The siege of Charleston and the operations on the south Atlantic coast in the war amoung the states

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

THE SIEGE OF
C HARLESTON

AND THE OPERATIONS ON THE
SOUTH ATLANTIC COAST IN
THE WAR AMONG THE STATES

BY

SAMUEL JONES

Formerly Major-General C. S. A.

NEW YORK

THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY
1911

Copyright, 1911, by
The Neale Publishing Company

FOREWORD

BY THE AUTHOR'S DAUGHTER

The following brief historical study is a fragment
of a work which was intended to cover the opera
tions against Charleston from their beginning to
their consummation. The author, General Samuel
Jones, late of the Army of the Confederate States,
died before its completion and before he had reached
the consideration of his own services in the defense
of Charleston. The work is published from an un
finished manuscript left among the author's papers,
and after the lapse of a number of years. It is
offered now in the belief that it will be found of value
and interest to the student of military history.

General Samuel Jones was born December 17,
1819, at Woodfield, the plantation home of his
parents, in Powhatan County, Virginia. His father,
Samuel Jones, was a nephew and ward of Governor
William Giles, of Virginia, under whose care he was
brought up, and a graduate of Princeton College.
General Jones' mother was Ann Moseley, daughter
of Mr. Edward Moseley, of Powhatan County.
General Jones was appointed a cadet at West Point
Military Academy from Virginia July i, 1837, and
was graduated and promoted to brevet second lieu
tenant July i, 1841, and to be second lieutenant in

271097

6 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the Second Artillery September 28, 1841. His first
duty was on the Maine frontier, at Houlton, pending
the Disputed Territory controversy. He was on
duty at West Point, 1846-51, as assistant professor
of mathematics and assistant instructor in artillery
and infantry tactics. He was appointed assistant to
the Judge Advocate of the Army at Washington and
continued in the discharge of the duties of his posi
tion until he resigned his commission in the Army of
the United States April 27, 1861. On May i, 1861,
he was made Major of Artillery in the military
force of Virginia and later promoted to be Colonel.
On July 22, 1861, he was made Chief of Artillery
and Ordnance of the Army of Northern Virginia.
He served on the staff of General Beauregard at the
first battle of Manassas, and was promoted to be
Brigadier General July 22, 1861, and appointed to
the command of the brigade of General Bartow,
which had lost its gallant commander on the field of
Manassas. (The brigade consisted of the Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Georgia, and the Fourth
Kentucky Regiments of Infantry and Alberto's Artil
lery.) On January 22, 1862, General Jones was
appointed to the command of the department of
which Pensacola was the headquarters. He was pro
moted to be Major General May 10, 1862, and on
September 23, 1862, was assigned to the command
of the Department of East Tennessee. From April
to October, 1864, he was in command of the Depart
ment of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, and
from January to May, 1865, of the Department of
Florida and South Georgia. Here he made one of

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 7

the last stands of the Confederacy, and held his
position until the surrender at Appomattox.

General Jones was an accomplished soldier and
gentleman, proficient in the sciences which entered
into his military education, ardently attached to his
profession of arms, and true to its highest ideals
of conduct. In private life he possessed in a high
degree the qualities which win and keep affection and
esteem.

EMILY READ JONES.

WASHINGTON, D. C,
September 2, 1911.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I 13

Ordinance of Secession — South Carolina Secedes — Fort
Moultrie dismantled — Major Anderson transfers
command to Fort Sumter — South Carolina takes
possession of Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney —
Star of the West fired on — Dissensions in Presi
dent's Cabinet — Virginian Peace Conferences — Inau
guration of Lincoln as President — Shall Sumter
be evacuated?

CHAPTER II

Sumter to be reinforced — Batteries erected on Morris
and Sullivan Islands — General Beauregard assigned
to command in Charleston — Charleston's defenses
strengthened — Fort Sumter prepares for assault —
Beauregard demands surrender of Sumter — Refused
— Sumter fired on — War fleet unable to succor
Anderson — Evacuation of Sumter.

CHAPTER III

War in earnest — South Atlantic Coast invested — Ad
miral DuPont in command — Fleet scattered — Hilton
Head's defenses — Forts Beauregard and Walker at
tacked — Masterly evolutions of fleet — Colonel Wag
ner disabled — Fort Walker taken — Fort Beauregard
evacuated — Sherman occupies Hilton Head.

47

io THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

CHAPTER IV 61

Port Royal occupied — Panic of inhabitants — Looting
Beaufort — Tybee Island — Gunboat reconnoissance of
South Carolina waters — General Lee in command of
military department — South Carolina's military force
— Want of artillery — Scarcity of arms.

CHAPTER V 74

Confederate defense centered on Charleston — Military
districts — Sherman's broad opportunities — Capture
of Savannah planned — Delays — Fernandina occu
pied — Jacksonville and St. Augustine abandoned —
Reduction of Fort Pulaski planned — Difficulties of
approval — Fort Pulaski — Siege of Pulaski — Reduc
tion and surrender.

CHAPTER VI 87

Blockade — Lack of Confederate resources — Inferiority
of equipment — Charleston's strategic value — Invest
ment of Charleston — Charleston and Savannah Rail
road — Denfenses of railroad — James Island — Unsuc
cessful assault — Vigor of Confederate fire — Con
federate position again assaulted — Engagement at
Secessionville — Federal reports of action — Federal
Republic — Within the Confederate lines.

CHAPTER VII 117

Operations on the South Atlantic Coast — General
Hunter's policy — Expedition up the St. John's —
Capture of St. John's Bluff — General Hunter is suc
ceeded by Major General Ormesby Mitchell — Ex
pedition toward Pocotaligo — Engagement at Framp-
ton's plantation and Pocotaligo — Negro troops —
General Saxton's activities — Contraband.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON n

PAGE

CHAPTER VIII 143

Strengthening the blockade — Palmetto State and Chicora
— Blockading fleet attacked — Result of engagement
— Federal reports — Blockade raised — Foreign con
sul's report — Diversity of statements — Capture of
the Isaac Smith.

CHAPTER IX 164

The Merrimac — The monitors — Fort McAlister — Advance
on Charleston — Fort Sumter again assailed — Iron
clads in action — Result of Confederate fire to iron
clads — Report of action — Confederate loss — Review
of the engagement — Lincoln's dispatch — Feeling in
the North — Investment of Charleston postponed.

CHAPTER X 190

Federal lack of co-operation — Army and navy at odds —
Hunter and DuPont relieved of commands — Gill-
more in command of army — Dahlgren commands
navy — Topography of Charleston harbor and city
— Gillmore's plan of operations — Strength of the
defense — Attack on Morris Island — Success of move
ment — Confederate loss — Assault of Battery Wag
ner — Repulse — Loss on both sides.

CHAPTER XI 222

Battery Wagner's armament increased — Its importance
in the defense of Charleston — Attack on Federal
position — Success — Wagner again bombarded — Whole
Confederate defenses engaged — Terrific fire — Scenes
in Charleston — Suffering of the besieged — Bayonet
assault — Repulse — Confederate loss — Federal loss —
Bombardment continues.

12 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

CHAPTER XII 247

Assault of Wagner abandoned — Its reduction by siege
planned — Fort Sumter again bombarded — Siege
operations — Federal defenses — Death of Captain
Wampler — Sumter silenced — The "Swamp Angel" —
Surrender of Sumter and Morris Island demanded
— Charleston bombarded.

CHAPTER XIII 262

Resumption of operations against Wagner — Siege lines
tightened — Losses and sick list enormous — North
clamors for reduction of Charleston — Night attack
on Wagner — Repulse — Wagner bombarded — Horrors
of the siege — Evacuation of Morris Island — Con
federate loss.

CHAPTER XIV 278

Dahlgren demands surrender o f Fort Sumter — Fort
Moultrie engaged — Assault of Fort Sumter — Disas
trous result — Army and navy mutually jealous —
Obstacles in approach to Charleston — Can the harbor
be entered? — Second bombardment of Fort Sumter
— Sumter still resists — What now? — Operations
against Charleston abandoned.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

CHAPTER I

Ordinance of Secession — South Carolina Secedes — Fort Moul-
trie dismantled — Major Anderson transfers command to Fort
Sumter — South Carolina takes possession of Fort Moul-
trie and Castle Pinckney — Star of the West fired on —
Dissensions in President's Cabinet — Virginian Peace Con
ferences — Inauguration of Lincoln as President — Shall
Sumter be evacuated?

When, on the 2Oth of December, 1860, the repre
sentatives of the people of South Carolina, in con
vention assembled, passed by a unanimous vote an
Ordinance of Secession dissolving the connection of
that State with the Government of the United States,
Charleston which for a long time had been one of
the most important seaports on the Atlantic coast
of America, became a point of increased interest
and solicitude both in this country and abroad.

Of the constitutional questions involved in the act
of secession it is no part of the writer's purpose to
treat. He proposes to give with the circumstances
leading to them only a connected narrative of the
principal military and naval operations against
Charleston and on the South Atlantic coast which

i4 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

followed the secession of South Carolina and ten
other Southern States.

Immediately on the withdrawal of South Carolina
from the Union, — indeed for many weeks before the
passage of the Ordinance of Secession, — the condi
tion of the military defenses of Charleston harbor
became most naturally a question of grave import
ance. At that time Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's
Island, was the only one of the forts constructed for
the defense of the harbor that was occupied by
United States troops. It was garrisoned by Com
panies E and H of First Regiment United States
Artillery, Major Robert Anderson, of that regiment,
commanding, the aggregate force present being less
than eighty men.

When Congress met in December it was generally
understood that the convention of the people of
South Carolina which had been called to meet at
Columbia on the iyth would surely and speedily
pass an Ordinance of Secession. In anticipation of
that event the representatives in Congress from that
State called upon the President, Mr. Buchanan, and
assured him that their State would in no way molest
the forts until time and opportunity could be had
for the consideration and amicable adjustment of
all questions growing out of the altered relations
between the State and general government, pro
vided the latter would not in the meantime send
reinforcements to, or change the military status in,
the harbor of Charleston. The President declined
to give any formal pledge in regard to the course
he would pursue, but it is claimed, on what authority

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 15

need not be stated here, that he approved of the
suggestions, and that an informal understanding was
arrived at to the effect that the military status in
Charleston harbor should remain unchanged pend
ing negotiations for the amicable adjustment of all
questions relating to public property, including the
forts within the limits of the State. And to the end
that there might be no needless delay in the settle
ment of those important questions, one of the first
acts of the convention after passing the Ordinance
of Secession was to depute Mr. Robert W. Barn-
well, Mr. James H. Adams, and Hon. James L.
Orr, eminent citizens of the State, to proceed to the
city of Washington "to treat with the Government
of the United States for the delivery of the forts,
magazines, lighthouses, and other real estate, with
their appurtenances, within the limits of South Caro
lina, and also for an apportionment of the public
debt, and for a division of all other property held
by the Government of the United States, as agents
of the Confederated States, of which South Caro
lina was recently a member; and generally to nego
tiate as to all other measures and arrangements
proper to be made and adopted in the existing rela
tion of the parties, and for the continuance of peace
and amity between this Commonwealth and the Gov
ernment at Washington."

On the nth of December, a few days after the
interview between the President and the represen
tatives of South Carolina, instructions were sent
from the War Department to Major Anderson, in
accordance with the understanding claimed to have

1 6 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

been agreed on. They were in substance that he
should carefully avoid every act which would need
lessly tend to provoke aggression, and to that end
he was instructed, not without evident and imminent
necessity to occupy any position which could be con
strued into the assumption of a hostile attitude. At
the same time he was ordered to hold possession of
the forts in the harbor, and if attacked "to defend
himself to the last extremity," or, as subsequently
modified, "as long as any reasonable hope remained
of saving the fort." His force was obviously too
small to occupy more than one of the three forts in
the harbor, but an attack on, or attempt to take pos
session of, any one he should regard as an act of
hostility, and in that event he was authorized to
occupy that one of the forts which in his judgment
could be most easily defended. He was further
authorized to take this precautionary measure when
ever he might have tangible evidence of a design on
the part of the authorities of South Carolina to pro
ceed to any hostile act.

Those instructions are such as are not infrequently
given by a military superior to an inferior, when
the former has not, or does not choose to express, a
clear and distinct purpose as to what is to be done
by the latter. In such cases the instructions are so
worded as in any event to shield the one who gives,
and throw the responsibility of action on the one
who has to execute them.

It was as well known at the War Department as
to Major Anderson, that Fort Sumter could at that
time be more easily and securely held than could

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 17

Fort Moultrie. If Major Anderson had remained
at Moultrie, the weaker post, and had he been at
tacked, and his post captured, he would have been
liable to censure under his instructions. Under the
same instructions, if he abandoned the weaker and
occupied the stronger fort, he thereby became open
to censure for taking a "position which could be con
strued into the assumption of a hostile attitude."

Major Anderson was in the embarrassing posi
tion which besets a soldier "when the bugle gives an
uncertain sound." He ardently desired to avoid, if
possible, a hostile collision, and he believed — or
apprehended — that a collision would occur if he re
mained at Fort Moultrie. He was a well trained
and tried soldier, and an accomplished gentleman,
with a high and scrupulous sense of honor. He
acted as might have been expected of such an officer
so circumstanced.

On the morning of the 2yth of December Charles
ton and Washington and the whole country were
startled by the announcement that during the preced
ing night Major Anderson had dismantled Fort
Moultrie, spiked the guns, burned the carriages, cut
down the flagstaff, and transferred his little com
mand to Fort Sumter. An explanation of his course
was immediately demanded by the Secretary of War,
and as promptly given. Anderson replied that he
had reason to believe the authorities of South Caro
lina designed to proceed to a hostile act. He aban
doned Fort Moultrie because he was certain that if
attacked, his garrison would be sacrificed and the
command of the harbor lost. He had spiked his

1 8 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

guns and burned their carriages to prevent their
being used against himself; that if attacked, his gar
rison would never have surrendered without a fight;
and he had felt it to be his solemn duty to remove
his command from a fort which he could not
probably hold longer than forty-eight or sixty hours,
to one in which his power of resistance was greatly
increased. And he might have added, if it would
have been respectful, that he could hold Sumter long
enough to give the Administration time to decide
on the course it would pursue in the critical emer
gency and assume the responsibility which properly
belonged to it instead of devolving it on one of its
subordinate officers.

This act of Major Anderson produced serious
complications both in the political and military
States. The government of South Carolina, regard
ing it as a violation of the pledge, expressed or
implied, to maintain the status quo, immediately took
possession of Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney
and other public property. And the political excite
ment throughout the country was greatly heightened.

As yet South Carolina was the only State which
had seceded, and it was by no means certain that
she would not continue to be alone in that move
ment. The course of Major Anderson and the atti
tude assumed by the Government in Washington
went far toward precipitating secession in other
States. Its effect in Georgia was quickly manifested.
There was a fort — Pulaski — at the entrance to the
Savannah River which was not garrisoned, but in
the care of an ordnance sergeant. What more prob-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 19

able, judging by what had just occurred in Charles
ton harbor, than that the Government of the United
States would speedily throw a garrison into Fort
Pulaski and thus close the entrance from the sea to
Savannah in the event of the secession of Georgia?
Excitement ran high in the State, especially in Savan
nah. Governor Brown of that State had in the
previous November called a convention of the people
of the State to meet on the i6th of January, but
long before the convention could meet the fort which
commanded the approach to the chief city of the
State would be occupied by United States troops
unless step? were taken to prevent it. Assurances
came from trusted representatives in Washington
that the United States Government would resort to
coercive measures, and produced the profoundest
sensation. Notwithstanding that the State was still
in the Union and its ultimate secession extremely
doubtful, leading citizens of Savannah had resolved
to seize Fort Pulaski without waiting for the as
sembling of the convention and its doubtful action,
or for the sanction of the Executive of the State.
Somewhat more moderate counsel, however, pre
vailed, and it was agreed to await the action of the
Governor, who, on an urgent request from the
Mayor of Savannah, hastened to that city, where he
arrived on the evening of January 2. Late in the
night, and after mature deliberation, he ordered Col
onel Alexander R. Lawton, commanding the First
Georgia Volunteers, to take possession of Fort
Pulaski, "and to hold it against all persons, to be

20 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

abandoned only under orders from me or under
compulsion by an overpowering hostile force. ":

The next day Colonel Lawton, with detachments
of the Chatham Artillery (Captain Claibourne), the
Savannah Volunteer Guard (Captain Scrivin), and
the Oglethorp Light Infantry (Captain Bartow),2
numbering about one hundred and twenty-five men,
took formal possession of the fort without opposi
tion, in the name of the State of Georgia.

Fuel was added to the fire by the sailing from
New York on January 5, under instructions from
the Headquarters of the Army, of the steamer Star
of the West, with two hundred men, Lieutenant
Charles R. Wood, Ninth United States Infantry,
commanding, to reinforce and provision Fort
Sumter. The Star of the West arrived off the bar
of Charleston harbor late in the night of the 8th,
and early in the morning crossed the bar and pro
ceeded up the main channel toward Sumter, the
Union ensign flying from the flagstaff. She was
warned off by shots fired across her bow from a
battery at Cumming's Point, but, disregarding the
warning, she ran up a large United States flag at
her fore and proceeded on her course, when the fire
was directed at her, three shots striking her. The
vessel then came about and steamed away, to New
York.

'The Governor's order was in writing, and is of interest as
a part of the history of the terms. See Appendix.
'Killed at first battle of Manassas.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 21

The Cabinet was hopelessly divided in opinion.
The Secretary of State had resigned because the
President would not send reinforcements to Charles
ton, The Secretary of War, regarding Major An
derson's movement as a breach of faith with the
representatives of South Carolina, resigned because
the President would not withdraw the troops from
Fort Sumter and from the harbor of Charleston.
Startling events followed one another rapidly. In
quick succession the States of Mississippi, Florida,
Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana seceded from the
Union. A congress of representatives of those States
assembled at Montgomery, Ala., on February 4 and
inaugurated a new government, giving to it the name
of "The Confederate States of America," which
was soon joined by other Southern States.

It is difficult at this day to conceive the excitement
and anxiety that pervaded Washington city during
that eventful winter and spring. The lobbies of
the hotels and of the Capitol and the galleries of
the two houses of Congress were thronged with
eager crowds discussing, or listening to the discus
sions of, the all-absorbing question of the day. As
State after State seceded, and it was known that its
representatives in Congress would rise in their places
to announce the fact and withdraw, anxious crowds
poured into the Capitol, and long before the hour
of meeting of the houses the galleries were packed
to the extent that it was difficult to escape from them
before the adjournment, which was often far into
the night.

To no class in the country were the passing events

22 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

of more absorbing and vital interest than to the
officers of the Army and Navy who were natives
and citizens of the Southern States. They could but
watch with feverish anxiety the march of events
which they were powerless to influence, though so
nearly concerned in, and which were hastening
rapidly and inevitably to a result which most of them
unquestionably deeply deplored. Many of them,
as their States seceded, resigned their commissions
and returned to their homes in the South. Their
resignations were accepted, and they left the old
service and joined the new, unmolested by the Fede
ral authorities, no one at that day openly impugning
their honor and integrity for pursuing the path to
which, in their judgment, duty and honor prompted.

Probably the preponderance of opinion at the
time was that a disruption of the Union was inevi
table and would be effected without war — when a
Southern and Northern republic would exist side
by side for a time, but a brief time; that when party
rancor which then raged so fiercely subsided and it
should become obvious that the mutual interests of
the different sections were more potent than the
questions which unhappily antagonized and divided
them the two would come together again in a new
and more satisfactory union under one government
and one flag.

In the meantime good and patriotic men in all
sections of the country, statesmen in the better sense
of the term, as distinct from mere party politicians,
were throwing oil on the troubled waters and striv
ing with all their might to bring about an amicable

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 23

adjustment of all questions in dispute, to avert, if
possible, the calamities of war, which the course of
fanatics and party politicians in both sections, who
prized party ascendancy above the public weal, had
for years tended to bring upon the country.

To this end a Peace Conference assembled in
Washington on February 4. It originated in the
General Assembly of Virginia, which, deprecating
secession, invited the other States to send commis
sioners to meet five of her own most eminent citizens,
"to consider, and, if practicable, agree upon some
suitable adjustment of the questions which were then
rending the Union asunder." Twenty-one States-
seven slave-holding and fourteen non-slave-holding
—were represented. It was presided over by the
venerable Ex-President John Tyler, and contained
many eminent and patriotic citizens of the States
represented. A plan of adjustment was agreed upon,
which it was earnestly hoped would prove satisfac
tory to all concerned. It was reported in both houses
of Congress, but the withdrawal from that body of
the representatives of six States had left one party
largely in the ascendancy, and the plan proposed by
the Peace Conference was rejected, not without
manifestations of contempt.

President Buchanan succeeded in tiding over the
few remaining days of his administration without
bringing on a war between the States.

One of his last acts was to intimate indirectly
through a distinguished Senator — Mr. Hunter of
Virginia, to Mr. Davis, President of the Southern
Confederacy — that he would be pleased to receive

24 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

in Washington a commissioner or commissioners
from the Confederate Government, and would lay
before the Senate any communication that might be
made through them. On this invitation Mr. Craw
ford of Georgia, Mr. Forsyth of Alabama, and Mr.
Roman of Louisiana were appointed special com
missioners to represent the Confederate States in
Washington.

On the 4th of March, just one month after the
Government of the Confederate States had been
established and put in operation, Mr. Lincoln was
inaugurated as President of the United States. All
eyes were eagerly directed to the new President with
the most anxious solicitude, as to the course he would
pursue under the complicated and embarrassing cir
cumstances that surrounded him.

The representatives of the Confederacy were not
formally and officially received by the President, but
in a few days after the inauguration they were,
through the agency of two Justices of the Supreme
Court, — Justices Nelson of New York and Campbell
of Alabama, — in communication with Mr. Seward
and other members of President Lincoln's Cabinet.

The all-important question, What should be the
relations between the United States and the Con
federated States? seemed to depend on the course
which the former would pursue in regard to Fort
Sumter. If the troops were withdrawn and amicable
relations maintained, it was believed that the eight
remaining slave-holding States would remain in the
Union, and time and the efforts of lovers of the
Union throughout the whole country might develop

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 25

some satisfactory solution of the political conflict.
If, however, an attempt were made to throw rein
forcements and provisions into Sumter, thus mani
festing a purpose to coerce the States which had
seceded, a hostile collision would ensue, and some—
perhaps all — of the remaining slave-holding States
would secede and join the Southern Confederacy.
Unquestionably a vast majority of intelligent men
in the Southern States believed, without the shadow
of a doubt, that any and every State of the Union
possessed an inherent and reserved right to secede
for cause, and that it rested with a convention of the
people of the State, duly convened, to decide abso
lutely when a cause had arisen. Probably a ma
jority of the same people believed that no sufficient,
cause had at that time arisen. An attempt, however,
to coerce into the Union a State which had seceded,
thus converting a union of consent into one of force,
would be generally regarded as so radical and dan
gerous an infringement of the rights of the States
as not only to justify, but to demand, secession as
the only adequate mode and measure of redress.

Eminent gentlemen high in official position, zeal
ous in devotion to the Union, whose opinions and
counsel were entitled to weight, strongly advised the
evacuation of Fort Sumter. Among them were Lieu
tenant- General Scott, General-in-Chief of the Army,
and General Totten, Chief of Engineers.

The President, in great doubt and perplexity as
to the best course to pursue in regard to Fort Sum
ter, addressed the following brief note to the Secre
tary of War:

26 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 15, 1861.
To THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF WAR.

Dear Sir: Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort
Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?
Please give me your opinion in writing on this question.
Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

The Secretary replied that he had been most re
luctantly forced to the conclusion that it would be
unwise to make such an attempt. His opinion was
based on those of the army officers who had ex
pressed themselves on the subject, including the
General-in-Chief of the Army, the Chief of Engi
neers, and all of the officers then within Fort Sumter,
whose written opinions the Secretary embodied in
his answer. The plan proposed by Mr. G. V. Fox,
late of the navy, would, he said, be entitled to his
favorable consideration if he "did not believe that
the attempt to carry it into effect would initiate a
bloody and protracted conflict. No practical benefit
will result to the country or the Government by
accepting the proposal alluded to, and I am there
fore of the opinion that the cause of humanity and
the highest obligation to the public interest would
be best promoted by adopting the counsels of those
brainy and experienced men whose suggestions I
have laid before you."

General Scott, who six weeks previously had
strenuously opposed the evacuation of Fort Sumter
and had urged that it be reinforced, had under the
altered aspect of affairs changed his opinion. To
attempt it now would, in his opinion, require, in

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 27

addition to the means already at command, a fleet
of war vessels, — which could not be assembled in
less than four months, — five thousand additional
regular troops, and twenty thousand volunteers. To
organize such a force, even if undertaken imme
diately and without the sanction of Congress,—
which was not then in session, — could not in his
opinion be done in less than six or eight months.
uAs a practical military question," he said, "the time
for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means at hand,
had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then
a surrender under assault or from starvation has
been merely a question of time." The abandon
ment of the fort in a few weeks he regarded as a
sure necessity, and since it must be done "the sooner,
the more graceful on the part of the government."
He went further, and advised the abandonment of
Fort Pickens, at the entrance to the harbor of Pen-
sacola; and, in addition to the military reasons as
signed for this course, added the further reason that
"our Southern friends are clear that the evacuation
of both the forts would instantly soothe and give
confidence to the eight remaining slave-holding States
and render their cordial adherence to this Union
perpetual."

The same views were most forcibly presented by
General Totten, Chief of Engineers, in a memo
randum read by him before the President and Cabi
net on March 15 in the presence of General Scott,
Commander Stringham, and Mr. Fox. And again
on April 3 General Totten, impelled by a profound
sense of duty and "under the strongest convictions

28 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

on some military questions upon which great political
events seem about to turn," urged the same views in
regard to both Forts Sumter and Pickens in a letter
to the Secretary of War, in which he said: "In ad
dition to what I have heretofore said as to the
impracticability of efficiently re-enforcing and sup
plying this fort [Sumter], I will now say only that
if the fort was fitted with men and munitions it could
hold out but a short time. It would be obliged to
surrender with loss of life, for it would be bravely
and obstinately defended, and the greater the crowd
within, the greater the proportionate loss. This issue
can be averted only by sending a large army and
navy to capture all the surrounding forts and bat
teries, and to assemble and apply these there is now
no time. If we do not evacuate Fort Sumter it will
be wrested from us by force." He added in con
clusion: "Having no personal ambition or party
feeling to lead or mislead me to conclusions, I have
maturely studied the subject as a soldier bound to
give all his faculties to his country, which may God
preserve in peace."

The Hon. Stephen A. Douglas, the popular leader
of a large party whose ardent love for the Union
no one could question, had introduced in the Senate
a resolution advising the withdrawal of the troops
from all forts within the Southern Confederacy,
except those at Key West and the Dry Tortugas;
and urged its passage in an earnest speech. Deeply
as he deplored the establishment of the Southern
Confederacy, its existence de facto he declared could
not be denied, and it was entitled to the forts within

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 29

its limits. He was the leader of a party, and spoke
by authority. "I proclaim boldly/' he said, "the
policy of those with whom I act. We are for
peace."

The Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, himself im
pressed upon the President and commissioners of
the Southern Confederacy, through the agency of
Justices Campbell and Nelson of the Supreme Court,
that no attempt would be made by the United States
Government to reinforce or revictual Fort Sumter,
and that the then existing military status in Charles
ton harbor should not be changed in any way preju
dicial to the Southern Confederacy. He authorized
Justice Campbell to write, as he did, to Mr. Davis,
that before the receipt of his letter he (Mr. Davis)
would have learned by telegraph that the order for
the evacaution of Fort Sumter had been given. On
April 7, no such order having yet been given, and
certain military and naval preparations which it was
well known the United States Government was mak
ing having caused much feverish apprehension, Jus
tice Campbell addressed a letter to Mr. Seward,
asking if the assurances the latter had given him
were well or ill-founded, to which Mr. Seward re
plied: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept — wait and see."
When that last assurance was given Lieutenant Tal-
bot, of the army, and Mr. Chew, confidential mes
sengers for the War and State departments, were
speeding away to Charleston, bearing to the Gov
ernor of South Carolina and to Major Anderson
assurances that Sumter would be speedily revictualed.

The Peace Conference, and all who were labor-

3o THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

ing for peace, had failed to accomplish the purpose
so ardently desired. Other and more potent influ
ences were at work, which influences frustrated and
brought to naught all efforts to attain an amicable
adjustment of the political complications.

CHAPTER II

Sumter to be reinforced — Batteries erected on Morris and Sulli
van Islands — General Beauregard assigned to command in
Charleston — Charleston's defenses strengthened — Fort Sum
ter prepares for assault — Beauregard demands surrender of
Sumter — Refused — Sumter fired on — War fleet unable to
succor Anderson — Evacuation of Sumter.

Pending the informal negotiations for peace, plans
were devised and preparations made to reinforce
and revictual Fort Sumter. Captain G. V. Fox, late
of the United States Navy, and Colonel Lawson,
both confidential agents of the Government, had at
different times passed from Washington through
Charleston to Sumter, and returned, ostensibly for
the purpose of arranging with Major Anderson the
details for the evacuation; but really, as subsequently
appeared, to ascertain by personal observation the
practicability and expediency of reinforcing and re-
victualing the fort. Captain Fox intimated to Major
Anderson the purpose of his visit, but made no
definite arrangement with him, nor even disclosed to
him his plans. Finally on the 8th of April Lieu
tenant Talbot and Mr. Chew, the confidential agents
of the War and State departments at Washington,
arrived in Charleston with assurances for Major
Anderson, which they were not permitted to deliver,
that if he could hold out until the I2th his garrison

31

32 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

would be reinforced and supplied; and before leaving
Charleston, on the same date, they informed Gov
ernor Pickens and the Confederate general com
manding that the Government would provision Fort
Sumter, — peaceably, if possible; forcibly, if neces
sary.

The decision of the Government to reinforce and
revictual Sumter was communicated to Major An
derson in a letter sent through the mail, and dated
April 4. Replying through the Adjutant Major,
Anderson expressed great surprise at the receipt of
the information, coming as it did so quickly after
and positively contradicting the assurances which
Mr. Crawford had telegraphed he was authorized
to make. It was too late then, he said, to offer any
advice in regard to Captain Fox's plan — then in pro
cess of execution — for the relief of the fort. He
doubted the practicability of the plan, but whether
the attempt should succeed or fail, the result he was
sure would be most deplorable. He ought, he mod
estly said, to have been informed that the expedition
was to sail. On the contrary, he had gathered from
his conversation with the Government's confidential
messenger, Colonel Lawson, that the plan hinted at
by Captain Fox would not be attempted, and he con
cludes: "We shall strive to do our duty, though I
frankly say that my heart is not in this war which I
see is to be thus commenced."

On the 5th and 6th of April the Confederate com
missioners then in Washington telegraphed Mr.
Toombs, Secretary of State of the Confederate
States, that active preparations were in progress to

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 33

dispatch troops and supplies to sea, conveyed by war
vessels. It was rumored that the expedition was to
sail for San Domingo, but Charleston was believed
to be its real destination. The New York Tribune
of April ii announced that the main object of the
expedition was the relief of Sumter, and that a force
would be landed which would overcome all opposi
tion. That announcement was promptly telegraphed
to the government at Montgomery and the authori
ties in Charleston.

On the loth the Confederate Secretary of War
instructed the general commanding in South Caro
lina that if he felt confident that Mr. Chew had been
properly authorized to announce the purpose of
the United States Government to provision Fort
Sumter, he would at once demand the surrender of
the fort; and, if refused, proceed to reduce it. In
the meantime the naval expedition which had been
fitted out in New York had gone to sea and was
steaming for Charleston harbor.

Major Anderson had carried with him from
Moultrie to Sumter only about three months' supply
of food, and the garrison would of necessity capitu
late when it had consumed that supply, provided it
were not revictualed. That could only be done by
vessels passing in through one of the channels. Bat
teries had been erected along the channel shore of
Morris Island to guard the main channel, and on
Sullivan's Island to guard Maffit's Channel. Prepa
rations had also been made, with all the care and
dispatch that could be employed, for the reduction
of Sumter if, unhappily, it should become necessary

34 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

to resort to force. These preparations were of such
a nature as to leave little doubt of the speedy accom
plishment of that purpose when the emergency
should arise.

Brigadier General Beauregard, assigned to com
mand of the military forces in and around Charles
ton, entered on that duty early in the first week of
March. He made some modifications of and addi
tions to the works already constructed and in course
of construction. There were batteries at Fort John
son, an old dilapidated work on James Island, — at
and near Cumming's Point, the northern extremity
of Morris Island. Sullivan's Island was further
strengthened by mortar batteries to the east of Fort
Moultrie, and its western end by a masked battery
to enfilade the channel front of Sumter. There was
also a floating battery of long-range guns off the
western end of Sullivan's Island, designed by and
constructed under the direction of Captain John Ran
dolph Hamilton, late an officer of the United States
Navy. The guns of Fort Moultrie had been re
paired and remounted and were in readiness for
action. There were mortar batteries near Mount
Pleasant on the mainland to the northward in Christ
Church parish, and at Castle Pinckney, between
Sumter and the city. At Cumming's Point, thirteen
hundred yards from Sumter, was a battery of long-
range guns, among them the first Blakely rifle gun
ever used in this country — a present to South Caro
lina from Mr. Charles K. Prioleau, of Charleston,
which had just arrived from England. Near this
was an ironclad land battery, devised and constructed

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 35

by Mr. (afterward General) C. H. Stevens, of
Charleston, a line of ten detached batteries of two
guns each stretched along the channel front of
Morris Island. To light up the channel at night
lest vessels might attempt to enter unperceived, two
strong Drummond lights were established at suitable
points — one on Morris, the other on Sullivan's
Island. The lights were purchased in New York
and arrived in Charleston in the latter part of March
or early in April. Fort Sumter was thus encircled
by a line of batteries varying in distance from 1300
to 2450 yards, and mounting thirty guns and seven
teen mortars, in readiness for action. The batteries
were manned mainly by the First South Carolina
Regular Artillery and detachments of the First
Regular Infantry and volunteer artillery companies.
Colonel Maxey Gregg's regiment — First South
Carolina Volunteers — was on Morris Island and
had charge of the channel batteries. Colonel Peta-
grew's Rifle Regiment and the Charleston Light
Dragoons guarded the eastern part of Sullivan's
Island. General James Simons commanded on
Morris Island, the batteries there being under the
immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel DeSaus-
sure. General R. G. M. Dunovant commanded on
Sullivan's Island, the batteries then being under the
immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel R. S.
Ripley, formerly of the United States Artillery, Cap
tain Ransom Calhoun commanding Fort Moultrie.
Captain Hollanquist commanded the masked or en
filading battery near the west end of Sullivan's
Island. Captain Hamilton commanded the floating

36 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

battery of his own construction, and a Dahlgren gun
near by. Captain Martin commanded the mortar
battery near Mount Pleasant, and Captain George
S. Thomas that at Fort Johnson.

Probably no more novel military force ever before
assembled under arms for actual service than that
assembled for the defense of Charleston at that
time. The Ordinance of Secession which had been
passed by a unanimous vote of the representatives
of the people in convention assembled was sustained
with great unanimity by the mass of the people in
person, and by a lavish expenditure of private means.
Gentlemen of wealth contributed liberally to arm
and equip the volunteers who were called into the
service. Some of them placed companies and batta
lions in the field. A gentleman long past the period
of life when military service may be exacted of the
citizen, was seen walking post as a sentinel on
Morris Island. He had at his own cost armed and
equipped a company and then given the command of
it to a younger brother, serving himself as a private
in the ranks. Gentlemen, the owners of large landed
estates, served with their sons and nephews as pri
vates in the ranks, toiled with the pick and shovel
side by side with their own negro slaves in the con
struction of earthwork and in the various other
laborious work incident to life in camp in active
service.

Fort Sumter, when occupied by Major Anderson,
was in an unfinished condition, and for many days
afterwards — in the opinion of Captain (now Gen
eral) Doubleday, an officer of the garrison — might

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 37

have been easily captured by escalade. It was not,
however, the policy of South Carolina, — or later of
the Southern Confederacy, — to proceed to any
hostile act while negotiations were in progress for
the peaceable possession of the fort. The little gar
rison labored diligently in mounting guns and put
ting it in condition to secure it from assault. In a
short time forty-eight guns of calibers from twenty-
four pounds to ten-inch columbiads were mounted
and ready for action. In addition, one ten- and
four eight-inch columbiads were arranged on the
parade, to be used as mortars to throw shells into
Charleston and on Cumming's Point. The garrison
consisted of six commissioned officers and seventy-
three enlisted men. There were also three officers
and forty mechanics and employees of the Corps of
Engineers. The commissioned officers were Rob
ert Anderson, Captain Abner Doubleday, Captain
Truman Seymour, First Lieutenant Jefferson C.
Davis, Second Lieutenant Norman I. Hall, all of
the First Regiment of Artillery; Captain J. G.
Foster and Lieutenants G. W. Snyder and R. K.
Meade, United States Engineers; and Assistant Sur
geon S. W. Crawford, United States Army.

On the afternoon of April 1 1 General Beauregard
sent to Major Anderson by three of his aides-de-camp
—Captain Stephen D. Lee, Ex-Senator James Ches-
nut, and Lieutenant A. R. Chisholm — a formal de
mand for the immediate surrender of Fort Sumter,
with the offer to allow him to take from the fort all
company arms and property and all private property
— he with his officers and men to be transported to

3 8 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

any port in the United States that he might desig
nate, and to salute his flag on lowering it. Major
Anderson replied in writing, declining in appropriate
terms to comply with the demand, but said verbally
to the officers who bore the summons: "I will await
the first shot, and if you do not batter us to pieces
we will be starved out in a few days." His reply
was telegraphed to the Confederate Secretary of
War, who, seizing upon the last informal verbal
expression as opening a possible way of escape from
a resort to force, instructed General Beauregard to
inform Major Anderson that if he would designate
a reasonable time when he would evacuate the fort,
and agree in the meantime not to use his guns against
Charleston or its defenses, fire would not be opened
on Sumter,, To this offer Major Anderson replied
carefully and guardedly as to the terms, that if pro
vided with suitable means of transportation he
would evacuate the fort at noon on the I5th "should
I not receive prior to that time contrary instructions
from my Government, or additional supplies. " He
would not in the meantime use his guns against the
Confederates unless compelled to do so by some
hostile act against "this fort or the flag of my Gov
ernment by the Confederate forces or any part of
them ; or by the commission of some act manifesting
a hostile purpose against the fort or the flag." The
reply was equivalent to a refusal of the offer, be
cause General Beauregard and Major Anderson had
ample reason for believing that an expedition for
the relief of Sumter had sailed from New York and
was then within a few miles of Charleston harbor,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 39

and would not be allowed to enter if it could be
prevented. Colonel Chesnut, the bearer of the mes
sage, therefore formally notified Major Anderson,
by authority of his chiefs, that fire would be opened
on Sumter in one hour. It was then twenty minutes
past three o'clock A. M.

At half-past four o'clock on Friday, April 12,
Captain George S. James, at Fort Johnson, on an
order from Captain Stephen D. Lee, of General
Beauregard's staff, aimed and fired the first shell,
which fell, bursting, on the parade ground of Fort
Sumter.

It was the initial shot of the war, the first harsh
note of a reveille which called the gunners to their
posts, and before five o'clock the whole circle of
batteries was in active play on the majestic fort in
the center. For nearly two hours Sumter remained
silent; then about seven o'clock opened; the bom
bardment became general and continued throughout
the day. The effect of the fire on Sumter was plainly
visible. The vertical fire from the mortar batteries
was surprisingly accurate, and so effective that the
barbet guns, which were of the heaviest caliber, were
soon abandoned, several having been dismounted by
the long-range guns, and the fire from the fort was
confined to the casemate guns. Fire was maintained
with spirit and effect, and directed mainly against
Cumming's Point, Fort Moultrie, and the batteries
near and to the west of it. At night the fire from
Sumter ceased, only to husband the scant supply of
ammunition. At the commencement of the action
there were but seven hundred cartridges in the fort.

40 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

All blankets, company clothing not in use, and hos
pital bedding were cut up to be converted into car
tridge bags, and men, when not at the guns, diligently
stitched through the long day and night — with the
only six needles in the fort — in the preparation of
cartridges. The Confederate fire slackened, but
continued slowly, and, mingling with the uproar of
a storm of wind and rain which prevailed, dropped
shells on the fort at intervals of about fifteen minutes
through the night.

There was no bread or flour in the fort, and in the
gray dawn the garrision breakfasted on salt pork and
a scant remnant of rice sifted as well as practicable
from fragments of broken window glass which an
accident had mingled with it.

Early in the afternoon of the I2th three war
vessels had been seen off the bar, where they were
joined by others early in the morning of the I3th.
The presence of the fleet bearing, as was well known,
reinforcements and supplies incited both the assail
ants and defenders of the fort to increased activity.
The Confederate fire was resumed at early dawn
with greater rapidity and accuracy than during the
previous day. During the morning Lieutenant Alfred
Rhett had been firing hot shot from thirty-two
pounders in Moultrie, and with effect, as was soon
manifested.3 About eight o'clock a small column
of smoke was seen rising above the fort, and soon

3The officers' quarters had been set on fire the day before,
but the upper cisterns having been pierced by shot, the water
flooded the quarters and extinguished the fire.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 41

increased to large volume over the officer's quarters,
the roof of which had been penetrated by hot shot.
It was impossible to extinguish the flames, which
spread rapidly. The burning quarters were near the
main magazine, which it was plain would be so en
circled with fire as to make it necessary to close the
doors — if even that would prevent an explosion. All
officers and men not at the guns worked rapidly and
with a zeal quickened by the imminence of the peril,
to remove the powder, but the flames spread so
rapidly that only fifty barrels were taken out and
distributed through the casemates before the intense
heat made it necessary to close the doors of the
magazine and pack earth against them. The Con
federate fire was quickened, and soon the whole
range of officers' quarters was in flames. The wind
carried the fire to the roof of the barracks and the
hot shot dropping on the burning building increased
the conflagration, which soon spread to both bar
racks. Dense clouds of smoke and cinders were
driven by the wind into the casemates, the smoke
blinding and stifling the men and the sparks setting
fire to boxes and clothing huddled together. This
made it perilous to keep the powder which had been
rescued from the magazine at so much peril, and it
was tumbled through the embrasure into the bay.

The fire reached the magazine of grenades ar
ranged in the stairs, towers, and implement rooms,
exploding the grenades, destroying the tower at the
west gorge angle, and nearly destroying the other.
The effect of the explosion, and the direct fire on the
towers, was to damage and fill the stairways with

42 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

debris so as to render it almost impossible to reach
the terre-plein.

Amid the storm of fire from without and within
the fire from the fort was most gallantly maintained.
Filled with admiration of the pluck of the men who
stood to their guns with such indomitable will when
it seemed they were in imminent danger of being
blown skyward by the explosion of thirty thousand
pounds of powder in the magazines, many Confed
erates sprang to the parapets, and at every shot from
the fort waved their hats and loudly cheered its
brave defenders. About one o'clock the flagstaff,
which had been repeatedly struck, fell. The flag
was secured by Lieutenant Hall and hoisted on a
temporary staff by Lieutenant Snyder and two labor
ers, Hart and Dosie of the Engineers. In the inter
val between the fall and hoisting of the flag General
Beauregard dispatched three of his aides to the fort
with an offer of assistance to extinguish the fire,
which offer, however, was respectfully declined.

Seeing the flag down and believing the garrison
to be in imminent peril, Ex-Senator Wigfall — one of
General Beauregard's aides-de-camp who was with
the troops on Morris Island — with the permission
of General Simons pulled in a small boat, with one
man, Private Gourdine Young of the Palmetto
Guard, to Sumter. Being permitted to enter, he urged
a suspension of hostilities, with a view to capitula
tion. He expressed to Major Anderson the high
admiration his gallant defense had inspired in all
who witnessed it, and assured him of the most honor
able and liberal terms. Major Anderson acceded

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 43

to the proposal, naming as his terms the same that
had been offered him on the I ith, and the white flag
was hoisted. In the meantime General Beaure-
gard's aides, who had been dispatched with the
offer of assistance, had arrived, and ascertaining from
them that the visit of Senator Wigfall was not au
thorized by the general commanding, Major An
derson declared that he would immediately raise his
flag again and renew the action, but consented to
delay until General Beauregard could be communi
cated with. The brief negotiations resulted in the
capitulation of the fort a little after dark, on the
same terms which had been offered on the i ith.

With the exception of burning the quarters of the
officers and men, a disaster which would not have
occurred if they had been made originally fire-proof,
the fort had sustained but little damage. The dis
tance of the nearest breaching battery was thirteen
hundred yards, too great for effective work with the
guns then in use. The main gates had been de
stroyed, but they could readily have been built up
with stone and rubbish. The quarters were for com
fort, not for defensive purposes, and were an element
of weakness from the beginning. When they had
been burned without exploding the magazine, with
sufficient labor the fort could have been made more
defensible than it was when the action commenced.
The obstacles in the way of a longer defense were
the lack of cartridges and men. The men could
have subsisted many days on the salt pork in store
and would cheerfully have done so. But with a fleet
bearing reinforcements and supplies in full view for

44 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

twenty-four hours without making an effort to reach
the fort, there was no encouragement to the garrison
to hold out in the hope of possible relief before the
alternative of starvation would compel a capitulation.

