See other formats

Full text of "Sherman and his campaigns"

t* 



S H E K M A N 



HIS CAMPAIG-NS 



A MILITARY BIOGRAPHY. 



BY 



COL. S. M. BOWMAN AND LT.-COL. R B. IRWIK 



NEW TOEK : 

CHAELES B. EICHAED8ON. 

OIFOINNATI: 0. P. VENT & 00. 

SPRINGFIELD : W. J. HOLLAND. 

1865. 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, 
By CHABLES B. RICHARDSON. 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of 
New York. 



PRESS OF GEO. C. RAND & AVERT. 



PREFACE. 



THIS history of SHERMAN'S army is written in. the single in- 
terest of truth. 

Using the authentic sources of information at our command, 
we have endeavored to render full and exact justice to all, and 
to perpetuate no errors that, under the circumstances, it was 
possible to avoid. 

It is hoped that the disadvantages usually attending the 
publication of a biography during the lifetime of its subject, 
are to some extent neutralized, in the present instance, by the 
co-operation in our task of many of those who themselves 
made the history we propose to recount. 

Nevertheless, and in spite of the most friendly offers of 
material assistance from Lieutenant-General GEANT and Ma- 
jor-General SHEEMAN ; from the army commanders, THOMAS, 
HOWAED, SLOCUM, and SCHOFIELD ; from Major-Generals LO- 
GAN, BLAIE, and JEJTEESON C. DAVIS; brevet Major-General 
KTLPATEICK, brevet Brigadier-General HICKENLOOPEE, of the 
staff of the lamented McPHEESON, and from very many other 
officers whose names we cannot now give at length, several of 
whom generously tendered free access to their reports, jour- 
nals, and private letter-books; the editors cannot but feel 
that, on many points of interest, their work is lacking in those 
details essential to historical completeness, which time alone 
can supply. 



4 PEEFACB. 

The events treated are, in some instances, perhaps too 
recent for enlightened and impartial criticism ; in others, 
respect for the living or for the honored dead, whose memo- 
ries are yet green, may have imposed reticence or silence upon 
the lips of those on whose evidence depends our knowledge of 
the truth ; in still others, it will probably require the careful 
collection and severe analysis, in the future, of minute frag- 
ments of evidence, to-day widely scattered, neglected, or in- 
accessible, in order to refute errors now prevalent, but un- 
suspected. 

The editors believe, however, that laboring with a sincere 
and constant desire to attain correctness, they have, at least, 
succeeded in establishing the essential outlines -which the 
criticism and controversy, hostile as well as friendly, tliey 
cannot hope to escape, and the new testimony that will there- 
by be elicited, will enable them or their more favored suc- 
cessors to perfect and finish. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

BEFORE THE WAR. GENERAL SHERMAN'S ANCESTRY AND BIRTH. CAREER 
AT WEST POINT. SERVICE IN FLORIDA AT MOBILE IN CHARLESTON HAR- 
BOR IN GEORGIA IN NORTH CAROLINA IN CALIFORNIA. His MARRIAGE. 
SERVICE AT ST. Louis. His EESIGNATION. IN CALIFORNIA. PRESIDENT 
OF LOUISIANA STATE MILITARY ACADEMY. KE-ENTERS THE ARMY . . 9 



CHAPTER II. 

AN EXPERIMENT. BATTLE OF BULL EUN. APPOINTED BRIGADIER-GENERAL 26 

CHAPTER III. 

THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. KENTUCKY NEUTRALITY. SHER- 
MAN IN COMMAND IN KENTUCKY AT ST. Louis AT PADUCAH ... 87 

CHAPTER IV. 
SHILOH. BATTLE OF PITSBURGII LANDING ........ 47 

CHAPTER V. 

CORINTH. THE BATTLE OF CORINTH, THE EVACUATION. APPOINTED MAJOR- 
GENKUAL OF VOLUNTEERS GO 



CHAPTER VI. 

ilEMTITIS. REPAIRING RAILWAYS. IN COMMAND AT MEMPHIS. ORGANIZA- 
TION OF ARMY COUPS. PREPARATION FOR THE MOVEMENT ON VICKSBUEG 71 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. SHERMAN'S ORDERS. THE MOVEMENT BE- 
GUN. THE NAVY CO-OPERATING. THE ATTACK ON CHICKASAW BLUFFS. 
FAILU UK OF THIS ATTACK. CHANGE OP COMMANDERS 80 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE SIEGE AND. TALL OF VI CKSBURG. PREPARATION FOR THE SIEGE. 
UP THE YAZOO. GRAND GULF. JACKSON. VICKSBURG. THE SURRENDER 98 

CHAPTER X. 

THE LULL AFTER VICKSBURG. THE ARMIES AT REST. SHERMAN'S COR- 
RESPONDENCE 119 

CHAPTER XI. 

TO CHATTANOOGA. BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE. THE MARCH TO 
CHATTANOOGA. CHANGE OF COMMANDERS. LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. MIS- 
SIONARY RIDGE. RINGGOLD 131 

CHAPTER XII. 

KNOXVILLE. RELIEF. RE-ORGANIZING. TREATMENT OF THE INHABITANTS 147 

CHAPTER XIII. 

THE MERIDIAN RAID. A NEW COMMAND. FOLK'S DEFEAT. BANKS'S EXPE- 
DITION TO RED RIVER. GRANT'S LETTER TO SHERMAN UPON ins PROMOTION 159 



CHAPTER XIV. 

THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE. ITS ORGANIZATION AND POSITION. SKETCH 
OF GENERALS THOMAS AND MCPHERSON. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY , 169 



CHAPTER XV. 

BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. TUNNEL HILL. BUZZARD'S-ROOST GAP. RESACA. 
ROME. KINGSTON. ALLATOONA PASS 183 

CHAPTER XVI. 

ACROSS THE CIIATTAHOOCHEB. ATTACK ON KENKSAW MOUNTAIN. DEATH 

OF MCPlIKKSON li) 

CHAPTER XVII. 
ATLANTA WON. STONEMAN'S RAID ON ANDERSONVILLE. HOOKER RELIEVED sot 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

TAKING BREATH. REMOVAL OF CITIZENS FROM ATLANTA. HOOD'S LETTER 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER XX. 

THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTH. SKETCHES OF GENERALS HOWARD, 
BLAIR, SLOCUM, KILPATRICK, AND OSTEKHAUS. DESTRUCTION OF ATLANTA 256 



CHAPTEE XXI. 

THE LOST ARMY 273 

CHAPTER XXII. 

TO THE SEA. LINE OF MARCH. APPROACH TO SAVANNAH .... 279 

CHAPTER XXIH. 

A CHBISTHAS GIFT. ASSAULT ON FORT MCALLISTER. MEETING OF SHER- 
MAN AND THE SECRETARY OF WAR. THANKS OF THE PRESIDENT . . 291 

CHAPTER XXIV. 
THE END OF HOOD. BATTLE AT FRANKLIN. VICTORY AT NASHVILLE . 301 

CHAPTER XXV. 

SAVANNAH. SHERMAN'S ORDERS RESPECTING THE FREEDMEN. DUTITCS OF A 
CONQUERED PEOPLE 314 

CHAPTER XXVI. 
NORTHWARD, SKETCH OF GENERAL LOGAN. CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA . 330 

CHAPTER XXVII. 

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA. BURNING OF COLUMBIA. DESTRUCTION OF 
COTTON 339 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

CO-OPEKATIVE MOVEMENTS IN NOHTII CAEOLINA.-STARTING FOR GOLDS- 
BORO'. CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER AND WILMINGTON 357 

CHAPTER XXIX. 
TO GOLDSBORO'. BATTLE OF BENTONSVILLE 307 



8 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XXXI. 

DA WIST. NEWS OF LEE'S SURRENDER. - SURRENDER OF GENERAL JOHNSTON 388 

CHAPTER XXXII. 

COEEESPOKDENCE DURING THE TRUCE. ORDERS TO GENERAL STONEMAN 
GENERAL GILLMORE GENERAL WILSON. LETTERS TO GENERAL JOHNSTON 
AND FEOM HEM TO, ADMIRAL DAHLGREN TO GENERAL THOMAS . . 405 

CHAPTER XXXIII. 

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. SECRETARY STANTON'S NINE REASONS. -Tii re 
VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE. PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S POLICY. THE TRUCE. ITS 
BEJECTION. GENERAL HALLECK'S ACTION 417 

CHAPTER XXXIV. 

HOMEWARD. THE HOMEWARD MARCH. ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON. THE 
GRAND REVIEW. SHERMAN'S FAREWELL TO HIS ARMY 430 

CHAPTER XXXY. 

DIGRESSIVE. NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS. RAILWAYS. DISLOYAL NEWS- 
PAPERS. NEGRO RECRUITING 447 

CHAPTER XXXVI. 
AT HOME. SHERMAN'S SPEECHES AT LANCASTER CINCINNATI ST. Louis 404 

CHAPTER XXXVII. 

CONCLUSION". SHERMAN'S PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS. 
REGARD FOR THE DISABLED.- PROMPTNESS AND DECISION. UKLIGIOUS CON- 
VICTIONS. ANDERSON VILLE PRISONERS. His VIEWS ON EJSCONSTUUCTION 475 

APPENDIX. 

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL SHERMAN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT 
OF THE WAR RELATIVE TO THE TRUCE ......... 491 



|)0rtra5is aitir 



PORTRAITS. MAJOR-GENERAL WM. T. SHERMAN -MAJOR-GENERAL 0. 0. HOWARD MAJOR- 
GENERAL H. W. SLOCUM MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. LOGAN MAJOR-GENERAL FRANK l\ 
BLAIR, JR. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. SCIIOFIELD BREVET MAJOK-GENEUAL J. C. DAVIS 
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL J. KILPATKICK. 

MAPS. THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, AND SIEGE OF ATLANTA FROM ATLANTA TO THE SEA 
FEOM SAVANNAH TO GoLDSBOuo 1 OPERATIONS AROUND RESACA. 



SHERMAN AID HIS CAMPAIGNS. 



CHAPTEE I. 

BEFOEE THE WAR. 

WILLIAM TECTJMSEH SHERMAN was born in. Lancaster, Olio, 
on the 8th of February, 1820. The branch of the Sherman 
family to which lie belongs is descended from the Honorable 
Samuel Sherman, of Dedham, in the County of Essex, Eng- 
land, who caine to Massachusetts in the year 1634, in company 
with his brother, the Reverend John Sherman, and their 
cousin, Captain John Sherman. The two latter settled at Mil- 
ford, in Connecticut, and became the founders of useful and 
influential families. Roger Sherman was a descendant of the 
captain's. Samuel Sherman, after residing for a time at Weth- 
ersfield, Connecticut, removed to Stamford, and finally to 
Stratford, in the same State. His son, Deacon John Sherman, 
went early in life to "Woodbury, Connecticut, where the family 
remained until the death, in 1815, of Ms great grandson, Tay- 
lor Sherman, for many years judge of one of the courts 
of his native State. His widow removed, with her children, 
to what Is now the town of Lancaster, in Fail-field County, in 
the State of Ohio. Charles Robert Sherman, the son of Tay- 
lor Sherman, and the father of the subject of this sketch, was 
born on the 26th of September, 1788. He was an accomplished 
lawyer, very successful as an advocate, and from 1823 to 
1829, when he died of cholera, was one of the judges of the 



10 



SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 



Superior Court of the State of Ohio. On the 8th of May, 
1810, lie married Mary Hoyt, "by whom he had eleven children ; 
first, Charles Taylor, a prominent lawyer, formerly of Mans- 
field, Ohio, now of Washington City ; second, Mary Elizabeth ; 
third, James; fourth, Amelia; fifth, Mia; sixth, William 
Tecumseh; seventh, Parker; eighth, John, for many years an 
influential member of the House of Eepresentatives from 
Ohio, now senator from the same State ; niath, Susan ; tenth, 
Hoyt ; and eleventh, Frances. - 

His death left this large family in very moderate circum- 
stances. Shortly afterwards, being then but little past nine 
years of age, William Tecumseh was adopted by the Honor- 
able Thomas Ewing, one of In's father's most intimate friends, 
as a member of his own family. Mr. Ewing sent him to 
school in Lancaster until the spring of 1836, when having, an 
a member of Congress from Ohio, the privilege of nominating 
a youth from his congressional district for appointment as a 
cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point, 
he exercised this right by procuring the warrant for his youth- 
ful charge. 

In June, 1836, Cadet Sherman entered the Academy, whore, 
with the exception of the months of July and August, 1838, 
which his class was permitted to spend at home on furlough, ho 
remained, pursuing the course of studies and military duties 
then in force, until the 30th of June, 1840, when he graduated, 
standing sixth in the order of general merit of his class of 
forty-two members all that were left of a hundred and forty 
who had entered the institution with him. Among Iris class- 
mates were Stewart Yan "Vliet, George H. Thomas, Bichartl 8. 
Ewell, George W. Getty, William Hays, Bushrod E. Johnson, 
and Thomas Jordan. 

His letters to Ms friends during the four important if 
uneventful years of cadet life, are very interesting, as ex- 
hibitrng the variety and force of his thoughts, and the 
energy and decision of his character, at that early a-e 
Through them all runs the elastic spirit of youth/ancf a 
manly candor and directness of speech that have never left 



BEFORE THE WAH. U 

him since. In one of these letters, dated February 17, 1839, 
he writes : 

" Bill is very ranch elated at the idea of getting tree of West 
Point next June. He does not intend remaining in the army 
more than one year, then to resign, and study law, prob- 
ably. No doubt you admire his choice; but, to speak 
plainly and candidly, I would rather be a blacksmith. Indeed 
the nearer we come to that dreadful epoch, graduation-day, 
the higher opinion I conceive of the duties and life of an officer 
of the United States Army, and the more confirmed in the 
wish of spending my life in the service of my country. Think 
of that. The church bugle has just blown, and in a moment 
I must put on my sidearms and march to church, to listen to 
a two-hours' sermon, with its twenty divisions and twenty-one 
subdivisions ; . . . but I believe it is a general fact, that 
what people are compelled to do they dislike." 

" As we have, then, two or three dancing-parties each week, 
at which the gray bobtail is sufficient recommendation for an 
introduction to any one, you can well conceive how the cadets 
have always had the reputation, and have still, here in the 
East, of being great gallants and ladies' men. God only knows 
how I will sustain that reputation !" 

Speaking of the appointment, by the War Department, of 
the Board of Visitors to attend the annual examination, he 
says, May 18, 1839 : 

" There is but little doubt of its being nearly as well selected 
as circumstances would admit of. Party seems to have had 
no influence whatever ; and, for my part, I am very glad of it. 
I hope that our army, navy, or the Military Academy may 
never be affected by the party rancor which has for some time 
past, and does now, so materially injure other institutions." 

Here is a glimpse of his tastes and occupations : 

" The last encampment, taken all in all, I think was the most 
pleasant one I have ever spent, even to me, who did not par- 
ticipate in the dances and balls given every week by the dif- 
ferent classes ; besides, the duties were of altogether a different 
nature from any of the previous ones, such as acting as officers 



12 SHEBMAN AOT) HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

upon guard and at artillery drills, practising at target firing 
with long twenty-fours and thirty-twos, mortars, howitzers, &c., 
as also cavalry exercise, which has been introduced this year. 
As to lording it over the plebs^ to which you referred, I had 
only one, whom I made, of course, tend to a pleb's duty, such 
as bringing water, policing the tent, cleaning my gun and 
accoutrements, and the like, and repaid in the usual and cheap 
coin advice ; and since we have commenced studying I make 
Mm bone (study), and explain to him the difficult parts of al- 
gebra and the French grammar, since he is a good one and 
fine fellow; but should he not carry himself straight, I should 
liave him found in January and sent off, that being the usual 
way in such cases, and then take his bed, table, and chair, to 

pay for th.e Christmas spree 

" I presume you liave seen the register of cadets for the last 

year, and remarked that I still maintain a good stand in my 

* class ; and if it were not for that column of ' demerit' it would 

be still better,, for they are combined with the proficiency in 

study to make out the standing in general merit. In fact, this 

year, as well as the last, in studies alone, I have been among 

the stars/ ... I fear I have a difficult part to act for the 

next three years, because I am almost confident that your 

I atlier's wishes and intentions will clash with my inclinations. 

In tlie first place, I think he wishes me to strive and graduate 

in tlae engineer corps. This I can't do. Next, to resign, and 

'"-become a civil engineer. . . . Whilst I propose, and intend, 

to go into the infantry, be stationed in the far West, out of the 

reacli of what is termed civilization, and there remain as long 

as possible." 

He liad already imbibed from his association with Mr. Ewing 
the doctrines of the Whig party, but his nature and education 
compelled him to repel with indignation the trickery and shams 
even of his own side. Thus, he writes, April 13, 1840, of the 
approaching presidential election : 

" You, no doubt, are not only firmly impressed, but abso- 
lutely certain, that General Harrison will be our next president. 
For my part, though, of course but a ' superficial observer,' I 



BEFOKE THE WAR. 13 

do not think tliere is the least hope of such a change, since 
his friends have thonglit proper to envelop his name with, log 
cabins, gingerbread, hard cider, and such, humbugging, the 
sole object of which, plainly is to deceive and mislead his ig- 
norant and prejudiced, though honest, fellow-citizens ; whilst 
his qualifications, his honesty, his merits and services are 
merely alluded to." 

In the same letter is this dash of descriptive humor : 

" Sometimes it appears that war with England is inevitable ; 
books are thrown in the corner, and broadswords and foils 
supply their place. Such lunging, cutting, and slashing 
enough to dispose of at least a thousand . British a day ; but 
the mail or recitation soon destroys the illusion with c It's all 
a hoax ;' or, c Sir, you've been neglecting your studies. 3 " 

Immediately after his graduation, Cadet Sherman was ap- 
pointed, in accordance with the customary recommendation of 
the Academic Board, to a second lieutenancy in the Third 
Regiment of Artillery, then commanded by Colonel William 
Gates, and was assigned to Company A of that regiment. 
After enjoying the usual furlough of three months granted to 
cadets on graduating, he was ordered to join his company at 
Fort Pierce, in East Florida, where he served until November, 
1841, when the company was removed to Fort Lauderdale. 
In January, 1842, he received his commission as a first lieu- 
tenant in the same regiment, dating from November 30, 1841, 
and also an order from the War Department transferring him 
to Company G, stationed at Saint Augustine. This was 
rapid promotion for those clays, when six or seven years were 
often required for a second lieutenant to obtain the next grade. 
Lieutenant Sherman was now placed in command of a small 
detachment of his new company engaged in guarding the post 
of Picoluta, situated on the Saint John's Biver, opposite the 
town of Saint Augustine. 

The service in Florida was not of a very inviting character. ' 
The summer was generally passed in idleness, the heat of the 
almost tropical sun and the swarms of mosquitoes rendering 
active exertion nearly impossible ; and the winter was spent in 



14 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

frequent incursions against tlie hostile Seminoles, under the 
leadership of the wily and cruel chief Sam Jones. These 
expeditions, sometimes scouting on foot, sometimes penetrat- 
ing tlie everglades -in boats, were always attended by severe 
labors, and involved no slight degree of risk, the numbers 
of our troops being small, and unceasing vigilance being 
necessary to guard against an ambuscade. The climate dur- 
ing the long summer season was exceedingly unhealthy, 
lieutenant Sherman was, however, contented, as long as there 
"was a prospect of activity/and, fortunately, continued to en- 
joy good health during his entire tour of duty in this section. 
From the outset, he conceived a clear and decided opinion of 
tlie policy that should govern the war against the Seminoles. 
He was earnestly opposed to parleys or truces, believing that 
no reliance could be placed in the promises of the Indians ; 
and was strongly in favor of the energetic exertion of the 
wkole military -power in the Territory in combined operations, 
having in view the prompt and relentless extermination of all 
th.e Indians who should continue to carry on hostilities, and 
tlie removal, in accordance with treaty stipulations, of those 
who should sue for peace. By such a course, he considered, 
and events have fully justified the opinion, that the war would 
be ended in a single campaign, thousands of human lives 
saved, both of whites and Indians, and peace permanently 
given to -the Territory. The Government should then en- 
deavor, he thought, to attract to the country a better class 
of white settlers, organize them into small communities, 
and require them to defend themselves for the future. Thus 
tlie army could be withdrawn from Florida, with the excep- 
tion of small garrisons at the more important permanent 
posts. 

Here is a view of his life in quarters at Fort Pierce, written 
April 10, 1841 : 

"Now that we are at peace, and our minds withdrawn from 
those pleasant excursions and expeditions in which w# have 
been engaged for the four past months, we are thrown upon 
our ingenuity to demise means of spending the time. Books 



BEFOKE THE WAR. 15 

we have few, but it is no use, you cannot read any but the 
lightest trash; and even the newspapers, which you would 
suppose we would devour, require a greater effort of mind to 
search than we possess. "We attribute it to the climate, and 
bring up these native lazy Minorcans as examples, and are 
satisfied. Yet, of course, we must do something, however 
little. Well, in this, each pursues his own fancy. The major 
and I have a parcel of chickens, in which "we have, by com- 
petition, taken enough interest to take up a few minutes of 
the day ; besides, I have a little fawn to play with, and crows, 
a crane, &c. ; and if you were to enter my room you would 
hesitate whether it was the abode of man or beasts. In one 
corner is a hen, sitting ; in another, some crows, roosted on 
bushes ; the other is a little bed of bushes for the little fawn ; 
whilst in the fourth is my bucket, wash-basin, glass, &c. So 
you see it is three to one." 

In a subsequent letter he touches the same vein : 

" I've got more pets now than any bachelor in the country 
innumerable chickens, tame pigeons, white rabbits, and a 
full-blood Indian pony rather small matters for a man to 
deal with, you doubtless think, but it is far better to spend 
time in trifles such as these than drinking or gambling." 

His desire for the freedom of frontier life is thus again 
shown : 

" We hear that the new Secretary of War intends proposing 
to the next Congress to raise two rifle regiments for the West- 
ern service. As you are at Washington, I presume you can 
learn whether it is so or not, for I should like to go in such a 
regiment, if stationed in the far West ; not that I am the least 
displeased with my present berth, but when the regiment 
goes North, it will, in all likelihood, be stationed in the vicinity 
of some city, from which God spare me." 

His indignation at any thing not perfectly straightforward, 

shows itself in an energetic remonstrance to a friend : 

~~ " If you have any regard for my feelings, don't say the word 

4 insinuation' again. You may abuse me as much as you 

please, but I'd prefer, of the two, to be accused of telling a 




16 SHEBMAJS AM) HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

direct falsehood than stating any thing evasively or under- 
hand; and if I have ever been guilty of such a thing, it was 
unintentionally." 

In March, 1842, his company was removed to Fort Morgan, 
situated on Mobile Point, at the entrance of the Bay of Mo- 
bile, and twenty miles from the city. Here Lieutenant Sher- 
man remained, performing garrison service, varied, in the 
intervals of duty, by fishing, boating, and occasional, though 
not frequent, visits to the city, until the following June, when 
the station of the company was again changed to Fort Moul- 
trie, on Sullivan's Island, Charleston Harbor. Moultrieville, 
'on Sullivan's Island, quite near the fort, was, at that time, a 
place of fasMonable resort during the summer season for the 
'V, wealthy families of Charleston and South Carolina generally, 

1 many of whom had temporary residences there, to which they 

I removed on the approach of hot weather, to escape from the 

I malarious influences of the city and lower country, and enjoy 

jJ the cool breezes and the sea-bathing. Officers of the army 

- . were at that time sought after, and hospitably entertained by 

nearly all of the better classes of society in the South, and 
Lieutenant Sherman was thus, upon Ms arrival at Fort Moul- 
trie, ushered into a life entirely new to him. During the sum- 
mer he made many agreeable and some valuable acquaint- 
ances, which were cemented and extended during the following 
winter, when he, in common with the other officers, was 
almost overwhelmed with invitations to accept the hospitali- 
ties of the citizens of Charleston, to whom they had been 
attentive at the fort. 

Hunting was always a favorite amusement with him, and 
while stationed at Fort Moultrie, he enjoyed frequent oppor- 
tunities of indulging this taste. Thus, with boating and 
drum-fishing, were passed Ms leisure hours during the first 
year of his stay. In the fall of 1843, he availed himself 
of a four-months' leave of absence to visit Ms home at 
Lancaster, and while there became engaged to Miss Ellen 
Ewing, the accomplished daughter of Ms guardian, and the 
Mend and companion of Ms school-days. At the expira- 



BEFORE THE WAR. 17 

tion of his leave, in December, 1843, lie rejoined Ms post, 
making an interesting detour down the Mississippi river to 
New Orleans, and thence by way of Mobile and Savannah. 
During the months of February, March, and April, 1844, he 
was associated with Colonel Sylvester Churchill, on a board 
of three officers,, appointed by the "War Department, to inves- 
tigate a large number of claims for horses lost by the Georgia 
and Alabama militia, in the Florida war in 1837 and 1838. 
Most of these claims were supposed by the Government to be 
fraudulent, and the members of the board were required to 
hear and patiently sift the evidence on the spot, and after- 
wards report the facts and their opinions to the War Depart- 
ment. During the course of the investigation the board was 
in session at Marietta, Georgia, at Bellefonte, Alabama, and 
at several other places in the central and northern sections of 
those States. Their report gave great satisfaction to the De- 
partment, and was considered by it as the means of saving 
vast sums of money to the treasury, while, at the same time, 
awarding justice to all concerned. 

All this time the young officer was not unmindful of the 
necessity of professional study and improvement. He took 
care to inform himself of the topographical features of the 
country in which he was stationed or through which he 
travelled, as well as in regard to the occupations, character, 
social organization, and sentiments of the inhabitants. The 
value of geography lie specially appreciated. He wrote to his 
friend, Philemon Ewing : 

" Every day ~L feel more and more in need of an atlas, such 
;is your father lias at home ; and as the knowledge of ge- 
ography, in its minutest details, is essential to a true military 
education, the idle time necessarily spent here might be prop- 
erly devoted to it. I wish, therefore, you would procure for 
me the best geography and atlas (not school) extant." 

After the adjournment of the Board, he began to turn his 
attention to such legal studies as might prove useful to him in 
his profession. Thus he writes, under date of June 12, 1844, 
from Fort Moultrie : 



18 SHERMAN AOT) HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

" Since my return, I liaye not been running about in the 
city or the island, as heretofore, but have endeavored to 
interest myself in Blackstone, which, with the assistance of 
Bouvier's Dictionary, I find no difficulty in understanding. I 
have read all four volumes, Starkie on Evidence, and other 
books, semi-legal and semi-historical, and would be obliged to 
you if you would give me^ a list of such books as you were re- 
quired to read, not including your local or State law. I in- 
tend to read the second and third volumes of Blackstone 
again, also Kent's Commentaries, which seem, as far as I am 
capable of judging, to be the basis of the common-law prac- 
tice. This course of study I have adopted, from feeling the 
want of it in the duties to which I was. lately assigned." 
And again, on the 20th of October : 
"I have no idea of making the law a profession, by no 
means ; but, as an officer of the army, it is my duty and inter- 
est to be prepared for any situation that fortune or luck may 
offer. It is for this alone that I prepare, and not for profes- 
sional practice." 

Early in 1845, he again paid a brief visit to his home in 
Ohio, to recover from the effects of illness. After his return 
to the South, he was, for a short time, stationed on detached 
service at the arsenal at Augusta, Georgia ; and, on another 
occasion, was detailed as a member of a general court-martial 
sitting at "Wilmington, North Carolina, where he had the pleas- 
ure of meeting once more with his old comrades of Company 
A, Third Artillery. 

On the breaking out of the Mexican war, Lieutenant Sher- 
man was assigned to duty as recruiting officer at Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvaaia. He remained there, however, but little more 
than a month, when Ms repeated applications for active ser- 
vice were met by an order from the "War Department, trans- 
ferring Mm to Company F, of Ms regiment, then about to sail 
for California, to meet Colonel Kearny's expedition across the 
plains. The first intimation he received of this change was 
conveyed by a letter, wMch reached Mm on the 28th of June, 
1846, from Ms friend, Lieutenant E. 0. 0. Ord, who was 



BEFOEB THE WAR. 19 

attacked to Ms new company. On the 29th of June he re- 
ceived the official orders, and on the following day, without 
seeking to visit his home and friends, pausing only to make a 
few hasty arrangements with regard to his private affairs, he 
set out for New York, The company sailed from N"ew York 
about the middle of July, in the ship Lexington, and after a 
voyage marked by no special incidents, touching at Bio de 
Janeiro and Valparaiso, landed at San Francisco. Contrary 
to the anticipations of active service entertained at the outset, 
the career of the company in California, far away from the 
theatre of war, proved uneventful. During his service there, 
"Lieutenant Sherman was detailed as acting assistant adjutant- 
general of the forces in the Tenth Military Department, under 
the command of Brigadier-General Stephen W. Kearny, after- 
wards under that of Colonel Ilicliard B. Mason, First Dra- 
goons ; and in this capacity attracted the notice of his brother 
o Qicors by the efficiency, clearness, and administrative ability 
ho showed in the discharge of the responsible duties confided 
to him. In 1850 he returned to the Atlantic States, and on 
the 1st of May, in the same year, was married to Miss Ellen 
Ewing, at the residence, in Washington City, of her father, 
then Secretary of the Interior under President Taylor. In 
the following September he received what was, in those days, 
considered one of the highest prizes the military profession 
hml in store for the subaltern, being appointed a commissary 
of subsistence with the rank of captain. He was immediately 
assigned to duty, as such, upon the staff of the commanding 
officer of the military department of the West, and stationed 
at St. Louis. In March of the following year he received 
from the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, a commission as captain, by brevet, to date from May 
30, 18-18, "for meritorious services in California during the 
war in Mexico." 

On the 6th of September, 1853, Captain Sherman resigned 
his commission in the army, and like many of his companions 
at that time, sought for such advancement in civil life as the 
army seemed little likely to afford. He was offered and 



20 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

accepted the position of manager of the branch banking-house 
of Messrs. Lucas, Turner & Company, at San Francisco, 
California, and accordingly went a second time to the Pacific, 
intending now to establish his home there. 

During all this time the seeds of discord had been ripening 
in the hot soil of slavery. The Southern statesmen, accus- 
tomed to rule, began to perceive that the country would not 
always submit to be ruled by them ; that hostility to slavery 
was a sentiment deeply rooted in the minds of the people of 
the Tree States, and daily spreading its influence ; and that 
the accession of men holding these opinions to power in the 
national councils and the national executive, meant nothing 
less than such a limitation of the further extension of slavery 
as would be fatal to its existence, even where it was already 
established. Slavery, they believed, could not thrive in con- 
tact with freedom ; and they had come to regard slavery as 
essential to their political and social existence. Without a 
slave caste, they could have no aristocratic caste. No class 
can enjoy exclusive rights except at the expense of another, 
whose rights are curtailed or extinguished. They began to 
isolate themselves from the North, as they termed the Free 
States ; from its dangerous opinions, by refusing to read or 
hear them ; from its society, by withdrawing their sons and 
daughters from Northern schools and colleges, and by declin- 
ing to associate with Northern men and women who were not 
well known to be free from the pernicious doctrines ; and finally, 
they prepared to throw off their political allegiance to the 
Government of the United States the moment it should have 
passed beyond their control. The Northern politicians, accus- 
tomed to follow the lead of their Southern associates, gen- 
erally believed that the defeat of Fremont, in 1856, as the 
^Republican candidate for the presidency, had insured the 
perpetuity of the Union ; the Southern politicians, generally, 
believed that the date of its dissolution was postponed during 
the next presidential term, and that four years and a facile 
President were given them to prepare for it. And they began 
to do so. 



BEFOKE THE WAK. 21 

The pro-slavery leaders were well aware that the attempted 
overthrow of the National Government would be likely, even 
in the disguise of peaceable secession, to be resisted by force. 
They accordingly got every thing in readiness to carry out 
their plans by force. The wiser heads among them hoped, if 
they did not altogether expect, to be allowed to secede in 
peace, but they were as determined as the rest to appeal to 
war in the last resort. Accordingly, during Mr. Buchanan's 
Administration, there was set on foot throughout the slave- 
holding States a movement embodying the reorganization of 
the militia, the establishment and enlargement of State mili- 
tary academies, and the collection of arms, ammunition, and 
warlike materials of all kinds. The federal Secretary of War, 
Mr. Floyd, thoroughly in the interests of the pro-slavery 
conspirators, aided them by sending to the arsenals in the 
Slave States large quantities of the national arms and mili- 
tary supplies ; the quotas of the Southern States under the 
inilitia laws were anticipated, in some cases by several years ; 
and he caused large sales of arms to be secretly made, at low 
prices, to the agents of those States. The pro-slavery leaders 
then began, quietly, to select and gather round them the men 
whom they needed, and upon whom they thought they could 
rely. Unable always to explain to these men their purposes, 
they were often compelled to trust to circumstances and the 
force of association to complete the work ; and in doing so, 
they occasionally, though not often, made mistakes. 

Among the men they fixed upon was Captain Sherman. 
Recognizing his aptitude in military art and science, the lead- 
ers in Louisiana determined to place him at the head of the 
new State Military Academy at Alexandria. It was explained 
, to him that the object of establishing the school was to aid in 
suppressing negro insurrections, to enable the State to protect 
her borders from the Indian incursions, then giving trouble in 
Arkansas and Texas, and to form a nucleus for defence, in case 
of an attack by a foreign enemy. 

It is rare, indeed, that a man whose youth has been spent 
in the army does not, in his maturer years, retain a lurking de- 



22 SHBEMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

sire for the old life, the old companions, the old ways. Let 
the temptation be offered in a moment when the cares and de- 
tails of civil life look more than ordinarily dull, when the future 
seems clouded, and the warm memories of former days may 
present a contrast too vivid for most men to resist. Cincin- 
natus leaves the plough and returns with the senators to the 
camp. So it was with Captain Sherman. Messrs. Lucas 
Turner & Company had broken up their branch-house at San 
Francisco. The offer was in a line with his associations, his 
tastes, and his ambition. He accordingly accepted the office, 
and entered upon his duties as Superintendent of the Louisiana 
State Military Academy, early in the year 1860. The liberal 
salary of five thousand dollars a year was attached to the 
office. 

The efficiency which Captain Sherman here displayed con- 
firmed the leaders in that State in the correctness of their 
choice, and satisfied them that he was a man to be kept at any 
price. They were met at the outset by a deep-seated loyalty, 
by a deep-rooted attachment and. fidelity to the Union, upon 
which they had by no means calculated. Every effort was 
expended to convert him to their way of thinking, but in vain. 
Surface opinions change with the wind, but it is useless to 
argue against fundamental beliefs. And such was the charac- 
ter of Sherman's attachment to the Union. 

As events ripened, he saw clearly that the election of Mr. 
Lincoln to the presidency would be followed by the general 
secession of the Southern States, and that secession meant 
war. When, at length, after using his influence to its fullest 
extent in favor of the Union, he perceived that the result could 
no longer be avoided, he decided upon his own course, and 
communicated his decision to the Governor of the State in 
this clear and straightforward letter, dated January 18, 18G1 : 

" SIE As I occupy a ^asi-military position under this State, 
I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such position 
when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and when the motto 
of the seminary, inserted in marble over the main door, was : 



BEFORE THE WAB. 23 

* By the liberality of the General Government of the United States : 
The Union Esto Perpetual 

" Becent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes 
all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraws from the Federal 
Union, /prefer to maintain my allegiance to the old Constitu- 
tion as long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay 
here would be wrong in every sense of the word. In that 
event, I beg you will send or appoint some authorized agent 
to take charge of the arms and munitions of war here belong- 
ing to the State, or direct me what disposition should be made 
of them. 

" And furthermore, as President of the Board of Supervisors, 
I beg you to take immediate steps to relieve me as superin- 
tendent the moment the State determines to secede ; for on no 
earthly account will I do any act, or think any thought, hostile 
to or in defiance of the old Government of the United States." 

His resignation was, of course, promptly accepted, and he 
at once returned to St. Louis. In consequence of the uncer- 
tain aspect of political affairs, he had deemed it most prudent 
that his family should not accompany him to the South. 

He was not destined to remain long inactive. The crisis for 
which the pro-slavery leaders had been so long preparing was 
precipitated by the rashness of the more incautious among 
themselves, and hurried forward by the frenzy of the people. 
The far-sighted conspirators had proposed to themselves to 
capture Washington before the North should be able to organ- 
ize resistance, and to proclaim themselves the true and lawful 
Government of the United States. They would have declared 
Mr. Lincoln's election, with the avowed purpose, among others, 
of disregarding what they considered as their constitutional 
right of holding slaves in the Territories, as unconstitutional, and 
therefore null, and would have based their assumption of power 
on the right of self-preservation. From their knowledge of the 
disposition of most of the foreign ministers resident at the Fed- 
eral capital, they expected their recognition by the leading 
European powers to follow closely upon the act. They counted 



24 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIG-NS. 

upon the trade-loving and tlie peace-loving instincts of the people 
of tlie Free States to keep the North inert. The great Central 
and Western States would probably be with them, and New 
England they would gladly leave, as they were accustomed to 
say, " out in the cold." But while the cool-headed conspira- 
tors plotted thus skilfully, one element of their calculation 
failed. It had been necessary to their plans to fire the Southern 
heart to the point of rebellion : the Southern brain took fire 
as well. Events took the bit in their teeth. On the 12th of 
April, 1861, Mr. Davis gave the order to open upon Fort Sum- 
ter. At noon the first gun was fired, and the war was begun. 
Sherman had gone to "Washington about the time of Mr. Lin- 
coln's inauguration, and had talked of the state of affairs with 
characteristic freedom. He believed that war was inevitable ; 
that it would be no pantomime of wooden swords, but a long 
and bitter struggle. He endeavored in vain, in earnest 
nervous language, to impress his convictions upon the Ad- 
ministration. Nobody listened to him except the President, 
who listened to everybody. Sherman went to him to offer his 
services in any capacity. His strong words and strong 
thoughts elicited a smile from Mr. Lincoln. " We shall not 
need many men like you," he said ; " the affair will soon blow 
over." Some of Sherman's friends in the army, who knew his 
talents, and, like him, believed there would be a war, urged 
his appointment to the chief clerkship of the War Department, 
a position which, at that time was always held by a confiden- 
tial adviser of the Secretary of War ; and somewhat later he 
was strongly recommended for the position of quartermaster- 
general of the army, made vacant by the resignation of Briga- 
dier-General Joseph E. Johnston. Neither application was 
successful. 

Sherman knew the Southern people; the Administration 
did not, nor did the people of the North in general. In his 
own words, we were sleeping upon a volcano. 

On the 15th of April, 1861, the President called for seventy- 
five thousand men to serve for three months, to be employed 
for the purpose of enforcing the laws of the United States, and 



BEFORE THE WAR. 25 

to hold and occupy the forts, arsenals, navy-yards, and other 
public places belonging to the National Government which 
had been seized by the rebels. Sherman was urged by his 
friends to go home to Ohio, and raise one of the three months' 
regiments. He declined to have any thing to do with such a 
trifling expedient, as he considered it. He did not believe 
that the three months' men would do any good, or that they 
could do any good. This affair was no riot, but a revolution. 
It was not a mob, to be put down by the posse comitatus, but a 
war, to be fought by an army. " Why," he said, " you might 
as well attempt to put out the flames of a burning house with 
a squirt-gun." 

He used all the influence at his command to induce the 
authorities to recognize his view of the case, and, by at once 
organizing the whole military force of the country, to crush 
the rebellion in its infancy. But the authorities still- believed 
there would be no fight, that the rebellion would succumb at 
the sight of the power of the Union. 

When the Government presently decided to add a regiment 
of artillery, one of cavalry, and nine of infantry to the regular 
army, Sherman at once applied for a command in this force, 
and, on the 13th of June, received a commission as colonel of 
the Thirteenth Eegiment of Infantry, to date from May 14th. 
As very little was done, just then, in regard to the organization 
of the new regiments, beyond the appointment of officers and 
a little feeble recruiting, Colonel Sherman's services were, like 
those of most of the newly-appointed officers who were known 
to possess military skill, made use of in another direction. 
Eichmond had been made the capital of the Confederate 
States. A force was collected to move on that city, capture 
it, and so suppress the rebellion at a blow. Major Irvin 
McDowell, assistant adjutant-general on the staff of Lieuten- 
ant-General Scott, had been appointed a brigadier-general in 
the regular army, and was assigned to the command of these 
troops. Colonel Sherman was ordered to report to him, and 
received the command of a brigade in the division of Brigadier- 
General Daniel Tyler. 



2(5 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 



CHAPTEB IL 

AN EXPERIMENT. 

THE troops which, were to move "on to Richmond," in 
accordance with the popular cry, were encamped in some sort 
of order on the south bank of the Potomac, from the Chain 
Bridge to Alexandria, and were thrown together, with more or 
less haste, into what were called five divisions, of two, three, 
or four brigades each. Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, of 
the Connecticut Volunteers, commanded the First Division, 
Colonels David Hunter, Sixth Cavalry, Samuel P. Heintzel- 
inan, Seventeenth Infantry, and Dixon S. Miles, Second In- 
fantry, the Second, Third, and Fifth, respectively, and Briga- 
dier-General Theodore Runyon, of the New Jersey militia, the 
Fourth Division. Three of these were old and experienced 
officers of the regular army, who had seen service in Mexico 
and in many Indian fights. Brigadier-General Robert C. 
Schenck commanded the First Brigade of Tyler's division; 
Colonel Erasmus D. Keyes, Eleventh Infantry, the Second; 
Colonel Sherman the Third Brigade, composed of the Thir- 
teenth, Sixty-ninth, and Seventy-ninth New York, and Second 
"Wisconsin regiments of infantry, with Captain Ayres's Battery 
E, Third Regular Artillery ; and Brigadier-General Israel B. 
Richardson commanded the Fourth Brigade. The troops 
were all raw. Most of them had volunteered for three months. 
As the end of that period approached, these men naturally 
thought more of home than they did of battle, more of living 
to see their friends than of dying for their country. Many of 
the volunteers had never fired a gun before, and felt nearly as 
much trepidation in loading their own pieces, and as much 



AN EXPERIMENT. O? 

alarm in discharging them, as the most deadly fire of the ene- 
my could have occasioned. Captains knew little or nothing 
of tactics beyond the manual of arms and the facings. Colonels 
could not put their regiments through the simplest manoeuvres. 
Eegimental commanders did not know their brigade command- 
ers, and brigade commanders made the acquaintance of their 
division commanders upon the field of battle. According to 
the ideas of those days, there was a deficiency of transporta- 
tion^Jhat is to say, eachTe^ment"ha~d-not a score of wagons : 
and the quartermasters in "Washington were at their wits' 
end to supply the demand. "Wagons intended for General 
McDowell's army went to General Patterson's, and General 
McDowell's army must therefore wait. The District of Columbia 
was embraced in a separate military department, called the 
Department of Washington. Its commander was overwhelmed 
by office details ; so the troops which were to go to the Army 
of Northeastern Virginia got mislaid, and had to be hunted 
up and hurried into brigades at the fifty-ninth minute of the 
eleventh hour. Every thing that was done was rushed into 
the newspapers, and most things that were intended to be 
done. The railroad lines leading South, with only .slight 
breaks, were still in use, and passes over them were freely 
issued, so that the rebel authorities might read the plan of to- 
day's operations at breakfast. But the people, drunk with 
hope, saw none of these things, or saw them double ; and 
those who might have led the people, ran after them. 

It may be said, in defence of the delusions of the hour, that 
our army was numerically stronger, as well officered, better 
equipped, and as well instructed as the rebel forces ; and so 
indeed it was. But the rebel army was to act upon the defen- 
sive, ours upon the offensive. The advantage of ground would 
be with the enemy, the advantage of surprise, and the great 
advantage of cohesion at the moment of attack. On the other 
hand, our troops would have to move, to find the enemy, and 
to attack him in his chosen position, or sustain his fire de- 
livered from behind cover or behind earthworks. But the 
salient point of this question is, that the result of any move- 



23 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

men*, by either side, was left to chance ; no man could have 
indicated the causes which would determine the result. It 
was purely chance whether any movement ordered from head- 
quarters would be made at all; a rare chance whether it 
would be made at the time designated in orders ; a miracu- 
lous chance if it were made exactly as ordered. By waiting a 
very little while, the result might have been reasonably 
assured. "We could not wait. In the American character, 
Hope crowds Patience to the wall. 

After much public discussion and excitement, the order was 
given to General McDowell to move forward. 

The enemy had a force of about twenty-two thousand men, 
organized in eight brigades, with twenty-nine guns, encamped 
and intrenched at Manassas Junction, and commanded by 
General Gustave T. Beauregard. They had outposts at Fair- 
fax Courthouse, and at Oentreville, seven miles from the Junc- 
tion. The brigades were commanded by Brigadier-Generals 
Ewell, Holmes, D. E. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham, and 
Colonels Cocke, Evans, and Early. 

General Joseph E. Johnston was at Winchester, with about 
twelve thousand men, watching our forces under Major-Gen- 
eral Robert Patterson, one of the Pennsylvania three months' 
militia. Generals Bee and Bartow and Colonel Jackson com- 
manded the brigades of General Johnston's army. General 
Patterson's force amounted to twenty-three thousand men of 
all arms, chiefly three months' militia. 

General McDowell was to move directly upon Manassas on 
the 9th of July, and, turning the enemy's right flank, cut off 
his forces from Richmond. The movement began on the 16th. 
The men, unaccustomed to marching, moved very slowly. 
Long years of peace had nourished in the minds of our citizens 
a reluctance to endure pain and privation, and the citizens had 
not become soldiers by a mere change of clothing. The men 
stopped every few moments to pick blackberries, stepped 
aside to avoid mud-puddles, crossed fords gingerly, emptied 
their canteens and fiUed them with fresh water whenever they 
came to a stream. Thus the army did not reach Oentreville 



AN EXPERIMENT. 29 

until the night of the 18th. Two days were spent here in re- 
connoissances, and on the 21st the final movement began. All 
this time the enemy, fully advised of our movements by the 
daily papers, was busily engaged in concentrating his avail- 
able forces to meet our attack. That he would do so was 
obvious. General Scott had undertaken to guard against this, 
so far as the army under Johnston was concerned, by instruct- 
ing General Patterson to observe him. Accordingly, after 
many delays, General Patterson moved from Martinsburg to 
Bunker HOI, nine miles from Winchester, and then turned 
aside and marched to Charlestown. At the very moment 
when Johnston was withdrawing with all speed from Winches- 
ter, and hurrying to Beauregard's aid, Patterson was retreat- 
ing to the Potomac. 

Tyler's division, which had marched from its camp near the 
Chain Bridge, on the extreme right of our lines, by the Vienna 
Road, was the first to reach Centreville. General Tyler's 
orders were to seize and hold this position, but not to bring on 
an engagement. He had no sooner arrived there than, elated 
at finding our progress undisputed by the enemy, he took the 
road to the left and pushed on, with Richardson's brigade, 
Ayres's battery, and a few cavalry, to Blackburn's Ford, where 
the Manassas and Centreville road crosses Bull Run. The 
ground on the left bank of that stream is, just here, open and 
gently undulating; on the other side it becomes at once 
heavily wooded, and ascends rather abruptly to the elevated 
plateau on which Manassas Junction is situated. General 
Tyler was surprised to find that the enemy had not occupied 
the left bank at the ford ; and still more, that they permitted 
our men to approach it unmolested. Nor was the enemy to 
be seen on the opposite bank. He deployed the infantry, and 
caused Captain Ayres to open fire from his battery on the 
woods opposite. Instantly a hot fire, as if from four thousand 
muskets at once, says the general, was opened from the woods. 
Our troops replied for a short while, and then retired. This 
movement was contrary to orders ; had no object worth mention- 
ing ; and its result had a most dispiriting effect upon the whole 



30 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

army of General McDowell. Before it, the men had been all en- 
thusiasm. They either would not meet the enemy at all, they 
dreamed, or they would whip him and chase him to Kichmond. 
The enemy had been met, had not fled at the sight of us, and 
had not bedn whipped. The enthusiasm, which had been at the 
boiling point, was chilled by a doubt. The delay of the 19th 
and 20th, while waiting for the subsistence to come up, spread 
and increased the flatness. 

The original plan was to turn the enemy's right, and so cut 
off his communication with Eichmond. General McDowell 
had objected to moving by his right to turn the enemy's left, 
because the movement would be indecisive. At the eleventh 
hour, this indecisive course was adopted, for the reasons that 
the roa.ds on the left appeared impracticable, that the enemy's 
attention had been attracted to Blackburn's Ford by tlie 
blunder of the 18th, and that it had now become an object to 
guard against the expected arrival of Johnston, by occupying 
his line of railway communication. 

On the night of Saturday, the 20th of July, General Mc- 
Dowell issued his orders for the attack. Eunyon's Fourth 
Division was left in the rear near Fairfax Courthouse. Tyler's 
division except Kichardson's brigade, which was to remain 
at Blackburn's Ford and report to Colonel Miles was to 
march at half-past two o'clock on Sunday morning down the 
Warrenton road, and threaten the Stone Bridge. Sclienck's 
and Sherman's brigades were encamped on the Warrenton 
road, about a mile beyond Centreville ; Keyes's brigade, 
which had become separated from the rest of the division, had 
gone into camp half a mile east of Centreville. Hunter's 
division, which was about a mile and a half beyond Keyes's, 
was to move at two o'clock, and close up on Tyler. Heintzel- 
man's division, which was encamped on the Braddock road, 
two miles east of Centreville, was to march at half-past two, 
and fall in in the rear of Hunter. Under cover of Tyler's 
attack, Hunter and Heintzelman were to move to the right, 
cross Bull Bun at Sudley's Springs, and turn the enemy's left. 
Miles's division was held in reserve at Centreville, to guard 



AN EXPEEIMENT. 31 

against a movement of the enemy by Blackburn's Ford, to cut 
off our rear. 

These dispositions, except as to Bunyon's division, were 
well made. Had^ they been executed, the result of the day 
must have been very different. 

At a blacksmith's shop, about a mile in advance of Tyler's 
position, a branch road leads from the "Warren ton pike towards 
Sudley's Springs. If Tyler had marched boldly forward, the 
rear of his division should have cleared that point in an hour, 
or, at the very latest, in an hour and a half. This would have 
enabled Hunter to file to the right certainly by four o'clock. 
In fact, the rear of Tyler's division did not pass the junction 
of the roads until half-past five, or fully an hour and a half 
later than it should have done. Schenck's brigade, which led 
the advance, started punctually at the time fixed in orders, 
but, as General Tyler himself explains, he felt called upon to 
move slowly and with caution, feeling his way down to the 
Stone Bridge. Tims occurred a fatal delay. 

The head of Schenck's brigade reached the Stone Bridge 
about six o'clock, and the artillery of his and Sherman's 
brigades opened fire about half an hour later. Hunter's di- 
vision could not find the road by which it was to march, and 
having been led by its guide by a wide detour through the 
woods, did not reach the ford until between half -past nine and 
ten o'clock, and occupied more than an hour in passing, so 
that it was after eleven o'clock before Heintzelinaii began to 
cross. The head of Hunter's column became engaged almost 
immediately after crossing Bull Kim, and drove the enemy 
steadily until about noon. While Hunter was crossing, orders 
were sent to Tyler to press his attack. Colonel Sherman, with 
his brigade, accordingly crossed Bull Pain at a ford just above 
the Stone Bridge, and pushed forward down the Warrcnton 
road until he joined the loft of Bumside's brigade of Hunter's 
division, then hotly engaged; Ayrey's battery, being i nablo 
to cross the ford, was left behind. Sherman came into action 
about half-past twelve, and was at once ordered by General 
McDowell to join in the pursuit of the enemy, then falling 



32 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

back on the left of the Groveton road. Placing Colonel 
Quiniby's Thirteenth New York regiment in front, in column 
by division, Colonel Sherman ordered the other regiments to 
follow in line of battle, in the order of the Second Wisconsin, 
Seventy-ninth New York, and Sixty-ninth New York. 

Thus far the tide of success had been unbroken. Our troops 
had effected the passage of Bull Eun, had driven the enemy 
before them in confusion a mile and a half, and we had suc- 
ceeded in uniting three divisions under the crest of the hill, 
which was to be the decisive point of the battle. On the left 
Eeyes was driving back the enemy, enabling Schenck to cross 
and remove the obstructions in his front, and to turn the 
enemy's right. The crisis was at hand. 

In his official report, Colonel Sherman thus graphically de- 
scribes the operations of his brigade at this time : " Quiniby's 
regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge, 
from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made an- 
other stand on ground very favorable to him ; and the regiment 
continued advancing as the enemy gave way, till the head of 
the column reached the point near which Eicketts's battery 
was so severely cut up. The other regiments descended the 
hill in line of battle, under a severe cannonading; and the 
ground affording comparative shelter against the enemy's ar- 
tillery, they changed direction by the right flank and followed 
the road before mentioned. At the point where this road 
crossed the bridge to our left the ground was swept by a most 
severe fire by artillery, rifle, and musketry, and we saw in suc- 
cession several regiments driven from it, among them the 
Zouaves and battalion of Marines. Before reaching the crest 
of the hill the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, 
and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible ; but 
when the "Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by 
order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, I 
ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank and to attack 
the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill 
steadily, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with 
spirit, and advanced, delivering its fire. This regiment is uni- 



AN EXPERIMENT. 33 

formed ia gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great 
bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fled in con- 
fusion, and retreated towards the road, there was a universal 
cry that they were being fired upon by our own men. The 
regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second 
time, and was again repulsed in disorder. By this time the 
New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and, in like manner, it 
was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the enemy 
from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of the ground. 
In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an in- 
cessant fire upon our advancing column, and the ground was 
irregular, with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of 
which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and 
musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth, headed by its 
colonel (Cameron), charged across the hill, and, for a short 
time, the contest was severe. They rallied several times under 
fire, but finally broke, and gained the cover of the hill. This 
left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Colonel Cor- 
coran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest, and 
had a full, open view of the ground so severely contested. 
The firing was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, 
and rifles incessant. It was manifest the enemy was here in 
great force, far superior to us at that point. The Sixty-ninth 
held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in dis- 
order." 

It was now half-past three o'clock in the afternoon. Tho 
men had been up since two in the morning, had been on their 
legs ever since, had been engaged for four hours, and had 
eaten nothing. The day was intensely hot. The troops, un- 
used to any of these things, were fagged. 

There was a slight lull on the extreme right. Porter's 
brigade of Hunter's division, and Giiffnrs and Kicketts's 
batteries were sent forward to occupy the crest of tlie hill, 
from which the enemy had been pushed. Hardly had they 
reached the new position, when a murderous volley was poured 
into them, at pistol range, from the clump of pines that skirted 
the hill, Early's brigade, of Johnston's army, had arrived, 



34 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

and thrown itself on our right flank. Our line began to melt. 
The movement was taken up reluctantly by some regiments, 
but soon became general. The retreat became confused, and, 
beyond Bull Kun, the confusion became a rout. The enemy 
did not pursue. That night, while a council of war was dis- 
cussing the expediency of holding Centreville, the sea of panic- 
stricken fugitives was making for Washington. Orders were 
issued for the coherent remains of the army to follow. 

Colonel Sherman says, of his own command : " This retreat 
was by night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men of 
different regiments mingled together, and some reached the 
river at Arlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part 
returned to their former camps at or near Fort Corcoran. I 
reached this point at noon next day, and found a miscellaneous 
crowd crossing over the aqueduct and ferries. Conceiving 
this to be demoralizing, I at once commanded the guard to be 
increased, and all persons attempting to pass over to be 
stopped. This soon produced its effect. Men sought their 
proper companies, comparative order was restored, and all are 
now (July 25) posted to the best advantage." 

The loss in Sherman's brigade was one hundred and eleven 
killed, two hundred and five wounded, two hundred and ninety- 
three missing ; total, six hundred and nine. Our total loss in 
this engagement, exclusive of missing, was four hundred and 
eighty-one killed, one thousand and eleven wounded. The 
loss in killed and wounded in Sherman's brigade was nearly a 
fourth of that of the entire army. The enemy lost, in all, three 
hundred and seventy-eight killed, fourteen hundred and eighty- 
nine wounded, and thirty missing. His loss in killed and 
wounded was considerably greater than ours, but he picked 
up many prisoners from among the wounded and the lagging 
stragglers. 

The prime causes which led to this disgraceful defeat are to 
be sought in the many delays attending the commencement 
and execution of the movement, in consequence of which our 
forces had to contend with the combined forces of Beauregard 
and Johnston. 



