The Siddhantalesasangraha Of Appayya Diksita Vol I

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Title

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This book ftioufkl be returned on or before the date last marked below.

Publications of the Department of Indian Philosophy

No. 4* v
General Editor: S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

THE

SIDDHANTALESASANGRAHA

OF

APPAYYA DlKSlTA

[VOLUME I TRANSLATION]

THE

SIDDHANTALESASANbKAHA

OF

APPAYYA DIKSITA

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI
Department of Indian Philosophy

VOLUME I
TRANSLATION

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS
1935

CONTENTS

PAGE

Introduction . . . . . . . . 1

Analytical Table of Contents . . . . 67

Translation of Chapter I .. ..129

Chapter II .. ..245

Chapter III . . . . 331

Chapter IV .. ..387

INTRODUCTION.

A BRIEF sketch of the life and works of Appayya
Diksita has been provided in the Introduction to the
Sivadvaitanirnaya. 1 The Diksita 's period was given
there as 1552-1624. This traditional date was subject
to questioning even then and has since been subjected
to further examination. 2 The principal arguments are
two, a negative and a positive ; the negative one seeks to
show that the traditional horoscope is a piece of
guess-work based on subsequent calculation, and is a
miscalculation at that, since the day arrived at would
appear to belong to the cyclic year Pramadica in tho
19th century and not in the 16th ; this information given
to the writer of the article by the late L. D. Swamikannu
Pillai is presumably collect ; in that case, we have to
accept the main contention of the article and accept the
antedating by thirty years as very probable. On. the
astronomical data alleged we are not qualified to
pronounce; but it is unfortunate that no upholder of
the traditional view has yet questioned the statement.
The positive argument, though striking, is far from
convincing. It is based on an inscription iu the temple
of Kalakanthesvara at Adayapalam. The inscription
records the building of the temjple by Appayya Diksita,
who in 1582 A.D. had written the jSivarkamanitKpika
as a commentary on ^rikantha's Bhasya, had been
bathed in gold by Cinna Bomma, had received gifts of

1 Published by the University of Madras, 1930.

2 See "More about the age and life of Srlmad Appayya
by Y. Mahalinga Sastri, JORM, III, 140.

S [-1

INTRODUCTION

gold and lands for teaching the said Bhasya to five
hundred pupils and so on ; it also states that the Dlksita
was the author of a hundred works sueh as the
Nyayaraksdmani and the Kalpatcmiparimcila. If it
can be presumed that the year mentioned is the year of
the inscription, then Appayya should certainly have
attained the zenith of his glory by then; and it would
be much more reasonable to suppose that he was born in
1522 tli an in 1552. But the inscription provides no
evidence as to when it was itself carved, nor even as
to when the temple was built (or moi-e likely re-built).
The date mentioned need relate only to Appayya *s
teaching of the BMsya, his writing of the Sirarlramani-
dipika and perhaps the honour done to him at China
Bomma's court, The word " subsequently (adukkup-
pin)" is vague, but not devoid of significance; and it
would suggest the considerable interval that must have
elapsed between this early mark of royal favour and the
finishing of his hundred and more works. The building
or re-edification of the temple might have fallen
anywhere within this period; even if that too be fixed
at 1582 A.D.,'it proves nothing as to the date of the
inscription itself. It may well have been the pious work
of sons and grandsons. Not even the first signatory can
be identified with Appayya, for a certainty; for he
himself is referred to as Appai Diksitar, while the
first signatory calls himself Appa Diksitar. They
are variants of the same name, no doubt, and there
is no uniformity about the spelling even of our
Appayya 's name; but a variation in the course of a
few words in one and the same inscription may well
make us pause, especially when there is no certain

DATE OF APPAYYA AND THE PRESENT WORK 3

means of dating the inscription itself. Other considera-
tions based on the dates of Appayya's known
contemporaries are by no means conclusive. All that
is certain is that the best part of Appayya's work
seems to belong to the second half of the 16th century;
whether he died at the close of that century or in the
first quarter of the seventeenth is uncertain.

For our purpose here, it is also immaterial. There
can be no doubt that the Siddhantalesa is one of the
earliest, if not the earliest of Appayya's. While show-
ing undoubted mastery of the varieties of advaita
doctrine, it exhibits very little of his own genius, except
in the discussion of sarvamukti at the end of the fourth
chapter. The prefatory remark that the author is
Setting down what he learnt from his father, for the
purpose of his own mental clarification, may be taken
at its face value, as indicating the comparatively early
stage of the author's development. We have not yet
the vigorous polemic writer ; much less do we have the
syncretist who blended with such an eminent degree of
success the system taught by his father with the system
he expounded by royal command, infusing into both the
devotion to Siva that came through natural piety.
Indeed, we have yet no trace of his Saiva leanings, but
a rather marked indication of his not having developed
any " sectarianism " (if it may be so called) when he
speaks of the Ganga as flowing from the toe of Vi$ruu
When' his devotion to Siva develops and he tries to
establish the superiority of Siva as identical with
Saguiia Brahman, not Samhai-a Kudra, wo find him
elaborately trying to show that there are two rivers

4 INTRODUCTION

called Ganga, that one flowed out of Visnu's toe but fell
down the side of Mem straight into the sea, while that
which is worn by Siva on his head is another Ganga,
whose fruitful waters course along different lands
bringing joy and plenty everywhere before they finally
unite with the sea. 3

I

The tiiddhantdlesa is much more than a catalogue
of varieties of advaita dodrine. The author's mind
has reacted on the views expounded and some evidence
of it is found in the way he arranges the views on each
topic. The order is not necessarily chronological,
though it may be so in a few cases. In the very first
topic, for instance, the first view expounded, that study
of the Vedfmta is an apurva-vidhi, is that of the author
of the Prakatartlia, while the last view, that there is no
injunction at all, is that of Vacaspati; and Vacaspati
was certainly earlier than the author of the
Prakatartha, who abused the former in vile language
for his alleged slavish adoption of Mandana's views.
The arrangement of the views is so made that, in most
cases, each prior view comes in for criticism from the
exponent of the next; criticism is thus immanent,
though rarely out of the mouth of Appayya himself.
In some cases, Appayya seerns either not to have had
access to originals or relied on a defective m'emory.

3 Sec the Drahmatwkasstava, vv. 35, 36 and 37. The same prefatory
verse about the Ganga flowing from Venn's toe is found in the
Nytiy<mik$tiniwii too. This work is posterior to the &id<lhantale$a,' but
prior to the &wa<lvaitaHirnay<*9 since in the discussion of sarvamukti, the
former 'work* is referred to, not the latter (see p. 192 of the

VALUE OF THE PRESENT WORK

Thus his references to the Brahmasiddhi are uniformly
unfortunate in the matter of both commission and
omission. A verse quoted in the fourth chapter is
ascribed to the Vartika, while it really occurs in the
Brahmasiddhi; a view ascribed to the Brahmasiddhi, as
to the nature of the removal of nescience, is not
distinctive of that work, and is not found stated there
in the words used by Appayya; the criticism of
difference is largely based on the Tattvasuddhi, a
work later than the Brahmasiddhi and expressly based
on it in regard to this topic; the view that whatever is
cognised is really of one nature alone, satta, and that
therefore difference has no place in valid knowledge is
pre-eminently Mandana's; 4 yet it is ascribed to the
author of the Tattvasuddhi, who derived it from
Mandana and did not add to it in any way. 5 But with
all this Appayya is fairly reliable as a guide to the
views he summarised.

It is often said that the Hindu habit of writing
commentaries and sub-commentaries on given cryptic
texts has not been favourable to originality or the
development of thought. A study of the Siddhantalesa
will help to dispel such delusions. Bound as the writers
no doubt felt themselves to be by the doctrines of the

4 "mlyam&nai-'ka-rupeu na ni$edho 'vakaavan||"

Brahma&iddJii, p. 58.

5 See Appendix for quotation from Tattvasuddhi.

6 Some attempts has been made to trace Appayya's quotations, and
references. As the literature is vast and much of it is unpublished, any
attempt to make out an exhaustive list takes an unconscionable time. The
present editor has had to content himself for the moment with the little he
has done, in the hope that his further work in post-Sankara advaita
will help him to complete the list m the fullness of time.

6 INTRODUCTION

Vedanta Sutras as interpreted by Sankara, they yet
show considerable variation and originality in tackling
the various problems in detail. The questions they
solve are not merely of exegetic interest, as in the
consideration of the question whether there is a vidhi in
respect of Vedanta study, but of profound logical and
psychological interest as well. The illusionism that they
apparently profess does not blind them to problems on
the empirical plane and the solutions suggested display
considerable ingenuity, to say the least. No one who
reads the lengthy discussion of the nature and function
of psychoses 7 will continue in the belief that there is no
scope for originality or progress in Hindu thought.
And no one who studies the dialectic on difference 8 will
imagine that the advaita is a facile intuitionism
based on alleged Scriptural declarations and mystic
experience, devoid of a cogent intellectual background.

II.

Even where the discussion seems to centre round
what the Sruti or !ankara said, it is not without
considerable interest to the modern student. In the
early part of the third chapter, two questions are
raised as to the competence of the sudra for Brahman-
kinowledge, and as to the need for renunciation as a
preliminary to Vedanta study. The treatment of both
questions shows how Hindu thought has by no means
been static or custom-bound. While one view holds that
the sudra is not competent to leam the Veda, that there-
fore he can neither know nor practise the Vedic rites

7 Chapter I, -section 5 and. sub-sections.
Chapter II, section I an4 sub-sections.

REFORM MOVEMfeNTS y

that are declared to lead to Brahman-knowledge, and
that consequently he cannot have Brahman-knowledge,
according to another view, learning the Veda is onl>
one of the means to Brahman-knowledge and though
this is denied to the sfidra, he 'has other means open to
him, such as recital of the sacred five letters
(pancaksara), the making of gifts and so on ; the section
of the Veddnta Sutras which denies competence to the
sudra relates only to such Sagiuia meditations as can be
learnt from the Vcdanta alone; knowledge of the
Nirguna Brahm'an in so far as it is learnt from the
Vedanta is of course excluded; but in so far as that
knowledge can be acquired otherwise, the sudra is
welcome to it, and knowledge in other ways cannot be
said to be impossible. We thus seem to find a liberal
movement tending to conserve the old prohibitions, but
restricting their scope as far as may be consistent with
ancient loyalties. But the liberal tendency would not
appear to have flourished without check ; for, according
to another view (mentioned at the close and possibly
favoured by Appayya), the observances for which the
sudra is eligible cannot of themselves lead to the
required knowledge, but will at best endow him. in the
next birth with the body of one of the twice-born castes.
The movement of reaction is almost proportional to that
of reform. 9

Similar movements may be noticed in the treatment
of the other question ; 10 even am'ong the twice-born, the

9 See Sections 1*421, and 1*422, Chapter III.

10 See Sections 2*14, 2-141, 2-142, 2-143, Chapter III. One may be
strongly tempted to see a chronological development in these views as
presented by Appayya; but, for this, of course, there is no justification.

g INTRODUCTION

brahmin alone seems to occupy a position of vantage;
for the sake of results both seen and unseen, renuncia-
tion is prescribed as a preliminary to study (sravana)
of the Vedanta ; but according to Scripture, the brahmin
alone is entitled to renounce. The most liberal answer
to this difficulty is to take Scripture to have used the
word "brahmin" figuratively, as a synecdoche implying
a reference to all twice-born castes; and this is the
answer according to the upholders of one view. Others,
no less liberal, would have it that though figurative
implication may not be justly resorted to, renunciation,
which no doubt is restricted to brahmins, is not a
necessary preliminary to Vedanta study; whore the
student is eligible to renoimce he should certainly do so ;
but ksatriyas and vaisyas, who arc not so eligible, may
proceed to the study without renunciation; else even
devas, who cannot renounce, since no karma is enjoined
for them, would be ineligible for study. In thus
exalting the ksatriya and vaisya almost to the level of
devas, this reformer laid himself open to a flank attack ;
the devas, it was said, have no need to renounce, since
they do not require its result seen or unseen; they are
not bound to perform any karma; hence there is no
distinction to be secured by samnyasa ; as for its unseen
result, that must have been secured by renunciation in
prior existences ; the devas do not have to renounce, just
as they do not have to learn the Veda by rote from a
teacher; but their position can be of no help in deter-
mining the competence of ksatriyas and vaisyas ; these,
like the widower, are eligible for study of a kind; that
study, however, will lead not to Brahman-knowledge,
but to re-birth as a brahmin. Reaction has set in with

SARVAMUKTI g

its belief in permanent hierarchies; and the belief in
re-birth proves a potent weapon against reform.

III.

The last part of the fourth chapter deals with the
conception of release. The advaitin, believing in a
single reality with which he himself is identical, may be
expected to care for nothing but his own salvation of
which he is eternally assured. Some advaitins do,
indeed, go to the extrem'e of treating everything except
their own selves as the presentations of a dream,
refusing to admit the existence of other jivas, released
or bound; Scriptural declarations of the release of
certain souls are treated as analogous to the release t
dreamt of in respect of dream creations. But the
average advaitin is not a solipsist ; the world of
experience is for him relatively real; other jivas exist;
what Scripture says about certain souls having been
liberated in the past is not a delusion; the present
bondage of other souls is as real as his own, and their
future release is as certain as his own. Release being
but the manifestation of one's own nature, and nothing
adventitious, cannot be denied to or withheld from any
one. It is not merely the natural right of all, but a 1
right which, being eternally attained, is now unattained
as it were. Universal salvation is more than a possi-
bility; it is a logical necessity. Different souls will, of
course, require a greater or less length of time in
proportion to their capacity to get rid of nescience. But
the final removal of nescience is certain, since nescience
is essentially indeterminable as real or unreal. So long,
however, as there is a single unreleased soul, nescience
S 12

J() INTRODUCTION

is not completely destroyed and there can be no absolute
release for any other soul, however far advanced on the
path of perfection. For, so long as mirrors exist, there
is the possibility of reflection, though with the removal
of a particular mirror the reflection therein has merged
with the prototype; as long as there are reflecting or
distorting media, we have merger, therefore, only with
what is capable of being reflected, a bimba as contrasted
with a pratibimba, but not merger in that which is
above both bimba and pratibimba and is the substrate of
both these appearances. In other words, salvation is
not the purely personal concern of each individual as
such; the release of his brethren is as much to his
interest as his own ; for, until the final release of all, he
can attain oneness not with the Absolute Intelligence,
but only with the less perfect form known as Isvara,
whose reflections in nescience are the many jlvas. Nor
is this merely the promise of a lesser degree of bliss.
It is not that the earliest released souls become so many
Isvaras in the matter of enjoyment. They become
identical with the one Isvara and perform his functions
of sustaining and governing the world. They have
thus not only the privileges but also the responsibilities
of lordship. It is only when by the due exercise of
these functions other souls too come to realise their
birthright that nescience is once for all destroyed.
There is no possibility of further reflection ; hence there
is no more distinction of bimba and pratibimba, Isvara
and jiva, but an assured and final realisation of oneness
with the Absolute. Such a doctrine, says Appayya, is
not an invention of his own, but underlies iSankara's
own teaching, as he seeks to show by a consideration of

DIFFICULTIES IN SARVAMUKT1 H

numerous passages from the Bhasya. The conception
seems to be at least as old as Vacaspati, among post-
&ankara advaitins. And there can be no doubt that, as
elaborated by Appayya Diksita, it will be eminently
acceptable to monists of the present day who are
required to reconcile their metaphysical conclusions
with the insistent claims of individuality.

The notion is not free from difficulties, the most
important of which relates to the assumption that the
temporal process can come to an end in time. So long
as we are concerned with the release of this or that soul,
we take it for granted that the world process will go on
for other souls and that for the released soul what
happens is a psychological change ; it is no longer aware
of anything outside itself, merged as it is in pure
consciousness; there is no time for it, since there is
nothing for it outside of itself, but time as such is not
annulled, since it continues to be perceived by other
bound souls. It is prima facie absurd to conceive of
any time when time comes to an end. Universal
salvation, however pleasing as a concept, cannot be real
in the sense of what can be adualised in time. Despite
its appeal to the populace, it is an illogical blend of
mutually exclusive concepts of time and timelessness,
postulating as it does that timelessness can be achieved
in time.

Two replies are possible. It is not necessary for
the advaitin to say that at any particular point of time
all souls will be released, though he cannot but say that
release cannot be withheld from' any soul that seeks it.
Ultimate release, though an inevitable metaphysical

J2 INTRODUCTION

assumption on advaita principles, need not be conceived
as actually attained at any particular time. Viewed
from the finite standpoint, progress towards absolute
perfection may be but asymptotic, while for him who
achieves the absolute view-point, perfection is eternally
attained. And since all sacred teaching is for the
luirelcased, it is surely reasonable to teach that what
is achieved by each jiva through striving and enlighten-
ment in time is lordship (Isvaratva), not the non-
temporal Brahmanhood. Transcendence of time is
implied only when there are no more souls to be
governed and Isvaratva automatically comes to an end.
But this is no more than a logical possibility. The jivas
in actuality are so numerous arid of such different
grades of perfection, the path to perfection is beset with
so many difficulties and dangers, and the activities of
souls in the acquisition and enjoyment of karma seem to
involve so much more of backsliding than progress, that
the sublimation of Isvaratva into Brahman-hood can
hardly be contemplated as anything m'ore than a bare
possibility.

Such a reply is certain to provoke the rejoinder
that what is questioned is not the actuality but even the
logical possibility. If universal release is logically
possible, that should also become actual at some time,
however distant. It may not be near enough to rouse
hope or to instil fear; but at some tiirie it is bound to
occur ; else there is no meaning iu talking of it as a possi-
bility. And when it does occur, what happens to time?
Does not your statement conic to this that time at a
particular point of it sel f annuls itself ? And is this not
the very absurdity which is K'ing'criticised?

DIFFICULTIES IN SARVAMUKTI 13

Granted that this is an absurdity, it is difficult to
see how it can be avoided on any variety of advaita
doctrine. For any soul that is released the temporal
process ceases to be ; this cessation comes about in and
through time ; good works are performed in time, the
desire to know arises in time, knowledge is acquired in
time, and release (whether in embodiment or on the
perishing of the body) is secured in time. For that
soul, then, time has ceased to be, by acts in time and at a
particular point of time. If this conception is contra-
dictory and unintelligible, then advaita should be
abandoned, not merely a particular variety thereof; for
all advaitins hold that the real is the timeless, that
though attained it is unattained, as it were, and that the
temporal process leads to that attainment, that is to say,
to its own annulment. And it is a commonplace that
this doctrine of reality is based on an extensive critique
of categories like space, time and cause. Turn which
way he will, the advaitin of whatever shade of thought
has to say that finite activities in time cause the attain-
ment of the infinite a-temporal Brahman. It is irrele-
yant to say that time continues to exist for the
unreleased soul,; for the question is whether it exists for
the released soul, and if not, how it came to annul itself
by temporal (processes and at a point of time. The
appeal to unreleased souls is as ineffective as the
Berkcleyan appeal to other souls and to God to conserve
the reality of a world which had first been dissolved into
ideas. And this is the second reply which the advocate
of universal salvation may give to his critics.

But thc-ttt quoque argument, though rhetorical', can
hardly bo "conclusive. It can only give room to the

J.4 INTRODUCTION

nott-advaitui to tell the advaitin "Despite your vaunted
criticism of the categories and your insistence
on intelligibility you are in an impasse as great as any
you brought us to. On your principles, we cannot see
how any of you can be saved, to say nothing of all.
Eternal damnation rather would seem to be the lot of
all of you, for you condemn time while yet you cannot
transcend it". Assuming the validity of the advaitin 's
criticism of whatever is phenomenal, including time,
let us see m'ore closely what happens in release. By
constant meditation on the defective nature of the
phenomenal and on the one true Reality which
is perfect, infinite, timeless and identical with
himself, the jiva attains that supreme self ; this
attainment is called release; it is the dawn of perfect
unshakable realisation ; it may or may not synchronise
with physical death; where it precedes disembodiment
we speak of the jivan-inukta. But when the light has
dawned, is there any distinction of time? l)oes he say,
"Yesterday I was not released, today. I ani released,
tomorrow my body will perish and I shall be fully
released".? A .person may conceivably say this, but
there is no justification for calling him a released
person on advaita principles. When really there
is attainment, the mukta does not see himself as
different from others ; for him there can be no before}
and after ; he cannot preach, for there is none to preach
to ; he cannot talk of his bondage, for that was in his
ignorance, and ignorance has ceased to be, andfhe cannot
intelligently speak of the non-existent ; by constant con-
templation of the true and the timeless as the substrate
of the fleeting and the temporal, he has become the

DIFFICULTIES IN SARVAMUKTI 15

timeless; for him timelessness alone is real, not the
becoming; it is we who say he was released at a
particular time; in his own realisation release has not
come to be; it was-, is and will ever be; if the body
continues he does not cognise it as such ; it is we who
sometimes see it functioning and imagine that there is a
further degree of release to be secured or reseeured at
its death ; but the attainment of release in time whether
at death or at a previous instant is purely a creation of
our imagination still obscured by nescience; for the
released soul there is no time, not because time com-
mitted suicide in time, but because for him time was not,
is not and will not be. If this is the explanation of
individual salvation, it may be extended to universal
salvation too. Timelessness appears illogically enougli
to be achieved in and through time. But the appearance
and its illogical nature last only so long as we stand
over against it as finite spectators bound in nescience.
When we are all released, the temporal process would
not appear as such at all. We shall be conscious only
of timelessness, not of timelessness as produced by and
in time, for the concepts of time and production would
alike have been transcended. To put it in other words ;
the world of time coming to an end in time would arouse
logical difficulties only on the assumption of a finite
mind like ours bound in the categories of nescience ; but
on the hypothesis of universal salvation there will be no
such mind left when the world of time comes to an end ;
for the released soul there is no problem calling for
reconciliation ; the unreleased soul which has problems
exists no longer since it too has been released. Whence
then the difficulty? As we are at present situated, the

16 INTRODUCTION

concept of tHe transcendence of time presents, no doubt,
difficulties enough. 11 But these are not peculiar to the
view of universal salvation. And they are not greater
than the difficulties in conceiving time to be real. We
are forced to take time to be an appearance of the non-
temporal. How exactly the latter appears as the
former we with our finite intelligence are unable to say,
though we feel ourselves forced to stop nowhere short of
the assumption of the timeless. But even if, in the last
resort, we are compelled to liken the transcendence of
time to suicide, that does no violence to commonsense ;
knowledge that arises in time may consume time, even
as the fire that breaks out in the bamboo forest does not
spare the bamboos that generated it.

The doctrine of universal salvation (sarvanmkti)
is clearly favoured by Appayya. Throughout the
present work, that is the only doctrine for which his
personal preference is clearly indicated; and this pre-
ference is further shown by the statement and defence
of it in the &ivtidvaitani'rnaya. It is in the light of
this doctrine that he discards certain views of the
relation of Isvara and the jiva, though he says nothing
about it where he expounds those views; and, wherever
possible, this may be used as a test of Appayya 's own

11 In the last resort, problems like those of time are insoluble by
mere Logic; for, the Logical concepts, which are in and of the phenomenal
world, can at best indicate but not grasp the noumenal substrate^ A
philosophical pursuit of Logic will, however, lead to the favouring of those
concepts which by their coherence clearly Indicate their own fulfilment in
what is above Logic.

RELEASE WHILE EMBODIED jy

attitude towai'ds certain advaita doctrines, Avhether
they square with tfre doctrine of universal salvation/"

IV.

A word may be said about jlvan-nnikti before we
pass to a consideration of other topics. Consistently
with the theory above sot forth, we shall have to hold
that the jivan-mUkta is he who has really found release
and has consequently no longer any conceit of "I" and
"mine" in the body etc.; and he who has such a
conceit, however perfect he may otherwise lx*, can be
treated only as on the* path to release, though release be
imminent; he may be figuratively spoken of as already
released, in order to hearten those who are much farther
removed from the goal. Such a view is maintained by
Mandana Misra and mentioned as a possible v*w by
Sarvnjfifitman ; but there is no indication oV Appayya
having adopted it unless ii be the mention of it last in hie
own treatment of the topic 13 and the accord of ihat view

12 A writer in the Indian Vulture, (Vol. I, No. 2, pp, 243- 246)
attempts a critique of Appayya's doctrine of release without a clear under-
standing of that doctrine or itg antecedents. The conception of universal
salvation is not specifically gaiva. There is talk of sarvamukti as early as
Vacaspati. A dilemma (on p. 245) is supposed to clinch the argument:
if the released soul feels his continuity with what he was, as conditioned,
he is not wholly released, since, in release, there arc no upadhis; U' lie
does not feel that continuity, he cannot be omniscient and hence cannot be
ISvara; hence, release must be identification wilh Pure Consciousness, m
which case, the above question does not arise. But is it not possible
for the Lord to be aware of Himself as continuous with the bound soul,
without Himself being bound? May he not have the knowledge "That
which appeared to be bound was Myself"? Is it not analogous to the
experience of the ordinary intelligent man who says "That which appeared
to be in the mirror was niy face"? The dilemma will not hold water.

13 See sections 1-1 to 1*4, Chapter IV.

S 1-3

lg INTRODUCTION .

with what he says, later, that release consists in the
attainment of the state of Isvara. For, tho continued
existence of the body for a while may be explained as
due to the residue of prior ntonientum, on tho analogy
of the potter's wheel, while the apparently intelligent
functioning of that body may w r ell be due to its control
not by a jiva who has a conceit of identity therewith,
but by Isvara with whom that jiva has become one by
intuitive realisation. The main reason for formulating
jlvan-muk,ti is the need for reliable preceptors of
advaita, persons who can speak with certitude froni
experience, not from mere intellectual cognition. If
the released person lives no more as one of us, he cannot
teach us ; and no one else is qualified to teach us ; how
then can advaita be taught, much less realised? This
difficulty disappears on the above view, since there can
be teaching through the bodily frame of the released
soul, as inspired by the Lord with which that soul has
become one. There is nothing repugnant to the lord-
ship of the supreme may in in thus actuating a product
of maya; and in certain theistic systems like the Saiva
Siddlianta it is the Lord himself who is acknowledged
to act as the preceptor whether in a divine or a human
garb.* 4 The majority of advaitins, however, have held
that in the so-called jivan-mukta there is a trace or
residuum of nescience and for this residue they have
sought various explanations and analogies. They have
sought to separate the protective energy of nescience
from its obscuring energy and maintained the continu-
ance of the former even when the latter is removed; an

14 See, further, section X of the Introduction to the Bh&matl
Qatusstitri (Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, 1933).

BLISS AS POSITIVE 19

example is the continued perception of reflection so long
as a mirror or other reflecting medium is present, even
though the illusion that the reflection is an independent
entity has been removed. But the perception of the
reflection here is due to the presence of a limiting
adjunct, an upadhi, vis., the mirror; is the jlvan-mukta
similarly conditioned by upadhis? If so, how can he
be said to be " released ?" The same difficulty applies
to all other illustrations, such as the smell of garlic in a
vessel that once contained it.

V.

Release is characterised as happiness or bliss; it is
not mere cessation of misery; grades of happiness are
admitted by the advaitin, but there can be no gradations
of mere non-existence. 15 The conception of the goal as
positive is significant, marking off advaita, as it does,
from nihilistic Buddhism and the Nyaya-Vaisesika.
But the topic has not been treated at any length. Here
again, the discussion would have greatly benefited from
a reference to the BraJimasidd'hi a work mentioned
elsewhere in this chapter without much point. Absence
of misery, says Mandana, is not happiness, for the two,
misery and happiness, may be experienced together by
a person half immersed in a cool tank on a hot day.
If mere absence of misery constituted any kind of
happiness, he who is being tortured in one hell ought to
be happy, because, at least for the time, he is spared
other tortures elsewhere. Further this alleged negative
nature is inconsistent with the experience of grades 01

15 See section 2 -42, Chapter IV.
16 See the Uruhmakajrfa, >. 13.

20 INTRODUCTION

happiness derived from 1 different objects and through
different means. If all that is sought be the cessation
of a particular want, say hunger, why should there be
the search for rich or tasty food? It may be said that
not everything' pleases, but only the object desired; and
this causes happiness by satisfying and thus extinguish-
ing the desire that was the cause of tension and misery ;
it is therefore the extinction of desire and the conse-
quent extinction of misery that constitute happiness.
This might be so, Mandana replies, if enjoyment of the
desired object extinguished desire. But the reverse is
notoriously the case; enjoyment becomes a habit and is
rpljpatcdly sought after. And, on the other hand,
desire may cease, not through enjoyment, but through
realising the worthlessuess of what is desired. In such
a case, absence of desire does not equate with happiness.
Nor is it true that, in all cases, happiness is
proportionate to desire and effort. Very often that
which is gained with less tension and effort gives. us
greater happiness; and what is greatly desired and
sought may cause misery in the end; further it is truer
to say that happiness conditions desire rather than that
desire conditions happiness; it is true that because of
our station in life we desire certain things straightaway
without knowing that they will cause happiness; but
this is because of our experience in a previous birth;
this is intelligible since those veiy experiences condition
our present station in life. Attachment to happiness
has no doubt been condemned; but what is meant is the
seeking after the lower, impermanent and impure forms
of pleasure; attachment to the Highest which is Bliss is
not raga any more than turning away from samsara is

is ATTAINMENT FIGURATIVE ? 21

dvesa. It is because the Highest is Bliss, and because
we are identical with the Highest, that even in bondage
the self is the object of supreme love (parama-
prema-'spada) ; and it is because all finite things
partake, in sotrie measure, of the nature of the Supreme,
that all creatures are declared to subsist on a fraction
of that Bliss, It will easily be realised how far such a
notion is from nihilism or pessimism.

yi.

The need for constant reference to two planes of
thought introduces som'e confusion in the description of
the attainment of release. Is it really attained or is it
only attained as it were? Both modes of speech are
justifiable. And thus we find different schools, some
maintaining that attainment is figurative, while others
say that the word is used in the primary sense. 17 The
justification for the former view is that in truth release
is eternally attained, that it is like the forgotten golden
ornament round one's own neck and that there is but
realisation of what already exists. Some adherents of
the latter view hold that though release is not produced
(for, it would then be subject to destruction) , it is legiti-
mate to speak of it as caused by cessation of ignorance
with the dawn of knowledge; for there is a causal con-
nection between A and B, if when A exists B comes to
be at the very next instant, though B is essentially such
that it does not derive its existence from A. Yet others
say that in the state of bondage consciousness (cit) alone
is manifest, but not bliss (ananda) ; and since in release

17 Sections 3 '1, 3-2, 3 -31, 3*32, Chapter IV.

22 INTRODUCTION

there is genuine mimif estation of bliss, release may be
said to be attained by knowledge. It is worth noting
that this last view is rejected by Vacaspati for very
valid grounds. It is not true that cit alone is
manifested, not ananda; 18 it is a commonplace of
experience insisted oil by sruti that the self is
experienced as the object of supreme love and that there
is happiness, however imperfect, derived from the
essential bliss of the self. Vacaspati himself inclines
to the first view that attainment of release and abandon-
ment of transmigration are figurative. 19 A fourth view
takes the empirical point of view that bliss, though
eternal, is not immediately manifested in samsara ; and
since release brings about such manifestation, it may
be really said to be the attainment of the unattained.
This view too fails to recognise that we do have
experience of happiness and that for all its imperfection
it is yet a fraction of the bliss that is Brahman. It may
be urged that from bondage to release there is a real
progress in that we advance from fractions to the whole :

"On earth the broken ares, in heaven the perfect round/'

But that would be to understand the Absolute
as a sum of parts. It is not that the whole does not exist
or results from the addition of parts ; though eternal,
it is manifested but partially to us in bondage. And
since manifestation too is not an added virtue, but is of
the essential nature of the Absolute, we seem forced to
say in the last resort that, from the absolute point of
view, attainment is but figurative.

18 See the Jtfcdmrr/i, p. 40 (7W/).
JIO UMtouifS, pp. 15&, 156

CRITICISM OF DIFFERENCE 28

ra

This "attainment as it were" and "abandonment as
it were ' ' are due to knowledge. But, as Vacaspati says,
"Even a thousand rope-cognitions cannot, indeed, alter
the character of the really present snake. In the case,
however, of those, which being super-imposed are
desired to be either attained or abandoned, it is possible
to attain as it were or abandon as it were, by the m'ere
intuition of the truth, without dependence on any
extrinsic observances. For they exist by the super-
imposition alone." 20 The demonstration that the world
of difference is but superimposed on the single absolute
self is thus of cardinal importance and has exercised the
minds of muny advaitins, beginning at least as early as
Mandana. Some of Mandana's arguments will be
found summarised in the Introduction and the notes
to the Bhamatt, reference to which is invited. Appayya
naturally devotes some space to this topic in the early
sections of the second chapter. He draws principally
on the Tattvasuddhi and the Nyayasudha. As already
noted, the former draws its inspiration from the
BrahmasiddM. Difference is not established either by
perception or by inference. Perception is of the one
real, differences being subsequently superimposed
thereon. We see that the pot is real, the cloth is real,
and so on ; the reality that is constant in all these is the
true content of perception. When the true content of
all perception is thus one, there is no room for negation
or difference. Let us assum'e for a moment that
difference too is perceived. Then perception would

20 Bnamatl, p. 166 (TPB).

24 INTRODUCTION

have two functions, positive and negative, the former
relating to the proper nature of what is perceived, the
latter to its difference from others. These two func-
tions, affirmation and negation, cannot obviously be
simultaneous; one must come first. Now negation
cannot be the first, since it involves the positive know-
ledge of what is denied and that of which it is denied
(thenisedha-pratiyogin andthenisedha-visaya). These
must depend on an antecedent perception, about which
there arises the question whether it is primarily affirma-
tive or negative; unless we admit the primary function
to bo affirmative we seem condemned 1o an infinite
regress. Granted this primary affirmative character,
there is no room for negation too being a function; for
cognition does not arise first and then function ; it arises
as affirming or denying; when once it has arisen as
affirmative, it is idle to contend that it subsequently
denies as well, for that would be io urge that the same
cognition is born twice over, affirmatively as well as
negatively; that is absurd in the case of cognitions,
which are momentary; if negation be said to be the
function of another cognition, that again pro-supposes
an affirmation and we are in the old round. Nor can
we say that affirmation is itself negation; is it negation
of everything else in the world? If so what is the justi-
fication for calling this perception? For perception is
cognition of what is in sense-contact and the negative
cognition of everything else in the world obviously
includes much that is not and cannot be in sense-contact.
Therefore, difference is not established through percep-
tion. Much less can it depend on inference, since
inference is based on concomitance of the perceived;

SUPERIOR VALIDITY OF SCRIPTURE 35

where perception can establish no difference at all,
inference is no more capable of it. Further, inference
proceeds on a basis of difference, that between probans
and probandum and subject, that between positive and
negative instance and so on ; if inference were invoked
to establish difference it would be a ease of pet it o
principii, since it would pretend to prove what it is
itself based on. As for testimony, it has been shown by
6ankara in his commentary on the samanvnya-sutra 31
that the harmonious purport of all Vedanta texts is
non-dualism.

VIII.

There can be no objection to the superior validity
of sruti in matters like the present which are superscn-
suous. It is of greater value than other pramfinay since
it is admittedly free from defect; and, as this cognition
arises subsequently to perception and inference, it,
like the cognition "This is not silver", occupies the
position of sublater with reference to the other two.
The principle of the subsequent sublatiug the earlier is
known as the apaccheda-nyaya. It holds where the
later cannot arise except as contradicting the earlier
cognition, as in " This is silver ' ' and ' ' This is not silver. ' '
Where the subsequent cognition can come into being
even otherwise and the whole context is governed by
syntactical unity with the sense of what comes first, then
the initial cognition is predominant and overrules what-
ever comes later. This is the principle known as

21 VeMnta 8Htras t I, i, 4, On the whole topic of this paragraph
see I: 6 and section 1 and its sub-sections in Chapter II,
S 1-4

2Q INTRODUCTION

upakrama-nyaya. In the present case, scriptural cogni-
tion of non-difference cannot come into being except as
contradicting the alleged perceptual cognition of
difference ; hence the apaccheda-nyaya applies and the
latter is sublated by the former. 22 Nor is it the case
that the former cannot arise except in dependence on
perceptual knowledge of words, sentences etc., for, even
if we do not agree with those who hold that there is
only such perception of words etc., as is common to
valid knowledge and delusion, there is no need to con-
cede more than empirical reality to perceptual cogni-
tion ; and this reality is not inconsistent with it, being
transcended on the realisation of non-difference. 23

It is not that Scripture overrides perception in
every case. We certainly do not admit its authority
where it contradicts experience saying that " stones
float " or asks us to "cook the golden grains. " In such
cases we say that there is no purport in the literal sense
of sruti, as the six marks of purport are not coincident ;
or even if it be difficult to deny purport we say that
smti trespasses into the limited field of empirical
reality which we have marked off for perception; the
heat of fire, the hardness of gold, the weight of stones,
these are definitely within the sphere of perception, and
Scripture has no application thereto ; or our denial of
the application of sruti may be due to our incapacity to
do what we are asked to do by Scripture ; cooking in the
sense of softening is impossible in the case of golden
grains; we therefore interpret it to mean nothing more

22 Sections 1*6, 2*1, 2*2 and sub-sections of 2 '3, Chapter II.

23 Section &, 3*1, 3' 2 and 3*3, Chapter II.

ACCOUNT OF ILLUSIONS 2?

than heating. On any one of these views may be justi-
fied our adoption of secondary implication (laksana)
for Scriptural passages that conflict with perception.
When, however, perception pretends to declare the
nature of ultimate reality, it is obviously doing some-
thing outside its scope; and its sublation of sruti is
legitimate.

IX.

The world of perception is illusory. There is not
much discussion of different views of illusion. But
the view of anirvacanlyakhyati is mentioned and justi-
fied in the case of som'e delusions like reflections and
dreams. According to this view, tho content of the
delusive cognition is neither real nor unreal nor a
combination of both, but is something which is
originated at the time. If it were unreal it would not
admit of empirical usage ; for the saitie reason it cannot
be what is real at some other time or place, for rib such
thing can be cognised as immediate or cause practical
activity ; if it were real, it could not be sublated; to say
that it is real and unreal is to violate the law of contra-
diction; hence it is something indeterminable arid
originated.

This view of the creation of the illusory has not
been consistently adhered to by the advaitins. The
view of anyathakayati, apprehension of what is else-
where or what is otherwise, has found favour in the
explanation r of certain illusions, which seem to be
manifestly due to external circumstances, like the flower
beside the crystal in the cognition of the crystal as red.
These are called instances of sopadhika-bhrarmi; in the

28 INTRODUCTION

explanation of these it is the quality of the upadhi that
is said to be apprehended erroneously in the pure
substrate. Many of the explanations offered by
Vacaspati 21 are of this nature, so much so that his
commentator, Amalananda, feels called upon to defend
him against the charge of maintaining anyathakhyati. 25
This is Vacaspati's explanation of the delusion that a
[perceived conch-shell is yellow: "the yellow, which
resides in the bile that is in contact with the exceed-
ingly pure rays going forth from the eye, is experienced
in dissociation from the bile ; the shell too is experienced
(but) with the whiteness concealed by a defect (in the
sense-organ) ; the non-relation of the yellow colour to
the shell is not experienced; because of similarity in
respect of non-apprehension of non-relationship, the
appositional relation previously seen (in experiences)
like * yellow mass of gold, yellow lilva fruit' is imposed
on yellowness and shell-ness and one speaks of the
yellow shell." - Similar explanations are given of the
delusion in dreams and in reflections. There are
assumed two psychoses in any such explanation, one
which appreheuds the "this" (in the experience "this
is silver"), or the colourless shell (in the experience
"the shell is yellow"), and the other, which apprehends
the silver-ness or yellowness present elsewhere. Now,
in one way or another, it is the business of a psychosis- to
remove ignorance. Does the first psychosis of the
"this" perform this function? If it does not, it is no
psychosis. If it floes, then ignorance being destroyed

24 BMmatL PP. 1819 (TPH).

25 Kalpatoni, p. 24 (Anantakn?ga Sastri's edn.),

26 Bhawatl, P. 18 (TPH).

TWO PSYCHOSES IN ILLUSIONS 29

there is no longer the material cause of delusion ; hence
there can be no illusion of silverness or yellowness.

At least two al tempts are made to conserve the
view of two psychoses. 27 According to one of these the
"this "-psychosis does remove ignorance, but only
about this-ness, not about the variety of the content.
Another view says that though ignorance is destroyed
in its obscuring (avarana) aspect, it is not destroyed
in its protective (viksepa) aspect. Hence it is that in
spite of the cognition of "this" as "this" it continues
to be perceived as silver or as yellow. A modus vivendi
by sub-division and adjustment is always interesting,
but does not take us far in the present instance. The
explanation would be satisfactory, if a cognition of the
bare "this" were possible at any time. We never have
a perception of a bare "here" and "now", super-adding
to it a cognition of "-thus" or "thus". From its very
origination our cognition is of a "that-what", though
the "that" and the "what" fall apart on reflection and
are found to be inadequate each to the other even in what
we call true cognition. But it runs counter to experience
to say that the "that" and the "what" are the
contents of different psychoses. What, for instance, can
be the nature of the psychosis of the shell in the delusion
' * The shell is yellow ' ' 1 The whole experience is visual ;
the first psychosis too is obviously visual. But can
there be any visual psychosis which does not apprehend
some colour? If not, what is the colour apprehended?
It is not white, else there would be no delusion. It is

27 Sections 5-151 and 5-152, Chapter I.

3() INTRODUCTION

not yellow, else there would be no second psychosis
apprehending yellowness. It is not some other colour,
as that is contrary to experience. It cannot be cogni-
tion of the colourless, as there can be no visual cognition
of such a nature.

In truth, then, there is only one psychosis, whether
of the form "The shell is yellow" or of the form "This
is silver". When there is defect, like bile in the sense-
organ, or like desire, greed etc. in the percipient, and
the sense-organ comes in contact with the object, there
is set up an agitation in nescience, the material cause
of delusion, and there results a transformation thereof.
This transformation is a "that-what", which on analysis
is found to comprise a sense-element and a memory-
element, the "that" being sensed and the "what"
remembered. But the "what" though supplied by
memory is cognised not as part of another remembered
object, but as part of a present content, the indeter-
minable transformation of nescience. If it related
merely to what exists elsewhere, this view would be
identical with anyathakhyati and would fail to explain
the practical efficiency of the cognition. Though m
delusions involving similarity, as in "This is silver",
there would seeni to be some case for admitting an
initial cognition of the substrate as a mere "this", we.
have to remember the other cases of delusions where
such a characterless cognition of the substrate is
obviously impossible, as in "the shell is yellow"; and
economy would compel us to assume as the cause of
illusion what is common to all cases, not what is peculiar

REFLECTIONS AS ILLUSIONS 31

to one set alone. 28 Modern psychological knowledge
would not warrant the assumption of a psychosis cognis-
ing the characterless substrate. Further, the explana-
tion here suggested by Kavitarkika Cakravarti Nrsimha
Bhattopadhyaya would certainly be more in conformity
with the advaitin's general tendency to explain the
cognition of attributes as arrived at not by an
independent psychosis, but by analysis of the indeter-
minable manifold given in sense-perception.

X

The indeterminable being admitted to be the
content of illusory cognition, the insistence on the
uniform adoption of this in explaining all illusion seems
to have come only from later advaitins. Thus both
Vacaspati and Padmapada look on the reflection not as
an indeterminable creation but as identical with the
prototype, with certain properties such as facing one-
self, being located in the mirror etc., superimposed
thereon. As against this, the Advaitavidyacarya 29

28 On the whole topic see section 5*153, Chapter I; also an article
by the present writer on "A Little Known Advaitin", Journal of the Madras
University, Vol. Ill, No. 1.

29 This Acftrya is cited extensively by Appayya and, in nearly every
instance, to clinch an argument by stating the final view. It is possible
in the nature of things that Appayya refers thus to his own father who
was his guru and whose teachings he is trying here to set forth compen-
diously. We are also told by Nllakaijtha DIk?ita, Appayya's brother's
grandson, that Appayya's father, Raftgaraja Makhin, was the author of
several famous works, such as the Advaitavidytimukura, and the
Vivaranadarpana (see Natocaritran&palca of Nllakajtfha Dik^ita, Bala-
manoraina Series, p. 3: "tasya ca paftcamafc sttnur advaitavidy&mukuro-
vivara$adarpa$ady-aneka-prabhanda-nirmata gilita eva Sri raftgarajftda-
varl"). Some Mss. of Nalacaritran&talca refer to the Advaitamukura, and
it is under this name that a very imperfect but interesting Ms. is found

32 INTRODUCTION

maintains that the reflection is but a creation. It is
not true that there is no cognition of the reflection as
something other than oneself. Children and other
unsophiscated persons look for the reflected face in or
behind the mirror. When the sublating cognition
com'es, therefore, it denies the reality of the reflection
itself, not merely the location of the original face in the
mirror. The identification of the reflected face with
the original is due to a later mental process. No doubt
in order that there may be a superimposition, residual
impressions of past experience are a necessary factor,
No one has had in the past a direct visual experience of
one's own forehead; in the absence of any such
experience or the impression consequent thereon, it may
seem' impossible to account for the creation of a super-
imposed forehead in the proximity of the mirror. But
there is no rule that superimposition requires as its
cause a residual impression of the experience of the
very object superimposed. Impression from visual
experience of other persons' foreheads, combined with
the experience of one's own forehead through senses
other than sight, m'ay well account for the super-
imposition. When we create a chimaera in our
imagination, it is not because we have actually had
experience of the chimaera, but because we have had

in the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Mysore. It runs only to the end or
the first pariccheda and the material therein gives no room for a positive
identification. Of the other work, Vivaranadarpana, an Imperfect Ms. in
Nandin&gari Is to be found in the Tanjore Palace Library (see No. 7064 ot
the Descriptive Catalogue by P. P. S. Sastri, Vol. XXI, p. 5206). There
is a reference to the VivaranapraMfa, as another book of Raftgaraja's in
the available fragment of the AdvaitaMukura; this is probably another
name for the Vivaranadarpana.

REFLECTIONS AS ILLUSIONS 83

experiences of the several elements which we put
together in our imagination to constitute the chimaera.
The advocates of the Vivarana view set up a wholly
implausible theory when they say that, in reflection,
rays of light proceeding from the eyes of the observer
are turned back by the reflecting medium', go back to the
prototype face and apprehend it. Do these reflected
rays go straight back to one's own face and nowhere
else? If so, how is it that we see reflections of other
objects too by the side of our reflected face? If the
rays be admitted to reach the other objects as well, how
is it that they do not reach to one who is right behind us
and cause the apprehension of his face too? Again, in
looking at a clear sheet of water, how is it that some rays
from the eyes are reflected back while others penetrate
the water and apprehend the sandy bottom? If it be
said that som'e rays are turned back because they are
exceedingly delicate, how is it that these same delicate
rays go up against the much stronger rays of the sun,
reach and apprehend the solar orb, thus causing the
cognition of the reflection of the sun? Again, if the
reflection is identical with the prototype, should not the
former have the properties of the latter? Yet who
ever heard of a reflection of the moon being cool, as the
moon is? For these and other reasons the Advaita-
vidyacarya has no hesitation in rejecting the teaching
of the Vivarana school on this point.

The view that the reflection is an illusory creation
offers some difficulties on the view that the jiva is a
reflection; for then the jiva too would be illusory and
there would be none to be released. Our Acarya gets
over the difficulty saying that it is peculiar only to the

S 15

,34 INTRODUCTION

view that holds the jiva to be a reflection and that there
is no such difficulty on the avaccheda view, according to
which Pure Consciousness is defined as it wsre in the
form of the jiva. Prom the position which he assigns
to it in the discussion and the elaborate way in which he
explains it, Appayya would seem 1 to have considerable
sympathy with the view of reflection as an illusory
creation. But we have seen in dealing 1 with sarvamukti
that he is forced to reject the avaccheda view, while the
present view of reflection seems to go with the rejection
of the view that the jiva is a pratlbimba. It is difficult,
therefore, to say whether he definitely accepts here the
theory of Advaitavidyacarya or whether he merely
states it as a view worthy of consideration. What is
interesting in this view of reflection is the attempt to
affirm one uniform principle in all illusion, whether due
to an external adjunct (sopadhika) or otherwise. It
cannot be that in certain cases there is transference of
attributes from elsewhere, while in others the content is
an illusory creation.

It is worth examining whether this uniformity
cannot be secured without making out the content of
the superimposition to be wholly illusory. When there
is experience of nacre-silver, what is it that is created
silver or silver-ness? We cannot say that there is
experience only of a "this," that "silverness" belonging
somewhere else is brought over here and associated with
the "this"; for, we are active in regard to "this", and
not because of its "this-ness v , but because of its "silver-
ness"; the "silverness" that belongs elsewhere cannot
cause activity here and now. We havB already, in dis-
cussing the Cakravarti's view, seen reason to reject the

AVACCHEDA VIEW AND SARVAMUKTI 35

hypothesis of two psychoses one relating to the "this' 1
and another to "silver". We have, then, a single
psychosis of the form "this-silver", a "that-what".
The "that "-element of this indeterminable "that-what"
need not itself be illusory; it is the "what "-element,
the silverness, that is illusory. In the whole experience,
it will be sufficient to postulate the illusory creation not
of silver but of silver-ness. Similarly, when it is said
that the jiva is a reflection, illusoriness follows not for
the jiva, but only for the jlvatva of Pure Consciousness.
That this jlvatva is an illusory creation any advaitin
may admit without fear of denying the possibility of
release.

It is by no means certain either that the avaccheda
view is inconsistent with sarvamukti. As Appayya
himself has shown towards the close of his Pariniala
on I, i, 4, Vacaspati holds the avaccheda view, though,
following the Sutrakara, he uses the analogy of reflec-
tion legitimately enough. The jiva is not a reflection,
but he may be likened to a reflection for purposes of
exposition. And Vacaspati would appear to be a
believer in universal salvation, though he develops the
doctrine nowhere and makes only a casual reference to
it. 30 But it is evident that to him at least no incon-
sistency was apparent in holding together the views of
avaccheda and sarvamukti. Appayya 's own criticism
of the avaccheda view is not quite sound. 31 The point

30 See the Bhdmati on Ved. #., II, iii, 40 (Anantakrsna Sastri's
edition, p. 617).

31 See foot-note to the translation of section 4*21, Chapter IV, also
Acyuta Kpftj&nanda's comment. The latter is translated hero. "This is
to be considered here: intelligence is of itself eteraaily released. For

36 INTRODUCTION

of that criticism is the contingence of fresh bondage for
the released soul, if a multiplicity of souls be admitted,
and the souls treated as Pure Consciousness defined by,
not reflected in, nescience or its product, the internal
organ. But as noted by the commentator, Acyuta
Krsnananda, the alleged contingence is not at all clear.
It is true that even when definition by one internal organ
has ceased, there m'ay be definition afresh of Pure
Consciousness by another internal organ ; but with this
there is not proved fresh bondage for the jiva that was
released. According to Appayya, it would follow that
on the a vaccheda view release of any kind is not possible,
no matter whether it be the attainment of Isvaratva
or the merger in pure intelligence. Our author has
evidently a long way to travel before he comes to a

this, as beginninglessly defined or conditioned or defined by an adjunct,
there is the state of the jiva and bondage; this is settled. And thus that
part of intelligence for which, as dependent on an adjunct, there was
bondage prior to release, not for that can fresh bondage be brought about.
For, through the removal of that adjunct at the time of release, there is
removal (also) of the former locus of bondage, dependent on that
(adjunct). Nor is it possible to bring about that (fresh bondage) to the
released pure intelligence. For, even when for that there is attainment
of the status of another jiva on the conjunction of the adjunct of some
other bound jiva, since there is no contingence of bondage for turn who
was formerly bound and then released, the statement 'because of tho con-
tingence of fresh bondage' i not possible. Further, when for the released
intelligence there is. through conjunction of another internal organ, the
attainment of the state of some other jiva having that (organ) as adjunct,
there is not possible the recollection '1 who was formerly a transmigrator
and was somehow released, I myself have again reached to transmigra-
tion'; for there is no identity of adjunct as between the bound jiva and the
released jiva. And thus, since this attainment of the state of another jiva
can do nothing, it does not import any defect. Similarly, even the earlier
mentioned attainment ot tlio state of another jivji of the nature of a
Reflection can do nothing (to import u delect into the theory);*

METIITS OP THE AVACCHEDA vlfiW #f

proper appreciation of the avaccheda view, ag found in
the Parimala.

XL

The avaccheda view is not based solely or
mainly on the difficulty mentioned above that if
the jiva be a reflection and if reflections are
illusory creations, there would be none to be
released. The more serious difficulty it alleges
against the reflection theory is the impossibility of a
reflection of intelligence. Reflections are invariably of
objects possessing colour in media possessing colour.
When neither the prototype (intelligence) nor the
reflecting medium (nescience) possesses colour, how can
there be a reflection of one in the other? As the
Bhattas ask "For sound, odour, taste and the like, how
can there be reflectedness?" The- apparent limitation
of the impartible ether affords a closer approximation
to the truth. Though ether is one and indivisible, we
treat it as if defined by a pot, a room etc. When a pot
is carried from one place to another, it is the pot alone
that is m'oved, not the ether ; how can the pervasive ether
be moved from place to place 1 In the same way pure
consciousness is defined, as it were, by nescience or its
products, the diverse interna^ organs. Which is
accepted as the limiting adjunct depends on whether
nescience is admitted to Jre one or many. Oij the former
view, the internal organs, are the adjuncts and on the
latter view, the nesciences .themselves function as the
adjuncts. Even on such a view, there is possibility of
sui'vumukti; lor the latter is based on the conception of
man's nature ass eternally tmd essentially intelligence.

$8 INTRODUCTION

The realisation of this is release ; it may be delayed more
or less, but can never be denied. Since the avaccheda
view has no objection to employ reflection as an illustra-
tion, here too may be accepted the view that till the final
release of all, release consists in attaining the status of
Isvara, though this is most intelligible on the view that
the jiva is a reflection of Isvara.

What causes real difficulty, however, is the position
of Isvara on the avaccheda view. Pure intelligence is
Brahm'aii; defined intelligences are the jivas ; where
does Isvara come in ? The difficulty seems great on the
views which recognise a single maya or nescience and
locate it in Brahman. Brahman as defined by maya in
its totality appears as Isvara ; as defined by the many
parts of m'aya, it appears as the jivas ; as undefined it is
Brahman. Such a solution is possible even on the
hypothesis of a plurality of mayas or nesciences;
as defined by those mayas taken collectively, Brahman
will be Isvara; as defined by them singly, it will
be the jivas. Akasa as defined by a group of trees
is called a forest; as defined by each particular tree, it
is called a tree. On this analogy, then, Isvara, who is
Brahman defined by m'aya, would be a kind of collective
jiva. lie would stand to the jiva in much the same
relation as Society or Humanity to individual m'en.
Such a conception is hardly adequate. Creation and
destruction generally attributed to Isvara can hardly
be attributed to a collective soul. Society may conserve
men and govern them ; it can hardly be said to make
them or destroy them except in a figurative sense.
This is, however, not a serious difficulty for
any Hindu philosophical system, since no such

GOD IN ADVAITA 39

system admits the creation or destruction of souls.
As for the creation of the material world, since
even individual souls are seen to be capable in
some measure of fashioning their objects of enjoyment,
it does no groat violence to imagine the collective soul as
creating and destroying the material universe. The
more serious defect of the view, however, is that Isvara
thus conceived can hardly occupy the same place as the
God of religion. The collective soul is sure to command
a certain degree of loyalty even as Society and
Humanity; but it can command little of religious awo
and adoration. God has to be not merely immanent, but
also transcendent ; the transcendence is secured in that
the collective soul is more than the individual; but the
transcendence is not great enough to constitute a
marked difference of quality as well; for it is
this difference which is implied by the conception
of God as a more, not a difference of degree alono. That
is why movements like the Religion of Humanity can
never secure a permanent foundation. Isvara cannot
be merely a collective soul.

It is possible to over-emphasise this aspect of
transcendence. This is done by the view which holds
Lsvara to be Brahman's reflection in maya, while the
jlvas are Brahman's reflection in avidya; avidya is dis-
tinguished from maya in that while pure sattva is
predominant in the latter, impure sattva is dominant
in the former. Such an account would be defective in
two ways. Reducing Isvara too to a reflection, it would
make him almost as helpless as the jiva. Such an
I6vara could hardly control the jivas; for, who ever
heard of one reflection controlling another? Much less

40 INTRODUCTION

can He sympathise or help. Whatever may be the
merits of the reflection theory, there is little to be said
for that variety of it which holds isvara too to be a
reflection.

Coming back, then, to the avaccheda view, we shall
have to turn to som'e form of it which gives Kvara a
better position than that of a collective soul. The view
that nesciences are many and that they arc located in
the jlvas would seem to be more suitable. On this view,
Isvara is the content of the nesciences, while the jlvas
are their loci. Neither Brahman nor Isvara may bo
treated as the locus, since this would conflict with their
eternal perfection. We have to say, of course, that
ignorance like everything else is in Brahman, but this
is different from the assertion that it belongs
to Brahman. It belongs to the jivas; and since jlvas
arc many, a plurality of nesciences is also assumed. 32
The content of the nescience is Isvara. This is what it
means in other words: for Brahman as pure intelli-
gence there is no question of attributes like omniscience,
omnipotence etc. It is the jiva who suffers from his
finitude, and feels the lack of these perfections. If
they did not belong to his essential nature he would,
never know of their non-existence; even in feeling their

32 The assumption of many gaktis for one avidya may reconcile the
singleness of avidya with the plurality of the jlvas; on such a view f
however, we have still to say that a akti of avidya is destroyed when a
particular soul is released; though this is not to say that avidya itself is
destroyed (thus implying the simultaneous release of all jivas), it is yet
difficult to see how a fiakti can be destroyed without affecting the possessor
of the gakti, for gakti and its possessor are fundamentally non-different.
From this point of view, it is simpler to assume a multiplicity of nesciences,
one of these being destroyed on the release of each jiva.

GOD IN THE AVACCHEDA VIEW 4j

absence, he transcends his apparent finitude ; if he does
not realise them fully in his own nature it is because of
his ignorance; this ignorance belongs to him as jiva; it
relates to the perfections which he lacks and which he
considers as embodied elsewhere; the embodiment of
these is Isvara who is thus the content of nescience, as
contrasted with the jiva who is but the locus. While
the loci of the various nesciences are different, their
content is in all cases the same Isvara. Every nescience
is bipolar, with Isvara at one end and a particular jiva,
at the other.

Jiva

Jiva 3

When knowledge comos to any jiva there is realisation
of the perfection about which there was ignorance;
and there is merger of that jiva with Isvara. But so
long as even a single nescience exists the polarity
of Isvara-jlva persists; and the jiva that has attained
the status of Isvara cannot move further and be identi-
fied with Brahman. This final merger will be possible
only when the said polarity disappears by the ultimate
destruction of all nesciences. The view, therefore, that
release until the final release of all is but the attainment
of the state of Isvara squares even with this variety of
the avaccheda theory of the jiva. A further merit of
the present view is that it avoids the defects of over-
stressing the aspects of God's immanence or
S 16

42 INTRODUCTION

transcendence. God is immanent in this view since
He is the internal ruler; He is not merely the content
of their ignorance, hut also the inspirer of their limited
knowledge and activity; the jivas would not know, feel
or net even to the limited extent that they do but for
tlieir fundamental identity with the omniscient and
omnipotent God; the life of the jlva as jlva is possible
only because his energies are fragments of the energies
of the Lord. But at the same time the jiva is ignorant
of the Lord; between his capacities and the Lord's, the
difference is great enough to be one of quality; He is
more than any jiva or all jivas put together; for of all
the nesciences together He is the wieldcr, 33 while the
jivas are not the controllers of the nescience said to be
located in them 1 , but are under its influence, on the
contrary. 34 A collective jiva would be under the
influence of collective nuiyfi, whereas Isvara is the over-
lord of maya. The avaccheda view of the jiva is thus
more in unison with the essentials of our conception of
God, while it makes room for the doctrine of universal
salvation so convincingly pressed by Appayya. 35

33 "mayinam tu maheSvaram": &vrf. Upa., IV, 10.

34 The jlva would not be what he Is but for nescience; in a sense he
is the product of nescience; how then can he be the locus of nescience?
The answer lies in pointing to the beginnlngless nature of nescience. An
earlier nescience produces the jlva who becomes the locus of subsequent
nescience. This means infinite regress, which, however, is no defect in
what is admittedly phenomenal and indeterminable. That, indeed,
constitutes the nescience-character of nescience; tad ev& 'vidyanam
avidyatvam.

35 For a statement of all views as to the relation of the jiva and
Kvara, see section 2 31 and its sub-sections, Chapter I. The sub-sections
of section 2 '32 discuss the unity or plurality of the jlva and of nescience.
A fuller statement of the other views has been avoicjed In the Introduction,

1LLUSORINESS AND PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY 43

XII.

The entire choir of heaven and furniture of the
earth being reduced to illusion by the advaitin, he has

since it will lead to undue prolixity besides serving no purpose. A great
deal of unnecessary refinement was introduced about the time of
Vidyaranya. Such, for instance, is the tendency to recognise a kutastha
intelligence or a witness-intelligence as distinct from the jlva, isvara
and Brahman. Fortunately the interests of parsimony have repeatedly
prevailed and we find the counter-tendency to assimilate these extraneous
entities to those already recognised. Thus the witness-intelligence has
been sought to be identified with a form of I6vara or a form of the jlva
(see sub-sections of section 5*141, Chapter I). There is a variety of the
pratibimba-vada, known as abhasa-vada; the abhasa is considered to be
wholly illusory* while the reflection , in some views, is real,
being identical with the prototype; hence the distinction between
the two theories; this view is not noted by Appayya, but
is mentioned by Madhusudana SasaravatI in tho SiddMntabindu; the
following is a translation of what he has to say on the whole topic of tho
distinction between jlva and lavara; "The self conditioned by ignorance,
who has .come to be identified with ignorance, is, because of non-discrimi-
nation from the appearance (abhasa) of the intelligence that Is Himself,
called the internal ruler, the witness, the cause of the world; and he,
who is conditioned by the intellect, who has come to be identilied \vith
that, is, because of non-discrimination of the appearance (abhasa)
(therein) of the intelligence that is Himself, called the jlva, the agent,
the enjoyer, and the cogniser; thus the Vartikakarapada. Because of the
difference of the Intellect with each body, there Is difference in the
appearances of intelligence present therein; hence even the intelligence
non-discriminated therefrom Is cognised as if different. Because of the non-
difference, however, of ignorance, and because of the non-existence of
difference in the appearance of intelligence present therein, in the case of
the witness-intelligence non-discriminated from that (ignorance) there io
at no time whatever the manifestation of difference. And on this view, in
respect of the words 'That, thou' etc., there is but exclusive secondary
implication; for, in respect of the conditioning adjunct together with the
appearance (therein), there is abandonment of the sense expressly
signified (by those words); while the appearance too is indeterminable.
as distinct from the inert and the non-inert. That is stated in the
8ank$epa6ariraka: 'Again, when the word Brahman comes to have for
express significance ignorance together with the appearance therein (ol

44 INTRODUCTION

to account for successful practical activity in the world.
There is no doubt that even the illusory is practically

intelligence), then the word / comes to have individuation for its express
significance; but on that view there is exclusive secondary implication.'
Nor may it be said that since bondage is for the appearance alone, while
there is release for pure intelligence, there is difference of loci for bondage
and release, as well as the unintelligibility of activity (on the part of the
appearance) for its own destruction; for, bondage is admitted even of
pure intelligence, through the channel of the appearance. That has been
said by the Vartikakarapada : 'This alone is what is evil, according to us,
'.viz., the experience of the self as a transmigrate!''. Therefore it is only
the (defective) appearance of pure intelligence that is bondage; and the
removal thereof is release; thus there is nothing irreconcilable. Or else,
even the intelligence non-discriminated from the appearance is the express
significance of the words 'That thou art'; therefore, since there is non-
abandonment of part of what is expressly signified, on this view there is
but the exclusive-non-exclusive secondary implication; hence there is no
defect whatsoever. It is this view which is called abhamviUa. The
prototype intelligence conditioned by ignorance is isvara; intelligence
as reflected by ignorance defined by the internal organ and its residual
impressions is the jiva: thus the author of the Vivarana. Intelligence
reflected in ignorance is Isvara; intelligence reflected in the intellect
is the jiva; the prototype intelligence conditioned by ignorance is the pure:
thus the author of the Sankxepasdriraka. On these two views, the
diversity of the jlvas is because of the differences of intellect. Because
of the reality of the reflection, in respect of the words 'That, thou' etc.,
there is but exclusive-non-exclusive secondary implication, It is this view
that they call the praMimba-vada* Intelligence made the content of
ignorance is Isvara: and that which is the locus of ignorance is the jiva;
thus says Vacaspati Misra. And on this view, because of the diversity of
ignorance, there is diversity of jlvas. And for each jiva the world is
different, since material causality of the world belongs to the jiva alone,
us conditioned by his own ignorance. (This is only one possible inter-
pretation of Vacaspati's view. For another, perhaps a sounder, view, see
Brahmananda's commentary on the tiiddhtintabindu, p. 117; also the
introduction to the BMmati, TPH edn.). And even recognition (of a
common world) is because of similarity, while Isvara's causality is figu-
rative, as being the substrate of the jlva's ignorance together with the
world cieated (theretrom). It is this which is the avacchcda-vada. The
prototype intelligence conditioned by ignorance is ivara and intelligence
reflected in ignorance is the jiva; pure intelligence unconditioned by

iLLUSORINESS AND PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY 4^

efficient to a limited extent, The water of the dream
quenches the thirst in the dream. But is practical
efficiency limited to the same grade of reality as that
which is efficient? While some schools incline to this
opinion, the Advaitavidyacarya holds that practical
efficiency may be even of a higher grade of reality. The
need for such a view com'es thus. The hostile critic of
advaita wants to know how non-dualism is known to be
the truth. Presumably because it is based on a valid
means of knowledge, say, revelation. But now we have
revelation as pramana, non-dualism as the prameya, he
who apprehends non-dualism' as the pramatr; in spite
of this three-fold distinction how can it be said that
non-dualism is the truth and that it is established by
Scripture l ? The only answer is that all these distinc-
tions, though existent, are not absolutely real. The
pramana, then, is not absolutely real ; how can it tell us
anything valid about absolute reality 1 The reply
would be that though belonging only to the empirical
grade of reality, the practical efficiency of the pramana
may be that of a higher grade, that though pramana
can never be absolutely real, it may yet make known the
absolutely real. For such a position, analogies are not
wanting in ordinary experience. The dream of a
damsel produces consequences which, far from being
sublated, persist in waking experience; similarly in the
case of a snake-dream. In the former we have a
persistent mental exaltation, in the latter we have a

ignorance is Ivara, what is conditioned by ignorance is the jlva; either
of these, as the principal conclusion of the Vedanta, is what is called the

eka-jlva-vada. It is this that they call drsU-srsti-vada" (pp. 112 118,

Advaitamafijarl edition). For further information about the
vada, see section 3 -71, its subsections, and section 3 P 72, Chapter

46 INTRODUCTION

persistent bodily trembling etc., consequent on fear. It
is true that trembling etc. continue even after the
illusory snake of waking experience is known to be
illusory; here the persistence is explained on the basis
of residual impressions (samskara). But where the
snake was dreamt of, the trembling and the snake belong
to different orders of experience. The appeal to
samsfcara is therefore not possible; even if such an
appeal is made it comes only to this that residual
impressions belonging to one grade of reality can
produce practical effects of another grade of reality;
and this is just the conclusion sought to be established.
If there were not such practical efficiency, why should
people desire pleasant dreams and hate unpleasant
dreams ? Nor may it be said that even in dream there
is something real, viz., the cognition of the dream
content and it is that which accounts for the practical
efficiency ; for this cognition is no more than the cogni-
tive aspect of the dream-experience; and when the
experience as a whole is said to be illusory, that aspect
too is but illusory and assumptive. The fact of
immediacy may perhaps claim not to be assumptive;
for it is a fact that the dream is experienced. But
immediacy as such cannot adequately account for the
practical effects in their gradation. He that has kissed
a girl in the dream has more happiness than he who has
merely seen one ; he that has been bitten by a snake in
the dream has more fear than he who has merely
touched one. The immediacy is common to all these
without distinction, but the practical efficiency varies as
shown by the grades of happiness and fear. It is esta-
blished thus that the practical efficiency of an

THE INDETEHMINABLE ALONE AS PRACTICALLY EFFICIENT 47

experience may belong to a higher grade of reality than
that experience. The merely apparent have empiri-
cally real effects and the empirically real may culminate
in absolute reality. The proposition will not appear so
paradoxical if we remember that when we speak of
effect, we mean not a bare consequent in time, but the
manifestation of what is latent. And ex hypotJiesi what
is latent being absolute reality, there is no contradiction
in its becoming manifest in the highest type of
empirically valid experience, viz., Brahma-saksatkara.

