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RCHIBALD MURRAY5
DESPATCHES
SIR ARCHIBALD MURRAY'S
DESPATCHES
All rights reserved
♦<
SIR
ARCHIBALD MURRAY'S
DESPATCHES
(June 1916 — June 1917)
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WITH SPECIALLY PREPARED
MAPS, AND PORTRAITS
1920
LONDON & TORONTO
J. M. DENT ftf SONS LTD.
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON <^ CO.
FOREWORD
The following four Despatches have until now never been
published in their full original text. This is especially true
of the fourth of this series, dated 28th June, 191 7. This
Despatch General Sir Archibald Murray is now permitted to
publish on the condition that the following letter is published
at the same time.
[COPYJ
War Office,
London, S.W.
^th March, 1920.
i2i/Mediterranean/5i77 (S.D. 5).
Sir,
With reference to previous correspondence on the question
of the publication of your despatch of the 28th June, 191 7, I
am commanded by the Army Council to point out that the
various changes of policy on which stress is laid in the first
part of the despatch were based not merely on local considera-
tions connected with the campaign east of the Suez Canal and
adjacent theatres of war, but on a general review of the course
of the war as a whole, including such considerations as the
development of the German submarine campaign, the failure
of General Nivelle's offensive and the extension of the British
line on the Western Front, Allied policy in the Balkans, and the
course of events in Russia.
I am to add that, unless this fact is appreciated by the reader,
the recital of various changes in pohcy without relation to
^47035
vi SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
events taking place in other parts of the world is calculated to
create a somewhat misleading impression.
In authorising the publication cf the despatch referred to
above the Council must ask, therefore, that this letter be
published at the same time,
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) H. J. CREEDY
General Sir A. J. Murray,
G.C.M.G., K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.,
Went House,
West Mailing, Kent,
EXTRACTS FROM THE DESPATCH
OF
FIELD MARSHAL SIR EDMUND ALLENBY,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
Commander-in-Chief Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
dated 28th June, 191 9
<< '
By the summer of 1917^ when I assumed command of the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Lieut. -General Sir A. Murray's
brilliant campaign in Sinai had removed the danger to Egypt,
and had forced the enemy back across his own frontiers."
*
'' I desire to express my indebtedness to my predecessor,
Lieut .-General Sir A. J. Murray, who, by his bridging of the
desert between Egypt and Palestine, laid the foundations for
the subsequent advances of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
I reaped the fruits of his foresight and strategical imagination,
which brought the waters of the Nile to the borders of Palestine,
planned the skilful military operations by which the Turks
were driven from strong positions in the desert over the fron-
tier of Egypt, and carried a standard gauge railway to the gates
of Gaza. The organisation he created, both in Sinai and in
Egypt, stood all tests and formed the comer-stone of my
successes."
vu
CONTENTS
PAGE
First Despatch.— ist June, 1916 . , , . i
Second Despatch. — ist October, 1916 . . ♦ 43
Covering Letter sent with Second Despatch. —
nth October, 1916 83
Third Despatch.— ist March, 1917 . . . '87
Fourth Despatch.— 28th June, 1917 . . . .127
Appendices . . . . ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ^79
Index ......... 221
IX
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
General Sir Archibald Murray . . Frontispiece
Lieut.-General The Hon. H. A. Lawrence facing page 45
Sandhills South of Romani ... ,^63
Lieut.-General Sir H. G. Chauvel . . « 89
Major-General Chauvel and Staff of the
Anzac Mounted Division . . „ loi
Lieut.-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bart. ,^ 139
sketch maps
Battle of Romani — Sketch Map showing
Positions of British Troops at
6 A.M., 4TH August, 1916 . . facing page 64
Battle of Romani — Sketch Map showing
Positions of British Troops at
Dusk, 4TH August, 19 16 . . „ 67
Map of Siwa Oasis. . , . . ,^ 118
XI
LIST OF FOLDING MAPS
(IN PORTFOLIO)
1. Outline Map of Turkish Empire
2. Map of Egypt
3. Map of Sinai Peninsula : Suez and Port Said
4. Map of Syria: Jerusalem and Rafa
zu
V
v^i
FIRST DESPATCH
15^ June^ 1 91 6
SIR ARCHIBALD MURRAY'S
DESPATCHES
FIRST DESPATCH
From— ^ ^ ^
The Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
The Secretary of State for War,
War Office, London, S.W.
General Headquarters y
Egyptian Expeditionary Forcet
ist June, i9i6.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit a report on the opera-
tions of the Force under my command from the date
on which I assumed command to the 31st May, 1916.
!♦ On 9th January, 19 16, I arrived in Cairo, and, on
the following day, took over the command of the
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force from General Sir
C. C. Monro, G,C.M.G., K.GB., who had himself
arrived from Mudros but a few days before. At that
date the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was in a
state of transition as regards its larger component, the
Dardanelles Army. On the night of the 8th /9th January
this Army had completed its successful evacuation of
Cape Helles ; its units were still concentrated at Mudros
and Imbros awaiting transport to Egypt, where all the
Force, excluding the Salonica Army, had been ordered
to concentrate. Meanwhile a portion of the Force,
which had been set free by the earlier evacuation of
3
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r, «
.-../'li/l/VSIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
the Suvla Bay and An^ac positions, had already arrived
in Egypt, where it had come under the command of
General Sir John Maxwell, K.C.B,, K.C.M-G. The
concentration of the Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps, for instance, was practically complete, and the
53rd Division was occupied in operations on the
Western Frontier of Egypt, General Headquarters
of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force were tem-
porarily established in Cairo.
The instructions which I had received from the
Secretary of State for War placed under my command
all organised formations then in Egypt, or on their
way to Egypt, with the exception of such troops as
might be considered necessary for the defence of
Egypt and the Nile Valley against attack from the west,
or for maintaining order in the Nile Valley and the
Nile Delta. The function assigned to me was that of
protecting Egypt against attack from the east, and the
westward limit of my command was roughly fixed by
a line running north and south approximately five
miles west of the Suez Canal. The British force at
Salonica was also placed under my general super-
vision. At the same time I was given the important
responsibility of maintaining a general strategical re-
serve of troops for the whole Empire, to be used in
whatsoever theatre of war the call should be most
urgent.
2. During the period under review, in addition to
the extensive military preparations required for the
defence of the eastern front, the amount of purely
administrative work thrown on all sections of my Staff
has been extremely heavy. The exigencies of the
Gallipoli campaign had placed the Force under my
command in a state of serious disorganisation. Some
FIRST DESPATCH 5
units were in Egypt, others on the sea, others in ^gean
ports. It was not until the end of February that the
last units of the Dardanelles Army reached Egypt.
Every day for over six weeks ship-loads of troops, guns,
animals and transport were arriving at Alexandria and
Port Said. The components of this mass had to be
disentangled and forwarded to their proper destina-
tions : old units had to be reorganised, new units to
be created, brigades, divisions, army corps to be re-
formed. The British troops from Gallipoli were in-
complete in personnel and material. It was urgently
necessary to bring them up to strength, re-equip them,
and provide them with train and mechanical transport
on a modified scale. The Australasian troops also
needed re-equipment, and, in their case, there was the
additional problem of dealing with a mass of un-
absorbed reinforcements. Further training of officers
and men was an urgent necessity. Moreover, the
embarkation of troops for service elsewhere began in
February and continued without intermission till the
end of April. To this work must be added not only
the maintenance of my Force, both in Egypt and
Salonica, with animals, supplies, ordnance stores,
works material, and medical and veterinary stores, but
also the provision and despatch of ordnance stores,
works material, and supplies specially demanded for
Basrah and East Africa.
The bulk of the work of disembarkation and em-
barkation, including the very heavy work of railway
transport, fell upon the staffs of my Deputy Quarter-
master-General and Inspector-General of Communi-
cations,^ to whom great credit is due. Between ist
' Up to March 19th the Inspector-General of Communications was also
General Officer Commanding Levant Base.
6 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
January and 31st May^ exclusive of sick and wounded,
10,057 officers, 256,623 other ranks, and 49,969 animals
were disembarked in Egypt. The numbers embarked,
exclusive of sick and wounded, were 8,507 officers,
202,249 other ranks, and 31,530 animals. The total
numbers carried on the Egyptian State Railways
during the same period were 67,756 officers, 1,029,499
other ranks, 156,393 animals, 560,300 tons of stores,
and 15,518 tons of ammunition. I append a tabular
return (see Appendix A) of the complete units em-
barked from Egypt for service elsewhere. The total
includes six complete divisions at full strength, and, in
addition, three infantry brigades and nine batteries of
heavy artillery, besides signal, engineer and medical
units. All six of these divisions were re-equipped or
completed with equipment : moreover, transport for
two further divisions had to be collected on a special
scale ; two newly-formed divisions were completely
equipped ; three further divisions and three dismounted
brigades were re-equipped for service in Egypt ; five
divisions at Salonica were completed with additional
pack saddlery to the amount of 20,000 sets, and supplied
with very large reserves of ammunition and ordnance
stores ; a newly-formed Camel Transport Corps and
the Imperial Camel Corps were also equipped and
provided with animals. This work, together with
the task of supplying and maintaining the troops
operating on the eastern, and subsequently also on
the western, front, was efficiently carried out by
the Ordnance, Supply and Transport, Remount, and
Works Departments.
As regards the formation of new units, the most
important work was that of absorbing the surplus
Australasian reinforcements. The New Zealand Divi-
FIRST DESPATCH 7
sion was remodelled so as to consist entirely of New
Zealanders^ and the constitution of the Australian
Provisional Formations under Major-General Sir H, V,
Cox^ K.C.M.G., C.B., C.S.L^ laid the ground-work
of two entirely new Australian Divisions, the 4th and
5th, which were actually embodied on 6th March.
Steps were also taken to bring the organisation of all
the Australasian troops into uniformity as regarded
their artillery and other divisional troops. The new
Australian divisions took their places in the front line
when the ist Australian and New Zealand Corps went
to France, whither they are themselves now about to
be despatched. The Australian and New Zealand
Mounted Division has been reconstituted, and has
proved most valuable both on the eastern and western
fronts. In addition, four brigades of dismounted
yeomanry have been organised on definite and uniform
lines ; brigade machine-gun companies have been
formed for practically all the divisions in the Force
(including those sent elsewhere and at Salonica) ;
Stokes gun batteries for sixteen brigades have been
reorganised ; the Imperial Camel Corps — a fighting
unit — of six companies has been raised and trained
for work in the desert, and four more companies are
now being trained ; the Indian Camel Corps in Egypt
have been combined into a Camel Transport Corps,
which has been raised from local resources to a strength
of 18,000. As regards instruction, a training centre for
Australasian reinforcements was started at Tel el Kebir
and continued until it was decided that the Australa-
sian training depots should be transferred to England.
Further, a machine-gun school was formed at Ismailia
which, after producing excellent results, was merged in
the Imperial School of Instruction at ^eitoun (suburb
8 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
of Cairo). The latter institution, which came under my
control after 19th March, has since been increased in
size so as to train officers in all branches of warfare*
Under its commandant, Lieut.-Colonel the Hon» E» M.
Colston, M.V.O,, its work has been most valuable. Be-
sides the ordinary courses for officers and non-commis-
sioned officers, it holds machine-gun, Lewis gun, signal
and telephone, artillery, Stokes gun, and grenadier
classes. Between 7th January and 31st May, 1,166
officers and 5,512 other ranks attended and passed in
the various classes. A machine-gun school was also
started at Salonica.
Excellent work has been done by the signal service
during this period. In the first place, it has efficiently
carried out the work of refitting the signal units from
the Peninsula, reorganising them to suit the conditions
peculiar to Egypt, and training locally officers and men
to fill the gaps and meet the increased demand for
signallers and telegraphists. Ninety-four officers and
1,305 other ranks have been trained in these duties at
Zeitoun and Alexandria this year. Secondly, it has had
to provide intercommunication for troops engaged
upon over 1,000 miles of front, which has involved
the development of an unusually extensive network of
military telegraphs. All the resource and ingenuity
of the service has been taxed to cope with the con-
ditions peculiar to this field of operations — abnormal
distances, unusual means of transport, desert, sand
storms and mirage. Lastly, it has substituted a military
telegraph and telephone service for the civil system
which, until this year, has been the only available
means of communication throughout Egypt and was
worked mainly by native personnel.
I would also specially mention the survey work
FIRST DESPATCH 9
that has been carried out since the arrival of the Medi-
terranean Expeditionary Force in Egypt* In addition
to the standardisation, printing and issue of tactical
maps of Sinai to the whole of the Army on the eastern
front, a new survey on a large scale of the Canal zone
and certain areas east of our lines and advanced posts
has been continuously carried on by the Topographical
Section of the Intelligence Branch working in close
co-operation with the Royal Flying Corps. This survey,
which has now been in process for nearly six months,
is now approaching Katia. I believe that the map
based on this survey is the first map entirely con-
structed on this principle. The work was initiated by
Mr. E. M. Dowson, Director - General, Survey of
Egypt, who placed his resources at the disposal of
the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. The actual
direction of the work has been in the hands of the
Intelligence Branch of my General Staff, and is based
on experience, gained in Gallipoli, of the production
of trench maps from aeroplane photographs, controlled
by ordinary field survey methods. Co-operation in
this survey has been part of the routine of the Royal
Flying Corps. The main object of the new map thus
being produced is to facilitate the co-operation of air-
craft and artillery, though it has already proved ex-
tremely useful in siting trenches and locating roads,
railways and pipe-lines. The system upon which this
survey proceeds was devised to obviate the extreme
difficulty of surveying large tracts of desert by ordinary
methods. Certain areas, from 8,000 to 12,000 yards
eastward of our front line, that were likely to include
enemy gun positions, were selected and photographed
from the air. The photographs were then reduced and
fitted by a complicated process to their correct positions
10 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
on the map. The result has been the attainment of
the highest topographical accuracy in the survey of
almost featureless desert^ which enables observers to
** spot ** with the greatest precision outside the areas
surveyed by ordinary methods.
These labours, most of which demanded the utmost
despatch in their completion, were carried out con-
currently with the conduct of more strictly military
operations, to my report on which I will now proceed.
3. When I arrived in Egypt the intentions of the
enemy as regards an attack on the Suez Canal were by
no means certain. Though his new means of communi-
cation in southern Syria and Sinai, commenced with
this end in view, were still in a backward state, he
undoubtedly had at his disposal the troops, amounting
to 250,000 men or more, necessary for such an attack.
The adequate defence of the Canal was therefore a
matter of serious importance. The outline of a scheme
of defence had already been prepared ; certain works
were being constructed, railways and pipe-lines and
roads commenced, and troops were being concentrated
in the three sections of the Canal Defences, which were
based on Suez, Ismailia and Port Said respectively.
The object aimed at was to construct a front line of
defence, suitable for withstanding an attack with heavy
artillery, some seven or eight miles east of the Canal.
A second, and inner, line was also to be constructed
on the east bank, besides certain permanent, fortified
bridge-heads. At the same time, the defence of the
Canal was to be, so far as possible, offensive, and
mobile columns were to be prepared for this purpose
in addition to the garrisons for the defensive line. This
scheme in outline I took over from the General Com-
manding in Egypt, under whom it had been operating
FIRST DESPATCH ii
for a short time, and, since on January nth the sole
direction of military operations at Salonica was given
to General Sarrail, while the responsibility for safe-
guarding the islands of Lemnos, Tenedos and Imbros
was taken over by the Admiralty, I was able to give
my undivided attention to the operations in defence
of the Canal. I decided to establish my General Head-
quarters at Ismailia. No. i Section, with Headquarters
at Suez, was allotted to the 9th Army Corps under
Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Julian Byng, K.C.M.G.,
C.B., M.V.O. ; No. 2 Section, with Headquarters at
Ismailia, to the Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps under Lieut.-General Sir A. J. Godley,
K.C.M.G., C.B., and No. 3 Section, with Head-
quarters at Port Said, to the 15th Army Corps under
Lieut.-General H. S. Home, C.B. These officers were
ordered to take over their commands immediately.
The composition of the Force at this time is shown
in Appendix B, attached. A satisfactory agreement
was arrived at between Sir John Maxwell and myself
regarding the delimitations of our respective spheres
of command and the troops to be allotted to him.
The 53rd and 54th Divisions, two mounted brigades
and a Territorial infantry brigade were permanently
transferred to his command, and certain other units
placed temporarily at his disposal. On 22nd January
General Headquarters opened at Ismailia.
My chief concern was now the defence of the Canal.
The work on the stationary defences was backward.
Difficulties of water supply on the east bank were
increased by shortage of piping ; labour troubles had
delayed the progress of roads and railways. Guns had
still to be emplaced, and no part of the front defence
line was actually occupied by troops. Nevertheless, as
12 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
there were no signs of an imminent advance on the
part of the enemy, the question of the stationary
defences caused me no serious anxiety, though every-
thing possible was done to hasten on their completion.
The organisation of the offensive defence, which time
has proved to be paramount, was, however, a pressing
matter hitherto untouched. Practically nothing had
been done towards the organisation of mobile forces.
The collection of a large number of riding and transport
camels had to be undertaken at once and a plan of
campaign to be devised. Moreover, time was short,
for it was plain that any offensive on a large scale by
the enemy must be commenced before the middle of
March. For the Force under my command the only
possible line of advance was along the northern line
from Kantara towards Katia and El Arish, and the
task was at once taken up of examining the possibilities
of an offensive on this line and solving the problem of
maintaining a considerable force at Katia during the
summer months. The result of these investigations
is to be seen in my memorandum of 15th February,
addressed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
in which I stated that the first step towards securing
the true base for the defence of Egypt was an advance
to a suitable position east of Katia and the construction
of a railway to that place. Preparations for this pre-
liminary movement were being actively pushed on. The
construction of the railway began immediately, and it
was anticipated that sufficient camels would be available
to equip a force of one division and one mounted brigade
with camel transport very shortly. Such a force would,
I then considered, be sufficient to clear and occupy the
Katia district and to hold the eastern end of it.
Meanwhile, certain changes had already taken
FIRST DESPATCH 13
place in the Force^ and others had been foreshadowed.
The 13th Division had been sent to Mesopotamia,
and the nth Division transferred from the 9th Corps
in the No. i Section to the 15th Corps in the No. 3
Section of the defences. The 8th Army Corps ceased
to exist, and its commander, Lieut.-General Sir Francis
Davies, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., took over command of the
gth Corps on General Byng's departure to England.
Up till the middle of February aeroplane recon-
naissance was the only active military operation possible,
owing to the need for reorganising the units of the
Force and for pushing on the work of laying roads,
pipe-lines and railways to enable an adequate force
to be maintained on, and beyond, the front lines. The
magnitude of the latter task may be judged from the
fact that, during the period covered by this despatch,
114 miles of road, 154 miles of pipe-lines, and 252
miles of railway ^ were laid. The work of the Royal
Flying Corps, most actively and gallantly pursued,
enabled me to keep the enemy^s posts at Bir el Has-
sana, Nekhl and El Arish under close observation, and
neither their reports nor those of the equally gallant
and efficient Naval Air Service, which observed by
seaplane the garrisons of southern Syria, showed any
concentration of enemy troops for a big attack on the
Canal. On i6th February the Russian Army entered
Erzerum, inflicting a heavy defeat on the Turkish
Army opposed to it. It seemed likely then that all the
enemy's schemes for attacking the Canal in force must
for the present fall to the ground, and such has proved
to be the case. The garrisons in Syria were gradually
reduced, until it was estimated that not more than
' 72 miles of 2' 6" gauge, 10 miles of metre gauge, 80 miles of 4' 8-2'' gauge,
and 90 miles of Decauville.
14 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
60,000 men were available for an attack on Egypt .^
During the latter half of February the work of recon-
naissance beyond the front line began in earnest,
especially in the northern section, where the 1 5th Corps
patrolled as far as Bir el Nuss and Hod um Ugba,
establishing the fact that the country was all clear and
practically deserted. At this period, too, a reconnais-
sance was undertaken from Tor (see Map 2). This post,
and that of Ras Abu Zeneima (see Map 2), both on the
Sinaitic coast south of Suez, were then garrisoned by a
battalion of the Egyptian Army — subsequently by the
14th Sikhs — and had, by arrangement with General
Maxwell, come under my direction. The reconnais-
sance from Tor was undertaken against a concentration
of a small body of the enemy at Wadi Ginneh, some
miles distant from the coast* This minor operation
was in every way successful, though the enemy had
fled before their camp was reached, leaving behind
their baggage, which was destroyed. The troops then
returned without further incident.
4. From March onwards, the rapid embarkation
of troops for France depleted my forces considerably.^
During this month the military operations on the
eastern front, if not momentous, were satisfactory. On
6th March a very gallant and successful attack on Bir el
Hassana was made by the Royal Flying Corps, which
resulted in the destruction of the pumping station.
Bomb attacks were made on Nekhl and other places
in Sinai, and on 24th March, Bir el Hassana was again
attacked in force with bombs. In the northern sector,
the preliminary steps were being taken for the advance
to Katia. Week by week permanent posts were pushed
' See telegram from War Office 16342 cipher, dated 11. 5. 16.
* See Appendix C giving the composition of the Force after the departure
of six divisions.
FIRST DESPATCH 15
further ahead, special reconnaissances were made with
a view to testing the water supply, and the broad gauge
railway from Kantara to Katia was being carried forward
as fast as possible. During this month, also, I gave
instructions to all commanders of sections of the Canal
Defences which considerably modified the original
scheme of defence, as I had taken it over. Starting
from the principle that, owing to evaporation of the
rain pools, it was now impossible for the enemy to
bring up and deploy a larger force than 50,000 men
for a sustained attack against the defences, I laid it
down that the front line of defence east of the Canal
should be looked upon and occupied as an outpost
line, the smallest force appropriate to the circum-
stances being allotted to it, and that all dispositions
should be based on the necessity for providing behind
it the forces necessary for undertaking a mobile defence.
Mobile columns were organised in each of the three
sections. All were to be provided with camel transport
and with camel convoys that would admit of a radius
of action of one day's march from the Canal in the case
of No. 3 Section, and two days* march in the case of
the other two sections, I directed, moreover, that in
each section any troops left over after the allotment of
units to the outpost lines and the mobile column,
should be made sufficiently mobile to operate rapidly
at a distance east of the Canal not exceeding half a day's
march from road and rail-heads.
5, On nth March I received instructions from the
late Secretary of State for War that the command of
the troops in Egypt was to be reorganised and that I
was appointed General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
all the Imperial Forces in this country, which added to
my original command the command held bv General
i6 SIR A. MURRAY*S DESPATCHES
Sir John Maxwell, The preliminary details for carrying
this change into operation were fixed at a conference
with General Maxwell held on 13th March, and on
19th March I formally took over the whole command
in Egypt, thus ending a system of dual control which
had of necessity been unsatisfactory, especially from
the point of view of economy. By this change I not
only became responsible for the administration of
martial law in Egypt and the maintenance of order
throughout the Nile Valley and Delta, but I also
succeeded to the direction of the operations against
the Senoussi on the western frontier, which had very
appropriately been brought to a triumphant period by
General Maxwell by his victories which led to the
occupation of Solium on 14th March, the capture of
Gaafer, the dispersal, with the loss of all his guns, of
Nuri's force, and the recapture from the enemy of 90
British prisoners taken by hostile submarines. The
53rd and 54th Divisions, the North Midland Mounted
Brigade, and other units, including garrison battalions,
were added to my Force, besides the Imperial School
of Instruction at Zeitoun. The unification of the com-
mand in Egypt made large economies in staff possible,
and these were carried out at once* The Levant Base
also ceased to exist. General Sir Edward Altham,
K.C.B., remaining as Inspector - General of Com-
munications. The work of reorganising the forces and
staffs for the Delta and Western Frontier Force was
pushed on as fast as possible. I decided to keep General
Headquarters at Ismailia, and to establish at Cairo a
General Officer Commanding the Delta District, who
would also act as Commander of Lines of Communi-
cation Defences. For operations on the west I formed
a Western Frontier Force, divided into two sections.
FIRST DESPATCH 17
a north-western and a south-western, divided by a line
drawn east and west through Darut es Sharif. These
staffs and forces were definitely established and at
work by ist April. The whole force under my command
now took the name of Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
Towards the end of March, at the request of the Sirdar,
I undertook the responsibility for the defence of the
reach of the Nile between Assuan and Wadi Haifa.
Captain F. H. Mitchell, R.N., D.S.O., was sent for
this purpose to make all arrangements for an armed
naval patrol of this reach.
On 1 8th March, Captain H.R.H. the Prince of
Wales took up his duties as Staff Captain on my Staff,
remaining till his departure from Egypt on ist May.
6. As soon as the conduct of operations on the
western frontier devolved upon me, I took steps, in
consultation with the various officers who were then
best acquainted with the situation, to estimate the size
of the hostile forces with which I should have to deal,
and to determine the policy along this front of over
800 miles by which the Nile Valley could best be
protected. It appeared from the information placed
at my disposal that the Senoussi forces, spread over
the whole western desert, did not exceed 3,000, and it
was certain that the enemy's moral had been severely
shaken by Sir John Maxwell's recent successful opera-
tions. The chief dangers, therefore, against which I
had to guard, were enemy raids upon the Nile Valley,
the stirring up of native tribes that were inclined to be
well-disposed towards the Senoussi, and the creation
of unrest in the Nile Valley and Delta among dis-
affected or nervous elements of the population. The
chief end to be held in view was to prevent any local
success on the part of the Senoussi.
i8 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Had it been possible, the best way of attaining this
end would have been the occupation of the Siwa Oasis,
which is the focus of all the routes between the Nile
Valley north of Assuan and the west. With the Siwa
Oasis in our hands, the retirement of enemy forces east
of Siwa would have been practically certain, thus
eliminating any menace against the Nile Valley and
Delta. However, I was advised that it would be im-
possible to undertake this operation unless it could be
successfully carried through within three weeks from
the beginning of April. For an operation requiring
most careful preparation and organisation, this time
was all too short, and I reluctantly came to the con-
clusion that it must be deferred for the present, though
I kept under consideration the question of extending
the coast railway from Dhabba to Mersa Matruh, and
from there eventually to Siwa. So far as the extreme
north-west was concerned, the state of affairs was such
as to relieve me of all anxiety. Mersa Matruh and
Solium had been reoccupied, and, as these are the only
Egyptian harbours west of Alexandria, their occupation,
together with the patrol of the coast undertaken by
the Navy, was likely to prevent the enemy from re-
ceiving arms, ammunition, or other assistance from
hostile submarines within the area under British control.
As regards the security of the Nile Valley and Delta,
at the moment when I took over command, this was
only provided for by the occupation of Wadi Natron
with patrols 45 miles out to Hammame and Moghara,
the occupation of the Fayum in considerable force, and
the posting of small detachments of troops along the
Nile as far south as Assuan. The question to be
determined was whether Moghara and the westerly
oases, Baharia, Farafra, Dakhla and Kharga, through
FIRST DESPATCH 19
one or more of which any enemy raids would have to
pass, should be denied to the enemy by occupation
on our part. The conclusion to which I came was that
the western defence of Egypt could be fully secured by
the occupation of Moghara, the Baharia Oasis and the
Kharga Oasis, and that any danger to the Nile Valley
between Minya and Girga could be met by subsequently
clearing the Dakhla Oasis of enemy troops and main-
taining a small force about Assiut ready to move up or
down the railway as might be required. I gave in-
structions accordingly to the General Officer Com-
manding the Western Frontier Force to make his
dispositions for occupying, in the order named, the
Kharga Oasis, Moghara, and the Baharia Oasis.
On 15th April the Kharga Oasis, which had pre-
viously been reported by aerial reconnaissance and
Resident agents to be clear of the enemy, was occupied
without incident. The movement of troops was effected
by the existing light railway, and by the i8th April a
force numbering 1,660 of all ranks was concentrated
in the Oasis. This force, commanded by Lieut .-Colonel
A. McNeill, i/and Lovat's Scouts, consisted of one
squadron of Egyptian Army Cavalry, a company of the
Camel Transport Corps, three regiments of the 2nd
Dismounted Brigade, a section of the Hong Kong and
Singapore Mountain Battery, a detachment of the
Royal Flying Corps, and a section of the Cheshire
Field Company, R.E.
On the 27th April the small oasis of Moghara
was occupied by a force consisting of the 2nd Com-
pany Imperial Camel Corps and the Denbighshire
Yeomanry (dismounted) under the command of
Lieut .-Colonel A. H. O. Lloyd, M.V.O., commanding
Shropshire Yeomanry, based at El Amaid station on
20 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
the Mariut railway. A strongly entrenched post has
been constructed. The occupation of this post has
materially assisted in preventing the passage of food-
stuffs from the Nile Valley to the west, and denies
the water to any enemy force attempting to move in
the contrary direction.
During April frequent raids and reconnaissances,
chiefly with a view to capturing concealed depots of
ammunition, were undertaken on the western front :
in these enterprises our armoured and light motor
cars have been of inestimable value. On 7th April a
detachment of four armoured cars, accompanied by
the machine-gun section of the 2 /7th Middlesex
Regiment, conducted a raid from Solium upon an
ammunition depot at Moraisa, 18 miles north-west of
Solium. After a very slight resistance from the guard
of 30 Muhafzia, 21 boxes of 8.9 centimetre Mantelli
gun ammunition and 120,000 rounds of small arms
ammunition were taken and destroyed. On nth April
a motor-car reconnaissance found and removed 1 1 rifles
and 7,000 rounds of small arms ammunition some 20
miles west of Solium. On 23rd April an armoured car
reconnaissance from Solium discovered and brought
in 140,000 rounds of small arms ammunition from a
concealed depot. On the 30th April a further 20,000
rounds were discovered and brought in to Solium.
During this month, also, four prisoners, including a
Turkish officer, were captured 60 miles west of Minya,
and two small camel convoys were captured near El
Amaid. The light-car patrols were responsible for
all these captures.
7. During the month of April, reconnaissance was
active all along the eastern front, with the result that
by the middle of the month all water supplies of any
FIRST DESPATCH 21
importance within 30 miles of the Canal were patrolled
by our troops, and mobile columns were ready to go
out and deal with enemy parties approaching them, or,
in the event of serious threat, to demolish the rock
cisterns. In No. i Section, on 20th April, a patrol from
Bir Mabeiuk came in contact with an enemy patrol,
50 strong, on the sand-hills near the mouth of the
Wadi um Hamatha, some 18 miles W.S.W. of Suez;. A
squadron and 50 rifles endeavoured to cut the enemy off,
but he at once retired and scattered among the hills.
Our casualties were two men killed. On 23rd April and
the following days, four columns, each composed of
mounted troops and infantry, carried out reconnais-
sances of the approaches from the west to Ain Sudr
and Sudr el Heitan. The columns returned to their
respective posts on 26th April.
In No. 2 Section, on 27th March, the 2nd Aus-
tralian and New Zealand Army Corps came into
existence on the departure of the ist Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps to France. The Corps was
commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Alexander Godley,
K.C.M.G., C.B., and consisted of the 4th Australian
Division, commanded by Major-General Sir H. V. Cox,
K.C.M.G., C.B., C.S.I., the 5th Australian Division,
commanded by Major-General the Hon. J. MacCay,
V.D., and the Anzac Mounted Division, commanded
by Major-General H. G. Chauvel, C.B., C.M.G.
(attached). In this section, the wells at Moiya Harab
and Wadi um Muksheib having been brought into the
regular patrolling area, a very successful reconnaissance
to Bir el Jif Jaffa was carried out between nth and 15th
April. The troops for this enterprise were a squadron
of the 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment, accom-
panied by a detachment of Bikanir Camel Corps, and
22 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
commanded by Major Scott, D.S.O,, gth Australian
Light Horse. The objective was 52 miles from the starting
point, and a jumping-off place for the attack, eight miles
south-west of the objective, was reached at 2.30 a.m. on
13th April. From here an attack was launched by three
troops upon the enemy's position at 9 a.m. The enemy,
cut off in their attempted retreat by the right flanking
party of the attack, stood at bay on one of the hills
above the village, and lost six men killed and five
wounded before surrendering. One Austrian lieutenant
of engineers and 33 other prisoners were captured, our
own casualties being one man and one horse killed.
The destruction of the enemy's camp was thoroughly
carried out, a quantity of correspondence was taken,
and the elaborate well-boring plant, which had been at
work for five months, was completely demolished. The
manner in which this operation was carried out was
most creditable both to the commander of the column,
and to all ranks composing it.
In conjunction with this reconnaissance, a mounted
column was sent out in No. i Section to reconnoitre
Bir el Giddi and the roads leading east from it. This
force satisfactorily accomplished its mission, and, after
an encounter with a hostile patrol, captured unwounded
three armed Arabs.
In the Katia District, where alone there is sufficient
water supply to maintain a large body of troops, pre-
liminaries to the accomplishment of our ultimate aim
— ^the permanent occupation of the well-watered zone
radiating 15 miles east and south-east of Katia — were
steadily pushed on. On 2nd April, a squadron of the
Gloucestershire Hussars under Lieut .-Colonel Yorke,
with a detachment of Bikanir Camel Corps, recon-
noitred Bir el Abd, some 15 miles east of Katia, met
FIRST DESPATCH 23
with no resistance, and burnt some tents and stores
belonging to the enemy. On the following day, Bir
el Mageibra, 10 miles south-east of Katia, was recon-
noitred by the Worcestershire Yeomanry. On the 6th
April, Brigadier-General E. A. Wiggin, commanding
the 5th Mounted Brigade, took command of the Katia
District, and was made responsible direct to the head-
quarters of No. 3 Section.
On gth April, a further reconnaissance of Bir el
Abd was undertaken by a squadron of Worcestershire
Yeomanry. This time a strong party of enemy were
found in possession of a ridge north-east of Bir el Abd.
A sharp skirmish ensued when the Yeomanry attacked,
and the enemy was driven eastwards from his position,
but, owing to the heaviness of the sand, it was impossible
for our cavalry to keep up the attack, and, after easily
fending off an attempt at a flank attack, they withdrew
unmolested. On 12th April, on orders being received
for General Home to proceed to France, Major-General
the Hon. H. A. Lawrence took over the command of
No. 3 Section, still retaining command of the 52nd
Division. The 15th Army Corps at the same time
ceased to exist.
By the 21st April, the railway towards Katia had
reached a point upon which a serious advance to hold
the whole district could be based, as soon as the neces-
sary dispositions could be made. On the 23rd, however,
the enemy attempted to forestall any such advance by
making a sudden raid in force upon Katia. This
operation, though comparatively small forces were
engaged, produced the severest fighting yet experienced
by the force under my command.
8. On 2 1 St April, the 5th Mounted Brigade were
disposed as follows : — the Worcestershire Yeomanry at
24 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
Katia, the Warwickshire Yeomanry, less one squadron,
at Bir el Hamisah, three miles S,S,W» of Katia, and
Brigade Headquarters and the Gloucestershire Yeo-
manry at Romani, six miles N,W. of Katia. General
Wiggin, commanding the Brigade, had received orders
to dispose his Brigade in the Katia District in such
a manner as to protect all railway, topographical and
water survey parties, with special attention to the
exploitation of the water supply ; also to observe the
route eastwards towards Bir el Abd, but not to take
any serious offensive measures without further orders*
It had also been impressed on General Wiggin by the
General Officer Commanding No* 3 Section, that, since
it would take two days to reinforce him with infantry,
he was, in the event of a heavy attack, to manoeuvre
back upon Bir el Dueidar, 13 miles from Kantara on
the Katia road, or upon the rail-head near Bir el Arais,
some seven miles N,W, of Katia. On the evening of
the 2 1 St, one squadron of Worcestershire Yeomanry
moved into bivouac at Oghratina, seven miles E.N.E.
of Katia, to cover an R.E. party detailed to prepare
wells. On the 22nd another squadron of Worcestershire
Yeomanry proceeded to Oghratina, being replaced in
Katia by a squadron of Gloucestershire Yeomanry,
pending the arrival of one regiment of the Ans^ac
Mounted Division, which had been ordered up from
Salihiya (see Map 2) so as to reach Katia on the 24th.
The remainder of the 2nd Australian Light Horse
Brigade was marching to arrive at Kantara on the 23rd.
In Katia the squadron of Gloucestershire Yeomanry
was covered by good trenches for some 50 or 60 men,
and a number of smaller shelters afforded good cover.
Their horses were picketed close to their camp.
The officer commanding the two squadrons of
FIRST DESPATCH 35
Worcestershire Yeomanry at Oghratina had been told
to push on entrenchment as far as possible, and it
was General Wiggings intention that these squad-
rons, if attacked in force, should retire on Katia and
thence, if necessary, on Romani, with their left flank
covered by the Gloucestershire Yeomanry and their
right by the Warwickshire Yeomanry from Bir el
Hamisah,
On the morning of the 23rd, both iposts stood to
arms at 4 a,m,, and I have ascertained that patrols had
gone out by that hour, though those at Oghratina were
probably much hampered by a thick fog.
On the 22nd April the Royal Flying Corps reported
to No. 3 Section that new bodies of enemy troops were
at Bir el Bayud, 15 miles E.S.E. of Katia, and Bir el
Mageibra, ten miles S.E. of Katia. Upon receipt of
this information. General Wiggin obtained leave from
General Officer Commanding No. 3 Section to attack
the enemy at Bir el Mageibra that night, reporting that
he intended to use two squadrons of Warwickshire, and
the one remaining squadron of Worcestershire Yeo-
manry. General Wiggin, with Lieut.-Colonel Coventry,
commanding the Worcestershire Yeomanry, accom-
panied the raid to Bir el Mageibra. Finding very few
enemy, they destroyed the camp and returned to Bir el
Hamisah about 9 a.m. on the 23rd with six Turkish
prisoners. In the meantime the post at Oghratina was
attacked at 5.30 a.m. This attack was repulsed. No
further information was received from the officer com-
manding at Oghratina until 7 a.m., when he reported that
he was again heavily attacked on all sides. This attack
carried the post, all the garrison of which were either
killed, wounded, or captured. No details of the fight-
ing have, therefore, been obtainable. Katia itself was
26 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
attacked about 9.30 a,m. Lieut.-Colonel Coventry was
detached with one squadron of Worcestershire Yeomanry
from General Wiggin's Force to operate towards Katia.
Unfortunately, this squadron became involved in the
unsuccessful resistance of the Katia Garrison, and, with
the exception of some 60 men and one officer who were
able to disengage themselves, fell with it into the hands
of the enemy. I have therefore been able to gather
no detailed information of the actual fighting at
Katia.
General Wiggin and Colonel Yorke, commanding
the Gloucestershire Yeomanry at Romani, both showed
great judgment in dealing with the situation, and did
all that was possible with their small forces against the
enemy force of about 2,500 with four guns of small
calibre. General Wiggin pushed forward from Hamisah
north-east against the enemy's left, south of Um Ugba,
and drove him back for about a mile ; the advance was
slow owing to the nature of the ground and the deter-
mined resistance encountered. Colonel Yorke, after
hearing that Dueidar was safe, moved his whole force
at 10 a.m. to attack the enemy's right advancing on
Katia. He skilfully drove the Turkish right back to
El Rabah, and caused their guns to shift their position
further east. The enemy gave ground slowly, and,
since by 3.30 p.m. it was evident that Katia had fallen.
General Wiggin determined to fall back ; he himself
retired on Dueidar by way of Hamisah, Colonel Yorke
on Romani : neither was followed. Meanwhile, at
5.30 a.m. a Turkish force 1,000 strong with one gun,
advancing from the south, attacked Dueidar, the most
advanced defensible post, which was held by 100 men
of the 5th Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, under the
command of Captam Roberts, 5th Battalion, Royal
FIRST DESPATCH 37
Scots Fusiliers. This officer, who throughout showed
conspicuous skill and ability, succeeded in repelling
two determined attacks on the position at 6.30 a.m.
and 8.30 a.m. respectively. Both attempts cost the
enemy dear. At 9.30 a.m. reinforcements of two
companies, 4th Royal Scots Fusiliers, under the com-
mand of Major Thompson, 4th Battalion, Royal Scots
Fusiliers, who had been despatched from Hill 70,
seven miles away, on the first news of the attack, arrived
at Dueidar. The various posts were strengthened, and
a counter-attack, delivered at 12.30 p.m. with great
spirit, forced the enemy to retire, leaving 30 prisoners
in our hands and 70 dead. The Turks were pursued in
their retreat by the 5th Australian Light Horse, who
had only arrived at Kantara at i p.m., and by aero-
planes, thereby suffering further loss. Besides the three
and a half squadrons of yeomanry and details lost at
Katia and Oghratina, our casualties on the 23rd were
2 officers and 18 men killed, 4 officers and 21 men
wounded. Aeroplane reconnaissance on the evening
of the 23rd established the fact that the enemy force,
which included a large body of picked Turkish regular
troops, was already retiring. At dawn on the 24th, eight
machines of the 5th Wing, Royal Flying Corps, made a
bomb and machine-gun attack from a low altitude on
the enemy troops left in Katia, causing very heavy
casualties and completely destroying the camp. One
machine also located and attacked a large body of
enemy at Bir el Abd, and located another party retiring
on Bir Bayud. On the morning of the 25th, further
bomb and machine-gun attacks were made by the
Royal Flying Corps on enemy forces at Bir el Abd and
Bir Bayud. Both attacks were extremely successful,
working great havoc among men and animals. I cannot
28 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
speak too highly of the admirable work done by the
5th Wing, Royal Flying Corps, during these few days.
