\v THE SHOOTDOWN OF BROTHERS TO THE
RESCUE: WHAT HAPPENED?
YH/iMyib-. e>ri
HEARING
BEFORE TIIE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF TIIE
committee on
internationaij relations
house of representatives
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 18, 1996
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
'^r*'i
MAR 1 S 1997
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1997
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-053987-0
\j THE SHOOTDOWN OF BROTHERS TO THE
RESCUE: WHAT HAPPENED?
yH-lMyii.-. B^^
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF TIIE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATRn^.S
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 18, 1996
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
MAR 1 9 1937
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1997
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-053987-0
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL REIATIONS
BENJAMIN A. OILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Michael H. Van Dusen, Democratic Chief of Staff
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ENl F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. MCKIN'NEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYXX, Maryland
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
VICTOR O. FRAZER, Virgin Islands (Ind.)
CHARLIE ROSE, North Carolina
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH. New Jersey
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
Pt:TER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina
GlI-EAD KaPEN, Subcommittee Staff Director ,
Scott Wilson, Democratic Professional Staff Member
ScOTT FEENEY, Professional Staff Member
Anita Winsor, Staff Associate
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
TOM LANTOS, California
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
CHARLIE ROSE, North Carolina
(II)
CONTENTS
WITNESSES
Page
Maria Fernandez, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American AfTairs, De-
Sartment of Defense 5
. Michael C. McMahan, Deputy J-3, Atlantic Command 6
Jose J. Basulto, President, Brothers to the Rescue 40
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Jose J. Basulto 55
Material submitted for the record:
I^etter to Rep. Dan Burton from Gen. Howard G. DeWolf, Office of Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense, September 5, 1996 59
Responses to members' questions submitted by Col. Michael C.
McMahan 61
Responses to members' questions submitted by Michael Ranneberger,
Coordinator for Cuba, U.S. Department of State 69
(III)
THE SHOOTDOWN OF BROTHERS TO THE
RESCUE: WHAT HAPPENED?
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1996
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on International Reiv^iTions,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m. in room
2172, Raybum House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Dan
Burton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Burton. The hearing will come to order. This meeting today
is to obtain testimony about a very serious matter. This past Feb-
ruary 24th, almost 7 months ago, Cuban Air Force MiGs shot down
two unarmed civilian planes belonging to "Brothers to the Rescue",
a non-profit humanitarian group on a mission of mercy.
Four brave pilots who were on board those planes were murdered
that day. Our thoughts and our prayers continue to be very much
with the families of the poor pilots who were cut down so tragically
in the prime of their lives.
We continue in our determination to see to it that freedom comes
to the people of Cuba and that the losses suffered by the families
will not have been in vain. The brutal murder of these brave men
on the high seas and in international air space graphically dem-
onstrated the true nature of the Fidel Castro regime. It also gave
added momentum to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act, the Burton-Helms Act which is commonly known as the
Libertad Act.
Many believe that it was the shootdown that convinced President
Clinton to finallv agree to the signing of our bill which is now hap-
pily the law of the land.
Since the tragic shootdown some questions have emerged regard-
ing the circumstances surrounding the events of that day. These
are the questions we wish to raise today. Let me make two points
very clear. First, we are not here to point an accusing finger at
anyone. We are only here to gather the facts. We have the highest
confidence in our military, and by no means should this hearing be
misconstrued as impugning the integrity of the military in any
way.
Second, the blame and the responsibility for the February 24th
crime rests squarely in one corner, that of the Castro dictatorship.
Bearing that in mind, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
today.
Before I conclude my remarks, let me also say that we have
asked Mr. Jeffrey Houlihan, the gentleman from the U.S. Customs
(1)
Service in California to come and testify today. For national secu-
rity purposes, the subcommittee will meet with him privately at
the conclusion of this hearing to find out some additional informa-
tion regarding the transmission of information from him to the
Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida and what exactly transpired. For
all those concerned on the subcommittee, I hope that you will be
able to stay with us for this private closed-door meeting with him
at the conclusion of this hearing.
Now, if I could have the witnesses stand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Before I recognize you for your opening statements,
Ms. Fernandez, Colonel McMahan, I will yield to the ranking Dem-
ocrat, Bob Menendez, for an opening statement.
Mr. Mf:nendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for holding this informative hearing today. I am, as you know, anx-
ious to determine whether the tragic course of events which re-
sulted in the death of four Americans on February 24th of this year
could have been averted.
On that Saturday, Fidel Castro expanded his reign of terror to
the United States when he shot down two unarmed civilian aircraft
and murdered four American citizens over international waters.
Nothing, nothing can replace the lives of Mario de la Pena,
Armando Alejandre, Carlos Costa or Pablo Morales. Their unwav-
ering commitment to the lives of their brothers and sisters fleeing
Cuba will clearly not be forgotten.
I would also like to take this opportunity to recognize the ex-
traordinary efforts of Brothers to the Rescue and its President Jose
Basulto. Brothers to the Rescue has saved more than 6,000 people
from the Straits of Florida. Without their vigilance and dedication,
many more Cubans might have died in their quest for freedom.
The Straits are rough, the rafts flimsy, and dehydration, starva-
tion, the scorching sun and shark-infested waters plague those who
seek the embrace of democracy. Brothers to the Rescue is a beacon
and light of life for those individuals.
In the days following the shootdown, it became clear that Fidel
Castro himself had carefully orchestrated and ordered the shooting
down of the planes over international waters. Since then the world
has spoken. The European Union, the Security Council of the Unit-
ed Nations and the International Civil Aviation Organization
strongly deplored the shootdown.
It was because of this tragic event that the President asked me
to travel to Geneva as part of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights and to present tne resolution condemn-
ing the Castro regime on human rights violations in Cuba. With
the support of most of our allies, the resolution was adopted. The
world sent a message to Castro.
Indeed it would be yet another tragedy if we as a nation did not
respond to the aggression of the Castro regime as we should have.
In this regard, I look forward to hearing the testimony of Colonel
McMahan, Deputy Assistant Secretary Fernandez and Mr. Basulto.
In closing, I would like to point out that although we have come
here today to understand the events of February 24th, we must
also remember that it was, and not lose sight of I would add, the
unlawful act of our common enemy, Fidel Castro. It is he who
bears the responsibility and the burden for the deaths of our fellow
Americans. I look forward to the testimony, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for the opportunity.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Congressman Menendez. Now my good
friend, Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Close to
7 months ago the entire world was witness to the brutal means by
which the Castro regime is willing to take in order to destroy any
opposition to its totalitarian regime.
On February 24th of that year, three American citizens and one
resident of this country were executed by Cuban fighter MiGs,
which following orders from the top hierarchy of the dictatorship,
perhaps Fidel Castro himself, shot down their two Cessna aircraft
which they utilize as vehicles to fulfill their unarmed humanitarian
mission of helping Cuban refugees in the Caribbean.
The four young men represented the best that America has to
offer. Armando Alejandre, a father of a teenage girl just starting
college fought in the Vietnam War for the country which gave him
a second chance at freedom. Mario de la Pena and Carlos Costa
were students who unselfishly gave of their free time to help the
Cuban refugees. Padre Morales had just begun to taste freedom
after being rescued himself by Brothers to the Rescue.
Many questions about this massacre remain unanswered despite
the many months that have transpired. But none of us expected
the questions raised by the recent hearings of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board which suggest or at least raise the specter
that the lives of these four young men could have been spared.
During these appeal hearings on the unjust revocation of the
pilot license of Jose Basulto, the president of Brothers to the Res-
cue, we learned that a U.S. Customs official in California around
3 p.m. observed on his radar screen and subsequently notified the
Air Force of Cuban MiG fighter jets in international air space.
Upon calling Tyndall Air Force base in our home state in Florida
to inform them of what he observed which is the equivalent of a
911 call, the California Customs official was told that we are han-
dling it. Do not worry.
This calm response was apparently given, we now know, because
evidence suggests that U.S. officials knew since 1:15 p.m. that
Cuban MiGs were already flying. However, unlike in previous occa-
sions when Brothers pilots were informed of the presence of the
Cuban MiGs, no warning was given on this occasion.
It was only a short time later after the call from California at
approximately 3:21 p.m. that the first Brothers aircraft carrying
Carlos Costa and Pablo Morales was shot down in cold blood.
Seven minutes later at 3:28 p.m., the aircraft of Mario de la Pena
and Armando Alejandre suffered the same fate. But the Cuban
MiGs were not done yet. Two MiGs followed the aircraft piloted by
Mr. Basulto to within 3 minutes of U.S. territory until they were
recalled back by Cuban authorities.
Mr. Chairman, despite the hearings held in this chamber regard-
ing the shootdown, none of this information was made available to
us. It was only made public because FAA and other agencies were
forced to do so during Mr. Basulto's appeals hearing. The unwill-
ingness of these agencies to cooperate on this matter further com-
plicates the already tightly webbed cloud of secrecy which seems to
hover over this tragic incident.
Why did the Air Force dismiss the call from the Customs official
in California of the presence of the Cuban MiGs? Why did the Air
Force not inform Brothers to the Rescue of the presence of Cuban
MiGs even after they knew that the Brothers flight plan would
take them close to them? Why was no action taken to intercept
Cuban MiGs pursuing the Brothers to the aircraft before two of the
planes were shot down? Why was no interception taken to intercept
the MiGs who pursued Mr. Basulto's aircraft to within 3 minutes
of U.S. shores?
Mr. Chairman, these are just a few of the questions which are
yet to be answered concerning this tragedy and we hope to have
the answers today. It saddens us to think that U.S. officials might
have been observing the murder of American citizens on their
radar screen and not take this as a life and death situation.
We can never bring back the brave young men whose lives were
ended at the prime of their lives. However, we owe it to them and
to their families to pursue the truth of what happened that day.
More importantly, we can prevent a similar incident from occur-
ring once again. Our mission today is not to place blame on U.S.
Government officials. We all know that there is only one man re-
sponsible for the murders that occurred that day and that man is
Fidel Castro.
Neither should this hearing sway us from concentrating on the
real solution to prevent similar incidents from repeating in the fu-
ture. The elimination of Castro and his murderous regime is what
we are after.
However, we have a responsibility as members of the U.S. Con-
gress to exercise our oversight responsibility over U.S. Government
agencies, especially when evidence suggests that these agencies did
not fulfill their mission to the best of their abilities.
The mission of the Armed Forces is to protect the United States
and its citizens. If on that day of February 24th, U.S. military offi-
cials did not fulfill their duty, then we must step in and examine
why their mission was not fulfilled.
We hope that this day will yield some answers to those worri-
some questions and I am especially anxious to get to the question
and answer part of our testimony where I am going to refer to an
August 30th letter that I received from Mr. Howard DeWolf, the di-
rector of InterAmerican Region, who states that certain things —
that the testimony of Mr. Basulto, hearing it, contradicts specifi-
cally about they knew that the Brothers to the Rescue were in that
area even though it says here neither party knew that the slow-
moving aircraft were Brothers to the Rescue aircraft. This goes
against the testimony presented here today and it says that the
aircraft were operating in the well-defmed Cuban air defense iden-
tification zone which also goes against the testimony of Mr.
Houlihan during Mr. Basulto s hearing. So we hope, and I would
like to make the motion now if I could make the testimony of Mr.
Houlihan part of our public record.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
IThe prepared testimony of Mr. Houlihan appears in the appen-
dix.!
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And I could refer to the letter that I received
from the Officer of Assistant Secretary of Defense, also as part of
the record. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Representative Ros-Lehtinen. Before
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart makes his opening statement,
I have to run to another committee hearing for 5 minutes. The
Honorable Chris Smith said he will take the Chair. I will be right
back.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend
you also, Mr. Chairman, for holding this critically important hear-
ing. I believe we cannot really concentrate or focus in on anything
more important than an incident or a series of incidents that led
to the assassination of American citizens.
I wish to commend Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen for what I be-
lieve was an extraordinarily well thought through and delivered
opening statement that touched upon many of the key questions
that I certainly would have. Why were no U.S. aircraft sent to pro-
tect the planes on February 24th? Could the murders have been
prevented, any of them? What is U.S. policy with regard to Cuban
MiGs approaching U.S. air space? Did anyone in the U.S. military
seek authorization at any time on February 24th to launch planes
to defend the Brothers to the Rescue? Did anyone in the Air Force
seek authorization to take off and defend the American citizens and
intercept the Cuban planes? What is U.S. policy with regard to
Cuban planes who are approaching our air space in the future?
Does the Department of Defense have a plan to respond to threats
from Cuban aircraft approaching our air space? These are just
some of the questions that I have and I look forward to the testi-
mony of our witnesses today. I also wish to welcome Mr. Basulto
and of course look forward to the executive session that we will
have after this. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Smith. I would like to thank my good friend, Mr. Diaz-Balart
for that fine statement, but also for posing some of the fundamen-
tal, basic questions that really have to be answered. To begin hope-
fully providing those answers, I would like to welcome our two dis-
tinguished witnesses. Secretary Maria Fernandez who is the Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary for Inter American Affairs for the Depart-
ment of Defense, and Colonel Michael McMahan, the Deputy J-3
for the Atlantic Command. Now, I would invite you in whatever
order you would like to proceed and until such time as you may
think is appropriate.
Mr. Menendez. Mr. Chairman, do we have written testimony
from the witnesses? We do not.
Mr. McMahan. Not from me.
Ms. Fernandez. Not from me, sir.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Please proceed.
Ms. Fernandez. I do have some opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF SECRETARY MARIA FERNANDEZ, DEPUTY AS-
SISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERAMERICAN AFFAIRS, DE-
PARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Fernandez. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. As a Cuban American, I fully agree with the commit-
tee's position that this was truly a reprehensible act on the part
of the Cuban Government. And I am pleased to appear before you
today with Colonel Michael McMahan and he is the Deputy Direc-
tor of Operations for Atlantic Command and is here to assist the
committee in this fact finding hearing and to address your concerns
surrounding the shootdown of the two Brothers to the Rescue air-
craft by Cuban fighters on February 24th, 1996.
There have been several investigations which have been con-
ducted by the U.S. Government and international organizations as
to what took place on that afternoon. They contain all the pertinent
facts concerning this unfortunate incident. I believe that these re-
ports have already been made available to the committee.
The shooting down by Cuba of two unarmed civilian aircraft over
international waters which resulted in the deaths of four persons
is a heinous and reprehensible act under international law and
international aviation standards. There is no justification for the
Cuban Government's unlawful use of deadly force against civil air-
craft as occurred on February 24th.
Such use of force is incompatible with the elementary consider-
ations of humanity and the norms governing international behav-
ior. The international norms recognize that states must refrain
from the use of deadly force against civil aircraft in flight and must
not endanger the lives of persons on board and the safety of the
aircraft.
The Cuban authorities acted in total disregard to these stand-
ards. And we were not in a position to anticipate the unwarranted
downing of the Brothers to the Rescue aircraft.
Having said all of this, it is time to find what happened on that
terrible day and for Colonel McMahan to answer your questions on
the facts surrounding the incident. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL MICHAEL MCMAHAN, DEPUTY J-3
FOR THE ATLANTIC COMMAND
Mr. MCMahan. I do not have a prepared statement to read. I
would just say that as the U.S. Atlantic Command representative
I am glad to be here. I appreciate the opportunity and I welcome
vour questions. And if you would like to proceed ahead, sir, I will
be more than happy to try and address the issues.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Colonel. We are going to try to proceed
under the 5-minute rule. There will probably be a couple of rounds
of questions for you. Did you make a statement? Chris, did you
have a statement?
I think my major concern is that Mr. Houlihan contacted your air
base at 3:15 andf the MiGs shot down the first aircraft at 3:21 and
that is 6 minutes. And it was my understanding that on the run-
way there were one or two F-16s already fired up at that time.
And my question is: if those F-16s were launched and came up
on Cuban radar during that 6-minute period, is it reasonable to as-
sume that they would have picked up on that and might have re-
treated rather than going ahead to attack those aircraft? And if
that is the case, why weren't those F-16s launched?
Mr. McMahan. All right, sir. The F-16s I believe that you are
referring to were under North American Aerospace Defense Com-
mand (NORAD) and control at the time rather than USACOM, but
I will still try and address the issue in general terms and the spe-
cifics we may need to go back to NORAD in order to get the an-
swer. There is a difference. I see a puzzled look. So maybe I should
explain.
Mr. Burton. Well, I am puzzled from the standpoint that when
Cuba is only a matter of minutes by MiG to the United States, to
have a chain of command that goes from one to the other does not
make much sense to me. If you have a commanding officer on the
ground and he gets a notification from somebody at Customs in
California that there are MiGs coming up and you have unarmed
aircraft in that vicinity that might be in danger to have it go back
to NORAD for approval and then back to you takes more precious
time. That needs to be explained as well. So if you could go ahead
and proceed.
Mr. McMahan. Oh, yes sir. In fact, I could not agree with you
more and in fact the facts are that they do not go between the two.
My point was that the U.S. Atlantic Command is not responsible
for the air defense of the Continental United States; but is respon-
sible for the Caribbean, and therefore, Cuba.
NORAD has responsibility, along with Canada, for the defense of
the Continental United States. Those F-16s that you are referring
to, sir, were in fact available but their mission is the air defense
of the Continental United States and Canada, in other words North
America.
So your point is very well taken and that is the position of the
Department of Defense that we should not have a long cumbersome
chain of command. So that is exactly right. I was just trying to
make sure that there was no confusion on that issue. And instead
I probably added confusion. For that I apologize.
Mr. Burton. OK
Mr. McMahan. But I would like to address the question in gen-
eral, if I could. There is no way, of course, in knowing exactly now
the Cubans would react to that situation. One can speculate as to
reaction. It is a course of action the Cubans could take. We do not
know whether they would have or not.
Mr. Burton. Well, let me interrupt.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Let us go on the assumption that if they saw F-
16s coming up, they would be possibly engaged within a 10-minute
time period. I imagine that is fairly close, is it not?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I would like to not get into specific reaction
times in an open session.
Mr. Burton. We will do it privately.
Mr. McMahan. I would like to proceed down this line. Go ahead.
Mr. Burton. But let us just make the assumption that within 10
minutes they could be engaged and there was a 6-minute time pe-
riod from the time that you were notified by Customs. Were there
F-16s already fired up on the runway?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, to my knowledge they were not "fired up" on
the runway.
Mr. Burton. Were they on the runway?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, they were sitting to my knowledge in their
normal alert status. They are a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week oper-
ation.
Mr. Burton. How long does it take them if they are called up?
8
Mr. McMahan. I would answer that for the record or in closed
session.
Mr. Burton. You have to tell me that.
Mr. McMahan. It is sensitive information that I think we would
prefer not to give out in open session.
Mr. Burton. Well, it seems like some of the questions will have
to be answered in closed session. I think you see the point I am
trying to make. The point is if those planes were scrambled, if they
went up within that 6-minute period, and if the Cubans picked that
up on radar, then some of us think that might have caused the Cu-
bans a little consternation and they might have been reluctant to
start shooting down unarmed American aircraft because they
might have been engaged and a real confrontation might have
started with the United States which I do not think Castro wants.
So that is something that I do want to pursue in closed session.
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I understand the question very well.
Mr. Burton. I think this timer is off. I do not think that was
5 minutes. Let me ask one more question, then I will yield to my
colleague. I know I am the chairman, but I try to be fair. Were you
aware that Brothers to the Rescue had those planes up and out
over the Caribbean in that area?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, in the U.S. Atlantic Command, we were not
tracking them as an event. We do not track them on a normal
basis.
Mr. Burton. In other words, you were not aware that those
planes were going up or were down around Cuba.
Mr. McMahan. Not in Atlantic Command, sir. We were not.
Mr. Burton. Who would have been aware of that?
Mr. McMahan. From what I have read since then it appears that
Customs had that information available to them, but that is only
from reading what they have said, sir.
Mr. Burton. OK Well, Customs had that information available.
A Customs official in California contacted Tyndall AFB and said,
and I have not read his testimony, but I presume he said there are
MiGs coming up. There are unarmed American aircraft in the area.
You should be aware of it and something should be done. Is that
about the gist of it?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I do not have information except for the
exact information you do also. I do not have any— —
Mr. Burton. Well, who was contacted by the Customs people at
Tyndall? Who was the person who got the 911 call, so to speak?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I do not know. We can answer that for the
record, please, but I do not know that information on who received
the phone. I have read the same information you have. It is some-
one at a command center it appears, based on what I have read.
