Merawi. Moreover Hunter's column once
launched could not be reinforced, owing to the difficulty
of camel transport by land and the impossibility of
hauling gunboats up cataracts in the face of an enemy.
To mislead the Dervishes a strong patrol was despatched
to Abu Klea wells whence rumours were spread that an
advance on Metemma was imminent . But a Dervish spy
had, of course, seen Hunter's column start, and a swift
camel soon carried the news to the Baggara chiefs.

There was thus an element of romance and un-
certainty in the enterprise undertaken by the fljang
column, and as all ranks in Dongola were acquainted
with the situation and knew that the force was cut
off from assistance, news of its progress was awaited
with interest. The men composing it had implicit
faith in the ability of their general whose rapid
promotion had been earned in their midst, and bore
with cheerful fortitude long and trying nights of
marching and days of broken sleep under a pitiless sun.
For eight and a half consecutive days the force
averaged seventeen miles across desolate rock-strewn

* See map facing page 238.

176 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

country, by tracks which cut short the bends of the
Nile in its struggle through the Monasir cataracts.
As the route had not been reconnoitred this work
was undertaken by a bimbashi who rode forward
with the cavalry scouts to select halting-places by
the river's edge. After leaving the fertile fields of
Dongola one is struck by the absolute nakedness of the
Monasir hills. The land possesses not even a thin
streak of vegetation and, looked at from a height, has
the appearance of a stormy ocean suddenly petrified
into solid, red trap-rock and left to bake for centuries
in the sun — a wilderness of volcanic hillocks, rising in
rugged ridges hundreds of feet above the river. The
inhabitants are few, and those few have a bearing as
sullen as the aspect of their home, to which no man
travels except his business be war. The Nile alone
has a smiling surface as it dances along its numerous
channels amidst water- worn boulders.

To march a column impeded by laden camels night
after night through such a country required endurance,
discipline and enthusiasm on the part of all concerned,
yet so well did the troops respond to the test that their
rate of marching brought them before Abu Hamed a
day ahead of the programme.

By the morning of August 6, Ginnifab, eighteen miles
from Abu Hamed, was occupied without opposition,
but news had reached Hunter that Dervish reinforce-
ments from both Berber and Metemma were on the
move and might possibly reach Abu Hamed that night.
Moreover it was discovered that a Monasir Arab had
accompanied our column from Merawi and had fre-
quently sent villagers of his tribe to warn Mohamed-
el-Zain of our approach. Hunter accordingly decided
to push forward that night to some point within striking
distance of the town and make a fortified zariba for

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 177

his impedimenta. Starting before sundown, the force
marched throughout the night, and at 4 a.m. halted by
the river a mile and a half from Abu Hamed, whose
look-out tower was just visible against the starlit sky.
As soon as the weary transport came up a strong
parapet was constructed of sacks of forage, biscuits,
camel-saddles and baggage, and manned by half a
battalion of infantry, two machine guns and all the
servants, camel-men and followers — under a bimbashi.

Within this little fort the mass of camels were
made to sit down, closely packed, with their forelegs
lashed to prevent a stampede when firing commenced.
Having thus secured his supplies and got rid of his
baggage, Hunter paraded in light order and marched
out to fight with 2200 men.

Much valuable time had been consumed by the
construction of the defensive post, and it was daylight
by the time we reached the plateau near Abu Hamed.
Two Dervishes perched on the watch-tower calmly
surveyed our proceedings. No other inhabitant was
visible, and the town itself lay tucked along the
river's bank so close to the steep slope of the over-
hanging plateau that nothing could be seen of it. A
couple of circular forts were found empty by the cavalry
scouts — who, accompanied by three staff officers, rode
well in advance of the infantry. As they neared the
watch-tower the two Dervishes sullenly climbed down
and disappeared with calm deliberation from the
plateau, whose crest lay just beyond. Their place was
taken by an eager bimbashi, who climbed to the top
and obtained a clear view of the town which was so soon
to be assaulted. It straggled for nearly a mile along
the Nile, and was silent and apparently deserted as he
gazed upon its walls and flat roofs. Across the wide
river lay the green, fertile island of Mograt, whose

M

178 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

inhabitants were commencing their morning work — as
though no disturbing element could interrupt their
labours. Overhead coveys of sand-grouse chirped in
alarm, but the Dervishes lay low, silent and invisible.

As soon as Hunter had considered the reports
of his staff he deployed the whole force on the
plateau, facing towards the town and river, but with
the left thrown shghtly back. The loth Sudanese
under Brevet Major Sidney held the more exposed left
flank, with the gth Sudanese next them ; the battery
was in the middle, half the 3rd Egyptians on the right
of the guns and the nth Sudanese on the extreme right
with its flank on the river. The infantry brigade was
commanded by MacDonald.

At 6.30 A.M. our guns broke silence and under
cover of their fire the infantry advanced to the crest
of the plateau, halted, fixed bayonets and awaited
orders, overlooking the houses. The battery then took
ground to the right to enfilade the walls. Our shells were
now bursting in the houses, but still the enemy made
no sign. Only some affrighted hens cackled in panic on
the roof-tops. To those unacquainted with Dervish
tactics the place might seem untenanted. The pause
enabled officers to examine their objective. Then the
advance sounded and the force moved down the slope
and was at once received by an outburst of rifle fire
from concealed trenches and loopholed houses. This
was the Dervish surprise on which they had expended
much cunning. Hunter rode ahead of the advancing
line amid a hail of bullets, and the men dropped fast,
especially on the left flank. Here the loth Sudanese,
in a few moments, had their commanding officer and a
bimbashi shot dead and a number of men killed and
wounded. The fire at short range was so galling to our
infantry on the exposed slope that Hunter resolved to

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 179

rush the place and bring the matter to an immediate
issue. He accordingly directed the maxims to en-
filade the enemy's firing line and then sounded the
advance and the double. Exasperated at the loss
of their beloved ofiicers and eager^ as always, for
a hand-to-hand fight, the blacks rushed down-hill
upon the trenches, regardless of the hot fire which
thinned their ranks, and bayoneted or shot every
Baggara who stood to his post. Passing over their
bodies, they stormed the walls, swarmed into the town
and dispersed through its narrow streets and alleys,
clearing the enemy out of houses and courtyards as they
proceeded. By 7.30 the place was in our possession,
after an hour's warm work. But a few desperate men
still held out, killing all who approached them and
refusing on any condition to surrender. In one house
nine such fanatics defended themselves till the afternoon
and were only quieted by having the building blown
to pieces by shells at close range.

The Egyptian casualties were two British ofiicers
killed — Major Sidney and Lieutenant FitzClarence —
and 24 men killed and 64 wounded, of whom 21 died
in the night. Among the Dervish garrison the loss was
heavier, as must generally happen with the beaten side.
Over 400 were either killed or too severely wounded to
escape, and 152 unwounded prisoners were captured,
including Mohamed-el-Zain and other chiefs. The
Baggara horse and remnants of the riflemen fled to-
wards Berber along the Nile and, meeting reinforce-
ments some twenty miles from the scene of action,
spread news of the disaster and arrested the advance of
their friends. At Abu Hamed the local tribesmen who
had fought for our enemy swam the river under a hail
of bullets, and dispersed themselves discreetly amongst
the peaceful inhabitants of Mograt island. Mean-

i8o SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

while our infantry, tired by perpetual night marching,
was not required to pursue — because it would have been
detrimental to the Sirdar's plan of campaign to send
detachments beyond Abu Hamed before the railway
reached it. Hunter, therefore, established his out-
posts along a ridge of hills to the south, brought up
his supplies from their temporary zariba, quartered
his battalions in the larger houses of the town, gave
them six hours in which to work off arrears of sleep
and proceeded to fortify and entrench against attack
from the south.

Next day all the empty camels and mules were
despatched to the base near Merawi for further provi-
sions, together with the Dervish prisoners and our
sick and wounded — for the problem of feeding the Abu
Hamed brigade taxed the Sirdar's slender resources
to the utmost. From Korosko in Egypt, from Rail-
head in mid-desert, from the Dongola Province, strings
of laden camels were directed on Abu Hamed, each
animal bearing its maximum load of 360 lb., of which
half consisted of the forage it would consume on the
journey. Thus each camel which survived the long
marches deposited one i8o-lb. sack of food-stuff at Abu
Hamed, as a contribution towards the total of 15,000
lb. of grain required by Hunter's column every day.
And the reader will perceive, through a simple calcula-
tion, how difficult it was to ration one brigade by
camel-transport even when it was not raided, and
how impossible would have been the task of supplying
several brigades across the southern deserts, where
convoys would certainly have been ambushed by
mounted Dervishes.

The news of Hunter's victory was conveyed by
swift riders to the Sirdar ; railway construction was
energetically resumed in mid-desert ; the laden camels

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK i8i

started on their weary journeys ; and the gunboats
and saiHng-boats forthwith commenced to ascend the
forbidding cataracts which had never before been
surmounted by such craft. Whilst bustle and stren-
uous work were the order of the day along two busy
hues of communication, the scene of interest was
moving from the Dongola to the Berber Province,
the base of operations was shifting from Merawi to Wadi
Haifa, and Dongola was henceforward relegated to a
mere siding on the lines of communication.

The step forward to Abu Hamed, timed as it was
to coincide with the Nile's full flood, ought to have
been followed by a halt in the operations— whilst the
railway and the cataracts received attention. But
events moved too fast for a pohcy of calculated pro-
gression, and Kitchener was compelled to occupy
the town of Berber and hold 150 additional miles
of the Nile, within a month of the battle of Abu
Hamed and many months before he was prepared for
such a responsibihty. War has its surprises in the
Sudan as elsewhere. The Dongola campaign of 1896,
starting at a moment's notice and without forethought,'
surprised us with its floods of rain and epidemic of
cholera ; but the Berber campaign of 1897 — undertaken
with studied care and a determined preference for
caution— astonished us by the dangerous rapidity of
its success.

As soon as Hunter had prepared Abu Hamed for
defence, he sent forward a contingent of friendly
Ababda Arabs on camels, to reconnoitre and report.
They proceeded through a disturbed country, spread-
ing rumours that they were merely the advanced-
guard of an immense force. Under ordinary cir-
cumstances the falseness of such reports would have
been discovered by the enemy and the Arabs would

i82 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

have been promptly ambushed and killed. But Zaki
Osman, the Dervish Emir, incensed because neither
the Khalifa nor Mahmud would send him sub-
stantial reinforcements, abandoned Berber in dis-
gust, and marched away south, leaving chaos and
consternation amongst the tribes of the place. Our
Arabs met one Dervish patrol which they defeated ;
then marched on boldly to the city, and took formal
possession of its grain-store in the name of the Sirdar.
Abu Hamed had been captured on August 7. On
September 2, Hunter telegraphed to Kitchener the
astonishing news that Berber also had fallen ; was he
to occupy it or not ?

Rarely in Lord Kitchener's eventful life has he been
asked a question more difficult to answer or one re-
quiring a more immediate and definite reply.

At that date Berber and the mouth of the Atbara
constituted the most important strategic position in
the Sudan — distant only seventy-five miles from
Metemma and Mahmud's pov/erful army. To occupy
and hold it in strength was therefore the most desirable
of all military events. But to occupy it with a weak
force, dependent upon insecure communications, meant
surrendering the initiative of the whole campaign to
the enemy, and none knew better than Kitchener the
value of retaining in his own hands the power of
the initiative — the secret of military success. If the
Khalifa, or Mahmud or even Osman Digna (who, with
2000 men, occupied Adarama on the Atbara, should
elect to attack Berber with vigour or cut it off from
the north, the chances of holding it w^ould be small,
and the campaign would assume very unpleasant
proportions. During twelve hours Kitchener weighed
all the consequences, decided in favour of the bolder
course, telegraphed Hunter to occupy Berber and

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AT WORK 183

himself rode there direct from Merawi to Berber with a
small escort by the shortest route — 170 miles across
the Bayuda Desert.

Meanwhile Hunter at Abu Hamed lost no time—
for a game of bluff, to be successful, must be played
without hesitation. He put 350 men of the 9th
Sudanese on the four available gunboats and disem-
barked them at Berber in two days' time. He then
sent on the gunboats to shell and harass Zaki Osman's
retiring force, and to create a general impression of our
strength amongst the riparian tribes as far as Metemma.
These measures had the effect of gaining time, just
when time was of infinite value to the Egyptian army,
scattered along a front of 300 miles from Dongola
to Berber.

If during September, October or November
Mahmud's Dervishes had attacked in force they would
certainly have captured Berber and would probably
have annihilated its weak garrison. But the Khalifa
who was essentially a civihan, obstinately refused to
permit Mahmud to attack. He remained convinced that
the Sirdar and his infidel band would advance against
Omdurman before the Nile fell, and was determined
to concentrate and husband the whole of his strength
in order to deal it a crushing blow near his city
walls. He therefore ordered Osman Digna back to
Shendi and redoubled his efforts to increase the Omdur-
man army by new levies. He collected stores of grain
from distant provinces, built forts and additional walls
round the city and rejected the advice of the fighting
Emirs who counselled a policy of attack. He thus
failed to profit by the initiative which had been tem-
porarily surrendered to him and the golden oppor-
tunity was lost.

By January 1898, Berber and the Atbara fort were

i84 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

sufficiently garrisoned to withstand a siege ; the road
from Suakin was open ; the Eastern Sudan — reUeved
from the disturbing influence of Osman Digna — was
incHned for peace ; the railway, completed to Abu
Hamed, was steadily advancing towards the Atbara ;
an Egyptian garrison had relieved the Italian force
at Kassala and was in touch with the Abyssinian
frontier ; our flotilla of gunboats patrolled the Nile
to the Shabluka cataract, occasionally engaging the
Metemma forts and keeping an ever-watchful eye upon
Mahmud's army.

Thus far the reconquest of the Sudan had been
accomplished by Egypt and her reorganised army,
unaided by British troops.* Under the guidance of
Kitchener and his officers, amongst whom Vandeleur
was a bimbashi in the gth Sudanese, much had been
done ; but it was obvious to all concerned that the
Khalifa's policy of concentration at Omdurman would
compel England to despatch reinforcements for the
final overthrow of the great Dervish army : and the
question which engaged our thoughts was, would the
British troops be placed under the Sirdar's command ?
or would he and his army fight under a senior general
from Pall Mall ?

* The British battalion which marched to Hafir and Dongola had
immediately returned to Egypt.

A SOLUIEK OF THE yiH SUDANESE

CHAPTER VIII

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898.

See maps facing pages 208 and 238

The following table shows the distribution of the troops
in December 1897 and January 1898 and illustrates
the facility for concentration conferred by the Desert
Railway, without which this campaign could not have
taken place.

Place. December 1897. January 1898.

^ J Battalion Infantry i Squadron Cavalry (Bimbashi Le
4 Gunboats Gallais)

2 Companies Camel Corps (Bim-
bashi King)

2nd Battery Artillery (Bimbashi
Peak)

3rd Egyptian Battalion (Sillem
Bey)

4th Egyptian Battalion (Sparks
Bey)

7 th Egyptian Battalion (Fathy
Bey)

15th Egyptian Battahon (Hick-
man Bey)

4 Gunboats (Commander Keppel)

2 Companies Camel 2 Squadrons Cavalry (Broadwood

Fort
Atbara

Berber

Corps
I Battery Artillery
4^ Battalions Infan-
try
I Gunboat

Bey)

4th Battery Artillery (Bimbashi

Lawrie)
5th Batter}^ Artillery (Bimbashi de

Rougemont)
IXth Sudanese Battalion (Walter
i- Bey)
Xth Sudanese Battalion (Nason

Bey)

i86

SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Place.

Berber

{Cont.)

December 1897.

Suakin

Kassala

Between
Berber

and Abu
Hamed

Detachment Garrison

Artillery
I Company Camel

Corps
2^ Battalions Infantry

Nil

January 1898.

Xlth Sudanese Battalion (Jackson

Bey)
Xllth Sudanese Battalion (Town-

shend Bey)
Xlllth Sudanese Battalion (CoUin-

son Bey)
XlVth Sudanese Battalion (Shekle-

ton Bey)
I Gunboat

Half 5th Egyptian Battalion (a
native officer)

I Company Camel Corps (native
officer)

1 6th Egyptian Battalion (Nichol-
son Bey)

Arab Battalion (lately Italian)

3^ Battalions Infantry ist Egyptian Battalion (Heygate

Bey)
2nd Egyptian Battalion (Pink Bey)
Half 5th Egyptian Battalion (Bor-

han Bey)
8th Egyptian Battalion (Kalussi

Bey)

Railhead

at Dekeish
(20 miles
South of

Abu
Hamed)

(Nil

Wadi
Haifa

{■

Battalion Infantry

Dongola
Province

8 Squadrons Cavalry

5 Companies Camel
Corps

3 Batteries Artillery

6 Battalions Infantry
Detachments Garrison

Artillery
3 Gunboats

Advance parties of Royal War-
wickshire, Lincolnshire, and
Cameron Highlanders, under
Major Simpson

I Battery Egyptian Horse Artil-
lery (Bimbashi Young)

4 Squadrons Egyptian Cavalry
(Bimbashi Mahon)

1 8th Egyptian Battalion (Matchett
Bey)

I Squadron Cavalry (depot)

5 Companies Camel Corps (Tud-
way Bey)

3rd Battery Artillery (Bimbashi
Stewart)

6th Egyptian Battalion (a native
Bey)

17th Egyptian Battalion (Bun-
bury Bey)

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898

187

Place.

Dongola (
Province 1

December 1897.

Nil

Between
Railhead -{
and Cairo

Cairo «(

ist Battery Egyptian
Horse Artillery

2 Battalions Egyptian

Infantry (being
raised)

3 Battalions British
Infantry

I Regiment British

Cavalry
I Battery R.F.A.

January 1898.

Detachments Garrison Artillery

(Egyptian)
3 Gunboats

ist Batt. Royal Warwickshire

Regiment (Lieut. -Col. Quayle

Jones)
ist Batt. Lincolnshire Regiment

(Colonel Verner)
ist Batt. Cameron Highlanders

(Colonel ]Money)

2 ist Lancers (Colonel Martin)
5th Fusihers (from Gibraltar)
20th Lancashire Fusiliers (from

Quetta)
87th Royal Irish Fusiliers (from

Burmah)
ist Batt. Seaforth Highlanders

(from Malta)
32nd Battery R.F.A.

Whilst the thoughts of those who interest themselves
in the continued progress of the British Empire were
directed towards Omdurman, its Dervish army and
Kitchener's scattered garrisons ; and whilst the Military
Clubs in London were still busily speculating on the
name of the particular general who might command in
the field, reports were reaching the Sirdar that the
Khalifa was on the move. He had marshalled his
host outside the walls of his city and was marching
north in great strength — determined to attack us in
Berber. This information came through such reliable
channels that it could not be disbelieved, however
unlikely it might seem, and in fact the Dervish army
did set forth from Omdurman one day in January
under the personal command of the Khalifa. Kitchener
at once concentrated the Egyptian army in the Berber
Province, by moving the Dongola garrisons back to
Wadi Haifa and forward to Abu Hamed by train, as

i88 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

shown in the table above. He telegraphed to Lord
Cromer for the loan of one brigade of British infantry
as reinforcement, and ordered an entrenched camp to
be constructed at the gunboat depot near the mouth of
the Atbara River. These necessary precautions were
most inconvenient both to the engineer subalterns
engaged on railway construction and to the inadequate
camel-transport, employed at several small cataracts
which made their unwelcome appearance between Abu
Hamed and Berber as the Nile fell.

Meanwhile the Khalifa's march northwards came
to a halt. Difficulties of transport and of food-supply
confronted him at the outset. Neither he nor any
other man can improvise supply and transport services
at a moment's notice. Moreover, he began to perceive
that he was not quite soldier enough to conduct a great
military enterprise to success. He therefore hesitated,
called together a council of war, mistrusted its advice
but yet feared to delegate to any of the fighting Emirs
the command of his precious troops. Finally he moved
the army back to Omdurman and ordered Mahmud's
division to attack Berber from Metemma. Now, if
this decision had been arrived at and acted upon
between September and January it might have
resulted in a Dervish victory. But in February —
owing to the power of rapid concentration possessed
by the Egyptians through their growing railway — the
Khalifa's belated order to Mahmud merely courted an
unnecessary defeat and illustrated the danger of en-
trusting military policy to a ruler however capable,
devoid of military instinct. Our own British history
abounds in similar misfortunes. For several months,
Mahmud who was gifted with a soldier's eye had implored
the Khalifa to let him attack Berber whilst its garrison
was still weak, but his appeal was merely snubbed and

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 189

refused. Now that Berber was stronger he received
supphes of ammunition and the order to attack. He
accordingly crossed the Nile with 15,000 fighting men,
joined Osman Digna's contingent at Shendi, and opened
the stirring campaign which tested Kitchener's capa-
city as a general and the quality of the Egyptian army,
as they had not been tested before. Although one
brigade of British infantry joined in the fray, it was
wisely decided not to supersede Kitchener or in any
way interfere with his unfettered conduct of the opera-
tions. The British infantry was therefore placed
entirely under his command as soon as its various
units passed southwards of Assouan. Thus for the
first time in our recent history — so far as my knowledge
goes — a British general, selected for proved efficiency,
commanded an army which, excepting the British
brigade, he had had ample time and opportunity to
equip, organise and train, in respect of every detail —
including finance, stores, enlistments, arms, clothing,
ammunition, promotion of officers and selection of
staffs — with a result which justified the , experiment
and may lead to its future adoption, even in India.