The strain thrown on pilots and machines was very
heavy, and the former displayed the utmost gallantry
and resource on all occasions. Chiefly through their
efforts the enemy was made to pay a very heavy price
for his partially successful raid. The general situation
in front of No. 3 Section was not affected by these
operations. Our cavalry continued to patrol the Katia
district, which was now practically clear of the enemy,
while our infantry posts at Dueidar and Romani were
strengthened, and the railway towards Romani was
pushed on with all speed.
9. After 1 6th January, when General Sarrail assumed
supreme control of the operations of the Allied Forces
at Salonica, the British Force there, commanded by
Lieut .-General Sir B. T. Mahon, K.C.V.O., C.B.,
D.S.O., only remained under my control for adminis-
trative purposes. From the beginning of January to
the end of April, no active operations of importance
took place. The general line of defences remained
practically unaltered. Some 200 miles of deep trenches,
including communication trenches, 710 emplacements
for guns, 230 reduits or strong posts, 160 miles of
obstacles (barbed wire) and 1,300 miles of telegraph
cable have been completed ; and the defences as a
whole are now quite ready for occupation should the
situation demand it.
On the 1 2th January, the railway bridge at Demir
Hissar and smaller bridges near Kilindir were destroyed
by the French. On the 28th January, Kara Burun Fort,
covering the entrance to Salonica Harbour, was occupied
by Allied troops, the Greek garrison merely protesting.
During February, excepting two air raids, which caused
FIRST DESPATCH 29
considerable damage in the town and in the French
main depot, nothing of interest occurred. During
March and April the French gradually pushed detach-
ments forward towards the frontier, and by the end of
April had, roughly, a brigade of cavalry, five or six
brigades of infantry, and a proportion of artillery
distributed along a line from about Snevce to about
Kara Sinanci. Detachments of French troops were
also posted at various points along the Monastir railway
line ; and British yeomanry squadrons were detached
to near Orfano, to Orljak and to Kopriva. At General
Sarrairs request, British troops took over a portion of
this advanced line, namely that between the hills west
of the Spanc valley on the right and the Sarigol-Doiran
railway on the left* For this purpose the 7th Mounted
Brigade, followed by an infantry and an artillery brigade^
and later by a second infantry brigade, were employed.
The headquarters of the British sector is at Kukus.
Artillery duels and constant petty skirmishing have
taken place with the enemy along the advanced line,
and a number of prisoners and deserters have been taken.
The Allied casualties have been very slight. Mean-
while the enemy forces have been mainly engaged in
establishing a series of defensive works on their frontier
line, on all possible lines of approach thereto, and on
the coast ; also in extensively improving their lines
of communication in all directions, by which means
the transport to the frontier of heavy artillery has
become practicable. By the end of April, the total
enemy forces, extending from Monastir to Xanthi,
were about 8 Bulgarian divisions and 7 German regi-
ments, or, roughly, 220,000 rifles. Along the Allied
front between Huma and the Struma river, the frontier
was continually crossed by small enemy detachments.
30 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
some of which definitely established themselves over
the frontier.
Since the deportation in December last of the enemy
consuls and their adherents, the activity of enemy
agents in and around Salonica has very sensibly dimin-
ished ; but, so long as the administration of Salonica
and the surrounding country remains in the hands of
the Greeks, the position is a difficult one to grapple
with. Increased pressure has, however, been brought
to bear on the Greeks lately, and, in certain cases,
the Allied authorities have assumed a more extensive
control. More stringent measures, for instance, have
been taken for the removal of undesirable persons from
Salonica and for the restriction of traffic across the
Allied defended zone. The enemy espionage organ-
isations outside the zone of Allied occupation have been
working with considerable vigour ; but the capture,
on the 27th April, by our yeomanry, of the German
Consul at Drama, who was director of the enemy
organisation in Macedonia, has had a restraining effect
upon these hostile agencies.
As in Egypt, so in Salonica the administrative work
has been extremely heavy. At the outset the state of
the communications was very unsatisfactory. There
were only two metalled roads leading to our lines, both
in a shocking state of repair ; the few existing tracks
soon became impassable in wet weather for everything
except pack animals. The construction and repair of
roads had, therefore, to proceed simultaneously with
the preparation of the defences. Roads in the forward
area were all begun by the troops themselves, and all
ranks worked admirably, the men thoroughly recog-
nising the importance of the matter. Later, it was
found possible to organise local civilian labour com-
FIRST DESPATCH 31
panics, who have largely been employed to complete
and maintain the road work begun by the troops.
Altogether about 90 miles of new metalled cart-roads
have been constructed and 105 miles of mule-tracks,
besides some 60 miles of repairs done to previously
existing roads and tracks. Railway extensions leading
to the various depots on the Monastir road, with the
necessary sidings, have been constructed, and Decauville
lines laid within the depots themselves. Preparations
have been made for further extensions. Another great
difficulty, that of insufficient wharfage accommodation,
has been met by the construction of new piers in the
bay itself and at Skala Stavros. These have reduced
the congestion to an appreciable extent and fully
justified the labour and expense involved.
The supply system, though hindered at first by the
state of the communications and by the fact that the
equipment of the force with a special scale of transport
was only in process of gradual completion, has worked
with uninterrupted success. The health of the troops
has been excellent, all ranks having benefited by hard
physical work in good climatic conditions. In view of
the approach of summer, when malaria is likely to
prevail in certain districts through which our line
passes, special precautions have been taken for the
protection of the troops, and, where possible, alternative
positions prepared.
Throughout the period the importance of training
the troops has been insisted upon. At first one day
weekly was devoted to training as opposed to road-
making or work on the defences. This proportion has
gradually risen to four days weekly, excluding one day
of rest. Two considerations have been kept in view
throughout — the possibility of a return to ordinary
32 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
trench warfare, and that of more open warfare in the
Balkans, At the end of April General Mahon reported
that discipline was good, that all ranks remained keen
and cheerful and that in the first four months of this
year the efficiency of the Salonica Army as a whole,
including all services and departments, had been
doubled.
On gth May, under orders from the War Office,
Lieut,-General G, F. Milne, C.B., D,S.O,, succeeded
Lieut,-General Sir Bryan Mahon, K,C.V,0., C.B,,
D.S,0., in command of the Salonica Army. General
Mahon sailed on the same date to take up command of
the Western Frontier Force in Egypt.
By 5th May the British detachment in advance of
Salonica consisted of the 7th Mounted Brigade and the
22nd Division, the whole detachment being placed on
this date under the command of Major-General the
Hon. F. Gordon, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding 22nd
Division. Nothing of importance occurred till 27th
May, when an enemy force of all arms advanced across
the frontier and occupied the Greek fortress of Rupel
without opposition from the garrison. Subsequently
the enemy occupied the high ground north and east of
Demir Hissar, but have advanced no further. During
the month the enemy have displayed increasing artil-
lery activity from the direction of Doiran, but otherwise
no active operations, except encounters between patrols,
have taken place on the Salonica front.
10. Towards the end of April I was informed by
the War Office that, in order to detain as many Turkish
troops as possible on the coast of Asia Minor, steps had
already been taken to give the enemy the impression
that a large force was to be concentrated in Cyprus for
landing operations in Syria or Asia Minor. I was
FIRST DESPATCH 33
instructed, in consultation with the Naval authorities,
to do what was possible to further this impression. I
accordingly sent to Cyprus Major (temp. Lieut.-
Colonel) H. Needham, then A.Q.M.G., 9th Army
Corps, with two other staff officers, and the 22nd
Garrison Battalion, The Rifle Brigade. My instructions
to Lieut .-Colonel Needham — that by every possible
means it should be made to appear that this was the
advance party of a much larger force — were most
efficiently carried out, and the objects of this feint were
successfully attained.
Early in May the Royal Naval Division was ordered
to proceed to France, and I received instructions to
send two garrison battalions with certain artillery and
engineer personnel to relieve this division in garri-
soning the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Tenedos.
The 2nd Garrison Battalion, King's Liverpool Regi-
ment, was sent from Egypt, and was joined later by the
garrison battalion which had just completed its special
mission in Cyprus. Brigadier-General F. W. B. Gray,
C.M.G., D.S.O., was put in command of the islands,
being under my orders for tactical purposes, and under
the Salonica Army for administration.
II. In Egypt during the month of May there was
no major operation to record. Intelligence received
early in the month showed that the Turks had materi-
ally increased their numbers in Sinai, doubtless with
the view of detaining troops in Egypt. The enemy's
main concentrations were too far away for me to strike
at them, and I was in hopes that he might be induced
to cross the barrier of hills which extends from north
to south some sixty miles from the Canal : he would
then have been exposed to attack with the defiles
behind him. However, he made no such advance, and.
34 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
during the hot weather in the middle of May there
were indications that he was drawing in his advanced
posts. On the 8th and 21st May, enemy aircraft
attacked Port Said with bombs, doing no material
damage. On the first occasion 3 civilians were wounded ;
on the second, 2 civilians were killed, 5 soldiers and 13
civilians were wounded. In each case the attack was
answered by prompt and successful retaliation by the
Royal Flying Corps. In all sections of the eastern
front, reconnaissances were frequent, particularly in
No. 3 Section, to which were now allotted three brigades
of the Anzac Mounted Division. During the month
the Mahemdia — Romani district has been occupied in
some force, and at a conference held on 17th May, at
which General Lawrence, commanding No. 3 Section,
was present, further decisions regarding the occupation
of the Katia district were arrived at. I considered that
it would not be essential to carry and maintain a line of
communication right through this district to its eastern
limit, but that if the railway were pushed out to the
latitude of Um Ugba, two miles east of Katia, and a
strong defensive position were maintained in front of
the rail-head, control of the eastern portion of the
district could be satisfactorily maintained by our mobile
troops operating from the advanced defensive position.
General Lawrence was, therefore, instructed to prepare
a strong defensive position, facing east, astride of the
Katia — El Arish road, between Um Ugba and Hod el
Reshafat, this position to be designed for about 4,000
infantry and sufficient mounted troops to ensure the
effective control of the country to the east, as far as
Bir el Abd. A second position, designed for 2,000
infantry and proportionate mounted troops, was to be
selected and prepared by General Lawrence to cover
FIRST DESPATCH 35
Romani and Mahemdia, I also directed that the works
at Dueidar were to be extended and improved to
accommodate a garrison of between 500 and 1,000
infantry, and that the main railway line should be
carried on from Romani to the rear of the advanced
position near Um Ugba,
During the month several successful reconnais-
sances to the east were made by the Anzac Mounted
Division, which proved itself a unit upon which I
could absolutely depend to display energy, resource
and endurance. On the 8th May, starting early from
Oghratina, the 2nd Light Horse Brigade reconnoitred
to Bir el Abd with patrols pushed out to Hod Salmana.
On the 1 6th May, a day of intense heat, the same
brigade, starting from Hod el Sagia, five miles E.S.E.
of Katia, reached Hod el Bayud, 15 miles on in the
same direction, at 7 a.m. Camels and dismounted men
were seen making off in a north-easterly direction*
The enemy^s camp was destroyed, and one prisoner,
36 camels and a quantity of ammunition were brought
in. The reconnaissance returned to Katia, having
covered 60 miles in 30 hours. During this time the
Canterbury Mounted Rifles went out to Bir Abu el
Afein, covering 40 miles in 30 hours.
On the 1 8th May a very successful bombardment
of El Arish from the sea and the air was carried out. A
sloop and two monitors of His Majesty's Navy bom-
barded the town, reducing the fort S.W. of the town to
ruins, and damaging the aerodrome. The seaplanes of
the Royal Naval Air Service then attacked with bombs,
being followed later by six machines of the Royal Flying
Corps, who had orders to attack any enemy aircraft
that appeared, and to bomb the enemy's camp and
troops. The camps were effectively bombed, and three
36 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
bombs exploded in the middle of a body of a thousand
men who were on the march south of the town. A
close reconnaissance of El Arish from the air was made,
and many valuable photographs taken at the same time.
All ships and aircraft returned safely. On 22nd May
the Royal Flying Corps carried out a highly effective
bombardment of all enemy camps on a 45-mile front,
roughly parallel to the Canal, during which severe
damage was done to the waterworks at Bir Rodh Salem,
and to buildings at Bir el Hamma and Bir el Mazar.
On 23rd May the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade
reconnoitred Hod el Gedadia, 15 miles east of Katia,
where shots were exchanged with a patrol of 40 men on
camels, who retired. Finally, on 31st May, the New
Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, one regiment of
Australian Light Horse, and a sub-section of the Ayr-
shire Battery, R.H.A., attacked the enemy*s post at
Bir Salmana, 20 miles E.N.E. of Katia. The post was
surrounded before dawn, and an enemy post on the
Ganadil road was rushed, while a camel detachment
was seen making off to the south-east. The enemy lost
15 men killed and two men captured. Our cavalry
pursued till 8 a.m., when the pursuit was taken up by
aeroplanes which bombed scattered parties with effect,
killing 20 camels and 8 more men. The force returned,
having covered 60 miles in 36 hours besides fighting an
engagement. The only casualties were two men slightly
wounded.
Towards the end of the month, orders having been
received for the embarkation in June of the 4th and 5th
Australian Divisions to France with the Headquarters
of the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Army Corps,
preparations were made to relieve them in No. 2 Section.
One brigade of the 53rd Division was moved to this
FIRST DESPATCH 37
section^ and I directed the General Officer Commanding
53rd Division to be prepared to assume command of
No. 2 Section on the approaching departure of Lieut»-
General Sir Alexander Godley.
On the western front during May, preliminary
measures for the occupation of the Baharia Oasis have
been in progress. A line of blockhouses has been estab-
lished along the Darb el Rubi, which runs due west
from Samalut on the Nile. Four blockhouses were com-
pleted and occupied by 23rd May. Work on the two
remaining blockhouses has been postponed till the rail-
way has reached a point where it can materially assist
in the supply of stores ; this should be about the end
of June. From the most advanced blockhouse it is now
possible to reconnoitre as far as the Mohariq sand-dunes,
some 80 miles west of Samalut. The difficulty of main-
taining such a line in a waterless desert subject to
frequent and severe sand-storms has not been small,
but all ranks have worked well and with great keenness.
The enemy has a small body of troops, under the
command of Nuri, collected on the Libyan side of the
frontier west of Solium, but as yet he has not openly
displayed his intentions. Two battalions of Italian
troops landed at Moraisa (west of Solium) during the
month and have occupied Bardia. The relations be-
tween the Italian and British Commanders on the
frontier are excellent, but military co-operation has
been rendered difficult by the instructions of the Italian
Government to the commander at Bardia. Negotiations
are now in progress which, I hope, will remove the
difficulties. The area between Solium and Barrani
(west of Solium) has been cleared of the Bedouin
population, and, though it has been impossible entirely
to prevent communication between the Bedouins and
38 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Siwa, the energy of our patrols, according to numerous
reports, is successfully restricting the entry of food
supplies into Siwa.
By means of patrols of Imperial Camel Corps and
motor-cars, communication between the oases occupied
by the enemy and the Nile Valley and Delta has been
rendered almost impossible. In particular, the camel-
patrolling from Kharga towards Dakhla and Beris has
been carried out most efficiently by No, i Imperial
Camel Company under especially trying conditions.
The Farafra, Baharia, Moghara, and Wadi Natron
fronts have also been controlled with great vigilance.
The Aulad Ali tribes in Egyptian territory are now
all west of Barrani, except for a receiving camp at
Solium, Markets have been established for the sale of
food at Solium, Mersa Matruh, Dhabba, El Ham-
mame, and Wadi Natron, where they are allowed to
purchase what is necessary for their daily needs. This
restricts indiscriminate movement to the west or to
the Delta.
In spite of the occupation, during very hot weather,
of so many advanced posts in the desert or on its edge,
I am glad to report that the health of the troops
has been remarkably good, I much regret, however,
that General Sir Bryan Mahon, shortly after his arrival
in this country to take up the command of the Western
Frontier Force, had to be invalided home, owing to
severe sunstroke. In the meantime Major-General
A, G. Dallas, C,B., Commanding 53rd Division, has
continued, with great ability, in temporary command of
that force,
12. I beg to acknowledge, with great respect, the
valuable assistance I have received from His Highness
the Sultan of Egypt, He has with great kindness placed
FIRST DESPATCH 39
at my disposal his unrivalled knowledge of affairs affect-
ing his country.
To His Excellency the High Commissioner, Lieut .-
Colonel Sir A, H, McMahon, G,C,V«0,, K,C.LE,,
C»S.L, and to the Government of Egypt, I owe a deep
debt of gratitude for whole-hearted co-operation and
help,
I am very greatly indebted to Vice-Admiral Sir R. E.
Wemyss, K,C.B., C.M.G,, M.V.O,, and the naval forces
under his command for constant assistance and active
co-operation.
The construction of roads, waterworks, and kindred
tasks in connection with the Canal Defences, which I
have described to you, owe their accomplishment, in a
very large measure, to the admirable services of Colonel
Sir Murdoch Macdonald, K.C.M.G., of the Pubhc
Works Department of Egypt. His wide experience and
capacity have been an indispensable asset to me in
dealing with these important problems.
I am particularly indebted to the Railway Depart-
ment, under Colonel Sir George Macauley, K.C.M.G.,
Reserve of Officers, Royal Engineers, for the highly
successful manner in which railway communication has
been carried on under great difficulties. The move-
ment of a large number of troops and impedimenta of
an army has severely taxed the capacity of the railway,
and has put a great strain on its staff. That it never
failed to accomplish what was desired is due to the
high efficiency this department has attained, and
to the personal exertions of Colonel Sir George
Macauley.
I wish to bring to your notice the very responsible
and important duties that have fallen to my Director
of Army Signals, Brigadier-General M. G. E. Bowman-
40 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
Manifold, D.S»0,, R,E., and to the admirable way in
which he has discharged them.
Military operations on the two fronts have been
spread over a very wide front, amounting to close on
1,000 miles in the west and 90 miles in the east. Prompt
and reliable intercommunication has been a matter
of vital importance.
In the successful achievement of this I beg also to
bring to your notice the services of the Egyptian
Telegraph Department, under Lieut.-Colonel J. S.
Liddell, D.S.O., Royal Engineers, and to express my
thanks to the Eastern Telegraph Company and the
Telephone Company of Egypt, who have given my
Director of Army Signals unceasing valuable help.
I beg to bring to notice the valuable services rendered
to the Canal Defences by the representative and princi-
pal officer of the Suez Canal Company, Charles, Comte
de Serionne, Agent Superieur de la Compagnie du
Canal de Suez, and by the staff of that Company.
The arduous and important work of the care of the
sick and wounded in the Hospitals has been consider-
ably lightened by a large amount of voluntary aid. I
wish specially to mention the work of the British Red
Cross Society and Order of St. John of Jerusalem,
under Sir Courtauld Thomson, C.B.
The Nursing Services, both English and Australian,
have done admirable work, and the voluntary aid of the
Sisters of Notre Dame de la Delivrance, working at
the Austrian Hospital at Alexandria, has been specially
brought to my notice.
Finally, and in conclusion, I wish to bring to notice
the admirable services of my Chief of the General Staff,
Major-General A. L. Lynden-Bell, C.B., C.M.G., my
Deputy Quartermaster - General, Major - General W.
FIRST DESPATCH 41
Campbell^ C.B*^ D.S.O., and my Deputy Adjutant-
General, Major-General J, Adye, C.B. No Com-
mander-in-Chief has ever been more loyally served
and no staff has ever worked with less friction.
I have other names to bring to notice for distin-
guished and gallant service during the operations under
review, and these will form the subject of a separate
communication.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) A. J. MURRAY, General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
SECOND DESPATCH
ist October, 191 6
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE HON. H. A. LAWRENCE
SECOND DESPATCH
From —
The Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force*
To—
The Secretary of State for War,
War Office, London, S.W.
General Headquarters^
Egyptian Expeditionary Force^
ist October, 191 6.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit a report on the opera-
tions of the Force under my command from the ist
June to the 30th September, 1916,
I, On the eastern front during the month of June,
vigorous counter-measures, culminating in the success-
ful attack on the enemy's aerodrome at El Arish, were
undertaken to check the much increased activity of
hostile aircraft. This operation was brilliantly carried
out on the morning of the i8th June by 11 machines.
Two of the machines, carrying observers, were ordered
to fly in observation at a height of 7,000 feet ready to
engage hostile aircraft, while the nine single-seaters
were to attack the sheds from 600 feet. The enemy
was completely surprised, owing to the fact that our
machines, having kept well out to sea, wheeled five
miles N.N.W. of El Arish, and delivered their attack
from a south-easterly direction. The first British
machine to arrive descended to 100 feet and attacked,
blowing to pieces an aeroplane on the ground and its
45
46 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
attendant personnel, A second machine on the ground
was also put out of action by bombs. Heavy fire from
rifles and anti-aircraft guns was now opened on the
attackers, but the British pilots carried out their orders
most gallantly. Altogether six out of the ten hangars
were hit, and two, if not three, were burnt to the ground.
A party of soldiers on the aerodrome was also success-
fully bombed, and at the close one of the observing
machines attacked the hangars with its machine gun
from a height of 1,200 feet. During the action three of
our machines were forced to descend ; two were de-
stroyed, and one sank in the sea. Two of the pilots were
rescued, and the third was taken prisoner.
On the eastern front there was comparatively little
activity during the month of June beyond the usual
patrols and reconnaissances, which were actively carried
out. In No. 2 Section a column of Australian Light
Horse, with detachments of engineers and of Bikanir
Camel Corps, under the command of Lieut .-Colonel
T. J. Todd, D.S.O., successfully executed the task
of draining the rock cisterns and pools in the Wadi um
Muksheib, some 40 miles S.E. of Ismailia, between
loth and 14th June. Some 5,000,000 gallons of water
were disposed of in four days and nights of continuous
effort, and the fact that every man and animal that left
rail-head on loth June returned safely testifies to the
efficiency of the staff arrangements. A column of
Middlesex Yeomanry from No. i Section co-operated
with this force and did very good work.
2. On the departure of the Headquarters, 2nd
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, to France,
the command of No. 2 Section was taken over by Major-
General A. G. Dallas, C.B. ; and, on the receipt of
instructions to embark the nth Division for France
SECOND DESPATCH 47
after the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, I formed a
new section of the eastern front, numbered 2a, extend-
ing from the northern boundary of No. 2 Section to a
line running east of Kilometre 50 on the Canal. The
command of this section was taken over on 25th June
by Major-General Sir W. Douglas, K.C.M.G., C.B.
On 24th August the troops in No. 2a Section were put
under the command of the General Officer Commanding,
No. 3 Section, and No. 2a Section ceased to exist.
In No. 3 Section the Australian and New Zealand
Mounted Division continued to do excellent work. On
loth and nth June, Bir Bayud, Bir el Mageibra, and
Bir el Jefeir were reconnoitred. Enemy stores and huts
were destroyed at Hod el Bayud, and at Hod Abu Dha-
babis a hostile patrol was successfully disposed of. On
15th June, Bir el Abd was reconnoitred, and between 21st
and 23rd June a reconnaissance of the Hod el Ge'eila,
Hod um el Dhaunnin and Hod el Mushalfat area was
carried out by the ist Australian Light Horse Brigade.
During the latter operation one of our aeroplanes
was reported missing and the reconnoitring troops
were ordered to find it. This they successfully accom-
plished, after considerable prolonged exertion in trying
weather conditions, and the damaged engine and the
machine gun were brought in on the 23rd. Bir el Abd
and Bir el Mageibra were reconnoitred on 30th June and
found to be clear of the enemy. On 27th June one
division moved out to the entrenched camp at Ma-
hemdia, and I obtained your sanction for the appoint-
ment of Major-General the Hon. H. A. Lawrence to the
independent command of No. 3 Section with a small
headquarters, and for his succession in command of his
division by Major-General W. E. B. Smith, C.M.G.
In No. I Section at the beginning of July a small
48 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
reconnaissance was carried out from Abu Zeneima by
detachments of the 23rd Sikh Pioneers and the Bikanir
Camel Corps under the command of Major W. J«
Ottley, 23rd Sikh Pioneers* The column left Abu
Zeneima on i ith July and returned on 14th July, having
captured an Arab sheik and some other prisoners,
3. As regards the western front, on 20th June
Major-General Sir Charles Dobell, K.C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., assumed command of the Western Frontier
Force. During the month no important enemy move-
ments took place on this front. In the coastal section,
reconnaissances by aeroplane, motor and camel corps,
to assure the safety of the Solium post, were carried
out irrespective of frontier, and with the agreement
of the Italian local military authorities, with whom a
complete accord has been established by the inter-
change of visits between the respective commanders.
Progress on the Baharia railway continued, though
slower than was anticipated, and the defences of posts
in the Kharga oasis were completed. Aeroplane re-
connaissance established the continued presence of an
enemy force of some 1,800 rifles in the Dakhla oasis.
On 25th and 26th July a raid from Solium was carried
out by a detachment of light armoured cars, under
the command of Captain C. G. Mangles, 20th Hussars,
in conjunction with some motor-cars and personnel
furnished by the Italian garrison of Bardia, supported
by half of No. 2 Company, Imperial Camel Corps,
and by the Italian armed yacht Misuratat ably com-
manded by Captain Como, Italian Navy. The objective
was a party of some 100 Muhafzia located near the
mouth of the Wadi Sanal in Italian territory, 40 miles
west of Ras el Melh, whence they had been robbing
the Bedouins under pretence of collecting taxes for the
SECOND DESPATCH 49
Senoussi* A complete surprise was effected, but only
about 25 Muhaf^ia were found in camp. These fled
towards the sea after a slight resistance, leaving six
killed and three prisoners. Scattered groups on the
sea-shore came under the gun-fire of the Misurata,
The importance of this well-conducted operation lies
in the proof which it gave to the Arabs of the close co-
operation and good-fellowship that existed between our
Italian neighbours and ourselves,
4, The end of June marked a definite stage in the
existence of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. During
the month the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, with
the Headquarters of the and Australian and New Zea-
land Army Corps, had been embarked for France, and
the embarkation of the nth Division, also for France,
was nearly completed. The role of this force as a general
strategic reserve for the Empire was practically at an
end, for it had been reduced to the smallest strength
compatible with securing the safety of Egypt during
the summer months. In the first half of the year two
complete divisions had been formed, equipped and
trained ; six divisions had been either re-equipped or
completed with equipment ; three Territorial divisions
and three brigades of dismounted yeomanry had been
re-equipped for service in Egypt, and transport for two
divisions had been collected on a special scale — all this
in addition to the preparation of defences, the main-
tenance of the troops, the formation of brigade machine-
gun companies, the raising of new personnel for the
Camel Transport Corps, and new units for the Imperial
Camel Corps, the continuous pushing forward of rail-
ways and improvement of water-supply, and attendance
on the special needs of the Salonica Army. The total
number of troops, including all the nth Division, sent
50 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
out of the country was some 232,000 men, not including
medical units or sick and wounded evacuated. In this
total were comprised nine complete divisions and three
independent infantry brigades, about 209,000 in all,
besides some 11,000 Indian troops sent to the East,
and nine batteries of heavy artillery.
The original scheme of defence, designed during
the winter, 191 5/ 16, to meet a heavy attack at any
point, in positions prepared for occupation by 250,000
men, had already been considerably modified in the
spring of this year, when the first large withdrawal of
troops from Egypt, and the approach of summer, led me
to remodel my dispositions on the basis of an outpost-
line, lightly held and designed principally to cover the
concentration and preliminary action of mobile reserves
held in readiness in the neighbourhood of the Canal
for offensive employment against an enemy advancing
from the east. By July, however, the withdrawal of
three more divisions, and the consequent reduction of
the force available on the eastern front to four weak
Territorial divisions, two weak Indian brigades, and a
few garrison battalions (some 60,000 rifles), in addition
to one mounted division and a mounted yeomanry
brigade, made a further and final readjustment of my
defensive measures in that zone necessary. During the
hot weather it was exceedingly unlikely that any large
enemy force could attack my centre or southern sec-
tions : in these sections, therefore, my policy was to
be in readiness to attack any enemy column which
should debouch on the western side of the rocky defiles
which face those sections. In the northern section,
however, my chief concern was the preparation of an
active offensive towards El Arish, to take place as soon
as possible in the autumn, with the objects of fore-
SECOND DESPATCH 51
stalling any Turkish attack along the northern road in
the winter, and of securing an advantageous position
on the enemy's flank, should he attack by the central
road. Plans were accordingly prepared for purely de-
fensive action in the southern and centre sections
{i,e,f south of Ballah), with a view to developing my
maximum strength for an active operation in the
northern section, against which any advance by the
enemy during the summer months would necessarily be
directed owing to vital considerations of water-supply.
This scheme allowed for the rapid concentration in
No. 3 Section of two infantry divisions complete with
attached troops, the Australian and New Zealand
Mounted Division with the 5th Mounted Brigade
attached, with full proportion of artillery. In addition,
alternative plans were worked out in detail, whereby
either (a) a general reserve of three infantry brigades
could be created at twenty-four hours' notice, by with-
drawing troops from the two remaining sections, with-
out essential modification of the existing scheme of
defence ; or (b) a reserve of 19 infantry battalions,
one yeomanry regiment, 10 R.F.A. i8-pounder and three
howitzer batteries could be concentrated at forty-eight
hours' notice. Since the latter alternative would entail
withdrawal in No. i and No. 2 Sections practically to
the line of bridge-heads and specially important points,
it was my intention only to adopt it as a temporary
measure and in circumstances of extreme urgency.
The prospective advance eastwards over the northern
portion of the Sinai desert differed from any previous
desert operations on a considerable scale in that it has
to be undertaken without the benefit of the months,
or even years, of preparation which have in the past —
notably in the late Lord Kitchener's Sudan campaigns
53 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
— laid the groundwork for successful operations of
this kind* For the force under my command, if it was
to carry out this advance, the construction of roads and
railways to provide rapid communication to the rear, the
purchase of a very large number of camels to give
mobility to the forward troops, and, above all, the
provision of an adequate water-supply at points far
out in the desert were questions just as urgent as the
formulation and execution of the tactical plan. The
water question was especially pressing, since the stretch
of desert east of Kantara was, for our purposes, practi-
cally waterless* The saline water of the local wells,
though tolerable to the Bedouin and even to the Turk,
is, as a rule, only a source of sickness to European
soldiers ; and European animals, even if they will
drink it, rapidly lose condition if restricted to this
water alone. The main essential, therefore, of any
preliminary advance during the dry weather was to
secure an adequate delivery of fresh water as far east
as the troops were likely to advance. It was calculated
that for the final advance a supply of 500,000 gallons
of water a day would be needed, and, for this purpose,
all material was ordered, and contracts made, for the
erection of a filter-plant at Kantara capable of supply-
ing 600,000 gallons of filtered water a day, the con-
struction of reinforced concrete reservoirs at Kantara
and Romani with a capacity of 500,000 gallons each, the
supply of enough 12-inch, lo-inch and 8-inch piping
to carry the water within striking distance of El Arish
and the provision of high-power oil engines for pump-
ing the water from one fortified post to the next. The
quick handling of all this heavy piping and machinery
necessitated a large amount of preparatory work, in-
cluding the construction of a new wharf with cranes
SECOND DESPATCH 53
and railway sidings at Kantara^ and laid a very con-
siderable burden upon the railways on the east bank
of the Canal. Besides these preparations for the final
advance, the immediate supply of water to the Romani
district had to be considerably improved, so that a
large body of troops could take up positions well in
advance of Romani. The installation of a new and
more powerful pump-house at Kantara and the con-
struction of a 50,000-gallon reservoir and a condensing
plant at Mahemdia, were among the measures taken
to meet this necessity. The difficulties connected with
the water-supply may be judged from the fact that,
during the Turkish attack at the beginning of August,
when it was still necessary to rely entirely on the water
pumped from the filter-plant at Kantara and on that
brought by water-boats along the Canal, an accidental
fire in the engine-house of the filter-plant nearly caused
the entire breakdown of the water-supply system on
this section ; this serious danger was only averted by
the resource and energy of the local engineer staff.
Since that time the local reservoirs have been com-
pleted, and the Royal Engineer units with the fighting
troops have been specially organised for the purpose of
developing and improving the water-supply from the
local wells and springs.
The main railway east from Kantara, the construc-
tion of which was essential to any permanent advance,
has proceeded since the end of May as fast as the supply
of material and the exigencies of other engineering work
in the northern section allowed. The advance of the
Turks in the latter half of July necessitated the stoppage
of work on this line for 24 days, and the construction
of a metre-gauge railway from Gilban to Dueidar, a
distance of six miles. This latter work had to be
54 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
completed in great haste, together with the laying of
some miles of 5-inch and 4-inch water-piping, at a time
when the railways were working^at high pressure in
moving troops, ammunition, and supplies.
The energy with which these heavy and multi-
farious labours were carried out by the engineer
staff, the officers and men of the Royal Engineers, and
by the Egyptian Labour Corps, admirably organised
by the Inspector-General of Communications and ably
officered by gentlemen residing in Egypt, calls for the
highest praise. The work of the railway transport offi-
cers and the officers and men responsible for running
the railways is equally deserving of commendation.
In this connection my thanks are especially due to my
late Engineer-in-Chief, Major-General G. Williams,
and to my present Engineer-in-Chief, Major-General
H. B. H. Wright, C.M.G., late R.E., the Director of
Railways, Colonel Sir G. Macauley, K.C.M.G., R.of O.,
Lieut.-Colonel G. Lubbock, R,E., who has been in
charge of railway construction, and Brigadier-General
E. McL. Blair, R.E., Chief Engineer of No. 3 Section.
With regard to the supply of camels, the liberal
provision of which would normally have been an in-
dispensable preliminary to any such operations, I have
been hampered by the necessity of buying at an un-
favourable time of year, so that the demands of this
force have always been in excess of the supply. I am
most grateful for the assistance given me by the Sirdar
in the collection of camels.
5. More than half the month of July passed with-
out any important occurrence on the eastern front.
In the northern section the Australian and New Zealand
Mounted Division carried out frequent reconnaissances
to the east, penetrating on 9th July as far as Salmana,
SECOND DESPATCH 55
but found the country clear of all but a few Bedouins.
On 17th July, however, enemy aircraft were active over
the Romani — Dueidar area, and on the i8th a patrol
of the and Australian Light Horse Brigade came in
contact with a camel patrol of 15 Turks, with whom
shots were exchanged. The Turks retired rapidly east-
wards. Up till this date there was no considerable body
of Turkish troops further west than Bir el Mazar, some
18 miles east of Oghratina, where for some time there
had been a camp of between 1,500 and 2,000.
The situation suddenly changed on July 19th,
when an evening reconnaissance by the Royal Flying
Corps revealed the fact that a large force of the enemy
had moved westwards from El Arish and established
itself on the line Bir el Abd — Bir Jameil — Bir Bayud.
Their numbers were estimated to be between 8,000 and
9,000, of which from 3,000 to 4,000 were at Bir el Abd,
and the remainder divided between the other two places.
It was not immediately clear whether the enemy's inten-
tion was to repeat the raid of 23rd April on the Katia
district on a larger scale, or to make a more deliberate
advance, but I at once decided, on receipt of this in-
formation, to reinforce the troops in No. 3 Section. The
158th Brigade of the 53rd Division, then in General
Reserve at Moascar (near Ismailia), moved to Kantara
on the night of the 19th /20th, being replaced in General
Reserve by four battalions from Nos. i and 2 Sections,
and the 127th Brigade was completed by the move of
its two remaining battalions from El Ferdan. On 20th
July the machine-gun companies of the 127th, i6oth, and
i6ist Brigades were also ordered to No. 3 Section, with a
detachment of Stokes guns and No. 3 Armoured Train.
The troops resting at Sidi Bishra (see inset, Alexandria,
Map 2), which included two battalions of the 156th
56 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Brigade, were ordered to return to their sections. On
the night of the 19th /20th the General Officer Com-
manding, No. 3 Section, reinforced Romani by the 156th
Brigade (less two battalions) with two battalions of the
127th Brigade attached. Major-General Chauvel, com-
manding Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division,
who had one brigade bivouacked at Katia, was ordered
to send out patrols before daylight on the 20th to get
into touch with the enemy and to keep his brigades
concentrated in readiness for a reconnaissance in force.
Early on the morning of the 20th the cavalry re-
ported that Oghratina was held by strong forces of the
enemy who were entrenching. This was confirmed by
the Royal Flying Corps, who further reported that the
pile of stores at Bir el Abd had increased in size, and
that the troops reported on the previous evening at Bir
Jameil and Bir Bayud had moved. A further air recon-
naissance, in the afternoon, revealed that this force had
moved to Bir el Mageibra, where there were between
2,000 and 3,000 men, with bodies of between 500 and
600 moving on a line between that place and Oghratina.
The General Officer Commanding, Australian and New
Zealand Mounted Division, was instructed to keep his
horses as fresh as possible at this stage, and both he
and the General Officer Commanding, 52nd Division,
were instructed to allow the enemy to involve himself
in an attack on our defences, if he would, and not to
hinder any such intention by a premature counter-
attack. The cavalry were in touch with the enemy all
day, capturing a few prisoners, from whose information
it appeared that the force in front of us was the 3rd
Turkish Division, consisting of the 31st, 32nd, and
39th Regiments, with mountain guns, heavy artillery,
and special machine-gun companies ; the artillery was
SECOND DESPATCH 57
manned by Turks, Germans, and Austrians, and there
were Germans with all the machine-gun companies.
Prisoners also stated that there were other echelons
following behind these advanced troops at a distance
of one day's march. This information was confirmed
in all essentials by the completer knowledge subse-
quently obtained of the attacking force, except that
prisoners all exaggerated the number of troops that
was following behind them. The whole force consisted
of the Turkish 3rd Division, with eight machine-gun
companies officered and partly manned by Germans,
mountain artillery, and some batteries of 4-inch and
6-inch howitzers and anti-aircraft guns, manned chiefly
by Austrians, with a body of Arab camelry. It was
commanded by Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, a
German officer in Turkish employ, and the German
personnel of the machine-gun units, heavy artillery,
wireless sections, field hospital and supply section had
been organised in Germany as a special formation for
operations with the Turkish forces. The force was in
fine physical condition and admirably equipped.
On the evening of the 20th, a demonstration with
artillery against Oghratina disclosed the fact that the
enemy was entrenching on a general line running
south-east from Oghratina, with his left flank thrown
forward to Bir el Mageibra, which was strongly held.
Bir el Abd was used by the enemy as an advanced base
throughout the operations.
During the next few days there was no appreciable
change in the situation. The enemy confined himself
to closing up his troops and strengthening the posi-
tion already occupied, pushing forward in one or two
places and entrenching wherever he established himself.
There were constant encounters between our cavalry
58 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
patrols and the enemy*s, but the latter handled his
covering troops well, and extended his right flank far
enough northwards to prevent anything less than a very
strong attack from interfering with his communications
along the Bir el Abd — Oghratina road.
By the 24th, the enemy had established a force,
estimated at 5,000 men, in a series of entrenched posi-
tions extending from Hod el Negiliat through Oghratina
to Hod el Masia, with supporting bodies of about 1,000
each at Bir Abu el Afein and Bir el Abd behind his right
flank. On his left, Bir el Mageibra was entrenched with a
series of strong redoubts and held by some 3,000 troops,
with small connecting posts northward to Hod el Masia.
By 22nd July it was evident that the enemy had no
intention of making an immediate raid upon the Katia
district, but was either contemplating a serious attack
upon the Canal Defences further west, or preparing to
establish himself firmly in the Um Aisha district, so
as to block our further advance towards El Arish> to
protect his own communications between Syria and the
Hedjaz (see Map i) and to prevent us from denying to
him the whole of the Katia area — the only district within
which he could collect and maintain any considerable
force within striking distance of the Suez Canal. In
either case, whether, on the first alternative, he was wait-
ing for further echelons to arrive before attacking, or,
on the second, he was preparing to establish himself
permanently, there was only one course of action that
commended itself to me — namely, to attack the enemy
and inflict a decisive defeat upon him as soon as possible.
