Full text of "Sir Douglas Haig's despatches (December 1915-April 1919)"

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SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S
DESPATCHES

(DECEMBER 1915 APRIL 1919)

EDITED BY LIEUT.-COLONEL

J. H. BORASTON, O.B.E.

(Private Secretary to Earl Haig)

SPECIALLY PREPARED
MAPS, SKETCH PLANS
y PORTRAITS

1919

LONDON 6f TORONTO

J. M. DENT ftf SONS LTD.
NEW YORK; E, P. BUTTON &

Published by permission o/ His Majesty's Government

PREFACE

THESE Despatches are republished as a tribute to the valour
of the British soldier and the character of the British nation*

They were written in the first instance with the object
of telling, in plain and straightforward language, all that
it was possible to make public at that time ; with the know-
ledge then available and without either lowering or exalting
unduly the splendid spirit of the nation, or giving assistance
to our enemies* By their means, I sought to convey to my
countrymen in all parts of the Empire the information it
was their right to possess concerning the progress and
prospects of the war ; to make those at home understand the
full nature of the difficulties with which our Armies in the
field had to contend, and the magnificent spirit and deter-
mination by which all difficulties were overcome*

That the account given in these Despatches is so frank
and full speaks very highly for the steadfast patriotism, good
sense, and equanimity of all classes of the people of our
Empire, to whom at all times the truth could be told* The
long series of glorious actions related all too briefly in their
pages bear equal testimony to the courage and devotion of
all ranks of the British Armies, and therefore cannot be too
widely known*

The general accuracy of the narratives, and the not
inconsiderable amount of detail which it was possible to
incorporate in them, reflects credit upon the staff arrange-
ments for the collection of reliable reports and for their
rapid transmission from the lower to the higher formations*
In normal times operation reports from Armies reached
General Headquarters by wire twice daily, in the early
morning and late evening* These " Army wires " were

vi SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

based upon a complete chain of reports extending through
Corps, divisions, brigades and battalions to the companies
in the line* Each link in the chain acted as a report centre,
where the information reaching it was collated and sum-
marised and the material portions forwarded in the form of a
brief and precise statement to the formation above it* To
ensure accuracy, to make certain that the reports sent on
contained only what it was material that the higher forma-
tion should know, that nothing of consequence was omitted,
and that a minimum of time was lost in the actual process
of transmission, entailed a high degree of organisation and
training in all formations*

During the periods of battle fighting, these diurnal
statements were supplemented by many others, as well as
by telephone, wireless or aeroplane messages sent whenever
there was anything of moment to report* These additional
messages might be the result of the immediate observation
of liaison officers, whether of Armies, Corps or divisions ;
they might be amplified, confirmed or at times even fore-
stalled by aeroplane reports received direct from the Head-
quarters, Royal Air Force, or by the reports of Intelligence
Officers*

A further and most important source of information was
supplied by the liaison officers sent out direct from General
Headquarters* These were all specially selected officers,
young, but of proved ability, experience and tact* Their
duties took them frequently to all parts of the sone of the
British Armies and into the actual fighting line* Their
reports were often of high value*

The senior officers of my Staff also made numerous
visits to lower formations* The information they were able
to obtain formed an important addition to the results of my
own personal observation*

There was present, therefore, at General Headquarters
a very ample source of current information from which the
framework of the Despatches could be built up* This was
again supplemented and checked by weekly Operation
Reports from Armies, by Army Diaries, Intelligence Sum-

PREFACE vii

maries and at times by special reports obtained from Armies,
Corps and divisions relative to particular actions or battle
periods* The other Branches of my General Staff also kept
records of their activities and these were available as material
for such portions of my Despatches as it was possible to
devote to their work.

Compiled, however, during the actual process of the
events they describe, the Despatches do not pretend to be a
complete and final account of the three momentous years of
crowded incident and stupendous happenings with which
they deaL Yet because they were put together under the
immediate strain of battle, while the results of the decisions
and actions they recount were still undetermined, and were
issued for the information of a nation whose fate still hung
in the uncertain balance of war, they possess an atmosphere
of their own which gives them a definite historical im-
portance* Moreover, they are at the moment the only
available official account of a most splendid and most
critical period in our national existence*

For these reasons, I thought it desirable to bring together
under the same cover all the different Despatches sent by
me from France and to arrange for their publication as a
single book, accompanied by a complete series of maps
with the aid of which the reader may follow every turn of
the great struggle* The text of the book is throughout
substantially the same as that which appeared in the Gazettes*
It has been possible, however, to insert the names of divi-
sions which in the earlier Despatches were omitted for
reasons of secrecy; to correct one or two minor errors,
and to add a few explanatory notes and sketches* The
large maps are copies of, or based directly upon, those
which actually accompanied my original Despatches to the
Secretary of State*

Being intended primarily for the eyes of British subjects
and dealing with the operations of the British Armies, the
Despatches necessarily refer but briefly to the actions of
our Allies* It must be left to future historians to write the
book in which the exploits of the different Allied Armies

viii SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

shall appear in their true proportion and perspective* For
me, it is enough to acknowledge here, as I have done more
than once in the Despatches themselves, the inestimable
debt we owe to our Allies, and especially to the French,
I would emphasize also once more the cordial relations
which throughout the whole period of the war prevailed
both between the officers and men of the different Allied
Armies in the field and between British soldiers of all
ranks and the civil population of France and Belgium, To
the general interchange of courtesy between the French and
ourselves, Marshal Foch has lately added an example
personal to myself by writing his admirable introduction
to the French edition of this book,

I am indebted to His Majesty's Government for per-
mission to republish my Despatches in book form.

HORSE GUARDS,

2nd September t 1919.

INTRODUCTION

FIELD-MARSHAL FOCH 1

IT has always been the custom for the Commander-in-Chief of the
British Forces in the field to forward to his Government Despatches
summarizing the principal periods of a campaign, Field-Marshal
Sir Douglas Haig has conformed to this practice. Twice a year on
an average, he has prepared a brief account of the most important
features of the British operations on the Western front* His De-
spatches cover the period during which he was Commander-in-Chief,
from the end of 1915 to the first days of April, 1919.

Written with the strictest regard for the truth and scrupulously
exact to the smallest details, these Reports are distinguished by their
unquestionable loftiness and breadth of view. The information that
they give, not only on the operations themselves, but also on the
condition of the troops on the changes made in their training and
their formation during the course of the war constitutes them
historical documents of the highest order. They throw into relief
the special character of each contingent that the Empire provided,
the unremitting labours of the Staffs, and define their respective
merits. They are a record, in fact, of the work thanks to which all
ranks rapidly improved their fighting experience and professional
skill, and adapted them to a struggle full of surprises. They give a
picture of the enormous task devolving upon the various services
charged with supplying the ever-growing needs of a modern army.

If the facts are sometimes set forth with a light touch, which does
not take us down to the underlying causes and some of their results,
it is because these Reports, written during the course of the war, and
addressed to the British Government, were destined eventually for
the eyes of the whole Nation, whose feelings must be considered,

1 This Introduction was written by Marshal Foch for the French Edition of the
Despatches, and is reproduced here in English with his permission and approval. The
French version will be found at the end of this volume see page 358.

x SIR DOUGLAS HAIG f S DESPATCHES

just as the enemy must be kept from gathering information of value.
None the less, to read them is to discover how remarkable was the
unswerving purpose which fashioned the British Army from 1917
onwards into a magnificent instrument of war. Its effect can be seen
in the training of the troops, in the creation of special services to
deal with the increasing number and variety of engines of modern
warfare, in the production and transport of munitions to satisfy a
demand hitherto unknown, and in the construction or repairing of
the lines of communication.

No instrument, however, can produce of itself; there must
always be the hand which knows how to use it. When, therefore,
the Despatches are content with telling us that the period of attrition
was followed in the natural course of events by the period of decision,
that the German armies, exhausted and worn out by the fighting of
1914, 1915, 1916 and 1917, were to be defeated in 1918, they do not
say why the former period was so long and the latter so short. Still
less do they explain the change in the decisive period when the
Allies advanced to victory at the double, only to be stopped by
German capitulation at the Armistice, The results are briefly set
forth, their causes are not explained. All mention of the hand which
guided the instrument is omitted. We may be allowed to make good
this deficiency, in which the all-important part played by the British
Higher Command is lost to sight.

The period of attrition coincided, in fact, with a period of
weakness for the Allies, which was the result of their incomplete
preparation for war. To the battlefields of 1914 the Entente had
not brought more than a British Army of six divisions and a French
Army lacking in the artillery and munitions required for modern
warfare.

With these inadequate means, we certainly did stem the invasion
in the first year, but so long as the shortage in our effectives and
material was not made good, we were not in a position to undertake
the long-sustained offensive which alone could force a decision by
arms. We were limited to local and spasmodic engagements, and the
best that could be done was to endeavour to co-ordinate them as to
space and time.

That is the explanation of the poor results obtained up to the
year 1917, Happily for the Entente, the enemy was obliged during
these years to cope first with the Russian and then with the Rumanian

INTRODUCTION xi

Armies in the East, Consequently, he had employed on the Western
front only a part of his forces, insufficient to gain a definite victory,
or had put into operation, as at Verdun, only a narrow and limited
conception of the offensive. The resulting weakness of the two
opposing lines threatened to prolong for some time to come what
has been called the war of attrition that struggle of unmarked and
unsustained advantages, which wears out both armies without
bringing gain to either a war without result. If a war is to end in
victory, it must always be given a character different from this.

In the course of this struggle for a decision (a necessary phase
be it said), Germany freed herself on the Eastern front in 1917 by
means of the Russian Revolution and the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk
and Bucharest, And when she turned the mass of her formidably
equipped armies, more than 200 divisions strong, against the Western
front to deliver the violent and, in the first instance, victorious
attacks on the Somme in March, 1918, on the Lys in April, on the
Chemin des Dames in May, on the Oise in June, and on the Marne
in July, who could perceive the signs of that fatal attrition, or the
dawn of victory for the Entente t Who will forget the danger of
fresh enemy advances, along the Somme, to Amiens, to split the
British Armies from the French, or towards Saint Omer and Dunkirk,
to cut off the British Forces from Great Britain ; or towards Paris
itself, the heart of France and centre of communications vital to the
Alliances' Where was the advantage claimed from the wastage of
the German Armies during the preceding years t Was there no danger
that the conflict of Armies, even Armies of the finest quality like the
British, might end in disaster, unless they possessed a Higher Com-
mand capable of dominating the situation and controlling the turn
of events, able to take the troops in hand again, to reorganize and so
dispose them that they might first bring the enemy to a standstill,
then attack him with such violence, dash and such repeated blows
as were never surpassed i

At every stage, both Higher Command and Staffs proved more
than equal to their tasks. Thanks to the activity they were to display
after the German attacks in the spring of 1918, and in spite of the
losses suffered, more than 60 British divisions, ten times the number
in 1914, were to be kept in fighting order until the end of the year ;
and their moral was to be better than ever. Lines of resistance were
multiplied before Amiens, Arras, Be'thune, Hazebrouck, Saint Omer

xii SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

and CasseL Preparations were also made to flood tracts of country,
for the ground was to be contested bitterly, foot by foot* Above all,
powerful supplies of Allied reserves were to be kept freely moving
in constant play between all the Armies. Thus it was possible for
French troops to relieve the Fifth British Army south of the Somme
at the commencement of April, and for seven French divisions to
support the Second British Army in Flanders in the same month ;
for five British divisions to reinforce the Sixth French Army on the
Chemin des Dames ; finally for two British divisions to assist the
Fifth French Army in the Forest of Reims, and two other divisions
the Tenth French Army at Villers-Cotterets, and join in the counter-
offensive of July the i8th.

Thus it was that, thanks in particular to the activities of the
British Higher Command and to their grasp of the needs of the
situation, more than 200 German divisions were stopped short in
their offensive by a smaller number of Allied divisions, and our
defensive proved to be victorious. The same must be said for the
support lent by the British troops to other armies during our actual
offensive.

In order to estimate the ardour and endurance of these troops
during this final stage, it will be enough to mention the dates and
importance of the main events :

Battle of Amiens. Aug. 8-13, in which the Fourth Army took
22,000 prisoners and more than 400 guns.

Battle of Bapaume. Aug. 2i-Sept. i, Third Army and Left
Wing of the Fourth Army ; 34,000 prisoners, 270 guns.

Battle of the Scarpe. Aug. 26-Sept. 3, First Army; 16,000
prisoners, 200 guns.

Battle of Havrincourt and Epehy. Sept. 12-18, Fourth and Third
Armies ; 12,000 prisoners, 100 guns.

Battle of Cambrai and the Hindenburg Line. Sept. 2y-Oct. 5,
Fourth, Third and First Armies, which ended in the breaking
of the Hindenburg Line and in the capture of 35,000 prisoners
and 380 guns.

Battle of Flanders. Sept. 28-Oct. 14, Second Army.

Battle of Le Cateau. -Oct. 6-12, Fourth, Third and First Armies.

INTRODUCTION xiii

Battle of the Selle. -Oct. 17-25, Fourth and Third Armies;
20,000 prisoners, 475 guns.

Battle of the Sambre. -Nov. i-n, Fourth, Third and First
Armies ; 19,000 prisoners, 450 guns*

The effect of these violent and repeated British attacks was
greatly enhanced because they were linked up with the actions of
other Allied armies, French, American, and also Belgian, who struck
blows which told no less powerfully in the general plan of this con-
verging assault, extending from the North Sea to the Moselle.

Never at any time in history has the British Army achieved
greater results in attack than in this unbroken offensive lasting 116
days, from the i8th of July to the nth of November* The victory
gained was indeed complete, thanks to the excellence of the Com-
manders of Armies, Corps and Divisions, thanks above all to the
unselfishness, to the wise, loyal and energetic policy of their
Commander-in-Chief, who made easy a great combination, and
sanctioned a prolonged and gigantic effort. Was it not the insight
of an experienced and enlightened Commander which led him to
intervene as he did, with his own Government on the 24th of March,
1918, and with the Allied Governments assembled at Doullens on
the 26th, to the end that the French and British Armies might at
once be placed under a single command, even though his personal
position should thereby suffer t In the events that followed, did he
not prove that he was above all anxious to anticipate and move in
perfect harmony with the general Allied plan, framed by the new
Supreme Command i

On this point the Despatches contain gaps which prevent the
reader from grasping all the reasons for our victory ; truth com-
pelled me to complete their account.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE BY FIELD-MARSHAL HAIG v

INTRODUCTION BY FIELD-MARSHAL FOCH ix

LOCAL OPERATIONS : ST. ELOI * * . . . i

THE OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 17

THE RETREAT TO THE HINDENBURG LINE . * . , 61

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 * * * , , * . 79

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS ,* 149

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 175

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY , . 243

THE FINAL DESPATCH , 309

ORIGINAL TEXT OF MARSHAL FOCH'S INTRODUCTION * 358

INDEX ,,,*, + ,., 363

PORTRAITS

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG . * * Frontispiece

GENERAL SIR HENRY RAWLINSON . * . facing page 19

GENERAL SIR HUBERT GOUGH * ,,63

GENERAL SIR EDMUND ALLENBY . 81

GENERAL SIR HERBERT PLUMER . 103

GENERAL SIR JULIAN BYNG . ,,151

GENERAL SIR HENRY HORNE ,,177

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM BIRDWOOD * 245

LIST OF SKETCH MAPS

THE Sf, ELOI OPERATIONS facing page 7

SOMME BATTLE : Attack of ist July, 1916 * , 25

SOMME BATTLE : Attack of i4th July, 1916 , ,,28

SOMME BATTLE : Attack of i5th September, 1916 41

SOMME BATTLE : Attacks of 25th and 26th Septem-
ber, 1916 .,,,**, 43

ANCRE BATTLE : i3th November, 1916 . ,,49

BATTLE OF ARRAS : 9th April, 1917 89

BATTLE OF MESSINES : 7th June, 1917 . . 106

THIRD YPRES BATTLE : Attack of 3ist July, 1917 , 113
THIRD YPRES BATTLE : Attack of 20th September,

191? 121

THIRD YPRES BATTLE : Attack of 26th September,

1917 ........ ,,123

THIRD YPRES BATTLE : Attack of 4th October, 1917 125
CAMBRAI BATTLE : British Attack, 2oth November,

191? * 154

xvii

xviii SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

LIST OF SKETCH MAPS-contimed

CAMBRAI BATTLE : German Attack, 3oth November,

1917 ..*,.*. facing page 163

SECOND SOMME BATTLE: German Attack, 2ist

March, 1918 ,,..,. 186

SECOND SOMME BATTLE : Stages of Retreat , * 196

THE LYS BATTLE : German Attacks of 9th and loth

April, 1918 * tt 220

VILLERS BRETONNEUX : 24th 25th April, 1918 231

THE LYS BATTLE: German Attack, 25th April,

1918 *,,,,,* 232
OPENING OF FINAL BRITISH OFFENSIVE : 8th August

9th September, 1918 . , * 262

BATTLE OF CAMBRAI AND HINDENBURG LINE : Cam-

brai Attack, 27th September, 1918 * . * 280

BATTLE OF CAMBRAI AND HINDENBURG LINE : Hin-

denburg Line Attack, 29th September, 1918 282

SECOND BATTLE OF LE CATEAU : 8th October, 1918 , 287

BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE : 4th November, 1918 294

GENERAL BATTLE SITUATION ON WESTERN FRONT:

25th September, 1918 * , * . * 378

LIST OF FOLDING MAPS

(IN PORTFOLIO)

i THE SOMME BATTLE, 1916

2* THE GERMAN RETREAT, SPRING, 1917

3* THE ARRAS BATTLE, 1917

4. THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN, 1917

5. THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS, 1917

6. THE GERMAN ATTACK ON THE SOMME, 1918

7. THE GERMAN ATTACK ON THE LYS, 1918

8. THE GREAT BRITISH ADVANCE, 1918

9* STRATEGIC MAP OF ALLIED OFFENSIVE, 1918
10. THE ADVANCE INTO GERMANY, 1918

LOCAL OPERATIONS: ST. ELOI

SIR

DOUGLAS HAIG'S
DESPATCHES

(DECEMBER 1915 APRIL 1919)

LOCAL OPERATIONS: ST. ELOI

General Headquarters,

igth May, 1916.*
MY LORD,

1. I have the honour to report the operations of the British
Forces serving in France and Belgium since igth December, 1915,
on which date, in accordance with the orders of His Majesty's Govern-
ment, I assumed the Chief Command.

During this period, the only offensive effort made by the enemy
on a great scale was directed against our French Allies near Verdun.
The fighting in that area has been prolonged and severe. The results
have been worthy of the high traditions of the French Army and of
great service to the cause of the Allies. The efforts made by the
enemy have cost him heavy losses both in men and in prestige,
and he has made these sacrifices without gaining any advantage to
counterbalance them.

During this struggle my troops have been in readiness to co-
operate as they might be needed, but the only assistance asked for
by our Allies was of an indirect nature viz., the relief of the French
troops on a portion of their defensive front. This relief I was glad to
be able to afford.

Its execution on a considerable front, everywhere in close touch
with the enemy, was a somewhat delicate operation, but it was
carried out with complete success, thanks to the cordial co-operation
and goodwill of all ranks concerned and to the lack of enterprise
shown by the enemy during the relief.

2. On the British front no action on a great scale, such as that at
Verdun, has been fought during the past five months, nevertheless
our troops have been far from idle or inactive. Although the struggle,
in a general sense, has not been intense, it has been everywhere con-
tinuous, and there have been many sharp local actions.

1 This Despatch was published as a Supplement, dated the 29th May, 1916, to the
London Gazette of the a6th May, 1916.

4 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

The maintenance and repair of our defences alone, especially in
winter, entails constant heavy work. Bad weather and the enemy
combine to flood and destroy trenches, dug-outs and communica-
tions ; all such damages must be repaired promptly, under fire, and
almost entirely by night.

Artillery and snipers are practically never silent, patrols are out
in front of the lines every night, and heavy bombardments by the
artillery of one or both sides take place daily in various parts of the
line. Below ground there is continual mining and counter-mining,
which, by the ever-present threat of sudden explosion and the un-
certainty as to when and where it will take place, causes perhaps a
more constant strain than any other form of warfare. In the air there
is seldom a day, however bad the weather, when aircraft are not
busy reconnoitring, photographing, and observing fire. All this is
taking place constantly at any hour of the day or night, and in any
part of the line.

3. In short, although there has been no great incident of historic
importance to record on the British front during the period under
review, a steady and continuous fight has gone on, day and night,
above ground and below it. The comparative monotony of this
struggle has been relieved at short intervals by sharp local actions,
some of which, although individually almost insignificant in a war on
such an immense scale, would have been thought worthy of a separate
despatch under different conditions, while their cumulative effect,
though difficult to appraise at its true value now, will doubtless prove
hereafter to have been considerable.

One form of minor activity deserves special mention, namely, the
raids or " cutting-out parties " which are made at least twice or three
times a week against the enemy's line. They consist of a brief attack,
with some special object, on a section of the opposing trenches,
usually carried out at night by a small body of men. The character
of these operations the preparation of a road through our own and
the enemy's wire the crossing of the open ground unseen the
penetration of the enemy's trenches the hand-to-hand fighting in
the darkness and the uncertainty as to the strength of the opposing
force gives peculiar scope to the gallantry, dash and quickness of
decision of the troops engaged ; and much skill and daring are
frequently displayed in these operations.

The initiative in these minor operations was taken, and on
the whole has been held, by us ; but the Germans have recently
attempted some bold and well-conceived raids against our lines, many
of which have been driven back, although some have succeeded in
penetrating, as has been reported by me from time to time.

4. Of the numerous local actions alluded to, the total number,

LOCAL OPERATIONS : ST. ELOI 5

omitting the more minor raids, amounts to over 60 since December
igth, of which the most important have been :

The operations at The Bluff, the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and at
St. Eloi ; the mining operations and crater fighting in the Loos
salient and on the Vimy Ridge ; and the hostile gas attacks north of
Ypres in December, and opposite Hulluch and Messines in April.

The most recent local operations worthy of mention are the
capture of some 500 yards of our trenches by the Germans at the
Kink, on the nth May, and the capture by us of 350 yards of their
trenches near Cabaret Rouge, on the night of the I5th/i6th May.

5. As an illustration of the nature of these local operations, it
will suffice to describe two or three of the most important.

Ypres Salient and The Bluff, 8th February to 2,nd March, 1916

During the period 8th to igth February the enemy displayed
increased activity in the Ypres salient, and carried out a series of
infantry attacks, preceded, as a rule, by intense bombardment, and
by the explosion of mines. These attacks may, no doubt, be regarded
as a subsidiary operation, designed partly to secure local points of
vantage, but probably also to distract attention from the impending
operations near Verdun, which began on the 2ist February.

After several days' heavy shelling over the whole of our line in
this area, the first attack took place on i2th February at the extreme
left of our line to the north of Ypres (i4th and aoth Divisions, Major-
Generals V. A. Couper and R. H. Davies commanding). A bombing
attack was launched by the Germans in the early morning, and they
succeeded in capturing our trenches. Our counter-attack, however,
which was immediately organised, enabled us to clear our trenches
of the enemy, and to pursue him to his own. After a period of
further bombardment on both sides, the German fire again increased
in intensity against our trenches and the French line beyond them ;
and in the evening a second attempt was made to rush our extreme
left this time entirely without success. Smaller attempts against
other trenches in the neighbourhood were made at the same time,
but were immediately repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire.
Throughout the operations our position in this part of the line
remained intact, except that two isolated trenches of no tactical
importance were captured by the enemy a day or two later ; they
were subsequently obliterated by our artillery fire. Throughout this
fighting the French on our immediate left rendered us the prompt
and valuable assistance which we have at all times received from them.

Another series of German attacks was launched about the same
time in the neighbourhood of Hooge to the east of Ypres. The enemy

6 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

had pushed out several saps in front of his trenches, and connected
them up into a firing line some 150 yards from our lines. During,
the whole of the I3th February he heavily bombarded our front-line
trenches in this neighbourhood and completely destroyed them. On
the following afternoon an intense bombardment of our line began,
and the enemy exploded a series of mines in front of our trenches,
simultaneously launching infantry attacks against Hooge and the
northern and southern ends of Sanctuary Wood (24th Division,
Major-General J. E, Capper commanding). Each of these attacks
was repulsed by artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire.

Further to the south, however, the enemy was more successful.
On the northern bank of the Ypres-Comines Canal there is a narrow
ridge, 30 to 40 feet high, covered with trees probably the heap
formed by excavation when the canal was dug which forms a
feature of the flat wooded country at the southern bend of the Ypres
salient. It runs outward through our territory almost into the German
area, so that our trenches pass over the eastern point of it, which is
known as The Bluff. Here also our trenches were almost obliterated
by the bombardment on the afternoon of the I4th, following which
a sudden rush of hostile infantry was successful in capturing these
and other front-line trenches immediately north of The Bluff-
some 600 yards in all (iyth Division, Major-General T. D. Pilcher
commanding). Two of these trenches were at once regained, but the
others were held by the enemy, in the face of several counter-attacks.
On the night of the I5th/i6th we made an unsuccessful counter-
attack, with the object of regaining the lost trenches. An advance
was begun across the open on the north side of the canal, combined
with grenade attacks along the communication trenches immediately
north of The Bluff, The night was very dark, and heavy rain had
turned the ground into a quagmire, so that progress was difficult for
the attacking force, which was unable to consolidate its position in
the face of heavy machine-gun and rifle fire. After the failure of this
attack it was decided to adopt slower and more methodical methods
of recapturing the lost trenches, and nothing of special importance
occurred in the Ypres salient during the rest of the month, although
both sides displayed rather more than the usual activity.

The recapture of The Bluff took place after the enemy had held
it for seventeen days. After several days' preliminary bombardment
by our artillery, the assault was carried out at 4.29 a.m. on the 2nd
March by troops of the 3rd Division, Major-General J. A. L. Haldane,
and of the lyth Division. Measures taken to deceive the enemy were
successful, and our infantry effected a complete surprise, finding the
enemy with their bayonets unfixed, and many of them without rifles
or equipment. About 50 Germans took refuge in a crater at the

final StMwi fynl /8$I9]6

THE ST. ELOI OPERATIONS

LOCAL OPERATIONS: ST. ELOI 7

eastern end of The Bluff, and these put up a brief resistance before
taking refuge in the tunnels they had constructed, in which they
were captured at leisure. Otherwise our right-hand attacking party,
whose objective was The Bluff, met with little opposition.

The front line of the centre attack, reaching its assigned objective
without much opposition, swept on past it and seized the German
Third Line at the eastern side of the salient. This line was not
suitable to hold permanently, but it proved useful as a temporary
covering position while the captured trenches in rear were being
consolidated, and at nightfall the covering party was withdrawn
unmolested. The later waves of our centre attack met and captured,
after some fighting, several Germans coming out of their dug-outs.

The left attacking party, at the first attempt, failed to reach the
German trenches, but those who had penetrated to the German line
on the right realised the situation and brought a Lewis gun to bear
on the enemy's line of resistance, completely enfilading his trenches,
and thus enabling the left company to reach its goal.

Thus our objective, which included a part of the German line, as
well as the whole of the front lost by us on the I4th February, was
captured, and is still held by us. Several counter-attacks were de-
stroyed by our fire. The enemy's trenches were found full of dead
as a result of our bombardment, and five officers and 251 other
ranks were captured.

The support of the Heavy and Field Artillery, and a number of
trench mortars, contributed largely to the success of the operation.

St . EM

6. On the ayth March our troops (gth Infantry Brigade, 3rd Divi-
sion) made an attack with the object of straightening out the line at
St. Eloi, and cutting away the small German salient which en-
croached on the semicircle of our line in the Ypres salient to a depth
of about 100 yards over a front of some 600 yards. The operation
was begun by the firing of six very large mines ; the charge was so
heavy that the explosion was felt in towns several miles behind the
lines, and large numbers of the enemy were killed. Half a minute
after the explosion our infantry attack was launched aiming at the
German Second Line. The right attack (ist Battalion Northumber-
land Fusiliers) met with little opposition, and captured its assigned
objective ; but the left attack (4th Battalion Royal Fusiliers) was not
so successful, and a gap was left in possession of the Germans,
through which they entered one of the craters. The following days
were spent by both sides in heavy bombardment and in unsuccessful
attacks, intended on our part to capture the remaining trenches, and

8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

on the part of the Germans to drive us from the positions we had
occupied* In the very early morning of April 3rd troops of the
y6th Infantry Brigade succeeded in recapturing the crater and the
trenches still held by the enemy, thereby securing the whole of our
original objective. We had, moreover, captured five officers and 195
men in the first attack on March 27th, and five officers and 80 men in
the attack on April 3rd. The work of consolidating our new position,
however, proved extremely difficult, owing to the wet soil, heavy
shelling and mine explosions ; though pumps were brought up and
efforts at draining were instituted, the result achieved was compara-
tively small. By dint of much heavy work the brigade holding these
trenches (6th Canadian Brigade, 2nd Canadian Division, Major-
General R. E. W. Turner commanding the division) succeeded in
reducing the water in the trenches by two feet by the morning of the
5th. This state of affairs could not, even so, be regarded as satisfactory;
and during the 5th the enemy's bombardment increased in intensity,
and the new trenches practically ceased to exist* On the morning of
the 6th the enemy attacked with one battalion supported by another ;
he penetrated our new line, and gained the two westernmost craters.
It is difficult to follow in detail the fighting of the next three weeks,
which consisted in repeated attacks by both sides on more or less
isolated mine craters, the trench lines having been destroyed by shell
fire. Great efforts were made to maintain communication with the
garrisons of these advanced posts, and with considerable success.
But there were periods of uncertainty, and some misconception as to
the state of affairs arose. On the nth it was reported to me that we
had recaptured all that remained of the position won by us on the
27th March and 3rd April. This report, probably due to old craters
having been mistaken for new ones, was subsequently found to be
incorrect. The new craters, being exposed to the enemy's view and
to the full weight of his artillery fire, have proved untenable, and at
the present time our troops are occupying trenches roughly in the
general line which was held by them before the 27th.

German Gas Attacks, zjthfeoth April

7. On the night of the 29th/3oth April the enemy carried out a
gas attack on a considerable scale near Wulverghem, on a front of
3,500 yards held by the 3rd and 24th Divisions. The operation was
opened by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire under cover of which
the gas was released. Immediately afterwards a heavy " barrage," or
curtain of artillery fire, was placed on three parts of this area, and
eight infantry attacks were launched. Of these attacks only two
penetrated our trenches ; one was immediately repelled, while the

LOCAL OPERATIONS: ST. ELOI 9

other was driven out by a counter-attack after about 40 minutes'
occupation* The enemy's object would appear to have been the
destruction of mine shafts, as a charge of gun-cotton was found
unexploded in a disused shaft, to which the enemy had penetrated.
But if this was his object he was completely unsuccessful.

Similar attacks were made by the Germans in front of Vermelles,
to the south of La Basse'e, on the 27th and 29th April, the discharge
of a highly concentrated gas being accompanied by bombardment
with lachrymatory and other shells and the explosion of a mine. On
the first occasion two minor infantry attacks penetrated our trenches,
but were driven out almost immediately ; on the second occasion a
small attack was repulsed, but the more serious advance which
appears to have been intended was probably rendered impossible by
the fact that a part of the enemy's gas broke back over his own lines,
to the visible confusion of his troops, who were massing for the attack.
8. While many other units have done excellent work during the
period under review, the following have been specially brought to
my notice for good work in carrying out or repelling local attacks and
raids :

3rd Divisional Artillery*

i yth Divisional Artillery*

ist Canadian Divisional Artillery*

62nd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery,

B Battery, 15 3rd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery*

83rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery (Lahore).

22nd Canadian (Howitzer) Brigade*

24th Heavy Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery*

1 1 5th Heavy Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.

1 22nd Heavy Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.

3rd Siege Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery*

1 2th Siege Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery*

9th Field Company, Royal Engineers *

56th Field Company, Royal Engineers*

yoth Field Company, Royal Engineers*

77th Field Company, Royal Engineers.

ist (Cheshire) Field Company, Royal Engineers.

i7Oth Tunnelling Company, Royal Engineers*

I72nd Tunnelling Company, Royal Engineers.

1 73rd Tunnelling Company, Royal Engineers*

253rd Tunnelling Company, Royal Engineers*

1 2th Divisional Signal Company, Royal Engineers,

24th Trench Mortar Battery.

767 ist Trench Mortar Battery.

No. 2 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps*

io SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

No, 6 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps,
2nd Battalion, Grenadier Guards,
ist Battalion, Coldstream Guards,
2nd Battalion, Irish Guards.
ist Battalion, Welsh Guards,

nth (Service) Battalion, The Royal Scots (Lothian Regiment),
ist Battalion, The Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment),
7th (Service) Battalion, The King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment),
8th (Service) Battalion, The King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment),
ist Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers,
1 2th (Service) Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers,
ist Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment,
8th Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment (Territorial).
8th (Service) Battalion, Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment).
9th (Service) Battalion, Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment).
4th (Extra Reserve) Battalion, The King's Liverpool Regiment,
i/8th (Irish) Battalion, The King's Liverpool Regiment (Territorial).
7th (Service) Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment,
i /4th Battalion, Suffolk Regiment (Territorial),
7th (Service) Battalion, Suffolk Regiment,
8th (Service) Battalion, Somerset Light Infantry,
7th (Service) Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment,
i/4th Battalion, The Prince of Wales's Own (West Yorkshire Regi-
ment) (Territorial),
2nd Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers,
nth (Service) Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers,
1 5th (Service) Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers.
i7th (Service) Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers.
2nd Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers,
1 5th (Service) Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers,
8th (Service) Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers,
7th (Service) Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
9th (Service) Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
loth (Service) Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
i /6th Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment (Territorial),
ist Battalion, East Lancashire Regiment.
7th (Service) Battalion, East Surrey Regiment.
8th (Service) Battalion, East Surrey Regiment.
9th (Service) Battalion, West Riding Regiment.
2nd Battalion, The Border Regiment.
7th (Service) Battalion, The Border Regiment,
nth (Service) Battalion, The Border Regiment.
7th (Service) Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment.
8th (Service) Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment,

LOCAL OPERATIONS: ST. ELOI u

8th (Service) Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment .

ist Battalion, Dorsetshire Regiment.

i/4th Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
(Territorial).

ist Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment.

5th (Service) Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment.

6th (Service) Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment.

ist Battalion, The King's (Shropshire Light Infantry).

ist Battalion, Duke of Cambridge's Own (Middlesex Regiment).

2nd Battalion, Duke of Cambridge's Own (Middlesex Regiment).

and Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps.

6th (Service) Battalion, The Duke of Edinburgh's (Wiltshire Regi-
ment).

1 8th (Service) Battalion, Manchester Regiment.

ist Battalion, The Prince cvf Wales 's (North Staffordshire Regiment).

8th (Service) Battalion, The Prince of Wales's (North Staffordshire
Regiment).

lyth (Service) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry.

8th (Service) Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire Buffs, The

Duke of Albany's).

ist Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders.
2nd Battalion, The Royal Irish Rifles.
9th (Service) Battalion, The Royal Irish Rifles,
ist Battalion, Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish Fusiliers).
2nd Battalion, Princess Louise's (Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders),
gth (Service) Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers.
3rd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own).
5th Canadian Infantry Battalion.
7th Canadian Infantry Battalion.
29th Canadian Infantry Battalion.
49th Canadian Infantry Battalion.

9. The activity described above has its counterpart in rear of
our lines in the training which is carried out continuously. During
the periods of relief all formations, and especially the newly created
ones, are instructed and practised in all classes of the present and
other phases of warfare. A large number of schools also exist for the
instruction of individuals, especially in the use and theory of the less
familiar weapons, such as bombs and grenades.

There are schools for young staff officers and regimental officers,
for candidates for commissions, etc. In short, every effort is made
to take advantage of the closer contact with actual warfare, and to
put the finishing touches, often after actual experience in the trenches,
to the training received at home.

12 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

10, During the period under review the forces under my com-
mand have been considerably augmented by the arrival of new
formations from home, and the transfer of others released from ser-
vice in the Near East, This increase has made possible the relief of a
French Army, to which I have already referred, at the time of the
Battle of Verdun, Among the newly arrived forces is the " Anzac "
Corps. With them, the Canadians, and a portion of the South
African Overseas Force which has also arrived, the Dominions now
furnish a valuable part of the Imperial Forces in France.

Since the date of the last Despatch, but before I assumed com-
mand, the Indian Army Corps left this country for service in the
East. They had given a year's valuable and gallant service under
conditions of warfare which they had not dreamt of, and in a climate
peculiarly difficult for them to endure. I regret their departure, but
I do not doubt that they will continue to render gallant and effective
service elsewhere, as they have already done in this country.

n. I take this opportunity to bring to notice the admirable work
which the Royal Flying Corps has continued to perform, in spite of
much unfavourable weather, in carrying out reconnaissance duties,
in taking photographs an important aid to reconnaissance which
has been brought to a high pitch of perfection and in assisting the
work of our Artillery by registering targets and locating hostile
batteries. In the performance of this work they have flown in weather
when no hostile aeroplane ventured out, and they have not hesitated
to fly low, under fire of the enemy's guns, when their duties made it
necessary to do so. They have also carried out a series of bombing
raids on hostile aerodromes and points of military importance. A
feature of the period under review has been the increased activity of
the enemy's aircraft, in suitable weather. But the enemy's activity
has been mainly on his own side of the line, and has aimed chiefly at
interrupting the work carried out by our machines. In order to
carry on the work in spite of this opposition, which was for a time
rendered more effective by the appearance in December of a new
and more powerful type of enemy machine, it has been necessary to
provide an escort to accompany our reconnaissance aeroplanes, and
fighting in the air, which was formerly exceptional, has now become
an everyday occurrence.

The observers, no less than the pilots, have done excellent
service, and many fine feats have been performed by both. De-
velopments on the technical side of the Air Service have been no less
remarkable and satisfactory than the progress made on the purely
military side. Much inventive genius has been displayed ; and our
equipment for photography, wireless telegraphy, bomb-dropping
and offensive action generally has been immensely improved, while

LOCAL OPERATIONS : ST. ELOI 13

great skill has been shown in keeping the flying machines themselves
in good flying condition*

12* The continuance of siege warfare has entailed for the Royal
Engineers work of a particularly arduous and important kind, extend-
ing from the front trenches to the Base Ports.

In the performance of this work the officers, non-commis-
sioned officers and men of the Field Companies and other units of
the Corps have continued to exhibit a very high standard of skill,
courage, and devotion to duty*

13* The work of the Tunnelling Companies calls for special
mention* Increased mining activity on the part of the enemy has
invariably been answered with enterprise combined with untiring
energy on the part of our miners, who in carrying out duties always
full of danger have shown that they possess in the highest degree
the qualities of courage, perseverance, and self-sacrifice* Their
importance in the present phase of warfare is very great*

14* The excellent work done by the Corps of Military Police is
worthy of mention* This Corps is inspired by a high sense of duty,
and in the performance of its share in the maintenance of discipline
it has shown both zeal and discretion*

15, All branches of the Medical Services deserve the highest
commendation for the successful work done by them, both at the
Front and on the Lines of Communication* The sick rate has been
consistently low ; there has been no serious epidemic, and enteric
fever, the bane of armies in the past, has almost completely disap-
peared owing to preventive measures energetically carried out.

The results of exposure incidental to trench warfare during
the winter months were to a very great extent kept in check by
careful application of the precautions recommended and taught by
regimental Medical Officers.

The wounded have been promptly and efficiently dealt with,
and their evacuation to the Base has been rapidly accomplished.

The close co-operation which has existed between the officers of
the Regular Medical Service of the Army and those members of the
civil medical profession who have patriotically given their valuable
services to the Army, has largely contributed to the prevention of
disease and to the successful treatment and comfort of the sick and
wounded.

As part of the Medical Services, the Canadian Army Medical
Corps has displayed marked efficiency and devotion to duty.

1 6. The Commission of Graves Registration and Enquiries has,
since it first undertook this work eighteen months ago, registered
and marked over 50,000 graves. Without its labours many would
have remained unidentified. It has answered several thousand

14 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

enquiries from relatives and supplied them with photographs* Flowers
and shrubs have been planted in most of the cemeteries which are
sufficiently far removed from the firing line, and all cemeteries which
it is possible to work in during the daytime are now being looked
after by non-commissioned officers and men of this unit.

17. The valuable nature of the work performed by the officers
of the Central Laboratory and the Chemical Advisers with the
Armies in investigations into the nature of the gases and other new
substances used in hostile attacks, and in devising and perfecting
means of protecting our troops against them, is deserving of recogni-
tion. The efforts of these officers materially contributed to the
failure of the Germans in their attack of igth December, 1915, as
well as in the various gas attacks since made.

1 8. The stream of additional personnel and material arriving
from England, and the move of complete formations to and from the
East during the period under review, have thrown a great deal of
work on our Base Ports and on the Advanced Base. The staff and
personnel at these stations have coped most ably with the work of
forwarding and equipping the various units passing through their
hands, and I desire to bring their good work to notice.

19. The large increases made to our forces have necessitated a
great expansion in the resources of our Lines of Communication,
and I have been greatly struck by the forethought shown by the
Administrative Services in anticipating the requirements of the
Armies in the Field and in the provision made to satisfy these
requirements.

The Base Ports have been developed to the utmost possible
extent, advanced Depdts have been provided, and communications
have been improved to ensure punctual distribution to the troops.

Labour has been organised in order to develop local resources,
especially in the matter of timber for defences and hutting, and stone
for road maintenance, whereby considerable reductions have been
made possible in the shipments from over sea.

Economy has attended the good methods adopted, and the
greatest credit is due to all concerned for the results obtained.

20. I desire to acknowledge here the valuable assistance rendered
by the naval transport officers on the Lines of Communication. They
have worked with and for the Army most untiringly, efficiently, and
with the utmost harmony.

I also desire to acknowledge the indebtedness of the Army to the
Royal Navy for their unceasing and uniformly successful care in
securing the safety of our transport service on the seas.

21. I wish to acknowledge the work done in the reproduction of
maps by the Ordnance Survey Department. Over 90 per cent, of

LOCAL OPERATIONS: ST. ELOI 15

the maps used in this country are reproduced and printed in Eng-
land by the Ordnance Survey, and the satisfactory supply is largely
due to the foresight and initiative displayed by this Department. I
can now count on obtaining an issue of as many as 10,000 copies of
any map within one week of sending it home for reproduction.

22. I have forwarded under a separate letter the names of the
officers, non-commissioned officers and men whom I wish to
bring to notice for gallant and distinguished service.