It is, however, instructive to note that this general
was technically the servant of the Khedive of Egypt
who paid him, and that, even when he commanded
auxiliary British troops, he remained in foreign employ
and fought under a foreign flag. He received his
orders, not from the War Office, but from Lord Cromer,
and thus enjoyed a position of freedom for his military
arrangements and of personal responsibihty for their
success, which has rarely been conferred on a Com-
mander-in-Chief in the field.

When, on the present occasion, the boots of the
British infantry proved unserviceable and its ammni-
tion defective, observers recognised the working of that

igo SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

time-honoured procedure which deprives individuals
of responsibihty and shifts the blame for defects from
one departmental office to another. During the years
which intervened between Waterloo and Colenso, we
perfected in peace a system of minimising a com-
mander's power and, by means of elaborate regulations,
promoted the art of evading personal censure into
an exact science. If the boots or ammunition of an
Egyptian brigade had been faulty, somebody would
certainly have been " hanged " for neglect. But
England's unfortunate habit of hurriedly assembling
battalions, and sending them forth to fight her
battles — under a general who is a complete stranger
to them and a scratch staff appointed for the occasion
— makes efficient supervision impossible. Yet, if the
British brigade which fought on the Atbara had been
trained for only one month in Egypt under its own
brigadier, minor defects would have been remedied
before instead of after the commencement of hostilities,
and the force would have started as an organised unit
instead of a heterogeneous assemblage of battalions.
But, instead of fairly facing any military problem and
acting with average foresight, we prefer to muddle
through somehow, trusting to luck to give us a general
who will get us out of the difficulties into which we
drift. In this instance we were fortunate enough to
pitch on Kitchener and may take credit for sticking to
him when found.

Let us then return to Berber where the units were
gathering for the campaign which their general had
long foreseen, and for which he had trained a foreign
army, at the expense of a foreign State.

The three weeks' operations upon which we now
enter present a striking example of what is called
offensive-defensive tactics. To understand this clearly

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 191

we should realise the objects which Kitchener and
Mahmud each desired to attain, and we can then appre-
ciate the logical sequence of the separate events and
not merely dwell upon marches and reconnaissances as
exciting incidents and view the battle as a purposeless
slaughter on an accidental field.

The audacity of Hunter's first occupation of Berber
with a mere handful of men was discussed in a previous
chapter, and the hazard which was then dehberately
courted can be measured by the effort now made to
defeat Mahmud' s attack — an effort which would cer-
tainly have overstrained our force, if the Khahfa had
launched his full strength upon the enterprise. For
the battle of the Atbara was fought solely in defence
of Berber, to ward off Mahmud' s unsupported attack,
and it would never have been fought at all, but for
the Emir's determination to throw himself into the
city in a headlong rush. For he calculated that his
adversary would wait for him in Berber and try to
hold it by passive defence. To sit down behind
entrenchments and utihse the labour of thousands of
soldiers to strengthen a position into a so-called
"impregnable "stronghold offers a temptation which
few commanders resist. Yet, in spite of the high
proficiency which mihtary engineering has attained,
the misuse of fortification has probably caused more
disasters than any other accepted theory of war,
because generals are not all gifted with the trained
imagination which alone can tell them when to trust
to mobihty and where to discard spade-work. Thus
Mahmud and his Emirs argued quite reasonably that
they would close on Berber and discover some way of
breaking into it, and that, even if they failed to do
this, they would certainly succeed in destroying the
railway which supplied its garrison. In fact their plan

192 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

of campaign, though undertaken too late, was not a
stupid one, and might have led to success even at the
eleventh hour — on the assumption that Kitchener
would defend Berber at Berber itself.

But, unluckily for Mahmud, the Sirdar adopted a
different plan of defence to that which was expected
of him. He marched his whole force — except one
Egyptian battalion — out of the town as soon as the
gunboats reported that the Dervishes were moving in
earnest. Representatives of the merchants and the
civil population remonstrated and entreated in vain.
Those who were loyal were served out with rifles and
ammunition to protect their property from the disloyal,
and the army remained free and mobile, unhampered
by passive defence or the civilian pressure which some-
times mars a campaign.

By the middle of March Kitchener had concen-
trated his force at the village of Kunur on the right
bank of the Nile, some five miles from the mouth of the
Atbara and eighteen miles south of Berber. Mahmud
on the same date was moving northwards from Shendi
to Aliab along the same bank of the river, and the
head of his marching column was distant some fifty
miles from Kitchener's camp. The position of these
places, whose inhabitants had fled from Dervish raids
and massacre, can be seen on the map on page 238,
and it is also important to notice the peculiar course
of the Atbara — whose bed at low water presented a
waste of sand-banks studded by deep pools — enclosed
within a wide belt of palm-trees and impenetrable
thorn thickets. The surrounding country, irrigated
and fertile when the Atbara rises in flood, was in
March a mere desert across which sand-storms and
wind-devils swept, beneath a brazen sun. Yet the
nights were cool and the climate healthy, owing

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 193

to the pure dry breezes which blew from the
north.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN ARMY DURING THE ATBARA

OPERATIONS

Concentrated at Kunur and Fort Atbara on March i6, 1898.

Sirdar. — (Commander-in-Chief) Major-General Sir Herbert Kitchener.

Cavalry — Lieut. -Colonel Broadwood.
Eight Egyptian squadrons and four Egyptian maxim guns
(horsed). One Battery Egyptian Horse Artillery.

Camel-Corps. — ]\Iajor Tudway.
Six companies (Egyptian and Sudanese).

Artillery. — Lieut. -Colonel Long.
Three Egyptian Batteries, small guns carried on pack mules.
Six maxim guns (British gun detachments).
One Naval Rocket Detachment.

Transport Corps (Camels) — Lieut. -Colonel Walter Kitchener.
Infantry (Except British Brigade). — Major-General Hunter.

British Brigade. — Major-General Gatacre. ist BattaUon Royal
Warwickshire Regiment (less two companies at Dongola).
ist Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment, ist BattaUon Seaforth
Highlanders, ist BattaUon Cameron Highlanders. Field
Hospital.

MacDonald's Brigade. — Lieut. -Colonel Hector MacDonald. 2nd
Egyptian BattaUon, 9th Sudanese Battalion, loth Sudanese
BattaUon, nth Sudanese Battalion. Field Hospital.

Maxwell's Brigade. — Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell. 8th Egyptian Bat-
talion, 12th Sudanese BattaUon. 13th Sudanese BattaUon,
15th Sudanese Battalion. Field Hospital.

Lewis's Brigade. — Lieut.-Colonel Lews. 3rd Egyptian BattaUon,
4th Egyptian Battalion, 7th Egyptian Battalion, 1 5th Egyptian
Battalion. Field Hospital.

Gunboats. — Commander CoUn Keppel, R.N.
Four Gunboats, patrolling the Nile.

Total Strength = 12,000 combatants.

Of the above, Lewis's Brigade was at Fort Atbara, the
remainder at Kunur — the whole in readiness to move

194 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

at a moment's notice, waiting only for Mahmud's in-
tentions to be translated into action.

With the exception of two officers attached to the
headquarter staff and the usual staff of a British
brigade, the whole of the staff-work was performed by
officers of the Egyptian army — mostly bimbashis under
thirty years of age. The supply, transport, and in-
telligence departments were also found by the Egyp-
tian army.

The advantage of Kunur as a point of concentra-
tion will be apparent after a glance at the map on
page 238. If Mahmud elected to cross the fordable
Atbara near its mouth and attack the fort at the con-
fluence. Kitchener could make a five-mile march from
Kunur and fall on the Dervish flank, whilst Lewis's
brigade engaged it in front ; should Mahmud evade
the fort and attempt to cross the Atbara at Hudi,
twenty-five miles from Berber, Kitchener could fore-
stall him by a ten-mile march to the same place ;
while, should Mahmud cross the Atbara at a point
higher up and then make for Berber, Kitchener could
keep him moving in the desert and attack him from a
base on the Nile. Thus Kunur secured to Kitchener
what is technically termed the interior line and relegated
Mahmud to the longer, exterior line of operation.

Having disposed the army in a good strategic
situation, early and accurate news of the march of the
Dervishes from Aliab was of paramount importance,
and right well was the Sirdar served by the gunboats on
the Nile and the cavalry watching the line of the
Atbara. The initiative still lay with Mahmud, and
the camp at Kunur buzzed with conflicting rumour
and amateur strategy— both in the English and Arabic
languages. The only man who never gave out his
views was the silent Sirdar. But every day he practised

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 195

the brigades in the special formations required for
desert warfare, and so a week passed in useful prepara-
tion and high expectation on the part of the troops.
On Saturday March 19, Mahmud's army began to
move inland from Aliab towards Hudi with the
intention of carrying out the second alternative
suggested above. But Kitchener promptly fore-
stalled his adversary by sending the cavalry to Hudi
the same day, following it up on Sunday with the
remainder of the army. The British brigade was at
Divine Service in the open air when the order to march
arrived. That evening the Kunur force joined Lewis's
brigade at Hudi, and thus occupied the very place
which ]\Iahmud had selected for his own camp on the
same date. One battalion remained in Fort Atbara
to safeguard the base. Mobility, aided by early and
accurate information, had already won a victory at a
cost of fifteen cavalry casualties, and Mahmud's
advance-guard was obliged to deflect its movement
to the east. His whole force arrived that night at
Nakheila after a magnificent forty-mile march across
the desert — a fine example of Dervish endurance and
discipline — though at Nakheila it was no nearer to
Berber than it had been at Aliab.

Next morning Kitchener pushed his advantage by
moving the Anglo-Egyptian camp to Ras-el-Hudi six
miles further up the river, where it makes a bend in its
course. Here he guarded the lower course of the Atbara
and his own communications, he remained on or near
the line of any Dervish advance on Berber, he length-
ened that line by keeping the enemy well up-stream,
and at the same time he interposed his concentrated
force between Mahmud and his objective. Meanwhile
the infantry halted, whilst the mounted troops en-
deavoured to clear up the situation by reconnaissance.

196 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

So far, in the preliminary moves for position,
Kitchener had outmanoeuvred his opponent and
shouldered him away from Berber, but the menace still
threatened. Mahmud's hardy warriors might yet
achieve success.

In a previous chapter a favourable opinion was
expressed regarding the Khalifa's wisdom in concen-
trating his strength at Omdurman when his Dongola
garrisons were routed in 1896, as it would then have
been futile to attempt the reconquest of the northern
province. But a policy of concentration, to be
effective, must include a determination to strike decisive
blows when favourable opportunity may offer. Yet
we saw how the Khalifa forgot this elementary truth
when the Egyptian advanced-guard reached Berber in
1897. One or two blunders may, however, be for-
given to any statesman or soldier who profits by
realising his own mistakes. But the Khalifa learned
nothing by experience. On the Atbara he launched
Mahmud against Berber but obstinately refused to
support the enterprise with reserve troops — just when
a reserve was obviously indispensable. The mere
presence of 10,000 Dervishes at Aliab — after Mahmud
reached Nakheila — would have greatly facilitated this
Emir's task by endangering Kitchener's communica-
tions between Fort Atbara and Ras-el-Hudi. Indeed
it is doubtful whether Kitchener could have main-
tained his position if a substantial Dervish body had
threatened him from Aliab, and this view is strengthened
by the fact that on March 26, the Sirdar sent a batta-
lion, a battery and three gunboats to raid and recon-
noitre the Dervish communications with Omdurman.
This expedition landed south of Shendi, attacked
Mahmud's depot, captured its supplies and returned
to report that no reinforcements were moving north-

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 197

wards from Omdurman. The information was to be
of great value to Kitchener, as it permitted him to deal
with Mahmud single-handed at his own time, and
enabled him to put his full force into the fighting line
whenever he should decide to strike a blow. Even the
astute and experienced Osman Digna, who had often
bested disciplined white troops around Suakin, could
now offer Mahmud neither hope of evading the Sirdar
nor prospect of attacking him at an advantage. In
fact the initiative was slipping from Mahmud' s hands
into Kitchener's, and the rest of the story discloses
how the latter made use of this power and how the
Dervish army met its fate at Nakheila — officially
named the Battle of Atbara.

The mere presence of the Anglo-Egyptian force at
Ras-el-Hudi — instead of at Berber — was a sore puzzle
to Mahmud. It upset his plans, and left him with the
choice between an immediate attack or an ignominious
retreat. He chose neither, and thereby surrendered
the initiative completely. But he arranged to conceal
his army in a cunning defensive position in the thickets
near Nakheila, whilst the arch-marauder Osman Digna
went to recover certain valuable grain stores, which he
had secreted in the desert on leaving Adarama. Thus
the opposing armies sat down within twenty miles of
one another, waiting, watching and uncertain — until
Kitchener should make up his mind how he would deal
with Mahmud. But before he could settle this, he
had to discover Mahmud' s exact position, and the task
of locating it devolved on the Egyptian cavalry. It
numbered only 800 troopers. The Arab horse were
some 3000 men. They were now to be pitted against
one another during a fortnight of incessant recon-
naissance.

Every day at dawn some of Broadwood's squadrons

198 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

rode forth to reconnoitre and skirmish towards Nak-
heila — in the scrub, over miles of undulating desert,
on stony ground, or across dry khors fissured and
cracked by the action of the sun on a wet surface. It
was not an easy country for cavalry. The wide belt
of mimosa-trees and dom-palms by the river was fresh
and green and beautiful to behold owing to the rich
alluvial soil deposited by the annual flood. Brilhant
parrots and other bright birds flitted amongst the
trees. The stagnant pools in the river-bed were
crowded with crocodiles and big fish waiting patiently
for the flood. Dainty gazelles hurried across the open
desert, disturbed by the opposing horsemen or scared
by the sharp crack of rifle fire in a silent landscape.
But it was a period of anxious work for the bimbashis
of cavalry, commanding Fellaheen troopers endowed
with no natural aptitude for either riding or raiding, in
conflict with Baggara Arabs who were experts at both.
Every day the patrols encountered superior numbers of
the enemy, lost men and horses, gained confidence in
themselves, procured knowledge of the strange country
and returned at nightfall — dogged back to their camp
by an enemy with whom they had fought rear-guard
actions all the afternoon.

Yet the main Dervish position had not been dis-
covered at the end of ten such weary days and Mahmud
still made no sign of moving. A single Egyptian
squadron could by no means pierce the Arab cordon
and the state of uncertainty threatened to be pro-
longed. The Sirdar, therefore, decided to risk his whole
mounted force on a decisive reconnaissance, in order
to break through the Arab horse and examine the
Dervish stronghold at close quarters. He entrusted
Broadwood with the enterprise, and sent Hunter and
some staff officers — unhampered by the cares of

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 199

executive command — to examine and report on the
enemy's position. A deserter from Mahmud was
impressed as guide, and the following units marched
from Ras-el-Hudi very early on March 30 — eight
squadrons cavalry, one battery horse-artillery, four
galloping maxims and a brigade of infantry.

As the day's outing might involve an engagement
and would certainly necessitate a forty- to fifty-mile
march, the supporting infantry proceeded a portion of
the distance to await developments in a defensive
position. The mounted troops trotted continuously
forward, brushed aside several strong bodies of Baggaras,
and — piloted by their Dervish guide — made straight
for Mahmud' s hidden position. The very boldness of
this manoeuvre, the sudden appearance of a compact
force in their midst disconcerted the Dervishes. They
apprehended that their defences would be instan-
taneously assaulted and stood by to defend them with
strict orders to hold their fire for close ranges. As the
only object of the reconnaissance was to see clearly
not fight, a near view was essential. Accordingly, the
horse artillery and maxims opened at 1000 yards on
the blurred hne — dancing in a mirage — which repre-
sented the enemy's camp, in the hope of attracting
attention and inducing the Dervishes to show them-
selves. Meanwhile Hunter and four staff officers rode
towards the place and actually got within 300 yards
of it before they reahsed what it was. Then as they
topped a slope the waving lines resolved themselves
into zaribas, palisades and trenches at least a mile in
length, one behind the other, enclosing an immense
area, swarming with Dervishes. It was a sight which
these adventurous officers will never forget. They
had accomplished in a few moments the whole object
of their enterprise and at once rode back to the guns

200 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

and attendant squadrons. The force then withdrew
to its infantry support as rapidly as it had come —
foUowed by the enemy for ten miles, but never
seriously engaged. It was a smart piece of work, and
the news that Mahmud's stronghold had at last been
seen was satisfactory alike to the Sirdar and all ranks
of the army.

A few days later the camp was moved to Abadar
six miles nearer the enemy and on April 5, the mounted
troops again undertook a similar reconnaissance,
supported by the 9th Sudanese (Vandeleur being with
it) and the loth Sudanese — in order to further investi-
gate the best method of arranging our infantry assault.
Hunter, Maxwell, and Long — the latter officer deputed
to select artillery positions — accompanied Broadwood,
in order to familiarise themselves with the approaches
to the place and advise as to the best plan of attacking
it. But, on approaching to within 1200 yards. Broad-
wood perceived that a reception very different from
the last awaited his second reconnaissance. Directly
his leading squadrons had crossed the front of the
zariba to "make good" the ground beyond, a cloud of
Baggara horsemen, superior in numbers to the Egyptian
force, emerged from the south end of the camp and
trotted through the scrub towards the desert. Our
squadrons and guns in compact order moved on at a
walk until the force was concentrated opposite the zariba
which lay 1000 yards to the right flank, and, mean-
while, the officers watched the continuous extension of
these hostile horsemen who evidently aimed at envelop-
ing the Egyptian front and left flank. Next it was
noticed that another considerable body of Arab horse
were issuing from the northern end of the camp and
threatened to cut off the Egyptian retreat. The long,
flat-bladed spears glinting in the morning sun and tiie

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 201

dust raised by so many bodies of cantering horsemen
plainly disclosed the intention of the enemy to surround
our diminutive force. Meanwhile the palisades and
entrenchments of the position literally swarmed with
Dervish spectators watching the progress of events,
and their guns, concealed in a dozen emplacements,
opened fire with loud reports and puffs of white smoke
owing to their use of black powder. Evidently the
situation though picturesque bore a serious aspect and
would require cool and judicious handhng. Broad-
wood decided to deal with one phase at a time, avoided
dispersing his force and reUed on the discipline and
training of his squadrons to counter-balance the vastly
superior numbers of the enemy.

The battery opened fire at 1800 yards on the
Baggaras extending in front, the horse-artillery and
maxims coming quickly into action with damaging
effect. Broadwood next detached two squadrons
under Major Le Gallais to deal with the Dervishes
who menaced his right flank and rear, and two other
squadrons under Captain Hon. E. Baring to protect
his left. With the four remaining squadrons and the
guns he moved cautiously forward — suspicious as
always of Dervish ambuscades — towards the horse-
men whom his guns had driven south. But, suddenly,
the move forward was brought to a standstill by a
solid line of dismounted spearmen, who rose out of a
concealed khor between the guns and the distant
horsemen and confronted Broadwood at 300 yards.
This was the ambush. In well-ordered array, sub-
divided into regular companies headed by white flags
the spearmen advanced. The four maxims came into
action in an instant. The battery trotted back a
couple of hundred yards to get a range. It then
opened with case-shot. The squadrons retired at a

202 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

walk, alternately facing and threatening the foe. The
promptness with which each unit acted prevented a
catastrophe and the retreat was continued without
confusion, whilst the spearmen's advance was tem-
porarily checked.

But now the Dervish spectators in the position with
one accord opened a sustained though wild fire. The
range was too great for accuracy, but the effect,
extremely galling as it was, was not allowed to hasten
the retreat. Meanwhile the staff officers for nearly
an hour had examined the ground. It was high time
to Withdraw. Indeed the order to do so was given none
too soon.

Already on three sides Dervishes menaced the
column in considerable numbers. The fourth side
might shortly be closed. Baring on the desert flank was
reinforced by one squadron but was pressed so hard
when the retirement started that Broadwood sent
him another, making four in all. Alternately the
battery and maxims retreated a few hundred yards,
faced about and poured out a damaging fire on the
advancing foe. On the river flank, which now claimed
the commander's attention, the Baggara horse made a
bold attempt to cut in behind and capture the guns.
This was frustrated only in the nick of time by Broad-
wood himself. He promptly took command of both
squadrons on this flank, sounded the "advance," then
the "charge" and — leading them in person — struck the
loose assemblage of 400 Baggaras obliquely. The
shock upset them. They were routed in a few moments
and fell back. The squadrons were then rallied and
dismounted, and directed to open carbine fire on the
retreating enemy. Here we wiU leave them for the
moment.

But meanwhile the precious guns were also in

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 203

danger from the pursuing spearmen in their front. So
Baring with two squadrons from the desert flank
galloped to the rescue, rode across the front of the guns
and charged the enemy in flank. He routed them,
broke them up and rode completely through them, but
not without disordering his own command. When his
troopers came out on the river flank, their companions
were already dismounted and firing volleys as already
described. Baring therefore raUied behind them,
restored order in his squadrons and returned with
them to his post on the left.