AN EXPEEIMENT. 35 

The panic which, followed tjie defeat must be traced to 
internal defects ; to the utter absence of coherence or cohesion 
in the masses of "militia ; to the want of confidence of men in 
iheir officers, of officers in thempelves and in their men ; to the 
sudden apparition of a new and undefined terror in place of the 
confidently expected triumph. The mass easily became a jum- 
oled crowd of individuals, because it had never been an army. 
' As to the general plan of campaign, it was certainly a fatal 
mistake that our army clung to the banks of the Potomac a 
long month after it should boldly have seized upon Centreville 
and Manassas ; and equally so, that a force of nearly eighty 
thousand should have been wasted by breaking it up into 
three fractions, destined to stand still on exterior lines, watch- 
ing the enemy concentrate on the key-point. 

But the mortifying and humiliating disaster was necessary, 
by crushing the shell at once, to show us in a moment our 
weakness and utter want of solidity. Disguised until the 
rebellion had developed and established its strength, the dis- 
ease would have been incurable. Laid bare at a stroke, the 
reaction set in at once, and the life of the nation was saved. 

Trust in every thing and everybody around" the capital was 
for the moment destroyed. Major-General George B. Mc- 
Clellan, who had been successful in his operations in Western 
Virginia, an accomplished officer, well known in the army, and 
possessing the confidence of the lieutenant-general, was at 
once summoned to Washington, and assigned to the command 
of all the troops for its defence. At the end of July, lie found 
i few scattered regiments cowering upon the banks of the 
Potomac. The militia went home. The North rose. Four 
months later, the Army of the Potomac counted two hundred 
thousand soldiers ready for their work. 

The sharpness with which Colonel Sherman criticised the 
conduct of some of the officers and men of his brigade at Bull 
Run, both in his official report and in his free conversations, 
made him many enemies ; but the vigor he had displayed on 
the field, added to the influence of his brother, the Honorable 
John Sherman, led the Ohio delegation in Congress to recom- 



36 SHEBMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

mend Ms promotion. He was commissioned as a Brigadier- 
General of Yolunteers on the 3d of August, 1861, to date back 
to the 17th of May, as was the custom at that time. ITor a 
short time after this he had command of a brigade in the Army 
of the Potomac, but early in September, upon the organization 
of the Department of Kentucky, he was transferred to that 
theatre of operations, and ordered to report, as second in 
command, to Brigadier-General Eobert Anderson, who was 
placed at the head of the department. 



THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. 37 



OHAPTEE IK 

THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. 

THE legerdemain by which the extreme Southern States were 
juggled out of the Union to feed the ambition of their leaders, 
had proved eminently successful. A Confederate dictionary 
had been made, in which slavery was called " the South ;" re- 
bellion, " secession ;" the execution of the laws, " coercion ;" 
and the desires of the conspirators, "the Constitution." A 
Confederate logic had been constructed, in which a system of 
postulates was substituted for the old-fashioned syllogism, and 
every thing taken for granted which it was impossible to prove. 
Only let it be granted that where thirteen or more parties have 
entered into an agreement with each other, any one of them 
can rightfully withdraw from the arrangement whenever he 
chooses, without the consent of the others, and you can prove 
any thing. A man whose mind is so organized that he can 
believe that, can believe any thing. And the Southern people 
were carefully taught to believe it. 

It followed, of course, that while those States which chose 
ho " secede" could not rightfully be " coerced" to remain in the 
Union, those States which chose to stay must be forced to 
secede. 

Unexpectedly, Kentucky chose to stay. Then the inventors 
of the Confederate dictionary and the Confederate logic put 
their heads together and hatched a new lie. They called it 
Neutrality. 

It meant that Kentucky was to be neutral until the rebellion 
should become strong enough to swallow her at a mouthful. 
She was to arm herself to resist invasion from the South or 



38 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

from the North. The governor, Beriah Magoffin, a secessionist, 
organized the State militia in the interest of his faction, and 
issued a proclamation declaring that Kentucky would remain 
neutral. A few prominent gentlemen, still retaining an at- 
tachment for the Union, suffered themselves to be lulled to 
rest by the tranquil sound of the new word. Their names had 
great weight at "Washington. The unconditional Union men 
were few in numbers and weak in influence. The Govern- 
ment could not make up its mind what to do. The secessionists 
prepared for war. 

Governor Magoffin called a special meeting of the Legisla- 
ture, and urged that body to assemble a State Convention to 
consider the crisis. The Legislature met on the 28th of April. 
Two days afterwards the governor issued a proclamation de- 
claring in effect that Kentucky would assume a position of 
belligerent neutrality, and would defend herself against in- 
vasion from any quarter. On the 22d of May, the Legislature 
resolved that the governor's proclamation of neutrality was not 
a true exponent of the views of the people. The State Militia 
law was so amended as to require the State Guard to take the 
oath of allegiance to the United States. On the 24th of May, 
the last day of the session, the Senate passed resolutions de- 
claring that "Kentucky will not sever connection from the 
National Government, nor take up arms for either belligerent 
party, but arm herself for the preservation of peace within 
her borders, and tender their services as mediators to effect a 
just and honorable peace." The resolutions were lost in the 
House by a vote of forty-nine to forty-three. The secession- 
ists began to be seriously alarmed. Their fears were not 
diminished when the result of the election for members of Con- 
gress, held on the 1st of July, showed a majority for the Union 
candidates of more than fifty-five thousand. * 

The Legislature met again on the 3d of September. In the 
mean time, the Government had authorized LoveH H. Eoussean 
to raise a brigade hi Kentucky for the United States service, 
and the Confederate troops, under Polk, had just invaded the 
State and occupied Hickman and Chalk Bluffs, General Grant, 



THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. 39 

who had been watching the progress of affairs, immediately 
took the responsibility of occupying Paducah. The seces- 
sionists, headed by the governor, londly demanded that both 
belligerents should withdraw their forces. They hoped to 
frighten the Government of the United States into compliance, 
while the rebel authorities, being under no obligation to listen 
to them, should absorb the State. On the llth, the Legisla- 
ture, by a vote of 71 to 26, requested the Governor to order 
the Confederate troops to evacuate the State. A series of 
test resolves was at once introduced, declaring that the neu- 
trality of Kentucky and the rights of her people had been in- 
vaded by the so-called Southern Confederate forces, requesting 
the governor to call out the military force of the State to expel 
the invaders, and invoking the assistance of the United States 
to that end. In the Assembly, the vote stood sixty-eight to 
twenty-six. On the 13th, the governor vetoed the resolutions. 
The Legislature promptly repassed them over his veto, by 
more than a two-thirds vote. 

The Confederate tactics changed at once. The men who 
had declared they must go with their State found they were 
under no obligation to stay with their State. The men who 
had protested that it was a crime to coerce a State to remain 
in the Union, discovered that it was their sacred duty to coerce 
Kentucky to leave the Union. Buckner and Brecldnridge fled, 
and at once took commands as general officers in the Con- 
federate service. They were followed by their fellow-conspira- 
tors, and by all whom their arguments or promises had se- 
duced. 

On the 17th of September, Buckner seized a railway-train, 
and moved from Bowling Green upon Louisville. An accident 
to the train delayed him within forty miles of the city, and by 
the time he was ready to move again, Eousseau's brigade and 
a battalion of Home-guards was ready to oppose him ; so he 
abandoned the attempt. 

In compliance with the call of the Legislature, and by order 
of the President, Brigadier-General Eobert Anderson assumed 
command of the Military Department of Kentucky on the 21bt 



4:0 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

September, and immediately made preparations for organizing 
the full quota of troops which the State had been called upon 
to furnish for the national service. The invasion of the State 
by the Confederate troops had torn the mask from the designs 
of the secessionists, and it was no longer possible to favor 
them openly. A strong pressure was, however, still exerted, 
in more or less secrecy, to keep men out of the Union army, to 
encourage their enlistment in the Confederate army, and to 
obstruct the operations of the Union authorities. The young 
men had nearly all been seduced into the rebel service, at first 
by the cry that they must fight for their State, and next by 
the cry that they must fight for slavery, under the name of 
" the South," against their State. Eecruiting for the Union 
army went on very slowly, and meanwhile, at Bowling Green 
and Nashville, Polk and Zollicoffer were gathering large bodies 
of rebel troops to invade and hold Kentucky. 

Brigadier-General Anderson, finding his health, already deli- 
cate, unequal to the demands made upon his strength by the 
cares and responsibilities of his position under these trying 
circumstances, asked the "War Department to relieve him from 
command. His request was complied with, and on the 7th of 
October he was relieved by Brigadier-General Sherman, then 
in command of a brigade at Lexington. 

General Sherman at once set to work with great energy to 
organize his department, and prepare the troops for the task 
before them. 

The quota of volunteers which Kentucky was called upon 
to raise was forty thousand, and with these General Sherman 
was expected by the "War Department to defend the State and 
drive the enemy from her soil. They were raised very slowly, 
and but few reinforcements came from any quarter. At the 
close of October, Sherman had succeeded in collecting and or- 
ganizing a force of nine thousand men at Lexington, and ten 
thousand in front of Louisville. The enemy had at the same 
time about fifteen thousand at Bowling Green, under Buckner, 
and a strong force at Cumberland Gap, under Zollicoffer. 
Bowling Green is the key to the military possession of Cen- 



THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. 41 

tral Kentucky, and Cumberland Gap to that of Eastern 
Kentucky. 

General McClellan, who succeeded to the chief command of 
the army on the 1st of November, immediately adopted a 
general plan of campaign, in which the operations in the De- 
partment of the Cumberland were subordinate to and formed 
a co-operative part of those of the principal army on the Po- 
tomac ; but the people, the press, and the Administration had 
become impatient of the general inactivity of our forces, and 
were clamoring for their advance. On the 16th of October, 
the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, accompanied by Briga- 
dier-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General of the Army, 
visited General Sherman at Louisville, for the purpose of as- 
certaining, in a personal interview, the precise condition and 
prospect of affairs in this quarter. Sherman shared the objec- 
tions entertained by Lieutenant-General Scott, and now by 
Major-General McClellan, to what the former termed " a little 
war," and believed, with them, with all the ardor of his tem- 
perament, in the necessity of concentrated and decisive move- 
ments by armies large enough not merely to undertake a suc- 
cessful advance, but to finish the war. He did not, however, 
as General McClellan seems to have done, overlook the im- 
portance of schooling his troops by minor operations, and 
keeping up their spirits by minor successes ; but he looked 
further ahead than was agreeable in a subordinate commander. 
Short views, generally the happiest, are often the wisest ; but 
it is not always possible for a man of powerful nervous organ- 
ization, and strong perceptions of cause and effect, to take 
short views. He frequently sees the future too clearly to con- 
template the present with calmness. So it was now with Sher- 
man. 

The secretary of war asked him how many troops he would 
require in his department. Sherman replied, " Sixty thousand 
to drive the enemy out of Kentucky ; two hundred thousand 
to finish the war in this section." Convinced of the inutility 
of advancing against the enemy until our strength would ren- 
der success decisive as well as reasonably certain, while defeat 



42 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

would not be irreparable, and aware of the ease with which 
the enemy, driven out of Kentucky, could concentrate and 
recuperate in Tennessee, and calling to his aid the vast re- 
serves then at his command, would finally compel us hastily to 
summon to the field at the eleventh hour., and concentrate upon 
an advanced and exposed position, a much larger force than 
would have been required in the first instance ; perceiving these 
things clearly and sharply, he could not sympathize with, 01 
even comprehend the spirit of his superiors, who were all foi 
present success, and for trusting to-morrow entirely to the fu- 
ture. On the other hand, the secretary of war and the adjutant- 
general could not understand Sherman, nor see the utility of a 
delay which they regarded as merely temporizing. Looking 
only at the force of the enemy then actually in arms in Sher- 
man's immediate front, they considered that he vastly over- 
estimated the obstacles with which he would have to contend. 
Calculations of difficulties generally seem to earnest men, not 
thoroughly familiar with the subject-matter, to spring from 
timidity or want of zeal. In a few days the report of the 
adjutant-general, embracing fuE particulars of the condi- 
tion of all the Western armies, as shown by this inspection, 
was given to the pnblic in all the newspapers. In referring to 
General Sherman, General Thomas simply stated that he had 
said he would require two hundred thousand men. Great ex- 
citement and indignation was occasioned in the popular mind 
by this announcement. A writer for one of tlie newspapers 
declared that Sherman was crazy. Insanity is hard to prove ; 
harder still to disprove, especially when the suspicion rests 
upon a difference of opinion ; and then the infirmities of great 
minds are always fascinating to common minds. The public 
seized with avidity upon the anonymous insinuation, and ac- 
cepted it as an established conclusion. 

On the 12th of November, Brigadier-General Don Carlos 
Buell was ordered by Major-General McOlellan to relieve 
Brigadier-General Sherman from the command of the Depart- 
ment of the Cumberland ; and the latter was ordered to report 
to Major-General Halleck, commanding the Department of the 



THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. 43 

West. General Buell was at once strongly reinforced, so as 
to enable Mm to take the offensive during the latter part of 
winter. 

These events embody the same useful lesson of tolerance 
for the conflicting opinions of others that has been pointedly 
taught us again and again during this war. At this distance 
of time, Sherman's views seem scarcely so extraordinary as 
they did to the public in 1861. Many more than two hundred 
thousand men liave been required to hold permanently Ken- 
tucky and Tennessee ; for, indeed, here as elsewhere, we have 
had to contend not alone against the force which the enemy 
has actually had in the field at any given time, but against 
that force augmented by the whole able-bodied male popula- 
tion behind it. 

Fortunately, indeed, under a powerful nervous organization, 
in spite of the -workings of a myriad of irritable fibres, there 
lay ;it the bottom the germs of a patience that was to render 
the genius of Slierman still useful to the republic. 

Although tlius suffering in the popular estimation and in 
the confidence of the War Department, General Sherman did 
not altogether lose the hold he had so long maintained upon 
the respect of his brother officers. The general-in-chief 
thought ho might still be. useful in a subordinate capacity, 
although he had failed to give satisfaction in command of au 
important department. Major-General Halleck, to whom he 
now reported, considered him competent to the charge of 
the rendezvous for volunteers at the Benton Barracks, near 
St. Louis, and assigned him to that duty. With the monot- 
onous a,iid caulless details of such a camp, Sherman was 
occupied during the winter of 1861. 

General Ealleck's command was the largest in extent of any 
of the departments, as organized at the time, and was considered 
by the gonoral-in-cliief as only inferior in importance to that 
of the Potomac, to which his personal attention was given. 
It cm! >raced two distinct theatres of operations, extending from 
the line of the Cumberland Eiver westward towards Kansas, 
and divided by the Mississippi Eiver. Of these, the chief in 



4A: SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

importance was east of the Mississippi. The enemy held 
Columbus on the Mississippi, Forts Henry and Donelson 
on the Tennessee, and Bowling Green in the adjoining De- 
partment of the Cumberland. These positions gave him the 
control of "Western and Central Kentucky, and each of them was 
strongly fortified and occupied in. large force. Major-Gen- 
eral Leonidas Polk commanded at Columbus, Brigadier-Gen- 
eral John B. Floyd at Fort Donelson, and Brigadier-General 
Simon B. Buckner at Bowling Green. The Cumberland was 
the dividing line between the Department of the Ohio, com- 
manded by General Buell, and the Department of the "West. 
It was determined to endeavor to break through the centre 
of the enemy's long line by ascending the Cumberland and 
Tennessee rivers, aided by a flotilla of gunboats which had 
been prepared at Cairo and at St. Louis, under the command 
of Captain A. EL Foote, of the navy. To Brigadier-General 
Ulysses S. Grant, then commanding at Paclucah, was assigned 
tlio chief direction of the movement. Very little was known 
of this officer. He had graduated at West Point in 18-13, 
had served in the Fourth Infantry until 185-1, when Laving 
risen to the grade of captain, he resigned his commission 
and settled in private life, in Illinois, as a surveyor. On the 
breaking out of the war, having offered his services to Gover- 
nor Yates in any capacity in which he could be useful, ho was 
for some time engaged in assisting the adjutant-general of the 
State iu organizing the three months' volunteers. On the organ- 
ization of the three years' troops, he accepted the colonelcy of 
the Sixty-Third Illinois regiment, arid exhibited such marked 
efficiency in its instruction and discipline, that lie wus soon 
commissioned as a brigadier-general of volunteers. He had 
commanded the brigade engaged in the demonstration against 
Behnont, Missouri, on the 7th of November, 1801. 

Suddenly the gloom of that dark winter, during which our 
large armies slept, our small forces encountered defeat, 
and the signs of anarchy gathered ominously from every 
quarter, was broken by a victory. Fort Henry was taken by 
Brigadier-General Grant on the 6th February, 1802. Or- 



THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY. 45 

the 16tli of the same month, Fort Donelson surrendered un- 
conditionally to the same officer, with a garrison of about 
twelve thousand men. In answer to the request of the rebel 
commander Buclmer, for a parley and more favorable terms, 
Grant replied that he could consent to no terms but those of 
unconditional surrender, and tersely added, "I propose to 
move immediately upon your works." A shout of joy rang 
throughout the land. Grant was made a major-general with- 
out an hour's delay. In a fervid letter to the New York 
Tribune, the Secretary of "War, Mr. Stanton, vented his en- 
thusiasm in raptures over the unconditional surrender, and 
cited with admiration the proposal to move immediately upon 
the enemy's works. Grant was the hero of the hour. 

By the President's War Order, No. 3, dated March 11, 1862, 
relieving Major-General McClellan from the chief command 
of the army, Major-General Halleck was assigned to the com- 
mand of the Department of the Mississippi, embracing all the 
troops west of a line drawn indefinitely north and south 
through Knoxville, Tennessee, and east of the western bound- 
aries of Missouri and Arkansas. Major-General Grant was 
shortly afterwards assigned by General Halleck to the com- 
mand of the army in the field, operating on the line of the 
Tennessee Eiver. 

When Grant moved upon Fort Donelson, Sherman was or- 
dered to Paducah, to take charge of the duty of forwarding 
supplies and reinforcements from that point. He set to work 
with a characteristic energy that must have found room enough 
to expand itself, for troops were hard to move in those days, 
and supplies, owing to the greenness of some and the rusti- 
ness of other officers of the quartermaster's department, 
harder still. General Grant took occasion to acknowledge the 
great importance of the services thus rendered. 

The Army of the Tennessee, after some changes, was 
finally organized in sis divisions, of which Major-General John 
A. McClernand commanded the first ; Major-General Charles 
F. Smith, the second ; Brigadier-General Lewis Wallace, the 
third; Brigadier-General Stephen A. Hurlbut, the fourth; 



46 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Brigadier-General "WIGiara T. Sherman, the fifth; and Briga- 
dier-General B. M. Prentiss, the sixth. The fifth division was 
composed almost entirely of the rawest troops, hastily gathered 
together and thrown into brigades, none of whom had eyer 
been under fire, or, indeed, under discipline. Sherman took 
command of his division at Paducah early in March. 

During all this time the public heard nothing of Sherman. 
The press said nothing against him ; it had ostracised and 
then forgotten Him. He was under a cloud still, but it was 
about to lift for a brief period. 



SHILOH. 



CHAPTEE IV. 

SHILOH. 

THE enemy's forces under General A. S.Johnston, consisting 
of the corps of Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, of two divisions 
each, and the reserve division of Brigadier-General Breckin- 
ridge, having successively evacuated Columbus and Nashville, 
and abandoned Tennessee and Kentucky, with the exception 
of Memphis and Cumberland Gap, had concentrated at Cor- 
inth., in Mississippi, and were there awaiting the development 
of our plans, ready to act according to circumstances, on the 
offensive or defensive, and to take advantage of any error we 
might make. The position was well chosen for observing our 
movements, for covering the line of the Mississippi, or for 
menacing the flank and rear of an army invading Mississippi 
and Alabama. 

General Halleck decided to advance up the Tennessee Bdver 
MS far as practicable by water ; then to debark on the west 
bank, attack the enemy at Corinth, and endeavor to cut him 
off from the East, and compel his surrender either at Corinth 
or on the banks of the Mississippi. Grant was ordered to 
move up the Tennessee, and Buell to march from Nashville 
and join him near Savannah, Tennessee. 

On the 14th of March, Sherman, with the leading division 
of Grant's army, passed up the Tennessee on transports, and 
after making a feint of landing at Eastport, dropped down the 
stream and disembarked at Pittsburgh Landing. It was Sher- 
man's intention to march from this point seven miles in the 
direction of luka, and then halting his infantry, to dispatch 
the cavalry to the nearest point on the Memphis and Charles- 



48 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

ton railway. The attempt was made, but the enemy was en- 
countered in greater force than had been expected, and it did 
not succeed. In the mean while, Major-General Charles F. 
Smith, who had command of the advance, haying landed his 
own second division at Savannah, had selected Pittsburgh 
Landing as the most favorable position for the encampment 
of the main body of the army, and under his instructions 
Sherman and Hurlbut, who, with the fourth division, had 
closely followed him, went into camp there. In the course of 
a few days they were joined by the first and sixth divisions of 
McOlernand and Prentiss, and by Smith's own division from 
Savannah ; and Major-General Grant himself arrived and toot 
command in person. During the last week of March, the 
Army of the Tennessee only waited for the Army of the 
Ohio. General BuelL had informed General Grant that he 
would join him before that time; but he had encountered 
great delays, and on the morning of the sixth of April the 
Army of the Ohio had not yet come. It was hourly expected. 
Instructions had been sent by General Grant to expedite its 
advance, and to push on to Pittsburgh. The importance of 
the crisis was apparent, for Johnston would naturally seek to 
strike Grant before BuelTs arrival ; but Buell marched his 
troops with the same deliberation as if no other army depended 
upon his promptness. By express orders he even caused in- 
tervals of six miles to be observed between his divisions on 
the march, thus lengthening out his column to a distance of 
over thirty miles. 

Pittsburgh is not a village, but simply a steamboat landing, 
containing a log hut or two, and is situated in a deep ravine, 
.down which the Corinth road leads to the Tennessee Biver. 
The distance to Corinth is twenty miles. The ground in front 
of Pittsburgh is an undulating table-land, about a hundred 
feet above the road bottom, lying between two small tribu- 
taries of the Tennessee, Lick Creek on the south, and Snake 
Creek on the north, and having a front of about three miles 
between the two streams. Owl Creek rises near the source of 
Lick Creek, and flowing northeasterly, empties into Snake 



SHILOH. 49 

Creek. Towards the river the bank is broken into abrupt 
ravines, and rises gradually to a range of low hills, which 
form the steep north banks of Lick Creek. The country is 
covered with a heavy forest, easily passable for troops, except 
where the dense undergrowth now and then constitutes an 
obstruction, and is sparsely broken by a few small cleared 
farms of about eighty acres each. The soil is a tenacious 
clay. About two miles from the landing the road to Corinth 
forks into two branches, forming the Lower Corinth road and 
the Eidge Corinth road ; and another road leads off, still far- 
ther to the left, across Lick Creek to Hamburgh, a few miles 
up the Tennessee River. On the right, two roads lead almost 
due west to Purdy, and another in a northerly direction across 
Snake Creek, down the river to Crump's Landing, six miles 
below. Innumerable smaller roads intersect these. 

On the front of this position, facing to the south and south- 
west, five divisions of the Army of the Tennessee were encamped 
on the morning of the Gtli of April. On the extreme left lay 
Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division, on the Hamburgh 
road, behind the abrupt bank of Lick Creek. Prentiss's small 
division, facing to the south, carried tlio line across a branch 
of the main Corinth road, nearly to Sherman's left. Sherman 
facing to the south., with his right thrown back towards the 
landing, extended tlio front to the Purdy road, near Owl Creek. 
This advanced line was about two miles from the landing. 
Near the river, about a mile in rear of Prentiss and Stuart, 
Hurlbut's division was encamped ; McClornand's was posted 
to the loft and rear of Sherman, covering the interval between 
him and Prentiss ; and C. F. Smith's division, commanded 
during his severe illness at Savannah by Brigadier-General 
W. H. L. Wallace, was on tlio right of Hurlbut. Lewis Wal- 
lace's division was six miles distant, at Crump's Landing. 
Our whole force in front of Pittsburgh was about thirty thou- 
sand men. 

On Friday, the 4th of April, the enemy's cavalry had made a 
demonstration upon the picket line, drove it in on Sherman's 
centre, and captured a lieutenant and seven nicu. They were 

4 



50 SHEBMA3ST AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

driven back by the cavalry of Sherman's division, and pursued 
for a distance of about five miles, with, considerable loss. The 
next day the enemy's cavalry had again showed itself in our 
front, but there was nothing to indicate a general attack until 
seven o'clock on Sunday morning, when the advance guard on 
Sherman's front was forced in upon his main line. Sherman 
at once got his men under arms, sent a request to General 
McClernand to support his left, and informed Generals Pren- 
, tiss and Hurlbut that the enemy was before him in force. Sher- 
1 man's division was posted as follows : The first brigade, under 
I Colonel J. A. McDowell, consisting of his own regiment, the 
6th Iowa ; 40th Illinois, Colonel Hicks ; 46th Ohio, Colonel 
"Worthington, and Captain Behr's "Morton" Battery held the 
right, guarding the bridge over Owl Creek, on the Purdy road. 
The fourth brigade, commanded by Colonel Buckland of the 
72d Ohio, and including that regiment ; the 48th Ohio, Colo- 
nel Sullivan, and the 70th Ohio, Colonel Cockerill, continued 
the line, its left resting on Shiloh meeting-house. The third 
brigade, commanded by Colonel Hildebrand of the 77th Ohio, 
was composed of that regiment, the 53d Ohio, Colonel Ap- 
pier, and the 57th Ohio, Colonel Mungen, and was posted 
to the left of the Corinth road, its right resting on Shiloh 
meeting-house. Taylor's battery of light artillery was in 
position at the meeting-house, and Waterhouse's on a ridge 
to the left commanding the open ground between Appier's 
and Mungen' s regiments. Eight companies of the 4th Illinois 
cavalry, Colonel Dickey, were placed in a large open field in 
rear of the centre of the division. Stuart's second brigade 
was, as we have seen, detached, and on the extreme left of 
the army. 

The enemy formed under cover of the brush that lines the 
Owl Creek bottom, and at eight o'clock opened fire from his 
artillery, and moved forward his infantry across the open 
ground and up the -slope that separated him from our lines. 
It now became evident that a general and determined attack 
was intended. Under cover of the advance on Sherman's 
front, the enemy was seen moving heavy masses to the left to 



SHILOH. 51 

attack Prentiss. About nine, the firing told that Prentiss was 
giving ground, and presently Colonel Appier's Fifty-third 
Ohio and Colonel Mungen's Fifty-seventh. Ohio regiments 
broke in disorder, exposing "Waterhouse's battery. A brigade 
of McClernand's division, which had been promptly moved 
forward by General McClernand to the support of Sherman's 
left, formed the immediate supports of this battery ; but the 
enemy advanced with such vigor, and kept up so severe a fire, 
that the three regiments composing it were soon also in dis- 
order, and the battery was lost. McDowell's and Buckland's 
brigades, and the remaining regiment of Hildebrand's brigade, 
maintained the position at Shiloh for an hour longer ; but ten 
o'clock found the enemy pressing heavily upon Sherman's 
front, their artillery supported by infantry entirely in rear of 
the left flank of the division, and Hildebrand's own regiment 
broken up also ; so that it was found necessary to change 
position at once, and Sherman accordingly gave orders 
to retire Ms line to the Purdy and Hamburgh road, near 
McClernand's first position, and there continue the defence. 
Taylor's battery was sent to the rear at once to take up 
the new position, and hold the enemy in check while the 
movement was in progress. Hiding across the angle, General 
Sherman met, at the intersection of this road with the 
Corinth road, Captain Belir's battery, attached to Colonel 
McDowell's brigade, and ordered it to come into battery. 
The captain had hardly given the order to his men, when 
ho was struck by a musket-ball and fell from his horse. 
Dismayed, the drivers and gunners incontinently fled without 
firing a single shot, carrying with them the caissons and one 
gun, and abandoning the other six to the enemy, who was 
vigorously pressing forward. General Sherman being thus 
reduced to the necessity of again choosing a new line, and of 
abandoning the attempt to maintain his old one, promptly moved 
tlio coherent remainder of his division, consisting of Colonel 
McDowell's and Colonel Buckland's brigades, Captain Tay- 
lor's battery, and throe guns of Captain Waterhouse's battery, 
to the support of General McClernand's right, which was just 



52 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

then seriously menaced. At half-past ten the enemy made a 
furicms attack on the whole front of McClernand's diTision, 
and for some time pressed it hard ; but the opportune move- 
ment of Colonel McDowell's brigade directly against his left 
flank, forced him back, and relieved the pressure. Taking 
advantage of the cover which the trees and felled timber 
afforded, and of a wooded ravine on the right, Sherman held 
this position for four hours, stubbornly contesting it with the 
enemy, who continued to make the most determined efforts to 
drive us back upon the river. General Grant visited this part 
of the lines about three in the afternoon, conversed with Mc- 
Clernand and Sherman, and informed them of the condition 
of affairs on the other parts of the field, where our resistance 
had been less successful. An hour later it became evident to 
bath the division commanders, from the sounds heard in that 
direction, that Hurlbut had fallen back towards the river ; and 
having been informed by General Grant that General Lewis 
Wallace was on his way from Crump's Landing with his entire 
division, they agreed upon a new line of defence, covering the 
bridge over Snake Creek, by which these reinforcements were 
expected to approach. The retirement to the position so 
selected was made deliberately, and in as good order as could 
have been expected. Many stragglers and fragments of troops 
were encountered during the movement, and united with the 
two divisions. The enemy's cavalry attempting a charge was 
handsomely repulsed. The Fifth Ohio cavalry arriving upon 
the ground, held the enemy in check for some time, until 
Major Ezra Taylor, chief of artillery of Sherman's division, 
came up with Schwartz's battery of McClernand's division, 
and opened an effective fire upon the enemy's flank as he 
pressed forward against McClernand's right. McClernand 
having now deployed his division on its new line, ordered a 
charge, which was handsomely executed, driving the enemy 
from his front, and forcing them to seek cover in the ravines 
in advance of our right. It was now five o'clock. The new 
line had been well selected, and afforded us a decided advan- 
tage, the ground along its front being open for a distance of 



SfflLOH. 53 

about two hundred yards. The enemy's momentum was spent, 
and he did not afterwards attempt to cross this open space. 

On the left the day had scarcely gone so well. The weight 
of the enemy's attack was chiefly directed against this wing. 
The two brigades of Prentiss gave way early in the morning, 
and drifted to the rear as Hurlbut advanced to their support, 
and by ten o'clock the division had melted away. Hurlbut 
made a gallant fight, obstinately contesting the ground with 
varying success, until four o'clock in the afternoon, when his 
division also was pressed to the rear, and the whole line com- 
pelled to retire. Smith's division, under the command of 
Brigadier-General "W. H. L. "Wallace, had been moved upon 
Hurlbut's right, and had materially aided in holding our 
ground there, but had in its turn been forced back. Colonel 
Stuart's brigade, held the extreme left until the pressure of 
the enemy on its front, and the exposure of its flank by the 
disaster to Prentiss, forced it successively to take up new lines 
of defence on the ridges which broke the ground towards the 
river. Our troops held this last line firmly. It was now after 
six o'clock in the afternoon. The battle had lasted nearly 
twelve hours. Our troops had been driven from all their camps 
of the morning, except Wallace's, to the line of woods in the 
rear, had been dislodged from that position, and again pressed 
back, and now held a line perpendicular to the river, with its 
left resting on the bluff behind which the landing was situated, 
and only half a mile from it. The enemy gathered up his 
forces, and made a last desperate effort to gain this position. 
But his losses had been very heavy, his troops were much 
shaken by the hard fighting they had encountered, and the 
spirit which characterized their first onset in the morning had 
burned out. Cheatham's division and Gladden's brigade, 
which now held the extreme right of the Confederate line on 
the river, lay directly under the fire of our artillery. They 
attempted to take it, but were repulsed in great disorder. 

A galling fire of artillery and musketry was poured into them ; 
and the gunboats "Lexington" and "Tyler" swept the flanks 
with their nine-inch shell. Their troops were re-formed with 



54 SHEEMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

difficulty. Night was closing in. General Beauregard gave 
the orders to retire out of range, and the battle was over. 

Darkness fell upon the disordered and confused remnants" 
of two large armies. In each the losses had been very heavy, 
the straggling fearful, and the confusion almost inextricable. 
But the enemy had failed. He had attempted to force us back 
upon the river and compel our surrender, and had not done 
so. In the morning we would attack him and seek to drive 
him from the field. General Grant had given verbal orders 
to that effect to General Sherman about 3 p. M. ; before the 
last repulse of the enemy. 

General Albert Sidney Johnston, the Confederate com- 
mander-in-chief, was mortally wounded in front of Sherman's 
division, and died shortly afterwards at half-past two o ? clock. 
Two regiments of Nelson's division, of the Army of the Ohio, 
crossed the river, and arrived upon the extreme left of the 
field about six o'clock, in time to fire a few shots just before 
the final repulse. As Nelson's troops came up, they met an 
appalling sight. A crowd of from seven to ten thousand 
panic-stricken wretches thronged the landing, crouching be- 
hind trees and under the bluff to avoid the enemy's shell, 
which had begun to drop in among them, and giving vent to 
the most sickening cries that we were whipped, and cut to 
pieces, and imploring their newly-arrived comrades to share 
their shame. But the gallant men of Nelson's division were 
unmoved by the scene, and greeted the loathsome pack with 
jeers and sarcasm. It is perhaps natural enough that those 
who saw only the stragglers should have found it hard to be- 
lieve that any one had fought. Yet the greater portion of 
the Army of the Tennessee had stood to their arms, and had 
repulsed the enemy. 

The troops slept that night in good spirits, although about 
midnight they were drenched by the heavy rain which began 
to fall. They knew that the enemy had failed, that Lewis 
Wallace would be up during the night, that Buell was arriv- 
ing, and that in the morning these fresh battalions would be 
hurled against the shaken and broken foe. The " Lexington " 



SHILOH. 55 

dropped a shell into the enemy's lines every ten minutes, until 

1 A.M., when the "Tyler" took her turn at the same task, 
firing every quarter of an hour till daylight. The demoraliz- 
ing shriek of the navy shells, while it robbed the enemy of rest, 
was inspiring music to the ears of our wearied troops. Dur- 
ing the night the remainder of Nelson's division crossed the 
river, and took position in the left front ; and later came Crit- 
tenden's division, followed by McCook's, successively extending 
the line to the right and connecting with Hurlbut's left. 
Lewis Wallace arrived about 1 A. M., and came into position 
on Sherman's right. 

Daybreak of the 7th found the enemy out of sight in our 
front. He showed no signs of advancing. Beauregard did 
not know that Buell had come, and yet he did not attack. 
As soon as it was fairly light, the division commanders re- 
ceived the orders promised by General Grant at the close of 
the previous day's battle, to move upon the enemy and drive him 
from our front. By six o'clock our artillery opened fire on the 
left. About seven, Nelson, Crittenden, and McCook pushed 
forward, and by ten were warmly engaged with the enemy in a 
contest for the possession of the old camps. Hurlbut, Mc- 
Clernand, Sherman, and Wallace now moved steadily forward. 
The open fields in front of the log church of Shiloli were 
reached. The enemy's position here was a strong one, and 
he contested it obstinately. For more than three hours lie 
held his ground in the scrub-oak thicket. But by one o'clock 
his weakness had become apparent. He was yielding every- 
where, and giving palpable signs of exhaustion. General 
Beauregard gave orders to withdraw from the contest. About 

2 p. M. his right retired, and two hours later his left followed. 
The movement was made in tolerable order. Near the junc- 
tion of the Hamburgh and Pittsburgh road with the Ham- 
burgh and Corinth road, his rear-guard under Brecvkinridgo 
made a stand ; and the next day his retreat was continued to 
Corinth. On the 8th, Sherman, with two brigades, followed 
Breckinridge to the point where he made his first stand. But 
our troops were worn out, disorganized, out of supplies, and 



gg SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

, t in no condition to enter upon a campaign. They returned to 

fl Pittsburgh to refit and reorganize. Sherman lost 318 killed, 

I 1,275 wounded, and 441 missing; total, 2,034. Brigadier- 

i General W. H. L. "Wallace was killed during the first day, and 

I Brigadier-General B. M. Prentiss taken prisoner, and their 

divisions broken up and distributed. 

* The enemy went into battle on the 6th with forty thousand 
three hundred and fifty-fire effective men. His losses, as 

' stated by General Beauregard in his official report, were, in" 

\ killed, 1,728; wounded, 8,012; missing, 959; total, 10,699. 

; General Beauregard says : " On Monday, from exhaustion and 

other causes, not twenty thousand men could be brought into 
action on our side." If we suppose two-thirds of the casual- 

' ties to have occurred on Sunday, there should still have been 

\ t over thirty-eight thousand men with the rebel colors on Mon- 

day ; and even imagining, for the sake of illustration, that all 
the losses took place on the first day, the enemy should have 
had nearly thirty-five thousand fighting men on the second. 
Tet that number was less than twenty thousand. Here are 
from fifteen to eighteen thousand men to be accoilnted for, or 
about half of his remaining force. These are the stragglers. 

General Beauregard, in his official report, estimate the 
Union forces engaged on Sunday at forty-five thousand, the 
remnant of General Grant's forces on Monday morning at 
twenty thousand, and the reinforcements received during the 
preceding night at thirty-three thousand, making fifty-three 
thousand arrayed against him on that day, or seventy-eight 
thousand on both days ; and he set down our aggregate losses 
at twenty thousand. 

The enemy's troops were comparatively old. Bragg's corps 
had been under fire at Pensacola; Folk's, at Columbus; and 
Hardee's, at Mill Spring, in Kentucky. A considerable por- 
tion of them had been organized and chilled since the summer 
of 1861, but there was also a large infusion of new regiments 
and new men, troops which had never been under fire, and 
militia just from the States. The commander-in-chief, Gen- 
eral Albert Sidney Johnston, was one of the ablest officers of 



SHILOH. 57 

the old regular army of the United States. General Beaure- 
gard, his second in command, had been known as a skilful 
officer of engineers, and by the exercise of his popular talents 
had suddenly achieved a reputation which his subsequent his- 
tory has failed to sustain. Of Grant's army only two divisions 
had been under fire. Sherman's, Prentiss's, Hurlbut's, and 
Lewis "Wallace's were all new and raw. 

The Union soldiers showed that they could fight, and that 
they would. They proved themselves superior to defeat. 
General Sherman says in his official report : 

" My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, all 
having received their muskets for the first time at Paducah. 
None of them had ever been under fire, or beheld heavy 
columns of an enemy bearing down on them, as this did on 
last Sunday. To expect of them the coolness and steadiness 
of older troops would be wrong. They knew not the value of 
combination and organization. "When individual fear seized 
them, the first impulse was to get away. My third brigade 
did break much too soon, and I am not yet advised where 
they were Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. Colonel 
Hildebrand, its commander, was as cool as any man I ever 
saw, and no one could have made stronger efforts to hold his 
men to their places than he did. He kept his own regiment, 
with individual exceptions, in hand an hour after Appier's and 
Mungen's regiments had left their proper field of action. 
Colonel Buckland managed his brigade well. I commend 
him to your notice as a cool, intelligent, and judicious gentle- 
man, needing only confidence and experience to make a good 
commander. His subordinates, Colonels Sullivan and Cocker- 
ill, behaved with great gallantry, the former receiving a severe 
wound on Sunday, and yet commanding and holding his regi- 
ment well in hand all day ; and on Monday until his right arm 
was broken by a shot, Cockerill held a larger proportion of his 
men than any colonel in my division, and was with me from 
first to last. Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the i'rst 
brigade, held his ground on Sunday till I ordered him to fall 
b ick, which he did in line of battle ; and when ordered, lie con- 



58 SHEBMAJST AJSTD HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

ducted tlie attack on tlie enemy's left in good style. In falling 
back to the next position he was thrown from his horse and 
injured, and his brigade was not in position on Monday morn- 
ing. His subordinates, Colonels Hicks and "Worthington, 
displayed great personal courage. Colonel Hicks led his regi- 
ment in the attack on Sunday, and received a wound which is 
feared may prove fatal. He is a brave and gallant gentleman, 
and deserves well of his country. Lieutenant-Colonel Walcutt, 
of the Ohio Forty-sixth, was severely wounded on Sunday, 
and has been disabled ever since. My second brigade, Colo- 
nel Stuart, was detached near two miles from my headquarters. 
He had to fight his own battle on Sunday against superior 
numbers, as the enemy interposed between him and General 
Prentiss early in the day. Colonel Stuart was wounded 
severely, and yet reported for duty on Monday morning, but 
was compelled to leave during the day, when the command 
devolved on Colonel T. Kilby Smith, who was always in the 
thickest of the fight, and led the brigade handsomely. . . . 
Lieutenant-Colonel Kyle, of the Seventy-first was mortally 
wounded on Sunday. . . . Several times during the battle 
cartridges gave out, but General Grant had thoughtfully kept 
a supply coming from the rear. When I appealed to regiments 
to stand fast although out of cartridges, I did so because to 
retire a regiment for any cause has a bad effect on others. I 
commend the Fortieth Illinois and Thirteenth Missouri for 
thus holding their ground under heavy fire, although their 
cartridge-boxes were empty. Great credit is due the frag- 
ments of men of the disordered regiments, who kept in the 
advance. I observed and noticed them, but until the briga- 
diers and colonels make their reports, I cannot venture to mime 
individuals, but will in due season notice all who kept in our 
front, as well as those who preferred to keep back near the 
steamboat landing." 

Sherman was everywhere ; encouraging his troops, rallying 
the stragglers, directing the batteries with his own hands, ad- 
vising with other commanders, superintending every movement 
in person. Those who still fancied him crazy did not, after 



SHILOH. 59 

this, deny his energy, coolness, courage, skill, and persever- 
ance upon the battle-field. This was his first battle, and yet 
so ingrained were the details of war upon his mind, that his 
spirit leaped at once above the novelty of the situation, and 
wore the new experience like an old habit. On Sunday, he was 
wounded by a bullet through the left hand, but bandaged it, 
and went on with his work. On Monday, he was again wounded, 
and had three horses shot under him, but mounted a fourth 
and stayed on the field. 

General Grant says, in his official report, otherwise suffi- 
ciently formal : " I feel it a duty to a gallant and able officer, 
Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, to make special mention. 
He not only was with his command during the entire two days 
of the action, but displayed great judgment and skill in the 
management of his men. Although severely wounded in the 
hand on the first day, his place was never vacant." 

A few days later, Major-General Halleck, not given to un- 
mixed praise, having arrived upon the ground, went so far 
as to observe, " It is the unanimous opinion here that Briga- 
dier-General "W. T. Sherman saved the fortunes of the day on 
the 6th, and contributed largely to the glorious victory of 
the 7th. ... I respectfully recommend that he be made 
a major-general of volunteers, to date from the 6th instant." 

And on the 26th of July, 1863, in urging Sherman's pro- 
motion as a brigadier-general in the regular army, General 
Grant wrote to the "War Department : " At the battle of Shiloh, 
on the first day, he held, with raw troops, the key point of thu 
landing. It is no disparagement to any other officer to say, 
that I do not believe there was another division commander 
on the field who had the skill and experience to have done it. 
To his individual efforts I am indebted for the success of that 
battle." 



60 SHEKMAN AOT HIS CAMPAIGNS. 



CHAPTEE Y. 

COEINTH. 

LOEEDIAO^ELY after the battle of Shiloh, Major-General Hal- 
leek left Saint Louis, proceeded to Pittsburgh Landing, and 
there took personal command of the forces, which he caused 
to be reinforced from other parts of his department. Major- 
General Pope was placed in command of the left wing, Major- 
General Buell of the centre, Major-General Thomas of the 
right wing, and Major-General McClernand of the reserve, 
while Major-General Grant was assigned, by General Halleck, 
to nominal duty as second in command. 

After his repulse at Shiloh, Beauregard concentrated his 
army at Corinth, and, strongly fortifying that position, and 
summoning to his aid all the available troops in the south- 
west, including the armies of Price and Van Dorn, from Mis- 
souri and Arkansas, as well as the militia of the States ol 
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, prepared for a determined 
defence. " Soldiers of Shiloh and Elkhorn !" he said to his 
troops, "we are about to meet once more in the shock oi 
battle the invaders of our soil, the despoilers of our homes, 
the disturbers of our family ties, face to face, hand to hand. 
. . . "With your mingled banners, for the first time during 
this war, we shall meet the foe in strength that should give 
us victory. Soldiers, can the result be doubtful ? Shall wo 
not drive back into Tennessee the presumptuous mercenaries 
collected for our subjugation ? One more manly effort, and, 
trusting in God and the justness of our cause, we shall recover 
more than we have lately lost." 

Bragg, too, addressed his men in the same strain, telling 
them : " You will encounter him in your chosen position, strong 



CORINTH. 61 

by nature and improved by art, away from his main support 
and reliance gunboats and heavy batteries and for the first 
time in this war, with nearly equal numbers." 

Corinth, ninety-three miles west-southwest from Memphis, 
and twenty-nine miles from Pittsburgh, is the junction of the 
Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston railroads. 
These two great lines intersecting each other at right angles, 
connect the Mississippi with the Atlantic and the Ohio with 
the Gulf. 

On the 13th of May, having three thousand four hundred 
and ten absent, sick, and wounded, out of a total of five thou- 
sand four hundred and sixty men, Sherman found it necessary 
to consolidate his division into three brigades, as follows : First 
brigade, to be commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan L. 
Smith, Eighth Missouri, Fifty-fifth Illinois, Fifty-fourth Ohio, 
and Fifty-seventh Ohio; second brigade, Colonel J. A. Mc- 
Dowell, Sixth Iowa, Forty-sixth Ohio, Fortieth Illinois, and 
Seventy-seventh Ohio ; third brigade, Colonel E. P. Buckland, 
Seventy-second Ohio, Seventieth Ohio, Forty-eighth Ohio, and 
Fifty-third Ohio. On the following day, however, Brigadier- 
General James W. Denver arrived, reported to General Sher- 
man for duty, and was assigned to the command of the third 
brigade. 

General Hallcck advanced cautiously and by slow marches, 
intrenching at every step. On the afternoon of 17th of May, 
in conformity with instructions previously received by him 
from the commander-in-chiof, General Sherman made dispo- 
sitions to drive the enemy from his position at Bussell's house, 
on a hill situated about a milo and a quarter from the outer 
intrenchments of Corinth, and about two miles in advance of 
the main camps of our army. [Requesting General HurlLut 
to put in motion two regiments and a battery of artillery, at 
three o'clock r. M., on the road which passes the front of his 
line and runs to Russell's house, Sherman ordered General 
Denver to take a right-hand road with two regiments of his 
brigade and one battery of light artillery, namely, the Seven- 
tieth and Seventy-second Ohio, and Barrett's battery, and 



4 < 62 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

I i 

; gave Mm a guide so to conduct liis march, as to anive on the 

; left of the enemy's position by the time he was engaged in 

!| ! front; and ordered General Morgan L. Smith's brigade, with 

i t Bouton's battery, to follow the main road, drive back a brigade 

I ' of the enemy's forces that held the position at Russell's, with 

I l I their skirmishers and pickets, down to the causeway and bridge 
f ' ; across a small stream about eight hundred yards east of Rus- 
1 .' sell's house. ' 

* ! 1 All these forces were put in motion at three P. M., General 

Denver's forces taking the right-hand road, and General 

1 ' Smith's the direct main road. On reaching the causeway, 

! General Smith deployed his skirmishers forward, and sent out 

! i . his advance-guard. The column advanced, and the skirmish- 

t ers became engaged at once. The firing was very brisk, but 

the enemy's pickets were driven steadily back tiH they reached 

| < the position of their brigade at Russell's house, where their 

; | resistance was obstinate. 

; The ground was unfavorable to artillery till the skirmishers 

I . had cleared the hill beyond the causeway, when Major Tay- 

] lor, chief of artillery, of Sherman's division, advanced first one 

; of Bouton's guns, and very soon after the remaining three 

'i guns of the battery. These, upon reaching the hill-top, com- 

i menced firing at Russell's house and outhouses, in which the 

enemy had taken shelter, when their whole force retreated, 

and full possession was obtained of Russell's house and the 

ground for three hundred yards in advance, where the roads 

meet. This being the limit to which the brigade was intended 

to go, it was halted. The head of General Denver's column 

reached its position as the enemy was beginning to retreat. 

General Morgan L. Smith conducted the advance of his bri- 
gade handsomely, and the chief work and loss fell upon his two 
leading regiments, the Eighth Missouri and Fifth-fifth Illinois, 
He held the ground till about daylight next morning, when, 
by General Sherman's order, he left a strong picket there, 
and placed his brigade back a short distance in easy support, 
where it remained until relieved. 
No loss was sustained by Huiibut's or Denver's commands 



CORINTH. 63 

* 

in their flank movements on Russell's; the loss in General 
Morgan L. Smith's brigade was ten killed and thirty-one 
wounded. 

Tlie position thus gained proved to "be mie of great natural 
strength, and Sherman at once proceeded to fortify it. Lines 
were laid off by the engineers, and although the advance on 
Corinth had witnessed their first experiment with intrenching 
tools, the troops in Sherman's division succeeded in construct- 
ing a parapet that met the approval of the critical eye of the 
commander-in-chief. The dense woods and undergrowth 
were cleared away in front, to give range to the batteries. 
The work went on day and night without interruption. The 
division continued to occupy the intrenched camp at Russell's 
until the night of May 27th, when an order was received from 
General Halieck by telegraph through which means regular 
communication had been established between general head- 
quarters and the several division commanders directing Gen- 
eral Sherman to send a force the next day to drive the rebels 
from his front on the Corinth road, to drive in their pickets as 
far as possible, and to make a strong demonstration on Corinth 
itself. Under authority conferred upon him by the same 
order, Sherman called upon Major-General McClernand, com- 
manding the Reserve Corps, and Major-General Huiibut, who 
commanded one of the adjacent divisions, to furnish one bri- 
gade each, to co-operate in the proposed movement with the 
two brigades of Denver and Morgan L. Smith, detached from 
Sherman's own division for the same purpose. Colonel John 
i. Logan's brigade of Judah's division, of McClernancTs 
r -serve corps, and Brigadier-General J. C. Veatch's brigade 
of Hurlbut's division, accordingly reported to General Sher- 
man for this duty. 

The house referred to was a double log building, standing on 
a high ridge on the upper or southern end of a large field, 
and was used by the enemy as a block-house, from which to 
annoy our pickets. The large field was perfectly overlooked 
by this Louse, as well as by the ridge along its southern line of 
defence, which was covered by a dense grove of heavy oaks 



64 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

and underbrush. The main Corinth road runs along the east- 
ern fence, whilst the field itself, about three hundred yards 
wide by about five hundred yards long, extended far to the 
right into the low Mnd of Phillip's Creek, so densely wooded as 
to be impassable. On the eastern side of the field the woods 
were more open. The enemy could be seen at all times in and 
about the house and the ridge beyond, and our pickets could 
not show themselves on our side of the field without attracting 
a shot. 

Sherman ordered General J. "W. Denver, with his third 
brigade, and the Morton battery of four guns, to inarch in 
perfect silence at eight A. M., keeping well under cover as he 
approached the field ; General Morgan L. Smith's first brigade, 
with Barrett's and Waterhouse's batteries, to move along the 
main road, keeping his force well masked in the woods to the 
left ; Brigadier-General Veatch's brigade to move from Gen- 
eral Hurlbut's lines through the woods on the left of arid con- 
necting with General M. L. Smith's ; and General John A. 
Logan's brigade to move down to Bowie's Hill Cat of the 
Mobile and Ohio railroad, and thence forward to the left, so 
as to connect with General Denver's brigade on the extreme 
right ; all to march at eight A. M., with skirmishers well to the 
front, to keep well concealed, and, at a signal, to rush quickly 
on to the ridge, thus avoiding as much as possible the clangor 
of crossing the open field, exposed to the fire of a concealed 
enemy. 

The preliminary arrangements having thus been mado, two 
twenty-pounder Parrot rifle-guns of Silfvcrsparro's battery, 
under the immediate supervision of Major Taylor, chief of 
artillery of Sherman's division, were moved silently through 
the forest to a point behind a hill, from the top of which could 
be seen the house and ground to be contested. Tito guns 
were unlimbered, loaded with shell, and moved by hand to" the 
crest. At the proper time he gave the order to commence firing 
and demolish the house. About a "dozen shells well directed 
soon accomplished this ; then designating a single shot of the 
twenty-pound Parrot-gun of Silfversparre as a signal for the 



CORINTH. g5 

brigades to advance, he waited till all were in position, and 
ordered the signal, when the troops dashed forward, crossed 
the field, drove the enemy across the ridge and field beyond 
into another dense and seemingly impenetrable forest. The 
enemy was evidently surprised. By ten A. M. we were masters 
of the position. Generals Grant and Thomas were present 
during the affair, and witnessed the movement, which was ad- 
mirably executed. 

An irregular piece of cleared land lay immediately in front 
of General Denver's position, and extended obliquely to the 
left, in front of and across Morgan Smith's and Veatch's bri- 
gades, which were posted on the right and left of the main 
Corinth road, leading directly south. About three p. M. Sher- 
man's troops were startled by the quick rattle of musketry 
along our whole picket-line, followed by the cheers and yells 
of an attacking column of the enemy. 

Sherman's artillery and Mann's battery of Yeatch's brigade 
had been judiciously posted by Major Taylor, and before the 
yell of the enemy had died away arose our reply in the cannon's 
mouth. The firing was very good, rapid, well-directed, and 
the shells burst in the right place. Our pickets were at first 
driven in a little, but soon recovered their ground and held it, 
and the enemy retreated in utter confusion. On further ex- 
amination of the ground, with its connection on the left with 
General Hurlbut, and right resting on the railroad near 
Bowie Hill Cut, it was determined to intrench. The lines 
were laid out after dark, and the work substantially finished 
by morning. All this time Sherman was within one thousand 
three hundred yards of the enemy's main intrenchments, which 
were concealed by the dense foliage of the oak forest, and 
without a battle, which at that time was to be avoided, Sher- 
man could not push out his skirmishers more than two hundred 
yards to the front. For his own security he had to destroy 
two farmhouses, both of which had been loopholed and occu- 
pied by the enemy. By nine A. M. of the twenty-ninth our 
works were substantially clone, and our artillery in position, 
and at four p. M. the siege-train was brought forward, and 

5 



66 SHEBMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Colonel McDowell's second brigade had come from the former 
lines at Russell's, and had relieved General John A. Logan's 
brigade. 

Sherman then had his whole division in a slightly curved 
line, facing south, his right resting on the Mobile and Ohio 
railroad, near a deep cut known as Bowie Hill Cut, and left 
resting on the main Corinth road, at the crest of the ridge, 
there connecting with General Hurlbut, who, in turn, on his 
left connected with General Davies, and so on down the whole 
line to its extremity. So near was the enemy that the Union 
troops could hear the sound of his drums, and sometimes of 
voices in command, and the railroad cars arriving and depart- 
ing at Corinth were easily distinguished. For some days 
and nights cars had been arriving and departing very fre- 
quently, especially in the night. Before daybreak, Sherman 
instructed the brigade commanders and the field-officers of 
the day to feel forward as far as possible, but all reported 
the enemy's pickets still in force in the dense woods to our 
front. But about six A. M. a curious explosion, sounding like 
a volley of large siege-pieces, followed by others singly and in 
twos and threes, arrested Sherman's attention ; and soon after 
a large smoke arose from the direction of Corinth, when he 
telegraphed General Halleck to ascertain the cause. The 
latter answered that he could not explain it, but ordered Sher- 
man " to advance his division and feel the enemy, if still in his 
front." Sherman immediately put in motion two regiments 
of each brigade, by different roads, and soon after followed 
with the whole division, infantry, artillery, and cavalry. 

Somewhat to his surprise, the enemy's chief redoubt was 
found within thirteen hundred yards of our line of intrench- 
ments, but completely masked by the dense forest and under- 
growth. Instead of being, as had been supposed, a continuous 
line of intrenchments encircling Corinth, the defences con- 
sisted of separate redoubts, connected in part by a parapet 
and ditch, and in part by shallow rifle-pits, the trees being 
felled so as to give a good field of fire to and beyond the main 
road. General M. L. Smith's brigade moved rapidly down the 



CORINTH. 67 

main road, entering the first redoubt of the enemy at seven A. M. 
It was completely evacuated, and lie pushed on into Corinth, and 
beyond, to College Hill. General Denver entered the enemy's 
lines at the same time, seven A. M., at a point midway between 
the wagon and railroad, and proceeded on to Corinth, and 
Colonel McDowell kept further to the right, near the Mobile 
and Ohio Bailroad. By eight A. M. all Sherman's division was 
at Corinth and beyond. 

On the whole ridge extending from Sherman's camp into 
Corinth, and to the right and left, could be seen the remains 
of the abandoned camps of the enemy, flour and provisions 
scattered about, and every thing indicating a speedy and con- 
fused retreat. In the town itself many houses were still burn- 
ing, and the ruins of warehouses and buildings containing 
commissary and other confederate stores were still smoulder- 
ing ; but there still remained piles of cannon-balls, shells, and 
shot, sugar, molasses, beans, rice, and other property, which 
the enemy had failed to carry off or destroy. 