To do this forthwith was impracticable, since 15 miles
of desert separated my main defensive position from
that of the enemy, and it would be absolutely necessary
that any force destined to advance across this tract
SECOND DESPATCH 59
to an attack on a strong enemy position should be
equipped with camel transport on a very complete scale.
While I was compelled, therefore, to remain for the
moment on the tactical defensive, I took immediate
steps to put everything in train for the adoption of a
vigorous offensive at the earliest possible moment.
On 24th July the 42nd Division was placed under the
command of the General Officer Commanding, No* 3
Section, and the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade
from No. 2 Section was also transferred to No. 3
Section. Schemes were also prepared whereby further
troops could be withdrawn at very short notice from
Nos. I and 2 Sections. The General Officer Command-
ing, No. 3 Section, was instructed to formulate his
plan for the earliest possible assumption of the offensive,
and to proceed with all speed with the mobilisation of
his striking force on a pack basis with camel transport.
I calculated that all arrangements would be completed
during the first days of August, and this calculation
was borne out by events. By ist August, 10,500 trans-
port camels had been concentrated in No. 3 Section,
and by 3rd August all the formations were ready to
take the field. My intention was to attack the enemy in
force about 13th August, the date of full moon, unless
myself attacked earlier.
During this period of energetic preparation the
Australian and New Zealand Mounted Troops kept
in constant touch with the enemy, harassing him in
every possible way, and making valuable reconnais-
sances ; and the Royal Flying Corps, having concen-
trated all available machines and pilots in Egypt on the
eastern front, was able to make valuable reports upon
the enemy's movements in rear of his advanced line.
On the night of the 27th /28th the enemy pushed
6o SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
forward all along his front and occupied a line, in
advance of his former entrenched position, running
froe him in
a position of great difficulty. General Lawrence issued
orders to the General Officer Commanding, 42nd Divi-
sion, to be ready to operate with all available troops
agamst the enemy's southern flank in the direction of
Mount Royston, a high sand dune about two miles
south of Pelusium Station ; the New Zealand Mounted
Rifles were directed to act vigorously from Dueidar
towards Hod el Enna ; the 3rd Australian Light Horse
Brigade were ordered to send one regiment to Hod el
Aras, and to be prepared to follow it up with the whole
brigade, so as to co-operate with the New Zealand
Mounted Brigade ; finally, I issued orders to the
Mobile Column under Lieut.-Colonel Smith, V.C.,
to commence operations against the enemy's left rear
towards Mageibra and Bir el Aweidiya, working wide of
the flank of the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
This column at once started for Hod el Bada, which it
reached by the evening of the 4th.
During the forenoon the enemy made several at-
tacks against the Mahemdia — Romani defences from
the east, south and south-west. These were repulsed
by the garrisons, found by the 155th and 158th Infantry
Brigades, with considerable loss, and in spite of heavy
artillery fire from the enemy's heavy howitzers, which.
66 SIR A. MUkRAV^S DESPATCHES
in one or two cases, inflicted severe casualties on our
troops, who behaved with admirable steadiness* The
fire of these howitzers, however, was very effectively
kept down by the guns of the monitors, with the co-
operation of the Royal Flying Corps.
There was, unfortunately, more delay than had been
anticipated in moving the infantry of the 42nd Division
up to Pelusium Station, so that, during the morning of
the 4th, no infantry was available for an attack on the
enemy's flank at Mount Royston. This caused the whole
brunt of the fighting in this area to fall upon the cavalry,
whose casualties had not been light, and whose right
flank was unprotected* A squadron of the Gloucester
Yeomanry from Pelusium, acting with commendable
initiative, supported the right of the Australian and
New Zealand cavalry from 745 a.m. onwards, holding
off attacks from the south-east for three hours, till the
composite regiment of the 5th Mounted Brigade, which
had come into action at 9.45, gained touch with it. The
result of the somewhat rapid advance of the Turks
from the south was that General Lawrence was obliged
to divert the cavalry originally destined to operate
against the enemy's rear, to strengthen the line of re-
sistance on the north. The New Zealand Mounted
Rifles Brigade was directed to move from Dueidar
northwards to attack the enemy's left flank, while the
General Officer Commanding, 3rd Australian Light
Horse Brigade, was ordered to send the regiment at Hod
el Aras to Dueidar, and to bring the rest of his brigade
across to Hill 70. By 12.30 p.m. the enemy on our south-
ern flank reached the furthest point of his advance — a
line running from north of Mount Royston, through
Bir Abu Diyuk, along the southern slopes of Welling-
ton Ridge, and thence bending round to the east and
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SECOND DESPATCH 67
north facing the southernmost infantry post. Shortly
after i p.m. the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade
with part of the 5th Mounted Brigade began to attack
Mount Royston from the west. This attack was pressed
slowly forward and was accompanied, in spite of heavy
fire from the enemy, by a general move forward of the
cavalry. By 3.30 p.m. two battalions of the 127th Bri-
gade, closely followed by a third, were on the march
southwards from Pelusium Station, and by 4 p.m. all
divisions were ordered to press forward for the counter-
attack, and gain and hold the line Mount Royston —
Wellington Ridge. On the right, this was carried out
by the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division
from the north, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle
and 5th Mounted Brigades and two battalions of the
127th Brigade from the west. By 6.30 p.m. Mount
Royston, with about 500 prisoners, some machine guns
and a battery of mountain artillery, was in our hands.
The General Officer Commanding, 52nd Division, had
already moved his reserve, consisting of the i/5th
Royal Welsh Fusiliers and 156th Brigade (less two bat-
talions), nearer to Bir Etmaler, and by 6 p.m. the whole
moved forward to attack Wellington Ridge, supported
by the fire of our artillery. The ridge was strongly held,
and, owing to darkness, the enemy remained in posses-
sion of part of it during the night. The result of the
day's fighting was that we had repulsed a vigorous
attack, capturing between 500 and 1,000 prisoners,
retaken Mount Royston and part of Wellington Ridge,
and were pressing back on the south a now exhausted
enemy. The outpost line for the night was taken up
by the leading battalions of the 42nd Division and the
infantry of the 52nd Division, with some of the Aus-
tralian and New Zealand cavalry in the centre. The
68 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, which had reached
Hill 70, was ordered on to Dueidar, to be ready to take
up the right flank of the pursuit.
Vigorous action, to the utmost limits of endurance,
was ordered for the next day, and the troops, in spite
of the heat, responded nobly. At daybreak, the 52nd
Division, assisted by the Australian and New Zealand
Mounted Division, took the remainder of Wellington
Ridge by assault, capturing about 1,500 prisoners.
Elsewhere the mounted troops pressed forward, meet-
ing with some opposition, but prisoners continued
to come in steadily, and it was soon obvious that
the enemy's offensive was completely broken. An
advance was ordered all along the line, and all
mounted troops were put under the command of
General Chauvel, commanding the Australian and
New Zealand Mounted Division, with orders to push
on as far and as vigorously as the resources at his
disposal would permit.
The 42nd Division marched to Hod el Enna during
the day, a very fatiguing march over extremely heavy
sand. The 52nd Division met some opposition in the
neighbourhood of Abu Hamra, and the high ground
to the east of it was not finally occupied till late in the
evening.
In the meantime the mounted troops pressed
steadily forward, and found the enemy holding the
ridges west of Katia, supported by artillery. The 3rd
Australian Light Horse Brigade, which had moved for-
ward from Dueidar by Bir el Nuss, came into contact
with the enemy near Bir el Hamisah and captured
some 450 prisoners, with machine guns and other
material. The further advance of this brigade, however,
was met with heavy fire from field guns and howitzers.
SECOND DESPATCH 69
and no further progress was made. Further northwards,
as soon as the 52nd Division had cleared Abu Hamra,
the advance was continued towards Katia, where the
enemy^s rearguard was found firmly established east of
the palm trees, with both flanks well protected, A
strong attempt was made to eject him by dismounted
action, but the attack failed to make progress, and
darkness found our troops and the enemy's facing each
other, roughly on parallel lines. During the day the
Royal Flying Corps reported that the retreat of the
Turks was general throughout their depth, and our
aeroplanes most effectively harassed his m.ovements
and threw his columns into confusion by well-directed
bomb attacks.
On the morning of the 6th, the enemy was found to
have retired from Katia, and, while the cavalry pressed
on in pursuit, the infantry moved forward and occupied
the line El Rabah — Katia — Bir el Mamluk. The ist
and 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigades, which had
borne the brunt of observing and harassing the enemy's
advance, were given a day's rest in camp, while the
remainder of the cavalry continued the advance. The
enemy's rearguard was found to be occupying his
previously prepared position extending across the road
and telegraph line between Hod el Reshafat and Hod
el Dhakar. Our attempts to turn his flanks by Hod
el Negiliat on the north and Hod el Sagia on the south
were frustrated by heavy artillery fire.
On the same morning the Camel Corps detachment
of Smith's Mobile Column occupied Bir el Mageibra
without opposition; the nth Australian Light Horse
also moved to Mageibra, with the City of London
Yeomanry in support at Bir el Jefeir. In the afternoon,
Major J. J, de Knoop, Cheshire Yeomanry, commanding
70 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
the Camel Corps detachment of this column, re-
connoitred towards Hod el Bayud, and reported that
a force of the enemy was in occupation of Hod el
Muhammam, five miles north-east of Mageibra. Orders
for an attack next morning were issued by Colonel
Smith.
On the 7th August the cavalry maintained their
action with the enemy's rearguard^ which had fallen
back to the line of his first entrenched position running
from Oghratina to Hod el Masia, with flanks thrown
well out to the north and south. There was continuous
fighting throughout the day, but the enemy was too
strongly supported by artillery for the cavalry to drive
him from his position. Meanwhile the Mobile Column,
operating from Bir el Aweidiya, had fought a very
successful action with the enemy force — consisting of
1,000 rifles, three machine guns, and two i2-pounder
guns — in the neighbourhood of Hod el Muhammam.
The camel detachment and cavalry, the whole under
the command of Lieut. - Colonel Grant, Australian
Light Horse, drove the enemy out of several successive
positions, capturing 53 prisoners, and successfully with-
drew at nightfall. This threat to his flanks was probably
an important factor in determining the enemy to con-
tinue his retreat. I regret to say that Major de Knoop,
who had handled the camel detachment throughout
with great skill and judgment, was killed while directing
operations.
On the 8th August the enemy was found to have
abandoned Oghratina, and, by the evening, to have
taken up a position covering Bir el Abd, his advanced
base. It was here that the enemy made his final
stand to cover the evacuation of his camp and stores.
Touch was now gained between the cavalry and Smith's
SECOND DESPATCH 71
Mobile Column, and was maintained from this time
onwards.
On the gth August the three cavalry brigades which
had hitherto carried out the pursuit were joined by a
composite brigade from the ist and 2nd Light Horse
Brigades. A strong effort was made to encircle both
flanks of the enemy at Bir el Abd and to cut off his
further retreat. Strong opposition was, however, en-
countered on both flanks, and it was decided to deliver
a dismounted attack with the object of driving out
the enemy. Our field batteries got close enough to
shell effectively the convoys removing stores from the
pile at Bir el Abd, but our artillery fire drew a heavy
reply from the enemy's howitzers which caused some
casualties. The enemy, well supported by artillery,
fought stubbornly. He made three counter-attacks,
all of which were driven back with heavy loss by our
rifle and machine-gun fire, and, in the evening, what
appeared to be a general advance, by fresh forces, was
made against our troops. This was also driven back
with heavy loss, but the enemy was able to maintain his
covering position. During the next two days our cavalry
was unable to do more than maintain continuous pres-
sure, but the Mobile Column, which had occupied
Bayud on the gth, continued to menace the enemy wide
on his left flank. On the loth a strong reconnaissance
was made against the enemy, who was in strength
at Hod el Mushalfat, south-east of Bir el Abd. On
the nth an enemy force with two mountain guns
approached Bayud. A sharp action, which commenced
at 5.30 a.m., was fought, and in the course of it all the
baggage camels and ammunition mules of the enemy
detachment were destroyed. Towards the afternoon
the enemy evacuated this position, and retired on the
73 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
main body of his rearguard. On the following day,
patrols from the neighbourhood of Bayud found the
country to the east and north all clear.
Early on the morning of the 12th it was found that
the enemy had retired from Bir el Abd, and, though
there was a small encounter with his rear troops about
Salmana, the general pursuit stopped at this point,
the enemy retiring through Bir el Mazar to El Arish.
The General Officer Commanding, No. 3 Section, was
ordered to hold the line Bir el Abd — Homossia with
two brigades of cavalry, keeping touch with the Mobile
Column which remained at Mageibra. The infantry
returned to the Mahemdia — Romani line, where work
on the railway was resumed with all speed* On 28th
August, the 52nd Division, less the 156th Brigade,
moved out to a position in the neighbourhood of El
Rabah, covering the rail-head. By the end of the month
most of the troops drawn from Nos. i and 2 Sections
had returned to their sections.
7. The complete result of the operations in the
Katia district was the decisive defeat and pursuit of
an enemy force amounting in all to some 18,000, in-
cluding 15,000 rifles. Some 4,000 prisoners, including
50 officers, were captured, and, from the number of
enemy dead actually buried, it is estimated that the
total number of enemy casualties amounted to about
9,000. In addition, there were captured one Krupp
75 mm. mountain battery of four guns, complete with
all accessories and 400 rounds of ammunition, 9 German
machine guns and mountings, with specially constructed
pack saddles for camel transport, 2,300 rifles, 1,000,000
rounds small arms ammunition, 100 horses and mules,
500 camels, and a large amount of miscellaneous stores
and equipment. Two field hospitals with most of their
SECOND DESPATCH 73
equipment were also abandoned by the enemy in his
retreat, and large quantities of stores were burnt by
him at Bir el Abd to prevent their capture,
Lieut.- General the Hon. H. A. Lawrence, General
Officer Commanding, No. 3 Section, directed the
operations throughout, and the warmest praise is
due to him and the commanders, staffs and troops
concerned in the operations. General Lawrence*s staff
deserve great credit for their efforts in working out the
allotment of camel transport, enabling our troops to
conduct a vigorous pursuit. Throughout the whole
month which elapsed between the enemy's first approach
and his final disappearance, Major-General H. G.
Chauvel, C.B., C.M.G., proved himself a resolute and
resourceful cavalry leader. The brunt of the fighting
fell upon the Australian and New Zealand Mounted
Division, which included the Leicester, Somerset,
Inverness and Ayr Batteries, R.H.A. (T.F.). I cannot
speak too highly of the gallantry, steadfastness and
untiring energy shown by this fine division throughout
the operations. The 5th Mounted Brigade came into
action successfully on 4th August, and subsequently
took part in the cavalry pursuit. The 52nd Division,
commanded by Major-General W. E. B. Smith, C.M.G.,
not only showed great steadiness under heavy artillery
fire, but was responsible for the assault which recaptured
Wellington Ridge on 4th August, and for clearing Abu
Hamra on the 5th. Of the 42nd Division, commanded
by Major-General Sir W. Douglas, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
only two battalions were in action on the 4th, but this
division carried out a march under very trying conditions
on the subsequent days. Detachments of the Bikanir
Camel Corps attached to these two divisions were in-
valuable in reconnaissances and as escorts to small
74 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
parties, besides bringing in much of the material
captured.
Most excellent work was done by Lieut.-Colonel
C. L. Smith, V.C., Officer Commanding, Camel Corps,
and by all ranks composing the Mobile Column under
his command. He executed the role ascribed to him
with great energy and carried out his instructions with
the highest intelligence. The arrangements made for
mobilising and maintaining his column reflect the
greatest credit on Major-General A. G. Dallas, C.B.,
and the staff of No. 2 Section, to which section belonged
the 158th Brigade which manned part of the Romani
defences on the 4th.
I cannot speak too highly of the work of the Royal
Flying Corps during the whole period. Their work
was extremely arduous and exhausting. The average
total daily reconnaissances during the period amounted
to 23 J hours, and, during the first five days of August,
to as much as 31 J hours. Many pilots and observers
were out two or three times a day for several con-
secutive days under very accurate anti-aircraft fire, and
were frequently engaged in air combats with enemy
machines of superior power. Special commendation
is due to Lieut.-Colonel P. B. Joubert, Officer Com-
manding, 5th Wing Royal Flying Corps, and to Major
H. Blackburn, Royal Flying Corps, who commanded
the detachment at Kantara.
I wish also to bring to notice the good work done
by H.M. Monitors M.15 and M.21, under the com-
mand of Lieut.-Commander A. O. St. John, R.N., and
Commander E. Robinson, V.C., R.N., respectively.
The shooting of these ships was consistently good,
and they were very successful in reducing the fire of
the enemy's heavy howit2;ers on the 4th August.
SECOND DESPATCH 75
8. With the exception of the operations described
in the preceding paragraph, there is little to record
beyond reconnaissances and patrols for the remainder
of the period under review.
On i6th and 17th September, a mounted force con-
sisting of two brigades AustraHan Light Horse, No. i
Battalion Imperial Camel Corps, the Ayrshire and
Inverness Batteries R.H.A., and the Hong Kong and
Singapore Mountain Battery, under the command of
General Officer Commanding, Australian and New
Zealand Mounted Division, carried out a successful
reconnaissance in force against the enemy's camp at
Bir el Ma^ar. At dawn on the 17th the camp was
attacked from the west and from the south and south-
east. On the west our troops occupied a ridge about
800 yards from the enemy's second line trenches ;
several small posts were rushed and taken. Our bat-
teries came into action in a favourable position, partially
enfilading some enemy trenches which were seen to be
occupied in strength, and inflicted considerable loss.
The enemy replied actively with shell fire and heavy
rifle fire. On the south and south-east our troops drew
the enemy's fire on a front of two miles, and in many
instances occupied the enemy's original first line
trenches. My instructions were that a general action
against the enemy in entrenched positions was to be
avoided, and the column, having successfully carried
out its mission, withdrew without any attempt on the
part of the enemy to molest it. The Royal Flying Corps
co-operated effectively throughout the operation, and
the gallant action of the seaplanes of the Royal Naval
Air Service off El Arish diverted the attention of the
enemy's aircraft from our troops at Bir el Mazar.
Our casualties were slight, and our captures included
76 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
one officer and 13 men of the enemy's camel corps,
besides a number of camels.
The success of this operation, apart from the
casualties inflicted, which were heavy, lay in the fact
that it gave the enemy a new and unexpected proof
of our extended radius of action, and induced him, in
the course of the next few days, to evacuate his camp
at Bir el Mazar and withdraw the troops to camps near
El Arish,
On 1 8th September, Major-General Sir Charles
Dobell, K.CB,, CM.G,, D,S.O,, took over temporary
command of No, 3 Section.
In No, I Section during the month of September,
various small reconnaissances were made. The most
important of these was carried out against Bir el Tawal
(about 30 miles west of El Kubri) by a column under
Brigadier- General A, Mudge, between the 14th and
2 1 St September, The column included half a squadron
Middlesex Yeomanry, one troop Hertfordshire Yeo-
manry, two companies i/5th Bedfordshire Regiment,
and one company each of the i /4th Northamptonshire
and i/ioth London Regiments, The approach march
was excellently carried out over very broken and intri-
cate country. The enemy's position was reached on
the 17th, and, after a preliminary reconnaissance on
that day, an attack was made early the next morning.
The infantry advanced with great dash, and almost
immediately the enemy took to flight, but pursuit
was impossible owing to the nature of the ground.
An inspection of the enemy's camp showed that he had
been completely taken by surprise, and had left behind
all his stores and personal effects, which were captured.
After the wells had been emptied, and such stores as
could not be brought away had been destroyed, our
SECOND DESPATCH 77
troops withdrew, reaching Kubri rail-head on 21st
September. Our total casualties were three other
ranks killed and two other ranks wounded.
On the western front during the months of August
and September there has been little of note to report.
The railway towards the Baharia oasis has been pushed
on, and the rail-head of the Kharga railway is now 10
miles beyond Kharga Station. Patrolling has been
most active in all sections of the line. On 31st August
a patrol of eight motor-cars captured an enemy camel
convoy 20 miles north-west of Jarabub. The escort
of 30 armed men surrendered without resistance, the
loads and saddles of the camels were burnt and most
of the camels destroyed. In the Baharia section a patrol
of two officers and three men, Imperial Camel Corps,
came in contact with a small body of between 15 and
20 enemy near the point where the '' Rubi ** road from
Samalut descends the escarpment of the Baharia oasis.
The two officers became detached from the men, who
made their way back to the post covering the rail-head,
but I much regret that subsequent search has failed
to discover the missing officers. In the Wadi Natron
section a motor-car patrol on 21st September arrested
a small convoy under a Tripolitan officer of the Senoussi
Force, which was bringing mails and a quantity of
bombs, gelignite and automatic pistols from Baharia
to Amria (12 miles west of Alexandria on the coast).
On the 1 8th September, Brigadier-General E. A.
Herbert, M.V.O., was appointed to temporary command
of the Western Frontier Force.
Throughout the period under review the command
of the Delta district and the Lines of Communication
Defences has been held by Major- General W. A.
Watson, C.B., CLE., and the duties of that command.
78 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
though happily involving no active operations, have
been carried out to my satisfaction. Great activity and
thoroughness has been shown in carrying out my in-
structions to establish a line of posts along the western
edge of the Canal Zone, to prevent the entrance of un-
desirable persons. The patrolling duties involved have
been entrusted to two squadrons of the 4th Australian
Light Horse Regiment, who have displayed the greatest
zeal, tact and resource in bringing the new orders and
restrictions into force. The results of this measure have
been excellent, and the Western Canal Zone can now
be said to be free from the presence of all unauthorised
persons.
g. It gives me the greatest pleasure to bring to
notice the services rendered by General Sir F. R.
Wingate, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., and
the Egyptian Army since the beginning of the war
to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force and the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and to express my
gratefulness for the assistance which has at all times
been so willingly given. Fifty-eight officers and 12
Sudan Government officials served — most of them for
short periods equivalent to the amount of leave to which,
in normal circumstances, they would have been entitled
— with the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force ; of
these, six officers were either killed or died of wounds,
II were wounded. Sixty officers and 27 Sudan Govern-
ment officials were lent at various times for service with
the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
Personnel of the Egyptian Army has been employed
at different times as guards for railway bridges and to
garrison various important points in the interior. The
Egyptian Army also supplied guns and gunners for
two armoured trains for use with the defences of Egypt.
SECOND DESPATCH 79
A Camel Maxim Section and an armed detachment
of the Military Works Department were attached to
the Bikanir Camel Corps, and took part in the opera-
tions against the Senoussi (in which operations No. i
Squadron Egyptian Cavalry was also employed) and in
the attack on the Sue2; Canal in April, 191 5. Two com-
panies of the 2nd (Egyptian) Battalion garrisoned Tor
in January, 191 5, and took part in the subsequent
operations in that district. The garrison of Abu Zeneima
was also supplied for some months by troops of the
Egyptian Army. In the course of 191 5, 2,230 Egyptian
reservists, who had been called up, were employed
on works connected with the Canal defences ; a num-
ber of Egyptian officers, from pension and unemployed
lists, volunteered for service with these reservists and
gave valuable assistance. A works battalion of six
companies was formed in May, 19 15, for service at the
Dardanelles, the battalion and the companies being
commanded by British officers in the employ of the
Egyptian Army. This unit did excellent work, under
perpetual shell fire, on the Peninsula, during the four
months of its employment.
Besides this assistance in the matter of personnel,
the Egyptian Army has most liberally placed at the
disposal of the Mediterranean and Egyptian Expedi-
tionary Forces accommodation, war material and trans-
port camels.
I would especially mention the loan of the Egyptian
Army Hospital at Cairo, complete with equipment,
to the New Zealand Division ; the purchase in the
Sudan of over 14,000 riding and baggage camels,
the collection, veterinary examination and despatch of
which threw a large amount of additional work upon
the province staffs ; the supply of 174,000 grenades for
8o SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force ; the loan of
tugs and steel plates for the Canal defences ; and the
manufacture and repair, in the Stores Department, of a
large number of articles of equipment and clothing.
For these, and all other, services rendered in addition
to their normal duties, the Egyptian Army and the
Sudan Administration deserve the most cordial thanks.
I also wish to express my extreme gratefulness to
Field Marshal the Rt. Hon. Lord Methuen, G.C.B.,
G.C.V.O., C.M.G., Governor and Commander-in-
Chief, Malta, and to all his staff, for the labours which
they have undertaken in connection with hospital work
for the benefit of the Mediterranean and Egyptian
Expeditionary Forces. In March and April, 191 5,
the accommodation in Malta for sick and wounded
began to expand, and rose from 321 beds in February
to 22,000 beds at the end of 191 5. The additional
accommodation required was found by the construction
of new hospitals in existing barracks, schools, and other
buildings, and by the erection of tented hospitals and
convalescent camps. During the operations on the
Gallipoli Peninsula and up to the evacuation of Mudros,
2,361 officers and 57,293 men were admitted from
transports and hospital ships. During March, 1916,
this accommodation was reduced to 12,000 beds with
a corresponding reduction in personnel, but, since July,
expansion to meet the demands of the Salonica Force
has steadily proceeded, till, at the end of August, there
were 21,174 beds on the Island, with the possibility
of expansion up to 27,000. By the beginning of
September a total of 854 officers and 23,119 men
had been received from the Salonica Force.
The expansion, reduction, and re-expansion of
accommodation has necessitated very hard work on the
SECOND DESPATCH 8i
part of the Engineer, Barracks, Ordnance, Transport
and Supply Services, as well as on the part of the
Medical Department,
I wish to call attention to the admirable work
that has been performed by the Nursing Services in
the hospitals in Egypt, Not only have they had to deal
with a very large number of wounded and sick from
Gallipoli, Salonica and Egypt itself, but also from
other theatres of war. The devotion to duty, zeal and
skill of the Nursing Services, British, Australian and
New Zealand, and of the voluntary helpers, have been
beyond praise, and I shall have great pleasure in
bringing to your notice in a subsequent despatch the
names of a number of these ladies for specially
distinguished service.
The distribution by the Army Postal Service of
letters and parcels over the extended desert fronts has
been fraught with difficulties. The successful manner
in which these have been overcome has greatly con-
tributed to the comfort and health of the troops under
my command. In this connection I wish to acknowledge
the assistance I have received from the Egyptian Postal
Service, under the able direction of N. T. Borton Pasha,
Postmaster-General.
The complete failure of the enemy's operations in
August was largely due to the manner in which the
plans for defence were prepared, and the distribution
of the troops arranged. In the accomplishment of this,
the Chief of my General Staff, Major-General A. L.
Lynden-Bell, C.B., C.M.G., rendered me able and
devoted service. His work has been of an onerous
nature, and he has discharged it with energy, skill
and determination.
My thanks are also due to Lieut.-General E. A.
82 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Altham, K.C.B., CM.G.^ for the manner in which
he has discharged his responsible duties as Inspector-
General of Communications.
I will submit in a separate despatch the names of
those officers and men who have rendered distinguished
service during the period under review, and whose
services I desire to commend.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
(Signed) A. J. MURRAY, General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
COVERING LETTER SENT WITH
SECOND DESPATCH
iith October, 19 16
COVERING LETTER SENT WITH
SECOND DESPATCH
From —
The Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
To— '
The Secretary of State for War,
War Office, London, S^W,
General Headquarters,
Egyptian Expeditionary Forces
11th October f 19 16.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith my despatch
deahng with operations between ist June and 30th
September.
I am aware that, as in my last despatch, there are
certain passages which it will not be advisable to publish
at present* I wish, therefore, in order to avoid delay
in publication, to express my willingness that such
passages should be deleted by the General Staff without
any further reference to me, while respectfully request-
ing that the general sequence and connection of the
whole should be preserved,
I have the honour to be. Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
(Signed) A. J, MURRAY, General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
85
THIRD DESPATCH
ist March, 191 7
> 1 n j-
' > 1 1 > J
c < c c r c *"
r f c c '■c <: <
,/ r , c
,1 « t c t ,
■ ' fccccc • •
LIEUTliNANT-GKNERAL SIR H. G. CHAUVICL, K.C.M.G.. C.H.
THIRD DESPATCH
From —
The Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
To—
The Secretary of State for War,
War Office, London, S.W.
General HeadquarterSf
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
ist March, 1917.
My Lord,
I have the honour to submit a report on the opera-
tions of the Force under my command from ist October,
1916, to 28th February, 1917,
i» During the months of October and November
and the first half of December, there were no important
operations upon my eastern front, though a successful
reconnaissance against the enemy positions at El Rakwa
and Bir el Maghara, 65 miles east of Ismailia, was
carried out between the 13th and 17th October by a
small force of Australian Light Horse, Yeomanry and
Camel Corps, This operation not only needed careful
preparation, but entailed two night marches over ex-
ceedingly difficult sand-dune country, the difficulties
being increased on the second night by the presence of
a thick fog. On the early morning of the 15th, the enemy
was located holding a strong position on the high
precipitous hills of Maghara. The force, attacking in
two columns, dislodged the enemy from his advanced
position, capturing a few prisoners. At the same time
89
90 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
the enemy's camp was repeatedly bombed by our aero-
planes, which furnished invaluable assistance through-
out the operation. After an engagement lasting two
hours, the force withdrew unmolested, and reached
Bayud on the 17th without the loss of a single camel.
The operation was well carried out, and valuable
information was obtained regarding the enemy's dis-
positions and the nature of the country.
With this exception, all was quiet on the eastern
front. The unexpected evidence of our mobility given
to the enemy by the successful reconnaissance against
Bir el Mazar which I recorded in my last despatch, and
the losses suffered by the Turks during this affair, had
given the enemy sufficient uneasiness to induce him to
withdraw altogether from Mazar, and towards the end
of October his nearest troops were in the neighbour-
hood of Ujret el Zol and Masaid, about seven and four
miles west of El Arish respectively. The enemy also
maintained several small posts in the neighbourhood of
Maghara, with small garrisons further south at Hassana
and Nekhl. About the same time the railway towards
El Arish, which had been making steady and uninter-
rupted progress, was in the neighbourhood of Bir
Salmana, some four miles east of Bir el Abd. The
Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, with
the 5th Mounted Brigade attached, had advanced from
Romani, and was covering the advance and the railway
construction east of Salmana with brigades thrown out
to its flanks and rear ; the 52nd Division was at Bir el
Abd, and the 42nd Division disposed along the line
of communication from Kantara to Negiliat (half-way
between Romani and Bir el Abd).
2. On the 23rd October, in order to be in closer
touch with the civil authority, I moved my General
THIRD DESPATCH 91
Headquarters from Ismailia to Cairo, and at the same
time the new Headquarters of the Eastern Force came
into existence at Ismailia, under the command of Lieut.-
General Sir Charles Dobell, K.C.B., C.M.G,, D.S.O.
This new command included the three sections of the
Canal Defences, of which I have previously spoken,
and the Sharqia province (between the edge of the Nile
Delta and the Sue^ Canal), including Port Said and
Suez* At the same time the Headquarters of the In-
spector-General of Communications, which had always
been in Cairo, were merged in General Headquarters,
and, on the lapse of his appointment, Lieut .-General
Sir E. A. Altham, K.C.B., C.M.G,, to my great personal
regret, returned to England. During the first half of
November further modifications were made in the
organisation of the force under my command, and I
made a general redistribution of troops in the Eastern
Force so as to set free a sufficient force for mobile
operations during the next stages of the advance.
Arrangements were completed for the abolition of the
three sections of the Canal Defences ; for the amalga-
mation of the old Nos. i and 2 Sections into the
Southern Canal Section ; and for the division of the
old No. 3 Section into two parts — one being the Desert
Column, which, for the time being, was composed of
the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division and
the 42nd and 52nd Divisions, and the other being called
the Northern Canal Section and practically forming
the lines of communication of the Desert Column.
The Northern Canal Section at first extended from the
Canal as far east as Romani, and will soon extend to
El Arish. I also made preparation for a considerable
reduction of the garrison in the Southern Canal Section,
and for the withdrawal of the 53rd Division altogether
92 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
from this area to form the general reserve of the Eastern
Force. All these preparations were completed during
the first half of November, and took effect between the
22nd November and 5th December, by which time the
whole of the 42nd Division had been relieved from its
line of communication duties and concentrated at Mazar.
The 53rd Division was concentrated in reserve at
Ismailia and El Ferdan, while the Desert Column and
the Northern and Southern Canal Sections were formed
as above described.
3. The first half of November was mainly occupied
in making the necessary arrangements for pressing for-
ward our advance towards El Arish. In the south a
small column under Brigadier-General P. C. Palin,
C.B., marched on Bir um Gurf, 30 miles south-east
of Suez;, on the 15th and i6th November, and attacked
and drove off some enemy posted in the hills. On the
north, construction was begun of a strong defensive
position which I had ordered to be made covering
Bir el Abd ; this position has since been prepared for
defence with the greatest possible completeness.
During the latter part of the month the Australian
and New Zealand Mounted Division gradually pushed
forward in advance of the railway, which by November
26th reached Mazar. Reconnaissances by mounted
troops were pushed forward to within eight miles of
El Arish by 17th November, when the enemy's out-
posts were located at Ujret el Zol ; on November 28th
a mounted patrol was pushed through to Bir el Masmi,
little more than three miles south-west of El Arish ;
and from this time our patrols were constantly in
touch with the enemy's position at El Arish — Masaid.
Throughout the month the enemy's aircraft showed con-
siderable activity, attacking the rail-head and bivouacs
THIRD DESPATCH 93
of our advanced troops with bombs. Little damage,
however, was done, and our own aircraft retained com-
plete superiority in the air. The Royal Flying Corps
in this month visited El Magdhaba (see Map 3), Sheikh
Zowaid, and Khan Yunus, for reconnaissance purposes,
and on the nth November made very successful bomb
attacks on Beersheba and El Magdhaba. At Beersheba
special attention was paid to the aerodrome and the rail-
way station, both of which were extensively damaged.
Presumably in retaliation for the air raid at Beersheba,
one hostile aeroplane dropped bombs on Cairo on the
13th, causing some casualties among the civil popula-
tion and killing one private ; no other damage of a
military nature was done. The Royal Flying Corps
promptly replied by heavily bombing the enemy's camp
at El Magdhaba by moonlight on the same night. On
the 17th November the enemy's camps at Masaid were
heavily bombed by four machines in reply to the appear-
ance of a hostile machine at Sue2; the same morning.
By the ist December the railway had reached Kilo-
metre 121, about five miles east of Ma2;ar. At this time
the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division,
supported by part of the 42nd Division, was in advance
of and covering the rail-head ; the remainder of the
42nd Division was at Mazar. The 52nd Division, less
one brigade, reached Mazar on the 2nd December ; the
53rd Division (general reserve), less one infantry brigade
and attached troops, was moving up to Romani. During
the first week of December constant patrols were sent
out by the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Divi-
sion, and the country was thoroughly reconnoitred in
the area Ma2;ar — Risan Aneiza — Bir Lahfan (see Map 4)
— ^Bir el Masmi. In the meantime, the enemy main-
tained his position of El Arish and Masaid, and, in
94 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
order to afford him no inducement to withdraw until
such time as I should be ready to strike, mounted patrols
were ordered to be as unostentatious as possible,
4. On the 7th December Lieut»-General Sir P, W.
Chetwode, Bt,, C.B,, D.S.O., assumed command of the
Desert Column, shortly afterwards moving his Head-
quarters from Bir el Abd to Ma^ar. By the loth the
railway was within 20 miles of El Arish, and the time
had come which was to reward the strenuous labours
of nearly a year. Since January, the force had gradually
pushed right across the Sinai desert, fighting when
necessary, organising and constructing incessantly in
the heavy sand and hot sun. The pressure on the enemy
in other theatres, and our success at Romani, were
undoubtedly contributing factors to this advance, but
the main factor — without which all liberty of action
and any tactical victory would have been nugatory —
— was work, intense and unremitting. To regain this
peninsula, the true frontier of Egypt, hundreds of miles
of road and railway had been built,^ hundreds of miles
of water-piping had been laid, filters capable of supply-
ing 1,500,000 gallons of water a day, and reservoirs
with a total capacity of 3,500,000 gallons had been
installed, and 900,000 tons of stone transported from
distant quarries. Kantara had been transformed from
a small canal village into an important railway and
water terminus, with wharves and cranes and a rail-
way ferry ; and the desert, till then almost destitute of
human habitation, showed the successive marks of our
advance in the shape of strong positions firmly en-
trenched and protected by hundreds of miles of barbed
wire, of standing camps where troops could shelter in
* The figures up to the end of February are as follows : — 388 miles of railway,
203 miles of metalled road, 86 miles of wire and brushwood road, 300 miles of
water-piping ; 960,000 tons of stone quarried.
THIRD DESPATCH 95
comfortable huts, of tanks and reservoirs built of con-
crete, of railway stations and sidings, of aerodromes
and of signal stations and wireless installations, by all
of which the desert was subdued and made habitable,
and adequate lines of communication established be-
tween the advancing troops and their ever-receding
base. Moreover, not only had British troops laboured
incessantly through the summer and autumn, but the
body of organised native labour had grown till the
Egyptian Labour Corps, with its special headquarters,
standing camps, clearing camps and recruiting stations,
had reached a total of nearly 40,000.^ The necessity of
combining the protection and maintenance, including
the important work of sanitation, of this large force of
workers, British and native, with that steady progress
on the railway, roads and pipes which was vital to the
success of my operations, put the severest strain upon
all energies and resources ; but the problem of feeding
the workers without starving the work was solved by
the good-will and energy of all concerned, and it was
only the period of active operations in August, and one
or two delays in the arrival of material by sea, that
stopped the steady eastward movement of pipes and
lines.
Moreover, organisation kept pace with construction.
The equipment of the fighting units with camel trans-
port, which had reached its first stage of completion
at the time of the Romani battle, had been perfected by
the middle of December. The three divisions of the
Desert Column were provided with some 3,000 camels
each, and a proportionate number of native drivers,
furnishing complete first-line transport, which had
been worked out in the minutest detail, for each of their
' This number is now 50,000, and is still increasing.
96 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
component units* A large number of additional camels
were provided for convoying supplies and water from
the rail-head to the front. The haulage of artillery
had been lightened by the fitting of ped-rails^ and all
surplus horses — the watering of which was a serious
burden — were withdrawn. The striking force was now
completely mobile, and the troops had grown skilful
in meeting the special problems of desert campaigning.
5. But no organisation could entirely overcome the
chief difficulty which had faced us all through the year,
the adequate provision of water for the troops. In fact,
during this final period this difficulty was accentuated
by the rapid advance of troops and railway, with which
the water-supply could not keep pace. Moreover, my
troops had passed out of the water-bearing Katia basin,
and had reached a tract in which local water was almost
non-existent. From Romani to Bir el Abd the local
water, though generally somewhat brackish, had been
always employed for the horses, mules and camels, and
it had been found that, if the necessary precautions
were taken, it had no ill-effect upon our troops, at all
events for a limited period. East of Bir el Abd the
situation is altogether different. Water is found in com-
paratively few and widely-separated localities. Such as
exists is generally too brackish for human consumption,
and the wells east of the water-line are so widely separ-
ated and are of so small capacity that it is a matter of
great difficulty — sometimes a complete impossibility —
to water any large number of animals. This latter fact
greatly restricted the employment of mounted troops.
During the first half of November, also, the 12-inch
pipe-line was not yet delivering water at Romani, and
the water for the advanced troops had therefore to be
brought up by rail in tank trucks, and stored in im-
THIRD DESPATCH 97
provised tanks at railway-sidings made for that purpose.
Since the railway had reached Kilometre 109 by 14th
November^ considerable strain was thrown on its re-
sources for this period, owing to the necessity for main-
taining the rate of construction, for forwarding material
for the construction of the 12-inch pipe-line, for sup-
plying the troops, and for undertaking the long haulage
of great quantities of water in addition ♦ By the 17th
November, however, the water situation was somewhat
relieved by the delivery of water through the 12-inch
pipe-line at Romani. This reduced by 25 miles the
distance over which water had to be hauled by the rail-
way. Thereafter the water difficulty again increased as
the railway advanced, until on the ist December the
12-inch pipe-line delivered water at Bir el Abd, there-
by again reducing the distance over which rail-borne
water had to be carried. But as the month advanced,
the water question presented itself more insistently
than ever as the one factor which would determine
the day when I could strike at El Arish. Every tactical
preparation for the offensive had been made, naval
co-operation planned, and arrangements made for the
landing of stores and construction of piers as soon
as the place was in my possession. But the difficulty
of water-supply, even with rail-head only 15 miles to
the rear, was immense. The enemy was so disposed
as to cover all the available water in the neighbourhood
of El Arish and Masaid. Between his position and ours,
and south of his position, no water could be found ;
nor had search in the Wadi el Arish, south of the town,
by parties sent in by night, proved more successful.