I do not know the individual if you are asking for a specific person.
Mr. Burton. Well, who is the CO down there?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I do not know who the CO is. That is an or-
ganization that I am not associated with directly.
Mr. Burton. Well, did we not invite somebody from that air base
who was notified about this? Did we not ask them to come up?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, we will be more than happy to get that infor-
mation for you.
9
Mr. Burton. I know, but that was the one of the main purposes
of the hearing. We asked the Defense Department to have appro-
priate people come up here who could give us the information. And
you are telling me that you do not know who got the call from the
Customs official?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I do not know that detailed information. I
will be more than happy to
Mr. Burton. But that is the crux of the whole hearing. What we
wanted to find out today was why they did not put planes in the
air, who was notified, and what the chain of events were; and you
do not know that.
Mr. McMahan. No, sir. I will be more than happy to share with
you the information that I do have, but I do not know that detailed
information, no sir.
Mr. Burton. Well, tell me what you know.
Mr. McMahan. All right, sir. I know that the U.S. Atlantic Com-
mand was notified of the possible downing of two civilian aircraft.
And we immediately took action, called up the U.S. Coast Guard
who is the lead element for a search and rescue at that time. We
dispatched ships and then we called NORAD to ask them, and that
was the first time and only time that I am aware of where we were
in direct contact and we had to ask permission and we received it,
of course, immediately to launch aircraft for a CAP as soon as pos-
sible for the search and rescue. We then continued an air-based
search and rescue for over 27 hours, sir. The Coast Guard again
was lead in that element. We were in support. And the Department
of Defense put all available resources against that.
Mr. Burton. I understand that. What I am getting from your
testimony is that you really do not have much information until
after the fact — until after the shootdown took place.
Mr. McMahan. That would be unique information that I would
have? That is correct, sir. And we have tried to share all informa-
tion with everyone as I think the whole Department of Defense
has. We are not holding back information, sir.
Mr. Burton. I will be happy to yield to my colleague from New
Jersey, but this mystifies me. In the testimony, Mr. Houlihan
called the air base.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. You do not know who he talked to.
Mr. McMahan. No, sir. I do not.
Mr. Burton. And nobody at the Defense Department knows who
he talked to.
Mr. McMahan. No, sir. I am not saying that. I do not know
Mr. Burton. Well, before you came to testify today, did not any-
body suggest to you that this might be one of the main questions
we would ask?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Chairman, if I could.
Mr. Burton. Sure. I would be happy to yield.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Houlihan, and I am going to read a lot
of his testimony into the record to make sure that everyone under-
stands it. He spoke to the senior director technician at the Air De-
fense facility. Since this hearing will go on for a little bit longer,
if you could perhaps tell someone who is in your staff to find out
for us what is the name of the individual who has the title senior
10
director technician at the Air Defense facility at Tyndall. I do not
know that would be too difficult and who was working that day at
that time, February 24th around 3 p.m.
Mr. McMahan. 3:15 to be exact.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Is it possible that you could tell someone
right now?
Mr. McMahan. I did not bring anybody with me, but there may
be
Ms. Ros-Lehtenen. I know you had no opening statement. You
have nothing to say. We asked you questions and you say you are
not the right person to answer. So if I could make a direct request
for you to have someone find out in the span of this hour or so of
this hearing who the person was who was the senior director tech-
nician at the Air Defense facility at Tyndall Air Force base in Flor-
ida?
Mr. Burton. At that particular date and time, is that correct?
Because it is a 24-hour-a-day operation. So you are asking for
the
Ms. Ros-Lehtenen. February 24th, 3 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. 1996.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. That is the reason that we are having this
hearing. That is the date and that is the time.
Mr. Burton. Pardon me. I reclaim my time. You have a colonel
who is with you today. Would it be possible for him to make that
kind of a phone call to see if you could get that information?
Mr. McMahan. I would be more than happy to try.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. I appreciate that. My good colleague
from New Jersey who is very patient. Bob Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Fernandez,
Colonel, when were you told that you were going to testify here
today?
Mr. McMahan. I was told late day before yesterday, sir.
Mr. Menendez. Late the day before yesterday.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. About 18.
Mr. Menendez. 18 is 6 in the evening?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Menendez. Did you have an opportunity to prepare for this
hearing?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. What I tried to do was review all the
information that we had at U.S. Atlantic Command and also all of
the information that is available throughout the Department of De-
fense. But I did not get into the details of specific people that were
at a location, sir. I thought this would be more along the line of
what actions and reactions were taken rather than asking for a
name. I apologize for not knowing that, sir.
Mr. Menendez. No, I am not concerned about that. I am worried
that the name is one thing, and not knowing more things is an-
other. I was concerned you did not even have a sense of other an-
swers that we might be asking.
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I will give you the best answers I have.
Mr. Menendez. I am sure you will.
Mr. McMahan. I promise you that.
11
Mr. Menendez. The question is whether you are in the capacity
to be able to do so. Let me ask you have you seen Mr. Basulto's
testimony that he is going to give before this committee?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I have not had an opportunity.
Mr. Menendez. I am going to show you a copy of his testimony
because my questions are elicited directly from his statement. And
I think since he is going to appear after you, I would like to have
him appear before you so that you can then respond. But I will ask
you the questions that he is going to be presenting to this commit-
tee and I hope that you can run down them with me and give me
some answers.
Mr. McMahan. I will try.
Mr. Menendez. As it is being presented to you, it is on page two
of four of the testimony he is going to provide before the committee.
The page begins we are convinced that if you review all of the
growing evidence which he describes as evidence received by U.S.
sworn court testimony, audio recordings of conversation between
MiG pilots and the Cuban controller's report by the International
Civil Aviation organization and others, it comes to the following
conclusions. And he says the U.S. Grovernment authorities were
aware of the especially dangerous conditions which threatened our
humanitarian mission on February 24 and that MiGs were in the
air that morning. He also says, contrary to previous instances, this
information was not shared with Brothers to the Rescue. And that
comes from an ICAO report. Are you aware of information as it re-
lates to that statement?
Mr. McMahan. I will be more than happy to share with you the
information I have. I think I have some that I might be able to
help you with.
With regard to the U.S. Government authorities, we are aware
of an especially dangerous situation. I am unaware that it was con-
sidered an unusual day or that there was an increase in tension
but there was no change in military posture. We had normal con-
cerns that we have day in and day out about Cuba, the military
and their readiness posture. I am unaware of any unusual factors.
Mr. Menendez. Were you aware of any unusual factors on Feb-
ruary 24th?
Mr. McMahan. No, not prior to the shootdown obviously.
Mr. Menendez. Is it customary to provide information that
might be considered unusual with Brothers to the Rescue and their
flight?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I am unaware of the details on how informa-
tion was transmitted to the Brothers to the Rescue. So I am unable
to answer that question. Although we share information within the
intelligence community, there is always a large sharing of informa-
tion throughout all levels of the intelligence community.
Mr. Menendez. But the Air Force directly would not normally
share information with Brothers to the Rescue or would they?
Mr. McMahan. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Burton. All right. So maybe we will hear from the person
who has this information.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Menendez. Second point. The U.S. Government authorities
prepared an unusually elaborate plan to follow, monitor and docu-
12
ment Brothers to the Rescue's February 24 flight. And if you read
the page there in front of you, it goes on to hst several things, in-
cluding alerting several radar reporters from the U.S. Air Force
and Customs and listening to all the communications of the aircraft
involved. Can you respond to those statements? Is that true to your
knowledge?
Mr. McMahan. I would not have characterized it quite the same
if I could use my words to maybe characterize what the normal
process is as I know it. And that is that there are several radars,
U.S. Department of Defense radars and custom radars, that all
feed into a central facility and I believe that during the closed
hearing later, you are going to be with an individual that can even
give you better information about that facility and how they fuse
that information. At that facility they are concerned about not only
military flights, but also civilian flights because of the nature of
what their business is which is Customs.
Therefore, they pay very close attention and sort and that is a
term that I will try and explain. It is taking a look at a radar re-
turn and identify it as to who it is so that they can track it. At
Customs they sort those in a different way than we do in the De-
partment of Defense.
At the Department of Defense, we are concerned about military
aircraft and in particular NORAD and our facilities are concerned
about military aircraft that would be coming from the south and
toward the southern part of the United States from the Caribbean.
So in that way on a day-to-day basis, we take a look at many,
many returns, identify who they are, sort out those that have spe-
cial interest either because we think that they are military or
counterdrug which is another area the Department of Defense is
very active in, all in support of law enforcement. We feed that in-
formation on a regular basis.
So we would be interested to know about a flight that is going
down or coming back from that area. Who they are at least to the
extent that we would always want to know: is it likely that it is
a drug flight or is it a military flight or does it appear that they
would approach the continent of North America without proper
clearance and permission?
Mr. Menendez. Colonel, let me just fine point my question. I
have listened to your answer. Mr. Basulto's testimony was that an
elaborate plan was contrived including a learning radar facility
from the U.S. Air Force which you are here representing. Limited
to the U.S. Air Force was such an elaborate plan devised to follow
the tracking of the Brothers to the Rescue plane on this day?
Mr. McMahan. Not that I am aware of, sir.
Mr. Menendez. And let me ask you this. The third point of Mr.
Basulto's — there is a lot more and I obviously will not get it from
this period. Maybe some of my colleagues will follow up on it. If
not I will come back to it. U.S. Government authorities proceeded
passively to watch and listen in silence for 53 minutes while Cuban
MiGs hunted two Brothers to the Rescue planes, killed their four
occupants and chased the third plane to within 3 minutes of the
United States.
Can you respond to that? Did the U.S. Government, did the U.S.
Air Force sit back, watch, listen for 53 minutes doing absolutely
13
nothing in response and permit a third plane to be chased within
3 minutes of the United States?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, 53 minutes does not ring a bell with me. I
will refer to information you already have available to you which
is a transcript of the sequence of events as we know it and let me
see if I can come up with a time.
Mr. Menendez. You know, we did not get that. The transcript
you are referring to is a confidential transcript, is it not?
Mr. McMahan. No, sir.
Mr. Menendez. Is it a released transcript?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, it is a minute-by-minute, second-by-second,
list of the radio calls that were made and I believe that is public
information, sir.
Mr. Menendez. Oh, this is not the pilot transcript that you are
talking about. What transcript are you talking about? Maybe that
is the easiest way to do it. What transcript are you referring to?
Mr. McMahan. It indicates that this is a listing of radio calls
that were made.
Mr. Menendez. I am sorry, phone calls? What type of calls are
you referring to?
Mr. McMahan. Radio transmission, sir. It starts off with, the
version I have starts at 1955 Zulu and I think there is a 5-hour
difference. So that is 14 or 2:55 which is almost 3 o'clock and it
starts off with Havana talking to Cessna No. 1 which I believe is
referred to as Mr. Basulto's aircraft. And the first indication that
we have going back in time is somewhere around on the hour at
04. So 04 I believe the tragic occurrence occurred about 20 after if
I remember correctly. So that would be more like 16 minutes total
is my knowledge, sir. Not 53 minutes.
Mr. Menendez. Let me just finish. How about the part about
chasing a third plane, which I believe is Mr. Basulto's actual plane,
to within 3 minutes of the United States?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, depending on the speed of a MiG, let us as-
sume it is Mach 1 which is going very fast, Mach 1 probably faster
than they would go, that is 10 miles a minute. So that is 30 miles.
To my knowledge they did not go north of the 24th parallel.
Mr. Menendez. To your knowledge they did not go north of the
24th parallel.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Menendez. And what is that in context of time to the United
States, into the U.S. air space?
Mr. McMahan. I do not know off the top of my head, sir, but it
is probably less than 10 minutes would be my guess. If you are al-
ready airborne and traveling at max going directly at the United
States. So even under your scenario, what you are saying is that,
and correct me if I am wrong, that MiGs pursued Mr. Basulto with-
in 10 minutes of the United States?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I know that they did not penetrate the 24th,
both in looking back over my notes and what I have read. So I
think your statement is correct only if they went max speed. But
I would not put a time on it because it depends on how direct
flight, what their speed was. It varies. But I would say that if they
went max speed, you are probably correct. Knowing that you could
take
36-388 97-2
14
Mr. Roth. Mr. Chairman, I know we will have a second round.
Mr. Burton. We will have another round. The gentlelady from
Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, very much for appearing before us. I wanted to read some of
the statements of Mr. Houlihan into the record. I refer to the letter
that I received August 30th from the Department of Defense and
ask you why they contradict what Mr. Houlihan says, and these
are court documents.
Through that entire area, the Southeast Air Defense has made
it very clear to me in briefings of the Southeast Air Defense, that
anything that pops up inside that area they will launch their inter-
ceptor aircraft immediately. Their assumption being that anything
that pops up in that area heading toward the United States is com-
ing out of Cuba.
Judge Pope: Would it be fair to say that the MiGs you saw were
in that area?
The Witness: Yes.
And the witness is Mr. Houlihan under oath.
And that is why you made the phone call.
Yes.
And as far as you determined, Judge Pope continues, from what
you saw interceptors were launched.
That is correct. Your Honor.
And Major Houlihan goes on to say, I spoke to the senior director
technician at the Air Defense facility.
And what did you tell him?
I told him that I saw a high speed primary only aircraft coming
out of the Cuban ADIZ, that I suspected that it was a Cuban MiG
and that it was going directly over Brothers to the Rescue. I can
recall almost specifically the words I used.
This is Major Houlihan under oath being quizzed by the Judge.
What I told him was do you see the Brothers to the Rescue air-
craft? The senior director technician replied, yes, that he did. I said
do you know what is going on with them today? And he said, yes.
We have been briefed. And then said do you see that primary air-
craft, 500 knot primary? And he said, yes, we see it. I said, well,
it looks like a MiG-23 to me heading directly toward the United
States. I think that is important. And he responded, yes, we are
handling it. Do not worry.
He goes on to say, and being quizzed, why did you take this pic-
ture? I took the picture because of the Cuban MiGs. I was con-
cerned. I had never seen Cuban MiGs out there flying before and
to see this it struck my attention. I was worried about what was
going on. I had certainly never seen them come out, outside their
ADIZ.
In fact, I had flat never seen them flying out before. They gen-
erally have a lot of problems providing fuel from what I have been
told. And I have never in the 2 years we have been watching that
area seen them fly at all. To see two up at the same time, to see
them coming directly at the Brothers to the Rescue aircraft and by
that northbound toward the United States concerned me. He goes
on to say it was the one that was directly over the Brothers to the
15
Rescue that was inside international air space heading for the
United States. He was on a northwest bound also.
He goes on to say, you have called the Brothers to the Rescue
hangar, is that correct?
Yes, I have.
And you have dialed the number?
Yes.
Do you know the number?
No, not by heart.
Do you have it handy at your console?
It is in our data base.
So you could call it up pretty quickly then?
Yes.
How long would it take you to call it up?
A matter of a minute to a minute and a half.
A minute and a half?
Depending on what route I took to get into the data base to get
it. A minute and a half
And then we have this letter. I am extremely disturbed by this
letter because it seems to contradict this testimony and it says our
air defense personnel were informed by a custom radar operator of
the MiGs closing on slower aircraft and reply that they also had
the aircraft on their radars. However, neither party knew that the
slow-moving aircraft were Brothers to the Rescue aircraft or were
aware of the Cuban Government's intentions.
Now, that seems to flat out contradict the testimony that has
come out under oath given by Mr. Houlihan in a Federal court in
Southern Florida. How do you account for that contradiction?
Also, the aircraft were operating in well-defined Cuban air de-
fense identification zone. Under those circumstances, it would have
not been improper for the Cuban MiGs to carry out a legitimate
aircraft identification mission. That is what we thought the Cuban
MiGs were doing. However, our personnel were not in a position to
have anticipated the unwarranted shooting of Brothers to the Res-
cue aircraft.
We understand that no one could have seen that, but I think the
evidence clearly points to the fact that the aircraft were identified,
both by Mr. Houlihan as well as this secret individual who we still
do not know who he is and that is the gentleman who talked to
Major Jeffrey Houlihan, the Southeast Air Defense at Tyndall Air
Force base, clearly identified, and this was under oath, clearly
identified as Brothers to the Rescue aircraft. And yet, this letter
says neither party knew about the slow-moving aircraft being
Brothers to the Rescue aircraft.
And Mr. Houlihan says almost specifically he can recall word by
word of what he said and that troubles me. And this part about
being the well-defined Cuban air defense identification zone, that
seems to contradict a lot of this testimony. If you could clear up
for us what accounts for these two different versions of what went
on. And we would really be interested how this letter could have
been written after the fact when this hearing took place when the
testimonies clearly contradict. Can you clear up some of those con-
tradictions for us?
16
Mr. McMahan. I am unaware of the contents of the testimony.
I have not had an opportunity to read it. I do not know if the De-
partment of Defense has a copy of that testimony. I suspect some-
where someone does, but I do not know that for a fact. I will be
more than happy to answer a couple of the questions and maybe
it will satisfy the basic points that you are looking for. I hope it
does.
There is a 12-mile limit around Cuba that is considered the terri-
torial limit of Cuba. Then there is an Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ) and most nations of the world have what they call an
ADIZ, Air Defense Identification Zone. That zone is well-defined on
maps. And it goes up to the 24th parallel in one area, in the area
that is closest to the United States, and then curves away depend-
ing on how the island of Cuba is versus the United States. So in
that way there is a well-defined zone.
I believe you also asked the question of Mr. Houlihan — could you
repeat that part of it? I am sorry. I may have lost the question.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense has sent me a letter dated August 30th. Mr. Howard G.
DeWolf, director, InterAmerican Region. Now, either Mr. DeWolf is
lying or Major Houlihan is lying. Major Houlihan swore under oath
in a Federal court in the southern district of Florida the following:
That he clearly identified the presence of Cuban MiGs, that he
clearly identified Brothers to the Rescue aircraft. That he clearly
notified an official at Tyndall Air Force Base in our home state of
Florida.
Yet, this letter says neither party knew that the slow-moving air-
craft were Brothers to the Rescue aircraft. Now, both cannot be cor-
rect. Either Major Houlihan under oath is not telling the truth in
which case we, of course, will be talking to Mr. Houlihan.
It was the committee's intention to have him here. He is only not
here because it was the specific request of the Administration not
to have him in this open hearing. I do not know why because his
statements are there under oath for the record. And that is why
we keep harping on his statement to make sure that it is in the
record.
So whatever you wanted to avoid by not having him here, we are
going out of our way to make sure that is on the record. And I do
not know why you say and how it helps you in any way to say that
Brothers to the Rescue aircraft were not identified wnen it seems
very clear that they were identified.
And then you talk about this international air space when Mr.
Houlihan has testified once again under oath in a Federal court
that it was the one that was directly over Brothers to the Rescue
aircraft that was inside international air space heading for the
United States.
I do not know why you can conclude that this was in any way
a "legitimate aircraft identification mission" unless what you want
is to go out of your way to avoid a direct confrontation with Fidel
Castro, not put yourself in a position that you would have to take
action as Mr. Houlihan pointed out in his many briefings.
The Southeast Air Defense has made it very clear to me in brief-
ings that anything that pops up inside that area they will launch
their interceptor aircraft on immediately.
17
It seems to me that all of these things are contradicting and that
is what I was trying to get at. And in my second round of question-
ing I will be glad to get to some other contradictory evidence. But
do you have anything to state to us about that? I am sorry I have
run out of time. But if you could conclude.
Mr. McMahan. I do not know whether General DeWolf had ac-
cess to that information. There is yet a third explanation and that
was that General DeWolf was unaware that Mr. Houlihan had said
that. But, I do not know. Could we take that one for the record and
research it so that we give you a really proper answer on that? I
think that would probably be best.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And we want to know if you have contracted
Brothers to the Rescue before why they were not contacted in this
incident?
Mr. McMahan. I will be more than happy to research that. I am
personally unaware of it. I wish I could give you the answer.
Mr. Burton. Before I yield to my colleague, Mr. Lincoln Diaz-
Balart, let me ask you to convey a message from me to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. They have asked you
to come and testify here today and I am sure you are doing your
best, but you are not the right person to be talking to us today and
I think they know that.