The two charges I have thus described, supple-
mented by the fire of the guns, maxims and troopers,
temporarily checked the whole Dervish movement
and saved the situation. An attack in force by the
enemy's infantry still threatened and the white-robed
riflemen were striding forward at a great pace. But
Broadwood eluded the menace, withdrew his force at
a trot and gradually shook off all pursuit. At 12
noon the mounted troops rejoined their infantry sup-
port and returned to camp with a loss of one British
ofhcer wounded, seven Egyptian troopers killed, eleven
wounded and thirty horses disabled.

The behaviour of the Fellaheen trooper, the quality
of his British bimbashi, the confidence placed m
them by their commander were admirably displayed
during this reconnaissance, and, if an infantry ofticer
may venture an opinion, I would suggest that Broad-
wood's success was directly due to his system of
training. Instead of fussy interference with details,
he adopted the novel plan of allowing his bimbashis to
really command their own squadrons. He recognised
that two good officers may have two diametrically
opposite methods of training men, yet may both
produce excellent results. He supervised their work

204 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

with intelligent interest, but never insisted on rigid
uniformity or strict adherence to minute rules. Years
of personal experience had taught him what was
important and what might be considered trivial and
he obtained from his subordinates a whole-hearted
devotion to sensible work, such as has rarely been
equalled before or since. And he had his reward when
the squadrons which he had created faced odds of
five to one in a tight place and the regenerated Fellah
of Egypt rode down the war-lord of the Sudan at a
signal from a British bimbashi.

Next day the Anglo-Egyptian army moved on seven
miles to Umdabia and marched on the following night
to the assault of Mahmud's position.

The reconnaissances had been deliberate, thorough
and somewhat prolonged. The army had approached
their enemy by short marches at long intervals.
But the final assault was swift and overwhelming.
Its success was due to disciplined combination
and to the practical and sensible arrangements made
by British officers of the Egyptian staff, who had been
working together at all kinds of soldiering during a
number of years. This staff was accustomed to carry
out its duties with the least amount of writing-paper
and the fewest printed regulations, and was a live
body — imbued with practical intelligence and resource.
But it was not created in one day. Any nation can, in
a crisis, enrol and arm a vast number of brave men, but
it cannot improvise a staff, create habits of discipline
or command military success by spending its money too
late — this the Sudan proved, as also the South African
and every other war ever waged.

On April 7, 1898 towards dusk, the troops fell in
for their twelve-mile night march, an operation which
is always critical and sometimes disastrous, though

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 205

absolutely necessary in tropical climates. No precau-
tion which the Sirdar's experience could suggest was
neglected. A staff officer, familiar with the country by
daylight, guided the leading brigade. Careful patrolUng
guarded against surprise, and the four brigades marched
in separate squares on a broad front ready to use their
rifles if attacked. The cavalry remained in camp with
orders to trot out and join the infantry before dawn,
leaving a single battalion to guard the camp.

At 9 P.M., a halt was called, water was served
out from camel-tanks and the men lay down to rest on
the open desert, protected by vigilant sentries. A
bitterly cold wind drove clouds of fine sand across the
landscape and any soldier who strayed from his post
would have had a difficulty in finding it again. The
moon rose early and illumined the weird scene of
thousands of uneasy sleepers lying in curious atti-
tudes beside their rifles, in death-like silence, rank by
rank. The reserve ammunition-mules and artillery
pack-mules received special attention to prevent them
bra)dng when the moon appeared. At one o'clock the
march was resumed, and those who saw it will not
forget the strange sight and stranger sound of thousands
of soldiers rising from the ground and stealthily moving
forward in ordered array — with no word uttered above
a whisper. Only the grating and monotonous crunch
of shoe-leather on dry sand could be heard and it
had a sinister sound, though none could foretell the
event. At four there was another halt, but the
bitter cold prevented sleep and only the glow of the
enemy's fires visible above some distant palms afforded
a point of interest to the waiting soldiery. Four miles
now separated the combatants. At da\dight the
deployment from square into attack-formation was
carried out according to programme — the British

2o6 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

brigade on the left, MacDonald's next, Maxwell's on the
right, Lewis's in reserve, the batteries in the intervals
between brigades — and thus the machine moved
towards Mahmud's position with bayonets fixed. The
value of the cavalry reconnaissances, the accuracy of
the staff leading, the precision and timing of the night
march were evident to all ranks, as the army strode
without concealment straight towards the thorn
thickets, where Mahmud had been waiting for nearly
three weeks. It halted on a gentle slope, some 900
yards from the enemy's zariba, and here at 6.15 a.m.,
the infantry sat down to watch the opening of the
battle by the artillery.

Three mule-batteries and the horse-artillery took
part, twenty-four guns in all. Thud ! phutt I ! went
the first discharge, and we all looked hard as the shell
burst well above the entrenchments in the middle of
the enemy's camp. A pale yellow flash in the midst of
a ball of white smoke marked the exact spot, and then
the crack ! of the explosion came faintly back, like an
echo, from the smoky-grey mist which hung over the
place. That first gun resembled a toy explosion in a
toy battle, but, when report followed report in quick
succession and the air above the trenches became
dotted with white puffs dealing out shrapnel bullets
and the cannonade grew ever louder as the projectiles
were multiplied, one realised that serious business was
on hand. Then gradually, the strange scene became
almost monotonous, and many a weary infantry-man
dozed into sleep, whilst the Egyptian gunners plied
their trade and searched with the precision of their
arm the whole interior of the circular encampment.*
The cavalry and maxims guarded the flanks which were
threatened but not attacked bytheBaggara horse.

* See plan facing page 208.

ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 207

After the shelling commenced the Dervish position
presented the appearance of a deserted place, and those
who had not accompanied the reconnaissances could
scarcely beheve it contained 15,000 fighting men —
waiting, as the event proved, to pour out a heavy
fire at the closest range. A number of coloured banners,
a few camels and donkeys, an occasional jibba-c\a.d
Dervish — strolhng with contemptuous unconcern
amidst shrapnel bullets^-were alone visible. All else
seemed empty and lifeless behind the stockade and
breastwork which ran along the front, covered by a
thorn zariba. The naval rockets set fire to some grass
huts and dry palm-trees and the smoke mingled with
shell puffs in the still air. For an hour and a quarter
the Egyptian gunners distributed a continuous hail of
shrapnel and expended a great quantity of ammunition
in their relentless methodical manner.

At 7.40 A.M. the guns ceased fire. Kitchener sounded
the general advance and gooo infantry swept majes-
tically into action in a thin line, strengthened at
intervals by supports. From flank to flank it was
three-quarters of a mile long, and looked very business-
like. Let us accompany Bimbashi Vandeleur and the
9th Sudanese into the fray, in which they took a
prominent part sharing with five other Sudanese
battalions the brunt of the close fighting and the
heaviest casualties. Vandeleur led the right wing of
his battalion and was posted near the centre of the
whole line in command of his two companies of blacks.

During the first few hundred yards the advance was
dehberate and slow, and several halts were made for
volley firing ; but with the cessation of the rain of
shells on the Dervish trenches, their unharmed riflemen
put up their heads and opened a continuous fire from
breastwork and stockade which, as by magic, bristled

2o8 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

with defenders. To advance slowly, halt and shoot
volleys merely exposed our men to unnecessary loss
wathout subduing the enemy's fire. Accordingly the
'' charge " was sounded, and the eager Sudanese
followed their beloved British officers in a rush at the
Dervish trenches — with the bands playing and colours
flying, just as in the days of Marlborough's great fights.
Vandeleur claimed that one of his companies got first
o\'er the zariba, whilst the British brigade was delayed
by a special drill they had invented for overcoming this
obstacle. Practically the whole line got over at about
the same time. Yet the enemy stuck to their posts
like brave men and let off their rifles in the faces of
their assailants with deadly effect. But the impetu-
osity of the Sudanese and the drilled discipline of the
Highlanders carried them over the breastwork and
stockade in spite of severe punishment, and those of
the defenders who were not immediately shot down
were subsequently bayoneted by the supports which
followed.

The line moved on into the interior shooting at
close quarters, and such was the fierce nature of the
enemy that wounded Dervishes would rise from the
trenches behind our backs and fire at our men mth
exasperating accuracy. The whole interior of the
camp was honeycombed into a labyrinth of irre:,ular
trenches, pits and deep holes, in which men, donkeys,
camels and even women had been sheltered during
the cannonade. They were now defended with the
courage of fanaticism and had to be cleared as they
were encountered, for, though the enemy were at last
bolting towards the Atbara, isolated bands would
neither run away nor accept or give quarter. It was
just a case of bullet and bayonet and butt, and
resembled a hideous nightmare in which the deafening

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ON THE ATBARA, APRIL 1898 209

roar of musketry never ceased. Our men fought their
way for half a mile through this curious encampment,
now the scene of such slaughter and destruction as a
fight to a finish must always produce.

The action ended at the river's bank three-quarters
of an hour after the infantry started, and we were then
able to congratulate ourselves on a complete victory.
Anything less would merely have led to a repetition of
the combat at an early date, which nobody at that
moment desired — not even the jubilant Sudanese who
crowded round their officers with joyous beaming faces
and insisted on shaking hands all round — first a short
shake, then a salute, another shake and another salute,
accompanied by proud grins. These are the men who
deliberately run ahead of their officers to try and stop
the bullets where the fire is hottest, so how can any one
be surprised that their officers believe in them and
place them amongst the best fighting troops in
existence ? They have dash and pluck and endurance,
and plenty of steadiness when carefully officered and
strictly disciplined ; but above all they are intensely
human and should never be treated like machines.

From Vandeleur's diary I find that his two com-
panies lost five killed and twenty-eight wounded, and
his battalion seventy-three killed and wounded out of
a strength of 717 in action. The hard fighting was
practically all done by eight battalions — namely, the
Seaforth Highlanders, the Cameron Highlanders and
six Sudanese battalions, total about 5700 bayonets.
Their casualties amounted to 473, which works out
at over 8 per cent. The casualties in the whole
force numbered nineteen British officers and 533 other
ranks, British and Egyptian.

Mahmud was captured by the loth Sudanese and
paraded in triumph through the streets of Berber.

210 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

One thousand one hundred other prisoners were taken.
Some 3000 Dervishes were killed, more were wounded,
the remainder escaped, but ceased to be in any sense
an army during the remainder of the campaign. When
the troops were all formed up and the wounded] had
been succoured, the Sirdar rode round the brigades
and was received with such an ovation of cheers as only
a successful general can ever experience — for there
was not a man in the force but realised that he had been
led to victory by Kitchener's brain and Kitchener's
tactics.

Let those who feel inclined to scoff at all " savage
warfare " reflect that England had been several times
humiliated in her Sudan campaigns, and let them also
try to picture what a catastrophe our defeat on the
Atbara would have entailed.

CHAPTER IX

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898.

See maps facing pages 232 and 238

The defeat and dispersal of Mahmud's army at the
Battle of the Atbara in April removed the only formid-
able body of Dervishes from Kitchener's path to
Omdurman, and the Khalifa did not deem it prudent to
send forward another contingent to delay the next
blow. Military critics in England thereupon suggested
that the Anglo-Egyptian force ought at once to follow
up their victory and advance upon the city before its
defenders were ready. The suggestion would have
been wise and appropriate in nine campaigns out of ten,
but its authors failed to appreciate the essential feature
of the river war — namely the Nile flood. In April and
May it was at its lowest. In June it would begin to
rise and would continue rising throughout July and
August. In September it would reach its highest
point and then commence slowly to subside. August
would therefore be the month to start on an offensive
campaign. Moreover the intense heat of a Sudan
summer and the risk of exposing the health of British
soldiers to the fatigues of marches at night and halts in
shadeless bivouacs by day rendered it advisable to defer
the campaign to the autumn. Finally the Sirdar was
not ready to start and was not the man to start before
he was ready.

Railhead had not reached even Berber. The new

212 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

gunboats, travelling in parcels between England and
Fort Atbara, could not be put together until the railway
could deposit them near open water. Food, fodder,
ammunition and steamer-fuel for several months must
be accumulated and provided with transport. Sailing-
boats must wait till half-flood before they could be
hauled over cataracts. Telegraph lines take time to
lay but are essential in modern war. In fact a hurried
advance after the Atbara would have entailed vexatious
delays at a critical stage later on. So the army retired
into summer quarters under the substantial roofs of
Berber and neighbouring villages, whilst Kitchener
and all the departmental services made adequate
preparation for future events. During four long weary
months they toiled without rest beneath a pitiless
sun. Along the 1400 miles of communications
stores were pushed forward day and night, and where
the Sirdar himself watched and planned work was got
through quickest and best. Even impossibilities, as
some said, were accomplished in the ordinary course
of business, and the difficulty of getting articles to the
front in the order of their relative importance was
overcome, in spite of the six changes of vehicle which
they made en route.

Thus by the end of July the railway terminus at
Fort Atbara presented the appearance of a busy port
containing streets of tinned beef-boxes, biscuits,
blankets, barrels and bales, and more than 200
sailing-craft, whose tapering spars waved aloft as they
rolled on the gentle billows of the broad river. At last
both the Sirdar and the Nile flood were ready to move
the troops, and on August 3, MacDonald's and
Maxwell's Sudanese brigades embarked on troop-barges
towed by steamers and started for the Shabluka cat-
aract— 150 miles to the south.

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 213

Vandeleur and the 9th Sudanese went in the first
boat, heartily glad to exchange the monotony of Berber
for the excitements of active service — his happy,
smihng blacks packed tight as tinned sardines on the
limited decks, whilst their wives gave them an enthusi-
astic send-off from the shore. The Nile in flood
presented a magnificent and imposing spectacle as the
volume of water, a mile broad, sped through this fertile
province at the rate of five miles an hour. The steamer
struggled slowly against the current, and Vandeleur
had ample time to note the scene and speculate on the
coming campaign. Shendi and Metemma and the
fourteen pyramids of Meroe were passed, and he was
particularly interested in an island noted as the
legendary abode of the Queen of Sheba. But, as the
business of the moment was war and an army was
concentrating at Shabluka, the reader shall not be
detained by reflections on this historic land, but shall
at once be transported to the advanced camp, in which
the troops detailed below were assembled by August
23 — with orders to start next day on their fifty-mile
march to Omdurman —

Sirdar. (Commander-in-Chief) Major-General Sir H. Kitchener.

Mounted Troops.

2ist Lancers (Colonel Martin) : four squadrons.
Egyptian Cavalry (Lieut. -Colonel Broadwood) : nine squadrons.
Egyptian Artillery (Major Young) : one battery, four maxim guns.
Camel Corps (Major Tudway) : eight Egyptian Companies.
Field Hospital, Captain Hill-Smith.

Artillery. — Lieut. -Colonel Long.

British. — 32nd Field Battery (Major Williams). 37th Howitzer
Battery (Major Elmslie), two Forty-pounder guns, six maxim guns.

Egyptian. — Four Batteries, carried by pack-mules.

Ammunition Columns — ist. Column (Camel Transport), 2nd Column
(Water Transport).

214 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Infantry.
The British Division (Major-General Gatacre).

ist Brigade [Brig. -General Wauchope] : ist Battalion Royal War-
wickshire Regiment (Lieut. -Colonel Forbes), ist BattaUon Lincoln
Regiment (Lieut. -Colonel Lowth), ist Battalion Seaforth Highlanders
(Colonel Murray), ist Battalion Cameron Highlanders (Colonel Money),
two maxim guns, Field Hospital.

2nd Brigade [Brig. -General Hon. N. Lyttelton] : ist' BattaUon
Grenadier Guards (Colonel Hatton), ist Battalion Northumberland
Fusiliers (Lieut. -Colonel Money), 2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers
(Lieut. -Colonel CoUingwood), 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade (Colonel
Howard), two maxim guns. Field Hospital.

The Egyptian Division (Major-General Hunter).

(i) MacDonald's Brigade [Lieut. -Colonel Hector MacDonald] : 2nd
Egyptian BattaUon (Major Pink), 9th Sudanese Battalion (Major
Walter), loth Sudanese Battalion (Major Nason), nth Sudanese
Battalion (Major Jackson). Field Hospital (Captain Spong), two maxim
guns.

(2) Maxwell's Brigade [Lieut. -Colonel Maxwell] : 8th Egyptian
Battalion (Kalussi Bey), 12th Sudanese Battalion (Lieut. -Colonel
Townshend), 13th Sudanese Battalion (Lieut. -Colonel Smith-Dorrien),
14th Sudanese Battalion (Major Shekleton), Field Hospital (Captain
Dunn), two maxim guns.

(3) Lewis's Brigade [Lieut. -Colonel Lewis] : 3rd Egyptian BattaUon
(Lieut. -Colonel Sillem), 4th Egyptian BattaUon (Major Sparkes),
7th Egyptian Battalion (Fathy Bey), 15th Egyptian BattaUon (Major
Hickman), Field Hospital (Captain Jennings), two maxim guns.

(4) Collinson's Brigade [Lieut. -Colonel ColUnson] : ist Egyptian
BattaUon (Major Doran), 6th Egyptian Battalion (A Native Bey),
17th Egyptian Battalion (Major Bunbury), i8th Egyptian BattaUon
(Captain Matchett), Field Hospital (Captain Whiston), two maxim
guns.

Gunboats (Commander CoUn Keppel, R.N.).

Ten gunboats of various patterns, carrying altogether thirty guns
and twenty maxims — manned by Egyptian crews, commanded by
British naval officers.

Transport.

3600 Camels (Lieut. -Colonel Walter Kitchener), 5 steamers, 206
sailing-boats (Captain Gorringe).

Total = 22,000 combatants.

The above army moved as a " flying Column/' that
is to say without hnes of communications beyond Fort
Atbara. By this arrangement the difficulties of

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 215

defending bases from raids was overcome, and all
reserve stores moved forward in sailing-boats and
steamers, which could accompany the march of the
army and be moored at night on either bank of the
river as required.

Some refreshing rain showers laid the desert dust
and cooled the air during our first march from Shabluka,
and the cataract was turned with ease and comfort by
the troops — though difficulty was experienced in
hauling laden boats up its narrow channel, which
reduces the Nile's width to a few hundred yards and
greatly increases its current. Beyond the cataract
the problem was quite simple till we reached the
neighbourhood of Omdurman. With cavalry spread
out like a fan several miles ahead, with gunboats on
the river flank and camel-corps on the desert flank, the
stolid infantry brigades moved forward on a wide front
(ij miles) and accomplished about ten miles every day
across a fairly level country covered by scrub and
stunted trees. Of population there was none, as the
Jaalin tribe had been almost mped out of existence by
Mahmud during the previous year.

Meanwhile the Khalifa, fully informed of our
advance, appears from information gathered after
the event to have planned that Kitchener, the
accursed, should be enticed to the outskirts of Omdur-
man and there exterminated as Hicks had been
exterminated in Kordofan. Like the President of
the South African Republic, the Khalifa AbduUahi
would wait till the tortoise poked its head out of its
shell before he would deal it the death blow. The
Baggara horse therefore retreated before our cavalry
and evacuated Kerreri village without an encounter.

And thus it came to pass that on September i.
Kitchener, continuing his steady methodical movement.

2i6 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

crossed the Kerreri ridge, descended on to a bare level
plain and bivouacked unopposed eight miles from
Omdurman at the village of Agaiga, by the bank of the
Nile. The Khalifa on the same day marched 60,000
warriors out of the city and camped them in the
desert only five miles from Kitchener.

Rarely have two armies aggregating 80,000 com-
batants approached so near to one another without a
preliminary skirmish or even an affair of outposts.
Rarely have two commanders been more certain of
success than were both Kitchener and Abdullahi.
And rarely have two forces been more imbued with the
spirit of their respective chiefs or more willing to make
such sacrifices as might be necessary to ensure victory.
The Dervishes were determined to fight in the open and
die for their religion and the glory of conquest. The
Anglo-Egyptians were prepared to attack a huge city
and sustain enormous losses during several days' street-
fighting — in the cause of their duty and their patriotism.
As between the motives animating these opponents the
verdict of the reader will doubtless vary according to
his temperament and inclinations, but the effect was
to bring about a colhsion with the least possible delay.
The choice of the battle ground lay with the Dervishes,
and they deliberately selected a treeless plain. Their
military system required a clear manoeuvring area for
concentrated masses of men to enable the Emirs to see
what they were doing and control their numerous
retainers. They had decided in any case to attack and
to keep on attacking regardless of loss till they won.
They attributed their recent defeats at Firkeh, Abu
Hamed and The Atbara to the defensive attitude they
had assumed in those actions. On this occasion they
meant to revert to the precedents of Hicks' disaster
at Shekan, Baker's disaster at El-Teb, Gordon's death

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 217

at Khartoum and a number of minor affairs — such as
McNeil's zariba near Suakim and the British square at
Abu Klea, both of which had been pierced by rushes of
spearmen. The Dervishes now possessed both riflemen
and spearmen in greater quantities than ever. They
would charge and charge again, as the Prophet Mohamed
had done in all his most glorious and holy battles.
Mahdism too should conquer on this the greatest day
of its history, and the plains of Kerreri should witness
the slaughter of the foe.

Midway between the armies in their respective
bivouacs a high conical hill, named Surgham, rose out
of the plain. It was occupied by our cavalry and a
signal station, and offered a distant view of the Dervish
host which was watched through glasses till night-
fall.