23. I cannot close this Despatch without some reference to the
work of my predecessor in Command, Field-Marshal Viscount
French. The Field-Marshal, starting the war with our small Expedi-
tionary Force, faced an enemy far superior in numbers and fully
prepared for this great campaign. During the long and anxious time
needed for the improvisation of the comparatively large force now
serving in this country, he overcame all difficulties, and before lay-
ing down his responsibilities he had the satisfaction of seeing the
balance of advantage swing steadily in our favour. Those who have
served under him appreciate the greatness of his achievement*

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

D* HAIG, General,
Commander-in-Chief, The British Forces in France.

THE OPENING OF
THE WEARING -OUT BATTLE

THE OPENING OF
THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE

General Headquarters,

2,%rd December, I9I6. 1
MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the opera-
tions of the Forces under my Command since the igth May, the date
of my last Despatch,

The General Situation towards the end of May

i. The principle of an offensive campaign during the summer of
1916 had already been decided on by all the Allies, The various
possible alternatives on the Western front had been studied and dis-
cussed by General Joffre and myself, and we were in complete agree-
ment as to the front to be attacked by the combined French and
British Armies.* Preparations for our offensive had made considerable
progress ; but as the date on which the attack should begin was
dependent on many doubtful factors, a final decision on that point
was deferred until the general situation should become clearer.

Subject to the necessity of commencing operations before the
summer was too far advanced, and with due regard to the general
situation, I desired to postpone my attack as long as possible. The
British Armies were growing in numbers 3 and the supply of muni-
tions was steadily increasing. Moreover a very large proportion of
the officers and men under my command were still far from being fully
trained, and the longer the attack could be deferred the more effi-
cient they would become. On the other hand the Germans were
continuing to press their attacks at Verdun, and both there and on
the Italian front, where the Austrian offensive 4 was gaining ground,
it was evident that the strain might become too great to be borne
unless timely action were taken to relieve it. Accordingly, while

1 This Despatch was published as a Supplement to the London Gazette of the 29th
December, 1916.

* The choice of front for the Allied offensive was governed by the consideration that
neither the French nor ourselves were at the moment deemed strong enough to under-
take unaided an offensive on a really large scale. It was therefore necessary to deliver
a combined attack.

a Between January, 1916, and July, 1916, the strength of the British Armies on the
Western front in bayonets and sabres increased from 450,000 to 660,000.

* On the i4th May, 1916, the Austrians attacked in the Trentino and by the end of
May had advanced to Arsiero and Asiago.

20 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

maintaining constant touch with General Joffre in regard to all these
considerations, my preparations were pushed on, and I agreed, with
the consent of H.M, Government, that my attack should be launched
whenever the general situation required it with as great a force as I
might then be able to make available,

2, By the end of May the pressure of the enemy on the Italian
front had assumed such serious proportions that the Russian cam-
paign was opened early in June, and the brilliant successes I gained by
our Allies against the Austrians at once caused a movement of Ger-
man troops from the Western to the Eastern front* This, however,
did not lessen the pressure on Verdun, The heroic defence of our
French Allies had already gained many weeks of inestimable value
and had caused the enemy very heavy losses ; but the strain con-
tinued to increase. In view, therefore, of the situation in the various
theatres of war, it was eventually agreed between General Joffre and
myself that the combined French and British offensive should not
be postponed beyond the end of June,

The object of that offensive was threefold :

(i) To relieve the pressure on Verdun,

(ii) To assist our Allies in the other theatres of war by stop-
ping any further transfer of German troops from the Western
front,

(iii) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us,

3, While my final preparations were in progress the enemy made
two unsuccessful attempts to interfere with my arrangements. The
first, directed on the 2ist May against our positions on the Vimy
Ridge, south and south-east of Souchez, held by the 4yth and 25th
Divisions (Major-Generals Sir C. St. L, Barter and E, G, T, Bain-
bridge commanding), resulted in a small enemy gain of no strategic
or tactical importance ; and rather than weaken my offensive by
involving additional troops in the task of recovering the lost ground,
I decided to consolidate a position in rear of our original line.

The second enemy attack was delivered on the 2nd June on a
front of over one and a half miles from Mount Sorrell to Hooge, held
by the 3rd Division (Major-General L, J, Lipsett), and succeeded in
penetrating to a maximum depth of 700 yards. As the southern part
of the lost position commanded our trenches I judged it necessary
to recover it, and by an attack launched on the I3th June, carefully
prepared and well executed, this was successfully accomplished by
the troops on the spot (ist Canadian Division, Major-General
A. W. Currie),

1 Brussilov's offensive on the Galician front in which Lutsk and Czernovitz were
taken by the Russians.

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 21

Neither of these enemy attacks succeeded in delaying the pre-
parations for the major operations which I had in view*

Preparations for the Somme Battle

4. These preparations were necessarily very elaborate and took
considerable time.

Vast stocks of ammunition and stores of all kinds had to be
accumulated beforehand within a convenient distance of our front.
To deal with these many miles of new railways both standard and
narrow gauge and trench tramways were laid. All available roads
were improved, many others were made, and long causeways were
built over marshy valleys. Many additional dug-outs had to be pro-
vided as shelter for the troops, for use as dressing stations for the
wounded, and as magazines for storing ammunition, food, water, and
engineering material. Scores of miles of deep communication
trenches had to be dug, as well as trenches for telephone wires,
assembly and assault trenches, and numerous gun emplacements
and observation posts.

Important mining operations were undertaken, and charges were
laid at various points beneath the enemy's lines.

Except in the river valleys, the existing supplies of water were
hopelessly insufficient to meet the requirements of the numbers of
men and horses to be concentrated in this area as the preparations
for our offensive proceeded. To meet this difficulty many wells and
borings were sunk, and over one hundred pumping plants were
installed. More than one hundred and twenty miles of water mains
were laid, and everything was got ready to ensure an adequate water
supply as our troops advanced.

Much of this preparatory work had to be done under very trying
conditions, and was liable to constant interruption from the enemy's
fire. The weather, on the whole, was bad, and the local accommoda-
tion totally insufficient for housing the troops employed, who conse-
quently had to content themselves with such rough shelter as could
be provided in the circumstances. All this labour, too, had to be
carried out in addition to fighting and to the everyday work of main-
taining existing defences. It threw a very heavy strain on the troops,
which was borne by them with a cheerfulness beyond all praise,

The Enemy's Position

5. The enemy's position to be attacked was of a very formidable
character, situated on a high, undulating tract of ground, which
rises to more than 500 feet above sea-level, and forms the watershed

32 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

between the Somme on the one side and the rivers of south-western
Belgium on the other* On the southern face of this watershed, the
general trend of which is from east-south-east to west-north-west,
the ground falls in a series of long irregular spurs and deep depres-
sions to the valley of the Scmme, Well down the forward slopes of
this face the enemy's first system of defence, starting from the Somme
near Curlu (vide Map I.), ran at first northwards for 3,000 yards,
then westwards for 7,000 yards to near Fricourt, where it turned
nearly due north, forming a great salient angle in the enemy's line.

Some 10,000 yards north of Fricourt the trenches crossed the
River Ancre, a tributary of the Somme, and still running northwards
passed over the summit of the watershed, about Hebuterne and
Gommecourt, and then down its northern spurs to Arras,

On the 20,000 yards front between the Somme and the Ancre
the enemy had a strong second system of defence, sited generally on
or near the southern crest of the highest part of the watershed, at an
average distance of from 3,000 to 5,000 yards behind his first system
of trenches.

During nearly two years' preparation he had spared no pains to
render these defences impregnable. The first and second systems
each consisted of several lines of deep trenches, well provided with
bomb-proof shelters and with numerous communication trenches
connecting them. The front of the trenches in each system was pro-
tected by wire entanglements, many of them in two belts forty yards
broad, built of iron stakes interlaced with barbed wire, often almost
as thick as a man's finger.

The numerous woods and villages in and between these systems
of defence had been turned into veritable fortresses. The deep
cellars usually to be found in the villages, and the numerous pits and
quarries common to a chalk country, were used to provide cover for
machine guns and trench mortars. The existing cellars were supple-
mented by elaborate dug-outs, sometimes in two storeys, and these
were connected up by passages as much as thirty feet below the
surface of the ground. The salients in the enemy's line, from which
he could bring enfilade fire across his front, were made into self-
contained forts, and often protected by mine fields ; while strong
redoubts and concrete machine gun emplacements had been con-
structed in positions from which he could sweep his own trenches
should these be taken. The ground lent itself to good artillery obser-
vation on the enemy's part, and he had skilfully arranged for cross
fire by his guns.

These various systems of defence, with the fortified localities and
other supporting points between them, were cunningly sited to
afford each other mutual assistance and to admit of the utmost

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 23

possible development of enfilade and flanking fire by machine guns
and artillery. They formed, in short, not merely a series of succes-
sive lines, but one composite system of enormous depth and strength.

Behind his second system of trenches, in addition to woods,
villages and other strong points prepared for defence, the enemy
had several other lines already completed ; and we had learnt from
aeroplane reconnaissance that he was hard at work improving and
strengthening these and digging fresh ones between them, and still
further back.

In the area above described, between the Somme and the Ancre,
our front line trenches ran parallel and close to those of the enemy,
but below them. We had good direct observation on his front system
of trenches and on the various defences sited on the slopes above us
between his first and second systems ; but the second system itself,
in many places, could not be observed from the ground in our posses-
sion, while, except from the air, nothing could be seen of his more
distant defences.

North of the Ancre, where the opposing trenches ran transversely
across the main ridge, the enemy's defences were equally elaborate
and formidable. So far as command of ground was concerned, we
were here practically on level terms ; but, partly as a result of this,
our direct observation over the ground held by the enemy was not so
good as it was further south. On portions of this front the opposing
first line trenches were more widely separated from each other ;
while in the valleys to the north were many hidden gun positions
from which the enemy could develop flanking fire on our troops as
they advanced across the open.

Arrangement

6. The period of active operations dealt with in this despatch
divides itself roughly into three phases. The first phase opened with
the attack of the ist July, the success of which evidently came as a
surprise to the enemy and caused considerable confusion and dis-
organisation in his ranks. The advantages gained on that date and
developed during the first half of July may be regarded as having
been rounded off by the operations of the I4th July and three follow-
ing days, which gave us possession of the southern crest of the main
plateau between Delville Wood and Basentin-le-Petit.

We then entered upon a contest lasting for many weeks, during
which the enemy, having found his strongest defences unavailing,
and now fully alive to his danger, put forth his utmost efforts to keep
his hold on the main ridge. This stage of the battle constituted a.

24 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

prolonged and severe struggle for mastery between the contending
armies, in which, although progress was slow and difficult, the con-
fidence of our troops in their ability to win was never shaken. Their
tenacity and determination proved more than equal to their task, and
by the first week in September they had established a fighting
superiority that has left its mark on the enemy, of which possession
of the ridge was merely the visible proof.

The way was then opened for the third phase, in which our
advance was pushed down the forward slopes of the ridge and further
extended on both flanks, until, from Morval to Thiepval, the whole
plateau and a good deal of ground beyond were in our possession.
Meanwhile our gallant Allies, in addition to great successes south of
the Somme, had pushed their advance, against equally determined
opposition and under most difficult tactical conditions, up the long
slopes on our immediate right, and were now preparing to drive the
enemy from the summit of the narrow and difficult portion of the
main ridge which lies between the Combles Valley and the River
Tortille, a stream flowing from the north into the Somme just below
Peronne,

THE SOMME BATTLE FIRST PHASE
The Over-running of the German Entrenched Positions

7, Defences of the nature described could only be attacked with
any prospect of success after careful artillery preparation. It was
accordingly decided that our bombardment should begin on the
24th June, and a large force of artillery was brought into action for
the purpose.

Artillery bombardments were also carried out daily at different
points on the rest of our front, and during the period from the 24th
June to ist July gas was discharged with good effect at more than
forty places along our line, upon a frontage which in total amounted
to over fifteen miles. Some 70 raids, too, were undertaken by our
infantry between Gommecourt and our extreme left north of Ypres
during the week preceding the attack, and these kept me well in-
formed as to the enemy's dispositions, besides serving other useful
purposes,

On the 25th June the Royal Flying Corps carried out a general
attack on the enemy's observation balloons, destroying nine of them,
and depriving the enemy for the time being of this form of
observation.

Line, morning 1st

evening
(Scale - 5/8" = 1 mile)

SOMME BATTLE ;

Attack of July ist, 1916.

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 35

The Opening Assault is* July

8. On July ist, at 7,30 a.m., after a final hour of exceptionally
violent bombardment, our infantry assault was launched. Simul-
taneously the French attacked on both sides of the Somme,
co-operating closely with us.

The British main front of attack extended from Mari court on our
right, round the salient at Fricourt, to the Ancre in front of St.
Pierre Divion. To assist this main attack by holding the enemy's
reserves and occupying his artillery, the enemy's trenches north of
the Ancre, as far as Serre inclusive, were to be assaulted simultane-
ously ; while further north a subsidiary attack was to be made on
both sides of the salient at Gommecourt.

I had entrusted the attack on the front from Maricourt to Serre
to the Fourth Army, under the command of General Sir Henry S.
Rawlinson, with five Army Corps at his disposal. The subsidiary
attack at Gommecourt was carried out by troops from the Third
Army commanded by General Sir E. H. H. Allenby. 1

Just prior to the attack the mines which had been prepared under
the enemy's lines were exploded, and smoke was discharged at many
places along our front. Through this smoke our infantry advanced
to the attack with the utmost steadinesss, in spite of the very heavy
barrage of the enemy's guns. On our right our troops met with
immediate success, and rapid progress was made. Before midday
Montauban had been carried by the 3Oth Division, and shortly

1 The disposition of our forces from south to north at the moment of attack was as
follows :
Fourth Army

XIIL Corps Lt.-Gen. W. N. Congreve.

30th Div Maj.-Gen. J. S. M. Shea.

i8th Div. ..... Maj.-Gen. F. I. Maxse.

XV. Corps Lt.-Gen. H. S. Home.

7th Div. ..... Maj.-Gen. H. E. Watts.

2ist Div Maj.-Gen. D. G. M. Campbell.

III. Corps Lt.-Gen. Sir W. P. Pulteney.

34th Div Maj.-Gen. E. C. Ingouville-Williams.

8th Div Maj.-Gen. H. Hudson.

X. Corps Lt.-Gen. Sir T. L. N. Morland.

32nd Div Maj.-Gen. W. H. Rycroft.

36th Div. ..... Maj.-Gen. O. S. W. Nugent.

VIII. Corps ..... Lt.-Gen. Sir A. G. Hunter- Weston.

2Qth Div Maj.-Gen. H. de B. de Lisle.

4th Div. ..... Maj.-Gen. Hon. W. Lambton.

3ist Div. Maj.-Gen. R. Wanless O'Gowan.

Third Army

VII. Corps Lt.-Gen. Sir T. D'O. Snow.

56th Div Maj.-Gen. C. P. A. Hull.

46th Div Maj.-Gen. E. J. Montagu Stuart-Wortley.

26 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

afterwards the Briqueterie to the east, and the whole of the ridge to
the west of the village were in our hands (i8th Division)* Opposite
Mametz part of our assembly trenches had been practically levelled
by the enemy artillery, making it necessary for our infantry (yth
Division) to advance to the attack across 400 yards of open ground *
None the less they forced their way into Mamets, and reached their
objective in the valley beyond, first throwing out a defensive flank
towards Fricourt on their left. At the same time the enemy's trenches
were entered by the 2ist Division north of Fricourt, so that the
enemy's garrison in that village was pressed on three sides* Further
north, though the villages of La Boisselle and Ovillers for the time
being resisted our attack, our troops (34th and 8th Divisions) drove
deeply into the German lines on the flanks of these strongholds, and
so paved the way for their capture later. On the spur running south
from Thiepval the work known as the Leipzig Salient was stormed
by the 32nd Division, and severe fighting x took place for the
possession of the village and its defences. Here and north of the
valley of the Ancre as far as Serre on the left flank of our
attack, our initial successes were not sustained. Striking progress
was made at many points and parties of troops penetrated the enemy's
positions to the outer defences of Grandcourt (36th Division), and
also to Pendant Copse (4th Division) and Serre (3131 Division) ;
but the enemy's continued resistance at Thiepval and Beaumont
Hamel (29th Division) made it impossible to forward reinforcements
and ammunition, and, in spite of their gallant efforts, our troops
were forced to withdraw during the night to their own lines.

The subsidiary attack at Gomme court also forced its way into
the enemy's positions ; but there met with such vigorous opposition
that as soon as it was considered that the attack had fulfilled its
object our troops were withdrawn,

The Attack Continued

9, In view of the general situation at the end of the first day's
operations, I decided that the best course was to press forward on a
front extending from our junction with the French to a point half-
way between La Boisselle and Contalmaison, and to limit the offen-
sive on our left for the present to a slow and methodical advance.
North of the Ancre such preparations were to be made as would
hold the enemy to his positions, and enable the attack to be resumed
there later if desirable. In order that General Sir Henry Rawlinson
might be left free to concentrate his attention on the portion of the
front where the attack was to be pushed home, I also decided
1 In the course of this fighting, a brigade of the 4Qth Division, Major-General
E. M* Percival, made a gallant attempt to force Thiepval from the north.

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 27

to place the operations against the front, La Boisselle to Serre,
under the command of General Sir Hubert de la P. Gough, to
whom I accordingly allotted the two northern corps of Sir Henry
Rawlinson's Army, My instructions to Sir Hubert Gough were that
his Army was to maintain a steady pressure on the front from La
Boisselle to the Serre Road, and to act as a pivot on which our line
could swing as our attacks on his right made progress towards the
north,

10, During the succeeding days the attack was continued on
these lines. In spite of strong counter-attacks on the Briqueterie and
Montauban, by midday on the 2nd July our troops (iyth Division,
Major-General T, D, Pilcher) had captured Fricourt, and in the
afternoon and evening stormed Fricourt Wood and the farm to the
north. During the 3rd and 4th July Bernafay and Caterpillar Woods
were also captured, and our troops pushed forward to the railway
north of Mametz, On these days the reduction of La Boisselle was
completed after hard fighting (igth Division, Major-General G, T,
M. Bridges), while the outskirts of Contalmaison were reached on
the 5th July (the 23rd Division, Major-General J, M, Babington,
taking part in this fighting with the zyth and yth Divisions). North of
La Boisselle also the enemy's forces opposite us were kept constantly
engaged, and our holding in the Leipzig Salient was gradually
increased.

To sum up the results of the fighting of these five days, on a front
of over six miles, from the Briqueterie to La Boisselle, our troops had
swept over the whole of the enemy's first and strongest system of
defence, which he had done his utmost to render impregnable. They
had driven him back over a distance of more than a mile, and had
carried four elaborately fortified villages.

The number of prisoners passed back to the Corps cages at the
close of the 5th July had already reached the total of ninety-four
officers and 5,724 other ranks,

n. After the five days' heavy and continuous fighting just de-
scribed it was essential to carry out certain readjustments and reliefs
of the forces engaged. In normal conditions of enemy resistance the
amount of progress that can be made at any time without a pause in
the general advance is necessarily limited. Apart from the physical
exhaustion of the attacking troops and the considerable distances
separating the enemy's successive main systems of defence, special
artillery preparation was required before a successful assault could be
delivered. Meanwhile, however, local operations were continued in
spite of much unfavourable weather. The attack on Contalmaison
and Mametz Wood was undertaken on the 7th July by the 38th
Division (Major-General I, Philipps), and the i7th, 23rd and igth

a8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Divisions, After three days' obstinate fighting/ in the course of
which the enemy delivered several powerful counter-attacks, the village
and the whole of the wood, except its northern border, were finally
secured. On the jth July also a footing was gained in the outer
defences of Ovillers (25th and i2th Divisions, Major-General A, B.
Scott commanding the I2th Division), while on the gth July on our
extreme right Malts Horn Farm an important point on the spur
north of Hardecourt was secured,

A thousand yards north of this farm our troops (3oth Division)
had succeeded at the second attempt in establishing themselves on
the 8th July in the southern end of Trones Wood. The enemy's
positions in the northern and eastern parts of this wood were very
strong, and no less than eight powerful German counter-attacks
were made here during the next five days. In the course of this
struggle portions of the wood changed hands several times ; but we
were left eventually, on the i3th July, in possession of the southern
part of it*

12* Meanwhile Mametz Wood had been entirely cleared of the
enemy (by the 2ist Division), and with Tr6nes Wood also practically
in our possession we were in a position to undertake an assault upon
the enemy's second system of defences. Arrangements were accord-
ingly made for an attack to be delivered at daybreak on the morning
of the 1 4th July against a front extending from Longueval to
Basentin-le-Petit Wood, both inclusive. Contalmaison Villa, on a
spur 1,000 yards west of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, had already been
captured to secure the left flank of the attack, and advantage had
been taken of the progress made by our infantry to move our artillery
forward into new positions. The preliminary bombardment had
opened on the nth July. The opportunities offered by the ground
for enfilading the enemy's lines were fully utilised and did much to
secure the success of our attack.

The Attack of the iqth July

13. In the early hours of the I4th July the attacking troops moved
out over the open for a distance of from about 1,000 to 1,400 yards,
and lined up in the darkness just below the crest and some 300 to
500 yards from the enemy's trenches. Their advance was covered
by strong patrols, and their correct deployment had been ensured by
careful previous preparations. 1 The whole movement was carried
out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case. The deci-
sion to attempt a night operation of this magnitude with an Army,

1 White tapes were laid out on the ground earlier in the night, to assist the attacking
troops to form up in their proper positions.

- Jl - *

Line jnorntng 14th July "-

SOMME BATTLE ;

Attack of 1 4th July, 1916.

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 29

the bulk of which has been raised since the beginning of the war,
was perhaps the highest tribute that could be paid to the quality of
our troops* It would not have been possible but for the most careful
preparation and forethought, as well as thorough reconnaissance of
the ground which was in many cases made personally by Divisional,
Brigade and Battalion Commanders and their staffs before framing
their detailed orders for the advance*

The actual assault was delivered at 3,25 a.m. on the i4th July,
when there was just sufficient light to be able to distinguish friend
from foe at short ranges, and along the whole front attacked our
troops, preceded by a very effective artillery barrage, swept over the
enemy's first trenches and on into the defences beyond.

On our right the enemy was driven by the i8th Division from
his last foothold in Trones Wood, and by 8.0 a.m. we had cleared
the whole of it, relieving a body of 170 men (Royal West Kents and
Queens) who had maintained themselves all night in the northern
corner of the wood, although completely surrounded by the enemy.
Our position in the wood was finally consolidated, and strong patrols
were sent out from it in the direction of Guillemont and Longueval.
The southern half of this latter village was already in the hands of
the troops who had advanced west of Trones Wood (gth Division,
Major-General W. T. Furze). The northern half, with the exception
of two strong points, was captured by 4.0 p.m. after a severe struggle.

In the centre of our attack Bazentin-le-Grand village and wood
were also gained by the 3rd and yth Divisions (Major-General
J. A. L. Haldane commanding the 3rd Division), and our troops
pushing northwards captured Bazentin-le-Petit village, and the ceme-
tery to the east. Here the enemy counter-attacked twice about
midday without success, and again in the afternoon, on the latter occa-
sion momentarily reoccupying the northern half of the village as far
as the church. Our troops immediately returned to the attack and
drove him out again with heavy losses. To the left of the village
Bazentin-le-Petit Wood was cleared by the 2ist Division, in spite
of the considerable resistance of the enemy along its western edge
where we successfully repulsed a counter-attack. In the afternoon
further ground was gained to the west of the wood (ist Division,
Major-General E. P. Strickland), and posts were established im-
mediately south of Pozieres by the 34th Division.

The enemy's troops, who had been severely handled in these
attacks and counter-attacks, began to show signs of disorganisation,
and it was reported early in the afternoon that it was possible to
advance to High Wood. General Rawlinson, who had held a force of
cavalry in readiness for such an eventuality, decided to employ a
part of it. As the fight progressed small bodies of this force had

30 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

pushed forward gradually, keeping in close touch with the develop-
ment of the action and prepared to seize quickly any opportunity
that might occur* A squadron (yth Dragoon Guards, Secunderabad
Brigade with the Deccan Horse operating with them) now came up on
the flanks of our infantry (yth Division), who entered High Wood at
about 8.0 p.m., and, after some hand-to-hand fighting, cleared the
whole of the wood with the exception of the northern apex. Acting
mounted in co-operation with the infantry, the cavalry came into
action with good effect, killing several of the enemy and capturing
some prisoners.

14. On the 1 5th July the battle still continued, though on a
reduced scale. Arrow Head Copse, between the southern edge of
Trdnes Wood and Guillemont, and Waterlot Farm on the Longueval-
Guillemont Road, were seized, and Delville Wood was captured and
held against several hostile counter-attacks (i8th and gth Divisions).
In Longueval fierce fighting continued until dusk for the possession
of the two strong points and the orchards to the north of the village.
The situation in this area made the position of our troops in High
Wood somewhat precarious, and they now began to suffer numerous
casualties from the enemy's heavy shelling. Accordingly orders were
given for their withdrawal, and this was effected during the night of
the 1 5/1 6th July without interference by the enemy. All the wounded
were brought in.

In spite of repeated enemy counter-attacks, further progress was
made by the ist Division on the night of the i6th July along the
enemy's main second line trenches north-west of Bazentin-le-Petit
Wood to within 500 yards of the north-east corner of the village of
Pozieres, which our troops were already approaching from the south.

Meanwhile the operations further north had also made progress.
Since the attack of the yth July the enemy in and about Ovillers had
been pressed relentlessly, and gradually driven back by incessant
bombing attacks and local assaults (25th and 3^nd Divisions), in
accordance with the general instructions I had given to General Sir
Hubert Gough. On the i6th July a large body of the garrison of
Ovillers surrendered, and that night and during the following day,
by a direct advance from the west across No Man's Land, our troops
(48th Division, Major-General R. Fanshawe) carried the remainder
of the village and pushed out along the spur to the north and east-
wards towards Pozieres.

Results, ijth July

15. The results of the operations of the i4th July and subsequent
days were of considerable importance. The enemy's second main
system of defence had been captured on a front of over three miles.

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 31

We had again forced him back more than a mile, and had gained
possession of the southern crest of the main ridge on a front of 6,000
yards. Four more of his fortified villages and three woods had been
wrested from him by determined fighting, and our advanced troops
had penetrated as far as his third line of defence. In spite of a reso-
lute resistance and many counter-attacks, in which the enemy had
suffered severely, our line was definitely established from Malts
Horn Farm, where we met the French left, northwards along the
eastern edge of Trdnes Wood to Longueval, then westwards past
Bazentin-le-Grand to the northern corner of Bazentin-le-Petit and
Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, and then westwards again past the southern
face of Pozieres to the north of Ovillers. Posts were established at
Arrow Head Copse and Waterlot Farm, while we had troops thrown
forward in Delville Wood and towards High Wood, though their
position was not yet secure.

I cannot speak too highly of the skill, daring, endurance and
determination by which these results had been achieved. Great
credit is due to Sir Henry Rawlinson for the thoroughness and care
with which this difficult undertaking was planned ; while the ad-
vance and deployment made by night without confusion, and the
complete success of the subsequent attack, constitute a striking
tribute to the discipline and spirit of the troops engaged, as well as
to the powers of leadership and organisation of their commanders
and staffs.

During these operations and their development on the I5th a
number of enemy guns were taken, making our total captures since
the ist July 8 heavy howitzers, 4 heavy guns, 42 field and light guns
and field howitzers, 30 trench mortars and 52 machine guns. Very
considerable losses had been inflicted on the enemy, and the prisoners
captured amounted to over 2,000, bringing the total since the ist July
to over 10,000.

THE SECOND PHASE THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RIDGE

1 6. There was strong evidence that the enemy forces engaged on
the battle front had been severely shaken by the repeated successes
gained by ourselves and our Allies ; but the great strength and depth
of his defences had secured for him sufficient time to bring up fresh
troops, and he had still many powerful fortifications, both trenches,
villages and woods, to which he could cling in our front and on our
flanks.

We had, indeed, secured a footing on the main ridge, but only on
a front of 6,000 yards ; and desirous though I was to follow up

33 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

quickly the successes we had won, it was necessary first to widen
this front.

West of Bazentin-le-Petit the villages of Pozieres and Thiepval,
together with the whole elaborate system of trenches round, between
and on the main ridge behind them, had still to be carried. An
advance further east would, however, eventually turn these defences,
and all that was for the present required on the left flank of our
attack was a steady, methodical, step by step advance as already
ordered.

On our right flank the situation called for stronger measures. At
Delville Wood and Longueval our lines formed a sharp salient, from
which our front ran on the one side westwards to Posieres, and on
the other southwards to Maltz Horn Farm, At Malts Horn Farm
our lines joined the French, and the Allied front continued still
southwards to the village of Hem on the Somme,

This pronounced salient invited counter-attacks by the enemy.
He possessed direct observation on it all round from Guillemont on
the south-east to High Wood on the north-west. He could bring a
concentric fire of artillery to bear not only on the wood and village,
but also on the confined space behind, through which ran the French
communications as well as ours, where great numbers of guns,
besides ammunition and impedimenta of all sorts, had necessarily to
be crowded together. Having been in occupation of this ground for
nearly two years he knew every foot of it, and could not fail to appre-
ciate the possibilities of causing us heavy loss there by indirect
artillery fire ; while it was evident that, if he could drive in the
salient in our line and so gain direct observation on to the ground
behind, our position in that area would become very uncomfortable.

If there had not been good grounds for confidence that the enemy
was not capable of driving from this position troops who had shown
themselves able to wrest it from him, the situation would have been
an anxious one. In any case it was clear that the first requirement at
the moment was that our right flank, and the French troops in exten-
sion of it, should swing up into line with our centre. To effect this,
however, strong enemy positions had to be captured both by our-
selves and by our Allies,

From Delville Wood (vide Map I.) the main plateau extends for
4,000 yards east-north-east to Les Bceufs and Morval, and for about
the same distance south-eastwards to Leuze and Bouleaux Woods,
which stand above and about 1,000 yards to the west of Combles, To
bring my right up into line with the rest of my front it was necessary
to capture Guillemont, Falfemont Farm and Leuze Wood, and then
Ginchy and Bouleaux Wood, These localities were naturally very
strong, and they had been elaborately fortified. The enemy 's main

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 33

second line system of defence ran in front of them from Waterlot
Farm, which was already in our hands, south-eastwards to Falfemont
Farm, and thence southwards to the Somme* The importance of
holding us back in this area could not escape the enemy's notice,
and he had dug and wired many new trenches, both in front of and
behind his original lines* He had also brought up fresh troops, 1 and
there was no possibility of taking him by surprise*

The task before us was therefore a very difficult one and entailed
a real trial of strength between the opposing forces. At this juncture
its difficulties were increased by unfavourable weather. The nature
of the ground limited the possibility of direct observation for our
artillery fire, and we were consequently much dependent on obser-
vation from the air. As in that element we had attained almost
complete superiority, all that we required was a clear atmosphere ;
but with this we were not favoured for several weeks. We had
rather more rain than is usual in July and August, and even when
no rain fell there was an almost constant haze and frequent low
clouds.

In swinging up my own right it was very important that the
French line north of the Somme should be advanced at the same
time, in close combination with the movement of the British troops.
The line of demarcation agreed on between the French commander
and myself ran from Maltz Horn Farm due eastwards to the Combles
Valley and then north-eastwards up that valley to a point midway
between Sailly-Saillisel and Morval. These two villages had been
fixed upon as the objectives, respectively, of the French left and of
my right. In order to advance in co-operation with my right, and
eventually to reach Sailly-Saillisel, our Allies had still to fight their
way up that portion of the main ridge which lies between the Combles
Valley on the west and the River Tortille on the east. To do so
they had to capture, in the first place, the strongly fortified villages
of Maurepas, Le Forest, Rancourt and Fregicourt, besides many
woods and strong systems of trenches. As the high ground on
each side of the Combles Valley commands the slopes of the ridge
on the opposite side, it was essential that the advance of the two
armies should be simultaneous and made in the closest co-operation*
This was fully recognised by both armies, and our plans were made
accordingly.

To carry out the necessary preparations to deal with the difficult
situation outlined above, a short pause was necessary to enable tired

1 On the 1 8th July the enemy had 138 battalions engaged in and behind the line
north of the Somme, as compared with 63 at the commencement of the battle. By the
end of August, 30 German divisions had been brought in to reinforce the 6 divisions
located on the front of our attack on the ist July.

34 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

troops to be relieved and guns to be moved forward ; while at the
same time old communications had to be improved and new ones
made* Entrenchments against probable counter-attacks could not be
neglected, and fresh dispositions of troops were required for the new
attacks to be directed eastwards*

It was also necessary to continue such pressure on the rest of our
front, not only on the Ancre but further south, as would make it
impossible for the enemy to devote himself entirely to resisting the
advance between Delville Wood and the Somme* In addition it was
desirable further to secure our hold on the main ridge west of Del-
ville Wood by gaining more ground to our front in that direction*
Orders were therefore issued in accordance with the general con-
siderations explained above, and, without relaxing pressure along
the enemy's front from Delville Wood to the west, preparations for
an attack on Guillemont were pushed on*

Attack and Counter- Attack

17* During the afternoon of the i8th July the enemy developed
his expected counter-attack against Delville Wood, after heavy pre-
liminary shelling* By sheer weight of numbers and at very heavy
cost he forced his way through the northern and north-eastern
portions of the wood and into the northern half of Longueval, which
our troops (3rd Division) had cleared only that morning* In the
south-east corner of the wood he was held up by a gallant defence
(gth and i8th Divisions), and further south three attacks on our
positions held by the 35th Division (Major-General R* J Pinney) in
Waterlot Farm failed*

This enemy attack on Delville Wood marked the commencement
of the long, closely contested struggle which was not finally decided
in our favour till the fall of Guillemont on the 3rd September, a
decision which was confirmed by the capture of Ginchy six days
later* Considerable gains were indeed made during this period ;
but progress was slow and bought only by hard fighting. A footing
was established in High Wood by the 33rd Division (Major-General
H* J, S* Landon) on the aoth July, and our line linked up thence with
Longueval by the yth and 5th Divisions (Major-General R* B*
Stephens commanding the 5th Division), A subsequent advance by
the Fourth Army on the 23rd July on a wide front from Guillemont
to near Pozieres found the enemy in great strength all along the line,
with machine guns and forward troops in shell holes and newly con-
structed trenches, well in front of his main defences. Although
ground was won, the strength of the resistance experienced showed
that the hostile troops had recovered from their previous confusion

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 35

sufficiently to necessitate long and careful preparation before further
successes on any great scale could be secured*

An assault delivered simultaneously on this date by General
Cough's Army (ist Australian Division, Major-General H, B.
Walker, and 48th Division) against Pozieres gained considerable
results, and by the morning of the 25th July the whole of that village
was carried, including the cemetery, and important progress was
made along the enemy's trenches to the north-east* That evening
(24th July), after heavy artillery preparation, the enemy launched
two more powerful counter-attacks, the one directed against our
new position in and around High Wood (5ist Division, Major-
General G, M* Harper) and the other delivered from the north-
west of Delville Wood, Both attacks were completely broken up
with very heavy losses to the enemy,

On the 27th July the remainder of Delville Wood was recovered
by the 2nd Division (Major-General W, G, Walker), and two days
later the northern portion of Longueval and the orchards were
cleared of the enemy by the 5th Division, after severe fighting, in
which our own and the enemy's artillery were very active,

The Problem of Guillemont

1 8, On the 3Oth July the village of Guillemont and Falfemont
Farm to the south-east were attacked, in conjunction with a French
attack north of the Somme, A battalion (2nd Battalion Royal Scots
Fusiliers, 3oth Division) entered Guillemont, and part of it passed
through to the far side ; but as the battalions on either flank did not
reach their objectives, it was obliged to fall back, after holding out
for some hours on the western edge of the village. In a subsequent
local attack on the 8th August our troops again entered Guillemont,
but were again compelled to fall back owing to the failure of a simul-
taneous effort against the enemy's trenches on the flanks of the
village.

The ground to the south of Guillemont was dominated by the
enemy's positions in and about that village. It was therefore hoped
that these positions might be captured first, before an advance to the
south of them in the direction of Falfemont Farm was pushed
further forward. It had now become evident, however, that Guille-
mont could not be captured as an isolated enterprise without very
heavy loss, and, accordingly, arrangements were made with the
French Army on our immediate right for a series of combined
attacks, to be delivered in progressive stages, which should embrace
Maurepas, Falfemont Farm, Guillemont, Leuze Wood and Ginchy.

An attempt on the i6th August to carry out the first stage of the

36 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

prearranged scheme met with only partial success, and two days
later, after a preliminary bombardment lasting thirty-six hours, a
larger combined attack was undertaken. In spite of a number of
enemy counter-attacks the most violent of which, levelled at the
point of junction of the British with the French, succeeded in forcing
our Allies and ourselves back from a part of the ground won very
valuable progress was made, and our troops (3rd Division) established
themselves in the outskirts of Guillemont Village and occupied
Guillemont Station, A violent counter-attack on Guillemont Station
was repulsed on the 23rd August by the 35th Division, and next
day further important progress was made on a wide front north and
east of Delville Wood (33rd and I4th Divisions),

Minor Operations

19, Apart from the operations already described, others of a
minor character, yet involving much fierce and obstinate fighting, 1
continued during this period on the fronts of both the British Armies,
Our lines were pushed forward wherever possible by means of local
attacks and by bombing and sapping, and the enemy was driven
out of various forward positions from which he might hamper our
progress. By these means many gains were made which, though
small in themselves, in the aggregate represented very considerable
advances. In this way our line was brought to the crest of the
ridge above Martinpuich, Pozieres Windmill and the high ground
north of the village were secured, and with them observation over
Martinpuich and Courcelette and the enemy's gun positions in
their neighbourhood and around Le Sars, At a later date our troops
reached the defences of Mouquet Farm, north-west of Pozieres,
and made progress in the enemy's trenches south of Thiepval,
The enemy's counter-attacks were incessant and frequently of
great violence, but they were made in vain and at heavy cost to him.
The fierceness of the fighting can be gathered from the fact that
one regiment of the German Guard Reserve Corps, which had been
in the Thiepval salient opposite Mouquet Farm, is known to have
lost 1,400 men in fifteen days,

Guillemont Taken

20, The first two days of September on both Army fronts were
spent in preparation for a more general attack, which the gradual

1 The ist, I2th, 1 5th Divisions (Major-General F. W, N* McCracken commanding
the I5th Division) ; igth, 23rd, 25th and 34th Divisions (Major-General C. L. Nicholson
commanding the 34th Division) ; 48th, 5ist, ist Australian, 2nd Australian and 4th
Australian Divisions (Major-General Sir H. V, Cox commanding the 4th Australian
Division), were engaged in this fighting.

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 37

progress made during the preceding month had placed us in a
position to undertake. Our assault was delivered at 12 noon on the
3rd September on a front extending from our extreme right to
the enemy trenches on the right bank of the Ancre, north of Hamel.
Our Allies attacked simultaneously on our right.

Guillemont was stormed 1 and at once consolidated, and our
troops pushed on unchecked to Ginchy and the line of the road
running south to Wedge Wood. Ginchy was also seised (jth Division),
but here in the afternoon we were very strongly counter-attacked*
For three days the tide of attack and counter-attack swayed backwards
and forwards amongst the ruined houses of the village, till, in the end,
for three days more the greater part of it remained in the enemy's
possession. Three counter-attacks made on the evening of the 3rd
September against our troops in Guillemont (47th Infantry Brigade,
1 6th Division) all failed with considerable loss to the enemy. We also
gained ground north of Delville Wood and in High Wood, though
here an enemy counter-attack recovered part of the ground won.

On the front of General Gough's Army, though the enemy
suffered heavy losses in personnel, our gain in ground was slight.

21. In order to keep touch with the French who were attacking
on our right, the assault on Falfemont Farm on the 3rd September
was delivered, by the 5th Division, three hours before the opening
of the main assault. In the impetus of their first rush our troops
reached the farm, but could not hold it. Nevertheless, they pushed
on to the north of it, and on the 4th September delivered a series of
fresh assaults upon it from the west and north*

Ultimately this strongly fortified position was occupied piece by
piece, and by the morning of the 5th September the whole of it was
in our possession. Meanwhile further progress had been made to
the north-east of the farm, where considerable initiative was shown
by the local commanders. By the evening of the same day our troops
were established strongly in Leuze Wood, which on the following day
was finally cleared of the enemy*

The Barrier Broken. Ginchy

2,2. In spite of the fact that most of Ginchy and of High Wood
remained in the enemy's hands, very noteworthy progress had been
made in the course of these four days' operations, exceeding any-
thing that had been achieved since the i4th July. Our right was
advanced on a front of nearly two miles to an average depth of
nearly one mile, penetrating the enemy's original second line of

1 goth Division, Major-General W. D. Smith, and attached brigade of i6th Division
Major-General W. B. Hickie,

38 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

defence on this front, and capturing strongly fortified positions
at Falfemont Farm, Leuse Wood, Guillemont, and south-east of
Delville Wood, where we reached the western outskirts of Ginchy.
More important than this gain in territory was the fact that the
barrier which for seven weeks the enemy had maintained against our
further advance had at last been broken . Over 1,000 prisoners were
made and many machine guns taken or destroyed in the course of
the righting.

23. Preparations for a further attack upon Ginchy continued
without intermission, and at 445 p.m. on the gth September the
attack was reopened on the whole of the Fourth Army front. At
Ginchy and to the north of Leuse Wood it met with almost immedi-
ate success* On the right (56th Division) the enemy's line was seised
over a front of more than 1,000 yards from the south-west corner of
Bouleaux Wood in a north-westerly direction to a point just south of
the Guillemont-Morval tramway. Our troops (49th Infantry Brigade,
i6th Division) again forced their way into Ginchy, and passing
beyond it, carried the line of enemy trenches to the east. Further
progress was made east of Delville Wood and south and east of
High Wood.

Over 500 prisoners were taken in the operations of the gth
September and following days, making the total since the ist July
over 17,000.

Results Achieved

24* Meanwhile the French had made great progress on our right,
bringing their line forward to Louage Wood (just south of Combles)
Le Forest Cle*ry-sur-Somme, all three inclusive. The weak salient
in the Allied line had therefore disappeared, and we had gained the
front required for further operations.

Still more importance, however, lay in the proof afforded by the
results described of the ability of our new Armies not only to rush
the enemy's strongest defences, as had been accomplished on the
ist and 1 4th July, but also to wear down and break his power of
resistance by a steady, relentless pressure, as they had done during
the weeks of this fierce and protracted struggle. As has already been
recounted, the preparations made for our assault on the ist July had
been long and elaborate ; but though the enemy knew that an attack
was coming, it would seem that he considered the troops already on
the spot, secure in their apparently impregnable defences, would
suffice to deal with it. The success of that assault, combined with
the vigour and determination with which our troops pressed their
advantage, and followed by the successful night attack of the

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 39

July, all served to awaken him to a fuller realisation of his danger*
The great depth of his system of fortification, to which reference has
been made, gave him time to reorganise his defeated troops, and to
hurry up numerous fresh divisions and more guns* Yet in spite of
this, he was still pushed back, steadily and continuously. Trench
after trench, and strong point after strong point were wrested from
him. The great majority of his frequent counter-attacks failed
completely, with heavy loss ; while the few that achieved temporary
local success purchased it dearly, and were soon thrown back from
the ground they had for the moment regained.