Now, even after we adjourn sine die as chairman of this Sub-
committee I have the ability to hold hearings. And I want you to
know and I want you to convey to the Defense Department that we
are going to get to the bottom of this. And for the Defense Depart-
ment to send you up here instead of the people who have the an-
swers and are well prepared to give us the answers is an obfusca-
tion of the whole issue, as far as I am concerned.
And I do not think you have anything to do with it. I think you
are the one they just sent up here and it really ticks me off. This
is just ridiculous. We have all kinds of testimony that my col-
leagues, both Democrats and Republicans, have been alluding to,
and we are not getting any answers. It really bothers me.
So we will have another hearing on this and the next time we
will have the specific names of who we ought to be questioning. If
we have to, we will subpoena the appropriate witnesses and tney
will be here and they will testify. So tell the people over at the Pen-
tagon to not do this anymore. We want to get the answers. We
want to find out a number of things.
I am looking at a map here and it shows that when the Cuban
MIGs shot down those unarmed aircraft they were right off the tip
of the keys. They were not that far from the keys. They were al-
most parallel with the tip of the keys of the United States of Amer-
ica in international air space. It is unbelievable that we did not
have scrambled F-16 fighter planes down there. And it is also in-
conceivable to me that the Cubans, if they saw those U.S. MiGs
coming up would not have taken some evasive action, especially in
view of the fact that this guy said they are going right over Broth-
ers to the Rescue MiGs before any of this took place. So I want that
message conveyed and I hope the State Department will also get
this message. We are going to have more hearings on this and we
are going to get to the bottom of it. I do not care how long it takes.
I would now yield to my colleague.
18
Mr. Diaz-Bai^rt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
you for your commitment, in your words, to get to the bottom of
this which I think we do need to do as a Congress.
Colonel, I know that you are not a policymaker and that you do
not even decide to bring yourself down here. You are under oath,
however.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You were told according to your testimony
then at 6 p.m. on September 16th that you would be the one testi-
fying here?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. It is my recollection that that is correct.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Now, can you brief us specifically as to how
then you proceeded to prepare for this meeting?
Mr. McMahan. I will be more than happy to, sir. What I did was
I went back through all of our Atlantic Command records. I was
not positive of the exact nature of the hearing, whether it was what
happened before, during or after. But I went ahead and researched
all three of those areas.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. How?
Mr. McMahan. I went through the records and talked to individ-
uals that were on the duty desk at the U.S. Atlantic Command. I
received information — excuse me.
Mr. Dl\z-Balart. Yes, could you tell me who you spoke to with
regard to that research?
Mr. McMahan. A specific name, sir?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, sir.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. I talked to Lieutenant Colonel John
Lewis.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. John Lewis?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And what is his title, sir? I mean, where is he
located?
Mr. McMahan. He is in the U.S. Atlantic Command.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And what did you speak to Lieutenant Colonel
Lewis about?
Mr. McMahan. About the events of that day, sir. He was the
command duty officer at the time of the unfortunate loss of the two
aircraft. And we discussed mainly the search and rescue efforts.
That is the thrust of our involvement there in the Command Cen-
ter. It revolved around the search and rescue effort. So we dis-
cussed that. I went back and talked to people from the intelligence,
the J-2 office, variety of action officers, one or two, that are our
Cuba experts.
Mr. Dl\z-Balart. Could you give me their names, please?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I do not recall their names off the top of my
head, but I will be more than happy to give them to you for the
record.
Mr. Diaz-Bai^rt. So though this was night before last, you do
not know who you spoke to, their names?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, what I did was I put a request for informa-
tion out to the J-2 office.
Mr. Diaz-Baiart. J-2, that is initial J?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. That is intelligence. I am sorry to use
acronyms. It is a DoD habit I am afraid. It is the intelligence folks.
19
I wanted to review the information that they had with regards to
what was the best information that was available. I put emphasis
on what was unclassified, which by the way most of it is now be-
cause it has been brought out in various testimony on the sequence
of events. So I gleaned that information. I would know in case this
was an open testimony, which it is, what the classification limits
were. And also just to get through the sequence of events because
it has been several long months since then and I needed to refresh
my memory as far as the sequence.
I also spoke to Mrs. Fernandez a couple of times very late yester-
day so that we would know what our background was before we
came over here and so that we would have an opportunity to get
to know each other since I have not had the opportunity to work
directly with Mrs. Fernandez in the past.
And I did a great deal of personal reading going back through
the documents, the press release that the White House gave, the
sequence of events that I referred to earlier, the radio calls and the
timing. I went back and tried to reconstruct those pieces of infor-
mation so that I would be able to address the larger issues of what
the sequence was and the real bottom line of, is it preventable?
And I tried to come up to a conclusion of that and my conclusion
is, it is not preventable. It was not at the time with the information
that we had.
Mr. Diaz-BaIoART. So vour answer with regard to who you spoke
to in preparation for tnis hearing was Lieutenant Colonel John
Lewis, two individuals at Defense intelligence?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. I would say a couple of individuals there
at U.S. Atlantic Command, our intelligence office that we have
there.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Defense intelligence at Atlantic Command.
Mr. McMahan. Sir, they are defense intelligence, but they are
not the Defense Intelligence Agency. I am sorry to pick words, but
I just wanted to make sure that it was not misconstrued. They are
part of the same command that I belong to.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Atlantic Command, right?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. D1AZ-BAI.ART. So two people who work on intelligence issues
for the Atlantic Command. Would that be a correct way to describe
it?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. But you do not recall that.
Mr. McMahan. And there may be more. I do not know who all
worked on — I put out a request for information.
Mr. Dl\z-Balart. Just who you spoke to.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Two individuals then who worked on intel-
ligence matters for the Atlantic Command?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. There might have been three. It was at
least two. I do not remember. These are people that I see in the
hallways a great deal. I was not trying to determine who I talked
to. I was after the information rather than the faces behind them,
sir. And I apologize for not knowing their names.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. So you worked with them, but you do not re-
call any of their names, is that correct?
20
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I do not remember at this point in time.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You do not.
Mr. McMahan. I apologize. I probably should remember them. I
do see them, but
Mr. Diaz-Bai^art. Not even one name. You do not recall even one
name of those people?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I do not. I am sorry.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. OK. And then you spoke to Ms. Fernandez and
then you did reading during this process. I know it is a very in-
tense process because you have had a very little amount of time.
Now, who informed you, Colonel, that you would be coming here
today?
Mr. McMahan. General Gile who is the J-3.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Gile?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. He is my immediate boss who has just
arrived at U.S. Atlantic Command about a month and a half ago,
I guess.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I am correct to assume that he was the officer
then who spoke to you informing you would be coming here at ap-
proximately 6 p.m. the night before last.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. And I am not sure of the exact time. I
will be honest with you. I did not keep a log on it. I knew that it
was late in the day and what I did was I gathered initial informa-
tion.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Jeffrey Gile.
Mr. McMahan. No, sir. General Gile.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Oh, general. First name, sir?
Mr. McMahan. He is Greg Gile.
Mr. Dlaz-Balart. Greg.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And there is no one else then that you spoke
to in preparation for this hearing?
Mr. McMahan. I spoke to the individual that you sent out of the
room. He is back now, Dennis Balkham, who is from the Joint Staff
Legislative Assistant's office. For the administrative arrangements
of when I would need to be where, when was the hearing.
Mr. Dl\z-Balart. I did not get that last name, sorry.
Mr. McMahan. Balkham, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Balkham?
Mr. McMahan. Balkham. With the Joint Staff.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. The Legislative Assistant's office.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. That is it then, sir? To the best of your recol-
lection. We are going to follow up and it is important to know who
spoke to you.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. I may have spoken to other people, but
I do not recall anybody
Mr. Dl\z-Bai^rt. Is it possible you spoke to someone from the
National Security Council?
Mr. McMahan. Oh, no sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Is it possible that you spoke to General
Sheehan? Did he speak to you about this?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I had spoken to him on that day. He asked
me what I knew about a hearing. He asked if I had heard that one
21
was going to occur today. And all I did was say, sir, all I have
heard is the rumor that there will be a hearing on
Mr. Diaz-Baiju^t. When was that conversation with General
Sheehan?
Mr. McMahan. Oh, sir. I would guess it was earlier that same
day. I do not know what time it was.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. So that is another person that you spoke to
concerning this hearing.
Mr. McMahan. I would not characterize it as speaking about the
hearing. He asked me if I had heard if there was going to be a
hearing and I responded to him, "Sir, I have heard that there may
be a hearing." And that was the extent of the conversation, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Someone just handed a note to you. Maybe
they can clarify this issue.
Mr. McMahan. No, sir. It does not add any information.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Did you speak to General Sheehan after you
spoke to General Gile or before?
Mr. McMahan. No, sir. I did not.
Mr. Dl\z-Balart. No, no. After or before I am asking.
Mr. McMahan. Oh. General Sheehan asked the question and I
speak to General Gile several times a day, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Sir, sir. You were informed by General Gile
that you would testify here today, is that correct?
Mr. McMahan. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Did you speak to General Sheehan with regard
to what you have described after that conversation or prior to that
conversation?
Mr. McMahan. It was prior to the knowledge that I was going
to be the witness here. I spoke to General Sheehan prior to the fact
that I was going to be a witness here. General Gile later informed
me that not only was there going to be a hearing, but that I would
be the representative that would attend from U.S. Atlantic Com-
mand.
Mr. Dl\z-Balart. So you were informed, let me see if I under-
stand it correctly, that you would be testifying here today after
your last conversation with General Sheehan.
Mr. McMahan. Yes. Sir, there was only one conversation that
even mentioned this. And the extent of the conversation was his
question to me of, "Did I know if there was going to be a hearing
or not." It was not "discussed".
Mr. Diaz-Balart. So he asked you about this hearing despite the
fact that you say that you did not know that you were going to be
here that day about that hearing.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. When he calls to the office, someone an-
swers the phone. General Gile was not present. I am the next rank-
ing and therefore I answered the phone. It was a simple courtesy
of answering the phone and I was the person at the other end, sir.
Mr. Burton. Do you know a Major Robert DeAngelo?
Mr. McMahan. No, sir. I do not, not that I am aware of.
Mr. Burton. Are you aware of Lieutenant Colonel Key, USA
Command?
Mr. McMahan. No, sir. K-E-Y?
Mr. Burton. K-E-Y. Or Brigadier General James Turner?
Mr. McMahan. No, sir.
22
Mr. Burton. Well, right after the shootdown, I called down thei
and talked to Major Robert DeAngelo. I believe he was the fellow
I talked to. And when I started questioning him about this, he said,
"Yeah, we knew about these things." And then he referred me to
Lieutenant Colonel Key who was really abrupt and whom we
thought should have been taken to task because of the way he was
responding to us. But the response I got from him was entirely dif-
ferent than that of Major Robert DeAngelo. But you do not know
either one of those people.
Mr. McMahan. Sir, was that the U.S. Atlantic Command or was
it possible
Mr. Burton. U.S. Atlantic Command, Lieutenant Colonel Key,
right. And I think Major Robert DeAngelo was his subordinate who
was in charge that day.
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I apologize.
Mr. Burton. OK. Let me ask one more question. Ms. Fernandez,
you just got a note. Did you find the information that we were re-
ferring to?
Ms. Fernandez. Yes, sir. The information that has just been pro-
vided to us refers to the following individual. That on February 24,
Senior Southeast District watch officer was Colonel Frank Willy,
W-I-L-L-Y, U.S. Air Force, and he is now retired.
Mr. Burton. W?
Ms. Fernandez. If I may, W-I-L-L-Y.
Mr. Burton. Willy?
Ms. Fernandez. I believe that that is the way it would be pro-
nounced, Willy.
Mr. Burton. Frank Willy. And he is now retired?
Ms. Fernandez. And the information that has been provided
here is it indicates that he is now retired.
Mr. Burton. OK But he was the one who was on duty and re-
ceived that transmission at that time?
Ms. Fernandez. Based on the information I have, sir, it says
here on the paper, on February 24, Senior Southeast District watch
officer was the individual whose name I just provided you.
Mr. Burton. OK Now, did you have any information on how we
could get hold of him if we need to?
Ms. Fernandp:z. We can certainly try, sir.
Mr. Burton. Could you do that for us because we probably want
to ask him to come and testify, and hopefully he will do that volun-
tarily. My good friend from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Fernandez, I would just like to ask you first of all: the background
of this hearing and much of what has gone on during the last 3
years vis-a-vis Cuban policy has been a continued overture toward
the Castro dictatorship by the Clinton administration. The Cuban/
American agreement on immigration is an example. My sub-
committee oversees refugee policy, and I consider it to be an abso-
lute shame. We will rue the day when we made Fidel Castro part
of our immigration apparatus, with the proviso that he use mainly
persuasive means, which is absurd. And when his thugs beat peo-
ple whom we have sent back to the island of Cuba, there is really
no response.
23
So this Administration has a tremendous credibiHty gap when it
comes to Cuba.
I would Hke to ask a number of questions. What has the Chnton
administration's attitude been, both before February 24th and
today, concerning the rescue flights that are undertaken by the
Brothers to the Rescue? Do they support them? Do they oppose
them? Are they somewhere in between? Do they discourage them?
Ms. Fernandez. I guess the best way of answering the question
is that we recognize the ability of individuals to be able to freely
express themselves in various different forms. The concern that we
have is that at times such expression may take the position where
it is a violation of rules and regulations. And it is unfortunately,
but that is true. And there are certain limitations that must be im-
posed in certain conduct when in fact it could hamper national se-
curity, No. 1. And No. 2, it is a violation of the law. The activities
of entering into the sovereign air space of another country is in fact
a violation and that is seen as a law enforcement issue now. And
the issues involving Brothers to the Rescue or similar activities
now come under the auspices of the Coast Guard and the Customs,
under the Department of Transportation.
Mr. Smith. But as a general policy, does the Administration sup-
port or oppose Brothers to the Rescue?
Ms. Fernandez. I cannot speak for the Administration.
Mr. Smith. Having been asked, would you provide that to us?
Ms. Fernandez. I will, certainly.
Mr. Smith. Perhaps the State Department Cuban Affairs Direc-
tor who is here could come to the microphone and respond to that.
Please identify yourself
Mr. Ranneberger. Yes, Congressman, Mike Ranneberger, Coor-
dinator for Cuban Affairs. Certainly we regard the activities of
Brothers to the Rescue in searching for migrants who may be at
sea as a legitimate activity. It is a humanitarian activity and, of
course, as such is inherently non-political.
Where our concerns do come into play, and I think we have made
these a matter of record, is in more recent times there have been
several alleged incursions of Brothers to the Rescue into the Cuban
territorial air space which does in our view raise law enforcement
issues and potential issues of danger with respect to the Cuban
Government.
Mr. Smith. If I could ask you an additional question. In our dia-
log with Fidel Castro or any Cuban official, has the work of Broth-
ers to the Rescue ever come up in that dialog in any meeting at
any time?
Mr. Ranneberger. The work of Brothers to the Rescue in
searching for migrants has never come up. The possible alleged vio-
lations of Brothers to the Rescue into Cuban air space has come up.
Mr. Smith. And what has been their side and their representa-
tion? And what has been our response?
Mr. Ranneberger. Well, they have claimed, and I do not have
the specific dates in from of me, but I believe on three separate oc-
casions in 1995 and earlier this year prior to the shootdown that
Brothers to the Rescue had made incursions into Cuban territorial
airspace.
24
We had told the Cubans that if they had information to substan-
tiate such allegations, they should provide it if they wanted to.
That we were looking into whether such alleged incursions were a
violation of U.S. law or regulations. And that if it did turn out to
be a violation of U.S. law and regulations, we would take appro-
priate action.
Mr. Smith. Were there any changes in U.S. Government re-
sponse to Brothers to the Rescue aircraft or any of their endeavors
after those conversations as it relates to policy, military or other-
wise?
Mr. Ranneberger. Not as such. There was certainly no change
in terms of our attitude toward their searching for migrants at sea.
Nor were there any efforts made to discourage them from doing it.
Mr. Smith. What about within air space or the territorial limits?
Mr. Ranneberger. Right. Well, in that respect obviously after
the first allegation occurred which was some time I believe in the
middle of 1975, and I would have to get back to you on the specifics
of that. Our concern about possible violations of Cuban air space
obviously heightened if you will say eye on Brothers to the Rescue
activities. With respect to the possibility of such activities occurring
in the future. And investigations were launched by other agencies
I think, appropriate law enforcement agencies, into whether there
had been these alleged incursions. And I think separately different
agencies have talked about those. So that was what our policy was.
Mr. Smith. I would ask you if you could provide the details of
those conversations, the dates and times with the Cuban officials
for the record of this hearing. Let me ask you about what has been
said previously, and Mr. Jose Basulto makes this comment in his
testimony which will follow, namely that the U.S. Air Force ignored
the equivalent of a 911 call made to them by Major Jeffrev
Houlihan for March Air Force Base in an attempt to save the life
of the BTTR pilots.
U.S. Air Force abandons its standard operating procedure to dis-
patch the interceptors upon the MiGs crossing the 12-mile terri-
torial limit of the island of Cuba. Major Houlihan gave sworn testi-
mony as to the existence of this standard operating procedure and
trigger line. Was that standard operating procedure at any time
prior to February 24th and was that altered in any way, shape or
form as a result of any of our dialog with the Cuban officials?
Mr. Ranneberger. Well, obviously I will let DoD address what
our military posture was. I can say from the state side that I am
not aware that there was any alteration in our military posture as
a reaction to those discussions with the Cubans.
Mr. Smith. Could I ask you if you could, again for the record, ask
other officials with whom you would have contact so that we can
have the absolute, definitive bottom line on that issue as to wheth-
er there was any change, any alteration in the policy vis-a-vis
whether or not we scramble jets if such an incident is occurring?
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield on that?
Mr. Smith. I would be happy to yield on that point.
Mr. Burton. I sense a little equivocation on that and I agree
that we would like to have some specificity in that answer, but I
hope the gentleman will also address that question to the military
as well, because we may get a more conclusive answer.
25
Mr. Smith. Secretary Fernandez.
Ms. Fernandez. I do not have an answer for you right now on
that, but I would certainly take that for the record and provide you
with that information.
Mr. Smith. I would appreciate that. Let me ask two final ques-
tions if I may, Mr. Chairman. Has the United States ever agreed
or given any signal to the officials of the Cuban Government that
we would not intervene in the event of an attack on a Brothers to
the Rescue aircraft?
Mr. Ranneberger. Again, and I am sure I would be aware of
this, absolutely not would be my answer to that. In fact, in our dis-
cussions with the Cuban Government which are a matter of record,
diplomatic notes went back and forth. The Cubans had warned, of
course, on a number of occasions, months before, that if aircraft en-
tered their territorial air space they would use any means nec-
essary to respond to that and we had said quite categorically that
any use of force, inappropriate force, against aircraft would be un-
acceptable and would have serious repercussions.
Mr. Smith. Did the U.S. officials meet with Cuban officials on
March 2nd, 1996 in New York or at any other time or place to dis-
cuss or possibly mutually agree upon, convenient positions that
both sides would take vis-a-vis this incident, especially as it relates
to the crossing of the 24th parallel? And let me again ask, is it the
view of the Administration, both the military and the State Depart-
ment that the MiGs never crossed?
Mr. Ranneberger. I think you are referring, Congressman, I be-
lieve the date is March 2nd. Although I would want to double check
my notes to a so-called secret meeting in New York between Cuban
and U.S. officials. Such a meeting did take place between officials
of both sides. That was, of course, a fully coordinated step within
the Administration. I was not at that meeting. My understanding
in obtaining readouts of that meeting after the fact was that we
presented information about the facts of what we knew had hap-
pened on February 24th. But the purpose of this was to make clear
to the Cuban Government that no purpose would be served in their
attempt to falsify what had happened. It was an effort in effect to
get them to accept responsibility for the reprehensible action and
to admit that it had occurred in international air space. Again, I
certainly have no reason to believe and no knowledge that any —
there was no discussion of an accommodation with respect to our
postures. We were not there to negotiate. We were there simply to
lay out the facts. And I also would say that as far as I am aware,
again all the information that I have ever seen on this indicates
that no MiG aircraft ever came north of the 24th parallel.