From the best information obtained from the few citizens 
who remained in Corinth, it appeared that the enemy had for 
some days been removing their sick and valuable stores, and 
had sent away on railroad-cars a part of their effective force 
on the night of the 28th. But, of course, even the vast 
amount of their rolling-stock could not carry away an army 
of a hundred thousand men. The enemy was therefore com- 
pelled to march away, and began the march by ten o'clock on 
the night of the 29th the columns filling all the roads leading 
south and west all night the rear-guard firing the train, which 
led to the explosions and conflagration. The enemy did not 
relieve his pickets that morning, and many of them were cap- 
tured, who did not have the slightest intimation of the pro- 
posed evacuation. 

Finding Corinth abandoned by the enemy, Sherman ordered 
General M. L. Smith to pursue on the Eipley road, by which 
it appeared they had taken the bulk of their artillery. 

General Smith pushed the pursuit up to the bridges 
and narrow causeway by which the bottom of Tuscumbia 



68 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Creek is passed. The enemy opened- with, canister on the 
small party of cavalry, and burned every bridge, leaving the 
woods full of straggling soldiers. Many of these were gath- 
ered np and sent to the rear, but the main army had escaped 
across Tnscumbia Creek. Sherman says, in his official report 
of the siege : 

" The evacuation of Corinth, at the time and in the manner 
in -which it was done, was a clear back-down from the high 
and arrogant tone heretofore assumed by the rebels. The 
ground was of their own choice. The fortifications, though 
poor and indifferent, were all they supposed necessary to our 
defeat, as they had had two months to make them, with an 
immense force to work at their disposal If, with two such 
railroads as they possessed, they could not supply their army 
with reinforcements and provisions, how can they attempt it 
in this poor, arid, and exhausted part of the country ?" 

From the time the army moved on Corinth, up to the date 
of its evacuation, the troops of Sherman's division had con- 
structed seven distinct lines of intrenchments. Scarcely had 
one line been completed before they were called upon to ad- 
vance a short distance, take up a new position, and construct 
another line. Occupying as it did the extreme right flank of 
the army, this division was necessarily more exposed, and was 
compelled to perform harder work, and furnished heavier de- 
tails than any other single division in the entire command. 
But every task was performed with a cheerfulness and alacrity 
that elicited the highest encomiums from the division com- 
mander. 

" But a few days ago," he says in his congratulatory order 
of May 31st, " a large and powerful rebel army lay at Corinth, 
with outposts extending to our very camp at Shiloh. They 
held two railroads extending north and south, east and west, 
across the whole extent of their country, with a vast number 
of locomotives and cars to bring to them speedily and cer- 
tainly their reinforcements and supplies. They called to their 
aid all their armies from every quarter, abandoning the sea- 
coast and the great river Mississippi, that they might over- 



CORINTH. gg 

whelm us with, numbers in the place of tlieir own choosing. 
They had their chosen leaders, men of high reputation and 
courage, and they dared us to leave the cover of our iron-clad 
gunboats to come to fight them in their trenches, and still more 
dangerous swamps and ambuscades of their Southern forests. 
Their whole country, from Eichmond to Memphis and Nash- 
ville to Mobile, rung with their taunts and boastings, as to 
how they would immolate the Yankees if they dared to leave 
the Tennessee Eiver. They boldly and defiantly challenged 
us to meet them at Corinth. We accepted the challenge, and 
came slowly and without attempt at concealment to the very 
ground of their selection ; and they have fled away. "We yes- 
terday marched unopposed through the burning embers of 
their destroyed camps and property, and pursued them to 
their swamps, until burning bridges plainly confessed they had 
fled, and not marched away for better ground. It is a victory 
as brilliant and important as any recorded in history, and 
every officer and soldier who lent his aid has just reason to 
be proud of his part. 

" No amount of sophistry or words from the leaders of the 
rebellion can succeed in giving the evacuation of Corinth, un- 
der the circumstances, any other title than that of a signal 
defeat, more humiliating to them and their cause than if we 
had entered the place over the dead and mangled bodies of 
their soldiers. We are not here to kill and slay, but to vindi- 
cate the honor and just authority of that government which 
has been bequeathed to us by our honored fathers, and to 
whom we would be recreant if we permitted their work to pass 
to our children marred and spoiled by ambitious and wicked 
rebels. 

" The general commanding, while thus claiming for his 
division tlieir just share in this glorious result, must, at the 
same time, remind them that much yet remains to be done, 
and that all must still continue the same vigilance and pa- 
tience, industry and obedience, till the enemy lays down his 
arms, and publicly acknowledges, for their supposed grievances, 
they must obey the laws of their country, and not attempt its 



70 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

overthrow by threats, by cruelty, and by war. They must be 
made to feel and acknowledge the power of a just and mighty 
nation. This result can only be accomplished by a cheerful 
and ready obedience to the orders and authority of our lead- 
ers, in whom we now have just reason to feel the most impli cii 
confidence. That the fifth division of the right wing will do 
this, and thafc in due time we will go to our families and friends 
at home, is the earnest prayer and wish of your immediate 
commander." 

The ability, and untiring energy displayed by General Sher- 
man during the siege elicited the warm praise of General 
Grant, who afterwards, in an official dispatch to army head- 
quarters, wrote : " His services as division commander in the 
advance on Corinth, I will venture to say-, were appreciated by 
the now general-in-chief (General Halleck) beyond those of 
any other division commander." 

On the 2d of June, Sherman was ordered by General Hal- 
leck to march with his own division and Hurlbut's through 
Corinth and dislodge the enemy, supposed to be in position 
near Smith's bridge, seven miles southwest of Corinth, where 
the Memphis and Charleston railway crosses Tuscumbia Creek. 
He set out immediately, his own division in advance ; but on 
the morning of the 3d, Colonel T. Lyle Dickey, Fourth Illinois 
Cavalry, who was sent forward to reconnoitre, returned and 
reported the bridge burned, and no enemy near it. Sherman 
then went into bivouac near Chewalla, and set to work to save 
such of the rolling-stock of the railway as could probably be 
rendered serviceable, and by the 9th, chiefly through the exer- 
tions of the Fifty-second Indiana, Major Main, which was 
generally known as "the railroad regiment," succeeded in 
collecting and sending to Corinth seven locomotives in toler- 
able order, a dozen platform-cars, over two hundred pairs of 
truck-wheels, and the iron-work of about sixty cars. 

On the 26th of May, Sherman had received from the War 
Department, and had accepted, a commission as Major-Gen- 
eral of Volunteers, dating from May 1st. 



MEMPHIS. 71 



CHAPTER VI. 

MEMPHIS. 

GRAND JUNCTION, fifty-two miles west of Memphis, and one 
hundred and fifty-four south from Cairo, is the junction of 
the Memphis and Charleston with the Mississippi Central 
Railway. Ninety-nine miles from Memphis, and a hun- 
dred and two from Grand Junction, the latter road joins 
the Mississippi and Tennessee Railway at Grenada. An army 
operating from Memphis as a base, and holding in force 
Corinth, Holly Springs, and some such point as Hornando, on 
the Mississippi and Tennessee Railway, arc in a position to 
defend "West Tennessee from the Tennossco River to the 
Mississippi, and to take the offensive against an enemy pro- 
tecting Northern Mississippi. 

No sooner was Corinth occupied, and the semblance of a pur- 
suit of the enemy ended, than General Hallock ordered General 
Bucll to march with the Army of the Ohio by Huntsvillo and 
Stevenson on Chattanooga, Tennessee, and seize tho key of 
the debouches from the mountain region of tho centre ; while 
General Grant, again restored to the command of the Army of 
the Tennessee, was left in command of tho District of West 
Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, and General Pope's 
troops were sent back to Missouri. The enemy was concen- 
trated at Tupelo, Mississippi, forty-nine miles below Corinth, 
on the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, under tho com- 
mand of General Braxton Bragg, who had relieved Beaure- 
gard in consequence of tlie latter' s illness. 

On the 9th of June, at Chewalla, Sherman received General 
Halleck's orders to march with his own division and Hurlbut's 
Fourth division to Grand Junction, to repair tho Memphis and 



72 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Charleston Railway west of that point, and then to assume 
the duty of guarding the road against any attempt of the 
enemy to interrupt its operations. Sending forward Denver's 
third brigade of the fifth division, and the whole of Hurlbut's 
division in advance, to repair the bridges on the road, Sher- 
man marched on the llth with the remainder of his command, 
reached Grand Junction on the night of the 13th, and, finding 
no water there, occupied La Grange, three miles further west, 
on the morning of the 14th. While engaged here in repair- 
ing two pieces of broken trestle-work, he sent Veatch's 
brigade, of Hurlbut's and Morgan L. Smith's brigade of his 
own division, to Holly Springs to clear his flanks of the enemy. 
After driving a small force of the enemy out of the town, and 
as far south as Lamar, the detachment remained two days at 
Holly Springs, and then rejoined the main body. On the 
"21st, Sherman marched from Holly Springs ; on the 23d, three 
miles west of Lafayette, met a railway train from Memphis ; 
and on the 25th, having built two long sections of trestle- 
work at La Grange, two large bridges at Moscow, and two 
small ones at Lafayette, was able to report his task accom- 
plished, and the railway in running order from Memphis to 
Grand Junction. His force was then disposed so as to pro- 
tect the line of the railway, Hurlbut's division at Grand Junc- 
tion and La Grange, his own at Moscow and Lafayette. 

On the 29th of June, in accordance with instructions 
received by telegraph from General Halleck, leaving one regi- 
ment and a section of artillery at each of these points, Sher- 
man marched on Holly Springs, twenty-five miles equidistant 
from La Grange and Moscow, to co-operate with Hamilton's 
division, of Eosecrans' corps, which he was informed would 
reach there at a given time. Concentrating at Hudsonvilie by 
converging roads, tlie two divisions reached the Coldwater, 
five miles from Holly Springs, early on the morning of the ap- 
pointed day. Denver's brigade, and the Fourth Illinois Cav- 
alry, the latter two hundred strong, were sent forward, and 
drove the enemy, consisting of about fifteen hundred cavalry, 
through and beyond the town of Holly Springs. Nothing was 



MEMPHIS. 73 

heard of Hamilton, who had approached within nineteen miles 
of Holly Springs and then retired to Corinth ; but, on the 6th, 
orders were received from General Halleck to fall back to the 
railway and protect it, and the command accordingly returned 
to its former position. 

Early in July, upon the appointment of General Halleck 
as general-in-chief of the Armies of the United States, the 
Department of the Mississippi was broken up, and General 
Grant was assigned to the command of the Department of 
the Tennessee, embracing the theatre of his previous opera- 
tions. That officer taking advantage of the period of in- 
activity which now followed, turned his attention to the con- 
dition of the country occupied by his command. Memphis 
in particular was in a sad plight. Nearly all of its young 
men were in the rebel army, many of its old men had fled 
upon the approach of the Union troops, or in anticipation 
of such an event, and in their places appeared a horde of 
unscrupulous traders, eager to make money in any legitimate 
way, and deeming any way legitimate that brought them large 
profits. They struck hands with other men of the same stamp 
whom they found in Memphis ready for their use, and the city 
became a nest of contraband trade. Commerce and war are 
mortal foes. Wherever they meet or cross each other's path, 
one of them must die. If the trader's gold is stronger than 
the soldier's honor, the soldier's honor trails in the dust, war 
grows languid, barter dulls the sword, treason flourishes, and 
spies reign. If the soldier spurns the bribe, in whatever in- 
nocent shape it may creep, trade perishes, merchants walk 
the streets idly, or crowd the headquarters uselessly, store- 
houses gape vacantly or turn into hospitals, women and chil- 
dren starve, and the provost-marshal is king. And these 
things are necessarily so. War itself is so cruel that those 
means are most truly humane which tend to bring the con- 
test soonest to a close, regardless of every intermediate con- 
sideration apart from its object. The general must think only 
o his army. 

On 15th of July, from Corinth, General Grant sent tele- 



74 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

graphic orders to Sherman, to march at once, with Ms own 
and Hurlbut's division, to Memphis, relieve Brigadier-General 
Hovey in command of that place, and send all the infantry of 
Wallace's division to Helena, Arkansas, to report to General 
Curtis. Accordingly, on Monday, July 21st, Sherman assumed 
command of the district of Memphis, stationing his own di- 
vision in Fort Pickering, and Hurlbut's on the river below, and 
on the 24th sent the other troops to Helena. 

General Grant had strongly impressed upon him the neces- 
sity of immediately abating the evils and disorders prevailing 
within the limits of his new command. He was to put Mem- 
phis in a thorough state of defence. "With regard to civil 
matters, his instructions were few. When the head of a family 
had gone South, the family must be made to follow. The quar- 
termaster was to seize, and rent for account of whom it may 
concern, all buildings leased or left vacant and belonging to 
disloyal owners. All negroes working for the United States 
were to be registered, and an account kept of their time, so 
that an adjustment could afterwards be made with their 
owners, if the Government should decide on taking that course. 
It will be remembered that the Government had not yet de- 
clared, or even adopted, any definite policy with respect to the 
slaves in the country occupied by our forces. 

Memphis was a camp of the Confederate Army, was cap- 
tured by the United States Army, and was occupied and hold 
by it as a military post. In a country, or in any part of it, 
held by an army in time of war, whether offensively or defen- 
sively, there is no law but the law of war. The law of war is 
the will of the commander. He is accountable only to Ids 
superiors. Nothing exists within the limits of his command, 
except by his choice. With respect to his army, lie is gov- 
erned by the Articles of War and the army regulations ; with 
regard to all others, his power is unlimited, except to the ex- 
tent that it may be abridged or controlled by the instructions 
of his Government. 

Sherman permitted the mayor and other civil officers of the 
city to remain in the exercise of their functions, restricting 



MEMPHIS. 75 

them to the preservation of law and order among the citizens, 
and the lighting and cleaning of the streets, and confining the 
action of the provost-marshal and his guards to persons in the 
military service and to buildings and grounds used by the army. 
The expenses of the local government were to be defrayed 
by municipal taxes. Sherman held that all persons who re- 
mained in Memphis were bound to bear true allegiance to the 
United States, and, therefore, did not always exact an oath of 
loyalty ; that they must make their choice at once between 
the rebellion and the Union; and that if they stayed and 
helped the enemy in any way, they were to be treated as spies. 
He required no provost-marshal's passes for inland travel, but 
restricted it to the five main roads leading from the city, and 
stationed guards on them to minutely inspect all persons and 
property going in or out. No cotton was allowed to be bought 
beyond the lines and brought in, except on contracts to be 
paid at the end of the war, so that the enemy might get no 
aid therefrom. Gold, silver, and treasury notes, when sent into 
the Confederate lines in exchange for cotton, always found 
their way, as he knew, sooner or later, voluntarily or by force, 
into the Confederate treasury, and were used to buy arms for 
the Confederate army in the British colonies. He, therefore, 
absolutely prohibited their use in payment. He forbade the 
exportation of salt, because it was used to cure bacon and 
beef, and thus to mobilize the Confederate army. A strict 
search was also made for arms and ammunition, which were 
often employed by the rapacious and unscrupulous traders as 
a means of accomplishing their ends. All able-bodied male 
negroes were required to work, either for their masters or for 
the Government, and the women and children, as well as the 
feeble, he refused to support or feed ; but in no case did he 
permit any intimidation or persuasion to be used, with those 
who chose to leave their masters, to compel or induce them to 
return. With regard to all these subjects, he preferred not to 
meddle with details or individual cases, but laid down full, 
clear, and precise rules, in the form of written instructions for 
the guidance of his subordinates, and left the execution to 



76 SHEKMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

them. His constant endeavor was to apply severe and exact 
justice to all, and to avoid the entanglements and anomalies 
of exceptions in favor of particular persons. Shortly after- 
wards, when the Government issued orders removing the mil- 
itary restrictions imposed on the purchase of cotton, Sherman 
yielded a ready acquiescence, but at once addressed strong 
remonstrances on the subject to the authorities at Washington, 
assuring them that the measure would greatly strengthen the 
hands of the Confederate forces. He also turned his attention 
to the depredations of the guerrillas who had hitherto infested 
the district, harbored and assisted by the more evil-disposed 
of the. inhabitants, protected against capture by the vicinity 
of a large friendly army, and secured against punishment by 
threats of retaliation upon the persons of our prisoners of 
war in the hands of the enemy. A guerrilla is a person who, 
alone or in company with a few comrades, wages war within 
or behind the lines of an enemy, for the purpose of inflicting 
incidental injury upon the persons or property of isolated 
persons or parties belonging to the opposing forces, adhering 
to the cause, or not adhering to the cause, of the army by 
which the guerrilla is sustained. He is careless as to the means 
he employs and the persons against whom he employs them. 
He wears no uniform. Robbery, arson, and murder he com- 
mits as a soldier. When in danger of capture, he throws away 
his arms and becomes a citizen. When captured, he produces 
his commission or points to his muster-roll, and is again a 
soldier. A few guerrillas endanger the lives and property of 
the thousands of non-combatants from whom they cannot be 
distinguished by the eye. The rebel government and the rebel 
commanders seem to have considered every thing justifiable 
that could be done by them in connection with the war : so 
they justified guerrillas and upheld them. Sherman regarded 
them as wild beasts, hunted them down and destroyed 
them. Where Union families were harassed, he caused the 
families of secessionists to be punished. Where steamboats, 
engaged in peaceful commerce, were fired upon, he caused the 
property of secessionists to be destroyed, and he finally an- 



MEMPHIS. 77 

nounced that, for every boat attacked by guerrillas, ten seces- 
sion families should be exiled from the comforts of Memphis. 
If, however, the inhabitants would resist the guerrillas, he would 
allow them to bring in produce and take out supplies. Thus, 
order and quiet were, for the time being, restored throughout 
the limits of his command. 

During the fall several important expeditions were sent out 
from Memphis. Early in September, Hurlbut moved with his 
division to Brownsville, for the purpose of threatening the 
flank of any force moving from the line of the Tallahatchie 
against General Grant's position at Bolivar; while, at the 
same time, Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith with his 
brigade, a battery of artillery, and four hundred cavalry under 
Colonel B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, moved to Holly 
Springs, destroyed the road and railway bridges over the Cold- 
water, and then returned, having held in check and diverted 
the enemy's forces assembling at Holly Springs to threaten 
Grant's communications, and by destroying the bridges having 
prevented the enemy from harassing the flank of a column 
moving eastward from Memphis. 

In the latter part of October, General Grant summoned 
General Sherman to meet him at Columbus, Kentucky, to 
arrange the plan of the coming campaign. Grant's army occu- 
pied, substantially, the line from Memphis eastward along the 
Chattanooga railway to Corinth. The Army of the Potomac 
remained inactive in "Western Maryland; the Array of the 
Ohio, having defeated Bragg's invasion by the decisive victory 
at Richmond, Kentucky, held the passive defensive ; and in 
Missouri, General Curtis was preparing to resist invasion from 
Arkansas. The great work before the Army of the Tennessee 
was the capture of Vicksburg. But the enemy, about forty 
thousand strong, under Lieutenant-General Pemberton, must 
first be dislodged from the line of the Tallahatchie, which 
they held in force, with all the fords and bridges strongly for- 
tified. Grant was to move his main army direct from Jackson 
by Grand Junction and La Grange, following generally the 
line of the Mobile and Ohio Eailway. Sherman was to move 



78 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

out of Memphis with four brigades of infantry on the Tehula- 
homa road, to strike the enemy at Wyatt's simultaneously 
with Grant's arrival at "Waterf ord. Major-General 0. C. "Wash- 
burne, over whom Grant had been authorized to exercise 
command in case of necessity, was instructed by Sherman 
to cross the Mississippi with above five thousand cavalry from 
Helena, Arkansas, and march rapidly on Grenada, to threaten 
the enemy's rear. Precisely on the day appointed, the three 
columns moved as indicated. While Pemberton was intent 
in preparations to meet Grant and Sherman behind his fortifi- 
cations,, he learned that Washburne, with a force of which he 
could not conjecture the size, source, or destination, had 
crossed the Tallahatchie, near the mouth of the Yallabusha, 
and was rapidly approaching the railways in his rear. There 
was no time to hesitate. Abandoning his works, Pemberton 
relinquished the line of the Tallahatchie without a battle, and 
hastily retreated on Grenada. 

During the fall, and in preparation for the movement on 
Vicksburg, a sufficient number of the regiments called out by 
the President, after the failure of the summer campaign in 
Virginia, reported to General Sherman, to swell his division to 
six brigades ; and by persistent and repeated applications he 
finally succeeded in adding the only organized battalion of his 
own regular regiment, the Thirteenth Infantry, under the com- 
mand of Captain Edward 0. Washington. Early in Novem- 
ber, the division, which in the latter part of October had been 
renumbered as the First Division of the Army of the Tennes- 
see, was organized as follows : 

The first brigade, Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, con- 
sisted of the Sixth Missouri, Eighth Missouri, Fifty-fourth 
Ohio, One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, and One Hundred 
and Twentieth Illinois. 

Second brigade, Colonel John A. McDowell, of the Sixth 
Iowa ; Sixth Iowa, Fortieth Illinois, Forty-sixth Ohio, Thir- 
teenth II. S. Infantry, a#d One Hundredth Indiana. 

Third brigade, Brigadier-General James W. Denver ; Forty- 



MEMPHIS. 79 

eighth. Ohio, Fifty-third Ohio, Seventieth Ohio, Ninety-seventh 
Indiana, and Ninety-ninth Indiana. 

Fourth brigade, Colonel David Stuart, of the Fifty-fifth Illi- 
nois ; Fifty-fifth Illinois, Fifty-seventh Ohio, Eighty-third In- 
diana, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, and One Hundred 
and Twenty-seventh Illinois. 

Fifth brigade, Colonel E. P. Buckland of the Seventy-second 
Ohio ; Seventy-second Ohio, Thirty-second Wisconsin, Ninety- 
third Illinois, and One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois. 

Sixth, or reserve brigade ; the Thirty-third Wisconsin, and 
One Hundred and Seventeenth Illinois. 

Besides these regiments of infantry, there were attached to 
the division, and tinassigned to brigades, seven batteries of 
light artillery, and the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Colonel Ben- 
jamin EL Grierson. The new regiments are designated in 
italics. 

Early in the winter of 1862, the organization of army corps 
commenced in the Army of the Potomac, just before its spring 
campaign was introduced in the "West. In December, the 
troops serving in the Department of the Tennessee were desig- 
nated as the Thirteenth Army Corps, and Major-General 
Grant as the commander. He immediately subdivided his 
command, designating the troops in the district of Memphis 
as the right wing of the Thirteenth Corps, to be commanded 
by Major-General Sherman, and to be organized for active 
service in three divisions. Sherman assigned Brigadier- 
General Andrew J. Smith to the command of the first division, 
consisting of the new brigades of Burbridge and Landmm ; 
Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith to the second division, 
including the brigades of Colonel Giles A. Smith, Eighth 
Missouri, and David Stuart, Fifty-fifth Illinois, formerly the 
first and fourth brigades ; and Brigadier-General George W. 
Morgan to the third division, comprising the new brigades of 
Osterhaus and Colonels Lindsay and De Courcey. The other 
brigades remained as the garrison of Memphis. 



80 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 



CHAPTEE YH. 

THE ATTEMPT ON "VTCKSBUBGL 

GENERAL GRANT directed General Sherman to proceed with 
the right wing of the Thirteenth Corps to the mouth of the 
Tazoo Kiver, and there disembark and attempt the capture of 
Vicksburg from the north side, while he himself, with the left 
wing, should move on Jackson, against the enemy from the 
rear, and, uniting the two columns, proceed to invest the place, 
in the event of the first part of the plan proving impracti- 
cable. 

Before entering upon the duty now confided to him, Sher- 
man issued the following characteristic orders, dated Memphis, 
December 18, 1862 : 

" I. The expedition now fitting out is purely of a military 
character, and the interests involved are of too important a 
character to be mixed up with personal and private business. 
No citizen, male or female, will be allowed to accompany it, 
unless employed as part of a crew, or as servants to the trans- 
ports. Female chambermaids to the boats, and nurses to the 
sick alone, will be allowed, unless the wives of captains and 
pilots actually belonging to the boats. No laundress, officer's 
or soldier's wife must pass below Helena. 

" II. "No person whatever, citizen, officer, or sutler, will, OB 
any consideration, buy or deal in cotton, or other produce of 
the country. Should any cotton be brought on board of any 
transport, going or returning, the brigade quartermaster, of 
which the boat forms a part, will take possession of it, and in- 
voice it to Captain A. E. Eddy, chief quartermaster at Mem- 
phis. 

" HI. Should any cotton or other produce be brought back 



THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURGr 81 

to Memphis by any cliartered boat, Captain Eddy will take 
possession of the same, and sell it for the benefit of the United 
States. If accompanied by its actual producer, the planter or 
factor, the quartermaster will furnish him with a receipt for 
the same, to be settled for on proof of his loyalty at the close 
of the war. 

" IV. Boats ascending the river may take cotton from the 
shore for bulkheads to protect their engines or crew, but on 
arrival at Memphis it must be turned over to the quarter- 
master, with a statement of the time, place, and name of its 
owner. The trade in cotton must await a more peaceful state 
of affairs. 

"V. Should any citizen accompany the expedition below 
Helena, in violation of those orders, any colonel of a regiment, 
or captain of a battery, will conscript him into the service of 
the United States for the unexpired term of his command. If 
he show a refractory spirit, unfitting him for a soldier, the 
commanding officer present will turn him over to tho captain 
of the boat as a deck-hand, and compel him to work in that 
capacity, without wages, until the boat returns to Memphis. 

" VI. Any person whatever, whether in the service of the 
United States or transports, found making reports for publi- 
cation which might reach the enemy, giving them information, 
aid, and comfort, will be arrested and treated as spies." 

Sherman embarked at Memphis on the 20th of December, 
1862, two days later than the time originally designated., hav- 
ing been delayed by tho groat want of steamboat transporta- 
tion. 

The three divisions of A. J. Smith, M. L. Smith, and Mor- 
gan, reported a grand aggregate of thirty thousand and 
sixty-eight officers and men of all arms for duty. At Helena 
his force was increased by the division of Brigadier-General 
Frederick Steole, twelve thousand three hundred and ton 
strong, comprising the brigades of Brigadier-Generals C. E. 
Hovoy, John M. Thayer, Wyman, and Frank P. Blair, Jr. 
The place of rendezvous was at Friar's Point, on the left bank 
of the Mississippi, below Helena. The fleet reached Milliken's 

6 



82 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Bend on the night of the twenty-fourth. On Christinas day 
Brigadier-General Bttrbridge landed with his brigade of A. J. 
Smith's division, and broke up the Vicksburg and Texas 
railway for a long distance near the crossing of the Tensas ; 
and without waiting for his return, Sherman pushed on to a 
point opposite the mouth of the Yazoo, landed on the west 
bank, and sent Morgan L. Smith with his division to break 
up the same road at a point eight miles from Yicksburg. On 
the 26th, the transports, led and convoyed by the gunboat 
fleet, under Acting Bear Admiral D. D. Porter, ascended the 
old mouth of the Tazoo about twelve miles. Of the tran- 
sport fleet, Morgan's division led the advance, followed in order 
by Steele, Morgan L. Smith, and A. J. Smith. By noon on 
the 27th, the entire command had disembarked on the south 
bank of the river, near the mouth of the Chickasaw bayou, a 
small stream, which, rising near the town of Vicksburg, finds 
its way across the bottom land about midway between the 
bluffs and the river. The clay bluffs, which are about three 
hundred feet high, and very steep, recede from the Mississippi 
on the north side of the town, and follow the course of the 
river at a distance of about four miles, the intermediate space 
being an alluvial swamp, full of lagoons, bayous, and quick- 
sands, and covered with cottonwood, cypress, and a denso 
undergrowth of tangled vines. The Yazoo was very low, and 
its banks were about thirty feet above the water. On reach- 
ing the point of debarkation, De Courcey's, Stuart's, and 
Blair's brigade, were sent forward in the direction of Vieka- 
burg about three miles, and as soon as the whole army had 
disembarked it moved out in four columns, Stecle's above the 
mouth of Chickasaw bayou ; Morgan, with Blair's brigade of 
Steele's division, below the same bayou ; Morgan L. Smith's 
on the main road from Johnson's plantation to Vicksburg, 
with orders to bear to his left, so as to strike the bayou 
'about a mile south of where Morgan was ordered to cross it, 
and A. J. Smith's division on the main road. 

All the heads of columns met the enemy's pickets, and 
drove them towards Vicksburg. During the night of the 



THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBUR6K . 83 

27th, the ground was reconnoitred as well as possible, and it 
was found to be as difficult as it could possibly be from nature 
and art. Immediately in front was a bayou, passable only at 
two points, on a narrow levee and on a sand-bar, wHcli were 
perfectly commanded by the enemy's sharpshooters that lined 
the levee or parapet on its opposite bank. Behind this was 
an irregular strip of beach or table-land, on which were con- 
structed a series of rifle-pits and batteries, and behind that a 
high abrupt range of hills, whose scarred sides were marked 
all the way up with rifle-trenches, and the* crowns of the 
principal hills presented heavy batteries. The county road 
leading from Yicksburg to Yazoo City ran along the foot of 
these hills, and served the enemy as a covered way along 
which he moved his artillery and infantry promptly to meet 
the Union forces at any point at which they attempted to 
cross this difficult bayou. Nevertheless, tjiat bayou, with its 
levee parapet backed by the lines of rifle-pits, batteries, and 
frowning hills, had to be passed before they could reach firm 
ground, and moot their enemy on any thing like fair terms. 

Stoelo, in Ids progress, followed substantially an. old loveo 
back from tlio Yazoo to the foot of the hills north of Thomp- 
son's Lake, but found that in order to reach tho hard land ho 
would liavo to cross a long corduroy causeway, with a battery 
enfilading it, others cross-firing it, with a similar line of rifle- 
pits and trenches before described. He skirmished with the 
enemy on tlio morning of the 28th, while tho other columns 
were similarly engaged; but on close and critical examination 
of tlio swamp and causeway in his front, with tho batteries 
and rifle-pits well maimed, ho canio to tho conclusion that it 
was impossible for lii.ru to reach tho county road without a 
fearful sacrifice of life. 

On his reporting that ho could not cross from his position 
to tho one occupied by the centre, Sherman ordered him to 
retrace his steps and return in steamboats to the southwest 
side of Chiokasaw bayou, and support Morgan's division. 
This ho accomplished during tho night of tho 28th, arriving 
iu tirno to support him, and take part in tho assault of the 29th. 



84 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Morgan's division were evidently on the best of existing 
ways from Tazoo to firm land. He had attached to Ms trains 
the pontoons with which to make a bridge, in addition to the 
ford or crossing, which was known to be in his front, and by 
which the enemy's picket had retreated. 

The pontoon bridge was placed during the night across a 
bayou, supposed to be the main bayou, but which turned out 
to be an inferior one, and it was therefore useless ; but the 
natural crossing remained, and Morgan was ordered to cross 
with his division, and carry the line of works to the summit of 
the hill by a determined assault. 

During the morning of the 28th a heavy fog enveloped the 
whole of the country. General Morgan advanced De Courcey's 
brigade and engaged the enemy : heavy firing of artillery and 
infantry was sustained, and his column moved on until he en- 
countered the real bayou, which again checked his progress, 
and was not passed until the next day. 

At the point where Morgan L. Smith's division reached the 
bayou was a narrow sand strip with abattis thrown down by 
the enemy on our side, having the same deep boggy bayou 
with its levee parapet and system of cross-batteries and rifle- 
pits on the other side. 

To pass it in the front by the flank would have been utter 
destruction, for the head of the column would have been swept 
away as fast as it presented itself above the steep bank 
While reconnoitring it on the morning of the 28th, during the 
heavy fog, General Morgan L. Smith was shot in the hip by 
a chance rifle-bullet, and disabled, so that ho had to be re- 
moved to the boats, and thus at a critical moment was lost 
one of the best and most daring leaders, a practical soldier 
and enthusiastic patriot. Brigadier-General David Stuart, 
who succeeded to his place and to the execution of his orders, 
immediately studied the nature of the ground in his front, saw 
all its difficulties, and made the best possible disposition to 
pass over his division as soon as he shoiild hear General Mor- 
gan engaged on his left. 

To his right General A. J. Smith had placed General Bur- 



THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBUR6L 85 

bridge's brigade of Ms division, -with orders to make rafts and 
cross over a portion of his men, to dispose Ms artillery so as 
to fire at tlie enemy across the bayou, and produce the effect 
of a diversion. 

Landram's brigade of A. J. Smith's division occupied a high 
position on the main road, with pickets and supports pushed 
well forward into the tangled abattis within three-fourths of 
a mile of the enemy's forts, and in plain view of the town of 
Vicksburg. 

The boats still lay at the place of debarkation, covered by 
the gunboats and four regiments of infantry, one of each di- 
vision. Such was the disposition of Sherman's forces during 
the night of the 28th. 

The enemy's right was a series of batteries or forts seven 
miles above us on the Yazoo, at the first bluff near Snyder's 
house, called Draingould's Bluff ; his left the fortified town of 
Vickslmrg ; and his lino connecting these was near fourteen 
miles in. extent, and was a natural fortification, strengthened 
by a year's labor of thousands of negroes, directed by educated 
and skilful officers. 

Sherman's design was by a prompt arid concentrated ^move- 
ment to "break tho centre near Ohickasaw Crock, at the head 
of *i bayou of tho same name, and onco in position, to turn to 
tho right, Viekslmrg, or left, Drniugould's. According to 
information then obtained lie supposed tho organized force of 
the enemy to amount to about fifteen thousand, which could 
Lo reinforced at thq^rato of about four thousand a day, pro- 
vided 05 on oral Grant did not occupy all the attention of Pcm- 
1 union's forces at Grenada, or Rosecrans those of Bragg in 
Tennessee. 

Nothing had yet boon hoard from General Grant, who was 
supposed to bo pushing south; or of General Banks, who was 
supposed to be ascending tho Mississippi, but who in reality 
had but very recently reached New Orleans, and was engaged 
in gathering his officers there and at Baton Hougo, and in 
regulating the civil details of his department. Time being all- 
important, Sherman then determined to assaiilt tho hills in 



gg SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

front of Morgan on the morning of the 29th, Morgan's divi- 
sion to carry the position to the summit of the hill, Steele's 
division to support him and hold the county road. General 
A. J. Smith was placed in command of his own first division, 
and M. L. Smith's second division, with orders to cross on the 
sand-spit, undermin'e the steep bank of the bayou on the fur- 
ther side, or carry at all events the levee parapet and first line 
of rifle-pits, to prevent a concentration on Morgan. It was 
nearly noon when Morgan was ready, by which time Blair's 
and Thayer's brigades of Steele's division were up with him, 
and took part in the assault, and Hovey's brigade was also 
near at hand. All the troops were massed as closely as possi- 
ble, and the supports were well on hand. 

The assault was made, and a lodgment effected on the 
hard table-land near the county road, and the heads of the 
assaulting columns reached different points of the enemy's 
works ; but here met so withering a fire from the rifle-pits, and 
cross-fire of grape and canister from the batteries, that the 
columns faltered, and finally fell back to the point of starting, 
leaving many dead, wounded, and prisoners in the hands of 
the enemy. 

General Morgan at first reported that the troops of his di- 
vision were not at all discouraged, though the losses in Blair's 
and De Oourcey's brigades were heavy, and that he would re- 
new the assault in half an hour. 

Sherman then urged General A. J. Smith to push his attack, 
though it had to be made across a narrow sand-bar, and up a 
narrow path in the nature of a breach, as a diversion in favor 
of Morgan, or a real attack, according to its success. During 
Morgan's progress, he crossed over the Sixth Missouri, covered 
by the Thirteenth Eegulars deployed as skirmishers up to the 
bank of the Bayou, protecting themselves as well as possible 
by fallen trees, and firing at any of the enemy's sharpshooters 
that showed a mark above the levee. All the ground was 
completely swept beforehand by the artillery, under the im- 
mediate supervision of Major E. Taylor, chief of artillery. 
The Skth Missouri crossed rapidly by companies, and lay 



THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURa. 



87 



under the bank of the Bayou with the enemy's sharpshooters 
over their heads within a few feet, so near that these sharp- 
shooters held out their muskets and fired down -vertically 
upon our men. The orders were to undermine this bank and 
make a road up it ; but it was impossible, and after the repulse 
of Morgan's assault, Sherman ordered General A. J. Smith to 
retire this regiment under cover of darkness, which was suc- 
cessfully done, though with heavy loss. 

Whilst this was going on, Burbridge was skirmishing across 
the Bayou in his front, and Landrum pushed his advance 
through the close abattis and entanglement of fallen timber 
close up to Vicksburg. "When the night of the 29th closed in 
we stood upon our original ground, and had suffered a re- 
pulse. During the night it rained very hard, and our men 
were exposed to it in the miry, swampy ground, sheltered 
only by their blankets and rubber ponchos, but during the 
following day it cleared off, and the weather became warm. 

After a personal examination of the various positions, Sher- 
man came to the conclusion that he could not break the ene- 
my's centre without being too much crippled to act with any 
vigor afterwards. New combinations having therefore be- 
come necessary, he proposed to Admiral Porter that the navy 
should cover a landing at some point close up to the Drum- 
gould's Bluff batteries, while he would hold the present 
ground, and send ten thousand choice troops to attack the 
enemy's right, and carry the batteries at that point ; which, if 
successful, would give us the substantial possession of the 
Yazoo River, and place Sherman in communication with Gen- 
eral Grant. Admiral Porter lent his hearty concurrence to 
this plan, and it was agreed that the expeditionary force 
should be embarked immediately after dark on the night of 
the 31st of December, and under cover of all the gunboats, 
proceed before day slowly and silently up to the batteries ; 
the troops there to land, storm the batteries, and hold them. 
Whilst this was going on, Sherman was to attack the enemy be- 
low, and hold him in check, preventing reinforcements going up 
to the bluff, and, in case of success, to move all his force thither. 



S3 SHERMAN AJSTD HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Steele's division and one brigade of Morgan L. Smith's 
division were designated and embarked ; the gunboats were all 
in position, and up to midnight every thing appeared favorable. 

The assault was to take place about four A. M. Sherman had 
all his officers at their posts, ready to act on the first sound 
of cannonading in the direction of Drumgould's Bluff ; but 
about daylight he received a note from General Steele, stating 
that Admiral Porter had found the fog so dense on the river, 
that the boats could not move, and that the expedition must 
be deferred till another night. Before night of January 1, 
1863, he received a note from the admiral, stating that inas- 
much as the moon would not set until twenty-five minutes 
past five, the landing must be a daylight affair, which in his 
judgment would be too hazardous to try. 

Thus disappeared the only remaining chance of securing a 
lodgment on the ridge between the Tazoo and Black rivers, 
from which to operate upon Vicksburg and the railway to the 
east, as well as to secure the navigation of the Yazoo Eiver. 

One third of the command had already embarked for this 
expedition, and the rest were bivouacked in low, swampy, tim- 
bered ground, which a single night's rain would have made a 
quagmire. Marks of overflow stained the trees from ten to 
twelve feet above their roots. A further attempt against the 
centre was deemed by all the brigade and division command- 
ers impracticable. 

It had now become evident to all the commanders that for 
some cause unknown to them, the co-operating column under 
General Grant had failed. A week had elapsed since the 
time when it should have reached the rear of Vickslmrg, yet 
nothing was heard from it. Sherman accordingly decided to 
abandon the attack and return to Milliken's Bend, which had 
a large extent of clear land, houses for storage, good roads in 
the rear, plenty of corn and forage, and the same advantages 
as any other point for operating against the enemy inland, on 
the river below Yicksburg, or at any point above where he 
might attempt to interrupt the navigation of the Mississippi 
Eiver. 



THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURGK 89 

On the morning of the 2d of January, the troops and 
materiel were embarked, and at 3 o'clock that afternoon the 
last of the transports, under convoy and protection of the 
gunboats, passed out of the Yazoo. At the mouth of that 
river, General Sherman met and reported to Major-General 
McClernand, who had come down on the steamer " Tigress," 
with orders to assume command of the expedition. On arriv- 
ing at Milliken's Bend, on the 4th of January, 1863, Sherman 
at once relinquished the command to General McOlernand, 
and announced the fact to the army in the following farewell 
order : 

" Pursuant to the terms of General Order No. 1, made this 
day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to 
exist, and constitutes in the future the Army of the Missis- 
sippi, composed of two c army corps,' one to be commanded 
by Gen. G. W. Morgan, and the other by myself. In relin- 
quishing the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and re- 
stricting my authority to my own c corps,' I desire to express 
to all commanders, to the soldiers and officers recently oper- 
ating before Yicksburg, my hearty thanks for the zeal, alac- 
rity, and courage manifested by them on all occasions. "We 
failed in accomplishing one great purpose of our movement, 
the capturing of Vicksburg ; but we were part of a whole. 
Ours was but part of a combined movement, in which others 
were to assist. We were on time. Unforeseen contingencies 
must have delayed the others. 

' " We have destroyed the Shreveport road, we have attacked 
the defences of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far as 
prudence would justify, and having found it too strong for our 
single column, we have drawn off in good order and good 
spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now 
here to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United 
States, who is charged by the Constitution to maintain and 
defend it, and he has the undoubted right to select his own 
agents. I know that all good officers and soldiers will give 
him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have 



90 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserve for all, 
and work enough too. Let each do his appropriate part, and 
our nation must in the end emerge from this dire conflict 
purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength 
and purity." 

The disgraceful surrender of Holly Springs, on the 20th of 
December, with its immense depot of supplies, essential to the 
movement of the column under General Grant, had delayed 
the march of that officer, and unexpectedly demanded his at- 
tention in another quarter, while the enemy was thus enabled 
to concentrate for the defence of Vicksburg, behind positions 
naturally and artificially too strong to be carried by assault. 
Thus it was that the expedition under Sherman failed. In an 
official communication, written after the capture of Yicksburg, 
General Grant says : " General Sherman's arrangement as 
commander of troops in the attack on Chickasaw Bluffs, last 
December, was admirable. Seeing the ground from the oppo- 
site side from the attack, afterwards, I saw the impossibility 
of making it successful." 



ABKANSAS POST. 91 



CHAPTEE VIII. 

AKKAITBAS POST. 

MAJOE-GENEEAL MOCLEBNAKD brought with Mm. an order, 
issued by the War Department, dividing the Army of the 
Tennessee into four separate army corps, to be known as 
the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, and 
to bo respectively commanded by Major-General H John A. 
McClernand, William T. Sherman, Stephen A. Hiirlbut, and 
James B. McPhorsou, "while General Grant was to retain 
command of 11 in whole. Tho army corps had now become 
the unit of administration and of linld movements. Com- 
pletely orgaiii/ied, generally possessing within itself all tho 
elements of a separate army, its commander was enabled 
to dispose promptly of tho groat mass of administrative do- 
tails without tho necessity of <'a,rrying tlunt up to gonoral 
]ica<l(jua,rt< k rs, to bnu'd drlay and vtxation find to distract tho 
mind of thn ^cii< i rjil-in-<^hi<f from tho <^H(vntial nutttcj-H upon 
which his mind should haves hisum to eonecvntrato its energies. 

Imnicdiaicly on a,ssumin^ command, (Umoral McOlernand 
assigned 'nrixJidicT-CJcncnil (icun'gc^ W. Morgan to tho immo- 
diaf.o ctvnnnaiid of his own corj'>s, tht^ Thirlcu^iith, coni])osing 
th<^ left wing, and consisting of A. J. Smith's division and 
IMorgaiTs own division, now to bo c-ommandi'd by Brigadior- 
Clrncrn.1 P. J. Ostrrhaus. 

Sh< i nnjin\s I^ifimilh C!or[)B, "svliich was to constituto tho 
right wing, comprised th<^ First Division, under tho command 
of "Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, and the Second .Divi- 
sion, temporarily under I he, command of Briga-dior-General 
David Stuart, in the absence, of Brigadier-General Morgan L. 
Smith. 



92 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Steele's first division was now organized as follows : 

First brigade, Brigadier-General Frank P. Blair Thirteenth 
Illinois, Twenty-ninth. Missouri, Thirty-first Missouri, Thirty- 
second Missouri, Fifty-eighth Ohio, Thirtieth Missouri. 

Second brigade, Brigadier-General C. E. Hovey Seven- 
teenth Missouri, Twenty-fifth Iowa, Third Missouri, Seventy- 
sixth Ohio, Thirty-first Iowa, Twelfth Missouri. 

Third brigade, Brigadier-General John M. Thayer Fourth 
Iowa, Thirty-fourth Iowa, Thirtieth Iowa, Twenty-sixth Iowa, 
Ninth Iowa, infantry. 

Artillery First Iowa, Captain Griffiths ; Fourth Ohio, Cap- 
tain Hoffman, and First Missouri horse artillery. 

Cavalry Third Illinois, and a company of the Fifteenth 
Illinois. 

The second division, formerly Sherman's fifth division, of the 
Army of the Tennessee, consisted of the following named troops : 

First brigade, Colonel G. A. Smith, commanding Eighth 
Missouri, Sixth Missouri, One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, 
One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, Thirteenth United States. 

Second brigade, Colonel T. Kilby Smith, commanding 
Fifty-fifth Illinois, One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois, 
Fifty-fourth Ohio, Eighty-third Indiana, Fifty-seventh Ohio, 
infantry. 

Artillery Companies A and B, First Illinois Light Artillery, 
and Eighth Ohio battery. 

Cavalry Two companies of Thielman's Illinois battalion, 
and Company C, Tenth Missouri. 

On the 4th of January, 1863, the expedition sailed on the 
same transports that had brought them from Vicksburg, con- 
voyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to attack Fort 
Hindrnan, commonly known as Arkansas Post, an old French 
settlement situated on the left or north bank of the Arkansas 
Eiver, fifty miles from its mouth and one hundred and seven- 
teen below Little Eock. This fort was a very strong bastioned 
work, constructed by the rebels at the head of a horse-shoe 
bend, on an elevated bluff which here touches the river and 
defines for some distance its left bank. The work has four 



ARKANSAS POST. 93 

bastion fronts, inclosing a space about one hundred yards 
square, and a line of rifle-pits extended three-quarters of a mile 
across a neck of level ground to a bayou on the west and 
north. In the fort three heavy iron guns, one three-inch rifled 
gun, and four six-pounder smooth bores were mounted at the 
salients and flanks, and six twelve-pounder howitzers and three- 
inch rifles were distributed along the rifle-pits. The garrison 
consisted of about five thousand men, under Brigadier-General 
T. J. Churchill, of the Confederate army. He was ordered by 
Lieutenant-General Holmes, commanding the rebel forces in 
Arkansas, to hold the post " till all are dead." 

The expedition was suggested by General Sherman, and the 
idea was promptly adopted by General McClernand. Its 
object was to employ the troops, which would otherwise have 
remained idly waiting for the full development of the combina- 
tions against Vicksburg, in opening the way to Little Rock ; 
thus placing the Arkansas River under the control of the "Union 
armies, and putting an end to the dangerous detached opera- 
tions carried on from that point against our communications 
on the Mississippi. The former river traversing and nearly 
bisecting Arkansas from northwest to southeast, is the key to 
the military possession of the State. 

The expedition moved up the "White Eiver through the cut- 
off which unites its waters with those of the Arkansas, up the 
latter stream to Notrib's farm, three miles below Port Hind- 
man, where the troops began to disembark at five o'clock on 
the afternoon of January 9th. By noon on the 10th the land- 
ing was completed, and the troops were on the march to invest 
the post. Sherman's Fifteenth Corps took the advance, and was 
to pass round the rear of the enemy's works, and form line with 
his right resting on the river above the fort. The Thirteenth 
Corps, under Brigadier-General Morgan, was to follow, and 
connecting with General Sherman's right, complete the invest- 
ment on the left. The gunboats opened a terrific fire upon 
the enemy during the afternoon, to distract his attention.. By 
nightfall the troops were in position, Steele on the right, rest- 
ing on the bayou, Stuart next, A. J. Smith's division on Stuart's 



94: SHEEMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

left, and Osterhaus's division on the extreme left near the river. 
During the night of the 9th and the following day Colonel D. 
W. Lindsay's brigade of Osterhaus's division had landed on the 
right bank of the river below Notrib's farm, and marching 
across the bend had taken up a position and planted a battery 
on that bank above the fort, so as to effectually prevent the 
succor of the garrison, or its escape by water. 

Admiral Porter kept up a furious bombardment until after 
dark. Early on the morning of the llth, Sherman moved his 
corps into an easy position for assault, looking south, across 
ground encumbered by fallen trees and covered with low 
bushes. The enemy could be seen moving back and forth 
along his lines, occasionally noticing our presence by some 
ill-directed shots which did us little harm, and accustomed the 
men to the sound of rifle-cannon. By ten A. M. Sherman re- 
ported to General McClernand in person that he was all ready 
for the assault, and only awaited the simultaneous movement 
of the gunboats. They were to silence the fort, and save the 
troops from the enfilading fire of its artillery along the only 
possible line of attack. 

About half-past twelve notice was received that the gun- 
boats were in motion. Wood's Battery, Company A, Chicago 
Light Artillery, was posted on the road which led directly into 
the Post ; Banett's Battery B, First Illinois Artillery, was in 
the open space in the interval between Stuart's and Steele's 
divisions, and Steele had two of his batteries disposed in his 
front. Sherman's orders were, that as soon as the gunboats 
opened fire all his batteries in position should commence firing, 
and continue until he commanded " cease firing," when, after 
three minutes' cessation, the infantry columns of Steele's and 
Stuart's divisions were to assault the enemy's line of rifle-pits 
and defences. 

The gunboats opened about one P. M., and our field-batteries 
at once commenced firing, directing their shots at the enemy's 
guns, his line of defences, and more especially enfilading the 
road which led directly into the fort, and which separated 
Morgan's line of attack from Sherman's. The gunboats could 



ARKANSAS POST. 95 

not be seen, and their progress had to be judged by the 
sound of their fire, at first slow and steady, but rapidly 
approaching the fort and enveloping it with a storm of shells 
and shot. The field-batteries continued their fire rapidly for 
about fifteen minutes, the enemy not replying, when Sherman, 
having withdrawn the skirmish line, ordered the firing to cease 
and the columns to advance to the assault. The infantry 
sprang forward with a cheer, rapidly crossed the hundred 
yards of clear space in their immediate front, and dashed into 
a belt of ground about three hundred yards wide, separating 
them from the enemy's parapets, slightly cut up by gulleys and 
depressions, and covered with standing trees, brush, and fallen 
timber. There they encountered the fire of the enemy's ar- 
tillery and infantry, well directed from their perfect cover. 
The speed of our advance was checked, and afterwards became 
more cautious and prudent. By three P. M. Sherman's lines 
were within one hundred yards of the enemy's trenches, and 
flanking him on our right, and completely enveloping his 
position. The gunboats could be seen close up to the fort, the 
admiral's flag directly under it. All artillery fire from the fort 
had ceased, and only occasionally could be seen a few of the 
enemy's infantry firing from its parapets ; but the strongest 
resistance continued in our immediate front, where the enemy's 
infantry was massed, comparatively safe from the gunboats, 
which were compelled to direct their fire well to the front, lest 
it should injure our own troops. A brisk fire of musketry 
was kept up along our whole front with an occasional discharge 
of artillery through the intervals of the infantry lines until four 
p. M., when the white flag appeared all along the enemy's lines. 
Sherman immediately ordered General Steele to push a brigade 
down the bayou on his right, to prevent the escape of the 
enemy. 

Simultaneously with Sherman's assault, Burbridge's brigade 
with the One Hundred and Eighteenth Illinois and Sixty-ninth 
Indiana, of Landrum's, and the One Hundred and Twentieth 
Ohio, of Colonel Sheldon's brigade, dashed forward under a 
deadly fire quite to the enemy's intrenchments ; the Sixteenth 



96 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Orr, with the Eighty- 
third Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Baldwin, of Burbridge's bri- 
gade, and the One Hundred and Twentieth Ohio, Colonel D. 
French, of Colonel Sheldon's brigade, being the first to enter 
the fort. Presenting himself at the entrance of the fort, Gen- 
eral Burbridge was halted by the guard, who denied that they 
had surrendered, until he called their attention to the white 
flag, and ordered them to ground their arms. 

Colonel Lindsay, as soon as a gunboat had passed above 
the fort, hastened with his brigade down the opposite shore, 
and opened an oblique fire from Foster's two twenty, and 
Lieutenant Wilson's two ten pounder Parrott's, into the 
enemy's line of rifle-pits, carrying away his battle-flag and 
killing a number of his men. 

The fort had surrendered. With cheers and shouts our 
troops poured into the works. 

As soon as order could be restored, Brigadier-General A. 
J. Smith, was assigned to the command of the fort itself, and 
Brigadier-General David Stuart to the charge of the prisoners 
and the exterior defences. 

Our entire loss in killed was 129 ; in wounded, 831 ; and in 
missing, 17 ; total, 977. Sherman's corps lost 4 officers and 
75 men killed, and 34 officers and 406 men wounded ; making 
a total of 519. 

General Churchill, in his official report, dated Richmond, 
May 6, 1863, to Lieutenant-General Holmes, commanding the 
Department of Arkansas, states that his loss "will not ex- 
ceed killed, and 75 or 80 wounded." He estimates the 
Union force at 50,000, his own at 3,000, and our loss at from 
1,500 to 2,000. 

By the surrender there fell into our hands 5,000 men, in- 
cluding three entire brigades of the enemy, commanded re- 
spectively by Colonels Garland, Deshler, and Dunnington ; 
seventeen pieces of cannon ; three thousand serviceable small- 
arms. ; forty-six thousand rounds of ammunition ; and five 
hundred and sixty-three animals. 

After sending the prisoners to St. Louis, having destroyed 



ARKANSAS POST. 



97 



the defences and all buildings used for military purposes, on 
the 15th of January the troops re-embarked on the transports 
and proceeded to Napoleon, Arkansas, whence on the 17th, in 
obedience to orders received from Major-General Grant, they 
returned to Milliken's Bend. Sherman had been in favor of 
taking advantage of a rise in the Arkansas to threaten Little 
Rock, and force all scattered bands of the enemy to seek 
safety south of that river ; but General McClernand was un- 
willing to take so great a responsibility in addition to that he 
had already incurred, by entering upon so important an enter- 
prise without orders. 

In noticing the services of the subordinate commanders, 
General McClernand remarks : " General Sherman exhibited 
his usual activity and enterprise ; General Morgan proved his 
tactical skill and strategic talent ; while Generals Steele, 
Smith, Osterhaus, and Stuart, and the several brigade com- 
manders displayed the fitting qualities of brave and successful 
officers." 

At Napoleon, Sherman was joined by the brigade of Brig- 
adier-General Hugh Ewing, which had been on the way to 
join General Eosecrans ; but that officer having just defeated 
Bragg in the desperate and decisive action of Stone River, no 
longer needed reinforcements. Ewing's command was as- 
signed to Morgan L. Smith's second division, as the third 
brigade of that division. The effective force of the Fifteenth 
Corps was now fifteen thousand nine hundred and nine men 
of all arms. 

7 



93 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS 



CHAPTEE DL 

THE SIEGE AND TALL OF VICKSBUEGk 

ON the 19th. of January, Sherman proceeded with his corps 
to Young's Point, opposite Vicksburg, and reported to Grant. 
Here he was joined by the division of Brigadier-General J. M. 
Tuttle, consisting of Mower's, Buckland's, and "Woods' bri- 
gades. From the moment of taking personal command of the 
army at Millikon's Bend, General Grant became convinced that 
Vicksburg could only be taken from the south. He immedi- 
ately caused work to be prosecuted on the canal begun, the pre- 
vious summer by Brigadier-General Thomas "Williams, under 
the orders of Major-General Butler, with the view of effecting 
an artificial cut-off across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, 
through which transports, troops, and supplies might safely 
pass to the river below the enemy's batteries at that place. 
Somewhat later he also caused a channel to bo cut through 
the west bank into Lake Providence, with the design of pass- 
ing down ih rough Bayou Baxter, Bayou Maeon, and tho 
Tensas, Wachita, and Hod rivers; and a third canal through 
the Ya/oo Pass into the Oolil water l>y means of which troops 
might cnicr tho Tallahatchie, and thence descending tho 
Ya/oo, land on tho high ground above Haiiies 1 Bluff. For 
various reasons, none, of these plans succeeded. 