The Dervish army left an impression of great power
on the minds of those who beheld it marching across the
desert towards its camp, and some of the squadrons
saw it at very close quarters in the morning's recon-
naissance. The enormous tract of country it filled, the
rate at which it moved and the spirit with which it was
animated caused thoughtful officers to doubt the issue.
Had Kitchener sufficient force to beat off such
numbers ? How could we stand up to their rushes
during the darkness of the night ? Such questions
arose involuntarily, as officers on Surgham Hill looked
from the Dervish mass in its vast camp towards
their own thin line, disposed in an irregular crescent
round the village of Agaiga.* Its flanks rested on
the bank of the Nile, and were a mile apart. The
crescent, about two miles long, was held only by a
double rank of infantry. Gunboats in mid-stream
brought a cross fire to bear on both flanks, and every-

* See plan facing page '232.

2i8 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

where the field of fire was excellent by daylight. But
by moonlight no man would see further than 200
yards beyond his rifle-barrel !

Thus the night of September i^ was an anxious one
for British officers, though the one most concerned,
Kitchener, showed no anxiety. He had taken the
precaution of privately informing some villagers of
Agaiga that he meant to attack the Dervish army at
midnight. He then sent them out to the Khalifa's
camp for news of the enemy — knowing full well they
would faithfully report his own intention to the other
side. Whether this ruse or the rooted aversion of the
Emirs to night operations influenced the Khalifa it is
impossible to know. He was himself inclined for a
night attack. He called a council of war after sunset,
and at this council the plans for next day were dis-
cussed and decided. The night attack was mooted and
rejected. My own impression after carefully cross-
examining one of the Baggara Emirs who was present
(he was subsequently wounded and taken prisoner) is
that the council of war was so numerously attended that
little business could be done, and that the real decision
rested with the Khalifa and Osman Azrak who together
planned the attack. At any rate the hours of darkness
passed without incident, and with daylight the Khalifa's
best chance of victory vanished.

The Battle of Omdurman has been described by
many pens. My own sketch shall therefore be brief,
and designed rather to carry forward the narrative to
the downfall of the Dervishes a year after the action
than to add any new light to what is known of the
battle-tactics and incidents of September 2, 1898. The
Dervishes were on the move long before daylight,
mars ailing their men in careful array, and when the
sun rose about 5.50 a.m. an Egyptian squadron posted

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 219

betimes on Surgham Hill beheld a stirring sight. In
five great subdivisions, all beautifully aligned and
occupying fully four miles of frontage, the brave Arabs
and blacks were striding into action at a prodigious
pace. The ranks were ten, twenty and sometimes
thirty deep. One of the masses followed in rear as a
reserve, marching straight towards Surgham HiU from
which the nearest body was but one mile distant. The
contingent of each great Emir was clearly denoted by
his flag borne aloft on a pole or spear, and the enthusiasm
of the whole force was sufficiently evinced by the
unhesitating way in which it moved, and by the shouts
and roars of tens of thousands of men calling upon
Allah to grant them victory. Long before our troops
could see a man or even a flag on the horizon the distant
murmur of raucous voices gave them some idea of the
vast numbers they were about to engage.

The Dervish plan of attack was simple, compre-
hensive and suitable to the ground they had selected
and the discipHne they could enforce. But it com-
pletely miscalculated the effect of fire-arms on an open
plain. The idea was to envelop the Sirdar's position
and attack it from three directions whilst a central
reserve of 20,000 picked men, concealed behind
Surgham Hill, waited till one of the attacks should
succeed. It was then to rush forward and complete
the victory. The five contingents were marshalled as
under, from left to right, but the figures should be
accepted as only approximately correct :

(i) Ali Wad Helu's Bright Green Flag .

(2) Sheik-el-Din's (son of the Khahfa) Dark Green Flag

(3) Yakoob's (brother of the Khalifa) Great Black Flag

(4) Osman Azrak's various Flags of Subordinate Emirs

(5) Sherif's Red Flag

6,000 men.
12,000 „
20,000 ,,
15,000

7,000 ,.

Total . 60,000

220 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

The Khalifa himself remained with Yakoob and
the Krupp artillery near the Great Black Flag which
was his own special ensign. The first two contingents
were to make for the Kerreri Hills, move behind their
cover, turn to the right and attack the northern face of
Kitchener's crescent. The third contingent was to
remain in reserve as stated above. The fourth under
its celebrated fighting chief was to make a frontal
attack across the level ground between Surgham and
Kerreri Hills. The fifth was to chmb over the Surgham
ridges and attack our southern flank simultaneously
with Osman Azrak. Osman Digna with several
hundred Hadendoa Arabs from Suakin was to lie
in wait near the Omdurman road and fall upon any
detachments which might try to get into the city.
Beyond the combination arranged between Osman
Azrak and Sherif we have no reason to believe that the
several attacks were intended to be simultaneous. The
evidence rather points to the probabiUty that each Emir
was to emulate the zeal of his neighbour and try to be
first into the invaders' ranks.

Whilst the Dervishes are still marching to their
allotted places let us glance at the map facing page
232 and notice Kitchener's dispositions to meet the
impending attack. He remained in the formation he
had selected when a night attack seemed probable and
rehed wholly on fire action to win the battle. He
therefore put as many rifles as possible in the firing
line, keeping only two companies per battalion in
support and one (Collinson's) brigade in reserve.
Roughly speaking the larger half of the crescent, which
faced Surgham Hill and the space between it and
Kerreri Hills, was manned by the British Division and
Maxwell's brigade. This was the part which Osman
Azrak and Sherif were about to attack. The lesser half

OMDURMAM, SEPTEMBER 1898 221

of the crescent, facing the Kerreri Hills and ridges, was
manned by MacDonald's and Lewis's brigades, which
were not attacked in the early morning. Batteries of
artillery were posted in the intervals between brigades,
maxims between battalions. Hunter had arranged
that his brigades should fire from a slight shelter trench
wdth no zariba in front, because a zariba would merely
impede the field of fire without affording any protection
against the enemy's bullets. But Gatacre's British
brigades laboriously collected branches and trees for a
zariba and omitted to dig a shelter trench. The
consequence was that, when the attack developed,
the British soldier had to stand up to shoot, as otherwise
he could not see to fire over his zariba, and he thus
laboured under the double disadvantage of being fully
exposed to bullets and of firing from an awkward
standing instead of an easy kneeling position. It was a
drawback from which Hunter's command was free.

The 2ist Lancers and Hospitals remained within
the Unes under cover of the Nile bank whilst the attack
was in progress. The Egyptian cavalry. Camel-corps
and Horse Battery were posted on Kerreri Hills under
Broadwood, where they were destined to take an
important part. The Howitzer Battery and 40-
pounders were several miles up the river and had
already inflicted considerable damage on the Mahdi's
tomb, the forts and the w^alls, from the right bank of
the Nile.

A flotilla of gunboats was engaged in reducing the
river-forts of Omdurman, the other flotilla stood by
with steam up to join in the general action at Agaiga,
whenever opportunity should offer.

Thus all the pieces were set out upon the board and
it will be easy to follow their play and see how each
contributed to the day's fighting. At 6.15 a.m. the

222 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

murmur of beating drums and war-cries grew very loud,
the tramp of Dervish feet was continuous, but as yet
from Agaiga we could only see cavalry scouts retiring
before the enemy across our front. Presently a line
of flags appeared like a crested wave on the horizon a
mile and a half in front of Maxwell's brigade. Then a
wave of linen-clad men emerged from under the flags
and drove towards us straight across the plain.
It was Osman Azrak's frontal attack. Behind and
beyond him similar waves of Green Flags dashed
towards the Kerreri Hills, whilst on his right the Red
Flag of Sherif topped Surgham ridge and descended
swiftly into the arena. Within half an hour of their
first appearance, Maxwell's brigade was hotly engaged
with Osman Azrak, Gatacre's Division with Sherif,
Broadwood's troops with Sheik-el-Din and the artillery
and maxims with all of them. The Khalifa opened the
battle with his Krupp guns, whose shells fell close to
our line.

If bravery and sublime indifference to death could
have carried men over the bullet-swept zone, Osman
Azrak and Sherif would certainly have closed with
Maxwell and Gatacre. But the thing was utterly
impossible. No human being could run and live in the
storm of lead which swept over the ground. Shrapnel
burst amidst the more distant masses with perpetual
accuracy : maxim and rifle bullets tore through the
flesh and bones of those who came nearer. The
Dervish ranks nevertheless hurried unflinchingly for-
ward in their magnificent and sullen determination
to grapple with the foe. But the attack in broad day-
light could have only one termination, though some
Dervishes survived to reach within a couple of hundred
paces of our position and some of their riflemen,
concealed by hollows and depressions in the plain, kept

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up a galling fire which killed more men in our reserves
than in our firing Une. By 8.15 a.m. after an hour
and a half of struggle the attack died away from sheer
exhaustion and loss, and two of the enemy's five
contingents were completely hors de combat. Mean-
while the British and Egyptians had suffered casualties,
though they passed unnoticed during the absorbing
interest of the engagement and amounted to a mere
nothing when compared with Osman Azrak's and
Sherifs 21 13 killed and about 6000 wounded. These
lay strewn over an area of a square mile, and so fierce
is the fighting instinct of the Mohammedan warrior
that he will rise wounded from the ground and expend
his last breath in using his rifle or spear against any
enemy who passes neghgently near him.

We had not wished to mow them down as they
advanced, nor had any one relished the process of
perpetually loading and pressing the trigger of a very
hot rifle, but there was no other method of dealing with
Dervishes and preventing the far greater slaughter
which would have occurred, had they penetrated our
formation.

Simultaneously with the events just narrated our
mounted force in observation on Kerreri heights became
seriously compromised with Sheik-el-Din's contingent,
and the action which ensued was to have a direct
bearing on the principal incident of the day. Broad-
wood's role was to observe and co-operate and feint.
He had no intention of undertaking a separate battle
on his own account, nor was his force organised for
close fighting in the hills. It numbered 1800 men,
trained to fight on foot and move on horseback or camel-
back, and was composed of nine squadrons of cavalry,
one battery of horse artillery and eight companies of
camel-corps. The Kerreri slopes were everywhere

224 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

strewn with rocks and volcanic boulders, whereas the
level plain around them had become a marsh owing to
recent heavy rain. On such ground the military
mobility of Broadwood's three arms may be compared
with that of a hunter, a hansom-cab and a milch-cow.
The desert-bred camel floundered hopelessly in the
marsh or stumbled painfully over boulders : the gun
wheels were in frequent difficulties : the cavalry alone
could be depended on to move quickly.

When Sheik-el-Din's thousands surged rapidly upon
them, Broadwood's men were posted on foot along
some ridges with their animals well in rear. Their
commander had but a moment in which to come to a
decision, and a moment was sufficient. He ordered
the men to retire and mount. They as usual supported
one another by a covering fire and, working with
deliberation, sought to check the tide of the enemy's
attack. Having regained their mounts the retirement
continued. This unequal combat was observed from
Agaiga with some apprehension, and the batteries
which could bear on Kerreri Hills diverted their fire
from Osman Azrak and burst shells amongst Sheik-
el-Din's men at 3000 yards. The Sirdar thought it
would be prudent to withdraw the cavalry within the
main lines, but Broadwood sent h'm a message that he
was too closely engaged to withdraw to his flank and
proposed to continue retiring due north till he could
shake off his pursuers.

But the pursuing footmen were now leaping over
the boulders quicker than the camels, so Broadwood
decided that he must at any rate free himself from the
incubus of his slow-moving camel-corps, and accordingly
ordered it to make for the Nile whilst he covered the
movement from a flank. In order to extricate the
camel-corps and get it safely within our lines, he was

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 225

prepared to make a desperate charge with all his
squadrons. Encumbered with forty wounded, the
camels made towards the river with Sheik-el-Din's
leading men in hot pursuit and only 300 yards distant.
It looked as though they must be completely over-
whelmed. But at this critical moment one of the
gunboats swung down-stream and at short ranges
plastered the Kerreri hill-sides with shrapnel and
maxim bullets, checked the Dervish pursuit, obviated
Broadwood's charge and enabled the camel-corps to
gain the safety of our lines. The infuriated Dervishes
baulked of their prey turned upon Broadwood with
renewed vigour and pursued his elusive squadrons
three miles down the river bank. Their appetite was
whetted by the capture of two of the horse artillery
guns, which stuck in a bog and had to be abandoned ;
but meanwhile Sheik-el-Din was led four miles away
from the battlefield during the most critical hours of
the day. Broadwood's squadrons, handled as he and
his bimbashis knew how to handle them, merely played
with the angry Dervishes and ended by slipping back
along the river bank under the covering fire of a gun-
boat. They recovered their lost guns and rejoined
the army soon after 10 a.m. Sheik-el-Din also ralhed
and marched back his scattered command, but by the
time it rejoined Ali Wad Helu's contingent the moment
for its most effective action had passed, as we shall
relate by-and-bye. Thus ended the first phase of the
battle.

We have, however, anticipated the main narrative
by two hours in order to follow Broadwood's manoeuvre
to its conclusion, and must now return to Kitchener at
Agaiga after the frontal attack was repulsed at 8,15
A.M. The Sirdar, having annihilated two contingents
and seen a third quit the battlefield in pursuit of his

226 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

cavalry, determined forthwith to reach the city before
the two remaining contingents could get there to
organise street fighting. He therefore marched out of
Agaiga and headed for Omdurman, moving in Echelon
of brigades from the left (river flank) in the following
order — 2nd (Lyttelton's) British Brigade, ist (Wau-
chope's) British Brigade, Maxwell's Brigade, Lewis's
Brigade, MacDonald's Brigade. Collinson's Brigade
followed along the river bank as a reserve, to protect
the hospitals and transport. As MacDonald's was the
most exposed brigade in this movement, it was rein-
forced by three batteries artillery and six maxim
guns.

To interpose your own army between the enemy

and his base is one of the soundest and oldest of the

maxims of good generalship. It has been applied in

all ages and in all campaigns whether by sea or by

land, and requires, to avoid defeat, that the force which

attempts it be sufficiently strong to maintain itself

against counter-attack. But the manoeuvre is by no

means an easy one to execute on the field of battle.

In the Boer War we accomplished it successfully at

Paardeberg, but failed to do so at Poplar Grove,

Driefontein, Johannesberg, Pretoria and Diamond Hill.

The Japanese, though successful in every engagement,

failed to interpose between the Russians and their base

at Liau-Yang and Mukden. Even Baron Stackelberg,

when soundly beaten at Telissu, was able to rejoin

Kuropatkin's army. The more we study military

history the more we are impressed with the fact that to

gain a really decisive action a general must successfully

interpose between his opponent and his opponent's base,

and that is why every ambitious commander has

attempted to do it. At any rate those who feared

the risk which such a manoeuvre involves have not

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 227

won the victory which perhaps their tactical successes
have deserved. Therefore, when Kitchener headed
for Omdurman with two unbeaten contingents of
Dervishes hovering still on his flank, he was merely
taking the road which would lead to the most decisive
result — confident, after the experiences of the morning,
that he could beat off the enemy's attacks. The
sequel justified his opinion and refuted that of the
critics, who perhaps forgot what has been proved a
thousand times over — the impossibility of bringing
off a victory without running some risk.

Thus at the commencement of the second phase of
the battle we find Kitchener's army marching south-
wards by brigades, separated from one another by very
wide gaps, with the 21st Lancers acting as advanced
guard. The Khalifa and his reserve still lay behind
Surgham Hill. Ali Wad Helu remained concealed by
the Kerreri heights. Sheik-el-Din was pursuing the
Egyptian cavalry. The time was about 8.40 a.m.

It was at this interesting climax that there occurred
an episode which, owing to the praise bestowed upon it
by public opinion at home, proves beyond doubt that
England is the paradise of amateurs . I refer to the charge
of the 2ist Lancers. The regiment had never before
been in action and every one sympathised with its ardent
desire to achieve a success. After passing between
Surgham Hill and the Nile it encountered various small
parties of the retreating enemy, for by now a steady
stream of fugitives from the beaten contingents were
making for their homes in the city. But unfortunately
for the Lancers there was also an ambush in a khor,
into which the regiment deliberately galloped. They
suffered heavy losses without inflicting much damage,
and then retired out of action. Such misfortunes are
not uncommon in war, but this one was magnified by

228 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

irresponsible writers into an Homeric Feat of Arms,
which serious soldiers sincerely deplore. The Lancers'
charge was not only unnecessary, but had the greater
disadvantage of incapacitating the regiment from the
performance of the particular duty it was brought into
the Sudan to accomplish — namely the capture of the
Khalifa — and the fact that both officers and men
behaved with great gallantry in a nasty place is no
excuse for a blunder.

Whilst this episode was taking place and the
Sirdar was leading the British brigades in the wake
of the Lancers, MacDonald's brigade took ground to
the right between Kerreri and Surgham Hills, pass-
ing over the plain on which Osman Azrak's attack
had been shattered. Vandeleur in the 9th Sudanese,
belonged to this brigade, and my narrative of what
befell it is derived from his diary and letters, which
were written immediately after the event and furnish
a clear and unvarnished account of what happened.
Fortunately the men were fresh, as they were not
in action during the first phase of the battle ; the
brigadier, MacDonald, was a fine fighting soldier who
knew how to train and command a brigade, and
Hunter, his immediate superior, had cautiously
strengthened him by the addition of all the artillery
and maxims he could spare from his other brigades.
Some delay had necessarily occurred before MacDonald
could start to take his allotted place in the Echelon,
and the result was a considerable gap between him
and Lewis, as well as between Lewis and Maxwell.
Moreover, these gaps tended to increase as the foot of
Surgham Hill was neared.

When MacDonald approached to within 1200
yards of its western slope, he became aware that he
was in for a stiff fight with the Khahfa's reserve

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 229

under the Black Flag, and Hunter accordingly sent a
galloper to Kitchener with the news. Soon after-
wards fighting was renewed along the whole ''refused"
flank from Kerreri hills to beyond Surgham, a distance
of four miles, and the march on Omdurman was
abruptly postponed. Wauchope started on a two-
mile tramp back towards MacDonald, Lyttelton
wheeled to the right south of Surgham slopes, Maxwell
wheeled and stormed vSurgham heights, Lewis became
engaged between Maxwell and MacDonald, and firing
was reopened by the Dervishes all along the line. Each
brigade had a story of its own but our particular
interest in Vandeleur engages us to follow the fortunes
of MacDonald's men, who bore the brunt of two such
furious attacks as have rarely been repelled in quick
succession by a single brigade. When he saw the
first onset impending from behind Surgham Hill, the
brigadier halted and made preparation. He deployed
the 9th Sudanese on the right, the nth Sudanese on
the left, the loth Sudanese in the centre — all facing the
Khalifa's Black Flag — and held the 2nd Battalion in
reserve, closed up in quarter-column ready to pro-
long or strengthen the fine as required. The three
batteries and eight maxims were disposed in the
intervals between the deployed battalions. Just as
these arrangements were completed the Baggara horse
charged down at top speed, followed by solid phalanxes
of riflemen and spearmen on foot. It was the pick
of the Dervish army making its effort to retrieve
the disaster of the early morning, and might fittingly
be compared to the last charge of Napoleon's Guard
at Waterloo. The Emirs rode their horses with desper-
ate energy and reminded Vandeleur of iocke3^s finish-
ing for the Derby. Not one flinched or turned tail
when met by the storm of bullets which emptied

230 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

many saddles. On they came, and single horsemen
almost penetrated the line, being killed a few paces
from it. Covered by this desperate charge the body-
guard (mulazamieh) strode forward with equal bravery
and suffered even greater loss. Their deep ranks were
mown down with frightful slaughter, especially at about
200 yards range, though individuals got within fifty
paces and less. Vandeleur wrote : "What a revela-
tion it was to see the Dervishes come on to certain
death without the slightest hesitation. I never saw
one man who had approached anywhere near turn
back. If he could no longer advance he lay down
and fired."

When 20,000 such warriors are eager to die in order
that a remnant of them may close with 3000, it is
merely a matter of time as to when the clash will occur,
and then the smaller force will perish. But at this
critical period Lewis and Maxwell appeared on the
Dervish flank, and diverted the dense masses in rear
from reinforcing the attack on MacDonald. They were
compelled to turn against their new assailants, and
thus the pressure on MacDonald was greatly relieved.
The roar of guns, maxims and rifles became incessant
all over and around Surgham Hill, and the Remington
rifles of the Black Flags spluttered in increasing numbers
as the Khalifa's reserve spread out.

The battle had lasted over four hours without many
pauses, and was being more hotly contested than ever,
when MacDonald was suddenly called upon to face
another crisis. This time it menaced his right rear
from the direction of the Kerreri hills.