Mr. Smith. I yield back and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank
you.
Mr. Burton. You are absolutely certain that no MiGs came
north of the 24th parallel.
Mr. Ranneberger. Congressman, of course, I cannot say that be-
cause I was not watching the radar screens. Again, nothing that I
have ever seen, and I have seen quite a bit of information as a re-
sult of the shootdown. None of it — I certainly came to this hearing
having followed this in great detail with the clear understanding
that no MiGs had ever come north of the 24th parallel.
26
Mr. Burton. I am going to be yielding really quickly to Chair-
man Ben Oilman, the chairman of the full committee.
Chairman Oilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. But before I do, let me just say one more thing. We
want a definitive answer to that question. No baloney. A definitive
answer. You know and the military knows if those MiOs came
north of the 24th parallel and we want to know the answer. No "I
do not think so." I want to know.
And if they did, why were our planes not scrambled? Why were
we not up there defending this country? Because according to the
map I have before me, they were almost even with the keys. So I
would like to have an answer to that as quickly as possible. Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman OILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to
commend you for conducting this hearing. If our panelists could tell
me, I have it in my notes that Retired Admiral Eugene Carroll,
Center for Defense Information, informed the State Department
and DIA that, during his visit to Cuba, the Cuban authorities had
asked him and others in his group how our government would
react if Cuba shot down exiled planes that violated Cuban air
space. But I do not see anywhere in the notes of what his response
was or what our government's response is. Can anyone tell me
that?
Mr. Ranneberger. Yes, sir. Admiral Carroll met with me at the
State Department and I know he has said in the press that he con-
veyed this "message" to the U.S. Oovernment. That was not my un-
derstanding of it and I was the person with whom he spoke. Here
is exactly what happened. He and a group from the Center for
International Policy, Wayne Smith's group, had been in Cuba. They
had been down there and had had meetings with military officials.
At my initiative, I asked him and the group to come in to debrief
me because I thought there might be some useful information out
of it. It had nothing to do with Brothers or any other threats. Dur-
ing the course of an hour and a half meeting, Admiral Carroll in
the 30-second comment said, and when I was talking to those mili-
tary officials, they said darn it. They are determined to stop these
violations of the air space and they will take any steps that they
have to. And I said, well, we are aware of that position. They have
repeatedly said they will use force in responding to violations of the
territory. It was in no sense conveyed to me as a message from the
Cuban Gk)vernment or any kind of specific threat against an up-
coming flight.
Chairman Oilman. So we did not respond in any manner to that
particular conversation.
Mr. Rannkhkrcer. Well, in the sense that that information we
already had because the Cubans had come into us .
Chairman Oilman. I am talking about the information that Ad-
miral Carroll gave to you of this conversation with the Cuban mili-
tary inquiring how we would react if exile planes crossed over into
their area. And did we respond to that at all?
Mr. RANNKBKRGKit. Well, Congressman, we did. We had already,
again, before that conversation, we had already told the Cu-
bans
27
Chairman Oilman. But with regard to this conversation, did we
do anything formally in writing or any other expression?
Mr. Ranneberger. Not in response to that conversation. I did
have subsequent discussions with Cuban officials and we did send
them diplomatic notes subsequently.
Chairman Oilman. Was that before this air strike?
Mr. Ranneberger. I would have to check the record. I believe so.
Chairman Oilman. Could you check that and inform this com-
mittee of whether or not we did respond to this warning, an appar-
ent warning by the Cubans of that kind of strike and what the re-
action would be? So that I am clear in my mind, I would ask the
panelists, what is our strategy when any MiOs start approaching
our air space? Is there a standard operating procedure, a trigger
line as to how close Cuban MiOs can approach our nation before
interceptors are launched?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, if that question
Chairman Oilman. Colonel, go ahead.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. I believe that that answer should be
given in a closed session because of sensitivity and the fact that it
has to do with our national defense.
Chairman Oilman. I do not understand the sensitivity of it. You
apparently did not scramble in this instance, which is an indication
that apparently being a couple of minutes away from our nation
did not warrant a scramble. Why is that this is sensitive informa-
tion that you cannot divulge here?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I think it is always wise in the military, to
not show a hand before we have to. We do not want to give defini-
tive information to people in an open session that might use it
against us.
Chairman Oilman. Are the Cubans aware of any of our standard
operating procedures?
Mr. McMahan. To my knowledge, sir, that is classified informa-
tion. Therefore, we have tried to keep it from them. And to my
knowledge, they do not know what that standard procedure is or
what the operations are.
Chairman OILMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will find
it within your province to obtain this kind of information for us.
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. I will be more than happy to supply it
for the record. We certainly will make that request.
Chairman Oilman. Is it customary to see Cuban MiOs flying
north outside the 12-mile territorial limit of Cuba?
Mr. McMahan. I would say that it is not unusual and I would
say that it has occurred over the years. It occurs
Chairman Oilman. Have we scrambled our plans when they
have done that?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, that is for NORAD to answer. I do not have
the answer on how many times. Obviously, sometimes we have. I
would have to guess, and NORAD would be able to answer that.
Probably for the record, again, would be an excellent way to do that
so we can give you better and more accurate information.
Chairman Oilman. And let me ask both of our military panelists
and Mr. Ranneberger, the chairman scheduled this hearing to try
to get the facts with regard to this intercept by the Cubans. And
you both come here without full information with regard to this in-
28
cident. Were you aware that you were going to be questioned with
regard to how this occurred?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I was informed about 6 o'clock a day and a
half ago.
Chairman Oilman. 6 o'clock when?
Mr. McMahan. Day before yesterday, sir, that I would be here.
Chairman Oilman. And did you review the topic of this hearing?
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. I reviewed everything that was available
that I could get my hands on in U.S. Atlantic Command.
Chairman Oilman. And did you recognize that you did not have
the information that would be needed?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I was not sure of the exact line of questions
that would come our direction and so I obviously failed to get the
information that you needed. And I think that it might be better
answered by someone that is more of an expert in that field than
I am.
Chairman Oilman. Well, did you state that to your commander?
Mr. McMahan. No, sir. I was here as a representative, I am here
as a representative of the U.S. Atlantic Command which is a dif-
ferent structure than NORAD is.
Chairman Oilman. Well, when you reviewed what the topic of
the hearing was and recognized that this would come under
NORAD, did you then point that out to any of your superiors?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, it also comes under the responsibility of the
U.S. Atlantic Command because the occurrence of the incident was
within our area of responsibility.
Chairman Oilman. Well, then how is it that you do not have full
information if it comes within your command?
Mr. McMahan. Because you are asking questions, sir, with re-
gard to NORAD's response which is a response for the defense of
North America. And so I am unable to answer those specific ques-
tions. I will be more than happy to take them back to the Depart-
ment of Defense for you and get the
Chairman OILMAN. Who in the Department of Defense would be
able to respond to those questions?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I do not have a specific name of someone,
but we will search out that individual or the offices so that we can
get a proper response for you.
Chairman OILMAN. And when will you get a proper response for
us?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, as soon as we can get the right answer for
you.
Chairman OILMAN. And how long will that take?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I do not know off the top of my head how
long that will take.
Chairman Oilman. Well, we are very much concerned about the
timeliness. This session of Congress winds up within about a 10-
day period.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Oilman. And we would like to know the answers be-
fore the congressional session winds up. I know the Chairman is
indicating he may go over beyond that period, but I for one would
like to know before we wind up just what information our defense
people have with regard to the operating procedures and why we
29
did not respond here with MiGs coming within a few minutes of
our coast Hne.
Mr. McMahan. Sir, we will do our very best to get it to you as
soon as possible.
Chairman Oilman. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Chairman, before you came to the meeting, I
talked to my colleagues on the subcommittee, and even though we
will be adjourning sine die within a couple of weeks, we were going
to make a request of the subcommittee to get subpoena power that
would go on to the end of the elective year so that we can subpoena
people who have relevant information on this issue.
Chairman Oilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. So we appreciate your help in that regard. Let me
just say before I yield to my colleagues again because I do not have
a great deal more in the way of questioning for this panel that I,
too, am very disappointed, and I have this visceral feeling that
there is a deliberate attempt on the part of the State Department
and the Defense Department to not give us the answers.
I just cannot believe that the people whom they sent here today
are so ill-prepared. And I am not saying that you are not bright
people, but you are just not prepared. You do not have the answers.
And this has to be more than just an oversight and that bothers
me a great deal. And that is why I want you to take this message
back: we will have additional hearings on this issue.
I also want to pose this question to the military and to the State
Department: we want to know exactly how far north those MiOs
went. I have heard on several occasions today any one of you say,
"Well, we do not believe they went above the 24th parallel." With
all of the technology we have, there has got to be an absolute defin-
itive answer to that question. And if they went north of the 24th
parallel, we want to know how far north they went and why that
happened.
In addition to that, the sworn testimony from the Court records
indicates that Mr. Houlihan, who we are going to be talking to in
a few moments, was told, or there was indications there were F-
16s on the runway ready to go up and they were shut down. I want
to know and this committee wants to know if there were F-16s on
the runway! Were they fired up and ready to go? If not, in what
position were they as far as launching?
Now, we have seen in some of this testimony, not your testimony,
but other testimony we have before us, that you can launch these
planes in a matter of 2 minutes, they can be well on their way to
their target in about 5 minutes, and they can intercept in no more
than 10 minutes. I know you said you cannot divulge that. How-
ever, I am saying that because it is in testimony in court records
that we have before us here today.
Now, if that is the case, and I am not asking you to say that be-
cause you have to be careful of what is said because of national se-
curity, but if that is the case, I want to know where those planes
were on the runway. If MiOs came up, what was the policy. And
if there was a policy that they were to be launched the minute they
crossed out of their territorial waters, why were they not launched?
We just want a complete answer to that question.
36-388 97-3
30
Mr. McMahan. Yes, sir. We will research that out and try and
get it as soon as possible for you.
Mr. Burton. And as Chairman Oilman said before he left, we
would like to have that as quickly as possible because it is going
to have a bearing on the additional hearings that we will have on
this matter.
The other thing that I would like for you to do (and I do not want
just conjecture), when you are researching this with other people
who have more knowledge, I would like to know what the previous
reaction was, if there was any, of Fidel Castro's MiGs when F-16s
did come up.
There must have been other occasions when they were flying, as
you said, outside their territorial air space when our planes scram-
bled because they thought there might be a move toward the Unit-
ed States because it was common policy. I want to know what the
reaction was in those previous cases, if any. Did the F-16s turn
around and high-tail it back to Cuba? Did they get back in their
own territorial air space? And if so, did they mess around out there
for a long period of time or did they just turn around and go right
back?
The reason I am asking these questions is because their answers
have a direct bearing on whether or not the Cuban MIGs would
have shot down those unarmed aircraft. Because if there is a his-
tory of Cuban F-16s turn-tailing and going back into their air
space because they did not want a confrontation with U.S. fighter
planes, then it is logical to assume that they may have done that
again if we had scrambled the planes in a timely manner and got-
ten them up there.
So we are looking at two issues here today as far as I am con-
cerned. One: did we properly protect those American aircraft that
we believe the U.S. military knew were up there? And second: are
we taking adequate precautions to protect the southern flank of the
United States from a crazy Fidel Castro at some point in the fu-
ture?
You know, we put a lot of pressure on Castro with the Helms-
Burton bill and his economy is foundering and he needs hard cur-
rency to survive. And we must watch him with a jaundiced eye be-
cause this guy is liable to do anything.
That being the case, are we and were we taking proper pre-
cautions to protect the southern part of the United States, Florida,
from an attack? It appears to me that if Cuban F-16s did come,
as depicted on this map, almost parallel, with the keys that they
could have been in Miami, a major population center in this coun-
try in just a matter of a few minutes. And if they had been able
to do that, we could have had big problems. With that, I will yield
to my colleague, Mr Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Fernandez, can
you tell me when you knew you were going to come here today?
Ms. Fi<:rnani)EZ. Yes, sir. I was advised that I would probably be
coming here last Friday.
Mr. Menendez. Last Friday.
Ms. Fernandez. That is correct.
31
Mr. Menendez. And did you have any say in determining who
came before the committee on behalf of the Department of Defense
to answer these questions?
Ms. Fernandez. No, I did not.
Mr. Menendez. May I ask what is the purpose of your visitation
here today?
Ms. Fernandez. I was asked to be here because Cuba is in my
portfoho. I do not have any information. I am not an operations
person. So I would have no information to provide within the oper-
ations area or the factual information asked, the minute-by-minute,
the time line as to what occurred here.
Mr. Menendez. Were you involved in discussions as to what tes-
timony would be presented today? Who told you, you were going to
be here today?
Ms. Fernandez. This was a matter that was discussed with my
supervisor who advised me that I would be probably the appro-
priate person to be here on behalf of the Assistant Secretary's Of-
fice.
Mr. Menendez. I do not mean any disrespect, but let me just
say, and Colonel, I do not want you to misinterpret anything I am
going to say. I respect what you have tried to do here. Any hear-
ings that are held in this time period can often be characterized as
having political overtones.
I came here with an open mind. Let me just say that the Defense
Department has done themselves a disservice as they have this
committee in the context of who they sent, not because you both
do not have intellect and capacity. You obviously do. But you do not
have knowledge of these facts.
This is something that the National Security Council knows all
about. This is something that the State Department knows all
about. This is something I would assume the Defense Department
knows all about and it would take a juvenile mind to think about
what questions would be asked here today.
Mr. Basulto has made his allegations in public several times. He
has not hidden what his views of the circumstances are and what
our government should have done and did not do. Now, whether
you agree with his facts or not or his position, it is out there. We
know what the issues are.
So I am going to do what the Chairman has asked me to. I do
not know how long I can stay, but I am going to agree to what is
a very unusual procedure with two caveats, and I would like to put
them on the record, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman has asked me
whether I would agree to go along with subpoenas subsequent to
the sine die of this session for the purpose of this issue and these
hearings. And I would normally not, in a blanket way I would nor-
mally say no to that.
But you have really in my mind, not you personally, the Depart-
ment mind you, has affronted our intelligence, whether by design,
deception or just incompetence, I am going to agree to that request
with two caveats. One is that anybody who the committee seeks to
have before it, I would hope that they would be asked first. And
if they agree to come, there is no need to subpoena them.
However, if they do not agree to come, then I will be joining in
the vote for the subpoena. As well as I would hope that the Chair-
32
man, as he has indicated he would, will confer with me as to the
individuals. I hope we have based upon your testimony. Colonel,
someone here from NORAD who can testify to standard operating
procedure, someone who can testify as to radar and what radar
prints we do and do not have and what they show. Someone from
customs who can testify in open session as well as the individual
we are going to hear from later.
And really your testimony here leaves me no choice but to con-
cur. We are in search of the truth here, whatever that might be.
And it is impossible to determine it from the answers to the ques-
tions posed.
I just want to add since I am the only Democrat on this side, Mr.
Chairman, that I hope you will give me some flexibility as I believe
we have given others in time. I just want to add one or two ques-
tions to my list and see if you do have answers to these.
I hope you will tell, Madam Secretary, of the Department that
speaking from my side of the aisle, I think it is a disservice to the
members of the committee what has happened here. It is not a par-
tisan comment obviously. I just came here with the hope of listen-
ing to answers that would dissuade my concerns about the defense
of citizens of the United States. And I leave here more concerned
than when I walked in.
Two questions. No. 1 is, Colonel, the testimony of Mr. Basulto
goes on to say the following: and actually maybe this is an answer
for Mr. Ranneberger, a combined answer, not just you. It says Brig-
adier General Howard G. DeWolf, director of the InterAmerican re-
gion of the U.S. Air Force stated in his letter to Congressman Dan
Burton, that the Department of Defense does not regularly monitor
the flights of civilian aircraft.
Yet, on the 24th of February, the State Department specifically
requested four U.S. radar tracking stations from Customs and the
U.S. Air Force to monitor the actions of Brothers to the Rescue.
First, Mr. Ranneberger, can you tell me is that the case? Did the
State Department specifically request four U.S. tracking stations
from Customs and the U.S. Air Force to monitor the actions of
Brothers to the Rescue?
Mr. Rannkbekger. No, Congressman, except indirectly. What
happened is that the night before February 24th, the afternoon be-
fore, we had obviously had a site. We counted earlier. A number
of exchanges over preceding months with the Cubans. The Cubans
had put on the record months and months before that they would
use up to and including deadly force in responding to violations of
their territory. We were also concerned as I had laid out for the
record about possible alleged infringement by Brothers to the Res-
cue of Cuban territorial air space.
In light of that, this had been the first flight in some time. I
talked to the FAA and I told the FAA that we should ensure that
all appropriate radar tracking was in place to be able to determine
with certainty whether the Cuban air space was violated or not.
Because I was increasingly frustrated with the Cuban attempts to
claim violation of their air space and I wanted to know, I wanted
our side to have definitive information.
33
Mr. Menendez. How did you know about their flights? Do you
regularly monitor how many flights Brothers to the Rescue take
every day?
Mr. Ranneberger. After these alleged violations had started in
1995 after they had been alleged by the Cubans, we did start to
monitor in the sense of FAA was alerted about the sensitivity of
it and FAA would in turn alert us when Brothers to the Rescue
were planning to fly.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentlemen yield really briefly?
Mr. Menendez. Sure.
Mr. Burton. Now, you are telling us that you knew that the
Brothers to the Rescue were flying in there on a fairly regular
basis and that you had been warned, there had been warnings from
the Cuban Government, that they would use up to and including
deadly force if their air space was violated and you wanted to find
out if Brothers to the Rescue were in fact violating their space.
That being the case, why, when you knew they were up there did
the U.S. military not have F-16s sitting out on those runways
watching for the Cubans to do something? Because American citi-
zens were going down there and you knew it and the Air Force
must have known it. And, according to the Customs officials, they
knew it. And yet, they were not even warmed up and they did not
take off. And I was told that they were warmed up and then shut
down. Why?
Mr. Ranneherger. Congressman, if I could just say, I also have
put on the record earlier and I want to emphasize this, that we had
talked to the Cubans in extremely strong terms in the months
ahead as soon as they used that first threat of what would happen
if plans entered their territorial air space. We said we do not care
whether vou have the right to do that or not. You do not have the
right under international law even if they do go into your air space.
Mr. Burton. I do not want to prolong this because it is his time,
but the fact of the matter is you knew Brothers to the Rescue was
up there. You knew the warning had been given by Fidel Castro
and you told him do not do that or we will smack you in the nose.
But the fact is there were not any precautions taken to protect
those guys. Why is that?
Mr. Ranneberger. Congressman, of course, I am not going to
speak for DoD here, but I do want to say that we had made very
clear after the first warning-like threat. I would use threat, not
warning. Warning implies there is a legitimacy. The first threat
was used. We had talked to the Brothers and we had kept them
apprised as well and I want to emphasize this about the kinds of
threats that were coming in from the Cubans. We had no indication
that Brothers would fiy into Cuban air space on that day because
they had emphasized to us that they would be staying in inter-
national air space and I want to stress that too for the record.
Mr. Menendez. But as a precaution, would it not have been pru-
dent to have those F-16s down there?
Mr. Ranneberger. Well, I cannot speak for the military, the pos-
ture that they would be in.
Mr. Menendez. Let me get back to my line of questioning. I un-
derstand what the Chairman is asking. Let me get back to my line
of questioning. Was there a time in which, based upon your state-
34
merits, Mr. Ranneberger, that you wanted to ensure that you could
say that the Brothers were not violating air space and that is why
you told the FAA?
And, does that mean that you called the FAA each and every
time Brothers to the Rescue flew, called you up, or filed a flight
plan to fly? Yes or no.
Mr. Ranneberger. Grenerally, they would inform us. I am not
sure they did it every single time. I mean, if it was a flight. Some-
times the brothers do training flights which is from Opa Locka and
they just do a quick round robin and come back. But any time they
were going south of the 24th parallel certainly we were informed.
Mr. Menendez. So you received information every time that they
were flying south of the 24th parallel and you specifically on the
night before this incident called the FAA?
Mr. Ranneberger. Yes.
Mr. Menendez. And said to them we understand they are flying?
How did you understand that?
Mr. Ranneberger. I think there had been some press reports.
Possibly FAA had told me that they were flying. I do not recall.