The enemy had, it is true, delayed our advance considerably, but
the effort had cost him dear ; and the comparative collapse of his
resistance during the last few days of the struggle justified the belief
that in the long run decisive victory would lie with our troops, who
had displayed such fine fighting qualities and such indomitable
endurance and resolution.

THE THIRD PHASE EXPLOITATION OF SUCCESS

25* Practically the whole of the forward crest of the main ridge,
on a front of some 9,000 yards from Delville Wood to the road above
Mouquet Farm, was now in our hands, and with it the advantage of
observation over the slopes beyond. East of Delville Wood, for a
further 3,000 yards to Leuze Wood, we were firmly established on
the main ridge ; while further east, across the Combles Valley, the
French were advancing victoriously on our right. But though the
centre of our line was well placed, on our flanks there was still
difficult ground to be won.

From Ginchy the crest of the high ground runs northwards for
2,000 yards, and then eastwards, in a long spur, for nearly 4,000 yards.
Near the eastern extremity of this spur stands the village of Morval,
commanding a wide field of view and fire in every direction. At
Leuze Wood my right was still 2,000 yards from its objective at this
village, and between lay a broad and deep branch of the main Combles
Valley, completely commanded by the Morval spur and flanked not
only from its head north-east of Ginchy, but also from the high
ground east of the Combles Valley, which looks directly into it.

Up this high ground beyond the Combles Valley the French
were working their way towards their objective at Sailly-Saillisel,
situated due east of Morval and standing at the same level. Between
these two villages the ground falls away to the head of the Combles
Valley, which runs thence in a south-westerly direction. In the
bottom of this valley lies the small town of Combles, then well

40 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

fortified and strongly held, though dominated by my right at Leuze
Wood, and by the French left on the opposite heights. It had been
agreed between the French and myself that an assault on Combles
would not be necessary, as the place could be rendered untenable
by pressing forward along the ridges above it on either side.

The capture of Morval from the south presented a very difficult
problem, while the capture of Sailly-Saillisel, at that time some
3,000 yards to the north of the French left, was in some respects even
more difficult. The line of the French advance was narrowed almost
to a defile by the extensive and strongly fortified wood of St, Pierre
Vaast on the one side, and on the other by the Combles Valley,
which, with the branches running out from it and the slopes on
each side, is completely commanded, as has been pointed out, by
the heights bounding the valley on the east and west,

On my right flank, therefore, the progress of the French and
British forces was still interdependent, and the closest co-operation
continued to be necessary in order to gain the further ground re-
quired to enable my centre to advance on a sufficiently wide front.
To cope with such a situation unity of command is usually essential,
but in this case the cordial good feeling between the Allied Armies,
and the earnest desire of each to assist the other, proved equally
effective and removed all difficulties.

On my left flank the front of General Gough's Army bent back
from the main ridge near Mouquet Farm down a spur descending
south-westwards, and then crossed a broad valley to the Wonder-
work, a strong point situated in the enemy *s front-line system near
the southern end of the spur on the higher slopes of which Thiepval
stands. Opposite this part of our line we had still to carry the enemy's
original defences on the main ridge above Thiepval and in the
village itself, defences which may fairly be described as being as
nearly impregnable as nature, art and the unstinted labour of nearly
two years could make them.

Our advance on Thiepval and on the defences above it had been
carried out up to this date in accordance with my instructions given
on the 3rd July, by a slow and methodical progression, in which great
skill and much patience and endurance had been displayed with
entirely satisfactory results. General Gough's Army had, in fact,
acted most successfully in the required manner as a pivot to the
remainder of the attack. The Thiepval defences were known to be
exceptionally strong, and as immediate possession of them was not
necessary to the development of my plans after the ist July, there
had been no need to incur the heavy casualties to be expected in an
attempt to rush them. The time was now approaching, although it
had not yet arrived, when their capture would become necessary ;

Line morning 15th Sept.
" evening

SOMME BATTLE ;
Attack of 1 5th September, 1916.

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 41

but from the positions we had now reached and those which we
expected shortly to obtain, I had no doubt that they could be rushed
when required without undue loss. An important part of the remain-
ing positions required for my assault on them was now won by
a highly successful enterprise carried out by the nth Division
(Major-General Sir C, L, Woollcombe) on the evening of the
i4th September, by which the Wonderwork was stormed,

26, The general plan of the combined Allied attack which was
opened on the I5th September was to pivot on the high ground south
of the Ancre and north of the Albert-Bapaume road, while the Fourth
Army devoted its whole effort to the rearmost of the enemy's original
systems of defence between Morval and Le Sars, Should our success
in this direction warrant it, I made arrangements to enable me to
extend the left of the attack to embrace the villages of Martinpuich
and Courcelette, As soon as our advance on this front had reached
the Morval line, the time would have arrived to bring forward my
left across the Thiepval Ridge, Meanwhile on my right our Allies *
arranged to continue the line of advance, in close co-operation with
me, from the Somme to the slopes above Combles ; but directing
their main effort northwards against the villages of Rancourt and
Fregicourt, so as to complete the isolation of Combles and open the
way for their attack upon Sailly-Saillisel,

The Attack -L^th September

27* A methodical bombardment was commenced at 6,0 a,m, on
the 1 2th September and was continued steadily and uninterruptedly
till the moment of attack.

At 6,20 a,m, on the i5th September the infantry assault
commenced, 2 and at the same moment the bombardment

1 At this time, the success of our attack had compelled the enemy to relax his pressure
at Verdun* The forces at the disposal of the French were correspondingly increased.
The British Armies south of the Ancre still constituted, however, the striking force
of the offensive.

2 The order of battle of the Fourth Army from south to north, was as follows :

XIV. Corps
56th Div.
6th Div.
Guards Div.

XV. Corps
I4th Div.
4ist Div.
N.Z. Div.

///. Corps
47th Div.
5oth Div.
1 5th Div,

Lt.-Gen. the Earl of Cavan.
Maj.-Gen. C. P. A. Hull.
Maj.-Gen. C. Ross.
Maj.-Gen. G. P. T. Feilding.
Lt.-Gen. H. S. Home.
Maj.-Gen. V. A. Couper.
Maj.-Gen. S. T. B. Lawford.
Maj.-Gen. A. H. Russell.
Lt.-Gen. Sir W. P. Pulteney.
Maj.-Gen. Sir C. St. L. Barter.
Maj.-Gen. P. S. Williams.
Maj.-Gen. F. W. N. McCracken.

#4;

42 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

became intense* Our new heavily armoured cars, known as
"Tanks/* now brought into action for the first time, successfully
co-operated with the infantry, and coming as a surprise to the
enemy rank and file, gave valuable help in breaking down their
resistance.

The advance met with immediate success on almost the whole of
the front attacked. At 840 a.m. tanks were seen to be entering Flers,
followed by large numbers of troops. Fighting continued in Flers for
some time, but by 10.0 a.m. our troops had reached the north side of
the village, and by midday had occupied the enemy's trenches for
some distance beyond. On our right our line was advanced to within
assaulting distance of the strong line of defence running before
Morval, Les Bceufs and Gueudecourt, and on our left High Wood
was at last carried after many hours of very severe fighting, reflecting
great credit on the attacking battalions of the 4yth Division. Our
success made it possible to carry out during the afternoon that part
of the plan which provided for the capture of Martinpuich and
Courcelette, and by the end of the day both these villages were in our
hands (taken respectively by the I5th Division, and and Canadian
Division, Maj.-Gen. R. E. W. Turner). On the i8th September
the work of this day was completed by the capture by the 6th Divi-
sion of the Quadrilateral, an enemy stronghold which had hitherto
blocked the progress of our right towards Morval. Further progress
was also made between Flers and Martinpuich.

28. The result of the fighting of the i5th September and follow-
ing days was a gain more considerable than any which had attended
our arms in the course of a single operation since the commencement
of the offensive. In the course of one day's fighting we had broken
through two of the enemy's main defensive systems and had ad-
vanced on a front of over six miles to an average depth of a mile.
In the course of this advance we had taken three large villages,
each powerfully organised for prolonged resistance. Two of
these villages had been carried by assault with short preparation
in the course of a few hours' fighting. All this had been accom-
plished with a small number of casualties in comparison with the
troops employed, and in spite of the fact that, as was afterwards
discovered, the attack did not come as a complete surprise to the
enemy. 1

The total number of 'prisoners taken by us in these opera-
tions since their commencement on the evening of the i4th
September amounted at this date to over 4,000, including 127
officers.

1 In spite of the secrecy maintained, the enemy appears to have obtained some
information regarding our intended use of tanks, and had issued warnings.

a^ . - (**''*

t^^~uT8,

r-r=v(- Line morning 25th Sept.- 1
A^SslL-tou^T. " evening

(Scale - 5/e" 1 .mile.) .

Line morning 26th Sept.
evpning "

SOMME BATTLE ;

Attacks of 25th & 26th September, 1916.

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 43

The Advance Renewed. Combles

29. Preparations for our further advance were again hindered by
bad weather, but at 12.35 p.m. on the 25th September, after a bom-
bardment commenced early in the morning of the 24th, a general
attack by the Allies was launched on the whole front between the
Somme and Martinpuich. The objectives on the British front in-
cluded the villages of Morval (5th Division), Les Bceufs (6th and
Guards Divisions) and Gueudecourt (2ist Division), and a belt of
country about 1,000 yards deep, curving round the north of Flers to
a point midway between that village and Martinpuich (55th Division,
Major-General H. S. Jeudwine, and New Zealand and ist Divisions)*
By nightfall the whole of these objectives were in our hands, with
the exception of the village of Gueudecourt, before which our troops
met with very serious resistance from a party of the enemy in a section
of his fourth main system of defence.

On our right our Allies carried the village of Rancourt, and
advanced their line to the outskirts of Fre*gicourt, capturing that
village also during the night and early morning. Combles was there-
fore nearly surrounded by the Allied forces, and in the early morning
of the 26th September the village was occupied simultaneously by
the Allied forces, the British to the north and the French to the
south of the railway. The capture of Combles in this inexpensive
fashion represented a not inconsiderable tactical success. Though
lying in a hollow, the village was very strongly fortified and possessed,
in addition to the works which the enemy had constructed, excep-
tionally large cellars and galleries at a great depth underground,
sufficient to give effectual shelter to troops and material under the
heaviest bombardment. Great quantities of stores and ammunition
of all sorts were found in these cellars when the village was taken.

On the same day Gueudecourt was carried by the 2ist Division,
after the protecting trench to the west had been captured in a some-
what interesting fashion. In the early morning a tank started from
the north-west down the portion of the trench held by the enemy,
firing its machine guns and followed by bombers. The enemy could
not escape, as we held the trench at the southern end. At the same
time an aeroplane flew down the length of the trench, also firing a
machine gun at the enemy holding it. These then waved white
handkerchiefs in token of surrender, and when this was reported by
the aeroplane the infantry accepted the surrender of the garrison.
By 8,30 a,m. the whole trench had been cleared, great numbers of
the enemy had been killed, and 8 officers and 362 other ranks made
prisoners. Our total casualties amounted to five.

44 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Thiepval

30* The success of the Fourth Army had now brought our
advance to the stage at which I judged it advisable that Thiepval
should be taken, in order to bring our left flank into line and establish
it on the main ridge above that village, the possession of which would
be of considerable tactical value in future operations*

Accordingly at 12*25 p.m. on the 26th September, before the
enemy had been given time to recover from the blow struck by the
Fourth Army, a general attack was launched against Thiepval and
the Thiepval Ridge* The objective consisted of the whole of the
high ground still remaining in enemy hands, extending over a front
of some 3,000 yards north and east of Thiepval, and including, in
addition to that fortress, the Zollern Redoubt, the Stuff Redoubt, and
the Schwaben Redoubt, with the connecting lines of trenches*

The attack was a brilliant success* On the right our troops (2nd
and ist Canadian Divisions of the Canadian Corps, Lieut*-General
Sir J. H* G* Byng) reached the system of enemy trenches which formed
their objectives without great difficulty* In Thiepval and the strong
works to the north of it the enemy's resistance was more desperate*
Three waves of our attacking troops (nth and i8th Divisions, II.
Corps, Lieut *-General C* W* Jacob) carried the outer defences of
Mouquet Farm, and, pushing on, entered Zollern Redoubt which
they stormed and consolidated. In the strong point formed by the
buildings of the farm itself, the enemy garrison, securely posted in
deep cellars, held out until 6,0 p.m*,when their last defences were forced
by a working party of a Pioneer Battalion acting on its own initiative*

On the left of the attack fierce fighting, in which tanks again
gave valuable assistance to our troops (i8th Division), continued in
Thiepval during that day and the following night, but by 8.30 am*
on the 27th September the whole of the village of Thiepval was in
our hands.

Some 2,300 prisoners were taken in the course of the fighting on
the Thiepval Ridge on these and the subsequent days, bringing the
total number of prisoners taken in the battle area in the operations
of the i4th-3oth September to nearly 10,000. In the same period we
had captured 27 guns, over 200 machine guns, and some 40 trench
mortars*

Further Successes

31* On the same date the south and west sides of Stuff Redoubt
were carried by our troops (nth Division), together with the length
of trench connecting that strong point with Schwaben Redoubt to
the west, and also the greater part of the enemy's defensive line

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 45

eastwards along the northern slopes of the ridge* Schwaben Redoubt
was assaulted during the afternoon of the 28th September (i8th
Division), and in spite of counter-attacks, delivered by strong enemy
reinforcements, we captured the whole of the southern face of the
redoubt and pushed out patrols to the northern face and towards
St. Pierre Divion*

Our line was also advanced north of Courcelette, while on the
Fourth Army front on the 2yth September a further portion of the
enemy's fourth system of defence north-west of Gueudecourt was
carried on a front of a mile by the 55th and New Zealand Divisions.
Between these two points the enemy fell back upon his defences
running in front of Eaucourt TAbbaye and Le Sars, and on the after-
noon and evening of the 2yth September our troops were able to
make a very considerable advance in this area without encountering
serious opposition until within a few hundred yards of this line. The
ground thus occupied extended to a depth of from 500 to 600 yards
on a front of nearly two miles between the Bazentin-le-Petit, Lingy
Thilloy and Albert-Bapaume roads.

Destremont Farm, south-west of Le Sars, was carried by a single
company (23rd Division) on the 2gth September, and on the after-
noon of the ist October a successful attack was launched l against
Eaucourt TAbbaye and the enemy defences to the east and west of
it, comprising a total front of about 3,000 yards. Our artillery barrage
was extremely accurate, and contributed greatly to the success of the
attack. Bomb fighting continued among the buildings during the
next two days, but by the evening of the 3rd October the whole of
Eaucourt TAbbaye was in our hands.

32. At the end of September I had handed over Morval to the
French, in order to facilitate their attacks on Sailly-Saillisel, and on
the 7th October, after a postponement rendered necessary by three
days' continuous rain, our Allies made a considerable advance in the
direction of the latter village. On the same day the Fourth Army
attacked along the whole front from Les Bceufs to Destremont Farm,
in support of the operations of our Allies.

The village of Le Sars was captured by the 23rd Division,
together with the quarry to the north-west, while considerable pro-
gress was made at other points along the front attacked. In particular,
to the east of Gueudecourt, the enemy's trenches were carried by
the 2Oth Division on a breadth of some 2,000 yards, and a footing
gained on the crest of the long spur which screens the defences of
Le Transloy from the south-west. Nearly 1,000 prisoners were
secured by the Fourth Army in the course of these operations.

1 By the New Zealand Division, the 47th Division, Major-General Sir G. F. Gorringe,
and the soth and 23rd Divisions*

46 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

The Situation

33. With the exception of his positions in the neighbourhood of
Sailly-Saillisel, and his scanty foothold on the northern crest of the
high ground above Thiepval, the enemy had now been driven from
the whole of the ridge lying between the Tortille and the Ancre.

Possession of the north-western portion of the ridge north of the
latter village carried with it observation over the valley of the Ancre
between Miraumont and Hamel, and the spurs and valleys held by
the enemy on the right bank of the river. The Germans, therefore,
made desperate efforts to cling to their last remaining trenches in
this area, and in the course of the three weeks following our advance
made repeated counter-attacks at heavy cost in the vain hope of
recovering the ground they had lost. During this period our gains
in the neighbourhood of Stuff and Schwaben Redoubts were gradu-
ally increased and secured in readiness for future operations ; and I
was quite confident of the ability of our troops, not only to repulse
the enemy's attacks, but to clear him entirely from his last positions
on the ridge whenever it should suit my plans to do so. I was, there-
fore, well content with the situation on this flank.

Along the centre of our line from Gueudecourt to the west of
Le Sars similar considerations applied. As we were already well
down the forward slopes of the ridge on this front, it was for the
time being inadvisable to make any serious advance. Pending
developments elsewhere, all that was necessary or indeed desirable
was to carry on local operations to improve our positions and to
keep the enemy fully employed.

On our eastern flank, on the other hand, it was important to gain
ground. Here the enemy still possessed a strong system of trenches
covering the villages of Le Transloy and Beaulencourt and the town
of Bapaume ; but, although he was digging with feverish haste, he
had not yet been able to create any very formidable defences behind
this line. In this direction, in fact, we had at last reached a stage at
which a successful attack might reasonably be expected to yield
greater results than anything we had yet attained. The resistance of
the troops opposed to us had seriously weakened in the course of our
recent operations, and there was no reason to suppose that the effort
required would not be within our powers.

This last completed system of defence, before Le Transloy, was
flanked to the south by the enemy's positions at Sailly-Saillisel, and
screened to the west by the spur lying between Le Transloy and Les
Bceufs. A necessary preliminary, therefore, to an assault upon it was
to secure the spur and the Sailly-Saillisel heights. Possession of the
high ground at this latter village would at once give a far better

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 47

command over the ground to the north and north-west, secure the
flank of our operations towards Le Transloy, and deprive the enemy
of observation over the Allied communications in the Combles
Valley, In view of the enemy's efforts to construct new systems of
defence behind the Le Transloy line, it was desirable to lose no time
in dealing with the situation.

Unfortunately, at this juncture, very unfavourable weather set in
and continued with scarcely a break during the remainder of October
and the early part of November* Poor visibility seriously interfered
with the work of our artillery, and constant rain turned the mass of
hastily dug trenches for which we were fighting into channels of
deep mud. The country roads, broken by countless shell craters,
that crossed the deep stretch of ground we had lately won, rapidly
became almost impassable, making the supply of food, stores and
ammunition a serious problem. These conditions multiplied the
difficulties of attack to such an extent that it was found impossible to
exploit the situation with the rapidity necessary to enable us to reap
the full benefits of the advantages we had gained. 1

None the less my right flank continued to assist the operations of
our Allies against Saillisel, and attacks were made to this end when-
ever a slight improvement in the weather made the co-operation of
artillery and infantry at all possible. The delay in our advance, how-
ever, though unavoidable, had given the enemy time to reorganise
and rally his troops. His resistance again became stubborn and he
seized every favourable opportunity for counter-attacks. Trenches
changed hands with great frequency, the conditions of ground
making it difficult to renew exhausted supplies of bombs and ammu-
nition, or to consolidate the ground won, and so rendering it an
easier matter to take a battered trench than to hold it.

Other Minor Operations

34. On the I2th and i8th September further gains were made
to the east of the Les Boeufs-Gueudecourt line and east of Le Sars,

1 The scheme of the Allied operations, if events went well, included an advance to
the general line Le Transloy south of Bapaume Bois Loupart. The British forces
would then have developed their successes in a northerly and north-easterly direction,
turning the enemy's defences south of the Scarpe, and threatening his troops in that
area with capture or destruction. The unfavourable weather, and consequent delay in
the Allied advance against Sailly-Saill sel and Le Transloy, made it necessary to abandon
this plan at the moment when our September successes seemed to have brought it almost
within our grasp. As the season advanced and the bad weather continued the scope of
our plan had constantly to be reduced, until finally it was only possible to undertake the
much more limited operation of the I3th November against Beaumont Hamel. The
brilliant success of this attack, carried out as it was under most difficult conditions
of ground, affords some indication of what might have been accomplished had the
weather permitted us to give fuller effect to our original plan.
D

48 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

and some hundreds of prisoners were taken* On these dates, despite
all the difficulties of ground, the French first reached and then cap-
tured the village of Sailly-Saillisel, but the moment for decisive
action was rapidly passing away, while the weather showed no signs
of improvement* By this time, too, the ground had already become
so bad that nothing less than a prolonged period of drying weather,
which at that season of the year was most unlikely to occur, would
suit our purpose* ,

In these circumstances, while continuing to do all that was pos-
sible to improve my position on my right flank, I determined to press
on with preparations for the exploitation of the favourable local situa-
tion on my left flank. At midday on the 2ist October, during a short
spell of fine, cold weather, the line of Regina Trench and Stuff
Trench, from the west Courcelette-Pys road westward to Schwaben
Redoubt, was attacked with complete success by the 4th Canadian,
1 8th and I5th Divisions, and the 39th Division (Major-General R.
Dawson)* Assisted by an excellent artillery preparation and barrage,
our infantry carried the whole of their objectives very quickly and with
remarkably little loss, and our new line was firmly established in spite
of the enemy 's shell fire* Over 1,000 prisoners were taken in the course
of the day's fighting, a figure only slightly exceeded by our casualties*
On the 23rd October, and again on the 5th November, while
awaiting better weather for further operations on the Ancre, our
attacks on the enemy's positions to the east of Les Bceufs and Gueude-
court were renewed, in conjunction with French operations against
the Sailly-Saillisel heights and St* Pierre Vaast Wood, Considerable
further progress was achieved by the 4th and 8th Divisions (Major-
Generals the Hon, W* Lambton and H* Hudson)* Our footing on
the crest of the Le Transloy spur was extended and secured, and
the much contested tangle of trenches at our junction with the
French left at last passed definitely into our possession* Many
smaller gains were made in this neighbourhood by local assaults
during these days, in spite of the difficult conditions of the ground,
In particular, on the loth November, after a day of improved weather,
the portion of Regina Trench lying to the east of the Courcelette-Pys
road was carried by the 4th Canadian Division on a front of about
1,000 yards*

Throughout these operations the enemy's counter-attacks were
very numerous and determined, succeeding indeed in the evening of
the 23rd October in regaining a portion of the ground east of Le
Sars taken from him by our attack on that day* On all other occasions
his attacks were broken by our artillery or infantry, and the losses
incurred by him in these attempts, made frequently with considerable
effectives, were undoubtedly very severe*

ANCRE BATTLE ;
1 3th November, 1916.

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 49

Beaumont Hamel

35. On the gth November the long-continued bad weather took
a turn for the better, and thereafter remained dry and cold, with
frosty nights and misty mornings, for some days. Final preparations
were therefore pushed on for the attack on the Ancre, though, as the
ground was still very bad in places, it was necessary to limit the
operations to what it would be reasonably possible to consolidate
and hold under the existing conditions.

The enemy's defences in this area were already extremely formid-
able when they resisted our assault on the ist July, and the succeed-
ing period of four months had been spent in improving and adding
to them in the light of the experience he had gained in the course
of our attacks further south. The hamlet of St. Pierre Divion and
the villages of Beaucourt-sur-Ancre and Beaumont Hamel, like the
rest of the villages forming part of the enemy's original front in this
district, were evidently intended by him to form a permanent line of
fortifications, while he developed his offensive elsewhere. Realising
that his position in them had become a dangerous one, the enemy
had multiplied the number of his guns covering this part of his line,
and at the end of October introduced an additional division on his
front between Grandcourt and He*buterne

The Assault

36. At 5 a.m. on the morning of the nth November the special
bombardment preliminary to the attack was commenced. It con-
tinued with bursts of great intensity until 5.45 a.m. on the morning
of the 1 3th November, when it developed into a very effective barrage
covering the assaulting infantry.

At that hour our troops advanced on the enemy's position through
dense fog, and rapidly entered his first line trenches on almost the
whole of the front attacked, from east of Schwaben Redoubt to the
north of Serre. South of the Ancre, where our assault (igth and 39th
Divisions) was directed northwards against the enemy's trenches on
the northern slopes of the Thiepval Ridge, it met with a success alto-
gether remarkable for rapidity of execution and lightness of cost.
By 7.20 a.m. our objectives east of St. Pierre Divion had been cap-
tured, and the Germans in and about that hamlet were hemmed in
between our troops and the river. Many of the enemy were driven
into their dug-outs and surrendered, and at 9.0 a.m. the number of
prisoners was actually greater than the attacking force. St. Pierre
Divion soon fell, and in this area nearly 1,400 prisoners were taken
by a single division (the 39th Division) at the expense of less than

50 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

600 casualties. The rest of our forces operating south of the Ancre
attained their objectives with equal completeness and success*

North of the river the struggle was more severe, but very satis-
factory results were achieved. Though parties of the enemy held
out for some hours during the day in strong points at various places
along his first line and in Beaumont Hamel, the main attack pushed
on* The troops attacking close to the right bank of the Ancre (the
63rd Division. Major-General C* D* Shute) reached their second
objectives to the west and north-west of Beaucourt during the morn-
ing* and held on there for the remainder of the day and night, though
practically isolated from the rest of our attacking troops* Their
tenacity was of the utmost value, and contributed very largely to the
success of the operations*

At nightfall our troops were established on the western outskirts
of Beaucourt* in touch with our forces south of the river, and held a
line along the station road from the Ancre towards Beaumont Hamel
(5ist Division), where we occupied the village. Further north the
enemy's first line system for a distance of about half a mile beyond
Beaumont Hamel was also in our hands (2nd Division)* Still further
north opposite Serre the ground was so heavy that it became
necessary to abandon the attack at an early stage ; although* despite
all difficulties, our troops (3rd Division. Major-General C. J. Deverell,
and 3ist Division) had in places reached the enemy's trenches in the
course of their assault*

Next morning* at an early hour* the attack was renewed between
Beaucourt and the top of the spur just north of Beaumont Hamel*
The whole of Beaucourt was carried, and our line extended to the
north-west along the Beaucourt road across the southern end of the
Beaumont Hamel spur* The number of our prisoners steadily rose,
and during this and the succeeding days our front was carried forward
eastwards and northwards up the slopes of the Beaumont Hamel spur.

The results of this attack were very satisfactory* especially as
before its completion bad weather had set in again* We had secured
the command of the Ancre Valley on both banks of the river at the
point where it entered the enemy's lines, and, without great cost to
ourselves, losses had been inflicted on the enemy which he himself
admitted to be considerable* Our final total of prisoners taken in
these operations, and their development during the subsequent days,
exceeded 7,200, including 149 officers*

Our other Armies

37* Throughout the period dealt with in this Despatch the r61e
of the other armies holding our defensive line from the northern

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 51

limits of the battle front to beyond Ypres was necessarily a secondary
one, but their task was neither light nor unimportant* While re-
quired to give precedence in all respects to the needs of the Somme
battle, they were responsible for the security of the line held by
them and for keeping the enemy on their front constantly on the
alert. Their r61e was a very trying one, entailing heavy work on the
troops and constant vigilance on the part of Commanders and Staffs*
It was carried out to my enti're satisfaction, and in an unfailing spirit
of unselfish and broad-minded devotion to the general good, which
is deserving of the highest commendation*

Some idea of the thoroughness with which their duties were per-
formed can be gathered from the fact that in the period of four and
a half months from the ist July some 360 raids were carried out, in
the course of which the enemy suffered many casualties and some
hundreds of prisoners were taken by us* The largest of these
operations was undertaken on the igth July in the neighbourhood
of Armentieres, Our troops penetrated deeply into the enemy's
defences, doing much damage to his works and inflicting severe
losses upon him*

GENERAL REVIEW
Our Main Objects Achieved

38* The three main objects with which we had commenced our
offensive in July had already been achieved at the date when this
account closes ; in spite of the fact that the heavy autumn rains had
prevented full advantage being taken of the favourable situation
created by our advance, at a time when we had good grounds for
hoping to achieve yet more important successes*

Verdun had been relieved ; the main German forces had been
held on the Western front ; and the enemy's strength had been very
considerably worn down*

Any one of these three results is in itself sufficient to justify the
Somme battle* The attainment of all three of them affords ample
compensation for the splendid efforts of our troops and for the
sacrifices made by ourselves and our Allies* They have brought us a
long step forward towards the final victory of the Allied cause*

The desperate struggle for the possession of Verdun had invested
that place with a moral and political importance out of all proportion
to its military value* Its fall would undoubtedly have been pro-
claimed as a great victory for our enemies, and would have shaken
the faith of many in our ultimate success* The failure of the enemy
to capture it, despite great efforts and very^heavy losses, was a severe

52 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

blow to his prestige, especially in view of the confidence he had
openly expressed as to the results of the struggle*

Information obtained both during the progress of the Somme
battle and since the suspension of active operations has fully estab-
lished the effect of our offensive in keeping the enemy's main forces
tied to the Western front* A movement of German troops eastward,
which had commenced in June as a result of the Russian successes,
continued for a short time only after the opening of the Allied attack.
Thereafter the enemy forces that moved East consisted, with one
exception, of divisions that had been exhausted in the Somme battle,
and these troops were always replaced on the Western front by fresh
divisions. In November the strength of the enemy in the Western
theatre of war was greater than in July, notwithstanding the abandon-
ment of his offensive at Verdun, It is possible that if Verdun had
fallen large forces might still have been employed in an endeavour
further to exploit that success. It is, however, far more probable, in
view of developments in the Eastern theatre, that a considerable
transfer of troops in that direction would have followed. It is there-
fore justifiable to conclude that the Somme offensive not only
relieved Verdun, but held large forces which would otherwise have
been employed against our Allies in the East.

The third great object of the Allied operations on the Somme
was the wearing down of the enemy's powers of resistance. Any
statement of the extent to which this has been attained must depend
in some degree on estimates. There is, nevertheless, sufficient
evidence to place it beyond doubt that the enemy's losses in men and
material have been very considerably higher than those of the Allies,
while morally the balance of advantage on our side is still greater.

During the period under review a steady deterioration took place
in the moral of large numbers of the enemy's troops. Many of them,
it is true, fought with the greatest determination, even in the latest
encounters, but the resistance of still larger numbers became latterly
decidedly feebler than it had been in the earlier stages of the battle.
Aided by the great depth of his defences, and by the frequent reliefs
which his resources in men enabled him to effect, discipline and
training held the machine together sufficiently 'to enable the enemy
to rally and reorganise his troops after each* fresh defeat. As our
advance progressed^four-fifths of the total number of divisions
engaged on the Western front were thrown one after another into
the Somme battle, some of them twice, and some three times ; and
towards the end of the operations, when the weather unfortunately
broke, there can be no doubt that his power of resistance had been
very seriously diminished*

The total number of prisoners taken by us in the Somme battle

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 53

between the ist July and the i8th November is just over 38,000,
including over 800 officers* During the same period we captured
29 heavy guns, 96 field guns and field howitzers, 136 trench mortars,
and 514 machine guns.

Our Troops

So far as these results are due to the action of the British forces,
they have been attained by troops the vast majority of whom had
been raised and trained during the war. Many of them, especially
amongst the drafts sent to replace wastage, counted their service by
months, and gained in the Somme battle their first experience of war*
The conditions under which we entered the war had made this
unavoidable* We were compelled either to use hastily trained and
inexperienced officers and men, or else to defer the offensive until we
had trained them* In this latter case we should have failed our Allies.
That these troops should have accomplished so much under such
conditions, and against an Army and a nation whose chief concern
for so many years has been preparation for war, constitutes a feat of
which the history of our nation records no equal. The difficulties
and hardships cheerfully overcome, and the endurance, determina-
tion and invincible courage shown in meeting them, can hardly be
imagined by those who have not had personal experience of the
battle, even though they have themselves seen something of war.

The events which I have described in this Despatch form but a
bare outline of the more important occurrences. To deal in any
detail even with these, without touching on the smaller fights and the
ceaseless work in the trenches continuing day and night for five
months, is not possible here* 1 Meanwhile, it must suffice to say that
troops from every part of the British Isles, and from every Dominion
and quarter of the Empire, whether Regulars, Territorials* or men
of the New Armies, have borne a share in the Battle of the Somme.
While some have been more fortunate than others in opportunities
for distinction, all have done their duty nobly.

Among all the long roll of victories borne on the colours of our
regiments, there has never been a higher test of the endurance and
resolution of our infantry* They have shown themselves worthy of
the highest'traditions of our race, and of the proud records of former
wars*

1 In the original Despatch, which does not mention divisions or other units by name,
the following passage occurs here : " Nor have I deemed it permissible in this Despatch,
much as I desired to do so, to particularise the units, brigades, or divisions especially
connected with the different events described. It would not be possible to do so without
giving useful information to the enemy. Recommendations for individual rewards have
been" forwarded'separately, and in due course full details will be made known."

54 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Against such defences as we had to assault far more formidable
in many respects than those of the most famous fortresses in history
infantry would have been powerless without efficient artillery
preparation and support* The work of our artillery was wholly
admirable, though the strain on the personnel was enormous* The
excellence of the results attained was the more remarkable, in view
of the shortness of the training of most of the junior officers and of
the N,C*O,'s and men* Despite this, they rose to a very high level of
technical and tactical skill, and the combination between artillery
and infantry, on which above everything victory depends, was an
outstanding feature of the battle* Good even in July, it improved
with experience, until in the latter assaults it approached perfection*

In this combination between infantry and artillery the Royal
Flying Corps played a highly important part* The admirable work
of this Corps has been a very satisfactory feature of the battle. Under
the conditions of modern war the duties of the Air Service are many
and varied. They include the regulation and control of artillery fire
by indicating targets and observing and reporting the results of
rounds ; the taking of photographs of enemy trenches, strong points,
battery positions, and of the effect of bombardments ; and the
observation of the movements of the enemy behind his lines*

The greatest skill and daring has been shown in the performance
of all these duties, as well as in bombing expeditions* Our Air
Service has also co-operated with our infantry in their assaults,
signalling the position of our attacking troops and turning machine
guns on to the enemy infantry and even on to his batteries in action*

Not only has the work of the Royal Flying Corps to be carried
out in all weathers and under constant fire from the ground, but
fighting in the air has now become a normal procedure, in order to
maintain the mastery over the enemy's Air Service* In these fights
the greatest skill and determination have been shown, and great
success has attended the efforts of the Royal Flying Corps* I desire
to point out, however, that the maintenance of mastery in the air,
which is essential, entails a constant and liberal supply of the most
up-to-date machines, without which even the most skilful pilots
cannot succeed*

The style of warfare in which we have been engaged offered no
scope for cavalry action, with the exception of the one instance
already mentioned in which a small body of cavalry gave useful
assistance in the advance on High Wood^

Intimately associated with the artillery and infantry in attack and
defence, the work of various special services contributed much
towards the successes gained*

Trench mortars, both heavy and light, have become an important

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 55

adjunct to artillery in trench warfare, and valuable work has been
done by the personnel in charge of these weapons. Considerable
experience has been gained in their use, and they are likely to be
employed even more frequently in the struggle in future.

Machine guns play a great part almost a decisive part under
some conditions in modern war, and our Machine Gun Corps has
attained to considerable proficiency in their use, handling them with
great boldness and skill. The highest value of these weapons is dis-
played on the defensive rather than in the offensive, and we were
attacking. Nevertheless, in attack also machine guns can exercise
very great influence in the hands of men with a quick eye for oppor-
tunity and capable of a bold initiative. The Machine Gun Corps,
though comparatively recently formed, has done very valuable work
and will increase in importance.

The part played by the new armoured cars known as " tanks "
in some of the later rights has been brought to notice by me already
in my daily reports. These cars proved of great value on various
occasions, and the personnel in charge of them performed many
deeds of remarkable valour.

The employment by the enemy of gas and of liquid flame as
weapons of offence compelled us, not only to discover ways to protect
our troops from their effects, but also to devise means to make use of
the same instruments of destruction. Great fertility of invention has
been shown, and very great credit is due to the special personnel
employed for the rapidity and success with which these new arms
have been developed and perfected, and for the very great devotion
to duty they have displayed in a difficult and dangerous service. The
Army owes its thanks to the chemists, physiologists and physicists
of the highest rank who devoted their energies to enabling us to
surpass the enemy in the use of a means of warfare which took the
civilised world by surprise. Our own experience of the numerous
experiments and trials necessary before gas and flame could be used,
of the great preparations which had to be made for their manufacture,
and of the special training required for the personnel employed,
shows that the employment of such methods by the Germans was
not the result of a desperate decision, but had been prepared for
deliberately.

Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar
methods, it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the evidence of
prisoners, of documents captured, and of our own observation, that
the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the
means of protection adopted by us have proved thoroughly effective.

Throughout the operations Engineer troops, both from home and
overseas, have played an important r61e, and in every engagement

56 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the Field Companies, assisted by Pioneers, have co-operated with
the other arms with the greatest gallantry and devotion to duty,

In addition to the demands made on the services of the Royal
Engineers in the firing line, the duties of the Corps during the pre-
paration and development of the offensive embraced the execution
of a vast variety of important works, to which attention has already
been drawn in this Despatch* Whether in or behind the firing line,
or on the lines of communication, these skilled troops have con-
tinued to show the power of resource and the devotion to duty by
which they have ever been characterised.

The Tunnelling Companies still maintain their superiority over
the enemy underground, thus safeguarding their comrades in the
trenches. Their skill, enterprise and courage have been remarkable,
and, thanks to their efforts, the enemy has nowhere been able to
achieve a success of any importance by mining.

During the Battle of the Somme the work of the Tunnelling
Companies contributed in no small degree to the successful issue of
several operations.

The Field Survey Companies have worked throughout with
ability and devotion, and have not only maintained a constant supply
of the various maps required as the battle progressed, but have in
various other ways been of great assistance to the artillery.

The Signal Service, created a short time before the war began on
a very small scale, has expanded in proportion with the rest of the
Army, and is now. a very large organisation.

It provides the means of inter-communication between all the
Armies and all parts of them, and in modern war requirements in
this respect are on an immense and elaborate scale. The calls on this
Service have been very heavy, entailing a most severe strain, often
under most trying and dangerous conditions. Those calls have
invariably been met with conspicuous success, and no service has
shown a more whole-hearted and untiring energy in the fulfilment
of its duty.

The great strain of the five months* battle was met with equal
success by the Army Service Corps and the Ordnance Corps, as well
as by all the other Administrative Services and Departments, both
on the Lines of Communication and in front of them. The mainten-
ance of large armies in a great battle under modern conditions is a
colossal task. Though bad weather often added very considerably to
the difficulties of transport, the troops never wanted for food, ammu-
nition, or any of the other many and varied requirements for the
supply of which these Services and Departments are responsible.
This fact in itself is the highest testimony that can be given to the
energy and efficiency with which the work was conducted.

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 57

' ^'In connection with the maintenance and supply of our troops, I
desire to express the obligation of the Army to the Navy for the un-
failing success with which, in the face of every difficulty, the large
numbers of men and the vast quantities of material required by us
have been transported across the seas,

I also desire to record the obligation of the Army in the Field to
the various authorities at home, and to the workers under them
women as well as men by whose efforts and self-sacrifice all our
requirements were met. Without the vast quantities of munitions
and stores of all sorts provided, and without the drafts of men sent
to replace wastage, the efforts of our troops could not have been
maintained.

The losses entailed by the constant fighting threw a specially
heavy strain on the Medical Services, This has been met with the
greatest zeal and efficiency. The gallantry and devotion with which
officers and men of the Regimental Medical Service and Field Ambu-
lances have discharged their duties is shown by the large number of
the R.A.M.C. and Medical Corps of the Dominions who have fallen
in the field. The work of the Medical Services behind the front has
been no less arduous. The untiring professional zeal and marked
ability of the surgical specialists and consulting surgeons, combined
with the skill and devotion of the medical and nursing staffs, both at
the Casualty Clearing Stations in the field and the Stationary and
General Hospitals at the Base, have been beyond praise. In this
respect also the Director-General has on many occasions expressed
to me the immense help the British Red Cross Society have been to
him in assisting the R.A,M,C, in their work.

The health of the troops has been most satisfactory, and, during
the period to which this Despatch refers, there has been an almost
complete absence of wastage due to disease of a preventable nature.

The Army Commanders and Staffs

With such large forces as we now have in the field, the control
exercised by a Commander-in-Chief is necessarily restricted to a
general guidance, and great responsibilities devolve on the Army
Commanders*

In the Somme Battle these responsibilities were entrusted to
Generals Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Hubert Gough, commanding
respectively the Fourth and Fifth Armies, who for five months con-
trolled the operations of very large forces in one of the greatest, if
not absolutely the greatest struggle that has ever taken place.

It is impossible to speak too highly of the great qualities dis-
played by these commanders throughout the battle. Their thorough

58 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

knowledge of their profession, and their cool and sound judgment,
tact and determination proved fully equal to every call on them*
They entirely justified their selection for such responsible commands*

The preparations for the battle, with the exception of those at
Gommecourt, were carried out under Sir Henry Rawlinson's orders*
It was not until after the assault of the ist July that Sir Hubert
Gough was placed in charge of a portion of the front of attack, in
order to enable Sir Henry Rawlinson to devote his whole attention
to the area in which I then decided to concentrate the main effort.

The Army Commanders have brought to my notice the excellent
work done by their Staff Officers and Technical Advisers* as well as
by the various commanders and staffs serving under them, and I
have already submitted the names of the various officers and others
recommended by them.

I desire also to record my obligation to my own Staff at General
Head Quarters and on the Lines of Communication, and to the
various Technical Advisers attached thereto for their loyal and
untiring assistance.

Throughout the operations the whole Army has worked with a
remarkable absence of friction and with a self-sacrifice and whole-
hearted devotion to the common cause which is beyond praise* This
has ensured and will continue to ensure the utmost concentration of
effort. It is indeed a privilege to work with such officers and with
such men.

Our Allies

I cannot close this Despatch without alluding to the happy rela-
tions which continue to exist between the Allied Armies and between
our troops and the civil population in France and Belgium. The
unfailing co-operation of our Allies* their splendid fighting qualities
and the kindness and goodwill universally displayed towards us have
won the gratitude* as well as the respect and admiration* of all
ranks of the British Armies.

Future Prospects

In conclusion, I desire to add a few words as to future prospects.