The war steamers Powhatan, Pawnee, and Poca-
hontas, the steamer transport Baltic, and three steam
tugs had been prepared to carry succor to Fort Sum-
ter, and sailed from New York on the 9th and loth.
The Baltic, which carried the reinforcements and
supplies, the Pawnee, and Pocahontas arrived off
Charleston, w7here they found the Harriet Lane early
on the morning of the I2th. The passage had been
stormy. One of the tugs was driven into Wilming
ton by stress of weather and neither of the others,
nor the Powhatan, arrived. The sea was running
high off Charleston, and Mr. Fox waited, but in
vain, for the Powhatan before attempting to enter.
That steamer was regarded as better constructed and
equipped for fighting than any other of the expedi
tion, and carried, besides, the launches which were
to have been used to throw men and supplies into
Sumter. But it had been withdrawn from the expe
dition and its destination changed on the 7th with
out the knowledge of Mr. Fox, by the President,
at the instance of the Secretary of State. Captain
Rowan, of the Pawnee, seized an ice schooner, which
he placed at the disposal of Mr. Fox, who intended
to go in it with succor for the fort on the night of
the I3th, but before night set in the white flag was
hoisted over Sumter.

In the public mind some odium attached to the
commandery of the naval expedition for failing to

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 45

attempt to throw the reinforcements and supplies
into Sumter. The concurrent opinion, however, of
the officers within the fort and of others whose
duties required of them careful study of the situa
tion, was that any persistent attempt to accomplish
the proposed object would not only have failed, but
would have ended disastrously.

It had been agreed between General Beauregard
and Major Anderson that the Union garrison should
evacuate the fort the next day, as soon as the neces
sary preparations could be made. A steamer would
carry the garrison to any port in the United States
that Major Anderson might designate, or transfer
it to one of the vessels then off the harbor. Major
Anderson preferred the latter course.

While saluting the flag one man, Private Daniel
Hough, was instantly killed, one Private Edward
Galway mortally, and four severely wounded by the
premature discharge of a gun and the explosion of
a pile of cartridges. The Confederate commander
ordered that the unfortunate man who had been
killed should be buried with military honors, and the
wounded properly cared for. At four o'clock P. M.
on Sunday the I4.th the Union garrison marched out,
colors flying and the band playing "Yankee Doodle,"
and, embarking on the steamer Isabel, passed out
over the bar, where it was transferred to the steamer
Baltic, and sailed away for New York. As the Isabel
passed through the channel the Confederate soldiers
manifested their respect for Major Anderson and
his gallant command by standing silent and uncov
ered in front of their batteries.

46 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

Lieutenant Colonel Roswell S. Ripley, command
ing a battalion consisting of Captain Hollanquist's
company of the First South Carolina Artillery, and
the Palmetto Guard, Captain Cuthbert command
ing, succeeded Major Anderson and the two com
panies of the First United States Artillery as the
garrison of the fort. The Confederate and palmetto
flags were hoisted side by side over Fort Sumter,
and amid enthusiastic cheers saluted by the bat
teries around the harbor.

When the news of the bombardment and reduc
tion of Sumter was flashed over the telegraphic
wires the whole country was startled and electrified.
The question of peace or war which had so long
trembled in the balance was no longer doubtful.
Hostilities had commenced. This was the begin
ning of a war in which before it closed the United
States alone, in addition to a vast naval force, armed,
equipped, and brought into the field nearly three
millions of soldiers, of whom nearly, if not quite,
four hundred thousand lost their lives in the service.
How many were brought into the field by the Con
federate States, and what the loss of life, will prob
ably never be known. The knowledge has been lost
with the cause they served.

CHAPTER III

War in earnest — South Atlantic Coast invested — Admiral Du-
Pont in command — Fleet scattered — Hilton Head's defenses
— Forts Beauregard and Walker attacked — Masterly evolu
tions of fleet — Colonel Wagner disabled — Fort Walker taken
— Fort Beauregard evacuated — Sherman occupies Hilton
Head.

The theater of the war which had virtually com
menced in Charleston harbor on the I2th of April,
1 86 1, was soon transferred to distant fields in other
States, and, with the exception of a blockading fleet
off her coast, South Carolina was for many months
exempt from the presence of a hostile force. Neither
party to the contest was prepared for war. Indeed,
for many weeks after the reduction of Fort Sumter
the country was not fully awake to the fact that war
on a gigantic scale had commenced. There was a
breach in the Union, and a hostile collision — happily
without the shedding of blood — had occurred in the
harbor of Charleston. Face to face with actual hos
tilities, those in the North charged with the conduct
of affairs might, it was hoped, pause to weigh well
and count the cost of a war to coerce into the Union
the States which had seceded and further to reflect
what would be the worth of a Union of States
"pinned together by bayonets," as Mr. Greely forci
bly expressed and deprecated. The first battle of Ma-

47

48 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

nassas, or Bull Run, went far towards dispelling any
expectation of an amicable settlement of the difficul
ties, but even after that event hope was cherished
that the war would be very brief. Mr. Seward,
Secretary of State of the United States, labored dili
gently to impress on the country, and on foreign
governments through their diplomatic representa
tives, that the contest would be ended in sixty or
ninety days. In the meantime preparations for war
went forward rapidly. Early in August prepara
tions were commenced for sending a combined land
and naval expedition to some point on the South At
lantic coast. Admiral S. F. DuPont was selected to
command the naval and Brigadier General T. W.
Sherman the land forces, and the two in concert were
charged with the organization of their respective
commands.

The troops were furnished by Pennsylvania and
New York and all of the New England States except
Vermont. There were thirteen infantry regiments
organized into three brigades, and of troops not
brigaded, the First New York Engineers, Colonel
Edward W. Sewell, Third Rhode Island Artillery
(heavy), Colonel Nathaniel W. Brown, and Battery
E, Third United States Artillery, Captain John
Hamilton. The brigades were commanded respec
tively by Brigadier General Egbert L. Viele, Briga
dier General I. I. Stevens and Brigadier General
Horatio G. Wright. The organization was desig
nated as "The Expeditionary Corps" and its aggre
gate strength the day before it sailed was twelve
thousand six hundred and fifty-three (12,653).

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 49

The land and naval forces had assembled by Oc
tober 22 in Hampton Roads, Va., where it was
detained until the 29th by foul weather and the ab
sence of some of the transports. Great precaution
had been taken to keep its destination a profound
secret, and it sailed under sealed orders. Neverthe
less its destination was known to the Confederate
Government and to the commanding general in
South Carolina before it left the Capes of Virginia.
Indeed, without direct information, it could scarcely
have been doubted that it was destined for Port
Royal, S. C., which was not only the best and most
commodious port on the Atlantic coast south of the
Capes of Virginia, but best situated as a base of
operations both by land and water on the coasts of
South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.

The expedition, which consisted of fifty vessels,
sailed on October 29, Flag Officer DuPont's flag fly
ing over the steam frigate W 'abash. It was the larg
est fleet that had ever sailed under the American
flag. It had been preceded the day before by a fleet
of twenty-five coal-laden schooners, convoyed by the
sloop-of-war Vandalia, with orders in the event of
parting company to rendezvous off the mouth of
Savannah River.

When the fleet had cleared the Capes of Virginia,
much care and time were expended in forming it into
a double echelon line, and when that was accom
plished it proceeded majestically on its course. On
the morning of November 2 only one sail of all the
vast naval armament was visible from the deck of

50 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the flagship W abash. During the afternoon of the
ist rough weather set in, gradually increasing to a
heavy gale from the southeast, and in the night it
rose to a hurricane, scattering the fleet. During the
2d the weather moderated and the vessels began to
heave in sight. Of the men-of-war the Isaac Smith,
Lieutenant W. A. Nicholson commanding, one of
the most efficient and best armed steamers of her
class, had narrowly escaped foundering in the gale,
throwing overboard her entire formidable battery.
Thus relieved, she was enabled to go to the assist
ance of the steamer Governor, which was in a most
critical condition, and in imminent peril of founder
ing. The Governor had on board a fine battalion
of six hundred marines, Major I. G. Reynolds com
manding. The most strenuous and heroic efforts of
the commander and crew of the Isaac Smith to
rescue the imperiled marines failed, but later the
steam frigate Sabine, Captain Cadwallader Ringgold,
commanding, came to the rescue. Every movable
article on the Governor had been thrown overboard
to lighten her, and the Sabine succeeded in rescuing
from the wreck before it went down the crew and all
of the marines except a corporal and six privates.
Some of the transport steamers were lost and others
were saved only by throwing overboard horses and
cargoes. None of the troop transports were lost.

On the morning of the 4th the flagship and nearly
all of the fleet were off the bars of Port Royal har
bor, when, under Flag-officer DuPont's order, it was
joined by the frigate Saratoga, Captain Sardoner,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 51

of the blockading fleet off Charleston. That evening
and the next morning the war vessels and transports
passed over the bar and anchored.

The coast line of Port Royal is such as to make
it exceedingly difficult of defense by land batteries.
The headlands on Hilton Head Island to the south
ward, and Bay Point to the northward, are nearly
three miles apart. At so great a distance none but
works of great strength, armed with guns of the
heaviest caliber and longest range, could make any
formidable opposition to the entrance of a powerful
fleet. General Beauregard, relieved about the end
of May from duty in South Carolina, before leaving
had examined the coast and designated certain points
at which defensive works should be constructed. The
importance of Port Royal and the difficulties in the
way of defending it were alike obvious.1 He planned
the works for the harbor and designated their arma
ments, which it was essential should be guns of the
heaviest caliber for the water fronts. Under the
direction of Major James H. Trapier, of the En
gineers, and subsequently under the administration
of Brigadier General Roswell S. Ripley, who was
assigned to the command of the Military Depart
ment of South Carolina on the 2ist of August, the
works at the designated points were commenced, and
the construction was pressed forward with all the
means available. Major Francis D. Lee, of the South

1He advised that no attempt be made to construct works
for its defense, but yielded to the urgent representations of
the Governor of the State, with the condition that the works
should be formidable in themselves and heavily armed.

52 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

Carolina Engineers, was charged with the construc
tion of the work on Hilton Head, called Fort
Walker, and Captain Gregory of one on Bay Point,
called Fort Beauregard. They were not commenced
until late in July, and were incomplete and not armed
agreeably to the prescribed plan, because suitable
guns could not be procured. Instead of seven ten-
inch guns, as had been designated for the water
front of Fort Walker, there was but one gun of that
class. The other twenty-three guns mounted were of
lighter caliber, two of them being twelve-pounders.
Brigadier General Thomas F. Drayton, a landed
gentleman whose plantations were in the immediate
vicinity, commanded the military district in which
Port Royal was embraced. His brother, Captain
Percival Drayton, commanded the Union steam
sloop-of-war Pocahontas. The garrison of Fort
Walker consisted of Companies A and B of the Ger
man Artillery, Captains D. Werner and H. Harmes;
Company C, Ninth (afterwards the Eleventh) South
Carolina Volunteers, Captain J. Bedon, manning the
guns on the water front; all under command of
Major A. M. Huger, First Artillery, South Carolina
Militia. The flank and rear guns were manned by
detachments from Captains Bedon's, Canaday's and
White's companies, Ninth Volunteer Infantry. A
reserve was commanded by Captain White. The
entire force in the work numbered two hundred and
twenty men, the whole commanded by Colonel John
A. Wagner, First South Carolina Militia Artillery.
The whole force on the island was 687 men. Across
the channel and distant 2 5/8 miles from Fort

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 53

Walker, on Bay Point Island, was Fort Beauregard.
It mounted nineteen guns of about the same class as
those in Fort Walker, and was manned by two com
panies, the Beaufort Artillery, Captain Stephen El
liott, Jr., and Captain Harrison's Company of In
fantry. Captain Elliott commanded the fort. Com
modore Tattnall commanded three small river
steamers which a single broadside from the flagship
alone could probably have sunk.

On the 5th, while four of the Union war vessels
were reconnoitering, a few shots were exchanged
between them and the forts and Commodore Tatt-
nall's steamboats, but with little damage to either
side. On the 6th a heavy westerly wind prevailed,
making it unadvisable to attack. The morning of
the 7th was calm and bright, the water of the bay
smooth, and with not a ripple to disturb the accuracy
of fire.

Early in the morning signals from the flagship
warned the commanders of the different war vessels
more than four miles outside of a straight line
connecting the positions of the two forts to form
line and prepare for action. At the head of the
main column was the flagship W 'abash, Commander
C. R. P. Rodgers, followed in the order named by
the side-wheel steam frigate Susquehanna, Captain
I. S. Sardoner; sloops-of-war Mohican, Commander
S. W. Gordon; Seminole, Commander J. P. Gillis:
Pawnee, Lieutenant Commander R. H. Wyman; and
gunboats Unadilla, Lieutenant Commander Napo
leon Collins; Ottawa, Lieutenant Commander
Thomas H. Stephens; Pembina, Lieutenant Com-

54 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

mander John P. Bankhead; and the sail sloop-of-
war Fandalia, Commander Francis S. Haggerty,
towed by the Isaac Smith, Lieutenant Commander
J. W. A. Nicholson. The latter vessel, as has been
stated, had thrown her guns overboard in the gale.
In the flanking column and little more than a ship's
length distant, were the Bienville, Commander
Charles Steadman leading; the gunboats Seneca,
Lieutenant Commander Daniel Ammen; Penguin,
Lieutenant Commander P. A. Rudd, and the Au
gusta, Commander E. G. Parrott.

Flag-officer DuPont's plan of action, carried out
with much precision, was to lead his main column —
the different steamers something more than a ship's
length apart — on an elliptical course, passing up the
main channel at the distance of about eight hundred
yards from Fort Walker, delivering their fire on that
fort as long as the guns could be trained upon it;
then turning seaward and approaching to within
about six hundred yards, again deliver fire as long
as the guns could be brought to bear. The operation
was to be continued until the fort should be silenced.
The flanking column delivered its fire on Fort Beau-
regard while passing up, then directed its attention
to Commodore Tattnall's little river boats, which
had steamed out of Beaufort River to take part in
the action. The Flag-officer cautioned the com
manders of his gunboats that he knew Tattnall well
as an officer of courage and capacity, and it was
highly probable that in the heat and smoke of battle
he would endeavor to pass out and destroy the trans
ports on which was General Sherman's Expedition-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 55

ary Corps. If he attempted it, his steamboats must
be destroyed. Tattnall's puny fleet was soon driven
off, however, and took shelter in Skull Creek to the
northwest. The gunboats then took favorable posi
tions to the northward of Fort Walker, and while
the main column moved slowly and majestically on
its prescribed course, delivering a direct fire, the
gunboats poured in a most destructive flank fire, all
the more effective because the fort had not been pro
vided with traverses. Later in the action the Poca-
hontas, Commander Percival Drayton, which had
been delayed by injuries received in the gale, steamed
into the harbor and taking suitable position opened
on Fort Walker.

The majestic fleet continued to move on its course
and deliver its fire with the regularity of machinery,
and the skill and deliberate coolness of the officers
and gunners, the weight and excellence of the arma
ments, and the glossy smoothness of the water, made
the fire wonderfully accurate and destructive.

It was a most unequal conflict. The contrast be
tween the batteries engaged was very marked. The
fleet carried 150 guns, many of them of the heaviest
and most approved pattern then in use; the ammuni
tion and equipments were perfect of their kind, and
the officers and men who directed and worked them
were engaged in their legitimate occupation, to which
they had been thoroughly trained. There were
twenty guns of much lighter caliber mounted in Fort
Walker, — against which the attack was mainly di
rected, — many of them hastily mounted on impro-

56 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

vised carnages, not adapted to the guns, after the
fleet appeared off the harbor, and the ammunition
was defective. The manufacture of heavy ordnance
and ammunition was almost an unknown industry in
the South prior to the war. Probably there was not
a man in Fort Walker who had been trained to the
use of heavy guns. The commanding officer himself
aimed and fired the first gun, and owing to defective
fuse the shell burst near the muzzle. Some ammu
nition did not fit the guns, — the shells could not be
driven home, — but they were nevertheless fired, with
more risk to those who worked them than to those
at whom they were aimed. The ten-inch gun, the
heaviest and only one of the kind in the fort
bounded from its carriage at the fourth or fifth dis
charge, and was useless during the remainder of the
action. The twenty-four-pounder rifle was choked
while ramming down a shell, and lay idle during the
engagement. There was no gun on the flank to
reply to the gunboats near the mouth of Fish Hall
Creek, the thirty-two pounder on the right flank
having been shattered by a shot early in the action.
The inexperienced gunners at these very defective
batteries were firing at steamers constantly in motion,
and often beyond effective range of the guns.

General Drayton crossed over to Hilton Head
early in the morning of the 5th, and assumed the
general direction of affairs. Captain Stewart's Com
pany of the Ninth South Carolina Regiment, which
occupied a battery at Braddock's Point, the extreme
southern point of the island, was ordered up to rein
force Captain Elliott at Battery Beauregard. But

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 57

the order miscarried, the company did not move
until the 7th, and its passage to Beauregard was
intercepted by the Union gunboats. Late in the
afternoon of the 6th 450 men of the Georgia In
fantry, Captain Berry commanding, and Captain
Read's Battery of two twelve-pounder howitzers and
50 men arrived. They had been sent by Brigadier
General Lawton to reinforce the troops on Hilton
Head. A little later Colonel DeSaussure's Regi
ment, the Fifteenth South Carolina Volunteers, 650
strong, arrived at Seabrook's Wharf on Skull Creek,
and passed over to within supporting distance of
Fort Walker. There were therefore on Hilton
Head on the 7th about 1450 men, 220 of whom were
in Fort Walker. They were there to defend the
island against the Union fleet manned by full com
plements of men, and carrying 150 guns, a battalion
of 600 marines, and General Sherman's Expedition
ary Corps of 12,653 — aggregate. The action com
menced about nine o'clock in the morning and con
tinued about four and a half hours. A few minutes'
fire of the fleet convinced the most sanguine in the
fort that the contest was, for them, hopeless; the
fight was continued simply as a point of honor.
About eleven o'clock General Drayton carried Cap
tain Read's artillery company to the assistance of
the men in the fort, who, from excessive labor for
several days and during the action, were greatly
exhausted. Between twelve and one o'clock Colonel
Wagner, commanding the fort, was disabled by a
fragment of a shell, and was succeeded by Major
Huger. Soon after one o'clock but three guns were

58 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

in serviceable condition on the water-front, and the
ammunition was nearly exhausted. The order was
given to stop the hopeless struggle and abandon the
fort. Captain Harmes, with three gun detachments,
was left to maintain a show of resistance by a slow
fire from the three serviceable guns, while the
wounded were carried to the rear. The garrison
then abandoned the fort, gained their supports, and
the whole, including Colonel W. H. Stiles' Georgia
Regiment, which had just arrived, retreated hastily
from the island. The flight of the garrison was
seen and reported "from the tops," when the flag-
officer dispatched Commander John Rodgers on
shore with a flag of truce. Rodgers, finding that the
fort had been abandoned, at 2 :2O hoisted the Union
flag on the deserted fort. A little later Commander
C. H. P. Rodgers was ordered ashore with a detach
ment of seamen and marines, and took possession
of the work.

General Sherman and his corps from their trans
ports were spectators of the action, in which they
took no part. A great part of the General's means
for disembarking his command had been lost during
the storm at sea. When the action was over the
troops commenced landing, and the fort was turned
over by Commander Rodgers to General H. G.
Wright, whose brigade was the first to disembark.
No attempt was made to pursue the retreating Con
federates, who did not leave the island at Ferry
Point on Skull Creek until half-past one o'clock the
next morning. Flag-officer Tattnall's steamboats,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 59

after aiding in ferrying the troops across Skull
Creek, proceeded to Savannah by the inland passage.

Comparatively little attention had been given by
the fleet to Fort Beauregard. It was an easy prey
after Fort Walker was taken. The inability of the
forts to protect the harbor against the fleet had been
made manifest, and any attempt longer to hold Bay
Point would not only have been futile, but in all
probability would have resulted in the capture of
the whole force on the island. Colonel Donovant
therefore ordered Captain Elliott to evacuate the
fort, and all of the troops on the island retreated
during the afternoon and night to Beaufort, by a
narrow trail known to but few, across Edding's
Island, which is little more than an impenetrable
marsh. Nothing but what the men carried on their
persons could be taken over such a trail. The re
treat was effected without the knowledge of the
enemy, or it might have been cut off by gunboats
passing up Beaufort River and Station Creek to
Jenkins' Landing and White Hall Ferry. The Con
federate loss on Hilton Head was eleven killed and
thirty-five seriously wounded, and in Fort Beaure
gard Captain Elliott and twelve men were badly
wounded. In the fleet eight were killed and twenty-
three wounded.

General Sherman completed the disembarkation
of his corps on the 8th, the greater part landing on
Hilton Head, where the construction of an extensive
intrenched camp was commenced and pressed for
ward rapidly to completion. Engineer officers made
reconnoissances of the island for the location of such

60 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

defensive works as might be needed to make it a
secure base of operations. At Braddock's Point, on
the southern extremity of the island, one lo-inch
gun, two 5^ -inch rifles, and two 12-pounder howit
zers were found, which were designed for a battery
in the course of construction at that point.

CHAPTER IV

Port Royal occupied — Panic of inhabitants — Looting Beaufort —
Tybee Island — Gunboat reconnoissance of South Carolina
waters — General Lee in command of military department —
South Carolina's military force — Want of artillery — Scarcity
of arms.

If evidence were needed to show that the States
which first withdrew from the Union did not con
template a war of coercion as one of the first conse
quences of secession, none more conclusive could be
presented than the defenseless condition of those
States when the war commenced. For it is inconceiv
able that intelligent men charged with the conduct
of public affairs would have plunged their States, so
unprepared, into so unequal a war. However well
assured they may have been of the right of a State
to withdraw from the Union, or however strong may
have been their convictions that separation from the
Northern States would contribute greatly to the
prosperity and happiness of their own States, they
would surely have deferred the practical assertion
of the right of secession until they had made some
adequate preparation for the maintenance of their
independence. They had no navy, and no means of
building up one of sufficient strength in time to be of
any avail in the defense of hundreds of miles of sea-
coast — a seacoast which was undefended by forts

61

62 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

and therefore was thus at the mercy of a hostile
naval power.

The occupation of Port Royal by the land and
naval forces of the United States was a fatal blow
to the domestic and social institutions and life of that
section of country. It at once reduced the planters
of that region from affluence to poverty, a sudden
reverse of fortune for which their easy and luxurious
mode of life for generations had peculiarly unfitted
them.

For many miles inland the South Atlantic coast is
penetrated and intersected by innumerable bays, tor
tuous rivers, creeks, and bayous, which were navi
gable by steamers of considerable capacity and draft.
The arable land of the islands formed by those
water-courses is very fertile, producing various crops
in abundance, especially the finest sea island cotton
in the world. These lands were generally owned in
large plantations by gentlemen to whom they had
descended from father to son for several genera
tions, and were cultivated by negroes who had been
inherited with the land on which they lived.

Probably no class of people ever lived in greater
luxury and ease than the proprietors of the sea
islands and adjoining plantations on the mainland.
The waters teemed with shell and other fish in great
variety and excellence, and in season were covered
with innumerable water fowl. Deer, wild turkeys,
and other game were abundant on the islands, and
all requisites for comfortable and luxurious living
which the land and water did not produce in kind
were procurable from the proceeds of the cultivated

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 63

crops. The commodious residences of the planters
were generally surrounded by extensive grounds,
shaded by stately oaks, magnolias, and other forest
trees gracefully festooned with the long gray hang
ing moss, and adorned by a lavish wealth of vines,
shrubs, and flowers which in that mild climate grow
in a profuse luxuriance unknown in colder regions.
Many of the houses were models of comfort and
luxury, adorned with works of art and well-selected
libraries, — and served by retinues of well-trained ser
vants — in all respects suitable residences for the re
fined and cultivated proprietors, generally educated
gentlemen who divided their time between the man
agement of their estates and the direction of political
affairs, enlivened by field sports and in dispensing
the generous hospitality which was characteristic of
their order.

The occupation of Port Royal exposed the whole
of the region of country to the invaders, whose gun
boats and transports could penetrate through all the
ramifications of the watercourses to the very doors
of planters' residences. The planters and their sons
capable of bearing arms were generally in the army,
their wives and children residing on their estates in
the accustomed confident security, surrounded by the
numerous plantation and house servants, fearing
nothing from them while their moral influence and
restraint remained undisturbed. The appearance of
the Union gunboats produced the wildest panic in
those communities — homes were hastily abandoned
by their white inhabitants, the women, flying from

64 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

perils worse to them than death, left their luxurious
homes to the pillage of bands of demoralized
negroes.

The day after landing at Hilton Head General
Sherman reports to the Adjutant General: "The
effect of this victory is startling. Every white inhabi
tant has left the island. The wealthy islands of
Saint Helena, Ladies' and most of Port Royal are
abandoned by the whites, and the beautiful estates
of the planters, with all their immense property, left
to the pillage of hordes of apparently disaffected
blacks, and the indications are that the panic has
extended to the fort on the north end of Reynolds'
Island commanding the fine anchorage of Saint
Helena Sound."

The "hordes of blacks" had not a monopoly of
the pillage of the "immense property left on the fine
estates"; opportunities and temptations to pillage
were too many and strong to be resisted. They recall
the temptation that beset the early British conquerors
of Bengal when the victory of Plassey placed the
untold treasures of Moorshedabad at their disposal;
and Lord dive's famous exclamation when defend
ing himself in the House of Commons for the share
he received of the treasures of that magnificent capi
tal, "By God, Mr. Chairman, at this moment I stand
astonished at my own moderation." In a short time
there was little of value left on those plantations.

Three days after landing General Sherman was
constrained to issue a general order rebuking some
of his officers and men for their active participation

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 65

in the pillage, and instructing his brigade and other
commanding officers to suppress all such depreda
tions.

About fifteen miles above Bay Point was the beau
tiful town of Beaufort — a town of private residences
belonging to the wealthiest planters on the islands.
The town was noted for the beauty and elegance of
its private residences and grounds, and nowhere in
South Carolina, or in any other State, was there a
more refined, cultivated, and hospitable community.
On the 8th the gunboats Seneca, Penguin, and Pern-
bina steamed cautiously up Beaufort River, with
orders from Flag-officer DuPont, if fired on from
batteries, as it was supposed they would be, to retire
out of range and notify the flag-officer, that a proper
force might be sent to reduce the works. But there
were no batteries on the river-banks, and when the
gunboats came in sight of the town a few horsemen
were seen riding away. There was not a white
person in the town, which swarmed with negroes
frantically plundering the luxurious residences and
carrying away their costly booty in every boat or
other conveyance they could lay their hands on.

The negroes left on the islands soon became
objects of solicitude and embarrassment to the Union
general commanding. They dearly loved and luxu
riated in idleness, and when freed from the control
and direction of their masters freely indulged their
natural propensity. Comparatively few of them
came into the military posts, and to the surprise of
the industrious and thrifty troops from New Eng
land, they manifested little inclination to work regu-

66 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

larly for wages. So long as they could procure food
they preferred to remain in idleness at their old and
often devastated homes. Many of those who came
into the posts and engaged to work, tired of it and
escaped back to their old haunts. Proverbially im
provident and accustomed all their lives to being
cared for and supplied with the necessaries of life
by their masters, they naturally looked to the white
people who had come among them for food and
clothing. Common humanity required that they
should not be allowed to starve, and it was plain
that they would soon be a heavy tax on the commis
sary and quartermaster's departments. To relieve
the Government of such a burden and make the
negroes self-sustaining, General Sherman divided the
part of the country under his control into districts
of convenient size for efficient supervision, over each
of which he purposed to appoint an agent or over
seer to organize the negroes and direct them in
working the plantations. All of the horses and
mules having been carried off, and most of them
appropriated to the use of the United States Gov
ernment, it was necessary to procure others, and
the Secretary of the Treasury, having regard to the
interest of the government in the cultivation of cot
ton, called on the Secretary of War to furnish the
necessary teams.

While the land forces were engaged in short
reconnoissances of Hilton Head and other neighbor
ing islands, and making themselves secure and com
fortable in their newly acquired positions, most of
the naval vessels were sent to the various blockading

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 67

stations, and the lighter draft gunboats were sent off
to reconnoiter the country bordering the inland navi
gable waters up and down the coast. Commander
Percival Drayton, a native of that part of the
country, went northward toward Charleston in the
Pawnee, accompanied by the Pembina and the
steamer Vixen of the Coast Survey. His knowledge
of the country well fitted him for the duty, and he
was accompanied by Captain Boutelle, whose long
service in that quarter on coast survey duty had
given him accurate knowledge of the watercourses
and the positions of the residences of planters, where
he had often been a welcome guest. On Otter Island
at the entrance to Saint Helena Sound they found a
deserted field-work. This was deemed an important
point, and Flag-officer DuPont undertook to guard
it until some of the land forces could occupy it.
Going up the Coosaw River another abandoned
field-work was found near the mouth of Bamwell
Creek. Ascending the Ashepoo about four miles,
another abandoned earthwork was found. A little
later the same commander ascended the last men
tioned river to the mouth of Mosquito Creek, where
the inland navigation to Charleston commences, and
landing on Hutchinson Island found, that the barns
and other outhouses had been burned by the owners
on the approach of the gunboats. No white person
— only some negroes — were found on the island.

Extending his reconnoissance, he went into North
Edisto. Quite an extensive line of abandoned earth
works was found on Edisto Island. Learning from
some negroes that there was a Confederate camp

68 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

at Rockville, a pretty village on a river bluff on
Wadmalaw Island, a few miles from Edisto, Com
mander Drayton approached in the Fixen, followed
by the gunboats. The camp was occupied by a batta
lion of 292 men, of Colonel John L. Branch's Rifle
Regiment, Colonel Branch commanding. On the
approach of the gunboats Colonel Branch withdrew
his battalion beyond range. Fifty marines and
sailors were landed at the wharf, where there was
no sign of life. The camp, which was about a mile
distant, had been abandoned, Colonel Branch appre
hending that if he did not withdraw his command it
would be cut off from escape to Johns' Island, and
captured.

Commander John Rodgers in the Flag, accompa
nied by the Seneca and Pocahontas, reconnoitered
Tybee Island at the mouth of the Savannah, and
receiving no reply to his fire on the earthworks, dis
covered that they, too, had been dismantled and
abandoned. This point also that flag-officer deemed
of sufficient importance to be held by the navy until
General Sherman could find it convenient to occupy
the island with a part of his troops.

Commander C. R. P. Rodgers examined Warsaw
Sound, Wilmington River, Ossabaw, Ogeechee, and
Vernon rivers. A fort on Warsaw Island was found
to have been dismantled and abandoned. A few
miles up Wilmington River an occupied work was
found, and another on Green Island, commanding
Vernon River, the Little Ogeechee, Hell Gate, and
the passage from Vernon River into the Great
Ogeechee. This fort indicated that it was occupied,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 69

by throwing a couple of shells at very long range at
the gunboats, the first sign of opposition they had
encountered since the bombardment of Forts Walker
and Beauregard.

Before Christmas the inland waters had been ex
amined by the navy from the Stono to Ossabaw
Sound, and the only occupied works were at those
extreme points of that line of coast. The plantations
visited presented pictures of destruction and desola
tion. The appearance of Commander Drayton's
boats in the vicinity of a plantation was generally a
signal to the master or his agent to apply the torch
to his cotton houses, to prevent that valuable crop
from falling into the hands of the enemy. The
reconnoisances were made in the latter part of No
vember and late into December. If they had been
made earlier the armaments of some of the aban
doned works might have fallen into their hands.

When it was known in Richmond that the fleet
and expeditionary corps had arrived at Port Royal,
an order issued from the War Department, Novem
ber 5, constituting the coast of South Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida a military department, and
assigning General Lee to the command. That officer
hastened to his new field of duty and assumed com
mand under most discouraging circumstances. He
went immediately to Coosawhatchie, the nearest
point on the Charleston & Savannah Railroad to
Port Royal Ferry, and on the afternoon of the 7th,
while riding to Hilton Head, met General Ripley
and learned from him that the Confederate troops
were retreating from Forts Walker and Beauregard

70 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

and the enemy in complete possession of that the
finest harbor on the coast. It was plain that posses
sion of that important harbor gave the enemy control
of the inland navigation and all of the islands on the
coast, and most seriously threatened both Charles
ton and Savannah. His sloops-of-war and large
steamers could ascend Broad River to Mackay's
Point, the mouth of the Pocotaligo, less than ten
miles from the Charleston & Savannah Railroad;
his gunboats could ascend some miles up both the
Coosawhatchie and Pocotaligo rivers, and smaller
boats could ascend still further toward the road.
There were no guns in position to resist the power
ful naval batteries, and there was no recourse left to
General Lee but to prepare to meet the enemy in
the field, and if the enemy should move forward
with the promptness and vigor which the number
and capacity of the war vessels and transports then
in Port Royal harbor indicated he was capable of
throwing into his campaign, the prospects of meet
ing him successfully in the field were exceedingly dis
couraging.

On retreating from Hilton Head General Thomas
F. Drayton halted his command of less than a thou
sand men at Bluffton, about eleven miles from Fort
Walker. The Georgia troops which had joined him
the day before continued on to Savannah. Colonel
Donovant, after crossing his command of six or
seven hundred men to the mainland at Port Royal
Ferry, was halted at Garden's Corner, a mile or so
on the road to Pocotaligo. Neither of these com
mands had brought anything with them except their

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 71

arms from the islands, and were in very destitute
condition. Colonel Clingman's regiment of North
Carolina volunteers, six companies of Colonel Ed
wards' infantry, and Colonel Martin's cavalry regi
ment, — the two last of South Carolina volunteers, —
were at and near Coosawhatchie. There was no
field artillery. The whole force from Charleston to
the Savannah River was less than four thousand
men. On November 19, two weeks after the Union
forces had arrived in Port Royal harbor, the Gov
ernor of South Carolina reported to General Lee
that there were 13,100 South Carolina troops in the
State. That was probably the number down on the
rolls, and small as it was greatly exceeded the num
bers present for duty. That force was distributed
from Georgetown to Hardeeville, S. C., a distance
of about 175 miles. Over about half of the distance
only was there railroad communication. A large
proportion of this force was necessarily held in the
works for the defense of Charleston.

On November 10 General A. R. Lawton, com
manding in Georgia, reported to General Lee that
he had only about 5500 troops, 2000 of them under
General Mercer, near Brunswick. The remainder
were between the Altamaha and Savannah, and all
but 500 of them within twenty miles of the latter
city. Of his whole force but 500 were cavalry, and
there were but three field batteries, very scantily sup
plied with horses.

As late as December 24 General Lee, writing to
Judge Magrath, President of the State Convention
(about to assemble), in regard to the preparations

72 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

for the defense of the State, says: "I have not been
able to get an accurate report of the troops under
my command in the State. I hope it may be as large
as you state, but I am sure those for duty fall far
short of it. For instance, DeSaussure's brigade is
put down at 3420 men. When last in Charleston
(the day I inquired) I was informed that in one
regiment there were no men for duty in camp on
the race course, and in the other about 200. Colonel
Branch, I am told, had only about 200 men with him
at Rockville, though I have had no official report of
his retreat from there. The companies of mounted
men in the service are very much reduced. The
Charleston Light Dragoons and Rutledge Mounted
Rifles have about 45 men each. The companies of
Colonel Martin's regiment are very small. One of
them, Captain Fripp's, reports 4 commissioned offi
cers and 19 privates. It is very expensive to retain
in service companies of such strength, and I think
all had better be reorganized. I have only on this
line [the letter was written at his headquarters at
Coosawhatchie] for field operations Heyward's, De
Saussure's, Dunovant's, Jones', and Edwards' regi
ments from South Carolina and Martin's cavalry.
General Ripley writes that Elford's and Means'
regiments are poorly armed and equipped, and at
present ineffective, and that the organization of the
troops thrown forward on James Island is so brittle
that he fears it will break. The garrisons at
Moultrie, Sumter, Johnson, and the fixed batteries—
the best and most stable of our forces — cannot be
removed from them; neither can those at George-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 73

town, and should not be counted among those for
operations in the field. You must not understand
that this is written in a complaining spirit. I know
the difficulties in the way, and wish you to under
stand them, explain them to the Governor, and, if
possible, remove them. Our enemy increases in
strength faster than we do. Where he will strike
I do not know, but the blow, when it does fall, will
be hard."

To General Ripley he writes: "Unless more field
artillery can be obtained, it will be almost impossible
to make head against the enemy should he land in
any force."

The scarcity of arms which existed from the be
ginning to the close of the war was manifested by
the urgent and repeated appeals of the Governors
of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida to General
Lee, the Secretary of War and the President, for
ten thousand Enfield rifles brought by the blockade
runner Fingal, Major Anderson commanding, which
succeeded in running into Savannah on November 13.

CHAPTER V

Confederate defense centered on Charleston — Military districts —
Sherman's broad opportunities — Capture of Savannah
planned — Delays — Fernandina occupied — Jacksonville and
St. Augustine abandoned — Reduction of Fort Pulaski
planned — Difficulties of approval — Fort Pulaski — Siege of
Pulaski — Reduction and surrender.

At Port Royal — a central position as regards this
long and insecurely guarded Confederate line —
General Sherman had in hand a compact and thor
oughly equipped body of about 13,000 men, and
there was present, besides, a fine battalion of 600
marines. The co-operating fleet in the harbor could
cover a landing within five or six mites of Coosaw-
hatchie, or at almost any other desirable point on
the coast. Luckily, — or unluckily as it may be re
garded, — for the Confederates the Union general
seems to have regarded his position as one in which
it behooved him to move with great deliberation and
caution.

After inspecting the batteries and posts from
Charleston to Fernandina, Fla., General Lee directed
all guns to be withdrawn from the less important
points and employed in the defense of Charleston,
Savannah, and the entrance to Cumberland Sound
and Brunswick, Ga. The attempt to hold the en
trance to Cumberland Sound was soon abandoned,

74

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 75

and the general's plan of defense was restricted to
holding the two most important points, Charleston
and Savannah, the line of the railroad between those
two cities, and the country between it and the sea
islands. Other points, such as Georgetown, S. C.,
Fernandina, Jacksonville, and Saint Augustine were
held, but not in force or with any expectation of suc
cessfully defending them against a formidable and
persistent attack., For the better administration of
his extensive department, the coast of South Caro
lina was divided into five military districts, as fol
lows:

The First, extending from Little River Inlet to
South Santee River, under command of Colonel
Arthur Middleton Manigault; headquarters, George
town.

The Second, from the South Santee to the Stono
River and up Rantowles Creek, embracing Charles
ton and its harbor, under command of Brigadier
General Roswell S. Ripley; headquarters, Charles
ton.

The Third composed the country between the
Stono and Ashepoo rivers, under command of Briga
dier General N. G. Evans; headquarters, Adams
Run.

The Fourth extended from the Ashepoo to Port
Royal entrance, thence through Colliton River and
Ocala Creek, Ferebeville, under command of Briga
dier General John C. Pemberton; headquarters, Coo-
sawhatchie.

The Fifth embraced the country between the last
named boundary and the Savannah River, under

76 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

command of Brigadier General Thomas F. Dray-
ton; headquarters, Hardeeville.

Brigadier General A. R. Lawton remained in
command in Georgia, and Brigadier General James
H. Trapier commanded in middle and east Georgia.
On Generals Lawton and Ripley devolved the re
sponsibility of defending Savannah and Charleston,
and under direction of the department commander
they pushed forward the several defensive works
with all possible haste.

The field for military operations opened to Gen
eral Sherman was so extensive and its possibilities so
many that he seems to have been bewildered. He
could not decide definitely at what point to strike,
and his perplexity was heightened by the exaggerated
reports he received, and believed, of the number of
troops he would have to encounter whenever he
should move against the enemy. Thus he writes in
November that the main body of the Confederate
force was at Pocotaligo, another large body collect
ing at Grahamville, and still others between the
latter place and the Savannah River, with their ad
vance post at Bluffton, whereas, as has been stated,
there were not more than 4000 troops between
Charleston and the Savannah River; again that his
latest news confirmed what he had previously ascer
tained, that there were 20,000 troops in and about
Savannah, among them two regiments of cavalry
and four field batteries; and later he writes to Gen
eral McClellan that he had information that there
were "about 65,000 in and about that city, which is
well fortified both on the land and river sides. They

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 77

are moving heaven and earth for a secure defense."
His own judgment was that upon the whole it would
be best to attack and capture Savannah. Recon-
noissances made by engineer officers had early de
veloped the fact that it was practicable to pass gun
boats by inland navigation into the Savannah River
by the left bank at two points, one being two, and the
other six miles above Fort Pulaski, and that the
river might also be entered above the fort from the
south by Wilmington River and St. Augustine
Creek. General Sherman desired to utilize these
inland passages to move a combined land and naval
force up the river and take the city by a coup-de-
main. Admiral DuPont was, however, unwilling to
risk his gunboats through the intricate passages into
the river without a more thorough examination.
Then the General proposed to capture the city by
siege, if necessary, but before he could make any
aggressive move he needed additional troops and
transportation. First he asked for a regiment of
cavalry, one of regular artillery, ten regiments of
infantry, and a pontoon train; and later asked for
twenty regiments of infantry. Reinforcements were
sent to him from time to time, until at the end of
February he had an aggregate force present of
17,875 men. The most favorable season for opera
tions in that locality passed, however, without any
important move, and in the meantime the Confed
erates profited by the delay to strengthen their lines
and increase their force. Every day's delay made
the capture of Savannah more difficult, until Gen
eral McClellan, general-in-chtef of the army, wrote

78 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

to General Sherman discouraging a siege of the
city, and advising that the preparations for the
reduction of Fort Pulaski be pushed forward to
completion.

"I am forced to the conclusion," he says, "that
under present circumstances the siege and capture
of Savannah do not promise results commensurate
with the sacrifices necessary. I do not consider the
possession of Savannah worth a siege after Pulaski
is in our hands. But the possession of Pulaski is of
the first importance. But, after all, the greatest
moral effect would be produced by the reduction of
Charleston and its defenses. There the rebellion
had its birth; there the unnatural hatred of our
Government is most intense; there is the center of
the boasted power and courage of the rebels."

The capture and occupation of Fernandina, Fla.,
had long been one of the purposes which the Expe
ditionary Corps should accomplish, but had been
delayed from time to time awaiting, it would seem,
naval co-operation. About March i Brigadier
General H. G. Wright's brigade sailed for that
place, accompanied by Admiral DuPont and his
fleet. In the meantime the capture of Fort Donelson
and retreat southward of General A. S. Johnston's
army made it necessary to reinforce him with troops
from other departments, among them the Depart
ment of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida,
which obliged General Lee to contract his lines. He
had therefore ordered Fort Clinch and other bat
teries on Amelia Island to be dismantled and aban
doned. In consequence General Wright took pos-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 79

session of Fernandina without opposition. In a
few days the fleet proceeded up the St. Johns River
and near the end of the month was followed by
General Wright, who occupied Jacksonville and St.
Augustine, which had also been abandoned. Hence
by the end of March the Union troops held the im
portant points on the coast from North Edisto Inlet
to St. Augustine, a distance of about 250 miles, and
with the exception of the bombardment of the works
in Port Royal Harbor, all of these points had been
occupied without opposition.

Early in December Captain Q. A. Gillmore,
chief engineer on General Sherman's staff, having
made under instructions an examination of Tybee
Island and Fort Pulaski for the purpose of ascer
taining the practicability of reducing the fort, re
ported it practicable, and submitted a plan of opera
tions. His plan, with some slight modifications,
was approved both by his chief and the War De
partment, and preparations were promptly com
menced for carrying it into execution. As a pre
liminary step the Forty-sixth New York Regiment
of Volunteers, Colonel R. Rosa, commanding, was
sent to occupy Big Tybee Island.

Fort Pulaski was built on Cockspur Island, Ga.,
at the head of Tybee Roads, and commanded both
channels of the Savannah River. The island was
simply a deposit of mud about a mile long and half
mile wide, and was about fourteen miles from Sa
vannah.

The river is but little if any more than an average
of a mile and a quarter in width and between the

8o THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

fort and city are several islands similar in formation
to Cockspur, stretching in the direction of the cur
rent. The first and most obvious step in proceeding
to reduce the fort was to cut it off from the city
by batteries, to be erected on the banks or the
middle islands. But the islands and banks, — if de
posits of soft mud scarcely above the water level at
ordinary high tide, and submerged by high spring
tides or when the wind is in a certain quarter, may
be called banks, — are exceedingly ill adapted to the
construction of batteries. On both sides of the
river these deposits of mud extend for many miles
and are thickly covered with tall reeds and coarse
grass, giving to the country the appearance sug
gestive of the appropriate name of the river. They
are intersected by numerous tortuous bayous, divid
ing the shore up into islands, making it practicable
for passage between the fort and city in small row-
boats when the river itself is closed.

Captain Gillmore was given the rank of Brigadier
General of Volunteers, and charged with the task
of reducing Fort Pulaski.