Somehow we had heard that they were flying.
Mr. Menp^ndez. Well, would you get that for us for the record?
It is either the FAA calls you and tells you they are flying or sud-
denly you had an independent source to identify that there was a
concern on this particular night on the day before there was a
shootdown that in fact alerted you, if I recall your testimony cor-
rectly, and we could have it read back, is that you called the FAA.
And the nature of that call was what?
Mr. Ranneberger. Congressman, again, what I did was the
afternoon I think it was, I think there had been press reports. I
will check that for you, but I told the FAA that in view of the alle-
gations that had been made in the past about violations of Cuban
air space, it was important for us to know whether in fact in case
the Cubans made accusations again as a result of the Saturday
flights, I wanted to be in a position to either refute those or
Mr. Menendez. So you did ask for the radar then.
Mr. Ranneberger. To FAA, not to DoD.
Mr. Menendez. To FAA.
Mr. Ranneberger. And I do not know if FAA contacted other
radar installations. That I do not know.
Mr. Menendez. And what press reports, I mean, I do not think
the Brothers announced that they are going to fly to the press nor
does the press find it particularly interesting after thousands of
missions to announce that Brothers to the Rescue are going to fly
tomorrow once again to save lives. What press report could there
have been that would have indicated a unique reason to call the
FAA?
Mr. Ranneberger. It could have been that FAA had told me. I
will check that. I just do not want to say. I do not know.
Mr. Menendez. If you would get that to us for the record. Let
me just ask one last thing and then I will wait for Mr. Basulto's
testimony. Mr. Basulto's testimony is why I am particularly angry
with the Department of Defense today. Because what he is going
to say here will go unresponded to, uncontradicted. It will leave
most Americans who will read it tomorrow wondering what their
35
government is all about. It will leave me as a Member of Congress
wondering what our government is doing.
He says, after the incident, the U.S. Government authorities fab-
ricated a favorable scenario that would cover up their inaction and
share responsibility. Among the actions taken, this is on page three
of his testimony, an attempt by a Customs's official to seize by
force and deception a tape recording of the radio communication be-
tween Brothers to the Rescue and Havana tower during the mis-
sion, to disavow any knowledge, which is in essence what we have
heard today, of MiGs in pursuit of the third Brothers to the Rescue
aircraft north of the 24th parallel. He has in parentheses, the MiG
pilot's communication is to their ground control as indicated other-
wise which you would have in your tape recordings that you have
of the incident through our intelligence.
He goes on to say, the State Department refused to appear for
deposition although properly subpoenaed by the administrative law
judge of the National Transportation Safety Board, and resisted the
judge's petition to produce in court the recordings of the radio com-
munications of the MiG pilots and their controllers, already heard
by ICAO investigators and released to the United Nations.
When finally obtained, these recordings provided Brothers to the
Rescue with evidence that the MiGs pursued the last remaining
Brothers to the Rescue aircraft above the 24th parallel and to with-
in 3 minutes of the United States. If that is true, then we have a
major problem. So my final question is having heard that, having
it in front of you, can you refute any of those things?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I have given you the information that I have
available which is that they did not go above the 24th. I think an-
swering it for the record will allow us to do another very thorough
search. I apologize for not having that detailed information for the
committee at this time, but we will come up with that information
and get it back to you.
Mr. Menendf:z. When you answer it, are you going to produce
radar prints for us?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, we will give you the best information we
have available. I am not sure whether it is data that is available
or whether it is a print.
Mr. Menendez. Well, I would like to see
Mr. McMahan. We will get you the information.
Mr. Menendez [continuing], in addition to a verbal response or
a written response actually which is what you are going to provide
the committee, as part of the written response, Mr. Chairman, I
would like to see the documentation that supports the written re-
sponse to show that your statement that to your knowledge it is
not above the 24th parallel can be supported by documentation
that will do that.
Mr. McMahan. We will do our best to get that for you as soon
as possible, sir.
Mr. Burton. One more thing in addition to what he just asked
for, it was indicated from this transcript that Customs officials
were trying to get the recording devices that the gentleman had
away from liim. We would like to know who those Customs officials
were.
Mr. McMahan. Sir, we will have to research that.
36
Mr. BuTiTON. Well, I would like to have it researched by the
State Department, the Defense Department, and the Customs
Service. I want to know who those people were and I want to have
them before the subcommittee under oath to find out who asked
him to go get that device and why?
Mr. McMahan. Sir, I was unaware of this statement and so
therefore I was not prepared to
Mr. Burton. We would like to have the names of the Customs
officials from either State, Customs or Defense, who those individ-
uals were who were ordered to go get that device so we can have
them before the subcommittee.
Mr. Ranneberger. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one response
to Congressman Menendez?
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Mr. Ranneberger. I wanted to say that clearly in response to
these statements of Mr. Basulto most of them concern other agen-
cies, but I would speak in general and say there was absolutely no
effort to fabricate a favorable scenario. In fact, I think the record
shows that all of our information was to try to get all of the facts
on the record. There was utter and complete cooperation with the
ICAO teams, for example, including speaking to Mr. Houlihan and
others. So I also wanted to add for the record that I was not asked
to testify today. I was asked to come up and be a resource in re-
sponding to questions and I am delighted to do that.
Mr. Burton. Before I yield to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, let me ask
if you are aware that there were Customs officials who tried to get
this device?
Mr. Ranneberger. Congressman, no. This is something we will
look into.
Mr. Burton. OK Thank you. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. As we
all know, the title of this hearing, and this is a public document,
it is clearly entitled The Shootdown of Brothers to the Rescue,
What Happened. Yet, we have been sent individuals, as respectful
as they are, who know absolutely nothing about the question, what
happened? And we respect your testimony. We respect your service
to our wonderful country.
But the title once again is the Shootdown of Brothers to the Res-
cue, What Happened? I think it might have seemed like a clever
ploy at the time to send individuals to our subcommittee who are
totally unable to answer the question what happened and more im-
portantly why it happened.
But as you can see that ploy did not work out as well as you
might have hoped and we certainly would like to have individuals
come before our subcommittee who are able to answer the question
what happened and why did it happen? And we would like your co-
operation. As the Chairman indicated, there are other tools to use
if the cooperation is not forthcoming.
I meant to enter also into the record and I neglected to do so,
Mr. Chairman, a letter from Jose Basulto and Domonus Vestcati,
dated September 13th to our subcommittee which is in response if
I could ask unanimous consent to do that.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
37
Ms. Ros-Lehtenen. Which is in response to the same letter that
you and I got and I assume everyone got it, sort of a form letter
full of, let us say, contradictory information, not to say untruths
from General DeWolf in his form letter to you is more or less the
same as my form letter.
It says I am responding to your letter of August 1st and mine
says I am responding to your letter of July 6th. And in that month
and a half not too much had changed in the form letter. And it is
interesting that Mr. Basulto in his letter of September 13th con-
tradicts some of that testimony when General DeWolf says Depart-
ment of Defense radars do not routinely and systematically track
civilian U.S. aircraft operating in international air space.
Mr. Basulto points out that while that may generally be accu-
rate, in fact on February 24th no less than four government agen-
cies were tracking and monitoring the three Brothers to the Rescue
aircraft and that has been brought out not only in the Basulto tes-
timony in the Federal courts but also in the ICAO report which I
hope would be partly in the record as well.
And Mr. Basulto I hope will point out in his testimony about the
difference between the Cuban ADIZ which is the Air Defense Iden-
tification Zone not being the same as our southern boundaries. So
we hope to clear that up because I think that we are mixing up
two different terms and I am sure that Mr. Basulto will point that
out.
Of course, the question that concerns us all is about the standard
operating procedures when Cuban aircraft is seen nearing the
United States. And once it was proven the clear intention of the
Cuban Government after shooting down the first plane, it is I
would imagine to be quite reasonable to expect some kind of action
from our U.S. military and why was nothing done? That is what
we want to know.
And once the second plane was brought down, why was nothing
done then? Why for over 30 minutes after the second plane was
brought down was nothing done when it was clear that the Cuban
MiGs were trying to bring down the third plane? And what does
it take short of a nuclear attack for the United States to react, if
I may ask?
Ms. Fernandez. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to address
the concerns of the committee. I want to assure the full cooperation
of the Department of Defense in any and all questions that have
been presented today.
It is unfortunate that a lot of the questions could not be ad-
dressed by the Colonel or myself because we just do not have the
personal knowledge about this. But now that we know the nature
and scope of the questions that are going to be asked, I think it
would be easier for us to identify
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Ms. Fernandez, what did you think that we
were going to speak about today? The title of the hearing as you
understood it to be in a public document, could you state the title
and the scope of the hearing? What exactly did you think that you
would be testifying on today in a hearing entitled the shooting of
the Brothers to the Rescue, What Happened?
Ms. Fernandez. In my discussion, I think it will be easier for me
to answer the question this way. In my discussions with the Colo-
38
nel, we talked about the information that he would be able to pro-
vide to the committee today in terms of factual information.
The questions, however, that have been asked are questions that
are not within the purview of his knowledge. But there are other
questions pertaining to this fact-finding hearing that I am sure he
can answer based on his position as well as
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Fernandez. Would you say
that it is quite abundantly clear to you, to your agencies, to every
agency in the U.S. Government now what exactly we will be talk-
ing about? We are going to be discussing in our next hearing which
you were not able to avoid. Because you did not come forth with
the answers today, you will just have to go through this again. We
actually want to discuss the same items that were discussed in our
letters, to all of these different agencies, to Secretary Perry. The
same questions remain. We would like to speak to any and all indi-
viduals who have any knowledge whatsoever working in the U.S.
Government, related to the shootdown of the Brothers to the Res-
cue aircraft which occurred on February 24th of this year at ap-
proximately 3:15 if we could round it out. And those are the indi-
viduals that we want to speak to and those are the questions that
we want to ask. What happened? Why it happened? Were proper
procedures followed? I think that we are being very clear and I re-
spect your service to our country. It is not intended to slap your
face. I think it was a ploy on the Department of Defense's part to
try and not answer the questions and I do not think it worked. So
we are going to go for round two. And we would like your coopera-
tion so that we do not have to go that extra step and subpoena any-
one. And why Mr. Houlihan was not here to answer these ques-
tions openly is totally mystifying to us. Since we have his testi-
mony, we have gone out of our way to enter it into the record. We
are just totally baffled why we would want to go through this at
a private hearing after this hearing.
Ms. Fernandez. If I may, Mr. Houlihan is not an employee of
the Department of Defense. I believe he is an employee of the Cus-
toms Department. Customs comes under the Department of Trans-
portation. So I really do not know. Excuse me, Department of
Treasury. I really do not know why he is not here. That was
not
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, why are you here, if I may ask, Ms.
Fernandez? I know that Mr. Menendez asked, but it is not quite
clear. Always good to have women testify, especially Hispanic
women. So we welcome you to our subcommittee, but what is your
role here?
Ms. Fernandez. It is certainly a pleasure for me to be here. I
was here to respond to any particular policy questions that were
addressed to me in terms of these particular
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You are not here as a token Cuban Amer-
ican.
Ms. Fernandez. No, I am not.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. To represent a good face for the Department.
Ms. Fernandez. I assure you I am not.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Even though you have no information about
the shootdown and you are not able to answer our questions.
39
Ms. Fernandez. Based on the questions that have been asked,
this was not within my purview.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And about the standard operat-
ing procedures, we can just get to it at the second round or the sec-
ond hearing, however you would like to do it, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. We will probably subpoena if necessary
quite a few people because of the lack of cooperation from the State
and Defense Department. The next hearing will be much bigger. I
hope I have three or four panels. We are going to get the answer
to these questions. My colleague from Florida.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again. I
am so glad the chairman of the full committee is here. Chairman
Oilman. Mr. Chairman, I really think that the Administration went
too far today. Now, they had reason to believe that their policy of
pleading ignorance would once again work. But they went too far
in their disrespect for you, Mr. Chairman, for the full committee
chairman, and for Congress generally.
Now, one of the reasons why the Administration may have
thought that they could have done so again this time because when
you, Mr. Chairman, held a hearing recently about the evidence that
exists with regard to the Cuban Government's participation in
narco trafficking, for example. They came here and pled ignorance.
And I recall that hearing.
Despite the fact we had the field people in South Florida, the
Customs field people, saying on tape, giving evidence, of Castro's
participation in drug trafficking. We had the head of DEA and the
head of Customs say here before you, Mr. Chairman, in what con-
stituted disrespect for you and this committee, ignorance.
So obviously, they thought that they could do it again. They went
too far this time. Ajid so I commend you for your commitment even
if we have to do it after adjournment, to subpoena whoever is nec-
essary and get the facts. Pleading ignorance will not work.
It is not going to work on the narco trafficking issue ultimately
because we are going to get to the facts there too. But first and
foremost, it is not going to work with regard to the murders of Feb-
ruary 24th. And you all, I am not talking personally to you. You
represent the executive branch. The executive branch is going to
have to produce the facts. They are not going to be able to cover
up the facts.
Now, you do not want to lie because you are under oath. So you
plead ignorance. But it is not going to work. There was a practice,
and this is, I think, the crux of the most serious allegation made
by Mr. Basulto. There was a practice of communicating danger to
Brothers to the Rescue. Whenever there were MiGs in the air,
Brothers to the Rescue would be called and informed of the fact
and Brothers to the Rescue would fiy back home to avoid the dan-
ger.
And today we had Mr. Ranneberger admit that before February
24th based on however, Mr. Menendez asked how did you know.
What was not denied is that the government knew that February
24th would be a day of much danger, despite that, the practice was
abandoned.
And despite the fact that confirmation came of the danger and
the MiGs were in the air. Brothers to the Rescue were not in-
40
formed. And then despite the fact that one airplane was shot down
and two people murdered, there was no attempt to notify Brothers
to the Rescue. And the second plane was shot down. There was no
attempt. And then the third plane was pursued almost to the Unit-
ed States.
This is very serious. This is very serious. The media is going to
become interested because of the seriousness of this issue and the
American people are going to be aware, become aware of the fact
of what our government did and failed to do February 24th.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are going to get to the bottom
of this.
Mr. Burton. Well, I will thank the panel for being with us today.
It has not been as productive as I would have liked. I hope that
the answers you are going to submit in writing with the graphs
and charts will be more helpful. But in any event, we appreciate
your being here. The next panel consists of Mr. Jose Basulto, presi-
dent of Brothers to the Rescue, and we are looking forward to hear-
ing what he has to say. Mr. Basulto, I am sorry you had to wait
so long, but hopefully this will prove to have been a worthwhile
wait.
Mr. Basulto. It was definitely worth it.
Mr. Burton. OK. Now, you have heard what was said and what
was not said. So what I would like to ask you to do is in your re-
marks, you have a prepared statement, is to maybe make some
comments if you would about the cooperation we have had or lack
thereof from the Department of Defense and State Department.
STATEMENT OF JOSE BASULTO, PRESIDENT, BROTHERS TO
THE RESCUE
Mr. Basulto. Yes, sir. If I may. I will read my statement so it
will be part of the record. For the record. Brothers to the Rescue,
Incorporated is a not for profit humanitarian organization founded
in 1991 in response to the number of deaths of Cuban rafters try-
ing to free the island in search of freedom. It is a volunteer pilot
group from 17 different nationalities. Founded by voluntary private
contributions, today Brothers to the Rescue has conducted 1,840
search and rescue missions over the straits of Florida resulting in
over 4,000 lives saved before the refugee crisis of 1994.
On February 24th of this year, two U.S. unarmed civilian Broth-
ers to the Rescue, BTTI aircraft, conducting a humanitarian search
and rescue mission over international waters were shot down by
Cuban MiGs. This terrorist-like attack resulted in the death of
three U.S. citizens and a legal U.S. resident. The rescue aircraft
which I was piloting, managed to escape although it was pursued
by an additional pair of MiGs to within 3 minutes of the United
States. Recent findings clearly show that this is designation and
the threat posed by the MiGs to U.S. security interests could easily
have been prevented by the United States.
Our testimony today before this congressional committee is based
upon sources which include (1) sworn U.S. court testimony by U.S.
officials, (2) access to the audio recordings of the conversations be-
tween the MiGs pilots under Cuban controllers, (3) the report by
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), (4) expert
witnesses that have confirmed that U.S. Government authorities at
41
a minimum wilfully chose not to act to protect the lives and planes
on that faithful mission.
We are convinced that if you review all of the foregoing evidence,
you will come to the same conclusions. (1) U.S. Government au-
thorities were aware of the especially dangerous conditions which
threatened our humanitarian mission on February the 24th and
that MiGs were in the air that morning. Contrary to previous in-
stances, this information was not shared with Brothers to the Res-
cue and this is backed by the ICAO report, pages 50 and 51.
Then (2) The U.S. Government authorities prepared an unusu-
ally elaborate plan to follow, monitor and document Brothers to the
Rescue, February 24th flight, which included to our knowledge, (a)
alerting several radar facilities from the U.S. Air Force and Cus-
toms, (b) listening to and recording the communications of all the
aircraft involved, (c) FAA control towers report of the departure of
our flight as well as radar tracking. Yet, the usual check inspection
performed by FAA prior to the departure of Brothers to the Rescue
flights was strangely omitted that day.
And (3) U.S. Government authorities proceeded passively then to
watch and listen in silence for 53 minutes while Cuban MiGs hunt-
ed two Brothers to the Rescue planes, killed their four occupants
and chased the third plane to within 3 minutes of the United
States.
Next (4) The U.S. Air Force ignored the equivalent of a 911 call
made to them by Major Jeffrey Houlihan from March Air Force
base in an attempt to save the lives of the Brothers to the Rescue
pilots. The U.S. Air Force abandoned its standard operating proce-
dure to dispatch interceptors upon the MiGs crossing of the 12-mile
territorial limit of the island of Cuba. Major Houlihan gave sworn
testimony as to the existence of this standard operating procedure
and trigger line.
Then (5) U.S. authorities, Air Force, Customs and FAA also
abandoned their practice of communicating with Brothers to the
Rescue planes in the air via radio or with Brothers to the Rescue
operation base in Opa Locka Airport to issue a warning as it had
done on multiple occasions on the past. Pilot's testimony is avail-
able to this effect. On every occasion when warned of MiGs in the
air. Brothers to the Rescue has immediately returned to its base.
And (6) After the incident, U.S. Government authorities fab-
ricated a favorable scenario that would cover up their inaction and
share responsibility,. Among the several actions taken we experi-
enced (a) an attempt by a Customs official to seize by force and de-
ception a tape recording of the radio communications between
Brothers to the Rescue and Havana Tower during the mission, (b)
Thev disavowed any knowledge of MiGs in pursuit of the Brothers
to the Rescue aircraft north of the 24th parallel. The MiGs pilots
communications to the ground controllers indicate otherwise, (c)
The State Department refused to appear for the position although
properly subpoenaed by the administrative law judge of the Na-
tional Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB). (d) It resisted the
Judge's petition to produce in court the recordings of the radio com-
munications of the MiG pilots and their controllers already heard
by ICAO investigators and partially released to the United Na-
tions. When fmally obtained, these recordings provided Brothers to
42
the Rescue with evidence that the MiGs pursued the last remain-
ing Brothers to the Rescue aircraft above the 24th parallel and to
within 3 minutes of the United States, (e) When we were fmally
allowed to hear the tapes, we were given access to only two of the
four tracks of the tapes. The other two probably pertinent land line
communications have not been released despite repeated requests
by Brothers to the Rescue attorneys.
And (0 By allowing the MiGs to come within such close proxim-
ity to the United States, American security interests were put at
risk. Brigadier General Howard G. DeWolf, Director of InterAmer-
ican Region, U.S. Air Force, stated in this letter to Congressman
Dan Burton that the Department of Defense does not regularly
monitor the flights of civilian aircraft. Yet, on the 24th of February,
the State Department specifically requested four U.S. radar track-
ing stations from Customs and the U.S. Air Force to monitor the
actions of Brothers to the Rescue.
Brothers to the Rescue believes that when Pablo Roquez, a
Cuban intelligence agent, doubling as an FBI informant and occa-
sional Brothers to the Rescue pilot, was instrumental in the per-
ception created in Cuba and the United States that our organiza-
tion was planning a pro Democracy demonstration for that Feb-
ruary 24th.