It is possible to go a step further and say that far
from practical efficiency requiring to be explained in
the case of the indeterminable, it is the indeterminable
alone that can be practically efficient. For, the efficient
is neither real nor unreal. If it were wholly real it
would be perfect, parti ess, free from change. Whence
then can there be activity or efficiency? The self alone
is the real, and the self knows no change. It is no good
to itself or another ; not to itself because it has no wants
to satisfy, not to others, since there are no others. The
unreal, again, like the horns of a hare cannot be active
or efficient, since it is non-existent. Efficiency then
requires existence, short of reality ; it is only that which
is neither real nor unreal that can possess practical
efficiency. This interesting argument is developed in
the Advaitavidydmukura but does not figure in the
Siddhantalesa, though one might have expected it
there.

XIII.

A more fundamental objection to the illusion doc-
trine attacks the status of that doctrine itself. Is that

4g INTRODUCTION

illusory or not ? If not, we have, besides Brahman, at
least one other reality, viz., this doctrine; hence non-
dualism fails. If, on the other hand, that too is illusory,
then the world, whose illusoriness is illusory, is
consequently real; thus again non-dualism has to be
abandoned. The present work gives two replies, both
of which are interesting. What is denied by us is the
reality of the world, and that which denies, viz., illnsori-
ness, need not bo more real than what is denied;
instances are known of error and delusion being
removed not by absolute truth, but by other error and
delusions; the illusoriness of the world may then have
the same grade of reality as the world of ether etc., not
absolute reality. 36 On the face of it, the argument is
riot very satisfactory. One would expect the sublater
to have a higher degree of reality than the sublated.
Further, while the proof is not yet complete about the
world of ether etc. not being real, it would seem to be
begging tho question to say that illusoriness may be of
the same grade of reality as the world of ether etc., and
need not be absolute. If illusoriness had been proved,
it would be valid to maintain that that itself may be
illusory; but illusoriness cannot be proved until there
is resolved the apparent absurdity of illusoriness being
illusory without the content being absolutely real.

The other answer mentioned by Appayya is a
trifle more subtle. We say that nacre-silver is illusory,
since when nacre is cognised to be such, i.e., when there
is the right intuition of the substrate of the nacre-silver
experience, there is conflict with non-nacreity; the

86 See section 4*61, Chapter II,

ILLUSORINESS AS ILLUSORY 49

silverness, which is illusory, is not opposed to the non-
silverness of the substrate. When there is cognition of
the world, its illusoriness is not removed, as nacreity is
not removed when nacre is perceived to be such; hence
it is opposed to the non-illusoriness of the world, in the
same way as nacreity is opposed to non-nacreity. The
very cognition of the world, then, makes out both itself
and its illusoriness to be illusory. 37 Here again, it is
difficult to see how the petitio principii is avoided.
When nacre is perceived as nacre, its nacreity cannot
be removed ; that is self-evident if not tautologous. The
parallel statement would be "When the world is per-
ceived as the world, its worldliness cannot be removed."
What is actually stated, however, is that its illusoriness
cannot be removed; and what we are opposing all the
time is the possibility of asserting illusoriness intelli-
gently in respect of the universe. If the world were
apprehended as illusory, its illusoriness would bo
opposed to non-illusoriness ; but according to the critic
the world cannot be apprehended as illusory, since Hie
concept of illusoriness cannot intelligibly fit in with
non-dualism. We seem to be really in an impasse.

To do the advaitin justice he has independent
proofs of the illusoriness of the world. The criticism
of the allegation that perception cognises a world of
difference has been already set forth. Other proofs
depend on the fact of the world being the object of finite
cognition, on its being sublatablc and so on. But all
these proofs have to surmount the logical obstacle sot
up by the critic, an obstacle based on the Law of

37 See section 4*52, Chapter II.

8 17

50 INTRODUCTION

Excluded Middle. If your illusoriness is itself an illu-
sion, the world must be real ; if not, illusoriness itself is
real; in either case, non-dualism is impossible. The
discussion in the Advaitavidydmukiira is fuller and
more interesting. This is the nerve of the argument.
The difficulty seems to arise from our imagining that a
qualification can apply only to something other than
itself, not both to itself and others; illusoriness is a
qualification we predicate ; and the subject of that predi-
cation cannot itself be illusory ; the illusory illusion
must be real. But surely nothing can be farther from
truth. When we predicate "reality" or "knowability "
do these qualifications have to apply only to what is
itself not real or knowable ? Do we not say that
Ueality is real, just as much as that it is knowable ?
And, on the contrary, would it make any sense if wo
maintained that the subject of the predication of reality
is other than real? The illusoriness of illusion is a
paradox assuredly, but no greater paradox than the
affirmation of the reality of the real. The whole of
finite experience abounds in such pciradoxes, just
because it is finite and mediated, while absolute expe-
rience is impartite. Our knowledge itself is a paradox ;
for it cannot be of the unknown, since there can be no
activity (not even cognition) in respect of what is un-
known ; nor can it be in respect of the known, that being
already known ; if it be said to be of the partly known,
does the cognitive activity apply to the known part or
the unknown ? In either case we have the same diffi-
culties over again. The conclusion that we are driven
to is not that our knowledge is perfect, but that it is an
imperfect relational appearance of the supra-relational

iLLUSORINESS AS ILLUSORY 51

perfect knowledge. We draw a similar conclusion in
respect of the illusoriness of illusion. In any case the
appeal to Excluded Middle is beside the point. If the
advaitin said that the illusoriness of illusion is true,
absolutely real, then the critic might argue to the reality
of the substrate of the illusion. But just as illusoriness
may be illusory, this illusoriness may again be illusory ;
and the possibility is not inherently absurd since as we
have said " illusoriness", like " reality" and " know-
ability", may be predicated both of itself and others.

The critic may put the difficulty in this way; we
say that a particular experience, say that of nacre-silver,
is an illusion ; we predicate illusoriness of it ; in proving
that predicate, illusoriness of the illusion is the probans;
is this illusoriness itself illusory? Then, not merely
nacre-silver and the like but even real experiences like
that of a pot may be substrates of this illusory illusori-
ness ; thus the probans as residing both in the real and in
illusions would be inconstant; even the real colour of
pot etc. is copresent with a substrate which is illusorily
illusory. Such an argument proceeds on the assump-
tion that we prove illusoriness because of illusoriness
and that this probans if illusory would be inconstant.
We do not start proving illusoriness by illusoriness,
because of infinite regress. Our proofs of illusoriness
are based on other well known grounds, such as being
the object of finite cognition ; and illusoriness being so
cognised is also proved to be illusory on the same
ground. Nor does the alleged inconstancy of the
probans amount to anything ; for in our final conclusion,
we do not admit the pot etc. or its colour etc. to be real
The whole world we say is illusory. Illusoriness is no$

52 INTRODUCTION

something outside of this world, but part of it; hence
there is nothing repugnant to reason in that too being
illusory. No doubt, within our finite experience we have
a difference established between nacre-silver and its
illusoriness. The former is merely apparent (prati-
bhasika) while the latter is empirical (vyavaharika).
But this difference is established by a prainana, whereas
there is no pramana for distinguishing the illusoriness
of illusoriness from illusoriness.

It may be argued that if nacre-silver, the substrate
of illusory illusoriness, is illusory, the self too may be
illusory, as the substrate of illusory illusoriness; for,
some systems do hold the self to be illusory; and that
belief is illusory according to those who believe in the
self; but on this very ground, it ought to be an illusion
in the same way as nacre-silver, it is clear that such
an argument can at best show the possibility of the self
too being delusive ; it cannot establish it as a certainty.
For we do not say that nacre-silver is illusory, because
it is the substrate of illusory illusoriness ; we say rather
that, as it is an illusion, it is the substrate of illusory
illusoriness. To argue back to the self being an illusion
because it is the substrate of illusory illusoriness is
wholly unjustified. But there is certainly a possibility,
because of similarity to nacre-silver in this respect.
This possibility is, however, negatived by Scripture
which teaches the reality of the self, and by reasoning,
which demands both a witness of and a limit to the
process of sublation. We do not say that the self is
real because it is unsublatable, but because, as the
witness even of sublation, it is self -certifying and self-
evidenced. Everything finite perishes up to the self;

INDIVIDUAL VARIATIONS OF SUKHA &c. 5$

but the self does not perish, even because it is the self
of all, yea, even of the doubter. Non-contradiction or
coherence (the two are negative and positive aspects of
one and the same principle) is of itself barren as the test
of truth; its complement is self -manifestation. The
self alone is self -manifest ; and if we hold that the self is
not illusory, it is not merely because it is unsublated,
but because it is self-manifest and unsublated.
Descartes was fundamentally right when he asserted the
impossibility of thinking away the thinker. His error
lay in constituting an independent reality of this solf
after eliminating everything that could possibly be its
content. The advaitin uses nearly the same words and
appears to follow the same path ; but he is saved from
the final error when he equates the individual with the
universal self and identifies it with experience, not with
one aspect of it the experience! 1 .

XIV.

The self is one, infinite, universal. Nor because of
this is there the contingence of all persons having the
same experience of pleasure or pain at the same time ;
for these are qualities of the internal organs, which
define the one Self, and hence vary with each jiva as
defined by the respective internal organs. Agency and
enjoyership do not belong to pure intelligence; they
belong to it as identified with the body, mind etc., or
as transferred to it by superimposition from the body,
mind etc. It does not follow that because the body,
mind etc. are the loci of the above-mentioned distinc-
tions, they themselves are real ; for the distinctions being
assumptive, their loci too may be assumptive. He who
is dissatisfied with this explanation of distinction

54 INTRODUCTION

(vyavastha) can find no greater satisfaction in the
hypothesis of a plurality of selves infinite or atomic.
Apart from the difficulty of conceiving plurality
together with pervasiveness, we find that the latter
attribute stands in the way of distinguishing the
experiences of different souls ; for, being infinite, every
soul is without distinction capable of being in contact
with everything an object in the present, an impres-
sion of the past or the unseen potency due to past acts.
Nor does the atomicity of souls offer a way out. How can
the atomic Caitra have experience of pleasure or pain
or both together in different parts of his body 1 If some T
how he may be said to have such experience, why should
he not experience Maitra's pleasure and pain as well,
since the different parts of his own body are not less
removed from him than Maitra's body? When along
with atomicity there is also the relation of .pail aijd
whole (amsa and amsin) as between jlva and Brahman,
the possibility of explaining the distinction of happiness
and misery (sukha - duhkha - vyavastha) disappears
Altogether. For, between part and whole there is a
relation of difference cum non-difference. The jiva's
experiences would thus be shared by Brahman ; even if
they should somehow be compensated in the total
perfection that is Brahman, another jlva in so far as
it is non-different from Brahman would share the
experiences of the original jlva, which too is nonr
different from Brahman; thus there would be inter-
mixture of the happiness and misery of different ji vas
even on this hypothesis. 38

98 See sections 5*2 to 5 '215 and 6-61 to 6-6222, Chapter II,

RELATION OF KARMA TO KNOWLEDGE 55

XV.

Ignorance of one's essential nature being the cause
of all supcrimposition and consequent misery, release
consists in the destruction of that by knowledge. The
knowledge meant is the immediate, final and unshakable
intuition of oneself as identical with the one real that is
neither knower nor known, neither agent nor enjoyei'
nor object of enjoyment, but Pure Consciousness, the
substrate of the appearance of all these distinctions.
The distinctions, however, persist up to the said realisa-
tion; and the activities consequent on the distinctions,
such as engaging in ritual and so on, have their own
contribution to make in arriving at that realisation.
According to one main school, that of the Vivarana,
knowledge itself is the result of such activities, through
ihe purification of the self, while, according to the
other school, that of the Bhamatl, such acts instil only
the desire to know. 30 The fact that independent fruit
of various kinds is prescribed for the various rites does
not stand in the way of their subserving knowledge too;
for, the latter results only when such activity is aided by
suitable auxiliary causes like hearing the Vedanta,
reflection thereon and repeated contemplation of the
truth taught therein. In any case since the subsidiari-
ness to knowledge is only through the channel of
purification, these activities are not proximate (sanni-
patya) but remote auxiliaries (arad-upakaraka). For
renunciation too, as for the performance of karma, there
is need; the two may belong either to different classes of

39 See sections 1-1 and 1-1, Chapter HI,

56 INTRODUCTION

people or to different stages of life; and its utility may
be through an apurva generated thereby or through the
seen fruit of securing non-distraction 40 from the hearing
(study) of the Vedanta.

The study etc., of the Vedanta would seem to be in
any case the indispensable preliminary to realisation.
It is, however, maintained by Bharatitlrtha that this is
only one of the two paths taught by the Lord, viz.,
sfmkhya and yoga. The path of yoga is that of contem-
plation, whose object is the attributclcss Brahman, not
the lower Brahman, as in saguna meditations. The
possibility of such contemplation is mentioned in the
Prasna TJpanisad and the negation of it elsewhere is
only apparent, being on a par with statements that
Brahman is not that which is known. The patli of yoga
leads to the same goal as that of sankhya ; there is need
for two paths because of difference in the capacity of
those interested (adhikarins). Yoga is suitable for
those who, because of dullness of intellect, failure to
find a skilled preceptor and so on, arc not able to engage
in inquiry into the Vedanta, though from the Vedanta
learnt by adhyayana they have a superficial knowledge
of the oneness of Brahman and the self. On the face
of things it would appear that such a person cannot
successfully intuit Brahman. He sets forth armed with
ignorance, not knowledge; his method is hit or miss
guess-work; but none the less he will succeed, though
with some delay; for, even guess-work is not destined to
fail invariably; it very often succeeds. 41

40 Sections 1*21, 2, 2-11, 2-12, 2-13, Chapter III.

41 See section 3-1, Chapter III.

CONTEMPLATION OP THE PURE BRAHMAN 57

What is valuable about this position is the
liberalising tendency it indicates. The supreme truth
of non-dualism is not the prize of the few ; it is not the
treasured possession of intellectual aristocrats. If it is
true that reality is one and that the jivas are identical
with that one, no self can be hopelessly far from the
realisation of that unity. It may be that those of keener
and clearer intellect are much nearer the intuition; the
paths followed by others are none the less paths to the
one goal, despite their circumlocution. Truth being a
perfect orb, you are bound to encompass it sooner or
later, no matter where you start from and in which
direction you go. This is all in the true catholic spirit
of Hinduism. But there is room to doubt whether
intellectual certitude is not a necessary preliminary to
the final realisation. A man may happen to make a
correct guess; but that guess is of no value to him or
others until it is verified by observation ; and when it is
verified we have intellectual certitude. It may, of
course, be said that this ascertainment has not been
arrived at though intellectual processes. There is the
guess followed by the experience which guarantees the
guess; in the light of that experience the intellect too
may be satisfied secondarily; but the certitude which is
given in experience has not been arrived at through the
intellect. There is assuredly a great deal to be said for
this point of view. All that a true philosopher can
insist on is the synoptic vision ; he need not and indeed
should not insist that this should be an intellectual
vision too. The man who trades in concepts is not
intrinsically superior to him who trades in sounds and
colours. The vision beatific may come through artistic

S 18

58 INTRODUCTION

as through intellectual channels; 42 and the truly moral
man, who has lost all thought of himself in the narrow
sense, IB not necessarily farther from realisation than
the artist or the philosopher. This much, however, the
philosopher can claim, viz., that his particular weapon,
the intellect, is the sole critic of all achievement and that
wKere this critic does not function the chances of going
astray are much' greater. But this comes to nothing
more than tKe admission of Bharatitirtha that the path
of yoga involves delay.

XVI.

About that which is directly the instrument
(karana) of intuition there are divergent views, some
holding that deep meditation is the karana, while others
claim that position for the mind or the principal texts
of the Vedanta. There is no doubt about the need for
everyone of these factors, the dispute being only about
the primacy of one or the other. Of special interest in
this connection is the discussion as to whether the mind
is or is not a sense-organ and whether verbal testimony
can of itself generate immediate apprehension. The
Bhamatl school holds that the final intuition cannot bo
effective in destroying ignorance, which is immediate,
unless it is itself immediate, that the immediacy can
come only from the functioning of a sense-organ, and
that, since no other sense-organ is operative in the
process of intuition by contemplation of the truth of

42 To Madhusudana Sarasvati belongs the credit of claiming non-dual
realisation to come through the channel of devotion (bhakti). The
language he employs is strongly suggestive of artistic experience. See
his Bhaktirasayanam,; also the Siddhantabin&u, translated by P. M. Modi,
Appendix II. The view marks yet another stage in the liberalising of
advaita, and seems to derive some inspiration from Bharatitirtha,

INSTRUMENT OP INTUITION 59

non-dualism, the mind must be admitted to be a sense-
organ. It is true, as the objectors would say, that the
mind is active in mediate cognition too. This need not,
however, stand in the way of its recognition as a sense-
organ; for, immediate cognition is not an invariable
consequent of the functioning even of the recognised
sense-organs, since immediacy may be obstructed by a
defect in the sense or the object. It is not every ear that
can appreciate music, but only the trained ear; the
trained sense, like that of the yogin, can have immediate
cognition of what we cannot perceive; the perfected
mind of the siddha can intuit the Absolute though our
minds cannot ; the need for discipline does not detract
from the sense-character of mind.

Even granted this character, is it the mind that is
directly the cause of intuition or is deep meditation the
cause? Both views seem to find favour with different,
writers. The school of thought which insists on deep
meditation (prasankhyana) as the direct cause, claims
Mandana as its strongest if not earliest adherent. This
view came in for extensive criticism even as early as
the time of Suresvara who condemns it in the
Naiska/rmyasiddhi. If the final intuition is true
knowledge one would expect its karana to be
a recognised means of knowledge (prama^a) and
prasankhyana is not a pramana. The admission of mind
as a sense-organ would get over this difficulty, because
contact of sense with object is perception, and this is
what happens when the mind through contemplation
envisages the Absolute. In this case, we recognise no
new pramana, but only a new variety of a well-known
pramana. The Vivarana school, however, holds that

60 INTRODUCTION

the principal texts of the Vedanta, such as "That thou
art", are themselves directly the cause of the intuition,
and that, though they work through the mind, the latter
is not a sense-organ or the direct cause of immediate
apprehension. According to this view, verbal know-
ledge may of itself be immediate, though its content be
not sensed. In the well known story of ten foolish men
who started counting themselves after crossing a river
and every time counted only nine since the enumerator
was left out in each case, when the stranger starts
counting, comes to the tenth man and says "Thou art
the tenth", there is immediate realisation of the whole
party being safe and sound, though there is no sense-
apprehension over and above what existed already with-
out producing the said realisation. The followers of
the Bhamatl view say that this is to beg the question ;
for the statement "Thou art the tenth" produces no
intuition except through the mind; and we say that the
mind is capable of producing that intuition because it
is a sense-organ. The story of itself cannot negative our
contention. The only legitimate criticism may direct
itself to the presence or functioning of mind in mediate
as well as immediate apprehension; and the reply to
that has already been stated. 43

XVII.

However final or superior or ultimate this intuition
may be, it is yet in the form of the conditioned ; it is not

43 On the whole topic see sections 4 and 5 of Chapter III, together
with the sub-sections, the Kalpataru on the BMrrtatl,, pp. lie,. ng t
driraftgam edition, the Ved&ntaparibhdyd, pp. 43 46 (Bombay edition
with the Sikhdmani) and The Six Ways of Knowing (D. M. Datta),
pp. 5358.

DESTRUCTION OF THE FINAL PSYCHOSIS Q

free from distinctions of knower and known ; though of
the impartite, it is itself not impartite. Two questions
naturally arise out of this position. When knowledge
that destroys appearance is itself of the form of
appearance, does it not require another agent for its
own destruction? and if so, what is that other agent?
Again, if the final cognition is impure, what is it that
figures as the object of knowledge therein? It seems
contradictory to assert that the pure is that object of
knowledge. What appears in a conditioned mode of
cognition must itself be the conditioned. If so, how
can there be realisation of the pure unconditioned
Absolute ? And failing such realisation, how can there
be release?

It is admitted by all schools of advaita that the final
psychosis, called the intuition of Brahman, has the
capacity to annul not merely the rest of the world of
appearance, but itself as well. Various analogies are
employed to illustrate this. The power of the clearing
nut when mixed with muddy water, precipitates both
itself and the mud already in the water; poison,
administered as a drug, expels both itself and the poison
already present in the system 1 ; when grass is completely
burnt up by fire, the fire too dies out. It is not true
that for the destruction of the final psychosis, something
over and above that psychosis is needed; this something-
other is undoubtedly required when a pot etc. is
destroyed, but to insist on that here would be to argue
from illegitimate analogy ; one may as well argue that
the final psychosis cannot be destroyed except by blows
from a hammer or the like. The co-operation of time,
unseen potency etc. is not denied, for they too exist

62 INTRODUCTION

prior to the destruction of the final psychosis along
with the destruction of the universe. Those who are
still unsatisfied maintain that what destroys both the
universe and the intuition of Brahman is not the
psychosis itself, which is inert, but the Brahman-
intelligence, associated with that psychosis. Thus is
avoided the apparent absurdity that the final psychosis
causes its own destruction. Though, in its own nature,
Brahman-intelligence is not inconsistent with error and
delusion, being the substrate thereof, yet as associated
with the final psychosis it destroys them; just as the
sun which by itself does not destroy a piece of cotton
yet does so when its rays are f ocussed thereon through a
burning glass. 44 Another ingenious solution would
have it that the psychosis directly destroys ignorance
alone ; but since ignorance is the material cause of the
entire universe of which the final psychosis too is a
part, with the destruction of ignorance this psychosis
too is destroyed. It should be noted that here too the
psychosis is itself the cause of its own destruction,
though indirectly; the difficulty if any in such a notion
is only postponed by a stage. Its only merit, then, lies
in its allowing for the continuance of the world-presen-
tation for a while, even after the dawn of the final
psychosis. But the persistence of the world for the
released soul (not merely in respect of him and for
others who are lookers on and unreleased) seems an
improvable and unnecessary hypothesis. We cannot
experience what the released souls experience ; while as
for what they say, much of it may depend on our
imaginative interpretation, even if we admit that those

44 For the whole topic see section 7 and sub sections, Chapter III.

THE CONTENT OP THE FINAL PSYCHOSIS gg

wKo make the statements are really released and not
merely on the brink of release. The doctrine of
jivan-mukti has been noticed earlier. All that may be
noted Here is that there is no need to bolster up that
doctrine by the hypothesis that Brahman-intuition
destroys ignorance alone and not the universe.
1 The second question offers greater difficulties. If
Brahman is known as the content of a psychosis, how
can it be pure and unconditioned ? That which enters
into a relation as the content thereof must surely be
conditioned by that relation. This is the position of
Vacaspati Misra who says that the final intuition is of
the conditioned (upahita). 45 If the relational form
persists even here and what is intuited is not the
Absolute, what is the justification for calling this intui-
tion final? The reply is that here there is no
awareness of the condition or the conditioning, while
there is awareness of Brahman alone. This is its
distinction from psychoses of lower grades. Where
the relationing has become so tenuous that it does not
obtrude on consciousness, it is ready to be transcended
in the fulness of the experience that is Brahman. It
is not unintelligible that such knowledge takes us to the
threshold of release. But an awareness of the
conditioned which is yet not an awareness of the
condition or the conditioning seems very difficult, if
not impossible, to distinguish from an intuition of pure
Brahman. Between the view which maintains the
intuition of pure Brafiman and the Bhamatl view
sfet forth earlier, the difference would thus seem to

45 See the BMmatV? p. 78 (TPH edition). The note thereon, as also
the relevant portion of the Kalpataru may also be looked up.

g^ INTRODUCTION

be mbre verbal than real. The truth seems to be this;
so long as one looks for what is apprehended in know-
ledge, even the highest knowledge can give only the
conditioned Brahman, since we continue to l6ok for
what can enter into the knowledge-relation; but when
we seek what is to be realised through knowledge, as
the fulfilment of knowledge through its transcendence
in the infinite, impartite experience, what is thus known
is the pure Brahman. The differences of view would
seem 1 to depend on the stressing of one or the other of
the abovementioned aspects. But in any case the path
to release is in and through knowledge ; no other path
exists (na 'nyah pantha 'yanaya vidyate).

In the preparation of this edition the following
Manuscripts and printed texts have been used.

1. A palm-leaf manuscript in Grantha characters,
No. xxv B 10 of the Adyar Library, cited as A x .

2. A palm-leaf manuscript in Grantha characters,
No. xxvi B 33 of the Adyar Library, cited as A 2 .

3. A palm-leaf manuscript in Telugu characters,
No. DC 4766 of the Government Oriental Manuscripts
Library, Egm'ore, cited as E x .

4. A palm-leaf manuscript in Telugu characters,
No. DC 4764 of the Government Oriental Manuscripts
Library, Egmore, cited as E 2 .

5. A paper manuscript in Devanagari script,
No. B 1885 of the Government Oriental Manuscripts
Library, Egmore, cited as E 3 . ,

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 65

6. The Kumbakonam edition (Advaitamaiijari
Series), (cited as K).

7. The Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series edition,
(This constitutes the basic text, cited as V, though in
some ways it is very unsatisfactory).

8. The Chowkhamba Press edition, (cited as B).

9. The Jivananda Vidyasagara edition, Calcutta,
(cited as C).

10. The Van! Vilas Press edition, Srirangam (in-
complete, cited as {).

The editor takes this opportunity of thanking the
Hon. Director, Adyar Library, the Curator, Govern-
ment Oriental Manuscripts Library, Egmore, and the
Manager, Vani Vilas Syndicate for their kindness and
courtesy.

Views and quotations have not been traced with as
much success as could be wished. It is hoped to carry
on the work of identification and publish a short
Appendix at a future date. The rather elaborate divi-
sion into sections and sub-sections will prove useful in
such a case. The translation made in the pages of the
Pandit is incomplete ; and in most places it is too much
of a paraphrase. An attempt has been made in the
present translation to keep close to the text. The
transliteration tries to make the text more easily
intelligible by splitting up long compounds into their
components joined together by hyphens. This has neces-
sitated the use of a double hyphen (=), where a word is
broken up solely because the end of the line has been

S 19

66 INTRODUCTION

reached; thus while "ajnanasraya" is ordinarily
printed "ajnana-'sraya", where the end of the line is
reached with "ajiia", it is printed "ajnama-'sraya".
The editor tenders his heart-felt thanks to all the
scholars, both in the University and outside, who gave
him their unstinted help.

NOTE.

The 8iddMntale&a seems to have had more than one commentary.
The best known is that by Achyuta Krn&nanda ; it is found in most
printed editions of the text. There is, in the Library of the Asiatic
Society of Bengal, the Manuscript of a commentary by one ViSvanatha
Tlrtha (I A 10). Tradition ascribes a commentary to Madhustidana
Sarasvati; no trace of this has been found so far. The well known,
advaitin, Sada&iva Brahmendra, wrote a verse compendium of this work,
called the Siddhtintakalpavain. A prose compendium by Vasudeva
Brahmendra Sarasvati, an advaitin who lived till recently, and another
verse compendium by one Gaftg&dhara Sarasvati are also in print; the
former is called SiMMntaletattltparyasangraUah, and the latter Veddnta-
siddMnta-suktimaftjarL

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER L

1 ! Nature of injunction in respect of hearing

(studying) the Vedanta.
3 -11 Three kinds of injunction, apurva-vidhi,

niyama-vidhi and parisankhya-vidhi.
1 -12 Which of the above three is the sravana-

vidhi?

1 -121 Prakatartha view that it is apurva-vidhi.

1 -122 Refutation of the above.

1 -131 It is a niyama-vidhi : one variety, to

insist on the study of Vedanta.

1 -132 Another variety : to insist on study of non-

dual texts.

1 -133 A third variety : to insist on study under a

guru.

1 -134 A fourth variety: to insist on the study of

the Scriptures in the original.

1 -135 A fifth variety : to insist on the study of

the sruti, as contrasted with itihasas,
puranas, &c.

1-136 A sixth variety: to insist on hearing, as

productive of immediate knowledge, in
conjunction with reflection and contem-
plation.

1 *137 A seventh variety: to insist on hearing, as

instrumental to mediate cognition alone.

68 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 -138 An eighth variety : to insist on hearing, as

certainly productive of immediate know-
ledge, co-operating with the mind.

1*139 A ninth variety: hearing means inquiry

which is insisted on for the removal of
doubt and error.

1-14 It is a parisankhya-vidhi to prevent dis-

traction by other activities.

1*15 There is 110 vidhi at all.

1 *151 Study under a preceptor established other-

wise.

1 *152 Study and adoption of dualist texts can be

avoided only by the Lord's grace, not by
a sravana-vidhi.

1 *153 Freedom from distraction established

otherwise.

1*154 Exclusion of works in the vernacular

tongues secured otherwise.

1-155 The need for inquiry &c. established by

their utility, observed in experience.

2-11 Definition of Brahnian; creation etc. each

a definition.

2 '12 All three activities together constitute the

definition.

2 *21 Brahman is the material cause.

2-22 Is it pure Brahman or Isvura or the jlva'?

2 -221 Pure Brahman as upadana.

2 -222 Isvara as upadana.

CHAPTER I 9

2-223 Both Isvara and the jiva as material

causes. Difference between avidya and

maya.

2 -2231 Another variety of the above view.
2-224 Both are material causes though there is

no distinction between maya and avidya.

2-225 Isvara as the cause of the empirical and

jiva as the cause of the illusory world.

2-226 Jiva alone is the cause of all, even

Isvaratva being posited by himself in
himself.

2 -23 Is not maya the m'aterial cause ?

2 -231 Maya as parinamy-upadana, Brahman as

vivarto-'padana.

2 -232 Brahman alone as upadana.

2 -233 Maya is only dvara-karana.

2 -234 Maya is only an auxiliary (sahakari).

2 -235 Maya alone is the upadana ; Brahman is so

only figuratively.

2 -31 Distinction between jiva and Isvara.

2 -311 Isvara and the jiva are both reflections.

2 -3111 Prakatartha view : Isvara is the reflection
in the single maya, jivas reflections in
its m'any diverse parts called avidyas.

2 -3112 Tattvavivetta view : prakrti wherein pure
sattva is predominant is maya ; that
wherein it is overpowered by rajas arid
tamas is avidya ; reflection in the former
is Isvara, that in the latter is jiva.

70 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 -3113 Prakrti as projective is m'aya ; as obscur-
ing it is avidya. Reflection in the
former is Isvara; in the latter, jlva.

2-3114 Reflection in avidya is Isvara; reflection
in its product, the internal organ, is the
jlva ; Sankepasanraka criticism of
avaccheda view as occasioning destruc-
tion of acquired karma and influx of the
non-acquired.

2-3115 Citradipa distinction of four forms:
kutastha, the substrate of the gross and
subtle bodies; jlva, the reflection in the
internal organ posited in the kutastha ;
Brahman the undefined pure intelli-
gence; Isvara, the reflection in the
impressions of the intellects of all
beings, such impressions being pre-
sent in maya located in Brahman.
Jivatva, experienced as"I-ness", is
the super-imposed elem'ent and is
destructible. Appositional designation
with Brahman intelligible, since appo-
sition is not through bare non-
difference, but through sublation. Even
on the former view of apposition,
"jlva" may secondarily denote the
kutastha. Isvara identical with the
blissful self of the sleep state described
in the Mandukya.

2-3116 Brahmdnanda view : the blissful self of
sleep is but the jlva. Explanation of

CHAPTER I 71

the Scriptural attribution of sarvesva-
ratva etc. Example of the artistically
worked cloth. Adhyatma forms are
shown by iSruti as included in the
adhidaiva forms to facilitate the passage
from the conditioned to the uncondi-
tioned.

2-3117 DrgdrsyaviveJsa includes kutastha under
jiva, of which there are three kinds :
absolute, i.e., what is undefined; empiri-
cal, i.e., reflection in the internal organ
posited in maya; the merely apparent,
i.e., one who has the conceit of the 'I' in
dream-bodies etc., posited by sleep, a
m'ode of maya.

2 -312 Vivarana view : Isvara is the prototype,

jiva the reflection.

2-313 Jiva is intelligence as defined by the

internal organ; what is not so defined
is Isvara. There can be no reflection of
what has no f orm. Isvara 's antaryami-
bhava not more intelligible on the
reflection theory. What is reflected is
only that portion which is outside the re-
flecting medium. Avidya, not the inter-
nal organ, may be treated as the defining
adjunct. The defect of krta-hana etc.
has to be m'et in any case by the real
identity of the jiva: and this explana-
tion is possible even if the internal organ
be the adjunct. There is no conflict

72 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

with texts or aphorisms; authority of
the aphorist in Vedanta Siitra, III, ii,
20 and HI, iii, 43 and of the Brahma-
bindu Upanisad.

2 -314 Brahman itself through its avidya appears

to be the jiva and by its own knowledge
is released as it were. Example of
Kaunteya's conceit of himself as
Radheya.

2 -32 Is the jiva one or many?

2-3211 A single jiva animating one body alone;
other bodies non-anim'ated, similar to
bodies seen in dreams; no distinction
between the bound and the released ; the
release of Suka etc. assumptive, as of
persons seen in dreams.

2 -3212 Hiranyagarbha, a reflection of Brahman,
is the one principal jiva; other jivas are
reflections of this; all bodies are
animated, but with a distinction.

2 -3213 A single jiva animates all bodies without
distinction ; non-recollection of one
another's happiness etc. is due to
difference of bodies. Even here, no
distinction between the bound and the
released.

2 -322 Jivas are many, as defined by the internal

organ etc, Distinction between bondage
and release recognised.

CHAPTER I yg

2-3221 Ignorance though one has parts; and is
removed in part when Brahman-know-
ledge arises.

2-3222 Brahman-knowledge destroys the mind
and thence is destroyed the conjunction
of ignorance with intelligence.

2-3223 Ignorance resides in the jivas, not in
Brahman; it is fully present in each
jlva, like jati in the particular, and
abandons some enlightened jivas, as the
jati abandons a destroyed particular.

2 -3224 Ignorances are many, one for each jlva.

2-32241 All the nesciences together create the
world ; when one is destroyed, the world
is destroyed, but is immediately re-
created by the surviving nesciences.

2-32242 Each nescience creates a different world
for each jiva; only a delusive sense of
identity, as in an illusion seen by several
persons.

2 -32243 Maya, located in Isvara, is the cause of the

empirical world ; avidyas cause obscura-
tion alone and the projection of the

merely apparent.

3-0 What is agency?

3 -1 Possession of such knowledge, desire to act

and volition as is favourable to what is
to be done.

3 -2 Possession of knowledge alone, such! as is

favourable to what is to be done.

SI 10

74 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

3 -3 Possession of knowledge of the form ' * This

is to be created. "

4 -1 Brahman 's oiriniscience intelligible though

there is no internal organ as for the jiva ;
for Isvara's adjunct is ignorance asso-
ciated with the impressions of the
intellects of all beings: Bharatitirtha.

4 '2 Prakatdrtha view: there are transforma-

tions of maya which reflect intelligence ;
through the manifestations reflected
therein, Isvara sees the world in all
three tim'es ; hence omniscience.

4-3 Tattvasuddhi view: in the above manner,

Isvara perceives the entire world of the
present ; through impressions produced
thereby there is memory of everything
past ; prior to creation maya transforms
itself into the presentation of all things
to be created in accordance with the
adrsta of jivas ; hence knowledge of the
future.

4 -4 Kaumudl view : Brahman 's essential know-

ledge manifests everything related to it ;
even the past and the future are related
to it as existing in avidya in the form of
impressions ; omniscience is not through
cognition due to psychoses ; Brahman is
of the nature of the knowledge of every-
thing but not the cogniser of everything.

4 *5 Vacaspati 's view : Brahman may be said to

be even the agent in knowledge since

CHAPTER 1 75

that knowledge though in its essence not
a product is yet a product of Brahman,
as defined by what is seen.

5 -0 Why does the jiva need psychoses'?

5-1 Vivarana view: jiva's intelligence unlike

Brahman's is not the material cause of
all things, is not in identity with them
and cannot manifest them ; but (a) there
is conjunction of the jiva with the
internal organ, whose transformation,
the psychosis, goes out through the
senses to the object and pervades it;
associated with this psychosis the jiva
cognises that object, (b) Or, the condi-
tioned jiva is finite and has no relation
with objects, but psychosis manifests its
non-difference front the object-defined-
intelligeiice ; and thus the jiva illumines
the object, (c) Or, the psychosis des-
troys the ignorance veiling the jiva ; and
the jiva, being manifested then, illu-
mines that object alone.

5 -11 What is the association with intelligence ?

5 '111 The relationship of subject and object.

5-112 For that relationship the psychosis need

not go forth; but when the psychosis is
related to the object, there is an indirect
relation to the object even for the jlva-
intelligence in proximity to the object/
since the psychosis is in identity with
this.

76 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

5 :113 Direct relation necessary for immediacy ;

hence when there is conjunction between
psychosis and object, for the jiva too
there is a conjunction born of a con-
junction.

5-114 Identification with the object secured

through non-difference between mani-
festing intelligence and Brahman-
intelligence; though the jiva is omni-
present, he cognises objects only as
conditioned by the internal organ;
difference from 1 the view (b), where
souls are finite.

5-12 What is the manifestation of non-

difference ?

5 -121 The identification through the psychosis of

intelligences as defined by the object and
by the internal organ; analogy of tank
water and, field water becoming one
through a channel.

5-122 The object-defined-intelligence creates a

reflection of itself in the proximate part
of the psychosis; with this there is
identification of the jiva, not with the
ob j ect-defined-intelligence itself.

5*123 The object-defined-intelligence itself is

identified with the jiva, but the former
is considered not as qualified by its being
the prototype, but as qualified per
accident* thereby.

CHAPTER 1

77

5 -13 What is the removal of obscuration? If

ignorance is destroyed, why is not the
world too destroyed c !>

5 -1311 Of a small part alone there is destination
as of darkness by a glow-worm, or a
rolling up as of a mat, or a retreat as
of frightened soldiers.

51312 Object-de&ied-intelligence, when in con-
junction with a psychosis, cannot be
obscured by ignorance; this is the
removal of obscuration ; ignorance need
not obscure that wherein it is located.

5-132 What is destroyed by a psychosis is not

primal ignorance, but a mode thereof
and its destruction alone is the removal ;
the ignorances to be destroyed are as
numerous as the cognitions.

5 -1321 These modal ignorances too are beginning-
less.

5-1322 They have a beginning; illustration from
sleep which causes dreams and the
experience "I slept well."

5-13211 Each cognition destroys one ignorance
alone, as it destroys one pragabhava
alone, other pragabhavas being seen to
continue, as capable of originating
doubt etc.

5-13212 All ignorances do not obscure all things at
all times; when one ignorance is
destroyed by a psychosis, when this

78

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

latter ceases, another ignorance obscures
the object. When Brahman-knowledge
arises all surviving ignorances are
destroyed, being dependent on primal
ignorance destroyed by that knowledge.

5-13213 The cognition while destroying one
ignorance, drives away the others too in
the sense of obstructing their obscuring
capacity so long as the cognition lasts.

5 -132131 Difficulty in a continuous stream of cogni-
tion. When the psychosis ceases,
ignorance re-obscures; therefore even
second and subsequent cognitions are
the causes of non-obscuration.

5-132132 Nyayacandrika view: each cognition des-
troys one ignorance alone; the other
ignorances obscure the nature of the
object only as qualified per accidens by
their respective times; and cognition
destroys all ignorances that obscure the
thing qualified per accidens by the time
it lasts.

5-132133 The essential nature of the object is
obscured by that ignorance alone which
is removed by the first cognition; the
second and subsequent cognitions re-
mlove ignorances relating to the object
as qualified by space, time etc. In the
continuous stream of cognition, a
multiplicity of psychoses is not ad-
mitted; or even if multiplicity be

CHAPTER I

79

admitted, there may be not many
instantaneous psychoses, but five or
six, each lasting for some time, so that
each has some gross time for content-
Even if they be instantaneous and thus
do not remove obscuration, there is no
harm, since as relating to the already
known they are not authoritative.

5 -1321331 Obscuring ignorance is two-fold located in
the object and located in the knower ; in
the case of mediate psychoses, the latter
alone is destroyed, not the former, since
the psychosis does not go forth.

5 -1321332 There is only one ignorance, located in the
knower; the illusion is a transformation
of Brahman as the content of the ignor-
ance located in the knower ; even medi ate
psychosis destroys modal ignorance, but
another mode of it projects what is not
true.

5-1321333 Obscuring ignorance is present in the
object alone ; though modal ignorance is
not related to the witness conditioned by
the internal organ, primal ignorance is
so related; and thence comes the
experience "I do not know nacre " etc.,
since even nacre etc. are non-different
from the intelligence that is the con-
tent of primal ignorance; and in any
case there is non-difference between the
mode and that which has modes j as for

8Q

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

the mediate psychosis, it does not
remove ignorance and its appearing to
do so mtiy be delusive. The rule about
removing ignorance applies only to
immediate psychoses, but not to all
immediate cognitions like the witness's
perception of nescience etc.

5 -141 Who is the witness ?

5-14111 Krttastha(Rpa view : the kutastha is the
witness. The two bodies are manifested
at intervals by psychoses of the internal
organ; at other times, they are mani-
fested together with the absence of
psychoses, by the witness. Individua-
tion etc. constantly associated with the
witness; hence not subject to doubt etc.,
and subject to recollection of continuity
contemporaneously with a continuous
stream of cognition of some other
object, Unlike the jlva, the kutastha
is an indifferent spectator. Natakadlpa
too distinguishes the witness from the
jlva; the witness is the Imtastha, com-
pared to a lam'p in a theatre. Tattvar
pradipika too says that the inner self
is the witness as non-different from the
jlva. In all three views, the Lord is not
the witness.

5-14112 Kaumudt view: the witness is some form
of the Lord, which is yet not the abode

CHAPTER I

81

of causality. In sleep, he is known as
Prajna.

5-14113 Tattvasuddhi: the witness though really
of the constitution of Brahman appears
to be of the constitution of the jiva, in
the same way as the this-ness, which
while really belonging to nacre appears
to belong to silver.

5-14121 The nescience-conditioned jiva is the
witness, the jiva in his own nature being
indifferent.

5-14122 The jiva is the witness, but as conditioned
by the internal organ, not by the omni-
present nescience; the jiva as qualified
by the internal organ is the cogniser.

If nescience obscures the witness, how are
nescience etc. manifested by the witness ?
Even by the light that it obscures, in, the
same way as Rahu.

5-1422 Another view: nescience obscures but to
the exclusion of the witness. Even the
bliss that is of the nature of the witness
is certainly manifested, since there is
seen unconditioned love for the self.

5 *14231 If bliss is manifest even here, what is the
difference between bondage and release $
The undefined nature of Brahman-bliss
does not count, since " not being defined "
is not of itself a human goal; though

SI II

82 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

Brahman-bliss, as contrasted with mate-
rial happiness, is unsurpassable, you
admit the real identity of all forms of
happiness ; nor may grades be admitted
because of differences in the mani-
festcrs, since the illustration is not
accepted ; and even if it were, the state
of bondage as one of clearer happiness
would be superior to the free state
where happiness is not clear, because
undefined. Therefore the witness-bliss is
not unobscured.

5 -14232 Advaitavidyacarya 's rcpl y : analogy of the
reflection in mirrors of different degrees
of purity; superiority and inferiority in
the happiness may be superimposed
because of the purity or impurity of the
reflecting intellect.

5 -14233 Bliss is certainly experienced as obscured ;
the witness is unobscured as intelligence,
but as bliss it is obscured; obscura-
tion is seen only where there is (partial)
manifestation, as in " I do not know the
sense stated by you". As intelligence
is not wholly obscured, so bliss too is not
wholly obscured but only to the exclusion
of the particular psychoses of happiness.

5*1424 Since individuation etc. are continuously
presented to the witness, since they do
not pass out to make room for

CHAPTER 1

83

memory-impressions, how can they be
recollected?

5 -14241 Individuation etc. are also manifested, by
the witness as defined by them, as
transformed into psychoses with the
forms of objects. This witness being
impermanent, recollection is possible.

5-14242 Recognition of a psychosis of nescience,
with the form "I" such as is necessary
to explain the recollection of nescience
etc. in sleep.

5-14243 This psychosis with the form "I" is a
modification of the internal organ (not
of nescience), but is not cognitive, not
being guaranteed by any ascertained
means of cognition.

5 -14244 Even this psychosis is cognitive, because of
the experience "I know myself' 7 ; the
mind itself should be assumed to be the
instrument for this cognition.

5-15 Removal of obscuration would seem to

belong only to psychoses relating to
external objects.

There is not even this rule, since in
delusion the psychosis of the ' ' this ' ' does
not remove ignorance, as otherwise the
delusion would have no material cause.
5-151 Ignorance about the this-element is cer-

tainly removed, but not about nacreity ;
that is the material cause of the

g4 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENT^

delusion; hence the distinction in the
Sanksepasariraka between the adhis-
thana and adhara of delusion.

5 -152 The ignorance of the this-element is itself

the material cause; though removed in
its obscuring aspect, it is not removed in
its projective aspect; the distinction
between the removal of these two
aspects has to be recognised to explain
jivan-mukti and the persistence of the
delusion in reflection.

5 -153 Kavitarkika-Cakravarti Nrsimha Bhatto-

padhyaya's view: no experience of a
psychosis of "this" as distinct from
' ' this is silver ' '. It is not to be assumed
from the effect, since its causality of the
delusion is not evidenced. The contact
of a defective sense is alone established
as the cause. The cognition of the
substrate cannot be the cause of such
delusions as yellow shell or blue water,
since there can be no visual perception
of what is colourless and the white
colour is not experienced at the
time of the delusion. Contact with a
defective sense-organ applies to all cases
of delusion and parsimony dictates its
choice as the cause. Nor may it be said
" Cognition of the substrate is a neces-
sary cause in super-impositions depen-
dent on similarity, e.g. nacre-silver ; and

CHAPTER 1 5

similarity is not a defect in the object,
since even delusive similarity may cause
superimposition ; and superimposition is
not dependent on the nature of the
object, since on the same cloth there may
or m'ay not be superimposition, accord-
ing as there is or is not similarity."
Cognition of similarity may be a cause
only in what is hindered by specific cog-
nition, not in delusions like the yellow
shell ; and the causes of specific cognition
would themselves explain, by their own
presence or absence, the absence or
presence of the superimposition ; no need
for the cognition of similarity. A piece
of iron in contact with the sense of touch
is not perceived as silver, since there is
the possibility of its being perceived as
any other piece of metal, copper etc.,
and hence is the object of doubt ; in the
neighbourhood of silver, it is perceived
as silver. The unhindered contact of
the this-object with a defective sense sets
up an agitation in nescience, whose
consequent transformation has the delu-
sive content, silver etc., too for content,
not the this-eleitient alone; the delusive
content is experienced as sensory. This
sensory nature cannot be explained
merely from the sense-contact of the
this-element alone, as, in yellow shell
etc., the this-elenient alone cannot be

ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS

sensed as colourless and is not sensed as
white ; nor is the sense of sight needed
for the perception of the yellowness
alone of the bile in the eye, as then both
the shell and its conjunction with yellow
would be non-perceptual. Nor does the
yellow go through rays from the eyes
and pervade the object, as then every
one should see it as yellow like a gold-
plated object. No violation of the sup-
posed causal laws in respect of percep-
tion in general, perception of a substance
and percept ion of silver. No law about
perception in general in the absence of
the ascertainment of a single mode of
contact common to samyoga etc. As for
contact with a substance being the cause
of perception of a substance, it is enough
i the contact be with that on which
substancencss is superimposed. There
is no room for a further law about per-
ception of specific substances. Even if
such laws be recognised they should be
restricted to empirically valid percep-
tions, in view of such experiences as "I
see blue water/' which cannot be
explained by such laws. This view is not
to be confounded with anyathakhyati,
for silver present elsewhere (as on
the aiiyulhfikhyati view) cannot be
perceived here and now, and we admit

CHAPTER I g7

its indeterminability to explain both its
perception and sublation. The non-
superimposition of tin etc. at the same
timfe as of silver is due to the absence of
such defects as human desire in relation
to the former.

5 -154 Others hold the psychosis with the form of

silver etc. to be superfluous ; the witness
manifested by the this-psychosis itself
manifests the silver superimposed there-
on ; and this psychosis may itself 1 account!
for the memory-impressions of silve3\

5-155 View of two psychoses, one of the form

"this" and the other of the form "This
is silver/' not of silver alone.

5-156 The cognition of silver need not have the

"this" as content ; for silver there is the
appearance of conjunction with the this-
ness of the substance ; similarly, for the
cognition of silver, there may be the
appearance of conjunction with the
this-ness of the substrate as content ; the
two the substrate and the super-
imposedneed not appear in a single
psychosis, since though the psychoses
are different, they appear in the one
witness manifested by the psychosis
with the form "this".

5*16 Objection: why is a psychosis needed in

addition to the witness? Even if it
accounts for memory-impressions, it

gg ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

need not go forth. Distinction between
mediate and immediate cognition may
be due to difference in the instrument,
like the distinction between knowledge
from verbal testimony and inferential
knowledge.

5 -161 Reply: object-defined-intelligence alone

manifests the object; where with that a
direct relation of identity is possible as
in perception, no other relationship may
be assumed ; this relationship is brought
about by the going forth of the
psychosis ; in mediate cognition there is
no observed channel for going forth;
hence som'e other relation sui generis is
assumed there.

5-162 Individuation etc. are immediately cog-

nised, only because of direct conjunction
with intelligence ; hence only in conjunc-
tion with objects, can it manifest
objects; for the manifestation of this
conjunction there is going forth.

5-163 In perceptual cognition there is definite-

ness, not in other cognition; for, in the
latter there is a continuance of the desire
to know. Definiteness results from
identity with m'anifested intelligence;
for the manifestation of this identity
there is the going forth.

Objection : the psychosis need not go
forth to remove the ignorance veiling

CHAPTER I 89

the object, as this may be removed even
by a mediate psychosis.

Reply: cognition, if it is to remove
ignorance, should have the sam'e locus
and content as the latter.

Objection : even Devadatta's cogni-
tion of pot and Yajfiadatta's ignorance
of it have both the same content and
the same locus, viz., intelligence as
defined by pot ; so having the same locus
does not count in the removal of ignor-
ance by cognition ; but the cognition that
is to remove should belong to the same
person and refer to the sam'e object as
the ignorance; this is possible even for
psychoses that do not go forth.

Reply: this would irriply removal of
ignorance even by mediate cognition.
Nor can immediacy be added as a quali-
fication of the cognitions ; for imm'ediacy
cannot be defined as a jati or upadhi.
For us, immediacy will be shown to be
what is produced by removal of ignor-
ance ; hence it cannot be a qualification
of what causes that removal. The
cognition that removes ignorance mtist
have come into being by invariable con-
junction with the intelligence that is the
locus of that ignorance. For the sake
of this invariable conjunction the
psychosis goes forth.

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90 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

5 *164 Parsimony prescribes the same locus for
the ignorance of the object and the
cognition that removes it; hence the
going forth of the psychosis.

5-165 Identity of locus for cognition and

ignorance established on the analogy of
external light and darkness; hence the
going forth.

5 -166 The going forth is needed either for asso-

ciation with intelligence or for the
manifestation of the non-difference
of the cogniser-intelligence from 1 the
Brahman-intelligence manifesting the
object.

6-0 The non-difference of the jiva from

Brahman has the authority of the
Vedantas, interpreted by the canons of
purport, as shown in Ved. Su., I, i, 4.

CHAPTER II.

1-0 How can Vedantas have non-duality for

purport? Conflict with perception.

Id Tattvasuddhi view: perception appre-

hends bare reality, the constant subs-
trate in pot, cloth etc. The co-presence
and co-abseuce of the sense-organ serves
only in the apprehension of bare reality,
pot etc. being delusively presented.
Absence of sublating cognition is no
defect. Differences cannot be cognised
through perception, because they are
apprehended only together with the
counter-correlates, many "of which are
rem'ote in space and time; nor is it
apprehended through memory, since
there is no memory-impression of its
being qualified by the counter-correlate
as such; nor can it be inferred, since
inference proceeds on the apprehension
of difference ; counter-correlates are
but delusive appearances ; hence, differ-
ences and their correlates are also
delusive ; hence no conflict of Scripture-
declared non-duality with perception.

1 *2 Nydyasudha view : perception does cognise

the particulars as real, but only as inter-
penetrated by the reality of the one
substrate; hence assumption of reality

92 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

in the particular too is superfluous;
Scriptural authority for this; distinc-
tion from 1 other attributes of the
particular, for the existence of which in
the substrate there is no Scriptural
authority.

1*3 Sanksepasdrlraka view : perception does

cognise the reality of the particular ; but
as relating to external objects it has no
authority in respect of the inner self, the
sole reality, wherein Scripture alone
is authoritative. The imperative in
drastavyah indicates not a command,
but the worthiness of the object.

1 4 Such reality as is recognised by perception

is not inconsistent with illusiveness, for,
perception relating to the present alone
cannot apprehend non-sublatedness in
all three times.

1 -5 Even if non-sublatedness be apprehended

by perception, yet because of Scriptural
declarations of superiority and infe-
riority as to reality, it follows that the
non-sublatedness of pot etc. is of
limited duration till Brahman-know-
ledge arises.

L -6 Where there is conflict Scripture alone is

stronger than perception, since the
former is free from defects and
rises subsequently, as the sublater;

CHAPTER II 3

apaccheda-nyaya. Even objects of per-
ception have to be investigated in the
light of valid teaching, e.g. the percep-
tion of odour in water or blueness in the
ether. Scripture superior; no upa-
jivya-virodha, for, the existence of
letters, words etc., is what is depended
on by revelation, not their reality.

2 -1 If 6ruti is superior to perception, why the

resort to secondary implication in cases
of conflict with perception^

2 -2 Bhamall view : Scripture is of force only

where it is purportful; perception is
stronger where there is no purport for
Scripture, as in mantras and artha-
vadas; and for these, where they
conflict with perception, secondary im-
plication is adopted.

2-31 Vivaranavartika view: lack of purport is

not the test, since purport exists even for
what is understood by laksana. Free-
dom from defect and posteriority in
time constitute the basis of the superio-
rity of Scripture ; but perception though
sublated should have a suitable content
assigned to it ; hence there is assignment
of empirical content capable of practical
efficiency, or adoption of secondary im-
plication for what is declared in Sruti.

2-32 The resort to secondary implication in

"Cook the golden grains " etc. is due to

94 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

inability to perform what is expressly
enjoined.

2-321 Explanation of the apaccheda-nyaya and

its applicability; perception thus sub-
lated by Sruti is not contentless, but has
an empirical content.

2 -3211 Objection : no sublation in the apaccheda-
nyaya, but statements of what are real
at different times.

2 -3212 Reply : Saslradlpika passage explained in
the light of the context : earlier obliga-
tion not admitted to exist in fact;
analogy of the black arid red colours of
the cherry shown to be inapplicable.

2 -322 Why should not perception be stronger, on

the upakrama-nyaya 2

2-323 Reply: syntactical unity needed for the,

application of the upakrama-nyaya;
illustration ; no suspicion of syntactical
unity between perception and non-dua-
list revelation; hence apaccheda-nyaya
alone applies.

3 -0 Alleged superiority of perception as upa-

jlvya ; distinction from cases where the
apaccheda-nyaya applies; it is not the
truth-aspect alone which is denied by
Scripture, but existence as well.

3*1 Reply: in sabda, what is depended on is

only such cognition of letters etc., as is

CHAPTER II

95

comm'on to valid knowledge and delu-
sion; even existence of letters etc. may
be denied.

3 -2 Capacity at least should exist for sounds

to convey their sense. This may be
recognised consistently with non-dua-
lism, according to which, the universe,
which persists up to Brahman-know-
ledge, is practically efficient and other
than the unreal. Non-existence may
subsist together with its counter-corre-
late, till sub! at ion of the latter. Defini-
tion of unreality, as being the counter-
correlate of negation in all places and
times, objected to.

3-3 Scripture denies the reality, not the

existence, of the world; negation and
counter-correlate cannot co-exist. Per-
ception has empirical reality for con-
tent : visaya-vyavastha,

3 '4 Non-acceptance of three grades of reality-

absolute, empirical and merely appa-
rent ; conceit of reality in pot, etc., and in
nacre-silver etc., even because of associa-
tion with Brahman and non-discrimina-
tion therefrom. Hence negation of
their reality is neither irrelevant nor
contradictory.

3-41 Origination admitted of the merely

apparent, in order to account for its
immediacy.

96 ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS

3 -411 Is origination admitted for the reflection

of the face? Immediacy not possible
for such portion of one's own face as the
forehead etc. The reflection cannot be
the merely apparent, as then the jiva
who is a reflection would also be so.

3 -4111 Vivarana view : the reflected face not other
than the prototype ; differences of posi-
tion etc. are super-imposed thereon ;
imiriediacy possible for one's own face,
since it is apprehended by rays of light
from the eyes, turned back by the
mirror etc.; such apprehension needed
to account for the memory-impression,
which is one of the three causes of
superimposition.

3-4112 Advaitavidyaeaiya's view : reflection is
illusory and different from the proto-
type ; reference to it as one's own face is
of secondary import; conflict within
experience on the Vivarcma view.
Memory-impression, as cause of super-
imposition, need not be of the specific
object super-imposed. Illusoriness does
not result for the jiva, as the reflection
theory is not accepted.

3-412 Criticism of the view that reflection is

real, being a variety of shadow.

3413 Nor is the shadow of a substance other

than darkness ; nacre-silver too would be
real.

CHAPTER II 97

3 -414 What ignorance causes this delusion ? By

what knowledge is it dispelled?

3 -4141 Ignorance of the adhisthana, persisting in
respect of protective energy, causes the
reflection; knowledge of the substrate
removes it when aided by non-proximity
of the image.

3-4142 Removal merely of obscuring energy is
due to obstacles posited by primal
ignorance which alone is the material
cause of the superimposition of reflec-
tion; difference from empirical reality
in that for the latter non-generation by
a defect is a further condition; sublation
of pratibhasika superim'position con-
sistent with non-removal of primal
ignorance.

3 -51 Dreams too the product of primal ignor-

ance and removable by Brahman-
knowledge alone ; merely apparent cha-
racter due to the additional defect,
sleep.

3-52 Dream sublatable by waking cognition;

true knowledge of the substrate not
necessary for the removal of delusion,
which m'ay be removed even by another
delusion.

3-53 Primal ignorance not the cause, but a

mode thereof, viz., sleep ; that sleep is a
mode of ignorance established by the

S 113

98 ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS

delusions in dreams due to obscuration
of the empirical world and jiva; a
pratibhasika jiva too projected as the
spectator of dream's; because of their
spectator being super-imposed on the
empirical jiva, the latter recollects the
dream on waking.

3 -541 Objections to dream being super-imposed

on (1) undefined intelligence, or (2) in-
telligence defined by individuation : in
(1) the dream elephant would require a
psychosis of the internal organ to
be manifested by ahankara-Vacchinna-
caitanya, and no psychosis is possible in
sleep; in (2) there is the contingence of
the experience " I am an elephant " not
"I possess an elephant. "

3 -5421 Reply to the first objection. Substrate of
dreartfs is intelligence not as outside the
body, but as within it, hence psychosis
possible without dependence on external
sense.

3 -5422 No psychosis not generated by valid testi-
mony can have undefined intelligence as
its sphere, hence that intelligence is the
substrate, as of itself immediate, not as
manifested by a psychosis; what is
obscured is Brahman-intelligence, not
the jiva-intelligence which is a reflection
thereof.

CHAPTER II

99

3 '543 The substrate is intelligence conditioned,

not qualified, by individuation and
reflected therein ; hence no experience of
the form " I am an elephant/ 9

3 -5431 Even nacre-silver is super-imposed on the
reflection of intelligence defined by the
this-element of the nacre.

3 -432 Nacre-silver superimposed on the proto-
type intelligence; others do not cognise
at the same time, as each one can per-
ceive that alone which has his ignorance
as m'aterial cause.

3 -6 How to account for the visibility of dream-

elephant etc. ?

3-61 There are not pratibhasika indriyas, for

the pratibhasika 'has no ajnata-sattva,
while indriyas are uncognised; the
empirical senses are then quiescent; no
subtle sense-organs known to exist.

3 -,611 Scripture declaring self -luminosity in the

dream-state rules out the psychoses of
the empirical senses.

3-612 Internal organ does not fail to be

eliminated by above-cited texts, because
that cannot be instrumental to cognition
except in dependence on an external
sense ; or because that organ through its
transformation stands as the object of
cognition ; recollection on waking is due
to memory-impressions consequent on

100 ANALYTICAL TAfiLE O# CONTENTS

avidya-vrtti or on the destruction of the
dream-state.

3 -613 Even admitting a psychosis of the internal

organ, its distinction from the jiva is
not well-known; hence elimination of
other luminaries secured by; the said
Sruti. ;

3-62 Co-presence and co-absence of the func-

tioning of the senses with the dream
experience; this too may be dream-
delusion, analogous to seeing the nacre-
silver.

3-71 D?sti contemporaneous with srsti; even

the elephant of waking experience not
an object of the sense of sight.

3-711 Who posits the waking world? Not the

unconditioned self as transmigration
would persist even after release ; nor the
conditioned self, because of reciprocal
dependence.

Reply : the stream of conditioning is
beginningless and he who is conditioned
by the earlier posited nescience posits
the subsequent nescience.

3-712 Nescience and five others are beginning-

less ; not in respect of them is perception
simultaneous with creation.

3 -713 What is the basis of the ruti declaration

of sequence in creation?

CHAPTER n

3 -7131 Reply : purport of Scripture is identity of
self with nisprapanca Brahman; iden-
tity known through adhyaropa and
apavada ; hence the mention of creation
etc.; discussions as to the sequence
intended by Sruti assume purport
therein for Sruti and have the purpose
of m'aking clear the principles of
interpretation.

3-7132 Declarations of attainment of fruit by
jyotistoma etc., parallel to the attain-
ment in dreams. Those texts are autho-
ritative since the observances prescribed
purify the intellect and lead to realisa-
tion of unity with Brahman.

3 -72 Drsti is itself srsti.

3-8 Drti is f the created. Creation is by

Isvara and in the stated sequence.
Illusoriness of the world though not
generated by the three causes thereof;
removable by knowledge alone; or
different from both the real and the
unreal j or is the counter-correlate of
that negation in all three times, which
occurs in the locus of what is cognised.

3-81 Even individuation, etc. are illusory like

nacre-silver, since they are cognised by
the witness alone.

3 -82 . They are not illusory in the same way, not
being sublated in waking; the Vivarana

102 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

declaration of the three-fold cause of

their super-imposition is a praudhi-

vada.
4 -0 How to account for the practical efficiency

of the illusory?
4-1 As in dreams, practical efficiency is of the

same grade of reality as the experience

itself.

4-2 Advaitavidyacarya : even dream expe-

rience causes effects not sublated in
waking, e.g., the dream-damsel ; it is not
that the cognition of the damsel in the
dream is the cause and that that is real,
for that too is assumptive ; nor is mere
immediacy the cause of happiness, since
there are grades of the latter, though
none in the form'er; hence practical
efficiency of a higher grade of reality is
possible.

4-3 Analogy of the darkness that obscures

objects in a dimly lit room, for one who
comes in from bright light ; this has the
same practical efficiency as well-known
darkness.

4 -41 What subserves practical efficiency is bare

existence, not reality; no practical
efficiency for the mirage etc., since
water-ness etc., are absent therefrom.

4 -42 Others : water-ness etc. do exist, as other-

wise activity in respect of mirage etc.

CHAPTER II

103

would be impossible; non-existence of
practical efficiency may be due to various
special causes, e.g., destruction of the
super-imposition by specific cognition;
not that which is unsublated in all three
times, but that which is not generated by
special defects is practically efficient;
hence, even the illusory may be practi-
cally efficient.

4-5 Illusoriness too is illusory. Objection:

illusory illusoriness not opposed to the
reality of the world.

4-51 Advaitadlpika: illusoriness negates the

reality oil its substrate the world; that
which denies reality, illusoriness, need
possess only the same grade of reality as
the substrate, the world of ether etc., not
absolute reality.

4 -52 What cannot be removed by the intuition

of its own locus negates any attribute
opposed to itself; nacreity in nacre
opposes non-nacreity, while its silver-
ness is not opposed to its non-silverness ;
illusoriness of the world is not removed
by the cognition of the world and hence
negates its non-illusoriness; but Brah-
man 's saprapancatva is removed by the
intuition of Brahm'an.

453 Objection: verbal testimony as the evi-

dence for Brahman should be real.
Reply : even the empirical and unreal

104 ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS

is practically efficient; the Vedantas
teach Brahman by such terms as "real"
not found in connection with the
agnihotra etc. ; texts of non-duality are
of greater force; even the validity of
knowledge about Brahman is less than
real, as involving Brahm'an-hood which,
as distinct from Brahman, the sole real,
is less than real.

5 -1 Intelligent beings not illusory as else there

will be none to be released; nor can they
be one with Brahman, in view of their
reciprocal difference.

5-2 Reciprocal differences due to differences

of upadhi.

5-21 Difference must be in the loci, not in

external adjuncts.

5-211 Reply of some: distinctions of happiness

etc. are certainly due to differences in
the adjunct, the internal organ, since
they are declared by Sruti to belong to
this ; apposition of bondage and intelli-
gence due to superimposition of the
identity of the internal organ with
intelligence; transmigration of the
latter consists in being the substrate of
the superimposition of identity with the
knot of individuation ; as for the evils,
so even for reciprocal differences there
is the conceit of belonging to the self;
the witness experiences happiness.

CHAPTER II

105

misery etc., only as identified with and
differentiated by the internal organ.
5-212 Others: not the internal organ, but the

reflection of intelligence therein is the
locus of bondage; these reflections are
diverse.

5 -213 Yet others: the enjoyer is intelligence as

endowed with body and organs and
identified with the mind.

5-214 Still others: in the proximity of the

internal organ, the real locus of agency
etc., agency etc. may be superimposed
even on pure intelligence as the locus;
analogy of flower and crystal.

5-215 Distinction (vyavastha) may be due to

difference whose locus is assumptive,
i.e., external adjuncts; example of the
lamp appearing nearer or farther away.

'6-0 Which adjunct accounts for one jiva not

recollecting another happiness etc.?

6-1 Difference in the abode of enjoyment is

Hie upadhi ; the hand goes forth to pluck
the thorn from the foot, because of the
non-difference of these organs from the
organism, the body; no such non-
difference as between Caitra and
Maitra ; nor do their bodies belong to a
comm'on organism.

6 -2 Difference due to disjoining of adjuncts is

the upadhi ; though the mother and the

S 114

106 ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS

child in the womb are not disjoined, they
are not united as organs of a single
organism.

6 -3 Identity or difference of bodies constitutes

the upadhi; no difference between the
bodies of youth and old age ; growth is
not by increase of parts.

6-4 Difference or non-difference of the

internal organ is the upadhi.

6-5 Avidyas are manifold, one for each jiva;

hence the non-recollection of one jiva's

experience by another.
6-61 Vyavastha not m'ore intelligible on the

basis of a plurality of pervasive selves ;

unity of the self favoured by !ruti and

parsimony.
6 -62 Nor can selves be atomic as happiness or

misery throughout the body would be

unintelligible.
6-621 Objection: !ruti and Srarti support

atomicity.
6-6221 Reply: vyavastha not established even

thus : Caitra may recollect Maitra's pain

even as he recollects pain in different

parts of his own body.
6 -6222 Objection : pure difference conditions

vyavastha.

Reply : is it non-concomitant with
the relation of part and whole or non-
concomitant with iion-difference? Not

CHAPTER II

the first, since the jlva is said to be a
part of Brahman and there would be
confusion between the experiences of
the jlva and of Brahman ; interpretation
of amsatva as similarity together with
inferiority; this itself is the relation
between the alleged members of the jlva
and the jlva. Amsatva is not difference
cum non-difference: possibility of con-
fusion among the experiences of various
jivas and as between the experiences of
the jivas and of Brahman; the diverse
jivas are non-different too in respect of
intelligence ; illustration of the members
of an assembly; hence too, since there
is not difference iioii-coiicoiriitant with
non-difference there should be confu-
sion.

6-623 'Objection: it is perception of noii-

difference that accounts for recollection.

Reply : 011 our view too it is failure to

perceive non-difference that accounts

for non-recollection.

6-624 According to you the Lord should grieve

through perceiving His real iion-differ-
ence from the jivas; but according to
us, He will not, perceiving the illusori-
ness of misery.

6 625 Objection : knowledge which is pervasive

may be the substrate of all differences.

108 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

Reply : experience of happiness etc.
cannot arise in dependence on know-
ledge; if that be an attribute of
knowledge, diversity should result for
knowledge, not for the self.

6-6261 Difference between Isvara and the jlva
not any more intelligible on this view:
Isvara too declared by iSruti to enter
into creation and to be atomic.