The enemy was disposed in depth covering all the water
in the area — there being about four miles between his
outpost line and his third line of defence. If, therefore.
98 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
he should be able to force us to spend two days in the
operation of driving him from his position, it would be
necessary to carry forward very large quantities of water
on camels for the men and animals of the formations
engaged. This entailed the establishment of a very
large reserve of water at rail-head, and the preparation
of elaborate arrangements for the forwarding and dis-
tribution of water*
The size of the Turkish garrison at El Arish was
known to me with approximate certainty. It consisted
of two battalions of the 8oth Regiment of the 3rd
Turkish Division — some 1,600 infantry in all — in a
strong entrenched position. Between the gth and 14th
December, increased activity was shown by the Turks,
and our aircraft and mounted patrols reported the con-
struction of new works, while the enemy camps at
Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila were reported to have
increased in size. On these indications of a probable
reinforcement to the enemy, the final preparations were
pushed on with most strenuous determination. Had
rain only fallen, an earlier move could have been made,
but as it was, the water-supply for the striking force
of two infantry divisions, the Australian and New
Zealand Mounted Division, and the Imperial Camel
Corps Brigade, was not adequately secured till 20th
December.
6. The swiftness of our final preparations was
rewarded, but not immediately, by a successful engage-
ment. We had been too quick for the enemy, but he
had recognised it, and, knowing that reinforcements
would arrive too late, had hurriedly withdrawn his
troops from Masaid and El Arish. This retirement
was reported by the Royal Flying Corps on the 20th
December, and the Australian and New Zealand
THIRD DESPATCH 99
Mounted Division and Imperial Camel Corps Brigade
were ordered to move on El Arish the same night.
The 52nd Division was to move in support of the
mounted troops. Accordingly, after a skilfully con-
ducted march of 20 miles in the moonless night, the
I St and 3rd Light Horse Brigades and the Imperial
Camel Corps Brigade surrounded the enemy's position.
Light Horse patrols reached El Arish about sunrise,
and found it unoccupied. By 7.20 a.m. the ist Light
Horse Brigade was east of El Arish, the Imperial Camel
Corps south of the town, the 3rd Light Horse Brigade
was about Masaid, and the New Zealand Mounted
Rifles Brigade was at Masmi. Subsequently, the
General Officer Commanding, Desert Column, reported
that there was no necessity for naval co-operation,
since the enemy had completely evacuated his position.
Owing to the fact that insufficient water had been found,
the 42nd Division was sent back to Mazar. During the
day our aircraft reported about 1,600 of the enemy on
the march in two columns in the neighbourhood of
Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila. Sheikh Zowaid and
Rafa appeared to be clear of the enemy. Maghara
had been evacuated, and the enemy was apparently in
process of withdrawing from the neighbouring posts.
By the night of the 21st December, therefore, the re-
occupation of El Arish had been effected, and the enemy
was evacuating, or had evacuated, his positions west
of a north and south line through that place, except
those at Nekhl and Hassana. The aircraft, moreover,
reported that the garrison of the latter place seemed
also to be reduced.
On the 22nd December the 52nd Division was
about El Arish and El Bittia. Mine-sweeping operations
were at once commenced in the roadstead, under the
100 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
direction of Captain A. H, Williamson, M.V.O», R.N.,
while the erection of a pier was taken in hand by the
Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train. In 48 hours
the roadstead was cleared of mines, and the supply ships
from Port Said began unloading stores and supplies
on the 24th. Supplies were also hastened to El Arish
by camel convoy, since it was of the utmost importance
to accumulate at once a sufficient amount to give our
mounted troops a further radius of action. Our air-
craft were exceedingly active during the day. A suc-
cessful attack was made on the railway bridge at Tel
el Sharia, north of Beersheba ; El Auja and Beersheba
were effectively bombed; and two battalions of Turkish
troops located by the Royal Flying Corps at Magdhaba,
some 20 miles south of El Arish, were attacked with
bombs by 13 of our aeroplanes, and suffered many
casualties.
In order to emphasise the capture of El Arish, in
the Southern Canal Section a column assembled near
Bir Mabeiuk on the 22nd December, and on the follow-
ing days advanced through the Mitla Pass and by the
Darb el Haj as far as Sudr el Heitan, more than half-
way to Nekhl. This column destroyed various enemy
posts and entrenchments, but, finding no enemy, re-
turned on the 25th.
7. The enemy having temporarily succeeded in
eluding us, it was of the utmost importance to strike
any of his forces that remained within our reach. I
had always anticipated that, should the enemy choose
to abandon El Arish, his line of retreat would be through
Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila towards El Auja. These
anticipations were confirmed by the report of the Royal
Flying Corps that an enemy force of about two regi-
ments was at Magdhaba. It appeared likely that this
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THIRD DESPATCH " rdr'
force consisted of the i,6oo infantry which had com-
posed the garrison of El Arish, and that it was preparing
to hold Magdhaba as a rearguard. Orders were given
that a mounted force should push forward with all
haste against the enemy, and arrangements were made
accordingly by General Sir Charles Dob ell for the move
of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division,
less the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, with the Imperial
Camel Brigade, against Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila
on the night of the 22nd /23rd. Major-General Sir
H. G. Chauvel, K.C.M.G., C.B., was in command of
the column.
8. Starting at 1245 ^*^^* o^ December 23rd, the
Flying Column halted at 4.50 a.m. in an open plain
about four miles from Magdhaba, whence the enemy's
bivouac fires could plainly be seen. General Chauvel
with his Staff and subordinate commanders immedi-
ately undertook a personal reconnaissance of the enemy's
position, and soon after 8 a.m., by which time the first
aeroplane reports had been received, the attack was
set in motion.
The enemy had taken up a position on both banks of
the Wadi el Arish, and was very strongly posted in
a rough circle of from 3,000 to 3,500 yards diameter.
Five large closed works, exceedingly well-sited, formed
the principal defences, and between these works was
a system of well-constructed and concealed trenches
and rifle pits. General Chauvel's plan of attack was as
follows :
The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the
3rd Light Horse Brigade, both under the command of
Brigadier- General E. W. C. Chaytor, C.B., were to
move to the east of Magdhaba and to swing round to
attack the enemy's right and rear. The Imperial Camel
roi SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Corps Brigade was to move direct against Magdhaba
to attack the enemy in front — that is, from the north-
west. The I St Light Horse Brigade was at the outset
in reserve. Between 8.45 a.m. and 9.30 a.m. the attack
developed, and at the latter hour General Chaytor moved
a light horse regiment and part of a machine-gun
squadron on a wide turning movement round the
rear of the enemy's position, with orders to come in
from the south. A little later, two regiments of the New
Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade were despatched in
more or less the same direction, though making a less
wide detour, with orders to move on Magdhaba from
the east. In the meantime the Imperial Camel Corps
Brigade was making progress, though somewhat slowly.
At 10 a.m. the aircraft reports indicated the possi-
bility that the enemy might try to escape. Thereupon
General Chauvel ordered the ist Light Horse Brigade,
less one regiment remaining in reserve, to push in
from the north-west. The brigade moved forward at
a trot, and, coming under shrapnel fire, increased the
pace to a gallop. The enemy then opened a very heavy
rifle and machine-gun fire, whereupon the brigade
swung to its right and gained cover in the Wadi, where,
dismounting, it began an attack against the left of the
enemy position.
Between noon and 1.30 p.m. the enemy's position
was practically surrounded, but for some little time it
had been found increasingly difficult to make pro-
gress. The horse-artillery batteries had been greatly
hindered by the mirage and the difficulty of getting
forward observation, the ground round the enemy's
position being absolutely flat and devoid of cover.
The Hong Kong and Singapore Camel Battery was
in action at less than 2,000 yards range.
THIRD DESPATCH 103
In the meantime reports were received from the
Field Squadron that no water could be found. Unless
Magdhaba could be taken during the day, therefore,
it was probable that our troops would have to with-
draw, as none of the horses had been watered since the
evening of the 22nd, and the nearest water, except
that in the enemy's position, was at El Arish» General
Chauvel reported the situation to the Desert Column
accordingly, and received orders to maintain the attack
at all hazards.
But even before this communication arrived, the
situation had begun to improve. The ist Light Horse
Brigade, pressing on against the enemy's left, captured
a work on the west of the Wadi, taking about 100
prisoners. At 2 p.m. two regiments of the 3rd Light
Horse Brigade, coming in from the north-east, were
within 200 yards of the position, in close touch with
the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade advancing from the
north-west. A quarter of an hour later the attack of
the remaining regiment of this brigade was pressing
heavily on the enemy from the south. By three o'clock
the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was within
600 yards of the enemy's trenches on the east.
From this time forward the pressure on the enemy
increased on all sides. Before 3.30 p.m. the ist Light
Horse Brigade and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade
attacked the second line of the enemy's trenches,
and at 4 p.m. the former brigade carried one of the
main redoubts, taking 130 prisoners, including the
Turkish commander. Immediately after this, part
of the loth Light Horse Regiment charged in from
the south, mounted and with fixed bayonets, and
by 4.30 p.m. all organised resistance was over, and
the enemy was surrendering everywhere.
104 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
The total number of prisoners taken in this fine
action was 1^282, including some 50 wounded. A large
number of the enemy were buried by our troops on the
position. Four mountain guns, one machine gun and
1,052 rifles were captured, and 200 more rifles were
destroyed.
Our own casualties were 12 officers and 134 other
ranks killed and wounded. It was possible to give
every attention to our wounded before moving them
back to El Arish, owing to the fact that the enemy
had a permanent and well-equipped hospital at Mag-
dhaba, to which they were taken as soon as the action
was over.
The troops marched back to El Arish during the
night of December 23rd /24th.
9. On the 27th December the Royal Flying Corps
reported that an entrenched position was being pre-
pared by the enemy at El Magruntein, near Rafa. Work
on this position was continued during the following
day, and it was occupied by a garrison equivalent to
about two battalions, with mountain guns. Since the
railway was only just reaching El Arish, where exten-
sive work on the station and sidings would be necessary,
it was not at the moment possible for me, owing to diffi-
culties of supply, to push on and occupy Rafa perma-
nently. Since, however, the enemy had again placed a
small detached garrison within striking distance of my
mounted troops, I determined, if possible, to repeat the
success at Magdhaba, by surrounding and capturing
the Magruntein position also. I communicated this
decision on 7th January to General Dobell, who en-
trusted the operation to Lieut.-General Sir Philip
Chetwode, Bt., C.B., D.S.O., commanding the Desert
Column, who set out from El Arish on the evening of
THIRD DESPATCH 105
the 8th /9th with a force consisting of the Australian
and New Zealand Mounted Division (less one brigade),
the 5th Mounted Brigade and the Imperial Camel
Corps Brigade, with the Hong Kong and Singapore
Battery attached.
So efficiently and swiftly was the approach-march
carried out that the enemy was completely surprised,
and by dawn on gth January his position was almost
entirely surrounded before he became aware of the
presence of any large forces in his vicinity. The position,
however, was a formidable one. It consisted of three
strong series of works connected by trenches, one series
facing west, one facing south-west, and one facing
south and south-east. The whole was dominated by a
central keep or redoubt, some 2,000 yards south-west
of Rafa. Moreover, the ground in front of these works
was entirely open and devoid of cover, and, in their
immediate neighbourhood, was almost a glacis.
The guns, with which aeroplanes were co-operating,
started to register at 7.20 a.m. The main attack, to
be carried out by Major-General Sir H. G. Chauvel,
K.C.M.G., C.B., General Officer Commanding, Aus-
tralian and New Zealand Mounted Division, was timed
for 10 a.m., with the New Zealand Mounted Rifles
Brigade on the right, attacking from the east, and the
I St Light Horse Brigade on their left, attacking from
the east and south-east, while the Imperial Camel Corps
attacked the works in their front from the south-east.
The 3rd Light Horse Brigade was in reserve, and the
5th Mounted Brigade in column reserve. Shortly after
10 a.m. parties of Turks, who were attempting to leave
Rafa by the Khan Yunus road, were met and cap-
tured by the New Zealand Brigade, who galloped the
Police Barracks and a machine-gun post, capturing six
io6 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Germans (including one officer), two Turkish officers,
and 163 other ranks*
Before 11 a.m. Rafa was occupied, and two regi-
ments of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade were advanced
against the works on the left of the ist Light Horse
Brigade. The ist Light Horse Brigade with the Camel
Brigade was ordered to press its attack on the works
facing south-west, and about the same time the re-
mainder of the New Zealand Brigade, with the ist
Light Horse Brigade, galloped an open space south of
the Police post, and established itself 300 yards east
of the nearest enemy work. The 5th Mounted Brigade
was also ordered to deploy against the western works
and to attack in conjunction with the Camel Brigade.
The encircling movement was now practically complete,
save for a gap in the north-west between the New
Zealand Brigade and the Yeomanry. At 12.20 p.m.
'' B '' Battery, Honourable Artillery Company, moved
forward some 1,500 yards to support the attack of the
5th Mounted Brigade. By i p.m. our troops were within
600 yards of the southern and western trenches, which
were being shelled with good effect by our artillery.
By 2 p.m. the right of the New Zealand Mounted
Rifles Brigade had linked up with the left of the
5th Mounted Brigade, and was pressing its attack on
the rear of one of the enemy works. General Chet-
wode now issued orders for a concerted attack on
the '' Redoubt,'' or central keep, by the New Zealand
Brigade and all other available troops of the Aus-
tralian and New Zealand Mounted Division, to
commence at 3.30 p.m. The 5th Mounted Brigade
was ordered to co-operate against the rear of the
work. By 3.15 two of the enemy's works had been
captured, and further prisoners had been taken.
THIRD DESPATCH 107
While the attack on the central redoubt was develop-
ing, information was received, both from patrols and
from the Royal Flying Corps, that an enemy relieving
force, estimated at 1,500 men, was marching from
Shellal on Rafa. This force was attacked frequently
with bombs and machine-gun fire by our aeroplanes
with success. General Chetwode did not allow this
threat, which complicated his situation, to affect the
execution of his purpose. He at once gave orders for
the attack to be pressed with vigour, and issued instruc-
tions that, if the position were not captured by 5 p.m.,
the engagement was to be broken off, and the force to
be withdrawn under cover of darkness. The troops,
admirably supported by the artillery, advanced with
great gallantry, and at 4.45 p.m. the New Zealand
Brigade captured the redoubt with brilliant dash,
covering the last 800 yards in two rushes supported
by machine-gun fire. By this achievement they were
able to take the lower-lying works in reverse, and these
soon fell to the Camel Brigade, the Yeomanry and the
Australian Light Horse. By 5.30 p.m. all organised
resistance was over, and the enemy's position with all
its garrison was captured, while the 3rd Light Horse
Brigade, which had come in contact with the detach-
ment marching from Shellal, drove off the enemy
without difficulty. The force now withdrew, taking
with them all prisoners, animals and material captured ;
one regiment and a light car patrol, which were left
to clear the battlefield, withdrew unmolested on the
following day.
In this fine action, which lasted for 10 hours, the
entire enemy force, with its commander, was accounted
for. More than 1,600 unwounded prisoners were taken,
including one German officer and five German non-
io8 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
commissioned officers. In addition, six machine guns,
four mountain guns and a number of camels and
mules were captured. Our casualties were compara-
tively light, amounting to 487 in all, of which 71 were
killed, 415 wounded, and one was missing.
ID. The result of these successful operations was
that the province of Sinai, which for two years had been
partially occupied by the Turks, was freed of all formed
bodies of Turkish troops. The destruction of his rear-
guard at Magdhaba compelled the enemy to withdraw
from Maghara, Hassana and Nekhl, all of which were
clear by the 31st December, and the victory at Mag-
runtein had driven him over the frontier at Rafa, which
he did not attempt to reoccupy. For this achievement
I am greatly indebted to Lieut.-General Sir Charles
Dobell, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., and his staff for their
unremitting efforts during the whole period to make
our advance, as it was, rapid and decisive. To them are
mainly due the excellent organisation and dispositions
which ensured success without delay, and, above all,
the perfection of arrangements for maintaining the
troops in a waterless district far ahead of the railway,
without which the dash and endurance of our troops
would have been of no avail. The foresight, rapid
decision and excellent arrangements of General Sir
P. Chetwode and the staff of the Desert Column, the
skilful leadership of General Chauvel, the cheerful
endurance by the troops concerned of the fatigue
and hardships entailed by the Magdhaba operations,
and their gallantry and dash at Magruntein, are also
worthy of the highest praise. During the actions the
work of the Royal Flying Corps in co-operation with
the mounted troops was admirable. Not only were the
enemy harassed with bombs and machine-gun fire
THIRD DESPATCH 109
throughout, but the aircraft reconnaissance was as
reliable as it was untiring. General Chauvel and General
Chetwode were kept constantly and accurately informed
both of the enemy^s movements and of the progress of
their own widely dispersed troops, and the co-opera-
tion of the aircraft with the artillery was excellent.
During the engagement at Magruntein the Royal
Flying Corps, besides attacking the entrenched enemy
and his relieving column, made a very successful raid
on Beersheba.
II. As a result of the action near Rafa the enemy
immediately began to concentrate his forces near Shellal,
west of which place he began rapidly to prepare a
strong defensive position near Weli Sheikh Nuran,
with the object of covering his lines of communication
and supply along the railway running into Beersheba
from the north, and along the Jerusalem — Hebron —
Beersheba road. The preparation of this position has
continued up to the present date. During the earlier
portion of January considerable activity was shown by
the enemy's aircraft, both in reconnaissance and small
bombing raids. On the other hand, the effect of our
recent success on his moral was proved by the very
marked increase in the number of deserters who came
into our lines.
In the meantime arrangements had been progressing
with a view to the concentration of additional troops
towards El Arish, advantage being taken of the altered
military situation in the south to reduce the number
of troops allotted to the direct defences of the Suez
Canal. During the first week in January the 53rd
Division was concentrated complete at Romani. By
the 13th January the 54th Division had been withdrawn
altogether from the Southern Canal Section, and was
no SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
concentrated at Moascar, ready to move north as soon
as might be required. In order to relieve the Desert
Column as far as possible from pre-occupation rear-
ward, the eastern boundary of the Northern Canal
Section was successively moved forward to the neigh-
bourhood of Ma^ar on 3rd January, and to just west of
Ujret el Zol on 24th January.
In the Southern Canal Section the only operation
to record was the emptying and blocking of all except
one of the rock cisterns in the Wadi um Muksheib,
which had filled with water owing to recent rains.
These measures were taken to ensure that lack of water
should prevent an enemy force of any size from moving
against the Canal by one of the southern routes.
Towards the end of January, in accordance with
your Lordship's instructions, I made arrangements
to concentrate the 42nd Division with a view to its
despatch overseas. At the end of the month, accordingly,
this division started from El Arish for Moascar, while
the 53rd Division moved forward to El Arish in its
place, and the 54th Division started from Moascar
for Mazar. In general, the period following the action
at Magruntein was, on my eastern front, devoted to
preparations for a further advance. During the latter
half of January a large supply depot had been formed
at El Arish with a view to building up at that place an
advanced base of sufficient size to support the opera-
tions of three divisions and a mounted division of five
or six brigades. After the railway reached El Arish
a very large amount of work was found to be necessary
in connection with the construction of a station of
sufficient size. For a considerable time, therefore, —
while this work was still incomplete — it was impossible
to run supplies into El Arish itself by rail. Stores and
THIRD DESPATCH iii
supplies had to be detrained at Masaid and carried
forward on camels, which necessarily increased the
difficulties and delays* Invaluable work was done
during this period, however, by the Royal Navy, in
transporting and landing suppHes from the sea at El
Arish whenever the weather made this possible* The
coast is exceptionally unfavourable for operations of
this kind, owing to strong currents, a shelving and
shifting beach, and heavy surf» Nevertheless, owing to
the whole-hearted co-operation of Vice-Admiral Sir
R. E. Wemyss, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., and those
under him, a large amount of stores and supplies was
landed ; and, in the earlier portion of the period, during
which our difficulties were at their greatest, the total
reserve of supplies at El Arish almost exactly corres-
ponded with the amount which had been landed from
the sea. Before the end of the month the railway station
at El Arish was completed, and sea transport of stores
and supplies, being no longer necessary, was eventually
discontinued. By the 31st January the forward con-
struction of the railway had been resumed, and the
track had been laid to a point 1,000 yards east of
El Arish station.
12. During the month of February, on the eastern
front, the railway, in spite of many difficulties owing
to the heavy sand, was gradually pushed out along
the coast from El Arish, till by the end of the
month it was just short of Sheikh Zowaid. The
period generally was devoted to the perfection of
the El Arish position, and to energetic training of
the troops. Our cavalry patrols kept the country
up to and beyond Rafa continuously under obser-
vation, and steps were taken to bring in the local
Bedouins who were becoming troublesome.
112 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
On 23rd February, deserters having given informa-
tion that Khan Yunus had been evacuated, a reconnais-
sance was carried out against that place by the New
Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade. The column, arriving
at dawn, found the position strongly held, and, after
manoeuvring the enemy out of his front line of defence
and capturing prisoners, withdrew without difficulty.
Continuous pressure maintained by our troops in
this neighbourhood, however, induced the enemy to
withdraw the garrison of Khan Yunus, which was
entered by our cavalry without opposition on 28th
February.
On 20th February, General Dobell transferred his
headquarters to El Arish.
During the month also a successful minor operation
was carried out in the interior of the Sinai Peninsula.
Information having been received that the enemy had
re-established small posts at Hassana and Nekhl, with
the object of regaining his prestige in the eyes of the
Bedouins, I ordered a combined operation against
those two places to be undertaken by three mobile
columns of cavalry and camelry, one column starting
from El Arish against Hassana, and two starting from
Serapeum and Suez respectively against Nekhl. The
advance was so timed that all the columns should arrive
at their destinations at dawn on i8th February. The
column from El Arish, which reached Lahfan on the
1 6th, surrounded Hassana by daybreak on the 18th.
The garrison of three officers and 19 other ranks at
once surrendered without resistance. The town was
searched, and a few camels, 21 rifles, and 2,400 rounds
of small arms ammunition were found.
The northernmost of the Nekhl columns, leaving
its point of concentration, some 25 miles east of the
THIRD DESPATCH 113
Great Bitter Lake, on the 14th, marched through the
W» el Baha Pass to Bir el Themada, 25 miles north-
west of Nekhl, where it arrived on the i6th. On the
following day a patrol sent forward towards the Nekhl
— Hassana road was fired on from the hills, and in the
afternoon it was further reported that the road was
clear and that men could be seen leaving Nekhl in
an easterly direction. The advanced patrol captured
four of the enemy and ten camels, but was prevented
from crossing the plain east of Nekhl by rifle fire
from about 50 of the enemy who had temporarily
halted in the foothills on the Nekhl — Akaba (see
Map 2) road. Nekhl was entered that evening by a
squadron of the nth Australian Light Horse Regiment,
who captured two Bedouins and one Turk, the town
being otherwise empty. Further pursuit of the enemy
was impossible owing to darkness, and the remnants
of the garrison were able to make good their escape
eastwards along the waterless road towards Akaba.
The main body entered Nekhl at dawn on the i8th,
and the Southern Column from Suez reached the town
at 9 a.m. The latter column, which included detach-
ments of Indian infantry, had marched from Bir Abu
Tif (20 miles south-east of Suez) through the difficult
W. Abu Garawid pass to Ain Sudr and thence to Nekhl.
The total captures at Nekhl were 11 prisoners, one
field gun, a number of rifles, 16,000 rounds of small
arms ammunition, 250 rounds of gun ammunition,
and a quantity of stores and explosives. These well-
executed and carefully-organised operations gave one
more proof to the enemy of the mobility of our mounted
troops, and of their power to strike over considerable
stretches of waterless desert. The excellent arrange-
ments for the Nekhl operation reflect great credit on
s
114 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Brigadier-General P, C, Palin, C.B., General Officer
Commanding, Southern Canal Section, and his staff.
13. During most of the period under review the
western front had been quiet. My advance to the
Baharia and Dakhla oases was accomplished without
opposition, and the subsequent task on that front was
that of policing its large area and guarding against the
possibility of further raids on the part of the Senoussi
with the minimum number of troops, so that as many
as possible might be set free for operations on the
eastern front.
On 4th October Major-General W. A. Watson,
C.B., CLE., took over the command of the Western
Force. By this date a column had already been con-
centrated at Shusha, three miles west of Samalut, for
the purpose of conducting operations in the Baharia
oasis. A few days later, however, reliable intelligence
was received to the effect that Sayed Ahmed, who had
already left the Dakhla oasis for Baharia, had left
Baharia for Siwa on 9th October, the majority of his
force preceding him, the rearguard following on the
next day. It is probable that the news of my impending
advance and the sickness and lack of food in the oasis,
which impaired the moral of his troops, were deciding
factors in determining his retreat. An immediate en-
deavour to intercept the enemy's rearguard was made
by concentrating all available light armed cars west of
Baharia, but the distance to be covered and the sandy
nature of the country prevented the success of the
attempt. Small mobile columns were at once pushed
into the oases of Baharia (no miles west of Samalut) and
Dakhla (75 miles west of Kharga), and all the enemy
who had not accompanied the retreat, some 300 in
number, were captured with little resistance. The Harra
THIRD DESPATCH 115
wells^ on the edge of the Baharia oasis^ were captured
by a detachment of the Imperial Camel Corps on the
17th, and on the 19th a detachment of the same corps
entered the oasis and took possession of the villages
of Harra, Mendisha, Bawitti^ and Kasr. By the 21st,
this oasis was completely in our possession, and the
Baharia railway, which reached its terminus on the
same date, commenced receiving traffic on the 23rd.
A light car patrol and a detachment of Imperial Camel
Corps, starting from Kharga on the 15th October,
covered 70 miles of desert, and occupied Tenida in
the Dakhla oasis by the 17th* The light cars pushed
on to Budkhulu, capturing a tabur of 45 men and 10
camels, and on the 19th the Camel Corps detachment
reached Bir Sheikh Mohammed, five miles west of
Kasr Dakhla, and captured 40 more prisoners. From
the 20th to the 22nd, a thorough ''drive ** was made of
the oasis, with a systematic search of the villages, which
resulted in the capture of 50 more of the enemy, besides
many political prisoners. By the end of the month
the oasis was entirely clear of the enemy.
During the following month permanent garrisons
were established in these two oases. The Baharia
garrison marched out on 6th November and encamped
on the escarpment at Legalit Gate, where a very healthy
site has been found. The inhabitants, who were un-
doubtedly glad to be rid of the Senoussi, all turned out
to welcome the troops, and so far throughout the oasis
the latter have always been well received. General
Watson himself visited the oasis on i6th November,
and held a durbar on the 17th at Bawitti, which was
attended by the omdas, sheikhs and principal inhabit-
ants. The Union Jack was hoisted in the presence of
a guard of honour. On 15th November a patrol left
ii6 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Legalit to reconnoitre the Farafra oasis. The town
of Farafra was entered on the 19th. All Senoussi
followers were separated from the inhabitants, and a
search made for arms, with the result that 18 Senoussi
prisoners and 12 rifles were taken. The patrol left
Farafra on the 20th.
The successful operation of these two oases enabled
me to commence reducing the Western Force to the
limits necessary for maintaining security along the front,
the chief units to be transferred to the eastern front
being one brigade of dismounted, and two brigades of
mounted, yeomanry, with two batteries of horse artil-
lery. During December, General Watson visited Dakhla
and held a durbar on the 19th. The task of reinstitut-
ing civil administration in both the Baharia and Dakhla
oases has now been taken over by the civil authorities
to the gratification of the inhabitants, and trade is being
encouraged as much as possible. British troops have
now been entirely withdrawn from Dakhla, while the
Baharia oasis is held by a small mobile force of Camel
Corps and motor patrols.
In the other sections of the western front the work
done by the light and armoured cars, owing to the dash
and enterprise of their officers, has been uniformly
excellent. They are the terror of all the ill-disposed
in the Western Desert, and to them, as much as to any,
is due the satisfactory state of things which exists
throughout from the coast down to the Fayum. The
geographical information obtained by these patrols is
also invaluable.
14. During October, under the direction of the
Italian authorities, a combined British and Italian naval
reconnaissance was carried out at El Ageila, 32 miles
west of Mersa Tebruk, where a large camp of fol-
THIRD DESPATCH 117
lowers of Idris and Nuri, with guns and a quantity of
ammunition, was reported* The camp was shelled,
serious casualties being inflicted. On 27th October
a light armoured car patrol, accompanied by Lieut.
Tescione, of the Italian Army, reconnoitred an enemy
camp at Zowia Jansur, the Muhafzia holding the camp
being driven off into the sand dunes by machine-gun
fire. During November and December much valuable
information of the desert routes in the Coastal Section
was obtained by patrols. In the Moghara Section several
attempts were made by the light car patrols to find a
practicable route to the El Qara oasis, but the boggy
ground and high sand dunes on each occasion defeated
the attempt. Towards the end of November an interest-
ing and useful reconnaissance was made from Assuan
through the Kurkur oasis to Beris on the southernmost
end of the Kharga oasis. The total distance covered
was 336 miles.
I5« During the month of January, I received in-
telligence that Sayed Ahmed, the Grand Senoussi, with
his Commander-in-Chief, Mohammed Saleh, whose
force amounted to some 1,200 men, were making pre-
parations to depart from the Siwa oasis and to retire to
Jaghbub. With the intention of capturing Sayed Ahmed,
if possible, and of inflicting as much loss as possible on
his followers, I gave orders on the 21st January that
operations were to be undertaken against the Siwa and
Girba oases (see map) at the earliest possible moment
by a mixed force to consist of Imperial Camel Com-
panies and armoured cars. Preparations for the march
of such a force, however, over the 200 miles of water-
less desert, between Mersa Matruh and Siwa, would
have taken at least one month, and the expenditure
of so much time was put out of the question by a
ii8 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
reliable report received towards the end of the month
that Sayed Ahmed and his followers were on the point
of leaving Siwa. I therefore ordered an immediate
reconnaissance of the Siwa and Girba oases to be under-
taken by a column consisting entirely of armoured
motor-cars, and supplied by motor transport based on
Mersa Matruh, with the object of verifying the above
report and of inflicting as much loss as possible on such
part of the enemy forces as might be met with. Com-
mand of this column was entrusted to Brigadier-General
H. W. Hodgson, C.V.O., C.B., whose plan was to
attack the enemy camp at Girba with his main body,
and to detach two armoured motor batteries to block
the pass at Garet el Munasib — the only pass between
Siwa and Jaghbub practicable for camels — so that
should Sayed Ahmed, as was probable, take to flight,
casualties might be inflicted on his retreating column
by the detached batteries, and his march be deflected
into the waterless sand dunes*
1 6. The fighting force of three light armoured
batteries and three light car patrols, each patrol of
six Ford cars, was concentrated at Mersa Matruh by
the evening of the 29th January. Owing, however,
to a severe sandstorm, some of the heavy lorries of the
heavy supply column did not arrive there from Dhabba
till the 31st. The light supply column of 40 Ford vans
moved out from Mersa Matruh on the same day, and
the fighting force moved out early the following morn-
ing* The column, having halted for the night on the
road, moved on the morning of the 2nd February to
the point of concentration half-way between Gebel
Lamlaz and Neqb el Shegga pass, 185 miles from
Matruh. This long march over the desert track was
carried out in good time, and all units reached the point
mapofsiwa oasis
THIRD DESPATCH 119
of concentration by 12 o'clock. After a reconnaissance
towards the Siwa oasis, orders were given for an advance
on Girba — at the western end of the Siwa oasis — on
the following day, and for the move of the detachment
allotted to block the Munasib pass.
By 9 a.m. on 3rd February all units had success-
fully descended the pass north-east of Girba and moved
off to the attack, the advanced guard being divided into
three parties of two armoured cars each, one of which
was to attack each of the three enemy camps already
located. The enemy was located in rough ground
close under the rocky escarpment ; he was completely
siirprised by the arrival of the armoured cars, and
thrown into considerable confusion. Brisk fire was
opened on the enemy, who at once took to the cliffs
and rocks beyond the camps and returned our fire.
The advanced guard was now reinforced, but, owing to
the very rough nature of the country, it was impossible
for the cars to approach nearer than a distance of 800
yards from the enemy without serious risk of getting
stuck. As the action progressed, it became evident
that the enemy, who was engaging the armoured cars
with two guns and two machine guns, was in consider-
able force and did not intend to retire without a fight.
Information obtained from deserters showed that the
strength of the enemy at Girba was 850, while Sayed
Ahmed, Mohammed Saleh and some 400 or 500 men
were at Siwa. As afterwards appeared, Mohammed
Saleh left to take command at Girba at the beginning
of the engagement, while Sayed Ahmed and his force
made off to the westward. General Hodgson, who made
skilful arrangements for extricating his force, in case
of a threat directed by the Siwa party on his left flank
and rear, continued the action all day. The light
120 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
armoured cars, though unable to get closer than 400
yards from the enemy's position, kept the enemy under
an accurate fire, inflicting some casualties. Towards
evening, the enemy's fire died down, though occasional
bursts were fired from his machine guns during the
night.
At 5 a.m. on the 4th February, the enemy fired
four final rounds from his guns and several bursts of
machine-gun fire. Fires were seen beyond his camp,
movements of men and animals could be distinguished,
and the sound of small-arms ammunition being burnt
was heard. By dawn he had completely evacuated his
position. The rest of the day was spent in destroying
the enemy's camp, reconnoitring towards Siwa and
resting the troops, and on the following morning, 5th
February, the column entered Siwa without opposition.
A parade, at which the local sheikhs were assembled,
was held before the court-house, and a salute of nine
guns fired with a Krupp gun that had been brought
from Matruh in a motor lorry. Arrangements were
then made for the collection of all rifles and for the
repair of the passes leading down to the escarpment.
The reception given to our troops by the inhabitants
of the oasis was friendly, and reports from them con-
firmed the fact that the enemy had incurred consider-
able casualties. The column left the town on the same
afternoon, and reached the point of concentration on
the following day.
Meanwhile, the Munasib detachment, consisting of
three armoured cars and a light car patrol, had reached
its position on the evening of the 3rd February. It was
found impossible to get the armoured cars down the
steep escarpment, and they were forced to remain at a
point 18 miles north of Munasib during the operations.
THIRD DESPATCH 121
The light car patrol and one Ford car managed to get
down the escarpment and take up a position at Munasib*
On the 4th this detachment captured a small convoy
of mail-bags proceeding east to Siwa, and on the 5th
it was able to intercept and cut up the leading parties
of the enemy retreating from Girba. Subsequently,
the enemy established a post out of reach of the cars,
and warned all subsequent parties of the enemy to
turn into the sand dunes before reaching the pass.
The detachment was therefore ordered to return to
the point of concentration, as there was no chance of
further successful action. The whole column returned
to Matruh on the 8th February, having sustained no
casualties to personnel beyond three officers slightly
wounded, or to material besides the loss of one tender
with broken springs. The enemy's losses were 40 killed,
including two Senoussi officers, and 200 wounded,
including five Turkish officers ; 70 rifles were brought
in and 150 destroyed ; 3,000 rounds of small-arms
ammunition were brought in and 2,000 destroyed,
besides what was burnt by the enemy ; 40 of the
enemy's camels were killed, and a large number of
shelters and tents were burnt,
17. Though the capture of Sayed Ahmed and
Mohammed Saleh was wanting to the complete success
of the operations, the fighting troops — supported most
admirably by the supply column working under ex-
tremely arduous conditions — accomplished all that was
possible under the circumstances, and great credit is
due to General Hodgson and his staff. The expedition,
which, at my request, was accompanied by Captain
Caccia, the Italian Military Attache, dealt a rude blow
to the moral of the Senoussi, left the Grand Senoussi
himself painfully making his way to Jaghbub through
122 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
the rugged and waterless dunes, and freed my western
front from the menace of his forces*
On 14th February, No. 2 Light Armoured Car
Battery left Solium to reconnoitre the road to Melfa.
During this reconnaissance two enemy caravans were
met and destroyed.
Preparations are now being made to maintain a small
force in a fortified camp a few miles north of the Siwa
oasis, in order to protect the inhabitants, and deal with
any raiding parties of the enemy that may appear. At
the same time, as a result of the above operations, I
have been able to make a considerable further reduction
in the fighting troops on the western front for the
benefit of the eastern theatre.
18. The outstanding features of the period covered
by this despatch have been, on the eastern front the
rapid progress of the railways, and on the western front
the work of the armoured cars. For the speed at which
the railway has been pushed out along the desert to
El Arish and beyond, the greatest credit is due to Colonel
Sir G. Macauley, K.C.M.G., C.B., Director of Rail-
ways, the officers of his staff, and the officers and men
of the railway companies. In spite of endless difficulties
owing to heavy sand and lack of water, they maintained,
by their strenuous efforts, a rate of advance which was
not far behind that of the fighting troops, and were
largely instrumental in enabling the latter to keep the
enemy under a continual pressure.
I have already referred to the excellent work of the
armoured cars and light car patrols on the western
front. Their mobility, and the skill and energy with
which they are handled, have made them an ideal arm
for the Western Desert, where the sand is not so heavy
as on the east. It is not too much to say that the success-
THIRD DESPATCH 123
ful clearance of the western oases, and the satisfactory
state of affairs which now exists on the western front,
is due more to the dash and enterprise of the armoured
car batteries and the light car patrols than to any other
cause, and the enemy has found many times to his
cost that their range of action is far beyond that of any
troops mounted on horses or camels.
The work of the Imperial Camel Corps has been
excellent throughout. Three battalions of this corps
have now been organised into a brigade, to which
the Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery
has been attached. This brigade has formed a most
valuable unit for operations on the eastern front.
The Imperial Camel Corps includes Australian, New
Zealand and Imperial units, and the efficiency of the
camel companies is largely due to the efforts of the
instructional staff at the headquarters of the corps at
Abbassia, which has been continuously engaged in
their training.
A great deal of the work of supplying the troops
on both fronts has been done by the Camel Transport
Corps, a unit which has been raised in this country
since the commencement of operations, and which
has invariably carried out its duties with the utmost
efficiency.
The execution of the enormous amount of work
necessitated by our advance on the eastern front would
have been quite impossible had it not been for the
Egyptian Labour Corps, which began to be recruited
in this country early in 19 16, and has now been in-
creased to nearly 50,000 men, with recruiting depots,
rest camps, and administrative centres of its own.
The officers of this corps have been largely found among
gentlemen who are resident in this country, and were
124 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
familiar with the language and customs of the popula-
tion. The work of the Egyptian Labour Corps has not
only been invaluable in this country, but detachments
of it, sent to other theatres of war, have already won
the highest appreciation.
My relations with the High Commissioner-General,
Sir F, R. Wingate, G.C.B,, G,C,V,0., K.GM.G.,
D.S.O., have always been most cordial, and I should
like to convey my gratitude for his ready assistance
and valuable advice, which have always been at my
disposal.
Now that the service of King's Messengers from
England to Egypt has been discontinued, I wish to
express my grateful appreciation of the services of all
the officers employed in this responsible work. The
risks involved were not small, as is proved by the fact
that one officer was drowned, and another, when his
ship was torpedoed, was forced to sink his despatches ;
nevertheless, this duty has always been faithfully and
efficiently performed.
I have, in a former despatch, referred to the admir-
able work of the Red Cross and Order of St. John in
this country, under the direction of Sir Courtauld
Thomson, C.B. I desire now to express my obliga-
tion to those ladies and gentlemen who have given
voluntary aid in connection with these institutions,
and who have worked with a devotion deserving of
the highest praise, in the interests of the sick and
wounded. Not only have they earned the gratitude
of the individuals they looked after, but also they
deserve the thanks of their country, as they have
materially contributed towards the rapid convalescence
and, therefore, to the maintenance of the fighting
efficiency of the Forces under my command.
THIRD DESPATCH 125
The operations which I have had the honour to
describe in this despatch, and which have resulted in
the freeing of Egyptian territory of all formed bodies
of the enemy, could not have been successfully carried
out by the Forces in the field, but for the devotion,
energy and skill of the Headquarters Staff and Heads
of the Administrative Services.