The result was a premeditated ambush to kill from Cuba and a
complete U.S. intelligence operative which watched and docu-
mented the events as they unfolded, but made no attempt to pre-
vent the loss of life.
Brothers to the Rescue therefore not only accuses and condemns
Fidel Castro and the Cuban Air Force of murdering U.S. citizens,
but also critically questions the rationale, purpose and intentions
behind the U.S. Government's conduct and inaction on February
the 24th.
Today we are providing this committee with the necessary evi-
dence and testimonies to support our findings and respectfully re-
quest that a full investigation be carried out and that the respon-
sible parties be held accountable. We also want to thank the com-
mittee for granting Brothers to the Rescue the opportunity to avail
itself of this important mechanism of our free and democratic soci-
ety which we trust will address the concerns we bring before you.
Thank you, very much.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, very much. I am glad you made it back.
I am terribly sorry that your compatriots who were fighting for
freedom were not as fortunate. How do you know for certain that
you were above the 24th parallel when they made their last pass
at you or when they came close to you?
Mr. Basulto. Sir, if you correlate the information provided to us
by the U.S. Grovernment during the hearing at which I was seeking
to recuperate my license as a pilot which was revoked by the FAA,
you will find two pieces of information that once they are put to-
gether they tell you exactly where I was.
I am talking here about the transcripts of the communications of
the MiGs pilots and their controllers which they state and we were
able to ascertain that at the time when the mission was concluded,
in other words when they were called off my back, it was 3:53 p.m.
exactly, 3:53 p.m. and 14 seconds as a matter of fact.
43
Then that information came from our being able to Hsten to
those tapes, watch the counter, the digital counter of the times
when the conversations were taking place. Plus the fact that we
double checked that using chronometers. Two independent
chronometers were used that day to check that time. That was a
very important time for us.
With that time in mind we went to the screen prints provided
by the U.S. Air Force in the hearing for my license and I am calling
to your attention U.S. Air Force screen print No. 3. If you allow me
a moment, I am going to look for it.
I will have to come close to you now. In the bottom picture you
see here, this is our radar screen print, shows the path of Novem-
ber 2506, the blue aircraft that I was piloting that is identified in
the communications of the MiG pilots and their controllers.
Mr. Burton. This one here?
Mr. Basulto. This line here. This line by the way changes color
because the aircraft is identified in blue when it is not responding
to the radar. In other words, its transponder is inoperative or it
has been shut off. I did shut off my transponder for a while to pro-
tect myself or not to give information of our location so that they
were not able to follow us. However, the radars kept picking us up
and this is what you see here is what is called a primary target.
It is ourselves all the way through.
Now, when you reach the top of the screen, you see the last posi-
tion they recorded of November 2506. It says here that at 2057
Zulu, that is equivalent to 3:57 p.m., our aircraft, that is November
2506, was here. Now, that is 4 minutes plus the time the MiGs
stopped. Our aircraft moves at a speed of two miles per minute.
So taking those 4 minutes, it was 8 miles south of that location.
That is how we estimated our position. These rings you see here
are 10-mile rings. So we would have been about here and we esti-
mated that position to be the one we have shown in that chart over
there.
Assuming that this was completely wrong, if we were 12 miles
north of Cuba at the time the second aircraft was shut down, 25
minutes later which is the difference in time from the second
shootdown and 3:53 p.m., we would have been 25 times two is 50
miles. And then the 12 miles would have been 62 miles. We would
have still been at the same place. So it matches. So I believe we
have almost unequivocally located our position on that place we
have shown to you in the other chart which I will bring to you now.
Based on that reasoning this was prepared, this position esti-
mated, and this is where we were, some 28 miles perhaps away
from Key West and on our position southwest of Key West. The
Martesis is here. So most likely this happened on U.S. waters, U.S.
territory. I can ascertain that, but it is very likely that it was.
Here you see in rings what that MiG would move at 800 miles
an hour which is not a fast speed for it. It was moving 500 at that
time, but it has a perfect applicability of going 800.
In rings of 13 miles a minute, where it could have reached, it
could have been in 10 minutes, 11 minutes, in Turnkey Point, the
nuclear plants, and in Miami in 12 minutes, 12 to 13 minutes.
44
Mr. Burton. Let me ask you one more question, then I will yield
to my colleagues. Do you know who the Customs people were who
were trying to get your recording device?
Mr. Basulto. I am sorry, could you repeat the question?
Mr. Burton. Do you know who the Customs people were who
were trying to get your recording devices?
Mr. Basulto. The recording device that I am talking about, if
you are talking about the same thing, you are perhaps referring to
the tapes, the recordings we made of the communications inflight
during the mission.
Mr. Burton. Right.
Mr. Basulto. It was a Customs agent, the one that three times
tried using force and deception to take the tape away from me. And
I resisted to the point that he said he was going to have to force
it from me. His name is Mike Molinary.
Mr. Burton. Write that down. Mike Molinary.
Mr. Basulto. Right. And he works at the Customs station there
in Miami from what I understand. There were three other people
there with me that witnessed the event, the way that he conducted
himself. Every time that he made an attempt to take it away from
me, he made a phone call somewhere. And somebody was appar-
ently giving him instructions.
Mr. Burton. Did he have any official documentation that would?
Any kind of a court order or anything demanding that?
Mr. Basulto. No, and I said you have to produce something,
some real document to do this, and we are calling our attorneys
right now and this you are doing is illegal. And I am going to
refuse it. You are going to have to force it away from me. So what
I did was just held to them and he tried, at a point twisted my
arm, pushed me and used foul language. Again, there were three
other witnesses. One of them is Mr. Arnaldo Iglasias who was
there that day. He was one of the survivors. He is here today with
me. He witnessed this event as he
Mr. Burton. You do not know who instructed him to try to get
that?
Mr. Basulto. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. Where were you when this took place?
Mr. Basulto. Well, this was as we were being debriefed that day
when we returned. There were many other agencies and officials
and people behaved quite correctly and properly. The only person
that misbehaved was Mr. Molinary from Customs. Again, as I re-
peat, bv force and deception tried to obtain that tape. That tape ap-
parently was very important for some reason.
Mr. Burton. All right. We will contact Mr. Molinary and have
him testify at some point in the future. Mr. Menendez, do you have
any questions?
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately, I had
to step out, but I have read all of your testimony. I assume that
you stuck to the written testimony that has been produced for the
committee?
Mr. Basulto. Sure, of course. If you need more copies, I will be
more than happy to.
Mr. Menendez. No, no, no. I just wanted to make sure that I did
not miss anything in the context I had already read your written
45
testimony and, of course, had opportunities to discuss. I want to
welcome you to the committee.
Mr. Basulto. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Menendp]Z. And thank you for your testimony. As you are
a witness, I tried to get a sense of responses to your questions so
that we can flush out the truth in the context of some of these is-
sues. And my question may be for us to ask when we have the sec-
ond hearing. We will be better prepared to ask about some of the
points that you have made. You may have already responded to
this, because when I came in you were producing the chart for the
committee.
What you are saying is that the information that was provided
to the Brothers through the hearing, that the findings obtained are
from the recordings provided Brothers to the Rescue with evidence
that the MiGs pursued the last remaining aircraft which I believe
was the one you were piloting, is that correct?
Mr. Basulto. Yes.
Mr. Menendez. Above the 24th parallel and within 3 minutes of
the United States, how is it that you are able to determine that?
Have you described that?
Mr. Basulto. Yes, I just did. It is simple math here. I correlated
two documents. One, the MiGs and controller communications and
the time that the mission was canceled together with the position
and tracking that the U.S. Air Force provided. Both documents are
U.S. source. They both came through the hearings and to recuper-
ate my license in court under sworn testimony and so forth. So
they are U.S. documents to that effect.
Mr. Menendez. So it is the tracking of the tapes and the time-
frame and what they say in the context of their positions between
the controllers.
Mr. Basulto. The controllers and the MiG pilots. I can read it
for you if you want here.
Mr. Menendez. No, I think I have a sense of what it is. I just
wanted to get the methodology that you used to make that state-
ment. Now, based upon that, the only way then that that would be
in error would be if the pilots or the control tower were making
statements that were erroneous.
Mr. Basulto. That is correct. That is if the pilots were just
dreaming up seeing a blue aircraft just like mine, a Cessna 337,
which is a very unusual aircraft, and seeing it more than one time.
Actually, they made like three sightings of it and they lose me
every time. Until the mission is canceled and according to what
they say because they are very high. And for a MiG, 5,000 feet is
not being very high. They are talking about latitude.
Mr. Menendez. Now, you say you were allowed to hear two of
the four tracks through your discovery efforts at your hearing.
Mr. Basulto. Yes, sir.
Mr. Menendez. There are two others you say.
Mr. Basulto. Apparently, yes. And I am not an expert on record-
ings, but it is a four-track and there is additional information there
that we were not allowed to hear. I would like to add something,
sir. While we were listening to the tape, we noticed many irregular-
ities in the digital counter.
Mr. Menendez. Would you explain that for me?
46
Mr. Basulto. Sometimes the time jumped forward or backwards.
Or sometimes it did not have a time.
Mr. Meni<:ndez. Which would indicate what?
Mr. Basulto. Possible tampering.
Mr. Menendez. What are the reasons, in your testimony, you
said that the other two, referring to the tracks that you are not al-
lowed to hear and I assume, were you given a reason why the other
two tracks
Mr. Basulto. No, the only thing they said, they did not say there
was additional information. They said that they were only in-
structed to bring the tapes, let us listen to them and go away with
them. They did not identify themselves by name, by agency, by
source, by anything.
Mr. Menendez. Now, with reference to the testimony of Mr.
Ranneberger, which I elicited in my question from him, in which
he states that they were concerned about the claims that Brothers
was violating Cuban air space and wanted to pursue proof that you
are not so that they could refute those claims. Were you aware as
the president of Brothers to the rescue through the State Depart-
ment that in fact they were doing that?
Mr. Basulto. Negative. No, sir. We were not aware that they
were monitoring us whatsoever.
Mr. Menendez. Did the State Department give you any
warnings in general first or specifically on this date meaning Feb-
ruary 24 th?
Mr. Basulto. No, sir.
Mr. Menendez. They did not give you any warnings about risk
in terms of any flights of Brothers to the Rescue in or about the
24th parallel?
Mr. Basulto. No, direct warnings, we never receive them. What
they have done is issue pressure releases at times when flotillas or
things like that have taken place. We do not consider that a direct
notification to Brothers to the Rescue.
Mr. Menendez. So the State Department has never engaged you,
Mr. Ranneberger, or the Cuba desk, or anybody from the State De-
partment. They have never called you up and said Mr. Basulto, we
have information that we are concerned about that we would be
concerned for your safety or that of your pilots.
Mr. Basulto. Not that I recall, sir. Our communications with the
State Department are minimal.
Mr. Menendez. With reference to any other agency of the Fed-
eral Grovernment did any other agency of the Federal Government
communicate with you that there was a risk on this particular
date, on February 24th, to fiy?
Mr. Basulto. No, sir. Absolutely not.
Mr. Menendez. Has any agency of the Federal Government prior
to February 24th communicated with you as the president of Broth-
ers to the Rescue that your flights are a risk in the context of flying
anywhere near the 24th parallel? Not necessarily February 24th, at
any other time.
Mr. Basulto. Perhaps in conversation with the FAA at the times
that the flotillas took place, I would have been given such type of
conversation, but not the State Department. Actually, and when
the flotillas took place, we informed them of our participation in
47
them. So it was our initiation of the communications which took
place.
Mr. Menendez. Now, when you make a statement that govern-
ment authorities prepared an unusually elaborate plan to follow,
monitor and document the Brothers February 24th flight including
alerting several radar facilities from the U.S. Air Force and Cus-
toms listening to and recording the communications of the aircraft
involved, how are you aware of that?
Mr. Basulto. I was not until I read the ICAO report, pages 50
and 51. That gives you a full description of all the preparations
made by the U.S. Grovemment to monitor, follow, track, document
and just watch what happened that day.
Mr. Menendez. So your statements on page two, No. 2, derive
from pages 50 and 51 of ICAO.
Mr. Basulto. That is correct, sir. It is in the handout I passed
to you.
Mr. Menendez. Last, you have made the statement that it is
standard operating procedure for the U.S. Air Force to scramble,
and take off, when they view Cuban MiGs take off from Cuba and
fly in Cuban air space or international.
Mr. Basulto. No, actually that statement was made by Jeffrey
Houlihan who as an expert witness testified at my hearings under
oath that such is the process from his experience. That once a
Cuban MiG crosses a line that goes pretty close to the AQlSOs and
they are almost coincidental in location. And it is on the radar
screen of the radar operators. Once a MiG crosses that line north-
erly, U.S. MiGs should be or would be scrambled. I am not privy
of that standard operating procedure. However, that also came
from the hearing for my license.
I want to mention also at this time that in 1991 at the very be-
ginning of Brothers to the Rescue, and I have written testimony,
actual written documentation of this. The first time that we ever
saw a MiG, the U.S. Air Force responded positively by sending, I
believe at the time it was Phantoms, F-4s, and the Cuban MiGs
left.
Mr. Menendez. My last question, have in the many flights that
the Brothers have taken, have they been pursued or in any way en-
gaged by Cuban MiGs before and if so what has been the response
of the U.S. Government at those times?
Mr. Basulto. As I said, the first time that this took place was
in 1991 at the very beginning of Brothers to the Rescue. We had
no procedures. It was the very beginning of our operation. It was
a young Argentinean pilot flying the mission that day and another
Cuban American pilot on another aircraft.
A MiG showed up and the first I knew of it I got a phone call
at home from the FAA telling me that there were MiGs around the
mission of Brothers to the Rescue that were at that time engaging
on the recovery of a raft. They were on top of a raft waiting for
the U.S. Coast Guard to show up. And they communicated with us.
They communicated with the airplanes. I have the records of that.
I can produce them the next time. And the U.S. Air Force sent an
interceptor or two interceptors, I am not sure, and the Cuban MiG
left.
48
Mr. MENP]NDfc:z. So you received that phone call from the FAA
you say?
Mr. Basulto. Yes, my conversation was with the FAA, but there
were other communications involved. That triggered a whole proce-
dure by which the following 2 days was elaborated. I had a meeting
with several agencies of the U.S. Government at the flight service
station at the Miami Airport and there I was told and I remember
the name of the lady that was the head of the group there,
Marianne Warzinski I think. I have her card too. She has retired
since.
That a procedure she said had been elaborated so that Brothers
to the Rescue could continue its mission safely. And that would in-
volve our always using our transponder with a discrete trans-
ponder code, namely we would be in each of our missions, each of
our aircraft, assigned a discrete code to respond to the radar of
Cuba and the U.S. our position, our unique position, at all times.
So that we could not be confused with anything else other than
what we were.
So every time that we go out in a Brothers to the Rescue flight,
we carry this red light, if you may, on top of us which is read by
the radars and they know exactly where we are at all times. We
were also asked to communicate upon crossing parallel 24 to the
south with the Cuban authorities and advise them that we were
coming in, in our mission and let them know what our purpose
area and time in the area was going to be.
This procedure was observed on the 24th of February. It is in-
cluded in the communications of the tape that was almost taken
away from me by Customs that day. That communications included
my call to Havana advising them that I was north of the city and
I said to them politely that the city looked very nice and that we
wished them a good day from Brothers to the Rescue. After that
they started shooting at us.
Mr. Menendez. After 1991, that first incident that you related
and before February 24th of this year, were there any other inci-
dents with Cuban MiGs?
Mr. Basulto. We have seen Cuban MiGs. I personally have seen
Cuban MiGs. I think I have seen them three times myself. I think
in the history of Brothers to the Rescue, there have been like
maybe five to six times where such incidents have taken place in
5, almost 6 years of Brothers to the Rescue.
Mr. Menendez. And what has been the U.S. response each time?
Mr. Basulto. The other times have not been in any way threat-
ening. We just saw them. They came by and left. One time they
were threatening, but it was actually to intimidate. Again, it was
another of the young Argentineans flying, a brother of the first one
that I mentioned before, Alberto Aras is his name, together with
another Argentinean who was flying for Brothers to the Rescue
whose name is Ivan Lowanowitz. Thev both saw a MiG that came
within 50 of their airplane circle about the airplane and then
stayed next to their plane. They said that the pilot laughed. I do
not know how they could, you know, but that is what they said.
Mr. Menendez. My concern, why I asked you this line of ques-
tioning, if there have been other occasions and if there was also no
response on those other occasions, why has the concern not been
49
raised before? I mean, obviously this time produced deadly action.
But before when Cuban MiGs scrambled and were clearly within
your view, why have we not had concerns raised before?
Mr. Basulto. We raised the concerns and it was also widely pub-
licized. Each one of those incidents was taken by the press. So I
believe that the United States was taken proper action to it. Some-
how it was always our belief that the United States kept telephone
communications with Cuba for situations like this where they could
at a moment's time realize what was going on.
Mr. Menendez. But on those occasions, Cuban MiGs scrambled.
They were in your view. But the U.S. Air Force did not take off.
Mr. Basulto. Only the first time I know for sure that they took
ofF. The other times I presume that it was handled via communica-
tions.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Basulto. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Burton. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I am
going to cover more of the same ground, but just to have it very
clearly established in the record so I will go over a lot of the similar
questions.
You had been notified in the past, Mr. Basulto, by U.S. officials
of problem days, MiGs in the area, potential hazards, is that true?
Mr. Basulto. Yes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. How many occasions and by whom were you
notified and what procedures did they use?
Mr. Basulto. OK An exact number I cannot tell you. But I can
find out for you. I am going to call a reunion, a meeting of our pi-
lots and gather all that information for you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtenen. Did you say one?
Mr. Basulto. I personally have been notified once of such occur-
rence. That was that first flight when things happened. Oh, no.
Wait. A second time. I remember now the day that Orestes Lorenzo
fiew into Cuba, we were called. And I am not trying to tie one
thing with the other. That is how I remember the time it was. It
was about 3 years ago. We were called on the air. We had five air-
craft in the air. I was fiying that day and we received a call to
land. And we, of course, did land. We went back. We landed in Key
West and found out there that the U.S. radar had seen MiGs fiying
overhead, the Brothers to the Rescue, and then we had been called
to return to base.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So you said that you were fiying. Who was
the one who gave you that signal? It was a radio call?
Mr. Basulto. A radio call, yes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. By a U.S. official.
Mr. Basulto. I think so. I do not recall exactly. I think it was
one of the other planes. I was not the radio operator that day. But
I can find out for you who received the call.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And other pilots in your organization might
have received similar types of notifications at other times.
Mr. Basulto. Correct. I remember that time because I was fiying
that day when that happened.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And you might get back to our subcommittee
to give us the details as far as they can remember the dates and
50
the circumstances by which they were notified and which officials
they were. And upon getting that notification and the incidence
that you just brought up, your response was to continue with your
flight or come back?
Mr. Basulto. No, we returned. We returned.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So those were notifications that you took se-
riously.
Mr. Basulto. Correct.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And you acted
Mr. Basulto. Upon them.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [continuing], in order to save human life by
coming back to the United States.
Mr. Basulto. Correct.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Should you have been notified by these var-
ious U.S. officials who were monitoring and tracking your flights
on February 24th of the presence of the MiGs?
Mr. Basulto. I believe we should have been notified. I believe
if they had the idea and this is something which I believe hap-
pened, that Brothers to the Rescue was going to participate in
some sort of, call it political statement, pro Democracy demonstra-
tion, which is what we do. This is the offense we do to the Castro
Government. If they had the idea that we were going to do some-
thing to that respect and they knew that the Cuban Government
knew about it, I believe that it would have been honest for them
to let us know that we were under an unusual danger.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And if you had been notified on February
24th, what do you think your response might have been?
Mr. Basulto. My response would have been very simple. Let us
take the day off.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Do you think that those four deaths could
have been prevented?
Mr. Basulto. I believe so.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Bv what action on the U.S. part?
Mr. Basulto. A simple telephone call.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. From whom to whom?
Mr. Basulto. Anybody. Anybody that knew about it. the FBI
was involved. The FBI was dealing with an agent from Cuba. That
agent from Cuba was feeding information both to the FBI and
Cuba. Perhaps the agent got too much credibility from both sides
and a certain scenario came out of it that both sides decided to act
against us. I do not know. That is what I am here for.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The issue of the coverup, Mr. Basulto, and
that you were given access to two of the four tracks of the tape,
what do you think is on those two tracks?