6-6262 'Objection : other texts establish Isvara as
all pervasive ; further He is the material
cause of the Universe; hence texts about
atomicity etc. to be secondarily ex-
plained.

Reply : why not secondary explana-
tion apply also to similar texts about the
jlva?

Objection; the going up of the jlva is
mentioned even before the going up of
the adjunct, the intellect; departure is
declared even after the release from
name and form.

6-6263 Reply: of the jlva too pervasiveness is
declared; further for you the material
cause is prakrti, not Brahm'an; even if
atomic, Brahman might be the material
cause, as the atomic jlva is alleged to be
the material cause of happiness and
misery present in a plurality of bodies;
secondary interpretation is possible of

CHAPTER II

both sets of texts; if attainment is
opposed to the pervasiveness of the
jiva, it is opposed to the pervasiveness
of Brahman too; pervasiveness is the
proper nature of the jiva though he is
finite as conditioned by adjuncts.

CHAPTER III.

1-0 Knowledge is the sole path to the

attainment of Brahman; karma useful
indirectly.

1 -1 BMmatl view : karma useful in generating

the desire to know ; desire to know, prior
to performing karma, is like the general
inclination for food in the case of one
who has become lean through distaste
for food.

1 -2 Vivarana view : karma useful in genera-

ting knowledge itself ; the suffix express-
ing desire not primary in this case;
analogy of "He desires to, go on horse-
back."

1-21 Such utility of karnia not inconsistent

with the need for renunciation, the two
belonging to different stages. Karmas
are practised only till desire for know-
ledge is generated; but the fruit per-
sists till knowledge is generated
through removing obstacles and secur-
ing favourable conditions for study etc.

1-3 What karmas are to be performed?

1 -31 Asrama-karmas.

1 -321 Kdlpataru view : even those outside

asramas (widowers etc.) are eligible for
knowledge; hence not asrama-karmas

CHAPTER III

alone are meant; even varna-dharmas,
e.g., japa etc., are of use ; but obligatory
rites alone are potent to produce know-
ledge.

1-322 Sanksepasdnraka admits the potency of

both obligatory and optional rites; the
principle of transfer from prakrti to
vikrti does not apply here, since sacri-
fice is prescribed in general terms by
Sruti, as subserving knowledge.

1-41 How is it that Janaka is said to have

reached perfection by karma alone ? Is
it because the path of knowledge is only
for brahmanas L i No, "brahmana" in-
cludes all the twice-born castes.

1 -421 The sudra not competent for such karma,

since he has no knowledge of the
Vaidika rites through adhyayana.

1-422 Others: even for the sudra there is com-

petency for such karma as subserves
knowledge, e.g., meditation of the
pancaksara, making gifts etc. ; study of
the Veda not necessary, instrumental
suffix being added separately to each
vedanuvacana, dana, yajfia etc. Impart-
ing knowledge of Vaidika rites is alone
prohibited. The apasudra section denies
competency for saguna meditation or
the acquisition of nirguna knowledge
through the Vedanta. Practice of

112 ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS

karma subserving knowledge m&y endow
the sudra with the body of a twice-born
in the next life.

2'0 How does renunciation subserve know-

ledge?

2-11 By producing an apurva that alone

destroys som'e of the sins which obstruct
knowledge; hence renunciation neces-
sary at least in a past or in a future
life.

2*12 Apurva from renunciation is a special

qualification of him who is competent
for sravana etc.

2-13 Utility through seen channels, securing

undistracted study &c.

2-14 The brahmana alone being competent to

renounce, how can the ksatriya or vaisya
be competent for study etc. ?

2-141 " Brahmana " is upalaksana for ksatriya

and vaisya as well ; these too are compe-
tent to renounce.

2 -142 Others : the brahmana alone competent to

renounce. In the -case of the knower
who renounces there is no distinction of
competency based on caste; but not in
the case of him who seeks knowledge;
ksatriyas and vaisyas are competent for
study; but samnyasa is not a qualifica-
tion of their competence, any more than
for those who have attained to the status

CHAPTER III H3

of divine beings on the path of release
by stages.

2-143 Eligibility for study belongs only to him

who has renounced; for ksatriyas and
vaisyas, as for widowers, there is
{permission for such study as will bring
about a brahmana body in another life.

2-1431 How can study in this birth produce
knowledge in another ? Where there
are obstacles in the present birth, the
Sutra declares realisation in the next
birth, through the generation of an
apurva or niyama-'drsta by hearing etc.,
carried on in this birth ; what is devoid
of renunciation cannot generate this
adrsta.

2-1432 Apurva due to previous sacrifice etc.
leads to hearing etc. in the present birth ;
this apurva itself may lead to realisation
even in another birth; this explanation
alone acceptable where no injunction is
recognised in respect of sravana etc.

2 -1433 The Vivarana view : the above explanation
holds even where a niyama-vidhi is
recognised, for the restriction is secured
with repetition, not with the bare com-
mencement of sravana ; analogy of
pounding; hence the niyama-'drsta does
not arise, for the most part, prior to the
attainment of the fruit*

SI-15

ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS

2*144 Vedfmta-sravana, though having a" visible

result has also an unseen potency of its
own. Only through this do sravana
etc. subserve the attainment of know-
ledge in a hereafter.

3*0 Bharatitlrtha's view : yoga a means to

attainment like sankhya; latter signifies
sravana etc., and the former signifies
contemplation of Nirguna Brahman;
such contemplation mentioned in Sruti,
supported by the Bhasyakara and the
Sutrakara; if Sruti denies Brahman
to be the object of contemplation, it
denies its being the object of knowledge
too; if its being the object of knowledge
is well known, the contemplation thereof
is also well known from other texts ; such
contemplation is suitable for those who,
because of dullness of intellect, failure
to find a skilled perceptor etc., are not
able to make an inquiry into the
Vedanta, but have a superficial know-
ledge of the one-ness of Brahman, and
the self from the Vedanta learnt by the
adhyayana; even such contemplation
may lead to fruition ; analogy of guesses
that turn out correct; the path of
inquiry is quicker for him who has no
obstacles ; that of contemplation involves
delay.

4 -0 !What is the karana of Brahman-intuition ?

CHAPTER III

4 -1 Deep meditation (prasankhyana) ; evi-

denced by &ruti and by the lover's
experience.

4-11 Prasankhyana not enumerated as a

pramana; the success of guess work is
due to mere chance and it cannot gene-
rate valid knowledge, though the content
may not be sublated.

4-12 liex)ly: There may be valid postulation

of what is not established by a pramana,
e.g., isvara's maya-vrtti. The know-
ledge of the oneness of Brahman and
the self being based on the Vedanta, the
intuition of that unity by meditation
is certainly well-based.

4-2 The iniml alone is the karana; deep

meditation is an auxiliary thereto, as
causing mental concentration.

4 '3 Only the mahuvakyas are the karanas;'

instrumentality of the mind denied by

Sruti; instrumentality of verbal testi-

n'ony at least in respect of mediate

knowledge has to be admitted here by

hose for whom mind is the karana ;

intuition of the sense is not through

sakti, but laksana; the mind too is a

cause, but not the karana.

5 -1 How can verbal testimony generate imme-

diate cognition? It may do so in con-
junction with the concentrated mind;

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

immediacy of knowledge necessary to
remove error which is immediate; and
for Brahman there is no pramana other
than the Upanisads.

5 -2 It may do so in conjunction with intense

contemplation, as the m'ind does in the
case of the lost damsel.

5 -3 Immediacy of the cognition consists in the

immediacy of the object and Brahman
is eminently immediate. Immediacy is
noii-dift'erence from the cognising intelli-
gence.

5 4 Advaitavidyacarya : immediacy of the

object is its iion-dift'erence from such
intelligence as is helpful to empirical
usage in respect of itself ; immediacy of
cognition is non-difference of such
intelligence, as is helpful to the respec-
tive empirical usages, from the respec-
tive objects. Immediacy an attribute of
intelligence, not of a psychosis. Hence
immediacy possible 'for happiness etc.,
which are witness-revealed; jlva in
samsara does not realise Brahman,
because of obscuration by ignorance;
ignorance not an obscuring agent for
Isvara, and only for him: to whom it is
an obscuring agent does it present
difference from the object-defined in-
telligence. That knowledge, which arises
only as in conjunction with its own

CHAPTER III

content, destroys ignorance ; and Brah-
man-knowledge, though from verbal
testimony, arises thus in conjunction
with Brahman-intelligence, the material
cause of all. Though adhyayana may,
give superficial knowledge and sravana
may give certitude of existence, igno-
rance is not removed, because of the
defect of mental distraction, for the
removal of which reflection and contem-
plation are necessary; the virtues of
these may have been acquired by
practice in a previous birth.

6-1 Why not pot-cognition etc. remove

ignorance about Brahman?

6 -2 Intelligence not the content of a psychosis

of the senses. Modal cognitions dispel
modal ignorances which have pot etc.
for content j ignorance as relating to the
inert has to be admitted indirectly, if
not directly ; on the strength of observa-
tion, primal ignorance can be removed
only by that knowledge whose contents
are not the products of that ignorance j
or pot etc. are contents of modal ignor-
ances alone ; this position established on
the analogy of sight of sandal-wood,
wherein there is no perception of its
smell too ; modes of ignorance, through
differences of content, as through
differences of cognisers.

ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS

6 -3 Because of the restrictive injunction about

study of the Vedanta, that knowledge
alone as aided by the niyama-'purva can
remove ignorance about Brahman.

6 -4 The sphere of primal ignorance is oneness

of the jlva and Brahman and can be
removed only by knowledge having the
same sphere, not by modal cognitions
touching the bare existence of intelli-
gence. Non-difference is not something
over and above intelligence; knowledge
of non-difference is that whose content
is intelligence through a special svarupa-
sambandha controlled by special causes ;
difference in the knowledge, as occa-
sioned by a svarupa-sambandha exem-
plified from the cognition of the
qualified (visista) and from doubt.

6 -5 Objection : Even Brahman-knowledge can-

not remove primal ignorance, since the
effect cannot conflict with its material
cause.

Reply : There is a conflict here, due to
knowledge and ignorance having the
same content; conflict even between
effect and cause exemplified from cloth
and conjunction of cloth with fire ; doc-
trine that destruction of the effect is
due to destruction of the cause not
accepted.

CHAPTER III

119

7-0 How is Brahman-knowledge itself des-

troyed?

7-1 Analogy of the clearing-nut which preci-

pitates the dirt in water and precipitates
itself.

7-2 Analogies of water consumed by heated

metal and of grass burnt up by fire.

7-3 Destruction not invariably generated by

what is other than its counter-correlate.
No undue extensiveness is not assuming
other causes in addition; for (1) need
for another cause is not denied in all
cases; (2) analogy of the destruction of
a pot cannot establish the need for
another cause in the present case, as,
then, hammer-blows will also be needed
to destroy Brahman-knowledge; (3) the
destruction of the fire-cognition may
have an additional cause, just as fire
which has fuel needs an additional cause
for being quenched; (4) destruction
even at the moment succeeding its origi-
nation is a contingence of the acceptable
in the case of Brahman-knowledge; in
the moment prior to its destruction, time,
unseen potency etc. also exist; hence
they too may be causes of the destruc-
tion; "removable by knowledge alone "
as the definition of the "illusory" means
"removable by knowledge while not be-
ing removable by any accessory of

120 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

knowledge except when conjoined with
knowledge. "

74 Ignorance and the universe are removed

not by the inert psychosis, Brahman-
knowledge, but by the intelligence asso-
ciated with that; analogy of the sun's
rays burning when f ocussed through a
burning glass ; thus intelligence removes
the final psychosis as well.

7 -5 Brahman-knowledge removes ignorance

alone; and this material cause being
destroyed, the world too is destroyed
along with Brahman-knowledge which is
a part of it; even after the rise of the
final psychosis, prarabdha-karma may
account for the continuance of a trace of
nescience, because of which there may
continue the appearance of a body etc. ;
hence the phenomenon of jivan-nmkti.

CHAPTER IV.

1-1 The persistent trace of nescience is an

element of the projective energy of
primal nescience.

1-2 It is the impression left behind by

nescience, like the smell of garlic.

1:3 It is primal nescience itself like a burnt

cloth retaining its configuration.

1?4 Sarvajiiatman : no trace of nescience can

survive knowledge ; jivanmukti is taught
by way of eulogising the injunction to
study ; this is not his final view.

2 -0 What is the removal of ignorance

2 -1 Nothing other than the self : Brahma-

siddhi; it is effected by knowledge on
the principle "yasmin saty agrima-
ksane yatsattvam" etc.

2:2 It is other than the self, and of a fifth

mode which is not real, nor unreal, nor
real and unreal, nor indeterminable :
Anandabodha.

2 '3 Advaitavidyacarya : removal of nescience

is certainly indeterminable, but it does
not persist and hence its material cause
need not persist ; removal is a modifica-
tion of existence relating to the last
instant alone ; the conjugational suffix
signifies relation to present time etc.,

s i J6

122 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

only as attaching to the sense of the
stem; refutation of pradhvamsa-'bhava
as permanent ; prag-abhava too may be
rejected.

2 -.31 Prag-abhava and pradhvamsa-'bhava not

needed to distinguish the past from the
future.

2 *41 Momenta viness of the removal of nescience

does not involve impermanence of
release; for when there is its removal
by knowledge, what results is not a
production but a manifestation of eter-
nal, impartite bliss and the cessation of
misery.

2 42 Citsukha : cessation of miseiy not the

human goal, but only as subsidiary to
happiness; but happiness is not subsi-
diary thereto ; gradations not possible in
non-existence of misery as a human
goal.

3-1 Bliss, though eternally attained, is un-

attained as it were, because of
nescience; analogy of the forgotten
golden ornament round one's neck;
attainment is figurative.

3-2 Non-existence of bliss in transmigration

patent to all, because of ignorance, which
posits non-existence of Brahman bliss ;
this ceases with knowledge; and on the
principle " yasmin saty agrimaksane "
etc., attainment is in the primary sense,

CHAPTER IV 123

3 -31 No immediacy for bliss in transmigration ;

hence it is not then the human goal ; non-
obscuration is present only with know-
ledge ; hence bliss as the human goal is
attained by knowledge.

3-32 In transmigration, difference is super-

imposed between intelligence and bliss;
this is removed by knowledge ; hence the
attainment.

4-0 Is release the attainment of the state of

Isvara ? or subsistence as pure intelli-
gence?

4 -1 Eka-jiva-vada can admit only subsistence

as pure intelligence.

4-21 Even so on the nana-jiva-vada, in that

variety of it which holds Isvara too to
be a reflection.

4-22 Release, until the final release of all, is

attainment of the state of Isvara,
according to the view in which Isvara
is the prototype of which jivas are
reflections; analogy of reflections in
many media.

4-221 The Lord's Isvaratva is due not to

His nescience, but to the nescience of
others, and so long as these persist, He
will continue to be Isvara.

4-222 Difference from the fruit of saguna medi-

tation ; no intuition of the iinpartite in

124 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

the latter ; hence no destruction of
ignorance; no unlimited Lordship.

4-223 Ignorance etc. do not attach to Isvara

though in incarnations He seems to be
ignorant, to suffer and so on; this is
mere acting; hence no contingence of
fresh bondage for those who have
become Isvara.

4 -2241 Conformity of this view with Sruti, Sutra,
Bhasya etc. Illustration from the
Bhasya on the dahara section of the first
chapter;

4-2242 from the amsa section of the second
chapter;

4-2243 from the dream section of the third
chapter;

4-2244 and from the section about the form of
manifestation in the fourth chapter.

4 -2245 Support of the Bhamatl and its followers.

4-2246 Erroneousness of the Scmksepasarlraka
view that statements about manifesta-
tion of Isvaratva are assumptive and
made for argument's sake.

4-23 Impossibility of attainment of Isvaratva

is the defect on the view of Isvara as a
reflection. Same defect in the eka-jiva-
vada and in the view of absolute
difference between jiva and Isvara.

CHAPTER IV

125

4*231 Apahatapapmatva etc. cannot attach to

the jiva in release, on the dualist hypo-
thesis; adventitiousness of these attri-
butes conflicts with Sruti and Sutra ; if
they are eternally established, bondage
is illusory.

4 -2311 Hence non-difference of the jiva from the
Lord is difficult to avoid.

4-23111 Apahatapapmatva, satyasankalpatva etc.
conceived as special powers which come
into being for the jiva at his release ; no
contingence of non-difference from
Isvara.

4-23112 No authority for such interpretation of
the words; in transmigration sin does
attach; when knowledge arises, even
because of knowledge, sin does not cling ;
the assumption of a power is futile.

ABBREVIATIONS.

AKS,

Ap. &S,
B,

Bh. G.,
Brh.,
Brh. Vart.,

C,

Chmd.,

K,

Mimd.,
Mem. Ed.,

Adyar Ms. No. xxv B. 10.
Adyar Ms. No. xxvi B 33.

Mahamahopadhyaya N. S. Ananta-
krsna Sastri's edition.

Apastamba 6rauta Sutras.
Benares Chowkhamba Press edition
of SLS.

Bhagavad Glta.
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad.

Brhadaranyaka - upanisad - bhasya-
vartika.

Jivananda Vidyasagara edition of

SLS.

Chandogya Upanisad.
Oriental Mss. Library Egmore Ms.

No. DC 4766.

Oriental Mss. Library Egmore Ms.
No DC 4764.

Oriental Mss. Library Egmore Ms:

No. R. 1885.

Advaitamanjaii edition of SLS.
Katha Upanisad.
Mandukya Upanisad.

Memorial edition of Sankara's works,
VanI Vilas Press.

127
ABBREVIATIONS. (Contd.).

MNP, . Mimamsanyayaprakasa.

Mund., Mundaka Upanisad.

Nrs. Ut., Nrsimha Uttaratapamya Upanisad.

Pat., Patanj all's Mahabhasya.

PM, Purva Mlmamsa Sutras.

Prasna, Prasna Upanisad.

SB, Siddhantabindu ( Advaitamafi j ari

edition).

SLS, Siddhantalesasangraha.

S&, Sanksepasariraka.

, Srirangam edition of SLS.

Svet., Svetasvatara Upanisad.

TPH, Theosophica! Publishing House.

Taitt., Taittiiiya Upanisad.

Taitt.Sam., Taitt iriya Samhita.

V, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series edition

of SLS.

VPS, Vivaranaprameyasangralin (VSS).

VSS, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.

Ved.Su., Vedanta Sutras.

OM

CHAPTER I.

Victorious is the auspicious birth-destroying
discourse (the Sutrabhasya) , which issues
from the blessed lotus face of the Bhagavat-
pada, has for its sole purport the non-dual
Brahman, and is diversified a thousand-fold on
reaching the (numerous) ancient preceptors
(who expounded it), in the same way as the
river (Ganga), which, issuing from the foot of
Visnu, 1 is diversified on reaching different
lands. (1)

Manifold are the ways disclosed by the
ancient ones, who, intent only on the establish-
ment of the unity of the self, paid no heed to
what is established in empirical usage ; some of
the different conclusions which lie at the base
-. of these (differences) and which have been
made known to me by the exposition of my
revered father, I here compendiously bring
together for the clarification of my mind. (2)

I write this not too extensive work, establish-
ing (therein) through arguments, according to
the best of my lights, such positions as require
so to be established. (3)

Now, there is considered first what kind of an
injunction it is that, in the form "The self, verily, is to

1 See the Introduction; compane also the Brahmatorkastava,
w. 8687.

SI 17

130 CHAPTER I

be seen, heard, reflected on," appears to be prescribed
in respect of the hearing (study) of the Vedanta, for the
sake of knowing that (Brahman-self), in the case of
one who has learnt (by adhyayana) his own section of
the Veda together with its subsidiary studies 2 , and in
whom there has arisen the desire to know the Brahman-
self known superficially through the Vedantas 3 .

1-11 Three, verily, are the varieties of injunction the

injunction of the novel, the restrictively complementary
injunction, and the exclusive injunction. Of these, the
first is that injunction whose fruit is the establishment
of what is not established in any way in all the three
times; for example, "He sprinkles the paddy-grains." 4
Here, for the purifactory act of sprinkling the paddy-
grains, in the absence of an injunction, there is no
establishment in any way by other evidence. The
second is that injunction whose fruit is the
complementation of the unestablished element, in
respect of what is established in part; for example,
"He pounds the paddy-grains." Here, even if
there were no injunction, the establishment of
the pounding of the paddy-grains would come about
even as presumptively implied for the production
of the rice, the basic material of the purodasa (sacrifi-
cial cake) ; hence the injunction is not for the establish-

2 The subsidiary studies (angas) are: phonetics, liturgy, grammar,
prosody, and astronomy.

3 In so far as they have been learnt by rote, not critically examined.

4 In all such texts, the imperative should be understood as the real
purport, though the indicative alone is used

THREE VARIETIES Otf VIDHI 131

ment of that; but, when pounding is established by
presumptive implication, in the very same way, husking
with the nails and so on would also be established in
part, there being no distinction in respect of the
causality as understood from experience; since thus
there is an element of non-establishment in respect of
pounding, that (injunction) has the fruit of comple-
menting that element (making pounding the sole
means). 5 The third is that injunction which, when
there is constant relation of one subsidiary to two
principals or of two subsidiaries to one principal, has
the fruit of removing the other principal or the other
subsidiary (whichever is superfluous in the case) ; for
example, (the injunction) in the agnicayana "He takes
hold of the reins of the horse with the words 'they seized
the bridle of the right'"; or (the injunction) in the
grhamedhiya, a particular rite included in the
caturmasya, "He sacrifices with the two ghee-portions."
Two acts are to be observed in the agnicayana, viz.,
taking hold of the reins of a horse and taking hold of
the reins of a donkey. Of these, since in the taking hold
of the reins of a horse the hymn "They seized" etc. is
constantly established even because of the characteristic
mark, consisting in its capacity to make known the
taking hold of the reins, the injunction is not either for

5 The term niyama-vidhi literally means injunction of restriction.
With this much, however, there is not secured its distinction from
parisankhyft-vidhi, since there cannot be restriction without exclusion.
The differentia of the niyama-vidhi is that It completes what is other-
wise incomplete; hence it may be said to be "restrictively complementary."
This equivalent Is, however, not used throughout, since it is rather
cumbrous. But the function of complementation should be understood
wherever the term "restrictive injunction" is used.

132 SHATTER i

the establishment of that or for the purpose of comple-
menting any non-established element therein ; but since
the hymn might, because of the characteristic mark
being non-distinctive, be established even in the taking
hold of the reins of a donkey, that (injunction) is for the
purpose of removing this (possibility). Similarly,
since the grhamedhiya has the darsa-purnamasa for
its archetype, the ghee-portions are constantly establish-
ed (for it) even by transfer ; 6 hence the injunction there
is not for the purpose of establishing those (portions) or
for the purpose of restricting them( as the sole material
for the sacrifice) ; but since by transfer even the fore-
sacrifices 7 etc. might be established, that (injunction) is
for the purpose of removing this (possibility). This
example which conforms (only) to the prima facie view
of the section on the grhamedhiya, is cited in the view
that an example may be cited (for the present purpose)
from anywhere (whether prima facie view or final
view).

Nor may it be objected that even in the restrictively
complementary injunction, when, for the pounding esta-
blished in part, the part that is non-established is made

6 Certain rites, all of whose subsidiaries are laid down explicitly
and in extenso by Scripture constitute the archetypal (prakrti) rites;
others modelled on them are called vikrtis. The Scriptural directions as
to the latter not being complete, they have to be taken over mutatis
mutandis from the archetype. This process of taking over or transfer is
called atidega.

7 The darSa-pftrgamasa consists of two sets of three rites. To each
Of these sets there belongs a set of five subsidiary rites called fore-
sacrifices (prayftjae). They are mentioned in this order: samidho yajati,
tanOnapatam yajati, itfo yajati, barhir yajati, svahakaraxn yajati. They
sbould be performed in this order.

RAVA1*A-VIDHI AS APURVA-VIDHI 133

up, that (demand for a means) is satisfied, that conse-
quently there is obtained also the removal of husking
with the nails etc., which are the other means
established in part, and that, therefore, no discrimina-
tion is possible in effect between restriction and
exclusion, there being no distinction (between them)
in their having the removal of the rest as the fruit.
For, in the absence of the restrictive complementation
resulting from injunction, as to the pounding, it would
not be possible to exclude husking with the nails and so
on, which are obtained by presumptive implication ;
therefore, the restriction, whose nature it is to comple-
ment the non-established element, comes first; and, as
present in the pounding that is enjoined, it is proximate ;
hence, that (complementation) alone is admitted to be
the fruit of the restrictive injunction; therefore, the
exclusion of others, which originates in dependence on
that (restriction) and is non-proximate, as present in
what is not enjoined, is not appropriately the fruit,
when a proximate fruit is possible.

Of the three kinds of injunction, thus distinguished, 1-12
of which kind is the injunction of hearing (study)
recognised to be?

Some, like the author of the Prakatartha say thus : 1*121
this is an injunction of the novel, since it (the hearing)
is not established (otherwise). Indeed, in respect of
the hearing (study) of the Vedanta being the cause of
the intuition of Brahman there is not the evidence of
co-presence and co-absence ; for, in ordinary experience,
even for him, who has heard (studied), that (intuition)
does not arise for the most part, while for Vamadeva,

134 CHAPTER 1

present in the womb, that arises, though he has not
heard (studied), and thus there is inconstancy both
ways. 8 Nor is there a general rule, apprehended from
the hearing (study) of other sacred teachings, that
hearing (study) in general is the cause of the intuition
of the thing that has to be heard about, in which case, it
may be doubted that, though here there be no means of
apprehending the causality specifically, causality may
(yet) be established at least through generality (i.e.,
resemblance to other sacred teachings). For, even
though, in the case of the hearing (study) of the science
of music etc., there be admitted causality of the intuition
of the sadja note etc., yet, since, from the hearing
(study) of the section relating to ritual etc., there is not
seen to result the intuition of its object, Religious Duty
etc., there is inconstancy. Therefore, this is certainly an
injunction of the novel. In the Bhasya too, in the
section " There is the injunction of some other auxiliary,
partially, which is the third for him who has that
(knowledge) ; as in the case of injunctions and the like,"
it is only an injunction of the novel that is recognised in
respect of hearing (study), denoted by the word
panditya, (in the following words) : "In the case of
mauna, the auxiliary to knowledge, an injunction alone
is to be recognised, as in the case of a childlike state and
panditya, since it is non-established (otherwise)". 9

g Le., both in the positive and in the negative instances, the
probans is not constant to the probandum.

9 For a proper understanding, the whole section should be studied
in the BM$ya. The question is whether of three auxiliaries mentioned
in the Sruti, balya, pancjitya and mauna, there is injunction of any, other
than the first, the injunctive term being explicitly used In relation to that
alone. The final view is that they are all enjoined as auxiliaries. The

SRAVANA-VIDHI AS NIYAMA-VIDHI 135

That the hearing (study) of the Vedanta is the 1-122
cause of the intuition of the eternally immediate
Brahman is not non-established, since, in niaintaining
the immediacy of knowledge through verbal testimony,
it is settled that for that (Vedanta study), defined as a
means of valid knowledge whose content is an immediate
object, the causing of the intuition (of that object) is
established. It is for that purpose, indeed, that there
is the commencement of that (topic). 10 Nor may it be
said that, though with this much, as being a means of
knowledge relating to Brahman, there may be esta-
blished causality in respect of a superficial realisation
consisting in an intuition of Brahman in a general way,
there is not established of that hearing (study) the
causing of that intuition consisting in the certitude of
existence, which is to be desired for the sake of the

word mauna, meaning the state of a muni, should be taken to mean not
"silence", but pre-eminence of knowledge. Panditya is not mere learning,
but study of the Vedanta; balya is a child-like state. Mauna is the third
auxiliary for him who possesses the other two. Mauna is taken to be
enjoined, in spite of the absence of an injunctive word, because it is novel
and non-established otherwise. Since the injunction is for him who
already possesses that (knowledge), it may be thought there is no novelty;
hence the word "partially" indicating that the injunction is for those who,
because of distractions, have not yet attained to pre-eminence of knowledge.

10 Nescience, which is realised as immediate, can be removed only
by immediate knowledge of the kind perception gives us. Brahman, how-
ever, is the sphere of verbal testimony alone, which, like inference, is
ordinarily supposed to give us but mediate cognition. While certain
advaitins hold that this mediate cognition becomes immediate by long
uninterrupted contemplation pursued with faith, another school holds that
even testimony can give immediate knowledge, where the object is imme-
diate. Brahman being the eternal, all-pervasive sole reality, there can
be no question as to its immediacy, though at first it is not realised.
Sabda, as the sole pramftna for Brahman, does give intuition of Brahman.
For a fuller discussion of these views, see Chapter III.

136 CHAPTER I

removal of nescience; for, it being established that
inquiry in general is the cause of the ascertainment of
what is inquired into and that the means of knowledge
relating to Brahman is the cause of the intuition of that,
it is established of hearing (study), which is of the
nature of knowledge of the words of the Vedanta as
subjected to inquiry, that it is the cause of that (certi-
tude of existence). Nor is there the afore-mentioned
inconstancy both ways; for, the inconstancy in the
co-presence is not a defect, being due to lack of the
auxiliary (e.g., inquiry) ; while, in the case of him who
remembers other births, the fruit being possible because
of hearing (study) in another birth, there is no incon-
stancy in the co-absence. Otherwise, causality being
sublated even by inconstancy, not even through express
statement would there be possible the knowledge instru-
mental to that (removal of nescience). 11 And even the
inconstancy in co-absence is not a defect, since it may be
doubted that like the sense of touch (present) over and
above the sense of sight in the perception of the pot,
there is some other means over and above hearing
(study) in the intuition of Brahman. 12 And thus,
because of (the result) being established, there is no
injunction of the novel. Hence it is that, in the com-
mentary on the section " Repetition (is required)
because of the teaching more than once," in the words

11 If inconstancy really ruled out the causal efficiency of gravana,
not even an express statement in the form of an injunction of the novel
could establish that efficiency.

12 In the case of Vamadeva it is possible to imagine some other
cause of intuition such as the might of austerities performed in a previous
birth, just as it is possible for one to perceive the pot by touch, though
not by sight, because of being blind.

RAVAtfA-V*DHI AS NIYAMA-VIDHI 137

" Hearing (study) and the rest, which indeed culminate
in intuition, are (processes) which have to be repeated
and have a visible result, like pounding etc., which culmi-
nate in the production of rice", repetition is taught of
hearing (study), which is for the sake of the intuition
of Brahman, since, because of its having a visible result,
the principle of the pounding in the darsa-purnamasa
applies (to it). If, however, there were an injunction
of the novel, like the pounding of the (mortar contain-
ing) sarvausadha, 13 this would not fit in. In the
agnicayana, in the words "Having filled it with all the
herbs, he pounds it ; then he places it near,"
pounding is prescribed for the purpose of the purifica-
tion of the mortar that is to be placed near;
of this, since it has no visible result, it is indeed
established in the Tcmtralaksana 1 * that there is no
repetition.

Therefore, this is certainly a restrictive injunction. 1-131
For, in the absence of that, just as a person who sees
something with the sense of sight, when told by some one
of some subtle peculiarity there not apprehended by
himself, proceeds to employ that same sense of sight
with concentration in order to know that, even so,
having heard in the case of the jlva, apprehended by the
mind as "I", that it is of the nature of attributeless
Brahman-intelligence propounded by the Vedantas ap-
prehended through adhyayana, a person might, in order

13 I.e., all the herbs needed in the sacrifice.

14 The eleventh chapter of the Pilrvamlm&wsG, dealing with tantra,
the principle of serviceability to many by a single application or function-
ing, as a lamp is of service to many who surround it; cp.

vistara on PM XI, i, 14.

S 1-18

138 CHAPTER I

to know that, sometimes proceed to employ therein the
mind alone with concentration ; hence, the engaging in
the hearing (study) of the Vedanta would be partial
(i.e., optional). As for (the text) "Not attaining (they
return) together with the mind," 15 it is possible to
doubt that it applies to the mind that is not concen-
trated, since it is also declared in Scripture "By the
mind alone is it to be perceived " and "But it is seen
by the concentrated intellect. "

1-132 Or else : from such Scriptural declarations as

"When he sees the excellent one, that other, the Lord,
he attains His glory, he becomes sorrowless", there is
the possibility of the delusion that release results from
the knowledge of the self as different (from the Lord) ;
then, for the sake of the knowledge instrumental to
release, there would be partial (optional) activity even
in respect of the hearing (study) of other sacred
teachings consisting in an inquiry into the self as
different (from the Lord); hence there may be a
restrictive injunction in respect of the hearing (study)
of that Vedanta whose purport is the non-dual self; for,
here, the term "self" has for purport the non-dual
self, as seen from a consideration of such topics as
"That which is all this is this self." It is not indeed
an invariable feature of (restrictive injunctions as) a
class that there is a restrictive injunction only where a
real alternative means is established; in that case it
might be doubted that since, in order to secure purport-
fulness for the restriction as to the hearing (study) of

15 Which seems to rule out the activity of the mind in the appre-
hensien of Brahman,

AS Nit AMA-VIDHI 139

the Vedanta, it has to be admitted of that hearing
(study) of the Vedanta that by that alone can be
accomplished the intuition of Brahman, consisting in
the certitude of (its) existence, through the hindering
impurities being removed by the unseen potency
(resulting from) the restriction, there would not exist
any real alternative means for that (intuition), and
therefore no restrictive injunction would apply; rather
is it that there is a restrictive injunction where,
because of the partial establishment of what may
possibly be considered an alternative means, the partial
non-establishment of the means desired to bo enjoined
cannot be avoided (otherwise) ; for even with this there
results the fruit of that (injunction), viz., complement-
ing the unestablished element.

Or else: immediate knowledge of Brahman, con- 1-133
sisting in the certitude of (its) existence, is possible
from inquiry into the Vedanta, even as accomplished by
a learned man merely by his own efforts, as much as
through that (carried on) under instruction from a
preceptor; but the unseen potency (consequent on) the
restriction as to the hearing (study) of the Vedanta
texts under instruction from a preceptor is of service in
the removal of nescience through destroying impurities ;
hence (the inquiry conducted without instruction),
being obstructed by the non-existence of that (destruc-
tion) does not remove nescience and remains equivalent
to mediate knowledge. Nor with the dawn of knowledge
is the non-removal of nescience unintelligible; for, the
non-existence of obstacles being needed everywhere (as
a cause), the non-removal of that (nescience), even

140 CHAPTER 1

where there is specific perception (of the object), is
intelligible because of hindrance by an external
adjunct, like the non-removal of the delusion of a
reflection. 10 Thus, in the same way as there is a restric-
tive injunction to learn Scripture by rote under
instruction from a preceptor, because of the possibility
(otherwise) of apprehending one's own section of the
Yeda from the written versions (thereof), let this
be a restrictive injunction as to the hearing (study)
under instruction from a preceptor, since there is
partially established the inquiry into the Vedarita
through one's own (unaided) effort alone, in order
to attain that intuition of Brahman, which consists in
the certitude of (its) existence. Nor may it be objected
that since even by the injunction to approach a precep-
tor, in "For the sake of the knowledge of that, he is
certainly to approach a preceptor", there is secured the
exclusion of inquiry without a preceptor, the (present)
restrictive injunction is futile; for, the approach to a
preceptor being subsidiary to hearing (study), when
there is no injunction as to this (latter), there can be no
injunction at all as to that (former) ; hence, there is no
contingence of the futility of the latter, because of the
former. Otherwise, since, even by the injunction to
approach, which is subsidiary to the learning by rote,
there is the exclusion of the study of written versions
etc., the restrictive injunction even as to learning by
rote (under instruction from a preceptor) would be
futile.

10 One may know that reflections have no independent reality and
that they do not exist in the media; in spite of this knowledge, one
continues to perceive reflections so long as there are reflecting media and
the objects reflected are proximate to them.

jSRAVAlSTA-VIDHl AS NlYAMA-VIDHI

Or else, there being a partial establishment of 1-134
the hearing (study) of works in the vernacular
languages, whose purport is the non-dual self, let there
be a restrictive injunction as to the hearing (study) of
the Vedanta. Nor is there the non-establishment of
that even from such prohibitions as "He is not to speak
a barbarous tongue"; for, in the case of him, who,
because of dullness in the learning of the sacred
teaching, feels that the hearing (study) of the Vedanta
is not possible (for him), and who, even transgressing
the prohibition which is for the sake of a human goal, 17
desires to know the non-dual through works in
the vernacular tongues, there is the possibility of his
engaging himself therein, and hence the f ruitfulness of
the restrictive injunction is intelligible. Though, as
explained in the section about the agent (in sacrifices),
there is, for the sake of a human goal, the prohibition of
the utterance of falsehood, yet, since, for some reason,
there may be, for him who transgresses even this accep-
ted prohibition in his desire for the proper completion
of the rite, engaging in the utterance of a falsehood,
there is again, in the section on the darsa-pur^amasa,
a prohibition for the sake of the rite, "Utter no false-
hood"; thus the prohibition for the sake of the rite is
indeed admitted to be fruitful.

17 A prescription or prohibition may serve human good generally or
the interests of a particular rite. In the former case, it is puru&rtha, in
the latter, it is kratvartha. The fact that there is already a prescrip-
tion or prohibition, which is puruartha, does not exclude a fresh pres-
cription or prohibition of the same in the interests of a particular rite.
This is exemplified in the next sentence, with reference to the full and
new moon sacrifices and the prohibition of the utterance of falsehood*

142 CHAPTER t

1-135 Or else, just as there is the restriction "By hymns

(mantras) alone should be called up the memory of the
objects connected with the hymns ", because of the
partial establishment of what is based on those (hymns) ,
such as sentences from the manuals of ritual and the
instruction of friends, similarly, (here) there is the
possibility of the partial establishment even of epics,
puranas and (other) works of human origin based on
the Vedanta ; therefore, let there be this restriction (to
the Vedanta).

In any case this is certainly a restrictive injunction.
As for the statement, in the Bhasya on the section
"There is the injunction of some other auxiliary par-
tially" etc., that there is an injunction of the novel, that
is in the view that there is partial non-establishment,
even if it be a restrictive injunction, as is made clear
even there by the construction of the word "partially"
in the aphorism, whose purport is to state partial non-
establishment. Thus say the followers of the Vivarana.

M36 For him who has heard (studied), from the verbal

testimony there arises at first mediate knowledge alone
as free from doubt, since verbal testimony, being of such
a nature as to generate mediate knowledge (alone),
cannot transcend its settled capacity. For him, how-
ever, who has subsequently performed reflection and
contemplation, because of the presence in abundance of
these special auxiliaries, from that alone arises imme-
diate knowledge. Just as the sense-organ, though
incapable of generating the cognition whose sphere is
the element of "that-ness," yet generates recognition
because of the co-operation of the memory impression

SRAVA^A-VIDHI AS NIYAMA-VIDHI 143

which has that capacity, similarly in the case of verbal
testimony, though of itself incapable of generating
immediate knowledge, the generation of immediate
knowledge stands to reason, because of the co-operation
with intense meditation which is settled to be capable
of that (generation of immediate knowledge), as in
the immediate presentation of the damsel con-
templated intensely by the bereaved lover. And thus,
since it is established of verbal testimony that of itself
in respect of its own content it generates mediate
knowledge, while, when it is defined as the instrument
of knowledge co-operating with intense meditation, it
generates immediate knowledge, like the internal organ
of the bereaved lover, there is a restrictive injunction as
before (in respect of the study of Vedanta). Thus
say som'e of those (followers of the Vivarcma)

The intuition of Brahman is not through the hear- 1-137
ing (study) of the Vedanta, but only through the mind ;
because there is the Scriptural text "By the mind alone
is it to be perceived" ; and because there is the statement
in the Bhasya 1 * on the Gita: "the instrument for seeing
the self is the mind purified by the sacred teaching, the

18 These would not seem to have understood the true doctrine of the
Vivararia, according to which the major texts of the Upaniads are of
themselves capable of generating immediate knowledge. The present
school holds that there is no injunction of the novel, since it is established
in experience that verbal testimony gives rise to mediate knowledge and
that, as aided by contemplation, it gives rise to immediate knowledge.
What is possible and necessary is, therefore, a restrictive Injunction as
to the obligatory exercise of inquiry, reflection and contemplation, in
respect of the texts of the Vedanta.

19 Here, as elsewhere, in this work, reference to the Bh&wa Is
always to Sa&kara's Commentary.

144 CHAPTER I

preceptor's instruction, calmness, equanimity etc/*
Hearing (study), however, is for the sake of mediate
knowledge free from doubt ; hence, for the sake of that
alone is there a restrictive injunction ; thus say some.

1-138 Only for the sake of immediate knowledge is there

a restrictive injunction in respect of hearing (study),
because of the statement of the fruit " (The self) is to
be seen." And its being for the sake of that is not
directly, but in co-operation with the mind which is the
instrument; because immediate knowledge is not
recognised (to result) from verbal testimony. Nor is
there the contingence of an injunction of the novel on
the ground that its being for the sake of that (immediate
knowledge) in that form (i.e., in conjunction with the
mind) is not established ; for, by the sense of hearing in
co-operation with the study of the science of music,
whose object is the removal of the superimposed
reciprocal non-discrimination among the notes heard,
such as sadja, there is the immediate realisation of their
true nature free from reciprocal confusion; hence, it
is settled that, where there is a science whose object is
the removal of super-imposed non-discrimination in
respect of a thing which is manifest, the study of that
(science) is useful as an auxiliary to the sense-organ
that generates the intuition of that (thing) ; thus say
others.

1-139 For hearing (study) which consists in a special

mental psychosis of the nature of inquiry into the
principles favourable for the ascertainment of the
purport of the Vedaiita texts about the non-dual
Brahman, neither mediate nor immediate knowledge

6RAVAtfA-VIDHI AS NIYAMA-VIDHI 145

in respect of Brahman is the fruit, since this is the fruit
of means of valid knowledge like verbal testimony.
Nor may it be said : " Let hearing (study) be but know-
ledge from verbal testimony as qualified by the purport
determined by inquiry of the aforesaid character; for
that Brahman-knowledge is appropriate as the fruit";
for, in respect of knowledge, an injunction is unintellb
gible, and since it is admitted of the injunction to hear
(study) that it is the basis of the aphorism about the?
desire to know (Brahman), which enjoins the obliga-
toriness of inquiry, it is appropriate to treat as hearing
(study) that inquiry alone, which consists in a mental
activity of the nature of the acceptance (of the princi-
ples of reasoning) and rejection (of false principles).
Nor may it be said "Let Brahman-knowledge be the
fruit of the inquiry itself either through the ascertain-
ment of the purport or through the removal generated
thereby of obstacles consisting in human failings, such
as delusion as to purport " ; for, it is not admitted of the
knowledge of purport that it is instrumental to the
knowledge from verbal testimony, 20 and it is not
admitted of the absence of obstacles that it is anywhere
the cause of the effect ; hence, either of the two serving
as a channel (to Brahman-knowledge) is unintelligible.
And if Brahman-knowledge were generated by an
extraneous cause consisting in inquiry, then, for the
validity of that (knowledge from verbal testimony)

20 See the topic in the fourth varnaka of the Vivarana; the author
of the Veddntaparil)hti$a accepts tatparya as a cause of valid knowledge
from verbal testimony, hut explains the Vivara^akara's position (p. 255)
on the ground that the latter understood tatparya to mean "heing pro-
nounced with a desire to cause the cognition of that"; see also VPS,
pp. 176, 176.

S 119

14ft CHAPTER I

there would be the contingence of being extrinsic. 21
Therefore, there is a restrictive injunction as to the
hearing (study), consisting in inquiry, only for the sake
of removing human failings through the ascertainment
of purport. As for the text " (The self) is to be seen",
that is but mere eulogy (of the self) as worthy of being
seen, not the statement of the fruit of hearing (study) ;
thus say the followers of the Scwksepasanraka.

1-14 For him who is engaged in the hearing (study) of

the Vedanta for the sake of Brahman-knowledge, in
the same way as for him who is engaged in the study of
the works of Caraka, Susruta etc., for the sake of
medical knowledge, there would at intervals be the
contingence of engaging in other activities; hence, the
text " (The self) is to be heard", which has the fruit of
removing that (distraction), is an exclusive injunction;
for, in the Chandogya text "He who is well-established
in Brahman attains immortality," it is restrictively
laid down that not having any other activity is the means
to release ; since the word "tisthati" preceded by "sam"
signifies fulfilment, the fulfilment in Brahman signified
by the word "brahma-samstha (being well-established
in Brahman) " consists in not having any other activity ;
and in the Atharvana text "Know that alone, the self,
give up all other forms of speech", other activities are

21 According to the advaitin, who follows Kum&rila in this respect,
validity does not require to be produced or revealed by any factors other
than those which enter into the original cognition itself; It is not made
known, for instance, by inference from practical efficiency; nor is it
produced by the repeated contact of the sense-organ with many parts of
the object perceived; the cognition comes to us as valid; its validity is
intrinsic, not extrinsic. See further, the VeMntapartoMfa pp. 291297.

Ad PAKISANKHYA-VIDHI 147

explicitly prohibited; and there is the text of the tradi-
tional code "Up to his sleep, yea, up to his death, let
him spend his time in reflecting on the Vedanta. ' ' Nor
may it be said (they urge) that, since, of any such other
activity not helpful (of itself) to Brahman-knowledge,
there is no establishment in conjunction with hearing
(study) in respect of a single result, an exclusive injunc-
tion for the exclusion of that (activity) does not stand
to reason ; for, in the aphorism "There is the injunction
of some other auxiliary" etc., and in the words of the
commentary thereon "in that case where, because of
the predominance of the perception of difference, he
does not attain that" there is a restrictive injunction
since, for him who has accomplished hearing (study)
and imagines that what is to be achieved has been
achieved even by the mere knowledge through verbal
testimony, there would be no engaging in contemplation,
helpful in the intuition that removes nescience,
there is admitted a restrictive injunction in respect of
contemplation, merely because of the partial establish-
ment of what is not instrumental to that ; hence, on that
principle, when there is establishment in conjunction
even with what is not instrumental, an exclusive injunc-
tion whose fruit is the exclusion of that (asadhana) is
possible. Thus say some who adhere to the statement
of the Vartika, ' ' The purport of the injunction there (in
'The self is to be heard' etc.) may be a restriction; or
it may be an exclusion, since, by the non-perception of
the not-self, we devote ourselves to the supreme self."

The hearing (study) that is laid down as relating 1-15
to the self in "The self is to be heard" in the same way

148 CHAPTER t

as reflection etc., is simply knowledge of the self, as
generated by revelation and the instruction of the pre-
ceptor, but is not of the nature of inquiry into the
purport; hence in respect of that, there is no injunction
whatsoever. Hence it is that in the aphorism about
harmony (of the texts), after the refutation of an
injunction in respect of knowing the self, there is the
(passage of the) Bhdsya beginning : "For what purpose,
then, are there texts like 'The self is to be seen, heard'
which have the appearance of injunctions? For the
purpose of turning one away, we say, from the objects
of natural activity." If hearing (study) were the
inquiry into the purport of the Vedanta, then, through
the ascertainment of the purport, its fruit would be only
the removal of obstacles consisting in delusion and doubt
as to the purport, not the removal of any other obstacle,
nor the realisation of Brahman. And its having that
fruit is established even in experience, and no other
means is established whether optionally or in conjunc-
tion (with this) ; hence there is no scope there for any
of the three injunctions.

M51 Though there be no injunction as to inquiry, the

approach to a preceptor enjoined for the sake of know-
ledge culminates in the goal of knowledge only through
the inquiry into the Vedanta under instruction from a
preceptor, since when a seen channel (of instrumenta-
lity) is possible, the assumption of an unseen channel
does not stand to reason. For the same reason there is
the exclusion of inquiry accomplished by one's own
efforts. If, however, there were no injunction to learn
by rote, then, the approach (to a preceptor), that is

NO VIDfll AS TO SRAVAtfA 1 49

enjoined, since it is not enjoined for the sake of knowing
the letters (alone of the Veda), would not for the sake
of that (knowledge) make a channel of learning by rote,
consisting in pronouncing (the texts) in the manner
pronounced by the lips of the preceptor; hence there
would not be established the exclusion of the study of
written versions ; hence, the restrictive injunction as to
learning by rote is fruitful.

Nor may it be said "For him who seeks the inquiry 1- 152
into the Vedanta for the sake of removing delusion as to
purport etc., sometimes there may be the engaging even
in the sacred teachings of dualists, since there too there
is inquiry into the Vedanta through constructions
acceptable to them ; hence, a restrictive injunction as to
that inquiry into the Vedanta, whose purport is the
non-dual self, is fruitful"; for, in the case of that
(dualistic teaching) which is of itself the cause of
delusion as to purport, there is not the removal of that
(delusion) ; hence there is not the establishment of any
other means. 22 Nor is it even the case that through the
delusion as to its removing (delusion as to purport)
there would be the engaging even therein, in the case of
some one, and that with this much there is the admission
of a restrictive injunction in "(The self) is to be
heard;" for, in the case of him who is devoid of the
faith in non-dualism that is gained (solely) by the grace
of the Lord, 23 even in respect of the text " (The self) is

22 Which would have to be ruled out by the restrictive injunction.

23 Cp. KhanQanakhandakhtidya, para 163, v. 25:

Igvara-'nugrahad ea puinsam advaita-vasana)
maha-bhaya-krta-trana dvi-tragam yadi j5,yatej[

150 CHAPTER t

to be heard ", because of the construction acceptable to
the adversary, the delusion is possible that the purport
is an injunction to inquire into the self that has a
second; for, engaging in other pursuits, as prompted by
delusion, cannot be restrained even by hundreds of
injunctions.

1-153 Nor does it stand to reason that it is an exclusive

injunction for the purpose of the exclusion of other
activities ; for, in the case of him who has not renounced,
the exclusion of other activities is not possible, while, in
the case of him, who has renounced, the exclusion of that
is established by the Scriptural text "He who is well-
established in Brahman attains immortality ", which
enjoins renunciation together with being well-
established in Brahman; in view of this other text
enjoining renunciation, the teaching of the exclusion of
other activities through the text "(The self) is to be
heard ' ' would be futile.

M54 Nor may it be doubted that though there be no

injunction in respect of inquiry, a restrictive injunction
is possible as to Vedanta being the content of the
inquiry, since there are objects of exclusion like works
in the vernacular tongues ; for, since the restriction to
the Vedanta is obtained even from proximity, it cannot
be the content of an injunction; further, even because of
the force of the restrictive injunction "One is to study
one's own section of the Veda", whose purpose is the
comprehension of the sense, this sense is obtained that
the knowledge of the meaning generated from the Veda
apprehended through learning by rote is what
culminates in the fruit, not that (knowledge) which is

DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN 151

generated from any 'other cause ; hence, in respect of
Brahman that is the sense of the Veda and is to be
known for release, there is no establishment for
vernacular works etc.

Nor may it be said that in the section " There is the 1-155
injunction of some other auxiliary ", an injunction is
recognised in respect of hearing (study), reflection and
contemplation, signified by the terms balya, panditya
and mauna ; for, that inquiry is the cause of the ascer-
tainment of the purport of what is inquired into, that
reflection consisting in recalling reasonings favourable
to the establishment of the object and contemplation
consisting in the repetition of the cognition of that
(object) are causes of the clarity of comprehension of
the object, these are establishedl in experience; and
hence, in respect of them, an injunction is not required ;
merely as producing excellence of activity (in respect
of them) through praising (them), there is the
empirical usage of injunctiveness (in respect of them),
as in the case of arthavada (eulogistic or condemnatory)
passages having the semblance of injunctions. And
thus, since there is non-injunction in respect of hearing
(study), like the inquiry into the section about ritual,
the inquiry into the section about Brahman too has for
its basis the injunction as to learning (one's own Veda)
by rote ; thus say those who follow the position of the
preceptor Vacaspati.

Of Brahman, that is the object of inquiry, the 2-11
definition has been stated to be the causality of the
creation, sustentation and destruction of the world, by
the Scriptural text "That, verily, from which these

152 CHAPTER I

beings originate ' ' etc. Of the creation, sustentation and
destruction of the world, the causality even of each one,
since it does not attach to any other (except Brahman)
is capable (of itself) of being the definition; if this be
said, true, this is certainly a three-fold definition, each
of which is independent of the others. Hence it is that in
such sections as "The eater (is Brahman), because of
the mention of the movable and the immovable, " the
destruction of all and so on are mentioned separately as
characteristic marks of Brahman j thus says the author
of the Kawmudi.

2-12 Others, however, say thus: since causality of

creation and causality of sustentation are common to the
efficient cause (too), in order to make known material
causality, there is shown the dissolution of the world in
Brahman. " Let Brahman be the material cause of the
world; (but) in respect of its creation, like the potter in
respect of the creation of the pot, and in respect of its
sustentation, like the king in respect of the sustentation
of the kingdom, the efficient cause may certainly be other
than the material cause" ; in order to remove this doubt,
the control of the creation and sustentation of the world
is declared of that (Brahman) alone. And thus, this
definition which is but single, qualifies per accidens 2 *
the non-dual Brahman as that which is without
differentiation the material and the efficient cause.

24 The non-dual Brahman cannot have any qualities which are real,
as there would be loss of non-duality. Hence, the causality of creation
etc. is not a real qualification (vieana), but is only an ctccidens
(upalak?a^a). It necessarily falls short of what it qualifies, but is never-
theless able to give us a glimpse of the nature of that subject.

PARItfAMA AND VIVARTA 1 53

And the material causality of Brahman, of the 2-21
nature of the non-dual, immutable intelligence, does not
consist in origination, as by the primal atoms, 25 nor
does it consist in transformation, as of Primal Nature ; 2G
but it is characterised by being illusorily transformed
through nescience into the form of the universe of ether
etc. That change, which is of the same grade of reality
as the thing, is transformation; what is not of the same
grade of reality is illusory manifestation; or, change,
which is of the same nature as the cause, is transforma-
tion; what is of a different nature from that is illusory
manifestation ; or, the effect which is non-different from
the cause is a transformation; the effect, which even
without being non-different from that (cause) is yet
difficult to state apart from that, is an illusory mani-
festation ; such is the distinction between transformation
and illusory manifestation.

Now, is the pure Brahman recognised as the 2-22
material cause, or in the form of the Lord (Isvara) or
in the form of the jiva ?

Here, some of the followers of the Sanlcsepasarlraka 2-221
say thus : the pure (Brahman) alone is the material
cause, since in the aphorism about the origination etc.
(of the world) and in the BJiasya thereon, material
causality is declared to be the definition of the Brahman
that is to be known. And thus, in such statements
of causality as " From the self ether originated, "

25 Of the Naiyfcyikas, who hold that by the combination of atoms
something new and previously non-existent is produced.

26 Recognised by the Sa&khya.

S 120

154 CHAPTER I

words like the "self 1 " whose expressed sense is
what is associated (with nescience) signify (here) only
the secondary implication in respect of the pure
(Brahman).

2-222 The followers of the Vivarana, however, think

thus : because of such Scriptural texts as "He who knows
all generally, who knows everything in detail, whose
austerity is of the form of knowledge, from him proceed
this brahma (i.e., the Veda), name, form and food (i.e.,
the earth) ", the material cause is only that form of
Brahman which is the Lord (Isvara) as qualified by
omniscience etc., and associated with maya. Hence it
is that in the BMsya, in such sections as " The one
within (the sun and the self), because of the qualities
of that being declared" and "(That which consists of
mind etc. is Brahman) because of there being taught
here what is well known everywhere", it is said that
being the self of all, which is declared in such Scriptural
texts as " That alone is the rk, that is the saman, that is
the uktha, that is the yajus, that is brahma, that is all
actions, all desires, all odours, all flavours," and which is
consequent on being the material cause of all, is a charac-
teristic mark of the Lord, to the exclusion of the jiva.
If, however, intelligence as such, common to the jiva
and the^Lord, were the material cause, that (being the
self of all) would not be the characteristic mark of the
Lord, to the exclusion of the jiva. Even the refutation
of the material causality of the associated (Brahman)
in the Scmksepasariraka is with the view of refuting the

igVARA AND jiVA AS MATERIAL CAUSES 155

material causality of what is qualified 27 by maya, but
does not have for purport the refutation of the material
causality of intelligence in the form of the Lord, as
distinguished (from maya) ; for, even in that (work),
at the close of the first chapter, it is said of the material
causality of the world that it is present in the
(expressed) sense of the word " That ".~ 8 And thus,
causality though present in the Lord is capable of
defining per accidens the impartite intelligence that is
present with that (Lord), as the bough (defines) the
moon ; hence the statement of that as a definition of the
Brahman that is to be known.

Since the universe of ether etc. is a transformation 2-223
of maya located in the Lord, in respect of that, the Lord
is the material cause. Since, however, the internal organ
etc. are products of the subtle elements produced by the
jlva's nescience in conjunction with the gross elements
which arc the evolutes of the maya located in the Lord,
in respect of them there is material causality for both
(the jlva and the Lord). Hence it is that in the
Scriptural text "Even thus, these sixteen digits

27 If isvara qualified by maya were the material cause, material
causality would pertain in part to the qualification too, maya. This is
what is said to be refuted in the Sank$cpa$&riraka. isvara, that is asso-
ciated with maya, is the material cause, but not as associated with maya;
rather is He to be distinguished from the latter, when upadanatva is
predicated of Him.

28 In the text " That thou art " the expressed sense of " That " is
the Lord characterised by omniscience, omnipotence etc., while the
expressed sense of "Thou" is the apparently finite jlva. The secondary
implication of both terms is the pure Brahman. The expressed sen.se is
understood here, since in respect of secondary implication there is no
difference between the two terms and the reference to the term "That"
would in that case be futile,

156 CHAPTER t

of the seer, that go towards the person, reach
and sink into the person, " it is shown of the
vital air, the mind etc., denoted by the word
" digit ", that, at the time of release from the body for
the enlightened one, they are destroyed by knowledge,
in view of that aspect of them which is the product of
nescience, removable by knowledge; in another text
" Gone are the fifteen digits to their elements, " there is
shown their resolution into their respective material
causes, in view of that permanent aspect of them which
is not removable by that (knowledge) and consists in the
transformation of the gross elements that are products
of maya; thus say those who maintain a difference
between maya and nescience (avidya).

2-2231 Just as, because the universe of ether etc. is a

transformation of maya located in the Lord, the Lord
is the material cause in respect of that, similarly,
because the internal organ etc. are transformations of
the nescience located in the jiva, the jlva alone is the
material cause in respect of that. Nor is it the case that
if the gross elements too, the products of maya, did not
enter into the internal organ etc., the distinction
between the two Scriptural texts cited would be un-
intelligible ; for discrimination is clearly established, in
the BM$ya on the section about the resolution of the
digits, that the Scriptural text about the destruction of
the digits by knowledge refers to the vision of him who
knows the truth, while the Scriptural text "Gone are
the fifteen digits " refers to the cognition of a dull
person, since, when a knower of the truth dies, the
persons near liim think that his body etc. too are resolved

I&VARA AND JIVA AS MATERIAL CAUSES 157

into earth etc., in the same way as a pot that
is destroyed; thus say some of those who maintain a
difference between maya and nescience.

Even among those who maintain their non-differ- 2*224
ence, some say thus: though of the universe of ether
etc., the Lord is the material cause, yet, of the internal
organ etc., the jiva alone is the material cause, because
of the cognition of (their) identity with the jiva; hence
it is that in the Bliasya on superimposition, there is
shown the super-imposition of the internal organ etc.
on the jiva alone; and in the Vivarana, in the prati-
karmavyavastha,~ y there are mentioned, in the case of
the intelligence that is Brahman, the connection with
pot etc., through being their material cause, and, in the
case of the jiva, though not connected therewith, the
connection with the internal organ etc.

Because of such Scriptural texts as "From this 2-225
proceeds the vital air, the mind and all the organs, ether,
air, fire, water, earth which is the support of all"
Brahman alone is the material cause of the entire
empirical world; but the jiva (is the material cause)
of the merely apparent dream world. (This is so
because of the following reason) ; in the section "There
is contingence (of transformation) of the whole or
conflict with the Scriptural declaration of (Brahman)
being without parts", the prima facie view being that,
if Brahman be the material cause of the world, on the

29 I.e., that part of the treatise which shows how for the jiva, though
essentially one with the Impartite intelligence, there is yet distinction
(vyavastha) in respect of objects (karma) cognised at different times
and places and in different ways.

158 CHAPTER 1

transformation of the whole of it in the form of the
world there would be contingence of the non-existence
of Brahman over and above the transformations, or on
the transformation of it in part there would be the
contingenee of conflict with the Scriptural declaration
of (its) being without parts, it is established as the
final conclusion by the aphorism "For, just as in the
(jiva-) self, there are variations, even so (it may be in
the supreme self)", with the doctrine of illusory
manifestation in view, that, like the creation of the
dream world of many forms in the jiva-self, that sees
the dream, without any destruction of its own nature,
the creation of ether etc., in Brahman is (also similarly)
intelligible ; thus say others.

2 226 r -Che J iy a himself being, like the seer of dreams, he

who posits in himself everything like lordship, is the
cause of all; thus too say some.

2'23 Now, because of the Scriptural text ' ' Know may a to

be prakrti (the primal cause) " and because of the
persistence of the inertness of maya in pot etc., maya
is cognised to be the material cause of the world; how
(then) is Brahman the material cause?

2-231 Here, the author of the Padarthatattvmirnaya

says; Brahman and maya are both the material cause,
and hence there is the intelligibility of both texts, as
also the intelligibility of the persistence of both attri-
butes, namely, reality and inertness. Of these,
Brahman, as illusorily manifesting, is the material
cause; and nescience, as transforming itself. Nor is
material causality a mere matter of terminology in the

BRAHMAN NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE WORLD 159

case of the substrate of illusory manifestation, since
there is no distinction even there in respect of the
definitive characteristic of material causality, viz,, being
in itself the cause of the origination of the effect.

Some, however, accepting even the aforesaid 2-232
teaching, mention another definition common to both
illusory manifestation and ti'ansf ormation : material
causality is the generation of an effect non-different
from itself. And, for the world, there is iion-
differcnce from the real Brahman through (its)
illusory manifestation, and from the inert ignorance
through (its) transformation; for, there is experience
of apposition, in the form "the pot is real," "the pot is
inert." Nor may it be said that, because (in the
comm'ents) on the aphorism "Non-otherness therefrom,
because of Scriptural texts like that about origination
(arambhana) ", there are the statements "Non-other-
ness means non-existence as distinct from Brahman,"
and "Indeed, by non-otherness we do not declare non-
difference, but we deny difference," which belong
(respectively) to the Bhasya and the Bhamati, and deny
of the world non-difference from Brahman, the accep-
tance of non-difference would be an unwelcome
conclusion; for, the purport of those two statements
being the denial of non-difference of the same grade of
reality as the substrate, namely, Brahman, there is
no conflict in accepting merely apparent non-difference,
as between nacre and silver.

The author of the SmksepasariraWa, however, 2233
says thus : Brahman alone is the material cause ; since,
in the case of the immutable, independent causality is

160 CHAPTER I

unintelligible, maya is the subsidiary cause ; the subsi-
diary, though not the cause, 30 is yet present in the effect,
since there is seen in the pot persistence of the softness
etc. (of the clay), as of the clay (itself).

2-234 Vacaspati Misra, however, says thus: Brahman,

that has been made the content of the maya located in
the jiva, is the material cause, since of itself it
illusorily manifests itself in the form of the world, the
locus of inertness; hence maya is merely an accessory,
not a subsidiary cause persistent in the effect.

2-235 The author of the Sidhantamuktavali, however,

says thus: the energy maya is alone the material cause,
not Brahman, because of such Scriptural texts as" This
Brahman has neither an earlier nor a later, neither an
outside " etc., and "Of that, there is neither effect nor
cause " ; but, as being the substrate of maya, the material
cause of the world, it (Brahman) is figuratively the
material cause ; such material causality alone is intended
to be declared in the definition (of Brahman).

2-31 Now, who is the Lord, and who is the jiva ?

2-3111 To this, it is said thus in the Prakatdrthavivarana:

the beginningless, indeterminable primal cause of
beings, which is associated with intelligence as such, 31
(that) is maya; the reflection of intelligence therein is
the Lord; the reflection of intelligence in the limited
innumerable parts even of that (maya), which (parts)

30 That is to say, not the material cause; even the subsidiary is a
cause.

31 Not Intelligence as delimited or as reflected or as the prototype of
ft reflection.

RELATION OF I&VARA TO jfVA 161

are endowed with the obscuring and projecting energies,
and are called nescience (avidya), (that reflection) is
the jiva.

In the Tattvaviveka, however, (it is thus) : of the 2-3112
primal cause, made up of the three constituents, 3 * two
distinct forms are established by the Scriptural text
"It creates the jiva and the Lord as reflections, and
itself becomes maya and nescience (avidya) "; what is
principally constituted of pure sattva, not overpowered
by rajas and tamas is maya ; that, whose sattva is over-
powered by those (two) and is (consequently) impure,
is nescience ; postulating 1 this distinction between maya
and nescience, it is said that the reflection in maya is
the Lord and the reflection in nescience is the jiva.

The one primal cause itself is, through the predo- 2-3113
minance of projection, called maya and is the adjunct of
the Lord ; through the predominance of obscuration, it is
called nescience or ignorance and is the adjunct of the
jiva; hence it is that though it is associated with
intelligence as such, common to both the jiva and the
Lord, the experience of conjunction with ignorance,
in the form "I am ignorant," is for the jiva alone, not
for the Lord ; such a distinction between the jiva and the
Lord is set forth in some (works).

In the Sanksepasariraka, however, following the 2-3114
Scriptural text "This jiva has the effect for adjunct,
the Lord has the cause for adjunct/' it is said thus : the
reflection of intelligence in- nescience is the Lord; the
reflection of intelligence in the internal organ is the

32 Sattva, rajas and tamas.
8 1-21

162 CHAPTER I

jiva ; nor may it be said that since the definition of intelli-
gence is possible by a substance, namely, the internal
organ, in the same way as of ether by a pot, the jiva
may be but intelligence as defined ; for, because of the
difference here and hereafter between the parts of
intelligence defined as the jiva, there would be the con-
tingence of the destruction of the (karma) acquired and
the influx of the non-acquired; the reflection, however,
is not differentiated by the incoming or outgoing of the
adjunct, in the same way as what is defined (thereby) ;
hence, there is not this defect in the reflection-theory.

Thus, in the above-mentioned views of the jiva and
the Lord as varieties of reflection, Brahman, that is in
the position of the prototype, is the pure intelligence
which is attained by the released.

2-3115 In the CitradTpa, the leaching of a three fold

division into jiva, the Lord, and pure intelligence is
abandoned, and a four- fold division of intelligence is
assumed (in the following way) : for example, the ether
though in fact one alone is yet four-fold, as (i) the pot-
ether, i.e., the ether defined by the pot, (ii) the water-
ether, i.e., what is reflected together with the clouds and
stars in the water located in that (pot-ether), (iii) the
undefined ether at large, and (iv) the cloud-ether, i.e.,
what is reflected in the watery parts of that (cloud),
which are of the form of dew, and which are inferred
(to exist) in the region of the clouds, that exist in the
ether at large, because of their effect, namely, rain;
similarly, there are (i) the immutable (intelligence),
i.e., the intelligence which exists as the substrate of
both the gross and the subtle body, is defined thereby

I&VARA AS A REFLECTION 165

t

and stands unmodified like an anvil, (ii) the jiva, i.e.,
the intelligence reflected in the internal organ posited
in that (immutable intelligence) and associated with
transmigration, (iii) Brahman, i.e., the undefined
intelligence, and (iv) the tord, i. e., the intelligence
reflected in the impressions of the intellects of all beings
that exist in the darkness of maya which abides in that
(Brahman) ; and thus, there is shown the difference
between the jiva and the Lord through differences in
adjunct, as between the internal organ and ignorance
coloured by the impressions of the intellect.

And this is another peculiarity of what is
said in that (Citradlpa) : among the four kinds
of intelligence, the jiva, which appears as the
" I ", is, like silver on nacre, superimposed on
the immutable (intelligence), the element whose
distinctive form of untainted bliss is obscured
by nescience. Hence it is that, as in the case of 1 "tins-
ness" and " silver-ness," there is in " I myself act "
etc., the appearance together of the feeling of "one-self"
and the feeling of " I ", which are of the nature of the
substrate that is the general element and the super-
imposed that is the special element. It is, indeed, the
feeling of " I " which is of the nature of the super-
imposed special element, being variable, since one per-
son cannot have the empirical usage "I" in respect of
another person. And the feeling of " oneself " is the
counter-correlate of " other-ness " and of the nature
of the substrate that is the general element, since it is
present, in the form " Devadatta himself goes," in the
empirical usage relating even to another person. Thus,

164 6&APTB& t

even because of reciprocal super-imposition, there is,
for men of the world, non-discrimination between the
immutable (intelligence) and the jlva. And the
distinction between them is clear in the Brhadaranyaka,
through the teaching " As a mere mass of sentiency,
rising from those elements, perishes even in their wake"
in respect of the jiva, that it perishes in the wake of the
perishing of the adjunct, and through the teaching
4 'Imperishable, verily, is this self" in respect of the
immutable (intelligence), that it is imperishable.