While the gunboats and troops sent through Ya^oo Pass 
were delayed near Greenwood at the junction of tho Yalla- 
busha and Tallahatchie, whore tho rebels had taken advan- 
tage of a bond in the river to construct a formidable work, 
Admiral Porter reconnoitred still another route. Seven miles 
above tho mouth of the Yu/oo, Steele's bayou empties into 



THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURGK 99 

that river ; thirty miles up Steele's bayou, Black bayou enters 
it from Deer Creek, six miles distant ; ascending Deer Creek 
eighteen miles, Rolling Fork connects it with the Big Sun- 
flower River, ten miles distant ; and descending the Big Sun- 
flower forty-one miles, you again enter the Yazoo, sixty miles 
from its mouth. By taking this course, the troops and gun- 
boats would reach a strong position between Haines' Bluff 
and Greenwood ; the enemy's forces at the latter point would 
be placed between two strong columns of the Union army, and 
would be compelled to fall back on Vicksburg ; one of the most 
important sources of supplies would be lost to the enemy, and 
a valuable line of operations gained for us. Satisfying him- 
self by a personal reconnoissance, in company with Admiral 
Porter, that the chances of success were sufficient to warrant 
so important an undertaking, on the 16th of March, General 
Grant ordered General Sherman to take Stuart's second divi- 
sion of the Fifteenth Corps, open the route, in co-operation with 
the gunboats, and seize some tenable position on the east 
bank of the Yazoo, whence to operate against Yicksburg and 
the forts at Haines' Bluff. Sherman started immediately with 
the Eighth Missouri regiment, and a detachment of pioneers, 
to open the bayou, and the next morning was followed by the 
remainder of the troops, who, in order to economize trans- 
portation, ascended the Mississippi to Eagle's Bend, where 
Steele's bayou approaches within a mile of the river, connected 
with it by Mud bayou, and there disembarking, marched across 
by land to Steele's bayou. The 18th and the forenoon of the 
19th were spent in bridging Mud bayou, which was greatly 
swollen by a crevasse. Marching to Steele's bayou, but one 
transport was found there, and the three following days were 
spent in transporting the troops up the bayou, in such boats 
as became available. At the mouth of Black bayou the troops 
were transferred from the steamers to coal barges and taken 
in tow by a tug. Admiral Porter had started on the 14th of 
Mi.irch with the gunboats Louisville, Lieutenant-Commander 
Owen; Cincinnati, Lieutenant-Commanding Baclie ; Caronde- 
lefy Lieutenant-Commanding Murphy ; Mound City, Licuten- 



100 SEEBMAJS AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

ant-Commanding Wilson ; Pittsburgh, Lieutenant-Commanding 
Hoel, four mortar-boats, and four tugs. The fleet easily 
passed up Steele's bayou, which, though very narrow , con- 
tained thirty feet of water ; but Black's bayou was found to 
be obstructed by fallen and overhanging trees, which had to 
be pulled out by the roots and pushed aside before the gun- 
boats could pass, and the frequent bends were so abrupt that 
the boats had to be heaved around them, with hardly a foot of 
room to spare. Twenty-four hours were occupied in going 
four miles into Deer Creek. The gunboats entered Deei Creek 
safely, aud pushed their way through the overhanging branches 
of cypress and willow, with which it was obstructed, at the 
rate of about a mile an hour at first, gradually diminishing as 
the difficulties increased, to half a mile an hour. When within 
seven miles of the Boiling Fork, the Confederate agents and 
some of the planters forcibly compelled the negroes to cut 
down immense trees directly across the Creek, for the purpose 
of delaying the advance. Removing these artificial obstruc- 
tions, in addition to the natural ones, with almost incredible 
labor, when within three miles of Boiling Fork, smoko was 
discovered in the direction of the Yazoo, and information 
reached Admiral Porter that the enemy was advancing with 
five thousand men, to dispute his progress. The Carondclet, 
Lieutenant-Commanding Murphy, was sent ahead to hold the 
entrance to Boiling Fork, and on the night of the 20th March 
found the gunboats within eight hundred yards of thai; stream, 
with only two or three trees and a narrow lane of willows be- 
tween them and open navigation. The next morning about 
six hundred of the enemy, with a battery of field-pieces, made 
their appearance, and began to annoy the fleet by sharp- 
shooters, and to fell trees in front and rear. Sherrnmi had 
not yet arrived. The road lay along the banks of the bayous, 
and he had found the banks overflowed below Hill's planta- 
tion on Deer Creek, at the head of Black bayou, so that the 
troops had to be transported twenty-eight miles to the mouth 
of Black bayou, on two small steamers, there transferred to a 
single coal-barge, and towed by a small tug two miles, to the 



THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURGK 101 

first dry ground. The wooden transports encountered the 
same difficulties that met the iron-clad gunboats, without the 
same means of overcoming them. It was a slow process. 
Sherman was now at Hill's plantation, with only three regi- 
ments. But upon receipt of a note from Admiral Porter, 
stating his condition, on the morning of the 21st, Colonel 
Smith, with the Sixth and Eighth Missouri and One Hundred 
and Sixteenth Illinois regiments of his brigade, was at once 
sent forward, and by a forced march of twenty-one miles over 
a terrible swamp road, succeeded in reaching the gunboats, to 
find them almost completely surrounded by the entire force 
sent out by the enemy through the Yazoo, and unable to move 
in either direction. The creek was so narrow that the broad- 
side guns were quite useless, and only one bow-gun could be 
brought to bear by either of the gunboats, and the steep 
banks required this to be fired at too great an angle to have 
much effect. The enemy had established a battery of fifteen 
guns in front. Colonel Smith disposed his force to protect 
the fleet, and prevent the felling of trees in the rear. On the 
morning of the 22d, after removing about forty of the felled 
trees, the enemy appeared in large force in rear of the gun- 
boats, and opened fire with artillery. The gunboats replied, 
and soon drove them off. The enemy then attacked Colonel 
Smith's brigade, and after a sharp skirmish, was again repulsed. 
When the firing began, Sherman, who had by great exertions 
succeeded in getting up the remainder of Colonel Giles A. 
Smith's brigade, consisting of the Thirteenth Regulars and One 
Hundred and Fifteenth Illinois, as well as the Eighty-third 
Indiana, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, Fifty-fourth and 
Fifty-seventh Ohio, of Colonel T. Kilby Smith's brigade, under 
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bice, Fif by-seventh Ohio, 
was advancing with them by a forced march, having led the 
troops by candlelight through the dense canebrake, and was 
six miles distant. Hearing the guns, he pressed rapidly for- 
ward in the direction of the sound, and arrived just in time to 
meet and disperse the enemy, who were preparing to pass round 
the rear of the boats, and again dispute their movement. The 



102 SHEEMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

fleet was saved. The expedition might now have been con- 
tinued, but officers and men of army and navy were alike 
exhausted ; the army had not brought rations for so long a 
work, and the navy provision-boat was too large to get through ; 
moreover, the enemy had had time to prepare, and full indi- 
cations of the direction and progress of the movement. There 
was nothing to do but to return. All of the 22d and 23d, and 
part of the 24th of March, was consumed in tediously retracing 
the route to Hill's plantation. The enemy, kept at bay by the 
army, did not molest the gunboats further. At Hill's the ex- 
pedition rested on the 25th, and on the 26th the fleet passed 
down, and in accordance with orders received from General 
Grant, Sherman returned with his troops to Young's Point. 

" The expedition failed," says General Grant, " more from 
want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this 
route than from any impracticability in the navigation of the 
streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pass. 
Want of this knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties 
were encountered, and then it would become necessary to 
send back to Young's Point for the means of removing them. 
This gave the enemy time to remove forces to effectually 
checkmate further progress, and the expedition was withdrawn 
when within a few hundred yards of free and open navigation 
to the Yazoo." 

Admiral Porter also, in his official report, speaks of the 
want of means of moving the troops through the bayous as 
the chief difficulty; "for," he remarks, "there wore never yet 
any two men who would labor harder than Generals Grant 
and Sherman to forward an expedition for the overthrow of 
Vicksburg." He continues : " The army officers worked like 
horses to enable them to accomplish wlia-t was desired. . . . 
No other general could have done better, or as well, as Sher- 
man, but he had not the means for this peculiar kind of trans- 
portation." 

General Grant now determined to march his army by land 
to New Carthage, twenty-three miles below Milliken's Bend, 
to run the transports past the batteries or through the canal, 



THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBUKGh 1Q3 

should the latter course prove feasible, to cross the river, and 
to attack Vicksburg from the south. The movement was com- 
menced by McClernand's Thirteenth Army Corps on the 29th 
of March. New Carthage was found to be an island, in conse- 
quence of the breakage of the levees, and the march had to be 
continued twelve miles further to Perkins' plantation. The 
roads were found to be level, but very bad, and the movement 
was necessarily slow. Over these roads the supplies of ord- 
nance and provisions had to be transported thirty-five miles in 
wagons. 

On the night of the 16th April, Acting Bear-Admiral Porter, 
who had entered with alacrity and energy into the general's 
plans, ran the Vicksburg batteries with his fleet and three 
transports carrying stores, and protected by hay and cotton. 
One of the transports only was lost, though all the boats were 
frequently struck. A few days later, five more transports, 
similarly prepared, and towing twelve barges, ran the batteries 
safely, a sixth being sunk, and half the barges disabled. The 
crews of the transports consisted of volunteers from the array, 
picked out of many hundreds of officers and men of the army, 
who offered themselves for this dangerous service. The 
limited amount of water transportation available below Vicks- 
burg now rendered it necessary for the army to march by a 
circuitous route, avoiding the flooded lands, thirty-five miles 
further to Hard Times, thus lengthening the line of communi- 
cation with Milliken's Bend to seventy miles. The final orders 
of General Grant for the movement, issued on the 20th of 
April, gave McClernand's Thirteenth Corps the right, Mc- 
Pherson's Seventeenth Corps the centre, and Sherman's Fif- 
teenth Corps the left, and directed the army to move by the 
right flank, no faster, however, than supplies and ammunition 
could be transported to them. On the 26th of April, when it 
was discovered that the march must be continued below New 
Carthage, General Grant sent orders to General Sherman to 
wait until the roads should improve, or the canals be finished; 
and, on the 28th, he notified Sherman that the following day 
was fixed upon for attacking Grand Gulf, and suggested that 



104: SHEEMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

a simultaneous feint on the enemy's batteries' on tlie Tazoo, 

near Haines' Bluff, would be most desirable, provided it 

could be made without the Hi-effect on the army and the 

country of an apparent repulse. The object was to make as 

great a show as possible, in order to prevent reinforcements 

being sent from Vicksburg to the assistance of the forces 

which would have to be encountered at Grand Gulf. " The 

ruse/' says General Grant, "succeeded admirably." In his 

official report, dated May 21st, 1863, convinced that the army 

could distinguish a feint from a real attack by succeeding 

events, and that the country would in due season recover 

from the effect, Sherman gave the necessary orders, embarked 

Blair's second division on ten steamboats, and about 10 A. M. I 

on the 29th April, proceeded to the mouth of the Yazoo, where f 

he found the flag-boat Black Hawk, Captain Breese, with the i 

Choctaw and De Kalb, iron-clads, and the Tyler, and several i 

smaller wooden boats of the fleet, already with steam up, pre- j 

pared to co-operate in the proposed demonstration against I 

Haines 3 Bluff. ^ 

The expedition at once proceeded up the Yazoo in order ; 
lay for the night of April 29th at the mouth of Chickasaw 
bayou, and early next morning proceeded to within easy range ! 

of the enemy's batteries. . 

The gunboats at once engaged the batteries, and for four '* 

hours a vigorous demonstration was kept up. Towards evening, !' 

Sherman ordered the division of troops to disembark in full r 

view of the enemy, and seemingly prepare to assault ; but he ! 

knew full well that there was no road across the submerged I 

field that lay between the river and the bluff. As soon as the 
troops were fairly out on the levee, the gunboats resumed their J, 

fire, and the enemy's batten A ,s replied with spirit. The enemy } 

could be seen moving guns, artillery, and infantry back and 

forth, and evidently expecting a real attack. Keeping up ap- fi 

pearances until night, the troops were re-embarked. During 
the next day similar movements were made, accompanied by 
reconnoissances of all the country on both sides of the Yazoo. 

While there, orders came from General Grant to hurry for- 



THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBUKG. 1Q5 

ward to Grand Gulf. Dispatching orders to the divisions of 
Steele and Tuttle at once to march for Grand Gulf via Kich- 
mond, Sherman prolonged the demonstration till night, and 
quietly dropped back to his camp at Young's Point. No casu- 
alties were sustained, except one man of the Eighth Missouri, 
slightly wounded. 

In the mean time, as many of the Thirteenth Army Corps as 
could be got on board the transports and barges were embark- 
ed, and were moved down to the front of Grand Gulf, for the 
purpose of landing and storming the enemy's works as soon 
as the navy should have silenced the guns. Admiral Porter's 
fleet opened at eight A. M. on the 29th of April, and gallantly 
kept up a vigorous fire at short range for more than five hours ; 
by which time General Grant, who witnessed the engagement 
from a tug-boat, became convinced that the enemy's guns were 
too elevated to be silenced, and his fortifications too strong to 
be taken from the water-front. He at once ordered the troops 
back to Hard Times, there to disembark and march across the 
point to the plain immediately below Grand Gulf. During ihe 
night, under cover of the fire of the gunboats, all the trans- 
ports and barges ran safely past the batteries. They were 
immediately followed by the fleet, and at daylight, on the 30th, 
the work of ferrying the troops over to Bruinsburg was com- 
menced. The Thirteenth Corps was started on the road to 
Port Gibson as soon as it could draw three days' rations, and 
the Seventeenth Corps followed as fast as it was landed on the 
east bank. The enemy was met in force near Port Gibson at 
two o'clock on the afternoon of the 1st of May, was driven back 
on the following day, was pursued across the Bayou Pierre, 
and eight miles beyond the north fork of the same bayou, both 
which streams were bridged by McPherson's corps ; and on 
the 3d of May, with slight skirmishing all day, was pushed to 
and across the Big Black Kiver, at Hankinson's Ferry. Find- 
ing here that the enemy had evacuated Grand Gulf, and that 
we were already fifteen miles from that place on the direct 
road to either Vicksburg or Jackson, General Grant halted 
his army to wait for wagons, supplies, and Sherman's corps, 



106 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

and went back to Grand Gulf in -person, to move the depot of 
supplies to that point. 

Sherman reached Young's Point on the night of May 1st. 
On the following morning, the second division, now com- 
manded by General Blair, moved up to Milliken's Bend to 
garrison that place until relieved by troops ordered from 
Memphis for that purpose; and at the same time, General 
Sherman himself, with Steele's and Tuttle's divisions, took 
up the line of march to join General Grant. They reached 
Hard Times at noon on the 6th, crossed the Mississippi to 
Grand Gulf during the night and the following day, and on 
the 8th inarched eighteen miles to Hankinson's Ferry, reliev- 
ing Crocker's division and enabling it to join McPherson's 
corps. General Grant's orders for a general advance had 
been issued the day previous, and the movement had already 
begun. McPherson was to take the right-hand road by Eocky 
Springs and Utica to Raymond, and thence to Jackson; 
McOlernand, the left-hand road, through Willow Springs, keep- 
ing as near the Black Eiver as possible ; Sherman to move on 
Edwards' Station, and both he and McClernand to strike the 
railroad between Edwards' Station and Bolton. At noon on 
the 10th, Sherman destroyed the floating bridge over the Big 
Black and marched to Big Sandy ; on the llth he reached 
Auburn, and on the morning of the 12th encountered and dis- 
persed a small force of the enemy endeavoring to obstruct the 
crossing of Fourteen Mile Creek. Pausing for the pioneers, 
to make a new crossing in lieu of a bridge burned by the 
enemy's rear-guard, towards evening Sherman met General 
Grant on the other side of Fourteen Mile Creek, and was 
ordered to encamp there, Steele's division towards Edwards' 
Depot and Tuttle's towards Raymond. During the night, news 
was received that McPherson, with the Seventeenth Corps, 
had the same clay met and defeated two brigades of the enemy 
at Raymond, and that the enemy had retreated upon Jackson, 
where reinforcements were constantly arriving, and where 
General Joseph E. Johnston was hourly expected to take per- 
sonal command. 



THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBUBGK 107 

Determining to make sure of Jackson, and to leave no 
enemy in Ms rear, if it could be avoided, General Grant at 
once changed Ms orders to McClernand and Sherman, and 
directed them to march upon Eaymond. On the 13th, Mc- 
Pherson moved to Clinton, Sherman to a parallel position at 
Mississippi Springs, and McClernand to a point near Eaymond. 
Having communicated during the night, so as to reach their 
destination at the same hour, on the 14th, Sherman and Mc- 
Pherson marched fourteen miles, and at noon engaged the 
enemy near Jackson. At this time McClernand occupied 
Clinton, Mississippi Springs, and Eaymond, each with one 
division, and had Blair's division of Sherman's corps near 
New Auburn, and had halted, according to orders, within 
supporting distance. The enemy marched out with the bulk 
of his forces on the Clinton road and engaged McPherson' s 
corps about two and a half miles from Jackson, while a small 
force of artillery and infantry took a strong position in front 
of Sherman, about the same distance from the city, on the 
Mississippi Springs road, and endeavored by unusual activity, 
aided by the nature of the ground, to create the appearance 
of great strength, so as to delay Sherman's advance until the 
contest with McPherson should be decided. 

During the day it rained in torrents, and the roads, which 
had been very dusty, became equally muddy, but the troops 
pushed on, and about 10 A. M. were within three miles of Jack- 
son. Then were heard the guns of McPherson to the left, and 
the cavalry advance reported an enemy in front, at a small 
bridge at the foot of the ridge along which the road led. 

The enemy opened briskly with a battery. Hastily recon- 
noitring the position, Sherman ordered Mower's and Matthie's, 
formerly Woods', brigades of Tattle's division, to deploy forward 
to the right and left of the road, and Buckland's to close up. 
Waterhouse's and Spohre's batteries were placed on com- 
manding ground and soon silenced the enemy's guns, when he 
retired about half a mile into the skirt of woods in front of the 
inteenchments at Jackson. Mower's brigade followed him up, 
and he soon took refuge behind the intrenchments. 



108 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

The stream, owing to its precipitous banks, could only be 
passed on the bridge, which the enemy did not attempt to 
destroy, and forming the troops in similar order beyond the 
bridge, only that Mower's brigade, from the course he took in 
following the enemy, occupied the ground to the left of the 
road, and Matthie's brigade to the right, the two batteries in 
the centre, and Buckland's brigade in reserve. 

As the troops emerged from the woods in their front, and 
as far to their left as they could see, appeared a line of in- 
trenchments, and the enemy kept up a brisk fire with artillery 
from the points that enfiladed the road. In order to ascertain 
the nature of the flanks of this line of intrenchments, Sher- 
man directed Captain Pitzman, acting engineer, to take the 
Ninety-fifth Ohio, and make a detour to the right, to see what 
was there. While he was gone Steele's division closed up. 
About one p. M. Captain Pitzman returned, reporting that he 
found the enemy's intrenchments abandoned at the point 
where he crossed the railroad, and had left the Ninety-fifth 
Ohio there in possession. Sherman at once ordered General 
Steele to lead his whole division into Jackson by that route, 
and as soon as the cheers of his men were heard, Tuttle's 
division was ordered in by the main road. The enemy's in- 
fantry had escaped to the north by the Canton road, but we 
captured about two hundred and fifty prisoners, with all the 
enemy's artillery (eighteen guns), and much ammunition and 
valuable public stores. Meanwhile, after a warm engagement, 
lasting more than two hours, McPherson had badly defeated 
the main body of the enemy, and driven it north. The pur- 
suit was kept up until nearly dark. 

Disposing the troops on the outskirts of the town, in obe- 
dience to a summons from Q-eneral Grant, Sherman met him 
and General McPherson near the State-house, and received 
orders to occupy the line of rifle-pits, and on the following 
day to destroy effectually the railroad tracks in and about 
Jackson, and ah 1 the property belonging to the enemy. Ac- 
cordingly, on the morning of the 15th of May, Steele's divi- 
sion was set to work to destroy the railroad and property to 



THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKRSBURGL 1Q9 

the south and east, including Pearl River Bridge, and Tuttle's 
division to the north, and west. The railroads were destroyed 
by burning the ties and warping the iron for a distance of four 
miles east of Jackson, three south, three north, and ten west, 

In Jackson the arsenal buildings, the government foundry, 
the gun-carriage establishment, including the carriages for two 
complete six-gun batteries, stable, carpenter and paint shops, 
were destroyed. The penitentiary was burned, as is supposed, 
by some convicts who had been set free by the Confederate 
authorities. A valuable cotton factory was also burned to the 
ground, as machinery of that kind could so easily be convert- 
ed into hostile uses ; and the United States could better afford 
fco compensate the owners for their property, and feed the 
poor families thus thrown out of employment, than to spare 
the property. Other buildings were destroyed in Jackson by 
some mischievous soldiers, who could not be detected, includ- 
ing the Catholic church and the Confederate hotel the former 
accidentally, and the latter from malice. 

Immediately on entering Jackson, General Grant had or- 
dered McClernand with his corps and Blair's division of Sher- 
man's corps to face towards Bolton, and march by roads con- 
verging near that place to Edward's Station. McPherson was 
also directed to retrace his route to Clinton and follow Mc- 
Clernand. Early on the morning of the 16th, hearing that 
Pemberton, with a force estimated by the enemy at ten bat- 
teries of artillery and twenty-five thousand men, was taking 
up positions to attack him, General Grant, who had intended 
to leave one division of the Fifteenth Corps a day longer in 
Jackson, ordered Sherman to bring up his entire command at 
once, and move with all possible dispatch until he should 
come up with the main body near Bolton. At the same time 
McClernand was ordered to move from the position reached 
on the night of the 15th, near Bolton, upon Edward's Station, 
and McPherson was ordered to join him. 

Sherman received his orders at ten minutes past seven A. M. 
In an hour his advance division, Steele's, was in motion, Tattle's 
followed at noon, and by night the corps had marched twenty 



SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

miles to Bolton. During the day the main body met the 
enemy in strong force at Champion Hills, and after a terrible 
contest of several hours' duration, fought chiefly by Hovey's 
division of McClernand's corps, and Logan's and Quimby's 
divisions of McPherson's corps, defeated him, capturing a 
large number of guns and prisoners, and cutting off the whole 
of Loring's division from Peniberton's army. That night 
Sherman was ordered to turn his corps to the right and move 
on Bridgeport, where Blair's division was to join him. On 
the morning of the 17th, McClernand and McPherson con- 
tinued the pursuit along the railroad, the former in advance. 
In a brilliant affair, Lawler's brigade, of Carr's division, Mc- 
Clernand's corps, stormed the enemy's works on the east bank 
of the Big Black, defending the crossing of that stream, and 
captured the entire garrison, with seventeen guns. The enemy 
immediately burned the bridge over the Big Black, and thus 
finally isolated his forces on the west bank. At noon, Sher- 
man reached Bridgeport, where Blair met him with his divi- 
sion and the pontoon train, which was the only one in the 
entire army. "With trifling opposition the pontoon bridge was 
laid by night, and Blair's and Steele's divisions passed over, 
followed by Tuttle's division in the morning. During the 
night of the 17th, McClernand and McPherson bridged tho 
Big Black, and by eight A. M., on the 18th, began to cross, the 
former 011 the Jackson and Vicksburg road, the latter above 
it. McClernand inarched to Mount Albans and there turned 
to the left, on the Baldwin's Ferry road. McPherson caino 
into the same road with Sherman, and turned to the loft, whore, 
as will be presently seen, the Litter turned to the right, at tho 
fork of the Bridgeport road, within three and a luilf miles of 
Vicksburg. 

Starting at daybreak, Sherman pushed rapidly forward, and 
by half-past nine A. M., of May 18th, the head of his column 
reached the Benton road and commanded the Yazoo, inter- 
posing a superior force between the enemy at Vicksburg and 
the forts on the Yazoo. Resting a sufficient time to enable the 
column to close up, Sherman pushed forward to the point 



THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURGK HI 

where the road forks, and sending out on each road the 
Thirteenth Kegulars to the right, and the Eighth Missouri to 
the left, with a battery at the fort, awaited General Grant's 
arrival. He very soon came up, and directed Sherman to 
operate on the right, McPherson on the centre, and McCler- 
nand on the left. Leaving a sufficient force on the main road 
to hold it till McPherson came up, Sherman pushed the head 
of his column on this road till the skirmishers were within 
musket-range of the defences of Vicksburg. Here he disposed 
Blair's division to the front, Tuttle's in support, and ordered 
Steele's to follow a blind road to the right till he reached the 
Mississippi. By dark his advance was on the bluffs, and 
early next morning he reached the Haines' Bluff road, getting 
possession of the enemy's outer works, camps, and many 
prisoners left behind during their hasty evacuation, and had 
his pickets up within easy range of the enemy's new line of 
defences. By eight A. M. of May 19th we had encompassed 
the enemy to the north of Vicksburg, our right resting on the 
Mississippi River, within view of our fleets at the mouth of the 
Yazoo and Young's Point ; Yicksburg was in plain sight, and 
nothing separated the two armies but a space of about four 
hundred yards of very difficult ground, cut up by almost im- 
practicable ravines and the enemy's line of intrenchments. 
Sherman ordered the Fourth Iowa Cavalry to proceed rapidly 
up to Haines' Bluff and secure possession of the place, it being 
perfectly open to the rear. By four p. M. the cavalry were on the 
high bluff behind, and Colonel Swan, finding that the place 
had been evacuated, dispatched a company to secure it. 
Communication was opened with the fleet at Young's Point 
and the mouth of the Yazoo, and bridges and ioads made to 
bring up ammunition and provisions from the mouth of the 
Chickasaw bayou, to which point supply-boats had been 
ordered by General Grant. Up to that time, Sherman's men 
had literally lived upon the country, having left Grand Gulf 
May 8th with three days' rations in their haversacks, and 
having received little or nothing from the cornirissary until 
the 18th. 



112 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

The three corps being in position, and Vicksburg as com- 
pletely invested as our strength admitted, and, relying upon 
the demoralization of the enemy, in consequence of his re- 
peated and disastrous defeats outside of the works, General 
Grant ordered a general assault to take place at two o'clock 
in the afternoon of the 19th. At that hour, Blair's division 
moved forward, Ewing's and Giles Smith's brigades on the 
right of the road, and Kilby Smith's brigade on the left, 
with artillery disposed on the right and left to cover the 
point where the road enters the enemy's intrenchments, 
Tuttle's division was held on the road, with Bucklancl's bri- 
gade deployed in line to the rear of Blair and the othei 
two brigades under cover. At the appointed signal the 
line advanced, but the ground to the right and left was 
so impracticable, being cut up in deep chasms, filled with stand- 
ing and fallen timber, that the line was slow and irregular in 
reaching the trenches. The Thirteenth Infantry, on the left of 
Giles Smith, reached the works first, and planted its colors on 
the exterior slope ; its commander, Captain "Washington, was 
mortally wounded, and five other officers, and seventy-seven 
men, out of two hundred and fifty, killed or wounded. The 
Eighty-third Indiana, Colonel Spooner, and the One Hundred 
and Twenty-seventh Illinois, Colonel Eldridge, attained the 
same position nearly at the same time, held their ground, and 
fired upon any head that presented itself above the parapet ; 
but it was impossible to enter. Other regiments gained posi- 
tion to the right and left close up to the parapet ; but night 
found them outside the works, unsuccessful. As soon as dark- 
ness closed in, Sherman ordered them back a short distance, 
where the formation of the ground gave a partial shelter, 
to bivouac for the night. McClernand and McPherson only 
succeeded in gaining advanced positions under cover. 

Spending the 20fch and 21st in placing the artillery in 
commanding positions, in perfecting communications, and 
in bringing up supplies to the troops who, having now 
been marching and fighting for twenty days on about 
five days' rations from the commissary department, were 



THE SIEGE AND FALL OF YICKSBURGK H3 

beginning to suffer for want of bread on the afternoon 
of the latter day, General Grant issued orders for a second 
assault to be made simultaneously, by heads of columns, at ten 
o'clock on the morning of the 22d of May. The three corps 
commanders set their time by his. Precisely at the appointed 
hour, and simultaneously along the whole front, the assault 
commenced. 

In Sherman's corps, Blair's division was placed at the head 
of the road, Tuttle's in support, and General Steele was to 
make his attack at a point in his front about half a mile to 
the right. The troops were grouped so that the movement 
could be connected and rapid. The road lies on the crown 
of an interior ridge, rises over comparatively smooth ground 
along the edge of the ditch of the right face of the enemy's 
bastion, and enters the parapet at the shoulder of the bas- 
tion. No men could be seen in the enemy's works, except oc- 
casionally a sharpshooter, who would show his head and 
quickly discharge his piece. A line of picked skirmishers 
was placed to keep them down. A volunteer storming party 
of a hundred and fifty men led the column, carrying boards 
and poles to bridge the ditch. This, with a small interval, 
was followed in order by Swing's, Giles Smith's, and Kilby 
Smith's brigades, bringing up the rear of Blair's division. 
All marched by the flank, following a road by which the 
men were partially sheltered, until it was necessary to take 
the crown of the ridge and expose themselves to the full view 
of the enemy. The storming party dashed up the road at the 
double-quick, followed by Swing's brigade, the Thirtieth Ohio 
leading, while the artillery of Wood's, Barrett's, "Waterhouse's, 
Spoor's, and Hart's batteries kept a concentric fire on the bas- 
tion constructed to command this approach. The storming 
party reached the salient of the bastion, and passed towards 
the sally-port. Then rose from every part commanding it a 
double rank of the enemy, and poured on the head of the col- 
umn a terrific fire. It halted, wavered, and sought cover. 
The rear pressed on, but the fire was so hot that very soon all 
followed this example. The head of the column crossed 

8 



SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

the ditch on the left face of the bastion, and climbed up 
on the exterkr slope. There the colors were planted, and 
the men burrowed in the earth to shield themselves from 
the flank fire. The leading brigade of Ewing being unable 
to carry that point, the xiext brigade of Giles Smith was 
turned down a ravine, and, by a circuit to the left, found 
cover, formed Hue, and threatened the parapet about three 
hundred yards to the left of the bastion ; while the brigade 
of Kilby Smith deployed on the further slope of one of 
the spurs, where, with Ewing's brigade, they kept up a con- 
stant fire against any object that presented itself above the 
parapet. 

About two P. M., General Blair having reported that none of 
his brigades could pass the point of the road swept by the 
terrific fire encountered by Swing's, but that Giles Smith had 
got a position to the left in connection with General Hansom, 
of McPherson's corps, and was ready to assault, Sherman or- 
dered a constant fire of artillery and infantry to be kept up 
to occupy the attention of the enemy in his front, while Han- 
som's and Giles Smith's brigades charged up against the par- 
apet. They also met a staggering fire, before which they 
recoiled under cover of the hill-side. At the same time, while 
McPherson's whole corps was engaged, and having heard from 
General Grant General McClernand's report, which sub- 
sequently proved inaccurate, that he had taken three of the 
enemy's forts, and that his flags floated on the stronghold 
of Vicksburg, Sherman ordered General Tuttle at once to 
send to the assault one of his brigades. He detailed General 
Mower's, and while General Steele was hotly engaged on the 
right, and heavy firing could be heard all down the line 
to his left, Sherman ordered their charge, covered in like 
manner by Blair's division deployed on the hill-side, and the 
artillery posted behind parapets within point-blank range. 
General Mower carried his brigade up bravely and well, but 
met a fire more severe, if possible, than that of the first assault, 
with a similar result. The colors of the leading regiment, the 
Eleventh Missouri, were planted by the side of those of Blair's 






7 



THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBTJKGK H5 

storming party, and there remained till withdrawn, after night- 
fall, by Sherman's orders. General Steele, with his division, 
made his assault at a point about midway between the 
bastion and the Mississippi Biver. The ground over which 
he passed was more open and exposed to the flank fire of the 
enemy's batteries in position, and was deeply cut up by 
gulleys and washes, but his column passed steadily through 
this fire, and reached the parapet, which was also found to 
be well manned and defended by the enemy. He could not 
carry the works, but held possession of the hill-side till night, 
when he withdrew his command to his present position. The 
loss in Sherman's corps in this attack was about six hundred 
killed and wounded. 

In the mean while portions of each of the storming columns 
on McPherson's andMcClernand's fronts planted their columns 
on the exterior slope of the parapet, where they kept them 
till night. But the assault had failed. The enemy's works 
were naturally and artificially too strong to be taken in that 
way. The enemy was able to maintain at each point assailed, 
and at all simultaneously the full force the position admitted ; 
and the nature of the ground was such that only small col- 
umns could be used in the assault. 

General Grant now determined to undertake a regular siege. 
The troops worked diligently and cheerfully. On the evening 
of the 3d of July the saps were close to the enemy's ditch, 
the mines were well under his parapet, and every thing was in 
readiness for a final assault. Meanwhile the investing 'force 
had been strengthened by Landrum's division from Memphis ; 
Smith's and KimbalTs divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, under 
Major-General C. C. "Washburne ; Herron's division from Ar- 
kansas, and two divisions of the Ninth Corps, under Major- 
General John G. Parke, from the Department of the Ohio. 
By the 25th of June, our intrenchments being now as formidable 
against a sortie as the enemy's works were against assault, and 
there being more troops than were needed for the investment, 
General Grant placed Sherman in command of the Ninth Corps 
at Haines' Bluff, Landrum's division, and one division each from 



116 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

the Thirteenth, Pifteenth, and Seventeenth corps, and assigned 
to him the duty of watching the movements of Johnston, -who 
had collected a large army at Jackson, and was apparently 
about to attack the rear of the investing force, with the 
design of raising the siege. Our position was a strong one. 
The Big Black covered us from attack, and would render 
Johnston's escape in the event of defeat impossible. Never- 
theless the condition of affairs with his army was so desperate 
that he moved from Jackson on the 29th of June*, ; but while 
he was making reconnoissances to ascertain the best point for 
crossing the river, on the 4th day of July, 180.% 'Vieksburg 
surrendered. 

General Grant in his official report of the Hiego, dated July 
6th, thus alludes to Sherman's operations while ^uanling the 
rear: "Johnston, however, not attacking, I determined to attack 
him the moment Yicksburg was in our possession, and ac- 
cordingly notified Sherman that I should again make an assault 
on Yicksburg at daylight on the Gth, and for him to have* up 
supplies of all descriptions ready to move, upon receipt of 
orders, if iho assault should prove a success. '.His prepara- 
tions wore immediately made, and when the place surrendered 
on the 4th, two days earlier than 1 had fixed fr the aitark, 
Sherman was found ready, and moved at once \vith a 1'oive 
increased by the remainder of both UK* Thirteenth and Fif- 
teenth Army corps, and is at present investing Jackson, where 
Johnston has made a stand." 

Johnston occupied the lines of rifle-pits mverinj/ the front 
of Jackson with four divisions of ( Ymfedentie trnnps, under 
Major-Generals Loring, Walker, French, and IXreekinri.i^e, and 
a division of cavalry, under ]Jrigaclier-(5eneral Jarksuii, ob- 
serving the fords. 

After toiling for nearly two months in the hot and stilling 
trenches, without pausing to share the general outbreak of joy 
for the national triumph which crowned their labors, Sher- 
man's men marched fifty miles in the heat and dust through a 
country almost destitute of water, to meet the. enemy. 

The advance of his troops appeared before HIM enemy's 



THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. H7 

works in front of Jackson on the 9th of July, and on the 12th 
had invested that place, until both flanks rested upon Pearl 
Biver. Constant and vigorous skirmishing was kept up in 
front, while a cavalry expedition was sent off to the east of 
Jackson to destroy the railroads, until the night of the 16th of 
July. Sherman now had all his artillery in position, and a large 
ammunition train for which he had been waiting had arrived 
during the day. Learning this fact, and perceiving the im- 
possibility of longer maintaining his position, Johnston having 
previously removed the greater portion of his stores, marched 
out of Jackson the same night, and destroyed the floating- 
bridges over the Pearl Biver. Early on the morning of the 
17th, the evacuation was discovered, and Sherman's troops 
entered and occupied the city. Johnston continued the re- 
treat to Morton, thirty-five miles east of Jackson. Two divis- 
ions of our troops, with the cavalry, followed as far as Brandon, 
through which place they drove the enemy's cavalry on the 
19th. General Sherman at once sent out expeditions in all 
quarters, to thoroughly and permanently destroy all the 
bridges, culverts, embankments, water-tanks, rails, ties, and 
rolling-stock of the railways centring in Jackson. Our loss 
during the operations before Jackson was about one thousand 
in all ; the enemy's was estimated by General Johnston at 71 
killed, 504 wounded, and about 25 stragglers. We took 764 
prisoners on entering the city. Leaving a small garrison iu 
Jackson, Sherman returned to the line of the Big Black, to 
recuperate. 

Thus terminated, in one hundred and nine days from its first 
inception, a campaign which resulted in the surrender of an 
entire army of thirty-seven thousand prisoners, including fif- 
teen general officers ; the discomfiture and partial dispersion 
of a second large army under a loader of approved skill ; the 
capture of Vicksburg ; the opening of the Mississippi Biver ; 
and the division of the rebellion, in twain. 

Of Sherman's part in the campaign General Grant remarks : 
" The siege of Vicksburg and last capture of Jackson and 
dispersion of Johnston's army entitle General Sherman to 



118 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

more credit than usually falls to the lot of one man to earn, 
His demonstration at Haines' Bluff, in April, to hold the <m- 
eray about Vicksburg, while the army was securing a foothold 
east of the Mississippi ; his rapid marches to join tho unity 
afterwards; his management at Jackson, Mississippi, in the 
first attack ; his almost unequalled march from Jackson to 
Bridgeport, and passage of Black River ; his securing Walnut 
Hills on the 18th of May, attest his great morit an a noldior." 
The army now rested. 



TUB LULL AFTKH VICKSBUEG. H9 



CHAPTER X. 

THE LULL AFT BE VICKSBUBO. 

IMMEDIATELY after tho surrender, while waiting for tho move- 
moiit of liia columns, Sherman seized a few moments to write 
these hasty lines to his friend Admiral Porter : 

"I can appreciate the intense, satisfaction you must feel 
at lyin# before the very monster that has defied us with such 
deep and malignant hate-, ami seeing your oner disunited 
fleet a^aiu a. unit; and bettor still, the chain (hat. made an in- 
closed sea, of a, link in the j;reat river broken forever. In 
so magnificent a, result I slop not to count, who did ii. It- in 
done, and the day of our nation's birth is consecrated and bap- 
tixed anew in a \ictory won by the united Navv and Armr of 
our country. (Jod j.;rant that the harmony and mutual respect 
that e:\ists between our respective commanders, and hlmrod by 
all the true men of the joint- .service, may continue* forever and 
serve to elevate our national character, threatened with ship- 
\vreek. Thus I muse as I ,sif in mv .solitarv camp out in thc^ 
wood I'M* from the point for which \ve have justly striven HO 
Inn^ and so \vell, and though personal eurio.silv would iempt 
me to t/n nnd see the tVouniii^ batteries and Minken pits thai 
have. d'iied us so lou;\ and s-nt to (lieir sih-nt ;.(rav*s so many 
of our early comrades in Hit* enb-rprise, I frel that olher iaskrf 
11*' before me, and time must not be 1m, t. \\'illiout easting 
anchor, and drspite tin- bc-at and the dur-i and the dnn;dit, I 
must a;-ain into the bv\els nf the laud to make the con- 
quest of Yick bui"' fulfil all the conditions it should in the, 
pro;,- n .-:. ol this war. \\ h-ther Mtec<'x-; attend mv efioiis or 
not, i kmvv that Admiral roller will ever accord to me tho 



120 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

exhibition of a pure and unselfish xeal in the service of our 
country. 

"Though further apart, tho navy and army will still act in 
concert, and I assure you I filiall never reach tin* hanks of the 
river or see a gunboat but 1 will think of Admiral Porter, 
Captain Breese, and the many elegant ami accomplished gen- 
tlemen it has been iny good fortune to inert on annt*il or 
unarmed decks of the Mississippi Squadron." 

There was now a lull in the war. After the givat st rubles 
which clostid the summer campaign of INO.'J, tlte combatants 
relaxed their grasp for a moment, to breatht*. Tin* Army of 
the Potomac rested upon the Kapidan. The A run of \l 
Oumbc-rland, gathered for the- leap, lay in front t*f Tullah<m:i. 
The Army of the Tennessee reposed on the banks of tin- rivi-r 
it had won. Steelo was sent to occupy Lilll*' Itnek. OrI with 
tho Thirteenth Corps, went to New OrJ an *, 1>\ t!.' K , d,. 
dor of Grant's army the interval was ; pi ut in i 
and recuperating. Tin* Fifteenth ('orp.^wa i"j .1. 
to consist of four divisions. The Fir .t, em.!,*, i ii* >i bv Itii & 
dier-(.!emral P. J. Osterhaus, was euiopu *1 *f t;. !*'! ,i i 
led by J>rigadier-(ieneral ( '. l(. Wood-* and ( <! i i J \. \\ i 
liamson, of the Fourth .Iowa. Tlir Seeund, r . \ i b^ 
Urigadier-di'iieral .Morgan L. Smith, eMinprUni i 1 , A d 
of .Urig!idicr-<Jenerals (Jiles A. Smith :tn*l J. A. I), i,, ! thmM 
r riic Third, commanded by Bri;,radiT-C lenrral J. M 'lutt'f, 
donsisted of three brigades, under l>ri^adi r ( i n ! I \ 
Mower, and K. P. Auckland, and ( f olnn*-lJ. .1. \\ , fl ,,f f , 
Twelfth Iowa. r rhe l-'ourth, eommandi'd b\- Hi i; !j , i 
Hugh Kwing, ineludrd tin* briiiadt'S Ird b\ ( ! m-r.ii.I. \I ( i . 
( lolonel Lnomis, of the Twentv-"si\th lili!ii',, : J{,, !<r ) J 
.Iu ( *oeken'li, of tin 1 Srventii-th Iowa. Major i 1 , lj 
,P. JUair was t<^mjorarilv relievi'd from dutv uilh tL i t f 
and Major-deneral Steele's division aeeompuni. 1 tii.it ttll- T 
to Arkansas. 

Wit may now avail ourselves of the lull to "Ian.-*- bri-Jlv aJ 
General Sherman's corresponds -nee, duriir;. thi ] i i*d ai<d !), 



THE LULL AFTER VICKSBURO. 

campaign just ended, relating to other matters than tlio move- 
ments and battles of his corps. 

While the new levies of 1868 were being rained, in a letter 
to the governor of his native State he took occasion to urge 
the importance of filling up the ranks of the veteran regiments 
rather than raising new ones, "I believe," ho said, "you 
will pardon one who randy travels out of his proper sphere to 
express an earnest hope that the strength of our people will 
not again be wasted by the organisation of new regiments, 
whilst wo have in the field skeleton regiments, with o dicers, 
non-commissioned officers, and men, who only need numbers 
to make a magnificent army. 

" The Prosit lent of the United Htatos is now clothed with a 
power that should have boon conferred just two years ago, 
and I feel assured he will use it. lie will call for a large- mass 
of men, and they should all be privates, and sent, so as to 
make every regiment in the Held equal to one, thousand men. 
Time has convinced nil reasonable mm thai war in iheorvand 
practice are two disiinci limits. Many an honest patriot, 
full of enthusiasm, zeal, and thirst, for f.'lory, has in practice 
found himself unequal to (he actual requirement:; of war, and 
passed to one .side, leaving another in his pla.ce and, now, 
after two years, ( )hio lias in the field one hundred and twenty- 
six regiments, whose officers unir are qualified, and the men of 
\vhich would ,",i\e lone and character to the new recruits. To 
fill these regiments uill require fifty thousand recruits, which 
are as many as the Stale could well raise. I therefore hope* 
and pray thai von will ir.e ( \our Influence ugjiinst an\ more 
new regiments, and consolidation of old ones, but, (ill up all 
the old (nes fo a full standard. Those who talk of prompt 
and speedy peace know not what thev sa\." 

Ke\ ert in;' to t he eiiki r;-d scope of th< war, and its probable 
future, he continues: "The South todav is more formidable 
and arrogant than r-'h* was two \ears a '.',<, and we lose far 
more b\ ha\in";i!i insiilHcienf. number of men than from anv 
ot her cause. \\ e are forced to in\ade we must l.i'ep t lie war 
South; thev aiv no! only ruined, exhausted, but humbled in 



122 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

pride and spirit Admitting that our armies to the front arc 
equal to the occasion, which I know is not the case, our linen 
of communication are ever threatened by their dashes, for 
which the country, the population, and character of tlm eiie 
ray are all perfectly adapted. 

" Since the first hostile shot the people of the. North has hud 
no option, they must conquer or be conquered. Then* can IN* 
no middle course. I have never boon concerned about the 
copperhead squabblings ; the South spurns and despises this 
class worse than we do, and would only accept their overtures 
to substitute them in their levies, in the cotton and corn-fields, 
for the slaves who have escaped. I do not pretend, nor liavo 
I ever pretended to foresee the end of all this, but I do know 
that we are yet far from the end of war. I repeat that il is no 
longer an open question ; we wnsf tij^ht it, nut. The moment 
we relax, down go all our conquests thus far. 1 know my 
views on this point have ever been regarded as extreme, even 
verging on insanity; but for yearn I had associated \\ith 
Bragg, Beauregard, and extreme. Southern mm, and lon r 1- 
foro others could realise the fact that Americans wouhl rai-e 
their hands against our consecrated ^ovenuneni, 1 was fire-tl 
to know it, to witness it. Two years will not have been spent 
in vain if tli o North now, by another ntaynifieeui uphea\ itr: 
of the real people, a#a in fill the. ranks of your proven ;jil 
tried regiments, and, assure them that, through good n |nt 
and evil report, you will stand by them. If Ohio will do tIJ , 
and if the groat North will do this, then will our arnu t' I 
that it has a country and a government worth dvinj.r f*r, 
As to tho poltroons, who falter and cry quits, let them <!i- 
and raise the food the*, army needs but ihev should n*-\-r 
claim a voice in the councils of the nation." 

A general order, issued from the adjutant-?enend % s nOiee, 
directed that all regiments which had fallen below one b;df 
their maximum strength should be. consoli<lafed lv redticiir-: 
the number of companies, and mustering out such of Hit* 
iield and staff officers as should therebv be rendered super- 
numerary. Strictly carried out, the effect of this order would 



THE L JLL AFTER VICKSBURGK 123 

have been to reduce a very large proportion of the regiments 
composing the army to the condition of feeble battalions, 
with impaired powers for the assimilation of recruits, and with 
the loss of many of the ablest and bravest officers. In many 
cases this actually occurred. To the policy of this order, 
Sherman felt called upon to object. " If my judgment do not 
err/ 5 he wrote to Adjutant-General Thomas, " you have the 
power to save this army from a disintegration more fatal than 
defeat. 

"You will pardon so strong an expression, when I illus- 
trate my meaning ; and if I am in error I shall rejoice to 
know it. 

" The Act of Congress, known as the ' Conscript Bill,' though 
containing many other provisions, was chiefly designed to or- 
ganize the entire available military strength of the nation, and 
provide for its being called out to the assistance of the armies 
now in the field. These armies are composed in great part of 
regiments which, by death in battle, by disease, and discharges 
for original or developed causes, have fallen far below the 
minimum standard of law, and many even below ' one-half of 
the maximum strength.' Yet all these regiments, as a general 
rule, have undergone a necessary and salutary purgation. 
Field-officers have acquired a knowledge which they did not 
possess when first called to arms by the breaking out of the 
war ; they have learned how to drill, to organize, to provide 
for and conduct their regiments. Captains, lieutenants, ser- 
geants, and corporals, have all been educated in the dear but 
necessary school of experience, and begin to have a knowl- 
edge which would enable them to make good companies, had 
they the proper number of privates. We had all supposed 
the conscript law would furnish these privates, and that at last 
we would have an army with a due proportion, of all grades. 
The receipt of General Orders No. 86 dispels this illusion, 
and we must now absolutely discharge the colonels and majors, 
and assistant-surgeons of all regiments below the standard of 
1 one-half the maximum.' This will at once take the very life 
out of our army. The colonels and majors of our reduced 



124 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

regiments are generally the best men, and are the fruit 
of two years' hard and constant labor. Then the ten com- 
panies must be reduced to five, and of course there will 
be discharged in each regiment field and staff, three ; cap- 
tains, five; lieutenants, ten; sergeants, twenty; corporals, 
forty; aggregate, seventy-eight. So that each regiment 
will be reduced in strength by seventy-eight of its chosen 
and best men. Extend this to the whole army, for the army 
is now or must soon fall below the standard, and the 
result will be a very heavy loss, and that confined to the best 
men. 

" Then, after regiments are made battalions, and again an* 
restored to their regimental organization, will come In a new 
set of colonels, majors, captains, etc., etc., and what guarantee, 
have we but the same old process of costly diminution will 
have to be gone over? . . A new set of colonels ami majors, 
and a strong infusion of new captains and limit* 'minis, will 
paralyze the new organization. The army is now in about the 
right condition to be re-enforced by recruits private's ; hut if 
this consolidation is effected, I have no hesitation in saying 
that my army corps is and will be paralysed by ihe change. 
It will be all loss and no gain, llegiments will lose, their 
identity, their pride, their esprit. If there 1m no intention to 
enlarge the present volunteer army, I admit thai; consolida- 
tion is economical and right; but when we all feel the armien 
must be filled up, it does seem strango we should begin ly 
taking out of our small but tried regiments some of tluj very 
best materials in them, especially their colonels." 

To a lady whose sight and hearing were shocked 1 >y (lie con- 
duct and language of some of the troops, and who took 
occasion to represent the matter at length, lie replied, defend- 
ing his men against the charges of misconduct, which, as in 
all other portions of the army, were continually brought 
against them in terms so vague and general thai no civil 
magistrate would have given them an instant's thought; and 
himself against the allegation that he tolerated invgulari- 
ties. 



THE LULL AFTEE VICKSBUEG. 125 

"Mrs. Z has fallen into a common error in saying 

it was useless to complain of a whole regiment to Brigadier- 
General Smith or Major-General Sherman. "We naturally 
demanded more specific complaint against incendiary acts 

than a mere vague suspicion that the did all iniquitous 

things, when twenty other regiments were camped round 
about Memphis, six thousand vagabonds and refugees hang- 
ing about, and the city itself infested by gangs of thieves and 
incendiaries, turned loose upon the world, and sheltered in 
their deeds of darkness by charging them upon soldiers. 
Neither General Morgan L. Smith or myself ever failed to 
notice a specific complaint against any soldier of our com- 
mand, if accompanied by reasonable proofs ; but we did, and 
rightfully too, resent a mere general charge, that every fire 
originating from careless chimneys, careless arrangement of 
stove-pipes, and the designing acts of wicked incendiaries, 
sh'ould without even an attempt at proof be charged to the 
. That regiment is one of the bravest and best dis- 
ciplined in our service, and being composed mostly of young 
and energetic men from the city of , is somewhat fa- 
mous for its acts of fun, frolic, mischief, and even crime, 
with a perfect skill in evading detection and pursuit. They 
are lawless and violent, and, like all our volunteer soldiers, 
have for years been taught that the people, the masses, 
the majority, are 'king/ and can do no wrong. They 
are no worse than other volunteers, all of whom come to us 
filled with the popular idea that they must enact war, that 
they must clean out the secesh, must waste and not protect 
their property, must burn, waste, and destroy. Just such 

people as Mrs. Z have taught this creed, sung this 

song, and urged on our men to these disgraceful acts ; 
and it is such as Morgan L. Smith and W. T. Sherman 
who have been combating this foul doctrine. During my 
administration of affairs in Memphis, I know it was raised 
from a condition of death, gloom, and darkness, to one of 
life and comparative prosperity. Its streets, stores, hotels, 
and dwellings were sad and deserted as I entered it, and 



126 SHERMAN -AJSTD HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

when I left it, life and business prevailed, and over fourteen 
hundred enrolled Union men paraded its streets, boldly and 
openly carrying the banners of our country. -No citizen, 
Union or secesh, will deny that I acted lawfully, liruil v, uncl 
fairly, and that substantial justice prevailed with < k \vn balancr', 
I do feel their testimony better than the hearsay of any would- 
be notoriety." 

To General Steele, while temporarily detach IH! from fho 
main body of his command, Sherman thus wroto respecting 
the destruction of the enemy's property :- 

"I most heartily approve your purpose to return to f:unilirH 
their carriages, buggies, and farming tools, wliert'wif It to mukr 
a crop. "War at best is barbarism, but to involve all chilihvn, 
women, old and helpless is more than can be just ifie<I. C hjr 
men will become absolutely lawless unless this ran I cherkrti. 
The destruction of corn or forage and provisions in I hi- eni-my's 
country is a well-established law of war, and is as jir IhlaMr 
as the destruction of private.) cotton by tin* South* i n ( 'onf-ii- 
eracy. Jiff. Davis, no doubt, agrees that they IK\- a rl; ? iif 
to destroy their j)oo])l(i's (Cotton, but tin* .^urrrillas *! i ( *! sfp 
to inquire whose cotton they burn ; ami 1 know, a -. \ u Knn\\. 
the Confederatti (.Jovenimcnt claim thr \\'ar-ri*!;lif t hum n// 
cotton, wliether biilojixing to their adlim-nts or tt i ni*u rm-n. 
We surely have a similar ri^ht as to corn, cotton, f II i. A *., 
used to sustain arm ins and war. Still, I alwavs f * ! that tin- 
stores necessary for a family should he spared, ant I I ihii.L It 
injures our men to allow them to plunder iniiiscriMiinaN h tli' 
inhabitants of the country." 

Near Jackson, Miss., at a house called Cl Ifurrican* */' fnnu-rlv 
occupied as a resid(Mico by Jefftirson Davis's hroih* r, .Ii.,.'jh 
Davis, some men of Ewing's division discovered, in :. "arr I, 
only reached through a trap-door in the ceiling, a IH * fc of J, tt r. 
and papers. By the time the box reached Shrrnriff, h ;if i 
quarters, whither it was forwarded, many of the eoatvnt kid 



THE LULL AFTER VICKSHUUU. 127 

been abstracted, but tho remainder wuro found to consist of 
letters addressed to Jefferson Davis by various persons during 
the preceding ten years. After attempting to arrange thorn 
in convenient shape for examination, Sherman found the task 
too great a tax on his time, and early in August forwarded 
them to the adjutant-general's ofiitio at Washington. 

The circumstances which form tho groundwork of somo of 
Wliittier's finest verses arc thus related, in an official dispatch 
to the secretary of war, dated August 8th, 18(.i!) :~~ 

"I take tho liberty of asking, through you, that something 
bo dono for a young lad named Orion P. Howe, of Wuukogun, 
Illinois, who belongs to tho Fifty-fifth IllinoiH, but is at present 
at his homo wounded. I think ho is too young for West Point, 
but would bo tins very thing for a midshipman. When tlm 
assault at Vioksburg was at its height, on the I'.Mh of May, 
and I was on foot near tho road which formed the line of at- 
tack, this young hid came up to me wounded and bleeding, 
with a, good healihy boy's cry : '(ieneral Sherman, ,s-nd some, 
cartridges to Colonel Walmbourg, UK* men are all out/ 
'What is the, mailer with my hoy?' l They shot me in the 
leg, but I ean go lo the hospital ; send the carfn'th'rs n"*hf, 
away/ Kven where we MtooJ, tho shot fell thick, ami I fold 
him logo to the rear at oner, I would :i.f fend to i he earl ridges, 
and of]' he limped, Jus! before he disappeared over the hill, 
he. turned, and called, as loud as he could, 'Calibre *'V(/ 

u 1 hav(\ not seen the lo\ since, and his coloni 1 !, Wnlin- 
bourg, on intjuiry, ;'i\e:; mr his addri-ss a;* above, and savs 
he is a bright intelli;-;rnt boy, \\iihu line preliminary eduea 
lion. 

" What arrested my attention then, was and what, renew:, 
my memory of the fact n<\\, is that one so voiing 
a musket-ball wound through hi:-. l-y, .should ha.\e 
way to nir on ill it falal ^-.pot, an*l tlfli\er'il his iw 
forgrtting the very important part, e\m, of the cal 
musket, which \n\\ knou is an unusual one. 

* 4 I'll warrant that tlie boy has in him the element:; of ;i man, 




128 SHERMAN AND HIS 

and I commend him to the Government as unit worthy tlwi 
fostering care of some one of its national instil utionn.'* 

On the 14th of August he received from flie War H jart- 
ment a commission as brigadier-general In fit* 1 K*;rular Anny 
of the United States, dating from the4iit of Juh. IM*:;, ami 
thus acknowledged his indebtedness to Gt*w ral (Jrant f.r ibis 
new honor : 

" I had the satisfaction to receive last ni^lii th* appoint- 
ment as brigadier-general in the regular nruiy, \\li\\ n Ji-tti-r 
from General Halleck very friendly snul *< wp!ifiiru -0-^ in ttfi 
terms. I know that 1 owe this to your fa\ *r, an i 1 - f' a. 
knowledge it, and add, that I value the* i* neim* *'ti LH !. * 
than the fact that this will associate mv iru '\it'* \M^I .A?,! 
McPherson's in opening tlm Mississippi, at* a* hi u n t *it ; 
importance of which cannot be orer-estimat^l. 