With incredible labor a battery of six guns
(twenty- and thirty-pounder Parrott rifles and an
eight-inch siege howitzer) was constructed by troops
of General Viele's Brigade, at Venus Point on
Jones' Island, about five miles above the fort. The
guns and material were carried from Daufuskie
Island, four miles distant, the nearest point of firm
ground on which troops could camp. The guns were
carried in the night by hand about three-fourths of
a mile over a marsh of unctuous mud, on a tramway

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON Si

of shifting planks, in which the wheels, when they
slipped, would sink to the hubs and the men nearly
to the waists. There was a drenching rain during
the night, and for the greater part of twenty-four
hours the men at work were up to their waists in
mud and water. The battery was in condition for
service.

Three days later a similar battery was constructed
on Birds Island directly opposite Venus Point. Ad
miral Tattnall's little fleet of river steamers, which
had escaped on the morning of February 1 1 from
Port Royal, steamed down the river and engaged
the Venus Point battery, but was driven off. Before
the end of February two companies of the Forty-
sixth New York Volunteers, with a battery of two
field pieces and a thirty pounder Parrott gun — sta
tioned first on Decent Island, and subsequently on
an old hulk in Lazaretto Creek, about 2^ miles
from Pulaski — and a small gunboat in the same
creek, in conjunction with the batteries on Venus
Point and Bird Island, effectually isolated Pulaski.
It would necessarily have had to surrender through
starvation when the supply of provisions should be
consumed; nevertheless the work for its bombard
ment and reduction went on.

It was not until February 21 that the first vessel
having the necessary ordnance and ordnance stores
and engineering supplies arrived off the entrance
to Savannah River. Tybee, like the other islands
bordering the lower river, is mainly a deposit of
mud, but it is somewhat better adapted to siege
operations than the others, in that there are on it a

82 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

few ridges and hummocks of firm ground, and the
shore on Tybee Roads, where it was proposed to
construct the batteries, is particularly skirted by low
sandbanks. The distance from the landing-place
on the island to the most advanced batteries was
about 2^ miles, the last mile presenting the same
obstacles to the transportation of heavy ordnance as
had been encountered and surmounted on Jones
Island, and was, besides, within range of Pulaski's
guns. A causeway was constructed on fascines and
brushwood over the marshy ground, which trembled
like jelly under the tramp and mallets of the labor
ers, and when the thin upper crust was broken
through a pole or oar could be thrust ten or twelve
feet in the soft mud. The herculean labor of trans
porting thirty-six of the heaviest guns then in use,—
some of them weighting 8^2 tons, — with the neces
sary ammunition and the appliances was performed
by the soldiers, nearly all of it in the night, often
in thick darkness and drenching rain, regardless of
weather and the miasma of the marshes spread out
for many miles around them. Two hundred and
fifty men could with difficulty drag a single piece.

On the evening of April 9 the batteries were com
pleted and all was in readiness for the bombard
ment. There were eleven batteries mounting thirty-
six guns, viz.: twelve 1 3-inch and four lo-inch
mortars, six lo-inch and four 8-inch columbiads,
five 3O-pounder Parrott rifles, and five James rifles,
48-, 64-, and 84-pounders. The breaching batteries
were at an average distance of 1700 yards from the
fort; the four lo-inch siege mortars were 1650

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 83

yards distant; the 1 3-inch mortars at distances vary
ing from 2400 to 3400 yards.

Fort Pulaski, on which these batteries were in
readiness to open, was built of brick; was pentago
nal in shape and casemated on all sides. Its walls
were ^y2 feet thick and in height 25 feet above
high water. It was arranged for one tier of guns
in embrasure and one in barbette. The gorge was
covered by an earthen outwork or demi-lune of bold
relief. The main work and demi-lune were sur
rounded by wet ditches — the one around the main
work 48 feet and that around the demi-lune 32 feet
wide. Communication with the exterior was through
the gorge, over a drawbridge into the demi-lune,
through a face of which was a passage by another
drawbridge over the ditch of the demi-lune. A full
armament for the fort would have been 140 guns.
At the time of the bombardment it mounted 46
guns, varying in class from 12-pounder howitzers to
lo-inch columbiads. Twenty of the heaviest of
the guns bore on the Tybee Island batteries. The
fort was garrisoned by five companies of the First
Georgia Regiment, — aggregate strength 385 — Col
onel Charles H. Olmstead commanding.

At sunrise on the morning of April 10 a summons
to surrender was sent under flag of truce, Lieutenant
James H. Wilson of the engineers bearing it to Col
onel Olmstead. The summons was refused. Fire
was immediately opened, and soon the thirty-six
guns on Tybee and those of the fort which could be
brought to bear on them were in full and active
play. The bombardment continued without inter-

84 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

ruption for ioJ/2 hours, and till it was too dark to
see distinctly. It then ceased. Throughout the
night two heavy mortars and a 3<D-pounder Parrott
maintained a slow fire, throwing a shell about every
five minutes, to interrupt any repairs that might be
attempted. At sunrise on the nth the bombard
ment was renewed, with greater accuracy than on
the previous day. The breach which had commenced
under the first day's fire rapidly extended, and by
12 M. two casemates had been battered wide open.
A third was rapidly crumbling under the concen
trated fire when, at 2 P. M., the white flag was run
up over the fort, which, with its armament and
garrison, was surrendered to the Union forces.

The reduction of Pnlaski reflected great credit
on the officers and men engaged, especially on Gen
eral Gillrnore, under whose personal direction it
was commenced and continued to a successful issue*
The troops who participated in all of the heavy
labor of the preparation and bombardment were the
Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infanry, Colonel
Alfred H. Terry, commanding; the Forty-sixth
New York, Colonel Randolph Rosa; two companies
of the New York Engineers, Lieutenant Colonel
James F. Hall; two companies of the Third Rhode
Island Artillery, and a small detachment of engineer
troops of the regular army.

It is worthy of note as illustrative of the readi
ness with which the volunteers adapted themselves
to any service demanded of them, that with the
exception of a detachment of sailors from the frig
ate Wabash, who served four light siege guns the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 85

second day, the labor of mounting and serving the
guns was performed by men who had no experience
whatever as artillerists. They were directed by
well-trained officers.

In the reduction of Fort Pulaski the superior
capacity of rifled cannon over smooth bores was
very clearly exemplified, and marks a new era in
siege operations. Up to that time from five hun
dred to seven hundred yards was regarded as the
extreme distances at which an exposed wall of a
well-constructed fort could be breached. By the
use of fifty-eight per cent, only of rifled guns a wide
and practicable breach was made in the walls of
Pulaski, under 18 hours of continuous fire, at an
average distance of 1700 yards.

Extensive as was the territory over which the
combined land and naval forces under General Sher
man and Admiral DuPont had hoisted the Union
flag, the editors of the most influential Northern
papers had not been slow to discover that all had
not been accomplished which might, in their judg
ments, have been expected and demanded of so
large a force fitted out and maintained at such vast
cost to the Government. Adverse criticism had
commenced early, and continued until a change was
effected in the command of the land force. Gen
eral Sherman, under whose command the reduction
of Fort Pulaski had been planned and pressed for
ward under great difficulties to within a few days
of its actual accomplishment, was not permitted to
witness the only triumph in arms of his corps, and
receive the surrender of the fort. On March 15

86 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

an order from the War Department in Washing
ton created a new military department, composed of
the States of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida,
designated as the Department of the South, and
Major General David Hunter was assigned to the
command. Brigadier General H. W. Benham was
assigned to the command of the troops of the Expe
ditionary Corps, designated as the Northern Divis
ion of the Department of the South. General
Hunter assumed command on March 31, and was
on Tybee Island in time to demand the surrender
of Fort Pulaski, and report its reduction to his
Government.

On March 2 President Davis had called General
Lee to Richmond, and Major General John C.
Pemberton succeeded him in command.

CHAPTER VI

Blockade — Lack of Confederate resources — Inferiority of equip
ment — Charleston's strategic value — Investment of Charles
ton — Charleston and Savannah Railroad — Defenses of rail
road — James Island — Unsuccessful Assault — Vigor of Con
federate fire — Confederate position again assaulted — En
gagement at Secessionville — Federal Reports of Action —
Federal Republic — Within the Confederate lines.

Cotton being the basis of financial credit of the
Southern Confederacy, it was manifestly of the
first importance that the government should hold
some seaports from which the cotton could be
shipped and into which the return cargoes could be
entered. Charleston and Savannah were the most
important ports of entry on the South Atlantic
coast. These two cities were connected by a rail
road of about one hundred and fifteen miles in
length, lying broadside to the coast, which is inter
sected by numerous bays, inlets, rivers, and creeks,
forming a network of watercourses navigable to
within easy striking distance of this railroad at
several points.

Before the close of the first year of the war the
Federal land and naval forces were in secure pos
session of important points on the coast of South
Carolina and of the navigable waters that border it

87

88 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

and extend far into the interior. Wherever their
fleets could be brought the Confederates could offer
no effective opposition to the landing of troops,
except at points within range of fixed batteries,
which at that early period of the war were few and
very incomplete. The Confederates had nothing
to oppose effectively to the heavy guns of the Fed
eral fleet, which could sweep over the low banks of
the rivers of that country with irresistible force.
Skillful engineers had selected with admirable judg
ment the most important and vital points for the
defense of the cities and the coast generally, and the
construction of the necessary earthworks under the
direction and superintendence of competent engineers
was a mere question of tools and manual labor.
But the arming of the works when constructed with
suitable guns and ammunition was a far more difficult
task.

The Confederacy labored under far greater dif
ficulties as to the supply of suitable arms and ammu
nition than is generally supposed. While some of
the guns, both of heavy ordnance and small arms,
that were found in the forts and arsenals within the
limits of the Confederacy were among the best then
known to the military profession in this country,
much the greater part of them were of old and
antiquated pattern, and even the best of them were
soon rendered comparatively ineffective when op
posed to the new and improved arms of all kinds
that the exigencies of the war and the inventive
genius of the country soon supplied and brought into
use. There were no great manufactories of arms,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 89

ammunition, and the various munitions of war in
the Confederacy. The South was essentially an agri
cultural country, and manufacturing generally
formed but a small part of its productive industry.
The manufacture of arms, gunpowder, and the vari
ous munitions of war generally were especially but
little practiced or known; and the rigid blockade of
the Southern coast, which was soon established and
maintained, while it by no means sealed the Southern
ports, greatly obstructed the introduction into the
country of all manner of arms and munitions of
war and the materials necessary for their manu
facture.

In the beginning the Confederate Government se
lected a most accomplished and efficient officer as
the head of the Ordnance Department in the person
of the late General J. Gorgas, who may be said to
have inaugurated new industries in the country, all
directed to the production of arms and their various
accessories absolutely essential to the prosecution of
war. With efficient aids, such as General George W.
Raines and Major Garesche, who established
powder mills, and Captain Brook, who introduced
an admirable rifled cannon (which bore his name),
and others in other branches, he very soon had the
Ordnance Department in wonderfully successful and
efficient operation.

But in the first year of the war the government
was wholly unable to supply suitable siege, garrison,
and field guns for the various forts and batteries or
small arms to put into the hands of the volunteers.
Hence it was that all along the coast and in the inte-

9o THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

rior Confederate artillerists manned and used many
antiquated guns, mounted on clumsy carriages, and
in the field Southern infantry and cavalry, armed
with old-pattern muskets, sometimes with flint-locks,
shot-guns, sporting rifles, and pistols, encountered
foemen armed with the best weapons of modern
warfare. And while new and improved arms were
constantly introduced in the North, this inferiority
of armament continued in the South throughout the
war.1 Generally the best arms in the Confederate
army were gathered on the battlefield. It is not
probable that much use was made in the Federal
army of the Confederate arms gathered in the same
way.

With land forces securely established on the coast
and the navy in undisputed possession of the sea,
and with ample transportation at command, the
Federal commanders on the Southern coast pos
sessed a base of operations which threatened at once
Charleston on their right, Savannah on the left, and
the connecting railroad and intermediate country.
The Confederate authorities very naturally appre
hended that so soon as the Federal forces were thus
in possession of the coast the commanders would
avail themselves of their resources to seize upon the

1General La Grange, a distinguished Federal cavalry com
mander, recently told the writer that in the winter cam
paign in east Tennessee of 1863-64 it seemed to him almost
unfair and cruel to meet in battle with Spencer repeating
rifles Confederates generally armed with muzzle-loading arms,
pne of the former being equivalent in a fight to six or eight
of the latter.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 91

Charleston & Savannah Railroad near the head of
Broad River, sever the connection between those two
cities, and with the combined land and naval forces
envelop alternately each of those important places.
That, it was plainly seen, would be a combination
difficult to resist successfully.

The capture of Charleston especially would have
been disastrous to the Confederacy in every point
of view — commercial, military, and political. The
city would not only have been lost as a shipping port,
but the railroad communication with Virginia, North
Carolina, and eastern Georgia would have been cut
off and the upper roads by Branchville would have
been placed in jeopardy by the presence of a hostile
force so near as Charleston. It is fair, too, to pre
sume that the capture of Charleston would have
caused as general satisfaction throughout the North
as the capture of Richmond, and the political effect
would have been as encouraging and stimulating
there as it would have been depressing and discour
aging in the South. Yet notwithstanding the im
portance of the two cities mentioned, and their con
necting railroads, their vulnerability and the ample
resources both on land and sea at the command of
the Federal Government, they were defended and
firmly held for nearly four years against every attack
made against them, and were only abandoned when
the march of the great army under General Sherman
from the west to the sea rendered them no longer
tenable. It is proposed to sketch here only the prin
cipal operations against Charleston and to tell how
they were met and brought to naught.

92 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

In the spring of 1862 Major General David
Hunter, United States Army, commanded the De
partment of the South, with headquarters at Hilton
Head, and Admiral DuPont commanded the South
Atlantic Squadron. Major General John C. Pem-
berton, Confederate States Army, commanded the
Department of South Carolina and Georgia, head
quarters in Charleston. Soon after the capture of
Fort Pulaski Brigadier General H. W. Benham,
commanding a division and second in rank to Gen
eral Hunter, submitted to the latter and to Admiral
DuPont a plan for the capture of Charleston.
Though favorably considered, it was not at once
adopted. On April 28 Admiral DuPont sent to
General Hunter reports from Captains Marchand
and Mullany, of the navy, giving information, which
they had derived from sources deemed reliable, as
to the force present for the defense of Charleston.
The information was to the effect that the force in
Charleston and within ten miles of it was from 2650
to 2860. Of this force between 1500 and 1600
were on James Island, between the mouth of the
Stono and Charleston, and about 600 at Fort John
son.

About the middle of May a crew of negroes, who
escaped from Charleston with the steamer Planter,
carried to Hilton Head the additional news that the
Confederate troops and guns had withdrawn from
Coles' and Battery islands, thus leaving the entrance
to the Stono unguarded. Gunboats sent by Ad
miral DuPont to reconnoiter entered the river with
out opposition, and Captain Percival Drayton re-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 93

ported to the Admiral : "We are in as complete pos
session of the river [Stono] as of Port Royal and
can land and protect the army whenever it wants. "
Finding this gateway to Charleston thrown wide
open, General Hunter decided to adopt General Ben-
ham's plan and make a dash to take the city by a
coup-de-main. Preparations to carry the plan into
execution were pressed forward rapidly.

James Island was generally regarded as the key
to Charleston. It was the opinion of the most com
petent military engineers that if the Union army
could once secure footing on that island the fall of
Charleston would be inevitable and only a question
of time. The plan of attack, briefly stated, was to
land a force of 10,000 men of all arms on the lower
end of James Island and by rapid movement over
take, engage, and defeat the Confederate force on
the island before it could be reinforced. That ac
complished, a securely entrenched camp would be
established beyond the range of the guns of Fort
Sumter and in easy shelling range of the city. From
that position, strengthened by reinforcements which
were expected, it would require a much larger force
to dislodge them than the Confederate Government
could assemble while all of the available force in
the eastern States of the Confederacy was in front
of Richmond, to meet General McClellan, then
marching on that city, and in Mississippi, confront
ing General Halleck. All these conditions of the
military problem seemed favorable for the success of
the proposed plan of operations.

This plan embraced, first, a preliminary expedi-

94 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

tion to cut the Charleston & Savannah Railroad and
destroy it from Salkehatchie to Coosawhatchie, a pre
cautionary measure to prevent the passage of rein
forcements from the latter to the former city. Briga
dier General I. J. Stephens, who commanded a divis
ion at Beaufort, was directed to execute that part
of the plan. General Stephens ordered Colonel B.
C. Christ, of the Fiftieth Pennsylvania Infantry, to
take his own regiment, one company each of the
Eighth Michigan and Seventy-ninth New York
Highlanders, a battalion of the First Massachusetts
Cavalry and one section of Rockwell's light battery
of Connecticut Artillery, in all about nine hundred
men, and to proceed to the execution of the plan.
This force crossed at Port Royal Ferry in the night
of May 28, was on the mainland by daylight the
next morning, and marched immediately for Poco-
taligo, via Garden's Corner and the Shelden Road,
and was considerably delayed, says Colonel Christ,
by the Confederate pickets before reaching Old Po-
cotaligo, about ten miles from Port Royal Ferry.
General Stephens regarded the force under Colonel
Christ as ample for the accomplishment of the object
of the expedition; nevertheless, "out of abundant
caution," he sent the Eighth Michigan and Seventy-
ninth Highlanders to Garden's Corner and the One
Hundredth Pennsylvania to the Ferry as reserves.

The approach to Old Pocotaligo by the road the
Federal troops were marching is over a causeway
partly flanked on either side by a marsh, through
which runs a narrow stream, spanned by a bridge
about fifteen feet in length. The flooring of the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 95

bridge had been torn off, leaving the string-pieces.
The marsh was bordered by a skirt of woods. In
the woods, and partly sheltered by the banks of
ditches, were parts of three companies of Confed
erate cavalry, viz. : Captain Trenholm's company of
the Rutledge Mounted Rifles and Companies A and
D of the First Battalion South Carolina Cavalry.
Some were armed with rifles, others with shotguns.
They were all dismounted and numbered only 76
men. Their horses were about half a mile in the
rear, where the other two companies of the First
Battalion and Captain D. B. Haywood's company
were held in reserve. Many of these men were
armed only with sabers. They numbered in all no
and were commanded by Major I. H. Morgan.
Colonel W. S. Walker commanded the whole.

At this point the Federal advance was disputed;
the seventy-six dismounted cavalrymen held their
position with admirable tenacity, keeping the enemy
at bay for more than two hours and a half, from
half-past ten until after one o'clock, and until Cap
tain Parker, of the Fiftieth Pennsylvania, passed
over the bridge at the head of his company and was
followed by the remaining companies, which, de
ploying to the right and left of the road, flanked the
Confederates, obliging them to fall back to their sup
port, which they did in good order and with little
loss. In this affair the gallant Captain Parker was
killed. The bridge was so repaired as to enable
the cavalry and artillery to pass, and Colonel Christ
and his command pressed forward in pursuit and
continued to advance until they came in full view

96 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

and within a quarter of a mile of the railroad the
destruction of which was the object of the expedition.

In the meantime the artillery had come up with
the infantry and cavalry, not in time, however, to
take part in the affair at Old Pocotaligo, because
the officer in command, Lieutenant Cannon, had
halted two hours on the march to feed and water
his horses. But the weather was warm, the men
were fatigued and had expended nearly all of their
ammunition. Some negroes had told Colonel Christ
that "the desperate stand by the enemy" at Old Po
cotaligo was made because they confidently looked
for reinforcements. As the Colonel says:

"In view of the positive orders I received to return
to Port Royal Island during the night, and to avoid,
if possible, bringing on a general engagement with
reduced ammunition, I deemed it prudent to retire,
and accordingly arrived at Port Royal Ferry at n
o'clock P. M."

Colonel Walker, having been reinforced by two
companies of infantry and three pieces of field artil
lery, under Captain Stephen Elliott, followed in
pursuit to Garden's Corner, where a few shots were
exchanged. The night was too intensely dark to
attack, and when morning dawned the Federal force
had crossed the ferry and was out of reach. General
Stephens says:

"In short, the operation was most successful as a
reconnoissance or demonstration, and it is very cer
tain that could the original programme have been
carried out the whole line would have been destroyed
from Salkehatchie to Coosawhatchie. It proves the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 97

correctness of the information which I had previ
ously gained, that the enemy was not in any consid
erable force at the railroad."

The expedition which General Stephens reported
as "most successful," his commanding officer, Gen
eral Benham, characterized as "a miserable failure."

The failure of this expedition to destroy the rail
road did not retard or interfere with the main expe
dition to James Island. On the morning of June 2
General Stephens' command steamed out of Port
Royal Harbor, and that evening entered the Stono
and landed a little above Coles' Island, on Legare's
plantation, on James Island, and brisk skirmishing
immediately began. A deiachrr-ent occupied Legare-
ville on the left bank. Brigadier General H. G.
Wright commanded a division on Edisto Island. At
that point about seven thousand men of all arms
had been concentrated. General Wright was or
dered to pass this force over to Seabrook's Island
and thence over Haulver Creek to John's Island,
and from there to march directly to Legareville, on
the Stono, and cross that river to take part with
Stephens' Division in the coup-de-main. The mass
of General Wright's command (it was designated
as the First Division, but a part of General Steph
ens' Division — the Second — was with him) was on
John's Island, near the Haulver, the night of the
2d. The distance from that point to Legareville, on
the Stono, is about ten miles, and the road good.
Captain Percival Drayton, of the navy, was in the
Stono prepared to cross the troops over to James
Island immediately on their arrival.

98 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

Some delay occurred in the movement of General
Wright's command, attributed to the lack of trans
portation and a damaged wharf at Seabrook's
Island. His command did not reach Legareville
until the evening of the 5th. This delay, occurring
after the arrival of Stephens' troops had given warn
ing of the approaching storm, had given General
Pemberton time, which it was believed he had pro
fited by, to throw reinforcements on James Island.
The purpose, therefore, of taking the island by a
coup-de-main was abandoned and it was determined
to hold the position already secured, provide a se
curely entrenched camp and await reinforcements.
General Wright's division crossed the Stono on the
9th and took position on Mr. Thomas Grimble's
plantation, two miles above General Stephens' com
mand. The Confederates immediately opened fire
of solid shot and shell, which fell into, around, and
over General Wright's camp and among the gun
boats in the Stono. General Stephens' camp was
also under fire. This at once convinced General
Benham that the main camps and landings were un
tenable while exposed to the Confederate fire, and
as there was not dry land enough on the island above
high water for a secure camp out of range of the
Confederate guns, it seemed evident that he would
be obliged to abandon the island, — the key to
Charleston, — or silence the advanced Confederate
batteries. On the loth General Hunter, having de
termined to return to Hilton Head, gave to General
Benham written instructions, in which he says:

"In leaving the Stono to return to Hilton Head,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 99

I desire in any arrangement that you may make for
the disposition of your forces now in this vicinity,
you will make no attempt to advance on Charleston
or attack Fort Johnson until largely reinforced, or
until you receive specific instructions from these head
quarters to that effect. You will, however, provide
for a secure, entrenched encampment, where your
front can be covered by the fire of our gunboats from
the Stono on the left and the creek from Folly River
on the right."

The fire from the Confederate batteries continued
to be very annoying on the loth, so much so as to
induce General Benham to make a move to put an
end to it. He ordered a reconnoissance in force to
be made on the Confederate works at the earliest
dawn of day on the morning of the nth. Picked
regiments of General Stephens' division were to lead
and "make a rush on the Confederate position," the
remainder of Stephens' division being held close in
hand to support the advance or follow up closely
any advantage that might be gained. General
Wright and Colonel Williams were to support
Stephens on the left. The whole remaining force
was to be held in readiness to give such strong and
prompt support as to change the reconnoissance in
force into a general engagement, if fortune favored
and it should be found expedient. In that case Colo
nel Robert Williams was to lead the assaulting col
umns. Written instructions were prepared for Gene
rals Wright and Stephens and Colonel Williams.

It seems that Generals Hunter and Benham had
their headquarters temporarily on the same steamer,

ioo THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the Delaware, in the Stono. Before issuing his in
structions for the dash of the next day General Ben-
ham showed them to General Hunter, impressing
upon him at the same time the imperative necessity
of capturing or silencing the batteries at Secession-
ville. He also pointed out to General Hunter a line
traced on a map from Secessionville obliquely to
ward Charleston as the line which the Federal
troops should occupy to render their hold on James
Island secure, to all of which Benham says General
Hunter cordially assented, and on Benham's solicita
tion Hunter agreed to defer his departure for Hilton
Head to await the result of the demonstration on
Secessionville. The line traced out as being the
proper one for the Union forces to occupy was al
ready occupied by the Confederates, and it was
plainly necessary that the Federal troops must first
capture Secessionville and drive off the Confederates
before occupying it themselves. This contemplated
movement for the morning of the nth was, how
ever, deferred, because General Wright represented
that his troops were not in condition for action. Gen
eral Hunter left the field of operations on the even
ing of the iith, leaving General Benham in com
mand, with the instructions already quoted.

Skirmishing had been brisk from the time of the
landing of the advance troops of the expedition.
From five to eight gunboats in the Stono and in a
creek flowing into Folly River had kept up a well-
sustained fire on the Confederate position. The
Federal commander had caused a battery of siege
guns to be constructed in front of General Stephens1

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 101

__p..:«;_j3

camp, to play upon the Confederate batteries in
front of Secessionville. The skirmishing and the
combined fire of the land and naval batteries were
particularly spirited on Sunday, the I5th, but no
perceptible effect was produced on the Confederate
batteries. The enemy were known to be busily at
work night and day, strengthening their positions,
and it had been reported to General Benham some
days before that from the masthead of a naval vessel
in the Stono several long trains of cars loaded with
troops had been seen pouring into Charleston over
the road which Colonel Christ's expedition had failed
to break. It therefore seemed manifest to General
Benham that whatever he proposed to do to "pro
vide a securely entrenched encampment" on James
Island, as ordered by General Hunter, he should do
quickly, without longer delay. He therefore deter
mined to assault the Confederate position at the
earliest dawn of day the next morning.

The plan of attack was substantially the same as
that proposed to be made on the loth, but on a
larger scale. Generals Wright and Stephens, com
manding divisions, and Colonel Robert Williams,
commanding a brigade, were called in to confer with
General Benham, and Captain Percival Drayton, of
the navy, was invited to be present at the conference.
The reports of what occurred in that conference are
so conflicting that it is impossible to reconcile them.

This much seems certain, that General Stephens,
whose division was designated to make the assault,
strongly objected to the time of making it. He pre
ferred to make it in the light of day, that his men

102 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

might see where they were required to go and what
was before them to be done. He advised that fire
be continued on the Confederate works, keep
ing the enemy constantly disturbed and uncertain as
to when and where the attack would be made, thus
wearying them out with watching, while the Federal
troops, their officers knowing exactly when the attack
would be made, could take their usual rest and regu
lar meals and, when needed for action, would go
fresh to their work. Whatever objections were
raised were overruled by General Benham, who
ordered the assault to be made.

The consolidated morning reports of June 9
showed the Federal force in hand on James Island
to be: Wright's Division, 3232; Stephens' Division,
4313; Williams' Headquarters Brigade, 1927 —
total, 9472. It was believed that the Confederate
force defending the works to be attacked was less
than 500 men. It was proposed to surprise that
force and capture the works.

General Stephens was ordered to form his entire
division before day dawn, secretly and in silence, at
the advanced picket line, and at day dawn, or about
four o'clock, to move rapidly upon the enemy's
works at and about Secessionville and carry them by
a coup-de-main. General Wright's Division, with
Williams' Brigade temporarily attached, was or
dered to move at the same time from their camp at
Thomas Grimble's, to support Stephens and protect
his left and rear from any attack that might be made
by the Confederates from that direction. This pre
caution to guard against a flank and rear attack was

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 103

deemed so important that General Wright was or
dered, in the event of Stephens being repulsed, not to
renew the assault.

The Confederate works in front of Secessionville
occupied the most contracted part of a narrow neck
of land, with marshes fringed with brushwood on
both sides. The route from General Stephens' camp
to this position, after passing a causeway, was over
cultivated fields, bordered with thorny hedges, the
most advanced hedge being about five hundred yards
from the Confederate batteries. The field in front
of this hedge converged rapidly to the Confederate
works, where the front of attack was about one
hundred yards in length, flanked on either side by the
before-mentioned marshes.

Stephens' Division was composed of two brigades
of infantry, of three regiments each. The First
Brigade, Colonel Fenton, Eighth Michigan, com
manding, made up of the Eighth Michigan, Lieu
tenant Colonel F. Graves; the Seventh Connecticut,
Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Hawley, and the Twenty-
eighth Massachusetts, Lieutenant Colonel More,
led the assault and was closely followed by the
Second Brigade, Colonel Leasure, of the One Hun
dredth Pennsylvania, consisting of the Seventy-ninth
New York Highlanders, Lieutenant Colonel David
Morrison; the One Hundredth Pennsylvania, Lieu
tenant Colonel D. A. Lecky, and the Forty-sixth
New York, Colonel Rudolph Rosa, commanding.
A storming party, consisting of Companies C and H
of the Eighth Michigan, Captains Ralph Ely and
R. N. Doyle, led the assault, conducted by Lieuten-

io4 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

ant Lyons, aide-de-camp on General Stephens' staff,
and followed by Captain Sears' company of New
York Engineers. Rockwell's Battery of Connecti
cut Light Artillery followed the First Brigade and
Captain Sargent's company of the First Massachu
setts cavalry followed in the rear.

About four o'clock on a dark cloudy morning
Stephens' whole command was in motion and, press
ing forward rapidly and in silence, surprised the
Confederate picket in the house they occupied, cap
tured two or three of the men and, debouching
through the advanced hedge, advancing at double-
quick time, deployed, or attempted to deploy, into*
line of battle, the Seventh Connecticut, the center
regiment, following close on the Eighth Michigan,
to form on its left. It seems that the mistake, or
blunder, had been made of attempting to charge
with brigade front over a space scarcely wide enough
for a regiment in line. While the regiments of the
leading brigade were forming forward into line in
double-quick time a storm of grape and canister
from the Confederate guns crashed through the
center of the line and continued tearing through the
ranks with great rapidity, severing the line, one part
crowding toward the right, the other to the left.
Says Lieutenant Colonel Graves:

"Still the regiment moved rapidly on, preserving
their order and leaving the ground in their rear
strewn with their dead and wounded, and did not
stop until they gained the parapet and delivered their
fire upon the enemy in his works. But they were
unable to contend against such great odds, and, being

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 105

entirely unsupported for a considerable time, they
fell back slowly, contesting every inch of ground a
short distance, where they maintained ground until
ordered to retreat, which they did in good order,
although under fire. The regiment, however, had
become much scattered, owing to the great number
of officers who had fallen."

The inevitable result of attempting to advance
with brigade front over space hardly wide enough
for a single regiment in line followed. The regi
ments became somewhat entangled with each other
and the brushwood-fringed marshes on the flanks.
When within two or three hundred yards of the Con
federate works the Seventh Connecticut "came
obliquely upon an unforeseen ditch and morass,"
crowding and doubling up the regiment toward the
center. At this moment a terrific fire of grape and
musketry swept through the ranks. "The line was
inevitably broken," says Colonel Hawley, "and
though the men stood bravely to their work the line
could not be re-formed until the colors were brought
into the open field. When re-formed it started again
under a heavy fire toward the earthworks, but had
proceeded but a little distance when an order came
from General Stephens, brought by his son, who was
then 'receiving his baptism of fire,' to call the men
off, and the regiment fell back to the cover of the
hedge in front of their hospital. The Twenty-eighth
Massachusetts had been unavoidably pushed far to
the left, and as soon as it was formed into line, ad
vancing, one regiment that was in front fell back

io6 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

and broke through our regiment, throwing it into
confusion.

"Forward again," he continues, "marched by the
flank through a dense brush on our left and followed
the edge of the bushes, which formed one side of a
marsh to within forty yards of the enemy's work.
Here our progress was interrupted by a large fallen
tree, between which and the enemy's work was an
impassable marsh. On our right was an abattis of
dense brush and on our left and front marsh. Here
we lost many of the men who were killed and wound
ed in the regiment. Seeing that we could be of no
possible use in this place with less than platoon front
to retaliate by fire on the enemy, and this position
being raked by the fire of the gun on the corner of
the enemy's work nearest the observatory, I ordered
the regiment to retire,2 and it, too, found shelter
behind the hedge."

While the First Brigade was being thus cut up the
Seventy-ninth Highlanders, leading the Second Bri
gade, was ordered by General Stephens to the right
to assail the work a little to the right of the point
from which the Eighth Michigan had been driven.
Lieutenant Colonel Morrison led the right wing of
his regiment to the parapet.

"As I mounted the parapet," says the Lieutenant
Colonel, "I received a wound in the head, which,
though slight, stunned me for the time being; but
still I was able to retain command. With me many
mounted the works, but only to fall or to receive
"Lieutenant Colonel Moore's report.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 107

their wounds from the enemy, posted in rifle-pits in
rear of the fort. . . . From the ramparts I had
a full view of their works. They were entrenched
in a position well selected for defensive purposes and
upon which our artillery seemed to have little effect,
save driving them into their retreats, and in attempt
ing to dislodge them we were met with a fierce and
determined opposition, but with equal if not superior
determination and courage were they met by our
forces, and had I been supported could have carried
their works, . . . for we virtually had it in our
possession. After remaining in this position some
considerable time and not being supported by the
other regiments, I received orders to fall back, which
I did in good order, leaving behind about forty killed
or badly wounded, many of whom fell on the ram
parts, and brought back with me six killed and about
sixty wounded," while the right companies of the
regiment — "the left having encountered a perfect
storm of grape and canister — were obliged to seek
shelter either by obliquing to the left, under cover of
a small ravine, or by dropping among the cotton
ridges in front of the fort, where they kept up a
steady fire on the enemy's gunners."5

Of the other two regiments of this brigade the
One Hundredth Pennsylvania was formed in line of
battle supporting the left of the Seventy-ninth High
landers, and the Forty-sixth New York the left of
the One Hundredth Pennsylvania. The brigade was
thus formed in three lines of battle in echelon.

"Report of Colonel Leasure, commanding the brigade.

io8 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

While the two latter regiments were coming into
line, Colonel Leasure, the Brigade Commander, with
his staff, hastened forward to hurry up the left of
the Seventy-ninth, intending to lead the assault in
person. When about three hundred yards from the
Confederate works he reached the storm. He says:

"We entered the range of a perfect storm of
grape, canister, nails, broken glass, and pieces of
chains, fired from three very large pieces on the fort,
which completely swept every foot of ground within
the range, and either cut the men down or drove
them to the shelter of the ravine on the left. I now
turned to look after and lead up the One Hundredth
Pennsylvania Regiment and found its center just
entering the fatal line of fire, which completely cut it
in two, and the right under Major Lecky obliqued to
the right and advanced to support the right of the
Seventy-ninth New York, and many of the men
reached the foot of the embankment and some suc
ceeded in mounting it, with a few brave men of the
Seventy-ninth, who were there with a portion of the
Eighth Michigan. . . .

"I may be permitted to report further that at the
time I arrived in front of the hedge near the fort I
saw nothing of any part of the supporting regiments
of the First Brigade , and between the advancing
Highlanders and the fort only a portion of the
Eighth Michigan, who led the attack in front of the
fort, that regiment having already been decimated
by the murderous fire through which we all had to
pass."

While the Forty-sixth New York was advancing

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 109

to the attack it was run into by parts of the Seventh
Connecticut and Twenty-eighth Massachusetts,
which were retreating, and swept along with them
in their retreat a part of the Forty-sixth New York.

"During all of this time our own artillery fired
over our heads from enormous distances and burst
several shells right over our heads. The fire of our
gunboats was also very disagreeable until they fin
ally succeeded in getting a better range."

The First Brigade having utterly failed and fallen
back terribly shattered, the Second Brigade was re
called and the whole division formed in two lines
near the points from which it had started. "My
men," says General Stephens, "were at the enemy's
works about 4:30 o'clock and the conflict of twenty-
five minutes, so dreadful in its casualties, was over
and the men returned." Rockwell's battery, or a
part of it, was pushed forward to the advanced
hedge and kept up a brisk fire on the fort, but the
assault had been made and failed disastrously.

General Wright's Division had moved promptly
at the appointed time and had well performed the
part assigned it. General Benham had joined
Wright about the time his division moved forward
and commanded in person. Receiving an urgent
request from General Stephens for support, Colonel
Williams was ordered to hasten forward with his
brigade and report to Stephens. His brigade ap
proached the Confederate works to the left of the
marsh which had so cramped General Stephens' Di
vision. It did not reach the point on which it was
directed until Stephens' attack had failed and his

no THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

division driven, or had fallen back, under cover.
The Ninety-seventh Pennsylvania joined the left of
Stephens' Division on the line to which it had fallen
back. The Third New Hampshire and Third
Rhode Island were pushed well to the front. The
Third New Hampshire approached to within forty
yards of the Confederate works and opened fire.
Colonel Jackson, commanding the regiment, reports
that he found no artillery on that part of the Con
federate works and that he could easily have gone
into the fort.

"If," he adds, "I could have crossed a stream
between me and the earthworks about twenty yards
in width, with apparently four or five feet of water,
and the mud very soft; the men therefore could not
cross. The enemy soon opened on me from a bat
tery about two hundred yards in our rear, throwing
grape into the ranks, from which we suffered se
verely. In a short time they opened fire with rifles
and infantry. At the same time a battery about a
mile north of us opened on us with shot and shell.

He seems to have been well enveloped in fire and
the regiment suffered severely. He saw reinforce
ments passing into the Confederate works, which he
was powerless to prevent. A section of Hamilton's
battery — regular artillery — succeeded in silencing
the battery in the rear and a battalion of the Third
Rhode Island penetrated the brushwood to dislodge
the Confederate sharpshooters, but did not succeed.
The assault was already essentially over and it was
a mere waste of life and limb to keep these troops
where they were. They were therefore withdrawn.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON in

General Stephens was holding his division, awaiting
orders and ready to renew the assault, but no orders
came and soon the whole Federal force on the island
had returned to the camps from which they started.

The aggregate Federal loss was 683. The
Eighth Michigan had lost most heavily. It lost
more than a third of the number engaged. Of
twenty-two commissioned officers who went into
action thirteen were killed or wounded. The Sev
enty-ninth Highlanders, Third New Hampshire, and
Seventh Connecticut had also suffered severely. All
the regiments actively engaged had lost seriously.
Among the killed were: Captain Edwin S. Hitch
cock and Lieutenant Thomas Hooton, Seventh Con
necticut; Captains Benjamin B. Church and Simon
Guild, Eighth Michigan; Captain Ralph Carlton,
Third New Hampshire; Lieutenant Ferdinand Se-
hert, Forty-sixth New York; Lieutenant James Kin-
ner, Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders, died on
the 1 8th of wounds received; Lieutenant Samuel J.
Moore, One Hundredth Pennsylvania, and Lieuten
ant Erasmus S. Bartholomew, Third Rhode Island
Heavy Artillery.

The assault which had resulted so disastrously
narrowly missed brilliant success. The works about
Secessionville were occupied by two companies of
the First (afterwards Second) South Carolina Ar
tillery, and two battalions of infantry, the Charles
ton Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Gaillard, and the
Pee Dee Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Smith com
manding, in all less than five hundred men. Colonel
T. G. Lamar, of the South Carolina Artillerv, com-

ii2 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

manded the post. From the landing of the Fed
eral force on the 2d to the morning of the i6th the
Confederate troops had been subjected, day and
night, to the most arduous duties. On the I5th
there had been sharp skirmishing and the combined
fire from the land and naval batteries had been un
usually heavy. Notwithstanding the secrecy ob
served in the Federal camps, Colonel Lamar had
observed enough to convince him that an attack
would be made in the night of the I5th or early the
following morning, and so reported to General
Evans, commanding on the island, who ordered
Colonel Johnson Hagood to reinforce Secessionville
up to 2000 men, but the reinforcements had not
arrived when the assault was made. Colonel Ha
good carried the reinforcements without orders
from General Evans. Colonel Lamar and his men
had been busily at work all night of the I5th and
until three o'clock in the morning constructing a new
land battery and transferring guns to it from an
old gunboat. About three o'clock in the morning
the men, exhausted by the skirmishing of the day
before and the labor of the night, were allowed to
lie down to rest.

It was the first time since Colonel Lamar had
been in command that his men had been allowed to
sleep without arms in their hands and at the point
where they would have to use them in the event of
an attack. The men had scarcely fallen asleep when
the storm of battle burst on them. Sending a courier
to Colonels Gaillard and Smith, to hurry forward
with their battalions, Colonel Lamar hastened to the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 113

batteries, where the gunners were found at their
guns and alert. He was just in time to see in the
gray light of a cloudy morning the enemy's line ad
vancing at the double-quick to the assault.

Mounting the chasee of the ten-inch columbiad,
he aimed it himself at the center of the advancing
line, to break and delay it until the infantry support
could come up. Immediately all of the guns were
firing, the columbiad and eighteen-pounders firing
grape and canister, the twenty-four-pounders firing
solid shot and shells. The fire on the center of the
line had, as we have seen, the desired effect of break
ing it and causing a little delay, and when the lead
ing regiment, the Eighth Michigan, reached the
ditch and mounted to the parapet it encountered a
storm of fire from Colonel Smith's Pee Dee Bat
talion, and after a brief and fierce struggle the
Eighth Michigan, as has been seen, was driven back,
badly shattered. The Charleston Battalion, under
Lieutenant Colonel Gaillard, followed closely on the
heels of the Pee Dee Battalion and was put into
action on the right of the battery. When the Michi
gan regiment fell back Colonel Smith sallied out and
gathered up the arms (they were better than his
own) which had fallen from the hands of the killed
and wounded, and put them in the hands of his own
men in time to use them in repelling the assault of
the Seventy-ninth Highlanders. Early in the assault
a detachment of one hundred men of the Twenty-
second South Carolina, sent to reinforce the garri
son, arrived and took an active part in the defense.
A little later Lieutenant Colonel McEnery arrived

ii4 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

with his Louisiana Battalion and also took an active
part in repelling the last assault.

That night Colonel Stevens, of the Twenty-fourth
South Carolina Regiment, commanded the picket
line of Hagood's Brigade. It consisted of seven
companies of the Twenty-fourth and six of the First
South Carolina Regiment and one of the Forty-
seventh Georgia Regiment. The picket line, con
necting on the left with the picket in front of Se-
cessionville, covered the whole Confederate front to
Newtown Cut. As soon as the Federal advance
was made known to Colonel Hagood he sent Mc-
Enery's Louisiana Battalion to Secessionville and
carried the remainder of his brigade not already on
outpost duty to the picket line, to the felled timber
near the Battery Island road. One of Captain
Boyce's six-pounder guns was placed in battery on
the left of the felled timber, which made good abat-
tis. About one hundred of Colonel Stevens' pickets
already occupied a thicket extending from the felled
timber to the morass on the left near the Secession
ville batteries. The Twenty-fifth South Carolina,
Colonel Simonton, was in rear of the felled timber
and to the right of the field piece.

Lieutenant Colonel Capers commanded the bat
tery at Clark's House, which, though at a greater
distance than the other batteries, was most effectively
served. These were the troops (Hagood's Bri
gade) that almost enveloped the Third New Hamp
shire and repulsed a very gallant and determined
dash made by a battalion of the Third Rhode Island
Heavy Artillery to dislodge the troops in the felled

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 115

timber and capture the gun which was galling the
rear of the Third New Hampshire. Colonel Wil
liams' Brigade was plainly seen by Colonel Hagood
in line of battle about Hill's Houses. He immedi
ately dispatched an officer to General Evans, com
manding on the island, asking to be supported in
making an attack on the flank and rear of Williams'
Brigade. But before permission to attack and as
surance of support were received Colonel Williams'
Brigade was withdrawn, the whole Federal force
on the island returned to the camp from which it
had started before the first dawn of day, and the
assault of Secessionville was ended.

The aggregate Confederate loss was 204, nearly
the whole of it falling on the troops who defended
the Secessionville batteries. The struggle for the
parapet had been especially stubborn and fierce.
Muskets were clubbed and Lieutenant Campbell and
Mr. Tennant, of the Charleston Battalion, in de
fault of better weapons, seized handspikes and
wielded them with effect. Among the killed were
Captain Samuel T. Reed, First South Carolina Ar
tillery; Captain Henry C. King and Lieutenant John
T. Edwards, of the Charleston Battalion; Lieutenant
B. A. Graham, of the Forty-seventh Georgia, and
Richard W. Greer, of the Twenty-fifth South Caro
lina.

As soon as the result of the assault was made
known to General Hunter, then at Hilton Head, he
relieved General Benham from command and
ordered him to Washington in arrest, charged with
disobedience of orders and instructions in making

n6 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the assault. General Wright, who succeeded Gen
eral Benham in command, was ordered to abandon
James Island, which was soon done, leisurely and in
perfect order. The Federal troops returned to the
points from which they had started on the expe
dition and the Confederates were left undisturbed
to complete the strong lines of earthworks on James
Island from Fort Johnson, on the harbor, to Prin-
gle, on the Stono, which were never captured.