The enemy's power has not yet been broken, nor is it yet possible
to form an estimate of the time the war may last before the objects
for which the Allies are fighting have been attained. But the Somme
battle has placed beyond doubt the ability of the Allies to gain those
objects. The German Army is the mainstay of the Central Powers,
and a full half of that Army, despite all the advantages of the defen-
sive, supported by the strongest fortifications, suffered defeat on the

OPENING OF THE WEARING-OUT BATTLE 59

Somme this year* Neither the victors nor the vanquished will forget
this ; and, though bad weather has given the enemy a respite, there
will undoubtedly be many thousands in his ranks who will begin the
new campaign with little confidence in their ability to resist our
assaults or to overcome our defence.

Our new Armies entered the battle with the determination to win
and with confidence in their power to do so* They have proved to
themselves, to the enemy, and to the world that this confidence was
justified, and in the fierce struggle they have been through they have
learned many valuable lessons which will help them in the future*

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship^ obedient Servant,

D* HAIG, General,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

THE RETREAT TO THE
HINDENBURG LINE

General Headquarters,

British Armies in France,

$ist May, 1 917**

MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit the following Report on the opera-
tions of the British Armies in France from the i8th November, 1916,
to the commencement of our present offensive*

Nature of Operations

i. My plans for the winter, already decided on at the opening of
the period under review, were based on several considerations :

The enemy's strength had been considerably reduced by the
severe and protracted struggle on the Somme battlefields, and so
far as circumstances and the weather would permit it was most
desirable to allow him no respite during the winter*

With this object, although possibilities were limited by the state
of the ground under winter conditions, I considered it feasible to turn
to good account the very favourable situation then existing in the
region of the River Ancre as a result of the Somme battle.

Our operations prior to the i8th November, 1916, had forced
the enemy into a very pronounced salient in the area between the
Ancre and the Scarpe Valleys, and had obtained for us greatly im-
proved opportunities for observation over this salient, A compara-
tively short further advance would give us complete possession of
the few points south of the Ancre to which the enemy still clung, and
would enable us to gain entire command of the spur above Beaumont
Hamel, Thereafter, the configuration of the ground in the neigh-
bourhood of the Ancre Valley was such that every fresh advance
would enfilade the enemy's positions and automatically open up to
the observation of our troops some new part of his defences. Arrange-
ments could therefore be made for systematic and deliberate attacks

1 This Despatch was published as a Supplement to the London Gazette of the igth
June, 1917.

E 63

64 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

to be delivered on selected positions, to gain further observation for
ourselves and deprive the enemy of that advantage* By these means
the enemy's defences would be continually outflanked, and we should
be enabled to direct our massed artillery fire with such accuracy
against his trenches and communications as to make his positions in
the Ancre Valley exceedingly costly to maintain.

With the same object in view a number of minor enterprises and
raids were planned to be carried out along the whole front of the
British Armies,

In addition to the operations outlined above, preparations for the
resumption of a general offensive in the spring had to be proceeded
with in due course. In this connection, steps had to be taken to over-
come the difficulties which a temporary lack of railway facilities
would place in the way of completing our task within the allotted
time. Provision had also to be made to cope with the effect of winter
conditions upon work and roads, a factor to which the prolonged
frost at the commencement of the present year subsequently gave
especial prominence.

Another very important consideration was the training of the
forces under my command. It was highly desirable that during the
winter the troops engaged in the recent prolonged fighting should
be given an adequate period out of the line for training, rest and
refitting.

Certain modifications of my programme in this respect eventually
became necessary. To meet the wishes of our Allies in connection
with the plan of operations for the spring of 1917, a gradual exten-
sion of the British front southwards as far as a point opposite the town
of Roye was decided on in January, and was completed without
incident of importance by the 26th February, 1917, This alteration
entailed the maintenance by British forces of an exceptionally active
front of no miles, including the whole of the Somme battle front,
and, combined with the continued activity maintained throughout
the winter, interfered to no small extent with my arrangements for
reliefs. The training of the troops had consequently to be restricted
to such limited opportunities as circumstances from time to time
permitted.

The operations on the Ancre, however, as well as the minor
enterprises and raids to which reference has been made, were carried
out as intended. Besides gaining valuable positions and observation
by local attacks in the neighbourhood of Bouchavesnes, Sailly-
Saillisel and Grandcourt, these raids and minor enterprises were
the means of inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, and con-
tributed very appreciably to the total of 5,284 prisoners taken from
him in the period under review.

RETREAT TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 65

OPERATIONS ON THE ANCRE

The Enemy's Position

2, At the conclusion of the operations of the i3th November and
following days the enemy still held the whole of the Ancre Valley
from Le Transloy to Grandcourt, and his first line of defence lay along
the lower northern slopes of the Thiepval Ridge, (See Map No* 2)

North of the Ancre, he still held the greater part of the spur
above Beaumont HameL Beyond that point the original German
front line, in which the enemy had established himself two years
previously, ran past Serre, Gommecourt and Monchy-au-Bois to the
northern slopes of the main watershed, and then north-east down
to the valley of the River Scarpe east of Arras.

Besides the positions held by him on our immediate front, and
in addition to the fortified villages of the Ancre Valley with their
connecting trenches, the enemy had prepared along the forward
crest of the ridge north of the Ancre Valley a strong second system
of defence* This consisted of a double line of trenches, heavily wired,
and ran north-west from Saillisel past Le Transloy to the Albert-
Bapaume Road, where it turned west past Grevillers and Loupart
Wood and then north-west again past Achiet-le-Petit to Bucquoy.
This system, which was known as the Le Transloy-Loupart line,
both by reason of its situation and as a result of the skill and industry
expended on its preparation, constituted an exceedingly strong
natural defensive position ; second only to that from which the
enemy had recently been driven on the Morval-Thiepval Ridge*
Parallel to this line, but on the far side of the crest, he had constructed
towards the close of the past year a third defensive system on the
line Rocquigny, Bapaume, Ablainzevelle*

Operations Commenced

3* The first object of our operations in the Ancre Valley was
to advance our trenches to within assaulting distance of the Le
Transloy-Loupart line*

Accordingly, on the i8th November, 1916, before the rapidly
deteriorating condition of the ground had yet made an undertaking
on so considerable a scale impossible, an attack was delivered against
the next German line of defence, overlooking the villages of Pys and
Grandcourt, Valuable positions were gained on a front of about
5,000 yards, while a simultaneous attack north of the Ancre consider-
ably improved the situation of our troops in the Beaucourt Valley, 1

1 The 4th Canadian, i8th, igth, 37th and 32nd Divisions, commanded respectively
by Major-Generals D. Watson, F. I. Maxse, G. T. M. Bridges, H. B. Williams and
W. H. Rycroft, carried out these attacks.

66 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

By this time winter conditions had set in, and along a great part
of our new front movement across the open had become practically
impossible. During the remainder of the month, therefore, and
throughout December, our energies were principally directed to the
improvement of our own trenches and of roads and communications
behind them. At the same time the necessary rearrangement of our
artillery was completed, so as to take full advantage of the oppor-
tunities afforded by our new positions for concentration of fire*

The Beaumont Hamel Spur

4. As soon as active operations again became possible, proceed-
ings were commenced to drive the enemy from the remainder of the
Beaumont Hamel Spur. In January a number of small operations
were carried out with this object by the 3rd, 7th and nth Divisions
(Major-Generals C. J. Deverell, H. E. Watts and A. B. Ritchie),
resulting in a progressive improvement of our position. Before the
end of the month the whole of the high ground north and east of
Beaumont Hamel was in our possession, we had pushed across the
Beaucourt Valley 1,000 yards north of Beaucourt Village, and had
gained a footing on the southern slopes of the spur to the east*

The most important of these attacks was undertaken at dawn on
the morning of the i ith January by the yth Division, against a system
of hostile trenches extending for some 1,500 yards along the crest of
the spur east and north-east of Beaumont Hamel. By 8.30 a.m. all
our objectives had been captured, together with over 200 prisoners*
That afternoon an enemy counter-attack was broken up by our
artillery.

Throughout the whole of the month's fighting in this area, in
which over 500 German prisoners were taken by us, our casualties
were exceedingly light. This satisfactory circumstance can be attri-
buted mainly to the close and skilful co-operation between our
infantry and artillery, and to the excellence of our artillery prepara-
tion and barrages. These in turn were made possible by the oppor-
tunities for accurate observation afforded by the high ground north
of Thiepval, and by the fine work done by our aircraft.

Grandcourt

5. Possession of the Beaumont Hamel Spur opened up a new
and extensive field of action for our artillery. The whole of the Beau-
court Valley and the western slopes of the spur beyond from opposite
Grandcourt to Serre now lay exposed to our fire. Operations were,
therefore, at once commenced under the cover of our guns to clear

RETREAT TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 67

the remainder of the valley south of the Serre Hill, and to push our
line forward to the crest of the spur,

On the night of the 3rd/4th February an important German line
of defence on the southern slopes of this spur, forming part of the
enemy's original second line system north of the Ancre, was captured
by our troops (63rd Division, Major-General C. D. Shute) on a
front of about three-quarters of a mile* The enemy's resistance was
stubborn, and hard fighting took place, which lasted throughout the
whole of the following day and night. During this period a number
of determined counter-attacks were beaten off by our infantry or
dispersed by our artillery, and by the 5th February we had gained
the whole of our objectives. In this operation, in which the excel-
lence of our artillery co-operation was very marked, we took 176
prisoners and four machine guns.

This success brought our front forward north of the Ancre to a
point level with the centre of Grandcourt, and made the enemy's
hold on his position in that village and in his more western defences
south of the river very precarious. It was not unexpected, therefore,
when on the morning of the 6th February our patrols reported that
the last remaining portion of the old German second line system
south of the river, lying between Grandcourt and Stuff Redoubt, had
been evacuated. The abandoned trenches were occupied by our troops
the same morning.

Constant reconnaissances were sent out by us to keep touch with
the enemy and to ascertain his movements and intentions. Grand-
court itself was next found to be clear of the enemy, and by 10 a,m,
on the morning of the 7th February was also in our possession (63rd
Division), That night we carried Baillescourt Farm, about half-way
between Beaucourt and Miraumont, capturing 87 prisoners,

The Advance against Serre

6, The task of driving the enemy from his position in the Beau-
court Valley was resumed on the night of the xoth/i ith February.
Our principal attack was directed against some 1,500 yards of a
strong line of trenches, the western end of which was already in our
possession, lying at the southern foot of the Serre Hill. Our infantry
(32nd Division, Major-General R, W, R, Barnes) were formed up
after dark, and at 8,30 p.m. advanced under our covering artillery
barrage. After considerable fighting in the centre and towards the
left of our attack, the whole of the trench line which formed our
objective was gained, with the exception of two strong points which
held out for a few days longer. At 5 a.m. a determined counter-
attack from the direction of Puisieux-au-Mont was beaten off by our

68 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

artillery and machine gun fire. Two other counter-attacks on the
nth February and a third on the i2th February were equally
unsuccessful.

The Advance towards Mirawnont

7. The village of Serre now formed the point of a very pronounced
salient, which our further progress along the Ancre Valley would
render increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for the enemy to hold.
Accordingly, an operation on a somewhat larger scale than anything
hitherto attempted since the new year, was now undertaken. Its
object was to carry our line forward along the spur which runs north-
wards from the main Morval-Thiepval Ridge about Courcelette, and
so gain possession of the high ground at its northern extremity. The
possession of this high ground, besides commanding the approaches
to Pys and Miraumont from the south, would give observation over
the upper valley of the Ancre, in which many hostile batteries were
situated in positions enabling their fire to be directed for the defence
of the Serre sector. At the same time arrangements were made for a
smaller attack on the opposite bank of the river, designed to seize a
portion of the sunken road lying along the eastern crest of the
second spur north of the Ancre and so obtain control of the approaches
to Miraumont from the west*

Our assault was delivered simultaneously on both banks of the
Ancre at 5.45 a.m. on the iyth February by the and, i8th and 63rd
Divisions (Major-Generals C. E. Pereira and R. P. Lee commanding
respectively the and and i8th Divisions). The night was particularly
dark, and thick mist and heavy conditions of ground, produced by
the thaw that had just set in, added to the difficulties with which our
troops had to contend. The enemy was, moreover, on the alert, and
commenced a heavy barrage some time before the hour of our assault,
while our attacking battalions were still forming up. None the less,
our troops advanced to the assault with great gallantry. On the left
of our attack (south of the river) our artillery preparation had been
assisted by observation from the positions already won on the right
bank of the Ancre. In consequence, our infantry were able to make
a very considerable advance, and established themselves within a
few hundred yards of Petit Miraumont. The right of our attack
encountered more serious resistance, but here also valuable progress
was made.

North of the Ancre our troops met with complete success. The
whole of the position attacked, on a front of about half a mile, was
secured without great difficulty, and an enemy counter-attack during
the morning was easily driven off.

Next day, at 11.30 a.m., the enemy delivered a second counter-

RETREAT TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 69

attack from the north with considerable forces, estimated at two
battalions, upon our new positions north of the river. His advancing
waves came under the concentrated fire of our artillery and machine
guns while still some distance in front of our lines, and were driven
back in disorder with exceedingly heavy losses.

Eleven officers and 588 other ranks were taken prisoners by us in
these operations.

Miraumont and Serre Evacuated

8. The ground gained by these two attacks, and by minor opera-
tions carried out during the succeeding days, gave us the observa-
tion we desired, as well as complete command over the German
artillery positions in the upper Ancre Valley and over his defences
in and around Pys and Miraumont. The constant bombardment by
our artillery, combined with the threat of an attack in which his
troops would have been at great disadvantage, accordingly decided
the enemy to abandon both villages. Our possession of Miraumont,
however, gravely endangered the enemy's positions at Serre by
opening up for us possibilities of a further advance northwards,
while the loss of Serre would speedily render Puisieux-au-Mont and
Gommecourt equally difficult of defence. There was, therefore,
good ground to expect that the evacuation of Pys and Miraumont
would shortly be followed by a withdrawal on a more considerable
scale. This in fact occurred.

On the 24th February the enemy's positions before Pys, Mirau-
mont and Serre were found by our patrols to have been evacuated,
and were occupied by our troops. Our patrols were then at once
pushed forward, supported by strong infantry detachments, and by
the evening of the 25th February the enemy's first system of defence
from north of Gueudecourt to west of Serre, and including Luisenhof
Farm, Warlencourt-Eaucourt, Pys, Miraumont, Beauregard Dovecot
and Serre, had fallen into our hands. The enemy offered some oppo-
sition with machine guns at selected strong points in his line, and his
artillery actively shelled the areas from which he had withdrawn ;
but the measures taken to deal with such tactics proved adequate,
and the casualties inflicted on our troops were light.

The enemy's retirement at this juncture was greatly favoured by
the weather. The prolonged period of exceptional frost, following
on a wet autumn, had frozen the ground to a great depth. When the
thaw commenced in the third week of February the roads, disin-
tegrated by the frost, broke up, the sides of trenches fell in, and the
area across which our troops had fought their way forward returned
to a condition of slough and quagmire even worse than that of the
previous autumn. On the other hand, the condition of the roads and

70 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the surface of the ground behind the enemy steadily improved the
further he withdrew from the scene of the fighting* He was also
materially assisted by a succession of misty days, which greatly
interfered with the work of our aeroplanes. Over such ground and
in such conditions rapid pursuit was impossible. It is greatly to the
credit of all ranks concerned that, in spite of all difficulties, constant
touch was maintained with the enemy and that timely information
was obtained of his movements*

Le Barque and Gommecourt

9. Resistance of a more serious character was encountered in a
strong secondary line of defence which, from a point in the Le Trans-
loy-Loupart line due west of the village of Beaulencourt, crossed in
front of Ligny-Thilloy and Le Barque to the southern defences of
Loupart Wood. Between the 25th February and the and March a
series of attacks were carried out by the ist Anzac Corps (Lieut.-
General Sir W. R. Birdwood) against this line, and the enemy was
gradually driven out of his positions. By the evening of the latter
day the whole line of trenches and the villages of Le Barque, Ligny-
Thilloy and Thilloy had in turn been captured. One hundred and
twenty-eight prisoners and a number of trench mortars and machine
guns were taken in this fighting, in the course of which the enemy
made several vigorous but unsuccessful counter-attacks.

Meanwhile rapid progress had been made on the remainder of
the front of our advance. On the ayth February the enemy's rear-
guards in Puisieux-au-Mont were driven to their last positions of
defence in the neighbourhood of the church, and to the north-west
of the village our front was extended to within a few hundred yards
of Gommecourt. That evening our patrols entered Gommecourt
Village and Park, following closely upon the retreating enemy, and
by 10.0 p.m. Gommecourt and its defences had been occupied. Next
morning the capture of Puisieux-au-Mont was completed.

Irks

10. The enemy had, therefore, been driven back to the Le
Transloy-Loupart line, except that he still held the village of Irles,
which formed a salient to his position, and was linked up to it at
Loupart Wood and Achiet-le-Petit by well-constructed and well-
wired trenches.

Accordingly, our next step was to take Irles, as a preliminary to a
larger undertaking against the Le Transloy-Loupart line itself ; but
before either operation could be attempted exceedingly heavy work
had to be done in the improvement of roads and communications,

RETREAT TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 71

and in bringing forward guns and ammunition. The following week
was devoted to these very necessary tasks. Meanwhile, operations
were limited to small enterprises, designed to keep in touch with
the enemy and to establish forward posts which might assist in the
forthcoming attack.

The assault on Irles and its defences was delivered at 5.25 a.m.
on the morning of the loth March by the 2nd and i8th Divisions,
and was completely successful. The whole of our objectives were
captured, and in the village and the surrounding works 289 prisoners
were taken, together with sixteen machine guns and four trench
mortars. Our casualties were very light, being considerably less
than the number of our prisoners.

The Loupart Line

11. The way was now open for the main operation against the
centre of the Le Transloy-Loupart line, which throughout the
nth March was heavily shelled by all natures of our artillery. So
effective was this bombardment that during the night of the I2th/i3th
March the enemy once more abandoned his positions, and fell back
on the parallel system of defences already referred to on the reverse
side of the ridge. Grevillers and Loupart Wood were thereupon
occupied by our troops, and methodical preparations were at once
begun for an attack on the enemy's next line of defence.

THE ENEMY'S RETREAT
The General Withdrawal

12* For some time prior to this date a number of indications had
been observed which made it probable that the area of the German
withdrawal would be yet further extended*

It had been ascertained that the enemy was preparing a new
defensive system, known as the Hindenburg Line, which, branching
off from his original defences near Arras, ran south-eastwards for
twelve miles to Quant, and thence passed west of Cambrai towards
St. Quentin. Various " switches " branching off from this line were
also under construction. The enemy's immediate concern appeared
to be to escape from the salient between Arras and Le Transloy,
which would become increasingly difficult and dangerous to hold as
our advance on the Ancre drove ever more deeply into his defences*
It was also evident, however, from the preparations he was making
that he contemplated an eventual evacuation of the greater salient
between Arras and the Aisne Valley, north-west of Rheims.

72 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Constant watch had accordingly been kept along the whole front
south of Arras, in order that instant information might be obtained
of any such development* On the i4th March patrols found portions
of the German front line empty in the neighbourhood of St. Pierre
Vaast Wood. Acting on the reports of these patrols, during that
night and the following day our troops occupied the whole of the
enemy's trenches on the western edge of the wood. Little opposition
was met, and by the i6th March we held the western half of Mois-
lains Wood, the whole of St. Pierre Vaast Wood with the exception
of its north-eastern corner, and the enemy's front trenches as far as
the northern outskirts of Sailly-Saillisel.

Meanwhile, on the evening of the i5th March, further informa-
tion had been obtained which led me to believe that the enemy's
forces on our front south of the Somme had been reduced, and that
his line was being held by rearguard detachments supported by
machine guns, whose withdrawal might also be expected at any
moment. The Corps Commanders concerned were immediately
directed to confirm the situation by patrols. Orders were thereafter
given for a general advance, to be commenced on the morning of the
1 7th March along our whole front from the Roye Road to south of
Arras.

Bapaume and Peronne

13. Except at certain selected localities, where he had left detach-
ments of infantry and machine guns to cover his retreat, such as
Chaulnes, Vaux Wood, Bapaume and Achiet-le-Grand, the enemy
offered little serious opposition to our advance on this front, and
where he did so his resistance was rapidly overcome. Before night-
fall on the 1 7th March Chaulnes and Bapaume had been captured
(6ist Division and and Australian Division, Major-Generals C. J.
Mackenzie and N. M. Smyth), and advanced bodies of our troops
had pushed deeply into the enemy's positions at all points from
Damery to Monchy-au-Bois. On our right our Allies made rapid
progress also, and entered Roye.

On the 1 8th March and subsequent days our advance continued,
in co-operation with the French. In the course of this advance the
whole intricate system of German defences in this area, consisting of
many miles of powerful, well-wired trenches which had been con-
structed with immense labour and worked on till the last moment,
were abandoned by the enemy and passed into the possession of our
troops.

At 7.0 a.m. on the i8th March our troops (48th Division, Major-
General R. Fanshawe) entered Peronne and occupied Mont St.
Quentin, north of the town. To the south our advanced troops

RETREAT TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 73

established themselves during the day along the western bank of the
Somme from Peronne to just north of Epenancourt. By 10,0 p,m, on
the same day Brie Bridge had been repaired by our engineers suffi-
ciently for the passage of infantry in single file, and our troops
crossed to the east bank of the river, in spite of some opposition*
Further south French and British cavalry entered Nesle,

North of Peronne equal progress was made, and by the evening
of the 1 8th March our troops had entered the German trench system
known as the Beugny-Ytres Line, beyond which lay open country
as far as the Hindenburg Line, On the same day the left of our
advance was extended to Beaurains, which was captured after slight
hostile resistance,

By the evening of the igth March our infantry held the line of the
Somme from Canizy to Peronne, and infantry outposts and cavalry
patrols had crossed the river at a number of points. North of Peronne
our infantry had reached the line Bussu, Barastre, Ve*lu, St, Leger,
Beaurains, with cavalry in touch with the enemy at Nurlu, Bertin-
court, Noreuil, and Henin-sur-Cojeul, Next day considerable bodies
of infantry and cavalry crossed to the east of the Somme, and a line
of cavalry outposts with infantry in support was established from
south of Germaine, where we were in touch with the French, through
Hancourt and Nurlu to Bus, Further north we occupied Morchies,

Difficulty of Communications

14, By this time our advance had reached a stage at which the
increasing difficulty of maintaining our communications made it
imperative to slacken the pace of our pursuit. South of Peronne, the
River Somme, the bridges over which had been destroyed by the
retreating enemy, presented a formidable obstacle* North of Peronne,
the wide belt of devastated ground over which the Somme Battle
had been fought offered even greater difficulties to the passage of
guns and transport,

We were advancing, therefore, over country in which all means
of communication had been destroyed, against an enemy whose
armies were still intact and capable of launching a vigorous offensive
should a favourable opening present itself. Strong detachments of
his infantry and cavalry occupied points of advantage along our line
of advance, serving to keep the enemy informed of our progress and
to screen his own movements. His guns, which had already been
withdrawn to previously prepared positions, were available at any
moment to cover and support a sudden counter-stroke, while the
conditions of the country across which we were moving made the
progress of our own artillery unavoidably slow. The bulk of the
enemy's forces were known to be holding a very formidable defen-

76 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

in which they have been subjected to the maximum of personal hard-
ship and physical strain, I cannot speak too highly of the qualities
displayed by all ranks of the Army,

I desire also to place on record here my appreciation of the great
skill and energy displayed by the Army Commanders under whose
immediate orders the operations described above were carried out.
The ability with which the troops in the Ancre area were handled by
General Sir Hubert Gough, and those further south on our front
from Le Transloy to Roye by General Sir Henry Rawlinson, was in all
respects admirable.

The retreat to which the enemy was driven by our continued
success reintroduced on the Western front conditions of warfare
which had been absent from that theatre since the opening months
of the war. After more than two years of trench warfare considerable
bodies of our troops have been engaged under conditions approxi-
mating to open fighting, and cavalry has been given an opportunity
to perform its special duties. Our operations south of Arras during
the latter half of March are, therefore, of peculiar interest, and the
results achieved by all arms have been most satisfactory. Although
the deliberate nature of the enemy's withdrawal enabled him to
choose his own ground for resistance, and to employ every device to
inflict losses on our troops, our casualties, which had been exceedingly
moderate throughout the operations on the Ancre, during the period
of the retreat became exceptionally light. 1 The prospect of a more
general resumption of open fighting can be regarded with great
confidence.

The systematic destruction of roads, railways and bridges in the
evacuated area made unprecedented demands upon the Royal
Engineers, already heavily burdened by the work entailed by the
preparations for our spring offensive. Our steady progress, in the
face of the great difficulties confronting us, is the best testimony to
the energy and thoroughness with which those demands were met.

The bridging of the Somme at Brie, to which reference has
already been made, is an example of the nature of the obstacles with
which our troops were met and of the rapidity with which those
obstacles were overcome. In this instance six gaps had to be bridged
across the canal and river, some of them of considerable width and
over a swift-flowing stream. The work was commenced on the morn-
ing of the 1 8th March, and was carried out night and day in three
stages. By 10.0 p.m. on the same day foot-bridges for infantry had
been completed, as already stated. Medium type bridges for horse
transport and cavalry were completed by 5.0 a.m. on the soth March,

1 Our weekly casualties for all Armies, which had risen to 7,000 during the Ancre
fighting, fell to 4,000 at the end of March.

RETREAT TO THE HINDENBURG LINE 77

and by 2,0 p.m, on the 28th March, or four and a half days after
they had been begun, heavy bridges capable of taking all forms of
traffic had taken the place of the lighter type* Medium type devia-
tion bridges were constructed as the heavy bridges were begun, so
that from the time the first bridges were thrown across the river
traffic was practically continuous.

Throughout the past winter the question of transport, in all its
forms, has presented problems of a most serious nature, both in the
battle area and behind the lines. On the rapid solution of these
problems the success or failure of our operations necessarily largely
depended.

At the close of the campaign of 1916 the steady growth of our
Armies and the rapid expansion of our material resources had already
taxed to the utmost the capacity of the roads and railways then at
our disposal. Existing broad and narrow gauge railways were in-
sufficient to deal with the increasing volume of traffic, an undue pro-
portion of which was thrown upon the roads. As winter conditions
set in, these rapidly deteriorated, and the difficulties of maintenance
and repair became almost overwhelming, 1 An increase of railway
facilities of every type and on a large scale was therefore imperatively
and urgently necessary to relieve the roads. For this purpose rails,
material and rolling stock were required immediately in great quan-
tities, while at a later date our wants in these respects were consider-
ably augmented by a large programme of new construction in the
area of the enemy's withdrawal.

The task of obtaining the amount of railway material required to
meet the demands of our Armies, and of carrying out the work of
construction at the rate rendered necessary by our plans, in addition
to providing labour and material for the necessary repair of roads,
was one of the very greatest difficulty. Its successful accomplishment
reflects the highest credit on the Transportation Service, of whose
efficiency and energy I cannot speak too highly, I desire to acknow-
ledge in the fullest manner the debt that is owed to all who assisted
in meeting a most difficult situation, and especially to Major-General
Sir Eric Geddes, Director-General of Transportation, to whose
great ability, organising power and energy the results achieved are
primarily due, I am glad to take this opportunity also to acknow-
ledge the valuable assistance given to us by the Chemin de Per du
Nord, by which the work of the Transportation Service was greatly
facilitated,

1 So great did these difficulties become, that it became necessary at this time to
adopt a new system on our Lines of Communication, involving the creation of the new
Department of Transportation, of which Sir Eric Geddes was the first Director-General.
See also Sir Douglas Haig's final Despatch, page 337.

7 8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

I wish also to place on record here the fact that the successful
solution of the problem of railway transport would have been im-
possible had it not been for the patriotism of the railway companies
at home and in Canada. They did not hesitate to give up the loco-
motives and rolling stock required to meet our needs, and even to
tear up track in order to provide us with the necessary rails. The
thanks of the Army are due also to those who have accepted so
cheerfully the inconvenience caused by the consequent diminution
of the railway facilities available for civil traffic.

The various other special services, to the excellence of whose
work I was glad to call attention in my last Despatch, have continued
to discharge their duties with the same energy and efficiency dis-
played by them during the Somme Battle, and have rendered most
valuable assistance to our artillery and infantry.

I desire also to repeat the well-merited tribute paid in my last
Despatch to the different Administrative Services and Departments.
The work entailed by the double task of meeting the requirements
of our winter operations and preparing for our next offensive was very
heavy, demanding unremitting labour and the closest attention to detail.

The fighting on the Ancre and subsequent advance made large
demands upon the devotion of our Medical Services. The health of
the troops during the period covered by this Despatch has been
satisfactory, notwithstanding the discomfort and exposure to which
they were subjected during the extreme cold of the winter, especially
in the areas taken over from the enemy.

The loyal co-operation and complete mutual understanding that
prevailed between our Allies and ourselves throughout the Somme
Battle have been continued and strengthened by the events of the
past winter, and in particular by the circumstances attending the
enemy's withdrawal. During the latter part of the period under
review, a very considerable tract of country has been won back to
France by the combined efforts of the Allied troops. This result is
regarded with lively satisfaction by all ranks of the British Armies
in France. At the same time I wish to give expression to the feelings
of deep sympathy and profound regret provoked among us by the
sight of the destruction that war has wrought in a once fair and
prosperous countryside.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

D. HAIG, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France,

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917

General Headquarters,

British Armies in the Field,

2$th December, 1917. *
MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit the following Report on the opera-
tions of the Forces under my Command from the opening of the
British offensive on the 9th April, 1917, to the conclusion of the
Flanders offensive in November, The subsequent events of this
year will form the subject of a separate Despatch, to be rendered a
little later,

INTRODUCTORY
The General Allied Plan

i. The general plan of campaign to be pursued by the Allied
Armies during 1917 was unanimously agreed on by a conference of
military representatives of all the Allied Powers held at French
General Headquarters in November, 1916,*

This plan comprised a series of offensives on all fronts, so timed
as to assist each other by depriving the enemy of the power of weaken-
ing any one of his fronts in order to reinforce another.

A general understanding had also been arrived at between the
then French Commander-in-Chief and myself as to the roles of our
respective Armies in this general plan, and with the approval of His
Majesty's Government preparations based upon these arrangements
had at once been taken in hand.

2* Briefly stated, my plan of action for the Armies under my
command in the proposed general offensive was as follows :

In the spring, as soon as all the Allied Armies were ready to
commence operations, my first efforts were to be directed against the
enemy's troops occupying the salient between the Scarpe and the
Ancre, into which they had been pressed as a result of the Somme
Battle.

It was my intention to attack both shoulders of this salient

1 This Despatch was published as a Supplement dated the 8th January, 1918, to
the London Gazette of the 4th January, 1918.

8 At Chantilly ; General Joffre was the French Commander-in-Chief at this time.

8a SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

simultaneously, the Fifth Army operating on the Ancre front while the
Third Army attacked from the north-west about Arras* These con-
verging attacks, if successful, would pinch off the whole salient, and
would be likely to make the withdrawal of the enemy's troops from it
a very costly manoeuvre for him if it were not commenced in good
time*

The front of attack on the Arras side was to include the Vimy
Ridge, possession of which I considered necessary to secure the left
flank of the operations on the south bank of the Scarpe, The capture
of this ridge, which was to be carried out by the First Army, also
offered other important advantages. It would deprive the enemy of
valuable observation and give us a wide view over the plains
stretching from the eastern foot of the ridge to Douai and beyond.
Moreover, although it was evident that the enemy might, by a
timely withdrawal, avoid a battle in the awkward salient still held
by him between the Scarpe and the Ancre, no such withdrawal
from his important Vimy Ridge positions was likely. He would be
almost certain to fight for this ridge, and, as my object was to
deal him a blow which would force him to use up reserves, it was
important that he should not evade my attack,

3, With the forces at my disposal, even combined with what the
French proposed to undertake in co-operation, I did not consider
that any great strategical results were likely to be gained by following
up a success on the front about Arras and to the south of it, beyond
the capture of the objectives aimed at as described above. It was
therefore my intention to transfer my main offensive to another part
of my front after these objectives had been secured.

The front selected for these further operations was in Flanders,
They were to be commenced as soon as possible after the Arras
offensive, and continued throughout the summer, so far as the forces
at my disposal would permit,

4. * * * * The positions held by us in the Ypres salient since May,
1915, were far from satisfactory, 1 They were completely overlooked
by the enemy. Their defence involved a considerable strain on the
troops occupying them, and they were certain to be costly to main-
tain against a serious attack, in which the enemy would enjoy all the
advantages in observation and in the placing of his artillery. Our
positions would be much improved by the capture of the Messines-
Wytschaete Ridge, and of the high ground which extends thence
north-eastwards for some seven miles and then trends north through
Broodseinde and Passchendaele, * * * *

The operation in its first stages was a very difficult one, and in
1916 I had judged that the general situation was not yet ripe to

1 Vide Map No. 4.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 83

attempt it* In the summer of 1917, however, as larger forces would
be at my disposal, and as, in the Somme Battle, our new Armies had
proved their ability to overcome the enemy's strongest defences, and
had lowered his power of resistance, I considered myself justified in
undertaking it. Various preliminary steps had already been taken,
including the necessary development of railways in the area, which
had been proceeding quietly from early in 1916, I therefore hoped,
after completing my spring offensive further south, to be able to
develop this Flanders attack without great delay, and to strike hard
in the north before the enemy realised that the attack in the south
would not be pressed further,

5. Subsequently, unexpected developments in the early weeks of
the year necessitated certain modifications in my plans above described.

New proposals for action were made by our French Allies l which
entailed a considerable extension of my defensive front, a modifica-
tion of the role previously allotted to the British Armies, and an
acceleration of the date of my opening attack,

As a result of these proposals, I received instructions from His
Majesty's Government to readjust my previous plans to meet the
wishes of our Allies, Accordingly, it was arranged that I should
commence the offensive early in April on as great a scale as the exten-
sion of my front would permit, with due regard to defensive require-
ments on the rest of my line. The British attack, under the revised
scheme, was, in the first instance, to be preparatory to a more
decisive operation to be undertaken a little later by the French
Armies, in the subsequent stages of which the British Forces were
to co-operate to the fullest extent possible,

It was further agreed that if this combined offensive did not
produce the full results hoped for within a reasonable time, the main
efforts of the British Armies should then be transferred to Flanders
as I had originally intended. In this case our Allies were to assist me
by taking over as much as possible of the front held by my troops,
and by carrying out, in combination with my Flanders attacks, such
offensives on the French front as they might be able to undertake,

6, My original plan for the preliminary operations on the Arras
front fortunately fitted in well with what was required of me under
the revised scheme, and the necessary preparations were already in
progress. In order to give full effect, however, to the new role
allotted to me in this revised scheme, preparations for the attack in
Flanders had to be restricted for the time being to what could be
done by such troops and other labour as could not in any case be
made available on the Arras front. Moreover, the carrying out of any

1 In December, 1916, General Nivelle succeeded Marshal Joffre as Commander-in-
Chief, and a new plan of campaign was adopted by the French.

84 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

offensive this year on the Flanders front became contingent on the
degree of success attained by the new plan,

7, The chief events to note during the period of preparations for
the spring offensive were the retirement of the enemy on the Arras-
Soissons front and the revolution in Russia*

As regards the former, the redistribution of my forces necessi-
tated by the enemy's withdrawal was easily made. The front decided
on for my main attack on the Arras front lay almost altogether out-
side the area from which the enemy retired, and my plans and pre-
parations on that side were not deranged thereby. His retirement,
however, did enable the enemy to avoid the danger of some of his
troops being cut off by the converging attacks arranged for, and to
that extent reduced the results which might have been attained by
my operation as originally planned. The rdle of the Fifth Army, too,
had to be modified. Instead of attacking from the line of the An ere
simultaneously with the advance of the Third Army from the north-
west, it had now to follow up the retiring enemy and establish itself
afresh in front of the Hindenburg Line to which the enemy withdrew.
This line had been very strongly fortified, and sited with great care
and skill to deny all advantages of position to any force attempting
to attack it.

The adjustments necessary, however, to enable me to carry out
the more subsidiary role which had been allotted to my Armies since
the formation of my original plans, were comparatively simple, and
caused no delay in my preparation for the spring offensive.

My task was, in the first instance, to attract as large hostile forces
as possible to my front before the French offensive was launched,
and my forces were still well placed for this purpose. The capture
of such important tactical features as the Vimy Ridge and Monchy-
le-Preux by the First and Third Armies, combined with pressure by
the Fifth Army from the south against the front of the Hindenburg
Line, could be relied on to use up many of the enemy's divisions and
to compel him to reinforce largely on the threatened front.

The Russian revolution was of far more consequence in the
approaching struggle. Even though the Russian Armies might still
prove capable of co-operating in the later phases of the 1917 cam-
paign, the revolution at once destroyed any prospect that may pre-
viously have existed of these Armies being able to combine with the
spring offensive in the West by the earlier date which had been fixed
for it in the new plans made since the conference of November, 1916.
Moreover, as the Italian offensive also could not be ready until some
time after the date fixed by the new arrangement with the French
for our combined operation, the situation became very different from
that contemplated at the Conference,

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 85

It was decided, however, to proceed with the spring offensive in
the West, notwithstanding these serious drawbacks. Even though
the prospects of any far-reaching success were reduced, it would at
least tend to relieve Russia of pressure on her front while she was
trying to reorganise her Government ; and if she should fail to
reorganise it, the Allies in the West had little, if anything, to gain by
delaying their blow.

Preparations were pushed on accordingly, the most urgent initial
step being the development of adequate transport facilities.

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN
Preparations for the Arras Offensive

8. When transport requirements on the front in question were
first brought under consideration, the neighbourhood was served by
two single lines of railway, the combined capacity of which was less
than half our estimated requirements. Considerable constructional
work, therefore, both of standard and narrow gauge railway, had to
be undertaken to meet our programme. Roads also had to be im-
proved and adapted to the circumstances for which they were re-
quired, and preparations made to carry them forward rapidly as our
troops advanced.

For this latter purpose considerable use was made, both in this
and in the later offensives, of plank roads. These were built chiefly
of heavy beech slabs laid side by side, and were found of great utility,
being capable of rapid construction over almost any nature of ground.

By these means the accumulation of the vast stocks of munitions
and stores of all kinds required for our offensive, and their distribu-
tion to the troops, were made possible. The numberless other pre-
paratory measures taken for the Somme offensive were again repeated,
with such improvements and additions as previous experience
dictated. Hutting and other accommodation for the troops concen-
trated in the area had to be provided in great quantity. An adequate
water supply had to be guaranteed, necessitating the erection of
numerous pumping installations, the laying of many miles of pipe
lines, and the construction of reservoirs.

Very extensive mining and tunnelling operations were carried
out. In particular, advantage was taken of the existence of a large
system of underground quarries and cellars in Arras and its suburbs
to provide safe quarters for a great number of troops. Electric light
was installed in these caves and cellars, which were linked together
by tunnels, and the whole connected by long subways with our
trench system east of the town.

86 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

A problem peculiar to the launching of a great offensive from a
town arose from the difficulty of ensuring the punctual debouching
of troops and the avoidance of confusion and congestion in the
streets both before the assault and during the progress of the battle*
This problem was met by the most careful and complete organisation
of routes, reflecting the highest credit on the staffs concerned*

The Enemy's Defences

9. Prior to our offensive, the new German lines of defence on the
British front ran in a general north-westerly direction from St.
Quentin to the village of Thilloy-les-Mofflaines, immediately south-
east of Arras (vide Map No, 3)* Thence the German original trench
systems continued northwards across the valley of the Scarpe River
to the dominating Vimy Ridge, which, rising to a height of some
475 feet, commands a wide view to the south-east, east and north.
Thereafter the opposing lines left the high ground, and, skirting the
western suburbs of Lens, stretched northwards to the Channel
across a flat country of rivers, dykes and canals, the dead level of
which is broken by the line of hills stretching from Wytschaete
north-eastwards to Passchendaele and Staden.

The front attacked by the Third and First Armies on the morning
of the gth April extended from just north of the village of Croisilles,
south-east of Arras, to just south of Givenchy-en-Gohelle at the
northern foot of Vimy Ridge, a distance of nearly 15 miles* It
included between four and five miles of the northern end of the
Hindenburg Line, which had been built to meet the experience of
the Somme Battle*

Further north, the original German defences in this sector were
arranged on the same principle as those which we had already cap-
tured further south* They comprised three separate trench systems,
connected by a powerful switch line running from the Scarpe at
Fampoux to Lievin, and formed a highly organised defensive belt
some two to five miles in depth*

In addition, from three to six miles further east a new line of
resistance was just approaching completion* This system, known as
the Drocourt-Que*ant Line, formed a northern extension of the
Hindenburg Line, with which it linked up at Que*ant*

Final Preparations. Fight for Aerial Supremacy

10* The great strength of these defences demanded very thorough
artillery preparation, and this in turn could only be carried out effec-
tively with the aid of our air services*

Oui

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 87

Our activity in the air, therefore, increased with the growing
severity of our bombardment* A period of very heavy air fighting
ensued, culminating in the days immediately preceding the attack
in a struggle of the utmost intensity for local supremacy in the air.
Losses on both sides were severe, but the offensive tactics most
gallantly persisted in by our fighting aeroplanes secured our artillery
machines from serious interference and enabled our guns to carry
out their work effectively* At the same time bombing machines
caused great damage and loss to the enemy by a constant succession
of successful raids against his dumps, railways, aerodromes, and
billets,

The Bombardment

u. Three weeks prior to the attack the systematic cutting of the
enemy *s wire was commenced, while our heavy artillery searched
the enemy's back areas and communications. Night firing, wire
cutting, and bombardment of hostile trenches, strong points, and
billets continued steadily and with increasing intensity on the whole
battle front, till the days immediately preceding the attack when the
general bombardment was opened.

During this latter period extensive gas discharges were carried
out, and many successful raids were undertaken by day and night
along the whole front to be attacked.

Organised bombardments took place also on other parts of our
front, particularly in the Ypres sector.

The Troops Employed

12. The main attack was entrusted to the Third and First Armies,
under the command of General Sir E. H. H. Allenby, and
General Sir H. S. Home, respectively.

Four Army Corps (the VII., VI., XVII. and XVIII. Corps,
under command respectively of Lieut .-Generals Sir T. D'O. Snow,
J. A. L. Haldane, Sir C. Fergusson and Sir F. I. Maxse) were placed at
the disposal of General Allenby, with an additional Army Corps
Headquarters (the XIX. Corps, Lieut.-General H. E. Watts) to be
used as occasion might demand. Cavalry also (the Cavalry Corps,
Lieut.-General Sir C. T. McM. Kavanagh) was brought up into the
Third Army area, in case the development of the battle should give
rise to an opportunity for the employment of mounted troops on a
considerable scale.