" I beg to assure you of my tleep prrsonal afta-l;iM i.!, MIH! 
^to express the hope that the ehanees of uar uill ! ;i\i- n ]t - I M 
serve near and under yon fill the dawn of t hat pr:*.-* f-u- v, | ; i,-h 
we arc contending, with the only purpose f hat it ?.h.ill i-.- li-n 
orablo and lasting." 



President Lincoln had id fhr sam 
oral Grant himself a commission as major 
lar army from the same dale; and M< a*i 
and MePlierson for Yirksbnnr, had ;tl n r 
list of the regular brigaiiier-genrnil-,. '1 
nature of the complijjH'nl thus besimuMl 1 
upon its faithful servants, it must I, ( * rrn 
major-goiujrals of ih regular army 
brigadi(ir-g(norals but nine*. 

It has boon alleged in some of the ne\\: j 
that while the army was encamped at Voim- 
Sherman handed to General (Irani a vriftt 
the proposed movenu-nt on (Sraml (Julf, :M 
has been coupled with s ich a show of i-ir. 





THE LULL AFTER VICKSBURGK 129 

obtain ready credence in many quarters. In fact, General 
Sherman never protested, either in writing or verbally, against 
any movement ever proposed or adopted by General Grant ; 
and throughout the entire campaign these two commanders 
acted together in perfect harmony and cordiality ; the com- 
mander-in-chief freely and constantly availing himself of Sher- 
man's advice, the subordinate promptly and faithfully carrying 
out the orders of his superior. But the movement on Grand 
Gulf was not Sherman's plan. It was the conception of Gen- 
eral Grant's own mind, and was adopted by him, against the 
opinion, though with the fall consent and support of the 
Executive. Sherman considered the north front of Yicksburg 
the true point of attack, and the line of the Tallabusha the 
best base of operations. On the 8th of April he frankly ex- 
pressed this opinion to General Grant in the following com- 
munication : 

" I would most respectfully suggest that General Grant 
call on his corps commanders for their opinions, concise and 
positive, on the best general plan of campaign. 

" My own opinions are 

" 1st. That the Army of the Tennessee is far in advance of 
the other grand armies. 

" 2d. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith bo moved 
from St. Louis to the vicinity of Little Bock, Arkansas, sup- 
plies collected while the river is full, and land communication 
with Memphis opened via Dos Ark, on tho White and Madi- 
son, on the St. Francis rivers. 

" 3d. That as much of Yazoo Pass, Coldwatcr, and Tallaliat- 
chee rivers as can be regained and fortified bo hold, and tho 
main army bo transported thither by land or water; that tho 
road back to Memphis bo secured and reopened, and as soon 
as tho waters subside, Grenada bo attacked, and tlio swamp 
road across to Helena be patrolod by cavalry. 

" 4th. That the line of the Yallabusha bo tho base from which 
to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central 
crossos Big Black above Canton, and, lastly, wlioro the Vicks- 

9 



130 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

burg and Jackson Eailroad crosses the river. Tim cap- 

ture of Vicksburg would result. 

"5th. That a force bo left in this vicinity not In rxrml trn 
thousand men, with only enough sltuimboats to limit 
transport them to any desired point. This foree to In* Itr-ltl 
always near enough to act with the gunboats, \vln-n the 
army is known to bo near Vicksburg, liain*-*' Bluff, or Yatfoo 
City. 

"The chief reason for operating WJ// by water wan tin* sea- 
son of the year, and high-water in Tallahatrhre anl Yallu- 
busha. The spring is now hen*, and soon thf^e Mtvaiun will 
be no serious obstacle, save the anibuseaib'H <f fon-^t, rtinl 
whatever works tho enemy may have enu-t*^! :tt r ni-ar 
Grenada. North Mississipj>i is loo valuabl*^ tt> ailuw flu in tci 
hold and make crops. 

"I make these suggestions with the iv)sir>4 that <;imnnl 
Grant simply read them, and simply j.rivf th-in, a-* I Li..v, J 1 ** 
will, a share of his thoughts. 1 would pn-fVr ! '^M^l-i i,t 
answer them, but merely give them as inueli r a lit?!*- ut '- j*t 
as they deserve." 

And ho added in conclusion ; - 

" "Whatever plan of action ho nuy adopt \\i\\ ivrrhr fr*ia 
me the same ^(^ilous c.!o-o])Tatioii ami rm-i^'i lit- ?'.ijpp*rt ;IM 
though concoived by myself." 



MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA 



CHAPTER XL 

THE MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA AND THE BATTUE OF HI88IONAIHT 

EIDGE. 

WHILE Sherman's corps was resting on tho Big I Hack, tlio 
situation of affairs in tho central region became such an to 
requires tho concentration of all available troops for operations 
in tliat theatre of war. Ilosecrans had in August expelled 
the enemy from Middle Tennessee, and, by the !Mh of .Septem- 
ber, by a brilliant series of ilank movement:;, had compelled 
J>ra^ ; t( to evacuate his strong fortified position a,t ( 'haitanoo^a, 
and fall back behind ihe Lookout and Mission monniaiiiB. 
imrnside had, at ihe same iime, driven the rebels from Ka.st 
'Tennessee, and had oeetipied Kno\ville and ( 'unibcrland (tap. 
Having lost the Mississippi, the enemy \\as now endeavoring 
to save Tennessee, and was bringing troops from the east and 
from the west to reinforce Ini,';^, so as to enable him to take 
ihe ofl'ensivc, and driv<* the I'nion army to the ( )hio. LOU*JJ- 
,sireet\s corps was on its \\;y from \*irrjnia., and Lniini^H di- 
vision had arrived frum tlohnstoiTs arinv. 

On the llith Septcnilier, <nirrs \\ere sent from Washington 
to I>urnsid* to move Io\\ n the Tt-nnessee townrd.s ( 'hat t a n >. a, 
and to Ilurlbut at Memphis and ( Jrant and Shennan al . Ysrb-v. 
lniri r , to sntd all their aiailablr frces to Corinth and TUM- 
<'iimbia to co-operate \\iih Ito^-erai.--;, in easr Hra^"' f.hotild 
aitempl o turn hi:; ri-ht Hank and invade 'I'eniH-^M-e. < hi 
the 'JIM, Howard's eh \entl.- corps and Slociim's < \\i-Ifth 
corps \\ri-M detachrd fj-Miji Us.- Army of the. Putomac, united 
undrr tin* command of Majr ( ieiicral Ho(ker, and ordrj-cd to 
Kasiniile. 



SHERMAN AND HIS (.'AMPA1UNH. 

On the 22d ? having received n telegram from C ii I;TH! ( ii.m 
directing him to detail one division to m.ueh to \i I 4 at 
and there embark for Memphis, Sh*riu;tu tli*p.t .. i o <IM 
hans with his first division. At four oVl *ek tit it aff :n< u 
was on the march, and embarked tin* n t l i.v. Oj t! t! . 
Sherman was called in person to Yirk: b'ir ', auI K 'tn^'t* 4 f 
prepare to follow with his wholt* eorjH. \ei jt faff!' * t,. 2 
division, which was to bo left with ( JMI* r.tl M^PJ. . % 
guard the line of the Big Bkrk, anil t * 1 ' r | i & >t ; *^ *. 
Fifteenth Corps by John E. Hmitir^ ilni'l'm i*I th ^ * 
teenth Corps, consiHting of thn?t< brix-t'l'^v*' 1 " *i^.iJ I 
tively by Brigadior(lcn<'ntl Matthia-t i lh ! ft. 
Fifty-sixth Illinois, ami (JolonrI J. J. U \.n,.l r I*. ;.?), 
nois. This division wan ulnaly on thi w,j\. ;MJ'!. }< l 1 i if 
at the earliest moment whcn it was pi , i!4 t* ji^ * 
boat transportation , Hhormaji ft >l)oivt'i in | i i . kn,\\i*! M < 
L. Smith's second division, and !',\tii/' tij*i t *r 
Owing to the low stage of watiT in tL* i : i ,i, >i f f * 
of wood on the banks, the last of tin- ll * ! J I /, , t i j M 
phis until the 4th of October. HUM, s ,, fl i ,* ] , 
from the general-in-ehief, (Jt-niTal Hill* . t ..' ij f 
Fifteenth Army Corps, with all oth.-r If ). 1 i ' , ! I 
spared from the line, of the MrmphK ;n^l I L <'^ *- 
to Athens, Alabama, and tht-nee r-jMirt f.,- . -1 , * >( . 
Bosocrans, at (..Ihaftanooga. Hi* \va , oj t ^ *j , , , 
tho railway eastwardly, rej>airin.r if ,t * h 12.' . ( ' 
his own liiu k s for supplies, ain! was in ij i t e* . i 
thorn upon lloseerans, thr. rmu'ls in \\ h , i* i, t . > . 
overtax<M.l to met't the wants of Ins n/, n .n ' , . it j 
first division was alreatlv in fn lit of I ,i jJ^ , j J ,, 
Smith's, styled the third, at Mi-mpi.i L \i? - ,, * j,-, , 
but tho capacity of tin- railroiul was.-. !;,.'i, IT ; , 
found that annuals ami wagons niilil 1. ' i ,,!. , , ,, 
by the common road, and the. whole of i; (i ;., ' , ; flll *, t , itj . 
moved in tho saiiKi manner. 

Ou tho llth of (Mobc^r, having put. in i li;i! vh f!^ iv ir 
the column, Sherman started for Corinth bvraiiua\ t in a .-..,, 



MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. 133 

train, escorted by the battalion of the Thirteenth Begular In- 
fantry, and reached CoUierville station at noon. The Sixty- 
ninth Indiana, under Colonel D. C. Anthony, was at that 
moment gallantly defending the post against the attack by the 
rebel General Chalmers with a force of nearly three thousand 
cavalry and eight field-guns, and Sherman's escort arrived just 
in time to assist in his defeat. The next day Sherman reached 
Corinth, and ordered General Frank P. Blair, who had again 
reported to him at the outset of the march, and whom he had 
assigned to duty as his second in command, to take charge of 
the advance, and push forward to luka with the first and 
second divisions of Osterhaus and Morgan L. Smith, while he 
himself remained behind a few days to push forward the troops 
as they came up, and to direct the repairs. On the 19th, he 
reached luka, and on the following day, in accordance with a 
previous agreement with Bear-Admiral Porter, two gunboats 
and a decked coal-barge reached East port to assist in crossing 
the Tennessee. While the repairs of the railway were progress- 
ing, Sherman ordered General Blair to push forward with the 
two divisions under his command, and drive the enemy, con- 
sisting of Roddy's and Ferguson's cavalry brigades, and a 
number of irregular cavalry, in all about five thousand strong, 
under the command of Major-General Stephen D. Lee, beyond 
Tuscumbia. After a short engagement, Blair drove the enemy 
from Ins front, and entered Tuscumbia on the 27th of October. 
In the mean time, on the 19th and 20th of September, Bose- 
crans, endeavoring to concentrate his scattered columns in the 
presence of the enemy, had been attacked by Bragg, had fought 
the bloody battle of Cliickamauga, had retreated to Chatta- 
nooga, and was there practically invested. On the 18th of 
October, Major-General Grant, wlio had been sent for some 
time before, arrived at Louisville, and in pursiiance of orders 
issued by the War Department on the IGth, and delivered to 
him by the Secretary of war in person, assumed command 
of the Military Division of the Mississippi, comprising the de- 
partments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, 
and the three large armies operating therein. "Upon his 



134 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

recommendation, the secretary of war immediately issued 
orders assigning Major-General Thomas to the command of 
the Department of the Cumberland, and aiajor-(.u.'m*ral Slier- 
man to that of the Department of tho Tennessee. Hherinuti 
received these orders at luka, on tho 25th of (Mobrr, ncetntt- 
panied by instructions from General Grant to retain personal 
command of the army in tho field. Investing Mujor-CJen^rul 
McPherson, at Vicksburg, with full authority to art in his 
stead in regard to the State of Mississippi, ami roiifc-rriiitf 
upon Major-General Hurllmt a similar authority as to \Vrht 
Tennessee, he at once published thu following instructions 
for the guidance of the officers and soldiers of his ilrpartianil 
in their relations with tho citizens : 

66 All officers in command of corps ami fixed nnlit;irv p'*;t,-i 
will assume tho highest military powers allo\\il I\ th 
laws of war and Congress. They must, maintain the ! t 
possible disci] >lino, and repress nil tlis<rilT, alaui**, in*l 
dangers in their reach. (Citizens who fail to ^uppui th< <i. 
ornment havo no right to ask favors ami p'ot ! i< M ; lu! if 
they actively assist us in vindicating tin* nati*w:l .i**tliMjjt^, 
all commanders will assist them and tln-ir l';ihJ!i* in t\iy 
possible way. Oilitrers nenl not. mrcliilr with jy.'dlt i'.-- *f tra'i*- 
and commerce, which by law drvolvr tni thr ollin r nf thr 
Treasury .I)e])iirt.nii'nt ; but wh'nrv<T th*-y disro\i r ;.-' I- - ns- 
trahand of war bring couvryrt! towanls thr pulli' rii ?ir\ 
tiiey will seize, all goods taintnl by such f ran>arii ui ., ;i.u! im- 
prison the. parties implicated ; but cart* must IN- tal.fh : in:iLi- 
full, records and report such ease. \Vh-n a di .trii't i - inh ->!?! 
by guerrillas, or held by the enemy, hor c ^uul u., l< , % M;J , 
foragti, etc., aro all mca-ns of war, and can h< fr * i\ t ' * ? i f df 
must bo ac.counted for as public. prop< ri\. If i' ; "j I *i* 
not want their horses and corn taken, the\ inu ! .[ i I ' ;i,.i 
repress all guerrillas or hosijlci bands in iht ir n i ' i *iiiM.,.l, 

"It is represented that officers, pn\-,t ru,!i ,-!i;iI,-., aitil 
others in the military services are enpi^vtl in business <r 
speculation on their own account, and that they ehar^n firs 



MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. 135 

for permits and passes. All this is a breach of honor and 
law. Every salaried officer of the military service should de- 
vote every hour of his time, every thought of his mind, to his 
Government, and if he makes one cent profit beyond his pay, 
it is corrupt and criminal. All officers and soldiers in this 
department are hereby commanded to engage in no busi- 
ness whatever, save their sworn duty to their Govern- 
ment. 

"Every man should be with his proper corps, division, 
brigade, and regiment, unless absent, sick, wounded, or de- 
tached by a written order of a competent commander. Soldiers 
when so absent must have their descriptive rolls, and when not 
provided with them the supposition is that they are improperly 
absent. Mustering officers will see that all absentees not 
away by a written order from their proper commander are re- 
ported on the muster-rolls as deserters, that they may lose 
their pay, bounty, and pensions, which a generous Government 
and people have provided for soldiers who do their whole 
duty. The best hospitals in the world are provided for the 
wounded and sick, but these must not be made receptacles for 
absentees who seek to escape the necessary exposures and 
dangers of a soldier's life. "Whenever possible, citizens must 
be employed as nurses, cooks, attendants, stewards, etc., in 
hospitals, in order that enlisted men may be where they be- 
long with their regiments. The medical inspectors will at- 
tend to this at once. The general commanding announces 
that he expects the wounded and sick to have every care pos- 
sible ; but this feeling must not be abused to the injury of the 
only useful part of an army a soldier in the field. 

"In time of war and rebellion, districts occupied by our 
troops are subject to the laws of war. The inhabitants, 
be they friendly or unfriendly, must submit to the controlling 
power. If any person in an insurgent district corresponds or 
trades with an enemy, he or she becomes a spy ; and all in- 
habitants, moreover, must not only abstain from hostile and 
unfriendly acts, but must aid and assist the power that pro- 
tects them in trade and commerce." 



136 SHEBMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Major-General Blair was placed In immediate command of 
the Fifteenth Army Corps, and Brigadier-General George M. 
Dodge was summoned from Corinth to organ ixtj and assume 
command of a picked column of eight thousand men from the 
Sixteenth Army Corps, and with it to follow* Sherman east- 
ward as rapidly as possible. Having made these dispositions, 
Sherman pushed forward with the advance of his troops. 

On the 27th of October, General Blair being, us lias been 
already seen, at Tuscmnbia, with tho first ami second di- 
visions, Sherman ordered General Ewing, with tho fourth 
division, to cross tho Tennessee, by means of the gunboats 
and scow, as rapidly as possible, at Kasiport., and push for- 
ward to Florence ; and the same day a messenger from Gen- 
eral Grant floated down the Tennessee over the Musele Shoals, 
landed at Tuseumbia, and was sent to headquarters at luka, 
bearing this short message: " 'Drop all work on the railroad 
east of Bear Creek. Put your command towards Bridgeport 
till you meet orders." Instantly the order of mareh \vus re- 
versed, and all the columns directed to Kasfport, the only 
place where the crossing of the Tennessee was practicable. 
At first the troops- had only tin* gunboats and coal-barge,, 
but two transports and a ferry-boat arrived on the 'Us!, of Oc- 
tober, and the. work of crossing was pushed with all the vigor 
possibles. Sherman crossed in person, and pa^srtl to the head 
of the column on the, 1st of November, leaving the advance 
division of Osterhuus, no\v become the rear, to In- conducted 
by General Blair to .Kogersville and the Klk I liver. Tina 
stream v/as found impassable, and there, was no time to bridge 
it or to cross in bouts, so that no alternative remained but to 
ascend the Elk to tho stone bridge at Favvf fr\ ill% where, the. 
troops crossed aixl proceeded to \Vine]ie.ster and I^eeherd. 
At Fayetteville, having received orders from (Jeiu-ral (Irani to 
repair to Bridgeport with the* Fifteenth (Wps, leaving Briga- 
dier-General Dodge's detachment of the Sixteenth Corps at 
Pulaski and along tho railroad from Columbia to I>eeafut% to 
protect it, Sherman instructed General Blair to follow in order 
with tho second and first divisions of Morgan L. Smith and 



MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. 137 

Osterhaus, by way o Newmarket, Larkinsville, and Belle- 
fonte, -while he himself should conduct the third and fourth 
divisions of John E. Smith and Ewing, by Decherd. Sher- 
man reached Bridgeport on the night of the loth, reported 
by telegraph to General Grant, was immediately summoned to 
his headquarters, left on the first boat, and on the morning of 
the 15th of November rode into Chattanooga. 

Previous to this, on the night of the 27th of October, Briga- 
dier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer of the Army of the 
Cumberland, had rapidly thrown a pontoon bridge across the 
Tennessee. On the following morning, before the enemy could 
recover from his surprise, Hooker with his two corps had crossed, 
seized the heights rising from Lookout Yalley at its outlet to 
the river, emerged into the valley, and taken up positions de- 
fending the road over which he had marched, and the roads 
leading to and connecting the ferries ; and thus two lines of 
supplies had been gained at the moment when, after more than 
ten thousand horses and mules had perished in supplying half 
rations to the troops over seventy miles of terrible roads, the 
remaining animals were so reduced that they could not have 
supplied the army a week longer. After vainly endeavoring 
to regain the advantage thus lost, Bragg detached Long- 
street to drive Burnsidc out of East Tennessee, and in order 
to compel the rebel commander to retain all his force, as well 
as to recall the troops he had sent away, it was Grant's inten- 
tion to attack Missionary Eidge the moment Sherman should 
arrive with his army and trains. The constraint imposed by 
the immediate presence of the enemy in his strong positions, 
with his cavalry constantly threatening our exposed and 
heavily-tasked communications, was severely felt, and the 
anxiety for Burnsido's safety was acute. 

Sherman was to cross the Tennessee, effect a lodgment on 
the end of Missionary Kidge, and with a part of his command 
demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, near Trenton. By 
General Grant's orders, pontoons had already been prepared 
for laying a bridge over the Ter tiessee, and all other necces- 
sary arrangements perfected. 



138 ' SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGN*. 

Ordering Ewing to march, with his fourth division lead- 
ing the advance, by way of Shell Mound to Tivntou 
to demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, hut to bo pre- 
pared rapidly to change direction on Cliaitano^a, Khrr- 
man got in a small boat at Kelly's, rourd doun f* BnM ^ 
port, there put his troops in motion, ard, <m tli- .*t't r 
noon of the 20th, upon arriving at (Irneral !liML > i**'*> lind- 
quarters, received General Grant's oiders for a ;.: HIT, I att.t*! h 
the following morning. But the third di\i < -in of J*!in II, 
Smith was the only one in position; O-.ttrh:ni. IV t .*? i 
Morgan L. Smith's second division iv.slm\h ?H Ut/ t!i ir 
way over a terrible road from Shell M'Mnd to < "n.*u*tiM^;; ; 
and Swing's fourth division had not I ft Tn ntnn. L> ..rnir, 
these facts, General ({runt postponed ihf :itt;if* 

On the 21st, Morgan L. Smith's seouid dlu 
bridge at Brown's Ferry, in spite of fn tpn ut 
frail stmcturo, and Ewing reurhed UN L ; j ! if 
his fourth division, but wus umiMr 1> no 
breakage, in spite of repealed nfli-iupf to i. ; 
23d. Tho bridge having again lnLrfj, !* ;r, Y 
on tho left bank, at Brown's I'Yrry. Shi i lan ti,. n 
the g<'ttieral-in-c,hief Io go info artinn \\ith i 
already with him, supporiftl !v Jrfirr .,!<'. 1 1. 
tho FoTirteejith Corps, whiln ( )si-rli; 'i ' fu f ** 
report to General I.lookn\ and art uiflj him . t ; { , 
MountaiiL On tli( same day, Miri';in f,. S, J;l' 
E. Smith's divisions bcin^ In-hind tl Li! 1 ', 
mouth of th(i(.Jhi(!k:imjiuxa,ShiTm;nr;nj dl;ri T 
Gilcw A. Smitli, with Ins sreond liri;';ad^ nf I!;M f i 
to ma,r(t'h under r.over of those hilln ti a pui't* .., 
Nort-li C'hiekjunuuxa, there to 111:111 the pontoon 1 < ,< 
night to drop silently down ton p(in< :d.n;i If* S , 
maugji,Liiul,mov<^iIonfrtlie. river, eaplmv tJ } , !Jt ?,. 
along its banks ; and then to re^cmhark, dr..p t|uir'J* 
low tho mouth of tho Ohielvaniau^a, lake p,, : lil^n \ 
left bank, and dispatch the. boats to Hit- opposite > id. 
forcements. This having been done, tho ivmaindrr ..f 




MARCH TO CHATTAJSTOOGA. 139 

L. Smith's division was raj idly ferried across, followed by that 
of John E. Smith, and by daylight of the 24th, these two di- 
visions, numbering eight thousand men, were across the 
Tennessee, and had thrown up a line of rifle-pits to cover 
the crossing. As soon as it was light, some of the boats 
were taken from the ferry for use in the construction of a 
pontoon bridge, under the direction of Major-General William 
K Smith, chief engineer of the military division, and by noon 
a fine bridge, thirteen hundred and fifty feet in length, had 
been laid down, 'and was practicable for all arms. A steamer 
having arrived during the morning to assist in the crossing, 
all three divisions were now concentrated on the left bank ; 
and, at the same time, General Jefferson 0. Davis reported 
himself ready to take the Missionary Hills. 

At one P. M. the troops marched from the river in three 
columns in echelon ; the left, Morgan L. Smith, the column of 
direction, following substantially Cliickamauga Creek; the 
centre, John E. Smith, in column, doubled on the centre at full 
brigade intervals to the right and rear ; the right, Ewing, in 
column at the same distance to the right and rear, prepared 
to deploy to the right, to meet an enemy in that direction. 
Each head of column was covered by a line of skirmish- 
ers, with supports. A light drizzling rain prevailed, and the 
clouds hung low, cloaking the movement from the enemy's 
tower of observation on Lookout Mountain. The foot of the 
hills was soon reached, the skirmishers continued up the face 
followed by their supports, and at half-past three P. M. the 
ridge was gained without loss. Not until a brigade of each 
division was pushed up rapidly to the top of the hill did the 
enemy seem to realize the movement, but it was then too late, 
for our troops were in possession. The enemy opened with 
artillery, but General Ewing soon got some of Captain Eichard- 
son's guns up the steep hill, and returned the fire, and the 
enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectual dashes at 
General Lightburn, who with his brigade had swept around 
and gained the real continuation of the ridge. 

Up to this time it had been supposed, fiom the map, that 



140 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGN'S. 

Missionary Eidge was a continuous hill, but Sherman 
found himself on two high points, with u (loop ih'pressu ft IH*- 
tweenthem, and a third hill immediately over th* tunnel, whirl* 
was his chief objective. The ground gained, however, was so 
important that nothing could be left to eham*<% ami If 
therefore fortified during the night. One brigade of eneh 
division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan I*. Swith*H 
closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of ( **neral John K. 
Smith's were drawn back to the bane in reserw, mitt (teneral 
Ewing's right was extended down into the plain, thus 
the ridge in a general line facing southeast. 

The enemy felt Sherman's right Hank about f*ur f . M., ami 
a sharp engagement with artillery and muskets i n^tu <I. \\h 14 
he drew off. Brigadier-General Gih'H A. Hmillt \\u . * \ r* !v 
wounded, and the command of the brigade 1 <l'nhil n 
Colonel Tapper, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinnl , Ja f 
as Sherman himself had crossed the bridge, C* u* r;il HM\\- 
ard had appeared, having come with flnvo n iui* uf friu 
Chattanooga along the, east bank of the Ti nr* * , i***fi 
necting Sherman's now position with that of the tn MII ar ^ In 
Chattanooga. Tlie. thnuj regiments were attaein 1 l \ J.-M. I\ 
to General Ewing's right, and (Seneral Hd\\arl "i.sn ,| t i 
his corps at Cluitlanooga. As night rinsed, Sin rm ^ . J. d 
General Jefferson C. Davis to keep one brigali n s lb I i 1 , 
one close up to tho main body of the Fifteenth ( ! j- , :\inl n,^ 
between tho two. Heavy details were kepi at v\..iL n tl,' 
intrenchments until morning. 

During tho night the sky cleared away bright, ;t .-,.M frnst 
filled the air, and the camp-fires revealed to the rn-in\. :mi to 
the army in Chattanooga, Shenuan's position on Mr..--iti:irv 
Eidge. About midnight, onlttrs eaine from (Ji-n.-ral i limit 
to attack the enemy at dawn of day, with notif- th;i! ( H n 
eral Thomas would attack in force early in th.- m.*niiir/. 
Accordingly, before light, Sherman was in the su^JI.% anil, 
attended by all his staff, rodo to the extreme left of his JMISI-' 
tion, near Chickamauga, thence up the hjll hrld h v Cien* nd 
Lightburn, and round to the extreme right of defend 



MAECH TO CHATTANOOGA. 

Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as was possible by 
the dim light of morning, he saw that his line of attack was in 
the direction of Missionary Bidge, with wings supporting on 
either flank. A valley lay between him and the next hill of 
the series, and this latter presented steep sides ; the one to 
the west partially cleared, the other covered with the native 
forest. The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded. The 
further point of the hill was held by the enemy with a breast- 
work of logs and fresh earth, filled with men and mounting 
two guns. The enemy was also seen in great force on a still 
higher hill beyond the tunnel, giving a plunging fire on the 
ground in dispute. The gorge between, through which several 
roads and the railway tunnel pass, could not be seen from 
Sherman's position, but formed the natural citadel where the 
enemy covered his masses, to resist the contemplated move- 
ment to turn his right and endanger his communications with 
the depot at Chickamauga. 

The brigades of Colonel Cockerell, of Ewing's division, Colonel 
Alexander, of John E. Smith's, and General Lightburn, of 
Morgan L. Smith's divisions, were to hold their hill as the key 
point ; General Corse, with as much of his brigade of Ewing's 
division as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack 
from the right centre ; General Lightburn was to dispatch 
a regiment from his position to co-operate with General 
Corse ; and General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the 
east base of Missionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse, 
and Colonel Loornis, of Ewing's division, in like manner, to 
move along the west base, supported by Matthias' and Baum's 
brigades, of John E. Smith's division, in reserve. 

The sun had already risen before General Corse had com- 
pleted his preparations, and his buglo sounded the "forward." 
The Fortieth Illinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio, 
on the right centre, with the Twentieth Ohio, Colonel Jones, 
moved down the face of the hill, and up that held by the 
enemy. The line advanced to within about eighty yards of 
the intrenched position, where General Corse found a second- 
ary crest, which he gained and held. To this point ho called 



142 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPARI XS. 

his reserves, and asked for reinforcements, uliieh wriv ** J 
but the space was narrow, aud it wan not well to mmd thi 
men, as the enemy's artillery and musketry lift s\\i jt tb< s*i- 
proach. As soon as General Corso had made liN pr janJi**^ 
he assaulted, and a close, severe contest rnsih t|, l.r.iiu" haj 
than an hour, giving and losing ground, hut n \ r I In p * :- 
tion first obtained, from which the enemy in vain uttiiupt*'! 
to drive him. General Morgan L. Smith hit a* lit} ^ui^ 1 
ground on the left spur of Missionary Iii*j,*, **n*l <'! ^ i 
Loomis got abreast of the tunnel arid fit* 1 railr*a<l *',K/?;!>- 
ment on his side, drawing the enemy's lire*, uiitl t th.it .? M 
relieving the assaulting party on the hill-eivst. I a| :.-in ;! 
ander had four of his gunn on General Kwinjr' 1 *' l.ul, .uii < p 
tain "Wood his battery of Napolco 1 1 gu i is < n i < S t * 1 1 * r . ) i L ; L 1 1 n 1 1 1 ; 
and two guns of Dillon's battery were wit'h Col- *ji 1 \t 4 i ,. . 
brigade. The day was bright and I'lrar. Hi*' **!u!'!i -f it > 
enemy were streaming towards Sherman, and thr i i * , , ' , \ t I 
lery poured its concentric fire upon him frm v \v f .1 i ! I 
spur that gave a view of any part of his position. U 1 "^M i^ , 
batteries directed their lire as ear* Tully as pus ih!< t * ' 1^ . f i!, 
hill to the front without endangering our c\ui ii]i 11. 1 ' f * 
raged furiously about ten A. M., when General c'**i * r . ^ ! 
a severe wound, and was carried ufl" the fn-M. ;*iil u. * , 
mand of the brigade, and of the assault at that I ,<*' 
devolved on Colonel Wulcott, <*f tint Fnriv-i\th Ul f : ,, t 
continued tho contest, ] massing forward at all pMiut . i -' I 
Loomis had made good progress to tin* ridii ; ami at al .;,? 
two KM. Goncral John E. Smitli, judging tin- huttl. t.. ! 
severe on tho hill, and luring requin-d tn .stij-.j.i.rt <iiiiM-..* 
Ewhig, ordered Colonel Baunfs and (ieneral .MaMhi.iV l.n 
gades across the fields to tho disputed suiaiuit. 'I'h.-\ m*\. 4 
up Tuu.br a heavy lire of cannon and muskefrv, ar:.l j.-ii,, ,1 
Colonel Wolcott, but tlie crest was so narrow thai th*-\ n* .-. -. 
sarily occupied the west face of tlu* hill. *n^ .-nrmv at th- 
time being massed in great strength hi the funn.'l t--i-.--. 
moved a large force, under com- of tin*, ground and tb- jj^.-L 
bushes, and suddenly appeared on tint rl-ht a,inl ivar .,f thi-, 



MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA. 143 

command. Tho two reserve brigades of John E. Smith's 
division, being thus surprised, and exposed as they were in the 
open ground, fell back in sonuulLsordor to tho lower end of the 
field, and reformed. This movement, neon from Chattanooga, 
five miles distant, gave rise to the report that Sherman "was 
repulsed on the left. Tho enemy nuulo a show of pursuit, but 
were caught in Hank by the well-directed fire of the brigade 
on the wooded crest, and hastily sought cover behind the hill. 
About three p. M., a white lino of iminkotry fire in front of 
Orchard Knoll, extending further right and In ft and front, and 
a faint echo of sound, satisfied Sherman that General Thomas 
was moving on the centre. The attack on the loft had drawn 
vast masses of tho enemy to that flank, so that the result on 
the centre was comparatively assurer!. 

Tho advancing lisa* of nmskriry fire from Orchard Knoll 
disappeared behind a spur of (lie hill, and could no longer lie 
seen, and it was not until ni;dit closed that Sherman Knew ISiat 
Thomas had swept across Missionary Hid|';e, and !>n>Ken the 
enemy's centre. 

The \icfory was wort, and pursuit was the ne\i step. Sher- 
man ordered (leiieral Morgan h. Smith to feel the tunnel, 
which was found vacant, save by the. roinmm|ded dead ani 
wounded of hoih armies. 

r llie reserve nf (leljeral JefFersotj ( !. DaVlS WHS ordered <<> 

mareh a! once, ly the pontoon hridj'e arross lite <'hirKamau"a 
at its mouth, and push forward for the depot, ( lem-nil Howard 
had reported In Sherman, in I he early par! of the day, \sifh the 
remainder of his corp--. f|,,. r;ir\-nfh, and had ieen pti^ied lo 

Connect Hie lefi \ulh ( 'hiel-.a hiau;'a (YeeK. He \\a,S ordf'I'ed fo 

repair an old IirnKni l-rid-*- alu.uf < u < milerj up the Thick- 
amau-'a, and fo frllo\\ (I. -hind Iht\i:i at four A. M. f !"hc^ 
Kifieeiith Army < 'orps ua:-. fo march at da\Ii"ht. Hut < Jem-nil 
.Howard found (In- repair.-, f OM ditllniif , an, I all wen ' mm pr lied lo 
Oross l!:i' ( liickafsiaf!;/a ou thrm-u pontoon lrid:-e. IJve! \en 
A. M., .!i-ri'-iv..n <\ haii -' .livi .ion appearetl al I lie d ju{, ju? I 

111 time io ;.., if in j|;,h;e.. !! eliteri'tl V, i t h ojj- l'i 

f;ade. and found tin- n;.-nr eenpu'n:' two hills parfiallv in- 



SHERMAN AND HIS CA 

trenclied just beyond the depot. These ho soon dr * 
away. Corn-meal and corn, in huge burning piles, bmL 
wagons, abandoned caissons, two thirty-two pounder rill* 
guns with, carriages burned, pieces of pontoons, baiJi 
chesses, etc,, destined for the invasion of Kentucky, ami ; 
manner of things, were found burning and broken. A ^* * 
supply of forage for the horses, and meal, beans, and the lil* 
for the men, were also discovered in good condition. 

Pausing but a short while, Sherman pressed forward, the, r ^ \ 
lined with broken wagoi is and abandoned caissons, till ni; f lj 
Just as the head of his column emerged from a dens f n^si 
swamp, it encountered the rear-guard of the retreating an* < 
The light was sharp, but the night closed in HO dark that r o 
troops could not move. Here Sherman was overtaken t 
General Grant. 

At daylight the march was resinned, and at Givysville, %\L* t 
a good bridge spanned the. Chickamauga, the Fourteenth (' | 
of (Jeneral Palmer was met on the south bank. i'Yont I . 
Sherman learned that CSeneral Hooker was on a roal . 1 i 
further south. His guns could be hranl nt-ar K5n p vrpM. \ 
thts roads werii iilltul with all tht* tro*ips thry cnulil am ri 
modate, Sherman then turiii-d to thr east, to fulfil aunt* t 
part of the general plan, by luvaking up all eomnmnieati* i 
btttween l>ragg anil Longstrret. 

(ieneral Howard was ordeivd to movt* t<> Parker's Clap, :LS-I 
theuc*' send a eomprtrnt fore** to Kfil (lay, or th*'(*ui 
(Jround, and fhcjv drstro\ a lar/e st-etion f tin* railv* 4 
which eonneets Dalttm anil ( "It-vrland. This \\nrk ua;, in * 
suciM'ssfully and eomplrtrly jtrrformed ilia! da\. Tlii' i 
vision of General Jril'^r^on C '. Ihtvis was jiiuu-d up cln: ? 
llinggold, to assist (Jrneral llookfr, if ntM-dinl, and fht* I ; 
teenth (,'orps he-Id at Gre\s\ilir, to taL- athanta;'*- nfriret* 
stances. About noon a nirssaj^eeainr fr< ia ( irn*ra 1 I IH k-r, .- ** 
ing that ho had had a hard liuht at tlir laountain pas,-, jn -! ' 
yontl Kinggold, and want* d Sherman to eoiur t'ur\\artl and t n i 
the ])osition. Howard, by passing through I^irkn-'s Gap ** 
wurds llctl Clay, had already done so. Sherman therefore r* ^ 



MARCH TO CHATTAWQQA. 

forward to Binggolcl, to find that tho enemy liad fallen back 
to Tunnel Hill, abandoned tho valley of Chickamauga and tho 
State of Tennessee, and was descending the southern slopes, 
whose waters flow to the Atlantic and the Gulf. 

At Einggold Sherman again met General Grant, and re- 
ceived orders, after breaking up the railroad between that 
point and the State lino, to move slowly back to Chattanooga. 

On tho following day, the Fifteenth Corps effectually de- 
stroyed the railroad from a point half-way between Groysvillo 
and Einggold, back to tho State lino; and General Grant, 
coming to Groysvillo, conwaitod that, instead of returning to 
Chattanooga, Sherman might Bend back his artillery, wagons, 
and impediments, and mako a circuit to the north an far as 
the Hiawassoe Biver. 

Accordingly, on tho morning of November 20th, General 
Howard moved from Parker's (lap to Cleveland, (General 
Davis by way of MeDaniel's (lap, and (General Blair, with two 
divisions of the Fifteenth Army ( Wps, by wav of Julian's 
(!ap; all meeting at Cleveland that night. Here another 
efleeiual break was made in the Cleveland and 'Dn.lt on road. 
On the IlOth, the army moved to Charleston, Oeneral Howard 
approaching so rapidly that the enemy evacuated in haste, leav- 
ing the bridge but partially damaged, and five ear-loads of 
flour and provisions on the north bank of the Uiawassee. 

The losses in Sherman's own eorps during this brief earn- 
pjiitfn were as follows : ( Merhaun' first division, H7 killed, ;)-M 
wounded, and <>f) mi.v in;' ; M. L. Smith's second division, 10 
killed, DO \\cnmdrel, and *J missing; John K. Smith's third 
division, S ( J killed, *.!.ss \uninded, and li missing; ,M\vin;'s 
fourth division, 7l! killrd, ."),'>.* \\oundecl, and til missing; total, 
k 2;")S killed, 1,^)7 \\tmndi-d, and lill missinv^. r The loss in 
rlefVerson C. Da\i.,' di\i imt of the Fourteenth Corps was small, 
linshbcck's brigade rf the r:ir\-n<h Corps lost \\1 killed, Mf> 
wounded, Si misNin- ; ttal, W.\. Amon;.; the killed wero 
Coln-ls Piifnam of the Nimtv-fliinl Illinois, ( >\"\Ieara, of tho 
Ninetirfh Illinois, 'I\>rn-nre of the Thiriirth Iowa, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Taft of tin- Klevrnth Corps, and Major iliisliiiell of 

10 



146 SHEKMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

the Thirteenth Illinois Volunteers ; while in the list of wounded 
appeared the names of Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith, 
J. M. Corse, and Matthias ; Colonel Baum, Fifty-sixth Illinois ; 
Colonel Wangeline, Twelfth Missouri Volunteers ; Lieutenant- 
Colonel Patridge, Thirteenth Illinois Yolunteers ; Major P. 3. 
Welch, Fifty-sixth Illinois Yolunteers ; and Major M. Allen, 
Tenth Iowa Yolunteers. Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, Seven- 
teenth Iowa, was reported missing. 

The army which eight days before had lain besieged, and 
barely subsisting behind the Missionary range, had shaken off 
its enemy, broken his strength and his spirit, pushed his 
shattered forces out of reach, and was returning to its camps 
holding the keys of the whole central region, and of the gates 
of Georgia. 



THE BBLIKK OF KNOXVILLE, 147 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. IlKOttclAXI/.IN'O. 

IT was General Grant's desire to continue tho purHuii, Imt 
Burnsido was closely beleaguered at Kaoxvillt* mid Lnni^ 
street was steadily pushing his approaches. The commander 
in-chief had instructed Burnside to Isold on lo MM* la t, " 1 
can hardly conceive, 1 ' he wrote, "the neee.ssifv f r ti .iiin"; 
from East Tennessee. If I did it at all, if \\..uM I.,- .iff. r 
losing most of the army, and thru neee-,-.itv \\mild n i f ! e 
route.. I will not attempt to lav out a lim- <>f i t n .if 

On th(^ od of DecemlMT, aeeordin;', <t U m u{ Huii it |. 'M 
n.^port, tli(i supplies would lie e\haustrd. I'Jli *f H\; i,,h f 
(Jiivnlry had a 1 ready started for Knn\vill' s and <u ; . i I <d 
hee.n ordered thither with tin* Fourth ( W|^. 1 u-dn. f j i n ii,i 
latter moved slowly and witlmut en* j r; r \,*n tin- ll fhii \.., i i- 
her, General Grant deeided to send Sherman mfh |,j e,,. ti 
mand, and accordingly ;'ave him nnli-r-s t f.d , c f ,j, : >, , 'n 
troops and hin own, and fo with all poy,-,ilIe h |.)* i, f , il sr 
n k lief of the hesie^et! rarrir-on. 

A Ia.rge part of Slu-rmaa's command Ij;id m.mti i ^j 
Memphis, had ^IUH- into liatilr iaiim diati I\ MM .M u 
(.'ha,ttanoo^a, ancl had ha.l nn r- I Nsnt-i'. Inth 1 if . \ 
ollieers and men had rarri-d no hi:'":t"' i pi,,,, ,, j 

week lieforc, they had left their ramp- , ,,n llu n hi J ,ij , 
Tennessee, with only two d:t\:,* ratinn-., Uifl 'if .1 . ' 
clothing, stripped fur the ii-lsf, eaeh ..ihe. r .1 , I i 
<*omm{jndni;( general dmut, ha \ in ; " hut :i ' ! 

overcoat. They had now no pr< \ i' i* sr . : a \ j ' 1 
gathered ly the road, and ueiv ill Mipplied ! J 



148 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Moreover, the weather was intensely cold. But twelve thou- 
sand of their fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in a mountain 
town eighty-four miles distant : they needed relief, and must 
have it in three days. This was enough. Without a murmur, 
without waiting for any thing, the Army of the Tennessee di- 
rected its course upon Knoxville. 

On the night of November 28th, General Howard repaired 
and planked the railroad bridge, and at dawn the army 
passed the Hiawassee, and during the day marched to Athens, 
a distance of fifteen miles. Granger, who was then near the 
mouth of the Hiawassee, was at first ordered to join the main 
column at Kingston ; but on reaching Athens, Sherman sent 
him directions to meet him at Philadelphia. The small force 
of cavalry which was, at the time of the receipt of General 
Grant's orders, scouting near Benton and Columbus, overtook 
the column at Athens during the night. 

On the 2d of December, the army moved rapidly north, 
towards London, twenty-six miles distant. About 11 A. M., 
the cavalry passed to the head of the column, and was ordered 
to push to Loudon, and, if possible, save the pontoon bridge 
across the Tennessee, held by a brigade of the enemy, com- 
manded by General Yaughn. The cavalry moved with such 
rapidity as to capture every picket ; but Yaughn had artillery 
in position, covered by earthworks, and displayed a force too 
large to be dislodged by a cavalry dash, and darkness closed 
in before General Howard's infantry arrived on the ground. 
The enemy evacuated the place in the night, destroying the 
pontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into 
the Tennessee, and abandoning a large quantity of provisions, 
four guns, and other material, which General Howard took at 
daylight. But the bridge being gone, Sherman was forced 
to turn east, and trust to the bridge at Knoxville. 

v It was now all-important that General Burnsicle should 
have notice of Sherman's approach, and but one more day of 
the time remained. Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the 
night of December 2d, Sherman sent an aid-de-camp for- 
ward to Colonel Long, commanding the brigade of cavalry, 



THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLK. 



149 



ordering him to select the bent material of his command, to 
start at onco, ford the .Littler Tennessee, and push into Kuox- 
villo at whatever cost of life and horseflesh. The distance to 
be travelled wan about forty miles, and the roads villanouH. 
Before day tho cavalry marched. At daylight the Fifteenth 
Corps was turned from Philadelphia to the* Little Tennessee, at 
Morgantown, where the maps represented the*, river us very 
shallow ; but it was found impossible to ford it, as tho "water 
was, in some places, live feet deep, and free/in^ cold, and tho 
stream was two hundred and forty yards wide. A bridge, was 
indispensable. ]$ri#adier-(eneral James II. Wilson, who ac- 
companied Sherman, undertook to superintend the- work, and 
with only such tools as axes, picks, and spades, working partly 
with crib-work and partly with trestles made of the houses of tho 
late town of Mordant own, by dark of Deeemhcr -1th the bridge 
was completed, and by daylight of the f>ih tin- Fifteenth ( 1 orps, 
General Blair, \\as ovn\ anil C mn*al ( Jranyrr's eorps and ( Jen- 
eral I>avis* division wen* ivady in pass; but ihe dia.;.M>isaI 
bracin^.^s wen* impi-rfi'rt, fr want, of proprr ,s|ulu\s, and tho 
brid^* broke, eatuiit;' ib-Iay. 

(ieneral llnir bad hn-n onirri-c] to ujar"h <ul cn the Ma.rys- 
viih' nad live luih-M, th're to auait iinfit'r that < inn-rid (Irau- 
grr was nn a paralh-l nal airea:*t <f him. At Use fork of (ho 
road a, mr.^si-n^n 1 rod*- up in <teitT;d Sln-rman, brin**!!!?^ a ie.w 
wtn'ds frofii <enrral i ui ur.idr, da(-ti i>rermler 'lih, stating 
that Colitnel I*on/ hud ai'-rivt-tl at Kitosvilh* \\ilh bis ea.va,Iry, 
and all WJis \\rll tln-n* ; thai I,on:<>tivi't still lay brfore. IJKJ 
]>lac(% lut thrrr urr' ?.\mptoms of a j.pndv drjjartiin*. 

AH soon as thr brid; r i- was nirndrd, all th troops moved 
forward. (leni'ral Howard b.'id mareh<'d from London, had 
found a f.;ood fonl for his wa;vns anl horsrs at. I>jivis, seven 
miles from Mor).riLhto\\!i,aiitl had mad* a bridge of the wagons 
hft by Vaughn at London. lb* marehrd 1\ 1'nitiaa.nd Ijotiis- 
vill\ Chi the nij f ht of the ^th, all the !i'ads of coluinn rom- 
municatrd at Mar\^\illr, \\lii-re an otlieer <f (inieral .IJurn- 
i;ide*s stall' arrivi-d \\ith the ne\\s that Lone.strret had, tho 
night before, retreated on thtt Kutled*.^e, Iio<l^;er,sville, and 



150 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Bristol roads, towards Virginia; and that General Burn- 
side's cavalry was on his heels ; and with word that 
the general desired to see General Sherman in person as soon 
as he could come to Knoxville. Ordering all the troops to 
halt and rest, except the two divisions of General Granger, 
which were directed to move forward to Little Biver and 
report to General Burnside, on the morning of December 6th 
Sherman rode from Marysville into Knoxville, and there met 
General Burnside. 

The siege had been already raised. Longstreet had 
hurled three brigades against the works, and met with a bloody 
repulse. The intelligence of Bragg's defeat, and the arrival 
of Colonel Long's cavalry, as the forerunners of the army 
known to be marching for the relief of the besieged garrison, 
had shown Longstreet the necessity of prompt movement, and 
he had taken the only line of retreat that continued practi- 
cable. General Burnside now asked for nothing but General 
Granger's command, and suggested to Sherman, in view of the 
large force he had brought from Chattanooga, that he should 
return with due expedition to the line of the Hiawassee, lest 
Bragg, re-enforced, might take advantage of his absence to 
assume the offensive. 

In the following communication General Burnside took oc- 
casion to express his thanks for the timely relief : 

" HEADQUARTERS AIIMY OF THE OHIO, 
Kuoxvillc, December 7, 1803, 

" Major- General W. T. Sherman, Commanding, etc. : 

" GENERAL I desire to express to you and your command my 
most hearty thanks and gratitude for your promptness in 
coming to our relief during the siege of Knoxville ; and I am 
satisfied your approach served to raise the siege. 

" The emergency having passed, I do not deem for the pres- 
ent any other portion of your command but the corps of 
General Granger necessary for operations in this section; 
and inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the force imme- 
diately with him in order to relieve us, thereby rendering the 



\ 

THE BELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 151 

position of General Thomas less secure, I deem it advisable 
that all the troops now here, save those commanded by Gen- 
eral Granger, should return at once to within supporting 
distance of the forces in front of Bragg' s army. 

" In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank you and 
your command for the kindness you have done us. 

" I am, general, very respectfuly, your obedient servant, 

A. E. BUBNSIDE, 
Major-General commanding." 

Having seen the forces of General Burnside move out of 
Knoxville in pursuit of Longstreet, and General Granger's 
move in, Sherman put his own command in motion to return. 

General Howard was ordered to move, by way of Davis* 
Ford and Sweetwater, to Athens, with a guard formed at 
Charleston, to hold and repair the bridge which the enemy 
had retaken after the passage of the army up the .river. Gen- 
eral Jefferson C. Davis moved to Columbus on the Hiawassee 
by way of Madisonville, and the two divisions of the Fifteenth 
Corps moved to Telire Plains, in order to cover a movement of 
cavalry across the mountain into Georgia to overtake a wagon 
train of the enemy's which had escaped by way of Murphy. 
Subsequently, on a report from General Howard that the enemy 
still held Charleston, Sherman directed General Ewing's di- 
vision on Athens, and went in person to Tolire with General 
Morgan L. Smith's division. By the 9th, all the troops were 
in position, holding the rich country between the Little Ten- 
nessee and the Hiawassee. The cavalry under Colonel Long 
passed the mountains at Telire, and proceeded about seventeen 
miles beyond Murphy, when, deeming his further pursuit of 
the wagon train useless, he returned on the 12th to Toliro. 
Sherman then ordered him and the division of General 
Morgan L. Smith to move to Charleston, to which, point ho 
had previously ordered the corps of General Howard. 

On the 14th of December, all of the command lay en- 
camped along the Hiawassee. Having communicated to Gen- 
eral Grant the actual state of affairs, Sherman received orders 



152 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

to leave on the line of the Hiawassee all the cavalry and proceed 
to Chattanooga with the balance of his command. Leaving 
at Charleston the brigade of cavalry commanded by Colonel 
Long, re-enforced by the Fifth Ohio cavalry, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Heath, which was the only cavalry properly belonging 
to the Fifteenth Army Corps, with the remainder Sherman 
moved by easy marches by way of Cleveland and Tynras 
Depot into Chattanooga. There he received orders from 
General Grant to transfer back to the appropriate commands 
the Eleventh Corps of General Howard and the division of the 
Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General Jefferson C. Davis, 
and to conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps to its new field of 
operations in Northern Alabama. 

In closing his report of the memorable campaign thus closed, 
Sherman wrote to General Grant : 

" It will thus appear that we have been constantly in motion 
since our departure from the Big Black, until the present mo- 
ment. 

" In reviewing the facts, I must do justice to my command 
for the patience, cheerfulness, and courage which officers and 
men have displayed throughout, in battle, on the march, and 
in camp. For long periods, without regular rations or sup- 
plies of any kind, they have marched through mud and over 
rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a murmur, without a 
moment's rest. After a march of over four hundred miles, 
without stop for three successive nights, we crossed the Ten- 
nessee, fought our part of the battle of Chattanooga, pursued 
the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned more than one 
hundred miles north, and compelled Longstreet to raise the 
siege of Knosville, which gave so much anxiety to the whole 
country. 

" It is hard to realize the importance of these events without 
recalling the memory of the general feeling which pervaded all 
minds at Chattanooga prior to our arrival. I cannot speak of 
the Fifteenth Army Corps without a seeming vanity, but as I 
am no longer its commander, I assert that there is no better 



THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 153 

body of soldiers in America than it, or "wlio have done more or 
better service. I wish all to feel a just pride in its real honors. 
To General Howard and his command, to General Jefferson C. 
Davis and his, I am more than usually indebted for the intelli- 
gence of commanders and fidelity of command. The brigade 
of Colonel Buschbeck, belonging to the Eleventh Corps, which 
was the first to come out of Chattanooga to my flank, fought 
at the Tunnel Hill in connection with General Swing's divi- 
sion, and displayed a courage almost amounting to rashness : 
following the enemy almost to the tunnel gorge, it lost many 
valuable lives, prominent among them Lieutenant-Colonel 
Taft, spoken of as a most gallant soldier. 

" In General Howard throughout I found a polished and 
Christian gentleman, exhibiting the highest and most chival- 
rous traits of the soildier. 

" General Davis handled his division with artistic skill, more 
especially at the moment we encountered the enemy's rear- 
guard near Greysville, at nightfall. I must award to this di- 
vision the credit of the best order during our marches through 
East Tennessee, when long marches and the necessity of for- 
aging to the right and left gave some reasons for disordered 
ranks. 

" I must say that it is but justice that colonels of regiments 
who have so long and so well commanded brigades, as in the 
following cases, should be commissioned to the grade which 
they have filled with so much usefulness and credit to the pub- 
lic service, namely : Colonels J. E. Cockerel!, Seventieth Ohio 
volunteers ; J. M. Loomis, Twenty-sixth Illinois ; C. E. Wol- 
cott, Forty-sixth Ohio ; J. A. Williamson, Fourth Iowa ; G. B. 
Baum, Fifty-sixth Illinois ; J. J. Alexander, Fifty-ninth In- 
diana. " 

Taking advantage of the inactivity at Chattanooga, Sherman 
now turned his attention to his own immediate department, 
and returned to Memphis and Vicksburg to inspect and reor- 
ganize his command. He reached Memphis on the 10th of 
January. 



154: SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

"While preparing for future military operations, it was ne- 
cessary for Mm to meet and dispose of many questions of a 
civil nature presented to Mm by his subordinates. With re- 
gard to the treatment of the inhabitants of a conquered 
country, he wrote on the 24th January, 1864 to Lieutenant- 
Colonel K. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant-general at depart- 
ment headquarters at Huntsville : 

" The Southern people entered into a clear compact of gov- 
ernment, but still maintained a species of separate interests, 
Mstory, and prejudices. These latter became stronger and 
stronger, till they have led to a war which has developed 
fruits of the bitterest kind. 

" We of the North are, beyond all question, right in our lawful 
cause, but we are not bound to ignore the fact that the people 
of the South have prejudices, which form a part of their 
nature, and which they cannot throw off without an effort of 
reason or the slower process of natural change. Now, the 
question arises, should we treat as absolute enemies all in the 
South who differ from us in opinion or prejudice, kill or 
banish them ? or should we give them time to think and grad- 
ually change their conduct, so as to conform to the new order 
of things which is slowly and gradually creeping into their 
country ? 

" When men take arms to resist our rightful authority, we 
are compelled to use force, because all reason and argument 
cease when arms are resorted to. When the provisions, for- 
age, horses, mules, wagons, etc., are used by our enemy, it is 
clearly ^ our duty and right to take them, because otherwise 
they might be used against us. 

" In like manner, all houses left vacant by an inimical people 
are clearly our right, or such as are needed as storehouses, 
hospitals, and quarters. But a question arises as to dwellings 
used by women, children, and non-combatants. So long as 
non-combatants remain in their houses and keep to their 
accustomed business, their opinions and prejudices can in no 
wise influence the war, and, therefore, should not be noticed. 



e 



THE EEUEF OF KNOXV1M<K. Ifi!) 

Uut if any ono comes out into tliti public streets ami civates 
disorder, ho or who should be punished, restrained, or ban- 
ished, either to ilw rear or front, as tin* ollieer in command 
adjudges. If tht* people, or any of theiu, keep up u corres- 
pondence wiili parties in hostility, they art* spies, ami ma bo 
punished with death, or minor punishment, 

11 These are well-established principles of war, und flu* peo- 
ple of tho South, having appealed to war, art* barred from 
appealing to our Constitution, which they have practically 
publicly detitHl. They Imvo appealed to war, and fiitir4 iitsltlt! 
It.* rules and laws. 