CHAPTER VII

Operations on the South Atlantic Coast — General Hunter's policy
— Expedition up the St. John's — Capture of St. John's
Bluff — General Hunter is succeeded by Major General
Ormesby Mitchell — Expedition toward Pocotaligo — Engage
ment at Frampton's plantation and Pocotaligo — Negro
troops — General Saxton's activities — Contraband.

While the Union troops under the command of
Brigadier General H. G. Wright were withdrawing
from James Island after the failure of the assault
of June 1 6 on Secessionville, there was urgent need
for reinforcements in both the Union and Confed
erate armies in other quarters.

In Virginia the battles of Fair Oaks and Seven
Pines had been followed by the seven days' battles
around Richmond; General McClellan's army had
been pressed back to Harrison's Landing on the
James, and General Lee was preparing to throw his
army against the Army of Northern Virginia, and
by threatening Washington recall General McClel-
lan from the prosecution of operations against the
Confederates, to the defense of the Union capital.
West of the Mississippi the battle of Pea Ridge had
been fought, and to the east of it the sanguinary and
indecisive battle of Shiloh had been followed by the
slow but steady advance of the army under General
Halleck toward Corinth, until General Beauregard

117

n8 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

was forced to face back to Tupelo. General Buell,
commanding the Army of the Ohio, detached from
General Halleck's army, was marching eastward to
seize the important strategic point of Chattanooga,
while General Bragg, who had succeeded General
Beauregard in command, was preparing to transfer
his army to the same point, anticipate General Buell
in its occupation, and to march thence into Ken
tucky. These military operations had been attended
with fearfully heavy losses in the various armies
engaged.

In response to a call from the War Department
for reinforcements, General Hunter sent seven regi
ments of infantry and a few companies of the First
Massachusetts Cavalry to Virginia, under Brigadier
General I. I. Stearns. So large a draft on his force
reduced it to that degree that General Hunter was
not only unable to renew offensive operations against
Charleston, but could not make any formidable
demonstration at any point on the mainland. Opera
tions along the coast were therefore reduced to
predatory excursions by small parties and surprises
and skirmishes between the advanced pickets.

General Hunter availed himself of this enforced
lull in active military operations in his own depart
ment to inaugurate a favorite plan of his, from which
he anticipated the happiest results. His predecessor,
General W. T. Sherman, had been embarrassed,
rather than aided, by the number of negroes who
had been brought under his care and control by the
occupation of some, and the exposed condition of
all of the sea islands and the adjacent mainland.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 119

General Hunter had, on May 9, without authority
from his Government, issued a General Order eman
cipating all of the slaves in the States of South Caro
lina, Georgia, and Florida, and proceeded to arm,
equip, and organize into companies and regiments
the able-bodied negro men under his control, to be
used in the prosecution of the war in those States.
His method of recruiting was most arbitrary and
summary. He ordered all able-bodied negro men
capable of bearing arms, and within the limits of his
command, to be sent under guard to his headquar
ters. The soldiers were employed to enforce the
order, and marched to different plantations, took
charge of the negroes, at work in the fields or when
ever they could be found, and hurried them off to
headquarters, without giving them time to go to
their cabins for necessary clothing or to make any
preparation for their sudden transition from the
cotton field to the ranks of the army. The order
produced the wildest consternation and panic among
the negroes. Many of them fled from their homes
and concealed themselves in the woods, where they
were pursued by the soldiers, and those of them
who could be found were forcibly brought in and
hurried off to Hilton Head, "sighing for the old
fetters as being better than the new liberty," says
Mr. Wells, one of the Northern overseers in charge
of a plantation.

The time, however, had not yet arrived for resort
ing to that measure for crippling the South and swell
ing the ranks of the Union armies. President Lin
coln repudiated and revoked General Hunter's

120 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

orders, not, however, until the latter had organized
one regiment of negroes, — the first of some forty-
eight thousand or fifty thousand of such troops that
he expected to organize during the summer and
autumn.

It was plainly desirable that the negroes left by
their owners on the abandoned plantations should
be organized and brought under some control, and
direction made for the cultivation of those produc
tive islands. Brigadier General Rufus Saxton, an
ardent advocate of the plan for giving arms and
military organization to the slaves, and using them
in the prosecution of the war in that quarter, had
been assigned to the special duty of organizing and
directing the negroes in the cultivation of the aban
doned plantations. He was clothed with full au
thority over all the inhabitants — who were not in the
military service of the United States — of that part
of the country within the Union lines, or that might
be brought within them in the prosecution of the
war. In ordering courts-martial for the trial of all
offenders, and taking final action on the cases tried,
his authority was the same as that vested in generals
commanding armies or military departments. He
was further authorized to organize and arm five
thousand negro men, and muster them in for the
war for service in the Quartermaster General's De
partment, and five thousand to be organized into
companies, regiments, and brigades. They were to
be officered by white men selected from the regi
ments then in service, and were to be armed and uni
formed and received into the service with the same

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 121

pay and allowances as other troops of the line. They
were to be employed in guarding and protecting
negroes who were engaged in the cultivation of the
plantations, to make forays into the country and
bring away all negroes of what condition soever,
and to destroy all property which might be useful
in the prosecution of the war that could not be
brought within the Union lines. Thus provision was
made for raising a quasi-army of ten thousand men,
in addition to the force already in the department,
and to be under the command of Brigadier General
Saxton.

On September 5 General Hunter left the depart
ment on a long leave of absence, and was succeeded
in command on September 17 by Major General
Ormesby M. Mitchell, Brigadier General J. M.
Brannan commanding in the interim.

During the brief period of his command General
Mitchell infused some new life and activity into the
military operations of his department.

In the preceding May General H. G. Wright,
whose brigade had occupied St. Augustine and parts
of Florida bordering on the St. John's River, was
withdrawn, with his command, to take part in the
general movements for the capture of Charleston.
On the withdrawal of the troops the Floridians re
turned to their homes in Jacksonville and other
points. Some Confederate troops also occupied that
part of the country and were engaged in placing it
in condition of defense. A battery of some strength
had been constructed in and armed at St. John's
Bluff, on the river of that name.

122 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

On September 30 General Mitchell dispatched
General Brannan to the St. John's River with the
Forty-seventh Pennsylvania and Seventh Connecti
cut Infantry, a section of the First Connecticut Ar
tillery, and a detachment of the First Massachusetts
Cavalry, in all 1568 men. On the way he was joined
by a fleet of six gunboats, Captain Charles Steed-
man commanding. The expedition entered the St.
John's in the afternoon of the next day. Three gun
boats proceeded to reconnoiter the battery on the
bluff, and after a brisk engagement retired out of
range. Under cover of the naval vessels the troops
landed at Mayport Mills, but ascertaining there
that, owing to intervening creeks and marshes, it
would be necessary to march about forty miles to
reach the rear of St. John's Bluff, General Brannan
moved his command in boats, furnished from the
fleet, higher up and landed the infantry at Burkbone
Creek, between Publo and Mount Pleasant. Early
on the morning of the 2d Colonel Good of the
Forty-seventh Pennsylvania moved with the infantry
of the command and the naval howitzers to the head
of Mount Pleasant Creek, drove from their camp
a Confederate picket, and occupied a position about
two miles from St. John's Bluff, to cover the landing
of the detachments of artillery and cavalry. Receiv
ing information which he regarded as reliable, that
there were 1200 Confederate infantry and cavalry
between him and the Bluff, General Brannan, after
consultation with Captain Steedman, called upon
Colonel Rice, commanding the Ninth Maine at Fer-
nandina, for reinforcement, and 300 men were

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 123

promptly dispatched to him. Late in the afternoon
of the 3d Captain Steedman, at General Brannan's
request, sent three gunboats to feel the battery at
the Bluff. Finding, to his surprise, that it was not
occupied, he sent a boat party ashore, which hoisted
the Union flag over the Confederate battery.

While General Brannan was waiting within two
miles of the Bluff for the arrival of reinforcements,
the battery had been for eighteen or twenty hours
wide open to receive him. As so often happened
during the war, each commander had greatly over
estimated his adversary's force.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Hopkins had been
assigned to the command of the Bluff a few days
(September 26) before the appearances of the
Union force in the river. In addition to the gunners
who manned the battery, he had outside for its de
fense on the land front a mixed force of about 500,
instead of 1200. Colonel Hopkins, who from his
position in the battery had watched the landing of a
part of the force, judging from what he had himself
seen and from information brought him by the picket
that had been driven in, estimated the Union land
force at 3000 men, whereas it was but little more
than half that number. Feeling his inability to de
fend his post against a combined attack of the troops
which he estimated outnumbered him by six to one,
and the six gunboats in the river in his front, Col
onel Hopkins, with the concurrence of the officers
of his command whom he consulted, abandoned the
battery about nine o'clock on the night of the 2d;
and not having the means of removing his heavy

124 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

guns and ammunition, and fearing that any attempt
to burst or otherwise disable them would apprise the
enemy of his intended retreat, left them all unin
jured. While General Brannan was surprised at his
good fortune in gaining possession, without striking
a blow, of a post strong by nature and strengthened
by well-planned and constructed works, Colonel
Hopkins congratulated himself on having saved his
small force from capture.1

After moving the guns and ammunition to a trans
port, blowing up the magazine, and destroying the
entire work, General Brannan proceeded up the
river to Jacksonville, which he found deserted, the
inhabitants, with the exception of a few old men,
women, and children, having abandoned their homes
on the approach of the enemy and moved back in
the interior. While at Jacksonville a small party
was sent in a transport, escorted by a gunboat, about
230 miles up the river, and took possession of a
small abandoned steamer, the Governor Milton. On
October 13 the whole expedition had returned to
Hilton Head. The return had been hastened by
General Mitchell, who proposed himself to lead a
more extensive expedition against the Charleston
& Savannah Railroad.

The force designated for this expedition was parts
of the First Brigade, Brigadier General J. M. Bran-
nan's, and of the Second Brigade, Brigadier General
A. H. Terrie's, augmented by detachments of other
organizations, making a total land force of 4450

*A court of inquiry which he demanded exonerated him from
all blame.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 125

men.2 Several boat howitzers manned by officers
and men of the navy were added to the land force.

The gunboats and transports of the expedition
were under command of Captain Charles Steedman,
United States Navy.

The organization of the command and all of the
details as to transportation, supplies, and ammuni
tion had been made entirely by Major General Mit
chell, who had intended to command it in person.
A few hours before it sailed, however, Brigadier
General Brannan was assigned to the command,
Colonel Chatfield of the Sixth Connecticut succeed
ing to the command of his brigade. The object of
the expedition was to destroy the railroad and
bridges on the Charleston & Savannah Road, and
the points of attack were Coosawhatchie and Poco-

2The troops composing the expedition were the following:
Forty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, 600 men, Colonel
Tolghman H. Good; Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, 400
men, Colonel Richard White; Fourth New Hampshire Volun
teers, 500 men (Colonel Chatfield) Lieutenant Colonel Spidel;
Seventh Connecticut Volunteers, 500 men, Colonel Joseph R.
Hawley; Third New Hampshire Volunteers, 480 men, Colonel
John H. Jackson; Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, 430
men, Colonel DeWitt C. Strawbridge; Forty-eighth New York
Volunteers, 200 men, Colonel William B. Barton; First New
York Mechanics and Engineers, 250 men, Lieutenant Colonel
James F. Hall; a section of Battery M, First United States
Artillery, 40 men, Lieutenant Guy V. Henry; a section of Ham
ilton's Battery E, Second United States Artillery, Lieutenant
E. Gittings ; detachment of the First Massachussetts Cavalry,
roo men, Captain L. Richmond. A total force of 4500. Colonel
Edward W. Serrgie, First New York Engineers, served on
General Brannan's staff.

126 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

taligo, two stations on the road about ten miles
apart. Scouts and spies had been sent by General
Mitchell to the most important points on the line
of the railroad, from the Savannah to the Salke-
hatchie rivers, a distance of sixty miles. Small parties
were also sent in boats up the Coosawhatchie, Tulli-
finnie, and Pocotaligo, to ascertain and report the
depth of water and condition of the different land
ings. A party was sent in advance to cut the tele
graph wires, and every precaution taken to insure
success. Mackey's Point, a narrow neck of land be
tween the Pocotaligo and Broad rivers, was selected
as the place for landing — a judicious selection, as
gunboats in the two streams could thoroughly sweep
the ground some miles in front and securely cover
the landing.

The expedition started from Hilton Head in the
night of the 2ist, in fourteen gunboats and armed
transports, and the leading vessel reached Mackey's
Point about half-past four o'clock the next morning.
It was eight o'clock before the other vessels arrived.
Colonel Barton, with fifty men of the New York
Engineers and fifty of the Third Rhode Island Vol
unteers was immediately sent up the Coosawhatchie
in the steamer Planter, which had been converted
into a heavily armed gunboat, accompanied by two
other gunboats, to destroy the railroad and bridges
at and near the village of Coosawhatchie. The main
body, under cover of the batteries of the gunboats,
landed without opposition at Mackey's Point, seven
or eight miles from Old Pocotaligo, and marched
forward over a good road up the narrow neck of

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 127

land between the Tullifinnie and Pocotaligo, which
securely protected the flanks, while the gunboats
covered the rear of the column.

Brigadier General W. S. Walker, C. S. A.,3 com
manded in the military district invaded, with head
quarters at McPhersonville, via the railroad about
ten miles from Coosawhatchie toward Charleston.
It was not until 9 A. M. that his pickets informed him
of the landing of the expedition at Mackey's Point
and the passage of gunboats up the Coosawhatchie.
His small force was distributed over a distance of
sixty miles along and near the railroad. The general
plan for the protection of the road and that part of
the country was to occupy the most vulnerable points
by as large detachments as the small available force
could supply; these detachments to be quickly con
centrated at the menaced point, and hold the enemy
in check until reinforcements could arrive from
Charleston and Savannah, and any other point from
which they could be spared. General Walker's meas
ures for defense were taken with the promptness
which characterized him. The troops nearest Mc
Phersonville were ordered to Old Pocotaligo, about
five miles from Coosawhatchie. The Lafayette Ar
tillery, four pieces; Lieutenant L. F. LeBeau's, and
a section of the Beaufort Artillery, Lieutenant H. M.
Stuart commanding, were ordered to Coosawhatchie.
Captain Wyman's company, Eleventh South Caro
lina, which was near the village, and five other com
panies of the same regiment at Hardieville were

alie was a colonel at the time, but was promoted a few days
later.

128 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

ordered up to support the artillery. Colonel Col-
cock's command of five companies of cavalry and
two of sharpshooters, in front of Grahamville, was
ordered to Coosawhatchie. Major J. R. Jefford's
battalion of cavalry (Seventh South Carolina) was
ordered from Green Pond to the Salkehatchie Bridge,
and calls were made on Savannah, Charleston, and
Adams Run for reinforcements ; those from Charles
ton and Adams Run to stop at Pocotaligo Station,
those from Savannah at Coosawhatchie. Captain
W. L. Trenholm, who commanded the outpost near
est Mackey's Point, was ordered to fall back with
his command of two mounted companies, his own
(the Rutledge Mounted Riflemen) and Captain M.
J. Kirk's company of Partisan Rangers toward Old
Pocotaligo.

When these dispositions were made General
Walker had with him to meet the advancing enemy
two sections of Beaufort Light Artillery and the Nel
son (Virginia) Light Battery, eight pieces, Captain
Stephen Elliott commanding; Captain Trenholm's
two companies; the Charleston Light Dragoons,
Captain B. H. Rutledge; the First Battalion South
Carolina Cavalry, Major J. H. Morgan; Captain
D. B. Heywood's company of cavalry; Captain J. B.
Allston's company of sharpshooters, and Captain
A. C. Izard's company of the Eleventh South Caro
lina Infantry, numbering in all 475 men, and as a
fourth of the mounted men were horse-holders, his
effective force was but 405 men. Of this force a
section of the Beaufort Artillery, supported by two
companies of cavalry under Major Morgan and All-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 129

ston's company of sharpshooters, was sent forward
to Caston's plantation to skirmish with and retard
the enemy, while the remaining troops took a strong
position on the Mackey's Point road at a salt marsh
skirted on both sides by woods traversed by a small
stream and crossed by a causeway near Dr. Hutson's
residence on the Frampton plantation.

Colonel Barton ascended the river in the Planter,
followed by the gunboats, to within about two miles
of Coosawhatchie, where he landed and marched
forward, driving the enemy's pickets before him.
When within a few hundred yards of the village a
train of cars was heard approaching, and he quickly
placed his little command in ambush. It was the
train which was bringing the troops ordered up from
Hardeeville for the defense of Coosawhatchie.
When it came within easy range Colonel Barton's
command poured into it a destructive fire of mus
ketry and canister from the boat howitzers, inflicting
serious loss among the men crowded together on the
platform cars. Among the killed were the com
mander of the party, Major J. J. Harrison, and the
fireman of the train. The engineer was badly
wounded, but stood to his post and dashed his train
at full speed through the fire.

Leaving Captain Eaton of the New York Engi
neers with a party of his men to tear up the road
and cut down and destroy the telegraph line, Colonel
Barton hastened forward to the village to attack
the troops while in the confusion of leaving the train.
But when he came in sight of the village he saw the
artillery advantageously posted and supported by

130 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

a company of infantry on the further side of the
stream, between the railroad and public bridges,
their flanks protected on their left by the river and
right by a swamp. The artillery immediately opened
fire, to which Colonel Barton replied by a few
rounds. But night was coming on, the reinforce
ments in the ambushed train had arrived, and find
ing himself in front of a much superior force Colonel
Barton drew off his men and returned to his gun
boats. Captain Eaton had succeeded in cutting the
telegraph line in several places and tearing up two
rails, and while toiling at others some cavalry
videttes appeared at a little distance, and he too
drew off, joining the rest of the command, and re
turned to the gunboats, destroying on the way four
bridges to retard pursuit.

Colonel Colcock, who was so prostrated by a pro
tracted fever that he could not take the field, ordered
Lieutenant Colonel Johnson to take the command
with the utmost dispatch to Coosawhatchie. On
the way Lieutenant Colonel Johnson was deceived
first by a report that reached him that the enemy
had landed at Seabrook's Island, indicating that the
attack was to be made at Grahamville; then by an
other that they were marching on Bees Creek Hill.
His movements to meet the altered conditions of
affairs as indicated by these erroneous reports so
delayed him that, when he ascertained that the Union
force was really marching on Coosawhatchie, he was
obliged to make a detour of five miles to reach that
place. When he arrived the little party under Colo
nel Barton had retreated and, the bridges having

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 131

been torn up, Colonel Johnson did not come up with
them until they were embarking, when a brisk fire
was exchanged with some effect, Lieutenant J. B.
Blanding, Third Rhode Island Artillery, who was
in charge of the Planter, being among the severely
wounded. But the batteries of the gunboat kept the
Confederate cavalry at too great a distance for
effective fire, and Colonel Barton dropped down the
river to the point from which he had started.

While Colonel Barton was carrying out his part
of the general plan, General Brannan's column
moved forward on the Mackey's Point road, and
after marching about ^/2 miles and debouching upon
an open, rolling country, it was fired upon by the
section of the Beaufort Artillery and its support in
position, as has been said, at Caston's plantation.
The First Brigade, in advance, was promptly de
ployed, the artillery hastened to the front, and after
a brisk artillery duel, in which Major Morgan, com
manding the Confederate support, was severely
wounded, the First Brigade advanced and the Con
federate advance guard fell back to the position
occupied by General Walker at the Frampton plan
tation, closely followed by the Union column. The
Confederate position was naturally strong. The
ground was firmer and somewhat more elevated than
that on the other side that the Union column soon
reached. Thick woods screened it and concealed the
Confederate weakness in numbers. The swamp in
front was broad and deep, traversed by a small
stream, and passable only by a narrow causeway, as
the bridge over the little stream had been broken.

132 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

On the Union side the marsh was fringed with timber
and covered by a dense thicket. The eight Confed
erate field pieces were in batteries on an arc of a
curve giving them a concentric fire on the causeway
and the woods on either side of it.

When the head of the first brigade came within
range a rapid artillery fire opened upon it; the two
sections of United States artillery and the naval bat
tery were hurried forward into position, and a rapid
and well directed fire was maintained on both sides,
until the Union ammunition was nearly exhausted.
In the meantime the infantry of the first brigade
struggled with steady courage and determination to
penetrate the woods and thicket, cross the marsh,
and reach the Confederate position on the further
side, but in vain. Twice it was driven out of the
woods with heavy loss. The Forty-seventh Penn
sylvania and Sixth Connecticut, which were in ad
vance, suffered most severely, the former losing
nearly a fifth of its men. Colonel Chatfield, com
manding the brigade, and Lieutenant Colonel Spei-
del, commanding the Sixth Connecticut, were among
the severely wounded, the command of the brigade
devolving on Colonel Good of the Forty-seventh
Pennsylvania.

At the first sound of the artillery fire General
Terry led his brigade at the double quick to the
support of the first. The Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania
of this brigade was thrown into the woods on the
left of the road to support the left of the first bri
gade, which was still striving to force its way through
the marsh. Knowing no way by which the Confed-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 133

erate position could be turned, General Brannan
placed Lieutenant Henry's section of the First Artil
lery, well supported, in a position on the left of the
causeway, from which a more effective fire could be
delivered, and again pressed his infantry through
the woods, so far that the infantry fire was having
a most destructive effect on the men and horses of
the Confederate artillery. That arm seems to have
been General Walker's main reliance, and was al
ready so badly cut up that he deemed it advisable to
withdraw to another strong position at the crossing
of the Pocotaligo, about 2^2 miles in his rear. This
was done in good order, Captain Allston's company
of sharpshooters and Lieutenant Campell's, of the
Eleventh South Carolina, covering the retreat. The
infantry of Brannan's first brigade promptly plunged
through the marsh, "up to the men's arm-pits" in
mud and water, and pressed forward in pursuit. The
little bridge was quickly so repaired by the engineers
as to permit the passage of the artillery, when the
remaining force passed over and followed in pursuit.
It was all-important to General Walker to hold
his enemy in check until reinforcements which he
was expecting could arrive. The object of General
Brannan's expedition was to reach the railroad and
destroy as much of it as possible. When he reached
the juncture of the Mackey's Point with the Coo-
sawhatchie road, it would seem that if, instead of
following and attacking General Walker in his new
position, he had marched directly forward a mile or
so over a comparatively open and practicable
country, he could have struck the bridge and trestle

i34 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

work about the Tullifinnie, where his engineer troops
could have accomplished much destruction in a very
short time. He, however, left a regiment and how
itzer to guard his flank and rear from that direction,
and followed the retreating Confederates to their
new position on the further side of the Pocotaligo,
where the men were sheltered by the houses and scat
tered trees of the little hamlet. The bridge over
the stream, which was approached by a causeway
over another marsh, was torn up and the artillery,
now much reduced, was in position to command the
causeway and crossing. Two pieces of the Beau
fort artillery had been silenced by the killing and
wounding of the gunners, and but two of the guns
were serviceable. The Nelson Battery had suffered
even more severely in killed and wounded, the two
Lieutenants, E. E. Jefferson and F. T. Massey, being
among the wounded; it had but seventeen service
able horses; one caisson had been broken by the
running away of the team early in the action at
Frampton's, and was left on the field. The ammu
nition happened to fit the naval howitzers, and was
returned to the Confederates at Pocotaligo from the
muzzles of those guns. Other pieces had been dis
abled, and only one could be brought into action in
the new position. General Walker had scarcely
made his dispositions for defense when the Union
column came in sight and the fighting was renewed
with spirit.

As at Frampton's, the Union troops endeavored,
but in vain, to cross the marsh. On a call for vol
unteers to find a way through, a party of men stepped

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 135

forward, and between the two fires scattered through
the marsh seeking a practicable passage through it,
but were unsuccessful. On another call a lieutenant
and sergeant penetrated to the little river and, re
turning, reported that, like other streams of the
country, though narrow, it was deep and the banks
steep and muddy.

The Union batteries had exhausted their ammuni
tion, and the caissons not having accompanied the
guns, the latter were sent back to Mackey's Point,
seven or eight miles, to replenish their ammunition
chests. In the absence of the artillery the Sharps'
breech-loading rifles were used with great rapidity
and effect. General Walker had been notified by
telegraph that reinforcements were on the way to
him from Charleston, Savannah, and Adams Run.
The Nelson Battalion (Seventh South Carolina) of
200 men, Captain W. H. Sleigh, commanding, ar
rived between four and five o'clock, but scarcely
more than filled the gaps already made in the ranks.
It was the only reinforcements that arrived in time
to take part in the engagement. Its arrival encour
aged and in a measure relieved the men who had
been fighting and retreating for six hours. They
were received with hearty cheers as they double-
quicked into position. About the same time the
Charleston Light Dragoons, which had been held in
reserve, were ordered up, and came into position
on the left with an inspiring shout. The cheering
produced the impression that reinforcements in con
siderable number were arriving. A piece of the
Beaufort artillery, with a small support, was moved

136 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

by a concealed route to a position which suggested
to General Brannan that it was a movement to turn
his left flank. His ammunition was nearly exhausted,
and there was none nearer than Mackey's Point,
and night was coming on. Recognizing the hope
lessness of attempting anything further against a
force which he believed (erroneously) was much
larger than his own, and in a strong position, Gen
eral Brannan ordered a retreat to Mackey's Point,
which was made deliberately and in good order. He
was unprovided with "sufficient transportation to
remove the wounded, who were lying writhing along
our entire route," he says. Nevertheless the killed
were generally buried and the wounded removed on
improvised stretchers. The bridges which had been
torn up by the retreating and repaired by the advanc
ing troops earlier in the day were again destroyed
to retard pursuit. But the Confederates were in no
condition for vigorous pursuit. They had lost 163
of the 475 men present when the fighting began, and
had received but 200 men as reinforcements. The
Union loss was 340. The following day the troops
of the expedition re-embarked at Mackey's Point
and returned to their respective stations.

General Brannan was under the impression that
in these engagements he had encountered superior
numbers, and two weeks later on, November 6, in a
General Order complimenting his troops for their
gallantry and good conduct on the expedition to
Pocotaligo, he tells them that "though laboring
under many disadvantages, yet by superior courage
and determination was a greater force of the rebels

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 137

driven from their strong and well studied positions
at Caston's and Frampton's, and pursued flying and
in confusion to their intrenchments on the Poco-
taligo" ; whereas, as has been seen, from the firing
of the first to the last shot of the day he had out
numbered his adversary from nine to ten to one.

This was the last expedition of any magnitude
undertaken in the Department of the South until the
next spring. On October 30 Major General Mitchell
died of fever at Beaufort, and General Brannan suc
ceeded by seniority to the command of the depart
ment. His aggregate force present when he assumed
command was but 12,838.

General Saxton, who as superintendent of aban
doned plantations and director of the negroes within
the Union lines, exercised an independent command
within a command, reporting directly to the Secre
tary of War, seems to have been thoroughly imbued
with the belief that the heaviest blow against the
South could be struck by negroes armed and organ
ized into a military force. And there were officers
about him who shared that belief. His plan was
to haul a number of light-draught steamers well
armed and protected against rifle shots. Each
steamer was to have on hand a company of one hun
dred negro soldiers, whom he regarded as better
fitted for the particular service required of them
than white soldiers. An abundant supply of muskets
and ammunition was to be placed in the hands of
the negroes who might be gathered and found
capable of bearing arms. These boats should be
sent up the bays, lagoons, and streams intersecting

138 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the Southern coast, some of which were navigable
for more than a hundred miles into the heart of the
richest part of the Southern country. They should
land at the various plantations, drive off the owners
or any pickets that might be found, and bring away
the negroes. Those who were capable of bearing
arms were to be placed in the ranks. This species
of warfare he thought would carry terror to the
hearts of the Southerners. "In this way," he writes
to the Secretary of War, "we could very soon have
complete occupation of the whole country. Indeed,
I can see no limit to which our success might not be
pushed — up to the entire occupation of States, or
their occupation by a large portion of the rebel
army."

The organization of a negro regiment called the
First South Carolina Union Infantry had been com
menced, the officers being white men selected from
the volunteer regiments. With these troops General
Saxton undertook on a small scale to carry his plan
into execution.

On November 3 he dispatched Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver T. Beard, of the Forty-eighth New York
Volunteers, in command of a detachment of the
First South Carolina Regiment on an expedition
along the coast of Georgia and east Florida, be
tween Saint Simon's Island and Fernandina; and
again on November 13 to the Doboy River, Georgia:
On both expeditions he was accompanied by a naval
gunboat. Lieutenant Colonel Beard's official reports
are brief and to the point, and will illustrate the
species of warfare carried on by General Saxton

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 139

on the Southern coast in the autumn and winter of
1862-3.

Reporting to General Saxton, Colonel Beard says :
" . . . On Monday, November 3, with the
steamer Darlington, having on board Captain Tro-
bridge's company of colored troops (Sixty-second),
I proceeded up Bell River, Florida, drove in the
rebel pickets below Cooper's and destroyed their
place of rendezvous; thence proceeded and destroyed
the salt works and all the salt, corn, and wagons
which we could not carry away, besides killing the
horses; thence we proceeded to Jolly River and de
stroyed two salt works, with a large amount of salt
and corn; thence proceeded to Saint Mary's and
brought off two families of contrabands, after driv
ing in the enemy's pickets.

"On Tuesday, November 4, I proceeded to Kings
Bay, Georgia, and destroyed a large salt work on
a creek about a mile from the landing, together with
all the property on the place. Here we were at
tacked by about eighty of the enemy, of whom we
killed two.

"On Thursday, November 6, landed on Butler
Island and brought off eighty bushels of rice; also
landed at Darien and captured three prisoners and
some arms.

"Friday, November 7, accompanied by the gun
boat Potemska, Lieutenant Budd commanding, pro
ceeded up Sapello River. The gunboat could pro
ceed no further than Kings. Lieutenant Budd came
on board the Darlington and proceeded up the river

140 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

with us to Fairhope. At Spauldings we were at
tacked by eighty or ninety of the enemy, who were
well posted on a bluff behind trees. At this point
the channel runs within fifty yards of the bluff. We
killed two of the enemy and had one colored man
wounded. At Fairhope we destroyed the salt works,
some ten vats, corn, and other things that might be
of use to the enemy.

uOn return past Spaulding's we were again at
tacked by the enemy in greater force. We effected
a landing and burned all the buildings on the place
and captured some arms, etc. Five of the enemy
were killed; we lost three wounded. We were
greatly aided here by the Potemska, which from a
bend below shelled the woods. Under the guns of
the Potemska we landed at Colonel Brailsford's,
drove in a company of pickets from his regiment,
and destroyed all the property on the place, together
with the most important buildings.

I started from Saint Simons with sixty-two fighting
men and returned to Beaufort with 156 fighting men
(all colored) . . .

"We destroyed nine large salt works, together
with twenty thousand dollars' worth of horses, salt,
rice, corn, etc., which we could not carry away."

Again reporting the result of his expedition to
Doboy River, Georgia, he says: "I succeeded in
loading the steamers Ben DeFord and Darlington
with from 200,000 to 300,000 feet of superior
boards and planks, besides securing a number of-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 141

circular and other saws, belting, corn mills, and
other property which I was directed to obtain for
your department."

In the following January Colonel T. W. Higgin-
son (of Massachusetts), commanding the First South
Carolina Colored Infantry, carried his regiment on
a similar expedition up the Saint Mary's River in
Georgia and Florida, in three steamers, the result
of which he reported to General Saxton as success
ful beyond his most sanguine expectations. He dis
covered and brought away much valuable property,
and left undisturbed much valuable household fur
niture, which he forbade his officers and men to take.
"No wanton destruction was permitted, nor were
any buildings burned, unless in retaliation for being
fired upon, according to the usages of war.

Nothing was taken for public use save articles strictly
contraband of war."

Among the articles which he seems to regard as
belonging to that class, and which he brought away,
were "40,000 large-sized bricks, four horses, four
steers, and a quantity of agricultural implements
suitable for Mr. Helper's operations at this local
ity." He also found great quantities "of choice
Southern lumber," and brought away as much of it
as he could; but he left behind more than 1,000,000
feet of choice lumber, "for want of transportation,"
the three steamboats under his control being laden
to their full capacity with other freight. The con
duct of his negro troops greatly surprised and filled
him with the most enthusiastic admiration for their

142 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

gallantry and peculiar adaptability to the kind of
service in which he had employed them, and for
which he regarded them as far better than the best
white troops. "It would have been madness," he
said, "to attempt with the bravest white troops what
I have successfully accomplished with black ones."
Their bearing "in battle," especially won his highest
admiration. Then they exhibited, according to his
account, a fiery energy beyond anything of which
he had ever read, except of the French Zouaves. It
required the strictest discipline to hold them in hand.
They were ascending the river in steamers so con
structed as to protect those within from the fire of
small arms. In the first attack, and before Colonel
Higginson could get "them all penned below," they
crowded at the open ends of the steamers, loading
and firing with unconceivable rapidity, and shouting
to each other, "Never give it up." When collected
into the hold they actually fought each other for
places at the few portholes from which they could
fire on the enemy. Their conduct generally on the
expedition thoroughly convinced Colonel Higginson
and all of his officers "that the key to the successful
prosecution of this war lies in the unlimited employ
ment of black troops."

CHAPTER VIII

Strengthening the blockade — Palmetto State and Chicora —
Blockading fleet attacked — Result of engagement — Federal
Reports — Blockade raised — Foreign consuls' report — Diver
sity of statements — Capture of the Isaac Smith.

At no time from the beginning of the war to the
spring of 1863 was the naval force of the South
Atlantic squadron deemed strong enough to encoun
ter the land batteries defending Charleston harbor.
The duties of the fleet were therefore restricted so
far as concerned Charleston to the tedious and mo
notonous task of blockading the port, enlivened oc
casionally by a chase, sometimes succesful, of a
blockade runner.

More effectually to seal the port than the block
ading fleet had been able to accomplish, an experi
ment was made to close it permanently by obstruct
ing the channel. On December 20, 1861, the first
anniversary of the secession of South Carolina, a
fleet of seventeen old merchant vessels laden with
stone was anchored at regular and short intervals
in a line across the main channel, and having been
stripped were scuttled and sunk. On January 20
following another fleet of similar vessels was sunk
in like manner, four of them on the western end of
Rattlesnake Shoals, the others in the track of ves
sels entering Charleston harbor by Moffitt's Chan-

143

144 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

nel. The question naturally arose as to whether
this method of blockading a port by destroying the
entrance to it was admissible under the laws of na
tions, and it was thought it might lead to some in
ternational complications. But the experiment ut
terly failed. The irresistible waters of the Atlantic
could not be stayed in their natural ebb and flow; the
currents edging around the obstructions washed the
sand from under them, speedily making as good
a channel as ever by sinking the vessels deeper than
had been intended; so deep that they offered no ob
stacle to ingress and egress.

After the failure of the assault on Secessionville
and the abandonment by the Federal troops of the
foothold they had secured on James Island in June,
more than a year elapsed before any demonstration
of note was made on Charleston by the land forces.
In the meantime the operations against that city and
its harbor were left to the navy, the land forces be
ing in readiness to co-operate with it when occasion
offered. Admiral DuPont remained in command of
the South Atlantic squadron until July, 1863. Gen
eral Beauregard had been assigned to the important
and difficult command of the Department of South
Carolina and Georgia, succeeding General Pember-
ton in that command on September 24, 1862.

Early in the morning of January 31, 1863, the
blockading fleet off Charleston was surprised by a
raid. There were two ironclad steamers or rams in
Charleston harbor, which had been built at private
shipyards in that city, the Palmetto State and Chi-
cora. They were admirable vessels of their class,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 145

each armed with four heavy guns and well officered
and manned. Captain John Rutledge commanded
the Palmetto State and Captain John R. Tucker the
Chicora. Commodore Duncan N. Ingraham com
manded the station, with his flag on the Palmetto
State. About a quarter past eleven o'clock on the
night of the 3Oth the two steamers left their wharves
and steamed slowly down to the bar, where they
awaited the high tide to pass over. About four
o'clock in the morning they crossed the bar and
made directly for the blockading fleet. The Pal
metto State went under full steam directly for the
nearest vessel seen at anchor, which proved to be
the United States steamer Mercedita, Captain Still-
wagen commanding.

The Commodore ordered Captain Rutledge to
strike with his prow and fire into her. As soon as
the officer of the deck of the Mercedita saw the
strange steamer approaching all hands were piped
to quarters and the guns manned for action. Com
mander Stillwagen, who had just turned in, quickly
sprang to his deck and, seeing the stranger close on
him, hailed: "What steamer is that? Drop your
anchor or you will be into us," and hearing the
answer, "The Confederate steamer Palmetto
State" he immediately ordered, "Fire! fire!"
These brief and hurried calls and answers, orders to
quarters and to fire, were scarcely uttered when the
Palmetto State struck the Mercedita on the quarter
abaft the aftermost thirty-pounder, and at the same
time fired a seven-inch shell, which crushed through
her starboard side diagonally across, passing

146 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

through the Normandy condenser and the steam
drum, killing the gunner in his room and, exploding
against the port side of the ship, tore a hole through
it four or five feet square.

The vessel was instantly filled and enveloped with
steam; outcries were heard that the shot had passed
through both boilers, that the fires were extinguished
by steam and water, that a number of men were
killed and others scalded, and that the vessel was
sinking rapidly. The Confederate commander
called out: "Surrender or I will sink you. Do you
surrender?" To which Captain Stillwagen replied:
"I can make no resistance; my boiler is destroyed."
"Then do you surrender?" "Yes," replied the cap
tain of the Mercedita, and quickly sent Lieutenant
Commander Abbott in a boat to the Palmetto State
to make known the condition of his vessel and ascer
tain what the Confederate commander demanded.
Lieutenant Abbott stated that he came in the name
of Captain Stillwagen to surrender the United States
steamer Mercedita, she being then in a sinking and
perfectly defenseless condition, that she had a crew
of 158, all told, that her boats were not large
enough to save the crew, and had besides been low
ered without the plugs being put in and had filled
with water. He was informed that the officers and
crew would be paroled, provided he would pledge
his word of honor that neither he nor any of the
officers or crew of the Mercedita would again take
up arms against the Confederate States during the
war, unless legally and regularly exchanged as pris
oners of war. "Believing it to be the proper course

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 147

to pursue at the time, I consented," says Lieutenant
Abbott. The Merc edit a did not fire a gun, the Pal
metto State being so low in the water and so near
that the guns of the former could not be turned
on her.

In the meantime the Chicora fired into a schooner-
rigged propeller and it was believed set her on fire;
then engaged a large side-wheel steamer at close
quarters, firing three shots into her with telling effect,
which then put on all steam and ran off, escaping in
the dark. She then engaged a schooner-rigged pro
peller and the Keystone State. The latter was com
manded by Captain Le Roy, United States Navy.
The first shot from the Chicora set her on fire in
her forward hold, when she kept off seaward to
gain time to extinguish the fire and prepare the ship
for action. About daylight she made for the Chi
cora for the purpose, if possible, of running her
down, exchanging shots with and "striking her re
peatedly, but making no impression on her, while
every shot from her struck the Keystone State with
telling effect." About a quarter past six o'clock a
shell crashed through the Keystone State's port side
forward guard and destroyed the steam chimneys,
filling the forward part of the ship with steam. The
port boiler, emptied of its contents, so lightened her
on that side that the ship gave a heel to starboard
nearly down to the guard. The water from the
boiler, which was rapidly pouring through two
shot holes under water, produced the impression that
the ship was filling rapidly and sinking. A foot and
a half of water was reported in the hold.

148 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

To add to the embarrassment the fire, which it
was supposed had been extinguished, broke out
again, while the steam forward prevented the men
from getting up ammunition, even if the ship and
crew had been in condition to use it. The signal
books and some arms were thrown overboard and
all the boats were made ready for lowering. "The
ram being so near," says Captain Le Roy, "the ship
helpless and the men being slaughtered by almost
every discharge of the enemy's guns, I ordered the
colors to be hauled down; but finding the enemy
were still firing upon us directed the colors to be
rehoisted and returned fire from the after battery."
In his official report Captain Le Roy makes no men
tion whatever of having struck his colors. His log
book, over his own signature, is much fuller in de
tail than his official report, and has been followed in
the foregoing narrative.

Captain Tucker states in his report that when the
Keystone State struck her colors she was completely
at his mercy, as the Chicora had a raking position
astern of her and distant about two hundred yards.
A large number of the crew were seen rushing to
the after part of the deck of the Keystone State, ex
tending their arms towards the Chicora in an im
ploring manner. He immediately ceased firing upon
her and ordered First Lieutenant Bier to man a
boat and take charge of the prize and, if possible, to
save her. If that were not possible, then to rescue
the crew. While the lieutenant and men were in the
act of manning the boat he discovered that the Key
stone State was endeavoring to make her escape by

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 149

working her starboard wheel, the other being dis
abled. Her colors being down, he at once started
in pursuit and renewed the engagement, but owing
to her superior steaming power she soon widened
the distance to about two thousand yards, when she
rehoisted her colors and commenced firing her rifle
gun. She was soon taken in tow by the United
States steamer Memphis and carried off to Port
Royal.

The Chicora next engaged a brig and a bark-
rigged propeller. Not having the requisite speed,
she was unable to bring them to close quarters, but
pursued them six or seven miles seaward. Toward
the end of the engagement and in broad daylight she
was engaged at long range with a large bark-rigged
steamer. It was doubtless the Housatonic, as no
other vessel appears to have been within range at
that time. If so, the reports of the respective cap
tains differ materially. Captain Tucker says that
in spite of all his efforts he was unable to bring the
steamer with which he was exchanging shots at long
range to close quarters, owing to her superior steam
ing qualities.

The report of Captain Taylor, of the Housatonic,
produces the impression that the Chicora was mak
ing for the harbor and desirous of avoiding an en
gagement with her adversary. She and the Pal
metto State were heading toward the harbor, and
the captain says he opened fire upon the ram as soon
as he got within range (which was returned deliber
ately) , and kept it up "as long as she remained within
range. At no time did she (the Chicora) deviate

1 50 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

from the course she was steering when we first saw
her, except that she turned twice to bring her stern
gun to bear on us." Admiral DuPont says: "The
Housatonic, Captain Taylor, gave chase. . . . The
Confederate vessels then passed to the northward,
receiving the fire of our ships and took refuge in the
swash channel behind the shoals." The Admiral
was at Port Royal at the time and, of course, made
his report on the faith of those made to him.

It is difficult to imagine why the commanders of
the ironclads should have wished to avoid the com
bat and take shelter anywhere. They knew that all
of the blockading vessels were of wood and most
of them merchant steamers armed. They had the
utmost confidence in the ability of the ironclads to
destroy any and every one of those wooden steamers
with which they might come into conflict, if the latter
did not profit by superior speed to escape. They
had gone into the midst of the fleet with no other
purpose than to engage it. They had engaged sev
eral steamers successfully, crippling them greatly,
while they (the ironclads) had received no injury,
and there had not been a casualty in either vessel.

If, as Captain Taylor's report plainly implies, he
was anxious to engage the ironclads with his wooden
ship, why he did not do so seems inexplicable. The
speed of the Housatonic was probably double that
of the ironclads, which was but six or seven knots an
hour. They had been in the midst of his fleet about
four hours, and if from any cause he was prevented
from following and engaging them at that time, he
could have approached them at any time during the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 151

day, as they lay at anchor in four fathoms of water
outside of the entrance to Beech Channel for about
eight hours. They could not have gone inside
sooner had Commodore Ingraham desired it, as
there was not water enough on the bar to take them
over except at high tide. An examination of the
chart will show that while anchored in four fathoms
they were very far beyond the range of any land
battery.

Having disposed of the Mercedita, the Palmetto
State stood to the northward and eastward and soon
found another steamer getting under way, stood for
her and fired several shots, but as the ram had to be
fought in a circle to bring her different guns to bear
the steamer was soon out of range. Just as day
dawned a large steamer with a smaller one in com
pany was seen under way on the starboard bow and
standing to the southward under full steam. They
opened their batteries on the Chicora, which was
some distance astern of the Palmetto State. The
latter turned and stood to the southward to support
the Chicora, if necessary, but the two steamers kept
on their course to the southward. The superior
speed of the blockading steamers made pursuit of
them hopeless. Commodore Ingraham therefore
signaled Captain Tucker to come to anchor and lead
the way to the entrance to Beech Channel. Captain
Tucker accordingly stood in shore, "leaving," he
says, "the partially crippled and fleeing enemy about
seven miles clear of the bar, standing to the south
ward and eastward."

About half past eight o'clock the two Confederate

152 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

steamers were at anchor off Beech Channel in four
fathoms water, where they remained until after four
o'clock in the evening. They were not injured, had
not even been struck, and there were no casualties.
The Federal loss in the engagement was four killed
and three wounded on the Mercedita, and on the
Keystone State twenty killed and twenty wounded;
total, forty-seven. The Mercedita had surrendered
and the Keystone State struck her colors to escape
destruction, thus virtually surrendering; but both
escaped to Port Royal. The raid was over and soon
the nearest of the blockading steamers was hull
down off to sea, the masts visible to those on the
Confederate steamers only with the aid of power
ful glasses.