If the denotation of the "I", the jlva, be perishable,
how is there non-difference from, the imperishable
Brahman? (The reply is) : this apposition (\ve teach)
is not in the view of non-difference, but in the view of
sublation. 33 Just as by the cognition of manhood in
' ' What was (taken to be) a post is a man", the cognition
of post-ness is removed, similarly, by the cognition of the
immutable Brahman-nature, in "I am Brahman,"
there is removed the superimposed nature of the
denotation of "1"$ for, there is the statement of the
Naiskarmyasiddhi : " As in ' What was a post is a man'
the cognition of the post (is removed) by the cognition
of a man, so by the cognition 'I am Brahman/ the cog-
nition of ' I ' is, indeed, removed without residue/'
And if, in the manner mentioned in the Vivarana etc.,
this be apposition in the view of non-difference, then, let
the word "I" denoting the jlva have the immutable

33 Of one of the terms in the appositional relation; when it is
iaid "the post is man", what is intended is not the non-difference of the
two as such, but the sublation of the prior cognition of the post; there
was really no post,

iSVARA AS A REFLECTION 165

(intelligence) for purport through secondary impli-
cation, since this (latter), which is not super-
imposed, is capable of non-difference from Brahman.
As for the Lord who is said to be comparable
to the cloud-ether and a reflection in the im-
pressions of the intellect, he is qf the nature
of the bliss of sleep, as established in the Mandukya
text " Having sleep for his abode, one in form, a mere
mass of sentiency, blissful, the enjoyer of bliss 7 '; for,
even in that (Upanisad) immediately after that (text),
it is declared " He is the Lord of all, he is omniscient,
he is the internal ruler, he is the cause of all origination
and absorption of beings"; and in the case of him, who
has for adjunct the impressions of the intellects of all
beings, having all things for their content, omniscience,
and for that same reason even universal agency etc., as
well, are intelligible. Nor may it be said that ontniscience
is not experienced in the case of any one who is condi-
tioned by the impressions of our intellect; for,
impressions being mediate, what is conditioned thereby
is also mediate. 34

34 The objection is "How is it that no one experiences in sleep 1 am
omniscient/ if conditioning by the impressions of the intellect accounts
for omniscience?" The reply one would expect is "Because in the case
of each individual being, the conditioning is not by the impressions ol
all the intellects of all beings." The reply given in the text, however,
seeks to go deeper. The denotation of "I" is what is conditioned by
the internal organ, which in waking is gross and perceptible. But in
sleep it is subtle, being of the nature of an impression;, hence there
cannot be immediately experienced either that or what is conditioned
thereby; thus there being no experience of the "I" in sleep, how can
there be the experience " I am omniscient"? This reply raises other
questions: (1) if there is no experience of "I" in sleep, how are we to
account for the experience "I slept soundly"? If the "I" here belongs
to the subsequent waking stage, should not one be similarly able to
say "I was omniscient"? (2) If he who is conditioned by vasana cannot
have the experience of " I ", can Igvara who is also conditioned by vasanas
have the experience " I am omniscient?" These may not be unanswerable,
but no reply is indicated in the text or commentary.

166

2-3116 in the Brahm&nanda, however, it is said that,

because of association with sleep, the blissful being
mentioned in the Mandukya is the jlva. It is thus:
the internal organ, which, on the cessation of the karmas
that bring about enjoyment in waking etc., is absorbed
in the form of sleep, becomes solid (i.e., patent),
when there is awakening, because of karma which brings
about enjoyment afresh; then, the jlva, who has that
adjunct, is said to be of the nature of cognition (vijnana-
maya). He himself, earlier, in the state of sleep,
having an adjunct in the state of absorption, is said to
be blissful. He alone is set forth in the Mandiikya
(text) "Having sleep for his abode" etc.

This being so, how can we reconcile the statement
of his lordship over all and so on? Thus. There are
two sets of three forms with attributes of the supreme
self, the cosmic (adhidaivata) and the personal
(adhyatma) . Four forms, the cosmic three of the above
and pure intelligence, are established in the Citradlpa,
with the illustration of the artistically worked cloth.
For example, the naturally white cloth is washed, made
stiff with starch, marked by the application of what is
of the nature of ink, and coloured by the use of colours ;
thus, there are four states even of the single artistically
worked cloth; similarly, the supreme self devoid of
maya and the adjuncts produced by it is pure; as
conditioned by maya, he is the Lord; as conditioned
by the collective subtle body, the product of the non-
quintuplicated elements, he is Hiranyagarbha ; as condi-
tioned by the collective gross body, the product of the
quintuplicated elements, he is the Virat self; thus there

ISVARA AS A REFLECTION

are four states even of the single supreme sell And in
this supreme self, which is in the position of the artisti-
cally worked cloth, what is in the position of the picture
is the entire universe, consisting of the immovable and
the movable. Just as for the men in the picture there
are delineated likenesses of clothes, of a nature like to
that of the cloth that supports the picture, even so, for
the embodied ones superimposed on the supreme self,
there are posited likenesses of the intelligence that is
the substrate ; and these, which go by the name of jivas,
migrate. As for the personal (adhyatma), it is of three
forms, being divided into Visva, Taijasa, and Prajiia.
Of these,Prfijna is the witness of bare ignorance, when
the internal organ is absorbed in deep sleep, and that
(intelligence) is here said to be blissful. Taijasa is that
which in dreams has conceit in the individual subtle
bodies. Visva is that which in waking has conceit in
the individual gross bodies. Here, the Mandul\ya
text "This self has four quarters" begins with the
difference of four states, as Visva, Taijasa, Prajiia and
Turiya in the case of this self that appears
in the experience of the "I"; (next) for the
sake of convenience in the attainment of the
fourth quarter, of the nature of Brahman with-
out relation to the world, through the merger of
each earlier quarter (in the next), it includes Virat etc.
in the Visva etc., because of (their) similarity in respect
of having adjuncts which are (respectively) gross,
subtle and more subtle; (and thus it) establishes the
quarters, Visva etc., in "He who seated in waking (expe-
rience) cognises the external" and so on. Therefore,

168 CHAPTER I

with the intention to declare the inclusion of the
unmanifest Lord in the blissful (one) denoted by the
word Prajiia, there is the statement there of the
attributes of that (Lord), such as rulership over all.
Thus alone has it been explained by the Bhagavatpada
in the commentary on (the Manditkya-kdrikas of)
Gaudapada.

2-3117 In the Drgdrsi/aviveka, however, there is ihis

difference that the immutable (intelligence) set forth
in the Citradlpa is included in the jiva-aapect and the
teaching of only a three-fold division 33 of intelligence
is adhered to. There, indeed), it is said that since, on
the analogy of Hie sheet of water, waves and bubbles,
there is positing of one on another, the jiva is three-fold,
as absolutely real, empirically real and merely apparent.
Of these, the one defined 30 is the absolutely real jiva;
for, in this, though what defines is assumptive, that
(self), which is to be defined, being non-assumptive, is
non-different from Brahman. The likeness of intelli-
gence (which appears) in the internal organ posited in
the maya which stands obscuring that (absolutely real
jiva) and which has the conceit of " I " because of
getting idientified with the internal organ, is the
empirically real (jiva) ; for, that, though the product of
maya, persists as long as there is empirical usage. That
Which has the conceit of "I" in the dream-body etc.,
posited by sleep, which is of the nature of a particular
state of the maya that in dreams stands obscuring even
that (empirically real jiva), is the merely apparent

35 Into pure intelligence, jiva and the Lord.

36 By mftyft,

I&VARA AS THE PROTOTYPE 169

(jiva) ; for, on waking, there is, along with the dream-
world, cessation even for the jiva that is the seer
thereof.

Thus have been shown these differences in the
views of those who maintain the Lord to be a reflection.

The followers of the V war ana y however, say thus: 2-312
since by the traditional code 37 "When the ignorance that
generates difference is absolutely destroyed, what can
produce the non-existent difference between the self and
Brahman?" it is taught of only a single ignorance that
it is the condition of the difference between the jiva
and the Lord, the difference between the jiva and the
Lord is through their being prototype and reflection, not
tli rough both of them being reflections, it being
impossible for both to be reflections, in the absence of
two adjuncts. Here too, the reflection is the jiva; what
is in the position of the prototype is the Lord. Only
when this is the case, on the analogy of prototype and
reflection in ordinary experience, do the freedom of the
Lord and the dependence of the jiva on Him stand to
reason. And the aphorism " But (the creative activity
of the Lord is) mere sport, as in the world"
also fits in, in the manner stated in the Kalpataru:
"Just as a man plays with the changes, straight,
crooked etc., occurring in the reflection, even so
does Brahman with the changes in the jiva."
Of the jiva that is a reflection in ignorance,
the particular transformation of ignorance, which is of
the form of the internal organ, is the place of distinctive
manifestation, as the mirror is for the sun's light that

37 The verse comes from the
12?

170 CHAPTER I

is all-pervasive. Hence too the empirical usage of that
(jiva) as having that (internal organ) for adjunct.
Nor with this is there the abandonment of (the view
of) ignorance being the adjunct; for, if intelligence, ns
delimited by the internal organ alone as the adjunct,
were the jiva, the yogin's control of a host of bodies
would be unintelligible. Nor may it be said that, since,
by the might of yoga, the yogin's internal organ attains
the pervasiveness capable of manifestation in a host of
bodies, for what is defined by that (internal organ) the
control of a host oC bodies stands to reason; for, in the
penultimate section of the sacred teaching, 38 " The
entrance is like that of a lamp, for so it is shown (in
Scripture)", in the Bluwya etc. thereon, there is des-
cribed the creation, through the might of yoga, of the
internal organ which like the sense of sight is certainly
different for each body in the host of. bodies. Since, in
the reflection, difference from the prototype is alone
superimposed, that is real in respect of its own existence ;
hence, on the ground that for tho jiva, which is of the
nature of a refleel ion, there can be no connection with
release, there need not be assumed over and above that,
in order that there may be connection with release,
either another defined jiva or another (variety of)
intelligence called the immutable, over and above the
jiva that is a reflection, and different from both the
jiva and the Lord. The Scriptural declaration
"Imperishable, verily, is this self " has this for pur-
port, that for the jiva, on tho removal of its adjunct,
though there is cessation of its condition of being a

38 The Ved&nta Sutras,

THE AVACCHEDA VIEW 17 i

reflection, its existence does not perish ; it does not have
for purport (the existence of) another intelligence, over
and above that (jiva) and called the immutable. The
intelligence defined by the jiva's adjunct, the internal
organ etc., is but the Lord that is the prototype ; for, even
by the texts "He who stands in cognition" 30 etc.,
existence in the midst of modifications is declared of the
Lord alone, in the (very) proximity of the jiva, 40
through being the internal ruler thereof.

Others, however, prefer the (following) view. In 2-313
the case of what is not conditioned by colour, a reflection
does not stand to reason; much more is this so, in
(a medium) which is colourless. Even the example of
the reflection of the sky does not stand to reason, for,
when the sun's rays pervading the expanse of the sky
are reflected in water, the empirical usage that the sky
is reflected is grounded on mere delusion. Even'
the view that letters are reflected in (the audible)
sounds does not stand to reason; for, (sound) being the
manif ester (of the letters), in the case of attributes of
sound like high pitch, their imposition on letters is
intelligible through mere proximity, and hence there is
no evidence for the assumption that sound takes on the
reflection of letters. The echo too is not a reflection of
the earlier sound; according to the doctrine of
quintuplication, the sounds of the drum, the sea etc.
are sounds of the earth, water etc., while the echo alone
is the sound of ether, and hence it cannot be the

39 The term "cognition (vijnana)" here means the finite self.

40 The Lord's coatrollership Is exercised not from a distance, but
in the very presence or proximity of what is controlled.

172 CHAPTER I

reflection of any other sound. Even the echo in the
form of a letter is not the reflection of a previous letter ;
for, the echo, which is caused by an audible sound
manifesting a letter, may, even like the original audible
sound, intelligibly be the manifester of the letter. 41
Therefore, the intelligence, which like the pot-ether is
defined by the internal organ, is the jlva ; what is not
so defined is the Lord. Nor may it be said ' ' Since thus
the intelligence that is within the world is defined in its
entirety in the form of jivas, by the respective internal
organs as adjuncts, for the Lord, who is of the nature
of intelligence devoid of that definition, there would be
existence outside the world alone; hence there would
be contradicted the declaration of existence in the
midst of modifications as internal ruler, in ' lie who
stands in cognition (i.e., the jlva-self)' etc.; on the
reflection-theory, however, since the reflected ether is
seen even while there does exist the natural ether
present in the water, the existence in two forms in one
place is intelligible. " For, even on the reflection
theory, it is only of the intelligence not within the
adjunct, that reflection in that (adjunct) may be
declared, but not the reflection of the whole, on the
analogy of the moon in water ; for, of the portion within
that, reflection therein is not possible. Verily, not like
the reflection of the ether or light defined by the cloud,
in water, is there seen the reflection therein even of what
is within the water. Nor, of the face etc., is there
reflection even when under water, as when they are

41 That is to say, the letter manifested by the echo need not be a
reflection.

THE AVACCHEDA VIEW 173

outside. Therefore, as in the case of the cloud-defined-
ether etc., in respect of the reflection in water, so, in
respect of the reflection in such adjuncts as the internal
organ, the prototype-character would belong only to
what is not within that (adjunct) ; hence what is of the
nature of the prototype could not exist in the midst of
modifications ; hence there is parity (between the two
theories) in the failure of the text about the internal
ruler to harmonise with (the conception of) the Lord.
Hereby is refuted (the objection) that if the defined be
the jiva, then, because of the difference in the portions
of intelligence defined by the internal organ here and
there, 42 at the times of agency and enjoyership there is
the contingence of the destruction of the acquired
(karma) and the influx of the non-acquired. Even
on the reflection-theory, since there has to be
declared the reflection in the internal organ of that
portion of intelligence which is not within (the adjunct)
itself and is proximate to it, when the internal
organ moves here and there, because of the difference
in the prototype, there would necessarily be difference
of the reflection too; (and thus) there is parity
of this defect (for both theories). Nor may it be
said: "Though there be parity of defect on the
view that the jiva is a reflection in the internal
organ, yet, on the view that the jiva is a reflec-
tion in nescience, and that, of this, the internal
organ which moves about here and there is the cause

42 That is to say, in this life and in a future one; definition is under-
stood on a spatial analogy, and the absence of identity between one limited
space and another is urged as an objection to the use of that analogy for
the jiva, who is conceived as identical in several lives.

174 CHAPTER!

of distinctive manifestation here or there, like the
moving bright light above the mass of clouds in the case
of the reflection of that (mass of clouds), there is not
this defect ; for, since there is no motion for nescience,
as (there is) for the internal organ, there is no con-
tingence of difference in the reflections." For, in the
very same way, even on the definition theory, it is
possible to admit that the jiva is what is defined by
nescience ; 43 and, since there too, in order to remove such
defects as the destruction of the acquired, in that for a
single jiva there is agency in one place and enjoyership
in another place, the identity of the jiva in 'fact has to
be resorted to, on that analogy, even on the view of the
internal organ as the adjunct, it is possible to remedy
that defect 41 by recognising as helpful (thereto) the
identity of intelligence in fact and the identity of the
defining adjunct. Nor on the definition-theory is there
conflict with the Scriptural text and aphorism
"As this one resplendent sun becomes differentiated in
manifold ways in the water, so this shining unborn self
creates in the bodies different forms through adjuncts,"
" Hence it is there is the analogy of the reflections of
the sun and so on "; for, in the aphorism " But since
there is not apprehended (any medium) like water,
there is not that nature (of being a reflection) ", whicli
succeeds immediately on the aphorism cited, there is
stated the impossibility of reflection, since, just as in
the case of the sun that has colour, water is apprehended
as capable of generating a reflection, being at a

43 Not by the internal organ.

44 Destruction of tfce acquired karma etc,

THE AVACCHEDA VIEW 175

distance from that (sun) and (itself) possessing colour,
there is not similarly in the case of the omnipresent self
anything at a distance from it capable of generating
reflection ; and in the aphorism immediately succeeding
that, " The experience of increase and decrease is
because of being within (limiting adjuncts), thus there
is accord of both (the illustration and what is
illustrated)", the aphorist himself states the purport
of those (texts) to be but the definition-theory, in that
just as the sun which is reflected in the water increases
as it wore with the increase of (the volume of) water,
and decreases as it were with a decrease of
(the volume of) water, and moves as it were
with the motion of the water, and consequently
the experience of its increase, decrease etc. concomitant
with (that of) the water is of the nature of
superimposition, similarly, in the case of the self,
since, as defined by the internal organ etc., it is within
adjuncts, there is the experience of increase, decrease
etc. concomitant with that (adjunct) and of the nature
of superimposition; and, since thus there is accord
between the illustration and what is illustrated, there
is no conflict ; and the definition-theory alone is accepted
by the Scriptural text " As when a pot is moved, the pot
alone is moved, not the ether enclosed in the pot, so too is
the analogy of the jiva with the ether " and by the
aphorism " (The jiva is) a part, because of the declara-
tion of difference". Therefore, in the case of the
omnipresent intelligence, definition through the internal
organ etc. happens of necessity; because of (this)
necessity, the jiva is what is defined.

176 CHAPTER I

2-3U Others, however, hold thus: the jiva is neither a

reflection nor the defined; but, like KaunteyaV 5
condition as Radheya, it is for the untransformed
Brahman itself that there is the condition of the jiva,
because of nescience ; for, it is taught in the BMsya on
the BrJiadaranyaka that, on the analogy of the prince
brought up in the family of hunters, Brahman alone,
through its own nescience, migrates, and, through its
o\\n knowledge, is released; and it is said in the Vdrtika
" Just as for the king's son, on regaining his memory,
the condition of being a hunter ceases, even so for the
ignorant self (there is release) because of such texts as
' That thou art ' ". And thus, since it is only by
Brahman, as having attained the condition of the jiva
through its own nescience, that there is the positing of
the entire universe, the Lord too, together with the
attributes of omniscience etc., is an assumption of the
jiva, like the deity perceived in a dream.

2 32 Now, is this jiva one or many?

2*3211 Some, who hold to the view mentioned just before,

adopt the unity of the jiva and say thus: the jiva is
one; and therefore, it is only one body that has a jiva;
others, like the bodies seen in dreams, have no jivas;
the world is posited by the ignorance of that (jiva) ; for
that (jiva) there is empirical usage as long as there is
nescience, as in the case of dreamnperception ; there is

45 The son of Kunti; here, Karna, who though born to the Sun-god
and Kunti, was brought up by a charioteer, in ignorance of his true status
as the son of Kunti; this state of ignorance is what is designated in the
text as the condition of Radheya, R&dliil being the wife of the charioteer
&n<J the foster-mother of Karna,

EKA-JIVA-VADA 177

not even the distinction between the bound and the
released, because of the unity of the jiva; even the
release etc. of uka is assumptive, like the release etc.
of persons other (than the dreamer) in dreams; and
the washing off of the mire of all objections that may
occur to this (view) is to be effected solely in the conti-
nuous torrent of the dream-analogy.

Others, however, not gaining mental faith in this 2-3212
view of a sole (animated) body and a sole jiva, and
thinking that there is conflict with such aphorisms as
" But (the Lord is) more, because of the designation of
difference/ 9 " But as in the world, (the creative activity
is) mere sport," which teach thai Hie Lord, who
is more than the jiva, is alone the creator of the universe,
not the jivn, and that though, because of having His
desires (already) realised, there is no fruit for Him,
there is creation of the world merely in sport, adopt the
(following) view of a single jiva with many distinctive 4 "'
bodies: Hiranyagarbha, the sole reflection of Brahman,
is the principal jiva; others, however, which are of the
nature of reflections of that (Hiranyagarbha), are
apparent jlvas, similar to the apparent clothes put on
the bodies of human beings sketched on an artistically
worked cloth, and are subject to transmigration etc.

Yet others, however, thinking that, because of the 2-3213
difference of Hiranyagarbhas in each aeon, there is

46 The bodies are distinctive (saviSesa) in that they are all animated
(sajivani) ; so says the commentator. One is tempted to disregard this
and take "saviSesa" with "vadam" so as to mean "distinctive view", the
distinction from the other eka-jlva-vada being manifest; a better inter-
pretation, perhaps, is to take it to mean that the many bodies are
"differently" animated, one by Hiranyagarbha and the rest by his reflec-
tions.

S I 2?

178 CHAPTER I

nothing to determine which Hiranyagarbha is the prin-
cipal jiva, prefer the (following) view of a single jiva
(animating) many bodies without distinction: a single
jiva alone controls all bodies without distinction; nor
thus is there the contingence of the remembrance of one
another's happiness, in spite of the difference in bodies,
just as (there is remembrance) in the case of the
different parts of a body; for, since there is not seen
the remembrance of the happiness etc. of another birth,
it is settled that difference of body is the cause of the
non-remembrance of that ; in the case of yogins, however,
the remembrance of the happiness etc. of a host of bodies
is, like the apprehension of objects at a distance, condi-
tioned by the might of yoga, and hence that is not an
instance (to the contrary).

2322 Still others, however, who are dissatisfied, sinco

here too there is parity in the non-existence of
the distinction between bondage and release and
hence there is non-accord with the Scriptural text
"Tie who, among the devas, is enlightened, he alone
becomes that " and with the Blidsya on the section " If
it be said that it is denied, no (we reply), since it is from
the embodied," which teaches the release of the bound,
resort to the view of many jlvas, through the admission
of the internal organ etc. as adjuncts of the jiva, and
obtain the distinction of the bound from the released.

2-3221 Of these, some say thus: though ignorance, which

has the pure Brahman for locus and content, is but one,
and only the destruction of that is release, yet, because
of the admission of the persistence of a trace of
ignorance in the state of release while embodied.

JIVA-MULTIPLICITY ANb UNITY OP AVIDYA 179

ignorance has parts; hence that itself, when, in some
adjuncts, there is the rise of the understanding of
Brahman, ceases in part, while in other adjuncts it
persists as before through (its) other parts.

Others, however, say thus: just as, in the view of 2*3222
some Logicians, the determinant of the presence of the
absolute non-existence of pot on the ground is the non-
existence of conjunction with the pot and hence the
absolute non-existence of pot which exists in association
with many places possessing that 47 is not in association
with some places, when by the rise of conjunction with
pot that non-existence is removed, similarly, since for
the presence of ignorance in intelligence the determinant
is the mind, the ignorance that exists in association with
parts of intelligence, through that adjunct, 48 is not in
association with some 40 when, by the rise of the
realisation of Brahman, the mind is removed, in tho
manner declared by the Scriptural text u The knot of
the heart 50 is cut "; elsewhere it remains as before; it
is only the association and non-association with ignor-
ance that constitute bondage and release.

Yet others, however, say thus : ignorance does not 2*3223
have pure intelligence as locus, but has the jlva for
locus and Brahman for content; and that (ignorance)
being, like generality in the particulars, separately

47 Absence of conjunction with the pot.

48 I.e., the mind.

49 Farts of intelligence.

50 By "heart" is here meant the internal organ; it is spoken of as a
"knot", since it is a superimposition on intelligence and is of a compound
nature, the "this" (the object) and the "not-this" (the subject).

180 CHAPTER t

realised in all the jlvas which are reflections in the
internal organ, abandons some one for whom knowledge
has arisen, as generality (abandons) a destroyed
particular; this alone is release; in others it resides as
before ; this is the distinction.

2-3224 Still others, however, establish the distinction

between bondage and release only by admitting a
different nescience for each jlva, and the persistence
and removal of that (individual nescience).

2'32241 On this view, by whose nescience is the world
effected? If this be asked, (the reply is), since there
is no determining consideration, it is effected by the
nesciences of all, and is on a par with a cloth caused by
several threads. When, on the release of one (person) ,
his nescience is destroyed, then, as for the cloth when a
single thread is destroyed, there is destruction of the
world common to him; even at that time, like (the
origination of) another cloth by the other existing
threads, there is the creation of another world, common
to all the rest, by the other nesciences : thus say some.

2-32242 Like the merely apparent silver produced by the
respective (individual) ignorances, and like the duality
which, in the view of the Logicians, is produced by the
respective (individual) enumerative cognitions, 51 the
universe of ether etc., produced by the respective

51 The phrase "enumerative cognition" has been taken over from
Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar's Primer of Indian Logic; it is hardly
satisfactory; what is intended is this: the notion of duality arises not in
dependence on things, as they appear, but in dependence on a subjective
desire to enumerate the things.

MULTIPLICITY OF AVIDYAS

(individual) nesciences, is different for each individual;
there is only the delusion of identity, as (in saying) in
respect of nacre-silver " The silver seen by you that
itself (is seen) by me too "; thus say others.

Maya alone, which is different from the host o 2-32243
nesciences located in the jivas and is (itself) located
in the Lord, is the cause of the universe; as for the
nesciences of the jivas, they are of service in bare
obscuration and in the projection of the merely apparent
nacre-silver etc. : thus say yet others.

(The topic of) material causation is concluded
together with what is related directly and indirectly.

Now, of what nature is the agency? 3-0

Some say thus: because of the Scriptural declara- 3-1
tions "That saw," "He desired," "That of itself
made itself," that (agency), as in the system of the
Logicians, consists in the possession of such knowledge,
desire to act and volition as is favourable to the
(production of the) effect.

Others, however, say thus : if in order to explain 3-2
agency in respect of the desire to act and volition, there
be needed another desire to act and volition, there is the
contingence of infinite regress; hence the agency of
Brahman is but the possession of knowledge favourable
to the effect ; nor is there this contingency in the case of
knowledge too, since that, being of the nature of
Brahman, is not an effect ; and thus, the statement in
the Vivarana that the jiva is the agent in respect of

CHAPTER I

happiness etc., 52 and the statement in the Kalpataru
that since they can be produced by a mere glance,
ether etc. are (His) glance, while the physical world
is (His) smile, since through the channel of Hiranya-
garbha it has to be produced with greater effort than
a glance, 53 are in accord (with reason).

3-3 Yet others, however, say thus: agency consists in

the possession of knowledge which is favourable to the
effect and is of the nature of a consideration that it is
to be created; it is not merely the possession of
knowledge favourable to Ihe effect, since, in the case of
nacre-silver, dreams and other such delusions, there is
contingency of agency for the jlva as possessing such
knowledge of the substrate as is favourable to the
super-imposition; nor may it be said " this is a contin-
genee of the acceptable, since it is of the jlva that
agency is declared in respect of the dream-world, even
by the Scriptural text * Now, he creates chariots,
horses and roads: he, indeed, is the agent' "; for, this
has been explained thus by the commentator : 54
" agency is merely figurative, as in ' the plough

52 The jlva has knowledge of happiness etc., as the witness thereof,
but does not will them; yet he is said to be the agent; this is intelligible
only on the view that agency requires the possession of favourable know-
ledge alone. It may not be objected that the jiva does will the means to
happiness, for, what is denied is volition whose sphere is the internal
organ, the material cause of happiness etc. The position thus set out by
the commentator is unacceptable to the modern psychologist.

53 Here too, the assumption of this school (and of the commentator)
is that a glance requires no effort at all and is of the nature of bare
knowledge, while a smile does require effort. The position has no support
either from modern psychology or from the text of the Kalpataru.

$4 Sa&kara,

BRAHMAN'S OMNISCIENCE

supports the cow etc./ since (the jiva is) the
efficient cause of the appearance of chariot etc."

Brahman 's omniscience, which results by impli-
cation from this very agency in respect of the creation
of the entire universe, is established in the section
" Because of being the sacred-teaching-source ", even
through the authorship of the Vedas.

Now, how does Brahman 's omniscience accord 4*1
(with reason), since knowership itself is impossible,
there being no internal organ as for the jiva ?

In reply to this, there has been already shown the
view of Bharatltlrtha and others that the Lord is He
whose adjunct is ignorance in association with the im-
pressions of the intellects of all beings having all things
for content, and that, therefore, there is omniscience
for Him, as the witness of the impressions of all
contents.

The author of the Prakatartha, however, says 4-2
thus: just as for the jiva, because the transformations
of its adjunct the internal organ take on reflections
of intelligence, there is cognisership through association
with that (adjunct), similarly, since for Brahman there
are transformations of its adjunct maya, which take
on the reflections of intelligence, there is omniscience,
because the universe, though existing in the three times,
is immediately known through the flashes (of
intelligence) reflected in that (maya).

The author of the Tattvamddhi, however, establishes 4.3
omniscience thus : since, in the manner mentioned,

184 CHAPTER I

perception of the entire existent world is possible for
Brahman, and since as possessing impressions produced
thereby, remembrance is intelligible, there is established
the cognition of all past things; since, prior to creation,
maya is transformed, in accordance with the unseen
potencies of the jivas, in the form of cognitions of all
objects, for Brahman too, which has that (maya) as
adjunct, there results, as witness thereof, instrumenta-
lity in respect of that (transformation), and hence
cognition relating to future things is intelligible.

The author of the Kaumudi, however, says thus:
since even by the knowledge that is Brahman's nature
everything in relation to that is manifested, there is
omniscience ; for, even in the case of the past and the
future, association with that is intelligible since they
exist, in the form of impressions, like a sketched but
unfinished picture painted on the wall of nescience ;
but His omniscience is not through cognitions through
psychoses, because of conflict with the restrictive
Scriptural text " That alone shining, all else shines
after it " ; and since, prior to creation, in accordance
with the restriction in " one alone, without a second "
there has to be declared the absorption of cognitions
through psychoses, in the same way as of the gross
elements, there is the contingence of the non-existence
of Brahman's omniscience at that time and consequently
the contingence of the non-existence of creator ship in
respect of the seeing, that is of the form of the first
transformation of maya, and in respect of the gross
elements etc., which are preceded by that (seeing). If
it be said " This being the case, for Brahman there

BRAHMAN'S OMNISCIENCE 185

would be only being of the nature of knowledge
relating to all, not omniscience consisting in the knower-
ship of all", true, Brahman is certainly of the nature
of knowledge relating to all, not the knower of all; for
Him, there is not knowership of the nature of agency ;
hence it is that in the section " Because of the agree-
ment of texts " it has been said by the commentator
that oognisership is a characteristic mark of the jiva;
even the Scriptural text, "He who is omniscient" has
to be construed only in the view of His being of the
nature of knowledge.

Though Brahman even by the intelligence that is 4-5
His own nature is the manif ester of everything in
association with Himself, yet that (knowledge), though
in its own nature not an effect, is still, in its nature as
defined by what is cognised, an effect of Brahman;
hence there is no conflict whatever even with the text
"He who is omniscient" which declares agency in
respect of the generation of knowledge : thus says the
preceptor Vacaspati Misra.

Now, why does not the jiva too, like the Lord, 5-0
manifest objects even by the intelligence which is of
his nature, without requiring a psychosis?

To this it is said thus in the Vivarana : 5-1
Brahman's intelligence being in identity with
everything, as the material cause of everything,
manifests everything associated with itself ; not
(so) the jfva's intelligence, for, though omnipresent
as having (the omnipresent) nescience for adjunct,
yet, as not being the material cause, it is not associated
s i-*4

186 CHAPTER I

(with those objects) . Just as the generality " cowness,"
which is omnipresent, though by nature not associated
with particulars likie horse, is yet associated with a
particular possessing a dewlap, similarly, the jlva,
though by nature not associated with objects, is yet
associated with the internal organ. And thus, when
the transformation of the internal organ, in the form
of a psychosis, goes out, through channels like the eyes,
extends up to the object quickly in the form of long rays
of light like the rays from the sense of sight, and
pervades the object, then, as associated therewith, (the
jiva's intelligence) has that object for the sphere
(of cognition). Just as grass etc., though not com-
bustible by pure fire, are yet combustible by fire in
association with an iron ball, though pot etc. are not
manifestable by the pure intelligence of the jlva, it
stands to reason that they are manifestable by that
(intelligence) in association with a psychosis of the
internal organ.

Or else, as having the internal organ for adjunct,
the jlva is finite ; therefore, because of absence of
association, he does not manifest pot etc.; but when,
through the channel of the psychosis, there is manifested
the non-difference from Brahman's intelligence as
defined by the object associated with that (psychosis),
it (the jiva's intelligence) manifests that object.

Or else, the jiva, though' omnipresent, is yet not
manifest himself, because of being obscured by
nescience ; hence he does not manifest objects ; because of
the association with a psychosis in respect of a particular
object, the obscuration being removed, he is manifest

FUNCTION OF THE PSYCHOSIS

there alone and manifests that object alone. And thus,
for the sake of association with intelligence, or for the
sake of the manifestation of non-difference from object-
(defined) intelligence, or for the sake of the removal of
obscuration, the going forth of the psychosis is required
and there is manifestation of that object alone which
is in association with that (psychosis) ; hence, even the
parviscience (little-ktoowingness) of the jlva is
intelligible.

On the first of these views, in the case of the omni-
present jlva, what is the association with an object
dependent on a psychosis ? For, even by a psychosis
it is not possible to bring about identity or conjunction
as between the jiva-intelligence and the object-intelli-
gence, both of which are already established and devoid
of activity.

To this some say that the relation is only that of
object and subject.

Others, however, say thus: if the psychosis were
determinative of the relation of object and subject
alone, then, the determination of that by a psychosis
of the sense, even when it does not go forth, would
not bring about undue extension ; hence there is
the contingence of the futility of the admission of
its going forth ; therefore, that (view) is not
acceptable; but, when the psychosis, which has attained
identity with the jiva-intelligence proximate to the
object, is in conjunction with the object, for that
( jiva-intelligence) too, there results through the channel
of that (psychosis) an indirect relationship; hence

188 CHAPTER!

this (relationship) alone is what is acceptable as the
association with intelligence.

5-113 Yet others, however, say thus: since immediacy is

seen for happiness etc., only in the case of what is in
direct association with intelligence that is immediate,
direct association is required in the case of objects (of)
immediate (experience) ; therefore, since, when the
psychosis is in conjunction with the object, there results
a definition (of the jlva), consisting in the psychosis, as
iso defined, even for the jlva, \vho is the material cause
of that/' 3 there occurs a conjunction (with the object)
born oi' a conjunction (between psychosis and object) ;
for, just as from the conjunction of a cause and a non-
cause there results the conjunction of an effect and
non-effect, there stands to reason, because of parity of
reasoning, the admission even of the conjunction of a
cause and a non-cause from the conjunction oi an effect
and a non-effect. 56

5.114 A section, however, says thus: what is acceptable

as the association with intelligence is but the production
of identity with the object, through the manifestation
of the non-difference of the intelligence, which is
conditioned by the internal organ and manifests the

55 As a substrate of the illusory presentation in the form of the
psychosis.

56 From the conjunction of the psychosis, an effect of jiva-intelligence,
with the object, which is not such an effect, a conjunction is sought to be
Inferred as between the jlva, which is a cause of the psychosis, and the
object, which is a non-cause. The illustration runs thus: when the hand is
in contact with a tree, the hand is a cause, the tree a non-cause; because
of their conjunction, there is conjunction between the body (an effect
of the hand) and the tree (a non-effect of the hand). The body being an
flvayavin is the effect of the avayava (hand).

FUNCTION OF THE PSYCHOSIS

object, from the Brahman-intelligence that has been
identified with the object; though the jiva, as
omnipresent, is in proximity to all objects, if in that
(jiva) form he could manifest objects, that (form)
being common to all, there could not be the distinction
of immediacy for different persons, and hence only in
that form of his, conditioned by the internal organ, does
he manifest objects; and thus, the final view that, in the
immediate experience of objects, a superimposed
relation is the determinant, is also in accord (with
reason) ; nor is there thus confusion with the second
view (as to the function of the psychosis), since there
is certainly this difference between the two, viz., that
the first view is (based) on the omnipresence of the
jiva, the second on its finitude.

Now, on the second view, what is the manifest ation 5-12
of non-difference '1

Some say thus: the identification of the object- 5-121
defined and internal-organ-delined intelligences through
a psychosis, like (the identification) of the waters of
the tank and the field through a channel, is the manifes-
tation of non-difference ; and thus, though the object-
defined Brahman-intelligence is alone what manifests
the object, yet the jiva manifesting objects is intelligible,
since by the identification (with the jiva) through the
psychosis, the nature of the jiva is brought about (for
that Brahman-intelligence ) .

Others, however, say thus: the manifestation of 5122
non-difference is not the identification of Brahman,

190 CHAPTER i

which is 111 the position of the prototype and is object-
divfined, with the jlva, who is in the position of a
reflection, since their identification is impossible so
long as there exists a distinguishing adjunct, like a
mirror (in the case of a reflection); and if by the
psychosis-produced manifestation of non-difference
there result the nature of the jlva for the object-defined
Brahman, then, there being no conjunction for Brahman
at that time with that object, cognisership of that would
be impossible and there would result non-existence of
His omniscience. Rather is it that the object-defined
Brahman-intelligence causes in the proximate part of
the psychosis associated with the object a reflection that
manifests the object, and hence there is the identification
of that reflection with the jlva ; and thus is intelligible
even the non-confusion among the intelligences defined
by the internal organ, its psychosis and the object, these
being respectively in the positions of knower, means of
knowledge and object known; nor may it be said " If
the psychosis-conditioned intelligence be valid know-
ledge of the object, since there is not for it, as for the
intelligence that is the substrate of the object, a super-
imposed relation with the object, the superimposed
relation would not be the cause of the immediacy of the
object"; for, since in the psychosis there is reflection
only of that intelligence which is the substrate of the
object and which is defined by the object, because of
their non-difference, 57 there exists that relation (of
superimposition) .

57 That is, non-difference of the reflection in the psychosis from the
original, viz., the intelligence that is the. substrate of the object

FUNCTION OF THE PSYCHOSIS

Yet others, however, say thus: what manifests 5-123
objects, through a direct relation 58 of superimposition,
is but the intelligence which is in the position of the
prototype and is the substrate of objects; though there
is difference (between it and the jiva) in its character
as (really) qualified by being the prototype, yet in its
nature as intelligence characterised per acdclens by that
(being the prototype) there is identification, which
alone is the manifestation of non-difference ; nor is there
thus confusion between the jiva and Brahman, nor
conflict with Brahman's omniscience, since that
continues as before, in the nature of prototype.

Now, on the third view, what is it that is said to be 5-13
the removal of obscuration ? If it be said to be the
destruction of ignorance, even by the cognition of the
pot there would be removed the universe grounded on
ignorance; if this be said, some say to this

that of the ignorance which obscures intelligence 5*1311
in its entirety, there is, through knowledge in the part
defined by the object, destruction in part as of total
darkness by the light of a glow-worm etc., or a rolling
up as of a mat, or a retreat as of a frightened soldier;
this is the removal.

Others, however, say thus : if ignorance be destroyed 5- 1312
in part, then, because of the non-existence of the
material cause, there could be no fresh origination (of
obscuration) there ; hence, when once removed, there is
the contingence of the non-existence of obscuration

58 Not a relation of superimposition in respect of a reflection, as on.
ttie preceding view.

192 CHAPTER I

even at other times; and, in the case of what is non-
active, retreat and rolling up are impossible; hence,
removal of the nature afore-mentioned is not possible.
Therefore even of the ignorance that obscures intelli-
gence in its entirety, the removal consists only in its
nature of not obscuring the object-defined intelligence,
which stands associated with the psychoses having the
respective forms (of the object) ; nor may it be objected
" In the case of ignorance which, like the cloth concealing
an object, stands located in the object-intelligence, how
does the non-obscuration of that (intelligence) stand to
reason ?"; for, by the cognition " I am ignorant/' it is
understood that even while located in the intelligence
that is manifest in the experience of " I ", there is non-
obscuration of that (jlva) by that (ignorance).

5-132 Yet others, however, say thus: what is experienced

in the form " I do not know the pot ", as in opposition
to the knowledge of the pot, and as removable by that
(knowledge), in the form "when there is knowledge
of the pot, the ignorance of the pot is removed " is not
primal ignorance, since this (latter) which has pure
intelligence for content and is removable by the know-
ledge of that (intelligence) cannot be of that
character. 59 Rather is it another ignorance, of the
nature of a particular mode of primal ignorance, having
pot-defined intelligence for content ; hence, the destruc-
tion of that alone is the removal ; nor thus, when that is
destroyed by a single cognition, is there the contingence
of the non-removal of obscuration by other cognitions,

69 I.e., removable by cognitions of particulars like the pot,

MODAL IGNORANCES 193

since it is admitted that as many as the cognitions are
the ignorances removable by them.

These ignorances, which' are of the nature of 5-1321
modes, are, like primal ignorance, beginningless, since
they are (of the nature of) ignorance : thus say some.

Sleep, which obscures the empirical world and jiva 5-1322
and projects the world and jiva in the dream, is of the
nature of a particular mode of ignorance, because of
being endowed with the obscuring and projecting
capacities; similarly, even the state of deep sleep is,
like primal ignorance, certainly a mode of ignorance
experienced in the period of deep sleep, since there is
seen the reflection " I slept well, I did not know
anything/' when the internal organ etc. are merged;
since these two (modes of ignorance) arise only when
there is quiescence of the karma that causes enjoyment
in waking life, they have a beginning; hence, even other
ignorance, of the nature of a mode, has a beginning;
thus say others.

Now, it may be said " On the view of beginning- 5-1323
lessness, in respect of a pot, even by the cognition that
arises first, there would be the destruction of all
ignorances about it, because of the absence of any
determination, 00 and because without the destruction off
all ignorances obscuring the intelligence defined by that
(pot), the manifestation of the object would be impossi-
ble ; therefore, in the case of the subsequent cognitions,
the (defect of) non-removal of obscuration certainly
continues as before ".

60 As to which ignorance is to be destroyed by which cognition.

$1-35

194 CHAPTER I

5-13211 To this some say thus : just as even though there
are many antecedent non-existences of cognition, when
a single cognition arises, only a single antecedent non-
existence ceases, and though there exist other antecedent
non-existences, which are of the nature of obscurations
of that (object), as capable of producing doubt etc.,
there is the manifestation of the object, similarly, when
a single cognition arises, a single ignorance alone
ceases; and though there exist other ignorances, there
is manifestation of the object.

5*13212 Others, however, holding that " the immediacy of
what is obscured is self -contradictory, and when a single
cognition arises, though other antecedent non-existences
exist, yet, because of the specific cognition (of the
object), there is not that obscuration which is of the
nature of the entirety of the non-existence o'f specific
cognitions," say thus: when a particular ignorance
obscures, then by the cognition of that, there is the
destruction of that (ignorance) alone; and all
(ignorance) does not obscure all the time, because of
futility; rather is it that when the obscuring ignorance
is destroyed by a psychosis, and when there is a cessa-
tion of that psychosis, another ignorance obscures; nor
when this is the case is there the contingenco that at the
time of the rise of Brahman-realisation, even by that
there would not be the removal of those ignorances
which remain without obscuring; for, these, though not
directly opposed to that (realisation), are dependent on
primal ignorance which is removable by that, and hence
even by the removal of that (primal ignorance) their
removal is intelligible, as in the case of the relation of

SUBSEQUENT COGNITIONS IN A CONTINUOUS STREAM 195

ignorance and so on; 01 it is only for the sake of this,
that, as of the nature of particular modes thereof, their
dependence on that (primal ignorance) is recognised.

Yet others, however, holding that "since it is of 5-13213
the nature of ignorance to have a content, as a general
rule, all (of it) certainly obscures all the time ; nor may
it be said that, since prior to the origination of the
object there is nothing to be obscured, obscuration
(then) does not stand to reason, since even then it exists
in a subtle form/' 02 make the following assumption;
just as in a place where many persons are gathered
together, the thunder that falls on some one's head
drives away others too, or just as the medicine that
cures sannipata, 03 while remedying one evil, drives
away another evil (too), similarly cognition, while
destroying one ignorance, subjugates other ignorances
as well; and the subjugation consists in counteracting
the obscuring capacity, so long as the cognition lasts.

Now, this being the case, in the case of a continuous
stream of cognition, there would be futility for the
second and subsequent cognitions, as not removing
obscuration, since obscuration in its entirety has been
removed even by the first cognition, through removal
and subjugation.

61 When ignorance is destroyed, the relation of ignorance to the
self is also destroyed therewith and does not call for another lagent of
destruction.

62 The Vedantins, unlike the NaiySyikas, are satkaryavadins, and
maintain the pre-existcnce, In a subtle form, of the effect in the cause.

63 A combined derangement of the three humours of the body, causing
fever of a dangerous kind.

196 CHAPTER I

5-132131 To this they say thus: ignorance, though subju-
gated by the psychosis, yet, on the cessation of that,
obscures again, as does the darkness subjugated by a
light, when the light goes out; but if at the time o the
cessation of a psychosis another psychosis arises, the
ignorance that has been subjugated remains in that
condition alone, as does darkness when another light
conies in at the time one light goes out; and thus, in
conformity with the definition common to whatever
maintains antecedent non-existence, 04 viz., that that of
which there is existence when there is existence of
another at the previous instant and of which there is
non-existence in the absence of that (other), is the
product of that (other), it follows that non-obscuration
is the product even of the second and subsequent
psychoses ; hence, there is not their futility.

5432132 The author of the Nyayacandrika, however, says
thus : by a particular cognition, there is but destruction
of a particular ignorance, but not the subjugation of
other obscuring ignorances as well; and thus, even in
the case of the second and subsequent psychoses in a
continuous stream of cognition, there is f ruitiulness, as
each destroys a single ignorance ; nor is there thus the
contingence of the non-manifestation of the object
because of the possibility of obscuration even on the

64 If an expiatory rite is performed, there is no misery; if it is
hot performed, there is misery. Hence the performance of the rite is
said to be the cause of the non-existence of misery, though what happens
is but the perpetuation of the antecedent non-existence of misery, and
antecedent non-existence is beginningless. The empirical usage of the
causal concept in such cases is based on the definition of causality here
formulated: that of which there is existence etc,

RELATION OF TIME TO THE FUNCTION OF COGNITION 197

rise of knowledge; for, ignorances which are of the
nature of modes, obscure the nature (of things) as
qualified per accidens by the respective times, and cog-
nitions destroy all ignorances that obscure the object as
qualified per accidens by their own times; 05 and thus,
when a particular cognition arises, because of the
destruction of the ignorance obscuring the object at that
time, and because of the other existing ignorances being
such as obscure the object at other times (alone), there
is no unintelligibility whatsoever in the manifestation of
the object at that time; like the proximity in time in
respect of rain, the fruit of the Kariri (rite), the
respective times are but qualifications per accidens in
respect of pot etc., the objects of ignorance, and hence do
not enter into the constitution of the objects; hence there
is no unintelligibility whatever even in the removal of
ignorances by the second and subsequent cognitions of
a continuous stream, which (cognitions) do not have for
content the subtle differences among the various times. 66

Some, however, (say thus) : it is only the ignorance 5-132133
removable by the first cognition that obscures the bare
existence (of the object) ; but what are removed by the
second and subsequent cognitions are those whose
objects are qualified by space, time and such attributes.

65 I.e., the time during which each cognition lasts.

66 The difference between each instant in a continuous stream is not
cognised; if these differences in time were really attributes Of the object,
ignorance could not be removed by the cognition not aware of the
temporal differences; hence the attempt to show that temporal
differences are but qualifications per accidens, on the analogy of the
Kariri rite, whose object is to produce rain; what is intended is no doubt
rain immediately, not in some distant future; but since this temporal
qualification by itself cannot be accomplished by a rite and may occur
independently of the rite, it is an upalaksana, not a vi6e?ana.

198 CHAPTER I

Hence it is that when there has once arisen the
perception of Caitra, which is of the nature of the certi-
tude of existence and removes ignorance, there is not
experienced the obscuration of existence in the form "I
do not know Caitra," but only the obscuration of the
qualified, in the form "I do not know where he is now"
arid so on. If it be the case with some forgetful persons
that there is seen obscuration of existence in the form
" I do not know ", even in respect of what was once
seen, let it be so in their case ; elsewhere, when (an object
has been) once seen, cognitions and ignorance have but
the qualified for objects. Nor may it be said " This
being the case, for the second and subsequent cognitions
of a continuous stream, there would not be the removal
of ignorance, since ignorance as qualified by gross
(i.e., perceptible) time has been removed even by the
first cognition, while, of the ignorance qualified by the
subtle tim'e other than those of the earlier and later
cognitions, 67 the removal is impossible by the second
and subsequent cognitions which do not have that
(time) for content;" for in the case of a continuous
stream, since it is possible even for the psychosis, that
arises first, to last for that period, 68 no differences of

67 The later cognition destroys, if at all, the ignorance qualified by
the time intervening between the lapse of the earlier cognition and the
coming into being of itself; this, it has been said, is momentary and too
subtle to be perceived. Since thus the cognition does not have that time for
content, how can it destroy ignorance as qualified by that time? This is
the objection*

68 I.e., the period of the entire cognition. For a further exposition
of this view, see the Vedantaparibtuift and the SikhtimaQi commentary
thereon (p. 23 et. scq). Most of the difficulties met here are due to the
conception of present time as a bare instant. But the Naiyayikas and the
Vedantins rightly recognise what is called the " specious present " as
containing a residuum of the past and a foreshadowing of the future. On
the subject of temporal perception and the "specious present," see Indian
Psychology, Perception, pp. 153162,

SUBSEQUENT COGNITIONS NON-PROBATIVE 199

psychosis are admitted; even if that were admitted,
since it m'ay possibly be of the nature of five or six
psychoses, each lasting a long time, it is intelligible
that they may have contents differentiated by such
qualifications as gross time differentiating them one
from another ; and even if it be admitted to be of the
form of a succession of many psychoses rising at* each
instant, since, for the second and subsequent psychoses,
as having for object only a thing already known, there
is no probativeness, there is no harm even if they do
not remove obscuration. Indeed, probativeness does
not consist merely in non-sublation of content, for, in
the case of the hill and the fire thereon, which are
(respectively) previously cognised and non-cognised,
and are the content of inference, there being no
distinction as to non-sublation, there is the contingence
of the probativeness of inference in respect of both.
Nor is this a contingence of the acceptable ; for there is
not seen the empirical usage " in respect of the hill too,
inference is the means of valid knowledge " as (there is
seen the empirical usage) "in respect of fire, inference
is the means of valid knowledge " ; and it is said in the
Vivarana in the case of ignorance (directly) established
by the witness that, though the content of inference etc.,
whose object is to make known the exclusion of non-
existence (from it), it is not the object of knowledge
for any means of valid knowledge. Therefore, since
for the second and subsequent psychoses, as for
psychoses like contemplation, there is no probativeness,
there is no harm even if they do not remove ignorance,

200 CHAPTER I

since the removal of that is admitted only in the case
of probative psychoses.

Now, there is not even this rule; for, a mediate
psychosis (though probative, as in inference) since it
does not go forth, does not remove ignorance ; if this be

said

i *-

5-1321331 in reply to this some say thus: the ignorance

that obscures objects is of two kinds; one is located in
the object, is of the nature of the material cause of the
projection associated with rope etc., and is assumed
because of the product (i.e., the delusion) ; the other is
located in the person and is known from the experience
" I do not know this "; since for what is located in the
person material causality is not possible in respect of the
projection associated with the object, and since for
what is located in the object there can be no conjunction
with the manifestation " I do not know this," which
is of the nature of the witness, there is necessity even
for both kinds (of ignorance) ; and thus, since there is
no going forth of the psychosis, in the case of the
mediate (cognition), and since, in respect of the tree at
a distance, though the particular size is understood from
the testimony of a reliable person, there is seen the
projection of a size contrary thereto, (it follows that)
even when the ignorance present in the object is not
removed, there is certainly the rem'oval of the ignorance
present in the person ; for, in the case of the ignorance
experienced in the form " I do not know the meaning
of the sacred teaching" its removal is experienced
immediately after the teaching of that (meaning);
hence it is that for the Vivarma (passage) "in

IGNORANCE AS SUBJECT-LOCATED AND OBJECT- LOCATED 201

inference etc., there is [not] removal of susupti
(lit., sleep)," it is said in the Tattvadlpcma that the
meaning is " there is (not) removal of the ignorance

present in the object of that (inference etc.)" 00

/

Others, however, say thus : ignorance located in the 5-1321332
person alone, like the film 1 in the eye, is what obscures
objects ; there is no evidence for an ignorance which is
over and above that and is present in the object; nor
may it be said: "for what is located in the person
transformation into the projection present in the object
is not possible; or, if it were possible, then, in respect
of the size of the tree at a distance, when ignorance is
removed by mediate cognition, the projection of a
contrary size would not be possible"; for, since, in the
doctrine of Vaeaspati, the whole universe is an illusory
manifestation of Brahman which has been made the
content of the ignorance located in the jiva, similarly,
it is intelligible that nacre-silver etc. are illusory
manifestations of Brahman made the content of the
ignorance located in the person; 70 and by a mediate
psychosis, though a particular mode be removed, yet

69 The word "not" has been introduced in square brackets in the
translation to .correspond to the negative particle in the original texts;
the mutilated quotation in the present work makes sense only in conjunc-
tion with the commentary; what is expressly stated in the Tattva&ipana
is only the non-removal of ignorance; but because inferential knowledge
too is knowledge and because of the use of the words "tad-vi?ay&-'jfi&na" it
is inferred that the removal of some other ignorance (purusa-gata-'jnana)
is meant.

70 It is only if the concept of transformation (pariijRma) is adopted
and a pariQ&ma-k&rana looked for, that ignorance resident in the object
would have to be treated as a material cause of the projection; no such
assumption is necessary on the hypothesis of illusory manifestation.
Sl26

202 CHAPTER I

the projection of a contrary size is intelligible, through
another mode (of ignorance).

5*1321338 Yet others, however, say thus: because of its
according with the intelligibility of the transformation
into nacre-silver etc., 71 it is only the ignorance present
in the object that obscures it, like a cloth that covers
the object; nor may it be said that if that be the case,
there would be the defects, viz., the unintelligibility of
the manifestation of ignorance because of its non-
conjunction with the witness that is conditioned by the
internal organ, and the impossibility of (its) being
removed by mediate psychoses ; for, though for
ignorance in the form of modes there is no conjunction
with the witness, yet the manifestation " I do not know
nacre " is certainly intelligible in the case of primal
ignorance, which is in conjunction with that (witness) ;
for, even in the case of nacre etc., since they are non-
different from the intelligence that is the content of
primal ignorance, there is no contradiction in their
being experienced as the content of that (primal
ignorance) ; and the evidence of the perception " I do
not know this " is exhibited in the Vivarana etc., only
in the context of establishing primal ignorance ; even if
there be admitted the distinction that only the
experience of ignorance in general, in the form " I am
ignorant", is the content of primal ignorance, while the
experience of ignorance as embracing particular
objects in such forms as "I do not know nacre," is the

71 If nacre silver is to be conceived as the product of a transforma-
tion, it must be the product neither of. nacre nor of ignorance located in
the subject, but of ignorance located in the nacre,

NATURE OP THE WITNESS 208

content of the modal ignorance, yet, whether because
of the conjunction of primal ignorance with the witness,
there being non-difference between modes and that
which has modes, or because of the identity in fact
between the witness-intelligence and the object-intelli-
gence, 72 it is intelligible that even the modal ignorance
present in the object may have the witness for content;
though mediate cognition does not remove ignorance,
the experience of its removal thereby is intelligible as
a delusion conditioned by non-experience caused by the
obstacle, viz., the mediate psychosis of the nature of
certitude of existence; for immediate cognition alone
is admitted to remove ignorance as a rule.

No\v, there is not even this rule, since, in the case
of the perception of nescience, individuation and
its attributes of pleasure, pain etc., the removal of
ignorance is not admitted; if this be said, no; the
perception of nescience etc. being of the nature of the
witness, there is no detriment to the rule that immediate
cognition in the nature of a psychosis does remove
obscuration.

Now, who is this witness, who is spoken of over and
above the jlva?

To this it is said thus in the Kutasthadlpa: the 5-14111
immutable intelligence, which is the substrate of the

72 Since there is non-difference between primal ignorance and its
modes, and since primal ignorance is in conjunction with the witness,
modal ignorances are also in such conjunction; this is the first explanation.
The witness-intelligence is in reality non-different from the object-defined
intelligence; modal ignorance located in the latter is, therefore, in con-
junction with the former tbo; this is the second explanation,

two bodies, 73 since it directly sees the two bodies that
define itself, and since it is free from modification, is
said to be the witness. In ordinary experience too, the
character of being a witness is well-known to consist
only in indifference and knowledge. Though for the jiva
there are psychoses which manifest the two bodies, yet
the two bodies which are certainly manifested to some
extent all the time by the all-pervasive immutable)
intelligence as defined by themselves, are (also)
manifested through psychoses-cognitions which go
forth at intervals from the internal organ, which is the
womb (as it were) of the reflection of intelligence
constituting the jiva; but in the intervals, they are
manifested, along with the non-existence of psychoses,
by the immutable intelligence alone. Hence it is that
individuation etc., being always in conjunction with
the manifestation, are not the sphere of doubt etc., and
there is the recollection in the case of the individuation
contemporaneous with continuous cognition of some-
thing else " for so long I was certainly perceiving
this." Nor may it be doubted how, in the case of what
is manifested by the immutable, there could be empirical
usage, memory etc. for the jiva; for, through identifica-
tion with the jiva by reciprocal superimposition the
immutable is proximate to 74 the jiva. Nor may it be said
" let the jiva intelligence itself be the witness, why the
immutable?"; for, in the case of that (jiva), the agent
in empirical usage, worldly and Scriptural, indifferent

73 The gross and the subtle.

74 That is to say, is not external to the jiva, as Devadatta and
Yajfiadatta are external to each other. In the latter case, what is mani-
fested by one could not serve the other's empirical usage or memory,

WITNESS AS OTHER THAN THE JIVA 205

spectatorship is impossible, and hence the character of
the witness, as declared in the Scriptural text " Witness,
intelligence, pure and free from gunas ", is impossible;
further, in the text "Of the two one eats of the sweet
fruit, the other looks on without eating, " the witness,
of the nature of indifferent manifestation, is mentioned
as distinct from the jlva, the enjoyer of the fruit of
karma.

In the Ndtakadipa too, the witness is shown as
distinct from the jiva, by the example of the
lamp in the theatre. It is thus: " The lamp present
in the theatre illuminates without distinction the
master (the owner of the show), the audience
and the danseuse, and illumines even in their absence.' 7
Similarly, the jlva, of the nature of individuation
qualified by the appearance of intelligence, is
comparable to the master who has a conceit
(of ownership) in the dance, since he possesses joy and
grief produced by the conceit (of ownership) in the
perfection or imperfection of the enjoyment of objects;
objects are comparable to the members of the audience,
since though existing close to that (jiva) they are free
from that (joy and grief) ; as possessing manifold
changes, the intellect is comparable to the danseuse;
that which illuminates all these and shines in sleep etc.,
even when individuation etc. are absent, is the witness,
which is of the nature of the immutable intelligence,
the substrate of the jiva-delusion consisting in indivi-
duation qualified by the appearance of intelligence.

The witness thus distinguished from the jiva does
not belong to the constitution of Brahman either, but is

206 CHAPTER I

intelligence untouched by the distinction of jiva and the
Lord : thus is it said in the Ktitasthadlpa.

In the Tattvapradlpikd too, it is said that since in
the case of the Supreme Lord, associated with maya and
endowed with attributes, the qualifications pure, with-
out gunas would be unintelligible, the pure Brahman,
who is the inner self of all, gets to be the witness,
because of non-difference from the jiva.

5-14112 In the Kaumudi, however, it is said thus: because
of the Scriptural declaration of divinity etc., in " The
one divine being, concealed in all beings, all-pervasive,
the inner self of all, the supervisor of (all) action, the
abode of all things, the witness, intelligence, pure,
without gunas ", what is called the witness is but some
particular form of the Supreme Lord, who knows
continuously the jlva's engaging in and desisting from
activity, himself being indifferent j and he, as not being
the abode of such attributes as causality (of the
world), 75 is immediate; and, as manifesting the
ignorance etc. persent in the jiva, he is proximate to
the jlvaj and in sleep etc., when there is quiescence of
the effect and the cause, 70 it is he who manifests the
ignorance present in the jiva and is called Prajna; in
the section about deep sleep and departure, it is
ascertained that what is taught by the two Scriptural

75 The witness, as the knower of the jlva's ignorance etc., is proxi-
mate to the jiva, while the Lord, the omniscient, omnipotent cause of the
world, is remote from the jiva. How, then, can the Lord be the witness?
The answer is that the witness is not the Lord, but a mode of the Lord, in
which mode there are not such attributes as causing the world.

76 The effect is the body, and the cause signifies the organs (the
indriyas).

WITNESS AS A MODE OP 1SVARA 207

texts " Just as he, embraced by the woman he loves,
knows nothing outside nor anything within, even, so
this person, embraced by this Prajna self, knows nothing
outside nor anything within ", " He goes forth making
a great noise, mounted by the Prajna self" as
different from the jiva in the states of deep sleep and
departure, is the Supreme Lord; this (ascertainment)
too has the witness for purport.

In the Tattvasuddhi too, this view alone is esta- 5-14113
Wished by the following statement : just as, in the
delusion " This is silver", the this-element, though
really included in the constitution of the nacre, is
apparently of the constitution of silver, even so, the
witness, who is certainly of the constitution of Brahman,
is apparently of the constitution of the jiva; hence its
service in the empirical usage of the jiva's happiness etc.

Some, however, say thus: the nescience-conditioned 5-14121
jiva alone is the witness, because of being directly the
spectator; for, in ordinary experience too, the
character of being a witness is well known to be
spectatorship without agency; and that is directly
possible only for the jiva, who is of the nature
of unattached, indifferent manifestation, since the jiva,
though subject to the imposition of agency etc., through
getting identified with the internal organ, is in himself
indifferent; as for the hymn " The one divine being
etc.," that teaches the character of being the witness in
the case of Brahman, with reference to its condition as
the jiva; the hymn " Two birds etc.," on the principle
of the section of (the persons in) the cave, has for

208 CHAPTER I

purport both the jira and the Lord ; 77 or, in the manner
explained by the Painyirahasya-brahmana cited in the
commentary on the section of the cave, it has for purport
both the jlva and the internal organ; hence, there is no
conflict whatever. 78

5-14122 Others, however, say thus: true, the jlva alone is
the witness, but not in his form as conditioned by
omnipresent nescience, as there is contingence of the
perceptibility of one person's internal organ etc., by
another person, there being no difference in the con-
junction with the witness that manifests one's own
internal organ; nor is there non-contingence of this,
since, through difference in the internal organ, there is
difference in the cogniser ; for, in respect of the internal
organ etc., which are to be manifested by Ihe witness,
when the witness is non-different throughout, the
difference in the cogniser is of no avail; therefore, it is
as conditioned by the internal organ that the jlva is the
witness ; and thus, whether because of the non-conjunc-
tion of one person's internal organ etc., with another
person's witness, because of the witness being different
for each person, or because of the impossibility of that
(perceptual relation), 79 the non-manifestation is intelli-
gible; since the internal organ exists in a subtle form

77 That is to say, the witness is the Lord in the jlva-condition, so
that there is no need to identify the bird that does not eat with the Lord
exclusively.

78 The jlva meant hy the Painffi-rahasya-brahmaya is the reflection
of intelligence In nescience, not in the internal organ; the latter cannot be
said not to eat; the former is unattached and indifferent and hence may
be Identified with the witness without contradicting Scripture.

79 In the case of other persons' internal organs etc,

WITNESS AS JIVA MANIFESTATION OF NESCIENCE 209

even in sleep, the witness conditioned thereby certainly
exists even then; nor may it be said " since the internal
organ-conditioned, is the cogniser, he is not the witness ;
and since in sleep, though there is no cogniser, the wit-
ness exists, their difference should necessarily be
declared"; for the difference between attribute and
adjunct being acceptable to the final position, 80 the
difference (between cogniser and witness) is intelligible
in the form " what is qualified by the internal organ is
the cogniser; what is conditioned by that (internal
organ, as an adjunct) is the witness."

Now, if, for the witness of the nature afore- 51421
mentioned, obscuration by ignorance, that obscures
intelligence in its entirety, is unavoidable, how, then, is
there the manifestation of nescience, individuation etc.
by what is (itself) obscured ? If this be asked, some say
that, like Rahu, 81 nescience is manifested by the light
obscured by itself.

In fact, ignorance obscures intelligence only to the 5-H22
exclusion of the witness-intelligence, which is the
manifester of nescience, the internal organ and its

80 Of the advaitins. The distinction is thus: what persists in the
effect is an attribute (vie?ana), like the blueness of the lily; what does
not persist is either an adjunct (upadhi) or qualification per accident
(upalak?ana) ; of these, the adjunct lasts at least as long as the effect, not
so the upalak^ana; when we say! "bring the red crystal", the redness^
though not natural to the crystal, lasts till the crystal is brought; but
when Devadatta's house is indicated as that which has a crow sitting on
It, the crow may not remain there till the house is reached. See the
Kalpataru, pp. 420, 421 (AK8).

81 Rahu is not seen except by the light of the luminary which It
obscures (in eclipses).

SI 27

210 CHAPTER I

attributes; because of this being postulated in confor-
mity with experience, there is no defect. Hence it is,
because of the conjunction of these (nescience etc.) all
the time with unobscured manifestation, that they are
not the sphere of ignorance, erroneous cognition or
doubt. If it be said that if the witness-intelligence be
unobscured, there is the contingence of the manifesta-
tion even of the bliss that is of its essential nature, no
(that is not a defect) ; for, it is a contingence of the
acceptable; for, in respect of the self there is seen
unconditioned love due to the manifestation of the
nature of bliss, and there is the Vwarana statement
"There is certainly manifested happiness characterised
by being the abode of supreme love."

5*14231 Be this so ; if happiness be manifest even now, there
is the contingence of non-distinction between release
and the state of transmigration. Now, though the
bliss of the witness, wherein difference is posited, 82 is
manifest, the undefined Brahman bliss, which is
obscured, is not manifest in the state of transmigration,
and hence there is distinction ; if this be said, no ; for,
the element of undefinedness in bliss is not a human goal,
while the mere immediacy of bliss exists even now. 83

82 From the bliss that is Brahman, which as reflected in nescience
constitutes the bliss of the witness; the latter is different from the former,
as a reflection from the prototype; but in both cases the difference is
assumptive.

83 The bliss of the witness is experienced by the different jlvas; this
experience has two aspects, immediacy and reciprocal difference. The
former aspect is present even now, in bondage; as for the latter, the
absence of the difference, which is posited in the self, is not of itself a
human goal. If, however, differentiation be an essential characteristic of
tho bliss we experience, then, our bliss should be radically different from
Brahman-bliss.

MANIFESTATION OF HAPPINESS OBJECTIONS

Now, the defined bliss of the witness is surpassable, is
not very clear, since it is common to sleep, and since
in the happiness from material objects there is
experience of its beingfc surpassed ; whereas the un-
defined Brahman-bliss is unsurpassable, since in the
AnandavalU, the description of the hundredfold supe-
riority of each succeeding stage beginning with human
bliss culminates in Brahman-bliss. If this be said, no ;
for, the bliss of the witness, bliss from material objects
and Brahman-bliss being in fact identical according to
the final position, superiority and inferiority are
impossible. If it be said that Scripture declares the
progressive superiority of each later stage beginning
with human bliss, who is it that says Scripture does not
declare it? But it is said that it cannot be justified on
the view of non-dualism. Now, since in the case of
the sun's light, which is but one, there are seen degrees
of manifestation, as conditioned by differences in the
manif esters, such as the palm (of the hand), a crystal
and a mirror, in the case of bliss, though one, the
possession of superiority and inferiority, consisting in
degrees of manifestation as conditioned by differences
in the manif esters, the psychoses of happiness, stands
to reason ; if this be said, no ; for, the illustration is not
admitted; in the case of the sun's light, which spreads
everywhere, which shines (but) not clearly in the sky
without relation to the palm etc., when the passage is
obstructed by relation to the palm, as in the case of
water running in deep places, there is greater manifesta-
tion because of intensification; when the passage is
obstructed by relation to a bright mirror etc., there is

CHAPTER 1

even greater manifestation than in that (other case),
because of intensification and because of the addition
of the brightness of that (mirror); hence there are
not admitted here degrees of manifestation as condi-
tioned by the manif esters; 84 and, if the illustration
were admitted, since, like the sun's light spreading in
the sky, undefined bliss would be not clear, while of the
bliss defined by the psychosis of happiness there would
be greater manifestation, as of the sun's light defined
by the palm etc., the state of transmigration itself would
turn out to be more desirable than release. Hereby is
refuted even the view that bliss, though manifest in the
state of transmigration, yet, being disturbed by illusory
cognition and its impressions, like the light of the lamp
disturbed by a stiff breeze, is not clearly manifest,
while in release, because of the absence of that
(disturbance), it is manifest as it is (truly) ; for, if the
distinctionless essential bliss be manifest, therein is not
possible an excellence which, because of the defect of
disturbance is not manifest, but attaches to (i.e., is
manifest in) the state of release. Therefore, the
assumption that the bliss of the witness is unobscured
does not stand to reason.