"Thu 1'nited States, an a belligerent party claiming rijtht 
in the noil as the ultiiuutt^ stiven'i^n, have it. ri.'ht. to 
change the populatin; and ii may l*i\ anl is, lioth p*lifi 
ami just, w< should dn HU in errtaiu di-ifnrtn, \V!i is t!-; 
inh.'d.itants p-r^i,s| inn !n^ in hn-,tiliiv, if m:i\ l-r lif*f 
fHtlif ir ;uid r!;'lif \\r- :,ltiiili| iaisi">ii f ! Jii .ind .*p| M j ' !. Ii i 
l;iml:* f a iiuu'i* l*nal nhd u-cfid |'|MJ| ! n>r V* ,,, 
<i n\ that tin- 1 'uit. -d St;iir-, \Miuld io- !., i, i t ..ii,- , 
in." ;i. in- .! pi'rjudin d, |j, ; irl ln-..| *l< ;M!} !' * s j 1 s , - 
Mil* -I ttu! ifi' 1 * ill Li-, plarr ii i|.; ft MI jnn j il, i ' * * , 

f ! v " til f;in;llh- ', r\r|| if I h-\ I * < f I M * | i 1 jj | | t | | | jj ' ( , f f 
, f<! "1 t pit- -rlit III!'. \ i.-'\ 1. 1 I | i is* t<i I i M \ ' 'i } I , 4 
fi t t ii, uhi } " t ]T U rirh ; 4 ji'i i , 3 If h\, |H I I , ', * j{ j. , ,J , , | |{ , 

indu--Ji\ and :4i!IJfiil 1^ M MMM!I f if* * ! .r j t ,,. np. t, 

t" pf'.Jiriit^ j'Urli h\ i*M I J 1 MM ,< M Ji i f u f , j 

ii. : Mii-, i iMVrrjuariit. Ii i .. is! ii, i ,i !i , {,< |j, , ** , at-' 
pl;jritrr. t ;a^ iii,ii f ] ;, . L l .',',. 4! ' j * 
;Mid thai fhi-^ r:s,n d* a I ' t v j ! . , f , j , ( , , , , 
C iM\rihiu'nt and ( -L.uf u t^ t . i (i . j| . ,, ; -. , 



"* \\ I U 1 1 . if !'*! M '' I in, I ,,j , j.f If , |,j I , f j ( ;l t 



. that L,,u di ( i,i i a . i>\ fuj.n ui ,un pi " 



1 56 SHERMAN AMD HIS 



officer ; 

inhabitants and ZkSTn 1 7 T tr ps ' to 
Propositions, and 
whether they and e . 

land which bj the acddlT ^ ^^ tlle 
Governnfent 



because 



, esd 

tHej want eternal wa ^7 afl d 7 , f ^^ P 
and dispels then, ' al? ? ^? "^ acc ^ the issue 
tnow thousands and m fflions nT 5 m P osses ^n. I 
notice, would C0me to rrtrAll 8 ' ^^ vho at sim P^ 
tonses and plantations!^ f^f^ aCC ^ ^ elegant 
thmk differently, let the m perSst in w ^^ f Hlm e 
then they will no t be conSe? C ^^ 7eMS lo ^ er ' and 
reflection and patience, they could t a fT ^ by a Wtle 
of peace and prosperit; S T ^ had a h d red years 
Last y ear they^oufd ^^ttT^ ^ Ve 
late: all the powers of earth t,^' bu * now ft is 
slaves, any more than thj d eT ^ t<5 ttem t 
&eir lands will be taLn -f^ "^ / ra ^^ers. Next year 

r^y too,-and in anUer " IheT ^ ^ tham ' ^ 
thezr hres. A people who wi) 7 ma7 be S ^ain for 

tain li m it ou g U io ^^^ * -ar beyond a cer- 



Ple, with less pertinacity TT ** 7 ' 

of national existence." 



' ' 

' have bee wiped out 



the eation Sl * * 

of 



on 



is aJready dead b 



THE BELIEF AT KNOXVILLE. 157 

he can run off without danger of recapture, the question is 
settled. Conventions cannot revive slavery. It should be 
treated as a minor question. 

" If a Convention is called in Tennessee it should be without 
regard to slavery, or any other single question. When assem- 
bled, the members would naturally discuss any and all ques- 
tions, and no doubt would waste more sound on the history of 
Greece and Eome than on the commonplace business be- 
fore it." 

Under date of the 27th he addressed a full letter of instruc- 
/ tions to Brigadier-General E. P. Buckland, who was to be left 
j in command of the district of Memphis. In the course of it 
he said : 

" You know how much stress I have put on honesty in the 
character of a United States officer. 

" Merchants naturally make gains. It is their calling, but 
an officer has a salary, and nothing else, and if you see by an 
officer's style of living, or any external symptoms, that he is 
spending more than his pay, or if you observe him interested 
in the personal affairs of business men, stop it, and send him 
to some other duty. Don't let officers settle down into com- 
fortable houses, but make camps, and collect in them all this 
floating mass, and send them to their regiments 

" You can confer in the most friendly spirit with the people 
here and in the country. Assure them that if they act in. good 
faith to the United States, we will fully reciprocate. They 
must, however ACT, good faith of itself is of no value in war. 

" As an army we will take care of all large hostile bodies, 
but cannot undertake to do the work of local police. 

" We have heretofore done too much of this, and you can, in 
your own way, gradually do less and less of it, till finally the 
city and county authorities can take it all off our hands. 

" Memphis as a military depot must be held with the tenacity 
of life ! The fort must be impregnable, the river secure, and 
the levee, and incidentally the town, or so much of it as gives 
storage and offices ; but if these are at all in danger, move 
them to the cover of the fort. 



158 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGN'S. 

"Encourage the militia in all manner of wav*. 1 ifamv t!a> 

poorer classes, the "working men, ar ITiiItiii, aiitl I WMIJ],| 11,4 
mind the croaking of the richer chisson. Tltrir jmvivr i^ j^.-iss- 
ing from their hands, and they talk of the* vul^arif v of ilr^ n,-n i 
regime ; but such arguments will lie lost, on you, I*ivi r mul 
success will soon replace this class of gmiii!ili*i*i4, f j^v will 
gradually disappear as a political power." 



THE MERIDIAN RAID. 159 



CHAPTEE XIIL 

THE MERIDIAN RAID. A NEW COMMAND. 

McPHERSON's seventeenth corps was still at Vicksburg ; 
part of Htirlbiit's sixteenth corps, with Smith's and Grier- 
son's divisions of cavalry, at Memphis. Lieutenant-General 
Polk, who commanded the Confederate forces in Mississippi, 
was at Meridian with French's division, and had Loring's di- 
vision at Canton; Forrest was, with twenty -five hundred ir- 
regular cavalry, in the northern part of tlie State ; Cash's and 
Whitfield's brigades of cavalry patrolling from Yazoo City, 
along the Big Black to Port Gibson ; and TV T irt Adams' bri- 
gade doing similar duty in the rear .of Port Hudson and 
Baton Rouge. 

To the Army of the Tennessee was assigned by General 
Grant the duty of keeping open the Mississippi Eivcr and 
maintaining intact our control of the east bank. 

Sherman decided to do this by occupying prominent points 
in the interior with small corps of observation, threatening a 
considerable radius ; and to operate against any strong force 
of the enemy seeking to take a position on the river, by a 
movable column menacing its rear. To destroy the enemy's 
means of approaching the river with artillery and trains, ho 
determined to organize a large column of infantry and move 
with it to Meridian, effectually breaking up the Southern 
Mississippi railway ; while a cavalry force should move from 
Memphis to meet him, and perform tlio same work with 
respect to the Mobile and Ohio railway. 

Brigadier-General "William Sovy Smith, chief of cavalry on 
General Grant's staff, was placed in command of all the cavalry 



160 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

of the department, and instructed to move with it from Mem- 
phis on or before the 1st of February, by way of Pontotoc, 
Okalona, and Columbus, to Meridian, a distance of two hun- 
dred and fifty miles, so as to reach that place by the 10th. 
General Smith was specially instructed to disregard all small 
detachments of the enemy and all minor operations, and 
striking rapidly and effectually any large body of the enemy, 
to be at his destination precisely at the appointed time. 
Simultaneously the Eleventh minois Volunteers and a colored 
regiment, under Colonel Coates, of the former regiment, with 
five tin-clad gunboats under Lieutenant-Commander Owen, 
were sent up the Yazoo to ascend that stream and its tributa- 
ries as far as possible, so as to create a diversion and protect 
the plantations on the river ; and Brigadier-General Hawkins 
was directed to patrol the country in the rear of Vicksburg 
towards the Big Black, and to collect some fifty skiffs, by 
means of which detachments of two or three hundred men 
might be moved at pleasure through the labyrinth of bayous 
between the Tazoo and the Mississippi, for the purpose of 
suppressing the depredations of the horde of guerillas then 
infesting that region. 

Having made all these arrangements, Sherman himself, 
with two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps under Hurlbut, 
two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps under McPherson, 
and a brigade of cavalry under Colonel E. F. Winslow, 
Fourth Iowa Cavalry, marched from Vicksburg on the 3d 
of February. The expedition moved out in two columns, 
Hurlbut's corps by Messenger's, McPherson' s along the Tail- 
way. The former met the enemy at Joe Davis' plantation, 
the latter at Champion Hills, on the 5th, and for eighteen 
miles kept up a continual skirmish, without delaying the 
march of the troops, and entered Jackson the same night ; 
thus entirely disconcerting the enemy's plan, which was at 
that moment in process of execution, of concentrating at that 
place Loring's and French's divisions, and Lee's division of 
cavalry. On the 6th, both columns being united, and Mc- 
Pherson taking the lead, crossed the Pearl Biver on a pontoon 



THE MERIDAN RAID. 

bridge captured from the enemy the day before ; on the 
7th marched into Brandon ; on the 8th reached Live Creek, 
five miles west of Morton ; and on the 9th entered Mor- 
ton, where McPherson's corps halted to destroy the railways 
for five miles around, and Hurlbut took the advance. From 
this point the troops moved by easy marches, with no greater 
opposition than the annoyance of foraging parties and strag- 
glers by the enemy's cavalry hovering on the flanks, through 
Hillsboro' and Decatur to the Tallahatchie Eiver, twenty-five 
miles west of Meridian, where the road was found obstructed 
by felled trees. Leaving the trains under sufficient guard, 
Sherman pushed on over these obstructions for the Ocktib- 
beha Eiver, where he found the bridge burning ; but in two 
hours the troops had built a new one, and at three and a half 
o'clock on the afternoon of the same day entered Meridian, 
with slight opposition. French's and Loring's divisions, of 
the Confederate troops, with General Polk in person, had evac- 
uated the place during the morning and the preceding night, 
Lee's cavalry covering their retreat ; and all the locomotives 
and cars, except one train found burning, had been removed 
towards Mobile and Selma. It was evidently impossible to 
overtake the enemy before they should cross the Tombigbee. 
The army therefore rested on the 15th, and on the 16th com- 
menced the destruction of the railways centring in Meridian. 
The depots, storehouses, arsenals, offices, hospitals, hotels 
and cantonments in the town were burned, and during the 
next five days, with axes, sledges, crowbars, clambars and fire, 
Hurlburt's corps destroyed on the north and east sixty miles 
of tics and iron, one locomotive, and eight bridges ; and Mc- 
Pherson's corps, on the south and west, fifty-five miles of rail- 
way, fifty-three bridges, G,075 feet of trestle-work, nineteen 
locomotives, twenty-eight stoam-cars, and three steam saw- 
mills. Thus was completed the destruction of the railways 
for one hundred miles from Jackson to Meridian, and for 
twenty miles around the latter place, in so effectual a manner 
that they could not be used against us in the approaching 
campaigns. 

11 



, 
. i 



162 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAI'iNS 

The cavaky, under General W. Sovy Sn/) : i i >' 
As was afterwards learned, that ofli*% r J*;* I . * / " M 
until the llth of February; ami };,"!{'* I < * i 
than West Point, from whit'h pktv b K> < , ; t 4 , 
22d, and rapidly retraced Ins stt-p ; to M 
Ascertaining that the uiriay's nif. tl 

Tombigbee on tho 17th of Ppbritun i < / - r 

of Smith, on tho 20th General Sin r; ^ i < u ! . M ' ' 
move slowly back on tlio main roati, tt ! !H ! ; j i 

but's corps and tho cavalry, mnrvlu 1 I'M, ' ? , ' , J ,,), 

Sherman moved through .Mai iun fi^i \3 ^ ' i I ..HI 

to Uxiion, whence 3io di.spatrln'd I*** 1 M I( f I 1 , ' f , , ? ., t 
regiments of cavalry to rhiljtiMjI i i -'.J f,, ,' - i 

distant, towards Oohnnbus^ <n t! 1 * i-- I i \ , \ ^ 

expected to coirn^ ; while tho 111,1 in h.J. i i , , , 

where, on tho 23d, it wan joiufii 1; \Jr ! " 1 1 ? * 

the 24th the army continue! flit- n, .'.', , - ' , . i 

the 25th and 2(ith <*rossrd <lu* I'.-; 1 1 I! : ,. (; | ( , , ,' 

and Edwards' Si(icni, ami li\nu;,, k 

division at HJC crossing fn !u,iL fir f! i . ' i i 

ville, Colonel Winslo\v snif nyf i- i 
and, swiiigiii<jr round fhr<ui!i Kf. . ; ' , 
tho army at Canton, without m w i* ' ; 

return IIUMV]] was iMnnoIi-.sti-iI. 

About OIK; thousand whifr n f<j , , j 

five thousand nt^i-ors, ihrt-r if ({ ; : 

number of wagons, \\viv l, r ,ii ! 4 t Ii i 
return. Our total loss u.is in I ;;i ,|, t 

sixty-eight; missing .i-hlv-orj, : j ' ,' ' ; 

seventy. During Ihn ciifiiv - } ,,' ' , . , t ] 

chiefly upon tli^ stoivs hrloii-in^ t , 
were found in |] i(i ( . oun f rv . ' hl " :.. s , p .. 
cavalry, tluMsolation of .MiUs^ppi/v,!,;,^:'-.. -:/.',' , i 
of the expedition, v/as acc'o?np!i,J lt ,j ..,,. .,-, 
three liundrod and sixtv to fo,, r hun,!.,'-! '-' i ^^ ' , ? ' ? -" ' 
and driving tho (jiio.my o U | of fh( . s ,. f( , ..j, .':'.'/ ' , ..... '. ' 
army returned in iH^Ur ' ' 



THE MKHfDIAN UAH). l(j;j 

started, confident in itself, ami Hchooled for tlw trying cam- 
paigns before it. 

On the* 28th of February, leaving the unity at f'anton, 
Sherman went tci Yickslmrg ; (hence sent hack orders in Hurl- 
but to eomo lit on the Mil of March, and at oner proceeded to 
Now Orleans, to confer with (tenentl Hanks and Adminil 
Porter, in regard to tho details of the t'omluncd movement up 

tllO fled HlVer. 

({cneral I tanks hud uskcd (Scncral Sherman for n force of 
ten thousand men, to leave Yieksburg on the 7th of March, 
and remain with him thirty days, and Hhernwn had promised 
to comply with thin request. His idea WH for a, heavy 
column, supported by ^1 JI * ii'on rlul ^unhoat.-^ t> mnve up flu* 
Red ItiiT durii"; hi"h \v,ii i f Mt\mdi :HiMhtie it'llu 
f^unlntat i enuid pa *tli r.phl .i.fira Shii,pMii lM ? ff\ 
and hoi I in ffM mi M fh ,]!, i <f fh.. p| , , 1 1 i h 
jn-rfMi'iit I'M!' th .i lli! !' iK ti\f i tl < i t, i ! 

vrnl in . iu i I" r .' t ! i , \ i> ^ ! , j' , M j 

si:- ippi tl ti t t 1 , i t ... m' M : ' ' * ,! * - , p i 

fin!! nf llj, ,n>i . i 1* . I' I'.' 1 , * J. I ! . , . h 

on tlit- J } ' ! < f 11'.*'' s t i I if, 

%vunld "fi p* i - j It *Mf' 'ill i .1 I ' * I ^ | H 
!.:! i ill , up ll !' t M 'I. ' \ ','!' | ,' ! } t. . *f 

!-,-'M ni. i, t'i . ' f . . i, i .,j,! i !, , f i \ i i i . ?b 

1 Vil, 'f Mul, i i j . I ,}, M< ii*t i ) , \ui\ 

if !li- 1. ii' ^ \ j, ,1 p i, ,1 , .*' ' M,! i 'I ,iu 

t IM IV ;t tl, i * * * < M ,'T , 4 |\ , ' f, !i v , ! * liMf 

I Jill*' In i <M . , * M,t i \ i ? I s!* 

I 1 M 1 1 . 

Slit !' . ' I, I ' I ' \ 1 ! 

M;iivh tl i j. ', ' 

A. J. v i i! I h i , i. i 

:i i.il <- ? I M ^ . J , 1 

I iiMti ,,i ,| ; ( i i , ' fi M 

I \\. ?i!;, I* . IM % t i , f "VJ, p ,. f 

< i* fi. r; 1 ^ ' f i 




164 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

troops from the Department of the Gulf marched by land. 
The duration of his absence was not to extend beyond thirty 
days. At the end of that time he was to return to Yicksburg, 
gather np all the detachments, equipage, and transportation of 
the Sixteenth Corps, and conduct the troops under his com- 
mand belonging to that corps to Memphis, where he was told he 
would probably find orders to join the Army of the Tennessee 
at Huntsville or Bridgeport. 

We need not follow the steps of this expedition in detail. 
General Smith landed at Simmesport, on the west bank of the 
Atchafalaya, on the 13th of March, took Fort De Eussy by 
assault on the 14th, and reached Alexandria on the 16th. The 
advance-guard of the cavalry of the Army of the Gulf arrived 
the same day, and the main body of that army several days 
later. The river was very high. The head of the column left 
Alexandria on the 27th. The army marched from Grand 
Ecore, where it had halted, on the 6th of April ; the main body 
by land; one division under General T. Kilby Smith on trans- 
ports accompanying Admiral Porter, who started on the same 
day, aiming to reach Springfield Landing on the 10th, where 
General Banks undertook to be at that time. On the 8th, Gen- 
eral Banks was met near Mansfield, and his attenuated column 
beaten in detail, by an inferior but concentrated force of the 
enemy, under General E. Kirby Smith. The army retreated in 
considerable disorder to Pleasant Hill, thirty-five miles distant, 
and there on the 9th again encountered the enemy, checked 
his pursuit, and routed him. The next day General Banks con- 
tinued the retreat to Grand Ecore. Admiral Porter and Gen- 
eral Smith readied Springfield Landing at the appointed time, 
heard o the disaster, and returned, with difficulty, to Grand 
Ecore. Here the army waited nearly three weeks, when hav- 
ing been re-enforced by all the available troops in the Depart- 
ment of the Gulf, General Banks continued the retreat to 
Alexandria. The river had fallen. The gunboats and trans- 
ports could not pass the rapids. By means of a dam, con- 
structed at the suggestion and under the supervision of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey, Fourth "Wisconsin Cavalry, 



MKUWIAN RAID. ||]5 

11 w waller in tho rhw wan HUNCH! Kuiliiru'ntly to allow tin 1 boats 
to d<'sr*nd, and on thtt 1.4th of May On* unity maivhrd on 
HiiiiitH'sport. On th<* Jilst it rvaHml Mor^an/ia Hrnd, ujt I hi- 
wst hank <if flm Mississippi, (irnrral Smith at omv -tn- 
Iwrkt'd his c'ommami and tvtunu'd to VifLshurj.*;, aftn* an 
nl>si*iu*' of just two months and n half, instrad of thr thirty 
days tnxHtiiIly figri'tnl iipcni, 

I a t!u. iiit'aii \vhilt, nearly t*n thinHand vi-ti-ran Vfiliiiifi*irp 
of tin* Si\tirnth ami Hrvi'iili't'iitli ( f orps, and tin* Wai itarti 
winis, hmi lK<n firrltii!^!tt*d for thirty <|jiys, on rondiiitm if n- 
4'nlistin^, ant! had rr^liirni'd with t!u ranks of thrir r""in 4 iitw 
HWi'lIi'd liy n'cruits. Marly in Marrh, Vratrh"?; diii'-ion if thr 
Sixtf^nth (*<rps liad Itn-a ord*rrd !< rrport In {irn* r;d l^tdj'i* 
sit If untsvilh*. 

< hi Ilir -Ith of Man-lu a! Na^in ill*', Mitjor < !ru i.d < < M n 

<N'iv-| frlr;T:tphi<' rd !':* <* f }*rt ill pi r.li ,*! \\ 1 '! J *!t 

^ ' ill f * I ," I p,t i 1 .1 it a t oil !i u iff i ! 1 1 | * i I I i f .1 

li* lit* f i i * i. i il I" * r 'I f 1 , ' ' n i t ! I,i i i j * , ** 

,!I 1 I' j.;. 'd. f I f -I f * f . d < i i I ! ( i ' , t , 

p I , lT I t. U. p it ! , ! ' -n f j , -In ! ] i 

|H ,', !' i f (| > V, (/ , I - ,' , ,1 1 , ,, , , . ., , 

i.il 1 ? > i! t ! i 1 '> i * ! J . , > , i , , it 




166 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

" There are many officers to whom these remarks are appli- 
cable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability 
as soldiers ; but what I want is to express my thanks to you 
and McPherson, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel 
indebted for whatever I have had of success. 

" How far your advice and assistance have been of help to 
me, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been 
given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you 
cannot know as well as I. 

" I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it 
the most flattering construction. 

" The word you I use in the plural, intending it for McPher- 
son also. I should write to him, and will some day, but start- 
ing in the morning, I do not know that I will find time just now. 
" Tour friend, 

"U. S. GBANT, 

" Major-General." 

Sherman received this letter near Memphis, on the 10th of 
March, and immediately replied : 

" DEAR GENERAL : I have your more than kind and charac- 
teristic letter of the 4th inst. I will send a copy to General 
McPherson at once. 

" You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assign- 
ing to us too large a share of the merits which have led to 
your high advancement. I know you approve the friendship 
I have ever professed to you, and will permit me to continue, 
as heretofore, to manifest it on all proper occasions. 

"Yon are now Washington's legitimate successor, and oc- 
cupy a position of almost dangerous elevation ; but if you can 
continue, as heretofore, to be yourself, simple, honest, and un- 
pretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of 
friends and the homage of millions of human beings, that will 
award you a large share in securing to them and their descend- 
ants a government of law and stability. 

" I repeat, you do General McJPherson and myself too much 
honor. At Belrnont you manifested your traits neither of us 



THE MERIDIAN RAID. 

being near. At Donelson, also, you illustrated your whole 
character. I was not near, and General McPhe'rson in too sub- 
ordinate a capacity to influence you. 

"Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost 
cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that pre- 
sented themselves at every point ; but that admitted a ray of 
light I have followed since. 

"I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the 
great prototype, "Washington as unselfish, kind-hearted, and 
honest as a man should be but the chief characteristic is the 
simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I 
can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in the 
Saviour. 

" This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, 
when you have completed your best preparations, you go into 
battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga no doubts no 
reserves ; and I tell you, it was this that made us act with 
confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me, 
and if I got in a tight place, you would help me out, if alive. 

" My only point of doubts was, in your knowledge of grand 
strategy, and of books of science and history ; but, I confess, 
your common sense seems to have supplied all these. 

" Now as to the future. Don't stay in Washington. Come 
West : take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley. Let us 
make it dead-sure find I tell you, tho Atlantic slopes and 
Pacific shores will follow its destiny, as sure as tli.o limbs of a 
tree live or die with the main trunk. We have done much, but 
still much remains. Time, and time's influences, are with us. 
We could almost afford to sit still, and lot these influences work. 

" Here lies the seat of the coming empire ; and from the 
West, when our task is done, wo will make short work of 
Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of tho 
Atlantic. 

" Your sincere friend." 

On the 12th of March, 1864, the President relieved Major- 
General Halleck from duty as general-in-chicf, and assigned 



168 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Lieutenant-General Grant to the command of the armies of 
the United States, with headquarters in the field, and also at 
Washington, where General Halleck was to remain as chief-of- 
staff. By the same order, Sherman was assigned to the com- 
mand of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and Major- 
General McPherson to the command of the Department and 
Army of the Tennessee. 

Sherman received this order at Memphis, on the 14th, while 
on his way to Huntsville, to prepare for the great campaign in 
Georgia. In accordance with the request of General Grant, 
accompanying the order, he immediately proceeded to Nash- 
ville, where he arrived on the 17th, and accompanied the 
lieutenant-general as far on his way to Washington as Cin- 
cinnati. During the journey, they had a fall and free con- 
ference as to the plan of operations in the approaching cam- 
paign, and a complete understanding of the work to be done by 
each. In a parlor of the Burnet House, at Cincinnati, bend- 
ing over their maps, the two generals, who had so long been 
inseparable, planned together that colossal structure whereof 
the great campaigns of Bichmond and Atlanta were but two 
of the parts, and, grasping one another firmly by the hand, 
separated, one to the east, the other to the west, each to strike 
at the same instant his half of the ponderous death-blow. 



TEE AEMY OF THE CENTRE. 



OHAPTEE XIV. 

THE ABMY OF THE CENTRE. 

As the army corps had relieved the commanders of depart- 
ments from the care of the great mass of minor and personal 
details relating to the troops under them, so the organization 
of military divisions, now for the first time introduced into 
our service although something similar had been intended 
when General McClellan was first called to Washington left 
the generals selected to command them entirely free to devote 
their minds to the organization, administration, and movement 
of their armies against the enemy. Tactical details devolved 
upon the department commanders. The unit habitually con- 
templated by the commander of the military division became 
an army ; his detachments were army corps. 

The military division of the Mississippi, in the personal 
command of which Sherman had just relieved the lieutenant- 
general, consisted of the four large departments of the Ohio, 
the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and Arkansas. Embracing 
the great central belt of territory from the Alleghanies to the 
western boundary of Arkansas, it included the entire theatre 
of war from Chattanooga to Vicksburg. Four largo Union 
armies occupied this central zone. 

The army of the Ohio, consisting of the Ninth and Twenty- 
third Army Corps, was at Kiioxville. Major-General John 
M. Schofiold had just taken command of it. Longstreet Lad 
disappeared from its front, and was retreating into Virginia to 
join Loo;, and the Ninth Corps was on the way to re-cuforce the 
army of the Potomac. The Twenty- third Corps, as it presently 
took the field, consisted of the divisions of Brigadier-Generals 
Miles S. Hascall and Jacob D. Cox. Three divisions remained 
to garrison East Tennessee and Kentucky. 



170 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

The Army of the Cumberland was at Chattanooga, under 
the command of Major-General George H. Thomas. It con- 
sisted of the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth corps, com- 
manded respectively by Major-Generals Oliver O. Howard, 
John M. Palmer, and Joseph Hooker. The Fourth Corps 
included the divisions of Brigadier-Generals D. S. Stanley, 
John Newton, and Thomas J. Wood ; the Fourteenth, those of 
Jefferson C. Davis, E. "W. Johnson, and Absalom Baird; 
and the Twentieth, those of A. S. "Williams, John W. Geary, and 
Daniel Butterfield. 

The Army of the Tennessee, comprising the Fifteenth, and 
portions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth corps, under 
Major-Generals John A. Logan, George M. Dodge, and Frank 
P. Blair, Jr., was at Huntsville, commanded by McPherson. 
The remaining divisions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Corps were at Memphis and Yicksburg, under Hurlbut and 
Slooum, except those absent on the Eed Eiver expedition. 
The Fifteenth Corps embraced the divisions of Generals P. J. 
Osterhaus, Morgan L. Smith, John E. Smith, and Harrow ; 
the Sixteenth, those of Thomas E. G. Eansom, John M. Corse, 
and Thomas W. Sweeney; and the Seventeenth, those of 
Charles E. Woods and Miles D. Leggett. 

The cavalry consisted of McCook's division of the Army of 
the Ohio, Elpatrick's and Garrard's divisions of the Army of 
the Cumberland, and Edward McCook's brigade of the Army 
of the Tennessee. 

The Department of Arkansas, including the whole of that 
State, was commanded by Major-General Frederick Steele, 
who, with the main portion of his troops, was at Little Eock, 
holding the line of the Arkansas Eiver, with the object of 
keeping an army of the enemy away from the Mississippi and 
out of Missouri. This department, however, did not long 
continue attached to Sherman's command, being added to the 
Military Division of West Mississippi, under Canby, when 
that organization was formed in May. 

John McAllister Schofield, the son of a clergyman, the 
Eeverend James Schofield, residing in Chatauqua County, in 



THE AKMY OF THE CENTRE. 

the State of New York, was born there on the 29th of Sep- 
tember, 1831. "When about twelve years of age his father 
took him to reside at Bristol, Illinois, whence, in 1845, they 
removed to Freeport, in the same State. In June, 1849, 
young Schofield entered the Military Academy at "West Point, 
and graduated four years later, standing seventh in the order 
of general merit in the same class with Generals McPherson, 
Sheridan, Sill, Terrill, E. 0. Tyler, and the rebel General 
Hood. He was appointed a brevet second-lieutenant, and at- 
tached to the Second Eegiment of Artillery, on the 1st of July, 
1853, and in regular course of promotion advanced to the 
grades of second-lieutenant in the First Eegirnent of Artillery 
on the 30th of August in the same year ; first-lieutenant in the 
same regiment on the 1st of March, 1855 ; and captain on the 
14th of May, 1861. After serving for two years with his 
company in South Carolina and Florida, in the fall of 1855, 
Lieutenant Schofield was ordered to "West Point, as Assistant 
Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy ; which 
position he held until June, I860, when he obtained leave of 
absence for twelve months to accept the Chair of Physics 
in Washington University, at St. Louis, Missouri, intending 
to quit the army at the end of the leave. This design he 
abandoned immediately upon the publication of the Presi- 
dent's proclamation of the 15th of April, 1861, calling for 
seventy-five thousand volunteers, and waiving the remainder 
of his leave, reported himself for orders and was assigned to 
duty as mustering officer at St. Louis. Shortly afterwards, 
by permission of the War Department, Lieutenant Schofield 
accepted the position of major of the First Eegiment of 
Missouri Volunteers, offered him by the governor of the 
State, and in that capacity participated with his regiment in 
the bold capture and dispersion of the nest of secessionists at 
Camp Jackson on the 10th of May, planned and executed 
by Captain, afterwards Brigadier-General Nathaniel Lyon. 
Major Schofield soon afterwards became General Lyon's 
principal staff-officer, and served with that gallant commander 
throughout the campaign which ended in his death. In the 



172 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

f all, the First Missouri Volunteers was converted into a heavy 
artillery regiment, and Major Schofield charged with its 
equipment. At Fredericktown, Missouri, he participated with 
Battery A, the first one mounted, in the defeat of Jeff. 
Thompson, by Plurnmer and Garlin. On the 20th of No- 
vember, 1861, Major Schofield was appointed by the President 
a brigadier-general of volunteers and at the same time 
received from the governor of Missouri a corresponding 
commission in the Missouri Militia, with orders to organize, 
equip, and command a force of ten thousand militia, to be 
called into the service of the United States, within the limits 
of Missouri, during the war. With this force General Schofield 
was enabled to relieve the main armies for active service in 
more important fields. In the spring of 1862, he was desig- 
nated by Major-General Halleck, commanding the Depart- 
ment of the "West, as commander of the district of Missouri, 
and in the fall organized and took personal command of the 
Army of the Frontier, serving in the southwestern portion of 
tiie State. He relinquished the former command in September, 
to give his undivided attention to the suppression of the 
terrible guerrilla warfare which then raged in Missouri. On 
the 29th of November, 1862, the President appointed him a 
major-general of volunteers, but his straightforward, decided, 
and just administration of affairs as commander of the district 
of Missouri having greatly dissatisfied the local politicians, 
they made a combined and determined effort to defeat his 
nomination, and so far succeeded that the Senate failed to act 
upon it, and his commission consequently expired on the 3d 
of March, 1863, by constitutional limitation. Immediately 
relieved, at his own request, from duty in Missouri, Brigadier- 
General Schofield was now ordered to report to Major-Gen- 
eral Kosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, 
at Mnrfreesboro', Tennessee, by whom he was assigned to 
the command of Thomas' old division of the Fourteenth 
Army Corps. A month later, President Lincoln reappointed 
him a major-general of volunteers, and sent him back to 
St. Louis, to relieve Curtis, in command of the Department 



THE AEMY OF THE CENTRE. 173 

of Missouri. In May, 1863, he assumed command, and realiz- 
ing the paramount importance of the operations before Ticks- 
burg, suspended all active operations in his own department 
and lent himself heartily to a co-operation with the plans of 
General Grant, then merely the commander of an adjacent de- 
partment, by furnishing him with Major-General F. J. Her- 
ron's fine division of the Army of the Frontier, and all other 
troops not necessarily required for a strictly defensive attitude 
in Missouri. After the capture of Vicksburg, Schofield was 
re-enforced by General Grant with Steele's division, lately of 
Sherman's corps. Sending a division of cavalry under Briga- 
dier-General J. "W. Davidson to join Steele at Helena, he 
ordered the latter forthwith to move on Little Bock, the key 
to the military possession of the line of the Arkansas Eiver 
and the control of the State, while he sent another column 
from Kansas, under Brigadier-General Blunt, to occupy Fort 
Smith and open communication with Little Bock. Both 
movements having proved successful, Missouri being thus 
secured from the ravages of a border war, and his army 
holding securely the line of the Arkansas, while menacing 
offensively the forces of the enemy between that river and the 
Bed, General Schofield was engaged in concerting with Major- 
General Banks, commanding the Gulf department, the details 
of a joint occupation of Shreveport and the lino of the Bed 
Biver, when, in January, 1864, the President appointed Major- 
General Bosecrans to relievo him from command. There 
were then three principal political parties in Missouri, which, 
under different names or various pretences, had existed over 
since the outbreak of the war. The entire control of affairs 
in Missouri necessarily rested with the military commander of 
the department. As it was impossible to please all parties, 
BO, in looking only upon his duty and his orders from a stand- 
point different from that of either, he generally ended by 
pleasing none. Fremont, Hunter, and Curtis had been suc- 
cessively relieved from command ; Schofield himself had been 
degraded for a time ; and now he was again to give way to the 
demands of the dissatisfied politicians. Perceiving at last 



174 SHEBMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

that the hostility of these gentlemen was indeed directed 
against himself, and not against his subordinates, President 
Lincoln, although he indorsed and supported Schofield's entire 
policy and acts, yielded to the demands of the politicians for 
the purpose of demonstrating their motives, and gave them a 
new commander of their own choice. In a few weeks, the 
howls against Eosecrans were as loud as those previously 
raised against any of his predecessors. At the request of 
General Grant, Schofield was now assigned to the command 
of the Army of the Ohio, which he assumed on the 9th of 
February. 

George H. Thomas, born in Southampton County, Vir- 
ginia, on the 31st of July, 1816, of wealthy and respectable 
parents, entered "West Point in June, 1836, and graduated 
twelfth in a class of forty-five members; on the first of 
July, 1840, was appointed a second-lieutenant in the Third 
Regiment of Artillery, attained by regular promotions the 
grades of first-lieutenant, on the 17th of May, 1843, captain 
in the month of December, 1853, and on the 12th of May, 1855, 
was selected as major of the newly raised Second Eegiinent of 
Cavalry. On the 25th of April, 1861, by regular promotion, 
consequent upon the resignation of the disloyal officers, he be- 
came lieutenant-colonel and on the 5th of May colonel of 
the same regiment, then and since known as the Fifth Cavalry. 
During this time, he served eighteen months in Florida, was 
brevetted first-lieutenant, on the 6th of November, 184:1, for 
gallantry in the war against the Seminoles ; served some time 
with his company at New Orleans Barracks, Fort Moultrie, in 
Charleston Harbor, and Fort McHenry, near Baltimore ; in 
July, 1845, was sent to Corpus Christi, Texas, to report to 
General Taylor; took part in the defence of Fort Brown 
against a short siege by the Mexicans, and in the battle of Ee- 
saca de la Palma ; was brevetted captain for gallant conduct 
at the battle of Monterey, September 23, 1846 ; commanded 
Company E, Third Artillery, during the following winter ; was 
brevetted major for highly distinguished service with his bat- 
tery in the decisive action at Buena Yista ; recrossed the Bio 



THE AEMY OF THE CENTRE. 175 

Grande at tlie conclusion of tlie war and was placed in charge 
of tlie commissary depot at Brazos Santiago ; served in Flor- 
ida, in command of Company B, of liis regiment, in 1849 and 
1850; served at Port Independence, Boston Harbor, during 
the first three months of 1851 ; was stationed at "West Point 
as instructor of artillery and cavalry from that time until the 
spring of 1854, when he was ordered to California with a bat- 
talion of his regiment and stationed at Fort Yuma, until July, 
1853 ; served with the Second Cavalry, into which he had now 
been promoted, until early in 1856, when it went to Texas, 
where he commanded it for three years ; and in April, 1861, was 
ordered to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to remount his 
regiment, which had been betrayed and robbed of its outfit 
and equipment by Twiggs, in his infamous surrender of 
the entire department under his command, after he had 
received orders relieving him, and with indecent haste to 
anticipate the hourly expected arrival of his successor. In 
May, 1861, Colonel Thomas took command of a brigade in 
the Department of Pennsylvania, under Major-General Patter- 
son, afterwards the Department of the Shcnancloali, under 
Major- General Banks, and continued to hold that position 
until the end of August. On the 17th of August he was ap- 
pointed a brigadier-general of volunteers, and shortly after- 
wards ordered to Kentucky to report to Brigadier-General 
Anderson, who gave him the command of Camp Dick Eobin- 
son with about six thousand new troops. On the 2Gth of 
October, a brigade sent out by him under Brigadier-General 
Schoepf defeated the enemy under Zollicoffer, in the battle of 
"Wildcat. On the 18th of January, after a march of nineteen 
days, over nearly impassable roads, with part of the first 
division of the Army of the Ohio, to which General Buell as- 
signed him, lie mot the fierce attack of Zollicoffer, near Mill 
Spring, Kentucky, repulsed it, attacked in his turn, broke the 
enemy and pursued the disordered remnants to the Cumberland 
Eiver, which they crossed during the night, abandoning all 
their artillery and baggage. In March, Thomas with his divi- 
sion, now forming the reserve of Buell's army, occupied Nash- 



176 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

ville, and in April joined the rest of that army after tlie battle 
of Shiloh, and moved with it and Grant's army on Corinth.. 
On the 25th of April, 1862, he was promoted to be a major- 
general of volunteers, and on the 1st of May his own division 
was transferred to the Army of the Tennessee, and he was as- 
signed by General Halleck to command the five divisions, in- 
cluding Sherman's, constituting the right wing of the forces 
before Corinth. After the evacuation of that place by Beau- 
regard, Thomas returned to the Army of the Ohio and was 
placed on duty as second in command of that army, during 
Bragg's invasion and the remarkable series of movements by 
which Buell manoeuvred it out of Tennessee, through Ken- 
tucky, and back to Louisville. On the 1st of October he was 
assigned to the command of the right wing of that army, and 
in that capacity took part in BuelTs nominal pursuit of Bragg. 
On the 5th of November, 1862, he was assigned by General 
Eosecrans, who had just relieved Buell, to the command of a 
corps comprising his own third division, now under Eousseau, 
and Negley's division. At Stone Eiver, on the 31st of Decem- 
ber, 1863, when Bragg impetuously hurled his entire army 
against Eosecrans' right and routed it, Thomas, with Eous- 
seau's division unbroken, stood firm, held his ground, and 
aided in the selection of the new line, whose strength enabled 
Eosecrans to turn back the enemy's second attack on the fol- 
lowing day. On the 20th of September, 1863, at the battle of 
Cliickamauga, when Me Cook and Crittenden on either flank 
yielded to the fury of the enemy's assault, and streamed back 
in such utter rout to Chattanooga that even Eosecrans gave 
up the day as lost, and hastened thither in person to prepare a 
new line of defence, Thomas with his corps, somewhat later 
augmented by Granger's division, stood like a lion at bay, 
and resting his flanks upon the sides of the mountain gap, 
resisted and severely punished every attempt of Bragg, either 
j j to force his position in front or to turn his flanks. Falling 

I i back in the night three miles to a better position, he again 

formed line of battle and waited all the day of the 21st 
for Bragg's expected attack, which never came. Having 



THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE. 177 

alone saved the Army of the Cumberland from destruc- 
tion, Thomas was very justly selected as the successor of 
General Rosecrans, when on the 19th of October it was 
determined to relieve the latter. On the 27th of the same 
month he was made a brigadier-general in the regular army. 
Faithful over all things and free from all petty desires, 
when Sherman, his junior in years, in experience, in commis- 
sion, and at no remote period his subordinate, was ele- 
vated to the command of the Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi, Thomas yielded a ready acquiescence in the selection, 
and a thorough, efficient, and essential co-operation in all the 
plans of his new superior. It is characteristic of Thomas, 
that in the twenty-five years that have elapsed since his 
graduation he has had but two short leaves of absence, one in 

1848, and one in 1860, and has never been on favored duty of 
any kind. In his most marked traits, Thomas is the antithesis 
of Sherman, his habitual repose of mind and temper being, 
perhaps, only less strongly marked than Sherman's electric 
restlessness. 

James Birdseye McPherson was born in Sandusky County, 
Ohio, on the 14th of November, 1828, entered the Military 
Academy towards the close of his twenty-first year, in June, 

1849, graduated at the head of the same class with Schofield, 
and on the 1st of July, 1853, was appointed a brevet second- 
lieutenant, and assigned to the corps of engineers. By^egu- 
lar promotion, he attained the grades of second-lieutenant, on 
the 1st of December, 1854, first-lieatenant, December 13, 1858, 
and captain, August 6, 1861. Upon the expiration of his 
graduating furlough, he was stationed at "West Point as as- 
sistant instructor of practical engineering, and remained there 
until September, 1854, when he was detailed as assistant 
engineer of the harbor defences of New York. From January 
to July, 1857, he was in charge of the construction of Fort 
Delaware, in the Delaware Eiver. In December, 1857, he 
took charge of the erection of the fortifications on Alcatras 
Island, in the Bay of San Francisco, California. In August, 
1861, he was detailed to superintend the construction of the 



178 SHERMAN AJSTD HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

fortifications of Boston Harbor. On the 12th of November, 
of the same year, Captain McPherson was, at the request of 
Major-G-eneral Halleck, appointed an additional aid-de-camp, 
with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and, on reporting to him 
at St. Louis, was assigned to engineer duty on his staff. 
Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson served as chief engineer on 
General Grant's staff, at Forts Henry and Donelson, and at 
Shiloh, and was brevetted major in the regular army for the 
two former and lieutenant-colonel for the latter. On the 1st 
of May he was promoted to be additional aid-de-camp, with 
the rank of colonel, and served on General Halleck' s staff as 
chief engineer of the army before Corinth. He was soon 
afterwards promoted to be brigadier-general of volunteers, 
from May 15th, 1862. After serving under Grant as gen- 
eral superintendent of the military railways in the Depart- 
ment of the Tennessee and upon the staff of that general in the 
battle of luka, he saw his first service in command of troops 
early in October, when, with a division, he fought his way 
through the rebel General Price's lines, then investing Corinth, 
marched in to the relief of the garrison, and the next day 
joined in the attack and pursuit of the enemy. In recognition 
of his continued meritorious services, he was, upon General 
Grant's request, promoted to be a major-general of volun- 
teers on the 8th of October, 1862. In December, 1862, 
he was assigned to the command of the Seventeenth Army 
Corps. He was appointed a brigadier-general in the regu- 
lar army, to date from the capture of Yicksburg. His 
share in the campaign which resulted in the conquest of 
the Mississippi Kiver, in the battles of Port Gibson, Eay- 
mond, Jackson, and Champion's Hill, and in the siege of 
Yicksburg, we have already noticed, as well as his subsequent 
assignment to the command of the district of Yicksburg, and 
the control of operations on that part of the river, and his 
part in Sherman's Meridian raid. He was tall in person, being 
over six feet in height, well proportioned and erect ; easy and 
agreeable in his manners ; frank in conversation ; accessible to 
all; gallant and dashing in action; regardless of danger; 



THE AEMT OF THE CENTRE. 179 

strictly honorable in all his dealings with men and with the 
Government. 

Schofield, young but matured, well poised, thoroughly scien- 
tific by education, thoroughly practical by contact with men, 
habituated to command; McPherson, in the full flower of his 
life, bold and enthusiastic, just emerging from a complete 
mastery of the science of defensive war into the wider field of 
the offensive, trained to command under the eye, and by the 
example of Grant and Sherman ; Thomas, the ripe growth of 
years and experience, of balanced and crystallized mind, 
strong and patient, steadfast and prudent, a true soldier, no 
genius, but a master of his profession, exhaustive in prepara- 
tion, deliberate in action, ponderous and irresistible in execu- 
tion : such were the men upon whom, under the leadership of 
Sherman, the destiny of the campaign was to rest. 

On the 25th of March, Sherman set out to inspect his com- 
mand, and prepare it for action. He visited Athens, Decatur, 
Huntsville, and Larkin's Ferry, Alabama; and Chattanooga, 
Loudon, and Knoxville, Tennessee. Meeting General McPher- 
son at Huntsville, General Thomas at Chattanooga, and General 
Schofield at Knoxville, he arranged with them in general terms 
the lines of communication to be guarded, and the strength 
of the columns and garrisons, and fixed the first of May as the 
date when every thing throughout the entire command was to 
be ready for a general movement. Leaving the department 
commanders to complete the details of organization and pre- 
paration, Sherman returned to his headquarters at Nashville, 
to look after the vital question of supplies. Two parallel 
lines of railway from the Tennessee Eiver on the east, and a 
third line from the Ohio at Louisville, bring supplies to Nash- 
ville. Thence by the Nashville and Decatur Railroad they 
are carried south to Decatur, and by the Nashville and Chat- 
tanooga Railroad southeast to Chattanooga, passing through 
Huntsville, Stevenson, and Bridgeport. The Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad forms the base of a triangle, one hundred 
and twenty-one miles from Decatur to Chattanooga; from 
near Decatur to Bridgeport it lies north of the Tennessee. 



180 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Thus in case of accident or destruction to either of the direct 
lines, there was generally communication by the circuitous 
route, and during the season of navigation the Tennessee 
River added a third. The railways were in fine condition, in 
spite of the repeated injuries inflicted upon them by the 
enemy's cavalry in their frequent raids, but the people in East 
Tennessee were so impoverished that the Union commanders 
had hitherto felt obliged to issue rations to them from the 
military stores. Sherman at once found that the army and 
the people could not both be fed by the railways. The army 
must be supplied, must remain, and must move forward ; the 
people could bring supplies by private means or could mi- 
grate to other parts of the country. Sherman's first duty was 
the success of his army. He accordingly issued orders stop- 
ping the issue of stores to the citizens, and made strenuous ex- 
ertions to increase the carrying capacity of the railways. " At 
first," he says, in his official report of the campaign, " my orders 
operated very hardly, but the prolific soil soon afforded early 
vegetables, and ox-wagons hauled meat and bread from Ken- 
tucky, so that no actual suffering resulted, and I trust that 
those who clamored at the cruelty and hardships of the day 
have already seen in the result a perfect justification of my 
course. 5 ' By the 1st of May the storehouses at Chattanooga 
contained provisions for thirty days, the ammunition-trains 
were fully supplied, the re-enlisted veterans had come forward, 
and all was ready. 

On the 10th of April, Sherman received his final instruc- 
tions from the lieutenant-general. From them he learned 
that Grant would march with the Army of the Potomac from 
Culpepper on the 5th of May, against Lee. Sherman was to 
move against Johnston at the same time, with Atlanta as his 
immediate objective. He immediately replied, giving the 
details of his plans, and concluding : 

" Should Johnston fall behind Chattahoochee, I would feign 
to the right but pass to the left, and act on Atlanta or its 
eastern communications, according to developed facts. This 
j 1 j is about as far ahead as I feel disposed to look ; but I would 



THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE. 181 

ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so 
busy that he cannot in any event send any part of his com- 
mand against you or Banks. If Banks can at the same time 
carry Mobile and open up the Alabama River, he mil in a 
measure solve a most difficult part of my problem provisions. 
But in that I must venture. Georgia has a million of inhab- 
itants. If they can live, we should not starve. If the enemy 
interrupt my communications, I will be absolved from all 
obligations to subsist on my own resources, but feel perfectly 
justified in taking whatever and wherever I can find. I will 
inspire my command, if successful, with my feelings, and that 
beef and salt are all that are absolutely necessary to life ; and 
parched corn fed General Jackson's army once, on that very 
ground." 

On the 27th of April, Sherman issued orders to all the troops 
that were to form part of the moving columns to concentrate 
towards Chattanooga, and on the 28th removed his headquar- 
ters thither. 

On the morning of the 6th of May the Army of the Tennes- 
see was near Gordon's Mill, on the Chickamauga Creek, the 
Army of the Cumberland at and near Einggold on the rail- 
way, and the Army of the Ohio near Eed Clay on the Geor- 
gia line, directly north of Dalton. It had been Sherman's 
desire and intention to move with one hundred thousand men 
and two hundred and fifty guns ; fifty thousand men in the 
Army of the Cumberland, thirty-five thousand in that of the 
Tennessee, and fifteen thousand in that of the Ohio. His 
actual force was ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and 
ninety-seven men, and two hundred and fifty-four guns, dis- 
tributed as follows : 

Army of the Cumberland. Infantry, 54,568; artillery, 2,377; 
cavalry, 3,828 : total, 60,773 ; guns, 130. 

Army of the Tennessee. Infantry, 22,437; artillery, 1,404; 
cavalry, 624 : total, 24,465 ; guns, 96. 

Army of the Ohio. Infantry, 11,183 ; artillery, 679 ; cavalry, 
1,697 : total, 13,559 ; guns, 28. 

A. J. Smith's and Mower's divisions, which were to have 



182 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

jj , joined the Arniy of Tennessee early in April, were still de- 

tained on the Mississippi, in consequence of the unexpected 
length and disastrous end of the Eed Eiver expedition. 

The Confederate army under Johnston, now numbering, 
according to his official report, forty thousand nine hundred 
infantry, in the three corps of Hardee, Hood, and Polk, and 
four thousand cavalry, under "Wheeler, was grouped around 
Dalton, on the line of the Chattanooga and Atlanta Kailway, 
Johnston's plan was to take the initiative, with his own force 
increased from other sources as largely as practicable ; but 
while Mr; Davis and General Bragg, then stationed in Bich- 
mond, as general-in-chief of the Confederate armies, were 
engaged in discussing details, and objecting to General John- 
ston's suggestions, Sherman advanced. 



BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. 183 



OHAPTEE XV. 

BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. 

THE two hostile armies were separated by an inaccessible 
spur of the Alleghanies, called Eocky Face Eidge, cloven by 
Buzzard's Eoost Gap, through which run the railway and 
Mill Creek. This narrow pass was strongly fortified, was 
flooded by the waters of the creek, artificially raised by means 
of a dam, and was swept by strong batteries on the projecting 
spurs and on a ridge at the southern extremity. To assault 
the enemy in this almost unapproachable position, formed no 
part of Sherman's plan. He decided to turn the enemy's left. 
McPherson was ordered to move rapidly by Ship's Gap, Vil- 
lanow, and Snake's Creek Gap, on the railway at Eesaca, 
eighteen miles below Dalton, or a point nearer than that 
place, make a bold attack, and after breaking the railway 
well, to retire to a strong defensive position near Snake Creek 
Gap, ready to fall on the enemy's flank when he retreated, 
as it was thought he would do. 

On the 7th of May, with slight opposition, Thomas occu- 
pied Tunnel Hill, directly in front of Buzzard's Eoost Gap. 
On the 9th, Schofield moved down close to Dalton, from 
his camps at Eed Clay, and Thomas renewed Ms demon- 
stration against Buzzard's Eoost and Eocky Face Eidge 
with such vigor, that Newton's division of Howard's fourth 
corps carried the ridge, but turning south, found the crest too 
narrow and too well protected by rock epaulements to enable 
it to reach the gorge. Geary's division of Hooker's twentieth 
corps, made a bold push for the summit, but the narrow road 
was strongly held by the enemy, and could not be carried. 



SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Meanwhile McPherson had reached Snake Creek Gap on 
tlie 8th, completely surprising a brigade of Confederate cav- 
alry which was coming to watch and hold it. The next day 
he approached within a mile of Eesaca, but finding that place 
very strongly fortified, and no road leading across to it, with- 
out exposing his left flank to an attack from the north, he 
retired to Snake Creek Gap and there took up a strong posi- 
tion. 

Leaving Howard's Fourth Corps and a small force of cavalry, 
to occupy the enemy's attention in front, on the 10th, Sherman 
ordered General Thomas to send Hooker's twentieth corps 
over to McPherson, and to follow with Palmer's fourteenth 
corps, and Schofield was directed to march by the same route. 
On the 12th, the whole army, except Howard's corps, moved 
through Snake's Creek Gap on Eesaca ; McPherson, in ad- 
vance, .by the direct road, preceded by Ealpatrick's division of 
cavalry ; Thomas to the left, and Schofield to the right. 

General Kilpatrick, with his division, led, and drove "Wheel- 
er's division of the enemy's cavalry from a cross-road to within 
two miles of Eesaca, but received a wound which disabled 
him, and gave the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray, 
who,, according to his orders, wheeled out of the road, leaving 
General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck the 
enemy's infantry pickets near Eesaca, and drove them within 
their fortified lines, and occupied a ridge of bald hills, his 
right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railway 
bridge, and his left abreast' the town. General Thomas came 
up on his left, facing Camp Creek. General Schofield broke 
Ms way through the dense forest to General Thomas' left. 
Johnston had left Dalton on the night of the 12th and morn- 
ing of the 13th, and General Howard entered it and pressed 
his rear. Eocky Face Mountain and the southern extremity 
of Snake Creek Gap had effectually concealed the flank 
movement of the Union army, and nothing saved Johnston's 
army at Eesaca but the impracticable nature of the country, 
which made the passage of troops across the valley almost 
impossible. This enabled him to reach Eesaca from Dal- 



Prepared V Brvt. Brig (ieii* 0. M. Poe. 

Etyrttyfjl- Jor "Shermmi arulJtiif CbcmfxajtfHs. 




BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. J85 

ton along tlie comparatively good roads constructed before- 
hand, by Ms own foresight. On the 14th of May, the whole 
rebel army was met in a strong position behind Camp 
Creek, occupying the forts at Besaca, the right on some 
high hills to the north of the town. Sherman at once ordered 
a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostanaula at Lay's 
Ferry, in the direction of Calhoun ; Sweeney's division of the 
Sixteenth Corps, to cross and threaten Calhoun, and Garrard's 
cavalry division to move from its position at Villanow towards 
Eome, cross the Oostanaula, and break the railway below 
Calhoun and above Kingston, if possible, while the main army 
pressed against Kesaca at all points. General McPherson got 
across Camp Creek near its mouth, and made a lodgment 
close up to the enemy's works, driving Folk's corps from the 
hills that commanded the railroad and trestle bridges ; and 
General Thomas pressing close along Camp Creek Yalley, 
threw Hooker's corps across the head of the creek to the main 
Dalton road, and down it close to Eesaca. 

General Schofield came up on his left, and a heavy 
battle ensued during the afternoon and evening of the 15th, 
during which General Hooker drove the enemy from several 
strong hills, capturing a four-gun battery and many prisoners. 
That night Johnston escaped, retreating south across the 
Oostanaula, and the next morning Sherman entered the town 
in time to save the road bridge, but not the railway bridge, 
which had been burned. 

The whole army started in pursuit, General Thomas directly 
on the heels of Hardee, who was bringing up the Confederate 
rear, General McPherson by Lay's Ferry, and General Scho- 
field by blind roads to the left. In Eesaca another four-gun 
battery and a considerable quantity of stores were found. 

During the 16th the whole of Sherman's army crossed the 
Oostanaula, and on the 17th moved south by as many different 
roads as practicable. General Thomas had sent Jefferson 
C. Davis' division along the west bank of the Oostanaula, to 
Eome. Near Adairsville, the rear of the rebel army was again 
encountered, and about sunset of that day General Newton's 



186 SHERMAN AND HIS CAJMPAIGNS. 

division, in the advance, tad a sharp encounter with his rear 
guard, but the next morning he was gone, and the Union troops 
pushed on through Kingston, to a point four miles beyond, 
where they found the enemy again formed on ground compar- 
atively open, and well adapted for a great battle. General 
Schofield approached Cassville from the north, to which point 
General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's corps, 
and General McPherson's army had been drawn from Wood- 
land to Kingston in. order to be in close support. On the 19th 
the enemy was in force about Cassville, strongly intrenched, 
but as our troops converged on him again he retreated, in the 
night-time, across the Etowah Eiver, burning the road and 
railway bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in possession 
of the valuable country about the Etowah Eiver. 

That morning Johnston had ordered Polk's and Hood's 
corps to advance and attack the Fourteenth Corps, General 
Palmer's, which had followed them from Adairsville, but 
Hood, who led the advance, being deceived by a report that 
the union troops had turned his right, delayed until the op- 
portunity was lost. On the night of the 19th, the Confed- 
erate army held a commanding situation on a ridge before 
Cassville, but acting upon the earnest representations of Lieu- 
tenant-Generals Polk and Hardee, that their positions were 
untenable, Johnston crossed the Etowah on the following 
morning. 