As soon as the result, or supposed result, of the
raid on the blockading squadron was reported to
General Beauregard, he telegraphed to the Adjutant
General in Richmond that the Confederate States
steam rams Palmetto State and Chicora had sunk
the United States steamer Mercedita of the block
ading squadron, that Captain Turner had set fire to
one vessel, which struck her colors, and thought he
sunk another. "Our loss and damage none. Ene
my's whole fleet has disappeared north and south.
I am going to proclaim the blockade raised." He
and Commodore Ingraham united in issuing a proc
lamation setting forth that the Confederate States
naval force had that morning attacked the United
States blockading fleet off the harbor of Charleston,
"and sunk, dispersed, or drove off and out of sight
for the time the entire hostile fleet," and they

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 153

formally declared the blockade raised by force of
arms.

Copies of the proclamation were sent to the for
eign consuls, and General Beauregard placed a
steamer at their disposal to see for themselves that
no blockade existed. The French and Spanish con
suls accepted the invitation.1 The Spanish consul,
Serior Munez de Monceeda, replying to the offer,
says: "Having gone out in company with the
French consul and arrived at the point where the
Confederate naval forces were, we discovered three
steamers and a pilot boat returning. I must also
mention that the British consul at this port mani
fested to me verbally, that some time subsequent
to this naval combat not a single blockading vessel
was in sight." That evening or night General
Beauregard telegraphed the Adjutant General:
"Some of the enemy's vessels have returned, but for
several hours (three or four) none were in sight.
Was blockade raised or not? What says the Attor
ney General? Shall I publish my proclamation,
written meanwhile?"

The truth of the statements contained in the proc
lamation and made by the foreign consuls and the
Charleston papers was vehemently denied by Cap
tain William Rodgers Taylor and Commander J.

The visit of the Spanish and French consuls was in the
afternoon. The Charleston papers of about that date stated
that the British consul, with the commander of the British
war steamer Petrel, had previously gone five miles beyond the
usual anchorage of the blockaders and could see nothing of
them with their glasses.

154 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

H. Strong, James Madison Frailey, E. G. Parrott,
Pend. G. Watmough and C. J. Van Alstine, all of
them commanding vessels of the blockading fleet in
an official joint certificate of February 10, 1863, ad
dressed to Admiral DuPont. Their denial is ex
pressed in very emphatic and harsh terms. It hap
pened also that the One Hundred and Seventy-sixth
Regiment Pennsylvania Militia was passing
Charleston harbor that morning in the transport
steamer Cossack, en route from Morehead City,
N. C., to Port Royal, S. C. Colonel A. A. Leckler
and Surgeon W. F. Funderburg, of the One Hun
dred and Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania, and Captain
T. C. Newberry, commanding the Cossack, united in
a letter of February 21, 1863, to Admiral DuPont,
in which they deny the truth of the foregoing Con
federate statements in terms quite as strong and
harsh as did the naval officers. In the very early
morning they heard some firing, but that was not un
usual. They arrived off Charleston harbor about
half past eight o'clock and found the blockaciing ves
sels at their usual stations at an estimated distance
of from four to five miles from land. Some of the
vessels were at anchor. They were in the midst of
the fleet little less than an hour, and communicated
with the officers, some of whom came on board their
ship. The weather was a little hazy, but they saw
land very clearly on both sides of the harbor. They
denounce the statements from Confederate sources
and the foreign consuls "as utterly false in every
particular."

Statements so diametrically opposed when made

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 155

by men of high official and social positions ought to
admit of some satisfactory explanation without the
imputation of deliberate falsehood. It may be that
the denial was leveled mainly at the statements of
the sinking of any vessel and of raising the blockade,
but was made more sweeping and comprehensive
than the officers intended. It is true that the Merce-
dha had not been sunk, nor did the proclamation
state that it had been. -It simply declared the block
ade raised in a way recognized as valid under the
law of nations, namely, that the blockading fleet had
been "sunk, dispersed, or driven off and out of
sight" for the time by force of arms. A simple
statement of the facts as they are set forth in the
official reports of the Federal officers themselves
W7ill show the grounds on which General Beauregard
and Commodore Ingraham based the statement.

Commodore Turner, of the United States steam
frigate New Ironsides, states that there wrere nine
blockading vessels lying off Charleston bar on the
morning of the attack. It would seem from the
statements of the Federal reports that the weather
was thick and hazy, so much so that the Palmetto
State was nearly upon the Mercedita before she was
seen by the officer of the deck of the latter, who was
on the alert. The Mercedita after being fired into
was surrendered with her crew, because, as her com
mander and executive officer stated, she was in a
sinking and perfectly helpless condition. When day
dawned she was nowhere to be seen, either by the
Confederate or Federal commanders. The latter,
Captain Taylor, was apprehensive that she had been

156 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

destroyed. It was therefore very natural that Com
modore Ingraham and Captain Tucker should have
believed she had sunk. She had, in fact, started
about five o'clock for Port Royal, and when day
dawned had been about an hour on that course and
was out of sight.

The Keystone State had lost about a fourth of
her crew and was so badly crippled that she struck
her colors, and as soon as it was light was taken in
tow by the Memphis and carried directly off to Port
Royal. As soon as the raid was over, about eight
o'clock, Captain Taylor dispatched the Augusta,
Parrott commanding, to Port Royal to carry the
news of the disaster to Admiral DuPont. Thus four
of the nine blockading vessels of the fleet reached
Port Royal after 3 o'clock P. M. that day.
About 8 o'clock A. M. Captain Parrott reported
to Captain Taylor what he had himself observed,
that the United States steamers Mercedita, Flag,
Stellin, and Ottawa could nowhere be seen, and
search was made for them. Between 9 and 10
o'clock A. M., therefore, seven of the nine block-
aders were out of sight, not only of the Confed
erate, but of the Federal commanders, leaving only
two — the H ous atonic and Quaker City — that could
by any chance have been seen. Of these two Cap
tain Taylor says: "The Keystone State was at this
time in tow of the Memphis and distant (from him)
two or three miles; the weather was unfavorable for
signaling and I was steaming toward her when the
Quaker City came up and expressed a desire to com
municate. Commander Frailey reported having re-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 157

ceived a shell in his engine-room and required sev
eral articles to repair the damage." Between 8
and 9 o'clock A. M., therefore, the Housatonic
was steaming southward to overtake two other ves
sels which were two or three miles off, when it fell
in with the Quaker City in a crippled condition. It
is not therefore marvelous that at about that time
Captain Tucker, Confederate States Navy, should
have reported that he left "the partially crippled
and fleeing enemy about seven miles clear of the bar
steaming to the southward and eastward."

Just where the Housatonic and Quaker City were
when they came together between 8 and 9 o'clock
A. M. does not appear; but it does appear from
Captain Taylor's own statement that from day
dawn to 3 o'clock P. M. the weather was so thick
and hazy that at no time was the land distinctly
visible, and that he did not start back to pick up his
anchor, where he had left it when the raid began,
until about three o'clock in the afternoon. The
Ottawa did not appear on the scene during the en
gagement, and nothing is said of her in the official
reports except that she was out of sight, but re
ported safe. She was probably in Stono River. Her
station was nearer the Stono Inlet than the other
vessels, and the morning of the 3ist her commander
sent word to Captain Taylor that the steamer
Isaac Smith had been captured and that the Com
modore McDonough, the only other gunboat in that
river, was in danger. Early that morning a gunboat
came into the river, steamed up it and shelled Le-
gareville and then fell down the river, but returned

158 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

in the evening and resumed fire. As the commander
knew or had been informed that the gunboat Mc-
Donough was in danger, and was himself so near
at hand, it is reasonable to suppose that his was the
gunboat that came into the river to assist the Me-
Donongh. If so, she was clearly out of sight of the
bar, leaving the Housatonic and Quaker City the
only two of the nine blockading steamers mentioned
by Commodore Turner as present that morning
which could by any possibility have been seen.

Under all of these circumstances it is surely not
wonderful or improbable that for three or four
hours during that day the blockading fleet could not
be seen by the Confederates who were near the bar,
and that is all the proclamation stated as to its posi
tion. To everyone who knew General Beaureguard
and Commodore Ingraham their statement of facts
will be received as absolutely true, and needs no
argument to prove them. Whether the facts as they
existed constituted a technical raising of the block
ade is a question of law on which there may be hon
est difference of opinion.

Again, the six naval officers in their letter above
mentioned say among other things: "These are the
facts, and we do not hesitate to state that no vessel
did come out beyond the bar after the return of
the rams at between 7 and 8 A. M. to the cover
of the forts. We believe the statement that any
vessel came anywhere near the usual anchorage of
any of the blockaders, or up to the bar after the
withdrawal of the rams, to be deliberately and
knowingly false." These statements, so unhesitat-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 159

ingly made and so harshly expressed, must in the
case of at least three of those officers have been
based on other evidence than their own observation.
They could not have known personally whereof
they spoke.

Two of them, Commanders Parrott and Wat-
mough, started early in the morning for Port Royal
and arrived there after 3 o'clock p. M. They there
fore could not have had personal knowledge of what
vessels came up to or over the Charleston harbor
bar that day. Another, Commander Strong, was
out of sight of his own commanding officer from
day dawn until half-past ten o'clock, when he came
up and brought news to Captain Taylor of the safety
of the Stettin and Ottawa. The Stettin came up
about eleven o'clock; her commander, Van Alstine,
brought a message from Lieutenant Commander
Whitney, of the Ottawa, that the United States
steamer Isaac Smith had been captured in the Stono
the previous evening and that the Commodore Mc-
Donough was in danger. Captain Strong was im
mediately sent into the Stono to assist the McDon-
ongh. The weather was so hazy all day that Cap
tain Taylor could scarcely see land anywhere, and
he was much nearer the bar than Captain Strong.
How, then, could Captain Strong have spoken with
such absolute certainty and from personal observa
tion of what vessels were near the bar? How, in
deed, could Captain Taylor himself, or the two
other officers, Commanders Frailey and Van Alstine,
have known what steamer came over the bar? Their
vessels, according to the Confederate accounts, were

160 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

hull down out to sea and only their masts could be
seen by persons outside of the bar, and according to
his own official report Taylor was so far out to sea
and the weather so hazy that he could scarcely see
land anywhere. It seems hopeless to attempt to
reconcile the statements made by the landsmen of
the One Hundred and Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania
Regiment and the captain of the transport steamer
Cossack with the concurrent official reports both
Federal and Confederate.

The report brought to Captain Taylor on the
morning of the 3ist by Commander Van Alstine,
of the capture the previous evening of a steamer in
the Stono, proved true. The United States steamers
Commodore McDonough and Isaac Smith had been
in the habit for some time of running up and down
the Stono reconnoitering and occasionally exchang
ing shots at long range with the land batteries. Gen
erals Beauregard and Ripley planned an ambush
which it was hoped would result in the capture of
one, and perhaps both, of the steamers. The execu
tion of the plan was intrusted to Lieutenant Colonel
J. A. Yates, of the First South Carolina Artillery, a
gentleman in every way admirably fitted for the suc
cessful performance of the duty.

On the night of January 29 two batteries of siege
and field guns were placed in ambush near the right
bank of the Stono, one of them at Trimble's place
on John's Island, and one lower down at Legare
Point Place. A third battery of three twenty-four
pounder rifle guns was placed in ambush near
Thomas Gimble's, higher up on the river and on the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 161

•A

James Island side. Major J. W. Brown, Second
South Carolina; Major Charles Alston and Captain
F. H. Harleston, of the South Carolina siege train,
commanded the batteries on the John's Island side.
The battery at Thomas Gimble's was commanded
by Captain John H. Geary, Fifteenth South Caro
lina Heavy Artillery. Captain John C. Mitchell,2
son of the Irish patriot, John Mitchell, commanded
a battalion of two companies (Twentieth South
Carolina Volunteers) of sharpshooters.

About 4 P. M. on the 3Oth the steamer Isaac Smith,
Lieutenant Conover commanding, steamed up the
Stono and anchored off Thomas Gimble's, about five
hundred yards from Captain Geary's guns. The
batteries had been so well screened from view that
they were not seen by anyone on the steamer. Cap
tain Geary waited about twenty minutes, hoping the
crew would land, but discovering no signs of landing
he opened, firing rapidly and with effect. The fire
was quickly returned with shell, canister, and grape
from the steamer, which at the same time slipped
her anchor and started down the river. Then the
upper battery on John's Island opened, and Lieuten
ant Connor discovered, as he says, that he was "en
trapped," and that his only way of escape was to
get below the batteries. To do that he would have
to run the gauntlet of the land batteries and sharp
shooters, fighting his way out.

2He was a handsome, gallant young Irish gentleman, and
while commanding Fort Sumter in the summer of 1864 was
killed on the parapet by a shell from Cutnming's Point.

1 62 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

Owing to a bend in the river the steamer, while
running more than a mile, was exposed to raking
fires from batteries on both banks of the river, to
which he could reply only with his pivot gun. As
soon as he reached a part of the river where his
broadsides could be brought to bear he opened with
shell and grape at from two to four hundred yards'
distance. But a shot through the steam chimney
effectually stopped the engine, and with but little tide
and no wind to carry him down the river and his
boats riddled with shots he was entirely at the mercy
of the enemy. Exposed to the concentrated fire
from the batteries on both sides and the rifles of
Captain Mitchell's sharpshooters, "the shot tearing
through the vessel in every direction and with no
hope of being able to silence such a fire," Lieutenant
Conover thought it his duty to surrender, and accord
ingly hauled down his colors and ran up the white
flag.

"Had it not been for the wounded men," he says,
"with which the berth deck was covered, I might
have blown up or sunk the ship, letting the crew
take the chance of getting on shore by swimming;
but under the circumstances I had no alternative left
me." The steamer and entire crew, consisting of 1 1
officers and 108 men, were surrendered. The loss
on the steamer was 9 killed and 16 wounded, among
the latter the lieutenant commanding. The Con
federate loss was i man mortally wounded and i gun
disabled. The steamer was armed with one 30-
pounder Parrot rifle and eight 8-inch columbiads.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 163

She was but little injured, was soon repaired, and
passed into the Confederate service under the name
of the Stono.

Commander Bacon, of the McDonough, which
was in Stono Inlet, hearing the firing up the river,
got under way and steamed up to assist the Smith,
but soon discovered the white flag flying over her and
her crew in boats going ashore as prisoners. He con
tinued to move on up with the intention of towing
her off or blowing her up. Before getting sufficiently
near to accomplish anything the guns at Point Place,
which had taken no part in the fire on the Smith,
and whose presence then was unknown, opened on
the McDonough and were followed quickly by other
guns. The steamer moved back down the river, re
turning the fire of the land batteries and keeping in
motion to prevent her range being ascertained until
dark, when she was beyond effective range. Com
mander Bacon then turned his guns upon the pretty
little town of Legareville, throwing shells into it, "in
the hope," he says, "of setting fire to the place."

CHAPTER IX

The Merrimac — The monitors — Fort McAlister — Advance on
Charleston — Fort Sumter again assailed — Ironclads in ac
tion — Result of Confederate fire to ironclads — Report of
action — Confederate loss — Review of the engagement — Lin
coln's dispatch — Feeling in the North — Investment of Char
leston postponed.

Among the United States war vessels which were
destroyed or partially destroyed by the Federal offi
cers on the eve of their evacuation of Norfolk and
the Gosport Navy Yard, April 20, 1861, was the
United States steam frigate Merrimac, which was
burned to her copper line and berth-deck, scuttled,
and sunk. Subsequently she was raised by Confed
erate naval officers, reconstructed on a novel model,
encased in iron plates, armed with heavy guns and
an iron prow, and soon became famous as the Con
federate States steam ram Merrimac. The report
went abroad that she was invulnerable to any guns
then in use, and could readily overcome and destroy
any vessels then in the navy with which she might
come in collision.

The knowledge of the existence of this novel
engine of war caused no little apprehension in the
North, which was greatly heightened by the ease
with which she and her consorts sunk the United
States ship Cumberland and destroyed the Congress

164

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 165

•• ".--"'- -'*
in Hampton Roads on March 8, 1862. Excitable

and imaginative people even apprehended that New
York city and Philadelphia would soon be under the
fire of her guns. It became therefore a grave ques
tion how the steam ram could be destroyed.

To that end an ironclad steamer designed by Cap
tain John Ericsson on a new model was speedily con
structed, and was the first of the class of war vessels
since known as monitors. Seven of them were hastily
constructed, armed with heavier guns than ever
before used, and sent to Port Royal, S. C., to oper
ate against Charleston. Early in January, 1863,
several of them were on their way to Port Royal.
(The original Monitor foundered at sea off Cape
Hatteras, and two others, the Montauk and Passaic,
narrowly escaped the same fate.)

While awaiting the arrival of the full number,
Admiral DuPont deemed it prudent to test the power
of those that had arrived, and selected as the object
on which to make the experiment Fort McAlister,
an earthwork at Genesis Point, on the Ogeechee
River, near Savannah, and if possible destroy or cap
ture it. On January 27, and again on February i,
the Montauk, aided by several other less formidable
vessels, engaged the fort. On March 3 the Mon-
tauk, having been joined by three other monitors, the
Passaic, Patapsco, and Nahant, and aided by other
vessels, again engaged the earthwork. The attack
and defense of Fort McAlister do not come within
the proposed limits of this narration. Suffice it to say
that after a bombardment of eight hours, in which

1 66 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the fire of the fort was directed exclusively on the
Passaic, the monitors withdrew.

No injury was done to the fort that could not
readily be repaired during the night, says Admiral
Ammen, who commanded the Patapsco. The gun
boats and mortar schooners, which fired at the dis
tance of about four hundred yards, did neither good
nor harm. On March 6 the monitors were taken in
tow to Port Royal. The Passaic had been so dam
aged in the bombardment that she required three
weeks of repairs, to be put in serviceable condition
again.

By April i the whole monitor fleet was in North
Edisto Inlet — an admirable harbor, about twenty
miles from Charleston bar — and as thoroughly pro
vided as they could be for the attack on Charleston.
Such a fleet had never before been seen. Its capacity
for destruction and resistance was unknown. In the
North it was looked to with confidence, hope, and
expectation for the accomplishment of an object so
ardently desired, — the reduction of Charleston,—
while in the South it unquestionably excited grave
apprehension.

Major General Hunter, commanding the Depart
ment of the South, with an aggregate land force
present of a little over twenty-three thousand men,
moved up a large part of his force and occupied
Folly and Seabrook's islands and other points on or
near the Stono, and prepared to follow up the ex
pected success of the fleet and occupy Charleston.

The concentration of such formidable land and

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 167

naval forces at Port Royal, Hilton Head, and North
Edisto had warned General Beauregard, then com
manding the Department of South Carolina and
Georgia, that the long expected attack on Charleston
was immediately impending, and he prepared to meet
it. The troops nearest the city were distributed as
seemed best to meet the coming storm, and arrange
ments made to draw reinforcements quickly, if re
quired, from other points in his department.

The first military district of the department, which
embraced the defenses of Charleston, was com
manded by Brigadier General Roswell S. Ripley, an
officer of distinguished ability, great energy, and
fertile in resource; no more accomplished artillery
officer could have been found in either army. He
was especially charged with the defenses of the
harbor, and the completeness of the preparations
was in a great measure due to his skill and energy.
Brigadier General James H. Trapier commanded
the second subdivision of the district, which em
braced Sullivan's Island. The defensive works on
that island — Fort Moultrie and Batteries Beaure
gard and Bee — were under the general direction of
Colonel Lawrence M. Keitt.

Fort Sumter, the chief object of attack, was com
manded by Colonel Alfred Rhett, of the First South
Carolina Regular Artillery, and was garrisoned by
seven companies of that regiment. Lieutenant Colo
nel J. A. Yates and Major Ormsby Blanding, of the
same regiment, had general charge, the first of the
barbette, the latter of the casemate batteries.

Brigadier General S. R. Gist commanded the first

1 68 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

subdivision of the district, which embraced James'
Island and St. Andrew's. It was known that General
Hunter had concentrated the mass of his force on
Folly Island and its vicinity, and it was supposed
would co-operate with the fleet by an attack either
on James or Morris Island. The responsible duty
of meeting the enemy in that quarter was confided
to General Gist.

Colonel R. F. Graham commanded the small force
on Morris Island, on which were the very important
works, Batteries Gregg and Wagner.

On the morning of April 5 Admiral DuPont, on
his flagship, the New Ironsides, having joined the
"ironclads," as they were generally called, at South
Edisto, the whole fleet steamed toward Charleston
harbor, the monitors in tow of suitable steamers.
That evening, having sounded and buoyed the bar
of the main channel, the Keokuk, the Patapsco, and
Kaatskill passed the bar and anchored within. The
next morning the Admiral, his flag flying on the New
Ironsides, crossed the bar, followed by the other
ironclads. It was his intention to proceed the same
day to Charleston, attacking Fort Sumter on the
way, but the weather was unfavorable and the pilots
refused to proceed further.

At midday on the yth signal was made for the
whole fleet to move forward to the attack. The
order of battle was "line ahead," the vessels moving
in the following order: The Weehawken, Captain
John Rodgers; the Passaic, Captain Percival Dray-
ton; the Montauk, Captain John L. Worden; the
Patapsco, Commander Daniel Ammen; the New

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 169

Ironsides (flagship), Commodore Thomas Turner;
the Kaatskill, Commander George W. Rodgers; the
Nantucket, Commander Donald McN. Fairfax; the
Nahant, Commander John Downs, and the Keokuk,
Commander A. C. Rhind.

The New Ironsides carried fourteen n-inch guns
and two i5O-pounder Parrott rifles; the Patapsco,
one 15-inch and one i5O-pounder Parrot rifle. The
Keokuk, two n-inch guns; the others one 1 5-inch
and one ii-inch gun each.

Commanders were ordered to pass the Morris
Island batteries, Wagner and Gregg, without re
turning their fire, unless specially signaled to do so
by the Admiral. They were directed to take posi
tions to the north and west of Sumter, within about
eight hundred yards, and open, firing low with great
care, and aiming at the center embrasures. The Ad
miral's order of battle adds: "After the reduction
of Fort Sumter it is probable that the next point of
attack will be the batteries on Morris Island." A
squadron of vessels, consisting of the Canandalgua,
Housatonic, Huron, Unadilla, and Wlssahlckon,
Captain J. F. Green commanding, was held in re
serve outside the bar and near the entrance buoy, in
readiness to support the ironclads in the proposed
attack on the Morris Island batteries.

The Weehawken was handicapped and incum-
bered by a raft attached to its bow to explode tor
pedoes.1 In weighing anchor her chain became en-

*It was called the "Devil" and was cut adrift and floated
ashore on Morris Island.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

tangled in the grapnels of the raft, delaying the line
nearly two hours. About 1 115 the whole fleet was
under way, but the raft attached to the W 'eehawken
delayed her and the ironclads that were following,
causing wild steering along the whole line ; the moni
tors "sheering every way" when their engines
stopped, so that it was impossible to preserve the
ordered interval of one hundred yards between the
vessels.

The weather was as calm and the water as
smooth as could have been desired for naval firing.
Reports had gone abroad of the extent of the ob
structions and number of torpedoes in the harbor.
While moving into action a number of buoys were
observed, unpleasantly suggestive of the presence of
torpedoes, one of which exploded near the Wee-
hawken, lifting her somewhat, but without disabling
her.

Just before the leading vessel came within range
the long roll was beat in Fort Sumter, "the garrison,
regimental and palmetto flags were hoisted and
saluted by thirteen guns, the band playing the
national air, 'Dixie.' ' A few minutes before 3
o'clock P. M., the leading monitor having approached
to within about two thousand yards of Fort Moultrie,
the action was opened by a shot from that fort, fired
by its commander, Colonel William Butler. Three
minutes later the leading monitor, when about fif
teen hundred yards from Sumter, fired two guns
simultaneously. Then Sumter opened, firing by bat
tery. The action became general and for more than
two hours nearly a hundred guns on land and water,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 171

many of them of the heaviest caliber yet ever used,
were in rapid action.

It was a calm and balmy day in spring — the season
of greatest natural beauty and luxuriance in that
mild region. It was the season at which Charleston
had been wont to present its most attractive phase,
when the wealthy planters and their families had not
yet been driven by the heat from their city houses
and when the hotels were most crowded with visitors
from the North. In strong contrast to the picture
of tranquil pleasure and enjoyment, in a mild, deli
cious climate, which the city had formerly presented
at this season, was the scene of strained excitement
and anxiety on this day of the attack on the harbor
defenses of Charleston. From every point of view
in the city the eyes of the many thousands of specta
tors were riveted on the grand and imposing spec
tacle. The church steeples, roofs, windows, and
piazzas of houses on the "Battery" were crowded
with eager, breathless witnesses of this bombard
ment, the precursor of a siege which was to arouse
in the people there assembled and those whom they
represented every high and patriotic hope, every
reserve of courage and endurance, the sublimest exer
cise of patience and submission.

From the blockading fleet and transports off the
bar this trial of strength and endurance between
forts and ships, the latter brought to the highest
point of precision and destructive power, was wit
nessed by other anxious spectators, who confidently
anticipated a brilliant victory for the fleet, with feel
ings scarcely less intense than those of the people in

172 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the city who fully realized the importance to them of
the events which hung upon the issue.

Through the thunder of artillery ran the heavy
thud of the huge shells as they pounded the brick
walls of Sumter and the sharp metallic ring and
crash of the shot and shells as they struck the iron
turrets and casings of the monitors, tearing away
the iron plates, crashing through the sides and decks,
or shivering into fragments by the concussion and
falling then in showers about the deck or into the
water.

The ironclads came into action in succession, and
though the engagement lasted about two hours and
twenty minutes, from thirty to forty-five minutes7
exposure to the fire of the forts and batteries sufficed
to put the vessels hors de combat.

The Weehawken fired twenty-six shots and was
struck fifty-three times. A part of her side armor
was so shattered that it hung in splintered fragments,
which could be pulled off with the hand, thus expos
ing the woodwork. Her deck was pierced, making
a hole through which the water poured, and her
turret was so shaken by the pounding to which it
was subjected that it revolved with difficulty, thus
greatly retarding her fire.

The Passaic, Captain Percival Drayton, was even
more roughly handled than the Weehawken. She
succeeded in firing only thirteen shots and was struck
thirty-five times. At the fourth discharge of her
n-inch gun the turret was struck twice in quick
succession, bulging in its plates and beams and forc
ing together the rails on which the gun-carriage

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 173

worked, rendering the gun wholly useless for the re
mainder of the action. An instant later the turret
was so jammed that it could not be moved, thus
effectually ending its fire. The turret was again
struck by a heavy rifle shot, which shattered all of
the eleven plates on the upper edge, then glancing
upward struck the pilot house with such force as to
mash it in, bend it over, open the plates and press
them out and, lifting the top, exposing the inside to
such a degree that another shot would, it was
thought, knock the top entirely off. Under the ter
rific fire to which his vessel was exposed Captain
Drayton could not examine it to ascertain the extent
of the injury. He could not fire a shot, and signaled
the Admiral for permission to withdraw; but receiv
ing no answer, he did not stand on the order of his
going, but went at once out of range. He could
not discover then, nor the next morning when he
had a good view of the exposed face of the fort,
that it was in the least injured, and he was satisfied
that under the circumstances then existing, "the moni
tors were no match for the forts."

The Montauk suffered less than her predecessors,
but the brief engagement convinced her commander,
Captain Worden, "that Charleston cannot be taken
by the naval force now present, and that had the
attack continued it could not have failed to result in
disaster."

The Patapsco opened fire on Sumter with her 150-
pounder rifle at fifteen hundred yards, and with her
15-inch gun at twelve hundred yards. At the fifth
discharge the i5O-pounder was disabled for the re-

174 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

mainder of the action. The commanders of the
leading vessels, apprehending entanglement by drift
ing within the rope obstructions which could be seen
ahead, turned their prows seaward. The Patapsco,
endeavoring to follow their lead, refused to obey her
helm, and was detained sufficiently long to receive the
concentrated fire of Sumter and the Sullivan Island
batteries. She was struck forty-seven times and her
turret was so battered as to prevent or greatly retard
its turning, thus rendering her only remaining gun
next to useless, when she retired out of range.

The turning back of the four leading monitors
and their moving seaward threw the line into much
confusion, the vessels becoming somewhat entangled,
so much so that the flagship came into collision with
two of the monitors and was obliged to anchor twice
to prevent running ashore. She could not fire on
Fort Sumter without great risk of firing into the
monitors, but was detained at the distance of about
a mile from Fort Sumter, subjected to a heavy fire,
all the more galling because it could not be returned.
She only fired eight shots at Fort Moultrie.

The Confederate account says she was struck
sixty-three times at the distance of between seven
teen hundred and eighteen hundred yards, and then
moved to the distance of two thousand yards — out of
effective range. She was less injured than the moni
tors, probably because she was, for want of sufficient
depth of water, at a greater distance than they. One
of her port shutters was shot away and Commander
Turner, in his official report to the Admiral, says:

"My impression is, had you been able to get this

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 175

ship into close position, where her broadsides would
have been brought to bear, that not one port shutter
would have been left under the fire of such enormous
projectiles as were thrown from the enemy's works
multiplied on every side of us."

For several minutes she was in greater peril than
any on board perhaps knew. She was directly over
a torpedo, which from some unknown cause failed
to explode.

Finding his own ship blocking the way, the Ad
miral signaled: "Disregard the movements of the
Commander-in-Chief" ; and the rear vessels passed
ahead, and coming under fire shared substantially
the same fate as those that preceded them. Com
mander Fairfax, of the Nantucket, says that having
approached close to the obstructions thrown across
the channel he opened fire on Sumter:

"We were then under the fire of three forts, and
most terrible was it for forty-five or fifty minutes.
Our fire was very slow, necessarily, and not half so
observable upon the walls of the forts as the rain of
the rifle shots and heavy shells was upon this vessel.
. . . Certainly their [the Confederate] firing was
excellent throughout; fortunately, it was directed to
some half dozen ironclads at once. . . . Our ves
sels could not long have withstood the concentrated
fire of the enemy's batteries. ... I must say that
I am disappointed beyond measure at this experi
ment of monitors overcoming strong forts. It was
a fair trial."

His fifteen-inch gun fired but three shots when it

1 76 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

was disabled for the remainder of the action and his
eleven-inch rifle fired twelve times.

Commander Downs gives a lamentable account
of the experience of his monitor, the Nahant, under
a fire "of one hundred guns," as he erroneously sup
posed, which he describes as terrific, and he believed
almost unprecedented. The blows from heavy shot
very soon so jammed the turret that it could not be
turned, which effectually stopped his fire. The con
cussion of a heavy shot on the pilot house forced oft
on the inside a piece of iron weighing seventy-eight
pounds, and drove it with such violence that in its
course to the other side it came in contact with the
steering-gear, bending and disarranging it so that it
could not be worked.

Bolt-heads were forced off and driven in showers
about the pilot house and turret, one of them mor
tally wounding the quartermaster, Edward Cobbf
and others knocking the pilot, Mr. Sofield, senseless,
leaving the commander himself alone in the pilot
house. His vessel was struck thirty-six times, the
iron plating was broken in several places, and in
some stripped from the wood backing, which was
broken. He describes the effects of the shot more
minutely than the other commanders, to draw atten
tion to the weak points of the monitors for the bene
fit of future builders of such vessels. After repeated
and futile efforts to train his guns on the fort and
renew the action, he abandoned the effort and with
drew.

The Keokuk was the rear vessel of the line. Her

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 177

commander, A. C. Rhind, becoming impatient of the
long delay, passed not only the Ironsides, but the
vessels ahead of him and, defiantly directing his prow
toward Sumter, approached nearer than any other
vessel had done, firing as he advanced, and drawing
on the Keokuk the concentrated fire of Sumter,
Moultrie, Bee, and the battery on Cumming's Point.
But he was permitted to fire only three shots. Com
mander Rhind's daring gallantry in carrying his ves
sel into action was equaled only by the frankness and
brevity with which he officially reported the result.
He says :

"The position taken by the Keokuk was main
tained for about thirty minutes, during which period
she was struck ninety times in the hull and turrets.
Nineteen shots pierced through at and just below
the water line. The turrets were pierced in many
places; one of the forward port shutters shot away;
in short, the vessel was completely riddled. Finding
it impossible to keep her afloat many minutes more
under such an extraordinary fire, during which rifle
projectiles of every species and the largest caliber,
as also hot shot, were poured into us, I reluctantly
withdrew from action at 4:40 p. M., with the gun-
carriage of the forward turret disabled and so many
of the crews of the after gun wounded as to prevent
a possibility of remaining under fire. I succeeded
in getting the Keokuk to an anchor out of range of
fire and kept her afloat during the night in the smooth
water, though the water was pouring into her in
many places."

In the morning the water becoming a little ruffled,

178 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

she sank, leaving only her smoke-stack out to show
her position. Her crew, with the killed and wounded,
were taken off.

About half-past four Admiral DuPont signaled
the fleet to withdraw, intending to renew the attack
the next day. By five o'clock the monitors were
under way, following the flagship seaward, and soon
anchored out of range, but within the bar, the fire
of the forts gradually ceasing as the fleet receded.

The fire of the fleet had been directed mainly
against Fort Sumter, but little attention being given
to the other batteries. The flagstaff of Fort Moultrie
was shot down, killing in its fall Private Lusby, of
the First South Carolina Infantry. There was no
other casualty on Sullivan's Island. When the flagstaff
fell, Captains Wigg and Wardlaw and Lieutenants
King and Calhoun quickly sprang to the top of a
traverse and on the parapet and displayed the regi
mental, garrison, and battle flags in conspicuous
positions.

Fort Sumter, though not seriously damaged, was
more injured than the Federals seem to have thought,
but not as much as might have been expected from
the impact on brick walls of the heaviest shot ever
yet used in war. The walls were struck by about
thirty-six of those heavy shot.2 Two 1 5-inch shells

2Admiral Ammen, in his book, says the fort was struck
fifty-five times, and it appears from the report of the Confed
erate engineer who examined the fort immediately after the
action that there were that number of marks or scars on the
walls, but he says that many of those scars were made by
fragments of shells that exploded in front of the walls.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 179

penetrated the eastern face near an embrasure of
the second tier, one exploding in the casemate, the
other in the middle of the fort. One i i-inch shot
also penetrated the wall. The carriage of a lo-inch
columbiad was demolished and a 42-pounder was
dismounted, both of which were promptly remounted
and made ready for action. Five men were wounded
by fragments of masonry and wood in Fort Sumter;
three were killed and five wounded in Fort Wagner
by an accidental explosion of an ammunition chest.

The Confederates had sixty-nine guns of various
caliber in action, but only forty-one of them (ex
clusive of mortars) were above the caliber of thirty-
two pounders. The armament of the fleet was thirty-
two guns (eight of which, it seems, were not fired),
of 8-, II-, and 1 8-inch caliber, which at a single dis
charge could throw nearly as great a weight of metal
as could the land batteries.

The Confederates fired in all 2229 shots and con
sumed 21,093 pounds of powder. The fleet fired
142 (the Confederates say 151) shots and consumed
nearly 5000 pounds of powder. The two combined
fired upon an average of seventeen shots, varying in
weight from 30 to 400 pounds (or about 1300
pounds of iron), and consumed about 185 pounds of
powder per minute, during 140 consecutive minutes,
the heaviest fire ever yet delivered in so brief a bom
bardment.

The Confederate fire seems to have been much
more accurate than the Federal. About an equal
proportion of the shots fired on each side struck the
objects at which they were aimed, but there was a

i8o THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

very wide difference in the sizes of those objects.
A monitor afloat is "in appearance not inaptly lik
ened to a cheese box on a plank," the "plank" repre
senting the deck and the "cheese box" the revolving
turret in which are the guns. Its apparent length is
200 feet and beam 45 feet. The hull, however, is
but 159 feet in length. The turret is 21 feet and
10 inches in diameter and 9 feet high. It is sur
mounted by a pilot house 9 feet 4 inches in diameter
and 7 feet high. From bow to stern the deck varies
from 2^4 to iV2 feet above the water. An exceed
ingly small part, therefore, of the hull was exposed
above water to fire. They were in motion also dur
ing the action.

Such an object in motion presented but a small
mark at which to fire at the distance of from one
thousand to fifteen hundred yards. Fort Sumter on
the contrary was a very large and stationary object,
presenting fronts of three tiers of guns at which to
aim. The accuracy of the Confederate fire was due
in a great measure to an ingenious contrivance of
Lieutenant Colonel Yates, which enabled five men
to hold the heaviest guns trained on the ironclads
when in motion.

The little damage that Fort Sumter suffered was
promptly repaired during the night and the weak
points in the walls which the fire had disclosed were
reinforced by sand-bags. The Confederates confi
dently expected the engagement to be renewed the
next day, and the forts and batteries were as well
prepared to receive an attack on the morning of
the 8th as they had been on the morning of the yth.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 181

But it was not renewed. "The enemy was beaten,"
says General Ripley, "before their adversaries
thought the action had well commenced."

During the evening of the 7th the commanders
of the ironclads went on board the flagship and ver
bally reported to the Admiral the incidents of the
engagement and the condition of their respective ves
sels. Their reports decided him not to renew the
attack, and he promptly forwarded to the Secretary
of the Navy a dispatch, in which he says:

"I yesterday moved up with eight ironclads and
this ship and attacked Fort Sumter, intending to pass
it and commence action on its northwest face, in
accordance with my order of battle. The heavy
fire received from it and Fort Moultrie and the
nature of the obstructions compelled the attack from
the outside. It was fierce and obstinate, and the
gallantry of the officers and men of the vessels en
gaged was conspicuous. This vessel could not be
brought into such close action as I endeavored to
get her. Owing to the narrow channel and rapid
current she became partly unmanageable, and was
twice forced to anchor to prevent her going ashore,
once owing to her having come into collison with
two of the monitors. She could not get nearer than
one thousand yards. Owing to the condition of the
tide and an unavoidable accident, I had been com
pelled to delay action until in the afternoon, and
toward evening, finding no impression made upon
the fort, I made a signal to withdraw the ships, in
tending to renew the attack this morning.

"But the commanders of the monitors came on

1 82 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

board and reported verbally the injuries of their
vessels, when without hesitation or consultation (for
I never hold councils of war) I determined not to
renew the attack, for in my judgment it would have
converted a failure into a disaster, and I will only
add that Charleston cannot be taken by a purely
naval attack, and the army could give me no co
operation."

In reply to a complimentary letter from General
Hunter, who had witnessed the action in a transport
steamer, the Admiral says:

"I feel very comfortable, General, for the reason
that a merciful Providence permitted me to have a
failure, instead of a disaster."

Admiral Ammen, who commanded the Patapsco,
says in his recently published book, "The Atlantic
Coast" :

"The result of the attack was mortifying to all
of the officers and men engaged in it. Had any loss
of life been regarded as likely to render another
attempt successful, there would have been few indeed
who would not have desired it. The opinion before
the attack was general, and was fully shared in by
the writer, that whatever might be the loss in men
and vessels blown up by torpedoes or otherwise de
stroyed (and such losses were supposed probable),
at all events Fort Sumter would be reduced to a
pile of ruins before the sun went down."

General Beauregard had confidently expected
every man of his command to do his duty, and he
was not disappointed, for their hearts were thor
oughly in their work. Confederate and Federal

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 183

officers alike bear testimony to the accuracy of the
Confederate fire, while the monitors themselves
bore mute but more expressive evidence of its
effects.

All that professional skill and gallantry could do
had been done by the officers and crews of the vessels
to achieve success. They had fought the united iron
clads to their utmost capacity. The result had
proved that these novel engines of naval warfare on
which such high hopes were built had not materially
changed the military relations between forts and
ships. It had also given another striking proof of
the fallacy of the belief that, caeteris paribus, ships
can reduce forts. Just two years previously, less one
week, Confederate land batteries had opened fire on
Fort Sumter, newly constructed by United States en
gineers, at greater distance than that which the moni
tors had attacked, and with greatly inferior guns had
compelled its surrender. A few months later Fede
ral land batteries on Morris Island, at more than
double the monitors' distance, had demolished the
exposed walls of Fort Sumter.

This attack also illustrated what was conspicuous
throughout the war, the great difference in the rela
tive numbers of killed and wounded in battles on
land and those between forts and ships. In this en
gagement between the Federal ironclad fleet and
the forts and batteries at the entrance to Charleston,
the casualties on the Confederate side were one killed
and five wounded. On the Federal, one killed and
twenty wounded. Little less than a year before in
a battle on James' Island in sight of Fort Sumter

1 84 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

nearly nine hundred men had been killed or wounded
in less than half an hour.

The fleet remained within the bar but out of
range, repairing and refitting, until high tide on the
evening of the I2th, when it passed out, the New
Ironsides taking her place with the blockading fleet,
and the monitors were towed southward to Port
Royal for repairs, leaving only the Keokuk sunk with
her smokestack out of water marking her position.
In a few days the Confederates dived into her and
lifted out her heavy guns, flags, swords, and smaller
articles. Her guns were soon mounted in the Con
federate batteries.

When the news of the failure reached Washing
ton President Lincoln dispatched Admiral DuPont:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 13, 1863.

Hold your position inside the bar near Charleston, or, if you
have left it, return to it and hold it until further orders. Do
not allow the enemy to erect new batteries or defenses on
Morris Island. If he has begun it, drive him out. I do not
herein order you to renew the general attack. That is to
depend on your discretion or further orders.

A. LINCOLN.

The following day, April 14, he dispatched to the
Admiral and General Hunter jointly:

This is intended to clear up any inconsistency between the
recent order to continue operations before Charleston and the
former one to remove to another point in a certain contin
gency. No censure upon you, or either of you, is intended;
we still hope by cordial and judicious co-operation you can
take the batteries on Morris Island and Sullivan's Island and
Fort Sumter. But whether you can or not, we wish the demon-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 185

gtration kept up for a time for a collateral and very important
object; we wish the attempt to be a real one (though not a
desperate one) if it affords any considerable chance of success.
But if prosecuted for a demonstration only, this must not be
rnade public, or the whole effect will be lost. Once again
before Charleston, do not leave till further orders from here.
Of course this is not intended to force you to leave unduly
exposed Hilton Head or other near points in your charge.

A. LINCOLN.

Replying through the Navy Department, the Ad
miral assured the Secretary that he would urge for
ward the repairs of the serious injuries sustained by
the monitors and return within the bar as soon as
possible ; he thought, however, that the move would
be attended with great risk to the monitors from
gales and the fire of the enemy's batteries, which
"they could neither silence nor prevent the erection
of new ones." He would, of course, obey with fidelity
all orders he might receive, even when entirely at
variance with his own judgment, such as the order
to reoccupy the unsafe anchorage off Morris Island,
"and an intimation that a renewal of the attack on
Charleston may be ordered, which in my judgment
would be attended with disastrous results, involving
the loss of this coast." He was painfully struck by
the tenor and tone of the President's orders, which,
he thought, implied censure, and requested the Secre
tary not to hesitate to relieve him by an officer who
might be thought "more able to execute that service
in which I have had the misfortune to fail- -the cap
ture of Charleston."

In Washington, and in the North generally, it
had been confidently believed that the attack would

1 86 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

result in the fall of Charleston. So confident was
the Navy Department of a successful result, that on
the 2d of April orders were issued and dispatched
to Admiral DuPont to send a number of the iron
clads, which the fall of Charleston would render
available, to the Gulf of Mexico for service in that
quarter and in the Mississippi. The failure was a
grievous disappointment in the North, while in the
South the vague but serious apprehension of danger
from the ironclads was dispelled, and in Charleston
especially it was felt that the city had nothing to
apprehend from the fleet alone.

Of course the failure was sharply criticised in the
Northern press. Whoever relies on the newspapers
of the period for correct information in regard to
the battles of that war will inevitably be led into
grave errors. In regard to this naval attack, some
of the papers severely censured the Administration
for ordering or permitting it without providing
ample means to insure success, and the causes of
the failure were fully explained. The ironclads, it
was said, while moving up to the attack had become
entangled in the rope obstructions which were well
known to be in the channel and, while so hampered,
had been exposed to the fire of three hundred guns,
many of them supplied from England and of the
heaviest caliber ever used in war, and at short range,
in some instances three hundred yards.

The Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, seems to
have obtained some of his information on the subject
from the newspapers rather than from the official
reports. In a printed circular letter signed by him

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 187

and addressed to the diplomatic agents of the gov
ernment abroad he says:

"An attack by the fleet on the yth of April last
upon the forts and batteries which defend the harbor
of Charleston failed, because the rope obstructions
in the channel fouled the screws of the ironclads
and compelled them to return, after passing through
the fire of the batteries. These bore the fire of the
forts, although some defects of construction were
revealed by the injuries they received. The crews
passed through the unexampled cannonade with
singular impunity. Not a life was lost on board a
monitor."

None of the ironclads approached the rope ob
structions nearer than six hundred yards, except the
Keokuk, which, after being disabled, drifted within
about three hundred yards of them before she
could be got under way again. The rope obstruc
tions were therefore not encountered by any of the
vessels. They had not passed through the fire of
the forts, for some of the heaviest batteries had not
been brought into action. The Keokuk, as has been
stated, was not nearer Fort Sumter than nine hun
dred yards, and none of the other vessels was so
near any of the forts or the batteries. The ranges
varied from nine hundred to about two thousand
yards.