,5-14232 To this the Advaitavidyacarya says thus: just as
when the very superior white light which is but one is
reflected in many mirrors possessing different degrees
of impurity, because of the different degrees of
impurity of the adjuncts, the inferiority of white-
ness is superimposed indifferent degrees on the

84 That is to say, we have in the alleged examples, cases not of
delimitation, but mechanical intensification.

MANIFESTATION OF HAPPINESS REPLY 21<J

respective reflections, even so, when the essential
bliss, which is really unsurpassable and one
alone, becomes the bliss of the witness, as reflected
in the internal organ, and becomes the bliss due
to material objects, as reflected in that psychosis
of the internal organ, which is of the nature of
happiness associated with different degrees of purity,
consisting in superiority and inferiority of the element
of goodness (sattva), caused by the contact of different
objects under the influence of merit acquired in a
previous life, then, because of the defect of degrees of
impurity in the adjunct consisting of the constituent
darkness (tamas), inferiority is superimposed in
different degrees (on that one bliss) ; hence, in bliss,
though manifest in the state of transmigration, there is
no satisfaction, since through the superimposed degrees
of inferiority, it is surpassable; on the rise of know-
ledge, since all superimposition of inferiority ceases and
the superimposed surpassability is lost, there is the
accomplishment of what was to be accomplished; this
distinction being intelligible, the bliss of the witness,
which is manifest as the sphere of unconditioned love,
is certainly unobscured.

Others, however, say thus: bliss, though m'anifest, 5'14233
is certainly obscured, because of the experience " in me
it is not, it is not manifest"; since even in one and the
same witness, differences of aspects posited by nescience
are possible, there is no conflict between non-obscuration
in respect of the intelligence aspect and obscuration in
respect of the bliss aspect ; and since the manifestation
of the essential nature (of Brahman) does not remove

214 CHAPTER 1

obscuration, 85 there is no conflict in the obscuration
(of bliss) when that (essential nature) is manifest ; and
obscuration is seen only in respect of what is manifest,
as in " I do not know the sense stated by you." Nor
may it be said that, in that case, there is experienced!
the obscuration of the specific, alone as defining the
unobscured general form; for, it would be an undue
extension for the obscuration of one to appear as what
defines another. Nor may it be said that (here) what
controls (that appearance) is the relationship of the
generic and the specific and that consequently there is
no undue extension ; for, since there is no relationship
of the generic to the specific other than that of the
pervaded and the pervader, there is the contingence
that the ignorance which obscures smoke would be
experienced in the form " I do not know fire. ' ?8 There-
fore, that by which ignorance appears as defined, that
alone is obscured; hence ignorance is consistent even
with what is manifest. And ignorance, just as it
obscures intelligence to the exclusion of the witness
element, even so it obscures bliss too only to the exclusion
of what have been appropriated by the various psychoses
of happiness. This alone is the removal of obscuration
in the case of bliss from (material) objects. And this
removal of obscuration, like the removal of outer

85 Obscuration can be removed by psychoses alone, not by the
essential self-manifestation of intelligence; for the latter co-exists with
error, which is superimposed thereon.

86 Tor, fire and smoke are in the relation of pervader and pervaded
and this is the only relation between the generic and the specific; if
Ignorance of the specific may determine the obscuration of the generic,
then ignorance of the pervaded (smoke) should appear as ignorance of the
pervader (fire) ; but this is absurd*

NON-ETERNAL FORMS OF THE WITNESS 215

darkness at dawn, comes in increasing degrees, under the
influence of different psychoses due to different causes.
Thence results the reciprocal difference between
essential bliss and the bliss from (material) objects, as
also among the (various) blisses from (material)
objects.

In any case, the witness-intelligence being un-
obscured, the manifestation of individuation etc. there-
by is certainly not in dependence on a psychosis : this is
certainly common (to all the positions).

Now, thus, how is there recollection of individuation 51424
etc., since impression, which is of the nature of cognition
in its subtle state, is impossible when cognition exists,
while its production by the witness, who is eternal, is
impossible?

To this some say thus: individuation, which. is 5-14241
always manifested by the witness in association with
itself, is manifested by the witness even as defined
by itself, as transformed into the forms of the
psychoses having the various pot etc. for objects ; hence,
because of the non-eternality of this (witness), the
production of impressions is possible, as in the case of
objects like pot. There is indeed no rule that the
production of an impression which has oneself for its
sphere should be by the witness only as defined by a
psychosis having the form of oneself; for, if that were
the case, an impression with a psychosis for its sphere
being impossible, there would be the contingence of non-
remembrance in the ease of a psychosis, while, because
of the contingence of infinite regress, the (existence of a)

216 CHAPTER I

psychosis having another psychosis for its sphere has
been refuted through the refutation of reflective
cognition. But, when by intelligence as defined by a
psychosis something is manifest, by that psychosis there
is the production of the impression whose sphere is that
(thing) ; this alone is the rule. And thus, even cogni-
tion, happiness etc., which are psychoses of the internal
organ, are manifested by the non-eternal witness
defined by themselves, in the same way as the sparks
proceeding from the red hot iron ball (are manifested)
by the fire defined by themselves; hence, the production
of impressions even among these (psychoses) stands
to reason. As for the views, stated in the (following
verse of the) Kutasfhadipa " Intelligence present in the
cognition with the sole form of the pot, would manifest
the pot alone; the known-ness of the pot is made
manifest by the Brahman-intelligence ", that cognition
which is an attribute of the object is manifested by
Brahman-intelligence as defined by the object, and the
view stated in the Tattvapradlpika that cognition,
desire etc. are manifested by the eternal witness, of the
nature of undefined pure intelligence, even according to
those two (views), association with psychoses should
necessarily be declared, since intelligence is of the
nature of the immediacy of what is in association with
itself; 87 hence, because of the existence of a non-eternal
form', as associated with those (psychoses), there is no

87 According to both views, there is immediate experience of known-
ness, or of cognition, desire etc.; this immediacy would not be possible
but for their association with intelligence; hence there is association of
Intelligence with psychoses; and, as so associated, a non-eternal form of
intelligence should be admitted.

THE I PSYCHOSIS 217

^intelligibility whatever in the production of
impressions in respect of them.

Others, however, recognising the psychosis of 5-14242
nescience, with the form " I ", postulated in order that
there may result recollection of nescience etc., (existing)
even during sleep, explain (through that) the impres-
sion whose object is the "I". Nor on this view is there
the unintelligibility of the recollection of the object "I"
contemporaneous with the continuous cognition of
another (object), in the form " for so long I was
certainly perceiving this" ; for, like the contemporaneity
of happiness and misery through the difference of what
defines (them), 88 there is no conflict in the contempo-
raneity even of two psychoses; hence, even at the time
of the continuous cognition of another (object), the
succession of psychoses of nescience with the form "I"
is possible.

Yet others, however, say thus: the psychosis with 5-14243
the form " I " is but a psychosis of the internal organ;
but like the psychosis of contemplation etc., it is not
cognition, since it is not generated by the settled cause
of that (cognition) ; indeed, such means of valid
perceptual knowledge as the sense of sight are not
possible there ; nor inference etc., since the recollection
of individuation is seen even in him who is deviod of the
knowledge of inference etc.; nor is the mind the
instrument (of valid knowledge), since for that which
is the material cause (of the psychosis), instrumentality
is not settled in any case whatever. If it be said ' ' Then,

88 E.g., happiness as defined by the foot may co-exist with misery as
defined by the head.
8 1-28

218 CHAPTER I

even the recognition of the object ' I ' would not be
cognition, " no; though, in respect of the I-element, the
nature of cognition does not belong to it, it is of the
nature of cognition in respect of the element of that-
ness, as generated by the impression which is settled to
be the instrument of memory; in the same way as
between mediacy and immediacy, validity and invalidity,
present in a cognition 89 through differences of aspect,
there is no conflict even as between being a cognition and
not being a cognition.

5-14244 Still others, however, say thus: even the psychosis
in the form "I" is certainly cognition, because of the
experience "I know myself"; nor is there impossi-
bility of an instrument, since, in conformity with
experience, instrumentality too is assumed of the mind
itself, the internal organ.

5 '* 5 This being the case, a rule about the removal of

obscuration results for those immediate psychoses alone
which have external objects.

Now, there is not even this rule, since, in the case of
nacre-silver, the psychosis in the form " this " does
not remove ignorance, as, otherwise, because of the non-
existence of the material cause, 90 the creation of silver
would be impossible. If this be said

to this they say thus : though by the psychosis in the
form "this" there is removed the ignorance about the

89 The cognition "The hill is fiery" is immediate In respect of the
hill and mediate in respect of the fire; similarly, in the delusion "This is
silver", the cognition is valid in respect of the this-element and invalid in
respect of the silver-element.

90 I.e., ignorance,

THIS PSYCHOSIS 219

this-element, since ignorance about the specific element,
nacreity etc., is not removed, that itself is the material
cause of silver; for, there is experience of the super-
imposition of silver when there is ignorance of nacreity
etc., and of the non-existence of that (superimposition)
when there is knowledge of that (nacreity etc.) ; and
in the Vivarana on the explanation 00 " of the Bhasya on
superimposition, material causality, in respect of the
superimposition of silver etc., is declared of that
ignorance alone whose co-presence and co-absence are
experienced; for this very reason, there is made in the
Sanksepasarlraka the distinction that the nacre-element
is the support, the this-element the substrate, that the
content of ignorance together with its elaboration is the
support, and that what appears superimposed in the
intellect, as of a particular form though not (really) of
that form, is the substrate. 01

Others, however, say thus: for the silver, which is 5453
cognised, in the form " this is silver," as identical with
the this-element, the material cause is only the ignorance
of the this-element; and of that (ignorance), though
the obscuring capacity alone is removed by the psychosis
in the form "this", there is continuance together
with its projecting capacity; hence there is no
impossibility in its being the material cause; in the
superimposition of a tree as upside down as reflected

90a I.e., the Paftcapddika.

91 If ignorance of nacre be the material cause, the delusion should
be of the form "nacre is silver", not "this is silver". To meet this objection
there is the distinction made between the substrate and the support,
the latter merely underlying the superimposition, and the former appearing
therein.

CHAPTER 1

in water and in the superimposition of the world that
continues in release while embodied, even though there
is the removal of obscuration that comes into being
immediately after the intuition of the substrate in its
entirety, there is admitted the material causality of
ignorance as conjoined with the projecting capacity
alone.

5-153 Kavitfirkika-Cakra varti Nr simha Bhattopadhyaya,

however, thinks that, since, prior to the creation of
silver, there is not at all, as distinct from the delusive
psychosis "this is silver, " a psychosis in the form
" this ," the inquiry as to whether it has or has not the
capacity to remove ignorance is baseless. It is thus:
a psychosis in the form "this", as distinct from the
delusive psychosis, is not established in experience,
since there is no experience of a duality of cognition. 02
Nor may it be assumed from the effect, that the cause
of superimposition is the cognition of the substrate in its
generality, since there is no evidence in respect of this
(latter) being the cause of that, Nor is this the
evidence, viz., the non-creation of silver etc., in the
absence of contact with the substrate, since therefrom
results the causality in respect of superimposition,
only in the case of the contact with a defective organ.
Nor may it be said : " Contact is not what pervades
delusion everywhere, whereas the appearance of the
substrate (in the cognition) pervades even the super-
imposition of individuation etc. on the self-luminous
inner self ",* for, that too does not pervade the super-
imposition of pot etc. ; for, prior to the perception of

92 As "this" and "this is silver .

NO SEPARATE THIS PSYCHOSIS 221

pot etc., a visual psychosis, whose sphere is the colour-
less Brahman that is the substrate of that (perception),
is impossible, while the natural luminosity (of that
substrate) is obscured; if mere manifestation of the
substrate, such as is common to the obscured and the
unobscured, be the cause of superiniposition, then, even
prior to the contact with the this-element of nacre,
since there exists the obscured natural luminosity of the
intelligence defined by that (nacre), even then there
is the contingeiice of superimposition.

Nor may it be said : " In respect of superimposition
in general, manifestation in general of the substrate is
the cause*, in the superimposition of the merely
apparent, the explicit manifestation of the substrate
(is the cause) ; hence there is no undue extension, since
there is appropriateness in the causality of the general
in respect of the general, and of the specific in respect
of the specific " ; for, even thus, there is no pervasion of
the merely apparent superimpositions of yellowness on
the shell, blueness on well-water and so on; visual
cognition (of what is) unconditioned by colour being
impossible, and the cognition of the whiteness present
in the shell etc., being non-existent at that time, there is
not, prior to the superimposition, the possibility of a
psychosis whose sphere is the colourless substrate such
as the shell etc.

Nor may it be said " Even am'ong the merely
apparent, only in the case of superimpositions like
silver, let there be the above-mentioned special cause";
for, in that case, in order that there may be the
contingence of the superimposition of yellow shell etc.,

222 CHAPTER I

prior to contact, it will necessarily have to be said that
the cause of that superimposition is the contact with
a defective organ; and when for this itself there results,
because of parsimony, causality in respect of all merely
apparent superimpositions in general, it is possible to
explain even the occasional nature of the silver-super-
imposition 03 from this alone ; hence, for the manifesta-
tion of the substrate, whether in general or specifically,
there does not result causality in respect of super-
imposition.

But now, though not a cause in other super-
imposition not dependent on similarity, in the super-
imposition of silver etc. dependent on that (similarity),
the cognition in general of the substrate, consisting in
the cognition of the substrate as qualified by a particular
colour etc. constituting the similarity to silver etc.,
should necessarily be said to be the cause; for, if the
contact with defective organ be alone the cause, there
is the contingeiice of the superimposition of that silver
on a cinder, as on nacre. Nor may it be said that
similarity too is a cause, as a defect of the object; for,
even between dissimilars there is superimposition,
when there is the delusion of similarity, since there is
seen the imposition of a dark rocky surface on the
distant expanse of the waters of the ocean. 94 Nor does
it stand to reason to say, on the principle of the cause
of that alone (being the cause), 05 that the causal

93 That is to say, why it occurs at certain times, not at others.

94 Here, similarity of colour is alone the cause, and that is not based
on a defect in the object, since water is really colourless.

95 Let the cause of that alone be the cause, why that other cause in
the middle?

SIMILARITY AS CAUSE OF SUPERIMPOSITION 223

aggregate of the cognition of similarity may be the

cause of superimposition ; for, it is not seen anywhere

that the causal aggregate of a cognition is the

cause of a thing, and there is parsimony (in the

assumption of causality) in the case of the cognition

of similarity itself. Nor may it be said "It is only

on pure water, though itself white and present in a

white silver vessel, that there is the superimposition of

blueness, not on a pearl: like this distinction, there is

(also) the distinction that there is the superimposition

of silver on nacre, not on cinder etc., even because of

the nature of things, but not because of dependence on

the cognition of similarity"; for, though on a piece

of cloth as such there is no superimposition of being

a lotus bud, yet since the superimposition of that is seen

on that form of it (the cloth) fashioned by scissoring,

it is ascertained that that superimposition does not

conform to the nature of the thing, (but) conforms to

the existence or non-existence of the cognition of

similarity; otherwise, at other times too, there would

be the contingence of that superimposition thereon.

The reply is : even on the view that the cognition
of similarity is the cause of superimposition, its
causality may be declared only in the superimposition
of silver etc., which are obstructed by specific cognition
(of the substrate), 90 but not in the superimpositions of
yellow shell etc., which are not obstructed thereby,
because of impossibility (of the said causality). And
in the case of what are obstructed by specific cognition,

96 E.g., when there is specific cognition of the nacre as nacre, not
merely as a bright white substance, silver cannot be superimposed on it,

224 CHAPTER I

there being the rule that the causal aggregate of the
obstructing cognition is also an obstruction, the causal
aggregate of the specific cognition should also be said
to be an obstruction; hence, all distinctions being
intelligible even from this, what (is the object) of the
assumption of causality in the case of the cognition of
similarity? It is thus: when, in respect of cinder etc.,
there is contact with the sense of sight, since there
exists the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of
its dark colour etc., there is no superimposition of
silver; even on nacre etc., when there is such contact
with the sense of sight as pervades the dark portion
etc., then, because of the existence of that (causal
aggregate), there is not the superimposition of that
(silver) ; (but) when there is contact with only that
portion which is similar (to silver), there is super-
imposition, because of the absence of that (causal
aggregate). If it be said that because of the existence
even then of the causal aggregate of the specific
cognition of nacreity, 97 there is the contingency of non-
superimposition, no ; for, the cognition of nacre being
absent at the time of the superimposition, the non-
existence of that causal aggregate must be stated even
by you. " By me there is the admission of the non-
existence at that time of the causal aggregate of the
cognition of nacreity, because of the obstruction by the
defect, viz., the cognition of similarity, which is the
cause of the superimposition; but if by you there be
such an admission, it would be the story of returning

97 The existence of this causal aggregate at that time is a mere
Assumption on the part of the objector.

SIMILARITY AS CAUSE OP SUPERIMPOSITION 225

to the toll-gate at break of day"; if this be said,
no; for, nacreity being cognised immediately on draw-
ing near, even when there is seen the glitter constituting
the similarity to silver, it is non-established of that
(cognition of similarity) that it is an obstacle to the
causal aggregate of that (specific cognition) ; hence,
the non-existence of that causal aggregate should be
said to be either because of obstruction by such defects
as distance or because of non-attention to what appre-
hends 98 the dark under-side etc., which manifest
(nacreity). Similarly, because of the defect which
causes the invariable superimposition of blue colour on
the waters of the ocean, and because of non-attention
to what apprehends the waves etc., which manifest the
wateriness at a distance, there is non-existence of the
causal aggregate of the specific cognition of a white
watery expanse etc., and hence there is the super-
imposition of dark rocky surface etc. In the spread-out
cloth, because of the existence of the causal aggregate of
the specific cognition of extendedness, there is not the
superimposition of being a lotus bud etc.; because of
the non-existence of that (causal aggregate) in that
form of it fashioned by scissoring, there is that
superimposition.

Now, thus, on a piece of iron felt with the hand, 09
because of the non-existence of the causal aggregate
of the specific cognition of its dark colour, why should

98 That is to say, to the sense-contact.

99 That is to say, when the tactile sense alone te operative and
there is no perception of colour, in respect of which there may be simi-
larity with other metals.

S 129

226 CHAPTER I

there not be the superimposition of silver, since the
cognition of similarity is not required (according to
you, for superimposition) ? If this be asked, that does
happen, (we reply) ; but, because of the non-existence
of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition that
excludes copper etc., that superimposition too might
come into being; hence, in some cases, where there is the
superimposition of many, it becomes the sphere of
doubt ; but in some cases where there is abundance of
silver, as in a treasury etc., there is only the super-
imposition of silver ; there is no harm even if in some
cases a superimposition does not originate, like the non-
origination of superimposition sometimes on nacre etc.,
because of the jion-existence of defect in the cause etc.,
though there is cognition of similarity. Therefore,
the psychosis in the form " this " is not to be assumed
from the effect.

Nor is it to be assumed from (its) cause, the
unhindered contact with, the object "this"; for, in
respect of the psychosis " this ", even as arising from
that (contact), it is declared by us that the content is
the silver, which is a transformation of nescience as
agitated by contact with a defective organ and is
contemporaneous with itself (i.e., the psychosis) ; and
though, in the silver which originates at the same time as
the cognition and exists only as long as the mere
appearance, there is not any contact prior to that
(origination), yet the apprehension of that too by the
sense of sight is intelligible even because of the contact
with the object "this", the locus with which that
(silver) is identified; for, in the case of the merely

THE SENSE-ORGAN IN DELUSION 227

apparent silver, there is the experience of visibility in
the form "I see the silver with the sense of sight", even
in the absence of the contact of itself (with the sense-
organ).

Nor may it be said " Even because of the sublater,
the non-existence of contact, that (silver) is not an
object of the sense of sight; nor is it originated by
contact with a defective organ, simultaneously with the
psychosis ' this ', since sense-contact, which is a cause of
cognition, is not settled to be a cause of an object; it is,
rather, subsequent to the psychosis ' this ', generated
by that, and manifested by that, since it is superimposed
on the witness manifested by that (psychosis) ; as for
the experience of its being an object of the sense of
sight, that is merely through the indirect dependence
on the sense of sight, as being generated by the
psychosis ' this \ which manifests the intelligence that
illumines (the silver) itself "; for, if that be the case,
in the delusion of the yellow shell, there is the contin^
gence of non-requirement of the sense of sight; for,
in that case, there is no requirement of the sense of
sight in the apprehension of the shell, since, of the mere
shell without colour, apprehension by the sense of
sight is impossible; nor in the apprehension of yellow-
ness (is there that requirement), since in what is
imposed, its being an object of a sense-organ is not
admitted.

Nor may it be said: "Yellowness is not super-
imposed as such; but in respect of the experienced
yellowness of the bile present in the eye, there is super-
imposed the conjunction alone with the shell; hence

228 CHAPTER I

there is the requirement of the sense of sight for the
experience of the yellowness alone "; for, if that be the
case, there is the contingency of the non-perceptibility
even of shell and its conjunction; for, not being con-
joined to the witness manifested by a psychosis having
the form of the yellowness of the bile present in the
region of the eyes, being manifested thereby is impossi-
ble in their case ; further, there is not admitted a single
psychosis whose sphere is the shell conjoined to
yellowness.

Nor may it be said: "It is not admitted that, of
the yellowness of the bile present in the region of the
eyes, there is, because of a defect, a superimposition
of relation on the shell; but of that (yellowness) which
has gone forth together with the rays from the eyes
and pervaded the object, there is the superimposition
of relation there, as in the red cloth made red by the
dye; hence, conjunction with the witness manifested
by the psychosis in that form is possible;" for, if that
be the case, in respect of a shell seen by an eye affected
by bile, there is the contingence of the cognition of
yellowness, for others too, as in respect of what
is covered with gold. Nor may it be said: "That
yellowness, like the bird which has flown high
up in the sky, can be apprehended at a distance,
only when apprehended close by; and in the case
of the others (not affected by bile) there is-
no apprehension (of yellowness) close by/ 7 For, there
being proximity to yellowness even in the case of those
others who place their sense of sight in the neighbour-
hood of that (affected) sense of sight, the apprehension

THE SENSE-ORGAN IN DELUSION 2JJ9

of that (yellowness by them too) cannot be avoided ; thus
too, in the superimposition of blueness on the pure river
water flowing on the exceedingly white sandy surface,
and in the superimposition of blueness on the sky, and
in the superimposition of darkness on red clothes, at
night by moonlight, since it is not possible to declare
the superimposition of what is (perceptually) expe-
rienced, if there be not admitted in these cases a visual
psychosis, whose sphere is the substrate in conjunction
with blueness, the non-utility of the sense of sight could
not be avoided (in any way) ; further, by the words of
the PaucapGdika, which proclaim that, in the case of
the infant who has not (yet) lasted bitterness, the
appearance of bitterness in what is sweet has for its
cause the impression of experience in another life, it is
made clear that only the taste of bitterness, which is
superimposed as such, 100 is of a sensory nature, as
otherwise the functioning there of the sense of taste
would be unintelligible. Therefore, in the cited cases
of the superimposition of blueness, the superimposition,
which, even because of the contact with the substrate,
arises simultaneously with the psychosis of the sense of
sight whose sphere is that (substrate); is the content of
that psychosis, and hence should be admitted its being
the object of the sense of sight; for, there being no
psychosis whose sphere is the bare substrate, without
colour, there is no manifestation of the object-intelli-
gence, and consequently manifestation by that
(intelligence) is impossible in the case of the water, the

100 That is to say, its sensory nature is not due to its being
experienced along with something else, e#., bile present in the tongue.

230 CHAPTER t

blueness superimposed thereon etc. In the case, how-
ever, of the superimposition of bitter taste, since for
the substrate and the superimposition there is not
apprehension by the same sense-organ, when, by the
psychosis which is generated by the tactile sense and
whose sphere is the substrate, there is manifested the
intelligence defined by that, even because of contact
with the sense of taste affected by bile, there arise
simultaneously the superimposition of bitter taste and
the taste-psychosis whose content is that alone ; hence
must be admitted bitterness being an object of the sense
of taste; for, in the bitter taste manifested by the
intelligence manifested by the psychosis which is
generated by the tactile sense and whose sphere
is the substrate, since there is no need for the
sense of taste even indirectly, it is impossible to
establish in any other way (except the one mentioned)
the experience of being an object of the sense of taste
(in the ease of that bitterness). Silver too as an
object of the sense of sight being intelligible even in the
same way, the experience " I see " is not to be sublated.

Nor may it be said " If the silver not in contact be
an object of the sense of sight, there would be violation
of the law apprehended about different effects having
different causes, such as that in respect of perception
in general the contact of object with the sense is the
cause, that in respect of the perception of substance the
conjunction with that (substance) is the cause, and that
in respect of the perception of silver conjunction with
silver is the cause. " For, there being no single mode
of contact common to conjunction etc., the first law is

SUGGESTED LAWS AS TO THE CAUSE OP COGNITIONS 231

non-established. The second law relates to that which
is the locus of substance-ness from an empirical point
of view, since, as in the case of darkness according to
the Logicians, 101 the superimposition of substance-ness
is possible in some cases even on what is not capable
of conjunction and is not a substance ; and, in the case
of the merely apparent silver, the cognition of
substance-ness is admitted to be due to the super-
imposition even of that present in the substrate, in the
same way as of the this-ness (present in the substrate) ;
because of (both) these, there is no conflict with the
second law. The postulation of a special relationship
of effect and cause, other than the general relationship
of effect and cause, in the form of the second law,
being set aside by (considerations of) prolixity, the
third law is non-established. Even the principle that
where the general is the cause of the general, the
specific is the cause of the specific, relates to cases where,
as on the admission of a general relationship of cause
and effect between seed and sprout, there is the contin-
gence of the origination of a different sprout from a
different seed; therefrom cannot be established any
special relationship of effect and cause, which is
(otiose and) comparable to the fleshy protuberance on
the goat's neck. Nor may it be said that even here, on
the admission merely of the general law that, in respect
of the perception of substance, conjunction with
substance is the cause, there is undue extension in that
there is the contingence of the perception of one
substance from the conjunction with a different one;

101 The Naiy&yikas hold that darkness is not a substance.

232 CHAPTER I

for, the law is admitted that in respect of the
perception of various substances conjunction with the
respective substances is the cause", as otherwise undue
extension could not be avoided even if the third law
were admitted. Therefore, there is no contingence of
the violation of any settled law.

Further, there would be no harm even if a settled
law were violated here ; for, in the case of the experience
" I see this silver/' "I see the blue water " etc., which
is not otherwise explicable, explanation would be
impossible unless laws, such as that, in respect of
perception in general, contact with the object is the
cause and so on, though primarily apprehended, are
restricted to empirically valid contents.

Nor, if this is the case, does there result the view
of (erroneous cognition as) cognition otherwise, since
the assumption is -possible even of this restriction that
contact is the cause in respect of valid knowledge, not
in respect of delusion, and there is the contingence of
the superimposition here of that silver alone which is
not in contact and is present in some other place ; for,
in the case of the silver which is devoid of identity with
the intelligence manifested (by the psychosis) and is
present in some other place, immediacy is unintelligible ;
further, it is established, through such considerations
as the unintelligibility (otherwise) of cognition and
sublation, that the content of delusion is indetermina-
ble.

Nor may it be asked : " If the sensory nature of the
merely apparent be admitted merely because of the

NO SILVER PSYCHOSIS 233

contact with the substrate, at the time of the super-
imposition of nacre-silver, why should there not be the
visibility of tin too which is superimposed even there
at some other time?"; at the time of the super-
imposition of silver, though there is no distinction in
the perception of the glitter common to tin and silver,
yet there is not then the superimposition of tin, because
of causes like the non-existence of human defects such
as desire (in relation to tin), and for that very reason,
there is admitted by me even the non-origination of a
psychosis whose content is that (tin).

Therefore there is only one sense-generated
psychosis whose sphere is the silver in identity with the
this-element ; prior to that there is no psychosis in
the form " this "; hence the inquiry is not to be made
as to the existence or non-existence of the removal of
ignorance even there.

Others, however, accept a psychosis in the form 5*154
" this ", since the cognition of the substrate is the cause
of superimposition, and think that the psychosis in
the form of silver is futile, because by the witness even
as manifestated by that (psychosis in the form "this")
the manifestation is possible of the silver superimposed
on that, and because the production of the impression
whose content is silver is intelligible even by that
" this "-psychosis, which manifests the witness that
illumines it. ^

On the view of two cognitions, one psychosis 5*155
(of the form) " this " is the cause of the super-
imposition, the second psychosis (of the form) " this is
silver " has the superimposed silver for content; it does
S

234 CHAPTER 1

not, however, have for its sphere merely what is
superimposed, without the this-element, since, in the
form " I cognise this silver," it is experienced to have
for content the silver that has been identified with the
this-object : thus say some.

5*156 Others, however, say thus: just as the nescience

present in intelligence as defined by the this-element is
transformed into the form of silver, even so the nescience
present in intelligence as defined by the cognitive
psychosis whose content is the this-element is trans-
formed into the illusory cognition of silver; but there
is not, like the psychosis of the this-element, a non-
superimposed cognition of silver; and thus, like the
manifestation of silver as in conjunction with the
this-ness present in the substrate, in the case of its
cognition too, there is intelligible the manifestation of
conjunction with having for content the this-ness
present in the substrate; and hence that too is not to be
admitted as having the "this" for content; nor may
it be said that since, like silverness, the conjunction of
silver and this-ness is the sphere of the silver-cognition,
the this-ness too, which is the counter-correlate of that
(conjunction) should be said to be the content of that
(cognition) ; for, there would be no undue extension
if even because the locus of its identity has " this-ness"
for content, it should have its conjunction for
content 102 ; nor may it be said that, since there is taught

102 The question is whether the illusory cognition should have "this-
ness" for content; the answer is that it need not, since the cognition of the
this-element, which is the locus of the illusory cognition and is in a
relation of identity with it, has the "this-ness" for content, and with this
much it is possible for the illusory cognition to have the conjunction (of
"silverness" and "this-ness") for content; in "the locus of its identity",
"its" refers to the illusory cognition, "the locus" being the cognition of
the this-element; "it" in "it should have" refers to the illusory cognition.

GOING FORTH OF PSYCHOSIS TO MANIFEST IDENTITY 235

in the Vivarana on the Bhdsya about the possibility
(of superimposition)the rule about the substrate and
the superimposed appearing in a single cognition, there
should be declared (their) being the content of a single
psychosis ; for, in spite of difference of psychoses, there
is admitted the manifestation of both in the single
witness manifested by the psychosis in the form
"this."

Now, since the manifestation of all things is 516
intelligible even because of the clarity of the witness,
what (is the use) of the psychosis? Though it be
needed for the intelligibility of the production etc. of
residual impressions whose contents are pot etc., the
admission of its going forth is futile ; for, as in the case
of mediate cognition, the manifestation of pot etc. too
is intelligible, even by the witness as defined by a
psychosis that has not gone forth. Nor in that case is
there the unintelligibility of the difference between
mediacy and immediacy, since, as between knowledge
from verbal testimony and inferential knowledge, that
(difference) is intelligible even because of the difference
in psychoses due to the different instruments.

To this some say thus : in the case of perception, the 5161
intelligence, which as the substrate of the object is
defined thereby, is alone the manif ester of the object,
since where a relationship of identity is directly
possible, it is impossible to assume a relation sui generis
or some other (relation) ; hence, for the sake of the
manifestation of that (identity), the admission of the
psychosis going forth stands to reason; in the case of
mediate cognition, in respect of the fire etc., which are

2o6 CHAPTER 1

remote, the conjunction of the psychosis being
impossible, and there not being cognised any channel
for the psychosis to go forth, such as is capable of co-
presence and co-absence in the same way as the sense-
organ, it is intelligence only as defined by the psychosis
that has not gone forth that is presumptively admitted
to have the object for its sphere through a relation sui
ye tier is, there being no other way.

5-1 62 Others, however, since, in respect of individuation,

happiness, misery etc., Which are directly conjoined to
intelligence, immediacy is settled, and consequently in
respect of pot etc., too, the cause of immediacy is
intelligence only as conjoined with the object, establish
the going forth of the psychosis as for the manifestation
of that (intelligence).

M63 Yet others, however, explain thus the going forth

of the psychosis : in what is understood by perception,
as compared with what are understood by verbal
testimony and inference, a (certain) definiteness is
experienced. Indeed, in respect of the particular taste,
fragrance etc. of the mango, there is not, even if taught
a hundred times by a trustworthy person, such
definiteness as in what is understood by perception,
since the desire to know persists even after that, in the
form " how is it?" Nor may it be objected: " Though
sweetness etc. in general may be understood from
verbal testimony, yet, since there are no words express-
ing particular sub-classes such as the sweetness of the
mango, and since even if they existed their relation
(to what they signify) would not have been apprehended
by the hearer, there is not through verbal testimony

TO CREATE DEFINITENESS AND REMOVE JIJNASA 237

the understanding of sweetness as defined by particular
distinctive classes ; hence the persistence of the desire
to know stands to reason"; for, from the statement that
in the mango there is a particular sweetness excelling
all else, there is understood even the particular sub-
class (of sweetness) present in it. This statement
does not, indeed, leave out the particular (sweetness)
present therein, and make known there the particular
present elsewhere; because there is the contingence of
non-authoritativeness. Nor may it be said " Even the
particular present there it makes known in its general
nature as a particular, but not as particularised; 103
hence the desire to know " ; for, since even by perception
the particular class of the attribute, sweetness, is made
the content only in its own nature (as generality), and
since some other particularity present in the
particular class is not made the content, 104 there
is the contingence of the persistence of the
desire to know (even in the case of perception).
Therefore, in what is apprehended by perception,
there is, because of identity with manifested intelligence
which is of one consistency of immediacy, definiteness
capable of removing the desire to know; because of the
non-existence of that in what is known through verbal
testimony etc., there is indefiniteness ; this distinction

103 That is to say, all that words can tell us is the existence of a
particular variety of sweetness in the mango, but they cannot tell us more
specifically what it is; we know, in other words, not the particular sweet-
ness, but that the sweetness has a particularity.

104 What the objector seems to require for the removal of jijnasa is
a cognition of the particularity of the particular class; and the reply is
that not even perception can give us this cognition.

238 CHAPTER I

is to be accepted. Hence it is that for happiness etc.,
known by the witness, there is definiteness ; for Brahman
there is indefiniteness, since, though known by psychoses
due to verbal testimony, ignorance is not removed
prior to reflection etc., and there is definiteness when
that (ignorance) is removed subsequent to that
(reflection etc.).

Now even with this the statement made that the
going forth of the psychosis is for the sake of the
removal of the ignorance obscuring the object, that does
not stand to reason; for, there would be no undue
extension even if there be admitted the removal of
the ignorance, which is present in the object-defined
intelligence and obscures it, by a psychosis which has
not gone forth. Nor may it be said: " In that case,
there is the contingence of the removal of Yajiiadatta's
ignorance of the pot by Devadatta's cognition of the
pot, since there exists (the feature of) their having the
same content, while both having the same locus is not
the ground of their opposition (such that one can remove
the other), since the cognition and the ignorance
present (respectively) in the denotation of '!' and the
object-defined intelligence have different loci (and are
yet opposed so that the cognition removes the
ignorance)"; for, even if there be admitted the going
forth of the psychosis on the recognition that the
ground of opposition between cognition and ignorance
is their having the same locus and the same content,
the undue extension continues as before, because
Devadatta's pot-psychosis and Yajnadatta's ignorance
of the pot come to have a single locus, intelligence

WHAT IS IMMEDIACY ? 239

defined by the pot; hence, only a separate ground of
opposition has to be stated in the form " When
ignorance obscures a particular object in respect of a
particular person, that (ignorance) is to be removed
by that person's cognition of that object"; hence,
having the same locus is not needed.

To this they say thus: if the going forth of the
psychosis be not admitted, the very ground of opposi-
tion between cognition and ignorance could not be
determined. If it be said that that (ground) has been
stated as " When ignorance obscures a particular
object in respect of a particular person " and so on,
no; for, there is the contingence of the removal of
ignorance present in the object, even by mediate
cognition. If it be said that immediacy too is an
attribute of the cognition that removes (ignorance),
what is that immediacy? It is not a generality; for,
in the visual cognition " This is a person who had a
staff", whose content is a person qualified by a staff
brought to mind by memory-impression, if that
(generality) be present in respect of the element of
the staff too, even in that (element) there is the contin-
gence of the removal of ignorance present in the object,
and there is the (consequent) contingence of the
experience of immediacy in respect of that element too,
in the form " I see the staff." If, even though there
is no experience (of immediacy), memory-impression
be assumed to be a mode of contact and there be
admitted an assumptive immediacy because of (the
cognition) being generated by sense-contact (under-
stood thus), there is the contingence of the recognition

240 CHAPTER I

of that (immediacy) even in inferential knowledge etc.,
by assuming knowledge of the probans etc. to be a mode
of contact; if, however, there be no immediacy in
respect of the staff-element, that (immediacy) could
not be a generality, because of the rule that generality
exists pervasively; even if there were not this rule,
it could not be a generality existing non-pervasively,
since there is not determined any special defining
adjunct. 1015 Nor is it (immediacy) an upadhi, 106 this
being undefined. If it be said to be generation by the
senses, no, since it is not pervasive of perception by the
witness, and since, in the perception of the pot qualified
by heaviness etc., brought to mind by inferential
knowledge and knowledge from verbal testimony, there
is over-pervasion of the attribute-element. For, though
mediate in respect of that element, yet because of the
non-existence of any other instrument (of cognition),
generation (of the cognition) belongs to the senses alone,
through the capacity of the accessory that brings to
mind; further, since there is not apprehended any
common property defining the generation, sense-gene-
ration itself is difficult to apprehend in many cases;
and, if such (defining properly) were apprehended,
that itself being primarily cognised would intelligibly

105 Immediacy and its non-existence cannot be present in the same
locus, unless the locus is defined in different ways for the two predicates;
and he who asserts their co presence should state the defining adjunct if
any; no such adjunct is determined by him.

106 This is difficult to render into English. Prof. S. Kuppuswami
Sastriar defines it as "an attribute which is not a jati". Unlike the jati,
it is related to the particulars not by inherence (samavaya), but by a
relation sui generis or some indirect relation. See A Primer of Indian
Logic, pp. 24, 25.

WHAT IS IMMEDIACY ? 241

be of the nature of immediacy, and it would not be
proper to assume in the case of sense-generation, which
is not capable of being perceptually experienced, that
it is of the nature of immediacy, which is so capable
(of being experienced). Hereby is refuted this doubt
too, that immediacy consists in generation by sense-
contact, and that in respect of the immediate element
in what is generated by the sense as aided by associa-
tion, there is no generation by contact, since, presenta-
tion through association being present even in
inferential knowledge, association, which is (thus)
common to other means of knowledge as well, is not a
mode of contact; and (this is refuted) also because
(origination by sense-contact) is not common (to all
cases of immediacy), no (single mode of contact) being
common to conjunction etc. 107 If it be said " what is
acceptable to you as immediacy, let that be for me too ",
no; for, that (immediacy), which is to be taught in
connection with the ascertainment of the immediacy of
knowledge from verbal testimony, 108 is, in the manner
to be shown even there, the consequence of the removal
of ignorance and hence cannot be an attribute of the
cause of its removal. Therefore, since the Brahman-
knowledge, which is declared in the Scriptural text
" He who knows the self crosses sorrow " and is
invariably conjoined to Brahman, the locus of primal
ignorance, the material cause of all, is what causes the
removal of primal ignorance, there should be admitted

107 I.e., to the several modes of contact recognised by the Logicians,
viz., conjunction (saipyoga), inherence in what is conjoined (sarjiyukta-
samav&ya) and BO on.

108 See Chapter III, sections 5*1 to 5*4.
S 1-31

242 CHAPTER I

the rule that psychoses of the senses, because of the
capacity of the respective sense-contacts, arise only in
conjunction with the intelligence as defined by the
respective objects, and invariability of conjunction with
the intelligence that is the locus of ignorance should
be said to be the attribute of the cognition
that removes (ignorance). And thus, the ground
of the opposition between cognition and ignorance
comes to be determined in the form: "When
ignorance obscures a particular object in respect of a
particular person, that is removable by his cogni-
tion, which relates to that object and comes
into being as invariably conjoined with the intelligence
that is the locus of that ignorance." Nor, if this is
the case, is there the contingenee of the capacity to
remove ignorance even for the verbal cognition about the
nature of the veins (nadis) and the heart ; for, though
for that (cognition) there may result by chance
conjunction with either object, the veins or the heart,
yet since verbal cognition is possible even without
conjunction with the object, there does not result
(for that cognition) the coming into being as invariably
conjoined with that. Therefore, in order to explain
the opposition between cognition and ignorance, the
going forth of the psychosis should be declared.

5-164 Others, however, say that, since it is established by

parsimony that the ignorance present in the object is
removable by cognition in the same locus, the going
forth of the psychosis is fruitful.

5-165 Yet others, however, say that the going forth of,

the psychosis is established because of conformity to

THE VEDANTA AS EVIDENCE FOR NON-DIFFERENCE 243

the illustration that external light is seen to be capable
of dispelling external darkness only where there is the
same locus (for both).

Some, however, say that though there be no need 5466
of the going forth of the psychosis for the sake of the
removal of obscuration, yet there is need of it either
for the sake of association with intelligence or for the
sake of manifesting the non-difference of the cogniser-
intelligence from the Brahman-intelligence manifest-
ing the object.

Now, this non-difference of the jlva from Brahman, 6-0
which is manifested by the psychosis, what evidence has
it? That it has the Vedanta for evidence has been
loudly proclaimed as with the pealing of bells. All the
Vedantas, whatsoever, examined with the marks of
purport such as the unity of the initial and concluding
passages, harmoniously lead to the non-dual Brahman,
non-different from the inner self. How this is the
sense (of the Vedantas), that has been elaborated in
the sacred teaching itself, in the chapter on harmony; 100
for fear of prolixity it is not set forth here.

109 ga&kara'a Bha$ya on Vedn &#., I, i, 4.

END OF CHAPTER ONE

CHAPTER II.

Now, how can the Vedantas harmonise in respect 1*0
of the non-dual Brahman, that being opposed to
perception etc. ? If this be asked, no (we reply) ; for,
through the Scriptural texts and reasoning of the
arambhana section, ilhivsoriiiess is understood of the
world known through perception etc., as being of the
nature of an illusory manifestation of Brahman. Now
(it may be said) the illusoriness of the world cannot
be made known by Scriptural texts and reasoning, that
being opposed to perception etc., which, in forms like
" The pot is real ", apprehend the reality of pot etc.

To this, the author of the Tattvaswddhi replies j.j
thus : perception apprehends neither pot, cloth etc., nor
their reality, but bare reality which is constant in pot
etc., as their substrate. And thus perception too is but
favourable to the establishment of non-dual Brahman
of the nature of reality. " If it be so, there would be
perception only of the form ' real, real, ' not per-
ception of the form ' the pot is real', concomitant with
the presence or absence of the sense-organ ". If this
be said, no (we reply) ; for, just as in delusions, for
the this-element, the substrate, there is apprehension
through perception, and the presence and absence of the
sense-organ are exhausted therewith, while for the
imposed silver-element there is presentation through
delusion, even so it is admitted that everywhere there is
apprehension of bare reality through perception and

246 CHAPTER II

that the functioning of the senses is in respect of this
alone, while the presentation of different things like
pot is through delusion.

Now, if it be said that, since no sublation is seen
here as there (in the case of the delusion), the
admission itself is baseless, no (we reply) ; for, though
no sublation be seen, the very incapacity of diverse
things like pot to be perceived, in the same way as things
remote in space and time, is the basis of that
(admission). It is thus: pot etc., which are cognised
immediately after the operation of a sense-organ, are
cognised as certainly different from everything else,
since no doubt or error is then seen in respect of that
difference of pot etc. Where in respect of post etc.,
there is doubt as to its being a man and so on, even there,
difference from those which are other (than these)
does certainly appear, not being subject to doubt or
error. And of difference, which is invariably cognised
along with the counter-correlate, 1 apprehension through
perception is not possible ; for, there is the possibility
even of counter-correlates which are not in contact,
being remote in space and time. If it be said " Let the
knowledge of difference be of the nature of memory,
since it is dependent on recollection for the counter-
correlate element, in the same way as recognition for
the element of that-ness ", that is not (so) ; for, even
thus, there is no residual impression of the element of
being qualified by the counter-correlate, which

1 For, difference is a relation; and cognition of a relation has for
content all the relata and is determined by cognition of all the relata.

DIFFERENCE NOT ESTABLISHED g47

(element) is present in difference 2 . Nor is there the
possibility of that impression as the conclusion of an
inference in the form " The golden hill is a counter- ,
correlate of difference because it is a thing ", the
sphere of which (inference) is the being qualified by
the counter-correlate of difference; for, since inference
cannot set out in the absence of the knowledge of
difference, self-dependence would result; for, where;
there is the delusion of non-difference in respect of the
subject, probandiim, prolans, presence (of probans)
in the subject etc., inference cannot set out, because of
(the defects of) establishing what is (already)
established and so on; hence, the knowledge of their
difference is needed to dispel the knowledge of their
non-difference.

If it be said " Then, as for the clement of
difference, even for the element of being qualified by
the counter-correlate, let there be perceptual character",
no (we reply) ; for, where the counter-correlate is
unperceived, being qualified by that cannot be per-
ceived; for, in the absence of the perception of both
relata, perception of the relation is impossible. There-
fore, for the counter-correlates incapable of being
perceived, there is but appearance, of the nature of

2 Since perceptual cognition of all counter-correlates is impossible,
there cannot be impressions either, in the case of many of these; hence,
cognition of difference cannot be even of the form of memory; even should
impressions be possible, "being qualified by the counter-correlate" cannot
be the object of an impression, not having been perceived before; this is
really a supplementary argument.

248 CHAPTER II

delusion ; consequently, difference, which is invariably
cognised in the same cognition as those (counter-
correlates), and pot etc., which are invariably cognised
in the same cognition as difference, are the content of
delusion alono; therefore, perception, which appre-
hends distinctionless bare reality, is favourable to the
establishment of non-dualism.

1-2

The author of the Nyayasudha, however, says thus :

though pot etc. are sensed, (the cognition) " pot is real"
and so on is blended with the reality of the substrate;
hence there is no conflict. If it be asked " Why thus,
should not (the cognition) ' pot is blue ' and so on be
blended with the blueness of the substrate?", no
(we reply) ; what is said by Scripture about the thing,
which is of the nature of reality, being the material
cause of the world is accepted by all, because of absence
of contradiction; when, in consequence, the appearance
" pot is real " and so on is intelligible even as inter-
penetrated by that, there would be -prolixity in the
assumption of reality even in pot etc. ; (while, however)
since that (Brahman) is devoid of colour etc., blueness
etc. have to be assumed in pot etc. alone ; there is thus
difference (between the two cases).

1*3 The learned author of the Sanksepasarlraka,

however, says thus : though perception has the property
of apprehending the reality of pot etc., yet, since for
perception etc., whose content is what is external, there
is no authoritativeness characterised by making
known the truth, there is not, because of conflict

NON-AUTHORITATIVENESS OF PERCEPTION &c.

with that, any suspicion of the sublatioii of Scripture
etc,, referring to non-duality. That, indeed, is a
means of valid knowledge, which makes known
what is unknown. And, in the case of pot etc.,
which are the contents of perception etc., th<jre
is not the property of not being known; for,
since in respect of the inert there is riot the act
of obscuration, it is not admitted to be the content of
ignorance. Since Brahman alone, which as self-
luminous has the possibility of manifestation, is the
content of ignorance, it is only what gives knowledge
of that, which makes known the truth and is a means
of valid knowledge. That (Brahman) alone is the
content of valid knowledge. It is for that reason that
Scripture too restricts valid knowledge to the self
alone in "The self, verily, is to be seen" etc. By the
words "to be seen", seeing -is not, indeed, enjoined,
since that, which is dependent on the means of valid
knowledge, is not the sphere of an injunction ; but, in
the form " The self is worthy of being seen ", it lays
down the restriction that being the object of valid
knowledge is appropriate to the self alone, because of
its being unknown, and not to anything else.

Some, however, say thus: on the view that 1-4
perception, which apprehends the reality of pot etc., is
valid, even if there be not understood its inferiority to
the means of valid knowledge applying to Brahman,
the reality apprehended thereby ends up by being
either of the form of the genus " reality ", because of
the cognition of its recurrence, or of the form of
s 132

250 CHAPTER II .

particular spatial and temporal relations, because of
the cognition of spatial and temporal relation in " Here
and now the pot is real", or of the form of the existence
of the pot etc., because of the cognition of the denial of
that existence in " The pot does not exist ". And this
is not in conflict with its own illusoriness. Even those
who maintain illusoriness do, indeed, refuse to admit,
in the case of pot etc., not their existence nor their
spatial and temporal relations, nor generality etc.,
therein, but (only) their unsublatedness. Nor may it
be said "Let unsublatedness alone be the reality
apprehended by perception "; for it is not possible to
apprehend through perception, which apprehends the
present alone, that there is no sublation of this
(cognition) in all the three times.

1*5 Others, however, say thus: though reality whose

nature is unsublatedness be apprehended by perception,
yet, from the text " The pranas are real; of these, this
(self) is the reality ", there is cognised superiority and
inferiority as between the reality of Brahman and that
of the entire world, synecdochically indicated by the
mention of the principal one, the fprana ; in respect of
reality of the nature of unsublatedness, there can be no
superiority or inferiority except by way of being
unsublated for all time and being unsublated for a little
while, since there can be no superiority or inferiority
by way of extensiveness or littleness of content, as in
the case of the properties of rulership and beauty, which
are the spheres of such expressions as "King of Kings,
Cupid among Cupids"; even if this (distinction)
were possible in some other way, that would but end

. SUPERIOR AUTHORITY OF SCRIPTURE 351

in the (distinction of) superiority and inferiority here
stated, because of unity of sense with other Scriptural
declarations of the world being sublated by Brahman-
knowledge; therefore, the reality of pot etc., appre-
hended by perception, is of the nature of unsublated-
ness, till there is Brahman-knowledge ; hence, there is
no conflict with the Scriptural declaration of illusori-
ness.

Yet others, however, say thus : of the two, Scrip-
ture and perception, which apprehend (respectively)
the illusoriness and the reality of the world, though
there is conflict it is Scripture alone that is stronger than
perception, which is tainted with the suspicion of
defect and comes into operation first, since the former
is free from defect and subsequent (to perception),
(as required) by the principle of the apaccheda
(section) ; and because it is said in the traditional Code
" Among those three (perception, inference and verbal
testimony), superiority belongs to verbal testimony
alone, because of its very nature (jati) M . Nor does
this statement of the traditional Code have for content
what can be known from the Vedas alone; for, there
can be no suspicion, in that ease, of conflict with
perception, while the declaration of the superiority of
the Veda is appropriate only in respect of 1<liat sense
of the Veda, where conflict with perception is suspected.
In the Naradasmrti too, in the section on witnesses,
it is said, even of what is seen by perception, that,
without putting faith in the perception, it should be
investigated by valid teaching and so on: " Ether is
seen to be like a surface, the glow-worm like a fire;

252 CHAPTER II

there is no surface in ether ; nor is the glow-worm fire ;
therefore, it is proper to make an investigation even
in respect of an object seen by perception; knowing
objects after investigation, one does not swerve from
righteousness/' Nor, in the absence of the revealed
teaching that, of the five (qualities) beginning with
sound, sound alone is the quality of ether, could the
perceived blueness of ether be refuted by perception
etc. Nor does that sublation result from the ascertain-
ment that, since blueness is not cognised in the ether
near by, the cognition of that (blueness) at a distance
is produced by the defect of distance; for, it
is also possible (to infer) that, since blueness is
seen at a distance, its non-cognition, near by is produced
by the defect of proximity, like the non-cognition of
what is enveloped in mist ; further, on the strength of
experience, it is intelligible that the blueness of the
ether exists non-pervasively. 3 Nor is there sublation
by the perception of the absence of the cognition of
blueness for one who has approached that (place in the
horizon) where the ether seemed to touch the earth,
at which place there was the cognition of blueness while
the person was at a distance ; for, it is intelligible that
the appearance of proximity to the earth, in the case
of the blueness that is but up above, is due to the defect

3 The attribute of a substance would normally be expected to per-
vade the entire substance; but this expectation may be set aside where a
quality is seen to be present in a substance, though not wherever the
substance is cognised; in such a case, the proper procedure is not to deny
its having that attribute, but to recognise the non-pervasive existence
(avyapya-vrttitva) of that attribute.

. NEED FOR CORRECTION BY SCRIPTURE 253

of distance, as in the case of the clouds, stars etc,
(which appear to touch the earth); 4 further, the
superiority of revelation to perception is indubitable,
since, in the case of odour etc., which are cognised as
intermixed with earth etc., distinction has to be
predicated only with the help of such revealed texts as :
"If some unlearned ones say that odour is cognised in
water, that is to be understood to belong to earth alone,
as conjoined with water and air." Among connate
qualities like odour, present in such loci as water,
it is not, indeed, possible for those like us to discrimi-
nate through perception, in the form " Odour is the
quality of earth alone, not the quality of water etc. " If
it be said that tlic perception, in which defect is
suspected, because, earth etc., being for the most part
reciprocally related, the presentation of the attribute
of one in another is possible, is there corrected by
revelation, then, here too, Brahman and the world
being reciprocally related in the relation of material
cause and effect, the presentation of the attribute of
one in the other is possible; hence in perception, in
which defect is suspected, distinction has to be made
with the help of revelation, in the manner mentioned
by the sage: "There are five aspects (of being),
existence, appearance, attractiveness, form and name ;
the first three are of the nature of Brahman; the latter
two are of the nature of the world"; thus, the position
(of perception) is equal (in the two cases). Nor thus

4 The cognition of blueness may be illusory in the case of the ether
which seemed to touch the earth, but not in the case of the ether which is
really up above.

254 CHAPTER it

is there conflict with that on which it (verbal testimony)
is dependent; 5 for, by revelation as a means of valid
knowledge, which is dependent on the perception of
the existence-aspect (alone) of letters, words and
sentences, there is destruction of their truth-aspect,
on which it is not dependent.

2*1 Now, if revelation be superior to perception, for

the word "sacrificer", in "The strew is the
sacrificer," secondary implication need not be assumed
in its reference to the strew; similarly, in " He is to
sacrifice with the soma, " the possessive implication
"with the sacrifice possessing (i.e., characterised by)
soma" need not be assumed in order that there may not
be the conflict with perception (which results) when the
construction has to be said to be appositional, because,
(otherwise), in construing them as referring to
different objects, there would have to be understood
instrumentality to what is desired, in the case of the
sacrifice, and instrumentality to the sacrifice, in the
case of the soma, and through this difference in
functions, sentence-split would result; for, in both the
cases (of implication), even though there is conflict
with perception, it should be possible for the superior
revelation to disregard this (conflict) and establish the
non-difference of the sacrificer from the strew and the
non-difference of the soma from the sacrifice.

2-2 If this be urged, it is thus answered in the work

(called) the BMmati. It is indeed purportful
Scripture that is of greater force than perception,

5 I.e., the perception of words and sentences and their sense.

PURPORTFULNESS OF AUTHORITATIVE SCRIPTURE 255

not all Scripture ; for mantras and arthavada
(eulogistic or condemnatory) passages, however, there
is no purport in respect of their sense, which is a
channel to the eulogy (or condemnation), any more than
(there is purport) in the word-senses, which are
channels to the sentence-sense. If it be said that if
they had no purport, there would not result from them
(even) what is not in conflict with other means of
valid knowledge, such as the possession of forms by
deities, since instrumentality to valid knowledge is
restricted to purportful testimony alone, no (we reply) ;
for, the said restriction is not established, since the
visista-vidhi " With the revati (rks) of this very
(agnistut), lie who desires cattle is to treat the
varavantlya (saman) as the agnistoma-saman and
sacrifice therewith " is seen to be authoritative in
respect of the nature of the qualification (viscsana),
though that is not the sphere of the purport (of the
text). Here, indeed, the varavantlya, which is based
on the revati-rks, is the qualification of the saman.
And this is not established in ordinary experience, in
the same way as qualifications like the soma, in which

6 Where the sacrificer desires not merely heaven hereafter, but cattle
here as well, he is enjoined to employ the revati-rks sung with the
varavantlya saman. This is called a vigista-vidhi, an injunction of the
qualified, for he is not merely asked to do this or that, but he Is also told
how it is to be done; and we have not two injunctions, in which case
there would be sentence-split, but one complex injunction. The purport
of the injunction can be only one, the rite; but the qualification of the
rite has also to be made known in this case by the prescription itself,
since, unlike the soma plant or curds, it is not established in experience.
Thus, the illustration shows that Scripture may be authoritative even in
respect of what is not strictly its purport.

256 CHAPTER II

case, the text would be authoritative in respect only
of the prescription of the sacrifice as qualified by that ;
nor is there implication of the qualification by the
injunction of the qualified; for, reciprocal dependence
would result, in that when the qualification is known
by implication there would be the injunction whose
sphere is the qualified, while when there is that
(injunction), there would be the implication of
qualification through that. Therefore, for the text
whose purport is but the injunction of the qualified
(visista-vidhi), authoritativeness has to be declared
even in respect of the nature of the qualification. And
there is no purport in respect of that (qualification)
since, if there be purport in respect of both, sentence-
split would result. Thus, for eulogistic passages too,
whose purport is the praise of what is prescribed, there
is no purport in respect of the sense which is a channel
to the praise; since, consequently it is perception that
is stronger than those, in order not to conflict therewith,
a different signification is assumed in their case. In
the text " He is to (achieve what he desires by)
sacrifice with the soma ", whose purport is the
injunction of the qualified, if it be admitted that a
sacrifice non-different from the soma material and
qualified (thereby) is prescribed, then, since what is
prescribed there is not established in ordinary
experience, like the curds prescribed in " He is to
(achieve what he desires by) sacrifice with curds ", its
establishment would have to be sought even from the
text whose purport is the injunction of the qualified,
without (this qualification) being the purport, in the

SCRIPTURAL SUPERIORITY NOT DETERMINED BY 257
PURPORTFULNESS.

same way as for the (other) qualification the
varavantlya (saman) based on the revati (-rks).
Truly, from a revealed text devoid of purport, there
cannot result a sense opposed to the perception, which
apprehends the difference between the sacrifice and
the soma plant; hence, so as not to conflict with that
(perception), there is resort to possessive implication
in that case. The Scriptural texts of non-duality,
however, whose purport is non-duality, as made known
by the six kinds of marks beginning with the harmony
of the initial and concluding passages, are of greater
force than perception; hence, therefrom results
sublation of perception itself, not the interpretation
otherwise of Scripture, so as not to conflict with that.

In the Vivaranavdrtika, however, it is taught thus : 2*31
the superiority of Scripture to perception is not through
its being puiportful; for, though the injunction " Cook
the golden grains " has for its purport the declaration of
cooking as relating to the golden grains, yet, since, in the
case of the golden grains, connection with cooking, in
its primary sense of an act culminating in the origina-
tion of a difference in form and taste, conflicts with
perception, so as not to conflict with that, there is
admitted of the word " Cooking " a secondary
implication in respect of heating alone; (similarly),
though for the text " That thou art " the purport be
the declaration of non-difference between the jiva and
Brahman, yet, since the non-difference of the expressed
sense of the word " Thou " from the expressed sense
of the word " That " conflicts with perception, so ag
S 133

CHAPTER II

not to conflict with that, there is admitted secondary
implication (for both words) in respect of intelligence
distinguished (from the expressed senses of both
words). Even in the case of eulogistic texts, as in the
case of injunctions of subsidiaries like the prayaja, while
knowing their respective senses, the objects (signified)
are certainly known not as subsidiary to another ; for
these, there is subsidiariness to another (cognised later),
because of the use (they should have) ; hence, for them
too, as for the text about the prayaja etc., there does
exist purport in respect of the intermediate syntactical
connection; for, the syntactical unity (here) is that of
a sentence (with another sentence, the injunction,
not that of a word with a sentence) ; for, intermediate
purport is not admitted (to be) solely where the
syntactical unity is as of a word (with a sentence) ; 7
this having been established by the Vivaranacarya in
the Nyayanirnaya, even for texts like " The strew is
the sacrificer ", there is a possibility of the primary
sense being the purport; and secondary imfplication is
admitted only so as not to conflict with perception.

How then is there the superiority of Scripture ?
The reply is : because of freedom from defect and

7 In the syntactical unity of a sentence with a ^entence (vSkyaika-
vakyata) , the first sentence conveys a novel significance, complete in itself
but for the expectancy of fruit; hence its construction as one unit with
the latter sentence. Where the syntactical unity is like that of a word
(padaikavakyata), even sentences apparently complete convey no novel
significance, and what they mean can be expressed in each case by a
word: e.g. "vayu is the swiftest deity" as a sentence is but equivalent to
the word "praise-of-vayu (vayuh-praSastya)". As against this view of the
BhOmati, the present view contends that even a eulogy is complete in itself
but for the fruit, and that there is an intermediate purport in respect of
that sentence-sense,

NIRDOgATVA AND PARATVA OF SCRIPTUftB 2 59

posteriority in time. 8 That Scripture as such is superior
to perception, is the general rule. But perception,
though sublated by Scripture, should somehow be
shown to be possible by the assignment of a suitable
content, since there cannot be contentless cognition.
Hence it is that perception, which has been diverted
from making known the truth, because of conflict with
non-dualist Scriptural texts, is justified by the assign-
ment of empirical content capable of practical efficiency.
Why elaborate? The perception of nacre-silver,
though sublated by the perception " This is not silver "
common to all, is yet justified in conformity with
experience by the admission in front of us of
(indeterminable) silver associated with nacre; but
there is not assumed as the content, in opposition to that
(experience), silver that is remote or within 9 or merely
unreal. And thus, of the perception, which apprehends
the difference of the strew from the sacrificer, and
persists till Brahman-knowledge, as in accord with
practical efficiency, justification is not possible by the
admission of a merely apparent content ; if sublated by
the Scriptural text " The strew is the sacrificer ", there
would be no content at all (for that perception) ;
consequently, in order to remedy this, the general rule
is departed from, and the Scriptural text itself is other-
wise interpreted in the manner declared in the section

8 The word "paratva" may mean merely supremacy; but posteriority
In time would rather seem to be the sense intended, because of the appli-
cation later on of the apaccheda-nyaya.

9 I.e., of the nature of cognition itself, as in the view of dtmakhyati.

g gO CHAPTER il

relating to "the achievement of that (sacrifice)/ 710
Nor, as in the case of (conflict between) non-dualist
Scriptural texts and perception, is it possible here to
justify perception by the admission of absolutely and
empirically true contents for Scripture and perception
(respectively) ; for, it is not possible to declare
absolutely true identity of the sacrificer with the strew
by a single eulogistic passage opposed to a multitude
of Scriptural texts whose declaration of the illusoriness
of all except Brahman is justified by the six-fold marks
of purport. Thus, if by the text ' ' That thou art ' ' there
be taught in respect of the expressed sense of the word
"Thou" the nature of Brahman as qualified by omni-
science, non-en joyership etc., the perception there
of non-omniscience, enjoyership etc., would be
entirely baseless ; hence, in order to remedy this,
secondary implication by partial abandonment is
resorted to, adopting the distinction that enjoyer-
ship etc. belong to what is associated with in-
dividuation, while to the pure (being) distinguished
from that (individuation) belongs the nature of the
indifferent Brahman. Thus, even in " Cook the golden
grains " etc., there being a possibility of perception
being wholly contentless, in order to remedy this, there
is secondary implication (recognised) for the Scriptural
text. But the justification of the content being some-
how 11 possible, in the case of " There are here no

10 Since the strew cannot literally be the sacrificer, what is the
similarity which conditions the one being spoken of as the other? It is
the fact that each is instrumental to the achievement of the sacrifice.

11 By the assumption of duality, which, though not absolutely real,
is practically efficient, perception is provided with a content.

DUE TO INCAPACITY TO PERFORM 26i

differents whatsoever ", of this Scripture, which is
superior, there is no interpretation otherwise; hence,
there is no contingence at all of a failure to distinguish 12
(between the two cases).

Or else, in " Cook the golden grains ", "Sacrifice 2-32
with the soma (i.e., achieve what is desired with the soma
sacrifice)" etc., the resort to secondary implication is
not in order to conform to perception, but because of
incapacity to perform (what is primarily signified by
the words). Cooking, in the primary sense, cannot
indeed be performed in the case of the golden grains,
in the same way as mere heating; nor can a soma-
sacrifice non-different from it (soma) be performed by
any one, in the same way as a sacrifice to which the
material, soma, is an accessory. Nor may it be said
that it is the conflict with perception of what is con-
sidered to be that which ought to be performed, which
is spoken of in other words as "incapacity to perform" ;
for, in the injunction " Make bright the lunar orb ",
though in respect of the lunar orb, the brightness, which
is considered to be what ought to be performed, does
not conflict with perception, there is seen incapacity
to perform ; therefore, the latter is different from the
former. And thus, in that case, the resort to secondary
implication is only because of that (incapacity).
Therefore, there is no sublation whatever of the
superiority of Scripture, as established by the
apaccheda-nyaya. 18

12 There is such a failure on the view that it is purport which condi-
tions the superiority of Scripture.

13 The principle is explained in the succeeding paragraphs. Reference
may be made to PM, VI, v. 4955.

262 CHAPTER II

2-321 Now, how does the apaccheda-nyaya apply here?
The reply is (as follows). In the jyotitoma, among
those who go round (the fire) for the sake of (the
ceremony called) the bahispavamana, (each succeeding
priest holding him who goes before by the tucked up
waist cloth), if there is a letting go by the udgatr, then,
on looking at the Scriptural text "Should the udgatr
let go, the sacrifice should be concluded without any fee,
and the same sacrifice should be recommenced/' there
arises the cognition of an obligation to perform an
expiatory rite occasioned by the udgatr letting go ; later,
if the pratihartr lets go, this (earlier cognition) is
sublated by the contrary cognition, which arises on
looking at the Scriptural text "Should the pratihartr
let go, the whole of the sacrificial fee should be given, 77
and relates to the obligation to perform another ex-
piatory rite occasioned by the pratihartr letting go;
similarly, the earlier perception of the reality of pot etc.
is sublated by the subsequent Scripture-generated cog-
nition of their illusoriness. " Though in the case cited
the earlier cognition of the obligation to perform an
occasioned rite is sublated by the subsequent cognition
of the obligation to perform another occasioned rite,
yet the sacred teaching which gives rise to the earlier
cognition of obligation to perform an occasioned rite
has scope where there is letting go by the udgatr alone,
or there is a simultaneous letting go by both, or the
letting go by the udgatr is subsequent (to the other's
letting go) ; if, however, perception should be sublated
by non-dualist Scripture, then, as having no other
content, it would be baseless;" such a difference

THE APACCHEDA-NYAYA 263

(between the two cases) should not be suspected; for,
when, in respect of pot etc., there applies the perception
sublated by Scripture, even in respect of that it obtains
an empirical content and has its purpose fulfilled;
hence, just as in the case of the sacred teaching connec-
ted with the earlier act of letting go, which is wholly
sublated where there is 3, subsequent act of letting go,
there is no need to look for some other content ; further,
here too, it is possible to say that perception has scope
as relating to the reality of Brahman that is known in
all cognition. 14

(This is said by some) : in the course of even a 2-3211
single sacrifice, there are obligations to perform diffe-
rent occasioned rites due to different occasions occuring
in sequence ; the two cognitions of obligation, since they
originate in succession, like the two cognitions of colour
in the case of the black and red colours of the cherry
fruit, are certainly both valid; hence, the apaccheda-
nyaya is not an example of the sublation of the earlier
cognition by a subsequent (one) ; hence it is that in the
Sastradlpika, in the section about letting go, there is
this statement: " This indeed is the meaning of the
sacred teaching about the occasioned rite : the sacrifice,
that has to be performed in one way before the rise of
the occasion, has to be performed in a different way,
when there is (that) occasion."