Holding General Thomas's army about Cassville, General 
McPherson's about Kingston, and General Schofield at Cass- 
ville's depot, and towards the Etowah bridge, Sherman gave 
his army a few days' rest, and time to bring forward supplies 
for the next stage of the campaign. In the mean time General 
Jefferson C. Davis, with his division of the Fourteenth Corps, 
had got possession of Eome, with its forts, eight or ten guns 
of heavy calibre, and its valuable mills and foundries. Two 
good bridges were also secured across the Etowah Eiver near 
Kingston. Satisfied that the enemy would hold him in check 
at the Allatoona Pass, Sherman resolved, without even at- 
tempting it in front, to turn it by a circuit to the right, and 



BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. 187 

haying loaded the wagons with forage and subsistence for 
twenty days' absence from the railway, left a garrison at Home 
and Kingston, on the 23d put the army in motion for Dallas. 

General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the month of 
Oonasene Creek, near Kingston, and moved for his position to 
the south of Dallas by way of YanWert. Davis' division 
of the Fourteenth Corps moved directly from Borne for Dallas 
by "Wan Wert. General Thomas took the road by Euhaiiee 
and Burnt Hickory, while General Schofield moved by other 
roads more to the east, aiming to come up on Thomas' left. 
The head of Thomas' column skirmished with the enemy's 
cavalry, under Jackson, about Burnt Hickory, and captured a 
courier with a letter of General Johnston, showing that he had 
detected the move, and was preparing to take a stand near 
Dallas. The country was very rugged, mountainous, and 
densely wooded, with few and obscure roads. 

On the 25th May, General Thomas was moving from Burnt 
Hickory for Dallas, his troops on three roads, Hooker's corps 
having the advance. When he approached the Pumpkin Vine 
Creek, on the main Dallas road, he found Jackson's division 
of the enemy's cavalry at the bridge to his left. Kapidly 
pushing across the creek, he saved the bridge, though on 
fire, and following eastward about two miles, encountered 
and drove the infantry some distance, until he met Hood's 
corps in line of battle, and his leading division, General 
Geary's, had a severe encounter. Williams' and Ward's (late 
Butterfield's) divisions of Hooker's corps, were on other roads, 
and it was nearly four o'clock P.M. before General Hooker 
got his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed, and, 
by Sherman's order, made a bold push to secure possession 
of New Hope Church, where three roads from Ackworth, Ma- 
rietta, and Dallas meet. Here a hard battle with Stewart's 
division of Hood's corps was fought, lasting two hours, but 
the enemy being covered by hastily constructed earthworks, 
and a stormy dark night having set in, General Hooker was 
unable to drive him from these roads. The next morning 
General McPherson was moved up to Dallas, General Thomas 



188 SHEBMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield 
directed towards the left, so as to strike and turn the enemy's 
right. General Garrard's cavalry operated with General Mc- 
Pherson, and General Stoneman's with General Schofield. 
General McCook looked to the rear. Owing to the difficult 
nature of the ground and dense forests, it took several days 
to deploy close to the enemy, when Sherman resolved gradu- 
ally to work towards our left, and as soon as all things should 
be ready to push for the railway east of Allatoona. In making 
the development before the enemy about New Hope, many 
severe encounters occurred between parts of the army. On 
the 28th, General McPherson was on the point of closing 
to his left on General Thomas, in front of New Hope Church, 
to enable the rest of the army to extend still more to the left, 
and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy 
made a bold and daring assault on him at Dallas. Fortu- 
nately our men had erected good breastworks, and gave the 
enemy a terrible and bloody repulse. After a few days' delay, 
for effect, Sherman renewed his orders to General McPherson, 
to move to the left about five miles, and occupy General 
Thomas' position in front of New Hope Church, and directed 
Generals Thomas and Schofield to move a corresponding dis- 
tance to their left. This was effected without resistance on 
the 1st of June, and by pushing the left well around, all the 
roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth were occupied, 
after which Sherman sent General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly 
into Allatoona, at the east end of the Pass, and General' Gar- 
rard's cavalry around by the rear to the west end of the Pass. 
This was accomplished, Allatoona Pass was turned, and Sher- 
man's real object gained. 

Ordering the railway bridge across the Etowah to be at 
once rebuilt, Sherman continued working by the left, and by 
the 4th of June had ^resolved to leave Johnston in his in- 
trenched position at New Hope Church, and move to the rail- 
way about Ackworth, when the latter abandoned his intrench- 
ments, and fell back to Lost Mountain. The Union army 
then moved to Ackworth and reached the railway on the 6th. 



BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. 189 

On the 7th. the Confederate right was extended beyond the 
railway, and across the Ackworth and Marietta road. On ex- 
amining the AJlatoona Pass, Sherman found it admirably 
adapted for use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary 
orders for its defence and garrison. As soon as the railway 
bridge was finished across the Etowah, stores came forward to 
camp by rail. At Ackworth, General Blair came up on the 8th 
of June with two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps, that had 
been on furlough, and one brigade of cavalry, Colonel Long's, 
of General Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses 
at Columbia. This accession of force nearly compensated for 
the losses in battle, and the detachments left at Eesaca, Borne, 
Kingston, and Allatoona. 



190 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 



CHAPTEE XVI. 

ACBOSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 

ON the 9th. of June, Ms communication in the rear being 
secure and supplies ample, Sherman moved forward to Big 
Shanty. 

Kenesaw Mountain lay before him, with a high range of 
hiUs, covered with chestnut-trees, trending off to the north- 
east, terminating in another peak, called Brushy Mountain. 
To the right was a smaller hill, called Pine Mountain, and 
beyond it, in the distance, Lost Mountain. All these, though 
links in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appear- 
ance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from 
any of the hills that abound in that region. Pine Mountain 
forms the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountains the base 
of a triangle, perfectly covering the town of Marietta and the 
railway, back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks 
the enemy had his signal-stations. Hardee's corps held the 
left of the enemy's line, resting on Lost Mountain, Polk's the 
centre, and Hood's the right, across the Marietta and Ackworth 
road. The enemy's line was fully two miles long more than 
he had force to hold. General McPherson was ordered to 
move towards Marietta, his right on the railroad ; General 
Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountains, and General 
Schofield off towards Lost Mountain : General Garrard's cav- 
alry on the left, General Stoneman's on the right ; and General 
McCook looking to the rear and communications. The depot 
was at Big Shanty. 

By the llth of June Sherman's lines were close up, and he 
made dispositions to break the enemy's line between Kenesaw 



ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 

and Pine Mountains. General Hooker was on its right and 
front, General Howard on its left and front, and General 
Palmer between it and the railroad. During a sharp can- 
nonading from General Howard's right and General Hooker's 
left, Lieutenant-General Polk, of the Confederate army, was 
killed on the 14th, and Major-General Lovell succeeded to the 
command of his corps. On the morning of the 15th Pine 
Mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals 
Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly 
intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw 
and Lost Mountains. At the same time General McPherson 
advanced his line,, gaining substantial advantage on the left. 
Pushing the operations on the centre as vigorously as the 
nature of the ground would permit, Sherman had again or- 
dered an assault on the centre, when, on the 17th, the enemy 
abandoned Lost Mountain, and the long line of breastworks 
connecting it with Kenesaw. Our troops continued to press 
at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber, and across 
most difficult ravines, until, on the 19th, they found him again 
strongly posted and intrenched, his right wing, composed of 
Hood's corps, thrown back to cover Marietta, resting on the 
Marietta and Canton road ; the centre on Kenesaw Mountain, 
held by Loring's corps ; and the left, Hardee's corps, across 
the Lost Mountain and Marietta road, behind Nose's Creek, 
and covering the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. 

From Kenesaw the enemy could look down upon the Union 
camps, and observe every movement, and his batteries thun- 
dered away, but did little harm, on account of the extreme 
height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over the heads of 
the men. During the operations about Kenesaw the rain fell 
almost continuously for three weeks, rendering the narrow 
wooded roads mere mud gulleys, so that a general movement 
would have been impossible ; but the men daily worked closer 
to their intrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket firing 
to annoy him. 

General McPherson was watching the enemy on Kene- 
saw and working his left forward; General Thomas swing- 



192 SHEKMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

ing, as it were, on a grand left wheel, his left on Kene- 
saw connecting with General McPherson ; and General Scho- 
field all the time working to the sonth and east, along the old 
Sandtown road. On the 21st, Hood's corps was moved to the 
left of the Confederate lines, and his former position on the 
right filled by "Wheeler's cavalry. On the 22d, General 
Hooter had advanced his line, with General Schofield on his 
right, when Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions of Hood's 
corps suddenly sallied forth, attacked Williams' division of 
Hooker's corps and a brigade of Hascall's division of General 
Schofield's army, and drove in their skirmish lines, but on reach- 
ing the line of battle received a terrible repulse and fell back, 
leaving dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. 
Upon studying the ground, Sherman now considered that he 
had no alternative but to assault the enemy's lines or turn his 
position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers ; and 
he perceived -that the enemy, as well as his own officers, had 
settled down into a conviction that he would not assault forti- 
fied lines. All expected him to " outflank." An army, to be 
efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but 
must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. 
Desiring, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful 
assault against the enemy behind breastworks, Sherman re- 
solved to attempt it on the left centre ; reflecting that if he 
could thrust a strong head of column through at that point, 
by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and a half miles, it 
would reach the railway below Marietta, cut off the enemy's 
right and centre from its line of retreat, and then, by turning 
on either fragment, that fraction could be overwhelmed and 
destroyed. On the 24th of June, he ordered that an assault 
should be made at two points south of Kenesaw on the 27th, 
one near Little Kenesaw by McPherson, and the other about 
a mile further south by Thomas. On the 27th of June, the 
two assaults were made exactly at the time and in the man- 
ner prescribed in Sherman's orders, and both failed, costing 
us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals Harker 
and McOook Colonel Eice, and others badly wounded ; our 



ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCEEE. 193 

aggregate loss being nearly three thousand, while we inflicted 
comparatively little loss to the enemy, behind his well-formed 
breastworks. The losses in Hardee's and Loring's corps, by 
which the brunt of the assault was sustained, are reported by 
General Johnston at about five hundred and forty. In his 
official report, Sherman says : " Failure as it was, and for 
which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it pro- 
duced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston 
that I would assault, and that boldly ; and we also gained and 
held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could 
not show a head above them/ 1 

On the 1st of July, Sherman ordered General McPherson to 
be relieved by General Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw, 
and rapidly to throw his whole army by the right to threaten 
Nickajack Creek and Turner's Ferry across the Chattahooehee ; 
and he also pushed Stoneman's cavalry to the river below 
Turner's. General McPherson commenced his movement on 
the night of July 2d, and, at the same moment, Johnston, finding 
his left turned, and in danger of being cut off from Atlanta, 
abandoned his strong position at Kenesaw Mountain, and fell 
back to Smyrna Church, five miles from Marietta. The next 
morning General Thomas' whole line was moved forward to 
the railway, and turned south in pursuit towards the Chatta- 
hooehee. General Logan's corps, of General McPherson's 
army, was ordered back into Marietta by the main road, and 
General McPherson and General Schofield were instructed to 
cross Nickajack and attack the enemy in flank and rear, and, 
if possible, to catch him in the confusion of crossing the 
Chattahooehee ; but Johnston had covered his movement too 
well, by a strong tete-de-pont at the Chattahooehee and an ad- 
vanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna Church, to 
admit of this. 

Leaving a garrison in Marietta, and ordering General Logan 
to join his own army near the mouth of Nickajack, Sherman 
overtook General Thomas at Smyrna. On the 4th of July, 
Thomas pushed a strong skirmish line down the main road, 
capturing the entire line of the enemy's pits, and made strong 

13 



194 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

demonstrations along Nickajack Creek and about Turner's 
Ferry. This had the desired effect, and during the night 
Johnston fell back to the Chattahoochee, covering the cross- 
ings from Turner's Ferry to the railway bridge, and sending 
"Wheeler's and Jackson's cavalry to the left bank to observe 
the river for twenty miles above and below. The next morn- 
ing, Sherman advanced to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas' 
left flank resting on it near Price's Ferry, General McPherson's 
right at the mouth of the Mckajack, and General Schofield in 
reserve. Heavy skirmishing along the whole front, during the 
5th, demonstrated the strength of the enemy's position, which 
could alone be turned by crossing the main Chattahooch.ee 
Eiver, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage 
of water by means of bridges, except at one or two very 
difficult fords. 

Conceiving that this would be more easy of execution be- 
fore the enemy had made more thorough preparation or re- 
gained full confidence, Sherman ordered General Schofield to 
cross from his position on the Sandtown Toad to Smyrna 
camp ground, and next to the Chattahoochee, near the mouth 
of Soap's Creek, and effect a lodgment on the east bank. 
This was most successfully and skilfully accomplished on the 
7th of July, General Schofield capturing a gun, completely 
surprising the guard, laying a good pontoon bridge and a 
trestle bridge, and effecting a strong lodgment on high and 
commanding ground, with good roads leading to the east. At 
the same time, General Garrard, with his cavalry division, 
moved rapidly on Eoswell, and destroyed the cloth factories 
which had supplied the rebel armies. General Garrard was 
then ordered to secure the shallow ford at Eoswell, and hold 
it until he could be relieved by infantry ; and, as Sherman con- 
templated transferring the Army of the Tennessee from, the 
extreme right to the left, he ordered General Thomas to send 
a division of his infantry that was nearest to Eoswell to hold 
the ford until General McPherson could send a corps from the 
neighborhood of Nickajack. General Newton's division was 
sent, and held the ford until the arrival of General Dodge's 



X ]V E 8 8 E 




TH E ATLANTA CAM PA IG 

furnished .by 

Brevet Brig. Gen. O.M. 

Cliief Engineer. 
f bf Sfarmari and Jus- Cursipazqiw?* 



ACEOSS THE CHATT.AHOOCHEE. 195 

corps, which was soon followed by the remainder of General 
McPherson's army. General Howard had also built a bridge 
at Powers' Ferry, two miles below General Schofield, and had. 
crossed over and taken position on his right. Thus, during the 
9th, we had secured three good and safe points of passage over 
the Chattahoochee above the enemy, with good roads leading 
to Atlanta. Learning these facts, Johnston crossed the river on 
the night of the 9th, and burned the bridges in his rear ; and 
thus, on the morning of the 10th, Sherman's army held undis- 
puted possession of the right bank of the Chattahoochee ; one 
of the chief objects of his campaign was gained ; and Atlanta 
lay before him, only eight miles distant. It was too impor- 
tant a place in the hands of an enemy to be left undisturbed 
with its magazines, stores, arsenals, workshops, foundries, and 
converging railways. But the men had worked hard and 
needed rest. 

In anticipation of this contingency, Sherman had collected 
a well-appointed force of cavalry, about two thousand strong, 
at Decatur, Alabama, with orders, on receiving notice by 
telegraph, to push rapidly south, cross the Coosa at the 
railroad bridge or the Ten Islands, and thence by the most 
direct route to Opelika, for the purpose of breaking up the only 
finished railway connecting the channels of trade and travel 
between Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, running from 
Montgomery to Opelika, and thereby to cut off Johnston's 
army from an important source of supply and re-enforcement. 
Major-General Lovell H. Eousseau, commanding the district 
of Tennessee, had asked and received permission to command 
the expedition. As soon as Johnston was well across the 
Ohattahoochee, and Sherman had begun to manoeuvre on At- 
lanta, the requisite notice was given. General Eousseau started 
punctually on the 10th of July, fulfilled his orders and instruc- 
tions to the very letter, passed through Talladega, reached the 
railway on the 16th, about twenty-five miles west of Opelika, 
and effectually broke it up to that place, as well as three miles 
of the branch towards Columbus, and two miles towards 
West Point. He then turned north, and, on the 22d, joined 



SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Sherman at Marietta, having sustained a loss of about thirty 
men. 

The interval to the 16th of July, was employed in collecting 
stores at AHatoona, Marietta, and Vining's Station, strengthen- 
ing the railway gualds and garrisons, and in improving the 
pier bridges and roads leading across the river. Generals 
Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry had scouted well down 
the river to draw attention in that direction, arid all things 
being ready for a general advance, on the 17th, Sherman 
ordered it to commence. General Thomas was to cross at 
Powers' and Price's ferry bridges, and march by Buckhead; 
Schofield, who, as has been seen, was already across at 
the mouth of Soap's Creek, to march by Cross Keys; and 
General McPherson to direct his course from Eoswell di- 
rectly against the Augusta road at some point east of Deca- 
tur, near Stone Mountain. General Garrard's cavalry acted 
with General McPherson, and Generals Stoneman and Mc- 
Cook watched the river and roads below the railway. On the 
17th the whole army advanced from their camps, and formed 
a general line along the old Peach-tree road. 

The same day, Jefferson Davis relieved General Johnston 
from the command of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, 
and designated Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood as his succes- 
sor. The telegram from General Samuel Cooper, adjutant- 
general of the Confederate army, communicating this order 
assigned as a reason for it that Johnston had failed to arrest 
the advance of the Union army to the vicinity of Atlanta, and 
expressed no confidence that he could defeat it. From the 
moment that stiffly bending to the pressure of public opinion, 
unmistakably uttered through the lips of the rebel Congress, 
Jefferson Davis had, against his will, restored General John- 
ston to command in the west, that wrong-headed man, ever 
warped by his private griefs to the injury of his own cause, 
had sullenly refrained from giving to his subordinate any as- 
sistance whatever, had spent the time for action in cavilling at 
details, had withheld the troops needed to render either offence 
or defence successful, and had left Johnston in entire igno- 



ACROSS THE CEATTAHOOCEEE. 197 

ranee as to the approval or condemnation of Ms plans until 
their consummation afforded the hungrily watched chance for 
Ms disgrace. With an army less than half the size of Sher- 
man's, a victory by Johnston on the banks of the Tennessee, 
by no means probable would even if possible, have proved in- 
decisive; while defeat, wMch he ought to have regarded as 
certain, would have been his utter destruction. Falling back 
successively to the strong mountain positions at Resaca, Alia- 
toona, Ackworth, and Kenesaw, and in turn interposing be- 
tween himself and the Union army three large rivers, the 
Oostanaula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee, Johnston had forced 
Sherman to consume seventy-two days in passing over the 
hundred miles that measured the distance between Kinggold 
and Atlanta, and there, behind secure fortifications, with an 
army larger than at the start, was preparing to attack the 
Union army, largely reduced by losses, by detachments, and 
by expiration of enlistments, in a position south of all the 
barriers it had passed, where a defeat would be so far decisive 
for Sherman as to cost him all the fruits already gained and 
months of delay, but indecisive for the Confederates, who could 
retire behind their works, too strong for assault and too exten- 
sive for investment. At tMs crisis of the campaign, Johnston, 
prudent, wary, and exhaustive in his plans, brave and skilful 
in their execution, was displaced by a successor, brave indeed 
but also rash, capable of fighting, but incompetent to direct. 
The Confederate tactics changed at once and the battle wMch 
Johnston, at the very moment he was relieved, was about to 
deliver upon the decisive point with thorough preparation was 
delivered by Hood, upon the first point that presented itself, 
with rash impetuosity. 

The Confederate army, numbering forty-one thousand infan- 
try and artillery and ten thousand cavalry, was now strongly 
posted, about four miles in front of Atlanta, on the hills 
which form the south bank of the broad channel known as 
Peach-tree Creek, holding the line of that stream and the 
Chattahoochee for some distance below the mouth of the 
creek. 



198 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

On the 18th, continuing on a general right wheel, General 
McPherson reached the Augusta railway, at a point seven 
miles east of Decatur, and with General Garrard's cavalry and 
General Morgan L. Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps, 
broke up a section of about four miles. General Schofield 
reached the town of Decatur the same day. 

On the 19th, General McPherson turned along the railway 
into Decatur. General Schofield followed a road towards At- 
lanta, leading by Colonel Howard's house and the distillery, 
and General Thomas crossed Peach-tree Creek in force by nu- 
merous bridges in the face of the enemy's intrenched lines. AH 
found the enemy in more or less force and skirmished heavily. 

On the 20th, all the armies had closed in, converging towards 
Atlanta, but as a gap existed between Generals Schofield 
and Thomas, two divisions of General Howard's corps of 
General Thomas' army were moved to the left to connect with 
General Schofield, leaving Newton's division of the same corps 
on the Buckhead road. During the afternoon of the 20th, 
about 4 P. M., the enemy sallied from his works in force, and 
fell in line of battle against Sherman's right centre, composed 
of Newton's division of Howard's corps, on the main Buck- 
head road, of Hooker's corps, next towards the south, and 
Johnson's division of Palmer's corps. The blow was sudden 
and somewhat unexpected, but General Newton had hastily 
covered his front by a line of rail-piles, which enabled him to 
meet and repulse the attack on him. General Hooker's corps, 
although uncovered, and compelled to fight on comparatively 
open ground, after a very severe battle, drove the enemy back 
to his intrenchments. The action in front of Johnston's divi- 
sion was comparatively light, as the position was well intrench- 
ed. Sherman's entire loss was about fifteen hundred killed, 
wounded, and missing, chiefly in Hooker's corps, by reason of 
its exposed condition. 

On the morning of the 22d, to his surprise, Sherman discov- 
ered that the Confederate army had, during the succeeding 
night, abandoned the line of Peach-tree Creek, where he 
should have interposed an obstinate resistance, and fallen back 



ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 199 

to a strong line of redoubts, forming the immediate defences 
of Atlanta, and covering all the approaches to that town. 
These works had been long since prepared, and the enemy 
was now engaged in connecting the redoubts with curtains 
strengthened by rifle-trenches, abattis, and chevaux-de-frise. 
The whole of Sherman's army crossed Peach-tree Creek and 
closed in upon Atlanta, McPherson on the left, Schofield next, 
and Thomas on the right. 

General McPherson, who had advanced from Decatur, con- 
tinued to follow substantially the Augusta railway, with the 
Fifteenth Corps, General Logan, and Seventeenth, General 
Blair, on its left, and the Sixteenth, General Dodge, on its 
right ; but as the general advance of all the armies contracted 
the circle, the Sixteenth Corps was thrown out of line by the 
Fifteenth connecting on the right with General Schofield near 
the Howard House. General McPherson, the night before, 
had gained a high hill to the south and east of the railway, 
where the Seventeenth Corps had, after a severe fight, driven 
the enemy, and it gave him a most commanding position 
within view of the very heart of the city. He had thrown out 
working parties to it, and was making preparations to occupy 
it in strength with batteries. The Sixteenth Corps, General 
Dodge, was ordered from right to left to occupy this position 
and make it a strong general left flank. General Dodge was 
moving by a diagonal path or wagon-track leading from the 
Decatur road in the direction of General Blair's left flank. 

About noon Hood attacked boldly. At the first indications 
of a movement, on his flank, General McPherson parted from 
General Sherman, with whom he was engaged in discussing the 
state of affairs and the plans for the future, and with his staff 
rode off to direct matters on the field. In a few moments, the 
sounds of musketry to McPherson's left and rear 5 growing in 
volume and presently accompanied by artillery, indicated to 
Sherman Hood's purpose of throwing a superior force against 
his left, while his front would be checked by the fortifications 
of Atlanta ; and orders were accordingly at once dispatched 
to the centre and right to press forward and give full employ- 



200 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

ment to all the enemy in his lines, and for General Schofield 
to hold as large a force in reserve as possible, awaiting devel- 
opments. About half-past twelve o'clock, Lieutenant-Colonel 
William T. Clark, assistant-adjutant-general, rode up and 
communicated to General Sherman the appalling intelligence 
that General McPherson was either dead or a prisoner, that 
he had ridden to General Dodge's column, which was then 
moving as heretofore described, and had sent off nearly all his 
staff and orderlies on various errands, and himself had passed 
into a narrow path or road that led to the left and rear of 
General Giles A. Smith's division, which was General Blair's 
extreme left ; that a few minutes after he had entered the 
woods a sharp volley was heard in that direction, and his horse 
had come out riderless and wounded in two places. There 
was no time to yield to the grief caused by this terrible calam- 
ity. Not an instant was to be lost. Sherman instantly dis- 
patched a staff-officer to General Logan to tell him what had 
happened and that he must assume command of the Army of 
the Tennessee, and hold stubbornly the ground already chosen, 
more especially the hill gained by General Leggett the night 
before. 

Already the whole line was engaged in battle. Hardee's 
corps had sallied from Atlanta, and, by a wide circuit to the 
east, had struck General Blair's left flank, enveloped it, and 
had swung round to the right until it struck General Dodge in 
motion. General Blair's line was substantially along the aban- 
doned line of rebel trench, but it was fashioned to fight out- 
wards. A space of wooded ground of near half af mile inter- 
vened between the head of General Dodge's column and 
General Blair's line, through which the enemy had poured. 
The last order known to have been given by General McPher- 
son was to hurry Colonel Wangelin's brigade of the Fifteenth 
Corps across from the railway to occupy this gap. Oppor- 
tunely, it came on the double-quick and checked the enemy. 
While Hardee assailed our left flank, Lieutenant-General A. 
P. Stewart, who had been placed in command of Polk's corps, 



AtROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHBE. 201 

on the 7th., was intended to move directly out from his main 
works and fall upon McPherson in front, but fortunately both 
attacks were not made simultaneously. The enemy swept 
across the hill which our men were fortifying, captured the 
pioneer company, its tools, and almost the entire working 
party, and bore down on our left until he encountered General 
Giles A. Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corps, who being 
somewhat in air, was forced to fight first from one side of the 
old rifle parapet and then from the other, gradually withdraw- 
ing, regiment by regiment, so as to form a flank to General 
Leggett's division, which held the important position on the 
apex of the hill. General Dodge received and held in check 
the attack of Hardee's corps, and punished him severely, cap- 
turing many prisoners. General Giles A. Smith had gradually 
given up the extremity of his line, and formed a new one, con- 
nected on the right with General Leggett, and the left refused, 
facing southeast. On this ground and in this order the men 
fought well and desperately for nearly four hours, checking and 
repulsing all the enemy's attacks. The execution on the ene- 
my's ranks at the angle was terrible, and great credit is as- 
cribed by Sherman to Generals Leggett and Giles A. Smith 
and their men for their hard and stubborn fighting. The 
enemy made no further progress on that flank, and by four 
p. M. had almost given up the attempt. In the mean time, 
Garrard's cavalry division having been sent off to Covington, 
Wheeler, with his Confederate cavalry, had reached Decatur 
and attempted to capture the wagon trains, but Colonel 
Sprague covered them with great skill and success, sending 
them to the rear of Generals Schofield and Thomas, and not 
drawing back from Decatur till every wagon was safe except 
three, which were abandoned by the teamsters. On our ex- 
treme left the enemy had taken Murray's regular battery of 
six guns, with its horses, as it was moving along unsupported 
and unapprehensive of danger in a narrow wooded road in 
the unguarded space between the head of General Dodge's 
column and the line of battle on the ridge above, but most of 



202 SHEBMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

the men escaped to the bushes. Hardee also captured two 
other guns on the extreme left flank, that were left on the 
ground as General Giles A. Smith drew off his men. About 
four p. M. there was a lull, during which the enemy advanced 
on the railway and the main Decatur road, and suddenly 
assailed a regiment which, with a section of guns, had been 
thrown forward as a picket, moved rapidly forward, and broke 
through our lines at that point. The force on this part of the 
line had been materially weakened by the withdrawal of Colonel 
Martin's brigade, sent by General Logan's orders to the extreme 
left, and Lightburn's brigade fell back in some disorder about 
four hundred yards, to a position held by it the night before, 
leaving the enemy for a time in possession of two batteries, 
including a valuable 20-pounder Parrott battery of four guns, 
and separating the two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, 
which were on the right and left 'of the railway. Being in per- 
son close by the spot, and appreciating the vast importance 
of the connection at that point, Sherman ordered several bat- 
teries of Schofield's army to be moved to a position command- 
ing the interval by a left-flank fire, and ordered an incessant 
fire of shells on the enemy within sight, and in the woods 
beyond to prevent his re-enforcing. Orders were also sent to 
General Logan to cause the Fifteenth Corps to regain its lost 
ground at any cost, and to General Woods, supported by 
General Schofield, to use his division and sweep the parapet 
down from where he held it until he saved the batteries and 
recovered the lost ground. With soldierly instinct, Logan had 
anticipated these orders, and was already in motion. The 
whole was executed in superb style, our men and the enemy 
at times fighting across the narrow parapet ; but at last the 
enemy gave way, and the Fifteenth Corps regained its position 
and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which were 
out of view, and had been removed by the enemy within his 
main work. With this terminated the battle of the 22d, 
which cost us 3,722 officers and men in killed, wounded, and 
prisoners. 



ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 203 

But among the dead was one whose loss no numbers can 
fitly represent. The accomplished, the brave, the noble Mc- 
Pherson had fallen ! 

The Army of the Tennessee had lost its commander, every 
man in its ranks a friend, America a great soldier, and 
humanity a bright ornament. 



204 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS, 



CHAPTEE XVII 

ATLANTA WON. 

ON the 23d, General Garrard, with his division of cavalry, 
returned from the expedition sent to Oovington to break up 
the Augusta railway, and reported that, with the loss of only 
two men, he had succeeded in accomplishing that object, in 
such a manner as to render the road useless to the enemy 
during the pending operations; haying effectually destroyed 
the large bridges across the Ulcofauhachee and Yellow rivers, 
which are branches of the Ocmulgee. 

The Macon railway, running at first almost due south, was 
now the only line by which the Confederate army in Atlanta 
could receive the supplies requisite to maintain the defence of 
the place. The problem before Sherman was to reach that 
road. Schofield and Thomas had closed well up, holding the 
enemy behind his inner intrenchments, and Logan, with the 
Army of the Tennessee temporarily under his command, was 
ordered to prepare to vacate the position on the left of the 
line and move by the right to the opposite flank, below Proc- 
tor's Creek, while General Schofield should extend up to and 
cover the Augusta road. General Eousseau, who had arrived 
from his expedition to Opelika, bringing about two thousand 
good cavalry, of course fatigued with its long and rapid march, 
was ordered to relieve General Stoneman in the duty of guard- 
ing the river near Sandtown, below the mouth of Utoy Creek. 
Stoneman was then transferred to the extreme left of the line, 
and placed in command of his own division and Garrard's, 
numbering in all about five thousand effective troopers. The 
new cavalry brought by General Eousseau, and which was 



u ?, 



fcl*neLo&P.C 



EaikVl 



Birnitl 



3-i 



THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 

fimiislied Iry 

Brevet Brig. Gen. O.M.Poe. 

Chief Engineer. 
S-l EG E or ATLANTA 
'/?/ SJia/'masi astd fas Garnpeugrut* 



' Canton 



^'<JL 1 A 



f \ 



^ 



'^U, 

r^ 



IGre 's 



fiC' 



fr 




\ 



^^ 



-. ; 



,>^ 



Reaj r 



r" 

FbdR<> 4 



feTOadk-1 



^^ 



, Ren 



3ONESBORO 



^ 



ATLANTA WON. 205 

commanded by Colonel Harrison, of the Eighth. Indiana 
Cavalry, was added to the command of Brigadier-General 
Edward M. McCook, making with it a division of about four 
thousand. 

The plan now was that while the Army of the Tennessee 
should move by the right on East Point to seize the Macon 
railway, Stoneman and McCook, with their well-appointed 
columns, were to march in concert, the former by the left 
around Atlanta to McDonough, and the latter by the right on 
Fayetteville, and, on the night of July 28th, to meet on the 
Macon railway, near Lovejoy's, and destroy the road in the 
most effectual manner. At the moment almost of starting, 
General Stoneman addressed a note to General Sherman, 
asking permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking the 
railway, to proceed with his command proper to Macon and 
Andersonville, and release our prisoners of war confined at those 
points, thirty thousand in number, suffering the extremities of 
starvation, and rotting by hundreds from the loathsome dis- 
eases that follow in its train. " There was something captiva- 
ting in the idea," says Sherman, and deeming the execution 
within the bounds of probable success, he consented that after 
the defeat of "Wheeler's cavalry and breaking the road, Gen- 
eral Stoneman might make the attempt with his cavalry 
proper, sending that of General Garrard back to the army. 
Both cavalry expeditions started at the time appointed. 

General McCook, in the execution of his part of the move- 
ment, went down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to near 
Eivertown, where he laid a pontoon bridge with which he was 
provided, crossed his command, and moved rapidly on Pal- 
metto station, on the West Point railway, where he tore up a 
section of track, leaving a regiment to create a diversion to- 
wards Campbelltown, which was successfully accomplished. 
McCook then rapidly moved to Payetteville, where he found 
a large number of wagons belonging to the rebel army in 
Atlanta, killed eight hundred mules, and captured two hundred 
and fifty prisoners. He then pushed for the Macon railway, 
reached it at Lovejoy's station at the time appointed, burned 



206 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

the depot, tore up a section of the road, and continued to wort* 
until forced to leave off to defend himself against an accumula- 
ting force of the enemy. He could. hear nothing of General 
Stoneman, and, finding his progress east too strongly opposed, 
moyed south and west, and reached Newman on the "West 
Point road, where he encountered an infantry force coming 
from Mississippi to Atlanta, and which had been stopped by 
the break he had made at Palmetto. This force, with the 
pursuing cavalry, hemmed him in and forced him to fight. 
He was compelled to drop his prisoners and captures and cut 
his way out, losing some five hundred officers and men ; among 
them Colonel Harrison, Eighth Indiana Cavalry, a valuable 
officer, who was taken prisoner while fighting his men as 
skirmishers on foot. McCook succeeded, however, in cutting 
his way out, reached the Chattahoochee, crossed the river, and 
got to Marietta without further loss. 

Sherman says in his official report : 

c ' General McCook is entitled to much credit for thus saving 
his command, which was endangered by the failure of General 
Stoneman to reach Lovejoy's. But on the whole, the cavalry 
raid is not deemed a success, for the real purpose was to 
break the enemy's communications, which, though done, was 
on so limited a scale that I knew the damage would soon be 
repaired." 

Pursuant to the general plan, the Army of the Tennessee 
drew out of its lines on the left, near the Decatur road, during 
the night of July 26th, and on the 27th moved behind the rest 
of the army to Proctor's Creek, the extreme right beyond it, to 
prolong the line due south, facing east. On the same clay, by 
appointment of the President, Major-General Oliver O. 
Howard assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee, 
relieving General Logan, who had exercised the command 
with great ability since the death of McPherson on the 22d, 
and who now returned to the immediate charge of his own 
Fifteenth Corps. Dodge got into line on the evening of the 
27th, and Blair came into position on the right early on the 
morning of the 28th, his right reaching an old meeting-house, 



ATLANTA WOK 207 

called Ezra Church, on the Bell's Ferry road. Here Logan's 
fifteenth corps joined on and formed the extreme right flank 
of the army before Atlanta, along a wooded and commanding 
ridge. About ten A. M., all the army was in position, and 
the men were busy in throwing up their accustomed piles of 
rails and logs, which, after awhile, assumed the form of a para- 
pet. In order to be prepared to defeat the enemy if he should 
repeat his game of the 22d, Sherman had, the night before, 
ordered Jefferson C. Davis' division, of Palmer's fourteenth 
corps, which, by the movement of the Army of the Tennessee, 
had been left in reserve, to move down to Turner's Ferry, and 
thence towards White Hall or East Point, aiming to reach the 
flank of Howard's new line. The object of this movement was 
-that in case of an attack this division might in turn catch the 
attacking force in flank or rear at an unexpected moment. 
Brigadier-General Morgan, who commanded the division dur- 
ing the temporary illness of General Davis, marched early for 
Turner's Ferry, but many of the roads laid down on the maps 
did not exist at all ; and from this cause, and the intricate 
nature of the wooded ground, great delay was experienced. 
About noon, Hardee and Lee sallied forth from Atlanta by the 
Bell's Ferry road, and formed their masses in the open fields 
behind a swell of ground, and after some heavy artillery firing, 
advanced in parallel lines against the Fifteenth Corps, expect- 
ing to catch it in air. The advance was magnificent ; but Sher- 
man had prepared for this very contingency ; our troops were 
expecting this attack, and met it with a galling and coolly de- 
livered fire of musketry that swept the ranks of the enemy and 
drove him back in confusion. But they were rallied again and 
again, as often as six times at some points, and a few of the 
rebel officers and men reached our lines of rail piles only to 
be hauled over as prisoners. About four p. M., the enemy 
disappeared, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. 
General Logan on this occasion was again conspicuous, his 
corps being chiefly engaged. Our entire loss was less than 
six hundred. Had Davis' division not been delayed by causes 
beyond control, what was simply a complete repulse of the 



208 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 



1 1 ( enemy -would Have been a disastrous rout. Instructed by the 

I: terrible lessons of the 22d and 28th of July, Hood abandoned 

|1 his rash offensive and assumed a strict defensive attitude, 

merely meeting Sherman's successive extensions of his right 
flank by continuing his own line of works to the south. 

Finding that the right flank of the Army of the Tennessee 
did not reach to East Point, Sherman was forced to trans- 
fer Schofield to that flank also, and afterwards Palmer's 
fourteenth corps of Thomas' army. Schofield moved from 
the left on the 1st of August, and Palmer's corps followed at 
once, taking a line below Utoy Creek, which Schofield pro- 
longed to a point near East Point. 

About the 1st of August, General Hooker, deeming himself 
aggrieved by the promotion of General Howard, who had 
served under him in the Army of the Potomac and had but 
recently come to the "West as his subordinate, to the command 
of the Army of the Tennessee, was, at his own request, relieved 
from command of the Twentieth Corps and ordered to report 
to the adjutant-general at "Washington. Major-General Henry 
W. Slocum, then at Vicksburg, was sent for to assume the 
command, which, until his arrival, devolved upon Brigadier- 
General A. S. Williams. Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis 
was promoted to the command of the Fourteenth Corps, in 
lieu of General Palmer, relieved at his own request ; and 
Major-General D. S. Stanley succeeded to the command of 
the Fourth Corps, vacated by General Howard. 

From the 2d to the 5th, Sherman continued to extend to the 
right, demonstrating strongly on the left and along the whole 
line. Keilley's brigade of Cox's division of Schofield's army, on 
the 5tli, tried to break through the enemy's line about a mile 
below Utoy Creek, but failed to carry the position, losing about 
four hundred men, who were caught by the entanglements and 
abattis ; but the next day this position was turned by General 
Hascall, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close 
up to and facing the enemy below Utoy Creek. Still he did 
not gain the desired foothold on either the West Point or 
Macon railway. The enemy's line at that time was nearly 



ATLANTA WON 209 

fifteen miles in length, extending from near Decatur to below 
East Point. He was enabled to hold this long and attenuated 
front by the use of a large force of State militia, and his posi- 
tion was so masked by the shape of the ground that it was 
impossible for the Union commanders to discover the weak 
parts. 

To reach the Macon road, Sherman now saw he would have 
to move the whole army ; but, before beginning, he ordered 
down from Chattanooga some four-and-a-half-inch rifled guns, 
which arrived on the 10th, and were put to work night and 
day, and did execution on the city, causing frequent fires and 
creating confusion. 

On the 16th of August, Sherman issued orders prescribing 
the mode and manner of executing the grand movement by the 
right flank, to begin on the 18th. This movement contem- 
plated the withdrawal of the Twentieth Corps, General 
Williams, to the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee 
bridge, and the march of the main army to the West Point 
railway, near Fairburn, and thence to the Macon road, at or 
near Jonesboro', with wagons carrying provisions for fifteen 
days. About the time of the publication of these orders, 
Wheeler, with his corps of ten thousand cavalry, was detached 
by General Hood to break up the Union communications. 
Passing round by the East and North, Wheeler made his 
appearance on the Chattanooga railway, near Adairsville, cap- 
tured nine hundred beef-cattle, and made a break in the road 
near Calhoun. Hood could not have more distinctly evinced 
liis want of mental perspective than by detaching so large a 
force on the eve of a battle momentarily to be expected. At 
the best, Wheeler could only annoy Sherman ; his absence 
might destroy Hood. Sherman was not slow to take advantage 
of a blunder so well-timed for his plans. Suspending the exe- 
cution of his orders for the time being, he directed General Kil- 
patrick to make up a well-appointed force of about five thou- 
sand cavalry, to move from his camp about Sandtown during 
the night of the 18th to the West Point railway, and effectually 
break it near Fairburn ; then to proceed across to the Macon 

14 



210 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

railway, and thoroughly destroy it; to avoid, as far as possible, 
the enemy's infantry, but to attack any cavalry lie could find. 
Sherman expected that this cavalry expedition would save the 
necessity of moving the main army across, and that in case of 
success it would leave him in a better position to take full 
advantage of the result. 

Kilpatrick got off at the time appointed, broke the West 
Point road, and afterwards reached the Macon road at Jones- 
boro', where he whipped Boss' cavalry, and got possession of 
the railway, which he held for five hours, damaging* it con- 
siderably ; but a brigade of the enemy's infantry, which had 
been dispatched below Jonesboro' in cars, was run back and 
disembarked, and, with Jackson's rebel cavalry, made it im- 
possible for him to continue his work. He drew off to the 
east, made a circuit, and struck the railway about Love- 
. joy's Station, but was again threatened by the enemy, who 
moved on shorter lines ; when he charged through their cavalry, 
taking many prisoners, of whom he brought in seventy, and 
captured a four-gun battery, of which he brought in one gun 
and destroyed the others. Eeturning by a circuit north and 
east, Kilpatrick reached Decatur on the 22d. He estimated 
the damage done to the railway as sufficient to interrupt its 
use for ten days ; but, upon learning all the details of the ex- 
pedition, Sherman became satisfied that it had not accom- 
plished the chief object in view, and accordingly at once 
renewed his original orders for the movement of the whole 
army. 

This involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta, 
taking the field with the main force, and using it against 
the communications of Atlanta, instead of against its rn- 
trenchments. The army commanders were immediately noti- 
fied to send their surplus wagons, encumbrances, and sick 
back to the intrenched position at the bridge over the Chat- 
tahoochee, and that the movement would begin during the 
night of the 25th. Accordingly, all things being ready, the 
Fourth Corps, General Stanley, drew out of its lines on the 
extreme left, and inarched to a position below Proctor's 



ATLANTA WON. 211 

Creek ; while the Twentieth Corps, General Williams, moved 
back to the river. Both movements were effected without loss. 
On the night of the 26th the Army of the Tennessee broke 
camp, and moved rapidly by a circuit towards Sandtown and 
across Camp Creek, a small stream about a mile below Proc- 
tor's Creek ; the Army of the Cumberland moved below Utoy 
Creek, while the Army of the Ohio remained in position to mask 
the movement, which was attended with the loss of but a single 
man in the Army of the Tennessee, wounded by a shell. On 
the 27th, the Army of the Tennessee moved to the "West Point 
railway, above Fairburn ; the Army of the Cumberland to Eed 
Oak, and the Army of the Ohio closed in near Diggs' and 
Mims'. The three columns were thus massed on the line of 
the West Point railway from Diggs', two miles below East 
Point, to within an equal distance of Fairburn. The 28th was 
consumed in destroying the road. For twelve and a half miles 
the ties were burned, and the iron rails heated and twisted 
with the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several 
cuts were filled up with the trunks of trees, logs, rock, and 
earth, intermingled with loaded shells, prepared as torpedoes, 
to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Having 
personally inspected this work, and being satisfied with its 
execution, Sherman ordered the whole army to face eastward 
and move the next day by several roads ; General Howard, on 
the right, towards Jonesboro', General Thomas in the centre 
to Couch's, on the Decatur and Fayetteville road, and General 
Schofield on the left, by Morrow's Mills. The railway from 
Atlanta to Macon follows substantially the ridge which divides 
the waters of the Flint and Ocmulgee Eivers, and from East 
Point to Jonesboro' makes a wide bend to the east. The 
position now selected by Sherman, parallel to the railway, 
facing eastwardly, was therefore a very important one, and he 
was anxious to seize it as a necessary preliminary to his 
ulterior movements. 

The several columns moved punctually on the morning of 
the 29th. General Thomas, who encountered little opposition 
or difficulty, save what resulted from the narrow roads, reached 



SHEEMAN AKD HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

his position at Couch's early in the afternoon. General Scho- 
field, being closer to the enemy, who still clung to East Point, 
moYed cautiously on a small circle around that point, and 
came into position towards Eough and Eeady ; and General 
Howard, haying the outer circle, and consequently a greater 
distance to move, encountered cavalry, which he drove rapidly 
to the crossing of Shoal Creek. Here a short delay occurred, 
and some cannonading and skirmishing, but Howard soon 
drove the enemy, passed the Eenfrew House, on the Decatur 
road, which was the point indicated for him in the orders 
of the day, and wisely pushed his march towards Jonesboro', 
saved the bridge across Flint Eiver, and halted only when 
the darkness compelled him, within half a mile of Jonesboro'. 
Here he rested for the night, and on the next morning, find- 
ing himself in the presence of a heavy force of the enemy, he 
deployed the Fifteenth Corps, and disposed the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth on its left and right flanks. The men covered 
their front with the usual parapet, and were soon prepared to 
act offensively or defensively as the case called for. 

As soon as Sherman, who made his headquarters with 
Thomas at Couch's, learned that General Howard had passed 
Eenfrew's, he directed General Thomas to send to that place 
a division of* General Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps, 
to move General Stanley's fourth corps, in connection with 
General Schofield, towards Eough and Eeady, and then to 
send forward due east a strong detachment of General Davis' 
corps to feel for the railway. General Schofield was also 
ordered to move boldly forward and strike the railroad near 
Eough and Eeady. These movements were progressing during 
the 31st, when Stephen D. Lee's and Harclee's corps of the 
enemy came out of the works at Jonesboro', and attacked 
General Howard in the position just described. After a con- 
test of over two hours, the attack was repulsed, with great loss 
to the enemy, who withdrew, leaving his dead and many 
wounded on the ground. 

In the mean while, Sherman was aiming to get his left and 
centre between Stewart's corps remaining in Atlanta and the 



ATLANTA WON. 213 

corps of Hardee and Lee engaged in Howard's front. Gen- 
eral Schofield had reached the railway, a mile below Bough 
and Ready, and was working up the road, breaking it as he 
went ; General Stanley, of General Thomas' army, had also 
struck the road below General Schofield, and was destroying 
it, working south ; and Baird's division of Davis' corps had 
struck it still lower down, within four miles of Jonesboro'. 

The Confederate forces being thus divided, orders were at 
once given for all the army to turn on the fraction at Jones- 
boro ; General Howard to keep the enemy busy, while General 
Thomas should move down from the north, with General 
Schofield on his left. The troops were also ordered as they 
moved down to continue the thorough destruction of the rail- 
way, as it was impossible to say how soon our hold of it might 
be relinquished, from the necessity of giving attention in other 
quarters. General Garrard's cavalry was directed to watch 
the roads to the north, and General Kilpatrick was sent 
south, to the west bank of the Flint, with instructions to 
attack or threaten the railway below Jonesboro'. On the 1st 
of September Davis' corps, having a shorter distance to travel, 
was deployed, facing south, his right in connection with 
General Howard, and his left on the railway ; while General 
Stanley and General Schofield were coming down the Eough- 
and-Eeady road, and along the railway, breaking it as they 
came. When General Davis joined to General Howard, Blair's 
corps, on General Howard's left, was thrown in reserve, and 
was immediately sent well to the right below Jonesboro 5 , to act 
on that flank in conjunction with General Kilpatrick's. About 
5 P. M., General Davis assaulted the enemy's lines across open 
fields, carrying them very handsomely, and taking as prisoners 
the greater part of Gowan's brigade, including its com- 
mander, with two four-gun batteries. Eepeated orders were 
sent to Generals Stanley and Schofield to hasten their move- 
ments, but owing to the difficult nature of the country and the 
absence of roads, they did not get well into position for attack 
before night rendered further operations impossible. About 
2 o'clock that night, the sounds of heavy explosions were heard 



214 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

in the direction of Atlanta, distant about twenty miles, with a 
succession of minor explosions, and what seemed like the 
rapid firing of cannon and musketry. These sounds con- 
tinued for about an hour, and again about 4 A. M. occurred 
another series of similar discharges, apparently nearer, which 
could be accounted for on no other hypothesis than of a 
night attack on Atlanta by General Slocum, or the blow- 
ing up of the enemy's magazines. At daybreak it was dis- 
covered that Hardee and Lee had abandoned their lines at 
Jonesboro', and Sherman ordered a general pursuit south ; 
General Thomas following to the left of the railway, General 
Howard on its right, and General Schofield diverging two 
miles to the east. Near Lovejoy's Station the enemy was 
again overtaken in a strong intrenched position, with his 
flanks well protected, behind a branch of Walnut Creek to the 
right, and a confluent of the Flint Kiver to his left. Pushing 
close up and reconnoitring the ground, Sherman found he 
had evidently halted to cover his communication with the 
McDonough and Fayetteville road, and presently rumors 
began to arrive, through prisoners captured, that Atlanta had 
been abandoned during the night of September 1st, that Hood 
had blown up his ammunition trains, which accounted for the 
unexplained sounds so plainly heard ; that Stewart's corps was 
then retreating towards McDonough, and that the militia had 
gone off towards Covington. It was then too late to interpose 
and prevent their escape, and Sherman being satisfied with 
the substantial success already gained, ordered the work of 
destroying the railway to cease, and the troops to bo held in 
hand, ready for any movement that further information from 
Atlanta might warrant. 

On the same night, a courier arrived from General Slocum, 
reporting the fact that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, 
blown up seven trains of cars, and retreated on tlie Mc- 
Donough road, and that he himself with the Twentieth Corps 
had entered and taken possession on the morning of 2d of 
September. 

Atlanta being won, the object of the movement against 



ATLANTA WON. 215 

the railway being therefore already concluded, and any pur- 
suit of the enemy with a view to his capture being futile in 
such a country, Sherman gave orders, on the 4th, for the army 
to move back slowly to Atlanta. On the 5th, the army 
marched to the vicinity of Jonesboro', five miles, where it re- 
mained a day. On the 7th, it moved to Kough and Beady, 
seven miles, and the next day to the camps selected. The 
Army of the Cumberland was then grouped round about At- 
lanta, the Army of the Tennessee about East Point, and the 
Army of the Ohio at Decatur, all in clean and healthy camps, 
at last enabled to enjoy a brief period of rest, so much needed 
for reorganization and recuperation. 

To return to the erratic movements of Wheeler, whom, in 
the presence of the campaigns of two large armies, we have 
almost forgotten. He succeeded in breaking the railway about 
Calhoun, made his appearance at Dalton, where Colonel Lei- 
bold held him in check until General Steedman arrived from 
Chattanooga and drove him off, then passed up into East 
Tennessee, and remained a short while at Athens ; but on the 
first show of pursuit he moved beyond the Little Tennessee, 
and crossing the Holston, near Strawberry Plains, reached 
the Clinch near Clinton, passed over towards Sequatchee 
and McMinnville, and thence to Murfreesboro', Lebanon, and 
Franklin. From Franklin he was pursued towards Florence, 
and out of Tennessee, by Generals Rousseau, Steedman, and 
Granger. He did great injury to many citizens, and destroyed 
the railway nearly as fast as the construction parties were 
able to repair it ; but, except by being absent from Hood's 
army at the critical moment, had no influence whatever upon 
the campaign. 

Thus ended, four months after its inception, one of the great- 
est campaigns of the war ; a campaign which doubly secured 
the possession of the mountain regions of the centre, and laid 
the Atlantic and Gulf slopes at the mercy of the Union com- 
mander. Divided in twain by the conquest of the Mississippi, 
the domain of the rebellion was quartered by the capture of 
Atlanta. A vital spot had been reached; the granary of 



216 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Georgia was lost ; and there was suddenly presented to the 
Confederate authorities the alternative, to concentrate their 
two remaining armies or to perish. 

Two dangers had menaced the success of Sherman's cam- 
paign. The first was the question of supplies. This was in 
great part solved by the energetic and successful management 
of the superintendent of military railways, Colonel "W. 
W. Wright. " No matter when or where a break has been 
made," says Sherman, "the repair train seemed on the spot, 
and the damage was generally repaired before I knew of the 
break. Bridges have been built with surprising rapidity, and 
the locomotive whistle was heard in our advanced camps 
almost before the echoes of the skirmish fire had ceased. 
Some of these bridges, those of the Oostanaula, Etowah, and 
Chattahoochee, are fine, substantial structures, and were built 
in inconceivably short time, almost out of the materials im- 
provised pn the spot." But the solution was mainly due to the 
forethought exercised by Sherman himself in successively 
establishing secondary depots, strongly garrisoned, as at Chat- 
tanooga, Eesaca, Eome, and Allatoona, and by great exer- 
tions accumulating at each stores sufficient to render the army 
independent of the rear during any temporary interruption 
of the communications. The second danger ever present con- 
sisted in the rapid diminution of the army, not only by the 
heavy casualties incidental to offensive warfare, but also by 
the expiration of the terms of service of a large numb or of the 
regiments. This was prevented from becoming fatal, by the 
bravery of the army in attacking; by the skill of its com- 
mander, in turning obstacles too great to be surmounted by 
direct approach ; by the patriotism of the veterans, in re- 
enlisting; by the noble exertions of the governors of the 
Western States, in encouraging and expediting re-cnlistmcnts, 
and pushing the veterans to the front ; and by tho folly of 
Hood, in attacking the Union troops in strong positions, pro- 
tected by earthworks, instead of attempting to take them at a 
disadvantage, as in crossing Peach-tree Creek. On the 12th 
of August, President Lincoln conferred upon General Slier- 



ATLANTA WON. 217 

man a commission as major-general in the regular army, as a 
reward for Ms services in this campaign. 

Stoneilian marched from Decatur on the day appointed, with 
the whole effective strength of his division, numbering about 
two thousand in all, organized in three brigades, commanded 
by Colonels Adams, Biddle, and Capron. The first brigade 
consisted of the First and Second regiments of Kentucky cav- 
alry ; the Second, of the Fifth and Sixth Indiana ; the third 
brigade, of the Fourteenth Illinois, Eighth Michigan, and a 
squadron of Ohio cavalry under Captain McLoughlin. 

Stoneman moved out along the line of the Georgia Central 
railway to Covington, and thence turned South and pushed by 
way of Monticello, Hillsboro', and Clinton, for Macon. A 
battalion of the Fourteenth Illinois cavalry of Capron's brigade 
succeeded in entering Gordon, destroying eleven locomotives 
and several trains of cars laden with munitions of war. The 
bridge over the Oconee was also destroyed by General Stone- 
man's orders, by another detachment from his command. 

On arriving within fifteen miles of Macon on the evening 
of the 30th of July, General Stoneman ascertained from reli- 
able sources that, in anticipation of such an attempt, the 
probability of which had been freely discussed in the Northern 
newspapers, the Confederate authorities had taken the pre- 
caution to remove all the Union prisoners previously confined 
in the military prisons at Macon and Millen, in the direction 
of Florence, South Carolina ; and that this movement had only 
been completed on the preceding day. The prime object of 
the expedition being thus, unfortunately, frustrated, Stoneman 
reluctantly determined to return to the main body. But in 
the mean while the enemy had concentrated in heavy force, 
and was now moving upon his line of retreat. 

On the morning of Sunday, the 31st of July, finding what 
seemed to be a heavy force of the enemy in his front, Stone- 
raaii deployed a strong line of skirmishers, which soon de- 
veloped the fact that, taking advantage of the unfavorable 
nature of the country for the operations of cavalry, Allen's 
brigade of Confederate infantry had passed around his flank 



218 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

and taken up a strong position directly across the lino of liis 
homeward march, while Armstrong's brigade of the enemy's 
cavalry, in connection with Allen's infantry, was dangerously 
menacing his left flank. With the Oconee in his rear and a 
formidable enemy in his front, Stoneman had evidently no re- 
source but to destroy that enemy or be himself destroyed. 

Dismounting the troopers of one brigade, he caused them 
repeatedly to charge the enemy on foot, but they were as often 
repulsed with heavy loss. Eallying the broken columns by his 
personal exertions and with the assistance of the gallant Major 
Keogh and other officers of his staff, Stoneman placed himself 
at the head of his men, and again charged, but without more 
favorable result. At the critical moment, Armstrong's brigade 
assailed his left flank. The Union cavalry gave way before 
the combined opposition, and were with difficulty reformed. 
By this time the enemy had completely surrounded them. 

Perceiving this, and deeming all further resistance useless, 
Stoneman gave permission to such of his officers and men as 
wished to try the apparently desperate chance of cutting their 
way through the opposing lines, to make the attempt, and then, 
causing hostilities to cease on his part, sent in a flag of truce, 
and unconditionally surrendered the remainder of his force. 

Among those who cut their way through the enemy's lines, 
and thus escaped and rejoined the main army, was the bulk of 
Colonel Adams' brigade and a number of Colonel Capron's men. 
The entire number captured was less than fifteen hundred. 