The Green Flags of Ali Wad Helu and Sheik-el-Din
— the latter only just returned from his exhausting
and abortive pursuit of Broadwood — were descending
upon the rear of the 9th Sudanese whilst the battahon

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 231

still confronted the Black Flags. It was a question of
minutes and drill, and the minutes were at the disposal
of one man — MacDonald. If he misused them his
brigade would be swept away, Lewis's would follow
a few moments later, Collinson's too must be wiped
out — together with hospitals, transport and reserve
ammunition. Wauchope was moving to the scene of
action at the double but could scarcely have saved the
situation if MacDonald's brigade had been over-
whelmed. Thus Mahdiism's last and only remaining
chance depended on MacDonald's making a mistake,
and he made none. He saw what was coming, knew
exactly what to do and did it. It was a matter of
drill under high pressure, and he had been drilling his
brigade under all circumstances during several years.
He had risen from private soldier to the command of a
brigade and was now to justify his promotion. With
calm precision he issued his orders, and in a few moments
all his battalions, batteries and maxims were extricating
themselves from their engagement with the Black Flags
and threading their way at the double by the shortest
route into a new alignment facing the Green Flags.
The change of front had barely been executed when
the Baggara horse came charging home, followed by
solid masses of riflemen and spearmen, just as the Black
Flags had done before. Only this time there was only
the cavalry and camel-corps to come in on their flank.
Vandeleur writing home within a week of the event
said: " The 9th, which was the first battalion to form
up on the new front, had just got into position when
down came another charge of horse, almost a better
one than the last, followed by the attack of the foot-
men. Laurie's battery on our left soon exhausted its
ammunition, but there were maxims on our right and
the noise was tremendous. If the Green Flags had

232 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

co-operated with the former attack and caught us in
rear when we were engaged in front, it would have been
extremely unpleasant. But the earlier attack had
exhausted itself before the second came on, so we beat
them in detail. The ist British Brigade (Wauchope's)
could be seen hurrying to support us, but the Dervish
attack was done for before they came up. The thing
was over and the cease fire sounded, so I rode out in
front of my men to stop the shooting — when a Baggara
spearman lying down unhurt about sixty paces from
us made for me. He ran at a great pace and my horse
being nervous interfered with my aim. His first spear
whizzed past my head. I hit him with two revolver
bullets but still he closed with me. I then warded off
his spear thrust with my right hand and revolver, and
he fell dead — finished off by one of the men's bullets.
But in doing it his spear wounded me in the hand
cutting the third finger and palm. Smyth* (who had a
similar experience) and I both agree that the new man-
stopping huWet is not much use against a good Dervish."
Vandeleur's simple narrative of what he saw and what
befell him is more graphic than some of the word-
pictures which have since been printed and it shows how
hotly his battalion and brigade were engaged. The
9th Sudanese had 48 killed and wounded by Dervish
rifle-fire, and the brigade including the artillery attached
to it totalled 151 casualties in about three-quarters of
an hour. Vandeleur's wound was happily a slight one,
and he was able to stay on his horse and command his
men.

Thus ended the second phase of the battle.

Before resuming his march to Omdurman, Kit-

* Bimbashi Smyth was awarded the Victoria Cross for this
exploit. He saved the life of a correspondent who was similarly
pursued by an Arab. Smyth received a spear wound in the arm the
same day as Vandeleur.

REFERENCE

British' Red/

D e-rvisKes BVu^e,

0 J} e Tf D e s e T -t

BATTLE OF OMDURMAN

2».* Sept 1898.

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REFERENCE
BritisK. .. Red,
DerviaJves Slu^

Stun/brd's Geag^ Estoi' LonAon,

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 233

chener moved three brigades in one long line west-
wards into the desert and drove before him, with
considerable losses, all formed bodies of Dervishes who
still showed an inclination to fight, and it was amazing
to realise how much punishment they required before
they would acknowledge defeat. At last the weary
troops turned from the field of slaughter, marched to
Khor Shambat — which is an overflow from the Nile
just outside the city — and halted to rest and eat
biscuits and drink some much-needed water. The
heat was intense and very little shade was obtainable
between i p.m. and 5 p.m., when the bulk of the army
marched into Omdurman — which had meanwhile been
captured by Maxwell's brigade.

This event which coincided with the pursuit of the
Dervishes by the Egj^ptian cavalry for thirty miles
south of the city, constituted the third and last phase
of the day's operations.

When the Khalifa Abdullahi saw that his attacks
had failed, that his brother Yacoob and thousands of
his best troops were killed, that his son Sheik-el-Din
was carried wounded from the field, and that the 13th
Sudanese were descending upon him from the top of
Surgham Hill, he mounted his horse and rode swiftly
to the city to organise its defence with the remnant
of his army. For the last time his great war-drums
and ombeya of elephant tusk resounded from the top of
the arsenal and boomed forth their dismal message
to assemble the faithful. We heard them at Khor
Shambat three miles away and knew what they meant.
For the last time the Khalifa ascended the pulpit of
the mosque to encourage his bodyguard and exhort
them to defend their homes and his. But those who
were present and unwounded heeded him no longer.
Their enthusiasm was dead.

234 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

At 2.10 P.M. Maxwell's brigade and the 32nd
Field Battery paraded at Khor Shambat and marched
into the city to reduce it to obedience. The start was
so quietly managed and the army was so tired that the
brigade got off without being noticed and was accom-
panied by no war correspondent but the Hon. Hubert
Howard. As he was to be most unfortunately shot in
the evening no account by an eye-witness of the fall of
the city has appeared, though several erroneous state-
ments have been printed. The Sirdar and his staff —
notably Slatin revisiting the scene of his bondage —
accompanied Maxwell and the Great Black Flag,
borne aloft by a mounted orderly, followed Kitchener
wherever he rode — a sign to the civil population that
the Khahfa was conquered. The 14th Sudanese acted
as escort to the Sirdar and the guns, whilst the three
remaining battalions moved on a wide front clearing
the side streets and guarding against ambuscades.
Every armed man met with was ordered to throw down
his weapon in the street. If he obeyed he was let off,
if he disobeyed he was shot, and the news that the
conquerors meant neither to sack the city nor massacre
its inhabitants soon produced stacks of rifles and
spears in the streets we occupied. The main thorough-
fare by which the Sirdar entered was fifty yards wide
and was thronged by an immense population, mostly
women. It led straight to the corner of a massive
masonry wall surrounding the heart of the town and
containing the Mahdi's tomb. Khalifa's house, treasury,
arsenal and many other substantial buildings — around
which were the soldiers' quarters occupying an area of
fully one square mile. Within this walled enclosure
were also immense stores of grain and sohd well-
constructed armouries, in which the precious Remington
rifles and cartridges were kept under lock and ke}^ except

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 235

when temporarily issued for fighting or drill. The
twenty-foot wall had been erected since Slatin's escape,
and he was therefore unable to guide us into the interior ;
in fact, besides some gates on the river face protected
by forts, there were only two entrances to the great
enclosure which was practically a prison. It was there-
fore decided that the 13th Sudanese should make their
way down to the Nile and break in under cover of the
gunboats, whilst the remainder of the brigade held all
the streets leading from the mosque and thus protected
the flank and rear from surprise.

Accordingly the 13th — commanded by Smith-
Dorrien — marched to the river, took the forts in
reverse and, after skirting the great wall for a couple of
miles, discovered a massive wooden gate which was
barred. They heard voices within, and a half com-
pany was drawn up ready to shoot, whilst the gate
was being smashed open with a beam. It was all very
interesting and very exciting for those who took a
share in the adventure, for no one could guess what
might occur at any moment. At last half the gate was
forced open, we squeezed into the enclosure and
beheld numbers of the Khahfa's riflemen bolting up
the streets and alleys. Only one body of Dervishes
and some stray individuals showed signs of fight and
were promptly shot. The majority had had enough
of slaughter, like ourselves, and threw down their arms
when ordered. At first slowly, then quicker and
quicker, the piles of Remingtons and bandoliers grew
in the street — till they amounted to thousands, guarded
by a few sentries. Undoubtedly our air of confident
assurance and habit of commanding blacks imposed
on the enemy and prevented them from reahsing that
only one battalion and some guns had entered the en-
closure.

236 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

A broad thoroughfare led straight to the Mahdi's
tomb, less than a mile from the gate we had forced,
and all around covering an immense area of ground was
a squalid medley of diminutive hovels, houses and
alleys — the home of the 10,000 picked Sudanese who
had formed the Khalifa's bodyguard. Above the
roofs appeared the tw^o-storied abodes of the Emirs and,
framing the picture, the solid masonry wall which for-
bade ingress or egress to the inhabitants.

Our objective was the Mahdi's tomb, a fine structure
whose dome had been shattered by the third shot of the
howitzer battery, at a range of two miles from across
the river. The battalion advanced cautiously towards
it, dropping sentries at the side streets, for experience
had taught its officers to be alert and leave nothing to
chance. Around the tomb and other public buildings
unexploded howitzer shells were lying about in the
streets, where they remained a serious danger until
removed and sunk in mid-Nile. Near the tomb were
the Khalifa's house and the great Mosque Square where
a miserable sight met our gaze — hundreds of wounded
Arabs and blacks sitting or lying, quite impassive
beneath some shade, attended by their wives who
brought them water. They informed us that the
Khalifa had just left the Mosque to go into his house,
adjoining it. The 13th, having been so near him at
Surgham, were desperately keen to catch AbduUahi
and hurried at once to his door. It was bolted and
had to be broken open. A labyrinth of courtyards,
passages and doors puzzled our blacks who failed
to find him in the front rooms, but a turning to the
right led into the Mosque Square whence an open
gateway gave access to the back. Quickly we took
this line and were provided with a dramatic incident
which, at sunset, terminated an eventful day.

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 1898 237

A low wall surrounded the Mosque Square into
which the faithful flocked daily for prayer through
several wide entrances — one of which was near the back
door of the Khalifa's house. When we approached
this entrance from the mosque side, six horsemen were
observed galloping across it from behind the Khalifa's
house, and their long spears remained visible just above
the wall as they rode on. They saw us making for the
entrance and only thirty yards from it, whereupon two
of their number stopped and waited behind the wall.
One dismounted and could no longer be seen, the other
sat on his horse and poised his spear above his head —
ready for action. Their four companions galloped
away as fast as they could. Evidently something was
up, so a section of the leading company of the 13th
Sudanese was drawn across the entrance with bayonets
fixed and rifles loaded. A pause ensued, during which
we all watched the spear poised above the wall in the
Baggara's hand. Then suddenly like a flash of light-
ning the two desperate men charged home, one on foot
the other mounted. The man on foot threw one spear
before he started from behind the wall, then closed
with another in his hand and wounded one of our blacks.
The horsemen made good his point and transfixed a
Sudanese corporal through the skull with his spear,
pinning him against the mosque wall and instantly
kilhng him. Both the Baggaras then fell dead at the
feet of our men riddled with bullets, as was also the
horse.

It was a gallant act gallantly performed in order to
gain a few moments time for the Khalifa to escape us.
He was one of the four horsemen we had seen, and the
sacrifice of their lives which his two men so willingly
made delayed us just enough to prevent our shoot-
ing at Abdullahi as he rode down the street. Then

238 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

suddenly the battalion and staff assembled round the
Khalifa's house felt shells bursting above their heads
and shrapnel bullets whizzing about them. These were
most accurately aimed and very unpleasant. Obvi-
ously we had come under the fire of the two British
guns which had been posted outside the great enclosure,
and our musketry had attracted their attention. They
knew not that they were shooting at their friends.
Hunter at once ordered the Khahfa's house to be
evacuated, but most unfortunately Mr. Hubert Howard
— the Times correspondent — was struck in the head by
a shrapnel bullet and killed on the spot. It was a
cruel end to a brilliant young life, to be thus sacrificed
at the close of the battle. The Sirdar and all those
present ran a similar risk, but it would be foolish to
impute blame to the staff or the gunners who had no
means of knowing that the Khalifa's house was already
in our possession. Such accidents are unavoidable in
war, and must be risked if artillery is to effectually
support infantry assaults.

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CHAPTER X
ANOTHER YEAR IN THE SUDAN

See map facing page 252

On Friday September 2, 1898 the Dervish army was
shattered and dispersed as narrated in the last chapter ;
on Saturday an Egyptian brigade took charge of the
city of about 250,000 inhabitants ; on Sunday at
Khartoum a touching rehgious service was held in
memory of Gordon on the ruins of his palace, over
which the British and Egyptian flags were hoisted with
due ceremony ; on Monday some semblance of law
and order was established in Omdurman ; on Tuesday
the British troops began their return journey to Cairo
and England ; on Wednesday a Dervish steamer arrived
from Fashoda with its old paddle-boxes riddled by the
French bullets of Major Marchand's Mission ; and on
Thursday the Sirdar steamed up the White Nile with
a flotilla of gunboats and a sufficient military force to
overpower the intruders, if necessary.

As Vandeleur did not accompany Kitchener during
the episode known as the Fashoda Incident, we need
only remark that it was settled to the satisfaction of
both England and France, and that Major Marchand
was cordially entertained by every British officer whom
he met at Omdurman, Cairo and lastly at Fort Nasser —
our furthest post up the river Sobat — on his road to
France through Abyssinia. All who had the pleasure

240 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

of meeting him were most favourably impressed by the
personahty of this enterprising French officer.

Meanwhile, although the Khahfa's adherents had
fled from the stricken field, his garrisons in outljang
provinces refused to disperse and had to be separately
dealt with. The great rivers soon came under our
control and mihtary posts were quickly established in
the chief riparian towns, but in the interior the well-
disposed populations were perpetually harassed, raided
and looted of their grain, flocks and herds. In fact
the battle of Omdurman marked the beginning of
a period of fifteen months' hard work by the Egyptian
army. So long as the Khalifa remained at large, this
remarkable man — notwithstanding his crushing defeat
— maintained a firm hold on all the turbulent elements
in the land and rendered any peaceful settlement
impossible. He attracted to his standard the leading
Arabs with their numerous retainers, who, after fourteen
years of undisputed sway, were naturally averse to
submitting to the new regime.

The first and most formidable of these was his
cousin, Ahmed Fedil, who commanded 8000 well-
disciplined men at Gedaref and on the Blue Nile. To
him General Hunter, left in supreme command during
Kitchener's absence at Fashoda, sent two emissaries to
announce the destruction of the Omdurman army and
the fall of the city, at the same time offering liberal
terms to induce the Dervishes to disarm and disperse.
But Ahmed Fedil only flew into a rage, declared to his
followers that Omdurman still held out, shot one of the
messengers, flogged the other, and sent him back to
tell Hunter that he meant to fight it out to the bitter
end. And he kept his word for fourteen weary months.
Hunter saw that he had better deal with him before the
Blue Nile should subside to unn:ivigable dimensions, and

ANOTHER YEAR IN THE SUDAN 241

accordingly organised river reconnaissances and military
garrisons all the way from Omdurman to Rosaires —
400 miles distant.

Thus, Vandeleur in command of eighty selected
men of his battalion was again on the warpath, even
before his wound was healed — as he started within ten
days of receiving the injury with a splint still on his
finger, and proceeded to Abu Haraz, 140 miles up the
Blue Nile.*

Hunter's object was to prevent Ahmed Fedil from
crossing the river from east to west without a deci-
sive engagement. The latter's object was to effect a
crossing, march to the White Nile, cross it also, and
so join forces with the Khalifa in Kordofan. But the
passage of a wide and deep river patrolled by vigilant
gunboats was more than he could accomplish, so after
several futile attempts he retired inland towards
Gedaref, the principal town of his district, to await
the fall of the flood-water and the consequent disap-
pearance of the pestilent gunboats.

The distance between Abu Haraz and Rosaires, the
extreme limit of navigation, was no less than 260 miles
by river ; and Ahmed Fedil who knew the country well
dodged from place to place collecting his food from
the unfortunate inhabitants, who fled for protection to
our military posts and gunboats. These were kept
perpetually on the alert in expectation of an attempt at
crossing at one spot or another, and Vandeleur and his
gunboat were very busy between Abu Haraz, Wad
Medina and Sennar. The eastern bank of the Blue
Nile and the country behind it were densely clothed in
tropical vegetation, almost impossible to operate in
with success. In fact the campaign seemed as if it
might drag on for an indefinite time without decisive

* See map facing page 252.

Q

242 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

result, whilst the peoples of several rich provinces
bordering the tributaries of the Blue Nile and Atbara
were unable to gather the harvest, now almost ripe.
Fortunately, however, Ahmed Fedil could be attacked
in rear as well as held in front and the period of
uncertainty was greatly reduced by two brilliant little
actions, which reflected more credit on the Egyptian
army than has yet been recognised. I refer to the
battles at Gedaref on September 22, and near Rosaires
on December 26, 1898. Their merit has not yet been
fully appreciated even by the small public which
interests itself in such matters.

It will be within the recollection of the reader that
Kassala was handed over by the Italians to the Egyptian
army on Christmas Day, 1897, and had since been held
strictly on the defensive. The moment was now at
hand for its garrison to act. As soon as authentic
news arrived concerning the Battle of Omdurman, its
commander Lieut. -Col. Parsons, who was well informed
regarding Ahmed Fedil's movements, organised the
following field force and started with it for Gedaref —

Half 16th Egyptian Battalion (Capt. McKerrel and Capt.

Dwyer) ........ 500 men.

Half an Arab BattaUon (formerly Italian, now commanded

by Capt. Wilkinson) ...... 450 ,,

Irregulars (Major Lawson) . . . . . . 350 ,,

Sudanese Camel-Corps (Capt. Hon. A. Ruthven) . . 80 ,,

Total . . 1,380

This force had no artillery or maxims and only seven
British officers, including the doctor, Captain Fleming,
who greatly distinguished himself and was awarded
the D.S.O.

Parsons' object was to capture Ahmed Fedil's base
of supply whilst this chief was engaged with Hunter on
the Blue Nile. The column accomplished the difficult

ANOTHER YEAR IN THE SUDAN 243

march of 107 miles to Gedaref in excellent style,
crossing the flooded Atbara in boats of their own
construction. On September 22, they arrived soon
after sunrise within four miles of the town, but their
approach was discovered, and the Emir Saadulla at the
head of 3400 Dervishes, detached from Ahmed Fedil's
mainbody, was ready to dispute their further progress.
Parsons, reconnoitring in front of his marching column,
beheld this body of men advancing in three lines straight
for his force, and knew that a colhsion must occur within
half an hour. He also noticed from the hill on which he
stood that a mile to his right front a small ridge rose
well above the plain and offered a favourable position
if only he could get his men on it before the Dervishes.
He therefore deflected their march to the right and
ordered them to move at the double. In good order
but breathless they gained the ridge before the enemy
reaUsed their object ; but the transport camels and
hospital lagged dangerously in rear and attracted the
attention of a large body of Dervishes who detached
themselves from the main force. Meanwhile the Arab
Battahon and i6th Egyptians were hning the crest of
the ridge, which the Dervish columns immediately
attacked. They came boldly up in their usual way,
some riflemen getting within 200 yards of the top. But
the Egyptians, Arabs and Irregulars, standing in high
grass on the ridge, poured out such a destructive
fire that the attack held off, though our losses were
numerous. Then, when the attacking hne wavered and
individual Dervishes even ran back, our hne advanced
upon them from the ridge and completed their dis-
comfiture.

But at this moment Parsons became aware that his
transport, seeking cover behind the rising ground, was
in danger of being overwhelmed by a Dervish attack

244 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

in his rear. He was between two fires; and the
situation was critical. His only chance lay in launching
the Arab Battalion boldly at the Dervishes in his front,
whilst the steady i6th was brought back to the ridge,
to shoot in the opposite direction. It turned about at
once and did its duty splendidly. Already the enemy
were right in amongst the camels, hamstringing and
killing, when they received at lOO yards' range the
appalling fire of the i6th Egyptians who treated them
to continuous independent shooting. This settled
the question. Both parties of Dervishes fled in confu-
sion, pursued by our Arabs and Irregulars for a short
distance. Our loss was 53 killed, 61 wounded and many
camels gone. The Dervishes lost over 450 killed and
wounded. There were several gallant deeds performed
during the short sharp encounter, notably by Captain
the Hon. A. Ruthven who was subsequently decorated
with the Victoria Cross.

At 12 noon Gedaref surrendered together with
Nur Angara — one of Gordon's old warriors — two guns
and 200 blacks, who took service with the victors. The
place was at once put into a proper state of defence, as
the Dervishes, encamped within a few miles, might
probably attack and would certainly cut off convoys
from Kassala. Within a week they did attack in great
strength, but the intervening days had been so well
spent in clearing the ground and loopholing the walls
of the largest houses that it was unlikely they should
succeed against the troops who had so recently defeated
them in the open. Their three attacks only resulted
in a loss of over 500 to themselves. The garrison was
cut off and practically besieged but no impression could
be made on its defences. Being without artillery
the captured Dervish guns were turned upon their late
owners with satisfactory results, and from start to finish

ANOTHER YEAR IN THE SUDAN 245

the diminutive Kassala column proved a remarkable
success. It would not, however, have been prudent to
launch it against Ahmed Fedil in his chosen position,
so General Rundle organised another column at Abu
Haraz in which Vandeleur commanded a half-battalion
of the 9th Sudanese. This column reached Gedaref
on October 21, and on October 24, Ahmed Fedil and
his army — much reduced in size — departed for the
almost impenetrable forests through which flows the
Binder River. His progress was slow, and he made
frequent halts to enable him to raid the neighbourhood
for grain and cattle, as well as to patrol the Blue Nile
and learn where he might cross it. But everywhere
he found gunboats within hail, so at length he made up
his mind to a long march south in order to cross above
the Rosaires cataract and avoid them. Thus the
game of hide-and-seek continued through December
and only came to an abrupt end at the beginning of
1899.