This is not (sound). Obligation to perform be- 2-3212
longs to what is subsidiary. And the expiatory rite,

14 According to the commentator, this, argument is for the benefit
of those who refuse to recognise three grades of reality absolute,
empirical and merely apparent,

264 CHAPTER II

whose occasion is the earlier act of letting go by the
udgatr, is not a subsidiary in a rite characterised by a
subsequent act of letting go by the pratihartr; for, just
as the sacred teaching about the ahavamya (as that into
which all should be offered) relates to all oblations
other than the oblation in the hoof -mark, 15 so too the
sacred teaching " Should the udgatr let go " relates to
a rite not characterised by a subsequent act of letting go
by the pratihartr. This has, indeed, been said in the
Nyayaratnamala: " The restriction of a sacred
teaching, whose nature is general and settled, by parti-
cularising the content and so on, is called sublation of
the established ". In analysing the " sublation of the
established " thus defined, it is said: " That being so,
this is the meaning of the sacred teaching : in the case
of the rite which is not characterised by a subsequent
act of letting go by the udgatr and is characterised by
the pratihartr letting go, the gift of the entire sacrifi-
cial fee is a subsidiary; the same is to be seen (to apply)
even where the udgatr lets go. "

As for the statement cited from the astradipiM,
that occurs towards the close of a passage declaring the
sublation of the earlier obligation, in the words : " There-
fore, the cognition of the earlier expiatory rite, though

15 As a general rule, all oblations should be offered in the ahavamya
fire. In the avamedha, however, there is the injunction to make the
offerings in the hoof-marks of the horse. If this were over-ridden by the
general rule, it would be entirely purportless. But by admitting its
validity for the particular sacrifice alone, the general principle is restricted
Without being nullified.

THE APACCHEDA-NYAYA 265

originated, becomes false, because of being sublated;
for the subsequent (cognition), however, there is no
sublation whatever "; therefore, its purport is a mere
reflection on the assumption " though it would have to
be performed in a different way, prior to the rise of the
occasion, i.e., without the occasion having arisen, i.e.,
where there is not the rise of the occasion "; but its
purport is not that prior to the rise of the subsequent
occasion the obligation occasioned earlier existed in
fact; for, there would result conflict with earlier
passages of the context.

Let be the conventions of the Mimamsakas. Where
is the conflict in admitting two obligations in succession,
on the analogy of the black and red colours (of the
cherry) ? The reply is : what is this obligation which
could be removed by the origination of an obligation in
respect of a subsequent occasioned rite? It is not the
capacity of the earlier occasioned rite to be accomplished
by volition, since that is not lost even subsequently. 18
Nor is it the possibility of the fruit accomplished by
volition; for, this has not been generated even earlier. 17
Nor does it consist in being that by the non-perfor-
mance of which there would be a defect in the rite; nor
(does it consist) in being a subsidiary; for, what causes
a defect in the rite, in the event if its non-performance,

16 Hence, it is not like the blackness of the cherry, which Is des-
troyed by its subsequent redness.

17 Tligrefore, it is not an object of v&licJ knowledge, like the priof
blackness of the cherry.

SI-34

266 CHAPTER II

is of the nature of a specific kind of effect ; 18 while a
subsidiary, whether (remote) as contributing to the
ultimate fruit, or proximate (as contributing to the due
performance of rite itself), 10 is a specific kind of cause ;
neither of these can be (merely) occasional; in order
to maintain (therefore) that they are of the very nature
(of the rite), they have to be particularised thus : in the
case of the rite not characterised by an act of letting go
occurring subsequently and contrary (to the earlier
act), the rite occasioned by the earlier act of letting go
is a subsidiary, and it is only there that its non-
observance is a cause of defect in the rite ; therefore, in
the case of a rite characterised by another subsequent
act of letting go, (even) prior to the rise of the sub-
sequent act of letting go, it is not possible either for the
rite occasioned by the earlier act of letting go to be a
subsidiary to the (main) rite, or for its non-observance
to be the cause of a defect in the rite. Truly, it has not

18 The word "niyama-viSe^a" would mean "a specific invariable
feature". The commentator specifies this feature further as an effect
(vySpya, literally, the pervaded). This is 'now he arrives at it. Non-
observance may be related to defect in the rite as originating it or as
pervading it or as pervaded by it; what is of the nature of non-existence
(abhava) cannot originafe anything; defect in the rite too may be treated
as a mode of prior non-existence, which cannot be originated; nor is non-
observance the pervader of the defect for even where there is need for
that expiation alone and that is performed, defect may still arise from some
other cause; the third possibility alone is left and that is here considered.

19 Subsidiaries may be either remote (aradupakaraka) or proximate
(sannipatyopakaraka). An example of the former is the offering of the
fore-sacrifice (prayaja) which contributes to the invisible (apurva) result
of the main sacrifice; the latter class too contributes to the apurva, but
through being accessory in the first place to something proximate, e.g.,
though purifying the material, such as rice-grains by sprinkling. See
MNP (Edgerton), sections, 182-192; Edgerton's equivalents, though not
implausible, are not those usually accepted.

CONFLICT WITH THE UPAKRAMA-NYAYA 267

been seen anywhere, nor does is stand to reason, that a
certain thing is pervaded by another thing' for a certain
time, not subsequently, or is the cause (of that other)
for a certain tim'e, not subsequently. Nor may it be
assumed that what is called obligatoriness is but some
other attribute, capable of coining and going, since there
is no evidence (for this), while a distinction is
intelligible between the two contrary teachings about the
act of letting go, in the same way as in the case of the
sacred teachings about ( the offering of obligations in)
the hoof -mark and (in) the uhavanlya fire. Therefore,
the statement about the origination of two obligations
in sequence, is baseless.

And now, on the principle of the section about the 2-322
(superior force of the) initial passage, why should not
perception itself be of greater force than revelation,
since at its origination it has nothing opposed to it?

The reply is: where syntactical unity is cognised, 2-323
there (the whole passage) should be understood to lead
to one sense alone, since the cognised syntactical unity
would be destroyed should there be different senses
(in the course of the passage). Thus, here, the initial
passage "Prajapati gave a horse to Varuna"
is a eulogistic passage /analogous to parakrti (as
referring to what is apparently an act of Prajapati) ; to
this no contrary has arisen, hi the first instance ; by it the
intellect of the donor is turned to (the performance of)
a sacrifice (as his duty consequent on the gift) ; the
combination of words in the concluding passage "As
many horses as one receives in gift, so many four-

268 CHAPTER II

potsherd-sacrifices one is to offer to Varuna" conveys a
sense opposed thereto; since (for these words), the
(cognition of this) contrary has already arisen, they
would not attain syntactical unity with that (opposite),
if they were construed as heard (i.e., literally) ; in order
to maintain the syntactical unity, the sense of the nic,
(the causative suffix) is interpolated; 20 and it is only
as in accord therewith that it (the later sentence)
derives its own existence ; hence the superiority of the
initial passage. Where, however, reciprocal syntacti-
cal unity is not cognised, there the sentence which has
come into existence without taking into account the
earlier existent, and has a sense opposed thereto, does
certainly make known its own sense ; hence not here is
the superiority of the earlier existent. Hence it is that
the statement about the non-use of the sodasin cup is
admitted to make known its own sense, without taking
into account the earlier existent statement of its use;
but since for both there is no difference of content, there
is recognised as inevitable optional performance even
there (in the use of the cup). And thus, since there
is no suspicion of syntactical unity between non-dualist
revelation and perception, the capacity (of the former)
to make known its own sense without taking into account
the latter, though earlier existent, is unhindered. And
in generating the knowledge of that sense, the principle
of apaccheda alone applies, (as said in) " The earlier
rises only as unsublated, since the later has not arisen;
the later, since it cannot arise in any other way, cannot
occur without sublating the earlier ", not the principle

20 So that "receives" means "causes to receive".

SUPERIORITY OF PERCEPTION AS UPAJIVYA 269

of (the superiority of) the initial passage. Hence it
is that even in ordinary experience the earlier existent
perception of nacre-silver is sublated by the teaching of
a trustworthy person.

Now, even thus, the superiority of perception, since 3-0
it is that which is depended on, cannot be avoided. Of
the two sacred teachings about letting go, since the
earlier is not depended on by the later, the sublation of
the earlier by the later is proper. Here, however,
perception, as apprehending the existence of letters,
words etc., is that which is depended on by the revela-
tion teaching illusoriness ; hence it is of the revelation
that sublation is proper, in the form of not teaching the
illusoriness opposed to that (perception). Nor may it
be said "Though by the Scriptural texts about illusori-
ness the reality-aspect of letters, words etc. be denied,
there is no denial of the existence-aspect (of letters,
words etc.), which is what is depended on; hence there
is no conflict with that which is depended on"; for, by
such Scriptural texts as " There are here no differents
whatsoever, " there is taught the non-existence of the
world, even in the existence-aspect.

To this some say thus : even for him who, because 3-1
of a defect of hearing, hears " bring the vrsa " as
"bring the vrsabha" and so on, there is seen valid
knowledge through the words 21 ; therefore, in valid

21 Both words mean the same thin& "bull"; but the hearing as
"vr?abha" is defective and delusive; what causes the valid cognition of
"bull" is, then, a sound heard which is common to both the valid and the
delusive hearing; this alone is what is depended on. The advaitin goes
one step further and says that perception which is wholly delusive is yet
depended on by the valid verbal testimony as to non-duality: thus the
commentator.

CHAPTER II

knowledge through verbal testimony, only such percep-
tion of letters, words etc., as is common to valid
knowledge and delusion, is needed; consequently, non-
dualist revelation depends only on the perception of
letters, words etc., not the valid knowledge thereof; and
thus, even though the existence of letters, words etc., be
denied, there is no conflict with what is depended on.

3-2 Others, however, say thus: though, in valid know-
ledge through verbal testimony, the establishment of
the existence of letters, words etc. be not needed, yet
since valid knowledge does not arise from a sound that
has not (the requisite) capacity, there does exist the
need to establish the existence of capacity. Even in
regard to this need, there is no conflict with what is
depended on ; for, though denied by the Scriptural text
" There are here no differents ", there is recognised
the existence of the universe, which persists up to
Brahman-knowledge, accords with practical efficiency,
and is different from the unreal; else it would follow
that perception and other empirically valid means of
knowledge are contentless. Nor may it be asked" How
can the world gain existence, despite the denial of the
existence-aspect, since denial, if it did not remove its
counter-correlate, would be self -contradictory?"; for,
in conformity with the two cognitions " this is silver "
and " this is not silver," in the case of nacre, there is
admitted, of the non-existence of the superimposed in
the substrate, a capacity to put up with the existence
of a counter-correlate, which persists till sublation and
is different from the unreal. Hereby, (the view that)
for the world ; if denied in respect of its existence, there

EMPIRICAL REALITY OF PERCEPTION 271

would be but unreality as for the horns of a hare, is
refuted; for, there is difference (from the horns of a
hare) because of the recognition of an existence that is
removable by Brahman-knowledge (alone). Nor may
it be said: " If of the superimposed there be denial in
the substrate, in respect of existence, the denial of it
elsewhere, in respect of existence, would follow of itself;
hence, because of the contingence of its being the
counter-correlate of negation relating to all places and
times, its unreality would be difficult to avoid; for
unreality is defined only in this way that unreality
consists in being the counter-correlate of negation
relating to all places and times, a definition of that in
any other way not being possible "; for, by those who
admit of the unreal that it is the counter-correlate of
negation relating to all places and times, there cannot
be given as evidence, in respect of its being so, either
perception, since all places and times cannot be per-
ceived, or revelation, since no such revelation is cog-
nised; hence, inference alone has to be offered as
evidence; consequently, that, which in that inference
has to be said to be the probams of exclusion from the
real, that itself, being cognised first (as compared with
the other mark), may intelligibly define unreality.

Others, however, say thus : the purport of Scriptu- 3.3
ral texts like " There are here no differents whatsoever "
is the negation of the world in respect of reality, not in
respect of existence ; for, if a negation in respect of
existence did not remove (that) existence, it could not
be the negation of that, while, if it did remove that
(existence), there would be conflict with perception.

272 CHAPTER II

Nor may it be said that since reality too is established
by such perception as " The pot is real ", negation is
not proper in that respect too ; for, in order that there
may be no conflict with Scripture, it is intelligible that
perception may have for content empirical reality
consisting in an appearance of reality. Nor, this being
the case, is there the unintclligibility of the negation
of the world in that respect, since in the world there
is no possibility of the absolute reality present in
Brahman; for, just as in nacre it is but the cognition
of the appearance of silver that constitutes the possi-
bility of real silver and consequently there is negation
of that hence it is that in "This is not silver, but
that ", " This is not my cow, but only that ' V ' He who is
present here is not Caitra, but (the one) in the room", of
that which is denied, reality is understood elsewhere
similarly, it is but the cognition of the appearance of
reality that constitutes the possibility of reality, and
consequently, the negation of that is intelligible. There-
fore, since there is not the suspicion of the denial of the
existence of letters, words, capacity etc., there is no
conflict with what is depended on.

3.4 Yet others, however, do not accept three grades of
reality consisting of absolute reality in Brahman,
empirical reality of the nature of an appearance of
reality in the world, and a merely apparent reality
inferior even to that, in nacre-silver etc.; for, even
because of interpenetration by the absolute reality of
the substrate, Brahman, the conceit of reality in pot etc.,
and in nacre-silver etc., is intelligible, and hence there
is no evidence for assuming an appearance of reality.

EXPLANATION OP REFLECTION

And thus, since in the world there is no cognition of
reality, and since, even from the cognition of that in
Brahman which has been identified therewith, the possi-
bility of that (cognition) in respect of the world is
intelligible through non-discrimination (of the world
from Brahman), there is, if there is negation of the
world in respect of reality, neither conflict with what is
depended on nor the negation of that of which there is
no possibility.

Nor may it be asked: "If no appearance of reality 3-41
be admitted in the universe other than the absolute
reality present in Brahman, for what reason is there
admitted in nacre the origination of an appearance of
silver, other than the silver at a distance (i.e., else-
where) ?"; for immediacy being impossible in the case
of what is at a distance and not in contact (with the
sense organ), in order to account for that (immediacy)
that (origination) is admitted.

Now, thus, even where there is delusion caused by 3-411
reflection, there should be accepted the origination of an
appearance of the face, in the mirror, other than the face
on one's neck; for, in respect of the face on one's own
neck, though immediacy is possible for the portion
defined by the nose etc., there cannot be immediacy for
such portions as the eye-balls and the forehead, while in
the delusion caused by reflection there is seen immediacy
for such portions as the eye-balls. Nor is there the
contingence of the acceptable in admitting the reflection
as other than the image ; for, the jiva too that is a
reflection of Brahman being different therefrom, there
would be the contingence of illusoriness for that Cjiva).

3 J-35

274 CHAPTER II

3*4111 To thig the followers of the vivarana say thus: it
is on the face on one's neck that, because of the defect,
viz., the proximity of the mirror as an external adjunct,
there occurs the superimposition of being present in
the mirror, facing oneself, and difference from the
(original) image; hence, there is not to be assumed the
superimposition of a face on the mirror, because of
prolixity (of assumptions) ; because there is sublation
of the relation alone, in the form "The face is not in
the mirror", while, if it were another illusory thing,
there would be sublation of its existence in the form
" This is not the face " ; and because there is recognition
of non-difference from one's own face in the form " My
face appears in the mirror ". Nor is immediacy
impossible for the substrate, i.e., the face on one's neck;
for, there is admitted the rule that the rays of l%ht
from the eyes obstructed by an external adjunct are
turned back and apprehend the (original) image, like
a creeper etc. (which, obstructed in its growth in one
direction, grows in another) ; for, if that rule were not
admitted, there would be the contingence of a visual
delusion of reflection (even) in the case of primal atoms
and in the case of gross objects though hidden by walls
etc. Nor may it be said " There is the rule that visible
delusion of reflection is only of what is not hidden, is
gross and of perceptible form, not of anything else";
for, since the grossness and perceptible form of the
image can be of use in the settled way of generating
visual cognition, it is unintelligible to assume (their)
use in any other way; further, if an interposition like
could serve here as an obstacle evep without

IDENTITY OF REFLECTION AND PROTOTYPE 275

preventing the conjunction of the obstructed rays of
light from the eyes (with the image), then, in the very
same way, even in the case of pot-perception etc., there
is the possibility of its being an obstacle, and it would
follow that contact with the sense of sight would as
such fail to be the cause (of visual perception). 22
Further, even by those who maintain the super-
imposition of an illusory face on the mirror, in order
that there may result the memory-impression included
in the three causes (of superimposition), 23 prior
experience (of the face) has to be established only by
the assumption of the apprehension of one's own face
by the rays from the eyes which are sometimes turned
back (by a reflecting medium). Nor is the memory-
impression intelligible even with the prior experience
(of the face) as defined by the nose and other such
(visible) parts, since with this much the super-
imposition of the reflection of the eye-balls etc., is*
unintelligible; further, it is difficult to predicate prior
experience in any way, where in the water of a tank
there is superimposition of the reflection of an unseen
person seated on the top of a tree by the side of the tank.
And thus, it has necessarily to be said of the rays of light
from the eyes, when obstructed by an external adjunct,
that they reach the (original) image and apprehend

22 The interposition of an obstacle is supposed to obstruct contact
of the object with the sense-organ. If the wall serves to obstruct visual
perception, but not as obstructing the passage of rays from the eyes to the
object, then, the passage of the rays would be immaterial, and sense-
contact would fail to have causal efficacy in perception.

23 The three causes are memory-impression (sainskara), defect
(dosa) and sense-contact (samprayoga) or cognition of the substrate
(adhirth&na-Jfiana).

276 CHAPTER II

it; 24 on the strength of the (experience) of the effect,
(we have to say that) the capacity to reach the image
and apprehend it belongs only to those which are
obstructed by a mirror etc., not to those which are
obstructed by a rock etc. ; for those, which are obstructed
by the not too pure copper etc., there is not the capacity
to apprehend the specific configuration of the face,
because of the defect of relation to an impure adjunct;
since in the case of those (rays) which have reached
an adjunct and have turned back, there is not the same
obstruction by the sun's light, as in the case of those
(rays) which desire to reach the sun direct, in looking
at the reflected sun there is not the same inability as in
looking at it direct; where there is contact with an
adjunct like water, though some (rays) obstructed by
the adjunct get (back) to the image, some apprehend
the sand etc. within that (water etc.) ; there is no defect
in making such assumptions.

3.1112 ^ e au *hor of the Advaitavidya, however, states
thus the view of the Preceptor Vidyaranya and others,
who admit the illusoriness of the reflection and main-
tain three classes of jivas. The reflection in the mirror,
which is clearly seen by the bystanders to be different
from and similar to Caitra's face, is certainly different
therefrom and illusory in its own nature, like nacre-
silver in relation to the silver in one's own hand. Nor
is there conflict with the cognition of non-difference
from the image, in the form " My face appears in the

24 The view summarised here has a superficial similarity to that of
modern science about the reflection of the rays of light; but the similarity
is not fundamental.

REFLECTION AS SUPERIMPOSITION 277

mirror " ; for, because of conflict with the clear cognition
of difference, duality, facing oneself etc., the cognition
of non-difference is impossible ; and the talk of "My face
in the mirror " is of secondary import like the talk of
one's shadow face as one's own face. Nor may it be
doubted why, because of conflict with the cognition of
non-difference, the talk of difference should not itself
be of secondary import ; for it is not possible to deny,
in the case of children (i.e., the unsophisticated), the
delusion pf another person in the reflection, leading up
to such practical activity as the desire to avoid or
approach. Nor may it be said that since even prudent
persons are seen to have recourse to the mirror etc., in
order to know the special features of their own faces,
the cognition of non-difference too leads to practical
activity; for, this recourse is intelligible even because of
the knowledge of the special rule that the reflection,
though different, has (yet) a form similar to that of
the image. As for the statement that the sublation ' ' The
face is not there " is only of the conjunction of the
face (with the mirror), not of the face, that is not
(correct) ; for, it would follow that even in " This is
not silver ", the sublation is only of the identity of
silver with the this-object, not of the silver. And if
because silver is superimposed by way of identity on
the this-element, (the statement) " This is not silver "
is the sublation certainly of the silver as identical and
not of the identity alone, then, since the face is super-
imposed on the mirror, as in conjunction with it, (the
statement) " The face is not there " is the sublation
certainly of the face as in conjunction, and not of the

278 CHAPTER It

conjunction alone ; thus there is parity (between the two
cases). As for the statement that there would be
prolixity in assuming superimposition in the case of the
substrate too, that is no defect, any more than the proli-
xity of the assumption of the appearance of silver
(in nacre), (the assumption, in both cases) being based
on evidence. Where there is delusion of reflection in
respect of one's own eye-balls etc., there is no means of
assuming immediacy for the (original) image; to
assume because of this that the rays from the eyes
obstructed by the adjunct reach to the (original)
image, leads to much that is in conflict with experience.
How, indeed can it be that on contact with water, while
some rays from the eyes pass through unobstructed,
others, which are so exceedingly delicate that they are
obstructed even by conjunction with water, conquer the
host of (solar) rays, that (ordinarily) obstruct the
whole body of rays from the eyes, 25 and enter the solar
orb situated in their midst? Again, since even in
looking at the moon's reflection, as in looking at the
moon, there is no distinction in respect of (sense)
contact with the (original) image, which is agreeably
cool as nectar, why should there not be satisfaction for
the eyes, through the manifestation of coolness (in look-
ing at the reflection) ? How, again, can it be that those
which are obstructed by conjunction even with water
are not obstructed by conjunction even with rocks etc.?
Or, how can it be that, if obstructed and turned back by
them, they do not get conjoined with the eye balls etc.?
Or, how can it be that, if they (the reflected) get con-

25 In the attempt to see the sun directly.

REFLECTION AS SUPERIMPOSITION 379

joined with them (the eye-balls etc.), they do not
perceive what is thus in conjunction ? It is seen that
even by a defect (where one exists) the apprehension of
the specific aspect alone is obstructed, but not the appre-
hension even of the very existence of the substrate that
is in (sense-) contact.

On the view, however, that the reflected face is a
superimposition, there need not be assumed anything in
conflict with experience. It is thus : since visual super-
imposition is seen only in the case of that which has an
unconcealed, gross and perceptible form, to the gross-
ness and perceptibility of the (original) image, for
which causality is settled in respect of the perception of
their locus, there belongs causality even in respect of
the superimposition of the reflection of their locus; and
in the case of an obstructing substance like a wall, which
is settled to obstruct the perception of a concealed
substance by intercepting the contact with the eyes,
which, on the analogy of the sense of touch and so on, is
understood to function by reaching (to their objects),
it is to be assumed that it (the obstructing substance)
obstructs in no other way even in the superimposition
of the reflection of what is concealed. What is the
conflict in this, in assuming, on the strength of the
effect, that for what is settled to be a cause etc., in some
cases, there is causality etc. elsewhere too? Hereby
is refuted (the statement) that if the rays from the eyes
obstructed by the adjunct be not admitted to reach to
the (original) image, there would be the contingence of
the delusion of visual reflection in the case of what is
concealed and is devoid of a perceptible form and so on.

280 CHAPTER II

Further, there is the contingence of the said defect
only on the acceptance of that (turning back and reach-
ing to the image). How? When, without turning
one's eyes (towards the object), as in looking at the sun
directly, one looks face downwards on the water, the rays
from the eyes which are obstructed thereby go up and
apprehend the prototype sun; when, without turning
one's eyes sideways, one looks with eyes straight at a
mirror, those (rays) obstructed thereby apprehend the
face of him who is by one's side ; similarly, even if one's
face be not turned backwards, the apprehension by those
(rays) obstructed by the adjunct, even in the case of
what is concealed behind one's back, would be difficult
to avoid; for, abandoning any principle regulative of
the turning back of the rays from the eyes obstructed
by the adjunct, it is admitted that the going (back) is
only to where the (original) image is. Similarly, when
in an impure mirror a fair face is reflected as dark,
since the fair colour of the (original) image, though
existent, is yet of no service in the visual cognition, the
visibility of the prototype face has to be maintained only
as qualified by an imposed colour, on the analogy of the
delusion that the shell is yellow ; hence, in the very same
way, it would be difficult to avoid (this), that even the
colourless may, as qualified by the darkness of the
adjunct mirror, be the object of a delusion of visual
reflection; for, in the case of ether, though of itself
colourless, visibility is admitted as qualified by super-
imposed blueness. Therefore, only the view that the
reflected face is in its nature a superimposition is more

REFLECTION NOT A SHADOW 281

acceptable. Nor is there a weakness here too in respect
of the memory-impression (needed as a cause, being a
consequence) of prior experience ; for, like the dream
superimposition of an unseen person merely through
the memory-impressions of the experience of persons in
general, the superimposition of particular faces in
mirrors is intelligible merely through the memory-
impression of the experience of faces in general. This,
however, is the difference: in dreams, the superimpo-
sition of the specific form of a person is in conformity
with the unseen potency which is the cause of what is
auspicious or inauspicious; here, however, the super-
imposition of the specific form of the face is in
conformity with the proximity of the (original) image.

Nor is it a defect that, if the reflection be in
its nature illusory, there would be the contingence of
illusoriness even for the jlva that is a reflection of
Brahman; for, though it be so in the case of the jlva
(looked upon) as a reflection, yet since the jlva (that is
Brahman) as defined is real, (his) experience of release
is intelligible.

As for the view of some that the reflection in the 3-412
mirror etc., being a variety of shadow cast by the face,
is certainly real, that is not (sound). Indeed, what
is called the shadow of a body and so on is only that
darkness which, when by particular members (of the
body), light that is pervasive is obstructed in some
places, comes into being in those places. And shadow-
ness of the nature of darkness is not appropriate in the
case of the reflections of pearl, ruby etc., which are of
white or red colour. Nor is that nature intelligible in
S I -36

282 CHAPTER II

the case of the reflection of the sun etc., which are devoid
of shadows of the nature of darkness.

3*413 Now, then, (it may be said that) if the shadow
which is of the nature of a reflection cannot be of the
nature of darkness, let it be another kind of substance,
since the assumption of another substance is intelligible
when there is non-inclusion among the recognised
substances, as in the case of darkness ; 2fl if this be said,
(we ask) will this other substance be associated with
such cognized properties as the peculiar colour, size and
configuration and with the property of facing oneself?
Or, will it' be devoid of these? On the latter
(alternative), it is not possible through this other
substance to explain the cognition of the reflection as
associated with the particular colour etc.; hence its
assumption is in vain. On the first (alternative),
however, how is it possible to explain the reality of the
reflections of numerous faces, large in size, which arc
cognised at the same time, without being mixed up, in
a single mirror of small size? How, again, when a
mirror, whose parts are closely packed, continues to
remain like that, can there be within it the origination
of another substance possessing many parts, low or
prominent, like the jaw, the nose etc. ? Further, in the
origination of a reflection possessing many colours like
whiteness, redness and yellowness, there is no cause of
the like nature present in the mirror and in contact with

26 Darkness (tamas) is recognised as an independent substance by
the MImamsakas and Vedantins, since it is cognised directly as possessing
blue colour, though it is not included among the substances enumerated
by the Naiy&yikas,

^REFLECTION NOT REAt

it. (It may be said) : " In the case of reflections, which
are only of such a size as to be fit to abide in the
(reflecting) adjunct, the cognition of large size and the
similar cognition of lowness and prominence are but
delusions; and some cause has to be assumed capable of
originating that kind of reflection without conflicting
with continuance as before of the mirror and its parts ".
If this be said, then, let nacre-silver too be real. For,
there too, it would be intelligible to assume some cause
capable of originating in the nacre, which continues
even as before, the silver that gets to be identified there-
with, and to lay down a rule in the case of that silver
that it is apprehended by a sense-organ (only) in co-
operation witli a cause which is considered to be a
defect. 27 Why then (follow) the maxim of (cooking)
half the gourd,- 8 and say that nacre-silver is unreal,
while the reflection is real? Nor in that case, would
there be for the nacre seen as silver the contingence of
liquefaction when thrown into the fire, as (there is)
for (real) silver ; for, the non-existence of the capacity
to liquefy in nacre-silver is intelligible in the same way
as the non-existence of heat or sweet smell in the
reflection of fire, musk etc. Now, it may be said : nacre-
silver is not real, because of the sublation admitted by
all, in the form " This is not silver, the silver appears
but as an illusion "; then, (we say) because of the
sublation established in all cases, in the form "The face
is not ip. the mirror, the face appears there, in the
mirror, only as an illusion ", it stands to reason that

27 As, for example, the glitter of nacre.

28 The other half being left to grow.

284 CHAPTER II

the reflection too is but unreal. Therefore, the conten-
tion that the reflection is real is unsound.

3 414 Now > the contention of i* s illusoriness too does not
stand to reason; for, there is not demonstrated (for it)
as in the case of nacre-silver, any ignorance which causes
(it) or any cognition which dispels (it), while being
capable of co-presence or co-absence (with it).

34141 ^ tllis some ( say ) : in the su P erim P os i tion *
reflection, which arises even after the full cognition of

the substrate (e.g., the face), the ignorance which
obscures the substrate is not the material cause (of the
superimposition), nor is the cognition of the substrate
in its specific aspect the dispeller (of that delusion) ;
though (this is so), yet, since for the ignorance
of the substrate, though dispelled in its aspect
of obscuring energy, persistence is possible in its aspect
of projective energy, .that (ignorance) itself is the
material cause ; and cognition of the substrate in co-
operation with the removal of the proximity of the
(original) image to the adjunct, is the dispeller of that
(delusion) together with its material cause.

Others, however, say thus: it is not natural 20 for
cognition to leave out the aspect of projective energy
and dispel the aspect of obscuring energy alone ; for, if
by Brahman-knowledge, in the case of primal ignorance,
and by the cognition of nacre etc., in the case of modal

29 That is to say, where the projective aspect is not removed, it
must be due to the presence of obstacles to the removal thereof, and not
due to the inherent capacity of knowledge to remove the obscuring aspect
alone; such obstacles are projected by primal nescience and they will
continue to exist for anything short of Brahman-knowledge; by such
cognitions, therefore, there is the removal of the obscuring capacity alone
of primal ignorance.

REFLECTION CAUSED BY PRIMAL IGNORANCE

ignorance, the aspect of obscuring energy alone were
dispelled, then, in respect of the protective energy there
would be the contingcncc of its persistence for all time.
Nor is that (persistence) determined by the presence of
an obstacle to the removal of the aspect of projective
energy, consisting in the proximity of the (original)
image to the adjunct ; for, even prior to the proximity
(coming about) of the (original) image to the adjunct,
when it is understood through perception that there is
no relation of the (original) image, Caitra's face, to the
mirror, or that Caitra's face is not in the mirror, there
should necessarily be the removal even of the aspect of
projective energy; hence it would follow that at that
time, if there be proximity of those two, (yet) because
of the non-existence of the material cause, there would
not be the delusion of reflection. Therefore, primal
ignorance alone is the material cause of the super-
imposition of reflection. Nor is there parity of the said
defect 30 even here ; for, though, in respect of external
things, different forms of psychosis do overcome primal
ignorance in its aspect of obscuring energy, in those
parts of intelligence which are defined by the respective
objects, yet, they do not dispel its aspect of projective
energy ; otherwise, there would be the contingence of the.
dissolution even of the empirical projections present
in those places. 31 Nor, if the reflection is the
product of primal ignorance, is there the contingence

30 I.e., failure of a material cause for subsequent reflections, when
once ignorance is dispelled.

31 That is to say, not merely the reflection, but the mirror too, would
disappear.

286 CHAPTER It

of its empirical reality; for, what is determinative
of empirical reality is non-generation by a defect
over and above nescience ; and since in the
present case there does exist a defect over and
above that, viz., the proximity of the (original) image
and the adjunct, (its) merely apparent character
is intelligible. Nor may it be said : " When this is
the case, there would be the contingence of even that
cognition of the substrate, which is aided by the removal
of the proximity of the (original) image and the
adjunct, failing to remove the superimposition of
reflection, since that has not the capacity to remove the
primal ignorance "; for, there is no conflict; 32 though
that (cognition) has not the capacity to remove igno-
rance about Brahman, yet, since the cognition of the true
nature of the substrate has for content what is opposed
to the superimposition of reflection which has that
(ignorance) for material cause, it is intelligible that, in
co-operation with the absence of obstacles, it has the
capacity to remove that (superimposition) ; even on the
view of modal ignorance as the material cause, since
its obscuring energy has been removed by an earlier
cognition of the substrate, there is failure of a common
content; 33 hence, it (the obscuring energy) cannot be
removed by that cognition of the substrate whicK
belongs to the same time as the absence of obstacles;
hence, it has to be accepted that merely the super-

32 Between removal of the superimposition and non-removal of
primal ignorance.

33 For ignorance and the cognition.

DREAM CAUSED BY PRIMAL IGNORANCE 287

imposition of reflection 34 is what is removed by that
(cognition) . Or else, let it be that this superimposition
is removable only by Brahman-knowledge that has the
capacity to remove (also) the ignorance that is the
material cause of (the superimposition) itself. As for
the contingence of empirical reality (for the reflection),
that is answered on the ground of its being generated
by a defect over and above nescience.

Thus, even in the superimposition of dreams, since 3-51
there is superimposition on undefined intelligence, or
on intelligence conditioned by individuation, (but)
devoid of modal ignorance, 35 and since (in the words)
" That darkness of ignorance is called sleep, which is
the cause of dreaming and waking " it is said by the
Preceptor that both the dreaming and waking worlds
are products of one ignorance, that (dream-superimpo-
sition) is the product of primal ignorance and hence
is sublatable only by Brahman-knowledge that has the
capacity to remove its (the dream's) own material
cause ; its merely apparent character is only because of
generation by a defect, such as sleep, over and above
nescience : thus say some.

Others, however, say thus : because of the statement 3-53
in the Bhdsya " These chariots etc. seen in dream's are
sublated on waking ", because there is seen in the
Vivarana (the passage) " since it is opposed to bondage
in the nature of ignorance, like waking cognition ", and

34 That is to say, merely the projective energy of ignorance.

35 This is the witness-intelligence; it is conditioned by individuation;
as the locus of the psychosis of pleasure, pain etc., it is devoid pf modal
ignorance,

288 CHAPTER II

because of the experience of the illusoriness of dreams
by one who has woken up, waking cognition has the
capacity to remove -the superimposition of dreams;
hence its merely apparent character is only because of
its being sublated by cognition other than Brahman-
knowledge. Nor may it be asked how the cognition,
which has not for its sphere the true nature of the
substrate and has not the capacity to remove the igno-
rance that is its material cause, can remove the super-
imposition ; for, in the case of the superimposition of the
rope-snake, removal is seen even by the delusion of a
stick, which arises immediately after itself (i.e., the
snake delusion), just as by the cognition which has the
capacity to remove the ignorance that is its material
cause and is of the true nature of the substrate.

3-53 Yet, others, however, (say) thus: not primal igno-
rance, but a distinct mode of primal ignorance, which
is of the form of sleep, and which, when there is the
quiescence of the karma that brings about enjoyment
in waking, arises as veiling both the empirical jiva,
the spectator of the waking world, who is of the nature
of a reflection, as well as the waking world seen by him,
(that) is the material cause of the superimposition of
the dream world. Nor is there no evidence for sleep
being a mode of ignorance ; for, the empirical jiva, who
is veiled by primal ignorance, who is the spectator of the
waking world, who has in respect of himself without
doubt or error such conceits as " I am a man, I am a
brahmin, I am a son of Devadatta", and by whom' such
incidents of the waking world as the death of his own
grandfather are always experienced as of one un-

DREAM CAUSED BY MODAL IGNORANCE 289

obscured form in respect of himself because of his long
association therewith, if for him there were no obscura-
tion by something at the time of dreams, then, in dream
too, as in the state of waking, there would be the
contingence of the non-existence of such delusions as
"I am a tiger, I am a sudra, I am a son of Yajnadatta"
and of such (other) delusions as that of his grandfather
being alive j therefore, it is only for sleep that there is
established the nature of a specific mode of ignorance,
which arises at that time and obscures the empirical
world and jlva. Nor thus, because of the jiva too being
veiled, is there the contingence of the non-existence
of a spectator for the world; for, there is a merely
apparent superimposition of the spectator, the jlva
too, along with that of the dream world. And thus,
when consciousness is called up by karma which
brings about waking enjoyment afresh, there is subla-
tion of the dream world, only by the cognition of the
nature of the empirical jiva, which has the capacity to
remove the ignorance of the form of sleep, that is the
material cause of (the dream) itself. Nor may it be
said that there being thus the sublation thereby even
of its spectator, the merely apparent jiva, there would
not be the recollection " I experienced an elephant in
the dream "; for, since the merely apparent jiva is
superimposed on the empirical jlva, there is no undue
extension even in admitting the empirical jlva's recollec-
tion of the (former's) experience.

Now, both the positions stated earlier, that there 3-541
is superimposition of the dream world on undefined
intelligence or on intelligence as conditioned by
s 137

290 CHAPTER II

individuation, do not stand to reason; for, on
the first (view), the dream elephant etc., since
they occupy space other than that of the wit-
ness conditioned by individuation, 80 cannot, like
happiness etc., be manifested by that, independently
of relation to a psychosis of the internal organ ;
and the sense of sight etc. being quiescent, the
rise of a psychosis is impossible; hence, there cannot
be manifestation by that, in dependence on the relation
to that (psychosis); (while), on the second (view),
there would be the contingence of (the experience) " I
am an elephant" as of "This is silver", or of " I possess
an elephant " as of " I am happy ".

3-5421 Here, some justify the first view (thus) : intelli-
gence undefined by individuation is accepted as the
substrate of the dream world, not as outside the body,
but only as within it. Hence it is that absolute illusori-
ness is declared of the dream-elephant etc., since there
is no space (in the body) corresponding to their
perceived dimensions. And thus, though the internal
organ, having no freedom (of action) outside the body,
has need of the sense of sight etc., in order to originate,
in waking, a psychosis whose sphere is the external this-
element of nacre and so on, yet, in the case of the
internal organ, (which) within the body is free, a
psychosis is possible of itself (i.e., without dependence
on any sense-organ etc.) ; therefore, there is no unintelli-
gibility whatsoever in the undefined intelligence, which

36 The witness, who is conditioned by individuation, is the percipient,
but the dream cognitions are, on the first view, superimposed on undefined
Intelligence, not on the percipient; hence the difference from the experience
of happiness etc., which are superimposed on the percipient,

DREAM SUPERIMPOSED ON UNDEFINED INTELLIGENCE 29 1

is manifested by the psychosis of the internal organ
within the body, being the substrate. For the same
reason there is this statement of Bharatltirtha in the
Vivaranopanyasa: just as, in waking, the nescience,
that is present in intelligence as defined by the this-
element of the nacre manifested by the psychosis
generated by (sense-) contact, is illusorily transformed
in the form of silver, similarly, in dream too, the
nescience, that is present in intelligence manifested in
the psychosis of the internal organ within the body
when there is the association of defects like sleep, may
illusorily transform itself ijti the form of the universe,
when in co-operation with the memory-impressions
of diverse objects called up by the unseen potency
(adrsta) (of past karma).

Others, however, say thus: undefined intelligence 3*5422
is not the substrate of the dream world, as manifested
by a psychosis. For, the origination is not possible of
a psychosis whose sphere is undefined intelligence,
except as based on verbal testimony, while the psychosis
in the form ' I ' is seen to rise only in intelligence as
defined by individuation etc. Therefore, its substrate
is that intelligence which is of itself immediate and is
undefined by individuation etc. Hence it is that, in the
Sanksepasariraka, there is (first) the verse : " The
delusive cognition of objects in the form of immediacy
comes about in dependence on a substrate cognised as
immediate by the mind or of itself or by the sense of
sight; for it is so cognised in dream, delusion etc.";
after stating thus that the immediacy of the substrate
needed by the superimposition cognised as immediate

292 CHAPTER II

(comes) sometimes of itself, sometimes by a psychosis
of the mind, sometimes by a psychosis of the external
organs, the immediacy of the substrate is cited as result-
ing of itself in dream superimposition, by the
immediately succeeding verses: " Here, in dreams,
intelligence is immediately cognised of itself; yet, even
in the absence of its substrate, the content of the sense
of sight (i.e., visual forms etc.), delusion arises
repeatedly only as with (such) form, because of the
instrumentality of the mind. Just like the delusion of
silver etc., in what is cognised by the sense of sight, so
in the ether too, which is cognised by the mind, there is,
because of the force of immediacy, the delusion which
ascribes various colours to it such as whiteness/'
Nor may it be said that since the whole of intelligence
undefined by individuation is veiled, there is no mani-
festation of it in the absence of a psychosis. For, it is
admitted that Brahman-intelligence alone is obscured,
while the jlva-intelligence, which is a reflection (of the
former) in nescience, is, though undefined by individua-
tion, not obscured. And thus, the dream-elephant etc.
being superimposed on intelligence undefined by
individuation, there is for the cogniser-intelligence too
the empirical usage " I see this ", because of the mani-
festation of non-difference effected by the psychosis
of the internal organ etc., which arises invariably at the
same time (as the superimposition) and has for its
sphere the substrate (of the superimposition). 87

37 If non-difference between the cognising intelligence and the
substrate intelligence were not thus manifested by a psychosis, the dream
being imposed on undefined intelligence, the experience "I see an elephant"
would not have been explained. The word "etcetera" after "internal organ"
includes the possibility of the psychosis being a transformation of nescience
(avidya-vrtti) B uch as has to be postulated for the cognition of sleep.

DEFINED INTELLIGENCE AS THE SUBSTRATE

Yet others, however, justify the second view thus:
in saying that intelligence defined by individuation is
the substrate, it is not admitted that individuation
enters into the substrate-aspect as its proprium; rather,
it is that intelligence alone which is conditioned by indi-
viduation and is of the nature of a reflection therein,
that is the substrate ; therefore, there is not the contin-
gence of experiences like " I am an elephant ".

Thus, even nacre-silver is imposed on that reflection 3. 543 1
of intelligence which is defined by the this-element of
the nacre and is present in the internal organ of which
there is the psychosis ; for, if it were superimposed on
the prototype intelligence which is defined by the this-
element of nacre and is common to all, there would be
the contingence of the non-existence of failure to cog-
nise by others, as in the case of happiness etc. ; 38 thus say
some.

Some (others) , however, admit the superimposition 3,5433
of that even on the prototype intelligence, and justify
the failure to cognise by others on the ground that what
has some one's ignorance as its material cause is
perceptible by that one alone, not by another jiva.

Now, in the case of the superimposition of nacre- g.g
silver, the experience of visibility is justified either
directly or through the channel of the cognition of the
substrate, since that is needed; the experience of

38 The experience of happiness etc. is cognisible by the experiencer
alone, not by others; the same is the case with delusions; but this would
be unintelligible if they were superimposed on the universal intelligence
common to all experients; hence the need for defining the substrate aa
reflected intelligence.

294 CHAPTER It

visibility in the case of the dream-elephant and so on,
how is that to be justified?

3-61 The reply is: in order to justify this, it is not

possible to predicate a merely apparent manifestation
of the senses too, as of the dream body and objects, since
for the merely apparent, there is no reality except as
cognised ; while, in respect of the reality of the senses
which are super-sensuous, uncognised reality would
have to be predicated. Nor is it possible to say even of
the empirical sense-organs that they go forth from
their respective orbs, locate themselves in the dream
body and apprehend their respective objects ; for, at the
time of dream (sleep), there is declared of them quies-
cence consisting in the absence of functioning; further,
the empirical tactile organ, which exists in the interior
of the body, devoid of empirical spatial properties
suitable to itself, cannot pervade the entire dream body
which is (sometimes) of greater dimensions than
itself; 30 and if it (the tactile sense) were located in some
one part (of that dream body), it could not explain
(the dream experience of) cold touch in all parts,
generated by immersion in the water of the dream.
Hence it is that there is refuted even the suspicion of
the explanation that in dreams, though the sense-organs
of waking life are quiescent, there exist subtle sense-
organs, which are parts of the subtle body, which are

39 The tactile sense is pervasive of the whole body, within and
without; but since dreams are experienced within the lody, only such part
of the tactile sense as is within can function, if at all; and this, of course,
does not pervade even the whole of the percipient's body or other similar
bodies, to say nothing of bigger bodies like those of elephants, etc.,
envisaged in dreams.

NO SENSE-FUNCTIONING IN DREAMS

of service in the empirical usage of Taijasa (the intelli-
gence of dream-consciousness), and that the sensory
nature of dream objects is due to these; for, there are
not known any subtle sense-organs other than the sense-
organs of waking life.

Further, (the text) " Here, this person is self- 3-611
manifest " teaches the self -luminosity of the self with
reference to the dream state, since, in waking, the self-
luminosity of the self is difficult to discriminate, because
of intermixture with luminaries like the sun and because
of (the self) functioning through psychoses of the sense
of sight etc. ; otherwise, since it is always self-luminous,
the word " here " would be futile. Therefore, if even
in dreams there be assumed functioning through
psychoses of the sense of sight etc., then, even there, as
in waking, its self -luminosity would be difficult to
discriminate; consequently the cited Scriptural text
would be affected. 40

Now, in dreams, though there be assumed the 3-612
quiescence of the sense of sight and so on, the internal
organ remains non-quiescent; since thus elimination
(of all organs) is not secured, there can be no discrimi-
nation of self -luminosity. (If this be said), not so.
For, in the section " (The self is the) agent, since the
sacred teaching (about rites) is purportful", it is said
in the Nyayanirnaya that the internal organ is not
instrumental to cognition except in dependence on some
other organ like the sense of sight; in the Tattavaprar
dlpika it is said that since that (internal organ) stands

40 In respect of its authoritattveness, i.e t , sublated.

296 CHAPTER II

as the object of cognition, through its transformation in
the form of elephant etc., in dreams, it cannot, at that
time, be the instrument of cognition; elimination (of all
organs) may result in either of these two ways. Nor,
if the internal organ did not function in dreams, would
it be unintelligible for one who has woken up to recollect
the elephant etc., seen in the dream; for, that is intelli-
gible through the transformation of nescience settled
(to exist) in sleep ; while, on the view favoured by the
Vedantaliaumndl, (in the words) " In sleep, what
manifests ignorance, happiness etc. is but essential
intelligence as conditioned by that state ; the recollection
by one who has woken up is due to the memory-impres-
sion generated by the destruction of the state (of sleep)
which is the conditioning adjunct," that in sleep there
is no transformation of nescience, here too, the recollec-
tion is intelligible, because of the memory-impression
generated by the destruction of the dream state that is
the conditioning adjunct of the intelligence that mani-
fests the dream-elephant etc.

3-6 13 ^ r e * se ' Because ^ suc h Scriptural texts as " That

is sattva (i.e., the internal organ) whereby one sees
dreams ", let there be even in dreams, in the manner
mentioned in the Kalpatam, a psychosis of the internal
organ, having the dream-elephant etc. for its sphere.
Nor with this is there non-establishment of elimination;
for, the internal organ apprehended as "I" being
always superimposed as identical with the jlva, its
distinction therefrom is not well known from the view-
point of ordinary experience; therefore, only the non-
existence of the functioning of the sense of sight etc.,

SENSE-FUNCTIONING IN DREAMS DELUSIVE 297

is needed for the sake of elimination; for, there being
the certitude that whatever is well known to be the seen 41
is capable of being manifested by the seer, nothing else
is needed for the sake of elimination. Therefore, the
functioning of the sense of sight etc., in dreams, being
in any case impossible, the experience of visibility etc.,
in the case of the dream-elephant and so on, is but a
delusion.

Now, in dream too, as in waking, there is cognised 3-62
the concomitance of the experience of elephant etc.
with the opening of the eyes and so on, so that when the
eyes are open there is experience of elephant etc., not
when they are closed; if this be said, like the experience
"I see the silver with my eyes", this too may be some
dream delusion, that superimposes on the experience of
the dream-elephant etc., which is of the nature merely
of the witness, either concomitance with the sense of
sight etc., or a psychosis that is concomitant with that.
What delusion, indeed, even though difficult to accom-
plish as it were, cannot maya accomplish, especially
when transformed in the form of sleep, by whose might
the chariot cognised in the dream is in an instant cog-
nised as a man and that again in an instant as a cat,
while for the percipient there is no recollection of
conflict between the earlier and later? Therefore,
though there is parity in respect of the cognition of
the concomitance of co-presence etc., it is only the
waking experience of elephant etc., that is generated by

41 What is needed is the elimination of whatever may be an object
of cognition (drSya) ; the exclusion of the internal organ is not necessary,
since, from the empirical point of view, it is confounded with the seer.

5 1-3$

CHAPTER n

the sense of sight etc., not the dream experience of
elephant etc.

3*71

Those, however, who maintain that perception is

creation (drsti-srsti-vadins) accept, for the whole
world of waking, creation contemporaneous with per-
ception, since the uncognised reality of what is assump-
tive is unintelligible; and they say that even the waking
experience of elephant etc., is not an object of the sense
of sight, since the cognition of the concomitance of the
perception of pot etc. with the contact with the sense of
sight, which (concomitance) is irreconcilable with the
non-existence of pot etc., prior to the perception, is
justified by them, only as in the case of dreams.

Now, if basing oneself on (the view of) perception
as creation, one admits of the whole world of waking
that it is assumptive, who is he that posits it ? Is it the
unconditioned self or the self conditioned by nescience?
Not the first ; for, since even in release there exists the
person who posits without the need of any other
instruments, the world would persist, and there would
be non-distinction from the state of migration. Not the
second; for, since nescience has itself to be posited, the
establishment of the person who posits has to be declared
even prior to the assumption of that (nescience).

To this some say thus: he who is conditioned by
the earlier posited nesciences is he who posits the subse-
quent nesciences. And since, in the case of the stream
of positer and posited, it cannot be said " This is the

VADA 299

first", there is not the defect of infinite regress. 42 Nor
may it be said " Since beginninglessness is admitted of
nescience, assumptiveness, as in the case of nacre-
silver, is inappropriate; otherwise, the distinction
between what has a beginning and what has not a
beginning would be unintelligible "; just as the tower
etc., posited in dreams, is in some part posited as already
existent and, in some (other) part, as originated at that
time, even so, in waking too, some (part) of what is to
be posited is posited as with a beginning and some (other
part) otherwise; hence, with this, the distinction
between what has a beginning and what has not a
beginning is intelligible. Hereby is explained even the
distinction between effect and cause. 43

Others, however, say thus: nescience etc. 44 are m 3.712
reality certainly beginningless; in respect of these, it is
not admitted that perception is creation, but only in
respect of the (rest of the) world other than these.

Now, even thus, who is he that posits, in the case 3.713
of ether etc., their creation, its sequence etc., which are
cognised from Scripture alone ? No one at all. What

42 A continuous stream has neither beginning nor end; and this
is no defect in what is recognised to be strictly like a stream; v:here,
however, one arbitrarily assumes a beginning and says "This is first" the
opponent can show that it is dependent on another and that on another,
thus involving infinite regress; it is only thus that infinite regress can be
a defect, not merely because of the indefiniteness of a continuous stream.

43 With its consequence that the object, as cause of the cognition,
should exist prior to and independent of the cognition.

44 The six beginningless ones, according to this school of advaita
are: jlva, Isa, pure intelligence, the difference between jiva and I6a,
nescience, and the relation of nescience to intelligence*

300 CHAPTER II

basis then, have such Scriptural texts as " From the
self, ether originated"?

3*7131 Know (then) that they have as basis the identity of
the self and Brahman devoid of connection with the
universe. Since the comprehension of Brahman devoid
of connection with the universe comes about through
superimposition and (subsequent) removal (thereof),
as instrumental to that comprehension, there is in
Scripture the mention of creation and destruction,
not because of (their) being the purport; this is loudly
proclaimed in the Bhdsya etc. (It may be said) ' i Then,
the attempt made in the quarters (of the Sutras)
relating to ether 45 and the vital air 46 to remedy
the reciprocal conflict among the Scriptural texts
about the creation of ether etc., about the order of
that (creation) and so on, would, if there be
no purport (in respect of them), be in vain."
Not in vain (we reply) ; for, that (attempt) sets out
on an assumption (that Scripture is purportful in
regard to these), for the sake of understanding the
principles (of interpretation). It has indeed been said
in the iSastradarpana: " Assuming that the Scriptures
have purport in regard to creation, this has been said
here; but that is not (really) so, since they have the
identity of Brahman and the self for purport ".

3.7133 The attainment of fruit by such observances taught

in Scripture, as the jyotistoma, is on a par with the
attainment of fruit produced by observances taught by

45 Ved. SH., II, ill.

46 Ved. 8&., II, ir.

VADA

301

Scripture in dreams. And since, for the Scriptural
texts about the jyotistoma etc., there is purport, in
regard to Brahman, through the channel of the purifi-
cation of the intellect, there is no non-authoritativeness
(for them) ; the elaboration of this and other ways, in
which the position that perception is creation
is supported, is to be seen, however, in the original
works. This is one variety of the view that perception
is creation, viz., that the creation of the universe is
contemporaneous with perception.

Another variety, however, of the view that per- 3-72
ccption is creation is that which is thus shown in the
Siddhantamuktavatt etc.: perception itself is the
creation of the universe, since there is no evidence of
the difference of the seen from the seeing; also because
of the traditional Code "The wise ones declare this
world to be but of the nature of cognition; others, of
defective vision, are deluded and see it as having an
ob j ective nature. ' '

Some preceptors, who gain no peace of mind on 3.3
either variety of the view that perception is creation,
prefer the view that perception is of the created. The
universe is created by the Supreme Lord in the order
shown in Scripture and is certainly endowed with non-
cognised reality; when in respect of each object the
corresponding means of knowledge turns up, there 4
results the perception of that (object). Nor may it be
said : " If thus there be no assumptiveness for the world,
(then), for that (universe) which has origination, des-
truction etc., as understood from Scripture, and which
has practical efficiency, as understood from perception

302 CHAPTER li

etc., reality alone would have been admitted;" for,
though there be not (mere) contemporaneity with the
assumption, since it is not, like nacre-silver etc.,
generated by the three causes (of superimposition)
consisting in sense-contact, memory impression and
defect, or cognition of the substrate, 47 memory impres-
sion and delect, yet there is admitted (for it) illusori-
ness, consisting in removability by knowledge alone, or
difference of nature from both the real and the unreal,
or being the countercorrelate of the negation in all three
times that is present in the locus of what is cognised; 48
on the view of reality, there would not be illusoriness
of the said nature in the universe; hence, there is
difference (of the present view) therefrom.

3*81 Now, thus, even for individuation and its attri-

butes, illusoriness of the said nature results, as for ether
etc., though there be no assumptiveness; hence, the
attempt made in the Bhasya, the tika 40 and the Vivarma
to show the threefold cause in respect of their super-
imposition is in vain.

If this be said, the preceptor Citsukha says : even
for individuation etc., merely apparent nature is

47 Cognition of the substrate, in its general nature, is substituted
for sense-contact, since the latter is absent from dream-delusion. Cognition
of the substrate fully, in its specific nature too, removes delusion; this is
what is referred to as knowledge (jfiana), when it is said that the
illusory is what is removable by knowledge alone.

48 The word "upadhi" here is used in the sense of locus (adhikarana).
Brahman is the locus of whatever is superficially cognised. In Brahman,
the world is denied in relation to all three times that it was not, is not
and will not be; hence, there, it is the counter-correlate of such negation*
The translation of "pratipanno-'pftdhi" follows Krgp&nanda's commentary.

49 The "tikft" in this context is the Paftcapadika.

PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF THE ILLUSORY 303

acceptable, since, like nacre-silver, they are cognised by
the bare witness (intelligence).

The preceptor Ramadvaya says thus : this (attempt 3*82
to show the three-fold cause) is only an argument on an
assumption (of the opponent's view) ; for, if from the
passage beginning with " For intelligence which is the
evidence for the non-dual substrate, the Brahman-self",
which establishes the three-fold cause there, intelligence
were the instrument of valid knowledge, there would
result contradiction of the postulation of the Vedanta
as instrumental and so on : hence, it is clear that this
is an extravagant argument (praudhi-vada).

Now, since on both the views, that perception is 4-0
creation and that perception is of the created, illusori-
ness is admitted, how is there practical efficiency for
what is illusory by nature'?

As in dreams we reply. Now, the practical 41
efficiency, of the nature of bathing etc., accomplished by
the dream-water etc., is certainly unreal. But what is
accomplished with the water etc. of waking experience,
is that real? 50 Practical efficiency of the same grade
of reality (as the experience itself) exists without
distinction in both : thus say some.

The author of the Advaitavidya, however, says, 4-2
thus: for dream objects, there is not merely such

60 The translation follows the commentary. It is possible, however,
to take the statement about the water of waking experience to be not a
question, but a further affirmation of the objector, contrasting it with the
dream content. The reply on either interpretation consists in pointing out
that practical efficiency is in no case absolutely real, but corresponds to
th$ grade of reality of the experience,

304 CHAPTER II

practical efficiency as is sublated by waking; for, in the
case of the damsel, the snake etc., of dreams, there is seen
the generation of happiness, fear etc., unsublated by that
(waking). For the happiness, fear etc., though gene-
rated by a dream content, no sublation is experienced
immediately on waking; but since, on the contrary,
even immediately on waking there is seen the continu-
ance of those together with mental satisfaction,
quaking of the body etc., it is concluded that they are
certainly real even before (waking). Hence it is that
for creatures there is desire again for the dream whose
sphere is the object that produces happiness, and
aversion to the dream which is not of that nature. And
in a dream, the rise of happiness, fear etc., which like
cognition, are of the nature of psychoses of the internal
organ, is possible. Nor may it be said that it is the
cognition of the dream-damsel etc., which produces
happiness etc., and that that (cognition) is certainly
real ; for, that too, which is of the nature of such
psychoses as sight and touch and is superimposed on
the witness of the dream world, is established to be
merely assumptive. Indeed, for him whose senses are
quiescent, real psychoses of the sense of sight etc. are
not possible. Nor may it be said that the mere imme-
diacy of that content produces happiness, and that that
(immediacy), being of the nature of the witness, is
certainly real; for, there being experienced different
grades of happiness and different grades of fear, as in
touch as contrasted with sight, in the touch of the hand
of the damsel as contrasted with the touch of the foot,
and in the serpent's contact with a vital spot as

PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF THE ILLUSORY 395

contrasted with a non-vital spot, it must be said that in
dreams too the respective grades of happiness, fear etc.
are generated by different grades of the assumptive
sight, touch etc.

Similarly, in waking experience, darkness is 4-3
assumed by one who has just entered a room, where
there is a light which is capable of illumining pot etc.
and is seen by another person present there; for this
(darkness) there is seen such practical efficiency as is
appropriate to well known darkness; for, by that
(darkness) in respect of that (person) there is seen the
obscuration of pot etc., the removal of that when a lamp
or the like is brought in, and re-obscuration when that
is taken away: thus too say some.

Others, however, (say thus) : in such practical 4-41
efficiency as drinking and bathing, it is the bare exis-
tence of water etc., that serves, not the reality thereof;
since for that (reality) there is neither causality nor
the determinant of that (causality), what (is the use)
of it ? Nor, this being the case, is there the contingenee
of such practical efficiency as is appropriate to well-
known water etc., even for the water of the mirage, for
nacre-silver etc. For, on the view of the author of the
Tattvasuddhi and others (like him), that in the water
of the mirage and so on, the class water-ness etc. does not
exist and that consequently the designation of the
delusion with that content by the word " water " is due
to its generation by a memory-impression of the former
experience of what is so designated, there is not the

(alleged) contingenee, since there does not exist the
3 139

306 CHAPTER II

class water-ness etc., that brings about the respective
practical efficiency.

4 * 42 On the view of those who, in the case of the merely
apparent, adhere to empirical usage of the same class
as that which was formerly seen, since even there the
class, water-ness etc., does exist, as otherwise there
would be conflict with the delusion designated as quali-
fied by that, and there would be the contingerice of the
non-existence of activity in respect of that (delusion)
on the part of those who need water, the non-existence
of practical efficiency here and there is intelligible, in
some cases because of the destruction of the super-
imposition, root and all, when the substrate is known
specifically, in some (other) cases because of the des-
truction of the superimposition alone by the cessation
(even) of the general knowledge of the substrate, and in
some (other) cases (still), where by the sense of sight
there is the superimposition of fire etc. on red beads etc.,
because of the non-superimposition of hot touch etc., that
cause burning, cooking etc.; and in some cases, some
kind of practical efficiency has to be recognised ; further,
if there has to be stated something which excludes the
water of the mirage etc., and is of the nature of what
is serviceable to practical efficiency, it is possible for
one to give up unsublatability in all three times, 51 which
is in conflict with Scripture 52 and is impossible of
apprehension through perception etc., and predicate

51 This is the kind of reality that is sought to be claimed to account
for practical efficiency; it is here suggested that a lower degree of reality
will serve the purpose.

52 I.e., those texts which declare the illusoriness of the world,

ILLUSORINESS OF THE ILLUSORY

serviceability to such practical efficiency as is appro-
priate to silver etc., only of the silver-ness etc., not
generated by special defects ; 53 therefore, since practical
efficiency is possible even in what is illusory, the world
is certainly illusory, not real.

Now, since, if illusoriness as an attribute of the 4-5
world be real, there would be loss of the non-duality of
Brahman, that (illusoriness) too should be said to be
but illusory ; consequently, whence the loss of the world's
reality, when, in the manner stated by you, that the
illusory connection of Brahman with the world is not
opposed to its (real) non-connection, illusory illusori-
ness is not opposed to reality ?

To this it is said thus in the Advaitadlpika : illusori- 4.51
ness consists in having the same nature as the world
of ether etc. And that negates the reality of the
substrate (of which it is an attribute). And in an
attribute negating an attribute opposed to itself, it is
established for both disputants that what is determina-
tive is the possession of reality of the same grade
as the substrate, not of absolute reality ; for, in
pot-ness etc., which negate non-potness etc., absolute
reality is not admitted by us. Since Brahman's
connection with the world does not possess the same
grade of reality as the substrate (Brahman), it
does not negate the non-connection with the world.
Hence too is refuted (the view), that if illusori-
ness be empirical, for the world's reality, which
is opposed to that, and is not merely apparent, there

53 E.g., defects of the sense-organs.

308 CHAPTER it

would be absolute reality ; for, if illusoriness, which is
of the same grade of reality as the substrate, is
empirical, the substrate too should invariably be
empirical.

4-52 Or else, that attribute which cannot be removed by
the intuition of its own locus, that is a negator of the
attribute opposed to itself ; for, there is seen the distinc-
tion that, in nacre, the identity with nacre, which cannot
be removed by the intuition of its locus, is, opposed to
non-nacreity; while, in that very thing (nacre), the
identity with silver, which is removable by that
(intuition of the locus) is not opposed to non-silverness.
And thus, since the world's illusoriness, though assump-
tive, cannot be removed by the intuition of the world,
it is certainly the negator of (the world's) reality. As
for Brahman's connection with the world, since that
can be removed by the intuition of Brahman, it is not
the negator of (Brahman's) non-connection with the
world.

4^53 Hereby is refuted the following view : " If Brahman
understood from verbal testimony be real, reality
should be predicated of the capacity of verbal testimony,
and of the authoritativeness of cognition through verbal
testimony ; for, there cannot be the establishment of an
empirical object through the statement of an untrust-
worthy person, which has merely apparent capacity, or
of a real object through such statements as those about
the agnihotra, which have empirical capacity ; hence, the
establishment is invariably of that sense of verbal
testimony which is of the same grade of reality as the
capacity; and if authoritativeness consisting in non-

EMPIRICAL VALIDITY & CAPACITY OF ABDA 309

sublation of content be unreal, the reality of the content
would be inconsistent ; and thus, because of the existence
of a real object over and above Brahman, duality neces-
sarily exists ; consequently, even the world of ether etc,
may be real ". Because, practical efficiency having been
established even of the empirical, the establishment of
the real Brahman even from what has empirical
capacity is possible ; because the reality of Brahman is
established from the existence of such terms as " real "
in the Vedanta whose purport is Brahman; because
difference (from statements about the agnihotra etc.)
is intelligible in that that (reality) is not established,
since such terms do not^exist in the texts about agnihotra
arid so on, and since even where they do exist they are
in conflict with the stronger Scriptural texts about the
non-duality of Brahman; because, the rule about the
sense of verbal testimony and its capacity having the
same grade of reality has no authority; and because
illusoriness is intelligible even of the authoritativeness
of the knowledge of the real Brahman, since it is asso-
ciated with what is other than that, 34 in the same way as
the authoritativeness of the pot-cognition is associated
with non-pot. Therefore, on the reasoning stated in the
arambhana section, the illusoriness of the whole world
of ether etc. is made firm as adamant.

Now, though illusoriness may be established of the 5-1
non-intelligent world of ether etc.,, by such words as

54 Validity consists in being that experience whereiji for what has
Brahman-hood, Brahman-hood is cognised as the predicate; it is, therefore,
associated with something over and above Brahman, viz., Brahman-hood;
and in thus passing beyond the one absolute real, it becomes less than real,
i.c., illusory.

310 CHAPTER il

arambhana, 55 since illusoriness is impossible in the case
of intelligent beings, who are to experience release, it
does not stand to reason that there is harmony (of the
Vedantas) in respect of the non-dual Brahman. Nor
can the earlier mentioned non-difference of these from
Brahman stand to reason, since for these, which are
reciprocally different, non-difference from the one
Brahman is impossible. Nor is their difference not
established, since it is established by the distinctions of
happiness, misery etc.

5.3 If this be said, no (says the non-dualist), since, on
their non-difference too, that distinction is intelligible
even because of differences in the external adjuncts.

5-21 Now, since their non-difference is not lost, even
though there be differences in the external adjuncts,
how (can there be) the distinction? Indeed, the non-
intermixture of conflicting attributes, which has to be
explained through differences in the locus, does not
result from the admission of difference in something
other than that.

5-211 To this some say thus : the distinction of happiness,
misery etc., does certainly result from difference in the
external adjunct, viz., the internal organ, since by such
Scriptural texts as " Desire, purpose, doubt, faith and
the absence of it, firmness and the absence of it, modesty,
keenness of intellect, fear, all these are in the mind
alone/' and " Vijnana (i.e., the mind) performs the

55 I.e., "modification" of speech, that being the way in which the
world is characterised by the Chandogya, on the advaitin's interpretation
Of it,

SUKHA-DU9KHADI-VYAVASTHA 3 1 1

sacrifice ", it is that alone which is declared to be the
locus of all evil, while by such Scriptural texts as
" Unattached indeed is this person", and " He Who is
unattached is indeed unaffected ", absolute indifference
is declared in the case of intelligence. Nor, this being
the case, is there conflict with the experience of the
apposition of bondage, like agency, with intelligence;
for, the internal organ being superimposed as identical
with intelligence, the experience of the attributes of that
(organ) as in apposition with intelligence is intelligible.
Nor may it be said that, if the internal organ be the
locus of bondage like agency, the intelligent one would
not be the transmigrator ; for, it is admitted that his
transmigration consists only in being the substrate of
the superimposition of identity with the knot of indivi-
duation, 50 which is the locus of bondage like agency;
for, even with this, the conceit of the self as the locus
of evil is intelligible, like the conceit " This is to be
feared " in the rope etc., the substrate of the super-
imposition of identity with the snake, which is the locus
of f earf illness ; and it is in this view alone that there
are found texts of Scripture and the traditional Code,
such as "As if contemplating, as if moving" and
" The self confounded by individuation thinks ' I am
the agent ' ".

Nor may it be said: "Since in one and the same
self there are superimposed the respective internal

56 Individuation, the substrate of I-ness, is called the knot of the
heart, for it is there that the strands of the self and not-self, the subject
and the object, the "not-this" and the "this" appear to cross and get
tater-twined, so that there is superimposition of either on tl^e other,

312 CHAPTER II

organs, which are the loci of diverse happinesses and
miseries, the distinction of the happiness, misery etc.,
of which there is a conceit in the self, does not result
even thus "; for, just as in the case of the host of evil
present in the internal organ, which has attained super-
imposition of identity, even of the reciprocal differences
therein, there is the conceit of (their) belonging to the
self; and the distinction in that (enjoyment) is
intelligible, through difference, which is of the same
kind as the self's experience of evil. Hereby is refuted
(the objection): "Though happiness, misery etc., are
attributes of the internal organ, yet since the experience
of these is of the nature of the witness and since that
is one, there does not result distinction in enjoyment
consisting in the experience of happiness and misery
(by different persons at different times)"; for, it is
only for that witness, which, by attaining identity with
the respective internal organs, is differentiated through
the differences of the respective internal organs, that
there is experience of the happiness, misery etc. of the
respective internal organs; hence, that distinction too
is intelligible.

5-212 Others, however, say thus : since the inert cannot
intelligibly be the locus of bondage like agency, (and)
because of the aphorism "(The self is) the agent,
because the sacred teaching is purportful ", which
declares the intelligent one alone to be the locus of these,
the locus of bondage is the reflection of intelligence in the
internal organ; and since this, which is unreal, which is
different from the (original) image, is different in each
(individual's) internal organ, there are such distinctions

SUKHA-DUSKHADI-VYAVASTHA 313

as learned and unlearned, happy and miserable, agent
and non-agent. Nor, if thus the superimposed be the
locus of bondage, is there the contingence of bondage
and release having different loci; for, since this
reflection of intelligence is superimposed on the absolu-
tely real jiva, which, as (intelligence) defined by the
internal organ, is real in its essential nature and persists
in release, his bondage is admitted to consist in being the
substrate of the superimposition of identity with the
reflection of intelligence, which (reflection) is the locus
of agency.