The failure to unite with McCook, which was the prime 
cause of this disaster, undoubtedly occurred in consequence 
of false, but apparently reliable, information concerning the 
roads and the crossings of the Ocmulgee Eiver, whereby Gen- 
eral Stoneman was led to believe he could prolong his east- 
erly march to Covington without sacrificing the combination. 
Yet in all concerted operations, the co-operative movements 
are of the first importance ; all others, no matter how great 
their intrinsic value, must be deemed secondary. Great suc- 
cess alone can excuse, while not even success can justify, any 
departure from the primary features of the plan. 



TAKING BREATH. 219 



CHAPTEE XVHL 

TAKING BEEATH. 

FBOM Lovejoy's Station, Hardee and Lee retreated to 
the line of the "West Point railway at Palmetto Station, 
twenty-five miles southwest from Atlanta, and situated at 
about the same distance from the Chattahoochee as that 
city is. Here Hood joined them with Stewart's corps, took 
up a position confronting Sherman, threw a pontoon bridge 
across the Chattahoochee, and sent a cavalry detachment be- 
yond the river, twenty-five miles westward to Carrollton, and 
another in a northerly direction to Powder Springs, about ten 
miles south of Lost Mountain, and an equal distance west of 
the Chattanooga railway. He also occupied Jonesboro' in 
some force. Lieutenant-General Stephen D. Lee succeeded 
Hardee in the command of his corps, the latter officer being 
relieved by orders from Richmond, and sent to Charleston to 
replace Beauregard. Lieutenant-General B. F. Cheatham had 
command of Hood's old corps, and Lieutenant-General A. P. 
Stewart still retained his assignment to Polk's old corps. 
The cavalry was largely reinforced and united in one corps, 
under the command of Major-General James Wheeler. Gen- 
eral Beauregard was summoned from Charleston, and placed 
at the head of all the Confederate armies operating in the 
central, region. 

During the month of September, Sherman's army remained 
grouped about Atlanta. The terms of enlistment of many of 
his regiments had expired, a large number went home on fur- 
lough, and others, previously furloughed on condition of re- 
enlisting, returned to the field with their ranks swelled by 



220 SHEKMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

additions of stragglers, convalescents, and recruits. Many 
changes were thus rendered necessary in the composition of 
the different commands. The Army of the Tennessee was 
consolidated into two corps, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, 
respectively commanded by Major-General P. J. Osterhaus 
and Brigadier-General Thomas E. G. Eansom; the former 
comprising the four divisions of Brigadier-Generals Charles 
E. "Woods, William B. Hazen, John E. Smith, and John M. 
Oorse ; the latter those of Major-General Joseph A. Mower, 
and Brigadier-Generals Miles D. Leggett and Giles A. Smith, 
with the First Alabama Cavalry, and the First Missouri engi- 
neer regiment, having in charge a large pontoon-bridge train. 
This organization was effected by transferring all the troops of 
the Seventeenth Corps remaining on the Mississippi to the Six- 
teenth Corps, breaking up the detachment of the latter corps 
in the field, and transferring Ransom's division, now com- 
manded by Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, and Corse's di- 
vision to the Seventeenth Corps. Major-Generals Logan and 
Blair were temporarily absent, engaged in the important politi- 
cal canvass then in progress. Major-General Schofield re- 
turned to the headquarters of the Department of the Ohio, at 
Knoxville, to give his personal attention to affairs in that 
quarter, leaving Brigadier-General Jacob D. Cox in command 
of the Twenty-third Corps. The cavalry was reorganized so 
as to consist of two divisions under Brigadier-Generals Ken- 
ner Garrard and Judson Kilpatrick. 

As stated in the last chapter, the Army of the Cumberland, 
under Major-General Thomas, held Atlanta ; the Army of tho 
Tennessee, commanded by Major-General Howard, was at 
East Point ; and the Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur. 
Garrard's cavalry division was also at Decatur, and Kilpai- 
rick's at Sandtown watching for any westward movement of 
the enemy. To render the communications more secure, with 
a view to the present wants of the army and possible future 
operations, Sherman sent Newton's division of Stanley's fourth 
corps, and Morgan's division of Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth 
corps, cf the Ajrmy of the Cumberland, to Chattanooga, and 



TAKING BREATH. 221 

Corse's division of Osterhaus' fifteenth, corps, of the Army of 
the Tennessee, to Borne, to garrison those places. 

The topography of the country in the immediate vicinity of 
Atlanta was carefully studied, and a new line of works con- 
structed for the defence of the place, capable of being 
maintained by a much smaller garrison than was contem- 
plated by the Confederate authorities when laying out the 
old line. 

Sherman now determined to make Atlanta exclusively a 
military post. On the 4th of September, he issued the follow- 
ing orders : 

" The city of Atlanta belonging exclusively for warlike pur- 
poses, it will at once be vacated by all except the armies of 
the United States and such civilian employes as may be re- 
tained by the proper departments of the Government 

At a proper time full arrangements will be made for a supply to 
the troops of all the articles they may need over and above 
clothing, provisions, &c., furnished by Government, and on no 
pretence whatever will traders, manufacturers, or sutlers be 
allowed to settle in the limits of fortified places ; and if they 
manage to come in spite of this notice the quartermaster will 
seize their stores, apply them to the use of the troops, and de- 
liver the parties, or other unauthorized citizens who thus place 
their individual interest above that of the United States, over 
to the hands of some provost-marshal, to be put to labor on 
forts or conscripted into one of the regiments or battery al- 
ready in service. The same military principles will apply to 
all military posts south of Atlanta." 

This order fell upon the ears of the inhabitants of Atlanta 
like a thunderbolt. Though they had lent all the moral and 
physical assistance in their power to the cause of the rebellion, 
they had begun to dream of the advent of the Federal troops 
as the commencement of an era of quiet. They had never 
imagined that the war would reach Atlanta. Now that it had 
come, and kept its rough, hot hand upon them for so many 



222 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

days, they were beginning to look forward to a long period 
when they might enjoy at once the advantage of the protec- 
tion of a just and powerful government, and the luxury of con- 
sidering the means whereby that protection was enforced 
against their chosen friends as a grievance. On the llth of 
September the town authorities addressed the following petition 
to General Sherman, praying the revocation of his orders : 



The undersigned, mayor, and two members of council 
for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ 
of the people of the said city, to express their wants and 
wishes, ask leave most earnestly, but respectfully, to petition 
you to reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta. 

" At first view, it struck us that the measure would involve 
extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the 
practical execution of it, so far as it has progressed, and the 
individual condition of many of the people, and heard their 
statements as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attend- 
ing it, we are satisfied that it will involve, in the aggregate, 
consequences appalling and heartrending. 

" Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy ; 
others now having young children, and whoso husbands are 
either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say : I have 
such a one sick at homo ; who will wait on them when 1 am 
gone? Others say: What are we to do? wo have no houses 
to go to, and no moans to buy, build, or to rent any no 
parents, friends, or relatives to go to. Another says : I will 
try and take this or that article of property, but such and sueh 
things I must leave behind, though I need them much. Wo 
reply to them: General Sherman will carry your property to 
Eough and Ready, and General Hood will take it from there 
on. And they will reply to that : But I want to leave the 
railway at such a point, and cannot get conveyance from 
there on. 

" We only refer to a few facts to try to illustrate in part how 
this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the 
people north of us fell back, and before your arrival here a 



TAKING BREATH. 223 

large portion of the people liad retired south., so that the 
country south of this is already crowded, and without houses 
to accommodate the people, and we are informed that many 
are now starving in churches and other out-buildings. This 
being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly 
women and children) to find any shelter ? and how can they 
live through the winter in the woods no shelter nor subsist- 
ence in the midst of strangers who know them not, and with- 
out the power to assist them, if they were willing to do so ? 

" This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this 
measure. You know the woe, the horror, and the suffering can- 
, not be described by words. Imagination can only conceive 
of it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration. 

"We know your mind and time are constantly occupied 
with the duties of your command, which almost deters us from 
asking your attention to this matter ; but thought it might be 
that you had not considered the subject in all its awful conse- 
quences, and that on more reflection you, we hope, would not 
make this people an exception to all mankind, for we know of 
no such instance ever having occurred ; surely none such in 
the United States ; and what has this helpless people done 
that they should be driven from their homes, to wander as 
strangers, outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity ? 

"We do not know, as yet, the number of people still here. 
Of those who are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, 
if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months 
without assistance, and a respectable number for a much 
longer time, and who might not need assistance at any time. 

"In conclusion, we must earnestly and solemnly petition 
you to reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this un- 
fortunate people to remain at home and enjoy what little 
means they have. 

" Respectfully submitted, 

" JAMES M. OALHOUN, Mayor. 
"E. E. BAWSON, Councilman. 
"L. 0. WELLS, Councilman." 



224 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

To this General Sherman replied, in full and clear terms, on 
the following day : 

"GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the llth, in the nature 
of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants 
from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to 
your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, 
and yet shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders 
are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to 
prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea hun- 
dreds of millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep 
interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all 
America. To secure this we must stop the war that now 
desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war, 
we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the 
laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To 
defeat these armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in 
their recesses, provided with the arms and instruments which 
enable us to accomplish our purpose. 

" Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that 
we may have many years of military operations from this 
quarter, and therefore deem it wise and prudent to prepare in 
time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent 
with its character as a home for families. There will be no 
manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here for the mainten- 
ance of families, and sooner or later want will compel tho in- 
habitants to go. "Why not go now, when all the arrangements 
are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting until the 
plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of 
the past month ? Of course I do not apprehend any such 
thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army will 
be here till the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject 
with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what I pro- 
pose to do, but I assert that my military plans make it neces- 
sary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my 
offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy 



TAKING BREATH. 225 

and comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in 

Jiarsher terms than I will. 

" War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it ; and those who 
brought war on our country deserve all the curses and male- 
dictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in 
making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to- 
day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have 
peace and' a division of our country. If the United States 
submit to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on till we 
reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United 
States does and must assert its authority wherever it has 
power ; if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, and I know 
that such is not the national feeling. This feeling assumes 
various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once 
admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the 
National Government, and instead of devoting your houses, 
and streets, and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this 
army become at once your protectors and supporters, shield- 
ing you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I 
know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error 
and passion such as has swept the South into rebellion ; but 
you can point out, so that we may know those who desire a 
government and those who insist on war and its desolation. 
"" You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as 

Against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, 
and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to 
live in peace and quiet at home, is to stop this war, which 
can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is 
perpetuated in pride. We don't want your negroes or your 
horses, or your houses or your land, or any thing you have ; 
but we do want, and. will have, a just obedience to the laws of 
the United States. That we will have, and if it involves tho 
destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it. 

" You have heretofore read public sentiment in your news- 
papers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the 
quicker you seek for truth in other quarters the better for 
you. I repeat, then, that by the original compact of govern - 

15 



226 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS 

ment, the United States had certain rights in Georgia which 
have never been relinquished, and never will be; that the 
South began the war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom- 
houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and 
before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I my- 
self have seen, in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missis- 
sippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing 
from your armies and desperadoes, hungry, and with bleeding 
feet. In Memphis, Yicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thous- 
ands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on 
our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now, that war 
comes home to you, you feel very differently you deprecate its 
horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of 
soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shells and shot to carry 
war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of 
hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to 
live in peace at their old homes, and under the government of 
their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want 
peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and 
war, and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to perfect 
and early success. 

" But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may 
call upon me for any thing. Then will I share with you the 
last cracker, and watch with you to shield your home and 
families against danger from every quarter. Now, you must 
go, and take with you the old and feeble ; feed and nurse 
them, and build for them in more quiet places proper habita- 
tions to shield them against the weather, until the mad pas- 
sions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once 
more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta." 

As soon as his arrangements were completed, General Sher- 
man wrote to General Hood, by a flag of truce, notifying him 
of his orders, and proposing a cessation of hostilities for ten 
days, from the 12th of September, in the country included 
within a radius of two miles around Eough and Eeady Sta- 
tion, to enable him to complete the removal of those families 



TAKING BREATH. 227 

electing to go to the south. Hood immediately replied on the 
9th, acceding to the proposed truce, but protesting against 
Sherman's order. He concluded : 

" Permit me to say, the unprecedented measure you propose 
transcends in studied and iniquitous cruelty ah 1 acts ever be- 
fore brought to my attention in this dark history of the war. 
In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing you 
are expelling from homes and firesides wives and children of 
a brave people." 

To this Sherman answered on the same date : 

" GENERAL : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt 
of your letter of this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball and 
Crew, consenting to the arrangement I had proposed to facili- 
tate the removal south of the people of Atlanta who prefer to 
go in that direction. I inclose you a copy of my orders, which 
will, I am satisfied, accomplish my purpose perfectly. 

"You style the measures proposed 'unprecedented,' and 
appeal to ' the dark history of war for a parallel as an act 
of studied and ingenious cruelty.' It is not unprece- 
dented, for General Johnston himself very wisely and prop- 
erly removed the families all the way from Dalton down, 
and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted. Nor 
is it necessary to appeal to ' the dark history of war,' when 
recent and modern examples are -so handy. You yourself 
burned dwelling-houses along your parapet ; and I have seen, 
to-day, fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable 
because they stood in the way of your forts and men. You 
defended Atlanta on a line so close to the town that every 
cannon-shot, and many musket-shots from our line of invest- 
ment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of 
women and children. General Hardee did the same thing at 
Jonesboro', and General Johnston did the same last summer 
at Jackson, Mississippi. 

" I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely in- 



SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

stance these cases of very recent occurrence, and could go on 
and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any fair man 
to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of 
'brave people.' I say it is kindness to these families of At- 
lanta to remove them at once from scenes that women and 
children should not bp exp6sed to; and the 'brave people' 
should scorn to commit their wives and children to the rude 
barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the rules of war as il- 
lustrated in the pages of its ' dark history.' 

" In the name of common sense, I ask you not to ' appeal to 
a just God' in such a sacrilegious manner you who, in the 
midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into war, 
dark and cruel war ; who dared and badgered us into battle ; 
insulted our flag ; seized our arsenals and forts that were left 
in the honorable custody of a peaceful ordnance sergeant ; 
seized and made prisoners even the very first garrisons sent 
to protect your people against negroes and Indians, long 
before any other act was committed by the, to you, ' hateful 
Lincoln government ;' tried to force Missouri and Kentucky 
into rebellion, in spite of themselves; falsified the vote of 
Louisiana ; turned loose your privateers to plunder unarm ed 
ships ; expelled Union families by the thousands, burned their 
houses, and declared by acts of your Congress the confiscation 
of all debts due Northern men for goods had and received. 
Talk thus to the Marines, but not to me, who have soon these 
things, and who will this day make as much sac.rifico for tho 
peace and honor of the South as tho best-born Southerner 
among you. If we must be enemies, let us be men, and fight 
it out as we propose to-day, and not deal in such, hypocritical 
appeals to God and humanity. 

"God will judge us in due time, and he will, pronounce 
whether it will be humane to fight with a town frill of women 
and the families of c a brave people' at our back, or to remove 
them in time to places of safety among their own friends and 
people." 

During the truce, four hundred and forty-six families were 



TAKING BEEATH. 229 

moved south, comprising seven hundred and five adults, eight 
hundred and sixty children/ and seventy-nine servants, with 
an average of sixteen hundred and fifty-one pounds of furni- 
ture and household goods of all kinds to each family. 

On the 8th, General Hood wrote to General Sherman pro- 
posing an exchange of prisoners captured by both armies since 
the comm.encem.ent of the campaign just closed. Sherman 
replied on the same day, agreeing to this proposition, on the 
basis of the old cartel, made by Generals Dix and Hill in 1862, 
but stating that he feared most of the prisoners in his hands 
were already beyond Chattanooga on their way north, and in 
custody of the commissary-general of prisoners. The next 
day he again -wrote : 

" GENERAL As I engaged yesterday, I consent to an actual 
exchange of prisoners, man for man, and equal for equal, 
differences or balance to be made up according to the cartel 
of 1862. I have appointed one of my inspector-generals, 
Lieutenant-Colonel W. "Warner, to carry out this exchange, 
and will empower him to call for the prisoners, and all such 
guards as he may need to affect the actual transfers. "We have 
here twenty-eight officers and seven hundred and eighty-two 
enlisted men; and en route for Chattanooga, ninety-three 
officers and nine hundred and seven men, making one thou- 
sand eight hundred and ten on hand that I will exchange for a 
like number of my own men, captured by you in this campaign, 
who belong to regiments with me, and who can resume their 
places at once, as I take it for granted you will do the same 
with yours. In other words, for these men I am not willing 
to take equivalents belonging to other armies than my own, 
or who belong to regiments whose times are out and who have 
been discharged. 

" By your laws all men eligible for service are ipso facto 
soldiers, and a very good one it is ; and, if needed for civil ' 
duty, they are simply detailed soldiers. We found in Atlanta 
about a thousand of these fellows, and I am satisfied they are 
fit subjects of exchange ; and if you will release an equal num- 



230 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

ber of our poor fellows at Anderson I will gather these together 
and send them as prisoners. They seem to have been detailed 
for railroad and shop duty, and I do not ask for them an equal 
number of my trained soldiers, but will take men belonging 
to any part of the United States army subject to your 
control. 

" We hold a good many of your men styled c deserters/ 
who are really stragglers, and would be a good offset to such 
of our stragglers and foragers as your cavalry pick up of our 
men ; but I am constrained to give these men, though sorely 
against the grain, the benefit of their character, pretended or 
real. 

" As soon as Colonel "Warner agrees upon a few points with 
the officer you name, I will send the prisoners to the place 
appointed, and recall those not beyond Chattanooga ; and you 
may count on about two thousand in the aggregate, and get 
ready to give me a like number. 

" I am willing to appoint Hough and Ready or Jonesboro* 
as the place of exchange, as also for the place of delivering 
the citizens, male and female, of Atlanta, who start to go 
south. 

To this Hood answered on the llth : 

" SIR I had the honor, on the 9th instant, to propose to 
you an exchange of prisoners officers and men captured by 
both armies since the commencement of the present cam- 
paign. 

" On the same day you answered my communication, stating 
that you accepted my offer ' to exchange prisoners of war in 
hand at this moment. 5 There being no condition attached to 
the acceptance, on your part, of my offer to exchange prisoners, 
I regarded it as obligatory to the extent of the number of 
prisoners represented by you to be within your jurisdiction. 

At the meeting on the llth instant between our respective 
staff officers, Major J. B. Eustis and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Warner, intended to arrange such preliminaries as the time 



TAKING BREATH. 231 

and place of delivery, etc., a communication was received from 
.you rendering, I regret to inform you, an exchange of prisoners 
impossible. 

" Tour refusal to receive, in exchange, your soldiers belong- 
ing to ' regiments whose times are out, and who have been dis- 
charged/ discloses a fixed purpose on the part of your Govern- 
ment to doom to hopeless captivity those prisoners whose 
term of service have expired, or will soon expire. 

" The new principle which you seek to interpolate on the 
cartel of our respective governments, as well as upon the laws 
and customs of war, will not be sanctioned by me. All captives 
taken in war, who owe no obligations to the captors, must 
stand upon the same equal footing. The duration of these 
terms of service can certainly impose no duties or obligations 
on the captors. The volunteer of a day, and the conscript for 
the war, who may be captured in war, are equally subject to 
all the burdens, and equally entitled to all the rights secured 
by the laws of nations. This principle is distinctly conceded 
in the cartel entered into by our respective governments, and 
is sanctioned by honor, justice, and the public law of all 
civilized nations. . 

" My offer to exchange the prisoners captured during the 
campaign precludes an intention on my part in the delivery to 
discriminate between your prisoners, as all would have been 
delivered ; and even had it been intended, this discrimination 
between your men, whose term of service had and had not 
expired, would have been impossible, and could not have been 
effected, as I had' no reliable means of ascertaining what por- 
tion of your men were entitled to their discharge. 

" Your avowal that this class of your soldiers will not be 
exchanged, but will be rewarded by the sufferings and priva- 
tions incident to military imprisonment because their boldness 
and courage subjected them to capture, although their terms 
of service had nearly expired, is deeply regretted by me, as I 
have the earnest desire of my Government to release from pro- 
longed confinement the large number of prisoners held by ' 
both parties. 



232 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

" Permit me to hope that this declared policy of your Gov- 
ernment will be reconsidered, as it is unjustly oppressive to 
those whom the hazards of military service have rendered 
prisoners, and is violative of the well-understood obligations 
of a Government towards those who are enlisted in its 
service. 

" As was proper, I notified my Government of my offer to 
you to. effect an exchange of prisoners captured during this 
campaign ; and not only was my action approved, but my 
Government placed at my entire disposal for immediate ex- 
change, man for man, all the prisoners at Andersonville. 

" I have the honor to renew my offer to exchange prisoners 
as proposed in my first communication, and remain your 
obedient servant, 

" J. B. HOOD, 

"General." 

By gathering up all the Confederate prisoners at Chatta- 
nooga 'and Atlanta, and all small squads in various quarters, 
Sherman succeeded in collecting about two thousand of them, 
and, notwithstanding the difficulties raised in the foregoing 
correspondence, a special exchange of these for an equal num- 
ber of Union prisoners in the hands of the enemy wa,s presently 
agreed upon and carried into effect. 

It was found necessary to confine the operations of the long 
lines of military railways connecting Atlanta with the Ohio 
Eiver to the transportation of troops and materials of war. 
Sherman gave the most stringent orders on this subject to all 
his subordinates having charge of the matter. They were not 
to allow a person or thing not needed and intended for the 
army to come to the front, nor a person or thing not sent from 
the army to go to the rear, without passes from himself or one 
of the three army commanders. Such passes were very spar- 
ingly given, and only in clearly exceptional cases. Every ton 
of freight, animate or inanimate, not strictly necessary for the 
immediate purposes of his army, diverted just so much power 
and onqupied just so much space absolutely needed for those 



TAKING BREATH. 233 

purposes. The railways had not sufficient capacity to serve 
both the army and the citizens, and the army alone was now to 
be considered. 

"We may now glance briefly at Sherman's correspondence 
during this interval and the preceding campaign. 

With regard to the treatment of guerrillas he wrote to Gen- 
eral Burbridge in June : 

" Even on the Southern State-rights theory, Kentucky has 
not seceded. Her people, by their vote and by their action, 
have adhered to their allegiance to the National Government 
and the South would now coerce her out of our Union and into 
theirs, the very dogma of coercion upon which so much stress 
was laid at the outset of the war, and which carried into rebel- 
lion the people of the Middle or Border Slave States. But 
politics aside, these acts of the so-called partisans or guerril- 
las are nothing but simple murder, horse-stealing, arson, and 
other well-defined crimes which do not sound as well under 
their true names as the more agreeable ones of warlike mean- 
ing. Now, before starting on this campaign, I foresaw, as you 
remember, that this very case would arise, and I asked Gov- 
ernor Bramlette to at once organize in each county a small 
trustworthy band, under the sheriff, if possible, and at once ar- 
rest every man in the community who was dangerous to it, and 
also every fellow hanging about the towns, villages, and cross- 
roads who had no honest calling, the material out of which 
guerrillas are made up ; but this sweeping exercise of power 
doubtless seemed to the governor rather arbitrary. The fact 
is, in our country personal liberty has been so well secured, that 
puUic safety is lost sight of in our laws and constitutions ; and 
the fact is we are thrown back a hundred years in civiliza- 
tion, law, and every thing else, and will go right straight to 
anarchy and the devil, if somebody don't arrest our downward 
progress. We, the military, must do it, and we have right and 
law on our side. All governments and communities have a 
right to guard against real or even supposed danger. The 
whole people of Kentucky must not be kept in a state of sus- 



234 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

pense and real danger, lest a few innocent men should be 
wrongfully accused. 

" 1st. "You may order all your post and district commanders, 
that guerrillas are not soldiers, but wild beasts, unknown to 
the usage of war. To be recognized as soldiers, they must be 
enlisted, enrolled, officered, uniformed, armed, and equipped 
by some recognized belligerent power, and must, if detached 
from a main army, be of sufficient strength, with written orders 
from some army commander, to do some military thing. Of 
course, we have recognized the Confederate Government as a 
belligerent power^ but deny their right to our lands, territories, 
rivers, coasts, and nationality, admitting the right to rebel 
and move to some other country, where laws and customs are 
more in accordance with their own ideas and prejudices. 

" 2d. The civil power being sufficient to protect life and prop- 
erty, e ex iiecessitate ra', J and to prevent anarchy, c which nature 
abhors, 5 the military steps in, and is rightful, constitutional, 
and lawful. Under this law, everybody can be made to c stay 
at home, and mind his or her own business/ and if they won't 
do that, can be sent away where they won't keep their honest 
neighbors in fear of danger, robbery, and insult. 

"3d. Tour military commanders, provost-marshals, and other 
agents, may arrest all males and females who have encouraged 
or harbored guerrillas and robbers, and you may cause them, to 
be collected in Louisville ; and when you have enough, say 
three hundred or four hundred, I will cause them to bo 'sent 
down^the Mississippi, through their guerrilla gauntlet, and by 
a sailing ship send them to a land where they may tako their 
negroes and make a colony, with laws and a future of their 
own. If they won't live in peace in such a garden as. Ken- 
tucky, why we will kindly send them to another, if not a better 
land, and surely this would be a kindness and a God's blessing 
to Kentucky. I wish you to be careful that no personalities 
are mixed up in this; nor does a full and generous love of 
country, <of the South,' of their State or country, form a 
cause of banishment, but that devilish spirit which will noj: 
be satisfied, and that makes war the pretext for murder, 



TAKING BREATH. 235 

arson, theft in all its grades, and all tie crimes of human 
nature. 

"My own preference was and is ' that the civil authorities of 
Kentucky would and could do this in that State ; but if they 
will not, or cannot, then we must, for it must be done. There 
must be an 'end to strife,' and the honest, industrious people 
of Kentucky, and the whole world, will be benefited and re- 
joiced at the conclusion, however arrived at. I use no con- 
cealment in saying that I do not object to men or women 
having what they call ' Southern feelings/ if confined to love 
of country, and of peace, honor, and security, and even of 
little family pride ; but these become ' crimes ' when enlarged 
to mean love of murder, of war, desolation, famine, and all the 
horrible attendants of anarchy. 5 " 

A few days later, on the 5th of July, Sherman's representa- 
tions to the "War Department, to the like effect, induced Presi- 
dent Lincoln to order the declaration of martial law and the 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus throughout Kentucky. 

With regard to the use of torpedoes, concerning which ho 
apprehended trouble, he wrote in advance to General Steed- 
man, left in command at Chattanooga : 

" As the question may arise, and you have a right to the 
support of any authority, I now decide that the use of the 
torpedo is justifiable in war, in advance of an army, so as to 
make his advance up a river or over a road more dangerous 
and difficult. But after the adversary has gained the coun- 
try by fair warlike means, then the case entirely changes. 

" The use of torpedoes in blowing up our cars and the road 
after they are in our possession, is simply malicious. It can- 
not alter the great problem, but simply makes trouble. Now 
if torpedoes are found in the possession of an enemy to our 
rear, you may cause them to be put on the ground, and tested 
by wagon loads of prisoners, or if need be, by citizens im- 
plicated in their use. In like manner, if a torpedo is sus- 
pected on any part of the road, order the point to be tested 



236 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

by a car-load of prisoners, or citizens implicated, drawn by a 
long rope. Of course an enemy cannot complain of Ms own 
traps." 

At this time Sherman considered the expediency of enlisting 
negroes in the army as an open question, which he was, indeed, 
willing and desirous to have decided by a fair test, but still an 
open one ; while their adaptation to service as teamsters and 
laborers he regarded as demonstrated by experience, and the 
necessity for their use in some capacity as obvious. Northern 
Georgia having been almost denuded of its able-bodied colored 
population by their removal by their former masters to the 
southern portion of the State, and the number still available 
not being more than sufficient to fill up the ranks of the ex- 
isting colored regiments already belonging to his army, he 
opposed the practice, just then begun, of sending commis- 
sioners to his command to recruit for men to fill the quotas of 
the Northern States. Under date of July 30, he wrote to Mr. 
John A. Spooner, agent for the State of Massachusetts, then 

at Nashville : 

* 

"On applying to General Webster, at Nashville, he will 
grant you a pass through our lines to those States ; and, as I 
have had considerable experience in those States, I would sug- 
gest recruiting depots to be established at Macori and Colum- 
bus, Mississippi ; Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile, Alabama ; 
and Columbus, Milledgeville, and Savannah, Georgia. 

" I do not see that the law restricts you to black recruits, 
but you are at liberty to collect white recruits also. It is 
waste of time and money to open rendezvous in northwest 
Georgia, for I assure you I have not seen an able-bodied man, 
black or white, there, fit for a soldier, who was not in this 
army or the one opposed to it. 

" You speak of the impression going abroad that I am op- 
posed to the organization of colored regiments. My opinions 
are usually very positive, and there is no reason why you 
should not know them. Though entertaining profound rever- 



TAKING BREATH. 237 

ence for our Congress, I do doubt their wisdom in the passage 
of this law : 

" 1. Because civilian agents about an army are a nuisance. 

" 2. The duty of citizens to fight for their country is too 
sacred a one to be peddled off by buying up the refuse of 
other States. 

" 3. It is unjust to the brave soldiers and volunteers who are 
fighting as those who compose this army do, to place them on 
a par with the class of recruits you are after. 

" 4. The negro is in a transition state, and is not the equal 
of the white man. 

" 5. He is liberated from his bondage by act of war, and the 
armies in the field are entitled to all his assistance in labor 
and fighting, in addition to the proper quotas of the States. 

" 6. This bidding and bartering for recruits, white and black, 
has delayed the re-enforcement of the armies at the times 
when such re-enforcements would have enabled us to make 
our successes permanent. 

" 7. The law is an experiment which, pending war, is unwise 
and unsafe, and has delayed the universal draft, which I firmly 
believe will become necessary to overcome the wide-spread 
resistance offered us ; and I also believe the universal draft 
will be wise and beneficial, for, under the providence of God, 
it will separate the sheep from the goats, and demonstrate 
what citizens will fight for their country, and what will only 
talk. 

" No one will infer from this that I am not a friend of the 
negro as well as the white race. I contend that the treason 
and rebellion of the master freed the slave, and the armies I 
have commanded have conducted to safe points more negroes 
than those of any general officer in the army ; but I prefer 
negroes for pioneers, teamsters, cooks, and servants ; others 
gradually to experiment in the art of the soldier, beginning 
with the duties of local garrisons, such as we had at Memphis, 
Yicksburg, Natchez, Nashville, and Chattanooga ; but I would 
not draw on the poor, race for too large a proportion of its 
active, athletic young men, for some must remain to seek new 



238 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGN 

homes, and provide for the old and young, the feeble and 
helpless. 

" These are some of my peculiar notions, but I assure you 
they are shared by a large proportion of our fighting men." 

In further explanation of these views, he subsequently wrote 
to Adjutant-General Thomas, then in special charge of the 
duty of raising colored troops in the West and Southwest : 

" My preference is to make this radical change with natural 
slowness. If negroes are taken as soldiers by undue influence 
or force, and compelled to leave their women in the uncertainty 
/ of their new condition, they cannot be relied on ; but if they 
can put their families in some safe place, and then earn money 
as soldiers or laborers, the transition will be more easy and 
the effect more permanent. "What my order contemplated was 
the eagerness of recruiting captains and lieutenants to make 
up their quota, in order to be commissioned. They would use 
a species of force or undue influence, and break up our gangs 
of laborers, as necessary as soldiers. We find gangs of negro 
laborers, well organized, on the Mississippi, at Nashville, and 
along the railroads, most -useful, and I have used them with 
great success as pioneer companies attached to divisions ; and 
I think it would be well if a law would sanction such an organ- 
ization, say of one hundred to each division of four thousand 
men. The first step in the liberation of the negro from 
bondage will be to get him and family to a place of safety ; 
then to afford him the means of providing for his family, for 
their instincts are very strong ; then gradually use a propor- 
tion, greater and greater each year, as sailors and soldiers. 
There will be no great difficulty in our absorbing the fqur 
millions of slaves in this great industrious country of ours ; 
and, being lost to their masters, the cause of the war is gone, 
for this great money interest then ceases to be an element in 
our politics and civil economy. If you divert too large a pro- 
portion of the able-bodied men into the ranks, you will leave 
too large a class of black paupers on our hands. 



TAKING BREATH. 239 

" The great mass of our soldiery must be of the white race, 
and the black troops should for some years be used with cau- 
tion, and with due regard to the prejudice of the races. As 
was to be expected, in some instances they have done well, in 
others, badly ; but, on the whole, the experiment is worthy a 
fair trial, and all I ask is, that it be not forced beyond the laws 
of natural development." 

On the 29th of August he issued the following compre- 
hensive order on the subject of trade within the limits of his 
command, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of 
the act of Congress, approved July 2, 1864, and the regula- 
tions of the Secretary of the Treasury, made in pursuance 
thereof : 

" I. All trade is prohibited near armies in the field, or moving 
columns of troops, save that necessary to supply the wants of 
the troops themselves. Quartermasters and commissaries will 
take such supplies as are needed in the countries passed 
through, giving receipts, and taking the articles up on their 
returns. When cotton is found, and transportation to the rear 
is easy and does not interfere with the supplies of the army 
dependent on the route, the quartermaster will ship the cotton 
to the quartermaster at Nashville or Memphis, who will de- 
liver it to the agent of the Treasury Department. It will be 
treated as captured property of an enemy, and invoiced ac- 
cordingly. No claim of private interest in it will be enter- 
tained by the military authorities. 

"II. In departments and military districts, embracing a 
country within our military control, the commanders of such 
departments and districts may permit a trade in articles not 
contraband of war or damaging to the operations of the army 
at the front, through the properly appointed agents and sub- 
agents of the Treasury Department, to an extent proportionate 
to the necessities of the peaceful and worthy inhabitants of the 
localities described ; but as trade and the benefits of civil gov- 
ernment are conditions not only of the fidelity of the people, 
but also of an ability to maintain peace and order in their dis- 



240 SEEBMAN AM) HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

I trict, county, or locality, commanding officers will give notice 

tfcat all trade will cease where guerrillas are tolerated and 
encouraged ; and moreover, that in such districts and localities, 
the army or detachments sent to maintain the peace must be 
maintained by the district or locality that tolerates or en- 
courages such guerrillas. 

" HI. All military officers will assist the agents of the Treas- 
ury Department in securing the possession of all abandoned 
property and estates subject to confiscation under the law. 

"IV. The use of weapons for hunting purposes is too dan- 
I ' gerous to be allowed at> this time, and therefore the mtroduc- 

\ tion of all arms and powder, percussion-caps, bullets, shot, 

I lead, or any thing used in connection with firearms, is pro- 

I Mbited absolutely, save by the proper agents of the United 

I States ; and when the inhabitants require and can be trusted 

I* with such things for self-defence, or for aiding in maintaining 

(' the peace and safety of their families and property, command- 

* - ing officers may issue the same out of the public stores in 

I, limited quantities. 

| " V. Medicines and clothing, as well as salt, meats, and pro- 

s' visions, being quasi-contraband of war, according to the con- 

! dition of the district or locality, when offered for sale, will be 

{ regulated by local commanders, in connection with the agents 

!i of the Treasury Department. 

" VI. In articles non-contraband, such as the clothing needed 
for women and children, groceries and imported articles, the 
\ f trade should be left to the Treasury agents, as matters too un- 

important to be noticed by military men. 

" VII. When military officers can indicate a preference to 
[ the class of men allowed to. trade, they will always give the 

preference to men who have served the Government as soldiers, 
and are wounded or incapacitated from further service by such 
wounds or sickness. Men who manifest loyalty by oaths, and 
nothing more, are entitled to live, but not to ask favors of a 
Government that demands acts and personal sacrifices," 



HOOD'S INVASION. 241 



CHAPTER XIX. 

HOOD'S INVASION". 

THE condition of affairs in the several theatres of war in the 
month of September, 1864, maybe summed up in a few words. 

Grant held Lee firmly at Petersburg, with a large force under 
Sheridan stopping the debouches from the Yalley of the Shen- 
andoah, and showed an evident purpose of persisting in his 
operations until a decisive result should be reached. In North 
and South Carolina matters were passive. Sherman, as we 
have seen, was at Atlanta and Hood southwest of that place, 
both watching each other ; each preparing to take the initia- 
tive. Along the Mississippi and west of that river no opera- 
tions of importance were in progress. Mobile was constantly 
threatened, more to compel the Confederates to keep a garri- 
son there than with any intention of resorting to decisive 
measures. For practical purposes, all the troops of the enemy 
west of the Mississippi might be considered out of the war, 
since, unless by some unlikely accident, they were powerless 
to influence the decisive campaigns about to commence. 

In point of fact, the issue of the war was now concentrated 
upon the result of the approaching campaigns of the two main 
armies on either side. It was obvious that the Union armies 
would, if allowed to complete all their preparations and select 
their time and direction, continue the offensive. Should Sher- 
man move to the southeast, while Hood maintained his pres- 
ent position, it would be in the power of the former, should he 
be able to reach the sea-coast in safety, to place himself in com- 
munication with Grant, and thus wrest from the Confederates 
their great advantage of interior lines. Under these circum- 
stances, it was evidently Hood's true policy to abandon all at- 
tempts to hold the line of the Chattahoochee or the country west 

16 



242 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

of it, and placing Ids army east of Atlanta, to be prepai ed to resist 
an advance of Sherman down the Atlantic slope, or to operate 
upon his flanks in case he should essay a movement towards 
the Gulf. At the same time the Confederate cavalry should 
have been constantly engaged in destroying the railways lead- 
ing to the north, thus interrupting Sherman's communications, 
and retarding, if not entirely preventing, the accumulation of 
the ammunition and other stores requisite to enable him to 
push the invasion. Had Hood's army been held between Lee 
and Sherman, tiie Confederates could, at some favorable 
moment, have concentrated the bulk of both their main 
armies, augmented by numerous garrisons and detachments, 
upon either theatre of war, according to circumstances, and 
placing one army on the strict defensive, suddenly assume the 
bold offensive with the other, with greater chances of success 
than were presented by any other course. 

But Jefferson Davis saw only a foo to be destroyed and but 
one speedy means of destroying him. To havo followed the 
course we have indicated, might have appeared to the public 
and the press of the Confederacy as an indorsement of Johns- 
ton's mode of warfare. Such a thing could not. bo tolerated 
for an instant. Hurrying from Richmond to Hie West, Davis 
visited his army, conversed with liis generals, and #avo his 
orders for their future government. To the. army lie promised 
that their feet should again press the soil of Tennessee. To 
the citizens he avowed that within thirty days ihe barbarous 
invader would be driven from their territory. The retreat of 
Sherman from Atlanta, he said, should be like Njipoleon'H 
from Moscow. 

About the 20th of September, Forrest, with his cavalry, 
crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama., destroyed a 
portion of the railway between Decatur and A i liens, and on the 
23d appeared before the latter place, n,nd <lrovo ihe. garrison, 
consisting of six hundred men of the One Hundred and Sixth, 
One Hundred and Tenth, arid One Htm<liv<l and Eleventh 
regiments of colored troops, and Third Tennessee Cavalry, 
the whole under command of Colonel Campbell, of the One 



HOOD'S EVASION. } 243 

Hundred and Tenth, into the fort constructed for the defence 
of the place. On the 24th, Forrest having completely invested 
the fort, succeeded in persuading Colonel Campbell, in a per- 
sonal interview "which that officer granted him, after refusing 
to comply with his summons to surrender, that it was useless 
to resist the odds against the garrison ; and Colonel Campbell 
accordingly capitulated. Half an hour afterwards the Nine- 
teenth Michigan and One Hundred and Second Ohio regiments 
arrived, but Forrest being now at liberty to use his entire 
force against them, they were soon compelled to yield, after a 
hard fight. Forrest then moved on, destroying the railway 
as he went, until the 27th, when he arrived before PulasM, 
where he was confronted and successfully resisted by a garri- 
son hastily collected by Major-General Lovell H. Eousseau. 
Finding his progress barred in this direction, on the 29th 
Forrest swung round to the Nashville and Chattanooga rail- 
way and began to break it up between Tullahoma and Decherd ; 
but General Eousseau, divining this plan, moved so rapidly 
by rail through Nashville to Tullahoma that he reached that 
place before the main body of Forrest's command could come 
up, and Major-General Steedman with five thousand men from 
Chattanooga, having crossed the Tennessee on the same day 
to check his movements, Forrest fell back through Fayetteville 
during the night. The next day the railway was again in 
running order. Forrest then divided his command into two 
columns, one under Buford being four thousand strong, and 
the other, commanded by himself in person, numbering three 
thousand. Buford appeared before Huntsville on the evening 
of the 30th, demanded the surrender of the garrison that night 
and again on the following morning, and being on both occa- 
sions refused, moved on Athens and attacked that place on the 
afternoon of October 1st and the morning of the 2cl, but was 
gallantly repulsed by the Seventy-third Indiana, under Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Slade, which Brigadier-General E. S. Granger had 
just sent to reoccupy the place. Buford then abandoned his 
portion of the expedition and recrossed the Tennessee on the 
3d at Brown's Ferry. Forrest, with his own column, appeared 



244 SHEEMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

before Columbia on the 1st of October, but did not attack, 
and on the morning of the 3d he too turned his face to the 
south, passed through Lawrenceburg on the night of the 4th, 
and on the 6th, though closely pressed, succeeded in effecting 
his escape across the Tennessee at Bainbridge. Meanwhile, 
dangers had been thickening in his path, for Newton's division 
of Stanley's fourth corps, now under Brigadier-General "Wag- 
ner, left Atlanta on the 26th and replaced Steedman at Chatta- 
nooga two days later ; Morgan's second division of Jefferson 
C. Davis' fourteenth corps started north on the 29th, reached 
Stevenson early on the 1st of October and Huntsville the same 
night, Athens on the night of the 2d, Eogersville on the 4th, 
and came up and skirmished with Forrest's rear-guard at 
Shoal Creek bridge ; Eousseau, with four thousand cavalry 
,and mounted infantry, followed Forrest from Columbia, at 
Pulaski was joined by Major-General C. C. "Washburne with 
three thousand cavalry from Memphis, and together they 
reached Waynesboro' on the 6th. Moreover, on the 28th of 
September, as soon as he became convinced of the enemy's 
I designs, Sherman had dispatched Major-General Thomas to 

f Nashville to take personal command of the rear, and on the 

| 3d, Thomas had ' reached that place and put in motion this 

* combination, which but for unforeseen causes, such as the rise 
> ! of Elk Eiver in front of Morgan, must, in all probability, have 
1 resulted in Forrest's destruction. 

| On the 1st of October, Hood began his fatal march to tho 

I north. Sending his cavalry in advance to move rapidly 

j against Sherman's communications beyond Marietta, he 

* crossed the Chattahoochee with his three corps of infantry, 
.) and pushed north by way of Dallas. 

\ Leaving Slocum with his Twentieth Corps to hold Atlanta 

j and the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee, on the 4th of 

] October, in accordance with his previous intentions and ar- 

| rangements, Sherman marched with the remainder of his 

t army to Smyrna Camp Ground, and on the following day to a 

j strong position at Kenesaw Mountain. The enemy's cavalry 
and French's division of Stewart's corps had struck the rail- 



HOOD'S INVASION. 245 

way at Big Shanty, effectually destroyed it and the telegraph 
for a distance of twenty miles, and was now moving on Alla- 
toona Pass, where were stored a million of rations, guarded 
by the Ninety-third Illinois regiment, tinder Lieutenant-Col- 
onel Tourtellotte, behind the redoubts previously constructed. 
The telegraph wires being broken by the enemy, and the in- 
termediate country occupied by his troops, Sherman sent a 
message by signals to Brigadier-General Corse, who, as we 
have seen, was at Borne with his division of the Fifteenth 
Corps, directing that officer to re-enforce the threatened post 
without delay. Corse started immediately by railway with 
the Fourth Minnesota and Seventh Illinois, and reached 
Allatoona at one o'clock, A. M., on the 5th of October ; but, 
owing to an accident to the train, it was so late in return- 
ing that no more troops had arrived when, an hour after 
Corse's arrival, French with his division appeared before 
the place and opened a brisk skirmish fire. By daylight, 
the works at Allatoona, manned by one thousand nine hun- 
dred and forty-four men, were completely invested by French's 
entire division of the Confederate army. At half-past eight, 
on the 5th, after a sharp cannonade of two hours' duration, 
General French sent a note to General Corse, under a flag 
of truce, intimating that he would give the garrison just 
five minutes to surrender, in order to spare the unnecessary 
effusion of human blood. Corse instantly replied that he 
should not surrender, and that he was prepared for this un- 
necessary effusion of blood as soon as his assailant chose to 
begin it. The enemy immediately assaulted with great fury ; 
and again and again, during the day, his columns surged 
madly up against the parapets, only to be. as often hurled 
back with great slaughter by the intrepid little garrison, stand- 
ing as grim and immovable as the rock itself ; until at night 
the shattered remnants of the enemy were at length driven 
from every position, and the possession of Allatoona was 
secure. At ten o'clock in the morning Sherman in person 
reached Kenesaw Mountain, eighteen miles distant, and 



246 8HEBMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

thence saw and faintly heaxd, bnt only too fully comprehended, 
what was transpiring at his depot. The distance was too 
great to offer any hope of being able to render direct assist- 
ance before the struggle should be decided, but Sherman at 
once sent the Twenty-third Corps, under Cox, out on the 
Burnt Hickory road, towards Dallas, to move against the 
flank and rear of the forces threatening Allatoona. From 
mountain to mountain the little signal flags, spelling their 
message in quiet defiance of hostile force, waved from Sher- 
man to Corse the words few and simple, but of thrilling im- 
port, which announced to him the presence of the comrnander- 
in-chief on the overlooking height of Kenesaw, the movement of 
troops for his relief, and exhorted him to hold out to the last. 
Quickly the flags moved again with Corse's brave reply, which 
would show his commander, even if there had been misgiv- 
ings on the subject, that here was a captain who would fight 
to the death for Allatoona and the safety of the army, resting 
f at that moment upon the unaided strength of his single arm, 

l But there were no such doubts. No sooner did the flags speak 

| Corse's name, than Sherman exclaimed, " If Corse is there he 

I will hold out. I know the man !" In this stubborn defence 

I against apparently overwhelming odds, the garrison, iiumber- 

1 ing less than two thousand, lost seven hundred and seven 

I officers and men killed and wounded ; among the latter, 

I Brigadier-General Corse himself, who, though struck in the 

I face by a bullet about noon, declined to leave the field, and 

f by his own energy and spirit imbued his command with the 

J strength that gave them the victory. Colonel Richard Rowell, 

I , Seventh Illinois, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tourtellotte, Ninety- 

* third Illinois, both of whom behaved with remarkable gal- 

lantry, were also wounded. The garrison captured eight hun- 
| dred muskets, three stands of colors, and four hundred and 

I eleven prisoners, and after the enemy retired, buried two hun- 

J dred and thirty-one of their men, who were killed outright. 

\ The arrival of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps at Pine 

I Mountain, and the movement of the Twenty-third Corps on 



HOOD'S INVASION. 247 

Dallas, hastened French's withdrawal towards the latter place, 
after his severe defeat. 

Hood now moved rapidly to the northwest, aiming to reach 
the railway at Eesaca. On the 6th and 7th, holding his army 
about Kenesaw, Big Shanty, and Kenesaw Mountain, Sher- 
man sent his cavalry towards Burnt Hickory and Dallas, and 
discovered this movement of the enemy. Accordingly, on the 
afternoon of the 10th, he put the troops in motion through 
Allatoona Pass, on Kingston. By a forced march of thirty-eight 
miles, the three armies reached Kingston on the llth. On the 
12th, the march was continued to Rome, a brigade of Hazen's 
division of Osterhaus' fifteenth corps being sent in advance, 
by railway, from Allatoona, to occupy the place, in anticipa- 
tion of Hood's movement against it. Sherman pushed Gar- 
rard's division of cavalry and the Twenty-third Corps across 
the Oostanaula, to menace the enemy's flanks, and Garrard 
succeeded in driving a brigade of the enemy through the narrow 
entrance of the valley of the Chattooga, capturing two guns, 
while, at the same time, Corse crossed the Etowah with his 
division, and the brigade of Hazen's division that had come 
forward by rail, and made a reconnoissance with a view to 
develop the force of the enemy guarding their pontoon bridge, 
sixteen miles below. Having thus ascertained that Hood's 
movement upon Rome had been merely a feint, and that he 
had in fact crossed the Coosa with his entire army, and was 
hastening with all speed towards Resaca and Dalton, Sherman 
put his command, except Corse's division, left to hold Rome, 
in motion, on the 13th, towards the former place, and ordered 
Howard to send forward Belknap's division of Ransom's 
seventeenth corps by railway to the relief of the garrison, ar- 
riving about midnight. From Kingston, Sherman had sent 
two regiments of Howard's army, under Colonel Weaver, to 
occupy Resaca, and had afterwards caused them to be re-en- 
forced by Baton's brigade of John E. Smith's division of the 
Fifteenth Corps. Hood appeared before the small garrison 
with his entire army, but General Baurn showed so bold and 
extended a front that, probably retaining a vivid recollection 



248 SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

of Allatoona, and knowing the contagious effect of such an 
example both upon besieged and besiegers, Hood contented 
himself with an attack by a skirmish line, and a summons to 
surrender, coupled with a threat that no prisoners would be 
taken in case he were compelled to carry the placeby assault. 
During the parley, portions of Hood's army were engaged in 
effectually destroying the railway for twenty miles to the 
northward, and in capturing the small and unresisting gar- 
risons at Tilton and Dalton. On the evening of the 14th, 
Sherman, with the main body of the army, arrived in Eesaca, 
and on the 15th, directing the Army of the Tennessee to move 
to Snake Creek Gap, and hold the enemy there, he caused 
Stanley, with the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps, to move by 
Tilton, across the mountains towards Villanow, in order to 
strike Hood in flank or force him to fight. But Hood evi- 
dently considered it his policy, at this time, to avoid a battle, 
for his lines gave way about noon before the advance of How- 
ard's skirmishers, and, followed by Howard, he escaped 
through Snake Creek Gap before Stanley had time to reach 
the other end of the Pass, and rapidly retreated, in a south- 
westerly direction, down the valley of the Coosa, to the 
vicinity of Gadsden, and occupied the narrow gorge formed by 
the Lookout Mountains abutting against the river. On the 
16th, Sherman moved towards Lafayette with the view of cut- 
ting off Hood's retreat, and found him intrenched at Ship's 
Gap ; but "Woods' division of Osterhaus' fifteenth corps, hav- 
ing the advance, rapidly carried the advanced posts, capturing 
two companies of a South Carolina regiment, and driving the 
remainder back on the main body at Lafayette. That night 
the armies went into camp at Taylor's Eiclge, where Ship's 
Gap divides it. 

On the 17th, the Army of the Tennessee moved to Lafayette, 
while the other corps remained in camp at the Eidge. 

On the 18th, Howard crossed the Chattooga at Tryon's 
Factory, and encamped near Summerville. Stanley moved in 
the same direction, through Mattock's Gap, in Taylor's Eidge, 
crossed the river at Penn's Ford, and halted four miles be- 



HOOD'S INVASION. 249 

yond it. On the 19th, the Army of the Tennessee reached 
Alpine, and the Army of the Cumberland, after a short march, 
encamped at Summerville, and, on the 20th, both these com- 
mands marched into Gaylesville ; while Cox, with the Twenty- 
third Corps and Garrard's division of cavalry, having moved 
by Villanow, Dirt Town, and Gover's Gap, arrived on the same 
day. 

In the mean while, Thomas had disposed of his small forces 
so as to oppose the greatest resistance in his power to Hood's 
movement on Bridgeport and Chattanooga, both of which 
places were seriously menaced by the direction of his advance. 
Leaving Decatur, HnntsviHe, Stevenson, and the rest of 
Northern Alabama to the care of their ordinary garrisons, 
Thomas caused Eousseau to recall his mounted troops from 
the pursuit of Forrest and concentrate at Athens ; Croxton's 
brigade of cavalry to observe and protect the crossings of the 
Tennessee Eiver from Decatur to Eastport ; Morgan's division 
of Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps to move by rail to 
Chattanooga, where, it will be remembered, Wagner already 
was with Newton's division of Stanley's fourth corps, and 
Steedman to follow Morgan to Bridgeport. On the 14th, 
Morgan reached his designated position, and Steedman's 
destination was also changed to Chattanooga. 

The Army of the Tennessee was now posted near Little 
Eiver, with orders to support the cavalry engaged in watching 
Hood ; the Army of the Ohio was at Cedar Bluff, with orders 
to lay a pontoon bridge across the Coosa, and feel towards 
Centre and Blue Mountains ; and the Army of the Cumberland 
was held in reserve at Gaylesville. In this position, in the 
heart of the rich valley of the Chattooga, in a country 
abounding with food, Sherman determined, while living upon 
the country, to pause in his pursuit of his erratic enemy, and 
giving him sufficient rope wherewith to entangle himself, to 
watch his movements. Communications were established 
with Eome, and a large force put to work, under Colonel W. 
W. "Wright, chief engineer of the United States military rail- 
ways in this division, in repairing the damages inflicted by 



250 SHEKMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS. 

Hood upon the railway. Slocum at Atlanta was ordered to 
send out strong foraging parties, collect aU the corn and fod- 
der possible, and put his trains in condition for service. As 
early as the 21st, telegraphic communication was restored be- 
tween Chattanooga and Atlanta, and by the 28th, although 
thirty-four miles of rails and ties had been destroyed, and 
several important bridges carried away by floods, trains be- 
gan running through on the railway. 

Hood had turned westward from Gadsden towards Decatur, 
and taken up a position threatening the Chattanooga and 
Atlanta railway, and at the same time menacing Tennes- 
see. His movements and strategy had conclusively de- 
monstrated that he had an army at all times capable of 
endangering Sherman's communications, but unable to meet 
and cope with him in battle. To follow Hood indefinitely 
towards the west and north would, without much prospect 
of overtaking and overwhelming his army, be for Sherman 
equivalent to being decoyed out of Georgia. To remain 
on the defensive, on the other hand, would be to lose the 
main effectiveness of the great Army of the Centre. Sher- 
man had previously proposed to General Grant, in the early 
stages of the pursuit, to break up the railway from Chatta- 
nooga to Atlanta, and strike out for Milledgeville, Millen, and 
Savannah. " Until we can repopulate Georgia," he wrote, " it 
is useless to occupy it ; but the utter destruction of its roads, 
houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By 
attempting to hold the roads we will lose a thousand men 
monthly, and will gain no result. I can make the march, and 
make Georgia howl" And again : " Hood may turn into Ten- 
nessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow 
me. Instead of being on the defensive I would be on the 
offensive. Instead of guessing at what he means, he would 
have to guess at my plans. The difference, in war is full 
twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, 
or the mouth of the Chattahoochee. I prefer to march 
through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea." He now pro- 
posed to the lieutenant-general to modify these plans, so far 



HOOP'S INVASION. 251 

as to give him tlie choice of either of the three alternatives 
just named. 

" I must have alternatives," he said ; " else being confined to 
one route the enemy might so oppose that delay and want 
would trouble me ; but having alternatives, I can take so 
eccentric a course that no general can guess at my objective. 
Therefore, when you hear I am off, have lookouts at Morris 
Island, S. C. ; Ossabaw Sound, Georgia ; Pensacola and 
Mobile bays. I will turn up somewhere, and believe me I can 
take Macon, MiUedgeville, Augusta, and Savannah, Georgia, 
and wind up with closing the neck back of Charleston, so that 
they will starve out. This movement is not purely military 
or strategic, but it will illustrate the vulnerability of the 
South." 

General Grant promptly authorized the proposed move- 
ment, indicating, however, his preference for Savannah as the 
objective, and fixing Dalton as the northern limit for the de- 
struction of the railway. Preparations were instantly under- 
taken and pressed forward for the consummation of these 
plans. 

On the 26th of October, Sherman detached the Fourth Corps 
under Major-General Stanley, and ordered him to proceed to 
Chattanooga and report to General Thomas at Nashville. On 
the 30th of October, he also detached the Twenty-third Corps, 
Major-General Schofield, with the same destination, and dele- 
gated to Major-General Thomas full power over the troops, 
except the four corps with which he himself designed to move 
into Georgia. This gave Thomas the two divisions of the 
Sixteenth Corps, under A. J. Smith, then in Missouri but 
on the way to Tennessee, the Fourth and Twenty-third 
corps, as just mentioned, and all the garrisons in Tennes- 
see, as well as all the cavaky of the Military Division, except 
the division under Brigadier-General Kilpatrick, which was 
ordered to rendezvous at Marietta. Brevet Major-General 
Wilson had arrived from the Army of the Potomac to assume 
command of the cavalry of the Army of the Centre, and he 
was sent back to Nashville with all dismounted detachments, 



' f 252 SH