For some time Lieut. -Col. Lewis had been patrolling
with cavalry along the left bank of the river and had
kept himself well posted as to Ahmed Fedil's move-
ments. He therefore betook himself to Rosaires in
anticipation of events and, when reports reached him
that the Emir was actually crossing the river twenty
miles to the south, he at once marched to attack him
with the following force :

loth Sudanese (Lieut. -Col. Nason and Major Fergusson)
9th Sudanese (Capt. Sir H. Hill) ....
Two maxims (Sergeants Lambert and Trowbridge).
Irregulars (Sheik Abu-Bakr) ....

Medical Corps (Capt. Jennings) ....

510 men.
30 „
10 ,,

400 ,,
4 .,

Total. , 954 ,,

This was on Christmas Day, 1898. After a halt to sleep

246 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

^n a village half-way, the march was resumed at 3 a.m.
the following morning and continued till eight, along
the eastern bank through a forest of thick-set bush.
Then suddenly the advanced-guard encountered a
Der\ash outpost which it drove in : and the column
debouched on the edge of the water, opposite a bare
island of sand and shingle in the middle of the Blue
Nile. On this island, a mile long and three-quarters
of a mile wide, the Dervish camp and a large force were
plainly visible. Beyond the island, the western bank
of the river rose in a cliff forty feet high, on the summit
of which Ahmed Fedil himself and several hundreds of
his rifle-men were already posted. In fact Lewis had
caught the Dervish force in the act of crossing ; their
strength was divided between the island and the chffs^
and the deeper, broader and swifter arm of the river
separated their two parties. They were, however, in
much greater strength than he had been led to expect
and the situation looked nasty. Of the two bodies,
that on the island was clearly the stronger, and Lewis
had to make up his mind how to deal with it.

If he did not attack quickly, the Dervishes certainly
would either attack him or escape across the river to
their friends, so with the bold instinct of a true soldier
he made up his mind to attack at once. He realised
the hazard but had no alternative, and, having counted
the risk, he launched his little column against 3000 men.
The brunt of the fighting which ensued fell upon that
magnificent battalion the loth Sudanese, and if an\^ of
my readers should still doubt the value of our Sudanese
regulars, surely the action above the Rosaires cataract
— 400 miles from Khartoum — will convince them of
their mistake.

On the further edge of the island, opposite the cliffs,
a hne of low sand-hills afforded the Dervishes a strong

ANOTHER YEAR IN THE SUDAN 247

position, with level shingle between themselves and
Lewis. He therefore opened the fight \vith long-range
volleys and maxims, which could by no means dislodge
the enemy, but did elicit a hot rejoinder and so enabled
him to mark the exact position they occupied. He
then ordered the maxims to maintain their fire whilst
he sent the Irregulars across by a ford, with instructions
to attack from the south end of the island and hold the
enemy in position till they could co-operate with the
regulars. At the same time he crossed over with the
loth Sudanese by another ford, in order to reach the
north end of the island and assault the enemy's flank.
When the loth reached the place in full view of the
cliffs they deployed rapidly into line and — with that
mixture of dash and discipline which was the character-
istic of the battalion — advanced across the open against
the sand-hills. They immediately became the target
of a furious musketry fire from both sand-hills and
cliff, and nearly a quarter of their numbers lay
strewn over the ground — killed or wounded. But the
five companies led by their two British officers never-
theless charged forward, increasing their pace as they
went till they reached the sheltering foot of the nearest
sand-dunes, where they were ordered to pause and take
breath. Thereupon the enemy, deceived by appear-
ances, rose with a confident shout from behind knolls
and hillocks, and, encouraged from the cliff by war-
drums and yells of triumph, advanced against their
hesitating foe to demolish him. But they had mis-
understood the loth Sudanese, who, in compliance with
their officers' orders, quietly lined the tops of the sand-
dunes and poured forth upon their attackers a con-
tinuous and deadly fire at short range. The effect was
immediate. The Dervishes wavered, then broke and
fled, pursued by our exulting blacks from sand-ridge

248 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

to sand-ridge. Some made for the river and attempted
to swim it, others escaped to the south of the island and
were attacked by the Irregulars. The loth moving
in one long irregular line swept over the ground, driving
their adversaries before them over hillock and down
dale, roUing up the Dervish line from end to end, till
they held the survivors at their mercy on the south
corner of the island — with a deep river running at seven
miles an hour at their backs.

The action was over. By three o'clock 2100
Dervishes had surrendered to the victors, who had been
marching and fighting for fully twelve hours. The
losses of the loth Sudanese included Major Fergusson
wounded, 30 men killed and 117 wounded. The
Irregulars had 40 casualties. The Dervish killed were
computed at 600, besides those drowned in the river.
Ahmed Fedil escaped with the party which had previ-
ously crossed the Blue Nile. He marched over to the
White Nile at Renk where a gunboat met him. The
majority of his force at once came in to tender their
submission and were sent to Omdurman. But the Emir
himself and his most trusted retainers managed to
cross the river in the night, and made their way to the
Khalifa in Kordofan — a broken band.

There we will leave them for the present. Peace
at last reigned in the Blue Nile provinces, and the
weary populations and soldiery enjoyed a period of
rest and quiet.

Many details of interest have necessarily been
omitted in the foregoing narrative, in order to concen-
trate attention upon active operations which led to
definite results. But, although successful skirmishes
and battles are more attractive topics than records of
sickness and failure, it should not be supposed that
soldiering in the Sudan was devoid of dull months and

ANOTHER YEAR IN THE SUDAN 249

keen disappointments to individual officers. Whilst
a few were taking part in the actions at Gedaref and
Rosaires the majority were coping with an epidemic
of fever on the Blue Nile which seriously incapaci-
tated the force. I find in Vandeleur's diary a copy of
the daily sick report for the garrison of Karkoj on
November 21 which states that 343 were in hospital out
of a total of 408 men in the place. It is not therefore
surprising that, after Ahmed Fedil had been dealt with
and the Khalifa's Kordofan gathering had been recon-
noitred by Colonel Kitchener, the Sirdar (now Lord
Kitchener of Khartoum) deemed it wise to grant the
Egyptian army a period of rest in comfortable quarters,
after their harassing campaign.

Leaving small but sufficient garrisons at Fort
Nasser, Sobat, Fashoda, Rosaires, Sennar, Kassala
and a few other places, he withdrew the scattered
army and concentrated it at or near Omdurman for
recuperation and training. Meanwhile a liberal
Gazette of Honours and Rewards, of which the Egyp-
tian army obtained a full and well-merited share,
showed that England appreciated the work of her
sons on the Nile. Lieutenant Vandeleur received an
honourable " mention in official despatches " and was
decorated with the Order of the Medjidie. Subse-
quently he was promoted captain in the Scots Guards
and Brevet Major in the Army, the latter as a recogni-
tion of his services in Nigeria. He thus obtained Field
rank before the age of thirty.

Early in 1899, Kitchener selected him for the
appointment of Inspector in the soldi r-civilian service
which was destined to start the Sudan on its new
career of regeneration and prosperity, and he com-
menced his task in March under Lieut. -Col. Mahon in
the Khartoum province. There was an immense work

250 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

to be done and it could only be accomplished very
gradually, for the populations, however friendly, were
so inured to oppression that they could not believe in
the possibility of what we call Justice. The first and
most urgent step was to put a curb on flagrant cases
of murder by individual ruffians, and to bring these
malefactors to book in open court. Egyptian mamours
were appointed to the various subdivisions of the
province, police posts were arranged in the towns and
villages, and it was the Inspector's duty to constantly
visit all these, both on the White and Blue Niles, and
to keep in touch by personal intercourse with whatever
occurred within his jurisdiction. Vandeleur was in fact
the outward and visible emblem of British civilisation
to the inhabitants of the Khartoum province and had
a steamer at his disposal for his necessary journeys.

But, as the months rolled by and our soldier-
civilian officers came to identify their interests with
those of the peoples whom they governed, it became
more and more evident that the Khalifa, though still
withdrawn into the province of Kordofan, was a
serious hindrance to the progress of adjoining districts.
Between Duem and Fashoda for a distance of 300 miles
the left bank of the White Nile and its vast hinterland
remained at the mercy of his followers, and Vandeleur's
journal contained numerous entries concerning the
raids and murders which came to his notice. The
Khalifa's armed force — instead of diminishing as had
been confidently hoped — increased with the lapse of
time and immunity from attack. Far from being an
outlaw, he was actually the ruler of the province from
which he and his Baggara had sprung. Such a fire-
brand in the midst of emotional and warlike tribes
could not be tolerated by a government which aspired
to bring about the peaceful regeneration of the Sudan,

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ANOTHER YEAR IN THE SUDAN 251

so in October 1899 ^^^ Sirdar organised a military
expedition to deal with the nuisance.

At that time the Khalifa and his army — 4000
fighting men — were located at Gebel Gedir in the hinter-
land of Fashoda, 100 miles from the Nile. The diffi-
culty of getting at him was very great, chiefly owing
to the arid nature of the belt of country between the
river and his camp. For fifty miles the troops had to
carry their water for the march, and it was impossible
to conceal their departure from Abdullahi's spies, who
swarmed between Omdurman and Fashoda. The
attempt was worth making, but it failed. Two days
before our cavalry reached Gebel Gedir the Khalifa
and his whole force with women, children and baggage
disappeared into the recesses of southern Kordofan.
As it was no use pursuing this elusive army from camp
to camp, and more definite results would be obtained
by striking at the head than by following the tail,
Lord Kitchener at once ordered the whole expedition
to return to Omdurman and wait for another and a
better opportunity. It was a great disappointment to
the officers and men of the Egyptian army, and with
sad hearts we returned to garrison duty on Novem-
ber I, finding no consolation in the gloomy telegrams
which reached us from the seat of war in Natal and
Cape Colony.

But the Sudan is and always has been a land of
surprises, and its people are unaccountably credulous.
Rumours reached the bazaars of Omdurman that the
Khalifa was coming to attack us, that his friends in
the city were inciting the populace to rise against the
soldiers, that arms (lying buried in the desert) would
be available. That he intended to march 400 miles
through Kordofan to attack the army from which he
had just escaped at Gebel Gedir was more than we

252 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

could pretend to believe, but the bazaars believed it,
and the bazaars were right. He was preaching a holy
war in the same country and at the corresponding date
to that preached by the successful Mahdi. Did they
not all recollect the glories of those Kordofan victories,
which culminated in Hicks' disaster on November 5,
1883 ? Next we had definite news of him by telegraph.
He had marched 200 miles north, his advanced-guard
under Ahmed Fedil was encamped near Abba island
and had actually fired at our gunboats.

Next morning, November 13, the 9th and 13th
Sudanese battalions left for the scene of action and
occupied Ahmed Fedil' s camp without resistance. He
was evidently on a grain-looting expedition, preparing
food depots for his uncle's march on Omdurman. Lord
Kitchener hurried from Cairo whither he had gone
to consult Lord Cromer on the Sudan budget, and
appointed Colonel Sir R. Wingate to command the
following field force for operations in Kordofan :

Cavalry, one troop (Capt. Bulkeley Johnson) ... 30 men-
Artillery, one battery (Capt. Simpson-Baikie). . . 120 ,,
Maxims, six guns (Capt. Franks) ..... 40 ,,
Camel Corps (Lieut.-Col. Henry) ..... 450 ,,
9th Sudanese (Major Doran) ..... 800 ,,
13th Sudanese (Major Maxse) ..... 800 ,,
2nd Egyptians, one Company (Egyptian Captain) . . 100 ,,

Total . . 2,340 ,,

Colonel Lewis commanded the infantry of the above,
and 900 irregulars under Major Gorringe were added to
the force, whose transport consisted of 870 camels.

Starting from the Nile on November 21, the column
marched sixty miles in sixty-one consecutive hours,
fought two successful actions, destroyed the Khalifa^
his principal Emirs and the last remnant of Dervish
power, and returned on the 29th with 3000 prisoners
of war.

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ANOTHER YEAR IN THE SUDAN 253

The Khalifa and all his chiefs — men whom we had
sometimes called cowards — died at the head of their
faithful followers, charging home with the bravery of
despair against out disciphned blacks. Their deaths
were more glorious than their hves and certainly more
beneficial to the Sudan, which has since made surprising
strides on the path of progress and prosperity. The
action is known as the battle of El Gedid where it was
fought.

But Vandeleur was not to see the results of
peace ; for on November 30, he started for Cairo and
London, on his way to the Boer War in South Africa
and said good-bye to the Egyptian army in which he
had spent two happy and successful years.

CHAPTER XI

IN THE BOER WAR

Travelling with five other officers — the first to
leave the Sudan for the Boer War — Major Vandeleur
embarked at Alexandria for Marseilles, where he
arrived on December 13, 1899, ^^^ heard of Gatacre's
disaster at Stormberg. Passing through Paris, he
learnt of Methuen's misfortune at Magersfontein, and,
on reaching London, of Buller's defeat at Colenso and
the appointment of Lord Roberts as Commander-in-
Chief in South Africa. He spent six days in London,
which was steeped in the gloom of Black Week, and
was then very glad to embark at Southampton on
the first outgoing troop-ship. Indeed England at that
time presented a sorry spectacle of impotent disappoint-
ment and was no place for an officer who knew some-
thing of the actualities of war. All classes were over-
come by the unreasoning despair which a military
reverse must always engender in a people who con-
sistently refuse to face war as a serious business. This
was not realised at the time and is not generally reahsed
now, but many thinking men are aware that it is
futile to rely upon the patriotism of individuals whose
personal service is not recognised as a Duty to the
State.

Our first and only Army-Corps, instead of marching
as proposed from Cape Colony to Pretoria " in a few
months," lay inert along a front of 500 miles from
Modder River to Natal checked at every point. Eng-

IN THE BOER WAR 255

land indulged in no recrimination against individuals
but cried aloud that " something must be done " —
the usual British formula. The fate of Ladysmith,
Kimberley and Mafeking depended upon fresh troops
being sent out, but these were not immediately avail-
able. We had never contemplated a big war and
therefore possessed no plan or scheme for organising
either a large professional army or a nation in arms.
There was no sufficient reserve of trained officers, or
even of horses, guns, saddlery, ammunition and equip-
ment. Since Waterloo we had, in a military sense,
lived from hand to mouth — fed on theories about the
wickedness of all wars, lulled into false security by
contemplating our wealth and our area, satisfied with
the smug conviction that we are not as other men.
Even the tattered " corner-boy " loafing up the Strand
had been taught that his precious existence was more
valuable than that of any private soldier of the Queen.
Yet in spite of all these drawbacks the heart of the
British people beat sound during the crisis of Black
Week, or we should not have carried through the South
African War. The rough, untutored patriotism of the
nation was even in the mood to respond to any demand
which might have been made upon it by persons in
authority. But unfortunately our public men failed
to rise to the occasion and grasp the elementary notion
that it is the citizen's privilege to serve the State in
defence of its liberties and its existence. Thus the
new-found national spirit was frittered away instead
of being crystallised into a permanent factor, and the
great bulk of the people did nothing more than cheer
the patriotic action of the few who voluntarily came
forward with definite offers of personal service. These
were forthcoming in all parts of our wide dominion,
but no one had previously thought out the best method.

256 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

or indeed any method of organising emergency troops ;
so the matter was left to the private enterprise of a
Small number of energetic and generous men. Our
existing Yeomanry and Volunteer Forces had never
been called out and could not be put on a war footing
— even for home defence. We were therefore largely
dependent on newly raised, scratch corps, equipped on
the spur of the moment. Thus, by dint of the unlimited
enthusiasm of a few civilians, a number of armed men
were hustled on board ship in England, Australia, New
Zealand and Canada, and despatched to the seat of
war. The fact that many of these excellent volunteers
had to learn to shoot, cook and ride in the presence of
the enemy in no way lessens the gratitude we owe them
for the assistance they rendered so promptly. But
nevertheless, an Empire which remains content to
entrust its defence to private enterprise is certain to
fare very badly in conflict with a trained nation on the
field of battle.

On the present occasion we fortunately had to deal
with only two small republics whose people, though
better organised for war than ourselves owing to their
system of universal service, were averse to discipline and
therefore incapable of driving home concerted attacks
or embarking upon a vigorous initiative. They en-
joyed the advantages of being on the spot, in their
own country, and six months ahead of us in their
preparations for war. But they failed to benefit as
they should have done by their own initial successes
and our original blunders.

On January lo, 1900, Lord Roberts and Lord
Kitchener landed at Capetown, where they found an
immense task awaiting them before an army capable
of leaving a railway line could be put into the field.
Yet it was essential to Lord Roberts' plan of campaign

IN THE BOER WAR 257

to have such an army at his command, and that
quickly. It does not, however, come within the scope
of this chapter to give even a brief outhne of the Boer
War, as it may fairly be assumed that my readers are
acquainted with those volumes of The Times History
of the War in South Africa which have already appeared.
Yet some indication of the general situation in Cape
Colony at the time of Major Vandeleur's landing,
January 17, must be given, if we are clearly to under-
stand the work he was called upon to perform.

Methuen was holding on at Modder River with the
1st Division and a force safeguarding the single line of
railway connecting him with De Aar and Capetown.
Gatacre was similarly holding Sterkstroom and the
railway to East London. Between these two distant
bodies, French had for two months been playing a
most skilful game against superior Boer forces near
Colesberg, and had succeeded by a policy of bluff and
bold tactics in preventing the invasion of the southern
districts of Cape Colony. At Naauwpoort he held the
railway line to Port Elizabeth.

The 6th Division under General Kelly-Kenny landed
early in January. The 7th Division under General
Tucker was due to reach Capetown later in the month,
as also several artillery and other units. The 9th
Division was in process of formation. In fact there
were plenty of regulars at or hurrying to the theatre of
operations, but they could not yet be called a field army.
The Cavalry Division was gradually collecting, but
there was still a sad dearth of mounted troops — owing
to the policy which had dictated the famous telegram
to the colonies, '' infantry preferred." Lord Roberts
therefore set to work to make good this deficiency by
converting 4000 regular infantry soldiers into eight
battalions of mounted infantry. These men were at

R

258 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

first as untrained as their recently landed horses, but
in process of time developed into an admirable force.
He likewise raised a number of South African Colonial
Corps during January. But, to enable his army to
move through an inhospitable country without a rail-
way, the greatest necessity was a service of mobile
transport, and this he directed Lord Kitchener to
prepare the very day after they reached Capetown.

The Commander-in-Chief's plan was to strike at
Bloemfontein in the heart of the Free State from the
western railway between Orange River and Modder
River, with 30,000 men — his object being to interpose
this force between Cronje's 9000 Boers at Magersfontein
and Kimberley and their base. The march to Bloem-
fontein, 100 miles, would also place him in rear of 7000
Boers near Colesberg and give him possession of the
railway through the Free State. To be successful, this
flank march within striking distance of Cronje must be
sprung upon the Boers as a complete surprise and then
be carried out with the utmost rapidity. To move
slowly to a flank and give the enemy time to concen-
trate upon it at leisure was the very thing which Lord
Roberts meant to avoid : and, contrary to other
experiences in the campaign, he did avoid it. The
result was complete and altogether dramatic. In a
single week (February 11 to 18) the whole face of the
war was altered to our advantage. Cronje's flight was
arrested at Paardeberg, where 4141 Boers subsequently
surrendered as prisoners of war : Bloemfontein was
captured : and all the Commandos south of the Orange
River retreated north in a panic.

The story of this success is so simple, so obvious
and so natural, when narrated at this distance of time
and in the light of our present information, that we are
apt to forget the situation as it presented itself before

IN THE BOER WAR 259

Lord Roberts took command. But the fact is that the
Battle of Paardeberg could not have been won by him
or by any one else until the army in Cape Colony was
fundamentally re-organised, and this was particularly
the case with regard to the transport. Therefore, as
Vandeleur was one of the first officers selected for this
special duty, we will revert to the beginning of January
and consider the condition of this service.

Just as the heterogeneous assemblage of battalions,
batteries and squadrons did not constitute an efficient
field army, so likewise a quantity of waggons, mules,
oxen, harness and " boys " — scattered over a wide area
— did not produce mobile transport. The fault, if
any, lay with the erroneous conception with which we
started to fight the Boers at the outset of the war, not
with the Army Service Corps whose work throughout
the operations was admirable. The original Army-
Corps sent out from home was provided with an
adequate transport for the campaign it was intended to
undertake — involving a march up the central railway
from the coast to Bloemfontein and Pretoria. Its
transport, as well as the Supply Department was placed,
in accordance with the carefully planned system of the
British Army, under the senior Army Service Corps
officer attached to the General's staff. Thus supply
and transport were twin-brothers working hand-in-hand
which in a small force is an excellent arrangement.
The scheme was elaborate in detail and carried out the
principle of decentralisation to its logical conclusion.
Each battalion, brigade and division was allotted a
separate set of vehicles for its own exclusive use. The
waggons when handed over to a battalion became
practically its property during the campaign, and were
looked after by one of its officers. Hence the system
came to be called the regimental system, and was much

26o SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

favoured by regimental officers. The waggons accom-
panied the battahon wherever it went but, as they only
carried food for two days, required constant replenish-
ing. This was provided for by supply columns which
accompanied the brigade or division, carrying rations
to the regimental waggons from the real carriers of the
army's food and forage — namely the supply park. The
latter moved in rear and drew upon the railways.