Yet others, however, say thus: in the text " The 5-213
wise ones declare him to be an enjoyer who is conjoined
with the body, the organs and the mind," enjoyership
is declared of that intelligent being, who is conjoined
with the body and the organs as auxiliaries and with the
mind, by way of identity; therefore, since through
differences of the internal organ there are differences
in what is qualified thereby, there is distinction (because
of these latter differences). Nor is there a difference
of locus (for bondage and release) in that bondage is for
the (internal organ) qualified, while release is for the
pure ; for, the bondage present in the qualified does not
fail to attach to the substrate (visesya), while (the
substrate included in) the qualified is not other (than
that pure one). 57

57 The translation of " vigistasya 'natirekat " follows the explanation
of the commentator: viita-'ntargata-vigesyasya kevalad anatirekad ity
arthaft. The man with the staff is recognised to be non-different from the
same man merely as man; this recognition is not sublated; therefore, the
man, the substrate in the cognition of the qualified-man-with-the-staff, is
essentially identical with mere man; the difference, as qualified or as npt
qualified, is assumptive.
SI 40

314 CHAPTER II

5 *214 Still others, however, say thus: let the pure intelli-
gent being be the locus of bondage like agency, since
on the analogy of the redness of the crystal, there is
admitted the superimposition of another agency etc.,
even on the intelligent being, because of the proximity
of the locus of agency etc., whether that be the internal
organ or what is qualified thereby. Nor, because of that
being one, is distinction unintelligible; for, that is
intelligible even because of differences in the external
adjunct, Nor may it be said that because of differences
in one (thing), there cannot be a distinction among
conflicting attributes in another (thing) ; for, merely
through the external adjunct of the nature of the base
or the top, there is seen in the tree the distinction
between conjunction and the absence thereof; 58 it is also
seen that in the case of the ether which has become the
sense of hearing, 59 there are, through differences in the
adjunct, viz., the respective ear-cavities of various
persons, such diversities as perceiving or not perceiving
sound, and perceiving what is high or low, pleasant or
unpleasant.

5-215 A few, however, say thus: if the distinction among

conflicting attributes has to be explained by difference
of locus alone, then, on the intelligent being alone, that

58 The same tree is botli conjoined and not conjoined with a
monkey, according as we are thinking of the base or the top of the tree.
The difference of the adjunct, base or top, accounts for the distinction
between conjunction and non-conjunction.

59 According to the advaitavedftnta, the sense-organs proceed from
the various elements; the element of ether becomes the sense of hearing;
similarly, the element of fire becomes the sense of sight; and so on. See
the

gUKH A-DU#KHADI- V YAVASTHA 3 1 5

has been distinguished (from adjuncts), let there be
positing of difference, because of the influence of
adjuncts, since it is not admitted anywhere that only
that difference, which has a non-assumptive locus, can
effect the distinction; 60 while, through differences
posited by such adjuncts as a gem, a mirror, and a sword,
distinction is admitted among such attributes of the
face as darkness, fairness, roundness or length, and
(it is admitted) among such attributes as that of a lamp
being nearer or farther away, through differences
posited by the adjunct, viz., the pressing of the finger. 61

When thus it is possible to explain distinction as 60
due to the influence of adjuncts, it should be determined
which is the adjunct that accounts for the jivas' non-
recollection of one another's happiness etc.

Here, some say thus: the non-difference and 6-1
difference of the abode of enjoyment constitute the
adjuncts that account for recollection and non-recollec-
tion ; for, the pain defined by the body is recollected as
defined by that, while the pain defined by the foot is not
recollected as defined by the hand, since there is not the
cognition "I, as defined by the hand, experience the
pain defined by the foot ". How, then, is there opera-
tion of the hand to remove the thorn that has run into
the foot? This operation of the hand is not due to a

60 Vyavastha is both distinction and adjustment consequent thereon;
the same word " distinction " has been used throughout, but " adjustment "
should be understood where suitable.

61 The illustration is not very clear, but this seems to be what Is
meant: when the finger is pressed against the eye-ball, a lamp in front
seems either to advance or to recede, i.e., appear in front of where it really
is (paurastya) or behind where it really is (paScatya).

316 CHAPTER II

recollection (of the pain) as (belonging to the self)
defined by the hand; since, as between the organ and
the organism, the foot and the body, there is no
difference, the pain defined by the foot is recollected as
(of the self) defined by the body, in the form " I have
a pain in the foot"; (the operation of the hand) is due
to this recollection, rather. Thus, since there is no non-
difference between the bodies of Caitra and Maitra, the
pain defined by Caitra 's body is not recollected as
defined by Maitra ? s body; nor is it recollected as
defined by another organism common to both the bodies,
since there does not exist even an abode of enjoyment
consisting in an organism common to both (bodies) ;
therefore, there is not the contirigeiice of the operation
of Maitra 's body to remove the thorn that has run into
Caitra 's body.

6-2 Others, however, say thus : what accounts for non-

recollection is the difference of disjoined adjuncts. And
thus, even if for that (self) defined by the hand there be
admitted recollection of the pain defined by the foot,
there is no defect. Nor, this being the case, is there
the contingence of the recollection of the mother's
happiness by the one in the womb, 62 for what are
intended by the word "disjoined" are those which do
not enter as organs into a single organism, and the two
bodies of the mother and of the (being in the) womb are
so (disjoined). Nor may it be said that recollection is
understood (to exist) even where there is disjunction,

62 The upadhis of the child and the mother, in this case, are not
disjoined (vi61i?ta). To meet this objection, the word "vi$lii?ta" is more
carefully defined in the next sentence.

SUKHA-DUtfKHADI-VYAVASTHA 317

because of the (following) statement of the Bharata:
"Lo! even (headless) trunks, with weapons held aloft
in their arms, and looking through the eyes in their own
severed heads, felled down (their) enemies"; for, even
there, the head and the trunk are such as can enter
(and had entered) as organs into one organism ; further,
when the head was cut off, there must necessarily have
occurred either swooning or death ; therefore, that kind
of statement opposed to perception has for purport the
praise of the excessive enthusiasm of combatants, on the
a fortiori principle; and even if it be a praise of the
existent, as having for content special persons endowed
with such power, non-recollection being accounted for
as a general rule by the (cause) set forth (by us) is not
nullified. For the same reason, in the views stated arid
to be stated, there is not the contingence of defect
because of the recollection of what occurs in another
body, by yogiiis and those who remember (other) births.

Yet others, however, say thus: the identity and 6-3
difference of bodies constitute the adjuncts that account
for recollection and the absence thereof, since, in the case
of the experience of infancy and another existence, there
are seen (respectively) recollection and the absence
thereof. Nor may difference of body be suspected even
as between infancy and youth, since there is recognition
(of the body as one). Nor may difference in that be
understood because of difference in size; for, just as by
differences of base and top in the case of the same tree,
so, in the case of the same body, the attaching of more
than one size is intelligible through difference in time.
" Now, without the increase of parts, there is no

318 CHAPTER II

difference in size, and the parts that arrive later do not
attach to the body as it exists already; hence, if there
is a difference of size, a difference of body is necessary " ;
if this be said, no (we reply) ; for, the light, which
pervades the central hall of a story, spreads out simul-
taneously with the lighting of the lamp, and contracts
simultaneously with the veiling of it j by him who follows
this (view of expansion and contraction), there is not
admitted the view of the creation (of the effect) from
the primal atom onwards (by accretion) ; and on the
view of (the effect being an) illusory manifestation, the
growth of the body is intelligible through maya, even
without the increase of parts, in the same way as
(that of) the body exhibited by magic.

6-4 Still others, however, declare the distinction bet-

ween recollection and non-recollection (to result)
through the non-difference or difference of the internal
organs. And this view has been explained earlier.

6-5 Some, however, adopt the manifoldness of igno-

rances, which are the adjuncts for the differences of
the jlva, and declare the distinction between recollec-
tion and non-recollection (to result) through the non-
difference or difference of that (ignorance).

6-61 Here some say thus : in the section (beginning with
the aphorism) "A part, because of the teaching of
diversity 77 , (there are) the following aphorisms:
" Since the unseen potency is not restrictive ", " And
even in the case of resolve etc., it is the same ", " If it
be said (that enjoyment is) from attachment to a
(specific) locality, no, because of its entry (into other

REPUTATION OP PLURALITY OF SELVES.

bodies as well) " ; if, following these aphorisms and the
commentary thereon, distinction be not admitted in
(the experience of) one and the same self through
differences of adjuncts, then, even on the view of
different selves, in the manneir of Kanada and others,
there is parity in the unintelligibility of the distinction
(in respect of enjoyment). It is thus: when, by the
thorn that has run into Caitra's foot, there is originated
pain for Caitra, why is pain not generated for other
selves too, since, all selves being all-pervasive, there is
no difference (among them) as to the entry into
Caitra's body? Nor is there the distinction that he,
whose body the thorn has pierced and so on, for him
alone there is pain, not for others ; for, it is not possible
to restrict the body, that is originated in the proximity
of all the selves, to belong to some one (self) alone, not
to others. Nor is there the restriction that the body
originated by some one's unseen potency belongs to that
one, since even for unseen potency restriction has not
been established. When, indeed, in order to originate
that unseen potency, the mind unites with some one self,
it certainly unites then with other selves too; when
the cause is com'mon, how can that unseen potency
originate in some one alone? "Now, though the mere
union with the mind is common, the resolve *I shall
attain this fruit', the volition that is favourable to the
act originating unseen potency, these and such others
are distinct (for the different selves) ; hence, from this
alone may result the restriction of unseen potency "; if
this be said, no (is the reply) ; for, resolve etc. being
originated by the conjunction with the mind, which

320 CHAPTER II

(conjunction) is common (to all selves), distinction is
not established even for them. "Now, since cognition
with one's own mind is the cause of resolve etc., the
conjunction of the mind becomes itself non-common ";
that is not (so) ; for, it is not possible to restrict the
mind, which is eternal and conjoined to all selves, as the
property of any one alone. Nor because of particula-
rities of unseen potency does there result for particular
selves the relationship of property and owner, in
respect of the mind; for, even of that unseen potency,
as (said) before, distinction is not established. " Now,
though the selves are pervasive, only particular loci 03
in them are subject to bondage ; hence, since, for other
selves, there is not (the occupation of) that particular
locus in Caitra's body, there may be the distinction
among happiness, misery etc."; that is not (so); for,
when Maitra arrives at the very locus, which Caitra has
left after enjoying happiness etc., happiness, misery etc.,
are seen even for the former ; hence, into certain bodies
there enter the loci specific to (unseen potency etc. of)
other selves too. Therefore, even if the solves be
different, the distinction is certainly difficult io explain.
And in explaining it somehow, it is proper to recognise
the unity of the self, because of conformity to Scripture
and because of parsimony, and explain it on that (basis)
alone.

6-62 " Let the selves, then, be but atomic, if distinction

is not easy to make out, on (the view of their) pervasive-

63 Prade6a, locality, is here used in the sense of the locus of the
unseen potency etc., belonging to the self: atmano yah pradeSo 'd
&rayas sa eva 'tra prade6a-6abda-'rthah.

REFUTATION OP JIVA'S ATOMICITY 321

ness ". Not so; for, if the selves be atomic, the rise
sometimes of happiness in all the parts (of the body),
which (happiness) is (yet) located in the hand, head
or f oot, would be unintelligible.

Here is a statement of what (some) moderns 6-621
assume: because of the declarations of going up,
departure and return being unintelligible otherwise, and
because of the explicit declarations of atomicity in such
Scriptural texts as " This self, whom these two, merit
and demerit, bind, is indeed atomic ", and "The
hundredth part of the point of a goad ", the jivas are
certainly atomic. Though they are atomic, there is
no non-cognition of happiness in all parts (of the body),
since cognition, happiness etc. have the property of
pervading localities extending beyond their locus, on
the analogy of the light of a lamp. Since jivas have
parts, in conformity with the traditional Code 04 "Drona
is a part of Brhaspati", there is no unintelligibility
whatever in the simultaneity of the happiness, misery
etc., common to the head, hands, feet etc., or in the
diversity of enjoyment of the yogins, who have entered
a multiplicity of bodies. And thus, there being no
confusion among the jivas, because of their atomicity,
there is the distinction of happiness, misery etc., as also
difference from the Lord, who is pervasive.

To this it is said (in reply) in the Advaitadlpika: 6*6221
even thus, how does the distinction result? For, it is
difficult to avoid Caitra's recollection of the happiness
or misery present in Maitra, in the same way as Caitra's

64. The word " smrti " has been loosely used to refer to the
which is an itih&sa.

CHAPTER H

recollection of the happiness or misery present in
different members of himself, in the form " There is
pain in the foot, but a pleasant feeling in the head".
The difference of his members from the jiva, Caitra, is
not, indeed, distinct from that of Maitra (from Caitra) ;
for, there is necessarily difference of the members from
the jiva, in the case of those who, in animating a
plurality of bodies, are capable of dissociating
(themselves from one body) and passing on to another;
and difference cum non-difference is admitted by you,
as between the members and the whole.

6-6222 Nor may it be said that pure difference accounts
for non-recollection. The purity of the difference
should, indeed, consist in non-concomitance with the
relation of member and whole or in non-concomitance
with non-difference. Not the first ; for, the jiva being
taught to be a member of Brahman, by such Scriptural
texts, traditional Codes and aphorisms as "He is,
indeed, a member of the Supreme ", " An eternal part
of myself (having become a jiva) in the world of jivas,"
"A part, because of the teaching of diversity," there is
the contingence of confusion of enjoyment, as between
the jiva and Brahman. 05

Now (it may be said) the jiva is not a member in
respect of Brahman, in the same way in which the
members of the jiva are in respect of the jiva; being a

65 Brahman and the jiva are related as the whole and a member;
pure difference is non-concomitant with this relation; therefore, there Is
not the condition which accounts for non-recollection; hence the possibility
of confusion between the enjoyments of the two. The relation of aipSa
and amgin is, of course, assumed by the advaitin for argument's sake t

REFUTATION OF AMSA-'MSl-BHAVA

member is (but) figurative and consists rather in being
inferior while being similar to that (other), as "The
orb of Jupiter is a hundredth part of the orb of the
moon "; if this be said, (we ask) what other than this
is membership in the principal sense which belongs to
the members of the jiva in respect of the jiva and which
is introduced into the body 00 of what accounts for non-
recollection? It is not the relationship of creation as
(there is) for threads in respect of cloth, since the jiva
is beginning-less; nor is it a relationship of locality, as
(there is) for pot-ether etc., in respect of ether at large ;
nor is it that of being a piece, as of pieces of stone broken
off with a chisel; for, being atomic, (the jiva) has no
localities and cannot be broken up. If it be said that
to be different and (yet) non-different is what it is to
be considered a member, no (we reply) ; for, in that case,
there is the contingence of confusion of enjoyment
between the jiva and the Lord and among the jivas
themselves ; for, among these, which are in themselves
different, non-difference too is admitted by you, because
of (their) being intelligent ; further on the view of you,
who maintain difference cum non-difference as between
an assembly and its members, there exists even recipro-
cal non-difference among the jivas included in a single
assembly, since through the non-difference of (another
from) the assembly non-different from oneself, the non-
difference of oneself too (from that other) is difficult
to avoid; 67 for, the rule that what is non-different from

66 I.e., "is made a constituent of."

67 A, a member of the assembly A lf is non-different from A lf which
in turn ie non-different from another member, B; therefore, A is non-
different from B,

324 CHAPTER II

that which is non-different from another is non-different
from that other 68 is admitted by you who say " If for
conjunction etc,., and for the genus there be location in
more than one, then, because of the non-difference of
the quality from what has the quality and so on, even
for cloth etc., non-different from the conjunction that
is non-different from pot, there would result non-
difference from pot." Nor is there any other non-
difference between members and the whole, which
accounts for recollection even in the midst of difference,
other than the non-difference based on such attributes
common to other jlvas as similarity in respect of being
intelligent or in respect of being included in one
assembly; (if there were such non-difference) its
mention could be intended, to avoid undue extension;
for, if that were the case, it would follow that that alone
should be distinctively mentioned. If it be said that
it is distinctive of the non-difference between members
and the whole not to be based on similarity of attributes
etc., no (we reply) ; for, it is the case that their non-
difference is based on similarity of attributes etc., since,
as between the jlva and its members there is similarity
of attribute in respect of being intelligent and so on,
and since there is (membership of) an assembly, both
when they (the jlva and the members) are defined by
a single body, and when there is a gathering together
of a plurality of bodies (animated by different members
of a yogin's jiva). If it be said that though there may
be another non-difference based on similarity of attri-

68 That IB to say, that A which is non-different from B, which again
is non-different from C, is non-different from C.

feEFUTATION OF PLURALITY OF SELVES. 325

butes etc., the non-difference between the jiva and its
members, based on the relationship of members to the
\vhole, is not based on that (other similarity), no
(we reply), since there are not two non-differences
between them; for, in your system, when the locus is
identical, plurality is not admitted whether of difference
or of non-difference, either through difference in the
counter-correlate or in the form of it. 69 Therefore,
undue extension is well established on the first
alternative. Even by this is refuted the second alter-
native too; for, if difference non-concomitant with
non-difference accounted for non-recollection, then,
since, in the manner stated, there, is, in your system,
non-difference too between the jiva and Brahman, and
among the jivas, undue extension would be difficult to
avoid.

"Now, since it is the perception of non-difference
that accounts for recollection, in its absence, there is
non-recollection; since the non-difference of oneself
from oneself and from one's own members is perceived,
there is recollection of misery etc., for him who sees that ;
since non-difference from other selves though it may
exist is not perceptible to him, there is not the
recollection of their misery etc. ; in the case of him, who
remembers other births, since there does exist
perception of non-difference from the self of the earlier
existence, there is recollection of incidents therein ; since
for others there is not that (perception), there is not
(recollection) ; all such things are thus consistent ". If

69 I.e., in what defines the counter-coirelateness (pratiyogitva).

26 CHAPTER II

this be said, even on the view of the self as one, because
of the ignorance that obscures its being the self of all,
there is not for Caitra the perception of non-difference
from the self of Maitra etc. ; since all distinctions are
intelligible even because of this, the admission of
differences in the self, in conflict with Scripture, is
futile.

6-624 Nor even thus can the distinction be supported by
you who maintain the reality of the world; for, there
being necessarily for the omniscient Lord the percep-
tion of the real non-difference from other jlvas, when
the jlvas are miserable, there is (for the Lord) the
contingence of the experience " I am miserable ". In
our system, however, the Lord, though perceiving
transmigration in the jlva non-different from Himself,
like the impurity in the reflected face, yet does not
grieve, because of the certitude of (its) illusoriness;
hence there is not that contingence.

6-625 "Be this so. Let not difference as among members
be the substrate of hands, head, feet etc., and of .the
plurality of bodies (animated by a single jiva) ; since
for the lamp of the self there is the indestructible
pervasive light of knowledge, that itself may become
the substrate of all ". If this be said, no (we reply) ;
for, of the experience of happiness and misery, which,
like knowledge, is an attribute of the self, origination
in dependence on knowledge is impossible; therefore,
there is the contingence of the non-existence of
diversity of enjoyment through differences of limbs
like hands and feet, in the case of the organism,
or through differences of bodies, in the case of

REFUTATION OF PLURALITY OF SELVES. 337

him who has a plurality of bodies. If it be
admitted that experience of happiness and misery and
so on is an attribute of knowledge itself and not of
the self, then, through their diversity, though difference
m'ay result for knowledge, which is an attribute of the
self, difference does not result for the self; therefore, it
is not possible through diversity of enjoyment and so on
to negate the non-difference of the self; there is also
the abandonment of the view that, because of the self,
the locus of enjoyment etc., being atomic and
consequently delimited for each body, there is not the
contingency of the confusion of the attributes of all,
as on the doctrine of its pervasiveness and on the
doctrine of its non-difference. Therefore, the explana-
tion of distinction by admitting the atomicity of the
self does not stand to reason.

Nor even does the establishment thereby of the 6-6261
difference of that ( jiva) from the Lord stand to reason.
On the view of you, who say that, because of the
Scriptural declaration of going up etc., and the express
Scriptural declaration of atomicity, the jiva is atomic,
it would follow that even the supreme (self) is atomic,
because of the declaration of entry in such Scriptural
texts as "Having created that, He entered that itself ",
" He, who, having entered the people, rules them ", and
"The two entered, dwelling on the highest sumtnit,"
and because of the express declaration of atomicity in
the Scriptural text "The small one, this mantra self,
within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice or a grain
of barley " ; whence then the establishment of difference

328 CHAPTER II

between the supreme (self) and the jiva through (their)
pervasiveness and atomicity (respectively) 1 ?

6-6262 Now, (it may be said), the all-pervasiveness of the
supreme (self) is established because of such Scriptural
declarations as " All-pervasive like the ether and
eternal " and " Greater than the sky, greater than
heaven ", and because of being the material cause of the
entire universe; therefore, the Scriptural texts about
His atomicity should be understood to be for the purpose
of contemplation or (made) in the view of the difficulty
of apprehending (Him) ; and the Scriptural texts about
entry are to be explained as relating to adjuncts like
the body. Nor may it be doubted that even the
Scriptural texts about the jiva's going up etc. may be
supported as relating to the adjunct, the intellect ; for,
(in the words) " That (jiva) going up, the prana goes
up after ", the going up of the jiva is mentioned even
as prior to the going up of the intellect, which is (here}
called the prana ; there is also the Scriptural declaration
of departure, even after release from name and form,
(in the text) " Thus, the enlightened one, released from
name and form, reaches the Shining Person, who is
higher than the highest ;" there is also cited the illustra-
tion of the waggon, which is naturally the locus of
motion, (in the text) "Just as a well laden waggon
goes creaking, even so this embodied self goes forth
shouting, mounted by the intelligent self".

6-6263 If this be said, that is not sound (we reply) ; for,
pervasiveness is declared even of the jiva in such'
Scriptural texts as "He is, verily, that great unborn

REFUTATION OF PLURALITY OF SELVES,

self, who consists of knowledge/' " Just as, when a pot
is carried, the pot alone is carried, not the ether enclosed
by it, even so is the jiva compared to the ether "; since,
in your system, material causality in respect of the
world belongs to Primal Nature alone, there is not for
Brahman the material causality of the world ; further,
the material causality of the world is possible for it,
though atomic, in the same way as the jiva's material
causality of the happiness and misery present in a
plurality of bodies (animated by itself) ; for these two
reasons the pervasiveness of that (Brahman) is not
established by that (material causality); if for the
Scriptural texts about its entry there be assumed
reference to the body as the adjunct, in the case of the
Scriptural texts about the jiva going up etc., it is
possible to admit reference to the intellect as the
adjunct; since in the commentary on the aphorism
" Five-fold activity is taught (of the prana) as of the
mind ", difference is taught between the intellect and
prana because of difference in their products, it is
intelligible that when the intellect-conditioned jiva goes
up first, the prana goes after it; the Scriptural declara-
tion of the attainment of Brahman after release from
name and form is opposed to pervasiveness as much in
the case of Brahman, the attained, as in the case of the
jiva who attains. In the system of him who maintains
that, even after release from material name and form,
Brahman has to be attained as associated with a non-
material world, form etc., since even for the jiva who
attains there exist non-material body, organs etc., there
is no opposition to the declaration of the attainment of

330 CHAPTER II

Brahman (by the jiva) as conditioned by these ; if by
the mere citation of the example of the waggon, the
natural locus of motion, there should result natural
motion for the jiva, then, because of proximity to the
jiva, the natural locus of entry, in " The two entered
the cave ", it is possible to establish entry as natural
for Brahman too; for, the one word "entered", which
attaches to both Brahman and the jiva, should be said
to have for purport a single form of entry. Therefore,
since in the system of others, there is not established
the distinction between Brahman and the jiva, as
pervasive and atomic, the desire to establish difference
thereon has to be left far behind. In our system, since
intermediate texts have to be interpreted in conformity
with major texts, whose purport is the identity of Brah-
man and the self, the explanation of the Scriptural texts
making out the difference of the jiva from Brahman
is in some such way as that pervasiveness belongs to the
jiva in his own nature and finitude to his form as
conditioned by adjuncts; this (explanation) is clear in
the Bhasya etc. Therefore, because of the illusoriness
of the non-intelligent world and because of the non-
difference of the world of intelligence from Brahman,
there is no conflict whatever in the harmony of the
Vedantas in respect of Brahman that can be attained
by knowledge alone.

END OF CHAPTER TWO.

CHAPTER 111.

Now, when it is said, in the traditional Code, "The i-o
means of attaining that, O Great Sage, have been
declared to be knowledge and karma/' that karma too
is a means of attainment, how can the attainment of
Brahman be through knowledge alone? True, (but)
(there is) the Scriptural declaration " No other path
(is known)" etc.; further, nothing other than know-
ledge can be instrumental to the attainment of the
eternally existent Brahman, (a process) analogous to
the attainment of a golden neicklet worn round the neck,
but forgotten; because of these reasons, that kind of
traditional Code signifies the need for karma (only)
indirectly, in the attainment of Brahman. What, then,
is the utility of karma?

Here, the followers of the BMmatt view say (thus) : H
its utility is in respect of (generating) the desire to
know, which is a means of attaining Brahman, through
the acquisition of knowledge; (they say this), because
of the text "This the brahmanas desire to know, by the
study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by
fasting." Now, why should it not be useful in respect
of the knowledge (itself), which is to be desired? No ;
because of the sense of the suffix (i.e., the saw-suffix,
signifying desire), and because of the Bhasya on the
section commencing with III, iv, 27, on Sarvdpeksa
which says "Calmness, equanimity etc. are proximate
means to knowledge, being related (directly) to know-
ledge, while sacrifice etc. are (comparatively)

CHAPTER III

external means, being related (only) to the desire to
know." Now, if he, who practises sacrifice etc. for the
sake of the desire to know, has a desire (for the Veda),
then, the desire to know exists already; if there is no
(such) desire, there cannot result any desire for the
desire to know, which (latter) is instrumental to
knowledge ; hence, since there would be no performance
of sacrifice etc. for the sake of the desire to know, it is
not meet to hold that sacrifice etc. are applied (i.e.,
directed) to the desire to know. If this be said, no (we
reply). He, who has become lean because of distaste for
food, has, in order to remedy that (leanness), a desire,
of the nature of a turning to food; but there is not
generated in him that taste (for food), which will lead
him to activity in respect of it, because there is the
defect of disordered humours, due to intense indigestion
etc. ; hence, medicine is prescribed to cure that disease.
So too, for the person, who has, by virtue of the clarity
of intellect, generated by obligatory and expiatory rites
practised without a desire for fruit, during many prior
existences, gained faith in respect of this sense (of
Sruti) that Brahman is of the nature of unsurpassable
bliss, and that knowledge is the means of attaining that,
(for such a one) there is desire, in the nature
of a turning towards the attainment of Brahman, and
knowledge (as the means thereto) ; yet, such taste, as
will lead to activity in respect of hearing (study) etc.,
which are means of knowing Btahman, does not arise,
because of obstruction by the defect of sins accumulated
in (prior) existences without beginning, which bring
about a leaning towards enjoyment of (sense-) objects,

KARMA INSTRUMENTAL TO KNOWLEDGE 333

in the same way as there is a leaning to prohibited acts,
for a person subject to desires, even though he has faith
in Scriptural authority; hence, as a consequence of the
removal of the obstruction, that (taste) is brought about
through sacrifice etc.; (and) the prescription of these
is intelligible.

Those, who follow the Vivarana, however, say thus :
the rule, that of the two the sense of the stem and the
sense of the suffix the sense of the suffix is of greater
force, is a general rule ; of greater force than this is the
.special rule, established by (a consideration of) such
texts as " He who desires heaven " etc., that the instru-
mentality taught by verbal testimony relates only to
that which is taught by verbal testimony to be the object
of desire. In such wordly usage as "He desires to go
on a horse, he desires to kill with a knife," the means,
such as horse etc., are understood to relate only to the
going etc., the object of the desire signified by the san-
suffix. So, too, in the case of the prescription signified
by the imperative suffix, in such Vedic usage as "That
is to be -sought, that, verily, is to be desired to be
known", "That is to be reflected on, contemplated."
Hence, sacrifice etc. apply (i.e., are directed) to know-
ledge that is signified by the stem (in the word
vividisanti).

Now, this being so, there would result the practice
of karma right up to the dawn of knowledge; there
would then be contradicted, in respect of renunciation
consisting in the abandonment of karma, its subser-
vience to knowledge, as established by the Scriptural
declarations like " Only by him who has renounced is

CHAPTER III

that to known." If this be said, no (we reply).
Before the seed is sown, there is ploughing; after that,
there is no ploughing; thus, the growth of rice etc.
results both from ploughing and not ploughing; like-
wise in conformity with the saying "For the saint, who
desires to attain yoga, karma is said to be the cause ; for
the same person, who has attained yoga, calmness
(non-activity) is said to be the cause," there is
practice of karma till, on the purification of the
intellect, there is the rise of a leaning towards what is
within (i.e., the self), in the form of a desire to know;
thence follows renunciation ; thus is admitted the rise
of knowledge from both karma and the renunciation
thereof. It is, indeed, said in the Naiskannyasiddhi:
"Karmas, securing for the intellect through its puri-
fication a leaning towards what is within, achieve
their object and disappear, even as clouds, at
the end of the rainy season." Even on the view that
karmas subserve knowledge, karma is practised only
up to (the generation of) the desire for knowledge. If,
therefore, it is asked "What is the difference between
this view r and that of subservience to the desire for
knowledge?" this (we say) is the difference; on the
view that karmas subserve knowledge, even though they
are quiescent (i.e., are abandoned) after securing the
desire for knowledge, which is a channel (to know-
ledge), yet there is a rule (understood) that they
generate knowledge by securing the means, which lead
up to the fruit when accompanied by cessation of
activity, viz., unhindered hearing (study), reflection
and contemplation, through the attainment of an

INSTRUMENTALITY OF ARAMA-KARMA 335

excellent preceptor. On the view, however, of their
subservience to the desire for knowledge, they achieve
their object even with securing an intense desire
capable of generating activity in respect of hearing
(study) etc. ; hence, there is no necessary rule that they
generate knowledge; this is on the view that karmas
subserve purification consisting in the removal of
impurities and the endowment of (good) qualities
which secures capacity for knowledge of the self, a
view founded on the traditional Code " Of him for
whom these eight and forty purificatory ceremonies"
etc.

Now, of what karmas is the application taught by 1-3
the Scriptural text cited? 1

To this, it is said by some : by the words "study of 1-31
the Veda " the duties of the student are indicated ;
similarly, the duties of the house-holder, by the words
"by sacrifice and by gifts" ; and the duties of the
forest-dweller, by the words " by penance, by fasting";
hence, it is the duties of the various orders of life that
alone serve (to bring about) knowledge. Hence it is
that in the Vedanta Sutra 2 " Even (for him who is
not desirous of release) the karma of his own order of
life (is compulsory) since it is enjoined", there is used,
in respect of karma (which is) for the sake of know-
ledge, the term " karma of his own order of life."

1 The reference is to Bffc., IV, 4, 22, "This, the brfchmanas desire
to know" etc.

2 HI, iv, 32,

336

CHAPTER III

1-321 In the Kalpatarn, however, it is said thus : it is not

the duties pertaining to the various orders of life that
alone serve (to bring about) knowledge; for, the utility
in respect of knowledge, even of the acts of those, who,
like widowers etc., are outside any order (of life), is
established in the section 3 " Even for those outside
(the orders of life), (there is competency for
knowledge), that being seen." Nor may it be objected
that this section is intended to establish, in the ease of
widowers etc., who being outside any order have (yet)
had the desire for knowledge aroused in them by
sacrifice etc. performed in prior existences, their
competency for the means of knowledge, viz., hearing
(study) etc., and (that it is) not (intended) to establish
the utility of the karmas practised by them (in this
life) in respect of knowledge ; for, it is explicitly said in
an aphorism 4 of that section, "And the promotion
(of knowledge is bestowed on them) through special
acts/' and in the commentary thereon, that even japa
(prayer) etc., which are duties pertaining to caste,
as such, (not to a particular order of life, in the caste),
are useful in respect of knowledge ; (as for) the
expression " karma of his own order ", in the aphorism
"Even (for him who is not desirous of release), the
karma of his own order of life (is compulsory) since it
is enjoined ", that is used to imply the duties of (one's)
caste as well. In this view it is said: "Utility in
respect of knowledge exists even in the case of duties
other than those pertaining to the orders of life; it

3 III, iv, 36.

4 III, iv, 38.

INSTRUMENTALITY OF ALL OBLIGATORY RITES 337

(belongs), however, only to obligatory (rites). Their
fruit, viz., diminution of sin, is, indeed, needed by know-
ledge, not the fruit of karma performed for a desired
end, such as heaven etc." 5 Just as, when subsidiaries,
whose utility is settled in the archetype (the prakrti
rite), are transferred (to a vikrti rite), 6 no utility may
be assumed for them, other than that obtaining in the
archetype, even so, of sacrifice etc., enjoined in the case
of knowledge, there may not be assumed, besides what
(fruit) is settled for obligatory rites, i.e., the diminution
of sin, any utility in respect of knowledge common to v
both obligatory and optional rites.

In the Sanksepasanraka, however, there is 1-322
declared the application of both obligatory and optional
rites ; for, there is no distinction in (the denotation of)
the words " sacrifice " etc, (in the Scriptural text).
The subsidiaries, whose utility is settled in respect of
the archetype, are related to the modelled rite by
transfer, only through the transference of their utility
as settled in the archetype; their utility is not assumed
after their transfer; hence, there is not, in that case,
the possibility of assuming any utility other than that
settled in the archetype. Here, however, sacrifice etc.

5 It may be said that though obligatory rites and optional rites (for
particular ends) have different specific results of their, own, yet there
may be assumed some fruit common to both, so that both may subserve
knowledge. Such a contention is answered in the next sentence.

6 Rite may be broadly divided into principal and subsidiary. In
some cases, a principal rite is enjoined together with its full complement
of subsidiaries. This serves as the archetype (prakrti) on which are
modelled other (vikrti) rites. The subsidiary rites of the vikrtis have
to be obtained by transfer (atideSa) from the prakrti, except where
explicitly prescribed,

R I 4.3

338 CHAPTER III

are primarily enjoined directly by Scripture; utility
has to be posited later, in their case, as in the case of
subsidiaries primarily laid down (and not obtained by
transfer). Why, then, should this not be assumed as
common to all obligatory and optional rites, (which
are) understood by the (use of the) general name
(sacrifice), even though this be not settled as necessary
to support the application (of sacrifice etc. to the pur-
suit of knowledge), as primarily understood? Even by
those who inquire into (the regulations for) sacrifices
etc., it is admitted that, in sacrifices etc., there is
fixation to the fruit (already) settled, only where
things are related (as subsidiaries to the vikrti) through
their utility (in the prakrti). Where, however,
utility is posited after the relation of a thing (as a
subsidiary), utility, though not (already) settled, is to be
posited in conformity with the nature of the thing which
is applied (as a subsidiary). It is only in the acceptance
of this principle that in order to secure (an occasion
for) the commencement (of the discussion) of the
nature of sublation, it is established in the beginning of
the tenth chapter (of the Purva Mimamsa"), that (the
subsidiaries) of the archetype are related to the
modelled rite, through their utility (in the former).
Further, if it be admitted that there is an injunction
only in respect of obligatory rites, because of there
being no (other) settled utility, then, the injunction (in
"by sacrifice, by gifts" etc.) would be futile, if the
diminution of sin from (the performance of) obligatory
rites and the rise of knowledge therefrom be otherwise
established; if they be not otherwise established, there

OPTIONAL RITES TOO INSTRUMENTAL 339

would be no distinction (between obligatory and
optional rites), since the origination of the service
needed by knowledge is not settled (as the f rait even)
of obligatory rites ; hence, it is difficult to avoid a pres-
cription common to obligatory and optional rites. Now,
it may be said, " Though it is otherwise established of
obligatory rites (that their performance is) the cause
of diminution of sin, in general, it is not established
in particular that it removes the sin, which is an obstacle
to the rise of knowledge ; but, when there is this injunc-
tion, obligatory rites being performed with a view to
knowledge, knowledge necessarily comes about; other-
wise, purity alone (would result) ; the rise of knowledge
being (thus) not invariable, the injunction is purpose-
ful.'' (To this we say), then, even in the case of
obligatory rites, the channels (of knowledge), viz., the
destruction of the sin that is an obstacle to the rise
of knowledge, and the unseen potency which secures
the attainment of an excellent preceptor and hearing
(study), reflection etc., are but unsettled as fruit, and
have to be posited. Hence, there being no distinction
in the matter of positing utility that is not settled,
there is no need to suspend the injunction common to
obligatory and optional rites, as understood from the
use of the general term ("sacrifice").

Now, even thus, how is it possible to support such 1*41
statements of traditional Codes, as "By karma alone
did Janaka and others attain perfection " 9 They do
not refer to the practice of karma as subservient to
knowledge; for, by the use of the word " brahmanas "
in the text about desire for knowledge, competency for

340 CHAPTER ni

karma as subservient to knowledge appears (to exist)
only in the case of brahmanas. Hence, it must be said
of the karmas practised by Janaka and others that they
directly serve (to bring about) release. Not so; for,
the use of the word " brahmana " in the text about the
desire for knowledge is impficative of the three (twice-
born) castes. As the venerable author of the Vartika
says, " The use of the word ' brahmana ' here implies all
twice-born persons, since there is no distinction in
respect of the competency of all (these) for knowledge
of the self." Nor is it proper to take the word
"brahmana'' as indicating a special kind of competent
person, in the paraphrased (iiijunctive) form, "Let him
who desires knowledge practise karma," which enjoins
competency in respect of him who desires knowledge;
for, a qualification cannot attach to the subject (of the
injunction). 7 Now, the injunction about the rajasuya,
"Let the king who is desirous of absolute empery
sacrifice with the rajasuya ", prescribes competency
for him who desires absolute empery; this means "Let
him who is desirous of absolute empery sacrifice with
the rajasuya which is to be performed by a king";
the "king" thus prescribed as a qualification of
the sacrifice, in the capacity of the agent, enters by
presumption (arthapatti) into the body of qualifica-
tions of him who is competent (to sacrifice), since no
one who is not a king can accomplish a sacrifice that is
to be performed by a king; even so, here too, the

7 I.e., the uddeya, the person desirous of knowledge. If it did BO
attach, the injunction would prescribe, for the performance of karma, two
independent qualifications, brahminhood, and the desire for knowledge,
and would thus suffer from the defect of v&kya-bheda or sentence-split.

NOT EXCLUSIVELY COMPETENT 341

" brahmana " prescribed as the agent in sacrifice etc.
(for the sake of knowledge), enters by presumption
into the body of qualifications for him who is competent
(to sacrifice). Even this is not intelligible. For, it is
established in the Stitra "In any case, the same duties
(have to be performed), because of the two-fold
marks", that, in the text about the desire for knowledge,
there is an injunction relating to special fruit, only in
respect of those sacrifices etc., which have been already
enjoined elsewhere (than in connection with know-
ledge), and that there is no injunction in respect of
sacrifice etc. not already established. Hence, if, in that
one text, which is a supplementary reference to the
sacrifice etc. already established, one understood two
prescriptions a subsidiary prescription of an agent,
and a prescription relating to fruit, there would result
the defect of sentence-split.

(Now, it may be said as follows) : On the view
which holds that there is no prescription of the king as
agent in the text about rajasuya, a qualified agency
results even from the mere proximity of the word
"king"; so, here too, in order that there may be no
sentence-split, though the "brahmana" is not pres-
cribed as the agent, yet performance by a brahmana
results even from the mere proximity of the word
" brahmana ". Hence, (the text) leads up to the (sole)
competency of the brahmana. Even this (we reply)
does not stand to reason. For, in the case of sacrifice
etc., which are established elsewhere as competent for
persons of (all) the three castes, and which are

342

CHAPTER III

prescribed as subservient to knowledge of the self for
which persons of (all) the three castes are competent, it
is proper that competency should belong to (all) the
three castes. It is not possible to restrict this compe-
tency by the mere proximity of the word " brahmana,"
which is not conjoined to a prescription; hence, it is
preferable to take the word " brahmana " to imply the
entire range of those competent for knowledge, as
already established.

Now, if the entire range of those competent be
implied, then, since desire for knowledge may occur even
to the sudra, there would result competency for him too,
in respect of karma subservient to knowledge. If this
be said, no (we reply) ; for, on the ground that there
is competency for Vaidika rites for him alone, who has
studied his section of the Veda by adhyayana and has
knowledge of it generated thereby, competency for
knowledge is denied in the apasudra section 8 in respect
of the sudra, who is devoid of adhyayana, the hearing
(study) of the words of the Scripture etc. ; because of
traditional Code "Give not knowledge to a sudra ",
there cannot result for him, as a means (to release),
even a superficial realisation of the glorious might of
knowledge ; hence, desire for that (knowledge) cannot
result; for these reasons, there cannot be for him
competency for knowledge. Thus say some.
1422 Others, however, say thus: there is competency for

karma subservient to knowledge even in the case of the

8 The section of the Ve&Qnta Sutras, wherein is discussed the
competency of the gatra for Vedanta study and is decided on adversely
to the ftttdra.

COMPETENCY OP THE UDRA 343

sudra; for, though there cannot be for him the study of
the Veda, performance of agnihotra etc., yet
there can be competency for the incantation of the
Pancaksara, which is the mantra-raj a-vidya, and (the
performance of) penance, gifts and paka-yajnas, 9
which are means for the diminution of sin, in the case
of (all of) which competency for all castes is explicitly
declared. Further, since the instrumental suffix is
used independently in the case of each of the means,
study of the Vedas, sacrifice, gifts etc., and since
widowers and others are permitted the practice only
of incapiations, gifts etc., as subservient to knowledge,
there is no need to combine the study of the Veda
(with these other means).

Nor is it that desire for knowledge does not come
about for the sudra. For, since there is the traditional
Code "Discourse unto the four castes, placing the brah-
mana foremost " declaring competency for (all) four
castes in respect of hearing epics, puranas etc., there
can come about the desire for knowledge, even for him
(sudra), who has realised the might of knowledge
from the puranas etc. As for the traditional Code
" Give not knowledge to a sudra ", that prohibits the
imparting of knowledge (only) about agnihotra and
other rites, which are not useful for his observance.
Or else, there being no means for him to know even the
duties of his own caste, there would result non-authori-

9 These seem to be sacrifices offered in the household fire, not in
the three-fold sacrificial fire. The competency of the gfldra for these
is mentioned in HUrtta Smrti, II, w. 11-14, and referred to by Gautama
in Chapter X, 64. The commentary on the latter explains the term as

344 CHAPTER III

tativeness consisting in non-observance for the texts
which specify his duties thus : " The sudra is a fourth
caste ; he is once-born (not twice-born, like the others) ;
his (duties are): truth, freedom from anger, purity;
the cleansing of the hands and feet, which is according
ro some the only purificatory ceremony (for him, not
acamana, the ceremonial sipping of water) ; 10 the
performance of (all five kinds of) sraddhas; the sup-
port of servants; being content with a wife of his own
(caste) ; service of the higher castes. "

Nor does the apasudra section thus become
contentless. In the case of the sudra, who is
devoid of the purificatory rite, subsidiary to knowledge,
viz., upanayanfy known as the approach to a
preceptor, in consequence of such texts of the
traditional Code as " Neither is there sin for a sudra,
nor is he fit for any purification, " that section denies
competency for meditation on Brahman as endowed
with attributes (saguna) and for the hearing (study)
etc. of the Yedanta as the means of knowing the
Attributeless. It cannot negate the sudra 's desire for
the knowledge of the Attributeless, since that desire is
prompted by the attractiveness of the subject ; and in
the case of what is not prescribed, there is no possibility
of competency (therefor), other than the desire for
it; hence, the denial of competency is improper. Nor

10 Gautama mentions this as the view of some, since, in his own
view, fiudras, like women, have the duty of sipping once, not thrice, for
ceremonial purposes. An alternative explanation is that, according to
some, bathing for gGdras consists in washing the hands and feet, while
Gautama holds that they should bathe, but without any mantras.

COMPETENCY OP THE SfJDKA 345

may it be said that since hearing (study) of the Vedanta
does not come about for him, knowledge will not arise,
even though the practice of karma subservient to know-
ledge may come about, and that, consequently, his
practice of the karma subservient to that end would
be futile. For, though he has no competency for the
hearing (study) of the Vedanta, competency in respect
of that means of knowledge, which consists in the
hearing of puranas etc., whose purport is the unity of
the self and Brahman, is shown by the Bhagavatpada in
the concluding words of the commentary on (Sutra 38
of) the apasudra section : " Since, moreover, there is the
traditional Code * Discourse unto the four castes/
declaring competency for (all) four castes, in respect
of the understanding of epics, puranas etc., it is settled,
however, that there is no competency for sudras (in
regard to knowledge) through the Vedas. 11 " And there
is 110 conflict in the siidra practising karma subservient
to knowledge, since it may subserve the rise
of knowledge through creating (in another birth)
the body of a person of one of the three (higher)
castes fit for the hearing (study) of the Vedanta.
This is analogous to the practice by the three
higher castes of the meditation on that which
is endowed with attributes (sagunavidya), whose
fruit is release by stages, since it (the meditation)

11 The punctuation, which is adopted in most printed texts and is
followed by Thibaut, puts in a full-stop after "legends etc.", the words "it
is settled" etc. commencing a fresh sentence. If this punctuation be
adopted, there would be no point in including the second sentence in the
quotation. The punctuation of the present text seems preferable, if the
sense of this paragraph is to be conveyed with adequate force,

S I 44

CHAPTER III

subserves release through the creation of pure divine
bodies (deva-sarira), fit for the rise of (the higher)
knowledge. Since, therefore, the word " brahmana "
in the text concerning the desire for knowledge has
for content all those who are established to be competent
for knowledge, there does result for the sudra too
competency for karma subservient to knowledge.

2*0 Now, let it be that karma subserves knowledge

through the purification of the intellect; in what way
does renunciation (samnyasa) serve that (end) ?

2-11 Some say (thus) : since the sins that obstruct the

rise of knowledge are infinite, some are removable by
the practice of sacrifice etc., some are removable by the
unseen potency from renunciation ; hence, renunciation
too subserves that end (vi^., knowledge), only through
the purification of the intellect, in the same way as
karma. And thus, for those house-holders, who prac-
tise healing (study) etc., in the intervals of karma,
there is attainment of knowledge, not in this life, but
only after attaining renunciation, in another life. As
for those like Janaka and others, who attain knowledge,
even while being house-holders, their attainment of
knowledge is due to renunciation in a prior life. Hence,
there is not even the suspicion of the inconstancy of
unseen potency (resulting) from renunciation, in the
case of knowledge.

2*12 Others, however, declare its subservience to

knowledge (thus) : in the text "Calm, tranquil, quies-
cent" etc., renunciation as understood by the wojxj

NEED FOR RENUNCIATION 34?

"quiescent" is included in the four means to knowledge;
in the commentary on the aphorism sahakary-antara-
vidhih, it is declared: "For those who possess that, ie.,
for those who possess knowledge, i.e., for ascetics, there
is prescribed mauna (excellence of knowledge), which
is the third in relation to balya and panclitya"; for, in
the text "Therefore, let the brahmana having acquired
panditya" etc., eligibility is understood for the ascetic
from the earlier words ' ' they lead a life of mendicancy" ;
further, it is said in the Varlika, "There is competency
for what comes at the end of the Ihree Vedas, only for
those who have abandoned activity without any residue, '
those who desire to overcome transmigration and those
who desire to know the unity of the self ". For these
reasons, the unseen potency from renunciation is a
special qualification of him who is competent for the
means to knowledge such as hearing (study) of the
Vedanta.

Yet others,, however, (say) thus: since it is said 243
in the Viv aroma, "Renunciation, being a subsidiary to
hearing (study) etc., produces knowledge of the
self as its fruit", its subservience to knowledge
consists in the generation of hearing (study) etc., free
from any other activity ; for, when there is a visible
channel (of utility), an unseen (channel) should not be
assumed. If the non-indolent, intelligent, heroic man
can attain to hearing (study) etc., in the intervals of
karma, even though stationed in other orders of life
(but that of the ascetics), then, a restrictive injunction
has to be admitted, that hearing (study) etc., should

48 CHAPTER hi

be brought about only by holding to the ascetic's order
among the four orders of life. 12

2-14 Now, on both these views, how is there practice of

the hearing (study) etc. of the Vedanta by ksatriyas
and vaisyas? For, renunciation is competent for the
brahmana (alone), because of the use of the word
" (brahmana " in texts about renunciation, such as " Let
the brahmana attain non-attachment", "Let the
brahmana rise above ", " Let the brahmana renounce ",
and because of the saying in the Vartika: " For the
reason that the word brahmana is used in the text to
make known the specially competent person, there is
no prescription of renunciation for ksatriyas and
vaisyas ".

M41 If this be urged, some reply (thus) : from the text

"Or else, let one renounce even from the student's
order of life, or from the house (-holder's) or the forest
(-dweller's)", which makes no distinction (of caste)
and is supported by the traditional Code "Let him
renounce from the house (-holder's order), be he
brahmana, ksatriya or vaisya, (for) these four orders
(of life) are for (all) the three castes ", there results
competency for renunciation even for ksatriyas and
vaisyas; the use of the word "brahmana", therefore, in
other texts is implicative of the three (castes). Hence
it is that in the Vartika itself, after the expression
of the view of the Bhasya in the verse (above

12 Renunciation does have the visible result of securing undis-
turbed study and so on. But those who have not renounced may
occasionally gain knowledge even in the intervals of karma. To rule
this out, there is a niyama-vidhi as to renunciation.

SOLE COMPETENCY OF THE BRAHMANA TO RENOUNCE 349

cited) about special competency, there is shown
in the succeeding verse his (the Vartikakara's)
own view that there is competency for renun-
ciation even for ksatriyas and vaisyas: "For the
reason that there is declared in Scripture the
renunciation of all the three (castes), without distinc-
tion, the use of the word 'brahmana' is for the purpose
of implying (all the three)' 7 . This is how these
establish the coming about of the practice of hearing
(study) etc., for those (two castes).

Others, however, say thus : competency for 3- 142
renunciation is for the brahmana alone ; for, the word
" brahmana " is used in more than one text prescribing
renunciation; and though the word " brahmana " is
not used in the prescription of renunciation cited from
the Jtibala-sruti, it (none the less) relates to the
brahmana in the text "He who wears no sacred thread
at the stage of renunciation, how is he a brahmana ?",
which assumes competency for the brahmana alone, as
established by other texts. (Further), in accordance
with the principle of the virodM-'dhikaram, 1 * only
that sense of the traditional Code should be apprehended
as does not conflict with Scriptural texts. As for the
saying of the Vdrtika that renunciation is competent
for all, that relates to the renunciation of the knower ;
it does not, in conflict with the view of the Bhasya,
have for purport the declaration of competency for

13 The maxim is to the effect that where there is conflict between
gruti and smrti, the latter is to be disregarded, while in the absence of
conflict, a sruti in support of smrti may be inferred, though non-existent.

350 CHAPTER III

all, iii respect of the renunciation by the dis-
tressed one who desires knowledge. For, in the
next verse, restrictive rules about competency are
denied only in the case of the renunciation of him who
knows, which (renunciation) is made by one liberated
(even) while embodied, after the dawn of the knowledge
of Brahman: " If knowledge which cuts at the root
of all competency be attained, on the strength of what
may one lay down rules of competency in respect of
renunciation?" Thus, renunciation is subsidiary to
the practice of hearing (study) etc., only for
brahmanas ; for ksatriyas ami vaisyas, competency for
hearing (study) etc. is not dependent on that
(renunciation). Thus is upheld the practice of
hearing (study) etc., by those two (castes). On the
view that renunciation is needed for hearing (study)
etc., it is not possible, verily, to lay down a rule that all
hearing (study) etc. is dependent on that (renuncia-
tion) ; for, in the case of those who have attained the
nature of divine beings by saguna meditation, which
brings about release in stages, there has necessarily
to be predicated non-dependence on renunciation
for hearing (study) etc.; for, since for divine beings
there is no possibility of engaging in karma, there
cannot result for them renunciation consisting in the
abandonment of that (karma).

2*143 Yet others, however, say thus: he, of whom, in the

words " He who is well-established in Brahman attains
immortality ", Scripture declares being well-esta-
blished, or ending in Brahman, that is to say, being

NON-ELIGIBILITY IN THE PRINCIPAL SENSE 351

OP THE KATRIYA ETC.

fixed therein, which consists in not engaging in any
other activity, for him there is eligibility, in the
principal sense, for hearing (study) etc.; for, constant
enquiry is prescribed in such texts of the traditional
Code as " Going or standing, aiwake or asleep, he whoso
mind is not directed to the enquiry (into Brahman) is
said to be dead", "Spend thy time in reflection on the
Vedanta, right up to sleep, yea, right up to death".
And this being well-established in Brahman does not
come about for those who remain without renunciation,
in other orders of life, because of distraction due to the
performance of duties prescribed for each one's order
(of life) ; hence, for ksatriyas and vaisyas, devoid of
renunciation, there is no eligibility in a principal sense
for hearing (study) etc. For these (castes), in whose
case there is no prohibition as for the sudra, there is,
rather, as in the case of widowers etc., permission for
such hearing (study) etc., as will bring about knowledge
in another body, because of eligibility merely in a non-
principal sense; this is on the principle enunciated in
the Bliasya on the section antara ca'pi tu taddrsteh :
"Further, knowledge, which has a visible result, makes
any one who seeks it eligible for hearing (study) etc.
even by the mere absence of prohibition". Nor
can it be said that, in the said section, the eligibility
recognised for widowers etc., who do not belong to
any order of life, is in the principal sense ; for,
it is made clear by the aphorist himself in "Better
than this, however, is the other (i.e., belonging
to an asrama), because of indicatory marks"
that their eligibility is non-principal. Nor may it be

352

CHAPTER III

objected that what is mentioned is not their eligibility
at all for hearing (study) etc., but the fact of their acts
favouring knowledge; 14 for, that is opposed to the
already cited BMsya on that section, to the effect that
knowledge has a visible result. (It may be objected
that) if there be eligibility in a non-principal sense for
ksatriyas and vaisyas, because of absence of renuncia-
tion, then, for the same reason, there would be eligi-
bility only in a non-principal sense for divine beings
too, in respect of hearing (study) etc.; and it would
necessarily have to be said of those who, after having
attained divine bodies through saguna meditation that
brings about release in stages, practise hearing (study)
etc., that they should be reborn as brahmanas, in order
to be capable of renunciation, for the purpose of know-
ledge; hence, there would be conflict with such texts
and aphorisms as " He, who attains the world of
Brahma does not return again", " Because of the decla-
ration of non-return", and so on. This too may not be
said ; for, since for divine beings there is no distraction
through karma to be practised, the not engaging in any
other activity results of itself in their case; hence,
because of the authoritativeness of the teaching which
prescribes saguna meditation as producing release by
stages, eligibility in the principal sense is admitted for
those (divine beings) even in the absence of renuncia-
tion.

1H431 Now, by those who are eligible in a non-principal

sense, the inquiry into the Vedanta has to be under-

14 Through some apflrva result

POSSIBILITY OF FRUITION IN ANOTHER BIRTH 353

taken for the purpose of the visible result of under-
standing the sense of the statements (therein), in the
same way as the unprescribed inquiry into other
sacred teaching; 15 how, then, can it serve towards the
attainment of knowledge in another birth? It is not,
indeed, proper to hold that the inquiry of to-day is the
cause of the realisation on a different day of what is
inquired into; remote indeed is the possibility of the
causation of that in another birth.

(Now), the hearing (study) undertaken even by
ascetics who are eligible in the principal sense has but
a visible result, realisation being a visible result; it
is determined (however), in the section " Even here, if
there is no active obstruction, that being seen " that this
(hearing), which does not generate its fruit in this
birth, because of obstruction by a variety of
prarubdha-karma, does generate its fruit in another
birth, the obstruction being removed; this may be so,
even in the case of that (hearing etc.) undertaken by
those eligible in a non-principal sense. This too, may not
be said ; for, on the view that hearing combined with the
other subsidiaries inculcated by the sacred teaching is
the object of an apurva-vidhi, it generates an apurva
leading up to the result; or, on the view that it is the
object of niyama-vidhi, it produces the adrsta conse-
quent on the restrictive complementation (niyama) ;
and it is proper to hold that that (adrsta), like the
adrsta, which brings about remembrance of another

15 Like the inquiry into the NySya &c.
S I 45

354 CHAPTER III

birth, rouses impressions belonging to a former
existence, and links up the inquiry, which is at their
root, with subservience to knowledge in another birth ;
hearing, however, which is devoid of the subsidiaries
inculcated by Scripture (i.e., here, devoid of renuncia-
tion), cannot generate the adrsta; whence, ihen, the
intelligibility of its subservience to knowledge in
another birth? For, there is undue extension (of
principle) in recognising that, in the absence of an
adrsta to link up, the functioning of means of knowledge
in one birth is the cause of realisation in another birth.

2-1432 The reply is: the hearing (study) that has to be

performed by him in whom has arisen the desire to
know, though he be qualified but in a non-principal
sense, is prompted by the apiirva generated through
the former practice of sacrifice etc., for the sake of
knowledge, which (practice) generates the channel,
viz., the desire to know. The very same apurva
functioning up to the stage of the fruit, viz., knowledge,
links up the hearing (study) effected by it, as subser-
vient even to knowledge in another birth ; in this there
is nothing unintelligible. On the view that there is no
injunction in respect of hearing (study) etc., since even
that hearing (study) which is performed in the wake
of renunciation does not generate any unseen potency,
the fact that, where there are obstacles, it causes
knowledge in another birth alone has to be explained
only thus. 16

16 That is to say, through the apdrva of sacrifice etc. performed
earlier.

POSSIBILITY OF FRUITION IN ANOTHER BIRTH 355

The preceptor, 17 however, says thus : this is the only 2-1433
explanation possible even on the view of there being a
restrictive injunction (in respect of hearing etc.) ; for,
prior to the attainment of fruit by the repeated practice
of hearing (study), the unseen potency, consequent on
the restrictive complementation, does not, for the most
part, arise. For, that has to be accomplished by the
exclusive practice of hearing (study), characterised by
repetition until the attainment of the fruit. The
restriction to hearing (study), which generates the un-
seen potency consequent on that restrictive comple-
mentation, cannot, verily, be accomplished by the bare
commencement of the hearing (study), which ought to
be repeated till the attainment of the fruit ; in such a
case (indeed), the unseen potency consequent on the
restrictive complementation which is generated by that
(much of hearing), might be considered to arise, even
prior to the repetition of hearing (study) till the attain-
ment of fruit, Since it is only as characterised by
repetition that hearing, in the same way as pounding,
is a means to the fruit, prior to the origination of that
thing which is the means to the fruit, the talk of the
accomplishment of that restrictive complementation is
baseless. Further, if the restrictive complementation
were secured even with the bare commencement of
hearing (study) or pounding, even with that would be
secured the observance of 18 the teaching of restrictive
complementation; hence it would follow that even
though it were not repeated there would be no defect.

17 Vivara^a-'carya.
J.8 I.e., confonpity to.

356 CHAPtER in

2-144 Some, however, say thus : to the hearing (study) of

the Vedanta, though it has a visible result, there belongs
the origination of an unseen potency of its own, on the
authority of such statements as this : ' ' From the daily
hearing (study) of the Vedanta, conjoined with devo-
tion, and gained through serving a preceptor, one
obtains the fruit*bf eighty krcchras". Because of the
force of (such) statements, the subservience to two ends
is intelligible, in the same way as the ceremonial
kindling of fire, which serves to purify the fire, yet
because of being enumerated among the ceremonies
which purify a man, serves that latter purpose too.
Thus, the subservience of the means, viz., hearing
(study), reflection and contemplation, to knowledge in
a hereafter, is only through the might of the unseen
potency generated by daily hearing (study).

30 ^Thus, the attainment of knowledge is through the

channel of the practice of the means hearing (study),
reflection etc. There being agreement among all in this
matter, Bharatitirtha, in the Dliyanadipa, declares yet
another means to the attainment of knowledge. There
are seen such statements of Scripture and the tradi-
tional Code, as the following: "That cause is to be
comprehended through sankhya and yoga ", " That
state which is reached by sankhya, that is reached by
yoga too." Hence, in the same way as the sankhya,
which is the inquiry into the Vedanta, denoted by the
word hearing (sravana) and aided by reflection etc., is
a means to the attainment of knowledge, even so is the/
contemplation of the Nirguna Brahman, denoted by the
word yoga. Nor may it be objected that there is no

CONTEMPLATION OF THE NIRQUtfA

contemplation at all of the Nirguna. For, in the
Saibya-prasna of the Prasmpanisad, contemplation is
taught of the Nirguna alone, in the words : ' ' He, again,
who contemplates the Supreme Person with this very
syllable OM of the three matras " etc. The Nirguna
Brahman, that is designated as the object of sight, in
the next text about the fruit of contemplation, "He
who sees the (Supreme Person, who is higher than this
collective soul (Hiranyagarbha), resting in the city",
that itself, not anything else, is the object of contempla-
tion even in the text about contemplation; for,
seeing and contemplation, which are effect and cause, are
confined to the same object. This sense is recognised
by the author of the Bhdsya and others in the section on
the object of sight (Iksati-karma). The contemplation
of the Nirguna is elaborated even elsewhere, in other
Scriptures like the Tapanfya, the Katha-valli etc.

Further, it is shown by the aphorist himself, in the
quarter (of the Sutras) relating to the combination of
attributes, which is commenced for the purpose of
determining the attributes to be contemplated (in
different meditations), that, even in the case of the
Nirguna, there is combination of positive attributes like
knowledge, bliss etc., as shown in the aphorism, "Bliss
etc., since they belong to the subject", and of negative
attributes like non-grossness etc., (as shown) in the
aphorism "But the (denials of) conceptions concerning
the imperishable (aksara) are to be comprehended, on
account of the equality and of the object being the same,
as in the case of the upasad; this has been explained ".

58 CHAPTER 111

Now, if it be said that, where there is combination
of attributes like bliss, what is contemplated is not the
Nirguna at all, no (we reply) : for, contemplation is
possible in the form "I am that impartite, homogeneous
Brahman qualified per accidens by bliss etc., and
non-grossness etc.," without detriment to the attribute-
lessness (of Brahman).

Now, if it be said that, because of the text " Know
that alone to be Brahman, not this which is contem-
plated here", the Supreme Brahman is not the object of
contemplation, no (we reply) ; for, then, because of the
text " It is, verily, other than what is known ", it would
follow that It cannot be the object of knowledge either.
If it be said that, since Its being the object of knowledge
is known from other texts, the text about not being
known signifies not being really an object of knowledge
(over against a subject), then, since contemplation
thereof is well known from the Atharvana-sruti etc.,
even the text about Its not being an object of contempla-
tion signifies its real nature (as not an object over
against a subject) . And thus, they for whom, in accor-
dance with the text, " Of which many are not able even
to hear' 7 , hearing (study) etc. do not result, because of
dullness of intellect or failure to obtain an eminent
preceptor skilled in explaining the principles (of inter-
preting Scripture), those persons, having obtained a
superficial understanding of the unity of the self and
Brahman, through the Veclanta learnt by adhyayana,
attain by stages to an intuition of the contemplated
Nirguna Brahman, even without an inquiry into that
(#edajuta), through the practice of the contemplation,

CONTEMPLATION OF THE NIRGUtfA 359

of Nirguna Brahman, ascertained from preceptors
whose knowledge extends only to traditional practice ;
this (contemplation) is declared in the Prasnopanisad
etc., and the teaching of the mode of its observance,
which lies scattered in many branches (of the Veda),
in the writings of sages, in codes like the Brahma,
VasistJia, etc., and in other works like the Panclkarana,
is brought together, in the same way as the teaching
about agnihotra (is brought together) in the Kalpa-
sdtras. On the analogy of the illusion that does not fail
to accord (with experience in practice), even contempla-
tion may in some cases lead to true knowledge, at the
time of fruition. On being asked by one who conceals
five cowries in one's hand "How many copies are
there?", if a person replies "five cowries", even in the
absence of basic evidence in the nature of knowledge of
the particular number which should be the basis for
framing the answer, (that reply) of the nature of an
arbitrary supposition yet happens to be true. Even
thus, contemplation of Nirguna Brahman does not
stand in need of the indubitable basic evidence
which discriminates the object as of the nature
(contemplated), and is to be performed in dependence
on the teaching of contemplation alone, in the same way
as the contemplation of the small ether within the heart
etc. ; yet, the intuition of its own content, which the
contemplation of the Nirguna generates, in the same

19 This work, attributed to SaAkaracarya, starts with premising an
inquiry into samadhi and ends with saying that samadhi consists in
remaining rooted in non-difference, holding firmly, "I am the self, the

witness. . > . not ignorance or its products, but I am Brahman itself".

For the present context, the emphasis is on the word "

360

CHAPTER III

way as the contemplation of the small ether etc.,
necessarily relates to a true content, even like the intui-
tion generated through means of knowledge like hearing
(study) etc. This, however, is the difference (between
the two) : for the person devoid of obstacles, the intuition
of Brahman comes about soon, through the channel of
hearing (study) etc.; hence the path of sankhya is the
better alternative. Through contemplation, however,
(the intuition comes) with delay ; hence the path of yoga
is the inferior alternative.

Now, on both of these views, what is the (specific)

instrument for the intuition of Brahman?

4-1 Some say that it is but deep meditation consisting

in the repetition of a cognition; for, this exists as
contemplation from the very first in the path of yoga,
and as contemplation succeeding reflection in the path
of sankhya. Nor is it that there is no evidence of its
being instrumental to the intuition of Brahman; for,
there is the text " Thereupon he perceives that partless
one by contemplation"; further, contemplation is
settled to be the instrument in the love-lorn swain's
intuition of the absent adored one; moreover, in the
sections "Up to death, for then too it is thus seen
(in Scripture) ", and " There is option, the results being
non-different ", in the case of those who contemplate
the small ether etc., as (identical with) themselves, it
is admitted that through deep meditation there is
intuition of the Saguna Brahman that is contemplated.

4-11 Now, deep meditation not being enumerated among

the means of valid knowledge, the intuition of Brahman

DEEP MEDITATION AS THE KARAtfA 36 1

generated thereby cannot be valid knowledge. Nor can
validity result through the non-sublation of the content,
as in the case of the supposititious knowledge of the
particular number of cowries, which happens to accord
(with fact, only) in the manner of the crow causing
the fall of the palm-fruit ; for, that which is not based on
valid evidence cannot be valid knowledge ; the activity
of supposition, like the activity of contemplation, being
a mental act other than cognition, validity is not
admitted of it, as in the case of desire, even where the
content is not sublated.

Not so (we reply) ; for, though not based on 4-12
established means of knowledge, validity is intelligible,
as in the case of that modification (vrtti) of maya,
which belongs to Tsvara; 20 further, there is agreement
(between the two cases) in respect of non-sublation of
content ; deep meditation on cither of the paths is based
on the understanding of the identity of the self and
Brahman resulting from the Vedanta, whether sub-
jected to inquiry or not; and hence, even the intuition
of Brahman generated by deep meditation is based on
means of valid knowledge. It has indeed been said by
the author of the Kalpataru : " The immediate cognition
generated by contemplation of the knowledge generated
by Vedanta texts does not become delusive 21 because
of the strength of the basic means of knowledge. 22 Nor

20 ISvara is said to be omniscient. There must be a vrtti for Him.
on the analogy of the vrtti of the internal organ for the jlva. A vrtti of
maya is therefore postulated and the postulation is valid.

21 Like the love-lorn swain's intuition of the absent adored,

22 I.e., the Vedanta texts,
S I 46

CHAPTER III

is there the contingence of validity being extrinsic; 28
for, the purity of the basic (means of knowledge) is
considered only for refuting (the possibility of)
exceptions ".

4- 2 Others, however, say thus: the mind alone is the

instrument of the intuition of Brahman, because of
such texts as " This subtle self is to be understood by the
mind", "(This) is seen by the concentrated intellect"
etc. ; for, there is settled of it instrumentality in respect
of the valid knowledge consisting in the psychosis " I ",
in the case of the conditioned self. It is taught to be
thus even in the following words of the Pancapadika-
vivarana: " Of the internal organ, which is the means
of the knowledge of the cogniser etc., of a nature
opposed to the dream-world" etc. Moreover, in the
text "He thinks (in dreams) 'all this is but myself,
I am all,' this is his supreme world (i.e. enjoyment),"
the instrumentality of the mind is accepted even in the
intuition of Brahman in dreams, there being no other
instrument (active) then. Deep meditation, however,
is of service as an auxiliary to the mind. For, there is
the saying of the Bhdmati: " The internal organ, aided
by maturity of contemplation of the sense of the text,
manifests in the case of the immediately experienced
denotation of the thou 24 its being the denotation of the
that,* 4 through the negation of the respective
adjuncts." Even in the text " (Becoming) pure of

23 The Vedantins, unlike the Naiyayikas, hold that the validity of a
cognition is self-revealed, not revealed by something other than that,
e.g., an inference based on practical efficiency.