I have on previous occasions expressed my apprecia-
tion of the able manner in which Major-General A. L.
Lynden-Bell, C.B., C.M.G., Chief of the General Staff,
has discharged his duties. I wish again to bring this
officer prominently to notice for his admirable work
during the period under review.
The abolition of the Inspector-Generalship, Lines
of Communication, has thrown upon my Deputy
Quartermaster-General, Major-General W. Campbell,
C.B., D.S.O., and my Deputy Adjutant - General,
Major-General J. Adye, C.B., the whole of the work
previously performed by the Inspector - General of
Communications, and these duties they have had to
discharge in addition to the normal work in connection
with an army in the field. Moreover, my chief base
at Alexandria is not only the base for the supply of the
forces under my command, but is practically a clearing-
house for stores for all campaigns in the East. The
eastward advance has also now lengthened the lines
of communication to something like 200 miles. I
wish, therefore, specially to acknowledge the excel-
lent work done by these two officers, and I shall have
the pleasure of bringing before you the names of a
number of officers of the Administrative Services in
this connection.
I wish to bring to your notice the excellent manner
in which my Assistant Military Secretary, Lieut.-
126 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
Colonel S. H, Pollen, CM^G^ has performed the
exceptionally heavy work of his department.
A list of those officers, non-commissioned officers
and men whom I desire to bring to your special notice
in connection with these operations will be forwarded
at an early date.
I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
(Signed) A. J. MURRAY, General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
FOURTH DESPATCH
2Sth June, 19 17
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LIEUTENANT. GENERAL SIR I'. \V. CHETWOIIE, HART., K.C..ALG., C.13., D.S.O.
FOURTH DESPATCH
From —
The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
To—
The Secretary of State for War,
War Office, London, S,W,
General Headquarters^
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
2Sth June, igiy.
My Lord,
I have the honour to submit a report on the opera-
tions of the Force under my command from ist March
to 28th June, 1 9 17.
!♦ Before entering into a detailed account of the
operations during this period, the main events of which
were the enemy^s voluntary retirement from his position
at Weli Sheikh Nuran and the two battles in front of
Gaza, I think it necessary to point out that the policy
of the War Cabinet, as communicated to me in instruc-
tions from the War Office, underwent several changes
between the end of 19 16 and April, 19 17. In October,
1916/ I was informed that the policy in Egypt was
to be mainly defensive, though it was hoped that all
preparations were being made for an advance on El
Arish. With this policy, including the plan of occupying,
if possible. El Arish, I agreed,^ though I stated at the
' W.O. letter 01/45/151, 4.10.16.
» My letter. No. G.S.Z./33/1, 31. 10.16.
I 129
130 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
same time that my previous estimate of the number of
troops necessary for holding and operating from El
Arish — namely, five divisions and at least four mounted
brigades — still held good, but that with the four divi-
sions then at my disposal, the 42nd, 52nd, 53rd and
54th, I was prepared to defend Egypt and undertake
the advance on El Arish, This advance, as I reported
in my despatch of ist March, 19 17, was successfully
accomplished by the end of December,
Meanwhile, early in the month of December, I
was asked by telegram^ to send my proposals for action
beyond El Arish, and to state the additional troops
which I should require to carry them out ; and it was
pointed out to me that the gaining of a military success
in this theatre was very desirable. In my reply ^ I asked
that two divisions might be sent to me, and, if possible,
some more mounted troops. A further telegram^ was
sent to me on 12th December, instructing me to make
the maximum effort possible during the winter, and
inquiring when the two divisions for which I had asked
would be required. I replied * that, while I was prepared
to attempt the advance to Rafa with only four divisions,
I considered that one additional division was now
necessary to ensure security and to hold, and operate
from. El Arish — thus once more repeating my original
estimate that five divisions would be required for this
purpose — and that another division would be needed,
not before 15th February, for a further advance from
Rafa towards Palestine, At the same time I forwarded*
in detail the plan on which I have since worked for my
* W.O. telegram. No. 26174, cipher, 9.12. 16.
' My telegram. No. A.M. 1380, 10. 12. 16.
" W.O. telegram. No. 26289, cipher, 12. 12. 16.
" My telegram, No. A.M. 1389, 13. 12. 16.
■' My letter, G.S.Z./33/1, 13. 12.16.
FOURTH DESPATCH 131
further advance along the sea coast into Palestine,
The next communication ^ which I received (dated 15th
December) indicated that the War Cabinet were not
prepared to give me the troops asked for, I was in-
formed that, notwithstanding recent instructions to
make the maximum effort possible during the winter,
my primary mission was the defence of Egypt, and that
I should be notified if and when the War Cabinet
changed this policy. I was further informed that no
more mounted troops could be sent, and that the possi-
bility of my getting two more divisions depended on
whether they could be released from another theatre of
war. No further indications of policy were given me
till after the occupation of El Arish, but early in January
it appeared that the War Cabinet had decided to make
everything subsidiary to the concentration of strong
forces in France, A telegram^ of i ith January informed
me that the War Cabinet had decided that, as the
general situation would not permit of sending out the
reinforcements for which I had asked, the undertaking
of any operations in Palestine on a large scale should be
postponed until the autumn, and that, while preparing
for this campaign during the summer, I was to be ready
to release one or two divisions for France, A few days
later, definite instructions arrived^ to send a division to
France, acting on which I withdrew the 42nd Division
— then the best in my force — forthwith, and it sailed
early in March, This indication of a changed policy
was confirmed by a letter* of nth January, in which I
was informed of the acceptance by the War Cabinet
in principle of an autumn campaign in Palestine, and
1 W.O. telegram. No. 26624, cipher, 15. 12.16.
' W.O. telegram, No. 27761, cipher, 11.1.17.
»W.O. telegram. No. 28297, cipher, 22.1. i7«
*W.O. letter 01 /45/151, 11.1.17.
132 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
instructed that my primary mission, after the occupa-
tion of Rafa, was the defence of Egypt during the
summer months and the preparation of an offensive
campaign in the autumn. In reply ^ to this, I again
stated that I adhered to my estimate of the need of
five divisions to safeguard Egypt, hold El Arish, and
protect the Suez Canal.
Between the end of January and the end of March,
though I was now reduced to three infantry divisions,
I made every effort as far as possible to keep up the
offensive. Owing to the satisfactory state of affairs
in the Canal defences and in the west, I was now able
to employ all three of my divisions on the eastern front,
to concentrate all my mounted troops in two mounted
divisions, and to commence the formation of the 74th
Division from the dismounted yeomanry brigades in
the force. Several months, however, were bound to
elapse before this division could be completely equipped,
efficiently trained and supplied with its full complement
of divisional troops. Early in March, to my disappoint-
ment, the enemy, whom I had every hope of success-
fully attacking in his position at Weli Sheikh Nuran,
evacuated this position before our troops were within
reach of him. It was to prevent a repetition of these
tactics and to bring the Turks to fight that I determined
to attack the Gaza position as soon as possible, con-
sidering that the advantage of thus exerting pressure
on the enemy, and possibly taking Gaza by a coup de
main, would outweigh the risk of making the attack in
a waterless country considerably in advance of rail-head.
Though the coup de main just failed, the military
results of the first battle of Gaza, in my opinion, justified
my anticipations. The enemy was brought to fight,
> My letter G.S.Z./33/i> 30.1. 17.
FOURTH DESPATCH 133
losing heavily in killed and wounded, and the advance
of the railway to Wadi Ghuzze was assured. It was at
this time, the end of March, when the hitherto adverse
situation in Mesopotamia was rapidly changing in our
favour, that the War Cabinet again changed the policy
in this theatre* In a telegraphic communication^ dated
30th March, I was instructed, in view of the altered
situation, to make my object the defeat of the Turks
south of Jerusalem and the occupation of Jerusalem.
I replied,^ drawing attention once more to my never-
varying estimate of the troops required, that a rapid
advance could not be expected unless I were fortunate
enough to inflict a severe blow on the enemy, and that
heavy fighting with considerable losses would have to
be expected if the Turks held, as I anticipated, a
series of strong positions between the Gaza — Beersheba
and the Jerusalem — Jaffa lines. After consideration of
this reply by the War Cabinet, I was informed^ that
the War Cabinet relied on me to pursue the enemy with
all the rapidity compatible with the necessary progress
of my communications, and was anxious that I should
push my operations with all energy, though at the
same time no additional troops were to be sent to me,
since it was considered that, in view of the military
situation of the enemy, my present force would suffice.
At that time, as always, I had fully appreciated the
importance of offensive operations in this theatre, and,
having failed to take Gaza by a coup de maiTif I was
anxious to take it, if possible, by more deliberate opera-
tions before the enemy was further reinforced, chiefly
on account of its water-supply. I was therefore ready,
as I stated at the time, to attack Gaza with my present
' W.O. telegram, No. 31854, cipher, 30.3.17.
^ My telegram. No. A.M. 1749, 31.3.17.
'W.O. telegram, No. 31955, cipher, 1.4.17, No. 32017, cipher, 2.4.17.
134 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
force before the end of April, and had good hopes,
provided the enemy was not heavily reinforced, of
capturing that town.
The second battle of Ga^a took place between the
17th and 20th April. I succeeded in pushing on to
within a mile or two of the town, but was unable to
take the key of the position, Ali el Muntar. The enemy
force in front of me was then five divisions, with con-
siderably increased numbers of Austrian and German
gunners and machine-gunners, and it was abundantly
clear that, owing to the relaxation of pressure further
cast, the Turks had been able to reinforce their units
heavily from depots in the north of Palestine.
When, therefore, after the second battle of Gaza, I
was asked ^ to state my requirements for a continuation
of the offensive, I replied ^ that my estimate of five fully-
equipped and complete divisions still held good, where-
as, at present, I had only three considerably depleted
by recent fighting, one just formed and incompletely
trained, and six battalions — the majority far from fit —
towards the formation of a fifth division. My require-
ments, therefore, were two complete divisions and
enough field artillery to complete all divisions to a
normal scale. With the troops which I had at the time
I could hope for no more than a local success. In view
of this position and the inability of the Russian Army
in the Caucasus to relieve the pressure, the War Cabinet
decided to change the policy, and at the end of April
I was informed^ that Jerusalem was no longer my
objective, but that my mission for the present was to
take favourable opportunity of defeating the Turkish
forces opposed to me and to follow up any success
' W.O. telegram. No. 33191, cipher, 21.4.17.
' My telegram. No. O. 328, 22.4.17.
'■' W.O, telegram, No. 33394, cipher, 25.4.17.
FOURTH DESPATCH 135
gained with all the means at my disposal. To this task
I devoted my energies throughout the month of May,
during which time I was engaged in broadening my
front by laying down branch railway and pipe-lines
from Rafa eastwards and south-eastwards to the Wadi
Ghuzze, so that I might eventually effectually threaten
Beersheba and the railway north of that place. Thanks
to the unremitting labour of all concerned, in spite of
immense difficulties, these preparations are now well
advanced, and we are now in a position to take the
offensive in any part of the line from Gaza to Beersheba,
though the date of the offensive must depend upon
when my deficit of 9,000 infantry can be made good
by drafts, and when reinforcements can arrive from
Salonica.
It would be of interest, as this is my last despatch,
to review shortly here how the Egyptian Expeditionary
Force has varied in strength between the beginning of
1916 and the present time.
At the end of January, 19 16, besides a small portion
of the 46th Division, there were in Egypt, either in
the Egyptian Expeditionary Force or in the Force in
Egypt, the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Divi-
sion, three mounted yeomanry brigades, the Imperial
Service Cavalry Brigade, and three double companies
Bikanir Camel Corps, 11 infantry divisions (including
the Australian and New Zealand troops), one Indian
infantry division, three dismounted yeomanry brigades,
two Territorial infantry brigades, two brigades of 60-
pounders, and the equivalent of three brigades of siege
artillery, besides garrison battalions and other minor
units. The South African Infantry Brigade subse-
quently arrived in this country.
Between this time and the end of May, 191 6, six
136 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
complete divisions at full strength, three infantry bri-
gades, and nine batteries of heavy and siege artillery,
besides certain signal, engineer and medical units, were
embarked for service in other theatres. Meanwhile,
the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions had been formed,
the dismounted yeomanry organised in four brigades,
six companies of the Imperial Camel Corps raised and
trained, and the Camel Transport Corps raised to a
strength of 18,000. So that in May, the Force in Egypt
having now been amalgamated with the Egyptian Ex-
peditionary Force, the following were the principal
components of the Force : — One mounted division,
three mounted yeomanry brigades, the Imperial Service
Cavalry Brigade (less one regiment), six companies
Imperial Camel Corps, six companies Bikanir Camel
Corps, seven infantry divisions,' four dismounted bri-
gades, seven battalions of Indian infantry, three batteries
of 6o-pounders.
During June and July, 19 16, the 4th and 5th Aus-
tralian Divisions and the nth Division embarked for
France, thus bringing the total number of troops sent
out of the country since January to 232,000, not
including medical units. Between this time and the
end of February, 19 17, no material change took place
in the composition of the Egyptian Expeditionary
Force, save that three further companies, Bikanir
Camel Corps, arrived, additional companies of the
Camel Corps were raised (the total number of com-
panies is now 18), the Camel Transport Corps was
also considerably increased, and the Egyptian Labour
Corps, the recruitment of which had begun early in
1916, had reached a total of nearly 50,000.
During the period covered by this report the 42nd
Division has sailed for France, the 74th Division has
FOURTH DESPATCH 137
been formed from three of the dismounted brigades
(one having been previously disbanded), with the
necessary divisional troops ; the 75th Division has
been formed from battalions that have arrived from
India and elsewhere and Indian infantry battalions.
The arrival of an additional mounted brigade from
Salonica has enabled me to reorganise my mounted
troops into three mounted divisions, each of three
mounted brigades. One more mounted brigade and
the 60th Division are in process of arrival from Salonica,
and reinforcements of heavy artillery (some of which
have already arrived) are en route. So that at the present
the composition of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
allowing for reorganisation now actually in progress,
is : — Three mounted divisions (each of three brigades),
four infantry divisions, one further infantry division
in process of formation and one division en route, 18
companies Imperial Camel Corps, nine companies
Bikanir Camel Corps, with a tenth now in process of
formation ; six batteries of 60-pounders, two siege
batteries and a prospective total of 7J siege batteries
of heavy howitzers. In other words, the present fight-
ing units of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, when
all advised reinforcements have arrived, will form the
equivalent of one cavalry corps and two infantry corps,
with the necessary artillery.
Having thus summarised these main developments
of policy and variations of strength, I now proceed to
the more detailed narrative.
2. At the beginning of March the Eastern Force,
under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Charles
Dobell, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., was concentrated in
the neighbourhood of El Arish. The headquarters of
the Desert Column, under the command of Lieut.-
138 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
General Sir P. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.M^G,, C.B., D,S.O.,
were at Sheikh Zowaid, in advance of which place
the mounted troops of the column were covering the
construction of the railway, which was being rapidly
extended along the coast towards Rafa. Our mounted
patrols, as I reported in my last despatch, had on 28th
February entered the village of Khan Yunus, which
had been evacuated by the enemy. Every preparation
was being made for an attack in force on the strong
position at Weli Sheikh Nuran, upon which the Turks
had been working incessantly since the beginning of
January. On 5th March, however, aeroplane recon-
naissance established the fact that the enemy had de-
cided not to face our attack and was evacuating this
carefully prepared position. I at once instructed the
General Officer Commanding, Eastern Force, to do
all that was possible either to prevent this evacuation
or to inflict loss on the enemy during its execution,
and the Royal Flying Corps were ordered to carry
out bomb attacks with the utmost energy against the
enemy's communications. Accordingly, on 6th March
and the following days vigorous attacks were made by
our aircraft on the railway at Beersheba, Tel el Sharia
and the junction station on the Jerusalem — Er Ramie
line ; but it was found impossible for our infantry or
mounted troops to make any effective move against the
enemy, owing to the distance between rail-head and
Weli Sheikh Nuran. The enemy had retired while he
was still out of reach, and his troops, which then con-
sisted of about two divisions, were subsequently dis-
tributed between Gaza and Tel el Sharia, with a small
garrison at Beersheba.
It thus became necessary to meet an altered situa-
tion, which was complicated by complete uncertainty
FOURTH DESPATCH 139
as to the line on which the enemy would ultimately
elect to stand, and also to decide on the method and
direction of my advance into Palestine. I decided that
it would in any case be unwise to make an attempt on
Beersheba, since by so doing I should be drawing my
line of communications parallel to the enemy's front,
and there was no technical advantage to be gained
by linking up the military railway with the Central
Palestine Railway, either at Beersheba or Tel el Sharia.
The true line of advance was still along the coast,
since the enemy was no less effectually threatened
thereby, while my line of communications was more
easily protected and railway construction was more
rapid, owing to the absence of gradients. The coastal
district, too, was better supplied with water. I decided
therefore to continue for the present a methodical
advance up the coast, moving troops forward as the
railway could supply them, together with energetic
preparation of the force for an attack in strength as
soon as the state of its communications should make
that possible. The most important thing was to in-
crease the radius and mobility of the striking force.
The Desert Column was therefore reconstituted to
consist of the two cavalry divisions (each less one bri-
gade) — the concentration of the Imperial Mounted
Division, under Major - General H. W. Hodgson,
C.V.O., C.B., being completed at Sheikh Zowaid by
1 6th March — and the 53rd Division, together with
two light armoured motor batteries. Local arrange-
ments were also made by which improvised trains,
both of horses and camels, should be available for the
three infantry and two cavalry divisions in the Eastern
Force. At the same time, the Imperial Camel Corps
Brigade was constituted as an independent unit of three
140 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
battalions, Imperial Camel Corps, with a proportion
of brigade troops, including the Hong Kong and Singa-
pore Battery; and the three infantry brigades which
had been formed out of the dismounted yeomanry regi-
ments were combined into the 74th Division, under the
command of Major-General E. S. B. Girdwood. This
division, however, had no artillery or other divisional
troops ; its brigades had to be gradually collected from
different parts of Egypt, and it needed a period of
divisional training before it could take its place beside
the three other infantry divisions in the force. Its
headquarters arrived at El Arish on 6th March, and its
first brigade at the same place on 8th March. I was
enabled to form this division by the continued quiet-
ness of the western front, which made it possible to
amalgamate the Delta District and Western Force into
one command, which was entrusted to Brigadier-
General H. G. Casson, C.M.G., and to garrison the
posts on the western front entirely with garrison
battalions, light armoured motor batteries and light
car patrols, and the Bikanir Camel Corps.
3. By the middle of the month the railway had
reached Rafa, and the work of making a large station
there, with the requisite sidings, was being rapidly
pushed on. The Desert Column was between Rafa and
Sheikh Zowaid, the 52nd Division was at Sheikh Zo-
waid, and the 54th Division between that place and El
Arish. There were distinct indications that the enemy
intended to withdraw his troops without a fight from the
Gaza — Tel el Sharia — Beersheba line, a move which it
was highly important to prevent, while it was necessary
to seize the line of the Wadi Ghuzze in order to protect
the advance of the railway from Rafa towards Gaza.
The chief difficulty lay in deciding, in view of these
FOURTH DESPATCH 141
considerations, the exact moment when it would be
wise to abandon the methodical advance and to push
out to its full radius of action a considerable force into
a country bare of all supplies and almost devoid of water.
I came to the conclusion that it would be necessary
to push forward the Desert Column as soon as it could
be supplied from Rafa Station, and the two other in-
fantry divisions could be maintained in support of it
between Rafa and the Wadi Ghu2;2;e. It appeared that
these conditions would be fulfilled shortly before the
end of the month. I therefore instructed the General
Officer Commanding, Eastern Force, to concentrate
the Desert Column about Deir el Belah, a small village
to the south-west of the Wadi Ghu^ze, with one of the
supporting divisions on the ridge to the east of Deir
el Belah and the other in the neighbourhood of Khan
Yunus, with the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade to
cover the right flank of the force* When these disposi-
tions were completed, the Desert Column, with the
Imperial Camel Corps Brigade attached, was to march
on Gaza, thus giving the enemy the alternative of stand-
ing his ground and fighting, or of submitting to the
attacks of our cavalry on his flanks and rear, should he
attempt to retire.
On the 2oth March, General Dobell moved his
headquarters to Rafa, whither, on the same day. Head-
quarters, Desert Column, moved from Sheikh Zowaid.
The further preliminary moves, covered by the cavalry,
who on the 23rd approached very near the outskirts
of Gaza, were completed without any hitch by the
25th March. By the evening of that date the whole of
the Desert Column were concentrated at Deir el Belah,
the 54th Division was at In Seirat under the hills to
the east of Deir el Belah, the 52nd Division at Khan
142 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Yunus, and the Camel Corps Brigade and armoured
batteries about Abasan el Kebir» All preliminary re-
connaissances had been carried out^ and the orders
to the General Officer Commanding, Desert Column,
were to advance on Gaza in the early hours of the
following morning, the cavalry pushing out to the east
and north of the town to block the enemy's lines of
retreat, while the 53rd Division attacked Gaza in front*
The 54th Division was to cross the Wadi Ghuzze in
rear of the mounted troops of the Desert Column to
a position of readiness in the neighbourhood of Sheikh
Abbas, a commanding ridge five miles S.S.E. of Gaza,
where a position was to be selected suitable for defence
against an attack from east or south-east. One infantry
brigade and one artillery brigade of this division were
to assemble at a convenient point to the west of this
position, where they would be held in readiness to
reinforce the Desert Column at short notice. One
brigade group of the 52nd Division was to be brought
up to replace the 54th Division at In Seirat. The
enemy's main body was in the Nejed — Huj area,
south of the Wadi el Hesi, covered by detachments
about Gaza, Sharia — Abu Hereira and Beersheba,
His strength appeared to be between two and three
divisions.
The object of this advance was three-fold : firstly,
to seize the line of the Wadi Ghuzze to cover the
advance of the railway ; secondly, at all costs to prevent
the enemy from retiring without a fight ; thirdly, if
possible, to capture Gaza by a coup de main and to
cut off its garrison.
On 25th March I set up my Advanced General
Headquarters at El Arish for the period of the opera-
tions, and on the following morning Battle Headquarters
FOURTH DESPATCH 143
of Eastern Force were established just north of In
Seirat.
4* Early in the morning of 26th March the pre-
liminary movements were begun and successfully
accomplished. The Australian and New Zealand
Mounted Division left its bivouacs at 2*30 a.m, and
crossed the Wadi Ghu2;2e, closely followed by the
Imperial Mounted Division, The leading division
headed for Beit Durdis, five miles east of Gaza, having
completed its crossing of the Wadi by 6.15 a.m. The
Imperial Mounted Division, after crossing the Wadi,
headed due east for El Mendur, where it arrived at
9.30. The moves of the mounted divisions, as well
as of the infantry, were considerably delayed by a
very dense fog, which came on just before dawn and
did not entirely clear till 8 a.m. This unavoidable
delay had a serious effect upon the subsequent opera-
tions. The Imperial Camel Corps Brigade crossed the
Wadi Ghuz^e a little further south, and also proceeded
to El Mendur, where its role was to assist the Imperial
Mounted Division in observing the enemy in the
direction of Huj and Hereira, and to withstand any
attempts to relieve Gaza from those directions. At
9.30 a.m. the Australian and New Zealand Mounted
Division reached Beit Durdis, and pushed out de-
tachments to the west, north and east. In the course
of these movements the 2nd Australian Light Horse
Brigade closed the exit from Gaza and rested their
right on the sea. A detachment of this brigade captured
the Commander of the 53rd Turkish Division, with
his staff, while he was driving into Gaza ; also a convoy
of 30 Turks. Later in the morning the same brigade
destroyed the head of a Turkish column with machine-
gun fire as it debouched from Gaza in a north-easterly
144 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
direction. The Imperial Mounted Division sent out
patrols towards Hereira, Tel el Sharia and Huj, while
two squadrons of the 5th Mounted Brigade were placed
astride the Beersheba — Ga2;a road^ about five miles
south-east of Gaza, and one squadron was sent north
to gain touch with the Australian and New Zealand
Mounted Division. Later in the morning these squad-
rons found themselves engaged with enemy mounted
troops, supported by bodies of infantry, and remained
so throughout the day against continuously increas-
ing numbers. They were also exposed to the fire of
heavy guns at Hereira, and suffered some casualties in
consequence.
Meanwhile, the 53rd Division, under the command
of Major-General A. G. Dallas, C.B., C.M.G., having
thrown forward strong bridge-heads before dawn,
crossed the Wadi Ghuzze at a point some three miles
from the sea-coast, with the 158th Brigade on the right
directed on the Mansura ridge, and the i6oth Brigade
on the left directed on El Sheluf, some two miles south
of Ga2;a on the ridge running south-west from that
place. The 159th Brigade was held in reserve, and
crossed in rear of 158th Brigade. The Gloucestershire
Hussars, with a battalion and a section of 60-pounders,
crossed the Wadi near the sea-coast, and for the re-
mainder of the day successfully carried out their role
of working up the sandhills to cover the left of the
53rd Division, and to keep the enemy employed be-
tween the village of Sheikh Ahmed and Gaza. At the
same time the divisional squadron secured a good gun
position and an excellent observation station for another
section of 60-pounders on the far side of the Wadi
Ghuzze, in the neighbourhood of the main road from
Gaza to Khan Yunus. The 54th Division, under the
FOURTH DESPATCH 145
command of Major-General S, W, Hare^ C.B., began
to cross the Wadi at 7 a.m., and the 162nd and 163rd
Brigades proceeded to take up a defensive position on
the Sheikh Abbas ridge, south-east of Gaza. These
brigades remained in their positions throughout the
day without coming into action. The i6ist Brigade,
with a brigade of field artillery, remained in the vicinity
of the Wadi, so as to be at the disposal of the General
Officer Commanding, 53rd Division, when required.
During the morning this brigade was ordered to Man-
sura, to come under the orders of the General Officer
Commanding, 53rd Division, and it finally assembled
at that point about 3.30 in the afternoon. After the
preliminary reconnaissances had been completed, the
53rd Division commenced to deploy from the line El
Sheluf — Mansura, to attack the Ali Muntar position,
with the following objectives : — The i6oth Brigade
astride the El Sheluf — Ali Muntar ridge on the enemy's
south-western defences ; the 158th Brigade moving
north from Mansura on the prominent AH Muntar
ridge on the southern outskirts of the town ; and the
159th Brigade, less one battalion in divisional reserve,
pivoting on the right of the 158th Brigade on the hill
1,200 yards north-east of Ali Muntar, in co-operation
with the attack of the 158th Brigade. The deploy-
ment of the i6oth and 158th Brigades commenced at
11.50 a.m., and the 159th Brigade moved forward
shortly afterwards to its assigned position. In co-
operation with artillery fire and long-range machine-
gun fire, the i6oth Brigade pressed forward along the
ridge, and the 158th and 159th Brigades over the flat,
open ground, practically devoid of cover. The final
advance, which began just after i p.m., was very steady,
and all the troops behaved magnificently, though the
146 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
enemy offered a very stout resistance, both with rifle
and machine-gun fire, and our advancing troops, during
the approach march, the deployment and attack, were
subjected to a heavy shrapnel fire.
About I p.m.. General OfiBcer Commanding, Desert
Column, decided to throw the whole of the Australian
and New Zealand Mounted Division against the north
and north-east of Gaza to assist the infantry. Both
mounted divisions were placed under the orders of
Major-General Sir H. G. Chauvel, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
General Officer Commanding, Australian and New
Zealand Mounted Division, with instructions that he
should bring the Imperial Mounted Division further
north to continue observing the enemy, while the
Imperial Camel Corps Brigade was ordered to conform
to this movement and observe the country from the
right of the Imperial Mounted Division. About the
same time, considerable enemy activity was observed
on the roads leading north and east of Tel el Sharia,
and also about Hereira. By 3.30 p.m.. General Chauvel
had collected his division, with the exception of some
detachments not yet relieved, and had commenced to
move on Gaza, together with the 3rd Australian Light
Horse Brigade from the Imperial Mounted Division.
The attack was made with the 2nd Australian Light
Horse Brigade on the right, with its right flank on the
sea, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade in the
centre directed on the continuation of the Ali Muntar
ridge, and the 22nd Mounted Brigade, less one detach-
ment, on the left, east of the town.
5. Meanwhile, the infantry attack was being
pressed with great vigour, and by 4.30 p.m. consider-
able progress had been made. Portions of the enemy's
positions were already in our hands, and shortly after-
FOURTH DESPATCH 147
wards the All Muntar hill^ a strong work known as
the Labyrinth^ and the ground in the immediate neigh-
bourhood, fell into our hands. The Australian and New
Zealand Mounted Division was already exerting pres-
sure on the enemy, and by 5 p.m. the enemy was holding
out in the trenches, and on the hill south of the mosque
only. The General Officer Commanding, 53rd Division,
called on the i6ist Brigade (Brigadier-General W.
Marriott-Dodington), which had been placed at his
disposal, to take this position. The brigade responded
with the greatest gallantry in face of a heavy fire, and
after some hard fighting, it pushed home its attack with
complete success, so that, when darkness fell, the whole
of the AH Muntar position had been carried and a foot-
ing gained on the ridge to a point about 1,200 yards
north-east of that position. Meanwhile, during the
relief of the observing detachments of the Australian
and New Zealand Mounted Division by the Imperial
Mounted Division, the enemy, pressing his advance
vigorously from the east, had succeeded in dislodging
our troops from a prominent position on the east of
Gaza. To restore the situation on this flank. General
Chauvel sent back the 3rd Australian Light Horse
Brigade. Thanks to the skilful leadership of Brigadier-
General J. R. Royston, C.M.G., D.S.O., General Officer
commanding this brigade, and his promptness in taking
up his position, the mounted troops, supported by
horse artillery and motor batteries, were able to prevent
any further advance by the enemy from this direction.
The attack of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted
Division on the north of Gaza was pushed home with
the greatest dash and gallantry, in conjunction with the
infantry attack. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles
Brigade were soon in possession of the redoubt of the
148 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
ridge east of Ga^a, while the 22nd Mounted Brigade
on their left carried the knoll running west from
that ridge. During these operations the Somerset
Battery^ Royal Horse Artillery, in support of the 2nd
Australian Light Horse Brigade, silenced two enemy
guns, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade
captured and retained, in spite of counter-attacks, two
77-mm. guns, which they used with skill on small
bodies of the enemy which were still in the occupation
of houses in the vicinity. As a result, 20 prisoners were
taken, and eventually the guns were safely brought
away. The whole division then established itself
amongst the cactus hedges on the outskirts of the town,
all brigades overcoming serious difficulties in fighting
their way through the cactus hedges, in spite of the
stubborn resistance of the enemy, the 2nd Australian
Light Horse Brigade, under the command of Brigadier-
General G. de L. Ryrie, C.M.G., particularly distin-
guishing itself in this phase of the operations.
6. When darkness fell, the situation was as follows :
Gaza was enveloped, and the enemy, in addition to
heavy losses in killed and wounded, had lost 700
prisoners. The 53rd Division was occupying the Ali
Muntar position, which it had captured, but its right
flank was very much in the air, only a thin line of
cavalry holding off the relief columns of continually
increasing strength which were approaching from north
and east. In support of this division, the 54th Division,
less one brigade, was holding Sheikh Abbas, with its
left about 2^ miles from the flank of the 53rd. The
Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division was
very much extended round Gaza, and was engaged in
street fighting. The Imperial Mounted Division and
the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, on a very wide
FOURTH DESPATCH 149
front, were endeavouring to hold off enemy forces.
The majority of the mounted troops had been unable
to water their horses during the day, and it appeared
that, unless Ga^a was captured during the day, they
would have to withdraw west of the Wadi Ghuzze in
order to water their animals. Strong columns of the
enemy, with guns, were moving to the relief of Ga^a
from the north, north-east and south-east. It was at
this moment that the loss of two hours* daylight made
itself particularly felt, since, had two more hours' day-
light now been available, there is no doubt that the in-
fantry would have been able to consolidate the positions
they had won, and that arrangements could have been
made by which the 54th Division could have effected
junction with the 53rd. It is perhaps possible that,
if General Dobell had, at this stage, pushed forward
his reserve (the 52nd Division) to support the 53rd,
the result would have been different, but the difficulty
of supplying water for men and horses would have been
immense, and impossible to realise by those who were
not on the spot. As it was, after consultation with
General Officer Commanding, Eastern Force, the
General Officer Commanding, Desert Column, in order
to prevent the envelopment of his mounted troops,
decided to withdraw them during the night ; he there-
fore directed General Chauvel to break off the engage-
ment and retire his divisions west of the Wadi Ghu22;e,
using the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade to assist in
his retirement. This movement made the maintenance
by the 53rd Division of the very exposed position which
it had captured no longer possible, and General Officer
Commanding, Desert Column, reluctantly ordered
General Officer Commanding, 53rd Division, to draw
back his right and gain touch on that flank with the
150 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
two remaining brigades of the 54th Division, which had
already been ordered by General Officer Commanding,
Eastern Force, to fall back westwards from Sheikh
Abbas and take up a line on the El Burjaliya ridge,
running south-westwards from Mansura, with their
left in touch with the i6ist Brigade, which was to fall
back from its line south of Ali Muntar and establish
an outpost line further back, with its right in touch
with the remainder of the division. These movements
were carried out during the night, the 53rd and 54th
Divisions converging so that their inner (or northward)
flanks rested one on the other, their lines running
along the El Sire and El Burjaliya ridges respectively,
the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade closing the gap
between the right of the 54th Division and the Wadi
Ghu^2;e. The retirement of the mounted troops was
accomplished without difficulty, though, during the
movement, the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade
became engaged with the enemy advancing from the
direction of Huj, but succeeded in driving them off
with the assistance of No. 7 Light Car Patrol. At dawn
on the 27th, the nth and 12th Light Armoured Motor
Batteries found themselves in the middle of a large
body of the enemy, but brilliantly extricated themselves,
causing considerable casualties to the enemy.
7. The withdrawal of the cavalry and the retire-
ment of the 53rd Division on to the El Sire ridge,
enabled the enemy to reinforce the garrison of Ga2;a
with considerable bodies of troops. At daybreak, never-
theless, reconnoitring patrols from the i6oth and i6ist
Brigades pushed forward and seized the positions up to
and including the Ali Muntar hill, which had been
captured on the day before. They encountered some
resistance, but drove the enemy out and established
FOURTH DESPATCH 151
themselves on this line. At 8 a.m. the 53rd Division
and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade passed under
the direct command of General Officer Commanding^
Eastern Force. As soon as the advanced parties of
infantry were established in the recaptured positions,
preparations were made by the General Officer Com-
manding, 53rd Division, to reinforce them, but before
the reinforcements could reach their objective, a strong
counter-attack was made by fresh Turkish troops,
which were pouring in from the north and north-east.
This counter-attack drove our patrols out of the posi-
tion on Ali Muntar Hill, though further advance from
it on the part of the enemy was prevented by our
artillery, and our infantry still held the rest of the
positions. Since, however, the junction of the right of
the 53rd Division and the left of the 54th made an
acute salient exposed to attack on three sides, it was
necessary to withdraw the line here, so as to eliminate
the acute angle. In addition to the Turkish reinforce-
ments coming from the east and north-east against
Ali Muntar, another body appeared early in the morn-
ing on the Sheikh Abbas ridge, which they occupied.
From this point they directed artillery fire on the rear
of our positions on the Mansura ridge, doing a certain
amount of damage among the transport animals, and
making any movement of camel transport during the
day impossible. Our positions were also exposed to
heavy artillery fire from the north. Nevertheless,
though tired and ill-supplied with water, the 53rd and
54th Divisions, now placed under the command of the
General Officer Commanding, 53rd Division, remained
throughout the day staunch and cheerful, and perfectly
capable of repulsing, with heavy losses to the enemy,
any Turkish counter-attacks. At no point was any
152 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
enemy attack successful, and the Imperial Camel Corps,
on the right of the 54th Division, in repulsing the attack
by the 3rd Turkish Cavalry Division, practically an-
nihilated the attackers. The position, however, was an
impossible one to hold permanently. It was narrow
and exposed to attack and artillery fire from three
directions ; also, it was devoid of water, and hostile
artillery fire made the approach to it by day of slow-
moving camel convoys with water and supplies im-
possible. If it had now been practicable for the General
Officer Commanding, Eastern Force, to advance with
his three infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions,
I have no doubt that Ga2;a could have been taken, and
the Turks forced to retire ; but the reorganisation of
the force for a deliberate attack would have taken a
considerable time, the horses of the cavalry were very
fatigued, and the distance of the rail-head from the
front line put the immediate maintenance of such a
force with supplies, water and ammunition entirely
out of the question. The only alternative, therefore,
was to retire the infantry, and this movement, after a
strong counter-attack at 4 p.m. on the northern apex
of our position had been shattered by our rifle, machine-
gun and artillery fire, was carried out during the night
at the order of General Officer Commanding, Eastern
Force. By daylight the whole force had reached the
western side of the Wadi Ghuzze and taken up a strong
defensive position covering Deir el Belah. The enemy
made no attempt to advance on the 28th, but contented
himself with the occupation of the Ga^a defences,
our cavalry remaining in touch with him throughout
the day. Arrangements were made on the 29th for the
defensive line on the western side of the Wadi Ghu^ze
to be divided into sections, to be held by the 54th,
FOURTH DESPATCH 153
52nd and 53rd Divisions respectively, to cover the
further progress of the railway, which was just reaching
Khan Yunus.
8. The total of the first battle of Gaza, which gave
us 950 Turkish and German prisoners and two Austrian
field guns, caused the enemy losses which I estimate at
8,000, and cost us under 4,000 casualties, of which a
large proportion were only slightly wounded, was that
my primary and secondary objects were completely
attained, but that the failure to attain the third object —
the capture of Gaza — owing to the delay caused by
fog on the 26th, and the waterless nature of the country
round Gaza, prevented a most successful operation
from being a complete disaster to the enemy* The troops
engaged, both cavalry, camelry and infantry, especially
the 53rd Division and the i6ist Brigade of the 54th,
which had not been seriously in action since the evacua-
tion of Suvla Bay at the end of 191 5, fought with the
utmost gallantry and endurance, and showed to the
full the splendid fighting qualities which they possess.
9. Preparations were immediately begun for a second
attack in greater force on the Gaza positions as soon as
possible, though I instructed the General Officer Com-
manding, Eastern Force, that upon no consideration
was a premature attack to be made. At the same time,
the utmost expedition was made necessary by the re-
ceipt of the instructions from the War Office to press
on towards Jerusalem, to which I have referred in my
first paragraph. The station at Deir el Belah, where
the headquarters of the General Officer Commanding,
Eastern Force, had been set up on 30th March, was
opened on the 5th April, and was rapidly developed
into an important rail-head. At this period the activity
of hostile aircraft in bombing Deir el Belah and other
154 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
advanced camps considerably increased^ but little
damage was done, and all attacks were followed by
vigorous retaliation on the part of the Royal Flying
Corps, The troops were all concentrated ready for
an advance and reconnaissances for artillery positions
east of the Wadi Ghu^^e were completed early in April,
but the chief factor in fixing the date of the advance
was our continual source of anxiety, the water-supply.
It was necessary for the next advance that two divisions
should be able to water in the Wadi Ghuz^e, where
the prospects of obtaining water by well-sinking were
smalL Tanks therefore had to be set up in the Wadi,
and arrangements made to pump rail-borne water from
Deir el Belah over the In Seirat ridge to fill them.
These preparations were energetically put in hand,
and even by the gth April 27,000 gallons were in the
cistern at Um Jerrar, and excavations for three 8,000-
gallon tanks at Tel el Jemmi were completed, while
nine cisterns with a total capacity of 60,000 gallons,
and seven empty cisterns, were located at Abasan el
Kebir.