The merit of the system was that battalions always
had waggons at their disposal, that the personnel of
these waggons was in charge of the battalions which
employed it, and that the officers in most cases took
a pride in the well-being of the animals. But it also
had grave defects. It frittered away a quantity of
vehicles in supply columns and much time was spent
in loading and unloading ; it wasted the waggons of the
numerous battalions and brigades which have to remain
stationary during long periods in any campaign ; and
it was practically inapplicable to South Africa where
one part of the army, holding railways, bridges and
lines of block-houses could do with only a few carts,
whereas another part, being perpetually on trek in
pursuit of Boers, required more than the regulation
allowance of transport. Thus, the regimental system
provided for a set of conditions which it was hoped
would prevail but was too inelastic to cope with the
actualities of the war.

On the other hand, the system favoured by the new
Commander-in-Chief and his Chief of the Staff was no
copy of either Indian or Egyptian methods, but was
dictated solely by the necessities of the situation. They
found their transport squandered about the country,
fixed to diminutive units and incapable of being rapidly
concentrated for the surprise march on Bloemfontein
which they were determined to carry out. Yet success

IN THE BOER WAR 261

in war so largely depends upon strategic surprise that
a system which impedes it must be fundamentally
faulty. It was therefore decided to impound the
regimental waggons, except the First Line Transport —
viz. : water-carts, ammunition-carts, ambulances and
the technical vehicles of engineer and other units, all
of which are part of their indispensable equipment.
The supply columns were hkewise impounded from
brigades and divisions, and the whole of the mule-
waggons thus withdrawn were reformed into companies
of forty-nine each, under a major or captain specially
detailed to command them. Thus the mobile transport
was amalgamated into one service under the Director
of Transport, who also controlled the supply-park,
consisting of ox-waggons. Such a serious change on
the eve of a campaign could only be justified by con-
siderations of paramount weight, which were not at
the time understood by the regimental officers whose
waggons were taken from them, or by those depart-
mental officers who were wedded to the system which
they knew. But Vandeleur and others qualified to
judge by service in the Transport, soon became con-
vinced that the elasticity of the newer system
outweighed the inconveniences of the change and
justified — on active service -^t lie principle upon
which it was founded. For, when shorn of its
highly technical details, a mobile transport is merely
the carrier of food and forage from the nearest avail-
able depot to the mouths of the soldier and the horse
in the lighting hne. The ownership of the waggon is
of minor importance provided the soldier is fed, and
fed he was throughout the war with remarkable regu-
larity, in spite of numerous difficulties, by the new
companies which combined the duties of regimental
transport and supply column under one officer. The

262 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

latter's business was to maintain touch with the men he
had to feed, however scattered they might be ; to be
posted with the latest information regarding probable
moves and the position of the supply-park ; to replenish
empty waggons wherever possible; to feed and care
for his mules (ten to each waggon) ; to pay his non-
commissioned officers and Cape-boys ; and to know
exactly where all his waggons were when detached on
odd jobs. It meant plenty of work for an active man
during such a campaign as we were engaged in, and
necessitated an intelligent appreciation of coming
events.

In the middle of January 1900 Vandeleur was posted
to the command of one of these companies at De Aar
during the process of its formation, and we will now
follow his fortunes to Bloemfontein and beyond.

De Aar, a horrible, dusty, wind-swept railway
junction, connecting Kimberley, Naauwpoort and
Capetown, one of those necessary camps on the lines
of communication which every officer and man is
always longing to leave, was the scene of feverish
activity during the reorganisation. A mule company,
complete with animals, equipment and personnel
takes time to create, and, as forty of them were in
process of formation in various places and in a great
hurry, Vandeleur had to keep alert to avoid being left
out of the scramble for essential necessaries. By the
end of January his company was ready to march to
Orange River Station. Several of the American and
Italian mules died on the journey though the waggons
were empty, but Seymour reached his destination in
good time and found himself in the vortex of the great
concentration early in February. Troop-trains from
Capetown, Naauwpoort and other places were per-
petually passing through and depositing their loads at

IN THE BOER WAR 263

various camps between Orange River and Modder. At
last the Headquarter Staff arrived, Vandeleur was
hurriedly ordered to Graspan thirty miles north, and
on February 11 found himself attached to Kelly-
Kenny's 6th Division as its senior transport officer for
the march. Next day the army of 30,000 combatants
quitted the railway in an easterly direction to Ramdam,
and Vandeleur noted in his diary the impressive
spectacle which it presented on the move.

As far as the eye could see the veldt was alive with
troops. Thin clouds of dust some miles in front marked
the progress of the cavalry division, screening the
movement with its widely extended squadrons ; thicker
dust-clouds denoted infantry brigades toihng slowly
behind ; whilst the thickest and blackest were raised
by loaded mule waggons straining in rear. Ramdam's
lake afforded ample water for the night's bivouac, and
next day the army moved on across the Riet, where
Vandeleur had his first experience of the difficulty
attending the passage of a " drift " by a crowd of waggons,
one by one. South African rivers are mostly deep,
wide ditches along the bottom of which flows a few
feet of water ; they are very rarely bridged, and a drift
is merely a place where the steep bank has been cut
down to a ford. These are few in number and cannot
be negotiated by more than one vehicle at a time. Thus
at Waterval Drift Vandeleur had to work all night to
get his baggage across the Riet and on to Wagdrei,
where it bivouacked on the 14th. The same night at
11.30 his Division started for Modder River to reheve
the cavalry at Khp Drift and enable French to make
his dash for Kimberley. On the 15th Kimberley was
relieved and Cronje bolted from Magersfontein, in a
panic, across our front to reach his base at Bloem-
fontein. On the i6th we fought his rearguard all day.

264 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Throughout the 17th we pursued him in hot haste and
continued the pursuit through most of the night to
Paardeberg Drift. On the i8th we pinned him to his
laager by a desperate infantry attack, simultaneously
heading him off with a cavalry brigade from Kimberley.
During this strenuous week neither troops nor
transport had a decent sleep or a square meal ; but
Kimberley was relieved, Cronje surrounded, the British
had gained their first real success, and Roberts stood
by till his foe should be compelled to surrender. This
occurred on February 27, the anniversary of our
Majuba defeat, and as Vandeleur was an eye-witness
of the event an extract from his diary will be of
interest —

"... A great deal of firing was heard at 3 a.m.
which proved to be the Canadians attacking the
trenches. They got within sixty yards and the
Engineers dug a trench which enfiladed the Boer lines.
I rode out at dawn to our first line on Battery Hill and
joined Colonel Higson commanding the 13th Brigade
and his aide-de-camp, who were meeting a flag of truce
brought out by two Boers. Their letter of surrender
was at once sent on to Lord Roberts, who directed
Cronje himself to appear. The two Boers on rather
nice ponies rode back to the laager, and in some excite-
ment we awaited Cronje' s arrival, at a point about a
thousand yards from his lines. In about half an
hour P. Cronje and another appeared. He was rather
fat, red-faced above his beard, a hard-looking man
in blue serge trousers, brown boots, yellow overcoat and
big felt hat with orange ribbon, riding a grey pony. He
only spoke Dutch and, after a hurried ' good-morning '
rode off with a staff officer to Lord Roberts, with whom
he breakfasted. All details of the surrender were left

THE BOER LAAGER AT PAARDEBERG ON THE
MORNING OF THE SURRENDER

From a Photograph H^ Seymoik Vandeli ik

IN THE BOER WAR 265

with Commandant Wolmarans and General Kelly-
Kenny with whom I returned to breakfast. Then I
rode down with him to the drift where the Boers were
collected, carrying their blankets and a few necessaries.
The Buffs, acting as guard, formed up in line some
distance from them. The Boers were distributed in
parties and counted. Result — Free Staters 1131,
Transvaalers 2620, Passed down the river (not counted
by us) 250, wounded 140. Total = 4141. It was a
great sight and they were a fine-looking lot of men."

During the operations which culminated in this
result the 6th Division had suffered its full share of
casualties ; Vandeleur's transport had come under a
very accurate and disagreeable pompom fire from the
Boer laager, and was only saved from a stampede by
his promptitude and presence of mind.

The day following Cronje's capitulation the Boers
in Natal also gave way, Ladysmith was relieved and
Roberts' army began to look wistfully towards Bloem-
fontein. But a disaster to half the supply-park at
Waterval Drift, where 170 loaded ox-waggons were
destroyed or captured by De Wet on February 15,
had curtailed the available rations and forage and
rendered a delay imperative. Moreover, heavy rains
turned the veldt into a quagmire and seriously impeded
the reduced transport service plying from both Modder
and Kimberley to Paardeberg, and, though the troops
were put on half-rations and the animals on a quarter
of their forage allowance, no sufficient accumulation
of supplies had been made to warrant an immediate
advance. Meanwhile the Boers were concentrating
at Poplar Grove to dispute our progress ; the Presi-
dents of the two Republics were in the field with
their commandos, exhorting them to stand and defend

266 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

the capital ; and everything pointed to a stubborn
encounter when, on March 7, the army deployed for a
carefully planned attack on the Boer flank. But, owing
to various tactical delays which Lord Roberts deplored
more than any one, the enemy were merely manoeuvred
out of their position and permitted to retreat unscathed
— pursued by us at a leisurely pace. At Driefontein,
however, on the loth we again came up with them, and
this time a vigorous attack, driven home with great
spirit by the 6th Division, inflicted a loss of over
100 killed and more wounded, and pushed the
Boers in headlong flight from their kopjes to Bloem-
fontein and beyond. Vandeleur was with his divisional
staff — the proper place for the senior transport officer
in an action — and remained under fire most of the day.
His waggons also received the unwelcome attentions of
a certain Creusot gun, which burst shells over them at
6000 yards range and caused them to shift with con-
siderable alacrity.

Next day the army continued its march, and
Bloemfontein was occupied wdthout further opposition.
At six in the evening the Guards Brigade, having
covered thirty-seven miles in twenty-six consecutive
hours, entered the town, and next morning Pole-Carew
with the Grenadiers, Scots Guards and four guns moved
by train 100 miles to Springfontein, where he met
Gatacre's scouts from the south. This feat was made
possible by the daring of Major Hunter- Weston, who
with a party of ten mounted sappers blew up a culvert
on the railway north of Bloemfontein before the Boers
evacuated, and thus secured eleven engines and 100
trucks which were of the utmost value.

During the pause of six weeks which occurred before
Roberts was ready to begin his great march to Johannes-
burg and Pretoria a number of minor engagements

IN THE BOER WAR 267

took place in the south of the Free State. Ladybrand
was occupied by our cavalry : Karree Siding, north of
Bloemfontein, was taken possession of by the 7th
Division, which ousted the Boers : Sauna's Post was
the scene of an unfortunate surprise, in which we lost
eight guns and much transport : Reddersburg was a
most " regrettable incident," in which 400 of Gatacre's
men surrendered : Wepener was strenuously attacked
but gallantly held by Brabant's Colonials. Meanwhile
the bulk of the army remained at Bloemfontein, railway
communication with Cape Colony was re-opened,
reinforcements of men, horses, mules and supplies were
brought up, and all was made ready for the next stage
of the campaign.

During his stay in Bloemfontein Vandeleur was
much gratified by hearing from Kelly-Kenny that he
had been mentioned in despatches, and the general
added a warm tribute of congratulation on his manage-
ment of the transport throughout the previous opera-
tions. Then Lord Erroll, who was appointed to com-
mand a brigade of the Yeomanry on its way out from
home, offered him the post of Brigade-Major, but
Kitchener declared that transport was a far more
important service and refused to sanction the proposal-
On the same day the following official telegram from
the War Office was put into Seymour's hands — " Will
you accept transfer as senior captan new Irish Guards
Regiment ? " This meant promotion from junior
captain in the Scots Guards at once and a certainty of
further advancement in the near future, but he hesitated
a great deal before replying, on account of his affection
for his old regiment and his dislike of leaving it. It
was, however, a compliment to be selected for transfer
and, as an Irishman, Seymour was very proud of the
honour — so he telegraphed his acceptance on the

268 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

condition that he should continue on special service
during the remainder of the war.

Meanwhile Kitchener had another post in view for
him, that of Senior Transport officer on the staff of
Major-General Hutton, just appointed to command the
1st Mounted Infantry Brigade. It was in process of
formation and was to consist of the following troops :

ist Brigade Mounted Infantry

15^ Mounted Infantry Corps {Lieut. -Colonel Alder son).

ist Battalion Mounted Infantry ; ist Canadian ^lounted Rifles ;

2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles ; Strathcona's Horse.

2nd Mounted Infantry Corps {Lieut. -Colonel De Lisle).
6th Battalion Mounted Infantry ; New South Wales Mounted
Rifles ; West Australian Mounted Infantry.

yd Mounted Infantry Corps {Lieut. -Colonel Pilcher).
3rd BattaUon Mounted Infantr\- ; Queensland Mounted Rifles ;
New Zealand Mounted Infantry^.

4ih Mounted Infantry Corps {Lieut. -Colonel Henry).
4th Battalion Mounted Infantry ; South Australian Mounted
Rifles ; Victorian Mounted Rifles ; Tasmanian Mounted
Infantry.
Also a Battery, R.H.A. ; four sections Pompoms. R.A. ; twenty
Machine Guns ; one company Australian Pioneers ; a Bearer Company,
N.S.W. Army INIedical Corps.

Total = 303 of&cers, 6076 men, 6347 horses.

A volume might well be devoted to the organisa-
tion of Mounted Infantry and another to the services
rendered by the various corps which were pitch-forked
into the middle of this campaign, because Britons do
not give personal service to the State until a war is
half lost. Everything had to be initiated in a hurry,
with a consequent loss of efficiency, driving-power and
hardness in officers, men and horses. Starting with
such a handicap, it is remarkable that the two mounted
infantry brigades were as good as they undoubtedly
proved themselves, and we are led to the inevitable
conclusion that if four such units as the one detailed

IN THE BOER WAR 269

above had been raised, equipped and trained for one
year instead of for one week, their mobihty, dash and
disciphne would have averted our ignominious perform-
ances at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso, and
might have reduced the duration of the war by a half
and its cost by £100,000,000 to ;f20o,ooo,ooo. This,
however, is not the place to dilate upon the permanent
weakness of the British Empire ; nor do I deem it neces-
sary to pursue Vandeleur from bivouac to bivouac-
there were no tents — with Hiitton's Brigade which,
together with French's cavalry, manoeuvred and fought
as the left wing of Roberts' army (39,000 men) through-
out its march from Bloemfontein to Pretoria. The
start was made on May i. The Boers were never once
seriously tackled during this memorable invasion but
were adroitly manoeuvred out of all their positions ;
and, as the old saying goes, " they lived to fight another
day."

On May 18 the situation was roughly as follows —
Roberts at Kroonstad ; Buller at Newcastle, Natal ;
Ian Hamilton at Lindley ; Methuen at Hoopstad ;
Hunter at Christiania : Maf eking just relieved. The
country was bare, the railway line was wrecked, and
the progress of the columns depended on the carrjdng
capacity of the transport, whose officers will all their
lives retam a vivid recollection of nights of struggle in
almost impassable drifts and days of anxiety to replenish
their waggons at the supply-park. Meanwhile on May 3
the mounted force under the able leadership of Hutton
turned, by a wide circling march, all the Boer positions
about Brandfort and the Vet River, and, after a stiff
fight on their flank, forced the enemy into a confused
retreat towards Kroonstad. It was during such move-
ments that the organising capacity of Vandeleur became
apparent and that, through his energy and resource-

270 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

fulness, the troops were fed as soon as they reached
their bivouac after an action. To him therefore is due
a great deal of the credit which the mounted men got
for their mobihty, for without the prompt supplies with
which he continually furnished them no wide turning
movements would have been possible. On the 9th
Hutton's brigade was joined by the cavalry under
French, and, thenceforward to the Battle of Diamond
Hill on June 12 the two were practically united into
one command under the latter general. Their flank
movement on the left of the enemy included the action
of the Zand River, the taking of Kroonstad, the turning
of the Vaal, the occupation of Johannesburg and
Pretoria and materially contributed to Lord Roberts'
successful advance. On the right Ian Hamilton
circling even further from the centre fought many
engagements, brushing aside all opposition at Winburg,
Lindley and Heilbron : whilst at the Battle of Johannes-
burg his Gordon Highlanders showed that quality of
stolid, enduring pluck which makes the British soldier
such a hard man to beat in a protracted campaign.
Johannesburg and the gold-mines were found intact,
notwithstanding Boer threats of destruction and the
problem of the future was to guard the 265 miles of
railway back to Bloemfontein from the depredations
of the unbeaten Free Staters. Nevertheless Lord
Roberts determined to push on at once and occupy
Pretoria which he did on June 5 — five weeks after
leaving Bloemfontein.

After this success most men in England and in the
army in South Africa believed the war was practically
over, and so it certainly would have been in any
organised community in Europe. We held the capitals
of the two Repubhcs, the main line of railway and all
the towns on it ; the mines, whose wealth had enabled

IN THE BOER WAR 271

the Boers to prepare for the war and keep it going, were
in our possession ; Kruger and Steyn were fugitive
presidents, the one in a railway carriage on the Lorenzo
Marques Hne, the other in the eastern districts of the
Free State ; the Hollander officials and other hostile
foreigners had no more stomach for fighting, and were
leaving the sinking ship after clamouring for arrears of
pay and " legalising " the monopolies, securities and
shares which some of them had plundered from the
Rand. But the back-country, agricultural Boers, the
men who held the Mausers and required neither govern-
ment pay nor government rations, had not once been
properly beaten in a fight to a finish, had rarely seen
many of their dead comrades lying about as mute
evidence of disaster, had not yet realised what the
newspapers call the " horrors of war." They had been
out-manoeuvred by superior forces and compelled to
abandon positions which they rfieant to hold, but had
ridden away with whole skins — fortified by practical
experience in the field and not much lowered in morale.
Being of a stubborn race and having become hardened
and proficient in war now that the weak and incom-
petent were eliminated, they found themselves still
amply provided with food, horses and ammunition and
unable to see why they should give in voluntarily to an
invader merely because he held the railways and towns
which they had always disliked. On the contrary, their
opportunity had at last arrived, and this they proved by
two long years of incessant guerilla warfare under the
new and able leaders whom the war had thrown up.
From Pietersburg in the northern Transvaal to Graaff
Reinet in southern Cape Colony their raids spread
gradually east and west and occupied our army without
pause or respite. From month to month and from
year to year the scene shifted from place to place ;

272 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

the commandos dodged, countermarched, disappeared
in the night to reappear elsewhere ; British columns —
as obstinate as their opponents — pursued, surrounded
and harried them, successfully and unsuccessfully,
suffering occasional reverses but steadily gaining
ground till they finally compelled a satisfactory sur-
render and the complete disarmament of every Boer
with a rifle. It entailed a long and tedious cam-
paign which could only be successfully terminated if
the grit of the British people remained uncompromising
and enduring. Fortunately it never wavered or failed
in spite of Pro-Boers and others who counselled peace
at any price, and thus we at last reached a solution
which promises permanent, beneficial results to the
future South African Nation.

But we must revert to the first days of the occupa-
tion of Pretoria in order to follow Vandeleur's personal
experiences in the guerilla war. He remained on
Hutton's staff and was present at the Battle of Diamond
Hill, east of Pretoria, where Botha made a gallant
stand before retiring to Middelburg. He states that
until remounted his brigade together with the two
cavalry brigades under French only mustered 1300
horses fit for duty between them, at the end of their
arduous march from the south. Meanwhile commandos
and bands of Boers hovered round Pretoria, Johannes-
burg and other towns and De Wet in the Free State
had captured a battalion of the Derbyshire Militia,
had firmly established himself on the railway and had
destroyed several trains carrying three weeks' mail
for the whole army. Hutton was first sent to the
Magaliesberg Hills, west of Pretoria, to disperse Boer
bands and join hands with Baden-Powell, on his way
from Mafeking ; then to the south-east of the capital
where for three weeks he was daily in touch with and

IN THE BOER WAR 273

fighting commandos under Botha to keep the railway
intact. During the second week of July occurred the
unfortunate defeat and capture of one of our detach-
ments at Zilikat's Nek, where some companies of the
Lincolnshire Regiment, a squadron of the Greys and
two Horse Artillery guns surrendered. Minor successes
of this kind were always magnified by the Boers into
victories of first-rate importance and had the incon-
venient result of encouraging their resistance and con-
siderably prolonging the war. Hutton's command
had proof of this in a fight the following week, when
a strong force of Boers under Viljoen made a desperate
attempt to break through to Pretoria but were re-
pulsed all along the line. Towards the end of the
month we find him at Middelburg with more Boers all
round, but the news of Prinsloo's surrender with 4800
men to Hunter in the Free State had a discouraging
effect on the enemy, keeping them quiet in their laagers
and very wary against surprise.