The attack of the First Army on the Vimy Ridge was carried out
by the Canadian Corps (Lieut.-General Sir J. H. G. Byng). It was
further arranged that, as soon as the Vimy Ridge had been secured,

88 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the troops in line on the left of the Canadian Corps (I. Corps, Lieut ,-
General A. E, A, Holland) should extend the area of attack north-
wards as far as the left bank of the Souchez River, An additional
Army Corps (the XIIL Corps, Lieut .-General Sir W, N, Congreve)
was also at the disposal of the First Army in reserve.

The greater part of the divisions employed in the attack were
composed of troops drawn from the English counties. These, with
Scottish, Canadian, and South African troops, accomplished a most
striking success, 1

My plans provided for the co -operation of the Fourth and Fifth
Armies, under the command respectively of General Sir Henry S,
Rawlinson, and General Sir H, de la P, Gough, as soon as the
development of my main assault should permit of their effective
action,

The Method of Attack

13, The attack on the front of the Third and First Armies was
planned to be carried out by a succession of comparatively short
advances, the separate stages of which were arranged to correspond
approximately with the enemy's successive systems of defence. As
each stage was reached a short pause was to take place, to enable the
troops detailed for the attack on the next objective to form up for
the assault.

Tanks, which on many occasions since their first use in September
of last year had done excellent service, were attached to each Corps
for the assault, and again did admirable work in co-operation with our
infantry. Their assistance was particularly valuable in the capture
of hostile strong points, such as Telegraph Hill and the Harp, two
powerful redoubts situated to the south of Tilloy-lez-Mofflaines, and
Railway Triangle, a stronghold formed by the junction of the Lens
and Douai Lines east of Arras,

1 The disposition of our troops for the attack was as follows, from South to North :
Third Army
VIL Corps

2ist Div Maj.-Gen. D. G. M. Campbell.

30th Div. , Maj.-Gen. J. S. M. Shea.

56th Div Maj.-Gen. C. P. A. Hull.

I4th Div Maj.-Gen. V. A. Couper.

VI. Corps

3rd Div Maj.-Gen. C. J. Deverell.

1 2th Div Maj.-Gen. A. B. Scott.

i5th Div Maj.-Gen. F. W. N. McCracken,

with the

37th Div, , Maj.-Gen, H. B. Williams

going through.

Hft_ ^fff"^
^^HF* 1 *

" /jri,~

morning 9th April
evening

k., -*

BATTLE OF ARRAS ;

9th April, 1917.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 89

The Arras Battle

14, The general attack on the 9th April was launched at 5.30 a.m.
under cover of a most effective artillery barrage* Closely following
the tornado of our shell fire, our gallant infantry poured like a flood
across the German lines, overwhelming the enemy's garrisons*

Within forty minutes of the opening of the battle, practically the
whole of the German front line system on the front attacked had been
stormed and taken. Only on the extreme left fierce fighting was still
taking place for the possession of the enemy's trenches on the slopes
of Hill 145 at the northern end of the Vimy Ridge,

At 7,30 a.m. the advance was resumed against the second objec-
tives. Somewhat greater opposition was now encountered, and at
the hour at which these objectives were timed to have been captured
strong parties of the enemy were still holding out on the high ground
north of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines, known as Observation Ridge, and in
Railway Triangle.

North of the Scarpe, North-country and Scottish Territorial
troops (34th and 5ist Divisions), attacking east of Roclincourt, were
met by heavy machine gun fire. Their advance was delayed, but
not checked. On the left, the Canadians rapidly over-ran the German
positions, and by 9,30 a.m., in spite of difficult going over wet and
sticky ground, had carried the village of Les Tilleuls and La Folie
Farm.

By 12 noon men from the Eastern counties of England (i2th
Division) had captured Observation Ridge and, with the exception
of Railway Triangle, the whole of our second objectives were in our
possession, from south of Neuville Vitasse, stormed by London
Territorials (56th Division), to north of La Folie Farm. ; A large
number of prisoners had already been taken, including practically a
whole battalion of the i62nd German Regiment at the Harp.

XVII. Corps

gth Div Maj.-Gen. T. Lukin,

with the
4th Div. .... Maj.-Gen. Hon. W. Lambton

going through.
34th Div. .... Maj.-Gen. C. L. Nicholson.

5ist Div Maj.-Gen. G. M. Harper.

First Army
Canadian Corps

ist Cdn. Div. . . . Maj.-Gen. A. W. Currie.
and Cdn. Div. . . . Maj.-Gen. H. E. Burstall.
i3th Bde., 5th Div, . . Maj.-Gen. R. B. Stephens.
3rd Cdn. Div. . . . Maj.-Gen. L. J. Lipsett.
4th Cdn, Div. * . . Maj.-Gen. D. Watson.

90 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Meanwhile our artillery had begun to move forward to positions
from which they could support our attack upon our third objectives*
The enemy's determined resistance at Observation Ridge, however,
had delayed the advance of our batteries in this area. The bom-
bardment of the German third line on this front had consequently
to be carried out at long range, with the result that the enemy's wire
was not well cut*

None the less, when the advance was resumed, shortly after mid-
day, great progress was made all along the line* In the course of
this attack many of the enemy's battery positions were captured,
together with a large number of guns*

South of the Scarpe, Manchester and Liverpool troops (3Oth
Division) took St* Martin-sur-Cojeul, and our line was carried
forward between that point and Feuchy Chapel on the Arras-Cam-
brai road. Here a counter-attack was repulsed at 2*0 pm* by the
I2th Division, and at about the same hour Scottish troops (i5th
Division) carried Railway Triangle, after a long struggle* Thereafter
this division continued their advance rapidly and stormed Feuchy
Village, making a breach in the German third line. An attempt by
the 37th Division to widen this breach, and to advance beyond it in
the direction of Monchy-le-Preux, was held up for the time by the
condition of the enemy's wire*

North of the Scarpe our success was even more complete* Troops
from Scotland and South Africa (gth Division), who had already
stormed St* Laurent Blangy, captured Athies* They then gave
place, in accordance with programme, to an English division
(the 4th), who completed their task by the capture of Fampoux
Village and Hyderabad Redoubt, breaking another wide gap in the
German third line system* The North-country troops (34th Divi-
sion) on their left seized the strong work known as the Point du Jour,
in the face of strong hostile resistance from the German switch line
to the north.

Further north, the Canadian divisions, with an English brigade
(i3th Infantry Brigade, 5th Division) in the centre of their attack,
completed the capture of the Vimy Ridge from Commandant's
House to Hill 145, in spite of considerable opposition, especially in
the neighbourhood of Thelus and the high ground north of this
village. These positions were taken by 1*0 p.m*, and early in the
afternoon our final objectives in this area had been gained* Our
troops then dug themselves in on the eastern side of Farbus Wood
and along the steep eastern slopes of the ridge west and north-west
of Farbus, sending out cavalry and infantry patrols in the direction
of Willerval and along the front of their position*

The left Canadian division (the 4th), meanwhile, had gradu-

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 91

ally fought their way forward on Hill 145, in the face of a very
desperate resistance. The enemy defended this dominating position
with great obstinacy, and his garrison, reinforced from dug-outs and
underground tunnels, launched frequent counter-attacks. In view
of the severity of the fighting, it was decided to postpone the attack
upon the crest line until the following day,

At the end of the day, therefore, our troops were established
deeply in the enemy's positions on the whole front of attack. We
had gained a firm footing in the enemy's third line on both banks of
the Scarpe, and had made an important breach in the enemy's last
fully completed line of defence.

During the afternoon cavalry had been brought up to positions
east of Arras, in readiness to be sent forward should our infantry
succeed in widening this breach sufficiently for the operations of
mounted troops. South of Feuchy, however, the unbroken wire of
the German third line constituted a complete barrier to a cavalry
attack, while the commanding positions held by the enemy on
Monchy-le-Preux Hill blocked the way of advance along the Scarpe,
The main body of our mounted troops was accordingly withdrawn
in the evening to positions just west of the town. Smaller bodies of
cavalry were employed effectively during the afternoon on the right
bank of the Scarpe to maintain touch with our troops north of the
river, and captured a number of prisoners and guns.

The Advance Continued

15, For some days prior to the gth April the weather had been
fine, but on the morning of that day heavy showers had fallen, and in
the evening the weather definitely broke. Thereafter for many days
it continued stormy, with heavy falls of snow and squalls of wind and
rain. These conditions imposed great hardships on our troops and
greatly hampered operations. The heavy snow, in particular, inter-
fered with reliefs, and rendered all movements of troops and guns
slow and difficult. It would be hard to overestimate the importance
of the resultant delay in bringing up our guns, at a time when the
enemy had not yet been able to assemble his reserves, or to calculate
the influence which a further period of fine weather might have had
upon the course of the battle. 1

North of the Scarpe little remained to be done to complete the

1 The following passage in Ludendorff s Memoirs is of interest here : " The battle
near Arras on April gth formed a bad beginning to the capital fighting during this year.
April loth and the succeeding days were critical days. A breach 12,000 to 15,000 yards
wide, and as much as 6,000 yards or more in depth is not a thing to be mended without
more ado. It takes a good deal to repair the inordinate wastage of men and guns, as well
as munitions, that results from such a breach."

9 2 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

capture of our objectives. South of the river we still required to gain
the remainder of the German third line and Monchy-le-Preux,
Despite the severity of the weather, our troops set themselves with
the utmost gallantry to the accomplishment of these tasks.

During the night English troops feyth Division) made consider-
able progress through the gap in the German defences east of Feuchy
and occupied the northern slopes of Orange Hill, south-east of the
village.

Throughout the morning of the loth April every effort was made
to gain further ground through this gap, and our troops succeeded in
reaching the enclosures north-west of Monchy-le-Preux,

At noon the advance became general, and the capture of the
whole of the enemy's third-line system south of the Scarpe was com-
pleted. The progress of our right beyond this line was checked
by machine gun fire from the villages of Heninel, Wancourt and
Gue'mappe, with which our artillery were unable to deal effectively.
Between the Arras-Cambrai Road and the Scarpe, English and Scot-
tish troops (i2th and I5th Divisions) pushed on as far as the western
edge of Monchy-le-Preux. Here our advance was held up as a result
of the unavoidable weakness of our artillery support, and for the
same reason an attempt to pass cavalry south and north of Monchy-
le-Preux (3rd and 2nd Cavalry Divisions, Major-Generals J, Vaughan
and W, H, Greenly) and along the left bank of the Scarpe (ist Cavalry
Division, Major-General R, L, Mullens) proved impossible in the
face of the enemy's machine gun fire*

Meanwhile, on the left flank of our battle front the Canadians
had renewed their attack at 4,0 p,m, on the portion of Hill 145 still
remaining in the enemy's possession, and captured it after sharp
fighting, together with over 200 prisoners and a number of trench
mortars and machine guns.

Monchy-le-Preux

16, Heavy fighting, in which cavalry again took part, continued
south of the Scarpe on the nth April, Two English infantry brigades
(37th Division), acting in co-operation with cavalry (3rd Cavalry
Division), attacked Monchy-le-Preux at 5,0 am., and, after hard
fighting in which tanks arrived at an opportune moment, carried the
position. As our men pushed through the village, the enemy was
seen retreating eastwards over the open, and many casualties were
inflicted on him by our machine guns. By 9,0 a.m. the whole of
Monchy-le-Preux was in our hands, with a number of prisoners.
During the afternoon and evening several determined counter-
attacks were beaten off by our infantry and cavalry, assisted by the
fire of our artillery.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 93

On other parts of the front our attacks had to be made across
open forward slopes, which were swept from end to end by the
enemy's machine guns. The absence of adequate artillery support
again made itself felt, and little ground was gained.

In combination with this attack on the Third Army front, the
Fifth Army launched an attack at 4.30 a.m. on the nth April against
the Hindenburg Line in the neighbourhood of Bullecourt (4th
Australian Division and 62nd Division, Major-Generals W Holmes
and W. P. Braithwaite), The Australian and West Riding battalions
engaged showed great gallantry in executing a very difficult attack
across a wide extent of open country. Considerable progress was
made, and parties of Australian troops, preceded by tanks, pene-
trated the German positions as far as Riencourt-lez-Cagnicourt.
The obstinacy of the enemy's resistance, however, in H&iinel and
Wancourt, which held up the advance of the Third Army at these
points, prevented the troops of the two Armies from joining hands,
and the attacking troops of the Fifth Army were obliged to withdraw
to their original line*

Heninel, Wancourt and the Souchez River

17. On the 1 2th April the relief of a number of divisions most
heavily engaged was commenced, and on the same day the cavalry
were withdrawn to areas west of Arras. Great efforts were made to
bring forward guns, and, in spite of the difficulties presented by
weather and ground, several batteries of howitzers and heavy guns
reached positions in rear of the old German third line.

On this day our attacks upon Heninel and Wancourt were
renewed, and our troops (2ist and 56th Divisions) succeeded in
carrying both villages, as well as in completing the capture of the
Hindenburg Line for some 2,000 yards south of the Cojeul River.
North of the Scarpe attacks were made against Roeux Village and
the chemical works near Roeux Station, and proved the commence-
ment of many days of fierce and stubbornly-contested righting.

On our left flank operations of the First Army astride the Souchez
River met with complete success. Attacks were delivered simul-
taneously at 5.0 a.m. on the i2th April by English and Canadian
troops (4th Canadian Division and 24th Division, Major-General J.
E. Capper) against the two small hills known as the Pimple and the
Bois-en-Hache, situated on either side of the Souchez River. Both
of these positions were captured, with a number of prisoners and
machine guns. Steps were at once taken to consolidate our
gains, and patrols were pushed forward to maintain touch with the
enemy.

94 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Withdrawal of the Enemy

1 8. The results of this last success at once declared themselves*
Prior to its accomplishment there had been many signs that the
enemy was preparing to make strong counter-attacks from the direc-
tion of Givenchy and Hirondelle Woods to recover the Vimy Ridge.
The positions captured on the I2th April commanded both these
localities, and he was therefore compelled to abandon the under-
taking. His attitude in this neighbourhood forthwith ceased to be
aggressive, and indications of an immediate withdrawal from the
areas commanded by the Vimy Ridge multiplied rapidly.

The withdrawal commenced on the morning of the I3th April.
Before noon on that day Canadian patrols had succeeded in occupy-
ing the southern portion of Givenchy-en-Gohelle, had pushed
through Petit Vimy, and had reached the cross-roads 500 yards
north-east of the village. That afternoon English patrols north of
the Souchez River crossed No Man's Land and entered Angres,
while Canadian troops completed the occupation of Givenchy-en-
Gohelle and the German trench system east of it. Further south our
troops seized Petit Vimy and Vimy, and Willerval and Bailleul were
occupied in turn.

Our patrols, backed by supports, continued to push forward on
the I4th April, keeping contact with the retreating enemy, but avoid-
ing heavy fighting. By midday the general line of our advanced
troops ran from a point about 1,000 yards east of Bailleul, through
Mont Foret Quarries on the Farbus-Me'ricourt road, to the eastern
end of Hirondelle Wood. North of the river we had reached Riau-
mont Wood and the southern outskirts of Lievin. By the evening
the whole of the town of Lievin was in our hands, and our line ran
thence to our old front line north of the Double Grassier. Great
quantities of ammunition of all calibres, as well as several guns, and
stores and materials of every kind were abandoned by the enemy in
his retreat.

Meanwhile, on the i3th and I4th April, fighting south of the
Scarpe continued, and some progress was made in the face of strong
hostile resistance. On the right of our attack our troops (aist Divi-
sion) fought their way eastwards down the Hindenburg Line till
they had reached a point opposite Fontaine-lez-Croisilles, about
seven miles south-east of Arras. In the centre a Northumberland
brigade of the 5oth Division (Major-General P. S. Wilkinson),
advancing in open order, carried the high ground east of Heninel
and captured Wancourt Tower. Three counter-attacks against, this
position were successfully driven off, and further ground was gained
on the ridge south-east of Heninel.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917

On other parts of our line heavy counter-attacks developed on
the I4th April, the most violent of which were directed against
Mcnchy-le-Preux* The struggle for this important position (held by
the 29th Division, Major-General Sir H. de B. de Lisle) was exceed-
ingly fierce. The enemy's attacks were supported by the full weight
of his available artillery, and at one time parties of his infantry
reached the eastern defences of the village. To the south and the
north, however, our posts held their ground, and in the end the
enemy was completely repulsed, with great loss*

Results of First Attacks

19. Our advance had now reached a point at which the difficulty
of maintaining communications and of providing adequate artillery
support for our infantry began seriously to limit our progress. More-
over, the enemy had had time to bring up reserves and to recover
from the temporary disorganisation caused by our first attacks.
Both the increasing strength of his resistance and the weight and
promptness of his counter-attacks made it evident that, except at
excessive cost, our success could not be developed further without
a return to more deliberate methods.

Already a very remarkable success had been gained, whether
measured by our captures in territory, prisoners and guns, or judged
by the number of German divisions attracted to the front of our
attack.

At the end of six days' fighting our front had been rolled four
miles farther east, and all the dominating features, forming the im-
mediate objects of my attack, which I considered it desirable to hold
before transferring the bulk of my resources to the north, had passed
into our possession. So far, therefore, as my own plans were con-
cerned, it would have been possible to have stopped the Arras offen-
sive at this point, and, while maintaining a show of activity sufficient
to mislead the enemy as to my intentions, to have diverted forthwith
to the northern theatre of operations the troops, labour and material
required to complete my preparations there.

At this time, however, the French offensive was on the point of
being launched. 1 It was important that the full pressure of the
British offensive should be maintained in order to assist our Allies,
and that we might be ready to seize any opportunity which might
follow their success. Accordingly, active preparations were under-
taken to renew my attack, but, in view both of the weather and of
the strength already developed by the enemy, it was necessary to

1 The French attack was planned originally to follow within two or three days of
the first British attack, but it was postponed owing to weather conditions.
G

96 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

postpone operations until my communications had been re-estab-
lished and my artillery dispositions completed. The following week,
therefore, saw little change in our front, though the labours of our
troops continued incessantly under conditions demanding the
highest qualities of courage and endurance.

So far as my object was to draw the enemy's reserves from the
front of the French attack, much had already been accomplished*
In addition to the capture of more than 13,000 prisoners and over
200 guns, a wide gap had been driven through the German prepared
defences. The enemy had been compelled to pour in men and guns
to stop this gap, while he worked feverishly to complete the Drocourt-
Queant Line. Ten days after the opening of our offensive the number
of German infantry engaged on the front of our attack had been
nearly doubled, in spite of the casualties the enemy's troops had
sustained. The massing of such large forces within the range of
our guns, and the frequent and costly counter-attacks rendered
necessary by our successes, daily added to the enemy's losses.

Subsidiary Operations

20. In addition to the main attack east of Arras, successful minor
operations were carried out on the gth April by the Fourth and Fifth
Armies, by which a number of fortified villages covering the Hinden-
burg Line were taken, with some hundreds of prisoners, and con-
siderable progress was made in the direction of St. Quentin and
Cambrai.

Throughout the remainder of the month the two Southern Armies
maintained constant activity. By a succession of minor enterprises
our line was advanced closer and closer to the Hindenburg Line,
and the enemy was kept under the constant threat of more serious
operations on this front.

The only offensive action taken by the enemy during this period
in this area occurred on the i5th April. At 4.30 a.m. on that morn-
ing the enemy attacked our positions 1 from Hermies to Noreuil
with considerable forces, estimated at not less than sixteen battalions.
Heavy fighting took place, in the course of which parties of German
infantry succeeded in penetrating our lines at Lagnicourt for some
distance, and at one time reached our advanced battery positions.
By 1.0 p.m., however, the whole of our original line had been re-
established, and the enemy left some seventeen hundred dead on
the field as well as 360 prisoners in our hands. During the attack
our heavy batteries remained in action at very close range and
materially assisted in the enemy's repulse.

1 This front was then held by the ist Anzac Corps, Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917
The Attack Resumed. Guemappe and Gavrelle

21 . On the 1 6th April our Allies launched their main offensive on
the Aisne, and shortly after that date the weather on the Arras front
began to improve. Our preparations made more rapid progress, and
plans were made to deliver our next attack on the 2ist April, High
winds and indifferent visibility persisted, however, and so interfered
with the work of our artillery and aeroplanes that it was found neces-
sary to postpone operations for a further two days. Meanwhile local
fighting took place frequently, and our line was improved slightly at
a number of points.

At 445 a,m, on the 23rd April British troops attacked on a front
of about nine miles from Croisilles to Gavrelle, At the same hour a
minor operation was undertaken by us south-west of Lens,

On the main front of attack good progress was made at first at
almost all points. By 10,0 a,m, the remainder of the high ground
west of Cherisy had been captured by the attacking English brigades
(3Oth and 5oth Divisions), and Scottish troops (i5th Division) had
pushed through Guemappe, East of Monchy-le-Preux British
battalions (29th Division) gained the western slopes of the rising
ground known as Infantry Hill. North of the Scarpe Highland
Territorials (5ist Division) were engaged in heavy fighting on the
western outskirts of Roeux Wood and the chemical works. On their
left English county troops (37th Division) had reached the buildings
west of Roeux Station and gained the line of their objectives on the
western slopes of Greenland Hill, north of the railway. On the left
of our main attack the Royal Naval Division (63rd Division, Major-
General C, E, Laurie) had made rapid progress against Gavrelle,
and the whole of the village was already in their hands.

At midday and during the afternoon counter-attacks in great
force developed all along the line, and were repeated by the enemy
with the utmost determination, regardless of the heavy losses in-
flicted by our fire. Many of these counter-attacks were repulsed
after severe fighting, but on our right our troops were ultimately
compelled by weight of numbers to withdraw from the ridge west of
Cherisy and from Guemappe. North of the Scarpe fierce fighting
continued for the possession of Rceux, the chemical works and the
station to the north, but without producing any lasting change in
the situation. Not less than five separate counter-attacks were made
by the enemy on this day against Gavrelle, and on the 24th April he
thrice repeated his attempts. All these attacks were completely
crushed by our artillery barrage and machine gun fire.

As soon as it was clear that the whole of our objectives for the
23rd April had not been gained, orders were issued to renew the

9 8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

advance at 6,0 p*m* In this attack Gue*mappe was retaken, but further
south our troops were at once met by a counter-attack in force, and
made no progress. Fighting of a more or less intermittent character
continued in this area all night.

In the early morning of the 24th April the enemy's resistance
weakened all along the front of our attack south of the Arras-Cambrai
Road* Our troops reaped the reward of their persistence, and gained
their objectives of the previous day without serious opposition.

After twenty-four hours of very fierce fighting, therefore, in
which the severity of the enemy's casualties was in proportion to
the strength and determination of his numerous counter-attacks, we
remained in possession of the villages of Gue*mappe and Gavrelle, as
well as of the whole of the high ground overlooking Fontaine-lez-
Croisilles and Che'risy. Very appreciable progress had also been
made east of Monchy-le-Preux, on the left bank of the Scarpe, and
on Greenland Hill.

In the minor operation south-west of Lens Cornish troops (ist
D*C*L,L, 5th Division) established themselves on the railway loop
east of Cite* des Petits Bois, and succeeded in maintaining their
position in spite of numerous hostile counter-attacks.

In the course of these operations of the 23rd and 24th April we
captured a further 3,000 prisoners and a few guns. On the battle-
field, which remained in our possession, great numbers of German
dead testified to the costliness of the enemy's obstinate defence.

Policy of Subsequent Operations at Arras

22. The strength of the opposition encountered in the course of
this attack was in itself evidence that my offensive was fulfilling the
part designed for it in the Allied plans* As the result of the fighting
which had already taken place, twelve German divisions had been
withdrawn exhausted from the battle or were in process of relief* A
month after the commencement of our offensive the number of
German divisions so withdrawn had increased to twenty-three. On
the other hand, the strengthening of the enemy's forces opposite my
front necessarily brought about for the time being the characteristics
of a wearing-out battle.

On the Aisne and in Champagne, also, the French offensive had
met with very obstinate resistance. It was becoming clear that many
months of heavy fighting would be necessary before the enemy's
troops could be reduced to a condition which would permit of a
more rapid advance. None the less, very considerable results had
already been achieved, and our Allies continued their efforts against the
long plateau north of the Aisne traversed by the Chemin des Dames.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 99

In order to assist our Allies, I arranged that until their object
had been attained I would continue my operations at Arras, The
necessary readjustment of troops, guns and material required to
complete my preparations for my northern operations was accord-
ingly postponed, and preparations were undertaken for a repetition
of my attacks on the Arras front until such time as the results of the
French offensive should have declared themselves.

The Final Arras Attacks. Arleux

23. The first of these attacks was delivered on the 28th April on
a front of about eight miles north of Monchy~le-Preux. With a view
to economising my troops, my objectives were shallow, and for a like
reason, and also in order to give the appearance of an attack on a more
imposing scale, demonstrations were continued southwards to the
Arras- Cambrai Road and northwards to the Souchez River.

The assault was launched at 4.25 a.m. by British and Canadian
troops, and resulted in heavy fighting, which continued throughout
the greater part of the 28th and 29th April. The enemy delivered
counter-attack after counter-attack with the greatest determination
and most lavish expenditure of men. Our positions ai: Gavrelle
alone were again attacked seven times with strong forces, and on
each occasion the enemy was repulsed by the 63rd Division with
great loss.

In spite of the enemy's desperate resistance, the village of Arleux-
en-Gohelle was captured by Canadian troops (ist Canadian Division),
after bitter hand-to-hand fighting, and English troops (2nd Division,
Major-General C. E. Pereira) made further progress in the neigh-
bourhood of Oppy, on Greenland Hill feyth Division), and between
Monchy-le-Preux and the Scarpe (i2th Division). In addition to
these advances, another 1,000 German prisoners were taken by us
in the course of the two days* fighting.

Fresnoy

24. Five days later, at 3.45 a.m. on the 3rd May, another attack
was undertaken by us of a similar nature to that of the 28th April,
which in the character of the subsequent fighting it closely resembled.

In view of important operations which the French were to carry
out on the 5th May, I arranged for a considerable extension of my
active front. While the Third and First Armies attacked from
Fontaine-lez-Croisilles to Fresnoy, the Fifth Army launched a
second attack upon the Hindenburg Line in the neighbourhood of
Bullecourt. This gave a total front of over sixteen miles.

ioo SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Along practically the whole of this front our troops broke into
the enemy's position* Australian troops (and Australian Division,
Major-General N. M. Smyth) carried the Hindenburg Line east of
Bullecourt. Eastern county battalions took Cherisy (i8th Division,
Major-General R. P. Lee). Other English troops entered Roeux (4th
Division) and captured the German trenches south of Fresnoy (and
Division). Canadian battalions (ist Canadian Division) found
Fresnoy full of German troops assembled for a hostile attack which
was to have been delivered at a later hour. After hard righting, in
which the enemy lost heavily, the Canadians carried the village,
thereby completing an unbroken series of successes.

Later in the day, strong hostile counter-attacks once more de-
veloped, accompanied by an intense bombardment with heavy guns.
Fierce righting lasted throughout the afternoon and far into the night,
and our troops were obliged to withdraw from Roeux and Cherisy.
They maintained their hold, however, on Fresnoy and the Hinden-
burg Line east of Bullecourt, as well as upon certain trench elements
west of Fontaine-lez-Croisilles and south of the Scarpe (i2th Division).

Nine hundred and sixty-eight prisoners, including twenty-nine
officers, were captured by us in these operations.

Situation Reviewed

25. On the 5th May the French delivered their attack against the
Chemin des Dames and successfully achieved the objects they had
in view. This brought to an end the first half of our general plan,
and marked the close of the spring campaign on the Western front.
The decisive action which it had been hoped might follow from the
French offensive had not yet proved capable of realisation ; but the
magnitude of the results actually achieved strengthened our belief
in its ultimate possibility. 1

On the British front alone, in less than one month's fighting, we
had captured over 19,500 prisoners, including over 400 officers, and
had also taken 257 guns, including 98 heavy guns, with 464 machine
guns, 227 trench mortars, and immense quantities of other war
material. Our line had been advanced to a greatest depth exceeding
five miles on a total front of over twenty miles, representing a gain of
some sixty square miles of territory. A great improvement had been
effected in the general situation of our troops on the front attacked,

1 The agreement to give immediate effect to the British plan of a Northern offensive
was reached at a Conference held at Paris on the 4th and 5th May. This marked the
abandonment of General Nivelle's plan, and ten days later that General was replaced
by General Petain.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 101

and the capture of the Vimy Ridge had removed a constant menace
to the security of our line*

I was at length able to turn my full attention and to divert the
bulk of my resources to the development of my northern plan of
operations. Immediate instructions were given by me to General
Sir Herbert Plumer, commanding the Second Army, to be prepared
to deliver an attack on the yth June against the Messines-Wytschaete
Ridge, the capture of which, owing to the observation from it over
our positions farther north in the Ypres salient, was an essential
preliminary to the completion of the preparations for my principal
offensive east and north of Ypres,

In order to assist me to concentrate troops on the new scene of
operations, it was agreed that the French should take over once more
a portion of the front taken over by me from them at the commence-
ment of the year. This relief was completed without incident on
the soth May, the French extending their front to the Omignon River,

Arras Activity Maintained

26, A necessary part of the preparations for the Messines attack
was the maintenance of activity on the Arras front, sufficient to keep
the enemy in doubt as to whether our offensive there would be pro-
ceeded with, I therefore directed the Armies concerned to continue
active operations with such forces as were left to them. The re-
quired effect was to be attained by a careful selection of important
objectives of a limited nature, deliberate preparation of attack, con-
centration of artillery and economy of infantry.

Importance was to be given to these operations by combining
them with feint attacks, and by the adoption of various measures and
devices to extend the apparent front of attack. These measures
would seem to have had considerable success, if any weight may be
attached to the enemy's reports concerning them. They involved,
however, the disadvantage that I frequently found myself unable to
deny German accounts of the bloody repulse of extensive British
attacks which in fact never took place, 1

1 The most noteworthy of these feint attacks was that of the 2,8th June on the Lens
front, referred to on page no below. On this occasion large numbers of dummy men
and some dummy tanks were employed, being raised up at zero hour by pulling ropes.
These dummies drew a very heavy fire and were shot to pieces. The Germans duly
reported that an attack had been annihilated, and that rows of British dead could be
seen lying before our lines ! The impression of a great British attack was further height-
ened by the fact that about this date the First Army held their Horse Show. This
involved much road traffic which might be taken by the enemy to indicate the con-
centration of troops in preparation for an attack.

102 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Bullecourt and Rceux

27. To secure the footing gained by the Australians in the Hin-
denburg Line on the 3rd May it was advisable that Bullecourt should
be captured without loss of time. During the fortnight following our
attack, fighting for the possession of this village went on unceasingly ;
while the Australian troops * in the sector of the Hindenburg Line
to the east beat off counter-attack after counter-attack. The defence
of this 1,000 yards of double trench line, exposed to counter-attack
on every side, through two weeks of almost constant fighting, de-
serves to be remembered as a most gallant feat of arms,

On the morning of the yth May, English troops (yth Division,
Major-General T, H, Shoubridge) gained a footing in the south-
east corner of Bullecourt, Thereafter gradual progress was made, in
the face of the most obstinate resistance, and on the lyth May
London and West Riding Territorials 2 completed the capture of
the village,

On other parts of the Arras front also heavy fighting took place,
in which we both lost and gained ground.

On the 8th May the enemy regained Fresnoy Village, Three days
later London troops (56th Division) captured Cavalry Farm, while
other English battalions (4th Division) carried Roeux Cemetery and
the chemical works. Further ground was gained in this neighbour-
hood on the 1 2th May, and on the night of the 1 3th/ 1 4th our troops
(5ist Division) captured RCEUX.

On the 2oth May fighting was commenced by the 33rd Division
(Major-General R. J, Pinney) for the sector of the Hindenburg Line
lying between Bullecourt and our front line west of Fontaine-lez-
Croisilles. Steady progress was made, until by the i6th June touch
had been established by us between these two points. Ten days
prior to this event, on the 5th and 6th June, Scottish and North-
country regiments (gth and 34th Divisions) captured the German
positions on the western face of Greenland Hill and beat off two
counter-attacks.

In these different minor operations over 1,500 prisoners were
captured by us,

1 ist, and and 5th Australian Divisions, Major-Generals H. B. Walker and
J. J. T. Hobbs commanding respectively the ist and 5th Australian Divisions.

1 58th and 62nd Divisions, Major-General H. D, Fanshawe commanding the s8th
Division.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 103

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN
Preparations for the Messines Attack

28. The preparations for the attack on the Messines-Wytschaete
Ridge were necessarily as elaborate as those undertaken before either
the Somme or the Arras Battles, and demanded an equal amount of
time, forethought and labour* They were carried out, moreover,
under circumstances of exceptional difficulty, for the enemy's posi-
tions completely overlooked our lines, and much of the area behind
them.

Neither labour nor material were available in sufficient quantity
for the Messines offensive until the prior demands of the Arras
operations had been satisfied. Nevertheless, our preparations in the
northern area had been proceeded with steadily, so far as the means
at our disposal would allow, ever since the formation of definite
plans in the late autumn of 1916,

A large railway programme had been commenced, and as soon as
it was possible to divert larger supplies northwards, work was pushed
on with remarkable speed. Great progress was made with road con-
struction, and certain roads were selected for extension as soon as
our objectives should be gained. Forward dumps of material were
made for this purpose, and in the days following the yth June roads
were carried forward with great rapidity to Messines, Wytschaete,
and Oosttaverne, across country so completely destroyed by shell
fire that it was difficult to trace where the original road had run.

A special problem arose in connection with the water supply.
Pipe lines were taken well forward from existing lakes, from catch
pits constructed on the Kemmel Hills, and from sterilising barges on
the Lys. Provision was made for the rapid extension of these lines.
By the I5th June they had reached Messines, Wytschaete and the
Dam Strasse, and were supplying water at the rate of between 450,000
and 600,000 gallons daily.

In addition, arrangements were made for the transport of water,
rations and stores by pack animals and carrying parties. So effi-
ciently did these arrangements work that during the attack water
reached the troops within twenty to forty minutes of the taking of
new positions, while in one case carrying parties arrived with packs,
and dumps were formed within four minutes of the capture of the
objective.

Underground Warfare

29, A special feature of the attack on the Messines-Wytschaete
Ridge, and one unique in warfare, was furnished by the explosion of
nineteen deep mines at the moment of assault.

104 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

The inception of a deep mining offensive on the Second Army
front dated from July, 1915 ; but the proposal to conduct offensive
mining on a grand scale was not definitely adopted till January, 1916.
From that date onwards, as the necessary labour became available,
deep mining for offensive purposes gradually developed, in spite of
great difficulties from water-bearing strata and active counter-mining
by the enemy*

In all, twenty-four mines were constructed, four of which were
outside the front ultimately selected for our offensive, while one
other was lost as the result of a mine blown by the enemy. Many of
these mines had been completed for twelve months prior to our
offensive, and constant and anxious work was needed to ensure their
safety. The enemy also had a deep mining system, and was aware
of his danger.

At Hill 60 continuous underground fighting took place for over
ten months prior to our attack, and only by the greatest skill, per-
sistence and disregard of danger on the part of our tunnellers were
the two mines laid by us at this point saved from destruction. At the
time of our offensive the enemy was known to be driving a gallery
which ultimately would have cut into the gallery leading to the
Hill 60 mines. By careful listening it was judged that, if our offensive
took place on the date arranged, the enemy's gallery would just fail
to reach us. So he was allowed to proceed*

At the Bluff, also, underground fighting went on incessantly.
Between the i6th January, 1916, and the yth June, 1917, twenty-
seven camouflets were blown in this locality alone, of which seven-
teen were blown by us and ten by the enemy. After the ist February,
1917, the enemy showed signs of great uneasiness, and blew several
heavy mines and camouflets in the endeavour to interfere with our
working. One of these blows destroyed our gallery to the Span-
broekmolen mine. For three months this mine was cut off, and was
only recovered by strenuous efforts on the day preceding the Messines
attack. The Spanbroekmolen mine formed the largest crater of any
of those blown, the area of complete obliteration having a diameter
of over 140 yards.

A total of 8,000 yards of gallery were driven in the construction
of these mines, and over one million pounds of explosives were used
in them. The simultaneous discharge of such an enormous aggregate
of explosive is without parallel in land mining, and no actual experi-
ence existed of the effects which would be produced. In these
circumstances, the fact that no hitch of any kind occurred in the
operation, and that the effects of the discharges were precisely
such as had been foretold, reflects the very highest credit upon those
responsible for the planning and construction of the mines.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 105

The Messines Battle. Description of Front *

30. The group of hills known as the Messines-Wytschaete
Ridge lies about midway between the towns of Armentieres and
Ypres* Situated at the eastern end of the range of abrupt, isolated
hills which divides the valleys of the River Lys and the River Yser,
it links up that range with the line of rising ground which from
Wytschaete stretches north-eastwards to the Ypres-Menin road, and
then northwards past Passchendaele to Staden.

The village of Messinss, situated on the southern spur of the
ridge, commands a wide view of the valley of the Lys, and enfiladed
the British lines to the south. North-west of Messines the village of
Wytschaete, situated at the point of the salient and on the highest
part of the ridge, from its height of about 260 feet commands even
more completely the town of Ypres and the whole of the old British
positions in the Ypres salient*

The German Defences

31. The German front line skirted the western foot of the ridge
in a deep curve from the River Lys opposite Frelinghien to a point
just short of the Menin road. The line of trenches then turned north-
west past Hooge and Wieltje, following the slight rise known as the
Pilckem Ridge to the Yser Canal at Boesinghe. The enemy's second
line system followed the crest of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge,
forming an inner curve.

In addition to these defences of the ridge itself, two chord posi-
tions had been constructed across the base of the salient from south
to north. The first lay slightly to the east of the hamlet of Oostta-
verne, and was known as the Oosttaverne Line. The second chord
position, known as the Warneton Line, crossed the Lys at Warneton,
and ran roughly parallel to the Oosttaverne Line a little more than a
mile to the east of it.

The natural advantages of the position were exceptional, and
during more than two years of occupation the enemy had devoted
the greatest skill and industry to developing them to the utmost.
Besides the villages of Messines and Wytschaete, which were
organised as main centres of resistance, numerous woods, farms
and hamlets lent themselves to the construction of defensive points.

Captured documents and the statements of prisoners proved the
importance attached by the enemy to the position. His troops in the
line were told that the coming battle might well prove decisive, and

1 Vide Map No. 4.

106 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

that they were to resist to the last. They were assured that strong
reserves were available to come to their assistance and to restore the
battle should the British attack succeed in penetrating their lines.

Preparations Completed

32. The final preparations for the assault on the Messines-
Wytschaete Ridge were completed punctually, and with a thorough-
ness of organisation and attention to detail which is beyond praise.
The excellence of the arrangements reflects the highest credit on the
Second Army Commander, General Sir Herbert Plumer, and his
Staff, as well as on the Commanders and Staffs of the various
formations engaged.

The actual front selected for attack extended from a point opposite
St. Yves to Mount Sorrel inclusive, a distance following the curve of
the salient of between nine and ten miles. Our final objective was
the Oosttaverne Line, which lay between these two points. The
greatest depth of our attack was therefore about two and a half miles.

As the date for the attack drew near fine weather favoured the
work of our airmen and artillery, and wire cutting, the bombardment
of the enemy's defences and strong points, and the shelling of his
communications, billets and back areas continued steadily. Counter-
battery work was undertaken with great energy and with striking
success.

The Assault

33. At 3,10 a.m, on the yth June the nineteen mines were
exploded simultaneously beneath the enemy's defences. At the same
moment our guns opened and our infantry assault was launched.
Covered by a concentrated bombardment, which overwhelmed the
enemy's trenches and to a great extent neutralised his batteries, our
troops swept over the German foremost defences all along the line.

The attack proceeded from the commencement in almost exact
accordance with the time-table. The enemy's first trench system
offered little resistance to our advance, and the attacking brigades
English, Irish, Australian and New Zealand 1 pressed on up the
slopes of the ridge to the assault of the crest line.

1 The arrangement of our troops from south to north was as follows :
//. Anzac Corps . . . Lt.-Gen. Sir A. J. Godley.
3rd Aust. Div. . . . Maj.-Gen. J. Monash.

N.Z. Div Maj.-Gen. Sir A. H. Russell.

25th Div Maj.-Gen. E. G. T. Bainbridge.

In support

4th Aust. Div. . . . Maj.-Gen. W. Holmes.

BATTLE OF MESSINES ;
yth June, 1917.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 107

At 5.30 a.m. Ulster regiments (36th Division) had already reached
their second objectives, including 1'Enfer Hill and the southern
defences of Wytschaete, while on their left a South of Ireland divi-
sion (i6th Division) fought their way through Wytschaete Wood.
At 7.0 a.m. New Zealand troops had captured Messines. Men from
the western counties of England (igth Division) had cleared the
Grand Bois. Other English county regiments (4ist Division) had
reached the Dam Strasse, and all along the battle front our second
objectives had been gained.

Only at a few isolated points did the resistance of the enemy's
infantry cause any serious delay. North-east of Messines our in-
fantry (New Zealand Division) were held up for a time by machine
gun fire from a strong point known as Fanny's Farm, but the arrival
of a tank enabled our progress to be resumed. So rapid was the
advance of our infantry, however, that only a few tanks could get
forward in time to come into action. Heavy fighting took place
in Wytschaete, and further north London troops (47th Division)
encountered a serious obstacle in another strong point known as the
White Chateau. This redoubt was captured while the morning was
yet young, and before midday the two Irish divisions had fought
their way side by side through the defences of Wytschaete.

Our troops then began to move down the eastern slopes of the
ridge, and the divisions in the centre of our attack who had farthest
to go, gradually drew level with those on either flank. About 2,000
prisoners had already been brought in, and Australian and English
troops had reached the first of the enemy's guns. Our own guns had
begun to move forward.

Further fighting took place in Ravine Wood, where English
county regiments and London troops (4ist and 47th Divisions)
killed many Germans, and short-lived resistance was encountered at
other points among the many woods and farm houses. Bodies of the
enemy continued to hold out in the eastern end of Battle Wood and
in strong points constructed in the spoil-banks of the Ypres-Comines

IX. Corps .... Lt.-Gen. A. Hamilton-Gordon.

36th Div Maj.-Gen. O. S. W. Nugent.

i6thDiv Maj.-Gen. W. B. Hickie.

igth Div. . Maj.-Gen. G. T. M. Bridges.

In support

nth Div Maj.-Gen. H. R. Davies.

X. Corps .... Lt.-Gen. Sir T. L. N. Morland.
4ist Div. .... Maj.-Gen. S. T. B. Lawford.
47th Div. .... Maj.-Gen. Sir G. F. Gorringc.
asrd Div. .... Maj.-Gen. Sir J. M. Babington.
In support

34th Div. .... Maj.-Gen. L. J. Bols.

io8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Canal. Except at these points, our troops gained their final objectives
on both flanks early in the afternoon* In the centre we had reached
a position running approximately parallel to the Oosttaverne Line
and from 400 to 800 yards to the west of it. The guns required for
the attack upon this line had been brought forward, and the troops
and tanks detailed to take part were moving up steadily* Meanwhile
the bridges and roads leading out of the triangle formed by the River
Lys and the canal were kept under the fire of our artillery.