The general plan of the attack had by this time
already been decided. It was that the advance on Ga2;a
with three infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions
should take place in two stages. The first stage would
be the occupation of the Sheikh Abbas — Mansura
ridge, south of Gaza, and its preparation as a strong
point from which any flank attack could easily be re-
pelled, A short period of development was to follow
the first stage, during which water-supply and com-
munications would be improved as far as possible,
heavy artillery and Tanks brought up and supplies
advanced, so that the final stage — an advance on Gaza
after a heavy bombardment — should be accomplished
FOURTH DESPATCH 155
rapidly. Meanwhile^ the enemy in front of me had
been considerably reinforced^ and had abandoned all in-
tention of further retirement. It became clear that five
divisions and a cavalry division had now appeared on
our front, with an increase in heavy artillery. Not only
were the Gaza defences being daily strengthened and
wired; but a system of enemy trenches and works
was being constructed south-east from Gaza to the
Atawineh ridge, some 12,000 yards distant from the
town. This put any encircling movement by our
cavalry out of the question, unless the enemy's line in
front of us could be pierced, and a passage made through
which the mounted divisions could be pushed. Until
that could be done, the role of our mounted troops
would be to protect the right flank of the infantry,
whose attack in the final stage was to be on the same
lines as the first attack. While one division advanced
from the Wadi Ghuzze between the sea and the Gaza
— Deir el Belah road, the two divisions occupying the
Sheikh Abbas — Mansura ridge were to attack the
south-western defences up to the Ali Muntar hill ;
the right division, after overcoming the enemy on its
front, to pivot on its left against the defences north of
Ali Muntar. The 17th April was fixed as the first stage
of the advance, and on the 15th April I proceeded
to Khan Yunus, where I set up my Advanced General
Headquarters.
10. For the first stage of the operations the dis-
positions of the General Officer Commanding, Eastern
Force, were as follows : — The 52nd and 54th Divisions,
the latter on the right, to seize and occupy the line
Sheikh Abbas — Mansura — Kurd Hill (on the El Sire
ridge). The General Officer Commanding, 52nd Divi-
sion, Major-General W, E. B. Smith, C.B., C.M.G.,
156 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
to command this attack. The 53rd Division, under the
command of Major-General S. F, Mott, to remain in
position just north of the Wadi Ghuz^e between the
sea and the Ga^a — Khan Yunus road, but to carry out
strong reconnaissances northwards along the coast.
The 74th Division to remain in general reserve in the
vicinity of In Seirat. Of the Desert Column, now con-
stituted of two mounted divisions and the Imperial
Camel Corps Brigade, one mounted division was to be
disposed about Shellal with the object of immobilising
enemy forces at Hereira, while the remainder of the
column was to protect the right flank of the 54th
Division. The enemy was disposed in a chain of
detachments along the 16 miles between Sharia and
Gaza, with strong trenches at Rijm el Atawineh (about
13,000 yards south-east of Gaza) and very strong
defences, known as the Warren, the Labyrinth, Green
Hill, Middlesex Hill, Outpost Hill and Lees Hill (see
inset. Map 4), running south-westwards along the
ridge from Ali Muntar. This position, which com-
mands all approaches to the town from the south-
west, south and south-east, had been very strongly
fortified and well wired, in addition to the natural
obstacles formed by thick cactus hedges, and had been
made into a nest of machine guns, largely manned by
Germans. The right of his line, between Gaza and
the sea, ran in the arc of a circle west and south-west
of the town. This section consisted of a double line
of trenches and redoubts, strongly held by infantry
and machine guns, well placed and concealed in im-
penetrable cactus hedges built on high mud banks
enclosing orchards and gardens on the outskirts of
the town.
The advance began at dawn on 17th April, and
FOURTH DESPATCH 157
the Sheikh Abbas — Mansura — Kurd Hill position was
taken by 7 a.m. with little opposition and practically
no casualties, though one Tank was put out of action
by direct hits from artillery. The consolidation of the
position was at once begun under intermittent bursts
of heavy shelling. The Desert Column fulfilled its
task of protection and reconnaissance, during which a
strong body of enemy cavalry was dislodged by a
brigade of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted
Division from a ridge just east of the Wadi Imleih.
The mounted troops of the Desert Column fell back
west of the Wadi Ghuz^e for the night, leaving an
outpost line from the right of the 54th Division south-
wards. Consolidation of the Sheikh Abbas — Mansura
position continued during the night, and all other pre-
parations for the second stage of the advance, which
was ordered to take place on the 19th, were pushed
on during the i8th. On this day the Desert Column
again made strong reconnaissances towards the east.
The Imperial Camel Corps Brigade was detached
from the Desert Column and placed under the
orders of the General Officer Commanding, 54th
Division.
The dispositions for the final stage, in which the
guns of the French battleship ** Requin ** and of H.M.
Monitors Nos. 21 and 31 were to co-operate, were as
follows : —
The 54th and 52nd Divisions, acting under the
command of General Officer Commanding, 52nd Divi-
sion, were to attack the Ali Muntar group of works,
the 54th pivoting on the right of the 52nd, and in-
cluding in its objective the group of trenches at Sihan,
east of Ga^a, the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade being
attached to it for this purpose. The 53rd Division was
158 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
to attack the enemy trenches in the sand dunes south-
west of Gaza, the line Sampson Ridge — Sheikh Ajlin
being its first objective.
The 74th Division, in general reserve, was to advance
and take up a position of readiness behind the Sheikh
Abbas and Mansura ridges* Of the Desert Column, the
Imperial Mounted Division was to make a dismounted
attack on the enemy's position at Rijm el Atawineh,
part of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted
Division to seize a spur at Baiket el Sana on the right
of the Imperial Mounted Division, and the remainder
to be held in reserve to take advantage of any success
gained by the Imperial Mounted Division.
The containing attack by the cavalry began at dawn,
and by 10.30 a.m. the Imperial Mounted Division
was on the line Gaza — Baiket el Sana Ridge, with its
right refused, while the Australian and New Zealand
Mounted Division had seized the ridge at Baiket el
Sana. The Imperial Mounted Division, under shell
and machine-gun fire, continued the attack on the
Atawineh trenches with the greatest gallantry, but
could make little headway. For the main attack, the
bombardment opened at 5.30 a.m. The guns of the
** Requin " and the monitors bombarded Ali Muntar
and the works immediately to the south-west. These
guns kept the enemy's defences and dug-outs under
an accurate and sustained fire, and were instrumental
during the day in rendering several enemy counter-
attacks abortive. At 7.15 a.m. the 53rd Division ad-
vanced on Sampson Ridge and Sheikh Ajlin, and at
7.30 a.m. the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, 54th
Division and 52nd Division advanced to the attack.
The 53rd Division, though meeting with considerable
opposition, gradually worked up to Sampson Ridge,
FOURTH DESPATCH 159
which was carried by the i6oth Brigade early in the
afternoon. This enabled the 159th Brigade to carry
the high ground between this position and the coast
with little opposition, and the first objective of the
division was attained. The remainder of the main
attack was not so fortunate. The 155th Brigade, the
left brigade of the 52nd Division, made good Lees
Hill, the nearest point to our line of the enemy's de-
fences on the Ali Muntar ridge, by 8.15 a.m., but on
advancing beyond Lees Hill this brigade came under
very heavy machine-gun fire from Outpost Hill, which
checked its progress. This prevented any advance of
the 156th Brigade, which was echeloned slightly in
the right rear of the 155th. A little later, one of the
Tanks came astride of the lunette on Outpost Hill,
causing considerable loss to the enemy, but the in-
fantry could not capture this lunette till shortly after
10 a.m. The Tank was unfortunately hit by three
shells and burnt out. Meanwhile, the 54th Division,
with the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, had advanced
steadily under fire on the right of the 52nd Division.
Its left brigade, the 162nd, was in advance of the right
of the 156th Brigade, and thus exposed to a heavy
enfilade fire from the direction of AH Muntar. At
9.30 a.m. the left of this brigade was heavily counter-
attacked, but the enemy were repulsed by machine-
gun fire. On the right of the 162nd Brigade, the
163rd Brigade fought its way forward against enemy
works between Ga2;a and Sihan. One Tank advanced
ahead of the infantry and inflicted heavy casualties on
the enemy in a redoubt, but was afterwards hit by shell
fire and burnt out. The Imperial Camel Corps Brigade,
in conjunction with the 4th Australian Light Horse
Brigade on its right, entered the enemy trenches
i6o SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
at Sihan by 9 a,m., the enemy withdrawing to a
position some 800 yards to the north. The Imperial
Camel Corps Brigade was unable, however, to advance
beyond Sihan, and the 163rd and 162nd Brigades,
in spite of most strenuous and gallant efforts to ad-
vance, were repeatedly checked by very heavy fire
from this front. Towards noon the left of the 163rd
Brigade was forced back by a determined counter-
attack from the north-east, and this left the 162nd Bri-
gade in a critical position, but it stood firm until,
assisted by the i6ist Brigade, the 163rd Brigade was
able to regain all the ground it had lost. The enemy
counter-attack against the 163rd Brigade was mean-
while continued against the 4th Australian Light Horse
Brigade, which was forced to give ground, and, with
the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade on its right,
suffered heavy casualties. However, the Imperial Camel
Corps Brigade, though in a critical position, held on till
the 6th Mounted Brigade filled the gap and stopped
the enemy's advance. Heavy shelling and machine-
gun fire were directed at the line during the remainder
of the afternoon. Meanwhile the 155th Brigade was
shelled out of its position on Outpost Hill, but the
position was most gallantly retaken on his own initia-
tive by Major W. T. Forrest, M.C., i/4th Battalion
King's Own Scottish Borderers (subsequently killed),
who collected a few men for the purpose. All further
attempts by the 155th Brigade to launch an attack from
Outpost Hill were shattered by fire at their inception,
and the 156th Brigade was forced to remain in the open
under a heavy fire.
II. The position at 3 p.m. was therefore as follows :
The operations of the Desert Column (in effect a
'* containing attack ") were meeting with all the success
FOURTH DESPATCH i6i
which had been anticipated. A serious enemy counter-
attack had been checked and driven back.
The 54th Division, on the right of the main attack,
had progressed, in spite of determined opposition and
heavy casualties, as far as was possible until a further
advance of the 52nd Division should prevent the ex-
posure of its left flank. Reports received from the 54th
Division stated that the situation was satisfactory,
and that no help was required in order to enable the
ground gained to be held until further progress by the
52nd Division should render practicable a renewal of
the advance. I should like to state here my appreciation
of the great skill with which General Hare handled his
fine division throughout the day.
The 52nd Division was unable to advance beyond
Outpost Hill. Middlesex Hill, and a large area of
extremely broken ground west and north-west of it,
had been made by the enemy exceedingly strong. The
nests of machine guns in the broken ground could not
be located among the narrow dongas, holes and fissures
with which this locality was seamed. Partly owing to
this, and partly owing to the extent of the area, the
artillery fire concentrated upon it was unable to keep
down the enemy's fire when the 155th Brigade at-
tempted to advance. The reserve Brigade of the 52nd
Division had not been employed, and the remaining
brigade (the 156th) was in position ready to attack
Green Hill and Ali Muntar as soon as the progress of
the 155th brigade on its left should enable it to do so.
Up to this time, therefore, only one brigade of the 52nd
Division was seriously engaged. The conformation of
the ground, however, was such that the attack on Out-
post and Middlesex Hills could only be made on an
extremely narrow front. It is possible that if the General
i62 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Officer Commanding, Eastern Force, had now decided
to throw in his reserves, the key of the position might
have been taken with the further loss of between 5,000
and 6,000 men, but this would have left my small force,
already reduced, with a difficult line of front to hold
against increasing reinforcements of the enemy, who,
owing to the conformation of the terrain, could attack
from several directions* As it was, the General Officer
Commanding, Eastern Force, in view of information
received that our attack had not yet succeeded in draw-
ing in the enemy's reserves, decided that the moment
had not yet come for an attempt to force a decision by
throwing in the general reserve, though he moved the
229th Brigade of the 74th Division up to Mansura, so
as to be ready to press home the attack of the 52nd
Division whenever required.
At 3.30 p.m. an enemy counter-attack against the
left of the 162nd Brigade was shattered by our shell fire
with heavy loss to the enemy, but otherwise no change
occurred in the situation till 6.20 p.m., when the 155th
Brigade was forced to evacuate Outpost Hill. Since it
was evident that the action could not be brought to a
conclusion within the day, at 4 p.m. I issued, personally,
instructions to General Officer Commanding, Eastern
Force, that all ground gained during the day must,
without fail, be held during the night, with a view to
resuming the attack on the Ali Muntar position under
cover of a concentrated artillery bombardment at dawn
on the 20th.
The position at nightfall was that the 53rd Division
held the Sampson Ridge — Sheikh Ajlin line ; the 52nd
Division on its right was facing north towards Outpost
Hill and Ali Muntar ; the 54th Division carried the
line south-eastwards and southwards round the Sheikh
FOURTH DESPATCH 163
Abbas ridge to El Meshrefe, whence the mounted
troops continued the line southwards to the Wadi
Ghuzzc* Our total casualties had amounted to some
7,000.
During the night of the 19th /20th I received a
message from General Dobell to say that, after care-
ful deliberation and consultation with all divisional
commanders, he was strongly of the opinion that the
resumption of the attack ordered for the following
morning did not offer sufficient prospect of success to
justify the very heavy casualties which such an operation
would, in his opinion, involve. He therefore urgently
requested my sanction to cancel the instructions pre-
viously issued, and my approval for the substitution
of orders for the consolidation of the positions already
gained, to be carried out on the 20th, with a view to a
further attack on the enemy's line at some point be-
tween Gaza and Hereira, as and when an opportunity
might offer. In view of the strongly-expressed opinion
of the General Officer Commanding, Eastern Force,
supported by the General Officer Commanding, Desert
Column, and the divisional commanders, I assented to
this proposal.
12. The ground gained by the end of the 19th
April was consolidated during the 20th. No ground,
in fact, gained on the day has since been lost, and the
position to which we then advanced has facilitated,
and will facilitate, further operations. The enemy,
contrary to my expectations, made no general counter-
attack on the 20th, and all his local counter-attacks
were easily repulsed. One counter-attack was nipped
in the bud entirely by our aircraft ; a reconnaissance
machine having detected about 2,000 infantry and
800 cavalry gathered in the Wadi near Hereira, four
i64 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
machines immediately attacked this force^ which they
found in massed formation, with bombs, and the entire
body was dispersed with heavy casualties*
On 2ist April, General Dobell visited me at my
Advanced General Headquarters to discuss the situa-
tion. He repeated that, in his opinion, which was con-
firmed by that of all his subordinate commanders,
in view of the great strength of the positions to which
he was opposed, the renewal of a direct attack with the
force at his disposal would not be justified by any
reasonable prospect of success. He was most strongly
of the opinion that deliberate methods must be adopted,
and that even the assumption of trench warfare might
be necessary, pending the arrival of reinforcements.
After full discussion, and not without considerable re-
luctance, I assented to this change of policy, and on
the 22nd April I reported to the War Office that with
my present force I could not probably count on being
able to effect more than a local success.
In the meantime, it became apparent to me that
General Dobell, who had suffered some weeks pre-
viously from a severe touch of the sun, was no longer
in a fit state of health to bear the strain of further opera-
tions in the coming heat of summer. To my great
regret, therefore, I felt it my duty to relieve him of his
command,, and to place the command of Eastern Force
in the hands of Lieut .-General Sir Philip Chetwode,
Bt., K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O. General Chetwode was
succeeded in command of the Desert Column by
Major-General Sir H. G. Chauvel, K.C.M.G., C.B. ;
and Major-General E. W. C. Chaytor, C.B., C.M.G.,
succeeded to the command of the Australian and
New Zealand Mounted Division. Accordingly, on the
morning of the 21st, I interviewed General Dobell and
FOURTH DESPATCH 165
informed him of my decision, in which he concurred.
I then interviewed General Chetwode, and instructed
him to relieve General Dobell in the command of
Eastern Force. On 26th April, I received the decision
of the War Cabinet, referred to in my first paragraph,
which substituted for previous instructions to advance
on Jerusalem, instructions to take any favourable
opportunity of defeating the Turkish forces opposed
to me, and follow up any success gained with all the
means at my disposal.
13. After this time no notable change took place
in the situation on the eastern front, where the im-
mediate task was so to consolidate the first line that it
could be held by the minimum of troops, thus releasing
one or two divisions for further offensive operations.
The enemy continued to receive reinforcements for
his units and additional troops, so that early in May
I estimated that he had nearly six infantry divisions
on his front line, while his total force in this theatre
might amount to eight divisions. There was no doubt,
moreover, that he had lately received considerable
reinforcements in artillery and machine-gun units, as
well as in mounted troops. Throughout the month
he continued to strengthen his positions between Gaza
and Hereira, and began to build a military branch line
from El Tine, on the Central Palestine Railway, towards
El Mejdel, north of Gaza.
As the result of recent operations, I was closely
in touch with the enemy on a front of some 14,000
yards from Sheikh Ajlin, on the sea, to the north-
eastern corner of the Sheikh Abbas ridge. From that
point my line turned back through Sharta towards the
Wadi Ghuzze, with the right flank extended to Shellal
in order to protect my southern flank and to deny to
i66 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
the enemy the valuable supplies lying in the Wadi at
that point. In the meantime, arrangements had been
made to construct a branch line of railway as rapidly
as possible from Rafa to the neighbourhood of Shellal,
to enable operations to be conducted on a broader
front than was possible from the single rail-head at
Deir el Belah. By 23rd June this branch line had pro-
gressed to the 25th kilometre, and stations had been
made at Amr and Weli Sheikh Nuran. The process of
strengthening the northern portion of the position,
from the sea to Sharta, in order to set free as many
troops as possible, was energetically continued during
the month of May, by the end of which it was possible,
roughly speaking, to hold this portion with two divi-
sions, thus leaving two divisions in general reserve*
The mounted troops of the Desert Column were un-
tiring in reconnaissance towards the east and north-
east during this time. For the time being, however,
the possibility of offensive action was governed by the
fact that, exclusive of the mounted troops, I had only
three fully-equipped and trained divisions and one
partially equipped and trained. The three former
divisions required some 350 officers and 9,000 other
ranks to bring them up to full strength. During April
and May one battalion arrived from East Africa, one
from Aden, and four from India towards the formation
of a further division, to be called the 75th, but the
health of the two former was much impaired, and on
the 1 2th May I was informed that the remaining batta-
lions destined for this division were to be retained in
India for the present. At the same time I was informed
that two mounted brigades would be sent to me from
Salonica, together with complete artillery for one
division, and also appreciable reinforcements in heavy
FOURTH DESPATCH 167
artillery. On 27th May I was informed that the re-
mainder of this division, the 60th, would sail for Egypt
from Salonica during June. These prospective additions
to the force entailed a considerable amount of re-
organisation, and at the same time it became necessary
to reorganise the transport of the fighting units, in
regard to which, in the exigencies of recent operations,
improvisation to meet the needs of the moment had,
of necessity, been resorted to.
14. From 6th May the defensive line from Sheikh
Ajlin to Tel el Jemmi was reorganised into two sections,
to be held on a regular system of reliefs. Cavalry
patrolling was actively carried on by the mounted
troops, who frequently came into contact with the
enemy's mounted patrols to the east and north-east.
During the earlier part of May, the enemy aircraft
made several attacks with bombs on Deir el Belah and
other points near the front line. The Royal Flying
Corps made effective retaliation against Ramie and
Sharia, and, as the month advanced, the enemy's activity
diminished in this respect. During May, also, our
heavy batteries, with the co-operation of the Royal
Flying Corps, made very effective practice on enemy
batteries in the neighbourhood of Gaza. The only
event, however, of any note during this month was a
cavalry raid carried out on the 23rd and 24th May
against the Beersheba — El Auja railway, with the object
of preventing the enemy from recovering and using its
material for the construction of his branch line from
El Tine to Mejdel.
The plans for this operation necessitated the move-
ment of one mounted brigade and demolition parties
to Bir el Esani, 10 miles W.S.W. of Beersheba on the
Wadi Shanag, during the afternoon before the raid
i68 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
took place* Since this movement could not be concealed,
it was arranged that an artillery demonstration should
take place on the left flank, in order to draw the enemy^s
attention from the movement on Esani, and place him
in doubt as to our intentions* For three days previously,
the artillery carried out wire-cutting on the Gaza de-
fences, and the enemy^s repairing parties were kept
under artillery and machine-gun fire. The artillery
demonstration was made more intense during the after-
noon of 22nd and the early morning of 23rd May. This
demonstration was very successful in making the enemy
apprehensive on his right, and he appears to have
suffered a considerable number of casualties.
On the afternoon of the 22nd, one brigade of the
Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, with
demolition parties from the field squadrons of both
mounted divisions, moved to Esani. During the night
of the 22nd /23rd this force marched on the railway
at Asluj and Hadaj by way of Khalasa. Khalasa was
surrounded during the night, and no opposition was met
with there. The demolition parties reached their posi-
tions on the railway line just before 7 a.m. on the 23rd.
The Imperial Camel Corps Brigade left Rafa early on
the 22nd and marched approximately down the Turco-
Egyptian frontier on Auja. Owing to the difficulties
of the country, the Imperial Camel Brigade demolition
party was unable to begin work on the railway before
11.45 ^♦^^ o^ t^^ 23rd. The demolition parties had
previously been thoroughly trained, and their work,
once begun, was carried out with great rapidity. Those
of the mounted divisions completed the destruction of
the railway from Asluj to Hadaj — about seven miles —
by 10 a.m. The destruction of this portion of the line
made interference with the work of the Imperial Camel
FOURTH DESPATCH 169
Brigade practically impossible* The demolition party
of that brigade, therefore, had time to complete the
destruction of six miles of railway eastward from Auja
during the day.
Thus 13 miles of railway line were completely de-
stroyed, each pair of rails being cut in the centre. One
6-span bridge, one 12-span bridge, a viaduct over the
Wadi Theigat el Amirin, and (between Thamiliat el
Rashid and Asluj) one i8-arched bridge, one 5-arched
bridge, one 3-arched bridge, one 2-arched bridge,
and two culverts were completely destroyed. All the
points and switches at Asluj railway station were de-
stroyed. A considerable number of telegraph posts
were cut down, wires cut, and insulators broken. A
quantity of Decauville material near Hadaj was de-
stroyed. Finally, a large stone building near Wadi
Imkharuba was demolished, with quantities of sand-
bags, timber and matting.
While this work was in progress, the mounted divi-
sions of the Desert Column carried out a demonstration
towards Bir Saba and Irgeig. The divisions marched
by night on the 22nd /23rd, and during the 23rd carried
a tactical and water reconnaissance of the area im-
mediately west and north-west of Bir Saba. The loth
Heavy Battery, R.G.A., was moved forward behind
this force and shelled the viaduct at Irgeig.
The withdrawal of the mounted troops was effected
without difficulty, the enemy showing no signs of
activity. The Australian and New Zealand Mounted
Division met a few Arab snipers. One armed Arab
was killed and 13 prisoners were taken. The Imperial
Mounted Division encountered only slight opposition
from small parties of enemy cavalry. Our casualties were
one man wounded. During this operation crops which
170 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
could not be brought in, and which would otherwise
fall into the hands of the enemy, were destroyed by our
troops. It is estimated that 120 tons were burnt during
the day. One of our aeroplanes employed for inter-
communication betw,een Desert Column Headquarters
and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade was damaged in
attempting to land near Auja. The Imperial Camel
Corps Brigade therefore remained at that place for the
night, 23rd /24th, and personnel of the brigade suc-
ceeded in repairing the aeroplane, the loss of which
was thereby avoided, and which returned safely to the
aerodrome on the 24th.
For the month of June there is nothing of special
note to record, the period being mainly one of energetic
preparation for further operations. For the time being,
the infantry in the northern part of the line were con-
fined to trench warfare, to which the troops soon
adapted themselves, while to the south and south-east
our cavalry patrols were daily in touch with the enemy.
15. During the period covered by this report,
the situation on the western front has been such as
to call for little comment. The light armoured motor
batteries, light car patrols and Bikanir Camel Corps,
who form the garrisons of the posts, have been able
to keep the whole front free from disturbance. The
route from Solium to Siwa has now been improved,
so that Siwa can be reached by car from Solium in a
single day.
In consequence of an agreement between the
Government and Sayed Mohammed Idris, signed at
Akrama on 15th April, I have approved certain regula-
tions to govern trade with Arabs of the western parts
through the market at Solium, the main object being
to treat Sayed Idris as liberally as circumstances will
FOURTH DESPATCH 171
permit, while at the same time regulating the quantity
of food offered for sale at Solium, so as to render it
impossible for the Senoussi to lay in reserve stocks
of any appreciable magnitude. The General Officer
Commanding, Coastal Section, has been instructed
to co-operate with the Civil Administration in putting
these regulations into force. I have also issued a new
proclamation defining the western line of the Coastal
Section, across which no person shall pass without
special permit issued by the military authorities at
Solium, movement to or from Egypt, except through
Solium, being forbidden. With a view to preventing
any disturbing effect on the local population, and also
to prevent any feeling of mistrust which might arise in
the mind of Sayed Idris by any action of our armed
parties, I have given instructions that the latter should
not operate beyond our western frontier, which, for
purposes of convenience, was defined broadly as a line
running north and south from Solium to the western
end of Melfa Oasis.
The attitude of the Sheikhs and inhabitants at Siwa
is very friendly, and the former are co-operating
loyally in carrying out all instructions received from
the civil and military authorities regarding restrictions
of trade, repair of road passes and the destruction of
the Senoussi '* Zawias,'* or teaching-houses.
No incident has occurred in the Southern Canal
Section, the garrison of which has been considerably
reduced since the beginning of the year. The extent
of the Northern Canal Section increased continuously
as the Eastern Force advanced, and at the beginning of
May this command was reorganised as that of the
General Officer Commanding, Palestine Lines of Com-
munication Defences, with headquarters at El Arish.
172 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
This command now extends from the northern part
of the Sues: Canal to Khan Yunus, and includes the
responsibility for the defence of almost the whole
length of the military railway and pipe-lines. Except
for attacks by hostile aircraft^ no enemy attempts have
been made against the lines of communication, but
between 7th and nth May a small force from this
command, consisting of two companies Imperial Camel
Corps and a field troop, made a successful expedition
to El Auja, Birein and El Kossaima, for the purpose of
blowing up the wells and water-supply at those places
to the utmost possible extent. The force met with
no opposition, captured five prisoners and completed
successfully the demolitions, including that of the rail-
way bridge north-east of El Auja.
In April, Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, Bt., joined my
staff as Chief Political Officer, while forming part
of a joint Anglo-French Political Mission in which
M. Picot was the chief French representative. This
mission proceeded to El Arish at the beginning of
May and subsequently paid a visit to the Hedjaz.
I have great pleasure in recording the addition to
the force under my command of a French detachment
under M. le Colonel Piepape, and of an Italian detach-
ment under Majer da Agostino. The French detach-
ment took over the defences at Khan Yunus on 25th
May, and the Italian detachment has proceeded to the
Rafa defences. At the end of May I was most happy
to welcome in Egypt M. le General Bailloud, who came
as inspector of French troops in Northern Africa to
inspect the French detachment.
At the beginning of May it became necessary to
reorganise the administrative services on the Eastern
Lines of Communication, owing to the increasing size
FOURTH DESPATCH 173
of the Eastern Force. An inspector, Palestine Lines of
Communication, was therefore appointed. His head-
quarters were established at Kantara on 2nd May, and
the advantage of this appointment has been proved by
the increased efficiency of the lines-of-communication
services east of the canal.
16. In conclusion, I should like to place on record
my appreciation of the magnificent work done by all
the fighting troops before Ga2;a. No praise can be too
high for the gallantry and steadfastness of the cavalry,
infantry, artillery. Royal Flying Corps and all other
units which took part in the two battles. Particular
commendation is due to the infantry. The 52nd, 53rd
and 54th Divisions, though actively engaged for over a
year in the Sinai Peninsula, had not, since their re-
organisation after the operations in the Dardanelles,
been able to show how they had improved out of all
knowledge in training and discipline, and in all that
goes to make up an excellent fighting organisation.
Under severe trial they have now given ample proof
of the finest soldierly qualities. It is hardly necessary
to reiterate the praises of the Australian and New
Zealand mounted troops, who have always come up to
their high reputation, and their comrades in the mounted
yeomanry have shown themselves to be endowed with
the same bravery, vigour and tenacity. The Imperial
Camel Corps, manned by Australian, New Zealand
and British personnel, has proved a corps d* elite, pos-
sessed with a quite remarkable spirit of gallantry.
The distinguished service rendered by the troops from
India is deserving of high commendation. Units of the
Indian Regular Army, mounted and dismounted Im-
perial Service troops and the Bikanir Camel Corps
have shown soldierly qualities in action, discipline and
174 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
endurance ; and I wish to record the unfailing devotion
to duty of the battalions in garrison in Egypt, and of
the British West Indies Regiment. The Camel Trans-
port Corps and the Egyptian Labour Corps — two units
raised in this country — are worthy of the warmest
praise for their untiring labours, under the severest
conditions, in close conjunction with the fighting troops.
The health of the troops has throughout been
singularly good. All branches of the medical services,
under Surgeon-General J. Maher, C.B., deserve the
highest commendation for their successful work at
the front, on the lines of communication and in the
base hospitals. The presence in the force of a number
of civil medical consultants, who have so patriotically
given their services, has been of the very greatest value,
and they have worked in successful accord with the
regular medical services of the Army. The Australian
Army Medical Corps and the New Zealand Medical
Corps have also been remarkable for their efficiency
and unremitting devotion.
The workings of the supply and transport services
have had to take into account quite abnormal condi-
tions, both of supplies available and terrain, involving
in some cases complete reorganisation of units to suit
local conditions. In spite of this, the functions of these
services have been discharged in a most admirable
manner, and great credit is due to the Director,
Brigadier-General G. F. Davies, C.M.G., and to all
ranks under him.
The same local conditions above referred to have
rendered the force more than usually dependent on
animal transport, while operations have involved the
use of important mounted forces. The remount and
veterinary services have consequently held a vital place
FOURTH DESPATCH 175
in the organisation, and they have carried out their
respective tasks to my complete satisfaction.
I have, in a previous despatch, brought to notice
the admirable work of the signal services, and I need
only now add that this service has continued in its
efficient and highly satisfactory condition. The work
done by the engineer services and the works directorate
deserves high commendation.
There is, perhaps, no department which has a
greater influence upon the moral of an army than that
of the Chaplains* Department. The thorough and
self-sacrificing manner in which chaplains of all de-
nominations, under the principal chaplain, Brigadier-
General A. V. C. Hordern, C.M.G., have carried out
their duties, has earned the gratitude of all ranks.
The impossibility of granting leave home on any
extended scale has rendered the Army in the Field
dependent on rest camps and voluntary institutions
for that rest and relaxation so necessary in view of the
arduous conditions of campaigning in the desert and
in tropical heat. I wish to take this, my last, oppor-
tunity of expressing the thanks of the whole Field
Force to those ladies and gentlemen who have done
so much to obviate the deprivations imposed on it by
those conditions. Especially are they due to the Church
Army and the Young Men's Christian Association,
whose recreation huts are provided, not only in the
rest camps, but also throughout the front. It would
be hard to exaggerate the value of these institutions,
both in sustaining the moral and the health of the
troops.
The dealing with reinforcements and material
arriving from England, the transference of such large
numbers of troops to other theatres of war, the keeping
176 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
of records thus affected and the registration of casualties
and evacuation of sick and wounded, have thrown very-
heavy work on the base ports. The staffs responsible
for these matters have discharged their arduous duties
with marked efficiency, frequently under difficult
climatic conditions and abnormal pressure.
In spite of the important operations in progress
during this time, military training has been continued
with undiminished vigour. The Imperial School of
Instruction at Zeitoun has by now passed over 22,000
officers and non-commissioned officers through its
hands.
A staff school was started early in the year for the
training of junior staff officers. Three courses, each of
about six weeks, were held at this school, for which
accommodation was found just outside Cairo, the num-
ber of candidates at the first two courses being shared
between this force and the Salonica Force, while the
last course was confined to the Egyptian Expeditionary
Force. The results of these courses have been exceed-
ingly useful, and the instruction has been extremely
well carried out.
His Highness the Sultan has, throughout the period
of my command, given me valuable encouragement
and wise counsel, based on his unrivalled knowledge
of Eastern affairs.
I wish once more to thank His Excellency The High
Commissioner, General Sir F. R. Wingate, G.C.B.,
G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., for the ready assistance
and quick sympathy which he has given me in all my
work ; all branches of the Civil Government of Egypt
have assisted the Forces in the Field with unfailing
readiness.
My gratitude is also due to Vice-Admiral Sir
FOURTH DESPATCH 177
Rosslyn Wemyss, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O,, Com-
mander-in-Chief, East Indies and Egypt, for his part
in securing the unfailing co-operation of the Royal
Navy at all times ; and I wish to make special reference
to the admirable and gallant work done by the Naval
Air Service, which has been of the greatest assistance
to my operations.
My Chief of the General Staff, Major-General
Sir Arthur Lynden Lynden-Bell, K.GM.G., C.B.,
has given me unvarying and loyal support at all times.
He has proved himself an ideal Chief of the General
Staff, combining a thorough knowledge of his duties
with an activity and an energy that overcomes all diffi-
culties. He has earned the confidence of all ranks.
Major-General John Adye, C.B., has been an ex-
cellent Deputy Adjutant-General, having great know-
ledge of all administrative work, and sound judgment.
He has been of the greatest assistance to me.
Major-General Sir Walter Campbell, K.C.M.G.,
C.B., D.S.O., my Deputy Quartermaster-General, is
an organiser of great general ability, very sound and
hard-working. I owe a great debt of gratitude to this
officer.
The General Officer Commanding, Eastern Force,
Lieut.-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.M.G.,
C.B., D.S.O., has united the qualities of brilliant leader-
ship and sure judgment, and has invariably inspired
confidence in all ranks.
The labours of a Commander-in-Chief in the Field
are considerably lightened when the complex and
difficult duties which fall to the military secretary
are ably discharged. In this respect I have been fortu-
nate. Lieut.-Colonel S. H. Pollen, C.M.G., is an officer
of outstanding ability and sound judgment, and the
M
178 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
manner in which he has carried out his duties has
greatly contributed to the smooth working of the staff,
and is beyond praise*
I am submitting, in a further despatch, the names
of officers, non-commissioned officers and men and
others whom I wish to bring to notice for gallant and
distinguished service during the period under review,
I have the honour to be.
Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
(Signed) A, J, MURRAY, General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
APPENDICES
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APPENDIX B
Showing the Chief Combatant Units of the Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force in Egypt on 27TH January^ 1916
General Headquarters Troops : —
Bikanir Camel Corps.
5th Wing^ Royal Flying Corps.
20th Brigade, R.G.A. (3 batteries of 4 60-pounders).
35th Brigade, R.G.A. (3 batteries of 4 60-pounders).
24th Brigade, R.G.A. (i battery of 4 6-in. howitzers).
(i battery of 2 9.2-in. howitzers).
(i section of 2 6-in. Mark VII guns).
32nd Brigade, R.G.A. (2 batteries of 4 6-in. howitzers).
14th Siege Battery, R.G.A. (4 6-in. howitzers).
48th Siege Battery, R.G.A. (4 9.2-in. howitzers).
4th Highland Mounted Brigade, R.G.A. (T.F.) (8 2.75-in.
guns).
2 Armoured Motor Batteries.
gth Army Corps {No, i Section) : —
nth Division.
29th Division.
42nd Division,
loth Indian Division.
Corps Troops. 4th (now 8th) Mounted Brigade.
2nd and 3rd Dismounted Brigades.
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps {No, 2 Section) : —
ist Australian Division.
2nd Australian Division.
New Zealand and Australian Division.
Corps Troops. Australian and New Zealand Mounted Divi-
sion (less I brigade lent to the Force in
Egypt).
184
APPENDIX B 185
i$th Army Corps (No. 3 Section) : —
13th Division.
31st Division.
52nd Division.
Corps Troops, ist (now 5th) Mounted Brigade,
ist Dismounted Brigade.
Lines of Communication Defence Troops : —
Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade.
3 Garrison Battalions.
NOTE
The chief troops then composing the Force in Egypt were
as follows : —
and (now 6th) Mounted Brigade.
i/ist North Midland (now 22nd) Mounted Brigade.
Imperial Yeomanry Brigade (2 regiments).
53rd Division.
54th Division.
2/ist London Infantry Brigade.
Composite Territorial Infantry Brigade.
South African Infantry Brigade (subsequently).
15th (Ludhiana) Sikhs.
" A " Battery, H.A.C.
Notts, and Berks. Batteries, R.HA. (T.F.).
Coast Defence Artillery.
Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery (6 10-
pounders).
2 Armoured Trains.
Garrison Battalions.
Motor Machine- Gun Battery.
Naval Armoured Cars.
APPENDIX C
Showing the Chief Combatant Units of the Egyptian Ex-
peditionary Force in May, 191 6, after the Departure
OF 6 Divisions and other Smaller Units
General Headquarters Troops : —
Imperial Camel Corps.
Bikanir Camel Corps.
5th Wing, Royal Flying Corps.
20th Brigade, R.G.A. (3 batteries of 4 60-pounders).
Stokes Gun Batteries of 4 Infantry Brigades.
2 Anti-aircraft Sections (each 2 13-pounders).
4th Highland Mounted Brigade, R.G.A. (T.F.) (8 2.75-in.
guns).
Coast Defence Artillery.
No, I Section^ Eastern Force : —
42nd Division (with 3rd Dismounted Brigade attached).
54th Division.
7 Battalions Indian Infantry (one at Tor and Abu Zeneima).
Mounted Troops. 8th Mounted Brigade.
No, 2 Section, Eastern Force (2nd Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps) : —
4th Australian Division.
5th Australian Division.
Mounted Troops. Australian and New Zealand Mounted
Division (less 3 brigades).
No. 3 Section, Eastern Force : —
52nd Division (with ist Dismounted Brigade attached).
nth Division (in reserve).
Mounted Troops. 5th Mounted Brigade.
Australian and New Zealand Mounted
Division (less i brigade).
186
APPENDIX C 187
Western Frontier Force {including North-Western and South-
western Forces) : —
53rd Division (with 4th Dismounted Brigade attached),
and Dismounted Brigade.
3 Battalions West Indies Regiment.
Mounted Troops. 6th Mounted Brigade (with i/2nd Co.
of London Yeomanry attached).
22nd Mounted Brigade.
Notts, and Berks. Batteries, R.H.A. (T.F.).
Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery.
4 Armoured Motor Batteries.
2 Armoured Trains.
Lines of Communication Defence Troops : —
Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade (less i regiment).
Garrison Battalions.
APPENDIX D
WATER-SUPPLY EAST OF THE SUEZ CANAL
From January, 191 6, to June, 1917
When it was decided that the construction of a defensive line
east of the Suez Canal should be taken up seriously, the im-
portant question of how the troops could be provided with an
adequate supply of pure water was at once considered.
No known source of fresh water existed for many miles east-
ward of the Canal line. Up to November, 191 5, the small garri-
sons and posts stationed on the east bank had been supplied
with water by means of water-barges from Port Said, Ismailia
and Tewfik ; but it was obviously impossible to employ these
means on so large a scale as the new system of defences
indicated.
If, by sinking deep tube-wells on the spot, drinkable water
in sufficient quantity were obtainable, this was obviously the
simplest and most economical plan. It was decided, therefore,
after consultation with the Egyptian Geological Department,
to make experimental borings at various selected points east
of the Canal. Nothing, however, but salt water was obtained,
although the wells were sunk to a depth of 300 feet. Later,
similar borings were made in the Romani — Mahemdia region
with a like result.
The only other possible source of supply was the Sweet-
water Canal, which runs, roughly, parallel with, and contiguous
to, the Ship Canal on its western side throughout practically its
entire length. But before this supply could be utilised for the
camps and defence works which were to be established east-
ward, it would be necessary to filter the water, as well as to get
it across the Suez Canal.
Ten concentration points were selected at intervals through-
out the length of the Suez Canal ; and at six of these points,
188
APPENDIX D 189
viz. : Kantara, Ballah^ El Ferdan, Serapeum, Shallufa and El
Kubri, filtering plant has been installed. The filters are
close to the Sweet-water Canal^ except at El Ferdan and Ballah,
where special water conduits, four miles long, have had to be
excavated.
Of the other four selected points, Ferry Post has received
its water, already filtered, from Ismailia town supply ; El Shatt
has been connected upon the eastward side with the El Kubri
system, while both Kabrit and Quarantine are supplied by
water-barges, the latter having a salt-water condensing plant as
a stand-by.
From the filters at the six points first mentioned the purified
water is carried by syphon-pipes across the bed of the Sue?
Canal into reinforced concrete reservoirs on the east bank.
Near these reservoirs machinery has been installed, and the
water pumped forward to the camps and defences through a
system of pipe-lines. This pumping-machinery had to be
ordered to meet requirements, which it was impossible to
forecast adequately, and the plant was therefore not always
equal to the task allotted to it.