24 In the Upani$adic text "That thou art/'

THE MIND AS THE KARANA 363

intellect through clarity of knowledge, thereupon he
perceives that partless one by contemplation ", contem-
plation is accepted only as the cause of mental
concentration signified by " clarity of knowledge".
Deep meditation is not, however, of itself the instru-
ment; for its instrumentality in respect of knowledge
is not settled anywhere ; and the instrumentality of the
mind itself as aided by deep meditation being intelligi-
ble even in the case of the intuition of the adored by the
lover and so on, it is not proper to assume another
instrument of knowledge (whose instrumentality is)
not settled.

Yet others, however, say thus: (1) because of the 4.3
declaration of release while embodied (jivaiimukti), on
the rise of the intuition of Brahman, immediately after
instruction by the preceptor, in such texts as " To him,
verily, who knows this", "He shows what is beyond
darkness", "That person knows who has a preceptor,
for him there is delay only so long (as he is not
released from the body)", (2) because of the declara-
tion of the non-expectancy of any other (instrument,
say) contemplation, in the text " Those who have well
ascertained the purport of Vedanta lore " etc., and
(3) because of the declaration of Brahman as knowablo
through the Upanisads alone, in the text " That person
propounded in the Upanisads " etc., only the major
texts of the Upanisads are instruments for the intuition
of Brahman, not the mind; for its instrumentality to
the intuition of Brahman is denied by the text " That
which is not thought by the mind ". Nor does this
(text) relate to the immature mind; for, all mind ia

364

CHAPTER III

understood in the complement of the text " That by
which the mind, they say, is thought."

Nor may it be objected that the instrumentality of
verbal testimony too is denied in respect of that
(intuition of Brahman, by the text) "That which is
not expressed by speech' '; for, even those who maintain
the instrumentality of mind have to admit of verbal
testimony that it is instrumental to the mediate cogni-
tion of the non-particularised (Brahman) ; in confor-
mity with the text " That from which words return
together with the mind, failing of attainment ", this
(other) text should be said to have for purport the
denial of instrumentality in respect of that (intuition)
for verbal testimony, through its primary significance
consisting in the comprehension of the sense expressed
by the word; hence there is not opposition to its
instrumentality in respect of that, through secondary
implication consisting in what is related to the
expressed (sense).

Nor may it be said that the instrumentality of the
mind too, as established by the text " By the mind alone
it is to be seen ", cannot be set aside; for, the instru-
mental case (in "by the mind") is intelligible even on
account of its being a cause (not the distinctive cause),
since concentration thereof is needed even in the
generation of intuition through verbal testimony; for,
this (usage) is seen in "He sees with the mind, he
hears with the mind" etc.; the declaration of the
instrumentality of the mind by the Bhasyakara in the

IMMEDIACY OF COGNITION THROUGH SABDA 365

gloss on the Gltd is set forth to express a view different
(from his own). 25

Now, even thus, it may be said, the generation of 5.1
immediate cognition is not consistent with verbal
testimony whose nature it is to generate mediate
cognition.

To this some say thus: verbal testimony, though
itself devoid of capacity (therefor), does give rise to
immediate cognition, when favoured by (the presence
of) the mirror, viz., the mind, which has attained
concentration on Brahman through the host of
impressions generated by the repetition of the cognition
preceded by the hearing" of and reflection on the sacred
teaching; this is assumed in the same way as that the
oblation made in the fire consecrated by the purifi-
catory ceremonies laid down in the sacred teaching
generates an unseen result; for, there is the authority
of sacred teaching (here too) " He who knows the self
crosses sorrow"; the superimposition of agency etc.,
which is immediate, cannot cease in the absence of
immediate cognition of the locus (the self) ; since in
respect of Brahman propounded in the Upanisads no
other means of knowledge can apply, if immediate
cognition be not originated even from verbal testimony,
impossibility of release would follow.

Others, however, establish it thus, in conformity 5 . 2
with what is seen : it is seen that an intuition of the lost
damsel is generated by the mind, when in conjunction

25 Presumably the view is that of the vrttikara who comes in for
criticism so often in the &<lrlraka-*bh&$ya t

ggg CHAPTER III

with intense meditation, though by itself it is not
capable of (creating) anything external; hence, the
generation of immediate cognition even by verbal
testimony, as in conjunction with contemplation, stands
to reason.

5.3 Yet others, however, say thus : what is called the

immediacy of cognition consists in its having for content
an object which is immediate, .since 110 other explana-
tion (of that immediacy) is possible. Nor does the
immediacy of the object consist in its being the content
of immediate cognition, so as to involve reciprocal
dependence ; rather does it consist in the non-difference
(of the object) from the intelligences of the respective
individuals (who cognise) ; thereisnoiion-pervasion (of
the definition) in respect of any case, since the internal
organ and its properties (pleasure, pain etc.), being
posited in the witness, are non-different therefrom; and
for the pot etc., posited in the intelligence outside, there
is, because of the manifestation of non-difference of the
intelligence outside from the intelligences of the respec-
tive individuals, as effected by the psychoses, non-
difference from those (individual intelligences). Nor
does immediacy result for merit, demerit and impres-
.sions, there being no distinction in respect of their
being posited in the witness, in the same way as the
internal organ and its properties like cognition; for
'they (merit etc.) are imperceptible, while it
is admitted only of a perceptible inert substance that
there is immediacy when there is non-difference from
intelligence. And thus, since (Brahman) is ever non-
different from the intelligences of all persons, and since

IMMEDIACY OP COGNITION THROUGH ABDA 367

(knowledge from verbal testimony) has for content an
immediate object as stated by Scripture itself in the
words " immediate Brahman" in the text " That
Brahman which is direct, immediate ", the declaration
of immediacy of the knowledge of Brahman even
through verbal testimony stands to reason.

The Advaitavidyacarya, however, says thus : the 5-4
immediacy of cognition does not consist in (its) having
an immediate object for content, for, it does not cover
the cognition, immediate in nature, of the happiness
which is of the self's nature, since self -luminosity is
denied to be that which consists in having itself, for
content ; rather (is it thus) : just as in the case of respec-
tive objects immediacy of the object consists in the non-
difference from such intelligence as is favourable to
empirical usage in respect of itself, 26 even so the
immediacy of cognition consists in the non-difference
of the intelligence, favourable to the respective
empirical usages, from the respective objects. And
thus, tliis immediacy is an attribute of intelligence
alone, not, however, an attribute of the psychosis of
the internal organ, like the attribute of being inferential
knowledge. Hence it is 27 that there is immediacy in
respect of the witness whose nature is to illumine

26 All objects being superimposed on intelligence, they are always
non-different therefrom; yet they are not always immediately present;
hence the qualification "favourable to empirical usage in respect of
itself, i.e., at the stage when it is defined by a psychosis whose sphere ia
the particular object.

27 Because immediacy is an attribute of intelligence, not of a
psychosis; on the latter view, happiness etc., being witness-revealed, not
psychosis-revealed, could never be Immediate,

CHAPTER III

happiness etc., (resulting from objects), and of the
intelligence whose nature is to illumine the happiness
which is of the nature of the self. Nor is this contra-
dicted by the experience (of immediacy) in the
psychoses of the senses, in respect of pot etc. ; for, it
is intelligible that that experience has for content the
immediacy present in the intelligence as defined by the
psychosis.

Now, the immediacy (here) declared in the case
of the cognition and its object, is unduly wide, as apply-
ing to the psychosis, viz., verbal knowledge having for
its sphere the heart etc., (which are within the body and
do not require the going forth of a psychosis), as
also the content of that (knowledge) ; for, if
perchance, there be at some time a conjunction
of the psychosis and the content (as there may well be,
both being within the body), the manifestation
of the non-difference of the psychosis-defined intelli-
gence from the content-defined intelligence could
not be avoided. If this be urged, no (we reply) ; for,
a mediate psychosis is not capable of removing the
ignorance investing the content-defined intelligence ;
hence, for the content-intelligence obscured by ignor-
ance there is no manifestation of non-difference from
the non-obscured psychosis-defined witness-intelligence ;
hence there is no possibility of immediacy. 28 Hence
it is that though, in the stage of transmigration, there is
in fact non-difference of the jiva from Brahman, there

28 Either for the heart etc., which are mediate, or for the mediate
cognitions, of the nature of intelligence defined by & verbal psychosis etc,,
whose sphere Is the heart etc.

IMMEDIACY OP COGNITION THROUGH SABDA 369

is no immediacy thereof; for, there is the difference
effected by obscuration due to ignorance.

Nor thus does there result lack of omniscience (for
Brahman), there being for Brahman too no immediacy
of the jiva; 29 for, since ignorance is not an obscuring
agent in respect of Isvara, it does not bring about in
Him (cognition of) difference from the jiva; the
ignorance, which is an obscuring agent in respect of a
particular person, brings about in respect of that person
alone, (cognition of) the difference from its own locus. 30
Hence it is that, when by Caitra's cognition his igno-
rance of the pot is removed, Maitra's ignorance, which
has not been removed, brings about the difference of the
content-intelligence (from himself) in respect of
Maitra alone; consequently there is no unintelligibility
of Caitra's experience of the immediacy of the pot.

Now, if thus immediacy, which consists in the mani-
festation of non-difference between intelligence as
doifined by the psychosis and as defined by the content,
be brought about by the removal of the ignorance
present in the intelligence defined by its own content,
it (the immediacy) could not be what brings
about the removal of ignorance; hence, knowledge
as such (not immediate cognition) would be what
removes ignorance. If this be said, no (we
reply) ; for (of the knowledge that removes ignorance)

29 On this very ground of the existence of difference effected by
obscuration due to ignorance.

30 That is, difference whose counter-correlate is the object-defined
intelligence, which is the locus of that ignorance,

S I 47

370

CHAPTER III

there is the qualification that that cognition alone,
which, when arising, does, because of the excellence of
its cause, arise only as in conjunction with its
content, removes ignorance, since sense-cognitions
are of this character. And thus, since Brahman-
knowledge, though arising from verbal testimony,
arises only as in conjunction with its own content,
viz., Brahman-intelligence which is the material cause
of all, its capacity to remove ignorance, and its
immediacy, because of the resolution of difference
grounded on that (ignorance), with the removal of
ignorance these are quite intelligible.

Now, thus, why should there not be immediacy
through the removal of primal ignorance even by the
knowledge of that (Brahman) generated by the
Vedanta learnt through repetition (adhyayana) ? Nor
may it be said that that is not what removes ignorance,
since it is not of the nature of certitude of existence
for, even thus, that (ignorance) being removed by
indubitable knowledge through verbal testimony for
him who has performed the hearing (study of the
Vedanta), there would follow the futility of reflection
etc. If this be said, no (we reply) ; for, though
indubitable knowledge may be present as the result of
hearing (study), ignorance is not removed, because of
the obstacle, the defect of mental distraction; in the
removal of this (obstacle), the practice of the content
of the restrictive injunctions as to reflection and
contemplation is fruitful ; and in the case of one who has
conquered mental distraction by the practice of reflec-
tion etc., in a former existence, the (realisation of the)

COGNITION OF POT &c. AND IGNORANCE OF BRAHMAN 371

immediacy of Brahman through the bare teaching is
(certainly) to be recognised.

Now, even thus, in the case of him who has per- 6-1
formed contemplation, why should there not be removal
of ignorance concerning Brahman, through the know-
ledge of pot etc., in the same way as through the
knowledge of Brahman? Nor may it be said that,
since that (knowledge) has not Brahman for content,
there cannot result therefrom removal of ignorance
concerning Brahman; for, of such psychoses of the
intellect as "'the pot is real ", it is admitted that
Brahman as reality is the content. Nor may it be said
that when, by the psychosis with the form of pot etc.,
ignorance relating thereto is removed, the intelligence
defined thereby shines forth as reality even by self-
manifestation and that this (intelligence) is not the
content of a psychosis in the form of pot etc.; for,
if it were not (the content), then, knowledge \vould
have the pot for content, while ignorance would have
for content the intelligence defined thereby; conse-
quently, by the knowledge, which has a different content,
there could not be the removal of that ignorance ; for,
the pot is not the content of ignorance since there
can be no obscuration in respect of what is inert. Nor
may it be said that though the psychosis, in the
form of pot etc., have for content the intelligence
defined thereby, there cannot result therefrom the
removal of primal ignorance, since it has not the form
of impartite bliss; for, that form is absent even from
the intuition generated by the Vedanta. Verily,
impartite-ness or bliss-ness is not present there as a

872 CHAPTER III

mode, as (otherwise) there would result detriment to
the Vedantas having an impartite sense consisting in
the generation of valid knowledge whose sphere is not
the relational Nor may it be said that there is a
restriction as to the removal of that (primal ignorance)
by that knowledge alone which is generated by the
Vedanta; for, when there does exist other knowledge
too, whose nature is settled to be the bringing about of
the removal of ignorance, it is not possible to effect
any such restriction. Nor may it be said that since
even the defined intelligence, whose content is the
psychosis in the form of pot etc., is but posited, it
has not for content that which is the content of primal
ignorance, viz., the true, undefined intelligence, and
that consequently there is not for the psychoses, in
the form of pot etc., even the settled cause (of removal)
consisting in having the same content as the ignorance
desired to be removed ; for, though the defining element
there be posited, what is defined is of the nature of non-
posited intelligence, which is the content of primal
ignorance j if this (too) were posited, it would be inert
like pot etc., and could not be the content even of modal
ignorance; consequently, modal ignorance should be
said to have for content the non^posited intelligence,
which is the content of primal ignorance; and even the
cognition of pot etc., which removes that (modal
ignorance) should necessarily have that (non-posited
intelligence) for content ; hence, even on this view, the
contingence of the removal of primal ignorance by that
(modal knowledge) cannot be helped.

SENSE-PSYCHOSES CANNOT GRASP BRAHMAN. 373

To this the preceptor replies thus : intelligence 6-2
is not the content of a psychosis generated by the sense
of sight etc. ; for it is taught by such texts as " His form
does not stand within the range of vision; no one
perceives him with the sense of sight ", "The self-
existent forced the senses outward; therefore they
perceive what is without, not the self within ", that it
is incapable of being perceived by the sense of sight etc.,
in the same way as primal atoms etc. ; there is also the
qualification "Him who is propounded in the
Upanisads ". Nor is there conflict with the statement
of the Vartika " The nature of Brahman being settled
to be such as may be known by all cognitions whatso-
ever " etc.; for, that has for purport the being known
in a figurative sense by the psychosis (in the form) of
pot etc., since, when the psychosis in the form of
pot etc. arises, obscuration is dispelled, and Brahman,
of the nature of self -luminosity and reality, becomes,
like the pot itself, the object of empirical usage, in the
words " the pot is real ". And the dispelling of
obscuration by the cognition of the pot etc., is intelligible
even because of the latter having pot etc,, for content;
for, pot etc. are also the content of ignorance, since
modal ignorances are experienced to have pot etc. for
content, in "I know not the pot ; by cognition of the pot,
ignorance of the pot is destroyed ".

Nor may it be said that there (in the case of pot
etc.) it is not meet to recognise ignorance, the function
of obscuration being absent, while the non-manifestation
of that (pot etc.) is intelligible even because of the

374 CHAPTER 111

obscuration of the intelligence that should reveal it
and is detfined by it; for, though, in the manner
indicated, being directly the content of ignorance is
denied of the inert, yet being indirectly the content of
ignorance is admitted, in that for the luminosity of
intelligence as defined by the inert there is obscura-
tion by ignorance, and that thence results for the inert,
though conjoined to the eternal luminosity of intelli-
gence, the capacity for such empirical usage as "It
does not exist, it is not manifest "; for, that which
is obscured by ignorance directly or indirectly,
it is the having of that as content by a cognition, which
constitutes what causes removal of that ignorance. 31
Nor does it follow from this that, since in the manner
stated pot etc. may be the contents of primal ignorance
too, there should be the removal of primal ignorance
even with the intuition of pot etc, ; for, on the strength
of the result (we conclude that) effective-ness in the
removal of that (primal ignorance) belongs to that
(knowledge) alone, which has for its content what is
other than the effects of that (primal ignorance). 32

Or else, the inert is not a content of primal
ignorance at all ; but the respective inert things are the
contents only of the modal ignorances located in the
defined intelligence as, otherwise, if the intelligence of

31 For knowledge and ignorance to be opposed, it is enough that there
should be some identity of content; the content need not be the same in
all respects.

32 The content of primal ignorance, other than its own effects, is
Brahman; and primal ignorance can be removed by Brahman-knowledge
alone, since we see from the event that it is not removable by any know-
ledge short of that.

THE INERT IS THE CONTENT OP MODAL IGNORANCES 375

(i.e., defined by) a piece of sandal wood be manifested
by a psychosis of the sense of sight, there would result
immediacy even for the smell associated with that,
while, if that (intelligence) be not manifested, there
would follow non-manifestation even of the existence
and colour of the sandal-wood. Nor may it be said that
because of the manifestation of the intelligence defined
by the existence and colour of sandal-wood, through a
psychosis of the sense of sight, these two are revealed,
while, because of the non-manifestation of intelligence
defined by the smell, in the absence of a psychosis of the
nature of smell, the latter is not revealed ; for, intelli-
gence cannot exist twice over; 33 the properties of a
single substance, which are pervasive of the whole of
their locus, cannot each define intelligence separately,
any more than they can define ether separately ; 34 since
these (properties) are revealed even by the intelligence
defined by the substance which is their locus, in the same
way as nacre-silver (is revealed) by the intelligence
defined through the this-element of nacre, from the
manifestation of that (intelligence) there would follow
the revelation of smell too, and from the non-manifesta-
tion of that (intelligence) there would follow the non-
revelation even of colour etc. Nor is there any
restriction that smell is revealed in that intelligence
alone, which is associated with a psychosis of the nature
of smell; for, the word " revealed " signifies only what
is conjoined with illumination; in the case of what is

33 As defined by colour and again as defined by smell.

34 Ether is not delimited in one way by the smell of the pot. in
another way by its .colour and in a third way by its configuratiin; so too of
intelligence.

376

CHAPTER III

conjoined with unobscured illumination, therefore, the
assumption of non-revelation would be self-contra-
dictory, even in the absence of a psychosis with that
form; (and) it is impossible to say of the manifested
intelligence, which is the material cause of smell, that
it is not conjoined to smell. Therefore, in the same
way as, when there is for Caitra a psychosis in the form
of pot, there is removal of the obscuring ignorance for
him alone, and consequently revelation of the content
(pot) for him alone, not for another, even so, through
the psychosis in the forms of the respective contents,
there is removal of the respective obscuring ignorances
alone, and consequently, there is no immediacy for any
other content ; for immediacy is admitted only for those
which are not obscured, because of their non-
difference from intelligence; hence, differences of
modal ignorance have to be predicated of the one intelli-
gence, through differences in the content as through
differences in the cogniser; modal ignorances having
thus the respective inert things as contents, there is
no unintelligibility whatever in psychoses with the form
of pot etc. removing modal ignorances; nor does it
follow that they should remove primal ignorance
(as well). Nor does it follow, even thus, in the case of
the psychosis in the form "I", whose content is the
jiva, that it should remove primal ignorance ; for, the
content of that is but the non-intelligent element
associated with the self -luminious intelligence ; even the
recollection " I am he " has but for content the quali-
fication of the self-luminous intelligence by earlier and
later temporal properties, along with* the qualification

RESTRICTIVE INJUNCTION OP VEDANTA STUDY 377

of it by the internal organ, and hence, it has not intelli-
gence for its content,

x Some, however, admitting that psychoses with the 6-3
form of pot etc. have for content intelligence as defined
by the respective objects, say thus: it is said in the
Vdrtika " All means of knowledge being possible (in the
case of Brahman), because of its being the locus of the
fruit of all means of knowledge, there is the statement
' it is to be heard ', in order to restrict (the means) to
the Vedanta " ; in conformity with the restrictive
injunction of the Vedanta, signified by the text about
the obligation to hear (study), it is that knowledge of
Brahman, which is generated by the Vedanta alone,
that, in conjunction with the unseen potency due to the
restriction, removes unhindered the ignorance about
Brahman ; hence, there is no possibility of its removal
by the cognition of pot etc.

Others, however, say thus: that knowledge alone, 6-4
which is generated by texts like " That thou art " and
pertains to the non-difference of the jiva from Brah-
man, removes primal ignorance, since primal ignorance
has that non-difference for its sphere ; hence, there is no
possibility of its removal by the cognition of pot etc.,
which has for sphere the bare existence of intelligence. 35
Nor may it be said that if the non-difference taught by
the means of knowledge, which makes known the truth,
were other than intelligence, duality would result, that,
therefore, intelligence itself is non-difference, and that,

35 Not the non-difference of jiva-intelligence from Brahman-
intelligence.

S I 48

378

CHAPTER III

consequently, the cognition of pot etc. which has that
(intelligence) for its sphere, has non-difference too for
its sphere. We do not, indeed, declare a difference in
respect of content, when we speak of the " knowledge of
non-difference"; 30 rather does the knowledge of non-
difference consist in having intelligence for content
through a special relation sni generis, under the control
of special causes, such as the reflection 37 on the two
substrates, which are the expressed senses of " That "
and " Thou ". Though there is no distinction in
respect of having for sphere the qualification, the
substrate and their relation, yet, for the knowledge as
qualified, the property of being knowledge as qualified,
which is other than the comprehension of an aggregate,
consists in having for its sphere those very three, (but)
through a special relation sui generis, under the control
of special causes, such as the knowledge of the qualifica-
tion (as qualification) ; or again, doubt is different from
the arbitrary supposition "This has the property of
a post as well as that of a man;" (in neither
case) 38 is there a difference ascertained in respect
of content. Similarly, in respect of pot etc., the
knowledge " This is that pot" has the pot for

36 I.e., we distinguish knowledge of non-difference from knowledge
of the existence of intelligence, not in respect of content, but in respect
of mode.

37 Consideration of the incompatibility of apposition between the
expressed senses, and resort to secondary implication by abandoning part
of the expressed sense.

38 Whether as between doubt and supposition, or between knowledge
as qualified and knowledge of the qualification, substrate and their
relation.

KNOWLEDGE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OF NON-DIFFERENCE 379

content through a special relation sui gmeris ; and
this alone constitutes the knowledge of its non-
difference, differentiated from the knowledge generated
by the mere word "pot" etc. ; for there is not ascertained
any non-difference other than this. Cognitions of non-
existence and similarity are linked by relations sui
generis to the locus and counter-correlate ; with the locus
there is a special relation sui generis, viz., the relation
of support and what is supported; with the counter-
correlate (there is another special relation, viz.,) the
relation between correlate and counter-correlate; in
these and other ways, there are assumed secondary
distinctions among relations sui generis. Even so, in
the case of psychoses which are conjoined with their
contents by a relation sui generis, viz., the relation of
content and cogniser of the content, conjunction and
identity being too wide 39 (as relations) in respect of the
content, when it is not possible to establish a difference"
in respect of content, it is possible to maintain reciprocal
distinction as between knowledge of non-difference
(and knowledge of intelligence as such), through the
assumption of secondary distinctions even in the settled
relation sui generis. And thus, since it is not admitted
of Brahman-knowledge that it has for its sphere some
relation called non-difference, there is no detriment to
the impartiteness of the sense of the Vedantas.

39 If the psychosis were in a relation of bare conjunction with the
content, since it is in such conjunction even with the eye-ball etc, the
latter too would become contents of the psychosis; if it were in a relation
of identity, such objects as pot could never be cognised, since they are
not identical with the psychosis, which is a modification of the internal
organ; else, it would follow that the internal organ is the content of tha
psychosis with the form of the pot etc.

80 CHAPTER III

6-5 Now, the removal of primal ignorance by Brahman-

knowledge stands to reason as little as by the knowledge
of pot etc. ; for, what is effective in the removal is con-
flict consisting in not suffering the continuance of that,
while, for the effect, there is no such conflict with its
material cause; if this be said, no (we reply); for
though such conflict be not seen elsewhere between the
effect and the cause, there does exist here such conflict,
caused by knowledge and ignorance having the same
content; further, such conflict is seen even as between
the effect and the cause, as between conjunction (of a
cloth) with fire and the cloth. Nor may it be said that
according to the teaching of thfe parts being disjoined
on the conjunction (of the cloth) with fire, 10 the des-
truction of the cloth results only from the destruction
of the conjunction, which is the non-intimate cause,
and not from the conjunction with fire ; for, since even
in the burnt cloth, there is seen the continuance of the
earlier configuration, while disjunction of parts is not
seen as in the case of a pot pounded with a hammer,
there is no evidence for the assumption of disjunction
of parts and the like. Nor does it stand to reason
that, threads too being burnt in that case, the destruction
of the cloth results from the destruction of the intimate
cause; for, the burning of the cloth being seen to be
simultaneous with that of the filament, threads etc., it
is not proper to assume a sequence; further, .since
lower down 41 there is no destruction of parts, in the

40 The reference is to the Nyaya -Vaige$ika teaching about the
nature of destruction.

41 /.<?., below the dyads or dvya^ukas; for, the parts thereof, the
primal atoms, are indestructible.

DESTRUCTION OF THE FINAL PSYCHOSIS 381

case of those parts, destruction should be said to result
only from the conjunction with fire.

Now, let this be so. Even thus, this Brahman- 7-0
knowledge, which is the destroyer of ignorance with all
its developments, how could it be destroyed, there
being no other destroyer?

If this be asked, some sa(y thus : just as 7-1
the powder of the clearing nut mixed with
water, while causing the precipitation of the mud
already conjoined (with the water) causes its own
precipitation as well, even so, Brahman-knowledge
superimposed on the self, while removing the whole of
the universe superimposed earlier, removes itself as
well.

Others, however, cite, in respect of the removal of 7-2
oneself after the removal of others, the analogy of
water consumed by the heated metal 42 ; yet others,
however, cite here the example of the fire that has
burnt up a heap of graps* 43

Nor is there any restrictive rule that destruction 73
is generated by something other than the counter-
correlate, since there is no ground (for such a rule),
and since there is inconstancy in such destruction as
that of the fuel-less fire. Nor may it be said that,
since there would be undue extensiveness in the
generation of destruction by the counter-correlate alone,

42 The water, while removing the heat, removes itself f<& well.

43 That is to say, the fire, after removing by combustion what can

be so removed, dies out and removes itself.

CHAPTER III

some other cause should necessarily be stated, and that,
even in the case of such destruction as of the fuel-less
fire, there are other causes such as time, unseen potency,
the Lord's desire; for, undue extensiveness is not
understood (by him who urges that as a defect here).
There is no undue extensiveness in the sense that no
other cause would be needed even for the destruction
of pot etc. ; for non-requirement of another cause is
not declared in respect of all destruction. Nor does
it (undue extensiveness) help to establish the need for
another cause even 111 respect of the destruction of
BraJiman-knowledge, on the analogy of the destruction
of the pot, as on that analogy it should help to
establish even the need for hitting with a hammer. Nor
is there undue extensiveness in the sense that because
of agreement in respect of being destruction of know-
ledge, the destruction of the knowledge even of pot etc.,
would need no other cause; for, though for the des-
truction of fire which has fuel a visible cause such as
sprinkling water is needed, that is not needed for the
destruction of fire which ha^s no fuel ; again, though for
the destruction of u waking cognition there is needed
another special quality 44 of a contrary nature, that is
not needed for the destruction of the cognition imme-
diately preceding sleep; even so, though for the
destruction of knowledge which does not remove primal
ignorance there is need for another cause, yet for the
destruction of the knowledge which does remove (that
ignorance), that (cause) not being needed is intelligible.

44 Of the soul, that is to say, another cognition.

DESTRUCTION OF THE FINAL PSYCHOSIS 383

Nor is there undue extensiveness in the sense that if
another cause be not needed, there would be destruction
even at the moment succeeding its own origin ; for, this
is a contingency of the acceptable ; the entire universe
superimposed on Brahman being consumed at the
very moment succeeding the rise of that (knowledge),
it is admitted that that (knowledge) which is included
in that (universe) is also consumed even then; further,
on the analogy of the destruction of the fuel-less fire,
there is no opposition to the destruction of Brahman-
knowledge too being generated by other causes like
time, unseen potency or the Lord's desire; for, what is
admitted is not that, after the removal of the entire
universe, there is the removal of Brahman-knowledge,
the solitary residue; and, in the moment prior to the
simultaneous consumption of all, existence does belong
to time, whether as the relation between intelligence
and nescience or as an independent substance, to the
unseen potency, whether as the grace of the Lord or
as a special quality of the internal organ, and to other
(such causes). Nor may it be said that, if a cause
other than knowledge be needed here (for destruction),
there would result the non-illusoriness of Brahman-
knowledge, since illusoriness is admitted to consist in
removability by knowledge alone ; for the meaning of
that (definition) is removability by knowledge, while
not being removable by any accessory not conjoined
with knowledge; even the text "No other path" etc.
has but this purport. Therefore, the analogy of the
fire that has burnt up what was to be burnt up is
certainly appropriate.

384 CHAPTER III

7-4 Some, however, say thus: Brahman-knowledge,

which is of the nature of a psychosis, is not what
removes ignorance and the universe based thereon ; for,
because of the rule that ignorance is removable by
illumination, its removability by an inert psychosis is
not possible ; what removes it is, rather, the luminosity
of intelligence associated with that (psychosis) ; though,
in its own nature, as the witness of that ignorance etc.,
it cannot remove that, yet, as associated with the
psychosis of the nature of the impartite, its capacity
to remove that (ignorance etc.) is intelligible; for,
there is the saying of the wise: "The sun's light, which
reveals grass etc., burns it also, when conjoined with a
burning glass; that analogy is to be applied here".
Thus, just as fire associated with some one faggot,
while burning up villages, cities etc., burns up that
faggot too, even so the luminosity of the impartite
intelligence, associated with the final psychosis, 45 while
rooting out the entire universe, is capable of removing
that (psychosis) as well ; hence there is no unintelligi-
bility whatsoever in the destruction of that,

7.5 Others, however, say thus : Brahman-knowledge

removes ignorance alone, since there is direct opposition
only as between knowledge and ignorance; as for the
universe, its destruction results from the destruction
of its material cause ; 46 thence alone the destruction of
Brahman-knowledge too, which is included in that
universe. Nor would the illusoriness of the universe

45 That is to say, the intuition of Brahman.

46 Ignorance.

POSSIBILITY OF JIVAN-MfjKTI 385

be unintelligible, if it be not removable by knowledge ;
for, though the removal of the universe is not directly
generated by knowledge, it is generated by the des-
truction of ignorance, which in turn is generated by
knowledge; for, it is recognised that illusoriness
consists in removability by knowledge alone, whether
directly or indirectly.

And thus is intelligible the appearance of a body
etc., even after the rise of the intuition of the truth,
in the case of one who is released while embodied:
for, even after the rise of the intuition of the truth,
it is intelligible that, because of the obstruction due to
prarabdha-karma, there may persist a trace of
nescience, which (trace) is the material cause of the
persistence of prarabdha-karma and its effect, the
appearance of the body etc. If, like ignorance, the
universe too were directly removable by the intuition of
Brahman, this would not be intelligible; for, where
there exists its opposite, the intuition of Brahman, the
existence of prarabdha-karnm being itself impossible,
that (karma) cannot be an obstruction to the removal
of (all) trace of nescience.

END OF CHAPTER THREE.

S I 49

CHAPTER IV.

Now, what is this trace of nescience, by the M
persistence of which there is release while embodied?

Some say that it is an element of the projective
energy of the primal nescience endowed with both
obscuring and projective energies, this (element) being
the cause of the persistence of prarabdha-kanna, the
present body etc.

Others say that it is the impression left behind by 1-3
nescience, comparable to the smell of garlic, which
persists in the vessel which contained garlic, (even
after being) cleansed.

Yet others say that it is but primal nescience itself 1-3
which persists, on the analogy of the burnt cloth (which
retains its configuration).

The preceptor, Sarvajnatman, 1 however, mentions 1 - *
this (following) too as a view: there cannot be the
persistence even of a trace of ignorance, on the rise of
the intuition that is opposed to it; hence, the sacred
teaching about release while embodied is only for the

1 According to a writer in the IHQ, VII, 301, the expression in the
text should be rendered as "the preceptor of Sarvajfiatman" i.e., Sures-
vara. But the construction is tortuous, while the information about
SureSvara is incorrect. Sarvajnatman's guru was one Devesvara and
there is no sufficient warrant for equating him with Sure^vara. It would
appear from a Ms. of the Pramanalak$anam, a work of Sarvajnatman's,
that the author's parama-guru was Devananda, not gankara, and that
Devananda's teacher was rethlnanda. Nowhere does this approximate
to the SaAkara, SureSvara, Sarvajnatman, tradition. See Travancore
Archaeological series, Vol. II, pp. 144-146.

388 CHAPTER IV

purpose of eulogising the injunction to hear (study)
and so on; for, there is no purpose in the sacred
teaching setting forth release while embodied. There-
fore, for him who has perf oiined contemplation, there
is, by the mere rise of the intuition of Brahman, the
removal of ignorance with all its effects and its
impressions. 2

2-0 Now, what is this removal of ignorance?

2-1 It is but the self, says the author of the Brahma-

siddhi. Nor is there futility of knowledge, since that
(self) is eternally existent; for, that (knowledge) is
sought, since, in the absence of knowledge, nescience,
the cause of evil, being existent, evil too would continue ;
further, the removal of nescience, though (such
removal is) of the nature of the self, is Avhat is effected
by knowledge, according to the definition " When oil
the existence of one, there is the existence of another at
the next instant, when, in the absence of that, there is
the absence of that (other), that (latter) is what is
effected by that (former) j" for, the said definition
applies in that where there is knowledge, the next
instant there is the removal of nescience, which
(removal) is of the nature of the self, while in the
absence of that (knowledge), there is the non-existence

2 The commentator, Acyuta Kr9ananda, seeks to make out that, on
this view, though avidya is destroyed, its impressions may persist, just
as trembling etc. may continue for a while even after the rope is known to
be but a rope. Such a view which is indistinguishable from that of
para 3 2, except perhaps, in that impressions on the latter view cannot
bind, is in substance that of Ma$(}ana Migra, as set forth in the
BrahmasiddhL

NATURE OP AVIDYA-NIV1JTTI 389

of that, consisting in (the presence of) its counter-
correlate, nescience.

The removal of nescience is certainly (something) 2-2
other than the self. That is not real, as non-duality
would (otherwise) be abandoned; nor is it unreal, as
(then) that could not be effected by knowledge; nor of
a nature, real and (yet) unreal, because of contra-
diction; nor indeterminable, since the indeterminable
has a beginning and has, as a rule, ignorance for its
material cause, so that there would follow, even in
release, the persistence of its material cause, viz.,
ignorance, and the possibility of its removal by know-
ledge; rather is it a mode other than the above-said

four modes : thus says Anandabodha Acarya.

The removal of nescience, like nescience (itself), is 2-3
certainly indeterminable. Nor is there the contingence
of non-release because of the rule that where there is
persistence of that (removal), there is persistence of
its material cause, ignorance, as well; for, there is no
evidence for the persistence of that (removal) ; for, just
as origination is a modification of existence relating to
the first instant alone, it is intelligible that removal too
is a modification of existence relating to the last instant
alone. Hence it is that just as there is the usage in
the present tense "is originated" only in reference to
the first instant of that origination, which, earlier and
later, is referred to as belonging to the future or the
past, in the words "will be originated" or "originated",
even so, there is the usage of the present tense in "is

$90 CHAPTER IV

removed, perishes, is destroyed 7 ' in reference to the last
instant alone of the removal, which, earlier and later, is
referred to as belonging to the future or the past, in the
words "will be renioved" or "removed". If, however,
the removal were to persist, then, even in reference to a
pot long since destroyed, there would be the usage "is
now destroyed" and so on; for, the conjugational
suffixes signify the sense of relation to present time
etc., as attaching to the sense of the stem.

Now, let it be that these (suffixes) signify the sense
of relation to present time etc., as attaching to what is
the subject or object of the sense of the stem and is the
locus of the number expressed by (the suffixes) them-
selves, or the sense of relation to present time etc., as
attaching to the operation, which is favourable to the
sense of the stem and is signified by themselves; thus,
since there is no relation to present time in the case
either of the subject of the act of destruction, viz,, the
pot long since reduced to dust, or in the case of the
operation favourable to the destruction thereof, there
is not the above-mentioned defect of undue extensive-
ness; if this be said, no (we reply) ; for, on the first
(alternative), even in reference to a pot already origi-
nated, there would result the usage "is (being)
originated", since the pot, the subject of the act of
origination, belongs to the present tim'e ; on the second
(alternative), in the body torpid with constipation and
flatulence, when an effort is made to rise, though rising
may not occur, there would (still) result the usage "it
rises", since for the operation of the nature of effoii,

REMOVAL AS A MODIFICATION OP EXISTENCE 391

which is signified by the suffix and is favourable to the
sense of the stem, vis;., rising, there is relation to present
time. Therefore, the sense of the conjugational suffix
is the relation of present time etc., as attaching to the
sense of the stem alone ; hence, if destruction should be
permanent, it would be difficult to avoid the usage "is
(being) removed" even in the case of the pot long since
removed.

And if in the case of a pot broken by a hammer etc.,
there be recognised a variety of non-existence, which is
called destruction, which has that (pot) as counter-
correlate, is permanent and has the ground etc. for its
locus, then, when the heap of potsherds has hpen removed
or when, even without its removal, there is not seen any
special configuration in the potsherds distinguishing
them from the shards of a jug or basin, why should
there not be the perception of that (non-existence) ?
If it be said that the destruction of pot etc. is to be
inferred from the special configuration of the pot-
sherds etc., and is not perceived, then, since from that
the inference is possible of a destruction which belongs
to the time when the hammer falls, and which, being
like origination a modification of existence, has the
counter-correlate for its locus, there does not result
from this a destruction which persists subsequently and
is of the nature of a non-existence resting in the same
locus as the counter-correlate. As for the usage in
respect of the ground that it is the locus of destruction,
in the words " On this ground, the pot has been
destroyed ", that, like (the usage) " On this ground;

392 CHAPTER IV

the pot has been originated ", is intelligible as having
for content the locus of the counter-correlate, as
conjoined to a modification of existence; as for the
usage of the non-existence of the pot on the
ground, after the destruction of the pot, that,
like the usage as to its noja-existence, on the
pot being taken away, is intelligible as based on
absolute non-existence as related to distinct times ; and
it need not be assumed to have destruction for content. 3
If it be said "This being so, since even the usage of the
non-existence of the pot prior to its origination has its
function fulfilled by absolute non-existence, there would
be no antecedent non-existence either", let that too not
be.

2-31 Now, thus, it will no longer be possible to

define prior time as the time which is the
basis of antecedent non-existence and subsequent
time as that which is the basis of destruction;
what, then, would be the basis of earlier and
later in regard to time ? Let it have for its sphere
some unanalysable (indefinable) attribute, like the
usage of " being a counter-correlate " etc., in the case
of pot etc. ; for even if there were admitted a permanent
destruction, of the nature of non-existence, it would
have to be said of the property of being destruction
and so on, (present) in these, that they are un-
analysable (indefinable). Nor is it that the property of
being destruction is certainly analy sable, as it is of the

3 It is not a persistent mode of non-existence, as it is liable to be
removed by the pot being brought back, in the case of tho pot that was
taken away.

NATURE OF PRAGABHAVA Ac. 393

nature of originated non-existence ; for, in respect of
the pot, which is the antecedent non-existence of
destruction, there would result the property of being
its own destruction. 4 Nor is it that there is intended
non-existentiality of the nature of the seventh category ;
for it would follow that even in respect of the antecedent
non-existence of the pot, there would result non-
existence of the property of destruction, and thence it
would follow that the usage in the case of the pot, when
it exists, that it belongs to the period subsequent to that
of antecedent non-existence, would be baseless. Nor
is the destruction of antecedent non-existence some-
thing other than the counter-correlate ; in that case, on
the same principle, the antecedent non-existence of
destruction too would be other than the counter-
correlate; consequently, even for the destruction of
antecedent non-existence there would be another
antecedent non-existence; of that too there would be
some destruction; of that too there would be another
antecedent non-existence; there would thus result the
assumption of uiievidenced infinite destructions and
antecedent non-existences. Nor is it possible to define
the property of being destruction in any other way
without involving self-dependence. That it is thus
with antecedent non-existence too has been elaborated
elsewhere. Therefore, there is not antecedent noiK
existence earlier ; nor subsequently is there non-
existence due to destruction; in the middle alone, there

4 The pot is originated and it is non-existence, as the antecedent
non-existence of destruction; hence, it would follow that the pot is its
own destruction, if the latter be taken to be originated non-existence.
S 1 50

394 CHAPTER IV

is for a time the superimposition of pot etc., endowed
with modifications of existence in the nature of
indeterminable origination, sustentation and destruc-
tion.

And thus, the removal of nescience too is a modi-
fication of existence, present in the instant immediately
succeeding the rise of the intuition of Brahm'an ; hence,
it does not persist in release; consequently, there is no
defect in its being indeterminable: thus says the
Advaitavidyacarya.

241 Now, if thus the removal of nescience be

momentary, release would not be a permanent human
goal. If this be said, (we reply) deluded art thou.
The removal of nescience is acknowledged to be accom-
plished by knowledge, not, indeed, because it is of itself
the human goal, since it is other than both happiness
and the absence of misery; but the manifestation of
im'partite bliss and the destruction of the misery of
transmigration result on the destruction of the
nescience which obscures the impartite bliss and causes
the misery of transmigration; hence, it is as subserving
these that it (the removal of ignorance) is acknow-
ledged to be accomplished by knowledge.

The preceptor, Citsukha, however, says thus : even
the non-existence of misery in release is not of itself
the human goal; since in every case the non-existence
of misery is subsidiary to happiness, as being the non-
existence of obstacles to the manifestation of the
happiness that is of the nature of the self, happiness
alone is of itself the human goal; all others

HAPPINESS ALONE THE HUMAN GOAL

are subsidiary thereto ; therefore, when it is
possible even for the knowledge of the instrumentality
to happiness to be the cause of that (removal), it is not
proper to assume of the non-existence of misery that
it is of itself the human goal, and, in order to cortipre-
hend the prompting to activity in respect of the means
thereto, assume (besides) that what prompts (the
removal) is knowledge of instrumentality to what is
desired, this being more prolix by the introduction
of " being the content of desire. " G Nor would the
reverse position follow that the non-existence of misery
is alone the intrinsic human goal, while happiness is
desired as subsidiary thereto; for, activity is seen in
respect of blame-worthy acts like (prohibited) sexual
intercourse, which generate momentary happiness,
though accomplished with long-standing misery; there,
if the non-existence of misery contemporaneous with
the momentary happiness were the human goal, the
experience of long-standing misery for the sake of that
would be unintelligible. Nor is there parity of defect,
even if momentary happiness be the human goal; for,
in the case of happiness, which is of the nature of an
existent, superiority and inferiority are established in
experience, and consequently, for the sake of some
very superior happiness, though for a moment, the
experience of misery for a long time is intelligible;

5 When it is possible to define the cause of the removal as knowledge
of instrumentality to happiness, it is uneconomical to define it as instru-
mentality to what is desired, introducing the new element, viz., content
of desire; nor do the facts require such cumbrousness, for, the absence
of misery is not an intrinsic human goal and cannot of itself prompt the
removal.

396 CJHAPTER IV

while, in the case of the non-existence of misery,
superiority and inferiority are not possible. There-
fore, in release, even the removal of the misery of trans-
migration is, like the removal of nescience, subsidiary
to happiness; hence, it is only the attainment of un-
defined bliss that is of itself the hum'an goal.

34 Now, undefined bliss, being of the nature of the

inner (self), is eternally attained! True; undefined
bliss, though eternally attained, is yet. made non-
existent as it were, in the state of transmigration, by
nescience, which, while obscuring that, exhibits objects
of a nature contrary thereto ; hence it becomes an
object not achieved; 011 the removal of that (nescience),
the projection of all evil being got rid of, it is attained
as it were, like the forgotten golden ornament round
one's neck; hence, its attainment is figurative: thus say
some.

3.3 Others, however, say thus: in the state of transmi-

gration, there is established for all the cognition "For
me unexcellable bliss does not exist' 7 , because of obscu-
ration by ignorance, whose nature it is to be capable
of the empirical usage " it does not exist, it is not
manifest "j hence, there persists, as long as nescience
persists, a posited non-existence of the bliss of
Brahman, as the basis of that (cognition) ; and, on the
removal of nescience, it too ceases, because of being
based on that; consequently, in conforaiity with the
definition "when, on the existence of one, there is at
the next instant " etc., the being attained of that (bliss)

IS ATTAINMENT FIGURATIVE ? 397

is certainly primary (in sense, not secondary or figura-
tive).

Yet others, however, say thus: since what is not 3-31
cognised is not a human goal, and since, in the state of
transmigration, there is no immediacy for undefined
bliss, though real (even then), that is not the human
goal. Nor may it be said ' ' There is immediacy even then,
through the knowledge which is of the nature of the
self, since that is ever non-different from 1 the happiness
which is of the nature of the self; as for immediate
cognition through a psychosis, that does not exist even
in release' 7 . 6 For, immediacy does not consist many
non-difference from the intelligence favourable to
empirical usage in respect of itself; for, when there
is the manifestation of intelligence as defined by pot,
for the smell too of pot, which is non-different there-
from, there would result immediacy; rather (does it
consist in) non-difference therefrom! of an object that
is not obscured. And thus, since the element of non-
obscuration is present only when there is intuition of
the truth, it stands to reason that the human goal, the
immediacy of unexcellable happiness, is attained by
knowledge.

Some others, however, say thus : let it be that imme- 3.33
diacy consists in any non-difference from intelligence
favourable to empirical usage. Even thus, because of
the might of ignorance, there is superimposed the
difference of intelligence from bliss, in the same way as
the difference of the jiva (from Brahman) ; hence, in

6 There being no psychoses at that stage.

398 CHAPTER IV

the state of transmigration, there is no immediacy of
undefined bliss, any more than there is immediacy of
the intelligence of one person for another person; on the
removal of ignorance, however, the difference of intelli-
gence from bliss being resolved, there is immediacy for
that (bliss) ; consequently there is for it the property of
being accomplished by knowledge.

. Now, for him who has turned away from the state

of the jlva, because of the resolution of external ad-
juncts on the rise of knowledge, is there the attainment
of the state of the Lord (Isvara) ? Or is there mere
subsistence as pure intelligence ? This has to be
discriminated.

4-1 The reply is (as follows) : on the view of a single

jlva (alone), on the rise of knowledge for him, there is
resolved the entire world of difference, such as the
distinction between the jlva and the Lord, (the whole of
which is) posited by the ignorance of that one ( jlva) ;
therefore, there is but subsistence as pure intelligence.

1-21 When the view of many jivas is admitted and a

distinction is recognised between the bound and the
released, though on the rise of knowledge for some one,
the universe produced by his nescience is dissolved,
yet the world of differences, such as that
between jlva and the Lord, produced by the
nesciences of other persons persists. Even thus,
on the view that, like the jlva, the Lord too
is a variety of reflection, for the released one there
is but subsistence as pure intelligence, which is the
prototype (of which jiva and the Lord are reflections) ;
for, where there are reflections of one in many external

RELEASE AS ATTAINMENT OF BRAHMAN

adjuncts, on the resolution of one adjunct, it is meet
that the reflection therein should subsist as the proto-
type alone; hence, the attainment of the nature of
another reflection (i.e., the nature of Isvara) is not
possible. If that were possible, the attainment some-
times even of the nature of another reflection that is
a jiva, would be difficult to avoid; consequently there
would be the contingence of fresh bondage for the
released, as on the view of (the jiva as a) definition (of
pure intelligence). That is why on the view of many
jlvas, the view of (the jiva as a) definition is not
supported; for, when there has been release (for
intelligence) as defined in a particular way, and when
another internal organ attaches to it as so defined, there
would be contingence of fresh bondage. 7

7 This position is neither clear nor sound. The jiva is pure intelli-
gence as defined by the internal organ etc. When there is release of what
is defined by one internal organ, with that disappears the distinction of
what defines and what is defined. It is pointless to suppose that another
internal organ may attach to intelligence as defined by the internal organ
of the released jiva; for, in release, the internal organ as what defines has
disappeared, as also the jiva in the form of defined intelligence. Should
bondage result from the contact of intelligence with another internal
organ, there is no reason to hold that the jiva now bound is the one that
was released. One may say that it is the body which defines intelligence.
Because of the association of the internal organ with intelligence thus
defined, there is bondage. Though this association vanishes in release,
the intelligence defined by that same body may get associated with another
internal organ; hence fresh bondage. Such a view has at least two
defects: it applies only to jivanmukti, where the body persists and defines.
And even here, it assumes that the jiva is intelligence as defined by the
body alone, whereas it is intelligence as defined by the internal organ as
well. When this is realised, surely the jiva that is bound afresh (sic)
cannot be said to be the very jiva that was released. The view that mukti
is LSvara-bhava-'patti is restated in the Siv&dvaitanirnaya, (pp. 115-120)
where, however, this statement about the avaccheda-vada does not recur.
And by the time he came to write the Parimala, the DIksita himself seems
to have veered round to avajccheda-vada; see the last paragraph of tfce
on I, i f 4,

CHAPTER IV

4-22 On the view, however, that the jiva is a reflection,

while the Lord is in the position of the prototype and
pure intelligence is common to both, there is recognised
for the released one, until the release of all, attainment
of the nature of the Supreme Lord, characterised by
omniscience, agency in respect of all, lordship over all,
the possession of desires which come true and so on.
When there are reflections of one face in many mirrors,
on the removal of one mirror, the reflection therein
subsists but as the prototype, not as the mere face, 8
since even then the face is not rid of the property of
being a prototype, which is occasioned by the proximity
of other mirrors; similarly, when the one Brahman-
intelligence is reflected in the many adjuncts, when on
the rise of knowledge in one reflection its adjunct is
thereby resolved, it must necessarily be that that
reflection subsists as the prototype.

4*221 Nor is lordship over all, characterised by such

attributes as possession of desires which come true,
unintelligible, since for the released there is no,
nescience; for, though there is no nescience for him,
there do exist the nesciences of other persons then
bound. Truly, the Lord's lordship and characterisa-
tion by such attributes as possession of desires which
come true are not produced by His own nescience, since
He is flawless; 10 rather should all this be recognised to
be produced by the nesciences of bound persons.

8 I.e., without reflection, actual or possible.

9 These attributes are manifestations of nescience.
10 Lit., free from afljana, another name for nescience.

RELEASE AS ATTAINMENT OF ISVARA'S STATUS 401

Nor does there follow non-difference of release 4-222
from the fruit of saguna meditation, since, even. for
those who meditate on the saguna, there is declared
union with the Lord, in such texts as " As a man's
resolve is in this world, so shall he be on leaving this",
" in the respective manner in which one contemplates
that" and so on. Since for those who contemplate the
saguna there is no intuition of the impartite, there is
neither the removal of nescience nor the resolution of
individuation etc., grounded thereon ; since the obscura-
tion is not removed, there is no manifestation of
impartite bliss. For them there is equality with the
Supreme Lord in respect of enjoyment, on the principle
enunciated in such aphorisms as " With the exception of
the world-operations, (the Lord) being the topic
(where those operations are referred to) and (souls)
not being proximate (to that context)" and " And on
account of indication of equality in respect of enjoy-
ment alone "; they are also capable of creating by their
mere resolve resplendent bodies, organs, damsels etc.,
to subserve their enjoyment; yet theirs is not the un-
limited lordship, characterised by freedom in respect
of the creation, destruction etc. of the entire universe ;
to the released, however, who have attained the state
of the Lord, in all respects, 11 all this belongs; great

11 The word "nissandhibandha" is explained by the commentator to
mean "sarvatmana, wholly, in all respects". It occurs once again later,
where this idea is made clear otherwise in the sentence. The word occurs
twice, in the form "nissandhibandhana", in the Nai$karmyasiddhi
(sambandhokti to II, 18 and III, 6). The Candrika and Sarartha explain
it as "free from sublating cognition (badhaka-pratyaya-r&hita)", This is
not adopted in the present translation,

SI SI

402 CHAPTER IV

therefore is the distinction (between release and the
fruit of saguna meditation).

4-223 ]tf or i s there the contingence of fresh bondage for
the released, if they attain the state of the Lord, since
ignorance, association with misery and so on are
declared for the Supreme Lord in such incarnations as
Raghunatha ; for, that has for purport only the acting
of these (ignorance etc.,) by the Lord, like an actor, in
order to uphold the rule made by Himself as to the
non-futility of the curses of sages, and to create faith
somehow in the curse of Bhrgu etc.; 12 otherwise, there
would be conflict with the Scriptural declaration of His
being eternally released, unrestrictedly free, without
an equal or superior and so on. Therefore, on the
view that the Lord is the prototype, there is no flaw
in the released having the status of tTie Supreme Lord,
till the release of all.

4*2241 This view alone is in conformity with Scripture,

the (Vedanta-) Sutra, the BMsya etc. It is thus.
First, in the chapter on the harmony (of Scriptural

12 In the Brahmanda Purana is narrated the following story: in a
protracted battle between the devas and the asuras, the latter being hard
pressed took refuge in the hermitage of Bhrgu, where Bhrgu's wife gave
them sanctuary. Visnu who came in hot pursuit did not respect the laws
of sanctuary but killed both Bhrgu's wife and the asuras. Bhrgu who
saw this on his return was exceedingly wroth and cursed Visnu to be
born on the earth in various forms and to suffer, Hence the incarnations.
Here, we are told that Tgvara put up with the curses so that the words of
righteous indignation from his well beloved sages might not be falsified.
Ardent Saivas, however, see in this incident a proof of the inferiority of
Visnu. And Appayya takes up the same position in works like the
Rdm&yariasdrasangrahd. In such works Visnu appears not as the Saguna
Brahman, but as just inferior to him. Another proof of 8LS being an
early work of our author's]

RELEASE AS ATTAINMENT OP ISVARA'S STATUS 403

texts), there is the section " The small (ether is
Brahman), because of what follows ". Here it is
determined that the small ether mentioned in such texts
as " Now, in this city of Brahman, there is the abode,
the small lotus; small is the ether within that", is
neither elemental ether nor the jlva, but the Supreme
Lord, because of the two reasons, viz., (i) the subsequent
complementary texts which proclaim " Both heaven
and earth are contained within it ", "As large as this
ether is, so large is that ether within the heart ", " It
is the self free from sin, free from old age, deathless,
griefless, hunger-less, thirst-less, possessing desires
which come true, purposes which come true", and
(ii) the property of being the support of heavens, earth
and so on. (Then) in the discourse between Indra and
Prajapati, which comes immediately after (the teach-
ing of) the meditation on the small ether, in the words
" the self free from sin " etc., there is introduced the
self which is to be taught and is associated with the
eight qualities beginning with freedom from sin. Then
there is the teaching of the jlva who in waking is
present as the seer in the eye, as stated in the text "The
person who is seen in the eye is the self", who has
attained the dream-state, as stated in the text " He who
moves about happy in dreams, he is the self ", who has
attained the sleeping state, as stated in the text "When
a man being asleep, reposing and at perfect rest, sees no
dreams, that is the self", and who has passed beyond
the three states, as stated in the text " That serene
being, arising from this body, is manifested in his own
form, as soon as he has approached the highest light j

404 CHAPTER IV

he is the highest person. " Hence, the eight qualities
beginning with freedom from sin exist in the jiva too.
Consequently, that is not determinative of the small
ether being the Supreme Lord. For, in the recurrences
(of the teaching) "He who in dreams' 9 etc., it is said
in each recurrence " This itself I shall explain to you
further " ; hence there is no room to object that the jiva
is the content of the second and subsequent recurrences
alone, because of the express m'arks of the jiva such as
dreaming, while Brahman is the content of the first
recurrence.

This doubt being raised, it is taught, by the
aphorism "If it be said that from the subsequent
chapter (the jiva appears to be meant) that (which is
referred to there is the jiva, in so far) as its true nature
has become manifest ", that the jiva ascertained in the
fourth recurrence is that whose true nature has been
manifested through being released from all bonds, not
that tainted by the difference incidental to the state of
transmigration; for, such properties as the possession
of purposes which come true are sublated in this
(latter state) ; the m'ention of the three states is for the
understanding of their subsidiariness to the teaching of
the fourth recurrence, through the mention of their
respective defects. The aphorist, who gives this
explanation, clearly declares that for the released
(soul) expounded in the fourth recurrence there is
attainment of the state of the Lord; for, in the absence
of that, possession of purposes which come true and
go on would be inconsistent even in release; and, if the

RELEASE AS ATTAINMENT Otf IVARA'S STATUS 405

enumerated eight properties existed even elsewEere
than in the Lord, there would not be gained any answer
to the objection raised. The commentator (Sankara)
too states very clearly that for the released there is
attainment of the state of the Lord endowed with attri-
butes, in (the commentary on) that aphorism: "Hence,
that non-absolute form of the jlva, established by
nescience, tainted by the flaws of agency, enjoyership,
attachment, aversion and the rest, united to manifold
evil by the dissolution of that, what is opposed there-
to, viz., the true nature of the Supreme Lord, possessed
of the properties of freedom from sin etc., is attained
through knowledge. "

Even in the chapter showing the absence of conflict 4-2242
(among texts or with reason) 13 (it is thus). The
section "A part, because of the declaration of differe-
rence " is introduced for the purpose of establishing
the relationship of part and whole, as between the jlva
and the Lord, who are understood to be in the relation
of the helped and the helper, being respectively the
agent in various acts and he who causes the performance
of various acts, because of such texts as "He, verily,
causes those, whom he wants to lead up from these
worlds, to perform good deeds ; he verily causes those,
whom he wants to lead downwards, to perform evil
deeds ". In that there is the statement of an objection :
" If the jlva be admitted to be a part of the Lord, then,
from his experience of the miseries of transmigration,
there would be experience of misery for the Lord

13 Chapter II of the S&tras.

406 CHAPTER IV

too, in the same way as in ordinary experience, by the
pain present in thfe hand, foot or some other part, there
is experience of pain for Devadatta, of whom that is
a part; and thence, for those who have attained that,
there will result greater misery; better than that would
be the prior state of transmigration; hence, it would
follow that perfect knowledge is fraught with evil ".
By this (statement of objection) and by the answer
which accepts the non-confusion effected by the rela-
tionship of prototype and reflection, made clear in the
Bhdmatl etc., the commentator has made it clear that
for the released there is attainment of the state of the
Lord.

4-2243 Even in the chapter which deals with the means 14

(it is thus). The illusoriness of the dream-world is
established in the section: " In the intermediate
place, 15 there is creation; (Scripture) indeed declares
that". There, it being doubted if the jiva is the
creator of the illusory dream-world, the aphorist says,
in the aphorism " But by meditation on the Supreme,
that which is hidden (is made manifest) ; from Him,
indeed, proceed bondage and its opposite ", that, though
the possession of purposes which come true and so on
pertain to the jiva because of non-difference from the
Lotfd, yet, since they are obscured by the defect of
nescience, creatorship in respect of the dream-world
is not possible for him; the commentator explains the
view of that aphorism thus: " That, again, which is

14 Chapter III,

15 7.e., in dreams.

RELEASE AS ATTAINMENT OP ISVARA'S STATUS 407

obscured, is manifested in some beings alone, who,
having their ignorance dispelled by strenuous medita-
tion on the Supreme Real, attain perfection by the
grace of the Lord, just as the power of clear vision is
recovered by the potency of medicine, on the removal
of the obscuring film ; (it is) not (manifested) naturally
in all beings ". By their recognition of the manifesta-
tion of the possession of purposes which come true and
so on, (properties) which serve in the creation of
dreams etc., both these have made it clear that for the
released there is attainment of the state of the Supreme
Lord.

Even in the chapter about the fruit 16 (it is thus). 4-2244
In respect of the Scriptural text " is manifested in his
own form" whose content is the released one, there is
the desire to know in what form the manifestation is
intended to be described. In the aphorism " In the
form of Brahman (thinks) Jaimini, because of the
reference etc.," (we are told that) this is the view of
Jaimini: manifestation is in that form 1 of Brahman
(the description of which) begins with freedom from
sin, ends with possession of purposes which come true,
and includes omniscience and lordship over all, (as
seen) from the reference in " That self, free from sin"
etc., and the making known of lordly powers in " He
moves about there laughing, playing, rejoicing with
women or vehicles" etc. In the next aphorism "In
the nature of intelligence alone, that being the nature
of the self; thus (says) Audulomi ", another view is

J6 Chapter IV,

408 CHAPTER IV

introduced that, since the true nature of the self is
understood to be intelligence alone, from such texts as
"Thus, verily, this self has neither inside nor outside,
but is a mass of intelligence alone ", manifestation is
in that form alone. In the aphorism stating the final
view " Though it be thus, because of the reference to
and the existence of the qualities mentioned earlier,
there is absence of conflict; so (thinks) Badarayana ",
the aphorist says there is no conflict (between the above
two views), since, though from the view-point of truth
(the released self) is intelligence alone, yet from the
empirical view-point of the person in bondage, there
is the possibility of the above-mentioned host of proper-
ties which are understood from the reference etc., and
are wholly of Hie nature of maya, and since therefore
there is no conflict between the two Scriptural texts.
(By the aphorist who says this) and by the commenta-
tor, who interprets the three aphorisms in the sense
mentioned, it is clearly recognised that for the released
there is the attainment of the state of the Lord.

4-2245 The author of the Bhdmatl too and those whe came

after him adopt in this sense alone the group of
aphorisms supported by Scriptural texts and the above
cited statements of the revered commentator.

4-2246 Nor does it stand to reason to say of this extensive

host of aphorisms and statements from the commentary
supported by Scripture that it is an assumption for
argument's sake, in the manner stated in Sanksepar
sarlraka. ' i What the aphorist says about the embodied
one, that his lordly powers, being obscured by ignorance,

REFUTATION OP DVAITA VIEW OF RELEASE 409

are manifested by contemplation, that, for reasons
already mentioned, is stated only as an assumption
(for argument's sake)".

Therefore, since it has necessarily to be admitted 4-23
that for the released there is attainment of the state
of the Lord, the impossibility of this is itself the defect
in the view that the Lord is a reflection. Thus, the
author of the Kalpatarw says: " What is reflected in
maya is not (that which is) attained by released ones".
The same impossibility constitutes the defect in the
view of a single jiva and in the view of absolute
difference of the jiva (from the Lord).

As for what is stated by som'e dualists that 4-231
though because of difference being absolute there is not
in release the attainment of the Lord by the jiva, even
then there is the possibility of the properties of freedom
from sin etc., as for the Lord, and that thus there is
no contradiction that is absurd; if that were so, since
freedom from sin etc. would belong to the jiva (too),
they could not be distinctive marks of Brahman; hence,
there does not result an answer to the (stated)
objection; consequently, there is conflict with the
aphorism "If it be said that from the subsequent
chapter (the jiva appears to be meant) that (which is
referred to there is the jiva, in so far) as its true
nature has become manifest "; further, in the aphorism
"In the form of Brahman, (thinks) Jaimini", in the
case of (1) the qualities of freedom from sin etc. present
in the jiva, and (2) the laughing etc., mentioned by the
text " laughing, playing, rejoicing", which are
152

410 CHAPTER IV

considered even by the opponents to be the sense of the
word "etcetera" in "because of the reference etcetera"
(of the same aphorism), there would be conflict with
the mention (of these) as of the nature of Brahman.
On the view of difference, those properties being real,
there would be conflict with the recognition by the
aphorism 1 stating the ifinal view " Though it be thus "
etc., that released jivas are but intelligence alone, as
stated in the aphorism " In the form of intelligence
alone" etc.; there would also be conflict with the
section beginning with (the aphorism) "On having
approached (the supreme light), there is manifesta-
tion (of the self's own nature) " etc. There, indeed, in
the text " (He) is manifested in his own form " mani-
festation in some adventitious form is not declared;
for, there would result the futility of the words "in his
own"; of that adventitious form in which he is mani-
fested, it cannot be said that it is his own; therefore,
because of the use of the word "own" signifying one's
self, it is established that the manifestation intended to
be declared is only in one's own eternally established
form, not through some (adventitious) attribute. Fur-
ther if this freedom from sin etc. were adventitious to
the jiva in release, there would be conflict (1) with the
denial of an adventitious form in release, in (the
aphorism) "On having approached (the supreme
light), there is manifestation " etc., and (2) with the
declaration, in respect of freedom from sin etc., that
they are obscured in bondage and manifested in release,
in (the aphorisms) "But by meditation on the
supreme, that which is hidden (is made manifest) " etc..

REFUTATION OF DVAITA VIEW OF RELEASE 4H

and " If it be said that from the subsequent chapter
(the jiva appears to be meant) that (which is referred
to there is the jiva, in so far) as its true nature has
become manifest" ; hence they should be said to be
eternally established; consequently, the illusoriness of
bondage is difficult to avoid. Eternally established free-
dom from sin is, indeed, the absence of sin always. Nor
in the case of him who is in fact always devoid of sin
is there the possibility of a relation to sin or a relation
to agency and enjoyership based thereon being
absolutely real.

And thus, even non-difference of the jiva from the
Lord is difficult to avoid, since there is no reality for
the bondage which is opposed to their non-difference
taught by Scripture; and besides, the statement that
the eternally established possession of desires which
come true is obscured for the transmigrating person
would not tit in. Nor is it recognised even by the
opponents that there is, as persistent in the state of
transmigration and as having something for its sphere,
some non-futile purpose, which is (yet) obscured;
rather has it to be explained thus alone, that the Lord's
eternally established, unrestricted possession of desires
which come true, that itself is obscured in the case of
the jiva, not being presented as his, because of the non-
manifestation of non-difference from the Lord, in the
staite of transmigration; thus, it is the story of (the
carter who turned up at) the toll-house at break of
day. 17 ,

17 The story behind the maxim is that a carter, to evade paying toll,
drove off into the fields and by-ways in the Uark, but, as luck would have
it, found himself approaching the toll-house at break of day.

412 CfiAfTER IV

4.28111 Now, it may be said, freedom from sin consists
not in the absence of sin, but rather in the possession of
a power that obstructs the origination of sin, even when
one performs acts that cause sin; hence, not through
this being eternally established is there the contingence
of the illusoriness of bondage; similarly, even the
possession of purposes which come true is to be defined
as of the form of a power; 18 consequently, there is not
the contingence of non-difference from the Lord.

4-23112 so ( xve r P^y) 5 ^ 01< > ^ lei ' e i s no authority for

assuming such a souse fur the words. The power that
obstructs the generation of sin cannot 9 indeed, be
assumed for the sake of non-origination of sin, in the
stage of going round in the migratory cycle; for, at that
time, the origination of that (sin) is acceptable. That
ever after the rise of knowledge, there is non-clinging,
even because of the might of knowledge, is shown by
the aphorism " On the knowledge of this, (there are)
the non-clinging and destruction (respectively) of
subsequent and earlier sins, this being declared (by
Scripture)". Even from this, the non-clinging of sin
in release too is intelligible ; hence, the assumption of a
power is in vain. Therefore, it is established that by
those who conform to the cited Scriptural texts and
aphorisms this must be supported, viz., that, till the
release of all, released jivas attain perfectly and in all
respects that which is not opposed to their real nature
as bare intelligence, and is the state of the Supreme
Lord, that is qualified by unrestricted lordly powers

18 Which cornea into being and is not eternally established,

CONCLUSION 413

and a host of other attributes suitable thereto (all of)
which are produced by the nesciences of the persons
(still) in bondage, and is the manifestation of
unexcellable bliss.

To Ranganija Makhin, the learned preceptor, the
performer of the Visvajit sacrifice enjoined (in
Scripture), the son of the performer of the Sarvato-
mukha-maha-vrata, the devotee of Him who wears the
moon on His head, there is a son known as Appa
Diksita. (1).

He has written this compendious exposition of the
rudiments of the different final positions (of advaitins),
following Scriptural basis as well as tradition, after
having studied all the works, made clear to him by a
mere portion of the (preceptor's) constant skill in clear
exposition. (2).

If there be anything here erroneously set down by
me, in ways other than those of the (respective)
final positions, may that be looked upon with grace
by scholars skilled in the examination of right
tradition 1 X3)-.

END OF CHAPTER FOUR
OF THE ASTRASIDDH&NTALE6ASA$QRAHA.

HERS ENDS THIS BOOK.

ERRATA

Page

Lino

For

5

28

attempts

105

20

another

119

10

is

233

22

manifestated

255

24

revati-rks

265

25

if

266

29

aradupakaraka

f

30

sannipatyopakaraka

99

34

though

820

31

abda-'rthal}

334

1

to known

337

13

Sankepaarlraka

338

22

Mimaipsa

349

16

Jubala-ruti

Read

attempt
another's
in

manifested
revati-rks
of

aradupakaraka
sannipatyokaraka
through
gabda-'rthah
to be known
Sank^epagarlraka

Jabalaavuti