Mr. Basulto. Possibly communications through land lines, per-
haps even communications with Cuba. Who knows? Anything can
be there that is definitely related to what was happening.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And you have tried to get those tapes.
Mr. Basulto. Yes, but we have given up on that already. It took
us a judge to get the capability to get them and the alternative was
that the judge was going to drop the charges on my revocation of
license. And that revocation of license again turned out to be some-
thing very important for the Administration. They wanted my li-
cense revoked. There are political reasons behind that. I question
51
what they are. I do not know either. But it was important enough
that they were wilhng to let us hsten to those tapes even though
they told them that thev were of the highest top security and so
forth, just not to lose sight of the legal process and have my license
revoked.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We have Mr. Houlihan who is here already
and after this hearing as you know we will be speaking to him. It
has been requested to be a closed hearing. It is not the subcommit-
tee's request, but rather the official's request. Why do you think
that that is being done, Mr. Basulto? Why do you think Mr.
Houlihan even though he has already testified under oath in a Fed-
eral court as to what he knew and when he knew it, why do you
think that
Mr. Basulto. Very simple.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [continuing], whatever official is involved has
requested this to be
Mr. Basulto. We were limited in the scope of questions we were
able to ask Mr. Houlihan and the others from the government
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. If you were to not have that limitation, and
I am just rushing you because we are short of time, if you were
not to have that limitation and you were us, what would you sug-
gest that we ask Mr. Houlihan?
Mr. Basulto. I would ask him several things and I am sure a
great deal of them he does not know the answer.
Ms. Ros-Lehtenen. Can you give me some of the questions?
Mr. Basulto. Yes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I am sure that he is Hstening. Or his superi-
ors are.
Mr. Basulto. The one that he might know the answer if he
stayed there after the shootdown of the second airplane to watch,
I would like to know what did those MiGs do at 3:55 p.m. at the
time that we were stating that they were behind me, according to
what we have just shown you.
If he saw them there in the radar, if it is possible that somehow
his radar or the information he was receiving could have been
blocked out because there was somebody perhaps controlling that
information in Key West.
The information came out from a balloon that was raised specifi-
cally for the purpose of monitoring Brothers to the Rescue flight
that day. The balloon that is called Fat Albert in Kudjo Key.
So it is very easy to have somebody manipulate that information
from there. I would like to ask him if it is possible that those MiGs
were there and he will know it. And I would like to ask him also
if he saw the MiGs. And the other questions that I have are I be-
lieve have to go a lot higher than that.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. If you were to put forth the agenda for the
hearing and you would like individuals to answer questions, who
would you invite from the U.S. Government agencies to answer?
Mr. Basulto. I would be calling people from the White House.
I would be calling from the National Security Council. I would be
calling people from the State Department because I believe what
happened there was a political decision.
Ms. Ros-Lehtenen. Thank you, Mr. Basulto.
Mr. Basulto. Thank you.
52
Mr. Burton. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Baiart. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, you were onto something
right there at the end with regard to something that you had asked
Mr. Houlihan. It had to do, I think, something with how would he
not be able to know? If he says he does not know
Mr. Basulto. He does not know who made the decision not to
send the F-16s. He does not know who made the decision to stop
or bypass the standard operating procedure. He just takes orders.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Sure.
Mr. Basulto. He is a peon.
Mr. Diaz-Bai^rt. To your knowledge then what he was doing, he
was watching the MiGs until what time does he say that he saw
the MiGs?
Mr. Basulto. I believe he said to me that he had been watching
up until the second MiG shootdown, I am sorry, the second Broth-
ers to the Rescue aircraft was shot down and he got involved in
that and he did not pay — you better ask him this because my mem-
ory goes a little bit blurry on that, that he did not follow the
progress of November 2506 all the way back to its base.
Remember that two other MiGs took off from another location in
pursuit of November 2506. These were not the first two MiGs. Had
the first two gone in pursuit of November 2506, I would probably
have been shot down.
Mr. DiAZ-BAlJSk.RT. And did he say that he had seen two other
MiGs take oft?
Mr. Basulto. I do not recall. I know that we have the informa-
tion that two other MiGs took off and there is kind of a, and I will
call it for its name, a coverup in statement made and it is in the
ICAO report. And with our conversations with the ICAO investiga-
tors recently, we asked about the explanation that is in the ICAO
report on the persecution that took place of an airplane that never
existed. And they answered to us that, yes, that was a loose end
on the ICAO report, but since that plane was never shot down,
they just had to leave it there. They just had to act upon informa-
tion that was given to them by both the Cuban Government and
the U.S. Grovernment.
Mr. Diaz-Baiart. OK. Nothing else that comes to mind that you
would ask Mr. Houlihan?
Mr. Basulto. No, but I would certainly thank him for being an
honest man, for having said the truth as he saw it. Perhaps thanks
to him we are able to have this hearing today because he has given
a great deal of information we needed to fmd the truth and per-
haps seek justice.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, I will and we thank you as well. Thank
you.
Mr. Burton. Let me ask one final question. Mr. Houlihan was
obviously watching radar and he could see when those MiGs took
oft. Could he tell, from his vantage point, using the radar at his
disposal, how far north those MiGs came?
Mr. Basulto. Well, first of all, I believe Mr. Houlihan is the su-
pervisor of the station and he was controlling several stations. He
was called by one of his operators.
53
Mr. Diaz-Balart. ok. Well, let me put it to you this way. Would
the operator that gave him the information have been able to pin-
point how far north those aircraft came?
Mr. Basulto. Probably, yes.
Mr. Diaz-BaIjVRT. ok. I just want to note to ask him that ques-
tion. I want to thank you very much for being so patient. The only
reason we have to rush is we have to go in and talk to him. But
we appreciate your patience and your testimony and we promise
you we will pursue this.
Mr. Basulto. And we thank you very much, sir. Thank you. You
have done a wonderful job.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. The official hearing is hereby adjourned
and we will go to the anteroom for the closed door testimony.
[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned to re-
convene at the call of the Chair.]
55
APPENDIX
Testimony of Jose Basulto, President of Brothers to tlie Rescue
before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
September 18, 1996
Brothers to the Rescue, Inc. is a not-for profit, humanitarian organization, founded
in 1991 in response to the number of deaths of Cuban rafters trying to flee the
island in search of freedom. It is a volunteer pilots group from 17 different
nationalities, funded by voluntary private contributions. To date. Brothers to the
Rescue has conducted 1,840 search and rescue missions over the Straits of Florida,
resulting in over 4,000 lives saved before the refugee crisis of 1994.
On February 24th of this year, two U.S., unarmed, civilian Brothers to the Rescue
(BTTR) aircraft, conducting a humanitarian search and rescue mission over
international waters, were shot down by Cuban MiGs. This terrorist-like attack
resulted in the death of three U.S. citizens and a legal U.S. resident. A third BTTR
aircraft which I was piloting, managed to escape although it was pursued by an
additional pair of MiGs to within three minutes of the United States. Recent
findings clearly show that this assassination and the threat posed by the MiGs to
U.S. security interests could easily have been prevented by the United States.
Our testimony today before this Congressional Committee, is based upon sources
which include:
1) Sworn U.S. court testimony by U.S. officials.
2) Access to the audio recordings of the conversations between the MiGs pilots
and their Cuban controllers.
3) The report by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
4) Expert witnesses that have confirmed that U.S. government authorities at a
minimum, willfully chose not to act to protect the lives and planes on that
fateful mission.
56
We are convinced that if you review all of the foregoing evidence, you will come to
the same conclusions:
1) U.S. government authorities were aware of the especially dangerous
conditions which threatened our humanitarian mission on February 24 and
that MiGs were in the air that morning. Contrary to previous instances, this
information was not shared with BTTR. (ICAO report pages 50 & 51).
2) U.S. government authorities prepared an unusually elaborate plan to follow,
monitor and document BTTR's February 24 flight, which included, to our
knowledge:
a) Alerting several radar facilities from the U.S. Air Force and Customs.
b) Listening to and recording the communications of all the aircraft involved.
c) FAA Control Tower's report of the departure of our flight as well as radar
tracking. Yet, the usual "ramp check" inspection performed by FAA prior
to the departure of BTTR flights was strangely omitted that day.
3) U.S. government authorities proceeded passively then, to watch and listen, in
silence, for fifty-three minutes, while Cuban MiGs hunted two BTTR planes,
killed their four occupants, and chased the third plane to within three
minutes of the United States.
4) The U.S. Air Force ignored the equivalent of a 911 call made to them by
Major Jeffrey Houlihan, from March Air Force Base, in an attempt to save
the lives of the BTTR pilots. The U.S. Air Force abandoned its standard
operating procedure, to dispatch interceptors, upon the MiGs crossing the
twelve mile territorial limit of the island of Cuba. Major Houlihan gave
sworn testimony as to the existence of this standard operaring procedure and
trigger line.
5) U.S. authorities (Air Force, Customs and FAA) also abandoned their
practice of communicating with BTTR planes in the air via radio, or with
BTTR operations base in Opa Locka airport, to issue a warning as it had
done on multiple occasions in the past. (Pilots testimony is available). On
every occasion, when warned of MiGs in the air, BTTR has immediately
returned to base.
57
6) After the incident, U.S. government authorities fabricated a favorable
scenario that would cover up their inaction and share of responsibility.
Among the several actions taken, we experienced:
a) An attempt by a Customs official to seize by force and deception a tape
recording of the radio communications between BTTR and Havana Tower
during the mission.
b) Disavow any knowledge of MiGs in pursuit of the third BTTR aircraft
north of the 24th parallel. (The MiG pilots communications to their
ground controllers indicate otherwise).
c) The State Department refused to appear for deposition although properly
subpoenaed by the Administrative Law Judge of the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
d) Resist the Judge's petition to produce in court the recordings of the radio
communications of the MiG pilots and their controllers, already heard by
ICAO investigators, and partially released to the United Nations. When
finally obtained, these recordings provided BTTR with evidence that the
MiGs pursued the last remaining BTTR aircraft above the 24th parallel
and to viithin three minutes of the U.S.
e) When we were finally allowed to hear the tapes, we were given access to
only two of the four tracks of the tapes. The other two, probably pertinent
land-line communications, have not yet been released despite repeated
requests by BTTR attorneys.
f) By allovWng the MiGs to come within such close proximity to the U.S.,
American security interests were put at risk.
Brigadier General Howard G. DeWolf, Director of Inter-American Region, USAF,
stated in his letter to Congressman Dan Burton that the Department of Defense
does not regularly monitor the flights of civilian aircraft. Yet, on the 24th of
February, the State Department specifically requested four U.S. radar tracking
stations from Customs and the USAF to monitor the actions of BTTR.
58
BTTR believes that Juan Pablo Roque, a Cuban intelligence agent doubling as an
FBI informant and occasional BTTR pilot, was instrumental in the perception
created in Cuba and the U.S. that our organization was planning a pro-democracy
demonstration for that February 24th. The result was a premeditated ambush to
kill from Cuba, and a complete U.S. inteUigence operative which watched and
documented the events as they unfolded, but made no attempt to prevent the loss
of life. BTTR therefore, not only accuses and condemns Fidel Castro and the
Cuban air force of murdering U.S. citizens, but also critically questions the
rationale, purpose, and intentions behind the U.S. government's conduct and
inaction on February 24th.
Today we are providing this Committee with the necessary evidence and
testimonies to support our findings, and respectfully request that a full investigation
be carried out and that the responsible parties be held accountable.
We also want to thank the Committee for granting Brothers to the Rescue the
opportunity to avail itself of this important mechanism of our free and democratic
society which we trust will address the concerns we bring before you.
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
September 5, 1996
Honorable Dan Burton
House of Representatives
2240 Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-0918
Dear Congressman Burton:
I am responding to your letter of August 1, 1996 to Secretary Perry.
We have thoroughly looked into the recent allegations made by Mr. Basulto
concerning events that transpired on February 24, 1996 related to the
shootdown of two Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR) planes by Cuban MiGs.
Our review of events has concluded that at no time was the sovereignty of
the United States threatened and our personnel acted properly at all times.
Department of Defense radars do not routinely and systematically track
civilian U.S. aircraft operating in international airspace. Our air defense
personnel were informed by a Customs radar operator of the MiGs closing
on slower aircraft and replied that they also had the aircraft on their
radars. However, neither party knew that the two slow-moving aircraft
were the BTTR aircraft nor were they aware of the Cuban Government's
intentions. The aircraft were operating in a well defined Cuban Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Under those circumstances, it would
not have been improper for the Cuban MiGs to carry out a legitimate
aircraft identification mission. However, our personnel were not in a
position to have anticipated the unwarranted shooting down of the BTTR
aircraft.
The northern boundary of the Cuban ADIZ is the southern boundary of
our ADIZ. This boundary has been honored by both the United States and
Cuba for many years. Records are not kept on information which would
directly answer your question about the reactions of airborne Cuban MiGs
operating within their ADIZ to the launch of U.S. military aircraft.
o
60
The United States had two aircraft on a heightened state of alert to
respond to the Cuban MiGs should they have crossed the 24lh Parallel,
which they did not. In fact, our radars indicated that no Cuban MiGs
approached the 24th parallel (the southern boundary of our ADIZ), or
United States airspace. As you may be aware from the ICAO report, our
radar data show that the last pair of MiGs came no closer than 40 nautical
miles from the remaining BTTR aircraft.
While there is no excuse for Cuba's actions in the downing of civilian
aircraft, it is also important to state that Mr. Basulto had been warned on
several occasions by the United States Government as to the dangers
inherent in flying in Cuban airspace or in their ADIZ. I trust the above
addresses your concerns.
Sincerely,
Howard G. DeWolf
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, Inter-American Region
61
UNCLASSIFIED
INSERT FOR THE RECORD
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE SUBCOMMITTEE
18 SEPTEMBER 1996
1. Why did the Air Force dismiss the call from the Customs official in
California of the presence of Cuban MiGs?
The Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) did not dismiss the call from
the Customs official. SEADS personnel were already totally focused on the
situation and closely monitoring the flight of the MIG to ensure it did not
become a threat to North American sovereignty. On several occasions prior to
24 Feb 96 the SEADS personnel had witnessed Cuban MIGs intercepting BTTR
aircraft in the Cuban internationally recognized ADIZ and perform legal
non-hostile identification of aircraft flying towards their sovereign
airspace. Neither the SEADS personnel nor anyone else in the NORAD
organization had any knowledge of Cuban hostile intent on 24 Feb 96. A call
between SEADS and DAICC (Customs) was not unusual since coordination occurs
many times each day to ensure proper identification and tracking of targets of
interest to the counterdrug traffic mission of Customs and the air sovereignty
mission of NORAD. SEADS had been monitoring this MIG radar track much earlier
than customs through intelligence cueing. There was nothing in this telephone
call that would cause SEADS to change its standard response to MIG activity.
2. Why did the Air Force not inform the Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR) of the
presence of Cuban MIGs even after they knew that the Brothers flight plan
would take them close to them?
NORAD/SEADS had no knowledge of Cuban hostile intent on 24 Feb 96. Cuba
has established a precedent for flying north of the island without incident,
and had previously intercepted BTTR aircraft in accordance with ICAO
guidelines. NORAD/SEADS has never provided warning of MIGs airborne north of
Cuba on any prior occasion when BTTR aircraft were in the same vicinity of the
MIGs.
3. Why was no action taken to intercept Cuban MIGs pursuing the BTTR aircraft
before two of the planes were shot down?
The BTTR aircraft were operating inside the Cuban Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) which extends to the 24th parallel. In fact, at
the time of the intercept, some BTTR aircraft were within 10 nm of Cuban
Sovereign airspace. As such, BTTR aircraft were subject to intercept for
identification, escort, or monitoring in accordance with accepted
international procedures. NORAD/SEADS uses these same ADIZ procedures north
of the 24th latitude to identify unknown/nonf light plan aircraft entering the
US ADIZ. Again, at no time prior to the first shoot down was there any
indication of hostile intent.
4. Why was there no interception of the MIGs which pursued Mr. Basulto's
aircraft within three minutes of the US shores?
62
UNCLASSIFIED
MIGs did not pursue Mr. Basulto "within three minutes of the US shores."
After the shoot down of the two BTTR aircraft the only two MIGs airborne
immediately turned south and flew directly back to Cuba. As Mr. Basulto was
headed north, another flight of two MIGs took off from the same Cuban airfield
and orbited between 15 and 23 nm north of Cuba. This second pair of MIGS came
no closer than 48.1 nm to Mr. Basulto. They also came no closer than 60.9 nm
to Key West and were never a threat to the air sovereignty of the US nor were
they a threat to the fleeing BTTR aircraft. Radar plots provide unequivocal
proof. By using the radio conversation which includes times, specific ground
reference and controller directions, we have plotted the position of the MIGs.
The accuracy of the radar plots was confirmed. Mr. Basulto was never
threatened post shoot- down, nor was US sovereign airspace.
5. Why were no US aircraft sent to protect the planes on February 24th?
Neither NORAD or USACOM have an assigned daily mission to protect US
civil aircraft in international airspace. Therefore, there are no forces in
place to accomplish this mission. Under CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement
(ROE) commanders may intercede when excessive or disproportionate force is
applied only on witnessing a hostile act or hostile intent. On February 24th,
the evidence of a hostile act or hostile intent through intelligence sources
did not occur until just prior to the second BTTR aircraft being shot down.
Due to the distance to the point where B 1 TR aircraft were attacked and the
short time preceding the second shoot down, no US military resources were in a
position to respond. There was not a threat to the surviving BTTR aircraft
after the SEADS received knowledge of the two shoot downs.
6. Could the murders have been prevented?
If the lead BTTR aircraft had heeded the warning call from Havana, which
he acknowledged, the shoot down would not have occurred. Without prior
knowledge of hostile intent and without an , assigned civilian force protection
mission the military could not have prevented the shoot down of BTTR aircraft.
7. What is US policy with respect to Cuban MIGs approaching US airspace?
Also, question 30: What is the standard operating procedure for Cuban MIGs
approaching US airspace? Please be specific.
Cuban MIGs flying north of Cuba conducting routine operations do not
necessarily trigger scramble of US fighter aircraft. A specific set of
criteria and procedures are in place to execute the air sovereignty mission
should this criteria be met.
8. Did anyone in the US military seek authorization at any time on February
24th to launch planes to defend the BTTR?
No one asked for authorization to launch planes to defend BTTR because
there was no requirement for special authorization. SEADS has full authority
to launch fighters to intercept unknown targets that threaten US sovereign
airspace. SEADS was in contact with NORAD during the ongoing incident in
international airspace to keep the headquarters informed. At the point that
SEADS determined a hostile act had occurred, the remaining BTTR aircraft had
separated from danger, the MIGs had established an orbit near the Cuban coast,
and any requirement for an immediate scramble was over.
UNCLASSIFIED
63
UNCLASSIFIED
9. Did anyone in the Air Force seek authorization to take off and defend the
American citizens and intercept the Cuban planes?
No. NORAD/SEADS had the best picture of the events on February 24th (see
question 8) . Again, by the time it was determined that a threat existed, the
opportunity to intervene on behalf of the BTTR aircraft had passed.
10. What is our policy with respect to Cuban planes approaching our airspace
in the future?
Our policy for protecting US airspace remains unchanged. Any unknown/
nonflight plan aircraft entering the ADIZ will be intercepted, identified, and
escorted or monitored as appropriate.
11. Does DoD have a plan to respond to threats from Cuban Aircraft
approaching our airspace?
Yes. NORAD has the peacetime responsibility for the air sovereignty of
North American airspace. Unknown/nonf light plan aircraft entering the ADIZ
will be intercepted for identified, and escorted or monitored as appropriate.
That plan was executed properly on 24 February, and no Cuban aircraft
threatened our airspace.
12. Who was contacted by the Customs people at Tyndall? Also, (13), who is
the Senior Director Technician at the air defense facility at Tyndall?
A review of the Customs telephone transcript indicates the call was
taken by the Senior Director Technician, who routinely handles assignment of
target symbology, FAA coordination, or other telephone coordination;
coordination with Customs is a routine function. We do not know which SD
Technician took the call. Transcript review indicates the conversation was a
routine coordination of radar track activity to ensure SEADS was tracking the
specific target. SEADS knew that BTTR was flying; further, they were actively
responding in accordance with established procedures to the MIG activity.