Instead of three hundred, there were but seventy-
six Confederate guns of all kinds in action. Some
of these were mortars, the fire of which on so small
a target as a monitor and at such long range is so
inaccurate as to be practically ineffective. Of the

1 88 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

other guns only forty-one were above the caliber of
32-pounders, and guns of this latter caliber were of
little avail against the ironclads. The most effective
fire was from ten lo-inch and nineteen 8-inch colum-
biads, three 9-inch Dahlgrens and two y-inch Brook
guns, and they were American, not English guns,
judging by the effects of the fire from the guns ac
tually engaged, and at such long range, it is hardly
extravagant to suppose that if, during the two hours
and twenty-five minutes the action lasted, the iron
clads had been exposed to the fire of three hundred
guns, at distances of from three to nine hundred
yards, every one of them would have been sunk or
irreparably disabled.

General Hunter had held his troops on Folly,
Cole's, and Seabrook's islands in readiness to follow
up the expected naval success. On the morning after
the attack all was in readiness to cross Lighthouse
Inlet to Morris Island uwhere," says the General,
uonce established, the fall of Sumter would have
been as certain as the demonstration of a problem in
mathematics." But the active co-operation of the
navy was deemed necessary to insure the success of
the movement. The crossing, however, was sus
pended because of the announcement of the Admiral
that he had resolved to retire. The General sent an
officer of his staff to represent to the Admiral his
readiness to make the movement, the great impor
tance of making it promptly when the enemy was
unprepared to dispute it successfully, and to urge
him to co-operate actively with the fire of his fleet.
But to all of these considerations, says the General,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 189

"earnestly and elaborately urged, the Admiral's
answer was that he 'would not fire another shot.' '
The intended movement was therefore abandoned
or indefinitely suspended. The land as well as the
naval expedition had come to naught and further
movements for the capture of Charleston were de
ferred.3

sln this narrative I have followed substantially the official
reports of the commanders of the ironclads, especially on all
points of which their knowledge may reasonably be supposed
more accurate than that of the Confederate officers. The only
material differences between the Federal and Confederate
reports are as to the distances of the vessels from the forts,
batteries, and obstructions. As to them, I have followed the
Confederate reports, because the officers making them had
been on duty in the harbor defenses for many months — some
of them for two years. They had made the harbor a military
study, had placed obstructions, planted torpedoes, anchored
buoys, and carefully measured the distances that it was de
sirable to know. They therefore of necessity had more accu
rate knowledge on those points than the naval officers could
have gathered in the brief period of the action, when they
were in strange waters, under a terrific fire, their attention
riveted to the work in hand, with such limited view of the
harbor as they could catch through the small circular holes in
the pilot-houses and the two port-holes in the revolving tur
rets, while the smoke was so dense that as Commodore Turner
says, often he could not see distinctly fifty yards ahead. Under
such circumstances they could scarcely be expected to judge
distances accurately. Colonel Rhett, the commander of Sum-
ter, had waited deliberately until the leading monitor had
reached a buoy the distance of which was well known, and on
which his guns were trained, before opening fire. Both Col
onel Rhett and his adjutant made careful observations during
the whole action.

CHAPTER X

Federal lack of co-operation — Army and navy at odds — Hunter
and DuPont relieved of commands — Gillmore in command
of army — Dahlgren commands navy — Topography of Char
leston harbor and city — Gillmore's plan of operations —
Strength of the defense — Attack on Morris Island — Success
of movement — Confederate loss — Assault of Battery Wag
ner — Repulse — Loss on both sides.

In order to reap all the advantages the combined
Federal land and naval forces could gain on the
South Atlantic coast, it was obviously necessary that
there should be very earnest and hearty co-operation
between those arms of service, and instructions to
that effect were given to the respective commanders
by their superior. It does not appear, however,
that there was uniformly such co-operation.

While the ironclad fleet on April 7, 1863, was
attacking the forts and batteries which defended
Charleston harbor, General Hunter, commanding
the Department of the South, who witnessed that
memorable bombardment from the deck of a trans
port steamer off the bar, on which he had his head
quarters, held all of his available force in close prox
imity, but made no aggressive movement with it.

Admiral DuPont, commanding the South Atlantic
squadron, in his reports to the Secretary of the Navy
of the ironclad attack and its failure on April 7,

190

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 191

admits very frankly that the result had convinced
him that Charleston could not be taken by a purely
naval attack, and he adds : "The army could give no
co-operation."

On May 22 General Hunter wrote a long letter
directly to President Lincoln and sent it by the hands
of one of his staff officers, reminding the President
that six weeks had elapsed since the naval attack on
Charleston, an attack of which he says: "From the
nature of the Admiral's plans the army could take
no active part" ; that he had himself been extremely
anxious to take advantage of the manifest weakness
of the Confederates on Morris Island, to seize that
important point, which he was very sure could have
been done with great ease; that his troops, which
were, he says, "unquestionably the best drilled sol
diers in the country," were in readiness and eager
to cross Lighthouse Inlet, which was only a few hun
dred yards wide, and make a descent on Morris
Island, and that a foothold secured on that strategic
point would make the fall of Fort Sumter as certain
as the demonstration of a problem in mathematics.
An attempt, however, to seize that island without the
co-operation of the navy would be wholly futile and
only result in a useless sacrifice of life. He had
therefore on the day after the naval attack urged
the Admiral to co-operate with him in making that
important move. He had sent an officer of his staff
to lay his views before Admiral DuPont, but not
withstanding the clearly and elaborately urged ad
vantages of the proposed move the Admiral laconi
cally replied that he "would not fire another shot."

1 92 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

Since then, says General Hunter to the President,
he had exercised patience with the Admiral, until
he had become "painfully but finally convinced that
no aid could be expected from the navy." He feared
that Admiral DuPont distrusted the ironclads so
much that he was resolved to do nothing with them
during the summer. General Hunter therefore
urgently begged the President to liberate him from
the orders to co-operate with the navy, "which now
tie me down to the Admiral's inactivity." And he
goes on to develop a plan of operations which he was
exceedingly anxious to undertake, if only released
from co-operation with the navy, which plan, though
interesting, need not be here detailed.

President Lincoln seems to have manifested his
disapproval of the proposed plan of campaign, and
settled, as he supposed, the question of co-operation
between the land and naval forces by relieving both
General Hunter and Admiral DuPont from their
respective commands.

The selection of a new commander of the Depart
ment of the South was indicative of the campaign the
Federal Government proposed to make in that de
partment.

General Hunter, in his published report of his
own services in the war, says Mr. Lincoln told him
that his "temporary suspension" from the command
"was due in a great measure to the influence of the
Hon. Horace Greeley," who, it seems, as Mr. Lin
coln expressed it, "had found the man to do the job"
—meaning the capture of Charleston. Moved by
this information, General Hunter addressed an angry

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 193

letter to the distinguished editor, in which he ex
pressed ironically the hope that since Mr. Greeley
had taken it upon himself to direct the attack on
Charleston, he would be more successful than in his
first advance on Richmond, "in which you wasted
much ink and other men shed some blood."

But it is not difficult to find other considerations
which no doubt had weight in the selection of the
new commander. The General-in-Chief of the Army,
Halleck, had been an officer of the United States
Engineer Corps; so also was his chief of staff, Gen
eral George W. Cullum. There was naturally and
most justly great esprit de corps among the officers
of that distinguished branch of the military service.
The General-in-Chief and his chief of staff, no doubt,
believed that an officer of the Engineer Corps was
better qualified than an officer of any other arm of
the service to direct the operations for the reduction
of Charleston, a task requiring military engineering
skill of a high order. Under those circumstances,
perhaps the following letter from the officer whom
Mr. Greeley had found "to do the job" had its
weight in the selection of General Hunter's succes
sor, and is given in full as indicative of the plan of
campaign to be followed in the Department of the
South.

NEW YORK, May 23, 1863.

GENERAL G. W. CULLUM, Chief of Staff to the General-in-Chief,

General: It has come to my knowledge that my name has

been mentioned to the Secretary of War in connection with

the reduction of the forts in Charleston harbor, and it has

i94 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

been urgently suggested to place me in a position where I
could direct and control the operations of the land forces
against that place. Two or three communications from promi
nent men here have been sent to the Secretary.

It is not necessary to inform you, who are so well acquainted
with me, that I am not in the habit of pushing myself forward
or thrusting my professional opinion unasked upon the notice
of those in authority. In my daily intercourse with gentlemen
of my acquaintance I am, however, always free to answer
questions, and I have at sundry times and in sundry places
expressed the opinion that the forts in Charleston harbor could
be reduced by the means (naval and military combined) now
available in the Department of the South, increased by a suit
able number of the best heavy rifled guns, provided these have
not been sent there since I left the department one year ago.

I have also said that I am willing to risk my own reputation
upon an attempt, as I did at Pulaski, provided I could be
allowed the untrammeled execution of my own plans (as at
Pulaski), except so far as they iim^ve co-operation from the
navy.

You are at liberty to show this letter to the General-in-Chief
or anyone else.

I expect to remain here until the evening of the 27th instant
and then go directly to Cincinnati.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q. A. GILL MORE, Brigadier General.

- General Gillmore, of the Volunteers, had served
with distinction as a captain of Engineers in the
Regular army under Generals Hunter and Benham
in the reduction of Fort Pulaski, Georgia, in April,
1862. A few days after the date of the foregoing
letter he was ordered to Washington for consulta
tion with the Secretary of War, the General-in-Chief
of the Army, and the Assistant Secretary of the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 195

Navy, on the plan of operations for the reduction of
Charleston. He seems to have reiterated the opin
ions already expressed in his letter and to have fully
developed his plan of operations.

He urged that there should be cordial and ener
getic co-operation between the land and naval forces.
The part which the latter would be called on to per
form in the execution of the proposed plan was
represented as one in which "audacity should enter
as an important element of success." The com
mander of the fleet, therefore, should be an officer
who had sufficient confidence in the efficiency of the
turret ironclads to be "willing to risk his reputation
in the development of their new and comparatively
untried powers against the harbor defenses of
Charleston." Admiral DuPont and his officers com
manding the ironclads seem to have been under the
impression that the powers of the ironclads had been
subjected to very fair and severe test in the attack
on the harbor defenses of Charleston on April 7,
and the result had not been encouraging.

On June 3 General Gillmore was ordered to relieve
General Hunter in command of the Department of
the South, and a few days later Admiral Foote, who
had distinguished himself in command of gunboats
on the Western water, especially in the operations
against Fort Donelson, was ordered to relieve Ad
miral DuPont. Admiral Foote, however, died a
few days later, and Admiral Dahlgren was assigned
to the command of the South Atlantic squadron.

The Confederate Government still retained Gen-

196 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

eral Beauregard in the important command of the
Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and
Florida, to which he had been assigned in September
of the previous year. With the exception of the
ironclad attack of April 7 and the concentration of
the land forces on that occasion to follow up the
expected naval success, no demonstration of moment
was made against Charleston from the unsuccessful
assault on Secessionville on June 16, 1862, to July
10, 1863. General Beauregard and his predecessor,
General Pembertori, had therefore something more
than a year in which to complete and enlarge the
defensive works which had been planned, and in
great measure completed, and to construct others
which close examination suggested and the progress
of the war had made necessary for the defense of the
city.

An important change in the original plan of de
fense had been made by General Pemberton, in the
abandonment of Cole's Island at the southwestern
extremity of James Island, an important strategic
point of the outer defenses commanding the entrance
to the Stono River. General Beauregard regarded
the abandonment of Cole's Island as a fatal mistake;
so did General Ripley, to whom, perhaps, more than
to any other officer, Charleston was indebted for
the system of defensive works which, together with
the works which had been constructed before the
war, enabled a comparatively small force to hold the
enemy at bay and keep them away from the city dur
ing the war. The abandonment of Cole's Island

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 197

had made necessary the construction of a long line
of works for the defense of James Island, which was
justly regarded as the key by land to Charleston.

More than a year had elapsed during which, with
the exception of April 7, the active war which was
devastating other parts of the country had not come
nigh Charleston. The time had now arrived, and
was to continue for about twenty months, when the
thunder of artillery — the sound, which no words can
describe, of the heavy rifle shots as they flew through
the air, day and night, bursting over and in their
city and crashing through their houses — was to be
come as familiar to her inhabitants as are the noises
of passing vehicles over the streets to the dwellers
in more fortunate cities. History may perhaps record
the military skill, steadfast fidelity, and gallantry
with which the city was defended, but the heroic for
titude, cheerful courage, and patient endurance with
which her non-combatant population bore the hard
ships of the siege and the adversity of the more try
ing period which followed it will probably never be
fully told.

It is as difficult to follow understandingly a nar
rative of military operations without the aid of a
good map as it is to comprehend the demonstration
of a complicated proposition in geometry without
the aid of a diagram. No description of the country
will adequately supply the place of a good map. A
brief description, however, of the limited scene of
the impending operations may aid those not familiar
with the locality to a better understanding of them,

198 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

The city of Charleston is at the extremity of the
narrow peninsula between the Cooper and Ashley
rivers. James Island, to the south and east, is sepa
rated from the city by Ashley River, and from St.
John's Island, to the south and west, by the Stono
River. In greatest extent from north to south it is
about 9 miles and from east to west about 7 miles.
On its sea front it is bordered by a narrow sandbank
extending from the entrance to Charleston harbor to
Stono Inlet, about n miles in length. About 3%
miles from the northern extremity this bank has been
cut through by the waters of the ocean, thus dividing
it into two islands. The northern part is Morris
Island, the southern Folly Island. The channel be
tween them is called Lighthouse Inlet. These islands
are separated from the firm land of James Island
by Folly River and Creek, Vincent's Creek, and im
passable marshes which are subject to overflow by
very high tides and are intersected by numerous, tor
tuous, narrow, but deep, streams.

The northern extremity of Morris Island, which
is called Cumming's Point, and Sullivan's Island to
the northeast, border the entrance to Charleston
harbor. Fort Moultrie is near the western end of
Sullivan's Island and distant 2700 yards from Cum
ming's Point, on which the Confederates had con
structed a work called Battery Gregg. Fort Sumter
was a brick work of three tiers of guns, built on an
artificial island or foundation south of the channel,
nearly midway between Sullivan's and James' islands,
about 1760 yards from Fort Moultrie on the former,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 199

1980 yards from Fort Johnson on the latter, 1390
yards from Cumming's Point and 3^ miles from
the city of Charleston.

About 1300 yards from Cumming's Point, at a
very narrow part of Morris Island, was an earth
work of considerable development and strength
called Battery Wagner, which extended from the
beach on the east to Vincent Creek on the west, pre
senting to the southwest a front of about 275 yards.

The island is wider in its southern than in its
northern part, the southern extremity on Lighthouse
Inlet being about 1000 yards in width. Its surface
is irregular and broken by sand ridges, forming at
many points secure shelter for troops. It has an area
of about 400 acres, its middle point is 5^ of a mile
from the nearest point of Charleston, and the main
channel into the harbor is parallel to and at about
an average distance of 1200 yards from it.

This small sand island has been thus minutely and
tediously described because it was destined to be the
camp home for nearly two years of many thousands
of men; it was to become famous as the scene of a
siege which will be memorable in military history
and one of the most formidable bombardments of
which there is any record, the scene of great labor
and exposure, much desperate fighting, of sickness
and death in all the frightful forms incident to war
and to wasting fevers.

General Gillmore assumed command of the depart
ment on June 12, 1863, with his headquarters at
Hilton Head. His troops held the coast from Light-

200 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

house Inlet to St. Augustine, a distance of about 250
miles, but the great mass of the force was in South
Carolina and near Charleston. He had ample steam
boat transportation at his command and could read
ily and rapidly concentrate his forces whenever and
wherever on the coast he desired to have them. He
entered on the duty assigned him untrammeled by
instructions, free to carry out his own plans, assured
of the liberal support of his government in supply
ing him with all requisite material for the successful,
accomplishment of the plan he had proposed, and
which had been approved after full and free discus
sion by a mixed board of officers of the army and
navy.

Of the several plans of operation against Charles
ton which naturally suggest themselves, that by way
of James Island, which it was generally believed
offered the surest and speediest avenue to success,
had been attempted and abandoned after the unsuc
cessful assault on Secessionville in June, 1862. So,
too, the plan of a forcible entrance of the fleet into
the harbor had been attempted and failed on April 7.

Of all the plans that by way of Morris Island
was regarded as the easiest of accomplishment in its
first steps. The land force was already in posses
sion of Folly Island. To cross over the narrow
channel of Lighthouse Inlet and secure a foothold
on Morris Island with the aid of the navy would be
very easily accomplished, and in the succeeding
operations on that island the navy could render ready
and efficient aid, having always close at hand in
North Edisto Inlet a secure harbor of refuge in the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 201

event of stormy weather; an important considera
tion, because the monitors were not suitable to ride
in safety in stormy waters.

But possession of Morris Island would be very
far from decisive of the fate of Charleston. Secure
possession of James Island, the forces remaining
relatively the same, would, it was believed, dead
inevitably to the reduction of Charleston, whereas
possession of Morris Island would be only a means
to the probable but remote accomplishment of the
same end.

Fort Sumter was regarded as the chief obstacle in
the way of the navy in any attempt which it might
make to enter the harbor. If that fort could be re
duced, or its defensive power destroyed, the fleet, it
was argued, could readily remove the obstructions,
force an entrance into the harbor, and compel the
surrender of the city, when the evacuation of the
harbor defenses would necessarily follow. It was
admitted that the navy alone could not capture
Sumter, or even so cripple it as to render it harm
less. That must be done by the combined land and
naval forces, and General Gillmore had been selected
to command the Department of the South and Ad
miral Dahlgren the South Atlantic squadron, for the
express purpose of carrying into execution the plan
of operations which the former had proposed for
the reduction of Fort Sumter and then the capture
of Charleston.

General Gillmore's plan of operations briefly
stated was:

202 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

First. Make a descent upon and take possession
of the south end of Morris Island.

Second. To lay siege to and reduce Battery Wag
ner, a strong earthwork near the north end of the
island and about twenty-six hundred yards from Fort
Sumter. The reduction of Battery Wagner would
necessitate the fall of Battery Gregg on Cumming's
Point.

Third. From the positions thus secured to demol
ish Fort Sumter and co-operate with the navy in a
heavy artillery fire when it should be ready to move
forward.

Fourth. The ironclad fleet to remove the chan
nel obstructions, run by the batteries on Sullivan's
and James islands, reach the city and compel its sur
render.

The army was to take the lead in all but the fourth
of these distinct operations. Admiral Dahlgren says
there had been no understanding between him and
General Gillmore as to the fourth of these distinct
operations.

When General Gillmore assumed command of the
department preparations for entering on the execu
tion of his plan of operations were already well
advanced. Early in the preceding April General
Vogdes had been assigned to the command of the
troops on Folly Island. His aggregate force for the
three months of April, May, and June varied from
about 4700 to 6000, or an average of about 5350.
It was actively employed in preparing the island as a

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 203

land base of operations against Charleston, for
which it possessed many advantages.

The woods and dense undergrowth, chiefly of pal
metto, together with the sand hills, screened the
General's operations from view and shielded his
troops from fire. It had, besides this, further ad
vantage in that it served as a base of operations
either by way of James or Morris Island. By the
3d of July, under the immediate direction of the
accomplished officers, Lieutenants Suter and Michie,
of the United States Engineers, not only had the
necessary defensive batteries been constructed for
the security of the islands, but others for the special
purpose of covering the descent on Morris Island.
These last mentioned batteries were constructed on
the northern end of the island called Little Folly
Island. The thick growth and sand hills of that
locality thoroughly screened the workmen from view.

The movements of troops were made and the
labor performed mainly in the night and every pre
caution was taken to conceal the operations from the
Confederates. So important was secrecy in the matter
regarded, that a blockade-runner, the Dart, which
to escape pursuit had been run ashore a little south
of Lighthouse Inlet, was permitted to be wrecked by
the Confederates and the cargo carried off, when it
could easily have been prevented by guns already in
position. The troops did not even return the brisk
Confederate fire which was kept on that end of the
island while the wrecking of the Dart was in prog
ress, though several men who were at work on the
batteries were killed and wounded.

204 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

In this way batteries were carefully constructed,
renetted, and embrasured, magazines and splinter-
proofs made, thirty-two rifled guns, varying from
10- to 30-pounders, twelve lo-inch and four 8-inch
mortars were mounted, and under the energetic man
agement of the ordnance officer, Captain Mordecai,
each gun was supplied with two hundred rounds of
ammunition. All this was done within from six hun
dred to eight hundred yards of the Confederate
pickets on the south end of Morris Island.

General Vogdes claims, as does General Gillmore,
that the existence of the batteries was not known to
the Confederates until they were unmasked and had
opened fire. General Beauregard says "the attack
was not a surprise, neither was the erection of the
enemy's works on Little Folly Island unknown to the
local commanders or these headquarters." That the
enemy was in large force and very busily at work on
the island was unquestionably known to the local
commanders, and to General Beauregard, but they
could scarcely have known the positions and extent
of the works constructed against them. General
Ripley, in whose district Morris Island was, says in
his official report to General Beauregard: "On the
morning of the loth the enemy opened a heavy fire
upon our positions from Little Folly with from
twenty to thirty long-range guns, which he had placed
in position during the night," whereas the fire had
been from forty-seven guns in batteries, which had
been in course of construction nearly a month, and
had been ready for action a week before they were
unmasked and opened.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 205

On the other side of Lighthouse Inlet, on the south
end of Morris Island, the Confederates had partially
constructed eight one-gun batteries and two mortar
batteries, one for two, the other for one mortar. All
were detached and stretched along the sand ridge,
designed to protect the beach, and they were very
incomplete. Rifle-pits or infantry epaulments were
also made, extending westward toward Oyster
Point.

While General Beauregard knew perfectly well
that Folly Island was occupied in large force and
was in course of preparation for both defensive and
offensive operations, and was confident that a blow
from it was impending, he could not know with cer
tainty where it would be directed. Regarding James
Island as unquestionably the vital point in the land
defenses of Charleston, and not having sufficient
force, labor, and heavy guns for the thorough
defense of both James and Morris islands, he had
employed his inadequate force and means chiefly in
putting the former (James Island) in a secure de
fensive state. Hence the comparatively defenseless
state of the south end of Morris Island.

On July 6 Admiral Dahlgren assumed command
of the South Atlantic squadron at Port Royal. A
day or two later, after a conference between the
commanders of the land and naval forces, General
Gillmore transferred his headquarters from Hilton
Head to Folly Island, and about* the same time
Brigadier General Truman Seymour was assigned
to the command of a division embracing the troops
serving on that island.

206 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

On entering upon the execution of his plan of
operations, General Gillmore assumed erroneously
that his adversary greatly outnumbered him. His
tri-monthly report for July 10 shows his aggregate
force present in the department, exclusive of the
sick, to have been 20,837. ^n h*s official report he
states his effective force to have been at that time
17,463. He was untrammeled with instructions, and
it was therefore left to his own discretion to employ
such part of his force as he thought proper in the
execution of the plans on which he was about to
enter.

At that time General Beauregard's force had been
reduced by detachments sent to other armies. The
battle of Gettysburg had been fought and lost by the
Confederates, and General Lee was calmly and defi
antly confronting his victorious enemy, with his back
to the flooded Potomac, waiting for it to fall suffi
ciently for him to cross and continue his march into
Virginia ; Vicksburg and Port Hudson had fallen,
and General Rosecrans, by skillful maneuvering, had
pressed General Bragg's army across the Tennessee.
General Beauregard therefore, like other depart
ment commanders, had been called on to detach
troops and send them to Virginia and the West. On
July 10 the "grand total" of his force of all arms in
South Carolina and Georgia was 15,318, being
28,000 less than he had estimated as necessary when
he assumed command.

Of that force 5841 were in the First Military Di
vision, which embraced James, Morris, and Sulli
van's islands and the city of Charleston, Brigadier

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 207

General Ripley commanding. There were but 2906
men on James Island and 927 on Morris Island, in
cluding the garrisons of Batteries Wagner and
Gregg.1

No plan of operations by land against Charleston
seems to have been regarded as complete which did
not embrace an expedition to cut the Charleston &
Savannah Railroad. On this occasion the execution
of that part of the plan was entrusted to Colonel
Higginson, who on the 9th started from Beaufort
with a regiment in two armed steamboats,, accom
panied by a small gunboat, the object being to go up
the Edisto River to Jacksborough, and destroy the
railroad bridge and as much of the road as practi
cable. Under cover of a dense fog the party reached
Willstown Bluff unperceived and moved up toward
the village.

The line of railroad had been nearly stripped of
troops for the defense of Charleston. A section of
the Chestnut field artillery, Lieutenant T. G. White,
and a few cavalrymen, under Colonel Aiken, near
Willstown, not being in condition to offer effective
resistance, fell back after some skirmishing. The
Federal troops delayed there long enough to plunder
the place, burn Mr. Morris' mill and barns, and
carry off about one hundred and thirty negroes,
chiefly women and children.

The expedition then proceeded up the river, but

'General Beauregard's report shows that on July 10 he had
in South Carolina 3461 infantry, 3664 artillery, and 2651 cav
alry. Total, 9776. In Georgia, 1745 infantry, 2130 artillery,
and 1667 cavalry. Total, 5542.

208 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the delay at Willstown had given time for a section
of the Washington Artillery, of Charleston, Lieu
tenant I. R. Horsey commanding, supported by a
platoon of cavalry, under Lieutenant John Banskett,
to reach the river; when the steamers were within
three miles of Jacksborough, opposite Dr. Glov
er's plantation, the field guns opened upon them; the
boats stopped, hesitated, and turned back, followed
by the section of the Washington Artillery and also
a section of the Marion Artillery, Lieutenant Robert
Murdoch commanding, which kept up the fire until
one steamer was so crippled as to become unmanage
able and ran aground, when it was set on fire and
burned. The other two steamed out of range and
returned to Beaufort.

The two field guns of the steamer were taken un
injured from the burned vessel and were soon in
Confederate service. General Gillmore in his official
report dismisses this expedition with the brief re
mark: "It signally failed, with a loss to us of two
pieces of field artillery and a small steamer, which
was burned to prevent its falling into the hands of
the enemy."

Colonel H. K. Aiken, commanding the Confeder
ates, claims that it was burned by the fire of the Con
federate field guns of the Macon Artillery. But for
the delay at Willstown Colonel Higginson might
have destroyed the bridge and damaged the road,
or at least have retarded the reinforcements which
soon passed over from Savannah.

To draw attention, and perhaps troops, from Mor
ris to James Island and produce the impression that the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 209

latter was to be the point of attack, General Gillmore
sent General A. H. Terry, with 3800 men in armed
transports, up the Stono, conveyed by the gunboats
Pawnee, Marblehead, and McDonough, Captain
Balch commanding. Under cover of the naval guns
from the steamers in the Stono and Little Folly
rivers, which thoroughly swept the ground in front,
the troops landed on Battery Island and Grimble's
place, moved forward in a threatening manner and
brisk skirmishing commenced between the pickets.
General Terry's force outnumbered by several hun
dred men all the infantry General Beauregard had
in South Carolina and by more than a thousand all
the infantry and artillery combined on James Island.

General Gillmore believed that his feint on James
Island had produced at least one of the effects de
sired, in drawing troops from Morris Island; but
he was mistaken. In truth, there were no troops
that could have been drawn from that island with
out abandoning at least the south end and leaving
the whole island in great jeopardy.

It had been General Gillmore's intention to make
the descent on Morris Island about midnight be
tween the 8th and Qth. He had given detailed in
structions to that effect, which were so far carried
out that obstructions in Little Folly Creek were re
moved by a party of the First New York Engineer
Regiment and the batteries were so far unmasked
as to disclose their presence to the Confederates.
That same night Captain Charles T. Haskell, of the
First South Carolina Infantry, visited Little Folly
Island with a scouting party, and discovered the

210 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

company's barges or launches collected in the creeks
approaching the inlet. During the whole of the
9th, therefore, there were abundant indications that
an attack was immediately impending.

General George C. Strong was selected to lead
in the attack with his brigade. He was a young
officer of the Ordnance Corps, who had graduated
with high honors at West Point in the class of 1858
and had distinguished himself in the war both in
Virginia and Louisiana. His brigade was com
posed of the Sixth Connecticut Regiment, Colonel
John L. Chatfield; Forty-eighth New York, Colonel
Barton; Third New Hampshire, Colonel Jackson;
Ninth Maine, Colonel Emory; Seventy-sixth Penn
sylvania, Colonel Strawbridge; battalion of four
companies Seventh Connecticut, Lieutenant Colonel
Rodman; Company C, Third Rhode Island
Artillery; detachment Third United States Artillery;
detachment First New York Engineers.

A battalion of the Forty-eighth New York, the
colonel commanding, and the detachments of
artillery were left on the island with General Vogdes.

The brigade was embarked on launches near the
south end of Folly Island early in the night of the
9th, and, conveyed four naval howitzer launches,
Lieutenant Bunce commanding, moved up Folly
River and Creek and halted near the entrance to
Lighthouse Inlet, where they were screened from
view by tall marsh grass, and there awaited the
signal to advance.

The remaining force on Folly Island was held
in reserve under General Vogdes. The Sixty-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 211

second Ohio, Colonel Pond; Sixty-seventh Ohio,
Colonel Voorhees, and Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania,
Colonel Howell, were near the signal station. The
Seventh New Hampshire, Colonel H. S. Putnam;
One Hundredth New York, Colonel Dandy; a bat
talion of six companies of the Forty-eighth New
York, Colonel Barker, and Battery B, First United
States Artillery, Captain G. V. Henry commanding,
were at the northern end of Little Folly Island, in
readiness to follow General Strong's Brigade. The
formidable batteries which were to perform so im
portant a part were commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Jackson and Major L. L. Langton, First
United States Artillery.

Just across Lighthouse Inlet and within easy
range were the detached Confederate battery of
eight guns and three mortars, manned by two com
panies of the First South Carolina Artillery, Cap
tains J. C. Mitchell and J. R. Macbeth commanding,
supported by the Twenty-first South Carolina In
fantry, about four hundred men, Major Mclver
commanding, and a detachment of the First South
Carolina Infantry, under Captain Charles T. Has-
kell (in all about seven hundred). The garrison of
Battery Wagner, about three miles distant on the
island, was two companies of artillery, Captains C.
E. Chichester and J. R. Mathews commanding, and
of Battery Gregg, Captain Henry R. Lesesne's com
pany of artillery. All of the artillery on the island
was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Yates,
First South Carolina Artillery. The whole force

212 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

was commanded by Colonel R. F. Graham, Twenty-
first South Carolina Infantry.

As the sun rose on the morning of July 10 the
Federal batteries were unmasked and thirty-two
guns and fifteen mortars opened fire, to which the
Confederates promptly replied. A few minutes
later four monitors, the Weehawken) Commander
E. R. Calhoun, the Nahant, Commander John
Downs, the Kaatskill, Commander George H.
Rodgers, and the Montauk, Commander D. McN.
Fairfax, which had crossed the bar and taken posi
tions from which some of the Confederate batteries
could be enfiladed and others taken in reverse,
opened fire with fifteen- and eleven-inch guns on
the Confederate left; the four howitzer launches
pulled into position and opened on the right, and
for nearly three hours about sixty guns, some of
them of the heaviest caliber, concentrated a rapid
and accurate fire on the Confederate position, to
which the Confederates as rapidly replied.

A little after seven o'clock the signal was given to
General Strong to cross the inlet, land, and assail
the batteries, and he pulled with the greater part of
his brigade directly and rapidly for Oyster Point,
the extreme left of the Confederate position. As
soon as the launches came into view some of the
Confederate guns were turned on them with effect,
destroying one of them, while the infantry hastened
to the Point to dispute the landing.

Colonel Chatfield, with his regiment, the Sixth
Connecticut, had pulled rapidly to the right, or

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 213

southeastern, extremity of the island, and the tide
being low the bank sheltered him from the fire of
the guns on the sand hills, which were about thirty
feet high — so high that the guns could not be trained
on the boats.

Both parties landed successfully and with little
loss. The battalion of four companies of the
Seventh Connecticut, Lieutenant Colonel Rodman,
was the first to land at Oyster Point, quickly fol
lowed by the battalions of the Forty-eighth New
York, Ninth Maine, Third New Hampshire, and
Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania.

The launches immediately crossed to Little Folly
Island, and in twenty minutes from the time they
touched the beach the Seventh New Hampshire, One
Hundredth New York, the battalion of the Forty-
eighth New York, and Captain Henry's battery of
the First Artillery were transported to and landed
on the south end of Morris Island.

In the meantime the main column at Oyster Point
had formed in line and advanced against the Twenty-
first South Carolina, while Colonel Chatfield ad
vanced directly against the batteries, throwing out
strong skirmishing parties on the right and left,
which soon flanked the batteries, taking them in re
verse. After an obstinate resistance, what was left
of the artillery had to abandon their guns and retire.
In truth, the batteries had been for nearly three
hours enveloped in fire and overwhelmed by the
weight of metal thrown on them.

Colonel Graham, finding his little band of in
fantry, which had lost heavily, in danger of being

214 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

cut off by Colonel Chatfield's column and captured
by General Strong's, ordered it to fall back to Bat
tery Wagner.

The two Federal columns, converging upon the
batteries, captured them all, one after the other,
and pursued the retreating Confederates, while the
monitors, steaming slowly parallel to the beach, con
tinued their fire upon the shattered Confederates.

The Seventh Battalion South Carolina Infantry,
Lieutenant Colonel Nelson, had been ordered to
reinforce Morris Island, but did not arrive in time
to take part in the battle. Two companies of it,
which arrived first, had been ordered forward to
support the batteries, but met the retreating Con
federates and were warmly engaged in endeavoring
to cover the retreat.

The Federals continued the pursuit until they
came within range of the guns of Battery Wagner,
which opened rapidly and the pursuit ceased.

The weather was excessively hot, so, too, was the
fire from Wagner, say the Federal reports, "rid
dling" the colors of the Sixth Connecticut. The
men were too much exhausted to storm Battery
Wagner. They were therefore halted a few hun
dred yards from it, where the sand hills sheltered
them from its fire, and threw up breastworks for
better protection.

The monitors took position abreast of Wagner
and kept up a brisk fire on it for the remainder of
the day, except (and this appears to have been a
custom in the navy which seems strange to soldiers)
that "at noon we hauled out of fire to give the men

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 215

dinner and about two o'clock went back and resumed
work," says the Admiral. Wagner returned the
fire with spirit from a ten-inch columbiad, her only
effective gun against the monitors. The Kaatskill,
against which the fire was mainly directed, was
struck sixty times, her deck crashed through and
pierced in several places, letting in water very freely.

By nine o'clock in the morning the affair on land
was over and two-thirds of Morris Island was in pos
session of the Federal troops. The descent had
been made with complete success and little loss
(General Strong reports fifteen killed and ninety-two
wounded). Among the killed was Captain Lent,
of the Forty-eighth New York. They had captured
three 8-inch navy shell guns, two 8-inch seacoast
howitzers, one rifled 24-pounder, one 3O-pounder,
one i2-pounder Whitworth and three lo-inch sea-
coast mortars — in all eleven pieces — the camp
equipage, and 127 prisoners.

The little band of Confederates had made a
gallant stand for three hours against great odds,
and had not retreated until it was absolutely
necessary to escape capture and until, out of a total
force not exceeding 700, they had lost 294 killed,
wounded, and missing, uamong whom," says Gen
eral Ripley, "I mention with especial regret the fol
lowing officers: Captains John R. Chevers and Has-
kell and Lieutenant J. S. Bee, who had rendered im
portant service previous to and behaved with dis
tinguished gallantry in the engagement."

General Seymour commended very highly the con
duct of his troops on the occasion:

216 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

"For the brilliant vigor," he says, "with which the
movements of his brigade were conducted the great
est credit is due to Brigadier General Strong, whose
personal example was heroism itself. His report
justly praises his subordinate commanders, and to
those I must refer, but I must mention particularly
the excellent conduct of Colonel Chatfield, Sixth
Connecticut, who led his regiment in the advance up
Morris Island until its colors were riddled by the
close fire from Battery Wagner. But to the hearty
devotion and the cheerful courage of the soldiers of
this division, in the patient labors in preparing for
the battle and the ready courage with which they
fought it, must, after all, be given the highest honors,
and their gallant conduct in this brilliant action will
always be to their commanders and their country the
source of just pride."

The assault of Battery Wagner, which the troops
were too much exhausted to attempt on the loth,
was made about day dawn the next morning by
General Strong.

The garrison of Wagner at that time consisted of
the shattered remainder of the troops which had
contested the landing the previous morning, namely,
the Twenty-first South Carolina Regiment, about
two hundred men, under Major J. G. W. Mclver;
twenty men of Company D, First South Carolina
Infantry, Lieutenant Horlbeck commanding, and
seventy men of Companies E, H, and I, First South
Carolina Artillery, under Captain John C. Mitchell;
also the Gist Guard, Captain C. E. Chichester;
Mathews' Artillery, Captain J. R. Mathews, which

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 217

had occupied the battery on the loth; the Seventh
South Carolina Battalion, about three hundred men,
Major J. H. Rion commanding; four companies
each of the First Georgia Regiment, Colonel C. H.
Olmstead; the Twelfth Georgia Battalion, Lieu
tenant Colonel H. D. Capers, and three companies
of the Eighteenth Georgia Battalion, Major W. S.
Basinger; in all about five hundred men, Colonel
Olmstead commanding. The aggregate force was
about twelve hundred men.

The South Carolinians manned the guns and the
right and right center of the ramparts. The
Georgians, who arrived in the night of the loth,
guarded the left and left center of the work. The
Eighteenth Battalion occupied the southeast bastion,
the First Georgia along the sea front to the left, the
Twelfth Georgia Battalion to the right, connecting
with the Carolinians. Lieutenant Colonel Yates
commanded the artillery and Colonel R. F. Graham
(Twenty-first South Carolina) the whole.

General Strong formed his brigade before day-
dawn. The assaulting column consisted of the bat
talion of the Seventh Connecticut, the Seventy-sixth
Pennsylvania, and the Ninth Maine. As on the
previous morning, the Seventh Connecticut led the
advance, Lieutenant Colonel Rodman commanding.
The Third and Seventh New Hampshire were held
in reserve. The battalion of the Seventh Con
necticut was deployed in line in front, followed
closely in the order named by the Seventy-sixth
Pennsylvania and Ninth Maine, each formed in
close divisions. They were ordered to carefully

2i8 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

preserve their intervals and when the Confederates
should open fire to rush forward with a cheer,
mount the parapet and carry the battery by storm.

General Strong commanded in person. His in
structions were most faithfully carried out by Lieu
tenant Colonel Rodman, who led his Seventh Con
necticut men under a brisk fire of cannon and
musketry to the ditch and some of them to the top
of the parapet, where, it is reported, they bayoneted
two Confederate gunners.

"But unfortunately," says General Strong in his
report, "when the enemy opened fire simultaneously
along the whole line, and with a range of two hun
dred yards, the Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania halted
and lay down upon the ground. Though they re
mained in this position but a few moments and after
wards moved gallantly forward, some of them even
to the ditch, that halt lost the battle, for the interval
was lost and the Seventh Connecticut, unsupported,
were driven from the parapet. The whole column,
including the Ninth Maine, which had reached the
ditch on the left, gave way and retreated from the
field."

The garrison of Wagner had of course expected
an attack and was on the alert all night. When
the column was seen advancing in the dim light of
early dawn Colonel Graham deliberately held his
fire until his enemy was within close range, then
opened simultaneously along his whole line, firing
rapidly and continuously until the last man of the
fast retreating column was under cover of the sand
hills.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 219

The Seventh Connecticut was particularly dis
tinguished on this occasion. Unsupported and
when there seemed no hope of success, some of the
men persisted with great daring in their efforts to
force an entrance into the work. One brave man
sprang to the parapet in front of a thirty-two-
pounder, double-charged with grape shot. Lieu
tenant Gilchrist, of South Carolina, in command of
the gun, struck by the man's fearless bearing, called
to him to come in before the gun was fired. As
quick as thought the man's rifle was leveled and a
ball whizzed by Gilchrist's head. The discharge
of the gun followed and the man was hurled across
the ditch a mangled corpse. This regiment had
been the first to enter Fort Pulaski when it was
captured the year before and the officers and men
had behaved with much kindness toward Colonel
Olmstead and his men who were captured on that
occasion. Among the prisoners captured at this
time were many of this regiment, who recognized
their former prisoners, calling them by name, and
were received by them with as much kind considera
tion as the circumstances permitted.

General Strong in his official report to General
Gillmore, made on the day of the assault, states
that his loss that morning was 8 officers and 322 non
commissioned officers and privates. Among the
severely wounded was Lieutenant Colonel Rodman
of the Seventh Connecticut. Captain Gray, who
succeeded to the command of the battalion of the
Seventh Connecticut, reports that 191 men of the
battalion went to the assault and that 103 of them

220 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

were killed, woui.Jed, and missing, and he adds that
their mess contained 1 1 officers that morning before
the assault and but 4 after it.

The Confederate loss in the assault was i officer
and 5 enlisted men killed and i officer and 5 enlisted
men wounded. Captain Werner, First Georgia,
and Edward Postelle, of the Eighteenth Georgia,
were killed, Lieutenant Frederick Tupper,
Eighteenth Georgia Battalion, severely wounded.
Colonel Graham reports that he captured 130 and
buried over 100 of the Federal troops.

The Federal losses on the mornings of the loth
and nth, as officially reported by General Strong,
who commanded in person on both occasions, aggre
gated 436. In an official letter from General Gill-
more to General Halleck reporting the success of his
descent on Morris Island, he says, speaking of the
assault on the morning of the iith: "The parapet
was gained, but the support recoiled under the fire
to which they were exposed and could not be got
up. Our loss in both actions (the mornings of the
loth and i ith) will not vary much from 150."

A more substantial and obvious reason for the
failure of the assault will naturally suggest itself to
the most causal reader than that assigned by Gen
eral Strong, namely, the brief halt of the Seventy-
sixth Pennsylvania. The probable cause of the fail
ure was that the assaulting column was too weak
numerically. It scarcely outnumbered the garrison,
which had all the advantages of position within a
strong field work.

There seems to have been some difference of

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 221

opinion between Generals Gillmore and Seymour as
to this point — on which of them did the responsibil
ity of the assault, as it was made, rest. The former
commanded the department, the latter a division of
the troops on the island, and the assault was made
by a part only of one of his brigades. General Gill-
more, in an elaborate report of his operations, makes
but brief mention of the assault, saying merely:
''General Seymour was ordered to carry Fort
Wagner by assault by daybreak on the following
morning. The attempt failed."

General Seymour says: "Before daylight on the
i ith an assault had been made by Brigadier General
Strong, with his brigade, in accordance with instruc
tions given to him directly by Brigadier General Gill-
more, which attack failed from the complete prepa
ration of the enemy, due to his pickets having been
driven in an hour before the attempted surprise."
General Strong reports officially that the assault was
made "pursuant to instructions from department
headquarters."

Immediately after the assault, in a conference be
tween General Gillmore and Admiral Dahlgren, it
was decided that the parapets of Wagner should be
battered down and its guns silenced by a combined
fire from land and naval batteries before making
the next assault.

CHAPTER XL

Battery Wagner's armament increased — Its importance in the
defense of Charleston — Attack on Federal position — Suc
cess — Wagner again bombarded — Whole Confederate de
fenses engaged — Terrific fire — Scenes in Charleston — Suf
fering of the besieged — Bayonet assault — Repulse — Con
federate loss — Federal loss — Bombardment continues.

The failure of the Federal assault on Battery
Wagner on the morning of July n, 1863, convinced
General Gillmore that before making another at
tempt to carry that work by storm it would be ex
pedient, at least, if not absolutely necessary, to
silence its guns and cut down its parapets, scarp and
counterscarp, by a combined and heavy artillery fire
from the land and naval batteries.

Admiral Dahlgren concurred in this opinion and
was quite ready to perform his part of the bombard
ment. The naval batteries were ready and could
be placed in and taken out of position at pleasure.
The mortar vessels, at a secure distance beyond the
range of the Confederate guns, having ascertained
the range, could drop their shells into Battery Wag
ner without danger from the return fire, while the
monitors, with their batteries securely encased within
iron plating of eleven inches thickness, could steam
into position and maintain their fire as long as it
suited the Admiral, steaming out of range again

222

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 223

with great regularity at stated intervals, that the
men might take their meals and accustomed rest un
disturbed by the Confederate guns, and return to
their work with the regularity of gangs of laborers
engaged in other and more productive industry.

But it was not so with the land batteries. It was
necessary to construct and arm them under the fires
of several Confederate batteries on Morris and
James islands and Fort Sumter. The daily fire of
the ironclads generally suppressed in a great meas
ure the fire of Wagner while the land forces were
contructing their batteries. But this daily firing of
the ironclads was not always made with impunity.
Though there was but one gun in Wagner that
could reach them with much effect, — a ro-inch colum-
biad, — that one gun under the cool and skillful
management of Captain Frazer Matthews was fired
with accuracy, doing much damage to the monitors,
one of which was seen on the evening of the I2th
going southward without a smokestack and ap
parently much crippled. But in spite of the Con
federate fire the work on the land batteries was
pressed forward rapidly night and day and com
pleted in the course of a week.