The final attack began soon afterwards, and by 345 p.m. the
village of Oosttaverne had been captured. At 4.0 p.m. troops from
the northern and western counties of England (nth and igth Divi-
sions) entered the Oosttaverne Line east of the village and captured
two batteries of German field guns. Half an hour later other English
battalions (24th Division) broke through the enemy's position further
north. Parties of the enemy were surrendering freely, and his casual-
ties were reported to be very heavy. By the evening the Oosttaverne
Line had been taken, and our objectives had been gained.

The rapidity with which the attack had been carried through,
and the destruction caused by our artillery, made it impossible at
first to form more than a rough estimate of our captures. When the
final reckoning had been completed, it was found that they included
7,200 prisoners, 67 guns, 94 trench mortars and 294 machine guns.

Subsequent Operations

34. During the night our infantry consolidated the captured
positions ; while tanks patrolled the ground east of the Oosttaverne
Line, and in the early morning of the 8th June assisted in the repulse
of an enemy counter-attack up the Wambeke valley. At 4.0 a.m. on
the same morning our troops captured a small portion of German
trench near Septieme Barn, where the enemy had resisted our first
attack. That evening, at 7.0 p.m., after an intense bombardment, the
enemy counter-attacked along practically the whole of our new line,
but was repulsed at all points.

Consolidation and the establishment of advanced posts continued
during the following four days, in the course of which Australian
troops captured La Potterie Farm, south-east of Messines, and the
hamlet of Gapaard was occupied.

Our progress on the right of the battle front made the enemy's
positions between the Lys River and St. Yves very dangerous, and
he now gradually began to evacuate them. Our patrols kept close
touch with the enemy, and by the evening of the i4th June the whole
of the old German front and support lines north of the Lys had
passed into our possession.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 109

That evening we again attacked south and east of Messines and
on both sides of the Ypres-Comines Canal, and met with complete
success* The strong points in which the enemy had held out north
of the canal were captured, and our line was advanced on practically
the whole front from the River Warnave to Klein Zillebeke.

By this operation the Second Army front was pushed forward as
far as was then desirable. Henceforward our efforts in this area
were directed to putting the line gained in a state of defence and
establishing forward posts.

The Northern Operations. Preparations Renewed

35. As soon as this preliminary operation had been successfully
accomplished, it became possible to take in hand our final disposi-
tions for our main offensive east and north of Ypres. Owing to the
great extent of front to be dealt with, the Fifth Army took over com-
mand of the front from Observatory Ridge to Boesinghe on the
loth June, and the whole of our available resources were directed to
completing the preparations for the attack*

It had been agreed that French troops should take part in these
operations, and should extend my left flank northwards beyond
Boesinghe* The relief by British troops of the French troops holding
the coast sector from St. Georges to the sea was accordingly arranged
for, and was successfully completed ten days later. In the first week
of July the Belgian troops holding the front from Boesinghe to
Noordschoote were relieved by the First French Army, under the
command of General Anthoine.

The various problems inseparable from the mounting of a great
offensive, the improvement and construction of roads and railways,
the provision of an adequate water supply and of accommodation for
troops, the formation of dumps, the digging of dug-outs, subways
and trenches, and the assembling and registering of guns, had all to
be met and overcome in the new theatre of battle, under conditions
of more than ordinary disadvantage.

On no previous occasion, not excepting the attack on the Messines-
Wytschaete Ridge, had the whole of the ground from which we had
to attack been so completely exposed to the enemy's observation.
Even after the enemy had been driven from the Messines- Wytschaete
Ridge, he still possessed excellent direct observation over the salient
from the east and south-east, as well as from the Pilckem Ridge to
the north. Nothing existed at Ypres to correspond with the vast
caves and cellars which proved of such value in the days prior to the
Arras battle, and the provision of shelter for the troops presented a
very serious problem.

The work of the Tunnelling Companies of the Royal Engineers

no SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

deserves special mention in this connection. It was carried on under
great difficulties, both from the unreliable nature of the ground and
also from hostile artillery, which paid particular attention to all
indications of mining activity on our part,

Minor Operations Continued

36. Meanwhile the policy of maintaining activity on other parts
of my front was continued*

Further ground was gained on Greenland Hill, and on the
I4th June British troops (3rd Division) captured by a surprise
attack the German trench lines on the crest of Infantry Hill, east of
Monchy-le-Preux, with 175 prisoners. This important position had
already been the scene of a great deal of fierce fighting, and during
the following six weeks was frequently counter-attacked. Our
advanced posts changed hands frequently; but the principal line,
giving the observation which lent importance to the position,
remained consistently in our possession.

Early in May local attacks had been undertaken by Canadian
troops in the neighbourhood of the Souchez River, which formed
the prelude to a long-sustained series of minor operations directed
against the defence of Lens. Substantial progress was made in this
area on the 5th and igth June, and five days later North Midland
troops (46th Division, Major-General W. Thwaites) captured an
important position on the slopes of a small hill south-west of Lens,
forcing the enemy to make a considerable withdrawal on both sides
of the river. Canadian troops (3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions) took
La Coulotte on the 26th June, and by the morning of the 28th June
had reached the outskirts of Avion*

On the evening of the 28th June a deliberate and carefully-
thought-out scheme was put into operation by the First Army, to
give the enemy the impression that he was being attacked on a
twelve-mile front from Gavrelle to Hulluch. 1

Elaborate demonstrations were made on the whole of this front,
accompanied by discharges of gas, smoke and thermit, and a mock
raid was successfully carried out south-east of Loos. At the same
time real attacks were made, with complete success, by English
troops (3ist Division, Major-General R. Wanless O'Gowan, and the
5th Division) on a front of 2,000 yards opposite Oppy, and by Cana-
dian and North Midland troops (3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions,
and the 46th Division) on a front of two and a half miles astride the
Souchez River. All our objectives were gained, including Eleu dit
Leauvette and the southern half of Avion, with some 300 prisoners
and a number of machine guns.

1 See previous footnote on page 101 above.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 in

The Lombartzyde Attack

37. The appearance of British troops on the coast seems to have
alarmed the enemy and caused him to launch a small counter-
offensive* 1

The positions which we had taken over from the French in this
area included a narrow strip of polder and dune, some two miles in
length and from 600 to 1,200 yards in depth, lying on the right
bank of the canalised Yser between the Plasschendaele Canal, south
of Lombartzyde, and the coast, Midway between the Plasschen-
daele Canal and the sea these positions were divided into two parts
by the dyke known as the Geleide Creek, which flows into the Yser
south-west of Lombartzyde, If the enemy could succeed in driving
us back across the canal and river on the whole of this front, he
would render the defence of the sector much easier for him.

Early on the morning of the loth July an intense bombardment
was opened against these positions, held by the ist Division (Major-
General E. P. Strickland) and the 32nd Division (Major-General
C. D. Shute). Our defences, which consisted chiefly of breastworks
built in the sand, were flattened, and all the bridges across the Yser
below the Geleide Creek, as well as the bridges across the creek
itself, were destroyed,

At 6.30 p,m. the enemy's infantry attacked, and the isolated
garrison of our positions north of the Geleide Creek, consisting of
troops from a Northamptonshire battalion and a Rifle battalion,*
were overwhelmed after an obstinate and most gallant resistance.
Of these two battalions some seventy men and four officers suc-
ceeded during the nights of the loth/nth and nth/i2th July in
swimming across the Yser to our lines.

On the southern half of the point attacked, opposite Lombartzyde,
the enemy also broke into our lines ; but here, where our positions
had greater depth and communication across the Yser was still
possible, his troops were ejected by our counter-attack.

THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
Preliminary Stages

38, By this date the preparations for the combined Allied offensive
were far advanced, and the initial stages of the battle had already begun.

A definite aerial offensive had been launched, and the effective
1 The Germans were not altogether wrong in their appreciation of the situation.
Had the weather permitted the Ypres offensive to proceed more rapidly, it had been
intended to develop offensive operations also along the coast. Subsequent events made
it necessary to abandon this plan, though the enemy's attack at Lombartzyde had failed
to deprive us of a sufficient bridgehead.

* ist Battalion Northampton Regiment and 2nd Battalion K.R.R.C., ist Division.

ii2 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

work of our airmen once more enabled our batteries to carry out
successfully a methodical and comprehensive artillery programme*

So effective was our counter-battery work, that the enemy com-
menced to withdraw his guns to places of greater security. On this
account, and also for other reasons, the date of our attack, which
had been fixed for the 25th July, was postponed for three days.
This postponement enabled a portion of our own guns to be moved
farther forward, and gave our airmen the opportunity to locate
accurately the enemy's new battery positions* Subsequently a
succession of days of bad visibility, combined with the difficulties ex-
perienced by our Allies in getting their guns into position in their new
area, decided me to sanction a further postponement until the 3ist July.

In addition to our artillery bombardment, gas was used exten-
sively during the fortnight preceding the attack, and a number of
highly successful raids were carried out along the whole front north
of the Lys.

The Yser Canal Crossed

39* As the date of the attack drew near, careful watch was main-
tained lest the enemy should endeavour to disarrange our plans by
withdrawing to one of his rear lines of defence* On the 2yth July the
German forward defence system was found to be unoccupied on the
northern portion of the Fifth Army front* British Guards and French
troops seized the opportunity to cross the Yser Canal, and established
themselves firmly in the enemy's first and support trenches on a
front of about 3,000 yards east and north of Boesinghe* All hostile
attempts to eject them failed, and during the night seventeen bridges
were thrown across the canal by our troops*

This operation greatly facilitated the task of the Allied troops on
this part of the battle front, to whose attack the Yser Canal had pre-
viously presented a formidable obstacle* Whether the withdrawal
which made it possible was due to the desire of the German infantry
to escape our bombardment, or to their fear that our attack would be
inaugurated by the explosion of a new series of mines, is uncertain.

Plan of First Attack

40. The front of the Allied attack extended from the Lys River
opposite Deulemont northwards to beyond Steenstraat, a distance
of over fifteen miles, but the main blow was to be delivered by the
Fifth Army on a front of about seven and a half miles, from the
Zillebeke-Zandvoorde Road to Boesinghe, inclusive*

Covering the right of the Fifth Army, the task of the Second
Army was to advance a short distance only* Its principal object at
this stage was to increase the area threatened by the attack and so

i ^-- -^v* t ^- -T

. *l^\Uw^^.I '*^Tsiti?^

THIRD YPRES BATTLE ;

Attack of 3 ist July, 1917.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 113

force the enemy to distribute the fire of his artillery. I had other
tasks in view for it at a later period* 1

On the left of the Fifth Army the First French Army was to
advance its right in close touch with the British forces and secure
them from counter-attack from the north. This entailed an advance
of considerable depth over difficult country, and ultimately involved
the capture of the whole peninsula lying between the Yser Canal
and the floods of the St. Jansbeek and the Martjevaart.

The plan of attack on the Fifth Army front was to advance in a
series of bounds, with which the right of the First French Army
was to keep step. These bounds were arranged so as to suit as far as
possible both the position of the principal lines of the enemy's
defences and the configuration of the ground.

It was hoped that in this first attack our troops would succeed in
establishing themselves on the crest of the high ground east of Ypres,
on which a strong flank could be formed for subsequent operations,
and would also secure the crossings of the Steenbeek. For this
purpose four Army Corps were placed at the disposal of General
Sir Hubert Gough: namely, the II. Corps, Lieut.-General Sir
C. W. Jacob ; the XIV. Corps, Lieut.-General F. R., Earl of Cavan ;
the XVIII. and XIX. Corps.

The Battle Opened

41. At 3.50 a.m. on the morning of the 3ist July the combined
attack was launched. English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh troops
delivered the main assault on the British front. 2

1 Had our attack made more rapid progress, the Second Army would have taken
an immediate part in our operations, on much the same lines as the attacks actually
carried out by the Second Army in the autumn of 1918,

* The disposition of the attacking troops of the Fifth Army was as follows, from
south to north :
//. Corps

24th Div Maj.-Gen. L. J. Bols.

30th Div. .... Maj.-Gen. W. de L. Williams,
with a Brigade of the

iSthDiv Maj.-Gen. R. P. Lee

going through.

8th Div Maj.-Gen. W. C. G. Heneker.

XIX Corps

1 5th Div Maj.-Gen. H. F. Thuillier.

55th Div. .... Maj.-Gen. H. S. Jeudwine.
XVIIL Corps

39th Div. .... Maj.-Gen. G. J. Cuthbert.
5ist Div. . . . . Maj.-Gen. G. M. Harper.
XIV. Corps

38th Div Maj.-Gen. C. G. Blackader.

Guards Div. .... Maj.-Gen. G. P. T. Feilding.

ii4 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Preceded at zero hour by discharges of thermit and oil drums,
and covered by an accurate artillery barrage from a great number of
guns, the Allied infantry entered the German lines at all points. The
enemy's barrage was late and weak, and our casualties were light*

On the greater part of the front of the main attack the resistance
of the German infantry was quickly overcome and rapid progress
was made. The difficult country east of Ypres, where the Menin
Road crosses the crest of the Wytschaete-Passchendaele Ridge,
formed, however, the key to the enemy's position, and here the most
determined opposition was encountered. None the less, the attacking
brigades, including a number of Lancashire battalions, regiments
from all parts of England and a few Scottish and Irish battalions
(24th, 3oth and 8th Divisions), fought their way steadily forward
through Shrewsbury Forest and Sanctuary Wood and captured
Stirling Castle, Hooge and the Bellewaarde Ridge.

Farther north, British and French troops carried the whole of the
first German trench system with scarcely a check, and proceeded in
accordance with the time-table to the assault of the enemy's second
line of defence. Scottish troops (i5th Division) took Verlorenhoek,
and, continuing their advance, by 6.0 a.m. had reached Frezenberg,
where for a short time stiff fighting took place before the village and
the strong defences round it were captured. South of Pilckem a
Prussian Guard battalion was broken up by Welsh troops (38th
Division) after a brief resistance, and Pilckem was taken. Sharp
fighting occurred also at a number of other points, but in every
instance the enemy's opposition was overcome.

At 9.0 a.m. the whole of our second objectives north of the Ypres-
Roulers Railway were in our possession, with the exception of a
strong point north of Frezenberg, known as Pommern Redoubt,
where fighting was still going on. Within an hour this redoubt also
had been captured by West Lancashire Territorials (55th Division).
On our left French troops made equal progress, capturing their
objective in precise accordance with programme and with little loss.

By this time our field artillery had begun to move up, and by
9.30 a.m. a number of batteries were already in action in their for-
ward positions. The Allied advance on this portion of our front was
resumed at the hour planned. English county troops (39th Division)
captured St. Julien, and from that point northwards our final objec-
tives were reached and passed. Highland Territorials (5ist Division),
Welsh and Guards battalions secured the crossings of the Steenbeek,
and French troops, having also taken their final objectives, advanced
beyond them and seized Bixschoote. A hostile counter-attack
launched against the point of junction of the French and British
Armies was completely repulsed.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 115

Meanwhile, south of the Ypres-Roulers Railway, Very heavy and
continuous fighting was taking place on both sides of the Menin Road.

After the capture of the German first line system our troops on
this part of our front had advanced in time with the divisions on
their left against their second objectives. Great opposition was at
once encountered in front of two small woods known as Inverness
Copse and Glencorse Wood, while further south a strong point in
Shrewsbury Forest held out against our attacks till the morning
of the ist August. North of Glencorse Wood English troops
(8th Division) continued their advance in spite of the enemy's
resistance, and reached the village of Westhoek.

Later in the day heavy counter-attacks began to develop from
south of the Menin Road northwards to St. Julien. Our artillery
caused great loss to the enemy in these attacks, although the weather
was unfavourable for aeroplane work and observation for our bat-
teries was difficult. At Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood a few
tanks succeeded in reaching the fighting line, in spite of exceedingly
bad ground, and came into action with our infantry* Fierce fighting
took place all day, but the enemy was unable to shake our hold upon
the ridge.

Results of First Day

42. At the end of the day, therefore, our troops on the Fifth
Army front had carried the German first system of defence south of
Westhoek. Except at Westhoek itself, where they were established
on the outskirts of the village, they had already gained the whole of
the crest of the ridge and had denied the enemy observation over
the Ypres plain. Farther north they had captured the enemy's
second line also as far as St. Julien. North of that village they had
passed beyond the German second line, and held the line of the
Steenbeek to our junction with the French.

On our left flank our Allies had admirably completed the im-
portant task allotted to them. Close touch had been kept with the
British troops on their right throughout the day. All and more than
all their objectives had been gained rapidly and at exceptionally light
cost, and the flank of the Allied advance had been effectively secured.

Meanwhile, the attack on the Second Army front had also met
with complete success. On the extreme right New Zealand troops
had carried La Basse Ville after a sharp fight lasting some fifty
minutes. On the left English troops foist Division) had captured
Hollebeke and the difficult ground north of the bend of the Ypres-
Comines Canal and east of Battle Wood. Between these two points
our line had been advanced on the whole front for distances varying
from 200 to 800 yards.

n6 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Over 6,100 prisoners, including 133 officers, were captured by
us in this battle. In addition to our gains in prisoners and ground
we also captured some 25 guns, while a further number of prisoners
and guns were taken by our Allies*

Effect of the Weather

43 The weather had been threatening throughout the day, and
had rendered the work of the aeroplanes very difficult from the
commencement of the battle. During the afternoon, while fighting
was still in progress, rain began, and fell steadily all night. There-
after, for four days, the rain continued without cessation, and for
several days afterwards the weather remained stormy and unsettled.
The low-lying, clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden with rain,
turned to a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of the
choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed into long
stretches of bog, impassable except by a few well-defined tracks,
which became marks for the enemy's artillery. To leave these tracks
was to risk death by drowning, and in the course of the subsequent
fighting on several occasions both men and pack animals were lost
in this way. In these conditions operations of any magnitude became
impossible, and the resumption of our offensive was necessarily
postponed until a period of fine weather should allow the ground to
recover.

As had been the case in the Arras battle, this unavoidable delay
in the development of our offensive was of the greatest service to the
enemy. Valuable time was lost, the troops opposed to us were able
to recover from the disorganisation produced by our first attack, and
the enemy was given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements.

Hostile Counter- Attacks. St. Julien and Westhoek

44. During the night of the 3ist July and on the two following
days, the enemy delivered further counter-attacks against our new
line, and in particular made determined efforts to dislodge us from
the high ground between the Menin Road and the Ypres-Roulers
Railway, and to recover his second line system between Frezenberg
and St. Julien. In this he completely failed. The violence of his
artillery fire compelled us, however, to withdraw temporarily from
St. Julien, though we retained a bridgehead across the Steenbeek,
just north of the village.

In spite of these counter-attacks and the great but unavoidable
hardships from which our troops were suffering, steady progress was
made with the consolidation of the captured ground, and every
opportunity was taken to improve the line already gained.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 117

On the 3rd August St. Julien was reoccupied without serious
opposition, and our line linked up with the position we had retained
on the right bank of the Steenbeek further north* A week later a
successful minor operation carried out by English troops (i8th and
25th Divisions) gave us complete possession of Westhoek. Seven
hostile counter-attacks within the following four days broke down
before our defence.

During this period certain centres of resistance in the neighbour-
hood of Kortekeer Cabaret were cleared up by our Allies, and a
number of fortified farm houses, lying across the front of the French
position, were reduced in turn.

Lens Operations Resumed. Hill 70

45. Towards the middle of August a slight improvement took
place in the weather, and advantage was taken of this to launch our
second attack east of Ypres. Thereafter unsettled weather again set
in, and the month closed as the wettest August that has been known
for many years.

On the day preceding this attack at Ypres a highly successful
operation was carried out in the neighbourhood of Lens, whereby
the situation of our forces in that sector was greatly improved. At
the same time the threat to Lens itself was rendered more immediate
and more insistent, and the enemy was prevented from concentrating
the whole of his attention and resources upon the front of our main
offensive.

At 4,25 a.m. on the I5th August the Canadian Corps (Lieut.-
General A. W. Currie) attacked with the 2nd and ist Canadian
Divisions (Major-General A. C. Macdonell commanding the ist
Canadian Division) on a front of 4,000 yards south-east and east of
Loos. The objectives consisted of the strongly fortified hill known
as Hill 70, which had been reached, but not held, in the battle of
Loos on the 25th September, 1915, and also the mining suburbs of
Cite Ste. Elisabeth, Cite St. fimile, and Cite St. Laurent, together
with the whole of Bois Rase and the western half of Bois Hugo. The
observation from Hill 70 had been very useful to the enemy, and in
our possession materially increased our command over the defences
of Lens.

Practically the whole of these objectives were gained rapidly at
light cost, and in exact accordance with plan. Only at the farthest
apex of our advance a short length of German trench west of Cite
St. Auguste resisted our first assault. This position was again
attacked on the afternoon of the following day and captured after
a fierce struggle lasting far into the night.

n8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

A number of local counter-attacks on the morning of the I5th
August were repulsed, and in the evening a powerful attack delivered
across the open by a German reserve division was broken up with
heavy loss* In addition to the enemy 's other casualties, 1,120
prisoners from three German divisions were captured by us,

The Ypres Battle. Langemarck

46. Close upon the heels of this success, at 445 a.m. on the
1 6th August our second attack was launched east and north of Ypres ;
on a front extending from the north-west corner of Inverness Copse
to our junction with the French south of St. Janshoek. On our left
the French undertook the task of clearing up the remainder of the
Bixshoote peninsula.

On the left of the British attack the English brigades detailed for
the assault (2gth and 2oth Divisions, Major-General W. D. Smith
commanding the 2Oth Division) captured the hamlet of Wijdendrift
and reached the southern outskirts of LangemarcL Here some
resistance was encountered, but by 8,0 a.m. the village had been
taken, after sharp fighting* Our troops then proceeded to attack the
portion of the Langemarck-Gheluvelt Line which formed their final
objective, and an hour later had gained this also, with the exception
of a short length of trench north-east of Langemarck. Two small
counter-attacks were repulsed without difficulty.

The attack of the First French Army delivered at the same hour
was equally successful. On the right a few fortified farms in the
neighbourhood of the Steenbeek again gave trouble, and held out
for a time. Elsewhere our Allies gained their objectives rapidly, and
once more at exceptionally light cost. The bridge-head of Drie
Grachten was secured, and the whole of the peninsula cleared of the
enemy.

In the centre of the British attack the enemy's resistance was
more obstinate. The difficulty of making deep mined dug-outs in
soil where water lay within a few feet of the surface of the ground
had compelled the enemy to construct in the ruins of farms and in
other suitable localities a number of strong points or " pill-boxes "
built of reinforced concrete often many feet thick.

These field forts, distributed in depth all along the front of our
advance, offered a serious obstacle to progress. They were heavily
armed with machine guns and manned by men determined to hold
on at all costs. Many were reduced as our troops advanced, but
others held out throughout the day, and delayed the arrival of our
supports. In addition, weather conditions made aeroplane observa-
tion practically impossible, with the result that no warning was

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 119

received of the enemy's counter-attacks and our infantry obtained
little artillery help against them. When, therefore, later in the morn-
ing a heavy counter-attack developed in the neighbourhood of the
Wieltje-Passchendaele Road, our troops, who had reached their final
objectives at many points in this area also, were gradually compelled
to fall back.

On the left centre West Lancashire Territorials and troops from
other English counties (48th and nth Divisions, Major-General R.
Fanshawe commanding the 48th Division) established themselves
on a line running north from St. Julien to the old German third line
due east of Langemarck. This line they maintained against the enemy's
attacks, and thereby secured the flank of our gains further north.

On the right of the British attack the enemy again developed the
main strength of his resistance. At the end of a day of very heavy
fighting, except for small gains of ground on the western edge of
Glencorse Wood and north of Westhoek by the 56th Division
(Major-General F. A. Dudgeon) and the 8th Division, the situation
south of St. Julien remained unchanged.

In spite of this partial check on the southern portion of our
attack, the day closed as a decided success for the Allies. A wide gap
had been made in the old German third line system, and over 2,100
prisoners and some thirty guns had been captured.

Effect of Hostile Resistance. Methods Revised

47. The strength of the resistance developed by the enemy at
this stage in the neighbourhood of the Menin Road decided me to
extend the flank of the next attack southwards. It was undesirable,
however, either to increase the already wide front of attack for which
the Fifth Army was responsible, or to divide between two Armies the
control of the attack against the main ridge itself. I therefore deter-
mined to extend the left of the Second Army northwards, entrusting
the attack upon the whole of the high ground crossed by the Menin
Road to General Sir Herbert Plumer as a single self-contained
operation, to be carried out in conjunction with the attacks of the
Fifth Army farther north.

During the wet weather which prevailed throughout the re-
mainder of the month, our efforts were confined to a number of
small operations east and north-east of Ypres, designed to reduce
certain of the more important of the enemy's strong points. In the
meantime the necessary re-arrangements of the British forces were
pushed on as rapidly as possible, so that our new attack might be
ready directly the weather should improve sufficiently to enable it to
be undertaken.

120 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

These arrangements included -a modification of our artillery
tactics, to meet the situation created by the change in the enemy's
methods of defence*

Our recent successes had conclusively proved that the enemy's
infantry were unable to hold the strongest defences against a properly
mounted attack, and that increasing the number of his troops in his
forward defence systems merely added to his losses. Accordingly,
the enemy had adopted a system of elastic defence, in which his
forward trench lines were held only in sufficient strength to dis-
organise the attack, while the bulk of his forces were kept in close
reserve, ready to deliver a powerful and immediate blow which
might recover the positions over-run by our troops before we had
had time to consolidate them*

In the heavy fighting east of Ypres, these tactics had undoubtedly
met with a certain measure of success. While unable to drive us
back from the ridge, they had succeeded, in combination with the
state of the ground and weather, in checking our progress. This new
policy, for our early knowledge of which, as well as for other valu-
able information concerning the enemy's dispositions and intentions
throughout the battle, much credit is due to the zeal and efficiency of
my Intelligence Service, necessarily entailed corresponding changes
in our method of attack. 1

Minor Operations

48, In the interval, on the igth, 22nd and 2yth August, positions
of considerable local importance in the neighbourhood of St, Julien
were captured with some hundreds of prisoners, as the result of
minor attacks conducted under the most unfavourable conditions of
ground and weather. The ground gained represented an advance of
about 800 yards on a front of over two miles. In combination with
the attack of the 22nd August, English troops (i4th Division) also
attacked astride the Menin Road, and after six days of continuous
local fighting established themselves in the western edge of Inverness
Copse.

Meanwhile, in pursuance of my policy of compelling the enemy
to guard himself on other fronts, successful minor operations had
been undertaken elsewhere. On the Lens front, Canadian troops
(4th and 2nd Canadian Divisions) attacked on the 2ist August, and
carried the line of German trenches skirting the town to the south-
west and west, taking 200 prisoners. Farther south, north-country
troops (34th Division) attacked on the 26th August east of Hargi-

1 These changes consisted, speaking generally, in limiting the depth of our
objectives and in making very careful artillery arrangements to deal with hostile
concentrations and counter-attacks,

morning 20th Sept.
evening

THIRD YPRES BATTLE ;
Attack of 20th September, 1917.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 121

court, and captured the enemy's advanced positions on a front of a
mile* In this operation 136 prisoners were taken, and on the gth and
nth September our gains were extended and further prisoners
secured.

The Ypres Battle. Preparations for the Third Attack Completed

49. At the beginning of September the weather gradually
improved, and artillery and other preparations for my next attack
proceeded steadily* Both the extent of the preparations required,
however, and the need to give the ground time to recover from the
heavy rains of August rendered a considerable interval unavoidable
before a new advance could be undertaken. The 2oth September
was therefore chosen for the date of our attack, and before that
day our preparations had been completed.

The front selected extended from the Ypres-Comines Canal
north of Hollebeke to the Ypres-Staden Railway north of Lange-
marck, a distance of just over eight miles along the line held by
us. The average depth of our objectives was 1,000 yards, which
increased to a depth of a mile in the neighbourhood of the Menin
Road. Australian, English, Scottish and South African troops
were employed in the attack, and gained a success conspicuous for
precision and thoroughness of execution.

The Menin Road Ridge

50. During the night of the igth/aoth September rain again fell
steadily, and when dawn broke thick mist made observation impos-
sible. Despite this disadvantage, the assembling of our troops was
carried out in good order, and at 5.40 a.m. on the aoth September
the assault was launched.

Good progress was made from the start, and as the morning wore
on the mist cleared. Our aeroplanes were able to establish contact
with our infantry, to assist them by engaging parties of the enemy
with machine gun fire, and to report hostile concentrations and
counter-attacks to our artillery.

On our right Welsh and west-country troops (igth Division)
advanced down the spur east of Klein Zillebeke, and, after sharp
fighting in the small woods north of the Ypres-Comines Canal, gained
the whole of their objectives. English battalions fegth Division,
Major-General E. Feetham) pushed through the eastern portions of
Shrewsbury Forest and reached their objectives in the valley of the
Bassevillebeek. Regiments from the south-east counties of England
(4ist Division) had some trouble from snipers and machine guns
early in their advance, but ultimately fought their way forward

122 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

across the upper valley of the Bassevillebeek and up the slopes of
Tower Hamlets. Here strong opposition was encountered, with
heavy machine gun fire from Tower Hamlets and the Veldhoek
Ridge.

In the meantime, however, north-country troops (23rd Division)
had already carried Inverness Copse, and, after beating off a counter-
attack in the neighbourhood of Dumbarton Lakes, captured Veldhoek
and the line of their final objectives some 500 yards farther east.
Their progress assisted the south-east county battalions on their right
to establish themselves across the Tower Hamlets spur.

On the left of the north-country division Australian troops (ist
and 2nd Australian Divisions) carried the remainder of Glencorse
Wood and Nonne Boschen, Before 10.0 a.m. they had taken the
hamlet of Polygonveld and the old German third line to the north of
it. This advance constituted a fine performance, in which the capture
of a difficult piece of ground that had much delayed us was success-
fully completed. Sharp fighting took place at a strong point known
as Black Watch Corner at the south-western end of Polygon Wood.
By midday this had been captured, the western portion of Polygon
Wood had been cleared of the enemy, and the whole of our objectives
on this part of our front had been gained.

On the Fifth Army front our attack met with equal success.
Scottish and South African troops (gth Division) advancing on both
sides of the Ypres-Roulers Railway, stormed the line of fortified
farms immediately in front of their position, and, pressing on, cap-
tured Zonnebeke and Bremen Redoubts and the hamlet of Zeven-
kote. By 845 a.m. our final objectives on this front had been gained.

West Lancashire Territorial battalions (55th Division) found the
ground south-east of St. Julien very wet and heavy after the night's
rain. None the less, they made steady progress, reaching the line of
their final objectives early in the afternoon. North of the Zonnebeke-
Langemarck Road London and Highland Territorials (58th and 5ist
Divisions) gained the whole of their objectives by midday, though
stiff fighting took place for a number of farms and strong places. 1

As the result of this most successful operation the whole of the
high ground crossed by the Menin Road, for which such desperate
fighting had taken place during our previous attacks, passed into our
possession. Important positions were won also on the remainder of
our front, by which the right of our attack was rendered more secure,
and the way opened for the advance of our left. In the attack, as well
as in the repeated counter-attacks which followed, exceedingly heavy
casualties were inflicted on the enemy, and 3,243 prisoners, together
with a number of guns, were captured by us.

1 Progress was also made by the aoth Division on the extreme left of the attack.

THIRD YPRES BATTLE ;
Attack of 26th September, 1917.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 133

Counter-Attacks

51. The enemy did not abandon these important positions with-
out further severe struggles. During the afternoon and evening of
the 2oth September no less than eleven counter-attacks were made
without success against different parts of our new front, in addition
to several concentrations of hostile infantry, which were broken up
by our artillery before any attack could be launched.

East of St. Julien the enemy at his third attempt succeeded in
forcing back our troops to the west of Schuler Farm, but on the
following day the farm was retaken by us and our line re-established.
North-east of Langemarck stubborn fighting took place for the
possession of the short length of trench which, as already recounted,
had resisted our attacks on the i6th August. It was not till the
morning of the 23rd September that the position was finally captured
by us (2Oth Division).

Fierce fighting took place also on the 2ist September in the neigh-
bourhood of Tower Hamlets (4ist Division). In the course of this
and the following four days three powerful attacks were launched by
the enemy on wide fronts between Tower Hamlets and Polygon
Wood, and a fourth north-east of St. Julien. All these attacks were
repulsed, except that on the 25th September parties of German
infantry succeeded in entering our lines north of the Menin Road.
Heavy and confused fighting took place in this area throughout the
day, in which English, Scottish and Australian troops (33rd Divi-
sion and 5th Australian Division) gradually drove the enemy from
the limited foothold he had gained.

The enemy's casualties in these many counter-attacks, as well as
in all those subsequently delivered by him on the Ypres front, were
consistently very heavy. Our constant successful resistance reflects
the greatest credit on the high fighting qualities of our infantry, on
the courage and devotion of our airmen, and upon the excellence of
our artillery arrangements.

Polygon Wood and Zonnebeke

52. All this heavy fighting was not allowed to interfere with the
arrangements made for a renewal of the advance by the Second and
Fifth Armies on the 26th September.

The front of our attack on that date extended from south of
Tower Hamlets to north-east of St. Julien, a total distance of rather
less than six miles ; but on the portion of this front south of the
Menin Road (39th Division) only a short advance was intended.
North of the Menin Road, our object was to reach a position from

124 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

which a direct attack could be made upon the portion of the main
ridge between Noordemdhoek and Broodseinde, traversed by the
Becelaere-Passchendaele Road,

The assault was delivered at 5.50 a.m., and, after hard and pro-
longed fighting, in which over 1,600 prisoners were taken by us,
achieved a success as striking as that of the aoth September.

Australian troops (5th and 4th Australian Divisions, Major-
General E. G. Sinclair-MacLagan commanding the latter division)
carried the remainder of Polygon Wood, together with the German
trench line to the east of it, and established themselves on their objec-
tives beyond the Becelaere-Zonnebeke Road. On the left of the
Australians, English troops (3rd Division) took Zonnebeke Village
and Church, and North Midland and London Territorial battalions
(59th Division, Major-General C. F. Romer, and 58th Division)
captured a long line of hostile strong points on both sides of the
Wieltje-Gravenstafel Road.

South of Polygon Wood an obstinate struggle took place for a
group of fortified farms and strong points. English, Scottish and
Welsh battalions of the same divisions * that had borne the brunt of
the enemy's attacks in this area on the previous day, gallantly fought
their way forward. In their advance they effected the relief of two
companies of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who, with great
courage and resolution, had held out in our forward line all night,
although isolated from the rest of our troops. It was not until
the evening of the 2yth September, however, that the line of our
objectives in this locality was completely gained.

Further Counter- Attacks

53. As had been the case on the 2Oth September, our advance
was at once followed by a series of powerful counter-attacks.

There is evidence that our operations had anticipated a counter-
stroke which the enemy was preparing for the evening of the 26th
September, and the German troops brought up for this purpose
were now hurled in to recover the positions he had lost. In the course
of the day at least seven attacks were delivered at points covering
practically the whole front from Tower Hamlets to St. Julien. The
fiercest fighting prevailed in the sector between the Reutelbeek and
Polygon Wood, but here, as elsewhere, all the enemy's assaults were
beaten off.

On the 3oth September, when the enemy had recovered from
the disorganisation caused by his defeat, he recommenced his attacks.
Two attempts to advance with flammenwerfer north of the Menin

1 33rd Division, Major-General P. R. Wood, and 3Qth Division,

Line morning 4th Oct
11 ' evening "

s& \{-

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THIRD YPRES BATTLE ;
Attack of 4th October, 1917.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 125

Road were followed on the ist October by five other attacks in this
area, and on the same day a sixth attack was made south of the
Ypres-Roulers Railway* Except for the temporary loss of two
advanced posts south-east of Polygon Wood, all these attacks were
repulsed with great loss by the 3yth, 23rd Divisions, 5th and 4th
Australian Divisions, and 3rd Division* At dawn on the 3rd October
another attempt in the neighbourhood of the Menin Road broke
down before our positions*

A Further Advance on the Main Ridge. Broodseinde

54* The spell of fine weather was broken on the evening of the
3rd October by a heavy gale and rain from the south-west* These
conditions serve to emphasise the credit due to the troops for the
completeness of the success gained by them on the following day.

At 6*0 a.m. on the 4th October our advance was renewed, in
accordance with plan, against the main line of the ridge east of
Zonnebeke. The front of our principal attack extended from the
Menin Road to the Ypres-Staden Railway, a distance of about seven
miles. South of the Menin Road a short advance was undertaken on
a front of about a mile, with the object of capturing certain strong
points required to strengthen our position in this sector*

The attack was carried out by Australian, New Zealand and
English divisions, including among the latter a few Scottish, Irish
and Welsh battalions, and was successful at all points*

On the right of the main attack troops from Kent, Devon and
Cornwall, and a battalion of the King's Own Scottish Borderers (5th
Division) carried their objectives after heavy fighting in the neigh-
bourhood of Polderhoek Chateau. Battalions from Yorkshire,
Northumberland, Surrey and Lincolnshire (2ist Division) cleared
the small enclosures east of Polygon Wood and seized the village of
Reutel, meeting with strong opposition* On their left Surrey, Staf-
fordshire, Devon, Border and Highland troops (yth Division),
advancing across the crest of the ridge, captured the hamlet of
Noordemdhoek.

Farther north, Australian troops (ist, 2nd and 3rd Australian
Divisions) advanced beyond the Becelaere-Passchendaele Road,
storming Molenaarelsthoek and Broodseinde, and established them-
selves well to the east of the crest line* New Zealand troops carried
Gravenstafel, and drove the enemy from a network of trenches and
strong points on the Gravenstafel spur*

On the whole of this front the enemy was met in great strength*
In addition to the two German divisions already in line, the enemy
had brought up three fresh divisions, with a view to launching an

126 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

attack in force upon the positions captured by us on the 26th Sep-
tember, Our advance anticipated this attack by ten minutes, and
the German infantry were forming up for the assault when our
artillery barrage opened. Very serious casualties were inflicted on
the enemy by our artillery, and our infantry, advancing with the
bayonet, quickly overcame the resistance of those of his troops who
had escaped our shell fire. Great numbers of prisoners were taken.

On the left of our attack South Midland troops (48th Division)
forced their way across the valley of the Stroombeek, in spite of diffi-
culties due to the rain of the previous night, and gained their objec-
tives according to programme, with the exception of a single strong
point at the limit of their advance. Other English divisions (nth
and 4th Divisions, Major-General T. G. Matheson commanding
the latter division), advancing on both sides of the Poelcappelle
Road, stormed the western half of that village, including the church,
and captured the whole of their objectives for the day. Tanks took
part in the attack on Poelcappelle and contributed to the success of
our troops.

On the extreme left (agth Division) considerable opposition was
met with, and determined fighting took place for the possession of
the rising ground known as 19 Metre Hill. Early in the afternoon a
hostile counter-attack forced us back from a portion of this position,
but later in the day our troops returned to the attack and recovered
the lost ground.

Meanwhile, south of the Menin Road English troops feyth Divi-
sion) had gained the whole of their limited objectives with the ex-
ception of two strong points. Soon after midday our final objectives
had been gained, and large numbers of prisoners had already been
brought in. The final total of German prisoners captured in these
operations exceeded 5,000, including 138 officers. 1 A few guns and
many machine guns and trench mortars were also taken by us.

The destruction of the divisions which the enemy had assembled
for his intended attack made immediate serious counter-attacks
impossible for him on a great part of our front. Between the Menin
Road and the neighbourhood of Reutel, however, no less than seven
counter-attacks were beaten off in turn. Exceedingly heavy fighting
took place in this area, and later in the day an eighth attack suc-
ceeded in dislodging us from Polderhoek Chateau and from the
eastern portions of Reutel. Another determined counter-attack,
delivered in three waves early in the afternoon north of the Ypres-
Roulers Railway, was broken up by our artillery, rifle and machine
gun fire. Hostile concentrations east of Zonnebeke and west of
Passchendaele were dispersed by our artillery.

1 Ludendorff speaking of this attack refers to the German losses as " enormous."

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 127

Results of this Attack

55. The success of this operation marked a definite step in the
development of our advance* Our line had now been established
along the main ridge for 9,000 yards from our starting point near
Mount Sorrel, From the farthest point reached the well-marked
Gravenstafel Spur offered a defensible feature along which our line
could be bent back from the ridge *

The year was far spent. The weather had been consistently un-
propitious, and the state of the ground, in consequence of rain and
shelling combined, made movement inconceivably difficult. The
resultant delays had given the enemy time to bring up reinforcements
and to organise his defence after each defeat* Even so, it was still the
difficulty of movement far more than hostile resistance which continued
to limit our progress, and now made it doubtful whether the capture
of the remainder of the ridge before winter finally set in was possible.

On the other hand, there was no reason to anticipate an abnor-
mally wet October, The enemy had suffered severely, as was
evidenced by the number of prisoners in our hands, by the number
of his dead on the battlefield, by the costly failure of his repeated
counter-attacks, and by the symptoms of confusion and discourage-
ment in his ranks.

In this connection, documents captured in the course of the
battle of the 4th October throw an interesting light upon the success
of the measures taken by us to meet the enemy's new system of
defence by counter-attack. These documents show that the German
Higher Command had already recognised the failure of their methods,
and were endeavouring to revert to something approximating to
their old practice of holding their forward positions in strength.

After weighing these considerations, as well as the general situa-
tion and various other factors affecting the problem, 1 among them

1 In a speech in the House of Commons on the 6th August, 1919 (Vol. 119 of the
Official Reports), Major-General Sir John Davidson, M.P., gave a more complete account
of the reasons which led to the continuing of the Ypres offensive. Briefly summarised,
they are as follows :

z. Since the breakdown of their July offensive the Russian Armies had ceased to be
a fighting force.

2. The fighting capacity of the French Armies was at this time very seriously dimi-

nished by grave internal troubles.

3. The solidarity of the Allied front in the west was jeopardised by the great reverse

suffered in the October of 1917 by the Italian Armies.

4. America was not yet in a position to give any assistance on land.

5. The Russian collapse had set free large hostile forces which were rapidly being

transferred to the Western front.

6. The only Allied Army capable of conducting serious offensive operations at this

time was the British.

7. If the British offensive ceased, the enemy would regain the initiative, and be free
I

i 2 8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the desirability of assisting our Allies in the operations to be carried
out by them on the 23rd October in the neighbourhood of Mal-
maison, I decided to continue the offensive further and to renew
the advance at the earliest possible moment consistent with adequate
preparation*

Accordingly, I determined to deliver the next combined French
and British attack on the gth October.