When preparing the original scheme of water-supply it was
estimated that it would be necessary to pump water to an eleva-
tion of about 200 feet. In some cases, however, posts have
been established at considerably greater heights, even up to 450
feet above sea-level. To meet this difficulty, intermediate re-
servoirs and relay pumping stations have been provided on the
pipe-lines.
Instructions to prepare for an advance in force from Romani
to El Arish were issued in July. It was decided to lay down a
pipe-line of 12 inches diameter to supply water for the troops
and railway, and orders for the necessary material were at once
placed in England.
Steps were taken to provide at Kantara an additional filter-
plant capable of dealing with 500,000 gallons a day, three more
6-inch syphons under the Canal, two 250,000-gallon reservoirs,
two sets of pumping engines, each of 66 h.p.,in separate engine
houses, to drive the water to Romani, and a special wharf to
discharge machinery and pipes from ocean steamers.
The first shipload of pipes for this new main reached Kan-
tara on the 20th September, and filtered water was flowing
igo SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
through the new main into reservoirs at Romani 25 miles away
on the 17th November.
At Romani, at Bir el Abd, and at Mazar, in succession,
storage reservoirs and pumping stations similar to those at
Kantara have been provided. At the last two places construction
commenced as soon as the advancing troops had secured the
situation. Filtered water reached Bir el Abd, 47 miles from
Kantara, on the ist December, 191 6, and it reached Ma2;ar, 70
miles from Kantara, on the loth January, 191 7.
The pipes necessary to complete the last section of the
line into El Arish reached Kantara on the 30th December,
1 91 6, and the pipe-line into El Arish was completed by
5th February, 191 7.
With the completion of the pipe-line into El Arish, the
available stock of piping of over 6 inches diameter, and also of
heavy engines and pipes, had been wholly absorbed. When,
therefore, it was decided, in the middle of February, to extend
the piped water-system east of El Arish, through Sheikh Zowaid
to Rafa, it became necessary to supply the additional piping re-
quired for this extension by the collection of all available 6-inch,
5-inch, and 4-inch pipes from lines in rear, the maintenance of
which was no longer essential.
This line has now been still further extended to the Wadi
Ghuzze in the neighbourhood of Abu Bakra, to which point it
is possible to supply by pump from Rafa up to 60,000 gallons
a day.
As regards the development of local water resources in the
immediate area of our present operations, there are at Khan
Yunus three stone-lined wells, producing an average daily
supply of from 100,000 to 120,000 gallons of good water. Pump-
ing plant has been installed, and the greater part of this water
(approximately 80,000 gallons per diem) is now distributed by
pipe-line to the troops in the neighbourhood of Abasan el
Kebir and Abu Sitta.
At Deir el Belah wells exist, but the water is brackish, and
is not at present fit for consumption by white troops, who have
therefore to be supplied with drinking-water by rail from El
Arish, the local supply being utilised exclusively for watering
animals. There are, however, indications that a supply of
drinking-water might be developed at a lower level in this
APPENDIX D 191
neighbourhood by deep boring, work upon which is at pre-
sent in progress in the Mendur — Jemmi area.
On the main line at present occupied by our troops in
front of the Wadi Ghuzze, arrangements for supply and distri-
bution of water are, briefly, as follows : —
Near the mouth of the Wadi, water has been developed in
shallow wells in the sand dunes in sufficient quantity to supply
approximately two divisions.
In the Sheikh Abbas section it has not yet been found pos-
sible to develop any local supply, and the troops are supplied
with water rail-borne from El Arish, pumped forward through
a pipe-line from temporary reservoirs at rail-head (Deir el
Belah).
Arrangements are now well in hand to supply troops in the
Mendur area with water pumped from Kantara along the pipe-
line, via Rafa, Abu Katli, Abu Sitta and Abu Bakra. The
Khan Yunus supply can also be pumped into this pipe-line.
At Shellal, springs which now produce a supply of about
200,000 gallons a day have been developed, a reservoir has been
constructed to store water, and preparations are being made to
install a pumping station to pump water forward in the direc-
tion of Abu Hereira.
At El Gamli and at Bir el Esani there are springs believed
to be capable of extensive development, but these have not yet
been fully reported on.
During the advance of the troops through the desert it was
not always possible to provide a piped supply of water. It has
been carried forward many miles in fantasses by camels, and in
water-tanks by the railway line.
Sidings have been specially laid where trains of water-tanks
on railway trucks were filled from batteries of stand-pipes. At
the rail-head, at block-houses and intermediate posts, permanent
reservoirs have been built or temporary canvas tanks installed.
The R.E. field companies and field squadrons on the
eastern front have, provisionally, been specially organised and
provided with equipment to enable them to develop local re-
sources to the fullest possible extent. Each field company
equipped for desert warfare carries 12 complete sets of pumps,
water-troughs, tube wells and linings for shallow wells.
At Mahemdia, on the Mediterranean coast, and at Quaran-
192 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
tine Station in the Gulf of Suez, condensing machinery has
been erected, and is available for use in the event of failure of
supplies by water-boat or other sources.
With regard to the system of filtration adopted : —
After careful consideration of the subject and consultation
with engineering authorities in Egypt, it was decided that the
method of mechanical purification by filters, as used in Cairo,
Alexandria and other large Egyptian towns, should be em-
ployed ; and the results have been most satisfactory.
At Moascar Camp near Ismailia a slow sand-filter was in-
stalled, and has proved very successful.
APPENDIX E
RAILWAYS
From January, 191 6, to June, 191 7
A. — Suez Canal Defences
As it had been decided to increase the force in Egypt and to
adopt a line of defence in front of the Suez Canal, a consider-
able amount of railway had to be laid. The general idea was to
have nine depots on the east bank of the Suez Canal and to
have a 2-foot 6-inch gauge railway and a road from each depot
to the second line of trenches, and a 60-centimetre gauge
Decauville line and a road from each depot to the front line
of trenches.
From a railway-traffic point of view it might have been
better to have had two long loop lines, one south and one north
of the Bitter Lakes, and one spur line from Port Said east to
Mahemdia, but tactical considerations outweighed the ques-
tion of convenience in railway working, and short spur lines
were laid. The depots on the east bank of the Suez Canal were
to be connected with the State Railway line by swing bridges
over the Suez Canal, and branch hnes from the Suez Canal
west bank to the State Railways' main line, whenever the dis-
tance rendered such branches advisable ; the State Railway
line between Port Said and Suez runs more or less parallel to
the Suez Canal and west of it.
Orders were received by the State Railways to prepare a
general scheme on these lines on the 25th November, 191 5.
It was evident that, in order to deal with the proposed num-
bers of troops, the line from Zagazig to Ismailia would have to
be doubled. On the 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th November,
1 91 5, the general manager went over the ground with the
General Officer in charge of the defence, and arranged to carry
N 193
194 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
out his orders. Work began on the ist December, 1915, and it
was to be finished by 15th January, 191 6.
The following work had to be done : —
1. Zagazig — Ismailia Doubling. — Line from Zagazig to Is-
mailia had to be doubled.
2. Sidings from State Railways to Suez Canal. — Sidings
had to be laid from the Port Said — Suez branch of
the State Railways to the Suez Canal west bank at
El Ferdan, Ismailia (Ferry Post), Serapeum, Shallufa
and Kubri.
3. Stations for camps on State Railways. — Special stations
and sidings for camps were required at Ballah, Ain
Ghosein, Abu Sultan, Abu Halab, Kantara, Ismailia
and Suez. Large stations had already been made at
Moascar and Tel el Kebir.
4. Extra Crossing Stations on State Railways. — Besides the
special stations and sidings for camps, extra stations
for crossing trains were wanted at El Hersh, Fanara
and El Gebel.
In carrying out items i, 2, 3 and 4, 150 kilometres of new
standard gauge track belonging to the Egyptian State Railways
were used, this being the quantity bought for doing renewals
for the two years 1916-1917. All renewals have accordingly
been postponed as far as the State Railways are concerned.
5. Light Railways east of the Suez Canal. — These lines were
2.6-inch gauge, except the one at Kantara, which was
metre %2Mgz..
6. Standard Gauge east of Suez Canal. — A standard 4.8|-inch
gauge line from Kantara was decided on in February,
1 91 6, the original destination being a point in the
neighbourhood of Katia.
7. Metre Gauge and Decauville Lines. — The metre gauge line
east of Kantara, which went as far as Romani and had
a branch to Dueidar, and the Decauville lines, were all
laid by the Engineer-in-Chief.
The metre gauge line has been closed, and, as the material is
only hired, it will be pulled up and returned to the owners.
APPENDIX E 195
B. — Western Frontier Defences
1. Alexandria — Dhahba Line. — In addition to the works for
the defence of the Suez Canal, it was decided to enlarge the
stations on this line in order to deal with the troops of the
Western Frontier Force.
2. Baharia Line. — It was decided to lay a 2-foot 6-inch
gauge railway from Samalut westwards for 134 kilometres in
the direction of the Baharia oasis.
3. Extension west of Kharga Oasis. — The 2-foot 6-inch
gauge line from the Nile Valley to Kharga Oasis was extended
to a point 30 kilometres west of Kharga Oasis.
Item No. I
Ismailia — Zagazig Doubling. — The doubling of this section
began on the 6th December, 191 5/ and was completed on 6th
January, 1916. It is 79 kilometres long ; 15,000 men were em-
ployed on the work. The new line was laid with Egyptian
Railways* standard track, which has 47-kilogram rails. Some
ridges had to be widened, and, of course, stations and signalling
had to be altered to suit double-line working.
Item No. 2
Sidings from State Railway between Port Said and Suez to
west bank of Suez Canal. — These were laid at the following
places : —
(a) El Ferdan. — Siding about i^ kilometres, with sidings
for supply depot, etc., at the end.
(6) Ismailia. — Siding about 2I kilometres long, from main
line to west bank of Suez Canal at a place called
Ferry Post. At Ferry Post there are railway workshops
for all the 2-foot 6-inch gauge lines east of the Canal,
and supply, ordnance and Royal Engineer depots.
(c) Serapeum. — Siding about 3 kilometres long, with open-
ing bridge over the Sweet-water Canal, and sidings
for supplies, ordnance and Royal Engineer stores on
the Suez Canal bank.
196 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
(d) Shallufa, — Siding 3 kilometres long, with opening
bridge over Sweet-water Canal, and sidings for sup-
plies, ordnance and Royal Engineer stores on the
Suez Canal bank.
(e) El Kubri. — Siding 3I kilometres long, with opening
bridge over the Sweet-water Canal, and sidings for
supplies, ordnance and Royal Engineer stores on the
Suez Canal bank.
Item No, 3
The existing stations at the following places had to be pro-
vided with extra siding accommodation, platforms, etc. : —
(a) El Hersh, — New loop and platform.
(b) Kantara, — Very large alterations, partly owing to the
necessity of providing for the trafi5c going from the
west to the east of the Canal, partly owing to the new
line from Salihiya, which was constructed in 1916. For
many trains Kantara became a terminal station, so a
triangle had to be provided for turning engines, and
extra sidings for remarshalling trains were wanted.
Platform accommodation had to be largely increased,
and sidings for hospital trains and disinfecting plants
had to be laid.
(c) Ballah, — Loop and sidings with new platform, to facili-
tate work on troop trains.
{d) El Ferdan, — Extra siding in old station, to work with
siding to Canal bank mentioned in Item 2 (a) above,
(e) Ismailia, — New sidings in old station and three new
sidings for a new goods station for army traffic, two
new sidings for emergency trains to stand on.
(/) Ain Ghosein, — New station for cavalry camp. Two loops,
siding for water train, and platform.
{g) Serapeum, — New station on main line for camp and for
working siding mentioned above. Item 2 (c).
{h) Abu Sultan, — New station for camp. Two loops, water,
train siding and platform.
(i) Abu Halab, — New station for camp. Two loops, water,
train siding and platform.
APPENDIX E 197
(j) Shallufa. — New station on main line for camp and for
working siding mentioned in Item 2 (d) above.
{k) El Kubri, — New station on main line (two loops and water
siding) for camp and to work with siding referred to
above, Item 2 (e),
(/) — {i.) Suez, Camp Station, — A new station at the north
end of Suez, with siding 2 kilometres long and two
loops at the end of it, for dealing with supplies, etc.
(h.) Suez Docks, — The railway accommodation was in-
sufficient here, and some new sidings were laid in ;
but there was very little room for sidings, and, until
more land has been reclaimed, the quay lines will
always be very cramped.
(m) Loops for crossing trains were put in at Fanara and El
Gebel. These were for convenience in working the traffic.
Item No, 4
Details of 2-foot 6-inch gauge lines, — The material used was
mainly 25-lb. rails and steel sleepers provided by the War
Office. The engines were petrol-driven and gave a great deal of
trouble at first. The wagons were good as regards under-frames,
but the truck platforms were too narrow, and chilled cast wheels
are not the best type for work in the desert. The lines were, of
course, not designed for the use to which they were put. Some
of the lines were laid with heavier rails and wood sleepers from
the Egyptian State Railways. At first six branches were decided
on, but later one was added from Port Said east to Mahemdia,and
the line from Shatt to Quarantine was extended to Ayun Musa.
The lines eventually laid are as follows : —
Length in Kilometres,
Port Said, cast, to Mahemdia . . '41
Ballah, eastwards . . . . . . 8«8
El Ferdan, eastwards ..... g-S
Ismailia (Ferry Post), eastwards . . . 1 1 '3
Serapeum, eastwards . . . . . 9'4
Shallufa, eastwards . . . . . i5«i
El Kubri, eastwards . . . . .7*4
El Shatt to Gebel Mur 7.3
El Shatt to Ayun Musa . . . . . ii'4
121.5
A total of 1 2 1. 5 kilometres, exclusive of sidings.
igS SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
The first of these hnes was commenced in December, 191 5,
and the last was completed in June, 191 6, with the exception of
the extension of the El Shatt line to Ayun Musa, which was
decided on and completed in August.
These lines were equipped with 33 petrol locomotives and
341 trucks. The traffic varied considerably from time to time,
a large part thereof consisting of stone for road-making.
The greatest tonnage on any one line in a week amounted in
the case of the Shallufa line in May, 1916, to 2,900 tons, of which
2,100 tons were stone.
The weekly average tonnage carried on all the 2-foot 6-inch
gauge lines in January, 1917, was 6,500 tons.
The maximum train load varied on the different lines,
according to their ruling gradient, between eight and eighteen
5-ton trucks or the equivalent thereof.
These lines have all been closed, but have been left in such
a condition that they can be reopened if necessary.
Item No. 5
Standard Gauge Lines east of the Suez Canal, — The standard
(4-foot 8|-inch) gauge line from Kantara eastwards was com-
menced towards the end of February, 191 6, the original destin-
ation being the neighbourhood of Katia, the materials used
being 75-lb. Vignolles section steel rails on wooden sleepers
with bearing plates and spikes.
Siding accommodation for locomotives and trucks was laid
down at Kantara, proportional to this length of line. It his had
to be largely increased subsequently, owing to the extension of
the line to El Arish.
The line reached Romani (Kilometre 40.5) on the 15th May,
1916, when a branch line to Mahemdia (5I kilometres) was
taken in hand and completed on the 20th June, 191 6.
The extension of the line beyond Romani began again on
the 7th July, 1916, but was stopped at Kilometre 47 on the
1 8th July and was not resumed till the loth August. During
the intervals, much work was done in providing additional
siding accommodation at Kantara and elsewhere.
APPENDIX E 199
The Une reached Bir el Abd (Kilometre 76) on the 5th
October, 1916, from which point arrangements were made
for an increased rate of progress.
Bir el Mazar (Kilometre 113.5) was reached on the
17th November, 191 6, and rail-head on the i6th February,
1 91 7, was at Kilometre 170, or 15 kilometres east of El
Arish.
During this period the depot at Kantara was further en-
larged and to some extent rearranged, to cope with increased
traffic and the greater length of line served.
From the i6th February, 1917 (Kilometre 170), to the 28th
March, 191 7, when Kilometre 215 was reached, construction
continued regularly, stations being laid in at El Burj, Sheikh
Zowaid, Rafa and Khan Yunus — besides some smaller crossing
stations necessary for traffic working.
At Kilometre 215 there was a slight check due to military
operations, but work was soon resumed and rail-head reached
Deir el Belah on the 4th April, 191 7. Here a sidmg had to be
laid down to the beach, four kilometres away ; also a long siding
(about three kilometres) for watering a post ; besides the usual
station with siding for supplies, hospital, etc.
The mileage of track laid in this railway is greater than
might be supposed, because every alternate station has
to be large enough to deal with the traffic necessary for
feeding, munitioning and, to a certain extent, watering the
Force.
On the 23rd April, 1917, orders were given for the con-
struction of a branch line from Rafa to Weli Sheikh Nuran, and
from there southwards to Gamli. Sheikh Nuran Station was
reached on the i8th May, 1917, Gamli (Kilometre 26 from Rafa)
on the 13th June, 1917.
A branch line to Shellal was started from Kilometre 22I on
the Rafa — Gamli branch.
The large Wadi at Shellal was reached on the 15th June,
1 91 7, and bank parties are now doing the heavy earthwork
necessary to get the line down into the bed of the Wadi,
across it and up the other side. There is a very large cube
of earthwork here, and a bridge is wanted over the Wadi
itself. The whole work is estimated to require 40 days from
3rd June, if no very hard soil or rock is met with.
300 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Meanwhile, the track-laying parties are occupied in laying
in loops for the extra crossing stations and diversions referred
to above.
On the 9th March, 1917^ at a conference with the Com-
mander-in-Chief, it was settled to keep the line beyond Gaza
near the coast and not to try for an inland route.
On the loth March, 1917, a bad sand-storm began, which
lasted for six days and interfered with traffic very much. It
was impossible to see far, and the line became covered with
sand in many places. An attempt to push traffic in spite of the
storm led to six derailments in one day. It took some time to
catch up the arrears of traffic. Fortunately, since then there
have only been two bad days.
A steel girder bridge on cylinders is being built across Wadi
el Arish and should be finished before the next rainy season ;
another minor bridge is being built. So far there have not been
many water-courses to cross, but as the line goes north the cli-
mate changes, more rain falls, and a number of culverts will be
required, besides a few larger bridges. Provision has been made
for these, and the girders for the next section of the line are in
the country. Rails, fish-plates and a large proportion of the
sleepers have been supplied from India. The finish of the
rails is equal to the best English work. It remains to be seen
how they will wear.
For various reasons (mainly water and the necessity of
laying large stations at frequent intervals) the capacity of the
line was put at 13 trains a day on an average. This, of course,
means that more than that number have to be run occasionally.
The coastwise water transport has helped very much, and so
far the 13 trains have seldom been needed.
A few more crossing stations have been put in, and some
other alterations made, which will bring the capacity of the
single line up to 16 trains each way daily on an average. If
more than these are needed the water-supply must somehow
be increased, and it would be wise to double the line as far
as Rafa at all events, and several other points will need
attention.
More rolling stock and engines have been sent from the
Egyptian State Railways ; 14 more South- Western locomotives
and 6 more coaches have been received from England,
APPENDIX E
201
The total engines and vehicles now on the Kantara East
line are as follows : —
Engines —
London and South- Western o — 6 — o .
Petrol
Egyptian State Railway o — 6 — o
Egyptian State Railway 4 — 4 — o
Egyptian State Railway 2 — 6 — o
Egyptian State Railway^ Tanks o — 6 —
Total
Coaches —
4-wheeled
6-wheeled
8-wheeled
Total
Wagons —
8, 10 and la tons
15 tons .
30 tons . . *
Brake vans
Sundry .
Total
Supplied
by War
Office.
26
3
Supplied
by Egyp-
tian State
Railways.
28
3
20
2
29
53
12
28
35
12
450
12
462
63
729
40
79
24
26
898
Total.
26
3
28
3
20
2
82
28
35
12
75
I/I79
40
79
36
26
1,360
Traffic, — The line now carries on an average 22,890 tons a
week, and has an engine mileage of 28,150 per week.
The maximum train-load is from 30 to 35 12-ton trucks,
according to the class of engine employed.
Water, — Water-supply has been one of the chief difficulties
to contend with, water having to be carried by rail beyond the
furthest point of supply by pipe-line, to some considerable
extent.
Communication with West Bank of Suez Canal, — A ferry
202 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
has been constructed at Kantara which is capable of carrying
an engine (or four wagons), so that any engine or wagon which
requires heavy repairs can be ferried over the Suez Canal and
run up to the State Railway shops in Cairo.
B. — Western Frontier Defences
Item No, I. — Western Frontier Force
Alexandria — Dhabba Line, — The stations on this line had to
have all the crossing loops lengthened to take larger trains than
the line was designed for. Full-sized trains cannot be used on
this line, as the bridge over the channel from Lake Mareotis will
not carry the heaviest engines.
Water, — The great difficulty on this line is water. There is
none fit for troops or boilers, and all water has to be carried in
tank trucks.
Rolling Stock, — Provided from Egyptian State Railway
stock.
The 4-foot 8|-inch gauge line from Alexandria to Dhabba
is now working on a peace basis again. One hundred and sixty-
six kilometres of good rails could be obtained from this line, if
necessary, for use elsewhere, but a large number of the sleepers
would need replacing, and a considerable percentage of new
fastenings would be required.
Item No. 2, — Western Frontier Force
Baharia Military Railway, — The Hne from Samalut towards
the oasis of Baharia is 134 kilometres long.
Gauge, — 3 feet 6 inches.
Materials, — Steel rails, wooden sleepers, spikes, no bearing
plates. Material all second-hand, bought from various light
railway companies in Egypt or provided by the State Railways.
Gradient, — The ruling gradient is i in 100.
Traffic, — Traffic for this line goes by the State Railways'
main Upper Egypt line to Maghagha, then over the Upper
Egypt Auxiliary Railways to Samalut, where it is transhipped to
APPENDIX E 203
the 2-foot 6-inch wagons of the Baharia military line. The Upper
Egypt Auxiliary Railways are light 4-foot Scinch gauge lines,
the property of the Egyptian State Railways.
Bridges. — A large bridge had to be built over the Bahr
Yussef Canal at Samalut.
Rolling Stock, — There are 20 engines and 200 wagons. A
train consists of one brake van and thirteen 5-ton wagons —
useful load, 65 tons.
Sand. — Sand gives trouble on this line; it drifts over it very
rapidly if there is a strong wind.
This line is still working, but with a greatly reduced traffic.
Item No. 3. — Western Frontier Force
Extension west of Kharga Oasis. — There was a line from the
Nile Valley to Kharga Oasis before the war.
Length. — 195 kilometres.
Gauge. — 2 feet 6 inches.
Gradient. — 1 in 30 on worst section, which is that leading
down to the Oasis itself.
Materials. — 4iJ-lb. rails. Steel sleepers mainly, but some
wooden.
Rolling Stock. — Four engines, 24 ten-ton wagons. The
engines are powerful for this class of line.
Composition of train. — An engine can pull 10 ten-ton wagons
up the steepest gradient.
It was decided to extend this line to a point 30 kilometres
west of Kharga in order to reach a part of the country which
was comparatively free from drift-sand and more suitable for
motor-cars.
The line is still working, but with a greatly reduced traffic.
Work on Egyptian State Railways
Traffic. — The work on these lines has been much increased
by the army. There are troop and hospital trains to be dealt
with, and supplies, stores and ammunition as well. A table is
attached which will show the traffic dealt with during 191 6,
204 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
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APPENDIX E 205
The State Railways are feeling the loss of rolling stock and
engines sent east of the Canal^ but not seriously so far* When
the force is increased more wagons will be needed on the State
lines for collecting and distributing food, etc., for the army,
and, with this and the necessity for sending more wagons east of
the Canal shortly, there will certainly not be enough rolling
stock to meet the usual demands made by the public during
the cotton season. Cotton and seed will have to be moved
more slowly. This will probably lead to complaints, but is
unavoidable.
Workshops, — Besides the extra repairs to rolling stock
necessitated by the extra traffic, a great deal of special work
has been done in the workshops, such as construction of and
repairs to wagons of all sorts, making camel saddles, parts of
guns and machine guns, bombs, etc. Extra men have been
taken on to deal with this work, or to take the place of men who
are employed on it.
APPENDIX F
EGYPTIAN LABOUR CORPS
January, 1916, to June, 1917
Organisation, Recruiting and Development
With the exception of the Naval wing, which is still at
Mudros, the Egyptian Labour Corps, after proving a useful
unit during the Galh'poli campaign, returned to Egypt in
January, 1916.
Headquarters were at Alexandria, and only 500 men were
working at Mersa Matruh.
The Engineer-in-Chief asked for 500 men for work on the
Canal, and on the 7th January these arrived, and were distributed
equally between Port Said, Ballah, Ismailia, Serapeum and
Suez Docks. Shortly after this, camps were opened at Shallufa,
El Kubri, Ayun Musa, Ferry Post and Kantara, bringing the
strength up to 1,000 men, all for Royal Engineer services.
During February and March, demands for labour were
continuously received from A.S.C. and Ordnance, and the
numbers employed by the Engineer-in-Chief were increased.
Sanitary gangs were asked for by medical services, to under-
take the sanitary fatigues in all camps. By the end of April
the strength of the corps was 42 officers and 9,000 men.
In order to meet the persistent demands for men, the form-
ation of a recruiting department under the Egyptian Labour
Corps was necessary, the establishment being one officer,
one doctor and one native clerk for each 10,000 men of the
corps.
During May, 5,000 additional men were indented for by the
Engineer-in-Chief and obtained with ease ; 150 of them were
despatched to El Amaid for road-making, and it is interesting to
206
APPENDIX F 207
note that the road constructed was first made by the Romans,
repaired by Napoleon, and remade by the Egyptian Labour
Corps.
Also, during May and June, four new camps were established
in Upper Egypt at Kharga, Samalut, Shusha and Fayum, These
camps were at first administered separately from Alexandria,
but later on an Officer Commanding, Upper Egypt, with head-
quarters at Minia, became necessary.
During June and July the strength at Kantara and in the
Katia area increased considerably to meet military require-
ments, and It was found necessary for purposes of administra-
tion to divide the Canal into three sections.
During June it had been found possible to reduce the pay
of unskilled labour to T.P. 5 per day without impairing the
efficiency of the corps.
In July a depot was formed at Hadra Camp for recruiting
and training volunteers for Egyptian Labour Corps and other
units required. The training of 1,000 drivers for horse trans-
port units was at once put in hand. They were drafted into
divisional trains, thus replacing an equivalent number of British
troops.
On 2nd August, instructions were received to recruit all
the men required by the Camel Transport Corps and to attest
them for continuous service at a pay of T.P. 7 per day. This
pay was afterwards reduced to T.P. 6, and 19,000 camel-drivers
were recruited up to 30th November, and all demands for
drivers met in the promptest manner.
Owing to the fact that Egyptian Labour Corps labourers
serve on a three months* contract, it is necessary to recruit
one-third of the total strength of the corps each month.
As all men under orders for overseas must be trained, a
second large depot was formed on Roda Island, Cairo, for
recruiting and training volunteers.
Recruiting, — As the demand for Egyptian Labour Corps
men increased, it became necessary to open recruiting camps.
The first camp for recruiting was opened at Assiut, Upper
Egypt, on the i6th October, 1916, which was followed by a
second camp, with the same object, at Sohag, 90 miles south
of Assiut.
Both these camps have proved of great value, and men can
2o8 SIR A, MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
now be collected in the camps and despatched to the coast by
special trains in drafts of 2,000.
On I2th February, 1917, a separate recruiting service was
formed for recruiting men in Upper Egypt for the Camel Trans-
port Corps, and Middle and Lower Egypt were developed as a
recruiting area for the Egyptian Labour Corps.
On 8th May, 1917, recruiting for all services was taken
over by a recruiting department, which is now being
developed.
The following recruiting figures are of interest : —
Recruited by the Egyptian Labour Corps
for Egyptian Labour Corps from ist
January, 1916,10 i2th February, 1917 . 127,862
Recruited by the Egyptian Labour Corps for
Camel Transport Corps during the same
period 38,305
156,167
Recruited by the Egyptian Labour Corps
from 13th February, 1917, to 8th May,
1 91 7, in Lower Egypt for Egyptian
Labour Corps ..... >7,599
Recruited by special recruiting service from
13th February, 1917, to 8th May, 1917,
for Egyptian Labour Corps . . . 7/335
Recruited by new recruiting department
from 9th May, 191 7, to 23rd June, 1917,
for Egyptian Labour Corps . . . 23,086
214,087
Egyptian Labour Corps men working in Egypt and Palestine
are engaged on a three months* contract.
Egyptian Labour Corps men for overseas are engaged on a
six months* contract, dating from the day of embarkation.
In September, 191 6, contractors* men were replaced by
Egyptian Labour Corps on the east bank of the Canal. The
numbers have decreased in the southern section, but have in-
creased considerably in the northern section, ue, on Palestine
Lines of Communication and East Force.
The total strength of the corps now is 51,000 labourers,
distributed as hereunder : —
APPENDIX F
209
Palestine Lines of Communi
cation and East Force
Canal Zone and Sundries
Naval Wing —
Mudros * *
Suez Docks .
Port Said
Beach (Southern Palestine)
Wing "H," Basrah (includ
ing those afloat) «
France
France (awaiting orders)
Salonica . * .
Non-com-
Officers.
missioned
Officers.
Privates.
138
127
255
62
108
162
2
I
—
2
3
—
I
3
_^^^
3
3
—
18
52
^^
48
166
126
6
22
10
3
5
Other
Ranks.
25,000
5,600
903
380
308
275
7,821
9/072
1,200
610
Wing ** H/* consisting of 2,000 unskilled and 500 skilled
labourers (including 13 different trades), sailed for Mesopotamia
during September, 1916, and on their arrival an additional
2,000 men were immediately asked for.
During October, November and December, drafts were sent
out to Wing " H," until the total number of Egyptian Labour
Corps men in Mesopotamia reached 8,ooo»
Owing to the difficulty of obtaining sufficient officers with
a knowledge of Arabic and accustomed to deahng with large
numbers of natives, authority was obtained in October to enlist
non-commissioned officers to replace civilian overseers who
were not under military discipline. Steps were immediately
taken to recruit and attest men for this grading, and in all cases
they volunteered for the period of the war.
The men were selected from British and Allied subjects,
the greatest care being exercised in selecting men with a know-
ledge of the languages necessary. Altogether some 470 non-
commissioned officers have been attested, equipped and drilled
in Hadra and Roda depots, and reports on their work from the
various camps to which they have been drafted are, so far,
satisfactory.
Owing to the large numbers of native labourers employed in
the Canal Zone, it became evident that additional police control
would be required. The raising of a police force was entrusted
210 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
to the Egyptian Labour Corps, and authority was given, on
igth April, 191 6, to raise a force of 260 men, with the necessary
officers.
The duty of this force was the issue and control of passes to
cross the Marine Canal and to guard pontoon bridges. This
force has grown considerably, and is now employed for guard-
ing stations and camps on Palestine lines of communication
and the villages of Southern Palestine. The present strength
of the force is 1,000 men.
It is interesting to note that in Mesopotamia Egyptian
Labour Corps men have been selected, trained and formed into
a police force for policing Baghdad.
Salonica Draft, — A specially trained company for railway
construction was requested for work at Salonica.
Company No. 70 was selected and trained for this work and
embarked for Salonica in March last. The company was up
to establishment, and favourable reports are being received.
French Draft, — During January, 1917, an application was
made for the services of Egyptian Labour Corps for France,
and it was decided to send 18 companies, having a strength per
company of : —
3 officers, II non-commissioned officers, 660 men.
Companies Nos. 71 and 72 embarked on 23rd March, 1917/
and arrived safely at Marseilles. Later, Companies Nos. 73 to
84 have embarked, and Nos. 85 and 86 are standing by for orders.
It has been decided that the remaining three companies, viz.,
87, 88 and 89, will not leave Egypt owing to the lateness of the
season and the difficulty of obtaining transport.
Reports from France are so far satisfactory.
Cadets, — Authority was obtained on 14th February, 1917,
to invite applications from suitable non-commissioned officers
and men of other units to apply for commissioned rank in the
Egyptian Labour Corps. A school for the purpose of teaching
selected cadets Arabic was organised ; 209 cadets passed through
this school, out of which 128 were selected and finally obtained
temporary commissions on probation. General List, for duty
with the Egyptian Labour Corps.
Maltese Wing, — The Classification Committee, whose object
it was to obtain information of British subjects living in
APPENDIX F 23;i
Egypt^ forwarded large numbers of names for interview, and
Egyptian Labour Corps officers interviewed all British and
Allied subjects wishing to serve. A large number of men
came forward, but they were of little value unless drilled and
disciplined.
The Egyptian Labour Corps, " Maltese Wing," was organ-
ised with a view of giving discipline to this class of man.
The men were invited to attest for the period of the war as
soldiers and under the usual conditions and pay.
Although IS. a day did not prove attractive, the prospect of
obtaining promotion to the non-commissioned-officer foreman
rank for service with the Egyptian Labour Corps did appeal to
Europeans of Allied nations, and altogether 1,043 men have
been attested, trained, and are now serving with the Egyptian
Labour Corps in Egypt or overseas.
The privates remaining in the wing are working in exposed
positions in Palestine, and are well reported on.
Large numbers of the old Zion Mule Corps attested for
service, and are proving useful men.
An interesting feature is that Egyptian Labour Corps
labourers who have been working with the corps for various
terms during the last two years are now offering their services
for the period of the war for this wing, with the knowledge that
the work will take them into exposed positions.
Administration
With a unit wliich has developed from 500 to 51,000, the
question of organisation and administration has proved one of
considerable anxiety. The corps has been reorganised under the
company system, which provides for an establishment, viz. : —
Headquarters, General Head-
quarters . . . Officer commanding, adjutant, officer
i/c indents and staff.
Base Office, Alexandria . . Officer commanding, officer i/c pay
duties, officer i/c records.
Branch Headquarters . each 10,000 men.
Camp Headquarters . each 1,200 — 1,800 men.
Company . . . each 600 men.
Distribution Camp.
Recruiting Camps " A" and " B."
212 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
The advantages expected to accrue from this reorganisation
are : — (a) An authorised establishment. (6) Mobility of com-
panies, (c) Regimental system of accounts, (d) Permanent
Reises (headmen), with promotion. This is expected to help
recruiting, as men will re-volunteer for their old companies.
(e) Organised recruiting depots, which will allow recruiting to
be continuous and not spasmodic (on receipt of indents for
labour) as previously.
Equipment and Rations
Various scales of equipment and rations were laid down
for Egypt in summer and winter, and for the men serving over-
seas, which were ample and much appreciated by the men.
During summer in Egypt and overseas, the men wear a neat
khaki uniform, consisting of shorts and a smock, with ** E.L.C*
worked in red letters on the chest. A suitable head-dress and
boots are suppHed when the climate or work necessitates them.
During winter an ample supply of underclothing is allowed, and
a military overcoat. When men become time-expired, these
articles are returned to store, disinfected and re-issued.
Rations have proved ample, but a complete system of
canteens became necessary, and these have been established
to supply the men with every possible want. Sanction has
been obtained for the profits from these canteens to be used
as compensation for dependents of men who have lost their
lives or have been disabled whilst serving in the corps.
Work Completed
Western Frontier Force. — Coastal Section. — At Matruh and
Solium, Egyptian Labour Force personnel have laid a Decauville
line, built blockhouses, erected sheds, quarried stone, cut roads
and constructed piers, where thousands of tons of stores, equip-
ment, guns and armoured cars were unloaded. On one occasion
900 tons were landed and stacked by 150 men in a day. Cap-
tured female camels were broken in and formed into a
transport unit, which accompanied the column to Solium^
APPENDIX F 213
carrying all the stores necessary for the defence of the advanced
base.
The corps also provided stretcher-bearer parties at Matruh
in connection with the engagements there.
Samalut — Shusha. — Blockhouse line to Baharia was con-
structed,
Kharga, — Skilled men have constructed the water dump.
After a recent collision, the line was cleared by Egyptian Labour
Corps men and communication with Egypt re-established, thus
enabling supplies to be brought up in time for the troops in the
oasis.
Canal Zone, — With the exception of some private contractors
working on roads up till July, generally speaking all the labour
for the Army has been supplied by the Egyptian Labour Corps
on the east bank of the Canal. Supply and ordnance depots
have been worked by Egyptian Labour Corps men. Sanitation
of camps has been done by special gangs under the supervision
of Sanitary Section, R.A.M.C., and the great bulk of the work
of R.E. services has been performed by the Egyptian Labour
Corps. A large proportion of huts, stables, messes and re-
creation rooms have been constructed by the carpenters. It
is interesting to note the number of different trades required
to keep an army in motion, viz. : — Carpenters, blacksmiths,
tinsmiths, rivetters, platelayers, tent-menders, wheelwrights,
masons, quarrymen, stonecutters, plumbers, bakers, engine-
drivers, stokers, wood-caulkers, boatmen, pipe-hands, painters.
Egypt was able to supply all these trades.
Southern Canal Section (including No. i and No. 2 Sec-
tions). — Egyptian Labour Corps have completed practically all
the inner and second hne defences. Men working at Shallufa
filled and laid on an average 150 sandbags per man per day.
Pipe-lines have been laid at all posts, all roads maintained, and
many new ones constructed. A narrow-gauge railway has been
constructed between El Shatt, Quarantine and Ayun Musa,
and extensions of existing lines at other places. Owing to the
advance in Southern Palestine and the clearing of the enemy
from the Sinai Province, work in the Southern Canal Section
has diminished to a considerable extent.
No, 3 Section or Palestine Lines of Communication and
214 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
East Force is an exceedingly large area extending from Kantara
to the '* front *' in Palestine,
During the early summer of 1916 the Egyptian Labour
Corps was employed at, and, in fact, made every permanent
trench east of, Kantara.
The 12-inch pipe-line was carried out to Romani, and the
metre -gauge railway constructed.
Later in the summer the important work of building the
Romani Redoubts was undertaken and completed by these men.
The men soon understood rivetting and wiring, and, although
they were constantly bombed, the work proceeded without
delay.
Taking into consideration the climate of Romani in July, it
is doubtful if British troops could have done the work as well
or in the time required.
The men came under fire freely on 4th August. They were
also employed as stretcher-bearers and were well reported on.
It is gratifying to know that these men on returning to
their villages re-enlisted after a few days, and, in fact, a large
number now look on the construction of defences as their
profession.
Laying the pipe-line from Kantara to the defences in Pales-
tine for a distance of 160 miles is perhaps the most important
work yet done by the Corps,
The work of laying the pipe-line can be divided as below : —
1. Discharging pipes from steamers and loading them on
rail trucks,
2. Discharging pipes from trucks and transporting to the
pipe-line, often on the shoulders of men.
3. Cutting a way for pipe-line through sandhills and filling
in low levels to carry the pipe.
4. Laying the pipe and connecting it.
5. Covering the completed pipe-line.
The total weight of pipes so handled is approximately
12,000 tons.
The A.S.C. largely employ Egyptian Labour Corps men.
At Kantara Depot over 2,300 men are continuously em-
ployed in discharging steamers brought alongside the depot,
and in loading trains for the advanced depots and dumps at the
APPENDIX F 315
front. The work usually goes on day and night, and after
three months the men certainly require a rest.
At the advanced depots and dumps Egyptian Labour Corps
men are also working by day and night. The work is well organ-
ised. It is interesting to watch a train steam into a depot, to
see the men spring on the trucks, and in the shortest possible
time the empty train steams out agam.
A service by sea is also maintained to a beach in Southern
Palestine, where Egyptian Labour Corps boatmen, stevedores
and men discharge stores from transports into surf boats, and
from the boats to the beach.
As there is little or no surf boating in Egypt, the work at
first was not good ; but the men soon learned what was required,
and the average weight discharged increased to 31.6 tons per
hour over a period ; the best day's work being 628 tons with
18 boats.
Defence Work, — After the battle of Romani on 4th August
there was a great deal of cleaning up to do, and the defences to
repair and complete.
The pipe-line layers were always working in advance of the
defence workers, but El Abd, Mazar, El Arish and Rafa were
fortified by the Corps, without difficulty or outside help.
At El Arish materials were carried long distances by the
men through heavy sand without complaint, and it is generally
thought that the men take an interest in their work.
Ordnance Department, — During the latter part of 1916, and
to date, the Egyptian Labour Corps has been employed in
ordnance depots, and, as various tradesmen were required, it
was necessary to train men specially for this service.
It is anticipated that the men so employed will prove of
great value to Egypt after the war.
Ammunition is now discharged and stored in dumps by
Egyptian Labour Corps men at a cost of 5d. per ton, average
weight per man per day being .3 ton.