In the meantime the Confederates were making
every possible exertion to strengthen and increase
the armament of works already constructed, and to
construct others which the Federal operations on
Morris Island and the safety of Charleston sug
gested as necessary. The armament of Wagner
was increased by four 12-pounder howitzers and
two 32-pounder carronades. In response to Gen-

224 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

eral Beauregard's earnest call for reinforcements,
General Clingman had been sent to him with his
brigade from North Carolina, and General A. H.
Colquitt had arrived with two regiments of his
Georgia brigade. The Eleventh South Carolina
Regiment and Marion Light Artillery had been
brought to Charleston from the line of the Charles
ton & Savannah Railroad, but the importance of
guarding that road very soon made it necessary to
return them to that duty.

The arrival of these reinforcements naturally sug
gested the question whether or not it was practicable
to drive the Federal force from Morris Island. In
a consultation with his general officers, Ripley,
Taliaferro, Hagood, and Jordan (chief of staff),
and Colonel E. B. Harris, chief of engineers, Gen
eral Beauregard presented that question for con
sideration. The number of troops deemed neces
sary to attack the enemy on Morris Island with
reasonable prospect of success was estimated at
four thousand, the area and the general shape of
the island making it impracticable to employ a
larger force to advantage. To carry out this plan
it would be necessary to throw the four thousand
troops on the island during the night and attack and
defeat the enemy before daylight. To make the
movement and attack in daylight would expose the
Confederates to the flank fire of the naval guns.
Seeing that the Federal force was about seven thou
sand, covered by defensive works, to attack it in
front and in the light of day, with the ironclads
pouring in a destructive fire on the flank, could

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 225

scarcely be hoped to prove successful. With the
very insufficient means of transportation at General
Beauregard's command, it was deemed impracticable
to throw a sufficient force on the island, move upon
the enemy, and make the attack during a single
night. The idea was therefore abandoned and a
purely defensive plan of operations was then deter
mined on.

The presence of General Terry at Legare's and
Grimble's, on James Island, with a larger force than
the Confederates had on the same island was a
standing menace to the latter, which it was im
portant to suppress. General Johnson Hagood
commanded the Confederates on that island, and
General Colquitt, having arrived on the I4th with
two regiments o his Georgia brigade, was sent to
reinforce him. Early on the morning of the i6th
a reconnoissance in force was made on the enemy,
Generals Hagood and Colquitt commanding in per
son. The enemy occupied Battery Island and parts
of Legare's and Grimble's plantations. The naval
gunboats were in the Stono and other armed
steamers were in Folly River, giving a cross fire
which could sweep the ground in front as far as the
Confederate pickets. The object of the movement
was limited to driving in the pickets on the left,
making a reconnoissance of that part of their posi
tion, capturing or destroying the part of the force
nearest Grimble's, and driving off and, if possible,
crippling the gunboats Pawnee and Marblehead,
which were anchored highest up the Stono.

General Colquitt, with the Twenty-fifth South

226 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

Carolina, Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Presley com
manding; Sixth Georgia, Colonel J. T. Lofton com
manding; Nineteenth Georgia, Colonel A. J.
Hutchins; four companies of the Thirty-second
Georgia, Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Pruden com
manding, and Captain E. L. Parker's Battery of
Artillery, in all about fourteen hundred men, were
ordered to cross the marsh dividing Legare's from
Grimble's plantation at the crossing nearest Seces-
sionville, driving the enemy as far as the lower
crossing near the Stono, recross the marsh by a flank
movement and cut off and capture the force at
Grimble's. Colonel C. H. Way, of the Fifty-
fourth Georgia, with about eight hundred infantry
of his own and the Thirty-first North Carolina Regi
ment, followed in echelon on the Grimble side of
the marsh to co-operate with Colquitt. A reserve
of a section of artillery, supported by a company
of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Lieu
tenant Colonel R. J. Jeffords, Fifth South Carolina
Cavalry, was held in hand near Rivers' house. On
the right Lieutenant Colonel Del. Kemper, with
four rifled 12-pounders and four Napoleon guns,
supported by Colonel James D. Radcliffe, of the
Sixty-first North Carolina, with about four hun
dred men of his own regiment, was ordered to at
tack the gunboats in the Stono.

The movement was made at day dawn. Six com
panies of the Twenty-fifth South Carolina deployed
as skirmishers on the right and left of the road
leading from Secessionville to Legare's house,
pressed forward, rapidly crossed Rivers' causeway,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 227

where the Federal picket line (Fifty-fourth Massa
chusetts) was encountered and driven back hastily
on the main line, which retired to Battery Island,
"leaving their camp strewn with muskets, accouter-
ments, blankets, overcoats, prisoners/' etc., says
Colonel Way. As soon as the picket firing com
menced the party at Grimble's, which was smaller
than had been supposed, fled to Battery Island and so
escaped capture. There was some brisk firing of
field guns on both sides. A company of the Nine
teenth Georgia pursued a party of the Fifty-fourth
Massachusetts, which had been cut off by the left of
the advancing skirmish line, killing and wounding a
number of them, the others escaping through the
marsh.

Colonel Radcliffe and Lieutenant Colonel Kem-
per surprised the Pawnee, (Captain Balch com
manding), and Marblehead at early dawn by a
rapid and accurate fire, striking the Pawnee forty-
two times with considerable effect. From the na
ture of their position in the Stono the gunboats could
not bring their guns to bear with effect on the troops,
but fell down the river out of range of the field
guns and in positions where their own batteries
could be used, and in response to a signal from
General Terry the gunboats swept the ground in the
Federal front, rendering valuable service, for which
General Terry was quick to acknowledge his in
debtedness to the naval commander.

The object of the reconnoissance having been ac
complished, the Confederates retired, and that night
General Terry abandoned the island, carrying his

228 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

force to Folly Island, and the Confederates occupied
the positions from which the Federals had retired.
The loss in the affair had been slight — about fifty on
the Federal and eighteen on the Confederate side.
The desired result was accomplished when the
Federal force withdrew from the island.

Service in Battery Wagner was necessarily one
of ceaseless vigilance, entailing on officers and men
such continued mental and physical strain that it was
necessary to relieve the garrison by fresh troops at
short intervals. It was General Beauregard's wish
that it should be relieved every forty-eight hours,
but the change had to be made in boats during the
night and soon became so difficult that the tour of
duty was extended. Brigadier General William B.
Taliaferro, who was on duty at Savannah when the
descent was made on Morris Island, hastened to
Charleston on leave of absence for a few hours and
solicited service in the defense of the city. His
offer was accepted and he was assigned to the com
mand of Battery Wagner on the I3th.

To guard against surprise a line of rifle-pits was
made across the island, about two hundred yards in
front of the work. The Federal advance picket line
was about three-quarters of a mile distant and could
be seen from the parapet of Wagner. Beyond that
point the enemy was concealed by sand hills and
neither their numbers nor the extent of the prepara
tions they were making were known.

To gain information on those points, cover the
men who were digging the rifle-pits, and inspirit the
garrison by an aggressive movement, General Talia-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 229

ferro ordered a sortie to be made on the night ot
the I4th, with one hundred and fifty men detailed
from the infantry of the garrison, namely, the Fifty-
first North Carolina, Twelfth and Eighteenth
Georgia Battalions, Twentieth Regiment and
Seventh Battalion South Carolina, Major James H.
Rion commanding. The sortie was made about
midnight, driving in the advance picket to the first
trench, from which the enemy was drawn; but a
heavy fire from a much larger force a hundred or
two hundreds yards further on arrested the advance
of the assailants, and it was believed killed and
wounded a number of the Federal soldiers who
were retreating. From prisoners taken it was as
certained that batteries were in course of construc
tion and many guns already mounted. The Con
federates lost eleven wounded, one mortally, and
three missing. Major Rion estimated the Federal
loss at not less than forty.

Battery Wagner was a field work made of sand
and riveted with turf and palmetto logs. It extended
across the islands from the beach on the east to
Vincent's Creek on the west, and presented toward
the south a bastioned front of about 275 yards.
The parapets were very thick and the ditch of mod
erate depth. The space within the work was from
east to west about 200 yards and from north to
south varied from 20 to 75 yards. On this space
to the west were quarters for officers and men, built
of wood, a bomb-proof (capable of sheltering from
eight hundred to a thousand men), bomb-proof
magazines and heavy traverses.

230 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

On July 1 8 the armament was one lo-inch colum-
biad, one 32-pounder rifle, one 42-pounder, and two
32-pounder carronades, two naval shell guns and
one 8-inch seacoast howitzer, four smooth-bore 32-
pounders and one lo-inch sea-coast mortar — in all
thirteen — and one light battery. Of those guns only,
the single lo-inch columbiad was of much effect
against the monitors. The Federal land batteries
were beyond the range of nearly all of the other
guns in Wagner.

On the morning of the iSth the infantry of the
garrison consisted of the Thirty-first North Caro
lina, Lieutenant Colonel C. W. Knight command
ing; Fifty-first North Carolina, Colonel McKethen;
and the Charleston Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel
P. C. Gaillard. The artillery was Captains W. T.
Tatam's and Warren Adams' companies of the
First South Carolina regular infantry, acting as
artillery; Captains J. T. Buckner's and W. J-
Dixon's companies of the Sixty-third Georgia Heavy
Artillery, and Captain De Pass' Light Battery — in
all an aggregate of about seventeen hundred men.
The Charleston Battalion and Fifty-first North
Carolina were assigned to the defense of the parapet
in the order named from the right along the south
front to the gun chamber opposite the door of the
bomb-proof, which was on the left or sea front. The
Thirty-first North Carolina extended along the sea
face from the left of the Fifty-first to the sallyport
toward Battery Gregg. A part of this regiment
(the Thirty-first) was held in reserve on the parade.

Two companies of the Charleston Battalion, Cap-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 231

tain Julius A. Blake commanding, were outside of
the work guarding the left gorge and sallyport. Two
of Captain De Pass' field pieces were also outside
of the work on the traverse near the sallyport.
Colonel E. B. Harris, chief of engineers, had that
day placed a howitzer on the right of the sallyport,
outside of the beach, to co-operate with the guns on
the left. To avoid the delay, which in a sudden as
sault might prove fatal, of assembling the men and
marching them in military order to their respective
posts, every man was instructed individually as to the
exact point which he should occupy, and which, on
an order to man the parapets, he would be required
to gain and hold. All of the artillery was undpr the
general command of Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Sim-
kins, Chief of Artillery.

On the 1 6th General Gillmore had completed his
preparations and was in readiness for the bombard
ment and assault, but heavy rains deluged his bat
teries, damaging the ammunition, and obliged him
to defer it until the iSth. He had constructed four
batteries, and the long list of officers killed in the
then recent battle of Gettysburg furnished names
for three of them — Reynolds, Weed, and O'Rorke;
the other was Battery Hays. They were at dis
tances from Wagner ranging from 1330 to 1920
yards, and mounted thirty-one rifled guns, varying in
caliber from lo-pounders to 3O-pounders, nine 10-
inch and four 8-inch mortars, in all forty-four pieces.
Lieutenant Colonel R. W. Jackson, First United
States Artillery, commanded Batteries Hays and

232 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

O'Rorke; Captain L. L. Langon, of the same regi
ment, commanded Batteries Reynolds and Weed.

The naval vessels in readiness to take part in
the bombardment were the New Ironsides, Cap
tain Rowan, and five monitors, namely the Kaats-
kill, Captain G. W. Rodgers; Montauk, Captain
D. McN. Fairfax; Nantucket, Captain Beaumont;
Weehawken, Captain Colhoun, and Patapsco, Cap
tain Badger. The Ironsides carried fourteen and
the monitors two guns each, all of 1 5-inch and n-
inch caliber — the heaviest guns in use. There were
besides five gunboats, the Paul Jones, Commander
Rhind; Ottawa, Commander Whiting; Seneca, Com
mander Gibson; Chippewa, Commander Harris,
and Wissahickon, Commander Davis.

General Gillmore had ordered the firing to com
mence at day dawn on the i8th, but another heavy
rain on the night of the iyth delayed it a few hours.
About 8 130 A. M. fire was opened, which, until mid
day, Gillmore says, was merely to obtain the proper
range, but the Confederate generals represent it as
rapid and heavy from the commencement. About
mid-day the land and naval batteries, about ninety
guns, were in rapid action and were replied to from
batteries on Morris, James, and Sullivan's island and
Fort Sumter. The bombardment — rarely, if ever,
exceeded in the history of war for the number and
caliber of the guns and the rapidity and accuracy of
fire — continued until nearly eight o'clock.

Words fail to convey an adequate idea of that
bombardment when uthe whole island smoked like

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 233

a furnace and trembled as from an earthquake."
None but those who witnessed can appreciate it. To
those who directed the storm "the spectacle pre
sented was of surpassing sublimity and grandeur,"
as described by General Gillmore. But only the
men who were in Wagner on that memorable day
can form an idea of its diabolical power as it ap
peared to them, which seemed capable of blasting
and destroying everything before it save the in
domitable will and resolution of those who defended
the work.

For eleven hours the air seemed filled with every
description of shot and shell that the magazines of
war could supply. Huge clouds of sand were blown
into the air from the craters formed by the bursting
shells; the water of the bay was lashed into foam
and thrown high in jets of spray by the ricocheting
shots from the ironclads bounding from the water
over the parapets and bursting within the work,
while a dense cloud of sulphurous smoke hung like a
pall over the scene. Of the garrison only the gun
detachments and a few sentinels were at their posts.
The troops generally were ordered to shelter them
selves in the bomb-proofs and behind the para
pets, traverses, and sand hills. The Charleston
battalion preferred the open air to the stifling heat
and vitiated. atmosphere of the bomb-proof, and
during the whole of that terrible day sheltered them
selves as they best could outside. It was necessary
to husband their strength to repel the expected as
sault. In the meantime their strength was to sit
still.

234 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

The lo-inch columbiad, the only gun which could
reach the ironclads with effect, and several other
guns were soon dismounted and the 32-pounder rifle
was rendered useless by bursting. In truth, the
armament of Wagner was so inferior to those which
opposed it that it was inappreciable. The field and
shell guns were dismounted and protected by sand
bags until they should be needed to repel the assault.
Comparatively passive endurance alone remained
for the garrison while the storm continued. Since
the assault of the nth Wagner had been much
strengthened under the skillful direction of the Chief
Engineer, Colonel D. B. Harris, and his able as
sistant, Captain Barnwell, and had stood the severe
test of the heavy fire to which it had been subjected
so well as to inspire the troops with confidence in
the efficacy of sand batteries.

Charleston was wild with excitement. From
church steeples, house-tops, and the wharves, from
boats in the harbor and the parapets of the sur
rounding forts and batteries, thousands of eager
spectators gazed anxiously on the work which held
its gallant defenders, whom they were powerless to
assist. Wagner itself exhibited scarcely any sign
of life.

The Confederate flag floated defiantly over it,
and when the halyards were cut by a shot and the
flag was blown into the fort Captain Barnwell, of the
Engineers, instantly sprang to the ramparts with a
battle-flag and drove the staff into the sand, while
others of the garrison leaped forward in a race
through the storm of shot and shell for the garrison

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 235

flag — Major Ramsey, Sergeant Shelton, and Pro
vost Flinn, of the Charleston Battalion, and Lieu
tenant Riddic, of the Sixty-third Georgia, dividing
the honor of flying it again from its staff. It was
again shot away and again restored to its place, this
time by Private Gaillard, of the Charleston Bat
talion. "These intrepid actions," says Genera]
Taliaferro, "emulating in a higher degree the con
duct of Sergeant Jasper at Moultrie, during the
Revolution, were loudly cheered by the command
and inspired them with renewed courage."

While the bombardment was at its height the
Chief of Engineers, Colonel D. B. Harris, a grad
uate of West Point, of the class of 1833, landed at
Cumming's Point, passed through the tempest of
shot to Wagner to inspect its condition and to give
his personal attention to whatever might be done to
repair the ravages of the bombardment. The per
fectly cool courage which characterized him and was
the admiration of all who saw him under the
heaviest fire inspirited the garrison and gave con
fidence in its capacity to withstand the terrible fire it
was undergoing.

A little more than a year later General Harris
died at Summerville of yellow fever, contracted
while inspecting the defenses of Charleston, leaving
an enviable reputation for skill, patriotism, and in
trepid bravery, tempered by a kindly, gentle, and
modest bearing.

The long midsummer day seemed endless and
the storm of fire increased as the hours wore on.
The fierce July sun seemed to stand still. Would

236 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

it never set? Water was scarce and men slaked
their thirst from the temporary wells opened by ex
ploding shells into which water oozed. Men were
found dead without wounds from the concussion of
bursting shells. A staff officer, Captain Tuiggs, in
the execution of an order was knocked down by an
exploding shell and found apparently lifeless, with
no wound. He was with difficulty restored. Men
were half buried in sand thrown up by bursting
shells; the commanding general himself was buried
knee deep and dug out with spades.

Much anxiety was felt for the safety of the mag
azine. The works might be battered out of shape,
the parapet, traverses, scarp, and counterscarp
might be cut down, but the sand could not be
wholly removed and would still afford some shelter;
but if the covering of the magazine were swept
away, a shell bursting would blow the whole garri
son skyward. The closest watch was kept upon it
and its condition reported at short intervals during
the day.

Later in the day General Gillmore signaled Ad
miral Dahlgren to redouble his fire and cease a little
after sunset, when the assault would be made.
Colonel Olmstead, of the First Georgia, who had
been relieved from duty in Wagner in the night of
the 1 7th and witnessed the bombardment from Fort
Johnson, says the General's signal to the Admiral
was intercepted by a Confederate signal officer, who
knew the Federal signals, and that the dispatch was
known by General Beauregard almost as soon as by
the Admiral; but General Taliaferro has no recollec-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 237

tion that it was communicated to him. No signal
was needed to warn him of the approaching as
sault. When the storm of fire culminated about
sunset and gradually subsided, it was evident that
the supreme hour of the day had come and that the
assault was at hand. Orders were given to man the
ramparts; the field guns and howitzers were un
earthed and mounted, and all preparations made to
meet and repel the assault.

General Gillmore had selected the time between
sunset and dark to make the assault, in order that
there might be light enough for his troops to see
their way, but not enough to enable the gunners in
the distant Confederate batteries to see distinctly the
advancing column. General Seymour commanded
in person the division of troops available for the
assault. It had been suggested to him — he does not
say by whom — that one brigade would be sufficient
for the work in hand, but Seymour thought dif
ferently. On close personal observation of Wagner
he could not discover that it had been materially
damaged by the unprecedentedly heavy bombard
ment to which it had been subjected, but he pre
sumed that so heavy a fire must have in a great
measure demoralized the garrison.

The First Brigade — General G. C. Strong's—
was selected to lead the assault. It was composed
of the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment,
Colonel Shaw; the Sixth Connecticut, Colonel Chat-
field; a battalion of the Seventh Connecticut, Cap
tain Gray; the Forty-eighth New York, Colonel
Barton; the Third New Hampshire, Colonel Jack-

238 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

son; Ninth Maine, Colonel Emery, and Seventy-
sixth Pennsylvania, Captain J. S. Little command
ing. It was supported by Colonel H. S. Putnam's
Brigade, composed of his own regiment, the Seventh
New Hampshire, Lieutenant Colonel Abbott; One
Hundredth New York, Colonel Dandy; Sixty-
second Ohio, Colonel Pond, and Sixty-seventh Ohio,
Colonel Voris. General Stevenson's Brigade of
four excellent regiments was held in reserve.

The First Brigade was formed in column by
regiments, except the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts,
which being much larger than the others, number
ing nearly a thousand men, was in column by bat
talion. It was a negro regiment, recruited in
Massachusetts, and was regarded as an admirable
and reliable body of men. Half the ground to be
traversed before reaching Wagner was undulating
with sand hills, which afforded some shelter, but
not so much as to prevent free and easy movement;
the other half smooth and unobstructed up to the
ditch. Within easy range of Wagner the marsh
encroached so much on the firm sand of the island
as to leave but a narrow way between it and the
water. A few stirring words were addressed by the
officers to their troops and the men responded with
cheers.

About half-past seven the assaulting column was
hurled against Wagner, with orders to use the
bayonet only, the Federal artillery continuing their
fire over their heads as long as it could be done
without risk to their own men. The Confederates
at their posts were straining their eyes to catch

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 239

through the deepening twilight the first glimpse of
the enemy. When the head of the column came in
view a rapid fire of grape and canister was opened,
and the fire from James' Island batteries was poured
in on the flank. Sumter and Gregg, firing over
Wagner, plunged their shot into the advancing
column and the parapets of Wagner were lit up by a
line of infantry fire.

The advancing column pressed defiantly forward,
breasting the storm of iron and lead which was
rapidly thinning their ranks. The leading regi
ment, the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, was soon
thrown into a state of disorder, which reacted in
juriously on those which followed. The wounded
"and many unhurt" were hastening in crowds from
the front along the beach. So heavy was the fire
and so great the disorder that General Seymour saw
the necessity of immediate support, and accordingly
dispatched his Assistant Inspector General, Major
Plympton, of the Third New Hampshire, to order
up Colonel Putnam with his supporting brigade. To
his amazement Colonel Putnam positively refused
to advance, because, as he explained, he had been
ordered by General Gillmore to remain where he
was.

In the meantime the First Brigade was urged on
with admirable spirit and gallantry by General
Strong, who had been assured of prompt support.
But the destructive fire from Wagner was more than
his men could stand. The Fifty-fourth Massa
chusetts broke and fled, large bodies of it falling
upon and with violence forcing their way through

240 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the ranks of the advancing column, greatly heighten
ing the general confusion. The First Brigade had,
indeed, ceased for the time to be an organized body
and came surging back to the rear in confusion.

General Strong had urged his command on with
great spirit and gallantry, but his losses had been so
severe that his regiments were much shaken, and
the consequent confusion was much heightened by
the yielding of the leading regiment, portions of
which fell harshly upon those in the rear. Frag
ments of each regiment, however, brave men bravely
led, went eagerly over the ditch, mounted the para
pet, and struggled with the foe inside. But their
efforts were too feeble to affect the contest ma
terially.

The storm of fire from Wagner had strewn the
ditch and glacis with killed and wounded. A few
of the bravest of the different regiments, notably
the Forty-eighth New York and Sixth Connecticut,
continued to press forward, bearing their colors and
striving to reach the ditch and mount the parapet;
but the brigade had been hopelessly repulsed, its gal
lant commander, General Strong, was mortally
wounded, as was Colonel Chatfield. Colonel Shaw,
of the Fifty-fourth Massachusettes, was killed, and
many other officers killed and wounded. The mass
of the brigade was hastening in disorder to the
shelter of the sand hills and trenches.

What were Colonel Putnam's feelings in the
meantime perhaps will never be known, but may
with much certainty be conjectured. He was a gal
lant young officer and could not stand idly by at the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 241

head of a fine brigade and see the command of his
classmates and intimate friends cut to pieces.
uAfter a disastrous delay and without orders,"
says General Seymour, "he led his brigade forward
and pressed on to the assault of the southeast angle
through a destructive fire, for, the first brigade hav
ing been repulsed, the fire from the center and both
flanks of Wagner were crossed in front of that
angle, sweeping the glacis and ditch with fatal
effect."

It seems that the terrible bombardment of eleven
hours had demoralized the Thirty-first North Caro
lina Regiment. It did not respond to the call to
man the ramparts. The southeast bastion and sea
front, to the defense of which it had been assigned,
was therefore unguarded. Colonel Putnam and a
part of his brigade crossed the ditch, which had been
nearly filled with sand by the long bombardment,
mounted the parapet, and a hundred or more men
gained possession of the southeast bastion.

Seeing the advantage gained by Colonel Putnam,
General Seymour had just dispatched an order by
Major Plympton to General Stevenson to advance
with his brigade to Colonel Putnam's support, when
he, too, was severely wounded. Before he was
carried from the field he repeated the order to Gen
eral Stevenson to advance, but the order was not
obeyed. Why does not appear.

Colonel Putnam, surrounded by his chief officers
—Colonel Dandy, One Hundredth New York;
Major Butler, Sixty-seventh Ohio; Major Coan,
Forty-eighth New York; Captain Klein, Sixth Con-

242 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

necticut, and others — was encouraging his men to
hold the ground they had gained, assuring them that
they would soon be reinforced, when he was shot
dead, "as brave a soldier, as courteous a gentleman,
as true a man as ever walked beneath the Stars and
Stripes," says his division commander. An officer
of his staff — Lieutenant Gate, Seventh New Hamp
shire — seeing the Colonel fall, sprang to his side to
aid him, when he, too, was struck by a shot and fell
dead across the body of his chief.

The Federal loss had been heavy, especially in
officers of rank. When General Seymour was taken
from the field wounded, General Gillmore sent for
ward his chief of staff, General Turner, to assume
command and draw off the troops. Those not al
ready within the work, despairing of support, re
treated as rapidly as they could through a destruc
tive fire until they gained the shelter of the sand hills
and trenches.

Those who had effected an entrance could not
escape through the cross fire in their rear and would
not surrender. The assailants had become the as
sailed. Volunteers were called for from the gar
rison to overcome and capture them. Major Mc
Donald, of the Fifty-first North Carolina, and
Captain Ryan, of the Charleston Battalion, quickly
sprang forward for the service. The latter with
his company was selected; the captain was shot dead
at the moment of the charge, his men faltered and
the opportunity was lost.

The desperate men inside seemed resolved to sell
their lives dearly rather than surrender. General

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 243

Hagood had arrived with Colonel Harrison's regi
ment, the Thirty-second Georgia, to reinforce the
garrison. That regiment was sent along the para
pet to the left and on the top of the magazine and
approached the rear of the imprisoned Federals,
who, seeing themselves so greatly outnumbered and
with no hope of escape, laid down their arms.1

The repulse was complete and disastrous. Gen
eral Seymour attributes the failure of the assault
"solely to the unfortunate delay that hindered
Colonel Putnam from moving promptly in obedience
to my orders, and to his not being supported after
he had essentially succeeded in the assault.'* The
heavy losses of the assailants attest their daring and
determined resolution, and their division commander
awards them the highest praise for the gallantry
with which they "did their full duty that night."

The light of the next morning disclosed a ghastly
scene of slaughter. The ditch and ground in front
of Wagner were thickly strewn with killed and
wounded.

The Confederate loss was only 174; surprisingly

Lewis Butler, of the Sixty-seventh Ohio, who was by
the side of Colonel Putman when the latter was killed, says :
"It is but just that I notice a special order of General Beaure-
gard, under date of July 27, 1863 (if I am correct as to date),
directing that special care be taken of the wounded captured
at Wagner, as men who were brave enough to go in there de
served the respect of their enemies. Another act of courtesy :
The effects, money, and papers belonging to members of the
Sixty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry who died in Charleston
Hospital were sent through the lines by flag of truce."

244 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

small, thanks to the sheltering capacity of sand
works. The loss on both sides had been unusually
heavy in commissioned officers. Among the Con
federate killed were Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Sim-
kins, First South Carolina Infantry; Captain W. H.
Ryan, of the Charleston Battalion; Captain W. T.
Tatam, First South Carolina Infantry, and Lieu
tenant G. W. Thompson, commanding company,
Fifty-first North Carolina. Major David Ramsay,
of the Charleston Battalion, was severely wounded.
Lieutenant Colonel Simkins, as Chief of Artillery,
had directed the operations of that arm with ad
mirable skill and daring, and when the assault com
menced mounted the parapet to aid and encourage
the infantry. "There on the ramparts in the front
this admirable soldier and accomplished gentleman
sealed his devotion to our cause by an early but
most heroic death."

The Federal loss has never been officially ascer
tained. General Taliaferro estimated it at not less
than 2000, perhaps much more. General Beaure-
gard in his official report says their loss must have
been 3000, as 800 bodies were interred in front of
Battery Wagner on the following morning.

In a letter of the 2Oth to Admiral Dahlgren Gen
eral Gillmore tells that during the ten days from
the beginning of his operations he had lost thirty-
three per cent, of his troops in killed, wounded,
missing, and sick. He had commenced with
somewhat more than 13,000 on Morris and Folly
islands, and his tri-monthly report for the 2Oth of

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 245

July shows an aggregate sick on those two islands
of 1241. It wrould seem therefore that General
Beauregard's estimate was not excessive.

General Hagood relieved General Taliaferro in
command of Wagner on the mon ing of the I9th.
The latter had been in command since the I3th, and
he and the officers and men of his command received
the highest encomiums from Generals Beauregard
and Ripley for skill and gallantry in the defense of
this important post. The Fifty-first North Caro
lina had brilliantly sustained the honor of their State,
and was highly commended, especially the field
officers, Colonel McKethen, Lieutenant Colonel C.
B. Hobson, and Major McDonald. The next year
in the operations around Petersburg the Thirty-first
North Carolina wiped out the reproach it had in
curred in a terrible moment of weakness. Sunday,
July 19, passed quietly and was devoted under a
flag of truce to burying the dead and caring for the
wounded.

The next day the bombardment was renewed from
both land and naval batteries. The Admiral sug
gested to the General to advance his batteries and
renew the assault by columns advancing simultane
ously on the southern and northern fronts. Gen
eral Gillmore demurred, because the attempt would
involve too heavy a loss of life for his already
greatly reduced force. He agreed, however, to
make another assault, provided the Admiral would
furnish from his fleet the column to assail the work
from the north, a proposal which the Admiral

246 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

promptly declined. The policy of carrying Wagner
by assault was therefore abandoned and the science
of engineering resorted to. The object which the
assaulting columns had failed to effect it was de
cided to attain by the slower process of a regular
siege.

CHAPTER XII

Assault of Wagner abandoned — Its reduction by siege planned —
Fort Sumter again bombarded — Siege operations — Federal
defenses — Death of Captain Wampler — Sumter silenced —
The "Swamp Angel" — Surrender of Sumter and Morris
Island demanded — Charleston bombarded.

Referring to Battery Wagner, Major General
Gillmore says in the official report of his operations
on Morris Island: "The nature of its construction
demanded and enticed an actual attempt upon the
works to make manifest its real and concealed ele
ments of strength." He had on two occasions yielded
to its enticements to attack first on the morning of
the nth and again on the evening of the i8th of
July, 1863, and the results had been disastrous on
both occasions, especially on the evening of July 18,
when the assault had signally failed with a loss in
his command variously estimated at from 1600 to
3000 men, among their killed being General G. C.
Strong and Colonel H. S. Putnam, commanding the
two brigades which made the assault, and Colonels
J. L. Chatfield and R. G. Shaw, commanding regi
ments.

Battery Wagner had exhibited such formidable
strength in itself, and its gallant commanders on
both occasions, General William B. Taliaferro and
Colonel Graham, and the officers and men under

247

248 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

their command such skill and resolution in utilizing
that strength to its utmost, as convinced General Gill-
more that the work could not be carried by assault,
even with the aid of the most powerful land and
naval batteries ever brought to bear upon so small
an object without a greater sacrifice of men than
he was disposed to make. He did indeed assent
to a suggestion made by Admiral Dahlgren to renew
the assault with columns advancing simultaneously
on the north and south fronts of the battery, but
only on the condition that the Admiral should fur
nish from his fleet the column to assault the northern
front. He had, he said, lost one-third of his com
mand in killed, wounded, captured and sick during
the ten days' operations on Morris Island. Another
assault would involve a heavier loss of life than his
already greatly reduced force alone could bear. The
Admiral declined to furnish an assaulting column
from his fleet, which had also a fearfully large sick
list.

The plan, therefore, of carrying Battery Wagner
by assault was abandoned and the longer and more
tedious process of reducing it scientifically by regular
approaches was adopted. The contest for the pos
session of Morris Island lapsed therefore into one
of engineering skill and steady endurance. With
sufficient labor, long-range guns, and other necessary
material the prospect of a successful defense would
have been encouraging — without them it was hope
less. The wealth of material and all manner of
necessary appliances for siege operations on the
Federal so greatly exceeded that of the Confederate

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 249

side that the ultimate result was never for a moment
doubtful. From the moment that General Gillmore
secured so firm a foothold on Morris Island that
General Beauregard felt and acknowledged his in
ability to dislodge him, the ultimate occupation of
the whole island was only a question of time.

Charleston was General Gillmore's objective
point, which he proposed to gain by way of Morris
Island and the subsequent action of the fleet. For
the complete success of his plan it wras exceedingly
important that he should, with the least possible
delay, demolish Fort Sumter and silence Fort Moul-
trie and other batteries on the west of Sullivan's
Island, the accomplishment of which formed a part
of his plan, and thus open the gate to Charleston for
the entrance of the fleet before his adversary could
prepare other works to bar his approach to the city.
Every hour's delay was important to the Confeder
ates, which gave them time to prepare interior works
of defense.

In that view of the case it would seem that in an
affair of so much moment, instead of relying upon
two brigades, or one, as General Seymour intimates
that General Gillmore did, to carry Battery Wagner
by assault on the evening of July 18, it would have
been better in a humane, as well as a military point
of view, if General Gillmore had on that occasion
hurled his whole available force against it, or even
to have renewed the assault as soon as his shattered
columns could have been re-formed and brought up
to the work and before reinforcements could arrive.
That course might, perhaps, have resulted in the

250 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

capture of Wagner. The loss would probably not
have been greater than that which resulted from the
daily tale of killed and wounded in the trenches and
the heavier loss by disease attending the fifty days'
siege which followed, and the physical suffering
would have been less.

It had been deemed essential to the success of
General Gillmore's plan of operations that his force
should occupy the whole of Morris Island before
proceeding to demolish Fort Sumter and silence the
Sullivan's Island works. To gain possession of the
island involved the necessity of capturing Batteries
Wagner and Gregg. Ten days' experience on the
island had demonstrated that the reduction of the
two batteries would require a much longer time than
had been supposed.

General Gillmore was amply supplied with means,
and though untrammeled by instructions from his
government he was under a strong pressure of public
opinion and expectation to hasten forward his opera
tions. He had been selected by President Lincoln
for this important service, on which he had entered
on the urgent recommendation of the most distin
guished and influential journalist of that day in this
country, and had staked his professional reputation
on the accomplishment of the task he had under
taken. There were, besides, newspaper correspond
ents with his command to prick him on to action, if
necessary, and to keep the public informed of the
progress of the operations for the capture of
Charleston. To gain time, therefore, he somewhat
modified his original plan of operations and decided

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 251

to attempt the demolition of Fort Sumter with bat
teries, to be established on ground already in his
possession, firing over Wagner and Gregg.

The conception and execution of this plan of
operations strikingly illustrates the marvelous pro
gress that had been made in a year or so in the
manufacture of heavy ordnance. About fifteen
months earlier it had been thought wonderful that
breaching batteries at the distance of a mile had
reduced Fort Pulaski at the mouth of the Savannah
River. Now at more than double the distance it was
proposed to reduce Fort Sumter. Nothing in siege
operations approaching it had ever been known.

Immediately after the repulse of the assaulting
columns on the evening of July 18, and while hun
dreds of his killed and wounded were lying on the
ground where they had fallen in front of Wagner,
General Gillmore gave orders for converting the
positions occupied by his most advanced batteries
into a strong defensive line capable of withstanding
the most formidable attack his adversary could prob
ably make against it, and for the erection of breach
ing batteries against Fort Sumter.

Probably no besieging army was ever better
equipped for the work to be done than was that
which General Gillmore commanded. In addition
to a corps of skillful engineer and artillery officers,
there was in his command an admirable and most
useful engineer regiment — the First New York En
gineers. The Colonel, E. W. Serrell, and many of
the officers were practical engineers. The enlisted
men were picked and many of them skilled mechan-

252 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

ics, who were of incalculable service, not only for
the actual labor they performed, but for their ca
pacity to instruct and direct others in all the mechani
cal work incident to a siege. And although the
ground was in many respects exceedingly unfavor
able for offensive engineering operations, presenting
as it did much too narrow a front, and being in some
places subject to overflow in stormy weather, these
drawbacks were more than counterbalanced by the
presence of a powerful fleet immediately on the right
flank, within easy and effective range, and always
ready to aid and sustain the operations on land by
its heavy and accurate fire. Unquestionably Admiral
Dahlgren's fleet contributed greatly to the success
of the operations on land. Indeed, it is not probable
that the plan of operations by way of Morris Island
would ever have been undertaken without the cer
tainty of the naval co-operation, or if undertaken
without such co-operation they would probably have
failed, General Gillmore's opinion to the contrary
notwithstanding.

Anticipating the damaging effect on Fort Sumter
of the enemy's heavy rifled guns firing from station
ary batteries on Morris Island, General Beauregard
had early commenced and continued nightly a partial
disarmament of that fort, removing all long-range
guns that could be spared to be mounted elsewhere
on interior lines. He instructed General Ripley, who
commanded the military district embracing the scene
of operations, to strengthen the gorge wall south
face of Sumter on the interior by bales of cotton
kept damp, the space between them to be filled in

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 253

with sand-bags, and also to place a covering of
sand-bags on the scarp wall of the same face from
bottom to top, if possible, and to protect the guns
remaining in the fort by traverse and merlons.

The armament of Battery Wagner was slightly
increased; so was that of Fort Johnson. Fort
Moultrie and Battery Bee were to be connected by
a covered way, and orders were given to press rapidly
to completion the new works on Shell Point (called
Battery Simkins in honor of the gallant Colonel of
that name who fell on the parapet of Wagner during
the assault of July 18), and Batteries Chevers and
Haskel in close proximity to it. General Beaure-
gard's plan, briefly stated, was to establish a circle
of batteries from Legare's Point on Schooner Creek,
James Island, to Battery Beauregard, on Sullivan's
Island, so as to concentrate their fire, including that
of Sumter and Moultrie, on the northern half of
Morris Island, to retard the siege operations and to
overwhelm or harass the enemy so soon as he should
gain full possession of that island.

The attack and defense were both conducted with
admirable and determined courage. It was a
species of warfare most trying to the patience and
endurance of the troops engaged, and for which it
might have been supposed new troops were least
adapted. Many consecutive days and nights the
monotonous work went on, exposing the men to the
perils without the excitement of battle. While the
heavy guns on each side were actively employed to
retard and demolish the works of the other, skillful
marksmen, armed with the longest range rifles, were

254 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

employed in efforts to pick off the gunners, and the
daily reports of the progress of the works were as
regularly accompanied by the reports of the killed
and wounded in accomplishing it. Whenever the
Confederate fire became so galling — as it often did
—that work on the trenches and batteries could not
be continued without too heavy a sacrifice of life
and limb, a signal from the General to the Admiral
would send a monitor or so abreast of Wagner, and
a storm of iron and lead would be thrown into the
work, which generally ended in driving the garrison,
with the exception of the necessary gunners and
sentinels, to the cover of the bomb-proof until the
fire from the ironclads should cease. But the
heaviest fire could not wholly suppress the fire of
the sharpshooters, who had become exceedingly ex
pert in covering themselves in the sand hills and with
sand-bags.

The greater part of the work was done under
cover of the darkness of night, interrupted oc
casionally when the bright harvest moon would light
up the scene. A most unpleasant and revolting part
of the work in the trenches was the removal of the
dead bodies — sometimes as many as ten in a night —
of those who had been killed by the sharpshooters,
which the sappers, while prosecuting their work, dis
turbed in their graves. At first these bodies were
moved and reburied out of the way, as was sup
posed, but the exigencies of the engineering opera
tions demanded all the space not covered by marsh,
and it soon became necessary to disturb again and
again their dead comrades, until the attempt to re-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 255

bury them beyond reach was abandoned, and in
future when the graves were encountered the bodies
were built with mother earth into the parapets and
there left.

By the evening of August 16 the third parallel
had been completed and twelve batteries erected and
made ready for action. Those especially intended
for the bombardment of Sumter were at an average
distance from that fort of 3917 yards — the nearest
being 3428 and the most remote 4290 yards. The
twelve batteries mounted twenty-eight heavy rifles of
calibers from 32- to 3OO-pounders, and twelve 10-
inch mortars; in all forty pieces. One of them,
called the "Naval Battery," mounting two 8-inch
Parrott rifles and two So-pounder Whitworth rifles,
was manned by sailors from the United States
frigate W abash and commanded by Captain Foxhall
A. Parker, United States Navy. The others were
manned by the Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery
and detachments from the One Hundredth and One
Hundred and Seventy-eighth New York, the Seventh
Connecticut, and Eleventh Maine Infantry, and
Company C, First United States Artillery.

The positions occupied by the Federal troops
were thoroughly protected by defensive works and
covered by inclined palisading and wire entanglements
stretching entirely across the island. Provision was
made for sweeping the fronts of the defensive works
by the fire of eight field guns and several Requa
batteries. The latter were novelties in warfare,
and consisted each of twenty-five rifle barrels, so ad
justed on a frame as to deliver a diffused fan-shaped

256 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

fire of 175 shots a minute, and it was claimed were
effective at the distance of a mile or more. The
Federal position on Morris Island was thus made as
secure against an assault as was Battery Wagner
itself.

Fort Sumter, against which these powerful breach
ing and mortar batteries were to be directed, was at
that time commanded by the same officer, Colonel
Alfred Rhett, of the First South Carolina Artillery,
aided by Major Ormsby Blanding, of the same
regiment, who had so gallantly and successfully de
fended it on April 7 against the ironclad attack
and the fort was garrisoned as then by men of his
own regiment. About day dawn on the morning of
August 17 the land batteries opened on Sumter,
directing the fire of the rifles or breaching guns
against the gorge wall, the mortars dropping shells
into the fort. The ironclads and gunboats soon
took up their prescribed positions and joined in the
general fire.

Batteries Wagner and Gregg replied with spirit,
but for several hours Sumter gave no sign of life,
the only object visible about it being the flag which
floated over it in the summer breeze. Wagner and
Gregg continued the fire, while the fifteen- and eleven-
inch shells from the ironclads hurled the sand in
cartloads from their parapets. About midday these
two batteries ceased firing, and Fort Sumter opened,
and so the thunder of heavy guns went on, gradually
ceasing as if from exhaustion as the long summer
day passed, and the first day's bombardment ended.
Nine hundred and forty-eight shots had been fired at

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 257

Sumter, and, the fire being surprisingly accurate for
the great distance at which it was delivered, the fort
was much damaged. The gorge wall had been
deeply cut into and other walls badly shaken. One
man of the garrison had been killed and Lieutenants
John Johnson, of the Engineers, and John Middle-
ton and Julius Rhett, of the First South Carolina
Artillery, and ten men wounded.

Usually the monitors performed their part in the
bombardments with immunity to life and limb, the
officers and men being shielded by an eleven-inch
thickness of iron. On this day, however, soon atter
they had gone into action, the Kaatskill was seen
steaming away, going southward, a signal from her
announcing that her commander, Captain G. W.
Rodgers, had been killed. He was the Admiral's
chief of staff, and usually accompanied him into
action, but on this occasion he had asked to be al
lowed to command his monitor, the Kaatskill. The
action had scarcely commenced when a shot struck
the pilot house, forcing off a large piece of iron on
the inside, which struck and killed Captain Rodgers
and Paymaster John G. Woodbury, who was stand-*
ing by him, and wounding the pilot and quarter
master. The Admiral speaks in the most compli
mentary terms of Captains Rodgers' great merit.

Battery Wagner had suffered but little except in
the death of its engineer, Captain Wampler. In
the midst of the heaviest fire, which had driven the
garrison, with the exception of the gunners, sentries,
and sharpshooters to the shelter of the bomb-proof,
it was discovered that the heavy bombardment had

258 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

slipped the covering of sand from the principal
magazine to such an extent as greatly to endanger
the whole garrison. Captain Wampler, with a
party of men, hastened to repair the injury, under
the destructive fire. In the evening, when it was
supposed the firing had ceased for the night, he was
sitting with the commanding officer, Colonel Keitt,
and Lieutenant Charles S. Hill, ordnance officer,
when a shell from the Ironsides fell in the midst of
them and, bursting, crushed the gallant young officer.

The fire from the breaching batteries continued
for seven consecutive days and was incessant from
daylight until dark. At the close of the seventh
day of the bombardment, the twenty-third day, the
destruction of the offensive powers of Fort Sumter
seemed complete.

The heavy firing ceased, and though a slow fire
was maintained, the bombardment was regarded
as having successfully accomplished its purpose.
Sumter seemed a shapeless mass of ruins. There
was but one gun in the fort that could be fired, and
that was a thirty-two pounder smooth-bore, whose
only use was to fire the usual evening gun. Within
the fort the debris of masonry, broken guns and
carriages, cotton bales and sand-bags, ripped and
torn to pieces, were mingled in inextricable confusion.
General Gillmore reported officially that Fort
Sumter was demolished, its offensive powers de
stroyed, and that it was reduced to the condition of
a mere infantry outpost, incapable of retarding the
approaches to Battery Wagner or of inflicting injury
upon the ironclads. Nevertheless the Confederate

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 259

flag still floated over the ruins, and the usual evening
gun announced that the fort was still occupied.

Now that its batteries were effectually silenced,
it had ceased to be an artillery post, and the gar
rison which had so long and gallantly defended it
was withdrawn on the night of September 4, and as
signed to other duty, the Charleston Battalion of in
fantry, Major Julius A. Blake, succeeding the
artillery as the garrison of the ruined fort. Major
Stephen Elliott succeeded Colonel Rhett in command
of Fort Sumter. The latter gentleman had com
manded longer than any other officer, and his name,
together with that of his regiment, the First South
Carolina Regular Artillery, is indissolubly linked
with the famous fort they had so long defended with
admirable skill and comspicuous gallantry.