13. Was the US Government aware of especially dangerous conditions which
threatened the safety of the BTTR mission February 24th?
No. The Cubans had stated in open press that they would protect their
sovereign airspace, but those warnings had followed other BTTR violations of
Cuban airspace. There was no forewarning of Cuban intent to shoot down BTTR
aircraft on February 24. Cuban MIGs were known to fly in their Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) which extends north to the 24th parallel. In
addition, Cuban MIGs often have intercepted BTTR aircraft in the past and
employed internationally accepted interception procedures; they had
established a well known precedent of intercepting BTTR aircraft without
incident .
14. Were you aware the MIGs were in the air that morning and that this
information was not shared with BTTR?
UNCLASSIFIED
64
UNCLASSIFIED
Yes to both questions. NORAD/SEADS was aware that Cuban MIGs had flown
in the morning. The flight was north of the island, slightly west of Havana.
Other agencies such as CARIBROC, Customs and FAA that feed off of the same
radar sensor may also have known that the MIGs flew that morning. NORAD/SEADS
has never shared information with BTTR aircraft concerning routine MIG flying
activities on any prior occasion. NORAD/SEADS did not have any knowledge of
Cuban hostile intent which would warrant notification to the BTTR.
15. Is it customary to provide information that might be considered unusual
with the BTTR concerning their Flight?
No. The BTTR flights are conducted under the purview of the FAA and
ICAO agreements. NORAD/SEADS would normally have no dialogue with BTTR.
16. Would the Air Force normally share such information with the BTTR?
If the Air Force had clear information that US lives were at risk, we
would certainly make every effort to warn and protect our citizens. On the day
of the shoot down, there was no "unusual information" (i.e., an indication
that US lives were in jeopardy) until the time of the first shoot down. There
was no unusual information to share.
17. On February 24, was there an elaborate plan implemented by the Air Force
or other US government agencies to follow or track by radar the BTTR planes?
There was no "elaborate plan" known to NORAD/SEADS. The NORAD/SEADS
tracking of the BTTR aircraft on February 24 used standard procedures which
would be used for any flights of special interest. The FAA alerted Customs
(DAICC) , 1st Air Force (SEADS) and CARIBROC that the BTTR would be flying in
the Florida Straits. They specifically requested support from Customs in
recording scope data on the BTTR aircraft on 24 Feb 96 based upon the need to
gather supporting information on BTTR violations. In response to this
expressed interest, SEADS also took steps to record their data.
18. Did US government authorities passively watch and listen in silence for
53 minutes while Cuban MIGs hunted the BTTR planes, killed their occupants and
chased me third plane to within 3 minutes of the United States?
No. NORAD/SEADS was actively involved in monitoring the events of 24
February using standard operating procedures as outlined for questions 7 and
30. The BTTR aircraft were operating within the confines of the Cuban ADIZ,
and Cuban forces had a legitimate right to intercept them in accordance with
established international rules. The Cubans had demonstrated no hostile
intent in the process of intercepting unknown tracks in the past, so there was
no hostile intent evident until 1521L, the time of the first shoot down. By
the time SEADS obtained unambiguous confirmation that a shoot down had
actually taken place (1525L) and accomplished coordination with NORAD
headquarters, the second shoot down had already taken place {1528L) and the
MIGs had disengaged to the south (1530L) . The radar data does not support the
claim that one MIG chased the remaining BTTR aircraft to "within three minutes
of the United States." On the contrary, the data shows no MIG ceime close to
the 24th parallel, much less to US sovereign airspace. A plot of the ground
track of the last flight of MIGs based on the radio transmission between the
pilots, ground control and SAR helicopter verifies the radar data.
65
UNCLASSIFIED
19. Did the Cuban MIGs ever penetrate the 24th parallel on February 24th?
No. The closest MIG approach to the 24th parallel during the shoot down
was 25.1 nautical miles (NM) south of that latitude. Following the shoot
down, a final set of MIGs approached no closer than 23.5 am to the 24th
parallel .
20. Customs official Major Houlihan testifies at a court hearing that on
February 24, the Cuban MIGs came out of the ADIZ, were flying in international
airspace toward the US and that one of the MIGs was flying directly over the
BTTR mission. True?
The MIGs did fly out of their 12 mile territorial limit, but not outside
their internationally recognized ADIZ (which extends north to the 24th
parallel) and fly toward the BTTR aircraft. This is accepted air defense
procedures if attempting to intercept, identify, and escort or monitor unknown
aircraft entering a nation's ADIZ. NORAD/SEADS had no knowledge of Cuban
intentions to shoot down BTTR aircraft on February 24th.
21. According to this transcript. Major Houlihan asked the Senior Defense
Official at Tyndall whether he could see the BTTR planes and that the official
at the base responded affirmatively and that it was being handled. True?
Transcripts from Customs indicate that the call took place. The
official that received the call was not the senior defense official at SEADS.
The Senior Director Technician could not remember the phone call; from a SEADS
perspective the phone call was no more than normal communication between SEADS
and any other organization in the process of monitoring radar tracks. Customs
and SEADS share the same radar feeds and often are involved in operational
coordination.
22. The above statements made by Major Houlihan appear to contradict DoD's
letter signed by General DeWolf which states that neither our air defense
personnel or Customs "...knew that the two slow-moving aircraft were BTTR
aircraft or were aware of the Cuban Government intention." Can you reconcile
these contradictory statements.?
The first part of the quoted statement was inaccurate and led to
misunderstandings. Clearly, both Customs and the air defense system knew the
position and the identity of the BTTR aircraft. The second part of the
sentence is correct... neither Customs nor SEADS had any prior notification or
knowledge of Cuban intent. A more thorough review of the incident should have
occurred to provide an unambiguous response however, it was not intended to be
misleading or untruthful.
23. Had US government authorities contacted the BTTR on other occasions to
warn them about the risks of flying into Cuban airspace?
OTHER AGENCY RESPONSE REQUIRED.
Was an attempt made to warn them prior to the February 24th incident?
UNCLASSIFIED
66
UNCLASSIFIED
The only NORAD/SEADS contact with BTTR in the last three years was to
obtain flight plan information. Since BTTR operates under the rules and
regulations of the FAA and ICAO, NORAD would have had no part in warning them
about the risks of flying in Cuban airspace. The governing body for civil
flying resides within the FAA. At no time did NORAD/SEADs provide a warning.
24. After Cuban officials complained to me State Department of alleged
violations of Cuban airspace by BTTR aircraft, were there any changes in the
US government response to BTTR aircraft or any of their endeavors as it
relates to policy or from a military standpoint?
OTHER AGENCY RESPONSE REQUIRED.
25. Can you provide the details of conversations, and the times and places
when Cuban authorities discussed their allegations that the BTTR violated
Cuban airspace with US authorities?
OTHER AGENCY RESPONSE REQUIRED.
26. Mr. Basulto contends that the USAF ignored the equivalent of a "911" call
from Customs official Houlihan to save the life of the BTTR pilots. Do you
agree?
No. That telephone call contained no information which would change
SEADS' interpretation of the developing air picture. The decision process by
SEADS centered around first identifying the threat of the MIGs to US sovereign
airspace and then scrambling if the criteria were met. Since the MIGs did not
meet that criteria, there was no scramble. Further, since NORAD/SEADS had no
specific knowledge of Cuban hostile intent until the first shoot down, there
was no reason to scramble based on a threat to BTTR. At the time Mr. Houlihan
called, the air picture was assessed by SEADS to be very similar to other
times when the Cuban MIGs have intercepted the BTTR aircraft. SEADS did not
perceive a "911" situation, so they did not interpret the call in those terms.
27. Did the USAF abandon its standard operating procedures to dispatch
interceptors upon the MIGs crossing the 12 -mile territorial limit of Cuba?
Was our standard operating procedure changed for February 24th and was it
changed after our discussions with Cuban officials?
No. NORAD/SEADS followed standard procedures on 24 February. As
discussed, NORAD does not routinely scramble aircraft in response to MIGs
operating north of Cuba. These procedures were not changed on 24 February for
any reasons.
28. Did we ever send signals to Cuban authorities that the US would not
intervene in the event of an attack on BTTR aircraft?
OTHER AGENCY RESPONSE REQUIRED.
29. In the secret March 2nd meeting with Cuban authorities did we seek to
establish mutually agreed upon positions as to the events of February 24th?
OTHER AGENCY RESPONSE REQUIRED.
UNCLASSIFIED
67
UNCLASSIFIED
30. Retired Admiral Carrol of the Center for Defense Information contends
that he relayed a message for Cuban authorities to US officials that they
would shoot down aircraft violating their airspace. After the meeting with
Admiral Carroll, did we warn the Cubans not to take such action?
OTHER AGENCY RESPONSE REQUIRED.
31. What is the standard operation procedure for Cuban MIGs approaching US
airspace. Please be specific.
See Question #7.
32. Is it unusual to see Cuban MIGs operating north, outside the 12 mile
territorial limit of Cuba? and do we scramble planes when they do so?
No, it is not unusual to see Cuban MIGs operating north of the island,
outside the territorial limit, but inside the Cuban ADIZ.
33. On February 24th, what was the status of the F-15s at Homestead? Were they
ready to launch? Were they told to stand down?
At no time based upon NORAD scramble criteria did the position of the
Cuban MIGs dictate a scramble. The F-15s at Homestead remained in a position
to launch within five minutes throughout the entire sequence of the BTTR shoot
down. Owing to communication mix-up between Cheyenne Mountain and SEADS,
Homestead was told to stand down from battle stations for 15 minutes, between
1520L and 1535L, the period that included both shoot downs. CINCNORAD
directed to Cheyenne Mountain that our alert aircraft should understand the
Rules of Engagement and that we were not to be provocative. This direction
occurred before the CINC was briefed that the MIGs were airborne. That
direction was interpreted by a NORAD duty officer that the fighters at
Homestead should come off battle station, which was neither the direction or
intent. By the time the SEADS commander clarified the situation and placed
the fighters back on battle stations, the engagement had already been
terminated. This command and control breakdown resulted in alert fighters on
5 -minute airborne response time instead of 2-3 minute response time and did
not impact the outcome to the day's events.
34. In previous cases, how did Cuban planes respond to US aircraft being
scrambled? Did they retreat? If they did, is it logical to assume mat they
would have retreated on February 24th had we scrambled US fighters?
In general, when US fighters have been scrambled, Cuban fighters have
avoided confrontation with US fighters by moving away from the 24th parallel
and closer to Cuba. Since the Cuban fighters were not near the 24th parallel
(they were never more than two minutes from their own territorial airspace) ,
it is difficult to speculate what their reaction would have been had we
scrambled our fighters as soon as the MIGs approached the BTTR aircraft.
Conservatively, it would have taken our fighters 20-25 minutes to reach the
site of the first shoot down once the two entities came together on the radar
scope. Since that occurred at 1514, the earliest our F-15s could have been in
visual range of the MIGs would be 15341539, or at least six minutes after the
second shoot down. All this is speculation, however, because our historical
UNCLASSIFIED
68
UNCLASSIFIED
reference for MIG reaction is a knowledge that the Cubans were attempting to
avoid confrontation; in the case of the BTTR shoot down, it became clear for
the first time after 1521 that they had hostile intent. It is not logical to
assume that they would have retreated.
35. Did the FAA inform me State Department that the BTTR was flying just
before or on the day of February 24th? What was the exchange of information
with the FAA?
OTHER AGENCY RESPONSE REQUIRED
36. After the incident, did Customs attempt to seize, by force or deception,
a tape recording of the radio communication of the BTTR and Havana during the
mission? Who were the Customs officials who attempted to do so?
OTHER AGENCY RESPONSE REQUIRED
37. Please provide copies of the radar prints which show that the Cuban MIGs
did not fly above the 24th parallel.
Radar prints provided as supporting documentation to the report.
UNCLASSIFIED
69
QUESTIONS FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Question:
Was the U.S. government aware of especially dangerous
conditions which threatened the safety of the BTTR mission on
February 24th? Were you aware that MIGs were in the air that
morning and that this information was not shared with BTTR?
Answer;
Prior to February 24, 1996, the State Department had issued a
number of warnings regarding the risks involved with
unauthorized entry into Cuban territorial seas or airspace.
These were normally made in connection with planned flotillas
of privately-owned vessels and aircraft proceeding from Florida
towards Cuba. The Department is attaching a summary of many of
the actions taken in this regard. A more exhaustive chronology
of State Department actions, including classified diplomatic
exchanges with the Cuban government, can be made available to
read here at the Department.
The Department was unaware of any specific threat to the safety
of the BTTR mission on February 24. We knew that the Cuban
Government was engaged in an island-wide crackdown on the
"Concilio Cubano," a newly-formed umbrella human rights
organization. Over 100 members had been arrested or detained
by February 24, the date the group had wanted to hold its first
public meeting (the GOC denied the request).
The Department was aware of public expressions of support for
the Concilio Cubano by the BTTR including the filing of an
application with the Department of the Treasury for a license
to send financial assistance to the group. On February 23,
Miami sources advised the Office of Cuban Affairs of rumors
that some Miami-based groups might engage in acts of solidarity
in support of the Concilio Cubano on February 24. The State
Department had no specific information indicating that the BTTR
would fly. Given the above circumstances, however, the State
Department (Office of Cuban Af f airs-ARA/CCA) contacted the
FAA's Office of International Aviation on February 23 to be
alert to possible flights which conceivably could be arranged
to demonstrate solidarity with the Concilio Cubano. ARA/CCA
asked that all appropriate radar assets be in place to track
any such flights. CCA explained that this was requested in
order to either disprove Cuban allegations of violations of
their airspace, or to assist in appropriate law enforcement
investigations should any U.S. -registered aircraft violate
Cuban airspace.
70
On the morning of February 24, the Office of Cuban Affairs
followed up with FAA to request that the State Department be
alerted should any Brothers to the Rescue pilots file flight
plans or fly. FAA advised during the morning that six BTTR
aircraft had filed flight plans for flights during the morning
in international airspace. The Department was alerted by FAA
at approximately 13:10 that Cuban military aircraft had reacted
to possible unidentified aircraft in or near their airspace.
The Cuban aircraft, after patrolling, returned to base without
incident. The Department's next involvement on flight issues
was when we were alerted in the late afternoon of February 24
that the Cubans had shot down two BTTR aircraft in
international airspace. We had no information that BTTR
aircraft would fly in the afternoon.
71
Question:
Had U.S. government authorities contacted the BTTR on other
occasions to warn them about the risks of flying into Cuban
airspace? Was an attempt made to warn them prior to the
February 24th incident?
Answer :
The Department of State issued public statements regarding the
risks involved of unauthorized entry into Cuban territorial
seas or airspace on July 7, 1995, August 8, 1995, August 29,
1995, and October 18, 1995. These announcements coincided with
planned flotillas to Cuba but the contents remained valid after
the date of issuance. Because the flotillas always left from
south Florida, copies of the public announcements were sent to
the Miami media to ensure widespread coverage. Starting in
August 1995, the announcement specifically drew attention to
the public statement issued by the Cuban government on July 14,
1995, that it would take actions necessary to prevent
unauthorized incursions into its territorial waters and
airspace, including the warning that "any boat from abroad can
be sunk and any airplane downed." In addition, the State
Department consular information sheet for Cuba, distributed on
a worldwide basis, contained warnings against violations of
Cuban territorial seas and airspace.
In addition to the above public announcements, senior officials
in the State Department's Inter-American Bureau met with
flotilla organizers on August 28, 1995. BTTR President Jose
Basulto attended this meeting where participants were informed
of the potentially serious consequences of unauthorized
penetrations of Cuban airspace. State Department officials
subsequently had additional conversations by phone or in person
with Mr. Basulto on August 31, 1995, January 24, 1996, and
January 26, 1996, and February 26. There were other contacts
after February 24, including a letter to flotilla organizers
signed by a senior-level ARA official, again warning "that
persons who enter Cuban territory, territorial seas or airspace
without authorization from the Cuban Government may be in
violation of U.S. and international law and place themselves
and others in serious danger".
72
Question:
Can you provide the details of conversations, and the times and
places when Cuban authorities discussed their allegations that
the BTTR violated Cuban airspace with U.S. authorities?
Answer;
The Government of Cuba submitted numerous diplomatic notes
during the period 1994 - 1996 alleging violations of its
airspace by aircraft from the U.S. Some of these notes mention
the BTTR by name.
On November 21, 1994, the Cubans submitted a note to the United
States Interests Section in Havana alleging that two BTTR
planes violated Cuban airspace following departure from the
U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo on November 10. The note
provided tail numbers for the planes and further alleged that
leaflets had been dropped over Cuban territory. This note
refers to two previous diplomatic notes dated July 21 and July
22, 1994, alleging other violations by the BTTR. The U.S.
government investigated the matter but did not provide the GOC
with a written response.
In response to an earlier question, the Department attached a
summary of actions taken in connection with the various
flotillas. A more exhaustive classified chronology outlining
conversations with Cuban government officials can also be made
available to Subcommittee Members to read.
In August 1995, an exchange of diplomatic notes with the GOC
began regarding an alleged air incursion by the BTTR on July
13, 1995. Following receipt of a GOC diplomatic note dated
August 21, the Department of State requested additional
information required by the FAA to conduct an investigation.
The Cuban government subsequently provided this information.
In January 1996, the GOC submitted a diplomatic note advising
of alleged air incursions on January 9 and January 13. The
Department of State again requested additional information
needed by the FAA to conduct an investigation. The GOC
provided this information in late January 1996. The GOC
submitted diplomatic notes in March 1996 alleging that air
incursions had occurred on March 23. The Department of State
responded that USG agencies were unable to confirm these
violations .
73
Question:
Did we ever send signals to Cuban authorities that the U.S.
would not intervene in the event of an attack on BTTR aircraft?
Answer;
At no time during the State Department's conversations with
Cuban authorities was there ever such a suggestion. In fact,
the State Department urged the Cubans at every opportunity to
exercise, in accordance with international legal principles
concerning the use of force and the law of the sea,, the utmost
discretion and restraint in responding to any incursions of
Cuban territorial seas or airspace. Any threats by the GOC to
use force were met with strong warnings by State Department
officials. There could be no doubt on the part of Cuban
authorities that the USG took a strong interest in protecting
the lives and property of flotilla participants, both vessels
and aircraft, and others involved in peaceful protest against
Cuba.
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 9999 05983 770 6
Question:
In the secret March 2nd meeting with Cuban authorities did we
seek to establish mutually agreed upon positions as to the
events of February 24th?
Answer;
U.S. and Cuban officials met in New York on March 2 to discuss
the shootdown. The purpose of the meeting was to make clear to
the Cubans that the U.S. Government had definitive information
that the aircraft were shot down in international airspace,
that no purpose would be served by any Cuban attempts to
distort the facts, and that the Cuban Government should accept
responsibility for the unlawful shootdown of the civilian
aircraft. The purpose of the meeting was not to develop or
mutually agree on positions which each side would take with
respect to the shootdown.
75
Question:
Retired Admiral Carroll of the Center for Defense Information
contends that he relayed a message from Cuban authorities to
U.S. officials that they would shoot down aircraft violating
their airspace. After the meeting with Admiral Carroll, did we
warn the Cubans not to take such action?
Answer:
The Department began issuing public warnings about the risks
involved in violating Cuban territorial seas and airspace even
before the Cubans first threatened to "shoot down planes and
sink boats" (following the July 13, 1995 flotilla). We have
presented a detailed chronology of all such warnings.
On February 21, a group from the Center for International
Policy, including retired Admiral Carroll, met with officers
from the Office of Cuban Affairs at that office's request to
debrief on their recent fact-finding visit to Cuba. In the
course of conversations lasting over an hour. Admiral Carroll
mentioned that the Cuban military indicated that they were very
concerned about alleged violations of their airspace and that
they might react forcefully if there were more such
violations. CCA replied that we were aware of such generalized
concerns and threats as conveyed through GOC public statements
and diplomatic notes. Admiral Carroll did not indicate that he
was passing any message from the Cubans to us. The issue took
up approximately three minutes of the total discussion.
o
ISBN 0-16-053987-0
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