Pay and Records, — The development of the Corps from 500
men to over 50,000 in 18 months has put a great strain on the
Pay and Record Departments at the Base Office, Alexandria.
Each man when recruited is paid 100 piastres advance, and
he probably receives two advances during his period of service
i
216 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
and the final payment on discharge. The Records are kept on a
modified Army system, but provide sufficient detail to allow of
the relatives of any man being communicated with immediately
in case of casualties. It is interesting to note that no soldier or
Enghshman of military age is employed on the clerical staff of 1
the Corps.
Egypt has contributed her man-power towards the prose-
cution of the war without interference in any way with the
cultivation of the country. This has only been possible
owing to the fact that the woman- and child-power had been
so splendidly developed in pre-war days.
APPENDIX G
CAMEL TRANSPORT CORPS
January, 1916, to June, 1917
1. General Remarks, — At the end of December, 191 5, orders
were given for the raising of two Camel Transport Corps, each
of 10,000 camels. At this time, there was in existence on the
Canal one company of about 800 camels, fully equipped and
with its full personnel. This was at once raised to 2,000, the
strength fixed for the establishment of the new companies,
and the Ministry of Interior commenced the purchase of camels
on a large scale. By the end of February, the strength of the
companies reached 18,923 camels ; this has since been in-
creased, and the present number is about 33,594. Companies
were organised and marched out of depot as follows : —
" A " Company, in existence on Canal Zone.
** B " Company, 13th January, 1916, to Canal Zone.
** C " Company, 17th January, 1916, to Mobile Column,
Solium.
" D " Company, loth February, 1 916, to Canal Zone.
** E " Company, 5th February, 1916, to Canal Zone.
" F " Company, 15th February, 1916, to Canal Zone,
** G ** Company, 21st February, 1916, to Canal Zone.
** H " Company, ist March, 191 6, to Western Frontier
Force.
** I ** Company, ist March, 1916, formed at Suez.
" K " Company, ist July, 1916, to Canal Zone.
** L " Company, nth September, 1916, to Canal Zone.
** M " Company, 26th September, 1916, to Canal Zone.
** N " Company, 14th September, 1916, to Canal Zone.
** O " Company, 6th October, 1916, to Western Frontier
Force (in relief of ** C " Company, to Canal Zone).
217
2i8 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
" P ** Company, 3rd November, 1916, to Western Frontier
Force.
** Q ** Company, 4th February, 1917, East Force.
** R ** Company, 20th April, 1917, East Force.
These animals were all clipped and dressed for mange
three times before being sent out to work.
Since the beginning of the year, " P," " Q " and " R "
Companies have been sent to East Force. ** H " Company has
been brought in from the Western Frontier Force and reorgan-
ised at Kantara, the Western Frontier Force being supplied
with transport from No. i Depot, in detachments at Baharia
200 camels, Matruh 250 camels, and Solium 250 camels. ** O '*
Company, which is composed of female camels, has been
transferred from the Western Frontier Force to the Canal
Zone.
2. British Personnel. — Of the officers who joined at the form-
ation of the Corps, one had had six months* experience with the
hired transport companies, and one for a month. The first
companies that were formed were officered by officials who
were lent by the Egyptian Government, and by gentlemen
who had been some years in Egypt in business : though they
had no military experience or knowledge of camel transport,
they had the advantage of knowing the language and the natives.
A year's experience has proved that, for the successful working
of transport with native drivers, a knowledge of this kind is
very necessary. The officer commanding company and adjutant
should always have local knowledge. About 50 per cent, of
officers were recruited locally.
3. Native Personnel. — When the corps was formed, native
drivers were recruited from the villages of Upper and Lower
Egypt on a three months' contract. Their period of engage-
ment has now been extended to six months, which has greatly
improved the efficiency. They have continued to work well,
and their conduct has been very satisfactory. The past six
months have been very trying, but their behaviour under fire
in all cases has been exemplary. Several instances have occurred
of natives showing particular devotion to duty, and these have
been rewarded under No. G.R.O. 2491, dated 23rd May, 1917.
Over 380 have been admitted to hospital from wounds from
APPENDIX G 219
camel bites, about 70 of whom have lost a limb. At present the
total native personnel employed numbers 20,000.
4. Classes of Camels, — Eight classes of animals have been
received : —
(i) Delta heavy camel. (5) Somali camel.
(2) Upper Egypt camel. (6) Egyptian female camel.
(3) Sudan camel. (7) Western desert camel.
(4) Indian Camel Corps. (8) Algerian camel.
The best animal up to date has been the heavy Delta bag-
gage camel; the better class of Sudan camel has also done well,
but he takes a long time to acclimatise. The Indian camels,
though given time to acclimatise, were a failure, and they had a
very heavy casualty list, though not hard-worked. The Somali
camel soon settles down, but his carrying capacity is small,
being limited to 250 lbs. The female' camels have done well
what little they have had to do, but their value must be put to
a longer test. 4,078 Algerian camels have been received as
remounts. The majority of these camels are small in size,
compared with the heavy-burden Egyptian. They arrived
in the country with very heavy, long, hairy coats, and very
soft in condition. The majority of them have not yet been put
to work, so that it is impossible to say whether they will be a
success or not.
The dealing with mange has been a continual trouble, but
it has been most successfully treated. The camel is a difficult
and delicate animal to work, and casualty lists in all campaigns
in which he has been used have been very high. Over 30,000
camels were worked during the first 1 1 months of last year, and
of these 1,473 died, 202 were killed in action, 189 sold owing
to injuries, and 7,741 admitted to hospital ; and though the
number of hospital cases seems large, it should be borne in
mind that hardly 50 per cent, of all camels were received with
clean backs. There has been a marked decrease in the number
of casualties during the last six months, it having been reduced
to 2.4 per cent, during the month of May. The casualties
of animals killed in action have increased, 188 having been
killed during that period. A certain number of casualties
occurred at two periods owing to excessive heat.
220 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
5. Equipment, — Beyond 750 Egyptian Army pack-saddles
which were issued to the first company, no saddlery was
available from the Ordnance Depot. Camels began to arrive
quickly, and contracts were entered into for the supply of
20,000 saddles, but owing to wood and rope not being avail-
able, both contractors failed to supply anything like the required
numbers. Camel purchasers were asked to purchase the native
saddle with the camels. This was done, and in this way some
10,000 saddles were received, but all had to be overhauled,
retied, pads restuffed, girths, breastplates and cruppers renewed
and made from any rope that could be procured, and as a rule
it took two saddles as received to make one strong enough for
military transport work. This overhauling and remaking of
saddles was undertaken in workshops at the Camel Depot and
in workshops of departments of the Egyptian Government.
The great advantage of these saddles was that they were made
of seasoned wood ; they were put in serviceable condition at
an average cost of P.T. 20 per saddle ; all have given I2
months' or more hard work, and a great many are still being used.
During the year several types of saddles have been experimented
with, and we have as a result two sizes of saddles which are
working well. The Indian pattern saddle did excellently for
the Indian camel, but, owing to the different shape of the
Egyptian camel's back, is unsuitable for that animal. Experi-
ments were also tried with the captured Turkish saddles, with
unfavourable results. An improvement has lately been made
in girths, to enable them to be tightened at any time when the
camel is loaded*
Head-collars. — The Egyptian Army pattern is the only prac-
tical one ; others were tried, but were not successful. Last
winter sacks were used as rugs, but this year a camel-rug made
from old blankets and sacks by the Ordnance Department is
being used with some success.
6. Loads. — The average load carried was 350 lbs. over very
heavy desert on the eastern side. The marches in most cases
were not long, but, owing to operations, the animals at times re-
mained loaded for long hours. Of good camel grazing there was
at first very httle, but lately some good grazing has been reached^
INDEX
i
INDEX
Abasan el Kebir, 142, 154
Abbassia, 123
Abu Aweigila, 98, gg, 100, loi ; —
Darem, 60 ; — Hamra, 68, 69, 73 ;
— Hereira, I42> 143, 144, 146, 156,
163, 165
Acknowledgments and Commendations,
38-41, 54, 73-4, 77-82, io8-g, 114,
122-6, 160, 161, 173-8
Adye, Maj.-Gen. J., 41, 125, 177
Aerodromes, 45-6, 95
Aeroplane attacks, 14, 27, 34, 35-6,
45-6, 60, g3, 100, 107, 138, 154, 164,
167; — reconnaissances, 13, 27, 48,
55» 59> 74» 98, 99> loO/ 102, 104, 107,
109, 138, 163 ; — repair, 170 ; —
survey, 9-10
Agostino, Majer da, 172
Ain Sudr, 21, 113
Aircraft and artillery, 109
Akaba, 113
Alexandria, 5, 8, 40, 125
Ali el Muntar, 134, 145, 146, 147, 148,
150, 151, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161,
162
Altham, Gen. Sir Edward, 16, 82, 91
Ammunition raids, 20
Amr, 166
Animal transport services, 174-5
Arab camelry, 57 ; — snipers, 169
Arabs, agreement with, 170-1
Armoured cars, 20, 114, 117, 118, 119,
120, 121, 122, 123, 139, 140, 150,
170 ; — trains, 55, 78
Army Brigades :
2nd Dismounted, 19
^th Mounted, 23, 51, 63, 64, 66, 67,
73> 90, 105, 106, 144; 6th, 160;
22nd, 146, 148
125th, 64; 127^/1,55,64,67; 156th,
67, 72, i59» 161 ; i5gth, 144, 145,
i5g; 160th, 63, 144, 145, 150;
161st, 145, 147, 150, 153, 160;
162nd, 159, 160, 162 ; 163rd, 159,
160 ; 22gth of 74th Div., 162
155th Infantry, 65, i5g, 160, 161, 162 ;
158th, 65, 74, 144, 145
Army Corps :
8th, 13 ; gth, 11, 13 ; 15th, 11, 13, 14,
23
Army Divisions :
11th, 13; 13th, 13; 42nd, 59, 62,
63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 73, 90, 91,
92, gg, no, 130, 131; 46th, 135;
52nd, 23, 56, 67, 68, 6g, 72, 73>
90, gi, 93, 99> 136, i40> 14I/ 142,
149, 153/ I55» I57» 158, 161, 162,
173; 53rd, II, 16, 36-7, 55, gi,
g2, g3, log, no, 130, i3g, 142,
144, 145, 147, 148, i4g, 150, 151,
153, 156, 157, 158, 162, 173;
54th, II, 16, 62, log, no, 130,
140, 141, 142, 144, 148, i4g, 150,
151, 152, I53> 155/ 157/ 158/ 161,
162, 173; 74'^/ 132, 136-7/ 1 40/
156, 158, 162 ; 75th, 137, 166
Army Postal Service, 81
Asluj, 168, i6g
Assiut, 19
Assuan, 17, 18, 117
Atawineh ridge, 155, 156, 158
Aulad Ali tribes, 38
Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps, 4, 5, 7, II, 21, 36, 46/ 47/ 49/
135, 136; Mounted Division,
7, 21, 24/ 34/ 35/ 47/ 5^/ 54/ 56, 59/
63, 67, 68, 73, 75, 90, 91, 92, 93, 98,
99, loi, 105, 135, 143, 144, 146, 147,
148, 157, 158, 164, 168, 169, 173
Australian Light Horse, 36, 46, 75, 8g ;
, 1st Regt., 47, 64, 6g, 71, 99,
102, 103, 105, 106 ; 2nd, 24, 35, 64,
69, 71, loi, 143, 146, 148 ; 3rd, 59,
63, 65, 66, 68, gg, loi, 103, 105, 106,
107, 146, 147, 150, 160 ; 4th, 78, I5g,
160 ; 5th, 27 ; gth, 21-2 ; 10th, 103 ;
11th, 61, 69, 113
Austrian Hospital, 40
Austrians, 57, 134
Ayrshire Battery, R.H.A., 36, 73, 75
Baiket el Sana, 158
Bailloud, M. le General, 172
Bardia, 37, 48
Barrani, 37, 38
Bawitti, 115
Bedfordshire Regt., i/5th, 76
Bedouins, 37-8, 48, 55, in, 112, 113
Beersheba, 93, 100, 109, 133, 135, 138,
139, 140, 142, 167
Beit Durdis, 143
Beris, 38, 117
Bikanir Camel Corps, 21, 22, 46, 48,
73-4/ 79/ 135/ 136/ 137/ I40> 17O/
173
323
224 SIR A. MURRAY'S DESPATCHES
Bit Abu el Afcin, 35, 58 ; — Abu Tif,
113 ; — el Abd, 22, 23, 24, 27, 34, 35*
47> 55» 56, 57> 58, 70, 7i» 72, 73, Qo,
92, 94, 96, 97 ; — el Aweidiya, 65,
70 ; — el Bayud, 25, 27, 47, 55, 56,
60, 71, 72, 90 ; — el Dueidar, 24, 26,
27, 28, 35, 53, 55, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68 ;
— el Esani, 167, 168 ; — el Giddi,
22; — el Hamisah, 24, 25, 26, 63,
68 ; — el Hassana, 13, 14, 90, 99,
108, 112; — el Jameil, 55, 56; —
el Jefeir, 47, 69 ; — el Jifjaifa, 21-2 ;
— el Mageibra, 23, 25, 47, 56, 57, 58,
60, 65, 69, 70, 72 ; — el Maghara, 89,
90, 99, 108 ; — el Masmi, 92, 93, 99 ;
— el Mazar, 36, 55, 72, 75, 76, 90, 92,
93, 94, 99, no ; — el Nuss, 14, 63,
68 ; — el Tawal, 76 ; — el Themada,
113 ; — Ettnaler, 62, 67 ; — Lahfan,
93, 112; — Mabeiuk, 21, 100; —
Rodh Salem, 36 ; — Saba, 169 ; —
Salmana, 36, 54, 90; — Sheikh
Mohammed, 115 ; — um Gurf, 92
Blackburn, Major H., R.F.C., 74
Blair, Brig.-Gen. E. McL., R.E., 54
Blockhouses, 37
Borton Pasha, N.T., 81
Bowman-Manifold, Brig.-Gcn., 39-40
British West Indies Regt., 174
Budkhulu, 115
Byng, Lt.-Gen. Sir Julian, 11, 13
Caccia, Capt., 121
Cactus hedges, 148, 156
Cairo, 4, 16, 79, 91, 93, 176
Camel Maxim Section, 79 ; — patrol-
ling, 38, 70 ; — transport, 12, 15, 59,
95, 100, III, 151 ; — Transport
Corps, 6, 7, 19, 49, 123, 136, 174
(see Appendix G)
Camels, 12, 20, 35, 36, 52, 54, 59, 72,
76, 77, 79, 95, 96, 139, 217-20
Campbell, Maj.-Gen. Sir Walter, 41,
125, 177
Camps, desert, 94-5
Canal Defences, io-i2, 13, 14-15, 33,
39, 40, 47, 50, 58, 79, 91, 109; —
Section, Northern, 50, 51, 53, 61, 91,
no, 171 ; , Southern, 50, 51, 91,
100, 109, no, 113, 171
Canterbury (N.Z.) Mounted Rifles, 35,
60
Captures, 20, 22, 35, 36, 48, 49, 56, 67,
68, 70, 72, 75-6, 76, 77, 103, 104,
105-6, 106-7, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116,
121, 143, 153, 169, 172
Casson, Brig.-Gen. H. G., 140
Casualties, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 34, 36, 46,
66, 70, 71, 75, 77, 78, 93, 104, 108,
121, 153, 160, 163, 169
Chaplains' Dept., 175
Chauvel, Maj.-Gen. H. G., 21, 56, 68,
73, loi, 102, 103, 105, 108, 109, 146,
147, 149, 164
Chaytor, Brig.-Gen. E. W. C, loi, 102,
164
Cheshire Field Company, 19 ; — Yeo-
manry, 69-70
Chetwode, Lt.-Gen. Sir Phih'p, Bt., 94,
104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 138, 164, 165,
177
Church Army, 175
Clothing, 80
Coastal Section, 18, in, 171
Colston, the Hon. E. M., 8
Communications, officers of, 5, 54, 91,
172-3
Como, Capt., Italian Navy, 48
Conditions peculiar to Egypt, 8, 37
Conquering the desert, 94-5
Coventry, Lt.-Col., 25, 26
Cox, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. V., 7, 21
Crops destroyed, 169-70
Cyprus, 32, 33
Dallas, Maj.-Gen. A. G., 38, 46, 74, 144
Darb el Rubi, 37
Dardanelles Army, 3, 5, 79, 173
Darut es Sharif, 17
Da vies, Brig.-Gen. G. F., 174
Davies, Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis, 13
Daylight, 149
Deir el Belah, 141, 152, 153, 154, 155,
166, 167
De Knoop, Major J. J., 69, 70
Delta District Command, 16, 140
Demolitions, 20, 22, 25, 35, 36, 47, 73,
76, 100, 168, 169, 170, 172
Denbighshire Yeomanry, 19
Desert advance, work of, 94-5 ; —
Column, 91, 92, 94, 95-6, 99, 104,
108, no, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146,
149, 156, 157, 158, 160, 163, 164,
i66, 169, 170 ; — water problem, 96,
97-8, 103, 149
Dhabba, 18, 38, n8
Dobell, Maj.-Gen. Sir Charles, 48, 76,
91, loi, 104, 108, 112, 137, 149, 163,
164, 165
Douglas, Maj.-Gen. Sir W., 47, 73
Dowson, Mr. E. M., 9
Dual control, 16
Durbars, 115, 116
Eastern Force, 91, 91-2, 137, 138, i39»
141, 142-3, 149, 150, i5i» 152, 153,
INDEX
225
155, 162, 163, 164, 165, 171 ; —
Front, 14, 46, 50, 51, 54, 89, 90
Egypt, concentration in, 3, 5 ; defence
of, 4; command in, unified, 15-16;
freed from formed bodies of the
enemy, 125 ; collecting troops in,
140 ; restrictions on leaving or enter-
ing, 171
Egyptian Army, 14, 78-80; — —
Cavalry, 19, 79 ; Hospital, 79 ;
Stores Dept., 80
Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 17,
49-50* 78, 79* 80, 135-7, 176 (see
Appendix C) ; — Government, 39 ;
— Labour Corps, 54, 95, 123-4, 136,
174 (see Appendix F) ; — Military
Works Dept., 79 ; — Postal Service,
81
El Ageila, 116; — Amaid, 19, 20; —
Arish, 12, 13, 35, 36, 45-6, 50, 58, 72,
75> 76, 90, 9i» 92, 93/ 94/ 97/ 98, 99>
100, loi, 103, 104, 109, no. III, 112,
122, 129, 130, 131, 132, 137, 140, 142,
171, 172 ; — Auja, 100, 167, 168,
169, 172 ; — Burjaliya ridge, 150 ;
— Ferdan, 55, 92 ; — Hammame,
18, 38; — Kubri, 76, 77; —
Magdhaba, 93, 98, 99, 100, loi, 102,
103, 104, 108 ; — Magruntein, 104,
108, 109, no; — Mcndur, 143 ; —
Rabah, 26, 63, 69, 72 ; — Sheluf,
144, 145; — Sire ridge, 150, 155;
— Tine, 165, 167
Embarkations from Egypt, Jan. g to
May 31, 1916, 180-3
Enemy air-raids, 28, 34, 92-3, 109,
153-4, 167, 172; — forces, 10, 17,
26, 33, 56-7, 58, 98, 134, 150, 151,
155/ 165 ; — plans, 12, 13, 15 ; —
raids, 23, 25-6 ; — supplies, measures
against,' i8,>2o, 21, 46
Engineer services, 175
Fayum, 18, ii6
Feint to detain Turks, 32-3
Filter-plant, 52, 53, 94
Flying Column, loi ; takes El Mag-
dhaba, 1 01-4
Food, 20, 38, 95, 171
Ford cars, 118, 121
Forrest, Major W. T., 160
France, 7, 14, 36, 46, 49, 131, 136
French troops, 172
Gaafer captured, 16
Galiipoli campaign, 4 ; troops, 5 ;
survey experience, 9 ; hospital cases,
80,81
P
Garrison Battalions, 33, 50, 135, 140,
174
Garrisons, 10, 13, 14, 25, 26, 33, 65, 78,
79, 115, 170
Gaza, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 140,
141, 142, i43» I44» i45> 146, I47» I48»
149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157,
158, 159, 163, 165, 167, 168, 173
Gcbei Lamlaz, 1 18
General Headquarters, Cairo, 4, 91 ;
Ismailia, 11, 16; EI Arish, 142;
Khan Yunus, 155, 164
German equipment, 57
Germans, 57, 106, 107-8, 134, 153, 156
Gilban, 53, 63
Girdwood, Maj.-Gen. E. S. B., 140
Gloucestershire Hussars, 22, 144 ; —
Yeomanry, 24, 25, 26, 66
Godley, Lt.-Gen. Sir A. J., 11, 21, 37
Gordon, Maj.-Gen. the Hon. F., 32
Grant, Lt.-Col., 70
Gray, Brig.-Gen. F. W. B., 33
Great Bitter Lake, 113
Green Hill, 156, 161
Hare, Maj.-Gen. S. W., 145, 161
Harra Wells, 1 14-15
Health, 38, 164, 166, 174
Hedjaz, 58, 172
He lies. Cape, 3
Herbert, Brig.-Gen. E. A., 77
Hertfordshire Yeomaru'y, 76
Hod Abu Dhababis, 47 ; — Amoia, 60 ;
— el Aras, 65, 66 ; — el Bada, 65 ; —
el Bayud, 35, 47, 70 ; — el Dhakar,
69 ; — el Enna, 64, 65, 68 ; — el
Gadadia, 36 ; — el Ge'eila, 47 ; —
el Masia, 58, 70 ; — el Muhammam,
70 ; — el Mushalfat, 47, 71 ; — el
Negiliat, 58, 69 ; — el Reshafat, 34,
69 ; — el Sagia, 35, 69 ; — Salmana,
35, 72 ; — um el Dhaunnin, 47 ; —
um Ugba, 14, 60
Hodgson, Maj.-Gen. H. W., 118, 119,
121, 139
Homossia, 72
Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain
Battery, 19, 75, 102, 105, 123, 140
Hon. Artillery Company, 106
Hordern, Brig.-Gen. A. V. C, 175
Home, Lt.-Gen. Sir H. S., 11, 23
Horse-artillery, 102
Horses, 72, 96, 103, 139, 149, 152
Hospitals, 40, 80, 81, 104
Huj, 142, 143, I44» 150
Imbros, 3, n, 33
Imperial Camel Corps, 6, 7, 19, 38, 48,
49, 60-1, 75, 77» "5> "7» 123, 136,
226 SIR A. MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
137, 152, 172, 173; Imperial Camel
Corps Brigade, 98, 99, loi, 102, 103,
105, 106, 107, 139-40, 141, 142, 143,
146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 156, 157, 158,
159, 160, 168, 169, 170
Imperial Mounted Division, 139, 143,
144, 146, 147, 148, 158 ; — Service
Cavalry Brigade, 135, 136, 173
Indian Camel Corps, 7; — Infantry,
50, 113, 135, 136, 137, 173
In Seirat, 141, 142, 143, 154, 156
Intelligence Branch, 9
Inverness Battery, R.H.A., 73, 75
Ismailia, 7, 10, 11, 16, 91, 92
Italian Commanders, 37, 48 ; — co-
operation, 48-9 ; — Government, 37 ;
— troops, 37, 172
Jaghbub, 117, 118, 121
Jerusalem, 133, 134, 138, 153
Joubert, Lt.-Col. P. B., R.F.C., 74
Kantara, 12, 15, 2?/ 52/ 53/ 55> 62, 74,
90,94
Kasr, 115
Katia, 9, 12, 14, 15, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 34, 35, 55, 56, 58, 63, 64, 68,
69, 72, 96
Katib Gannit Hill, 62, 63, 64
Khalasa, 168
Khan Yunus, 93, 105, 112, 138, 141, 142,
144, 153, 155, 156, 172
Khirbet Sihan, 159, 160
King's Messengers, 124
Kitchener, Lord, 51
Kressenstein, Col. Kress von, 57
Kurd Hill, 155, 157
Labyrinth, 147, 156
Lawrence, Maj.-Gen. the Hon. H. A.,
23/ 34/ 47/ 62, 63, 64, 65, 66^ 73
Lees Hill, 156, 159
Legalit Gate, 115, 116
Leicester Battery, R.H.A., 73
Lemnos, 11, 33
Levant, 5 (note), 16
Liddell, Lt.-Col. J. S., R.E., 40
Light car patrols, 20, 48, 116, 117, 118,
120^ 122, 123, 140, 150, 170
Lines of Communication Defences, 16,
77, 125, 171-2, 172-3
Lloyd, Lt.-Col. A. H. O., 19
London, City of. Yeomanry, 61, 69 ; —
Regiment, i/ioth, 76
Lubbock, Lt.-Col. G., R.E., 54
Lynden-Bell, Maj.-Gen. Sir Arthur, 40,
81, 125, 177
Macauley, Col. Sir George, R.E., 39,
54, 122
Macdonald, Col. Sir Murdoch, 39
MacGay, Maj.-Gen. the Hon. J., 21
McMahon, Lt.-Col. Sir A. H., High
Commissioner, 39
McNeill, Lt.-Col. A., 19
Mahemdia, 34, 35, 47, 60, 62, 63, 65,
72
Maher, Surgeon-Gen. J., 174
Mahon, Lt.-Gen. Sir B. T., 28, 32, 38
Maintenance of Forces, 5, 6
Mangles, Capt. C. G., 48
Mansura Ridge, 144, 145, 150, 151, 154,
155/ 157/ 162
Maps, 9
Marriott-Dodington, Brig.-Gen. W.,
147
Masaid, 90, 92, 93/ 97/ 98, 99/ m
Maxwell, Gen. Sir John, 4, 11, 14, 15,
16, 17
Medical Corps, 174
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, 3,
9/ 78/ 79, 80 (see Appendix B)
Mejdel, 167
Mendisha, 115
Meredith, Mount, 64
Mersa Matruh, 18, 38, 117, 118, 120,
121
Mesopotamia, 133
Methuen, F.M. the Rt. Hon. Lord,
80
Middlesex Hill, 156, 161 ; — Regiment,
2/7th, 20 ; — Yeomanry, 46, 76
Milne, Lt.-Gen. G. F., 32
Mine-sweeping, 99-100
Minya, 19, 20
Mirage delays artillery, 102
Misurata, 48, 49
Mitchell, Capt. F. H., R.N., 17
Moascar, 55, no
Mobile Column, 61, 65, 69, 70, 71, 74 ;
— defence, 15, 50, 61 ; — striking
force, 96
Mohammed Saleh, 117, 119, 121
Mohariq sand dunes, 37
Monitors, 60, 66, 74, 157, 158
Monro, Gen. Sir G. C, 3
Moraisa, 20, 37
Motor-car raids and reconnaissances,
20, 48-9, 77, 115, 116, 117, 1 18-21,
122
Motor transport, 118
Mott, Maj.-Gen. S. F., 156
Mudge, Brig.-Gen. A., 76
Mudros, 3, 80
Muhafzia, 20, 48, 49, 117
Murray, Sir Archibald : Takes over
command at Cairo, 3 ; his instruc-
INDEX
227
tfons, 4 ; organises Canal Defences,
10-12 ; modifies original scheme, 15,
50-1 ; appointed to Chief Command,
15-16 ; determines policy against the
Senoussi, 17-19 ; plans defences of
Katia District, 34-5 ; prepares desert
campaign, 51-3 ; reinforces Eastern
Front, 55-6 ; prepares to attack
Turks, 58-9 ; anticipates enemy's
plans, 63 ; redistributes troops in
Eastern Force, 91-3 ; prepares posi-
tion covering Bir el Abd, 92 ; organ-
ises advance against El Arish — ^water
supply the decisive factor, 94-8 ;
Turks having abandoned El Arish,
arranges pursuit, loo-i ; after taking
Magdhaba, decides to attack Magrun-
tein, 104 ; establishes depot at El
Arish, iio-ii ; takes posts at Hassana
and Nekhl, 112- 14; occupies Baharia
and Dakhla oases, 1 14-16; sends
armoured cars against Siwa and
Girba oases and frees Western Front
from Senoussi menace, 117-22;
recites changes in War Cabinet
policy in Egypt, 129-35 ; discusses
strength of Egyptian Expeditionary
Force, 135-7 J his advance to Gaza
and first battle, 137-53 ; plans and
dispositions for second battle, 153-6 ;
advance and second battle of Gaza
described, 156-63; decision to break
off battle, consolidate ground won and
await opportunity for further attack,
163-5
Naval co-operation, 35, 39, 60, 66, 99,
III, 157, 158; — Air Service, 177;
— patrol, 17, 18 ; — reconnaissance,
116-17
Needham, Major H., 33
Negiliat, 90
Nejed, 142
Nekhl, 13, 14, 90, 99, 100, 108, III, 113
New Zealand Division, 7, 79 ; —
Mounted Rifles Brigade, 36, 63, 65,
66, 67, 99, loi, 102, 103, 105, 106,
107, 112, 146, 147, 148
Nile district, 4, 16^ 17, 18, 19, 20, 37, 38,
77-8
Northamptonshire Regt., i/4th, 76
North Midland Mounted Brigade, 16
Notre Dame de la Delivrance, 40
Nuri, 16, 37, 117
Nursing Services, 40, 81
Oases : Baharia, 18, 19, 37, 38, 48,
77, 114, 115, 116;^ Dakhla, 18, 19,
38, 48, 114, 115, 116; El Qara, 117;
Farafra, 18, 38, 116; Girba, 19,117,
118, 119, 121 ; Kharga, 18, 19, 38,
77, 115, 117; Kurkur, 117; Melfa,
171 ; Moghara, 18, 38, 117; Siwa, 18,
38, 114, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 170,
171
Offensive defence, 10, 12
Oghratina, 24, 25, 27, 55, 56, 57, 58, 70
Operations against Turks, 64-74,
98-109, 112-14, i37-53» 153-65; —
against Senoussi, 1 14-16
Ordnance Department, 6
Ottley, Major W. J., 48
Outpost Hill, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162
Palestine advance, 130-2, 133, 134-5,
139 ; — Lines of Communication
Defences, 171-2, 173
Palin, Brig.-Gen. P. C, 92, 114
Passes: Caret el Munasib, 118, 119,
120, 121 ; Mitla, 100 ; Neqb el
Shegga, 118; Wadi Abu Garawid,
113 ; — el Baha, 113
Patrol work, 20, 21, 22, 23, 36, 38, 55,
56, 57-8, 75, 77, 78, 92, 93» 94» 98,
107, III, 115, 116, 117, 167
Ped-rails, 96
Pelusium, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67
Picot, M., 172
Piepape, M. le Col., 172
Piping, 13, 52, 54, 94, 95, 96, 97, 135,
172
Pollen, Lt.-Col. S. H., 125-6, 177-8
Port Said, 5, 10, 11, 91, 100
Port services, 175-6
Prince of Wales, 17
Prisoners, British, 16; enemy, 56-7
Rafa, 99, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, III,
130, 132, 135, 140, 141, 166, 168, 172
Railway construction, 12, 13, 18, 23, 28,
31, 48, 49, 52, 53-4/ 77/ 90, 92, 93, 94,
95, 104, no. III, 115, 122, 133/ 135/
138, 140, 166 (see Appendix E) ; —
demolition, 168, 169; — transport,
5-6, 19/39/ 53/97/ no- 11
Railways : Baharia, 115; Central Pal-
estine, 138, 139, 165 ; desert, 95,
96-7 ; Egyptian State, 6 ; Mariut,
20 ; military, 1 72 {see Appendix E)
Ramie, 138, 167
Ras Abu Zeneima, 14, 48, 79
Reconnaissances, 14, 20, 21, 34, 35, 47,
48, 54/ 55/ 59/ 74/ 75/ 7^-7/ 89-90,
92-3, 112, 157/ 166
Red Cross, 40, 124
Re-equipment, 5, 6
228 SIR A, MURRAY^S DESPATCHES
Reinforcements, British and Australian,
5, 6-7 ; refused by War Cabinet, 131,
133 ; arrive from Colonies, 166 ;
promised from Salonica, 166-7;
French and Italian, 172
Remount Department, 6, 174
Reorganisation, 5, 6
"Requin," 157, 158
Reservoirs, 52, 53, 94, 95
Roads and road-making, 11, 13, 30-1,
39» 52, 77/ 94/ 95» 206-7, 212, 213
Roberts, Capt., 26-7
Robinson, Commdr. E., R.N., 74
Rock cisterns, 21, 46, no
Romani, 24, 25, 26, 28, 34, 35, 53, 55,
56, 62, 63, 64, 65, 72, 90/ 9i» 93/ 94/
95/ 96/ 97/ 109 ; — battle, 64-74
Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train,
100 ; — Engineers, 19, 53, 54, 175 ;
— Field Artillery, 51 ; — Flying
Corps, 9, 13, 14, 19, 25/ 27, 28, 34,
35/ 36, 55/ 56, 59/ 60, 66, 69, 74, 75,
93, 98, 100, 104, 107, 108-9, 138, 154,
167, 173 ; — Horse Artillery, 73 ;
— Naval Air Service, 13, 35, 75 ; —
— Division, 33, 39 ; — Scots
Fusiliers, 26, 27 ; — Welsh Fusiliers,
67
Royston, Brig.-Gen. J. R., 147
Royston, Mount, 65, 66, 67
Russians, 13, 134
Ryrie, Brig.-Gen. G. de L., 148
St. John, Lt.-Commdr. A. O., R.N., 74
St. John of Jerusalem, 40, 124
Salihiya, 24
Salonica, British force at, 4, 5, 32, 49;
machine-gun school, 8 ; General
Sarrail in command, 11, 28, 29;
defences at, 28 ; operations, 12 Jan.-
30 April, 1916,28-31 ; training, 31-2 ;
command changes, 32 ; enemy move-
ments, 32 ; hospital cases, 80, 81 ;
reinforcements from, 135, 137; staff
course for force, 176
Samalut, 37, 77
Sampson Ridge, 158, 162
Sanitation, 95, ao6, 213
Sayed Ahmed, the Grand Senoussi, 114,
117, 118, 119, 121 ; — Mohammed
Idris, 117, 170, 171
School of Instruction, Imperial, 7-8,
16, 176
Schools, machine-gun, 7, 8 ; staff, 176
Scott, Major, 22
Senoussi defeated, 16; policy against,
17-19, 1 14 ; convoy arrested, 77 ;
Egyptian aid against, 79; cleared
from oases, 1 14-16; attacked by
armoured cars and cleared from
Western Front, 117-22; restrictions
against, 171 ; " zawias," 171
Serapeum, 112
Serionne, Charles, Comte de, 40
Sharqia province, 91
Sharta, 165, 166
Sheikh Abbas, 142, 145, 148, 150, 151,
154, 155, 157, 162-3, 165 ; — Ahmed,
144 ; — Ajlin, 158, 162, 165, 167 ; —
Zowaid, 93, 99, III, 138, 139, 140,
141
Shellal, 107, 109, 156, 165, 166
Shropshire Yeomanry, 19
Shusha, 114
Sidi Bishra, 55
Signal services, 8, 39-40, 175 ; —
stations, desert, 95
Sihan, 157
Sikh Pioneers, 23rd, 48
Sikhs, 14th, 14
Sinai, g, 10, 33, 108, 173 ; — , coast of,
14 ; — , desert of, 51, 94
Sirdar, 17, 54
Smith, Lt.-Col. C. L., 60, 65, 70, 74
Smith, Maj.-Gen. W. E. B., 47, 155-6
Solium, 16, 18, 20, 37, 38, 48, 170, 171
Somerset Battery, R.H.A., 73, 148
South African Infantry Brigade, 135
Staff work, 4, 5, 81-2, loi, 125
Stokes gun batteries, 7, 55
Stone, 94, 212
Sudan, 51, 79 ; — Administration, 78,
80
Sudr el Heitan, 21, 100
Suez, 10, II, 91, 93, 112, 113; —
Canal, 4, 79, 132, 172 ; Com-
pany, 40
Sultan, His Highness the, 38-9, 176
Supply and Transport Dept., 6 ; —
depot at El Arish, no- 11
Survey work, 8-10
Suvla Bay, 4, 153
Sykes, Col. Sir Mark, Bt., 172
Syria, 10, 13, 32, 58
Tanks, 154, 157, 159
Tel el Jemmi, 154, 167 ; — el Kebir, 7 ;
— el Sharia, 100, 138, 139, 140, 142,
144, 146, 156, 167
Telegraph Company, Eastern, 40 ;
of Egypt, 40
Telegraphs and telegraphists, 8
Tenedos, 11, 33
Tenida, 115
Territorials, 11, 50, 135
Tcscione, Lieut., 117
Thompson, Major, 27
Thomson, Sir Courtauld, 40, 124
INDEX
229
Todd, Lt.-Col. T. J., 46
Topographical Section, 9
Tor, 14, 79
Training, 31-2, 11 1 ; — centres, 7
Trench warfare, 164, 170
Troops required, 130, 132, 134
Tugs and steel plates, 80
Turks carry Oghratina and Katia, 25-6 ;
repulsed at Dueidar and pursued, 27,
28 ; concentrate in Sinai, 33 ; advance
from El Arish, 55, entrench at
Oghratina, 56, 57, and still advance,
59-60, 63 ; force back outpost line
along Wellington Ridge, 64-5 ; foiled
by Mahemdia-Romani defences, 65-6;
rapid advance of, affects British plan,
66 ; reach farthest point, 66-7 ;
driven from Mt. Royston and Wel-
lington Ridge with loss, 67, 68 ;
retire from Katia, 69 ; abandon
Oghratina and make last stand near
Bir el Abd, 70-1 ; retire to El Arish,
71-2 ; losses of, 72-3 ; on being
raided retire from Bir el Mazar, 75-6 ;
surprised at Bir el Tawal, 76-7 ;
aircraft activity of, 92-3 ; control
water-supply at El Arish, 97-8 ;
retire from El Arish and Masud, 98-9 ;
lose Magdhaba, 101-4 ; entrench at
El Magruntein, 104, 105 ; lose Rafa
and El Magruntein and withdraw
from Sinai province, 105-9 ; concen-
trate near Shellal, 109; lose posts at
Khan Yunus, Bir el Hassana and
Nekhl, 1 12-14; question of attacking
in Palestine, 130-2 ; evacuate Weli
Sheikh Nuran, 132, 138 ; strength of,
in Palestine, 133, 134 ; hold Gaza
in first battle, 142-53 ; strengthen
defences of Gaza, 155, 156; hold
Gaza in second battle, 156-62 ; begin
building railway, 165
Ujret el Zol, 90, 92, no
Um Aisha, 58; — Jerrar, 154; —
Ugba, 26, 34, 35
Wadi el Arish, 97, loi, 102, 103 ; —
el Hesi, 142 ; — Ginneh, 14 ;
Ghuzze, 133, 135, 140, 141, 142, 143,
144, 145, 149/ 152, 154/ 155/ 156, 157/
165, 166; — Haifa, 17; — Imleih,
157; — Natron, 18, 38, 77; Sanal,
48 ; — Theigat el Amirin, 169 ; —
um Hamatha, 21 ; — um Muksheib,
21, 46, no
War Cabinet policy, v-vi, 129, 130, 131,
133/ 134/ 153/ 165
Warren, the, 156
Warwickshire Yeomanry, 24, 25, 26
Water, saline, 52, 96 ; — supply, 11, 15,
20, 24/ 39/ 49/ 5I/ 52-3/ 96-8, 103,
no, 133, 149, 152, 154, 172 {see
Appendix D)
Watson, Maj.-Gen. W. A., 77-8, 114,
115, 116
Weli Sheikh Nuran, 109, 129, 132, 138,
166
Wellington Ridge, 64, 66, 67, 68, 73
Wemyss, Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn, 39,
III, 176-7
Western Desert, 17, 116, 122; —
Frontier Force, 16-17, ^9/ 38, 48, 77,
114, 116, 122, 140
Wharf and pier construction, 52-3, 100
Wiggin, Brig.-Gen., 23/ 24, 25, 26
Williams, Maj.-Gen. G., 54
Williamson, Capt. A. H., 100
Wingate, High Commissioner-General
Sir F. R., 78, 124, 176
Wireless installations, desert, 95
Worcestershire Yeomanry, 23, 24, 25, 26
Works Department, 6, 175
Wright, Maj.-Gen. H. B. H., 54
Yeomanry, 50, 61, 89, 107, 132, 135,
136, 140, 173
Y.M.C.A., 175
Yorke, Lt.-Col.^ 22, 26
Zeitoun, 7, 8, 16, 176
Zowia Jansur, 117
I
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