General Gillmore regarded his part in the general
plan for the capture of Charleston as virtually ac
complished when he had succeeded in destroying the
offensive power of Fort Sumter, and thus opened the
gate to Charleston for the entrance of the ironclad
fleet. But during the month of August his com
mand had been reinforced by General George H.
Gordon's Division of two brigades (Schimmel-
fennig's and Ames') and three other brigades,
Wild's Foster's, and Alford's, and with the force
and material at his command something more than
the silencing of Sumter was expected of him. The
possession of the whole of Morris Island, includ
ing Batteries Wagner and Gregg, he did not re
gard as essential to the entrance of the fleet into
the harbor. Wagner and Gregg were mere out-

26o THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

i

works auxiliary to the defense of Sumter; the
latter having been silenced, the possession of the
iormer was important only as facilitating a stricter
blockade of the port. It only remained, so General
Gillmore thought and said, for Admiral Dahlgren
to perform his part of the general plan, to enter the
harbor with his fleet and take possession of the city
of Charleston.

The Admiral, however, did not so regard it; in
deed, he did not admit that he was a consenting
party to any such general plan. He was ready and
anxious to enter the harbor when the obstructions in
the way should have been removed; but they were
not yet removed. There stood Sumter, an obstacle
in itself, and protecting other obstacles which the
Confederates had placed in the way.

While approaching Wagner and preparing to
demolish Sumter, General Gillmore had made other
preparations, by which he seems to have supposed
that he might gain possession not only of Sumter,
but of the whole of Morris Island, without striking
another blow. He had with great difficulty and at
much cost constructed a battery known as the
"Swamp Angel," in the marsh between Morris
Island and the Confederate works on James Island,
from which Charleston could be bombarded. On
August 21 he addressed a letter to General Beaure-
gard demanding the surrender of Fort Sumter and
the whole of Morris Island. There was some de
lay in the delivery of this letter, and when opened
it was found to be without signature, and was re
turned to General Gillmore's headquarters. Of

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 261

course General Beauregard declined to comply with
the extraordinary demand, and a little after mid
night the bombardment of Charleston commenced
and, it may be added, was continued with varying
violence for nearly eighteen months. Fifteen in
cendiary shells were fired into the city that night
from an eight-inch Parrott rifle, destroying some
medical stores, but doing little damage to the city.

The indignant refusal of General Beauregard to
surrender Fort Sumter and Morris Island, coupled
with a reminder that "after two years of trial you
have failed to capture this city or its defenses,"
prompted General Gillmore to attempt at once to
seize Sumter by assault. The assaulting party was
to consist of six hundred men to be selected by
colonels of regiments, and General Ames, command
ing a brigade of General Gordon's Division, was
selected to command it. He did not purpose to
hold Sumter after seizing it, but to blow it up. He
was dissuaded, however, from making the assault,
the more readily because he had received informa
tion which he regarded as reliable, that the Con
federates themselves intended to blow up the fort
when it should be rendered untenable.

CHAPTER XIII

Resumption of operations against Wagner — Siege lines tightened
— Losses and sick list enormous — North clamors for reduc
tion of Charleston — Night attack on Wagner — Repulse —
Wagner bombarded — Horrors of the siege — Evacuation of
Morris Island — Confederate loss.

Operations against Wagner, which had been
somewhat delayed by the bombardment of Sum-
ter, were resumed with redoubled vigor when the
latter work was apparently demolished. Between
two and three hundred yards in front of Wagner
was a sand ridge occupied by Confederate sharp
shooters, who greatly annoyed the sappers engaged
in pushing forward the trenches. In conjunction
with the fire from James Island, Wagner, and Gregg
they occasionally interrupted entirely the work in
the trenches. On the evening of August 21 the One
Hundredth New York, Colonel Dandy, made a
dash to drive them off, but was repulsed. All of
the lighter mortars were then moved up to the
front to dislodge them by a vertical fire, but that
attempt also failed. The Union engineer officers in
charge reported that while the efficiency of the Con
federate sharpshooters was daily increasing, their
own was falling off, and that for the further prose
cution of the work it was absolutely essential that

262

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 263

the Confederates should be driven off or captured
and the ridge occupied by Union troops.

On the 26th General Gillmore placed the re
sources of the command at the disposal of General
Terry, who was in immediate command, with orders
to dislodge those sharpshooters at the point of the
bayonet and hold the ridge. Between six and seven
that evening the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts, Lieu
tenant Colonel F. A. Osborne, supported by the
Third New Hampshire, Captain I. F. Randlett,
were thrown upon the ridge and readily occupied it,
capturing seventy-six of the eighty-nine men of the
Sixty-first North Carolina Regiment, which con
stituted the whole picket line. The fourth parallel
was immediately marked out and constructed on that
ridge within two hundred and fifty yards of Wagner.

The darkest and gloomiest days of the siege were
now at hand. The exceedingly narrow front of ap
proach, in one place scarcely more than twenty-five
yards at high tide, gave great effect to the direct and
flank fire on the head of the sap. The way was over
ground defended by torpedoes, which were designed
to explode by the tread of persons passing over
them, or by the chance strokes of the picks and
shovels in the hands of the sappers. "Here is a
log in my way," said a sapper to the officer who was
directing the work.. "Never mind, dig around it,"
was the reply, and the next instant the supposed log
exploded, blowing the sapper to pieces.

The losses in the trenches were increasing from
day to day and the progress was discouragingly slow
and uncertain. The sick list was fearfully large; so

264 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

large that it is said the chief surgeon had advised
that the work be again assaulted and the siege ended
at the point of the bayonet, as involving a probable
less loss of life than the slow process of regular ap
proaches was inflicting on the command. The re
turns of the Union forces for August show a sick list
of 4661 in an aggregate force present of 29,405,
and for September of 5269 in an aggregate of
28,981. About the middle of August the sick list
was nearly one-fourth of the aggregate force present.

"Matters indeed seemed at a standstill," says
General Gillmore, "and a feeling of despondency
began to pervade the rank and file of the command.
There seemed, indeed, no adequate return to ac
complished results for the daily losses which we
suffered and no means of relief cheering and en
couraging to the soldiers appeared near at hand."

No wonder that there was gloom and despon
dency among the rank and file, when it had long
since begun to dawn upon officers high in rank, and
had strengthened into conviction, that possession of
the whole of the little sandbank would be but a
lamentably inadequate return for the expenditure of
so much labor, treasure, health, and life. Public
sentiment at the North clamored for the destruction
of Sumter and the capture of Charleston. The
sentiment which demanded the destruction of Sumter
had been gratified when General Gillmore reported
that the fort had been demolished and reduced to a
mere infantry outpost, but the Union forces were
practically no nearer to Charleston than when the
campaign opened. The question naturally sug-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 265

gested itself, Would the possession of Wagner really
bring them any nearer to the objective point? And
with many the answer was emphatically No ! It
seemed that the siege must be abandoned or new life
and vigor thrown into it.

General Gillmore determined to pursue the latter
course. Wagner should be overwhelmed by the
heaviest fire from land and naval batteries, driving
the men to the shelter of the bomb-proofs and keep
ing them there, while the heaviest rifle guns should
pound and demolish the bomb-proofs and so un
cover and expose the garrison to the heaviest fire
that had yet been thrown against it. In the mean
time the sap should be pressed forward to the
ditch and the fort stormed and carried at the point
of the bayonet, if the stubborn garrison would not
surrender before that last resort became necessary.

As preliminary to the complete success of these
final operations, General Gillmore proposed to sur
prise and seize Battery Gregg, thus at once cutting
off reinforcements for Wagner and the escape of
the garrison.

The attempt was made on the night of the 4th
by troops in barges, supported by naval boats,
armed with howitzers. All was in readiness soon
after dark except one boat, which, having pulled out
further toward Sumter than the others, discovered
a small Confederate boat, which happened just at
that time to be carrying to Charleston Major W. F.
Waley, of the Second South Carolina Artillery, who
had been badly wounded that day. The officer in
charge of the Union boat could not resist the temp-

266 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

tation to capture the Confederate, gave chase, and
fired upon it. He succeeded in capturing the boat
and the wounded officer, but the firing had aroused
the garrison of Gregg, disclosed the surprise party,
and defeated the expedition. It was attempted
again the next night, but it could scarcely have
been expected that a garrison which had so nar
rowly escaped a formidable surprise attack on the
preceding night would not be on the alert. If there
was any such expectation General Gillmore effec
tually defeated it himself. In the afternoon of the
5th he signaled Admiral Dahlgren: "I shall try
Cummings' Point to-night and want the sailors again
early. Will you please send in two or three moni
tors just by dark to open fire on Moultrie as a diver
sion? The last time they were in they stopped rein
forcements and may do it to-night. Don't want any
fire in the rear from reinforcements. The signal
for assault will be the hauling down of the red light
on the Ironsides. I shall display skirmishers be
hind Wagner and Gregg. Don't fire into them; let
the Ironsides engage — by nine o'clock."

This dispatch was intercepted by a Confederate
signal officer and forwarded to General Ripley, who
communicated it to Colonel Keitt, commanding
Wagner, with instructions to him to prepare to repel
the attack.

Major James Gardner, commanding the Twenty
seventh Georgia Infantry, already supporting
Gregg, was warned of the impending attack and re
inforced after dark by seventy men of the Twenty-
fifth South Carolina Infantry and two field how-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 267

itzers, manned from Kanapaux's Light Artillery,
Lieutenant Macbeth commanding, and directed to
prepare to repel the attack. The beach between
Wagner and Gregg was picketed by 50 men of the
Twenty-eighth Georgia. At ten o'clock Major
Gardner reported that his whole force numbered
only 234 men — too small for the work required of
it, but added: "I shall hold the place if it is pos
sible."

The monitors were promptly in position and
swept with their fire the ground between the two
forts; but there was confusion in assembling the
barges in position and so much delay that it was
past midnight before the assault was attempted,
when Captain Lesesne, commanding Battery Gregg,
discovered fifteen or twenty barges approaching
from the junction of Vincent and Schooner creeks
with muffled oars. He waited until they approached
to within about one hundred and seventy yards,
when he opened upon them with ten-inch canister.
Fort Moultrie also opened fire, sweeping the water
on both sides of Cummings' Point.

The fire produced a panic among the assaliants,
who had expected to surprise the post. Some of
the boats were turned back and pulled rapidly away;
others were pulled toward the beach, some men in
them crying out not to fire, that they were friends,
but they were answered by a fire from the infantry
and the field howitzers. All these turned and were
pulled rapidly back through the creeks and marshes
with serious loss in killed and wounded, the troops
generally dispirited by the failure of the expedition.

268 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

In this affair Captain J. R. Haines, of the Twenty-
eighth Georgia, and Lieutenant R. A. Blum, of the
Twenty-fifth South Carolina, were killed by a shell
from a monitor.

At dawn on the 5th the final bombardment of
Wagner commenced, and for forty-two consecutive
hours seventeen mortars and twenty-four rifled guns
— one hundred-, two hundred-, and three hundred-
pounders — and the guns of the New Ironsides
poured an incessant fire of shot and shell night and
day on the battery. The heavy rifle fire was directed
against the southeast angle of the bomb-proof for
the purpose of demolishing it and exposing the gar
rison to the vertical fire of the mortars and the Iron
sides. The ricochet fire of the ironclads was
especially effective. Long practice had given the
gunners great accuracy of aim and their eleven-inch
shells, bounding gracefully from the water, leaped
over the parapet and, bursting within, searched the
doomed work in every part. At Wagner night was
turned into day. Calcium lights thrown on the fort
brilliantly lighted it, bringing out every object in
vivid and sharp relief, while the besiegers were
shrouded in impenetrable darkness.

Under this overpowering fire the trenches were
pressed forward rapidly and almost with impu
nity, for the sappers were so near Wagner that the
distant batteries on James and Sullivan's islands could
not fire upon them without risk of dropping their
shot into the fort. With the exception of an oc
casional telling fire from the sharpshooters, Wagner
itself was almost as silent as the grave. At the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 269

first shot from the Ironsides nearly all of the in
fantry not already in the sandhills between Wagner
and Gregg were ordered into the bomb-proof, leav
ing a few sentinels and sharpshooters at the parapet.
Full detachments of artillerymen were kept at the
guns on the land front. It would have been a use
less waste of life to keep men exposed to that
storm of shot and shell. The best that could be
done was to husband all resources to repel the as
sault which was anticipated.

Life in the bomb-proof during the forty-two hours
of the bombardment had become almost unen
durable. The men were crowded together in the
dark place, where the surgeons were occasionally
obliged to operate on the wounded by the dim light
of a candle. Some men fainted and others were
exhausted by breathing the hot, vitiated atmosphere;
if a man stepped out for an instant to catch a breath
of fresh air he did so at the peril of his life. The
men who had been killed in the two assaults had been
buried, the Federals in front and the Confederates
in rear of Wagner. The graves were necessarily
shallow and in shifting sand. The besiegers had
been burrowing through the graves, removing the
bodies. The ground had been torn up in every
direction by nearly two months' firing and the wind
had blown off the sand, exposing corpses to the
fierce summer sun, tainting and poisoning the air.
Even the water in the shallow wells within the fort
was so tainted as to be unfit for use, and the gar
rison had to rely upon the precarious supply that
could be brought from Charleston.

270 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

The effect of the heavy rifle fire was exceedingly
destructive to the southeast angle and bomb-proof,
scattering the covering of sand and blocking up
the passageways. The engineer officer, Captain T.
B. Lee, was powerless to arrest the destruction or
repair the damages. Early in the afternoon of the
second day of the bombardment the chief engineer,
Colonel D. B. Harris, made his way through the
terrific fire to Wagner to inspect the work and
directed some alterations and repairs, leaving Cap
tain F. D. Lee to relieve Captain T. B. Lee. But
so destructive was the fire that it was found imprac
ticable to work under it. Heroic endurance was all
that remained for the besieged.

Soon after dark the sappers had pushed beyond
and to the right of the south front, following the
direction of the east or sea front and crowning the
crest of the counterscarp near the flank of that
front, completely masking the guns of the fort. A
row of long pikes, which were planted at the foot of
the counterscarp as an obstacle to an assault, were
removed by the sappers early in the night. The
long and heavy bombardment had so torn and cut
down both scarp and counterscarp as to render the
mounting of the parapets by a storming party com
paratively easy. The sappers by spade and shovel
had facilitated the ascent and only the light of
another day was awaited for making the final as
sault of the work.

General Gillmore gave minute orders for the as
sault to be made at nine o'clock the next morning,
that being the time of low tide, when the beach

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 271

could be used for the movements of troops.
Brigadier General A. H. Terry was ordered to com
mand the assault in person.

On the 4th General Beauregard had called about
him his general officers and chief engineer in con
sultation to determine how much longer it would be
advisable to hold Wagner. The questions pre
sented for consideration were, How long could it
be held with regard to the safety of the garrison?
How long without regard to the safety of the gar
rison? How long with reasonable prospect of
ultimately withdrawing the troops? How long
after the fall of Wagner could Battery Gregg be
held? Could the heavy guns (two in Wagner and
three in Gregg) be withdrawn without endangering
the safety of the works and garrison, and, lastly,
could the offensive be taken with fair prospect of
success by throwing three thousand men on the
north end of Morris Island in the night, which, with
the garrisons of Wagner and Gregg, would make
an effective force of about four thousand men, with
the certainty that no more reinforcements could be
sent them until the next night and probably not
then?

The result of the deliberations was that the heavy
guns were necessary for the defense of the posts to
the last extremity; that there were, besides, insur
mountable obstacles in the way of removing them,
and that they should be ultimately disabled and left
when it became necessary, as it was evident it soon

272 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

would be, to abandon the batteries, which, how
ever, should be held as long as communication with
them by rowboats by night could be maintained.

Colonel Keitt kept the general commanding fully
informed of the progress of the enemy's sap and
the destructive effects of the fire. During the 6th
he wrote : "The enemy will to-night advance their
parallel to the moat of this battery (Wagner). The
garrison must be taken away immediately after dark,
as it will be destroyed or captured. It is idle to
deny that the heavy Parrott shells have breached the
walls and are knocking away the bomb-proofs. Pray
have boats immediately after dark at Cummings'
Point to take away the men. I say, deliberately,
that this must be done or the garrison will be sacri
ficed. I am sending the wounded and sick now to
Cumming's Point, and will continue to do so, if pos
sible, until all are gone. I have not in the garrison
four hundred effective men, excluding artillery.
The engineers agree in opinion with me, or rather
shape my opinion."

And again later: "The enemy's sap has reached
the moat and his bombardment has shattered large
parts of the parapet. The retention of the post
after to-night involves the sacrifice of the garrison.
If the necessities of the service make this advisable
the men will cheerfully make it, and I will cheer
fully lead them. I prefer to assault the enemy to
await the assault and I will at four o'clock in the
morning assail his works."

General Beauregard, accepting the situation, gave

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 273

minute instructions for the evacuation of Morris
Island. Between 4 and 5 P. M. General Ripley
signaled the information to Colonel Keitt, and at
dark Captain McCabe, of General Ripley's staff,
delivered to the Colonel the General's instructions
for the evacuation.

On the morning of the 6th there were about nine
hundred Confederates on the island, only about two-
thirds of them effective, the others being wounded
or sick. There were about nine thousand Union
soldiers on the island exclusive of the sick, and
the most advanced of them were abreast of Wag
ner, only across the street, as it were, from the
Confederates. The space — about three-quarters of
a mile — between Wagner and Cumming's Point
where the garrison was to embark was swept by
the fire of the monitors, and there were armed
guard boats on the other side, in Vincent's Creek, to
give warning of any attempt to escape.

Anticipating pursuit, Lieutenant Robert M.
Stiles, engineering officer at Gregg, had constructed
after dark a rifle-pit across the island at a narrow
point a quarter of a mile in front of Gregg, from
which to cover the embarkation. Two Confederate
ironclads, the Charleston and Palmetto State, under
Captain John R. Tucker, had taken position near
Fort Sumter, their guns bearing on Cumming's Point
and to the eastward of it, and the land batteries were
in readiness to sweep the water face of Battery
Gregg. Transport steamers were as near Cum
ming's Point as prudence would permit, to receive

274 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the men from the small boats in which they were to
leave the island.

During the two days' bombardment the sick and
wounded had been sent to Cumming's Point as
promptly as transportation between that point and
Wagner could be provided, and they were first cared
for and left the island in the first boats. Im
mediately after dark the movement from Wagner
commenced; four companies (one hundred men) of
the Twenty-fifth South Carolina Regiment, and a
field piece taken from Wagner, moved first and
embarked. Half an hour later Captain W. P.
Crawford, with the Twenty-eighth Georgia Regi
ment and a howitzer, moved out, occupied the rifle-
pits in front of Gregg and embarked by company as
transportation could be in readiness. Major James
Gardner, with the Twenty-seventh Georgia, suc
ceeded the Twenty-eighth Georgia in the rifle-pits,
and in turn was followed by the remainder of the
Twenty-fifth South Carolina, Lieutenant Colonel J.
G. Pressly commanding, and artillery.

The movement was made quietly and in admirable
order, the majority of the men being under the im
pression that they were about to be relieved as usual,
having served their tour of duty in Wagner. At
eleven o'clock Colonel Keitt proceeded to Cum
ming's Point, leaving Captain Thomas A. Huguenin
in Wagner commanding the rear guard, consisting
of a few gunners and twenty-five men of the First
and ten of the Twenty-fifth South Carolina, under
Lieutenants F. B. Brown and B. M. Taft. As soon

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 275

as the infantry had left Cumming's Point Captain
H. R. Lesesne, who had for a long time commanded
Battery Gregg, and Captain Kanapaux, commanding
the three remaining howitzers, which he had just
brought up from Wagner, spiked their guns and
embarked their men.

Left in Wagner with about thirty-five men, Cap
tain Huguenin kept up a slow fire, chiefly of sharp
shooters, with an occasional mortar fire to deceive, if
possible, his enemy as to his real purpose, and was
busy with his final preparations. About midnight
the rear guard was sent off, leaving Captain Hu
guenin, with Captain C. C. Pinckney and Lieutenant
Mazyek, of the Ordnance; Lieutenant James A.
Ross, of the Twenty-fifth South Carolina Volunteers,
and Ordnance Sergeant Leath in Wagner to spike
guns, destroy such property as they could, and lay
the train to burst the only useful ten-inch gun in
the work and to blow up the magazine.

In the meantime the Federal guard boats in Vin
cent Creek had discovered the passage of boats
carrying away troops and opened fire upon them.
Colonel Keitt dispatched a messenger to Captain
Huguenin to say that boats were in readiness and
that he must at once abandon the battery, which he
did, reaching Cumming's Point about half-past one
o'clock, under a rapid fire from the Union guard
barges.

The safety fuse for blowing up the magazine of
Battery Gregg was laid by the commissary of the
post, Captain Holcumb, and was burning brightly
when the last officer stepped into the boat, but from

276 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

some cause, probably defective fuse, neither mag
azine was blown up.

The steam transportation was under the manage
ment of Major Matt. A. Pringle, the embarkation
of the troops was superintended by Colonel Daut-
zler, Twentieth South Carolina Infantry, and the
small boats employed in moving the troops were
under the control of Captain W. H. Webb, of the
ironclad Palmetto State. The whole was conducted
systematically and with great success, only two
boats' crews of nineteen men and twenty-seven
soldiers falling into the hands of the enemy. Under
the circumstances of difficulty and peril which at
tended the movement in the face of an overwhelming
numerical force, it was marked by a degree of cool
ness and discipline worthy of the best tried veterans.

The different organizations in the military district
served there by turn, and were commanded succes
sively by Brigadier Generals Taliaferro, Johnson
Hagood, A. H. Colquitt, and T. L. Clingman, and
Colonels George P. Harrison and Lawrence M.
Keitt. The Confederate loss on the island during
the whole fifty-eight days' operations was but 641
killed and wounded, and it is illustrative of the
sheltering capacity of sand that, deducting the loss
due to the descent on the island on July 10 and the
assaults of the nth and i8th, the loss in killed and
wounded during the whole of the terrible bombard
ment was but 296 men. It is still more remarkable
that during the same period in the fire which de
molished Sumter only 3 men were killed and 49
wounded. Before dawn on the 7th the Union

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 277

troops occupied both Wagner and Gregg, and were
thus at last in possession of the little sand island of
four hundred acres for which they had so persever-
ingly contended for nearly two months.

General Gillmore was rewarded by his govern
ment with a major general's commission, and there
was naturally great exultation in the Union camp
over the success of the operations on Morris Island.
Salutes were fired and patriotic speeches delivered,
but it was all too plain to intelligent men that they
had at best achieved but a barren victory. The
blow which had been aimed and delivered against
Charleston with so much care had, as it were,
glanced and exhausted its force on the end of a
barren sandbank nearly four miles distant from the
objective point of the campaign. From Cummings'
Point the Union troops, still under Confederate fire,
looked over a wide sheet of water bordered with
heavy batteries and defended by torpedoes and
other obstructions over which they must pass to
reach Charleston.

CHAPTER XIV

Dahlgren demands surrender of Fort Sumter — Fort Moultrie
engaged — Assault of Fort Sumter — Disastrous result —
Army and navy mutually jealous — Obstacles in approach to
Charleston — Can the harbor be entered? — Second bombard
ment of Fort Sumter — Sumter still resists — What now? —
Operations against Charleston abandoned.

Having silenced Fort Sumter, reduced Battery
Wagner, and occupied the whole of Morris Island,
General Gillmore conceived that the land force had
accomplished all that could be reasonably expected
of it in the prosecution of the general plan of opera
tions. To make the campaign a complete success it
only remained, in his opinion, for the naval force to
perform its part, — namely, to remove, if necessary,
any obstructions that might be in its way, proceed
to within easy range of Charleston and compel its
surrender. That he thought could and should have
been done at any time from August 23, when Sumter
was apparently demolished, to September 7, when
Battery Wagner was evacuated by the Confederate
force and the island occupied by the Union troops;
and he was exceedingly impatient at what he re
garded as the culpable delay of the Admiral.

Admiral Dahlgren, however, did not think the
time had yet arrived for making the attempt to enter
the harbor with his ironclads. The Union flag

278

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 279

should float over Sumter before, in his opinion, he
could, with due consideration for the safety of his
monitors, venture to carry them into the inner har
bor. Early on September 7, when he learned that
the Confederate troops had evacuated Morris Island,
he sent, under flag of truce, to Major Stephen El
liott, commanding Fort Sumter, a demand for the
surrender of that fort. Major Elliott refused to
surrender his post, and forwarded the demand to
General Beauregard, who replied that the Admiral
could have Fort Sumter only when he could take and
hold it. Preparatory to enforcing his demand, the
New Ironsides and five monitors steamed up, and
at about 6 P. M. took position between Cumming's
Point and Fort Moultrie and opened fire on that
fort, throwing an occasional shot into Sumter. The
Sullivan's Island batteries replied, and until after
dark a fierce cannonade was maintained, the Iron
sides continuing the fire until nine o'clock.

During the night one of the monitors, the Wee-
hawken, ran aground on Morris Island beach within
range of Fort Moultrie. When it was discovered
the next morning, Colonel William Butler, com
manding Moultrie, opened fire on it, which was
promptly returned, both firing with accuracy and
effect. About nine o'clock five other monitors and
the Ironsides came up and, taking positions varying
from nine hundred to fifteen hundred yards from
Moultrie, opened fire, and a furious cannonade was
maintained for about five hours, when the fleet with
drew, leaving the Weehawken aground, and one
monitor badly crippled. Usually in affairs between

28o THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

the forts and monitors the former had the advantage
of being able to fire more rapidly than the latter.
On this occasion a scant supply of ammunition in
the land batteries made their fire slower than that
of the ironclads. Early in the action a shell from
the Weehavcken struck the muzzle of a columbiad in
Moultrie, and, glancing and bursting among some
ammunition, caused an explosion which instantly
killed sixteen and wounded twelve men of Captain
R. P. Smith's company of the First South Carolina
Infantry (Third Artillery). Captain B. S. Burnet's
company of the same regiment was quickly brought
up from Battery Beauregard to supply the place of
Captain Smith's. The fire had been mainly directed
against Moultrie, in which, in addition to the loss by
the explosion, three men were killed and two officers
(Captain G. A. Wardlaw and Lieutenant D. B. De-
Saussure) and fourteen men were wounded. Lieu
tenant Edward W. Macbeth was wounded in Bat
tery Beauregard and one officer and one man in Bat
tery Bee.

While the affair between the ironclads and forts
was in progress, both the Admiral and General were
preparing to carry Fort Sumter by assault. Strangely
enough, both commanders were without concert pre
paring to assault the same work on the same night.
Whatever cordiality of feeling there may have been
between them seems to have ceased. Each was con
fident of his ability to seize the work without the
aid of the other, and each ambitious of the honor of
capturing the fort which had so long resisted and
defied them. Needing some additional boats for the

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 281

expedition, the Admiral sent to borrow them from
the General. The latter replied that he could not
spare them because he proposed to storm Sumter
himself that night. Learning the General's inten
tion, the Admiral seems to have desired co-operation,
but declined the former's suggestion that the army
officer commanding his storming party should also
control the naval party. Each therefore proceeded
independently of the other, the only agreement be
tween them being that, to prevent accident of colli
sion, of the two storming parties the first which
entered the fort should display a red light from the
battered walls.

The naval storming party consisted of 450 picked
men, sailors and marines. Captain Thomas H.
Stephens was selected to command it. The several
divisions of boats were commanded by Lieutenants
E. P. Williams, G. C. Raney, S. W. Preston, F. J.
Higginson, T. M. Bunce, E. T. Brewer, and En
signs James, Wallace, Porter, and Crane of the
navy, and Captain C. G. McCawley, First Lieutenr
ants Charles H. Bradford and John C. Harris, and
Second Lieutenants R. L. Meade, Lyman P. Wal
lace, and L. E. Fagan, of the Marine Corps. Lieu
tenant Morean Forest was adjutant of the expedi
tion.

The party assembled at the flagship Philadelphia,
and left it in tow of the steam tug Daffodil about ten
o'clock at night. When within about eight hundred
yards of Sumter the tug stopped, the final instruc
tions were given to the officers commanding the dif-

282 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

ferent divisions, the boats were cast off and pulled
toward Sumter.

Lieutenant Higginson had been ordered to pull up
to the northwestern front, for the purpose of draw
ing the attention of the garrison from the real point
of attack. The remaining divisions were ordered to
close up and await orders to advance upon the south
front, where it was intended to make the assault.
Captain Stephens' purpose for delaying the advance
of the main body was to profit by all the advantage
he hoped to derive from Lieutenant Higginson's
diversion. The latter's movement, however, seems
to have been mistaken by some of the boat com
manders, for a general advance, "and, in that spirit
of gallantry and emulation which characterize the
service," says Captain Stephens, "they pulled for the
fort." It was too late to stop the movement, and
Stephens gave the signal for all to advance.

The demand for the surrender of Sumter had
given significant warning that an assault was im
pending. Two Confederate ironclads were in posi
tion to sweep with their fire the exposed faces of
Sumter. Forts Moultrie and Johnson were in readi
ness on a signal from Sumter to open fire.

Major Stephen Elliott, Jr., commanded the fort,
which was garrisoned by the First South Carolina
Battalion of Infantry, 205 men, under Major Julius
A. Blake. A boat attack had been expected for sev
eral nights past, and one-third of the garrison was
kept constantly under arms on the parapet, the re
mainder close at hand.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 283

At one o'clock Major Elliott saw the fleet of
barges approaching from the east. He immediately
ordered up three companies, and reserved his fire
until the boats had deployed and the men began to
land, then opened fire. The outer boats returned
the fire rapidly for a few minutes. The crews of
those that had effected a landing rushed to the south
wall, where they expected to find a practicable ramp
formed by the debris of the wall, up which they
might charge into the fort. They found indeed a
ramp, but at the top of it a wall from fifteen to
twenty feet high, and the storming party was not
provided with scaling ladders. Unable to get in or
away, they sought shelter under the projecting
masses of the wall. Immediately on the signal of
fire from Sumter, the ironclad Chicora, lying a short
distance to the north, the Sullivan's Island batteries
to the northeast, and Fort Johnson to the westward
opened and encircled Sumter with their fire, effec
tually assisting to prevent the more distant boats
from coming up. Some that had come nearest were
disabled by hand grenades and masses of loose
masonry hurled from the parapet. The men who
had landed and sought shelter from fire under pro
jecting masses of masonry were dislodged by hand
grenades and fire balls. Cut off from reinforcements
and escape, they called for quarter, and were ordered
to make their way, by detachments, to the gorge of
the fort, where they were taken within.

The boats which had, on a signal from Captain
Stephens, not landed, turned and fled. "All who had
landed," says Captain Stephens, "were killed or

284 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

taken prisoners, and serious casualties occurred in
the boats nearest the fort." Only eleven officers and
116 men had landed, of whom 6 were killed, 15
wounded, and 106 made prisoners. Five barges
and as many colors were also captured. The affair
ended in complete failure in about twenty minutes.
Admiral Dahlgren, who was on a monitor about a
quarter of a mile off, says: "Moultrie fired like a
devil, the shells breaking around me and screaming
in chorus. It did not look like a vigorous assault.
Some of the boats' crews jumped overboard at the
first fire, and I fell in with two boats a mile from
Sumter. I came away without being able to see how
the matter ended, and after a weary pull got on
board the Lodona" He adds later in his journal:
"Thus this attack on a fort which General Gillmore
assumes he had demolished, necessarily failed."

General Gillmore's storming party consisted of
six or seven hundred infantry. It was delayed some
what by the state of the tide, but presently proceeded
in barges, toward Sumter. When the firing of the
naval party commenced, the barges halted, and when
it was apparent that the naval attack had failed,
they pulled back to Morris Island. Why the failure
of the naval assaulting party should have induced the
larger land force to abandon the assault which it
had started, it is not easy to conceive. It would
seem that the chances of success would have been
enhanced if the two parties had assaulted simulta
neously. And if made separately, the troops had
a better prospect of success than the naval party,
because the latter attempted the assault on a front

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 285

where the breach was not practicable, whereas on
the gorge front which troops would have assaulted
there was and had been for some weeks a practicable
breach.

"The result," says General Gordon, "did not dis
sipate the growing feeling of ill humor that had been
for some time manifest between the land and naval
forces. With no single head to devise and execute
operations looking to the same end, there must needs
be clashing and inefficiency and bad blood. In the
meantime Sumter grew daily in strength."

For several weeks after gaining possession of
Morris Island the Federal force was diligently at
work altering and enlarging Batteries Wagner and
Gregg to adapt them to the changed purposes for
which they were designed, and in constructing new
and formidable batteries between the two. A rather
slow fire was maintained on the working parties by
the batteries on James' and Sullivan's islands, enough
to retard but not to prevent the construction of the
work. If it had been possible under the most favor
able circumstances, with the Confederate guns in po
sition at so great a distance, to have prevented the
construction of the Federal works, there was not
ammunition enough in the Confederate batteries to
have maintained an effective fire; nor was it practi
cable to procure a sufficient supply. Twenty tons
of shot and shell per day would not have sufficed,
and that could not be supplied. Late in September
a slow fire was maintained from day to day on Sum
ter, enough as it was supposed, but erroneously, to
prevent repairs and the remounting of guns.

286 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

The most favorable time for the ironclad fleet to
attempt to force an entrance into the inner harbor
was passing rapidly away; for while the Federals
were busily at work on Morris Island the Confed
erates were not idle. They were strengthening the
inner line of defensive works, arming them with guns
taken from Sumter, and five or six were remounted
in Sumter itself. Still the ironclad fleet made no
attempt to enter, and to General Gillmore it seemed
that the fruits of his success on Morris Island were
passing away in consequence of the Admiral's delay.
Newspaper correspondents near the General's head
quarters sent to New York papers the most glowing
accounts of the achievements of the army, giving
little notice and no commendation to the part per
formed by the navy. On the contrary, the general
tenor of the letters from the special correspondents
at the seat of war in the Department of the South
produced the impression that the delay of the naval
commander alone prevented the complete fruition
of all the hopes and expectations based on the cam
paign for the capture of Charleston.

Admiral Dahlgren was keenly alive to the deli
cacy and responsibility of his high position in the
government service. He knew and shared the in
tensely hostile feeling pervading the North which
demanded the reduction and occupation of Charles
ton, which was looked upon as the hotbed of seces
sion and the initial point of the war. At the same
time he fully appreciated the injury that would result
to the cause he served with great zeal if any serious
disaster should befall the ironclad fleet he com-

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 287

manded and which he deemed essential to the mainte
nance of the blockade of the port, a measure he
regarded as even more important than the occupa
tion of the city itself.

One of his officers, Captain Daniel Ammen, recon-
noitered and examined the obstructions stretching
from near Sumter across toward the northwestern
extremity of Sullivan's Island, and reported that
they could be removed, and that he, with volunteers
from the fleet, would make the attempt to remove
them. The Admiral seems to have entertained the
offer and given it serious thought. It is a significant
manifestation of the estimate he placed on the zeal
for the naval service of the men under his command,
that he suggested as a suitable and tempting reward
for gallant service to announce that those who sur
vived the attempt should be honorably discharged
from the service. But the attempt was not made.
It was recognized that within the harbor were more
formidable obstacles to encounter than the rope and
timber and torpedo obstructions at its entrance.

Before leaving Washington to enter on the cam
paign, General Gillmore had expressed to the Sec
retary of the Navy his conviction that when he had
gained possession of Morris Island and had demol
ished Fort Sumter he could, with batteries erected
on Cumming's Point, silence the batteries on Sulli
van's Island, thus completely opening the gate to
Charleston. His experience before Wagner had
long since demonstrated the utter hopelessness of
attempting to silence the Sullivan's Island batteries,

288 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

a mile and a half distant, across the channel. Those
batteries were still intact.

The Admiral perhaps had that fact in mind when
at this time he addressed a formal letter to Gen
eral Gillmore, reminding him that the obstacles
which barred the entrance to Charleston harbor had
not yet been removed or destroyed. Sumter he re
garded as still a serious obstacle in itself, and as
guarding other obstructions. "The only fort you
have attempted — Sumter — you have not reduced,"
and he asked that it be occupied by the Union troops.
The General replied sharply, that from the concur
rent testimony of the Confederates themselves, and
the Admiral's own admission, Sumter was no longer
regarded as capable of any harm to anyone. If,
however, the Admiral thought, after only one abor
tive attempt on the part of the navy to capture the
fort, that the few infantry soldiers who held it could
offer any serious impediment to the removal of the
obstructions between the fort and Sullivan's Island,
he, the General, would remove them with his own
troops. The Admiral replied, if the obstructions
were to be removed, it was properly his province to
remove them, and he did not need the services of the
troops for that purpose. All he desired was that the
Union troops should occupy the fort.

If the removal of the obstructions was regarded
as an important preliminary to the entrance of the
fleet, it was surely an excess of punctilio to stand
on the order of their removal, whether by the land
or naval force.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 289

But in truth the obstructions were by no means
so formidable as was supposed. There was no doubt
risk to be encountered from submerged torpedoes,
as was subsequently discovered by the explosion of
one under the monitor Patapsco while covering an
attempt to remove obstructions, instantly sinking
the monitor and more than half of her crew, and
like experiences elsewhere. But risks are inevitable,
and these were such as the officers and men of the
navy expected and were perfectly ready to encounter
for the accomplishment of commensurate results.
The difficulty was not so much to get into, as to get
out of the inner harbor; and it was a question for
grave consideration whether the results which might
reasonably be expected to follow a successful en
trance into the inner harbor would be at all com
mensurate with the risk to the ironclads. A glance
at the map of the harbor will show that, leaving out
of consideration Sumter and the formidable batteries
on Sullivan's Island, there were seventeen batteries
mounting fifty-eight guns covering the waters of the
inner harbor. Long experience in the bombardment
of Wagner and Moultrie had most clearly demon
strated that the combined land and naval batteries,
throwing a weight of metal such as had never before
been thrown on any work, could not permanently
silence these land forts, or silence them any longer
than they were immediately under fire. It would
have been idle to suppose that the naval batteries
alone could accomplish on the works within the har
bor what the combined land and naval batteries had
failed, under much more favorable circumstances, to

29o THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

effect on those without. There were, besides, two
new and formidable Confederate ironclads within
the harbor, which would have played a conspicuous
part in any engagement in those waters. "The truth
is," says Admiral Dahlgren, "that the entrance of
ironclads could only make sure of the destruction of
the city, — and not this without undue risk, if these
were only monitors. The act itself could not be ob
jected to by the Rebels, for it was understood to
be their intent to destroy the place themselves rather
than that we should occupy it. If so, it was quite as
logical that we should destroy it rather than they
should occupy it."

All arguments in favor of the entrance of the iron
clads proceeded on the assumption that they were in
good condition for action, which was far from being
the case. They had all been under steam for six or
seven months; their bottoms were so foul as mate
rially to impair their speed; they had been repeatedly
in action and were much damaged by the battering
they had received, and two of the twenty-six guns
they carried had been disabled and needed repairs
before going again into action.

But public sentiment in the North clamored for
the reduction of Charleston, and the "special cor
respondents at the seat of war" continued to lay the
blame of the failure to accomplish that so eagerly
desired consummation, to the navy.

At the instance of the Secretary of the Navy, Ad
miral Dahlgren, on October 24 convened a council
of the ironclad captains, and in a session of six hours'
duration the whole subject was discussed fully and

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 291

without restraint. It was decided by a vote of six
to four, the senior officers being in the majority, that
an attempt to enter the harbor and proceed to the
city would be attended with extreme risk without
adequate results. To the question, Should the Iron
sides enter with the monitors? there was no decision,
— four for, four against, and two undecided; there
was but one dissenting voice to the question, Would
it be advisable to co-operate with the army in an
attack on Sullivan's Island? and to the question, Can
Forts Johnson and Moultrie be reduced by the pres
ent force of ironclads, unsupported by the army?
the answer was unanimously No. The matter was
briefly and forcibly stated by Commodore Rodgers
in reply to an inquiry by a committee of the United
States Senate, as follows:

"Ordinarily and popularly, to take a place means
to take its defenses. General Gillmore was forty-
eight2 days on Morris Island, acting against Fort
Wagner, with some ten or twelve thousand men
against a garrison of about 1500 men or less, assisted
by the monitors and by artillery which excited the
wonder of Europe. After forty-eight days he took
the place, not by his artillery nor by monitors, but
by making military approaches and threatening to
cut off their means of escape and take the place by
assault; and when he took it, it was not so greatly
damaged as to be untenable. Now, if General Gill-
more, on the same island, assisted by his artillery
and the whole force of the monitors, in forty-eight

2He was so engaged from July 10 to September 7.

292 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

days could not capture Fort Wagner alone by them,
it is perfectly certain that the monitors alone never
can take the much stronger defenses which line
James Island and Sullivan's Island. In going up to
Charleston, therefore, he would have to run by the
defenses, and leave the harbor, so far as they con
stitute the command of it, in the power of the enemy;
and when he got up to the city he could not spare a
single man from his monitors, even if they should
consent to receive him; and if he burned the town
he would burn it over the heads of non-combatant
women and children, while the men who defend it
are away in the forts. I should be reluctant to burn
a house over a woman's and child's head because her
husband defied me. Dahlgren, if he burns Charles
ton, will be called a savage by all Europe, and after
the heat of combat is over he will be called a savage
by our own people. But there are obstructions in the
way which render it doubtful whether he can get
there. And if he goes up under the guns of those
fortifications, sticks upon the obstructions, and is
finally driven off by any cause, leaving one or two
of his monitors there within their power, they will
get them off, repair them, and send them out to what
part of the coast they please and give a new character
to the war. The wooden blockade will be mainly at
an end, unlimited cotton going out and unlimited
supplies coming in. I see no good to compensate
for that risk, except it be in satisfying the national
mind that retributive justice has been done against
the city of Charleston, the nursery of the Rebellion.
He might possibly go up there and burn the town,

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 293

in which there are no combatants, and a place which,
in a purely military point of view, as far as I know,
possesses no value. To do that he risks losing
vessels upon the obstructions, and if they should be
so lost, and fall into the enemy's hands, a new phase
will be given to the war. In a word, I do not think
the game is worth the candle. Whether these reasons
operate with him, I do not know; they would with

me."

Admiral Dahlgren decided to make no attempt
to enter the inner harbor until the monitors should
be repaired, cleaned, and put in fighting trim, which
would not be sooner than about the middle of No
vember. He was, however, ready to co-operate with
the land force in any operation it might undertake
against Sullivan's Island or elsewhere. But General
Gillmore, believing that he had accomplished his
part of the general plan, was not disposed to enter
on any new operations without reinforcements. His
batteries at and near Cumming's Point being ready
for action on October 26, he commenced what he
calls the second bombardment of Sumter, in which
the ironclads as usual bore a conspicuous part, their
1 1- and 15-inch guns being especially effective. This
bombardment was maintained with great violence
for about ten days, until many of the guns in the land
batteries were worn out. The second bombardment
had resulted in rendering the southeast face a more
complete ruin than the gorge wall, and other faces
were greatly shaken. What further to do to bring
the compaign to a successful end was a most per
plexing problem. Various projects were suggested

294 THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

and discussed in frequent conferences between the
commanders of the land and naval forces. One was
to attempt to capture Fort Johnson, but General
Gillmore was unwilling to attempt to hold the ground
west of Johnson or co-operate with the navy within
the harbor, without an addition to his force of
15,000 men, and that he could not get. Another
plan was to operate against Sullivan's Island by
way of Bull's Bay. Since it seemed that Charleston
could not then be taken, it was suggested that the
combined force be turned upon Savannah and cap
ture that city, and this project was discussed until it
became known in Savannah, when preparations were
in progress to meet it. Pending the consideration
of these projects it was deemed advisable to divert
public attention and let it be understood that further
operations against Charleston were abandoned.
General Gillmore undertook to have that report
spread abroad by the special newspaper correspon
dents.

Meanwhile no explicit instructions came from
Washington, and it was understood that the Secre
tary of War and the General-in-Chief of the army
were averse to any further active operations at that
time by the army against Charleston, the occupation
of which they would have regarded as an "elephant
on their hands."

Indeed, the purpose of the Administration in
Washington in regard to Charleston is shrouded in
some doubt, not withstanding the efforts made to cap
ture that city.

In a letter from Colonel A. B. Ely, who had been

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON 295

General Benham's chief of staff, to Major General
G. W. Cullum, he says, referring to the failure of
the assault on Secessionville June 16, 1862 : "I could
give you the reason of the want of success, but 1
need not now disparage anybody in that regard, nor
is it needful that I should speak of the weak and
wicked considerations which interfered to prevent
any further action of General Benham in that direc
tion, particularly when I was assured by the Presi
dent himself that he did not want we should take
Charleston."*

Eighteen months after the assault on Secession
ville, in December, 1863, General Gillmore, in con
ference with Admiral Dahlgren in regard to their
future operations, said that the War Department
had "never entertained an idea beyond the occupation
of the exterior islands."

The exterior islands — Morris and Folly — were
securely held, and a slow fire was maintained on the
city and Forts Sumter and Moultrie; but whatever
may have been the wishes of the Administration,
General Gillmore's campaign of four months' dura
tion virtually ended with the second bombardment of
Fort Sumter.

'The letter is dated Boston, Mass., June 12, 1867.

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