Meanwhile in Pretoria a plot was hatched by
Lieutenant Cordua — a regular officer of the Staat's
Artillery and a naturalised German — to capture Lord
Roberts in the night and carry him off to the enemy's
camp. It was a mean and dastardly enterprise, for the
Commander-in-Chief had exercised special clemency in
permitting Cordua to remain in the town on parole and
his men to revert to peaceful citizenship, on condition
they took no further part in hostilities. The reason
given for this lenient treatment was that the Staat's
Artillery and Zarps, from whom the conspirators were
drawn, had represented themselves as the paid servants
of the Republic with no means of livelihood when the
Boer government decamped. Cordua was tried in open
court, found guilty and sentenced to be shot. His
confederates to the number of 300 were deported to

s

274 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Ceylon. Throughout August and September opera-
tions on a considerable scale were carried out between
Middelburg and Komati Poort, as also in the Lyden-
burg and Barberton Districts on both sides of the rail-
way to Lorenzo Marques. Lord Roberts himself moved
to Belfast where the Guards Brigade was in bivouac ;
Buller, advancing through Ermelo^ at last reached the
railway and attacked Dalmanutha, driving away the
Boers with heavy loss ; Ian Hamilton with a strong
division of mounted men and infantry arrived at
Belfast, and Vandeleur was transferred from Mutton's
Brigade, now much reduced in strength, to Ian
Hamilton, as staff officer in charge of his numerous
mule-transport. This was not only promotion to a
bigger command, but also involved Seymour in the
active operations which culminated in the capture of
Lydenburg and occupation of Komati Poort, on the
border of Portuguese East Africa. Here a parade was
held by Pole-Carew, in honour of the birthday of the
King of Portugal, to which a special train conveyed
Portuguese officers and a number of ladies from the
coast. After this Vandeleur obtained two days' leave,
bought a white duck suit at a store and paid a surrepti.
tious visit to Lorenzo Marques, where he saw ex-
President Kruger emerging from the Governor's house,
where he was living, to go for a drive in the town. The
place was full of Hollanders, Frenchmen, Italians and
Irish — lately in the service of our enemies, now strolHng
about with nothing to do. The bay struck Vandeleur
as quite beautiful and the whole place impressed him
favourably.

In October Hamilton's force was broken up in
Pretoria and Seymour was granted a few months'
leave to recuperate in England. He selected the Dur-
ban route, in order to visit the battlefields of Natal.

"ON TREK IN SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE BOER WAR 275

Several days were thus spent in riding round the Lady-
smith Defences and exploring Spion Kop, Pieters Hill,
Colenso and Majuba, but on reaching Durban early in
November he was met by a telegram ordering him back
to Pretoria, in order to take command of a contingent
of Australian Bushmen serving under General Paget in
the Rustenburg district. He was delighted at the
prospect, for — like every ambitious soldier — he was
longing to obtain an independent command in the
field. He well knew how great a difference there is
between the work of the highest staff officer, respon-
sible for carrying out the orders of another, and that of
an independent commander acting on his own initiative.
Moreover, Vandeleur was thoroughly fitted by training,
experience and his own natural aptitudes for the
command he desired, and we may therefore judge how
bitter was his disappointment on learning at Pretoria
that the G.O.C. on the spot had already filled the post.
This was perhaps the greatest personal disappointment
Se5miour ever had to face, and he faced it with the
equanimity and sound good sense which distinguished
him throughout his career and gave to his character a
touch of sublime composure, whenever difficulties
arose. Instead of again starting on his homeward
journey as nine out of ten other men would have done
under similar circumstances, he made up his mind to
stay quietly in Pretoria and, as his real value had
been appreciated and reported upon by all the generals
under whom he served, he had not long to wait for re-
cognition and employment.

At the end of November Lord Roberts made over the
army in South Africa to Lord Kitchener and returned
to London, to take up the appointment of Commander-
in-Chief. On the 29th Kitchener sent for Vandeleur
and offered him the command of the 2nd Mounted

276 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

Infantry Battalion, which happened to be the first to
fall vacant. It formed part of the 6th Mounted
Infantry Corps and was at that time engaged with
Major-General Clements' force against several com-
mandos under De la Rey. Hopes were held out to
Vandeleur that, after a period of duty with this batta-
lion, he might expect promotion to the command of a
Mounted Infantry Corps or possibly an independent
column of all arms. But, before he could join from
Pretoria, Clements was surprised at Nooitgedacht,
suffering a loss of 400 casualties and of most of his
horses and mules. Out of 190 men of the 2nd M.L
present in the action no less than 90 were killed and
wounded, and the officer acting as its commander was
shot. It was under these depressing circumstances that
Seymour took over its command in the Magaliesberg
Hills, near the scene of the recent fight, and found he
could muster but 250 men, including the recruits who
had just joined from Krugersdorp. Our reverse in
this district, occurring so soon after the capture of
five infantry companies and two guns by De Wet and
Steyn at Dewetsdorp in the Free State, fanned the
flame of guerilla warfare into renewed activity, and
Vandeleur was almost daily in action right up to the
end of the year 1900. One description, however, will
suffice to give the reader some insight into the work
which constantly engaged the Mounted Infantry. On
December 19 Clements' force marched to attack a Boer
position which stretched across a valley from Nooit-
gedacht to Hekpoort, in the Rustenburg District.
The 6th Corps started at 3.30 a.m. as advanced guard
to the main column and crossed the Magalies River,
with the 2nd M.I. in front, followed by four field guns
and the 14th M.L The Boers opened fire from a kopje
as soon as our men were over the drift. The guns and

IN THE BOER WAR 277

14th were brought up to assist, and Vandeleur with
the 2nd M.I. pushed on through some trees under an
increasing fire. When he emerged, he saw that his
forward scouts were already chmbing one of the lower
knolls and, being a believer in rapid movement under
fire, he decided to make a dash for the crest-line. A
mile of open ground separated him from the foot of the
kopje, and across this he and his M.I. galloped, fired at
from two distant hills on the flanks. Two horses were
shot whilst fording a boggy stream, but his troops
lined the crest without losing a man, just in time to
forestall 150 Boers coming up from the opposite direc-
tion. These were routed with considerable loss, one Boer
being killed at only twenty-five yards' range. At this
point Seymour was obliged to await reinforcements, as
the enemy were known to be in strength and French
required time to cut them off. When the main column
came up the Boers were hustled and pursued for seven
miles across country, but as usual they escaped in the
dark.

Similar engagements were the order of the day with
our elusive enemy throughout his native land, and we
who are now privileged to look back on the event can
reahse how mistaken was our impatience because
progress was slow. For we had much to learn when
the war opened, and much more to take to heart when
it was at last concluded. Great Britain began by
expecting her sons to beat the enemy without hurting
him ; to gain \dctories without suffering casualties
and to obtain these remarkable results in a few months'
time and at a moderate price. The lesson of Majuba
had apparently been forgotten. But the back-country
Boer was not nurtured on the mawkish sentimentality
which sometimes masquerades as " magnanimity " in
London. He called it by the plain Dutch word which

278 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

signifies " funk " ; and, when England really meant
business, he regarded it as bluff. If therefore a peace
had been hastily patched up as soon as Pretoria fell,
that is before the war had been carried into the home
of the farmer, he would have remained in ignorance of
its penalties and a standing menace to peace. Whereas,
through the prolongation of hostilities and the multipli-
cation of our mobile columns, the whole country was
fought over and occupied from end to end. It was a
disagreeable and hateful task for both officers and
men and was by no means lightened by the false
accusations of cruelty which a few stay-at-home
Englishmen levelled at the troops in the field — with no
shred of evidence to support them. All through igoo
the war continued, but, as we are only concerned
with Vandeleur's work, further reference need not be
made to the general situation.

In January 1901 his M.I. Battalion mustered 493 men
and 527 horses and, still under Clements, was engaged
in safe-guarding convoys marching to and from Rusten-
burg through a country infested by De la Rey's com-
mandos. As a rule they contented themselves with
sniping from a distance, but ever}' now and then assem-
bled for a surprise attack either on a railway Hne, a
camp or a column of marching ox-waggons. Thus
on January 24, two days after the death of Queen
Victoria, Seymour was out reconnoitring beyond the
lines at 5 a.m. when he became aware that more Boers
than usual were on foot, evidently concentrating to
close on the camp. He at once placed his men in
position to check them, for already their shots were
inflicting losses on the tethered transport animals.
When later it became necessary to reinforce the advance
picquets, Seymour and his Sergeant-Major rode forward
to a hill in order to dispose the men to the best advan-

IN THE BOER WAR 279

tage. Bullets were spattering the rocks, so he cantered
on to take cover when, suddenly, he had an impression
of a noise and a blow, then a tremendous blow and
concussion on the left thigh and he realised he was
hit. The Sergeant-Major got him off his horse and
bandaged him with the puggaree of his hat ; but he
had to He behind some boulders in very great pain for
nearly three hours, under constant fire. Eventually
he was carried back — a perilous journey still under fire
— and placed in a house around which bullets con-
tinued singing all day. The one which hit him in the
morning had penetrated the right hip, travelled down
the left leg, missing the femoral artery by a fraction
of an inch and emerged in front of the left thigh.
Mercifully the thigh bone was not broken, but the
wound was a very serious and nasty one and was not
improved next day when he and an officer with enteric
were jolted in an ambulance along a bad road to
Krugersdorp Station, en route for the Wanderers Club,
Johannesburg, in use as an officers' hospital.

After thus trekking for sixty miles it was indeed a
comfort to poor Vandeleur to find himself in a hospital
where every attention was paid to his wants and the
best medical science could be bestowed on his wound.
His general health was so good that at the end of a
month he was well enough to be moved to Capetown,
where his father met him from England. They sailed
early in March and, by the time Seymour landed
at Southampton, he was able to get about without
assistance. At home in Ireland he mended apace, as
the weather was fine and his days were mostly spent
on a yacht. When the '' Honours Gazette " appeared,
and he saw his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel at the age of thirty-one, his w^ound was for-
gotten and he insisted on going before a Medical Board,

28o SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

with a view to returning to active service at once
He accordingly sailed on July 13, reached Pretoria on
August II and dined the same evening with Lord
Kitchener, whose columns were at last producing
an appreciable effect on the Boers still under
arms.

I append one among many letters in my possession
showing how Vandeleur was appreciated by those
under whom he served. It is from Major-General Sir
Edward Hutton :

" Dear Colonel Maxse, — It was with mutual
pleasure to us both that Seymour Vandeleur reported
himself to me at Bloemfontein early in April 1900 as
officer in charge of the Transport belonging to the
large force which, under Lord Roberts' orders, I was
then organising. It is not easy to do full justice to
Vandeleur' s remarkable success as Transport ofhcer
to such a cosmopolitan brigade as mine. It was in
itself nearly always twice and at one time nearly three
times the size of a Cavalry Division, composed of
militia troops from our over-sea self-governing Colonies
as well as of regular Mounted Infantry, selected from
twenty-eight British regiments. This Force was one
especially difficult to handle and doubly difficult to
administer as regards transport and supply.

" It was Vandeleur's able and quick powers of
organisation and his ready tact in dealing with those
under him which enabled him to meet all the demands
made upon his administrative capacity. Personally,
I never had to give him a single order or to tax him
with a single oversight during the whole time he was
Chief Transport Officer. Living with me at the head-
quarter mess and in constant personal touch with me,

IN THE BOER WAR 281

he knew, as by instinct and almost without actual
orders from my Chief Staff Officer, what was required
of him and his transport.

" His capable arrangements for the evacuation of
sick and wounded from the Field Hospital were not
the least noteworthy of his services, and the only time
I had a difference of opinion with Vandeleur was at
the commencement of the critical action upon May 28,
1900, at Oliphants Vlei, before the taking of Johannes-
burg, when his fighting instinct brought him into the
firing line and prompted him to abandon for a few
brief moments his important charge, in order to join
me in the action.

" You will realise from what I have written how
much I owed to Vandeleur for his management of my
transport. The Mounted Force with which he played
so leading a part had no Press correspondent to chronicle
their work, and the splendid service which was rendered
by them, one and all, has never been realised by the
Pubhc.

" I have said nothing of Vandeleur' s personal
character, which I perhaps had better opportunities of
knowing than many of his friends. He was of those
highest and noblest types of British officer whom, it
has been said, ' Britain has never failed to find amongst
her sons.' The recollection of the high-minded ideal
cherished by Vandeleur of his mission in life, the
modesty and the moral strength which were peculiarly
his characteristics, will ever remain a sacred memory
to his friends.

" Believe me,

" Yours very truly,

" Edward H. Hutton, Major-General.

"London, Nov. 3, 1905."

CHAPTER XII

THE END

The war was dragging on to its inevitable conclusion.
Some tenacious commandos fighting gamely to the end
took every opportunity of pouncing upon insufficiently
guarded convoys or wrecking trains for the loot they
might contain, but many burghers were growing tired
of the precarious and detestable existence to which they
were reduced by Kitchener's combination of sweeping
columns and lines of block-houses. During Vande-
leur's first week in Pretoria 884 Boers surrendered or
were captured ; whilst north, south, east and west
they were being relentlessly harried by our officers and
men — now hardened and experienced campaigners.

North of Pretoria the Boer who gave most trouble
was Commandant Beyers in the difficult and rugged
country known as the Bush- veldt, and against him a
strong column under Lt.-Col. Harold Grenfell was
operating from Nylstroom, having its base on the
railway. This force was composed of the 2nd, 12th
and 2oth Mounted Infantry Battalions, Kitchener's
Fighting Scouts, four field guns and a half battalion
of infantry. Grenfell, who had been fighting inces-
santly since the outbreak of hostilities, stood in need of a
rest, and the Commander-in-Chief was looking about for
a really good man to succeed him. After carefully con-
sidering all other claims. Kitchener selected Lieutenant
Colonel Vandeleur for this post and directed him to
join the column at Nylstroom when next it came in

KREVKT LT.. COLONEL SEVMOlk VANDELKIK. D.S.O.
IRISH GUARDS. 1901

THE END 283

touch with that station ; then to accompany it on one
trek as Grenf ell's subordinate in order to acquaint
himself with the force, the country and the circum-
stances ; and then to take command directly Grenfell
went home on leave. Thus the strenuous work of his
whole life was to meet with the only reward which
could satisfy Seymour's legitimate ambition. It came
to him at the age of thirty-two, when he was young
enough to feel that his future still lay before him yet
experienced enough to act with the ripe judgment of
an old hand ! He had seen much of war and knew its
difficulties, but to overcome them he possessed, beneath
a quiet demeanour and never-failing cheerfulness, the
stern quality of grit without which officers cannot
successfully command in action. Indeed he was so
full of hope and delight at the prospect, that the friends
who were with him before he started from Pretoria
felt his enthusiasm to be contagious ; and those of us
who best appreciated his character and brain-power
were convinced that he would prove himself a brilliant
commander in the field.

But our belief in him was not to be tested and con-
firmed, for he never reached his destination.

On Friday, August 30, 1901, he lunched and dined
with Colonel Romilly of the Scots Guards, and went
down to the railway station at 11 p.m. to sleep in the
train, which was to start at dawn next morning for
Nylstroom. After a disturbed night spent in shunting,
the train of three open trucks and one ordinary corridor-
coach left Pretoria with its passengers asleep in fancied
security. They included two ladies returning with
their children to Pietersburg, Vandeleur, Major Beatson
and an escort of non-commissioned officers and men in
the armoured truck next the engine. Besides baggage
and stores there were also ^f 20,000 in cash, the pay of

284 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

the troops in the northern district. The train reached
Watcrval North, sixteen miles from Pretoria, in safety
and should have waited there until the local com-
mandant had definite news that the hne to the next
station, Haman's Kraal, thirteen miles, was reported
clear. The arrangements made for the protection of
the railway, in addition to the block-houses and the
defence of each station, were that two native " boys "
started at midnight from Waterval North and two
others from Haman's Kraal. They were to meet
half-way between the stations, exchange passes to
prove they had met and return to their respective
commandants to report on the safety of the line.
Telegrams were then to be exchanged between the
commandants, and no train ought to have been per-
mitted to start until all these preliminaries were duly
completed. Unfortunately on the date in question
the train left \A'aterval North before any report or
telegram had come to hand.

Meanwhile the notorious train-wrecker Jack
Hindon, an Irishman, had reached a cutting three
miles beyond Waterval North with fifty to sixty Boers at
midnight, and had placed a dynamite mine beneath
the rails. He and his party then concealed themselves
in some bushes fifty yards off, leaving a few of their
number to watch the cutting. When the two scouts
from Waterval North approached they were imme-
diately set upon in the dark, taken prisoners and
flogged. The two scouts from Haman's Kraal reached
their destination half-way, waited as usual for the
others to arrive, and then, suspecting miscliief, pluckily
advanced along the railway almost as far as the cutting-
Here they saw the Boers actually in position on both
sides of the line just as the train was approaching from
the opposite direction. The engine panted slowly up

THE END 285

the steep gradient towards the trap, whilst on top of
the cutting the Boers lay concealed by heaps of exca-
vated earth, ready to fire down on the open trucks.
The two scouts ran towards the engine holding up
their hands to try and stop it, but the driver did not
understand, and the brave " boys " were shot just as
the mine was exploded beneath the engine — over-
turning it and the armoured carriage. At the same
instant a fierce musketry fire was poured into every
part of the train before its occupants could seize their
rifles. Both the ladies were wounded. Vandeleur,
in the adjoining compartment, sprang from his seat and
rushed out into the corridor — similar to those on our
English railways — shouting as loud as he could
" Ladies and men, lie down flat." When he reached
the door to get out of the carriage and take command
of the men he was confronted by a Boer named Uys
with a loaded rifle at his shoulder, and was instantly
shot dead at two yards' range. Nine non-commis-
sioned officers and men were killed, two officers, four-
teen non-commissioned officers and five civilians were
wounded. Another mine was exploded some distance
behind to prevent help arriving, and the wreckers
proceeded to loot and burn the train before they rode
off.

Hindon and his gang are branded as murderers and
robbers, not only for this shameful deed but also on
account of other similar massacres. They were reputed
as marauders who feared to fight in the open, but took
advantage of the state of war to pillage and plunder
belligerents and civilians alike.

The survivors of the disaster were soon succoured
from Pretoria, and Vandeleur's body was reverently
carried to the capital. On Sunday, September i, it
was laid to its last rest in the cemetery of the Enghsh

286 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

church, with full mihtary honours. It happened that
on this day yandeleur's old battalion, the 2nd Battalion
Scots Guards, was moving by train from Springs to
Potchefstroom and was thus within reach of Pretoria.
In obedience to a telegram from Lord Kitchener the
Right Flank company, under Major Godman, was
brought up by special train to attend the funeral.
And so it came to pass that the final volleys over his
grave were fired by the very comrades whom he would
have wished for and that the regiment of which he
had been so bright an ornament had at least the mourn-
ful satisfaction of paying its last tribute to his memory.
The Commander-in-Chief, who loved his subordinate,
was present with the headquarters staff and all the
officers of the garrison ; and a more impressive cere-
mony, or one tinged with a deeper sorrow and a truer
regret it would be difficult to conceive.

Men of Seymour Vandeleur's stamp do not die in
their beds and it is in accordance with the life they have
chosen that they should meet death in the discharge of
duty, and in the service of their country. But in Van-
deleur's case it is bitter to think that when the end
came he did not fall in the fair field of battle, where
his life had been risked on so many occasions. To
be the victim of a pitiful highway robbery, murdered
in cold blood without the chance of reprisal by a
dastardly scoundrel who wrecked trains for loot — such
is not the kind of death which his friends can contem-
plate without a feeling of vengeance in their hearts.
Yet, after all, it is a man's life not his death that
matters, and the memory of Seymour Vandeleur as he
was — a bright, ambitious, happy companion — still
lingers with those who follow his calling and sympa-
thise with his spirit. To them he will ever remain an
example of straight, young manhood and of a life

THE END 287

spent in the pursuit of that which is best and highest
in the profession he loved, heedless of any notoriety
it might happen to bring him. To those who have
read this memoir of his short career it will be obvious
that he possessed a tenacious purpose through life,
that he was rapidly developing along the natural lines
of his character and that he had emerged, a distinct
personality, from the junior ranks of the army. But
by those who worked with him for years in different
places and had the best opportunities of judging his
strength, Vandeleur's death is recognised as a distinct
loss to his country. Viewed in this light it was a
public calamity, though this was known to few outside
his profession.

In these pages I have endeavoured to place before
my readers the story of his life, not in the form of a bio-
graphy but rather by narrating the events in which he
took part and discussing the problems which absorbed
him. This I feel sure is what he himself would have
preferred to a more personal narrative, dwelling less on
the work than on the man. Indeed one purpose of
this book is to afford to Vandeleur's countrymen a
glimpse of what is being done by hundreds of picked
officers, who are the real builders of the Dependencies
and Crown Colonies of our Empire. They long ago
laid the foundations upon which our Indian Dominion
was reared; they are now toiling ceaselessly and suc-
cessfully in such places as Somaliland, Uganda, East
Africa, Nigeria, The Egyptian Sudan — in fact wherever
the Union Jack flies. Sometimes recognised but more
often snubbed by official England, their names are
unknown to the British Public and rightly so, because
men should not acquire notoriety for merely doing
their duty well. Their reward is in the knowledge
that they are sowing seed which will ripen into an

288 SEYMOUR VANDELEUR

abundant harvest whose true value will be appre-
ciated by future generations of Britons. When, how-
ever, one of their number is cut off in the prime
of • his manhood and with his promise unfulfilled, it
is meet that the story of his life should be recorded
— as an instance of the toll exacted by Empire and a
reminder to us who sit at home that there still are men
whose pride it is to render service to the State.

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