Houthulst Forest Reached

56. Unfortunately, bad weather still persisted in the early part
of October, and on the yth October heavy rain fell all day. The
unfavourable conditions interfered with our artillery preparations ;
but every effort was made to engage the enemy's batteries in their
new positions, and on the date last mentioned our artillery co-
operated effectively in the repulse of two hostile attacks.

On the 8th October rain continued, and the slippery state of
the ground, combined with an exceptionally dark night, made
the assembling of our troops a matter of considerable difficulty.
No interference, however, was encountered from the enemy's
artillery, and at 5*20 a.m. on the gth October our attack was renewed
on a front of over six miles, from a point east of Zonnebeke to our
junction with the French north-west of Langemarck. On our left
our Allies prolonged the front of attack to a point opposite Draai-
bank. At the same time, minor operations were undertaken on the
right of our main attack, east and south-east of Polygon Wood.

The greatest depth of our advance was on the left, where the
Allied troops penetrated the German positions to a distance of nearly
one and a half miles. French troops and British Guards crossed the
flooded valley of the Broenbeek, and, making steady progress towards
their objectives, captured the hamlet of Koekuit, Veldhoek, Man-
gelare and St. Janshoek, besides woods and a great number of farm
houses and strong points. Early in the afternoon both French and
British troops had established themselves on their final objectives on
the outskirts of Houthulst Forest.

On the right of the Guards, other English divisions (2gth and
4th Divisions) made equal progress along the Ypres-Staden Railway

to attack wherever he thought the Allied line weakest. The condition of our Allies
at this period was such that it was impossible to accept this risk while any
alternative remained.

8. It followed, that the British must continue to attack, until the coming of winter

put an end for the time being to the danger of a German counter-stroke.

9. The German submarine campaign was at its height. Our own Admiralty were

anxious about our communications across the Channel so long as Ostend and
Zeebrugge remained in the enemy f s hands.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 129

and secured a line well to the east of the Poelcappelle-Houthulst
Road* Stiff fighting took place around certain strong points, in the
course of which a hostile counter-attack was repulsed.

Farther south, English battalions (nth Division) fought their
way forward in the face of great opposition to the eastern outskirts
of Poelcappelle Village. Australian troops and East Lancashire,
Yorkshire and South Midland Territorials 1 carried our line forward
in the direction of Passchendaele and up the western slopes of the
main ridge, capturing Nieuwemolen and Keerselaarhoek and a
number of strong points and fortified farms*

In the subsidiary attack east of Polygon Wood Warwickshire
and H*A*C. battalions (yth Division) successfully regained the
remainder of ReuteL

Over 2,100 prisoners were taken by the Allies in the course of
these operations, together with a few guns*

Progress Continued

57, Though the condition of the ground continued to deteriorate,
the weather after this was unsettled rather than persistently wet, and
progress had not yet become impossible, I accordingly decided to
press on while circumstances still permitted, and arrangements were
made for a renewal of the attack on the I2th October, On the night
of the nth/i2th October, however, heavy rain commenced again,
and, after a brief interval during the morning, continued steadily
throughout the whole of the following day.

Our attack, launched at 5.25 a.m. on the I2th October between
the Ypres-Roulers Railway and Houthulst Forest, made progress
along the spurs and higher ground ; but the valleys of the streams
which run westward from the main ridge were found to be impass-
able* It was therefore determined not to persist in the attack, and
the advance towards our more distant objectives was cancelled.

Certain strong points and fortified farms on the western slopes
of the ridge were captured by the I* and II* Anzac Corps on this
day, and were incorporated in our line. Farther north, on both sides
of the Ypres-Staden Railway, English County divisions (4th and
I7th Divisions, Major-General P* R* Robertson commanding the
latter Division) and the Guards gained their objectives in spite of all
difficulties* Though for many hours the position of our advanced
troops on this part of our front was uncertain, communication was
at length established and the captured ground maintained*

1 These troops were the 2nd Australian Division, the 66th Division (Major-General
Hon. Sir H. A. Lawrence), 4Qth Division (Major-General E. M. Perceval), and the
<8th Division.

130 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Over 1,000 prisoners were taken by us in this attack, in which the
troops employed displayed remarkable gallantry, steadfastness and
endurance in circumstances of extreme hardship*

Plan of Subsequent Operations

58. By this time the persistent continuation of wet weather had
left no further room for hope that the condition of the ground would
improve sufficiently to enable us to capture the remainder of the
ridge this year. By limited attacks made during intervals of better
weather, however, it would still be possible to progress as far as
Passchendaele, and in view of other projects which I had in view it
was desirable to maintain the pressure on the Flanders front for a
few weeks longer.

To maintain his defence on this front the enemy had been obliged
to reduce the garrison of certain other parts of his line to a degree
which justified the expectation that a sudden attack at a point where
he did not expect it might attain a considerable local success. The
front for such an attempt had been selected, and plans had already
been quietly made. But certain preparations and movements of
troops required time to complete, and the 2oth November had been
fixed as the earliest date for the attack.

No large force could be made available for the enterprise. The
prospects of success, therefore, depended on complete secrecy and on
maintaining sufficient activity in Flanders to induce the enemy to
continue his concentration of troops in that theatre.

As has been indicated above, our Allies also had certain limited
operations in view which would be likely to benefit by the mainten-
ance of pressure on my front, and, reciprocally, would add to the
prospects of success of my intended surprise attack. Accordingly,
while preparing for the latter, operations of limited scope were
continued in Flanders.

The Merckem Peninsula

59. After the middle of October the weather improved, and on
the 22nd October two successful operations, in which we captured
over 200 prisoners and gained positions of considerable local im-
portance east of Poelcappelle and within the southern edge of
Houthulst Forest, were undertaken by us, in the one case by east-
county and Northumberland troops (i8th and 34th Divisions), and
in the other by west-county and Scots battalions (35th Division,
Major - General G, McK. Franks) in co-operation with the
French*

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 131

The following two days were unsettled, but on the 25th October
a strong west wind somewhat dried the surface of the ground , It
was therefore decided to proceed with the Allied operations which
had been planned for the 26th October*

At an early hour on that morning rain unfortunately began again
and fell heavily all day* The assembling of our troops was com-
pleted successfully none the less, and at 545 a,m, English and
Canadian troops attacked on a front extending from the Ypres-
Roulers Railway to beyond Poelcappelle,

The Canadians (4th and 3rd Canadian Divisions) attacked on the
right on both sides of the small stream known as the Ravebeek,
which flows south-westwards from Passchendaele. On the left bank
of the stream they advanced astride the main ridge and established
themselves securely on the small hill south of Passchendaele, North
of the Ravebeek strong resistance was met on the Bellevue Spur, a
very strong point which had resisted our efforts in previous attacks.
With splendid determination the Canadians renewed their attack on
this point in the afternoon, and captured it. Two strong counter-
attacks south and west of Passchendaele were beaten off, and by
nightfall the Canadians had gained practically the whole of their
objectives,}

On the left of the Canadians the Royal Naval Division and
battalions of London Territorials (58th Division, Major-General
A, B, E, Cator) also advanced, and, in spite of immense difficulties
from marsh and floods in the more low-lying ground, made
progress.

In a subsidiary attack undertaken by us at the same hour English
troops (7th and 5th Divisions) entered Gheluvelt and recaptured
Polderhoek Chateau, with a number of prisoners. Our men's rifles,
however, had become choked with mud in their advance, and when
later in the morning strong German counter-attacks developed, they
were obliged to withdraw.

The operations of our Allies on this day were limited to establish-
ing bridgeheads across the floods of the St, Jansbeek, This was suc-
cessfully accomplished, in spite of considerable opposition. Next
day the French continued their advance in concert with Belgian
troops, who crossed the Yser opposite Knockehoek, and captured
Aschhoop, Kippe, and Merckem, The southern end of Blankaart
Lake was reached on the same day, and early on the 28th October
French and Belgian troops completed the capture of the whole
Merckem peninsula,

Over 400 prisoners were taken by our Allies in these operations,
bringing the total Allied captures since the commencement of our
attacks on the 36th October to over 1,200,

132 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Passchendaele

60. At this date the need for the policy of activity outlined above
had been still further emphasised by recent developments in Italy*
Additional importance was given to it by the increasing probability
that a time was approaching when the enemy's power of drawing
reinforcements from Russia would increase considerably* In pur-
suance of this policy, therefore, two short advances were made on
the 3oth October and the 6th November, by which we gained
possession of Passchendaele*

In the first operation Canadian and English troops attacked at
5*50 a.m. on a front extending from the Ypres-Roulers Railway to
the Poelcappelle-Westroosebeke Road.

On the right the Canadians (4th and 3rd Canadian Divisions)
continued their advance along the high ground and reached the out-
skirts of Passchendaele. capturing an important position at Crest
Farm on a small hill south-west of the village. Fighting was severe
at all points, but particularly on the spur west of Passchendaele.
Here no less than five strong counter-attacks were beaten off in the
course of the day, our troops being greatly assisted by the fire of
captured German machine guns in Crest Farm.

Farther north, battalions of the same London and Naval divi-
sions (58th and 63rd Divisions) that had taken part in the attack on
the 26th October again made progress wherever it was possible to
find a way across the swamps. The almost impassable nature of the
ground in this area, however, made movement practically impos-
sible, and it was only on the main ridge that much could be effected.

During the succeeding days small advances were made by night
south-west of Passchendaele, and a hostile attack on both sides of the
Ypres-Roulers Railway was successfully repulsed.

At 6.0 a.m. on the 6th November Canadian troops (2nd and ist
Canadian Divisions) renewed their attack and captured the village of
Passchendaele, together with the high ground immediately to the
north and north-west. Sharp fighting took place for the possession
of " pill-boxes " in the northern end of the village, around Mossel-
markt, and on the Goudberg Spur. All objectives were gained at
an early hour, and at 8.50 a.m. a hostile counter-attack north of
Passchendaele was beaten off.

Over 400 prisoners were captured in this most successful attack,
by which for the second time within the year Canadian troops
achieved a record of uninterrupted success. Four days later, in
extremely unfavourable weather, British and Canadian troops (2nd
and ist Canadian Divisions and ist Division) attacked northwards
from Passchendaele and Goudberg, and captured further ground on
the main ridge, after heavy fighting.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 133

GENERAL REVIEW

61. These operations concluded our Flanders offensive for the
time being, although considerable activity was still continued for
another fortnight for purposes already explained.

This offensive, maintained for three and a half months under the
most adverse conditions of weather, had entailed almost superhuman
exertions on the part of the troops of all arms and services. The
enemy had done his utmost to hold his ground, and in his endeavours
to do so had used up no less than seventy-eight divisions, of which
eighteen had been engaged a second or third time in the battle, after
being withdrawn to rest and refit. Despite the magnitude of his
efforts, it was the immense natural difficulties, accentuated manifold
by the abnormally wet weather, rather than the enemy's resistance,
which limited our progress and prevented the complete capture of
the ridge.

What was actually accomplished under such adverse conditions is
the most conclusive proof that, given a normally fine August, the
capture of the whole ridge, within the space of a few weeks, was
well within the power of the men who achieved so much. They
advanced every time with absolute confidence in their power to
overcome the enemy, even though they had sometimes to struggle
through mud up to their waists to reach him. So long as they could
reach him they did overcome him, but physical exhaustion placed
narrow limits on the depth to which each advance could be pushed,
and compelled long pauses between the advances. The full fruits of
each success were consequently not always obtained. Time after
time the practically beaten enemy was enabled to reorganise and
relieve his men and to bring up reinforcements behind the sea of
mud which constituted his main protection.

Notwithstanding the many difficulties, much has been achieved.
Our captures in Flanders since the commencement of operations at
the end of July amount to 24,065 prisoners, 74 guns, 941 machine
guns and 138 trench mortars. It is certain that the enemy's losses
considerably exceeded ours. Most important of all, our new and
hastily trained Armies have shown once again that they are capable
of meeting and beating the enemy's best troops, even under condi-
tions which favoured his defence to a degree which it required the
greatest endurance, determination and heroism to overcome. 1

In this respect I desire once more to lay emphasis upon the
supreme importance of adequate training prior to placing troops in

1 Ludendorff in his Memoirs pays a striking tribute to the disastrous effect which
fighting in Flanders had upon the moral of the German Army.

134 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the line of battle , whether for offence or defence. It is essential, if
preventable sacrifice is to be avoided and success assured, that troops
that are going into battle should first be given an opportunity for
special training, under the officers who are to command them in the
fight, for the task which they are to be called upon to perform.

Owing to the necessity, already referred to, of taking over line
from the French, our offensive at the beginning of the year was com-
menced under a very definite handicap in this respect. This initial
disadvantage was subsequently increased by the difficulty of obtain-
ing adequate drafts a sufficient length of time before divisions were
called upon to take their place in the battle, to enable the drafts to
be assimilated into divisions and divisions to be trained.

The general conditions of the struggle this year have been very
different from those contemplated at the conference of the Allied
Commanders held in November, 1916. The great general and
simultaneous offensive then agreed on did not materialise. Russia,
though some of her leaders made a fine effort at one period, not only
failed to give the help expected of her, but even failed to prevent the
enemy from transferring some forty fresh divisions from her front
in exchange for tired ones used up in the Western theatre, or from
replacing losses in his divisions on this side by drafts of fresh and
well-trained men drawn from divisions in the East.

The combined French and British offensive in the spring was
launched before Italy could be ready ; and the splendid effort made
by Italy at a later period was, unfortunately, followed by develop-
ments which resulted in a weakening of the Allied forces in this
theatre before the conclusion of our offensive*

In these circumstances the task of the British and French Armies
has been a far heavier one throughout the year than was originally
anticipated, and the enemy's means of meeting our attack have been
far greater than either he or we could have expected.

That under such conditions the victories of Arras, Vimy, Mes-
sines and Flanders were won by us, and those at Moronvilliers,
Verdun and Malmaison by the French, constitutes a record of which
the Allied Armies, working in close touch throughout, have a right
to be proud.

The British Armies have taken their full share in the fighting on
the Western front. Save for such short intervals as were enforced
by the weather or rendered necessary for the completion of the
preparations for our principal attacks, they have maintained a vigor-
ous and continuous offensive throughout practically the whole of
the period covered by this Despatch. No other example of offensive
action on so large a scale, so long and so successfully sustained, has
yet been furnished by the war.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 135

In the operations of Arras, Messines, Lens and Ypres as many
as 131 German divisions have been engaged and defeated by less
than half that number of British divisions*

The number of prisoners and guns captured by us is an indica-
tion of the progress we have made. The total number of prisoners
taken between the opening of our spring offensive on the gth April,
1917, and the conclusion of the Flanders offensive, exclusive of
prisoners captured in the Cambrai Battle, is 57,696, including 1,290
officers. During the same period and in the same offensives we have
also captured 393 guns, including 109 heavy guns, 561 trench mortars
and 1,976 machine guns.

Without reckoning, therefore, the possibilities which have been
opened up by our territorial gains in Flanders, and without con-
sidering the effect which a less vigorous prosecution of the war by us
might have had in other theatres, we have every reason to be satisfied
with the results which have been achieved by the past year's fighting.
The addition of strength which the enemy has obtained, or may yet
obtain, from events in Russia and Italy has already largely been dis-
counted, and the ultimate destruction of the enemy's field forces
has been brought appreciably nearer.

The Defensive Fronts

62. Before passing from the subject of the operations of the past
eight months, tribute must be paid to the work accomplished on the
defensive portions of our line.

In order to meet the urgent demands of battle, the number of
divisions in line on other fronts has necessarily been reduced to the
minimum consistent with safety. In consequence, constant vigilance
and heavy and unremitting labour have been required at all times of
the troops holding these fronts.

The numerous feint attacks which have been organised from
time to time have called for great care, forethought and ingenuity on
the part of Commanders and Staffs concerned, and have demanded
much courageous, skilful and arduous work from the troops en-
trusted with the task of carrying them out. In addition, raids and
local operations have continued to form a prominent feature of our
general policy on our defensive front, and have been effectively
combined with our feint attacks and with gas discharges. In the
course of the 270 successful raids carried out by us during the period
covered by this Despatch, the greatest enterprise and skill have been
displayed by our troops, and many hundreds of prisoners, together
with much invaluable information, have been obtained at 'compara-
tively light cost.

136 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Our Troops

63. In my Despatch dealing with the Somme Battle I endeavoured
to express something of the profound admiration inspired in me by
the indomitable courage, tireless energy and cheerful endurance
of the men by whose efforts the British Armies in France were
brought triumphantly through that mighty ordeal. To-day the
Armies of the Empire can look back with yet greater pride upon
still severer tests successfully withstood and an even higher record
of accomplishment*

No one acquainted with the facts can review the general course
of the campaigns of 1916 and 1917 without acquiring the sense of a
steady progression, in which the fighting superiority of the British
soldier has been asserted with ever-increasing insistence. This feel-
ing permeates the troops themselves, and is the greatest guarantee
of victory,

Infantry

Throughout the northern operations our troops have been fight-
ing over ground every foot of which is sacred to the memory of those
who, in the first and second battles of Ypres, fought and died to make
possible the victories of the armies which to-day are rolling back the
tide stayed by their sacrifice. It is no disparagement of the gallant
deeds performed on other fronts to say that, in the stubborn struggle
for the line of hills which stretches from Wytschaete to Passchen-
daele, the great armies that to-day are shouldering the burden of our
Empire have shown themselves worthy of the regiments which, in
October and November of 1914, made Ypres take rank for ever
amongst the most glorious of British battles.

Throughout the months of strenuous fighting which have wiped
the old Ypres salient from the battle map of Flanders, the finest
qualities of our infantry have been displayed. The great material
disadvantages of the position from which they had to attack, the
strength of the enemy's fortifications, and the extraordinary hard-
ships imposed by the conditions of ground and weather during
August and throughout the later stages of the attack, called for the
exercise of courage, determination and endurance to a degree which
has never been surpassed in war,

Artillery

The courage of our infantry would have been in vain but for the
skill, steadfastness and devotion of the artillery. Their task in the
Ypres Battle was again a peculiarly hard one. The long preparatory
bombardments had to be conducted from a narrow and confined

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 137

space, for the most part destitute alike of cover and protection, and
directly overlooked by the enemy*

As our infantry advanced, our guns had to follow, at the cost of
almost incredible exertion, over ground torn by shell fire and sodden
with rain. When at length the new positions had been reached, our
batteries had to remain in action, practically without protection of
any kind, day after day, week after week, and even month after month,
under a continuous bombardment of gas and high explosive shell.

It would be easy to multiply instances of individual heroism, to
quote cases where, when the signal from our infantry for urgent
artillery support and the warning of German gas have been given at
the same moment, our gunners have thrown aside their half-adjusted
gas masks and, with full knowledge of the consequences, have fought
their guns in response to the call of the infantry till the enemy's
attack has been beaten off.

A single incident which occurred during the preparation for the
attack of the 3ist July may be taken as a general example. A howitzer
battery had received orders to cut a section of German wire in the
neighbourhood of Hooge, and 400 rounds had been allocated for the
purpose. The battery, situated in an unavoidably exposed position
in the neighbourhood of Zillebeke Lake, had already been subjected
to constant shelling. On the occasion referred to, not more than 50
rounds had been fired at the German wire, when a hostile 15 cm.
battery opened a steady and accurate fire in enfilade. Each time the
British battery opened, salvos of 15 cm. shells raked its position.
Four of its six guns were put out of action, and two ammunition
dumps were blown up, but the remaining two guns continued in
action until the last of the 400 rounds had been fired. A few days
later, when our infantry advanced over the sector this battery had
shelled, the enemy's wire was found to have been completely cut.

The debt owed to the artillery throughout the whole of this year's
fighting, and particularly in the Ypres Battle, is very great. Despite
the extraordinary strain to which the gunners have been subjected,
yet, wherever conditions of weather and light have made accurate
shooting possible, they have never failed to dominate the German
batteries. As the result of their close and loyal co-operation through
long periods of continuous fighting, hostile artillery has never suc-
ceeded in stopping our attacks. Our infantry would be the first to
acknowledge their admirable devotion and self-sacrifice.

Royal Flying Corps

During the past year the part played by the Royal Flying Corps
in modern battles has grown more and more important. Each

138 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

successive attack has served to demonstrate with increasing clearness
the paramount necessity for the closest co-operation between air
and land arms* All must work together on a general plan towards
our end the defeat of the enemy forces*

In accordance with this governing consideration, co-operation
with artillery, photography and reconnaissance have been greatly
developed and actively continued* Air fighting has taken place on an
ever-increasing scale in order to enable the machines engaged upon
these tasks to carry out their work* In addition, a definite aerial
offensive, in which long-distance raiding has taken a prominent
place, has become a recognised part of the preparations for infantry
attack*

Throughout the progress of the battle itself low-flying aeroplanes
not only maintain contact with our advancing infantry, reporting
their position and signalling the earliest indications of hostile counter-
attack, but themselves join directly in the attack by engaging the
enemy's infantry in line and in support with machine gun fire and
bombs, by assisting our artillery to disperse hostile concentrations,
and by spreading confusion among the enemy's transport, reinforce-
ments and batteries*

In answer to the concentrations of hostile machines on our front
and the strenuous efforts made by the enemy to reassert himself in
the air, the bombing of German aerodromes has been intensified,
and has been carried out at great distances behind the enemy's lines,
In more than one instance the enemy has been compelled to abandon
particular aerodromes altogether as the result of our constant raids.

Besides his aerodromes, the enemy's railway stations and com-
munications, his dumps and billets, have also been attacked with
increasing frequency and with most successful results*

The persistent raiding by hostile aeroplanes and airships of
English cities and towns, and the enemy's open disregard of the
losses thereby caused to civilian life and property, have recently
decided our own Government to adopt counter-measures* In con-
sequence of this decision a series of bombing raids into Germany
were commenced in October, 1917, and have since been continued
whenever weather conditions have permitted*

In the discharge of duties constantly increasing in number
and importance, the Royal Flying Corps throughout the whole of
the past year has shown the same magnificent offensive spirit which
characterised its work during the Somme Battle, combined with
unsurpassed technical knowledge and practical skill.

The enemy, however, shows no sign of relaxing his endeavours
in this department of war* While acknowledging, therefore, most
fully the great effort that has been made to meet the ever-increasing

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 139

demands of this most important service, I feel it my duty to point
out once more that the position which has been won by the skill,
courage and devotion of our pilots can only be maintained by a
liberal supply of the most efficient machines*

Before passing from the artillery and air services I wish to refer
to the increasingly efficient work of the Anti- Aircraft and Searchlight
Sections in France. The growing activity of the enemy's bombing
squadrons has thrown a corresponding strain on these units. They
have responded to the call with considerable success, and the fre-
quency with which hostile aircraft are brought down by our ground
defences shows a satisfactory tendency to increase.

Cavalry

During the first days of the Battle of Arras the depth of our
advance enabled a limited use to be made of bodies of mounted troops.
The cavalry showed much promptness and resource in utilising such
opportunities as were offered them, and at Monchy-le-Preux, in
particular, performed most valuable service in support of and in
co-operation with the infantry.

Special Services

The gradual development of modern warfare during the past
year has shown a very definite tendency to emphasise the importance
of the various Special Services, while at the same time bringing their
employment into closer co-ordination with the work of the principal
arms.

Tanks

Although throughout the major part of the Ypres Battle, and
especially in its latter stages, the condition of the ground made the
use of tanks difficult or impossible, yet whenever circumstances were
in any way favourable, and even when they were not, very gallant
and valuable work has been accomplished by tank commanders and
crews on a great number of occasions. Long before the conclusion
of the Flanders offensive these new instruments had proved their
worth and amply justified the labour, material and personnel diverted
to their construction and development.

In the course of the various operations in which tanks have
taken part, at Arras, Messines and Ypres, officers and men have
given frequent examples of high and self-sacrificing courage as well
as strong esprit-de-corps.

Trench Mortars

Trench mortars have continued to play an important part in
supplementing the work of our artillery in trench warfare, and have

i 4 o SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

also been used most effectively in the preliminary stages of our offen-
sives* The personnel concerned have shown great skill and enter-
prise in obtaining the best results from the various types of mortars.

Machine Gun Corps

During the past year the use of the machine gun in offensive
warfare has been considerably extended. The machine gun barrage
has taken a definite place with the artillery barrage in covering the
advance of our infantry, while the lighter forms of machine guns
have proved of great assistance in the capture of hostile strong points.
In these directions, as well as in the repulse of hostile counter-attacks,
great boldness and skill have been shown, and very valuable work
has been done by all ranks of the Machine Gun Corps.;

Royal Engineers

The prolonged period of active fighting and the vast amount of
work involved by our different offensives have thrown a peculiarly
heavy burden on the Royal Engineers, both preparatory to and
during operations.

The Field, Signal, Army Troops and Tramway Companies,
together with Pioneer and Labour Battalions, from home and over-
seas, have played an increasingly important part, not only in the
preparation for our offensives, but also during the latter stages of the
battles. The courage and enduring self-sacrifice displayed by all
ranks, whether in the organisation of captured positions or in the
maintenance of forward communications under heavy shell fire, are
deserving of the highest praise.

The Tunnelling Companies have maintained their superiority
over the enemy underground, and the important tactical success
achieved by the Messines mines is a sufficient testimony of their un-
tiring efforts. They have taken a large share in the construction of
dug-outs and road-making during operations, and have worked with
great courage and cheerfulness under conditions of much hardship
and danger.

The successful manner in which the difficult problem of water
supply during operations was overcome reflects great credit upon
the Royal Engineers. My thanks are also due to the War Office Staff
concerned, and the manufacturers and their employees, for the
special efforts made by them to meet the demands of the Army in
respect of the necessary machinery and plant.

The other Engineer units, both in forward areas and on the lines
of communication, have discharged their various special dudes with
an equal skill and perseverance. The increased demand for accom-

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 141

modation, hospitals and workshops l on the lines of communication
has been met with commendable promptitude, and the supply of
Engineer stores and materials, now required in vast quantities, has
throughout been most efficiently maintained* A notable feature also
is the progress which has been made in the devices for the conceal-
ment of troops and material*

Signal Services

The Signal Service, which at the end of the battle of the Somme
had already grown into a great and intricate organisation, has had
even larger demands made upon it during the past year.

Apart from the perfecting and maintenance of rear communica-
tions, special provision has had to be made for carrying our com-
munications forward as our troops have advanced. The measures
adopted to this end have been skilfully devised and admirably carried
out. In many cases within a few hours of a successful operation large
numbers of buried telephone circuits have been extended into the
captured zone under very trying conditions ; the provision of com-
munications for artillery Forward Observation Officers, etc., pro-
ceeding simultaneously with the organisation of the new line. Thanks
to the rapidity with which communications in the forward areas
have been established, information of hostile concentrations has
frequently been transmitted by their means from the front in time
to enable the artillery to break up impending counter-attacks.

The success which has attended the establishment of these
forward communications has been largely due to the untiring energy
and devotion to duty of the officers and men of the numerous small
Signal Sections and Detachments. On them has devolved, in cir-
cumstances of great difficulty and danger, the execution of the com-
plicated schemes of communication necessitated by the present form
of warfare.

The Carrier Pigeon Service has also been greatly developed
during the present year, and has proved extremely valuable for
conveying information from attacking units to the headquarters of
their formations.

Gas Services

Reference has been made earlier in this Despatch to the valuable
services rendered by the Special Brigade, both on the defensive
fronts and in the battle areas where large quantities of gas were

1 The development of the German submarine campaign in this year led to a vigorous
and successful attempt to make the British Armies in France self-supporting in all
possible respects. The great increase in hospitals, workshops, etc., was due to this
cause, as was largely the expansion of Forestry and Quarry services in France (see below).

i 4 2 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

successfully discharged in preparation for our different offensives.
These special troops have taken an active part also in our feint
attacks and in the various measures taken to harass German divisions
sent by the enemy to recuperate on the quieter portions of his front.
Gas discharges have become matters of almost nightly occurrence,
and have been carried out with success on all portions of the front
from the right of our line to the sea. In the period covered by this
Despatch a total weight of nearly 2,000 tons of gas has been liberated
in the course of 335 separate discharges.

Numerous new methods and devices have been put into practice
with excellent results. Many of these have entailed very heavy work
and great courage and devotion on the part of the personnel em-
ployed ; but all demands have been met with unfailing cheerfulness
and carried out with the greatest efficiency. Evidence of the serious
casualties inflicted on the enemy by gas and kindred methods of
offence continues to accumulate.

Field Survey Companies

Special mention again deserves to be made of the Field Survey
Companies, who throughout the year's operations have carried out
their important functions with the utmost zeal and efficiency. With
the assistance of the Ordnance Survey they have enabled an adequate
supply of maps to be maintained in spite of the constant changes of
the battle front. Their assistance has also been invaluable to our
artillery in locating the enemy's new battery positions during the
actual progress of battle.

Meteorological Section

The Meteorological Section has kept me furnished with valuable
information concerning the probable course of the weather, in spite
of the limited area from which the necessary data are now procurable.

Transportation Services

In describing the preparations for our offensive, constant refer-
ence has been made in the body of this Despatch to the work of the
Transportation Services. The year has been one of rapid expansion
in all branches of the various Transportation Services, and the
manner in which the calls made upon them have been met is
deserving of the highest praise.

During the present year the dock capacity allotted to the British
Armies in France has been thoroughly organised, and its equipment,
efficiency of working and capacity greatly improved. In the first
nine months of this year the number of working cranes was more

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 143

than doubled, and during the year the discharging capacity of the
docks has proved equal to the maximum import requirements. The
rate of discharge of vessels has been accelerated by 100 per cent,,
and the weekly average of ship-days lost has been reduced to nearly
one-fifth of its January figures.

As regards railway expansion, the number of imported broad
gauge locomotives in traffic in France in October, 1917, was nearly
ten times as great as at the end of 1916, The number of imported
broad gauge waggons in traffic shows a corresponding growth, and
the necessary erecting and repairing shops for this increased rolling
stock have been provided and equipped. Many hundred miles of
broad gauge track have been laid, also, both in immediate connection
with our offensives and for the general service of our Armies,

The result of these different measures has naturally had a most
marked effect upon the traffic-carrying capacity of the broad gauge
railway system as a whole. The average number of trains run daily
during October, 1917, showed an increase of nearly 50 per cent, on
the daily average for March,

Light railways have grown with a like rapidity, and the track
operated at the end of October was already eight times as great as
that working at the commencement of the year. During the same
period the plant used in the making and upkeep of roads has been
multiplied nearly seven times, rendering possible a very considerable
improvement in the conditions of road transport. At the same time,
the possibilities of Inland Water Transport have been further de-
veloped, resulting in October, 1917, in an increase of 50 per cent, in
the weekly traffic handled, as compared with the figures for January,
1917.

Forestry and Quarry Units

In the spring of 1917 the activities of the Army were extended
by the formation of a Forestry Directorate, controlling Royal
Engineer and Canadian Forestry Companies, to work certain forest
areas in France and provide material for the use of our own and
the French Armies. Quarry companies have also been formed in
immediate connection with the Transportation Services.

Some idea of the magnitude of the work involved can be gained
from the fact that from quarries worked in a single locality * over
600,000 tons of material were produced in the nine months ending
3ist August, 1917. Between March and October of this year the
total weekly output of road metal received in the Army areas has
nearly doubled. The average area of new and re-made roads com-
pleted weekly during October was seven and a half times greater
than the weekly average for March.

1 The Marquise Quarries.

i 4 4 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

By September, 1917, the Army had become practically self-
supporting as far as regards timber, and during the active period of
working, from May to October, over three-quarters of a million tons
of timber were supplied for the use of the British Army* Included in
this timber was material sufficient to construct over 350 miles of
plank roads and to provide sleepers for 1,500 miles of railway, besides
great quantities of sawn timber for hutting and defences and many
thousand tons of round timber for fascines and fuel. The bulk of the
fuel wood is being obtained from woods already devastated by
artillery fire.

These Forestry and Quarry units have proved of great value, and
have been the source of very considerable economy. My special
thanks are due to the French Forestry authorities, as well as to the
Comite* inter-Allie des Bois de Guerre, for their assistance in our
negotiations regarding the acquisition of woods and forest areas,

Army Service Corps

The long period of active fighting, combined with the magnitude
of our operations, has once more placed a heavy strain upon the per-
sonnel of the Army Service Corps and of the Administrative Services
and Departments generally. The difficulties of supply have been
increased by the unavoidable congestion of the areas in which opera-
tions were taking place, as well as by the inevitable deterioration of
roads and by long-distance shelling and bombing by the enemy.

In spite of all difficulties the Army Service Corps has never
failed to meet the needs of our troops in food, ammunition, material
and stores of all kinds. Particularly good work has been done by the
Motor Transport drivers, who have shown the greatest gallantry and
devotion to duty in getting forward the requisites of the Army under
heavy shell fire and during long hours of exposure*

Ordnance Corps

The energy and zeal of the Ordnance Corps have also been admir-
able. The intensity of our artillery preparations and bombardments
has placed the heaviest demands upon the Ordnance workshops in
the repair and the overhauling of guns of all calibres. Work has been
continued by day and night in order to keep our guns in action, and
the unsparing efforts of officers and men have contributed in no
small degree to the success of our operations,

Medical Services

The work of the Medical Service in all its branches has continued
to afford me most valuable assistance. The high standard of effi-

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 145

ciency displayed by all ranks of the Medical Service has resulted in
an almost entire freedom from epidemic disease, and has been the
cause of much saving of life and limb amongst the wounded*

The devotion and gallantry of the Royal Army Medical Corps
and of the Medical Corps of the Overseas Dominions during the
recent operations have earned universal admiration and praise *
Their work of collecting the wounded from the front has been of an
exceptionally arduous nature, owing to the condition of the ground
and weather* I regret that so many gallant officers and men have
lost their lives in carrying out their duties.

The Medical Service of the United States of America has shared
in the work of the British Medical Service, and has given very
valuable help.

I am much indebted to the devotion and work of the consulting
surgeons and physicians and to the Auxiliary Services of the British
Red Cross Society and Order of St. John of Jerusalem*

The Nursing services, several of whose members have unfor-
tunately lost their lives from hostile air raids, have, as always, devoted
themselves with untiring care and seal to their work of mercy*

The excellent organisation and administrative work of the
Medical Services as a whole have given me entire satisfaction.

Veterinary Corps

The work of the Army Veterinary Corps and of the Mobile
Veterinary Sections has been ably carried out, and has contributed
largely to the general efficiency of the Army.

The Chaplains' Department

I take this opportunity to express, on behalf of all ranks of the
British Armies in France, our great appreciation of the devotion
and self-sacrifice of the Army Chaplains serving in France* No
considerations of personal convenience or safety have at any time
interfered with their work among the troops, the value of which
is incalculable*

Army Commanders

My thanks are again due to the Army Commanders for the com-
plete loyalty and conspicuous ability with which they have carried
out my plans during the past year* The task of launching three great
offensives on different sectors of the British front, in addition to the
almost constant fighting that has taken place in the neighbourhood
of Lens, has demanded professional knowledge, determination and
soundness of judgment of a very high order on the part of the

146 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Commanders of the Armies concerned. It required, moreover, the
most willing and unselfish co-operation between Armies, and an
absolute subservience of all personal interests to the common good.
In all these respects the different Army Commanders have most
completely fulfilled the high standard of character and ability
required of them*

Staff

In the heavy and responsible work which they have so admirably
performed, the Army Commanders have been most loyally supported
and assisted by their Staff Officers and Technical Advisers, as well
as by the Commanders and Staffs of the units serving under them.

My Chief of the General Staff, Lieut.-General Sir L. E. Kiggell,
my Adjutant-General, Lieut.-General Sir G. H. Fowke, and my
Quartermaster-General, Lieut.-General Sir R. C. Maxwell, as well
as the other officers of my Staff and my Technical Advisers at
General Headquarters and on the Lines of Communication, have
given me the greatest and most valuable assistance. I am glad
once more to place on record the debt that I owe to them.

The entire absence of friction or discord which characterised
the work of all Services and Departments during the Somme Battle
has constituted a most pleasing feature of the operations of the
past year. There could be no better evidence of the singleness of
purpose and determination of the Armies as a whole, and no stronger
guarantee of victory.

The Army's Acknowledgments
To the Navy.

64. The debt which the Army owes to the Navy grows ever
greater as the years pass, and is deeply realised by all ranks of the
British Armies in France. As the result of the unceasing vigilance
of the Navy, the enemy's hope that his policy of unrestricted sub-
marine warfare would hamper our operations in France and Flanders
has been most signally disappointed. The immense quantities of
ammunition and material required by the Army, and the large
numbers of men sent to us as drafts, continue to reach us with
unfailing regularity.

To Home Authorities.

In this connection, I desire once more to record the obligation
of the Army in the Field to the different authorities at home, both
civil and military, and to the great mass of men and women in Great

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1917 147

Britain and throughout the Empire who are working with such
loyalty to enable our manifold requirements to be met.

The confidence which is felt throughout the Army that the
enemy can and will be beaten is founded on the firm conviction that
their own efforts in the field will be supported to the limits of their
power and resources by all classes at home.

To our Allies.

At the close of another year of fighting in France and Belgium, it
is a source of great gratification to me to be able to record that nothing
has occurred to mar the happy relations existing between the Allied
Armies, or between our troops and the civil population in France
and Belgium.

The feelings of good will and comradeship which existed between
the French and British Armies on the Somme have been continued
in Flanders, where the same excellent relations have characterised
the combined operations of the Belgian, French and British troops.

During the present year the Portuguese Expeditionary Force has
taken its place in the line, and for many months has held a sector of
the British front. Though they have not been engaged in major
offensive operations, yet in a number of raids and minor engage-
ments the officers and men of the Portuguese Expeditionary Force
have shown themselves gallant and efficient soldiers.

During the present year, also, the United States of America have
entered the war, ana have taken up their part in it with all the well-
known energy and ability of that great nation. Already many thou-
sands of American soldiers are in France. Warm as is the welcome
they have received from the French people, nowhere will they find
a more genuine or a more friendly greeting than among all ranks of
the other great English-speaking Armies.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

D. HAIG, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS

General Headquarters,

British Armies in the Field,

2oth February,
MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit the following Report on the opera-
tions on the Cambrai front during November and December, 1917,

General Plan

i. As pointed out in my last Despatch, the object of these opera-
tions was to gain a local success by a sudden attack at a point where
the enemy did not expect it* Our repeated attacks in Flanders and
those of our Allies elsewhere had brought about large concentra-
tions of the enemy's forces on the threatened fronts, with a conse-
quent reduction in the garrisons of certain other sectors of his line*

Of these weakened sectors the Cambrai front had been selected
as the most suitable for the surprise operation in contemplation* The
ground there was, on the whole, favourable for the employment of
tanks which were to play an important part in the enterprise, and
facilities existed for the concealment of the necessary preparations
for the attack*

If, after breaking through the German defence systems on this
front, we could secure Bourlon to the north and establish a good
flank position to the east, in the direction of Cambrai, we should be
well placed to exploit the situation locally between Bourlon and the
Sensed River and to the north-west* The capture of Cambrai itself
was subsidiary to this operation, the object of our advance towards
that town being primarily to cover our flank and puszle the enemy
regarding our intentions.

The enemy was laying out fresh lines of defence behind those
which he had already completed on the Cambrai front ; and it was
to be expected that his troops would be redistributed as soon as our
pressure in Flanders was relaxed. He had already brought large
forces from Russia in exchange for divisions exhausted in the
struggle in the Western theatre, and it was practically certain that
heavy reinforcements would be brought from East to West during

1 This Despatch was published as a Supplement dated the 4th March to the London
Gazette of the ist March, 1918.

I 5 2 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the winter. Moreover his tired divisions, after a winter's rest, would
recover their efficiency.

For all these reasons, if the existing opportunity for a surprise
attack were allowed to lapse, it would probably be many months
before an equally favourable one would again offer itself. Further-
more, having regard to the future, it was desirable to show the enemy
that he could not with impunity reduce his garrisons beyond a
certain point without incurring grave risks.

Against these arguments in favour of immediate action I had to
weigh the fact that my own troops had been engaged for many
months in heavy fighting, and that, though their efforts had been
uniformly successful, the conditions of the struggle had greatly
taxed their strength. Only part of the losses in my divisions had
been replaced, and many recently arrived drafts, still far from being
fully trained, were included in the ranks of the Armies, Under these
conditions it was a serious matter to make a further heavy call on
my troops at the end of such a strenuous year,

On the other hand, from the nature of the operation, the size of
the force which could be employed was bound, in any case, to be
comparatively small, since success depended so much on secrecy,
and it is impossible to keep secret the concentration of very large
forces. The demand made upon my resources, therefore, should
not be a great one.

While considering these different factors, preparations were
quietly carried on, so that all might be ready for the attack if I found
it possible to carry it out. The success of the enemy's offensive in
Italy l subsequently added great force to the arguments in favour of
undertaking the operation, although the means at my disposal for the
purpose were further reduced as a consequence of the Italian situation.

Eventually I decided that, despite the various limiting factors, I
could muster enough force to make a first success sufficiently sure
to justify undertaking the attack, but that the degree to which this
success could be followed up must depend on circumstances.

It was calculated that, provided secrecy could be maintained to
the last moment, no large hostile reinforcements were likely to reach
the scene of action for forty-eight hours after the commencement of
the attack, I informed General Sir Julian Byng, to whom the
execution of the plans in connection with the Cambrai operations
was entrusted, that the advance would be stopped by me after
that time, or sooner if necessary, unless the results then gained
and the general situation justified its continuance.

The general plan of attack was to dispense with previous

1 The Austro-German attack on the Isonzo front was launched on the 24th October.
By the loth November the Italians had fallen back to the line of the Piave.

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS 153

artillery preparation, and to depend instead on tanks to smash
through the enemy's wire, of which there was a great quantity
protecting his trenches*

As soon as the advance of the tanks and infantry, working in
close co-operation, began, the artillery was to assist with counter-
battery and barrage work ; but no previous registration of guns for
this purpose could be permitted, as it would rouse the enemy's
suspicions. The artillery of our new Armies was therefore necessarily
subjected to a severe test in this operation, and proved itself entirely
worthy of the confidence placed in it.

The infantry, tanks and artillery thus working in combination
were to endeavour to break through all the enemy's lines of defence
on the first day. If this were successfully accomplished and the
situation developed favourably, cavalry were then to be passed
through to raid the enemy's communications, disorganise his system
of command, damage his railways and interfere as much as possible
with the arrival of his reinforcements. It was explained to all Com-
manders that everything depended on secrecy up to the moment of
starting, and after that on bold, determined and rapid action. Unless
opposition could be beaten down quickly, no great results could be
looked for.

The Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, to whom I
secretly communicated my plans, most readily agreed to afford me
every assistance. In addition to the steps taken by him to engage the
enemy's attention elsewhere, he arranged for a strong force of French
infantry and cavalry to be in a position whence they could be moved
forward rapidly to take part in the exploitation of our success, if the
situation should render it possible to bring them into action. On the
2Oth November certain of these French units were actually put in
motion. The course of events, however, did not open out the re-
quired opportunity for their employment, but the French forces
were held in readiness and within easy reach so long as there appeared
to be any hope of it. Had the situation on the 2oth November de-
veloped somewhat more favourably in certain directions, the nature
of which will become apparent in the course of this report, the
presence and co-operation of these French troops would have been
of the greatest value.

The Enemy's Defences

2. The German defences on this front had been greatly im-
proved and extended since the opening of our offensive in April, and
comprised three main systems of resistance. (Vide Map No. 5.)

The first of these three trench systems, constituting part of the
Hindenburg Line proper, ran in a general north-westerly direction

154 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

for a distance of six miles from the Canal de TEscaut l at Banteux
to Havrincourt. There it turned abruptly north along the line of
the Canal du Nord for a distance of four miles to Mceuvres, thus
forming a pronounced salient in the German front.

In advance of the Hindenburg Line the enemy had constructed
a series of strong forward positions, including La Vacquerie and
the north-eastern corner of Havrincourt Wood. Behind it, and at
distances respectively varying from a little less to rather more than a
mile, and from three-and-a-half to four-and-a-half miles, lay the
second and third main German systems, known as the Hindenburg
Reserve Line, and the Beaurevoir, Masnieres, Marquion Lines*

The Attack

3. All necessary preparations were completed in time, and with
a secrecy reflecting the greatest credit on all concerned. At 6.20 a.m.
on the 2oth November, without any previous artillery bombard-
ment, tanks and infantry attacked on a front of about six miles from
east of Gonnelieu to the Canal du Nord opposite Hermies.

At the same hour, demonstrations with gas, smoke and artillery
took place on practically the whole of the British front south of the
Scarpe, and subsidiary attacks were launched east of Epe*hy and
between Bullecourt and Fontaine-les-Croisilles.

On the principal front of attack, the tanks moved forward in
advance of the infantry, crushing down the enemy's wire and form-
ing great lanes through which our infantry could pass. Protected by
smoke barrages from the view of the enemy's artillery, they rolled
on across the German trenches, smashing up the enemy's machine
guns and driving his infantry to ground. Close behind our tanks
our own infantry followed and, while the tanks patrolled the line of
hostile trenches, cleared the German infantry from their dug-outs
and shelters.

In this way, both the main system of the Hindenburg Line and
its outer defences were rapidly over-run, and tanks and infantry
proceeded in accordance with programme to the attack upon the
Hindenburg Reserve Line.

In this advance, the i2th (Eastern) Division 2 (Major-General A. B.

1 The Scheldt Canal.

8 This was the first occasion on which the full descriptions of divisions taking part
in operations were mentioned in the Despatches sent from France. The change of
practice, however, did not indicate a change of policy. During the winter of 1917-1918
divisions were reduced from a 13 battalion to a 10 battalion basis and our Order of
Battle was altered in the process. The mentioning of units by name in this Despatch
did not, therefore, give the enemy information of any value. In the following Despatch,
describing the great German attacks of March and April, the identifications obtained by
the enemy in his advance made secrecy impossible. In the Victory Despatch secrecy
was unnecessary.

Line morning ZOtn Nov.

evening -

/ Scale ':** I,. . .- tr ,j 1 mile,'

**"^

(r /

aNt\ I/

CAMBRAI BATTLE ;

British Attack, 2Oth November, 1917.

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS 155

Scott), moving along the Bonavis Ridge on the right of our attack,
encountered obstinate resistance at Lateau Wood, which sheltered a
number of German batteries* Fierce fighting, in which infantry and
tank crews displayed the greatest gallantry, continued throughout
the morning at this point, and ended in the capture of the position,
together with the enemy's guns*

Meanwhile, the 2oth (Light) Division (Major-General W* D*
Smith), which had captured La Vacquerie at the opening of its attack,
stormed the powerful defences of Welsh Ridge* The 6th Division
(Major-General T* O, Marden) carried the village of Ribe" court, after
sharp fighting among the streets and houses, while the 6and (West
Riding) Division (T*) (Major-General W. P* Braithwaite) stormed
Havrincourt, where also parties of the enemy held out for a time*

The capture of these two villages secured the flanks of the 5ist
(Highland) Division (T*) (Major-General G* M* Harper), advancing
on the left centre of our attack up the slopes of Flesquieres Hill
against the German trench lines on the southern side of Flesquieres
Village* Here very heavy fighting took place* The stout brick wall
skirting the Chateau grounds opposed a formidable obstacle to our
advance, while German machine guns swept the approaches* A
number of tanks were knocked out by direct hits from German field
batteries in position beyond the crest of the hill* None the less, with
the exception of the village itself, our second objectives in this area
were gained before midday*

Many of the hits upon our tanks at Flesquieres were obtained by a
German artillery officer who, remaining alone at his battery, served
a field gun single-handed until killed at his gun. The great bravery
of this officer aroused the admiration of all ranks* 1

On the left of our attack west of the Canal du Nord, the 36th
(Ulster) Division (Major-General O* S* W* Nugent), captured a
German strong point on the spoil bank of the canal and pushed
northwards in touch with the West Riding troops, who, as the first
stage in a most gallant and remarkably successful advance, had taken
Havrincourt. By 10*30 a*m. the general advance beyond the Hinden-
burg Reserve Line to our final objectives had begun, and cavalry
were moving up behind our infantry*

In this period of the attack tanks and British infantry battalions
of the agth Division (Major-General Sir H* de B* De Lisle) entered
Masnieres and captured Marcoing and Neuf Wood, securing the
passages of the Canal de TEscaut at both villages.

At Marcoing the tanks arrived at the moment when a party of
the enemy were in the act of running out an electrical connection to
blow up one of the bridges* This party was fired on by a tank and

1 He was not identified.

156 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the bridges secured intact* At Masnieres, however, the retreating
enemy succeeded in destroying partially the bridge carrying the
main road. In consequence the first tank which endeavoured to cross
at this point fell through the bridge, completing its destruction,

The advance of a number of our guns had been unavoidably
delayed in the sunken roads which served this part of the battle-field,
and though our infantry continued their progress beyond Masnieres,
without the assistance of tanks and artillery they were not able at
first to clear the enemy entirely from the northern portion of the
village. Here parties of Germans held out during the afternoon, and
gave the enemy time to occupy Rumilly and the section of the Beaure-
voir-Masnieres line south of it ; while the destruction of the bridge
also prevented the cavalry from crossing the canal in sufficient
strength to overcome his resistance*

In spite of this difficulty, a squadron of the Fort Garry Horse,
Canadian Cavalry Brigade (5th Cavalry Division, Major-General
H, J, M, Macandrew), succeeded during the afternoon in crossing
the canal by a temporary bridge constructed during the day. This
squadron passed through the Beaurevoir-Masnieres line and charged
and captured a German battery in position to the east of it. Continu-
ing its advance, it dispersed a body of about 300 German infantry,
and did not cease its progress until the greater part of its horses had
been killed or wounded. The squadron thereupon took up a position
in a sunken road, where it maintained itself until night fell. It then
withdrew to our lines, bringing with it several prisoners taken in the
course of a most gallant exploit.

Meanwhile, west of the Canal de TEscaut patrols of the 6th Divi-
sion during the afternoon entered Noyelles-sur-l'Escaut, where they
were reinforced by cavalry, and other cavalry units pushed out
towards Cantaing, West of Flesquieres, the 6and Division, operat-
ing northwards from Havrincourt, made important progress. Having
carried the Hindenburg Reserve Line north of that village, it rapidly
continued its attack and captured Graincourt, where two anti-tank
guns were destroyed by the tanks accompanying our infantry. Before
nightfall infantry and cavalry had entered Anneux, though the
enemy's resistance in this village docs not appear to have been
entirely overcome until the following morning.

This attack of the 6and (West Riding) Division constitutes a
brilliant achievement, in which the troops concerned completed an
advance of four and a half miles from their original front, over-
running two German systems of defence and gaining possession of
three villages.

On the left flank of our attack Ulster battalions pushed north-
wards along the Hindenburg Line and its forward defences, main-

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS 157

taining touch with the West Riding troops, and carried the whole of
the German trench systems west of the Canal du Nord as far north
as the Bapaume-Cambrai Road,

At the end of the first day of the attack, therefore, three German
systems of defence had been broken through to a depth of some four
and a half miles on a wide front, and over 5,000 prisoners had already
been brought in. But for the wrecking of the bridge at Masnieres and
the check at Flesquieres, still greater results might have been attained.

Throughout these operations the value of the services rendered
by the tanks was very great, and the utmost gallantry, enterprise and
resolution were displayed by both officers and crews. In combina-
tion with the other arms they helped to make possible a remarkable
success. Without their aid in opening a way through the German
wire, success could only have been attained by methods which would
have given the enemy ample warning of our attack, and have allowed
him time to mass troops to oppose it. As has been pointed out above,
to enable me to undertake such an operation with the troops at my dis-
posal, secrecy to the last moment was essential. The tanks alone made
it possible to dispense with artillery preparation, and so to conceal
our intentions from the enemy up to the actual moment of attack.

Great credit is due also to the Royal Flying Corps for very gallant
and most valuable work carried out under conditions of the greatest
difficulty from low clouds and driving mist.

In the subsidiary attack at Bullecourt battalions of the 3rd Divi-
sion (Major-General C, J, Deverell) and the i6th (Irish) Division
(Major-General W, B, Hickie) successfully completed the work
begun by our operations in this area in May and June, 1917, captur-
ing the remainder of the Hindenburg support trench on their front,
with some 700 prisoners, A number of counter-attacks against our
new positions at Bullecourt on this and the following day were
repulsed, with great loss to the enemy*

The Advance Continued

4, On the morning of the 2ist November the attack on Flesquieres
was resumed, and by 8,0 a,m. the village had been turned from the
north-west and captured. The obstacle which more than anything else
had limited the results of the 2oth November was thereby removed,
and later in the morning the advance once more became general,

Masnieres had been cleared of the enemy during the previous
evening, and at 11,0 a,m, our troops attacked the Beaurevoir-
Masnieres line and established themselves in the portion to the east
and north of Masnieres, Heavy fighting took place, and a counter-
attack from the direction of Rutnilly was beaten off. At the same
hour we attacked and captured Les Rues des Vignes, but later in the

i 5 8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

morning the enemy counter-attacked and compelled our troops to
fall back from this position. Progress was also made towards Creve-
cceur; but though the canal was crossed during the afternoon, it
was found impossible to force the passage of the river in face of the
enemy's machine gun fire.

That evening orders were issued by the Third Army to secure
the ground already gained in this area of the battle, and to capture
Rumilly on the morrow ; but in consequence of the exhaustion of
the troops engaged it was found necessary later in the night to cancel
the orders for this attack*

West of the Canal de TEscaut infantry of the 29th Division and
dismounted regiments of the ist and 5th Cavalry Divisions, 1
including the Ambala Brigade, were heavily engaged throughout the
day in Noyelles, and beat off all attacks in continuous fighting*

Following upon the capture of Flesquieres, the 5ist and 62nd
Divisions, in co-operation with a number of tanks and squadrons of
the ist Cavalry Division, attacked at 10,30 a,m, in the direction of
Fontaine-notre-Dame and Bourlon,

In this attack the capture of Anneux was completed, and early in
the afternoon Cantaing was seized, with some hundreds of prisoners.
Progress was made on the outskirts of Bourlon Wood, and late in the
afternoon Fontaine-notre-Dame was taken by troops of the 5 ist
Division and tanks. The attack on Bourlon Wood itself was checked
by machine gun fire, though tanks advanced some distance into the
wood.

Farther west, the 36th Division advanced north of the Bapaume-
Cambrai Road, and reached the southern outskirts of Moeuvres,
where strong opposition was encountered.

The Position on the list November

5. On the evening of the second day of the attack, therefore, our
troops held a line which ran approximately as follows :

From our old front line east of Gonnelieu the right flank of our
new positions lay along the eastern slopes of the Bonavis Ridge,
passing east of Lateau Wood and striking the Masnieres-Beaurevoir
line north of the Canal de TEscaut at a point about half way between
Crevecceur and Masnieres. From this point our line ran roughly
north-west, past and including Masnieres, Noyelles and Cantaing, to
Fontaine, also inclusive. Thence it bent back to the south for a
short distance, making a sharp salient round the latter village, and
ran in a general westerly direction along the southern edge of Bourlon
Wood and across the southern face of the spur to the west of the

1 Major-General R. L. Mulkns commanding the ist Cavalry Division.

THE CAMERA! OPERATIONS 159

wood, to the Canal du Nord, south-east of the village of Mceuvres.
From Mceuvres the line linked up once more with our old front at a
point about midway between Boursies and Pronville.

The forty-eight hours after which it had been calculated that
the enemy's reserves would begin to arrive had in effect expired, and
the high ground at Bourlon Village and Wood, as well as certain
important tactical features to the east and west of the wood, still
remained in the enemy's possession. It now became necessary to
decide whether to continue the operation offensively or to take up a
defensive attitude and rest content with what had been attained.

The Decision to Go On

6. It was not possible, however, to let matters stand as they were.
The positions captured by us north of Flesquieres were completely
commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless this ridge were gained
it would be impossible to hold them, except at excessive cost. If I
decided not to go on, a withdrawal to the Flesquieres Ridge would be
necessary and would have to be carried out at once.

On the other hand, the enemy showed certain signs of an inten-
tion to withdraw. Craters had been formed at road junctions, and
troops could be seen ready to move east. The possession of Bourlon
Ridge would enable our troops to obtain observation over the ground
to the north, which sloped gently down to the Sensee River. The
enemy's defensive lines south of the Scarpe and Sensee Rivers would
thereby be turned, his communications exposed to the observed fire
of our artillery, and his positions in this sector jeopardised. In short,
so great was the importance of the ridge to the enemy that its loss
would probably cause the abandonment by the Germans of their
carefully prepared defence systems for a considerable distance to
the north of it.

The successive days of constant marching and fighting had
placed a very severe strain upon the endurance of the troops, and,
before a further advance could be undertaken, some time would
have to be spent in resting and relieving them. This need for delay
was regrettable, as the enemy's forces were increasing, and fresh
German divisions were known to be arriving, but, with the limited
number of troops at my command, it was unavoidable.

It was to be remembered, however, that the hostile reinforce-
ments coming up at this stage could at first be no more than enough
to replace the enemy's losses ; and although the right of our advance
had definitely been stayed, the enemy had not yet developed such
strength about Bourlon as it seemed might not be overcome by the
numbers at my disposal. As has already been pointed out, on the

i6o SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Cambrai side of the battlefield I had only aimed at securing a
defensive flank to enable the advance to be pushed northwards and
north-westwards, and this part of my task had been to a large
extent achieved.

An additional and very important argument in favour of pro-
ceeding with my attack was supplied by the situation in Italy, upon
which a continuance of pressure on the Cambrai front might reason-
ably be expected to exercise an important effect, no matter what
measure of success attended my efforts. Moreover, two divisions
previously under orders for Italy had on this day been placed at my
disposal, and with this accession of strength the prospect of securing
Bourlon seemed good.

After weighing these various considerations, therefore, I decided
to continue the operations to gain the Bourlon position.

The 22nd November was spent in organising the captured
ground, in carrying out certain reliefs, and in giving other troops the
rest they greatly needed. Soon after midday the enemy regained
Fontaine-notre-Dame ; but, with our troops already on the out-
skirts of Bourlon Wood and Cantaing held by us, it was thought that
the recapture of Fontaine should not prove very difficult. The neces-
sary arrangements for renewing the attack were therefore pushed on,
and our plans were extended to include the recapture of Fontaine-
notre-Dame.

Meanwhile, early in the night of the 22nd November, a battalion
of the Queen's Westminsters (56th Division, Major-General F, A,
Dudgeon) stormed a commanding tactical point in the Hindenburg
Line west of Moeuvres known as Tadpole Copse, the possession of
which would be of value in connection with the left flank of the
Bourlon position when the latter had been secured,

The Struggle for Bourlon Wood

7, On the morning of the 23rd November the 5ist Division,
supported by tanks, attacked Fontaine-notre-Dame, but was unable
to force an entrance. Early in the afternoon this division repeated
its attack from the west, and a number of tanks entered Fontaine,
where they remained till dusk, inflicting considerable loss on the
enemy. We did not succeed, however, in clearing the village, and at
the end of the day no progress had been made on this part of our
front*

At 10,30 a,m, the 4Oth Division (Major-General J, Ponsonby)
attacked Bourlon Wood, and after four and a half hours of hard
fighting, in which tanks again rendered valuable assistance to our
infantry, captured the whole of the wood and entered Bourlon

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS 161

Village* Here hostile counter-attacks prevented our further pro-
gress, and though the village was at one time reported to have been
taken by us, this proved later to be erroneous. A heavy hostile
attack upon our positions in the wood, in which all three battalions
of the gth Grenadier Regiment appear to have been employed, was
completely repulsed*

Throughout this day, also, the 36th Division and troops of the
56th (London) Division (T.) were engaged in stubborn fighting in
the neighbourhood of Mceuvres and Tadpole Copse, and made some
progress.

This struggle for Bourlon resulted in several days of fiercely
contested fighting, in which English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish
battalions, together with dismounted cavalry, performed most gallant
service and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy.

During the morning of the 24th November the enemy twice
attacked, and at his second attempt pressed back our troops in the
north-eastern corner of the wood. An immediate counter-attack
delivered by the I4th Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders,
the 1 5th Hussars, dismounted, and the remnants of the ngth In-
fantry Brigade (4Oth Division and ist Cavalry Division), drove back
the enemy in turn, and by noon our line had been re-established.
Meanwhile, dismounted cavalry had repulsed an attack on the high
ground west of Bourlon Wood, and in the afternoon a third hostile
attack upon the wood was stopped by our artillery and rifle fire.

On this afternoon our infantry again attacked Bourlon Village,
and captured the whole of it. Later in the evening a fourth attack
upon our positions in the wood was beaten off after fierce fighting.
Further progress was made on this day in the Hindenburg Line
west of Mceuvres, but the enemy's resistance in the whole of this
area was very strong.

On the evening of the 25th November a fresh attack by the enemy
regained Bourlon Village, though our troops offered vigorous re-
sistance, and parties of the i3th Battalion, East Surrey Regiment
(4oth Division), held out in the south-east corner of the village until
touch was re-established with them two days later. The continual
fighting and the strength of the enemy's attacks, however, had told
heavily on the 4oth Division, which had borne the brunt of the
struggle. This division was accordingly withdrawn, and on the
following day our troops were again pressed back slightly in the
northern outskirts of Bourlon Wood.

With the enemy in possession of the shoulder of the ridge above
Fontaine-notre-Dame, as well as of part of the high ground west of
Bourlon Wood, our position in the wood itself was a difficult one,
and much of the ground to the south of it was still exposed to the

i6a SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

enemy's observation. It was decided, therefore, to make another
effort on the 27th November to capture Fontaine-notre-Dame and
Bourlon Village, and to gain possession of the whole of the Bourlon
Ridge*

In this attack, in which tanks co-operated, British Guards (Major-
General G. P. T. Feilding) temporarily regained possession of
Fontaine-notre-Dame, taking some hundreds of prisoners, and
troops of the 62nd Division once more entered Bourlon Village.
Later in the morning, however, heavy counter-attacks developed in
both localities, and our troops were unable to maintain the ground
they had gained. During the afternoon the enemy also attacked our
positions at Tadpole Copse, but was repulsed.

As the result of five days of constant fighting, therefore, we held
a strong position on the Bourlon Hill and in the wood, but had not
yet succeeded in gaining all the ground required for the security of
this important feature. The two following days passed compara-
tively quietly, while the troops engaged were relieved and steps were
undertaken to prepare for a deliberate attack which might give us
the tactical points we sought.

Meanwhile, on other parts of the front the organisation of our
new positions was proceeding as rapidly as conditions would allow.
In particular, troops of the i2th Division had effected some im-
provement on the right flank of our advance opposite Banteux, and
the 1 6th Division had made further progress in the Hindenburg
Line north-west of Bullecourt.

At the end of November the number of prisoners taken in our
operations south-west of Cambrai exceeded 10,500. We had also
captured 142 guns, some 350 machine guns, and 70 trench mortars,
with great quantities of ammunition, material and stores of all kinds.

THE GERMAN ATTACK
Early Warnings

8. During the last days of November increased registration of
hostile artillery, the movements of troops and transport observed
behind the German lines, together with other indications of a like
nature, pointed to further efforts by the enemy to regain the positions
we had wrested from him.

The front affected by this increased activity included that of our
advance, as well as the ground to Vendhuille and beyond. The mass-
ing of the enemy's infantry, however, his obvious anxiety concerning

CAMBRAI BATTLE ;

German Attack, 3Oth November, 1917.

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS 163

the security of his defences south of the Sense*e River, the tactical
importance of the high ground about Bourlon, and the fact that we
were still only in partial possession of it, all pointed to the principal
attack being delivered in the Bourlon sector.

Our Dispositions for Defence

9. Measures were accordingly taken, both by the Third Army
and by the lower formations concerned, to prepare for eventualities.
Arrangements had been made after our last attack to relieve the
troops holding the Bourlon positions by such fresh divisions as
were available, and when these reliefs had been satisfactorily
completed, I felt confident that the defence of this sector could
be considered secure.

Covering our right flank from Cantaing to the Banteux Ravine, a
distance of about 16,000 yards, five British divisions were disposed,
and, though these had been fighting for several days and were con-
sequently tired, I felt confident that they would prove equal to
stopping any attack the enemy could make on them.

From the Banteux Ravine southwards the divisions in line were
weak and held very extended fronts. On the other hand, the line
held by us in this southern sector had been in our possession for
some months. Its defences were for this reason more complete and
better organised than those of the ground gained by us in our attack.
Moreover, the capture of the Bonavis Ridge had added to the security
of our position farther south.

The reserve divisions immediately available in the area consisted
of the Guards and 2nd Cavalry Divisions (Major-General W. H.
Greenly commanding 2nd Cavalry Division), both of which had
been engaged in the recent fighting at Fontaine and Bourlon Wood.
These were located behind the La Vacquerie-Villers Guislain front,
while another division, the 62nd, which had also been recently
engaged, was placed farther to the north-west in the direction of the
Bapaume-Cambrai Road. A fresh South Midland division (6ist
Division, Major-General C. J. Mackenzie) was assembling farther
back, two other cavalry divisions were within two or three hours'
march of the battle area, and another cavalry division but a little
farther distant.

In view of the symptoms of activity observed on the enemy's
front, special precautions were taken by local commanders, especi-
ally from Villers Guislain to the south. Troops were warned to
expect attack, additional machine guns were placed to secure sup-
porting points, and divisional reserves were closed up. Special
patrols were also sent out to watch for signs of any hostile advance.

1 64 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

The Battle Reopened

10, Between the hours of 7,0 and 8,0 a,m, on the last days of
November the enemy attacked, after a short but intense artillery
preparation, on the greater part of a front of some ten miles from
Vendhuille to Masnieres inclusive. From Masnieres to Banteux, both
inclusive, four German divisions would seem to have been em-
ployed against the three British divisions holding this area (29th,
2oth and i2th Divisions), Between Banteux exclusive and Vend-
huille one German division and portions of two others were
employed against the northern half of the British division holding
that front (the 55th Division, Major- General H. S, Jeudwine),

On the Masnieres front the 29th Division, composed of English,
Scottish, Welsh, Irish, Guernsey and Newfoundland battalions,
although seriously threatened as the day wore on by the progress
made by the enemy farther south, where their battery positions
had been taken in reverse, most gallantly beat off a succession of
powerful assaults and maintained their line intact.

At the northern end of the Bonavis Ridge and in the Gonnelieu
sector the swiftness with which the advance of the enemy's infantry
followed the opening of his bombardment appears to have over-
whelmed our troops, both in line and in immediate support, almost
before they had realised that the attack had begun.

The nature of the bombardment, which seems to have been
heavy enough to keep our men under cover without at first seriously
alarming them, contributed to the success of the enemy's plans. No
steadily advancing barrage gave warning of the approach of the
German assault columns, whose secret assembly was assisted by the
many deep folds and hollows typical of a chalk formation, and
shielded from observation from the air by an early morning mist.
Only when the attack was upon them great numbers of low-flying
German aeroplanes rained machine gun fire upon our infantry, while
an extensive use of smoke shell and bombs made it extremely difficult
for our troops to see what was happening on other parts of the battle-
field, or to follow the movements of the enemy. In short, there is
little doubt that, although an attack was expected generally, yet in
these areas of the battle at the moment of delivery ths assault effected
a local surprise.

None the less, stubborn resistance was offered during the morn-
ing by isolated parties of our troops and by machine gun detachments
in the neighbourhood of Lateau Wood and south-east of La Vac-
querie, as well as at other points. In more than one instance heavy
losses are known to have been inflicted on the enemy by machine
gun fire at short range. North-east of La Vacquerie the 92nd Field

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS 165

Artillery Brigade (2oth Division) repulsed four attacks, in some of
which the enemy's infantry approached to within 200 yards of our
guns, before the surviving gunners were finally compelled to with-
draw, after removing the breech-blocks from their pieces* East of
Villers Guislain the troops holding our forward positions on the
high ground were still offering a strenuous resistance to the enemy's
attack on their front, at a time when large forces of German infantry
had already advanced up the valley between them and Villers Guis-
lain. South of this village a single strong point known as Limerick
Post, garrisoned by troops of the i/5th Battalion (King's Own),
Royal Lancaster Regiment, and the i/ioth Battalion, Liverpool
Regiment (both of the 55th Division), held out with great gallantry
throughout the day, though heavily attacked.

The progress made by the enemy, however, across the northern
end of the Bonavis Ridge and up the deep gully between Villers
Guislain and Gonnelieu, known as 22 Ravine, turned our positions
on the ridge as well as in both villages. Taken in flank and rear, the
defences of Villers Guislain, Gonnelieu and Bonavis were rapidly
over-run. Gouzeaucourt was captured about 9.0 a.m., the outer
defences of La Vacquerie were reached, and a number of guns which
had been brought up close to the line, in order to enable them to
cover the battle-front about Masnieres and Marcoing, fell into the
hands of the enemy.

At this point the enemy's advance was checked by the action df
our local reserves, and meanwhile measures had been taken with all
possible speed to bring up additional troops. About midday the
Guards came into action west of Gouzeaucourt, while cavalry (4th
and 5th Cavalry Divisions, Major-General A. A. Kennedy command-
ing 4th Cavalry Division) moved up to close the gap on their right
and made progress towards Villers Guislain from the south and
south-west.

The attack of the Guards, which was delivered with the greatest
gallantry and resolution, drove the enemy out of Gouzeaucourt and
made progress on the high ground known as the St. Quentin Ridge,
east of the village. In this operation the Guards were materially
assisted by the gallant action of a party of the 2Qth Division, who,
with a company of North Midland Royal Engineers, held on through-
out the day to a position in an old trench near Gouzeaucourt. Valu-
able work was also done by a brigade of field artillery of the 4yth
Division, which moved direct into action from the line of march.

During the afternoon three battalions of tanks, which when they
received news of the attack were preparing to move away from the
battlefield to refit, arrived at Gouzeaucourt and aided the infantry
to hold the recaptured ground. Great credit is due to the officers and

166 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

men of the Tank Brigade concerned for the speed with which they
brought their tanks into action.

Meanwhile, the defence of La Vacquerie had been successfully
maintained, and our line had been established to the north of that
village, in touch with our troops in Masnieres,

The Northern Attack

n. In the northern area, from Fontaine-notre-Dame to Tadpole
Copse, the German attack was not launched until some two hours
later. This was the enemy's main attack, and was carried out with
large forces and great resolution.

After a heavy preliminary bombardment, and covered by an
artillery barrage, the enemy's infantry advanced shortly after 9.0 a,m,
in dense waves, in the manner of his attacks in the first battle of
Ypres, In the course of the morning and afternoon no less than five
principal attacks were made in this area, and on one portion of
the attack as many as eleven waves of German infantry advanced
successively to the assault. On the whole of this front a resolute
endeavour was made to break down by sheer weight of numbers the
defence of the London Territorials and other English battalions
holding the sector.

In this fighting the 4yth (London) Division (T.) (Major-General
Sir G, F, Gorringe), the 2nd Division (Major-General C. E, Pereira)
and the 56th (London) Division (T.) greatly distinguished them-*
selves, and there were accomplished many deeds of great heroism.

Under the fury of the enemy's bombardment a company of the
iyth Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, were in the course of being with-
drawn from an exposed position in a sap-head in advance of our line
between Bourlon Wood and Mceuvres when the German attack
burst upon them. The officer in command sent three of his platoons
back, and with a rearguard composed of the remainder of his com-
pany held off the enemy's infantry until the main position had been
organised. Having faithfully accomplished their task, this rearguard
died fighting to the end with their faces to the enemy.

Somewhat later in the morning an attack in force between the
Canal du Nord and Mceuvres broke into our foremost positions and
isolated a company of the I3th Battalion, Essex Regiment, in a trench
just west of the canal. After maintaining a splendid and successful
resistance throughout the day, whereby the pressure upon our main
line was greatly relieved, at 4.0 p.m, this company held a council of
war, at which the two remaining company officers, the company
sergeant-major, and the platoon sergeants were present, and un-
animously determined to fight to the last and have " no surrender,"

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS 167

Two runners who were sent to notify this decision to Battalion Head-
quarters succeeded in getting through to our lines and delivered
their message* During the remainder of the afternoon and far into
the following night this gallant company were heard righting, and
there is little room for doubt that they carried out to a man their
heroic resolution.

Early in the afternoon large masses of the enemy again attacked
west of Bourlon Wood, and, though beaten off with great loss at
most points, succeeded in overwhelming three out of a line of posts
held by a company of the ist Battalion, Royal Berks Regiment, on
the right of the 2nd Division, Though repeatedly attacked by vastly
superior numbers the remainder of these posts stood firm, and when,
two days later, the three posts which had been overpowered were
regained, such a heap of German dead lay in and around them that
the bodies of our own men were hidden.

All accounts go to show that the enemy's losses in the whole of
his constantly repeated attacks on this sector of the battle front were
enormous. One battery of eight machine guns fired 70,000 rounds of
ammunition into ten successive waves of Germans, Long lines of
attacking infantry were caught by our machine gun fire in enfilade,
and were shot down in line as they advanced. Great execution also
was done by our field artillery, and in the course of the battle guns
were brought up to the crest line and fired direct upon the enemy
at short range.

At one point west of Bourlon the momentum of his first advance
carried the enemy through our front line and a short way down the
southern slopes of the ridge. There, however, the German masses
came under direct fire from our field artillery at short range and
were broken up. Our local reserves at once counter-attacked, and
succeeded in closing the gap that had been made in our line. Early
in the afternoon the enemy again forced his way into our foremost
positions in this locality, opening a gap between the i/6th Battalion
and the i/i5th Battalion, London Regiments, Counter-attacks, led
by the two battalion commanders, with all available men, including
the personnel of their headquarters, once more restored the situation.
All other attacks were beaten off with the heaviest losses to the
enemy.

The greatest credit is due to the troops at Masnieres, Bourlon
and Moeuvres for the very gallant service performed by them on
this day. But for their steady courage and staunchness in defence,
the success gained by the enemy on the right of our battle front
might have had serious consequences,

I cannot close the account of this day's fighting without recording
my obligation to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies for

168 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the prompt way in which he placed French troops within reach for
employment in case of need at the unfettered discretion of the Third
Army Commander, Part of the artillery of this force actually came
into action, rendering valuable service, and though the remainder of
the troops were not called upon, the knowledge that they were
available should occasion arise was a great assistance,

The Fighting at Gonnelieu and Masnieres

12. On the ist December fighting continued fiercely on the
whole front.

The Guards completed the capture of the St. Quentin Ridge and
entered Gonnelieu, where they captured over 350 prisoners and a
large number of machine guns. Tanks took an effective part in the
fighting for the ridge. At one point, where our infantry were held
up by fire from a hostile trench, a single tank attacked and operated
up and down the trench, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy's
garrison. Our infantry were then able to advance and secure the
trench, which was found full of dead Germans. In it were also
found fifteen machine guns that had been silenced by the tank. In
the whole of this fighting splendid targets were obtained by all tank
crews, and the German casualties were seen to be very great.

Farther south, a number of tanks co-operated with dismounted
Indian cavalry of the 5th Cavalry Division and with the Guards in
the attacks upon Villers Guislain and Gauche Wood, and were in
great measure responsible for the capture of the wood. Heavy fight-
ing took place for this position, which it is clear the enemy had
decided to hold at all costs. When the infantry and cavalry finally
took possession of the wood, great numbers of German dead and
smashed machine guns were found. In one spot four German
machine guns, with dead crews lying round, were discovered within
a radius of twenty yards. Three German field guns, complete with
teams, were also captured in this wood.

Other tanks proceeded to Villers Guislain, and, in spite of heavy
direct artillery fire, three reached the outskirts of the village, but
the fire of the enemy's machine guns prevented our troops advanc-
ing from the south from supporting them, and the tanks ultimately
withdrew.

Severe fighting took place, also, at Masnieres, During the after-
noon and evening at least nine separate attacks were beaten off
by the 29th Division on this front, and other hostile attacks were
repulsed in the neighbourhood of Marcoing, Fontaine-notre-Dame
and Bourlon. With the Bonavis Ridge in the enemy's hands, how-
ever, Masnieres was exposed to attack on three sides, and on the

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS 169

night of the ist/2nd December our troops were withdrawn under
orders to a line west of the village,

On the afternoon of the 2nd December a series of heavy attacks
developed against Welsh Ridge in the neighbourhood of La Vac-
querie, and further assaults were made on our positions in the neigh-
bourhood of Masnieres and Bourlon, These attacks were broken in
succession by our machine gun fire, but the enemy persisted in his
attempts against Welsh Ridge and gradually gained ground* By
nightfall our line had been pushed back to a position west and north
of Gonnelieu,

Next day the enemy renewed his attacks in great force on the
whole front from Gonnelieu to Marcoing, and ultimately gained
possession of La Vacquerie. North of La Vacquerie repeated attacks
made about Masnieres and Marcoing were repulsed in severe fight-
ing, but the positions still retained by us beyond the Canal de TEscaut
were extremely exposed, and during the night our troops were with-
drawn under orders to the west bank of the canal,

The Withdrawal from Bourlon

13, By this time the enemy had evidently become exhausted by
the efforts he had made and the severity of his losses, and the 4th
December passed comparatively quietly. For some days, however,
local fighting continued in the neighbourhood of La Vacquerie, and
his attitude remained aggressive. Local attacks in this sector were
repulsed on the 5th December, and on this and the following two days
further fierce fighting took place, in which the enemy again endea-
voured without success to drive us from our positions on Welsh Ridge.

The strength which the enemy had shown himself able to de-
velop in his attacks made it evident that only by prolonged and
severe fighting could I hope to re-establish my right flank on the
Bonavis Ridge. Unless this was done, the situation of my troops in
the salient north of Flesquieres would be difficult and dangerous,
even if our hold on Bourlon Hill were extended.

I had therefore to c Je either to embark on another offensive
battle on a large scale, or to withdraw to a more compact line on the
Flesquieres Ridge.

Although this decision involved giving up important positions
most gallantly won, I had no doubt as to the correct course under
the conditions. Accordingly, on the night of the 4th /5th December
the evacuation of the positions held by us north of the Flesquieres
Ridge was commenced. On the morning of the yth December this
withdrawal was completed successfully without interference from
the enemy.

i 7 o SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Before withdrawing, the more important of the enemy's field
defences were destroyed, and those of his guns which we had been
unable to remove were rendered useless. The enemy did not dis-
cover our withdrawal for some time, and when, on the afternoon of
the 5th December, he began to feel his way forward, he did so with
great caution* In spite of his care, on more than one occasion bodies
of his infantry were caught in the open by our artillery*

Much skill and courage were shown by our covering troops in
this withdrawal, and an incident which occurred on the afternoon of
the 6th December in the neighbourhood of Graincourt deserves
special notice. A covering party, consisting of two companies of the
i /i 5th Battalion, London Regiment, 4yth Division, much reduced in
strength by the fighting at Bourlon Wood, found their flank exposed
by a hostile attack farther east, and were enveloped and practically
cut off. These companies successfully cut their way through to
our advanced line of resistance, where they arrived in good order,
after having inflicted serious casualties on the enemy.

The new line taken up by us corresponded roughly to the old
Hindenburg Reserve Line, and ran from a point about one and a
half miles north by east of La Vacquerie, north of Ribecourt and
Flesquieres to the Canal du Nord, about one and a half miles north
of Havrincourt z.e., between two and two and a half miles in front
of the line held by us prior to the attack of the aoth November. We
therefore retained in our possession an important section of the
Hindenburg trench system, with its excellent dug-outs and other
advantages.

The Results of the Battle

14. The material results of the three weeks' fighting described
above can be stated in general terms very shortly.

We had captured and retained in our possession over 12,000
yards of the former German front line from La Vacquerie to a point
opposite Boursies, together with between 10,000 and 11,000 yards
of the Hindenburg Line and Hindenburg Reserve Line and the
villages of Ribecourt, Flesquieres and Havrincourt. A total of 145
German guns were taken or destroyed by us in the course of the
operations, and 11,100 German prisoners were captured.

On the other hand, the enemy had occupied an unimportant
section of our front line between Vendhuille and Gonnelieu.

There is little doubt that our operations were of considerable
indirect assistance to the Allied forces in Italy. Large demands were
made upon the available German reserves at a time when a great
concentration of German divisions was still being maintained in
Flanders. There is evidence that German divisions intended for

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS 171

the Italian theatre were diverted to the Cambrai front, and it is
probable that the further concentration of German forces against
Italy was suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period,
when our Allies were making their first stand on the Piave Line.

GENERAL REVIEW

15. I have already summarised in the opening paragraphs of this
Despatch both the reasons which decided me to undertake the Cam-
brai operations and the limitations to which those operations were
subject.

In view of the strength of the German forces on the front of my
attack, and the success with which secrecy was maintained during our
preparations, I had calculated that the enemy's prepared defences
would be captured in the first rush* I had good hope that his resist-
ing power behind those defences would then be so enfeebled for a
period that we should be able on the same day to establish ourselves
quickly and completely on the dominating Bourlon Ridge from
Fontaine-notre-Dame to Mceuvres, and to secure our right flank
along a line including the Bonavis Ridge, Crevecoeur and Rumilly to
Fontaine-notre-Dame. Even if this did not prove possible within
the first twenty-four hours, a second day would be at our disposal
before the enemy's reserves could begin to arrive in any formidable
numbers.

Meanwhile, with no wire and no prepared defences to hamper
them, it was reasonable to hope that masses of cavalry would find it
possible to pass through, whose task would be thoroughly to dis-
organise the enemy's systems of command and inter-communication
in the whole area between the Canal de 1'Escaut, the River Sensee
and the Canal du Nord, as well as to the east and north-east of
Cambrai.

My intentions as regards subsequent exploitation were to push
westward and north-westward, taking the Hindenburg Line in
reverse from Mceuvres to the River Scarpe, and capturing all the
enemy's defences and probably most of his garrisons lying west of a
line from Cambrai northwards to the Sense*e, and south of that
river and the Scarpe.

Time would have been required to enable us to develop and
complete the operation ; but the prospects of gaining the necessary
time, by the use of cavalry in the manner outlined above, were in my
opinion good enough to justify the attempt to execute the plan. I
am of opinion that on the 2oth and 2ist November we went very
near to a success sufficiently complete to bring the realisation of our
full programme within our power.

173 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

The reasons for my decision to continue the fight after the aist
November have already been explained. Though in the event no
advantage was gained thereby, I still consider that, as the problem
presented itself at the time, the more cautious course would have
been difficult to justify. It must be remembered that it was not a
question of remaining where we stood, but of abandoning tactical
positions of value, gained with great gallantry, the retention of
which seemed not only to be within our power, but likely even yet
to lead to further success.

Whatever may be the final decision on this point, as well as on
the original decision to undertake the enterprise at all with the forces
available, the continuation of our efforts against Fontaine-notre-
Dame gave rise to severe fighting, in which our troops more than
held their own.

On the 3oth November risks were accepted by us at some points
in order to increase our strength at others. Our fresh reserves had
been thrown in on the Bourlon front, where the enemy brought
against us a total force of seven divisions to three and failed. I do
not consider that it would have been justifiable on the indications to
have allotted a smaller garrison to this front.

Between Masnieres and Vendhuille the enemy's superiority in
infantry over our divisions in line was in the proportion of about
four to three, 1 and we were sufficiently provided with artillery. That
his attack was partially successful may tend to show that the garri-
son allotted to this front was insufficient, either owing to want of
numbers, lack of training, or exhaustion from previous fighting.

Captured maps and orders have made it clear that the enemy
aimed at far more considerable results than were actually achieved
by him. Three convergent attacks were to be made on the salient
formed by our advance ; two of them delivered approximately
simultaneously about Gonnelieu and Masnieres, followed later by a
still more powerful attack on the Bourlon front. The objectives of
these attacks extended to the high ground at Beaucamp and Trescault,
and the enemy's hope was to capture and destroy the whole of the
British forces in the Cambrai salient.

This bold and ambitious plan was foiled on the greater part of
our front by the splendid defence of the British divisions engaged ;
and, though the defence broke down for a time in one area, the
recovery made by the weak forces still left and those within im-
mediate reach is worthy of the highest praise. Numberless instances

1 The strengths of the 55th, I2th, aoth and 3Qth Divisions just prior to the German
attack totalled some 43,000 rifles. The estimated strength of a German division at this
time was some 8,500 rifles. Only a part of the front of the 55th Division was involved
in the attack.

THE CAMBRAI OPERATIONS 173

of great gallantry, promptitude and skill were shown, some few of
which have been recounted.

I desire to acknowledge the skill and resource displayed by
General Byng throughout the Cambrai operations, and to express
my appreciation of the manner in which they were conducted by
him, as well as by his Staff and the subordinate commanders.

In conclusion, I would point out that the sudden breaking
through by our troops of an immense system of defence has had a
most inspiring moral effect on the Armies I command, and must
have a correspondingly depressing influence upon the enemy. The
great value of the tanks in the offensive has been conclusively proved.
In view of this experience, the enemy may well hesitate to deplete
any portion of his front, as he did last summer, in order to set free
troops to concentrate for decisive action at some other point*

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,
Your obedient Servant,

D. HAIG, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France*

THE

GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE

General Headquarters,

loth July, igiS, 1
MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit the following report upon the opera-
tions of the Forces under my Command during the period following
the actions in the vicinity of Cambrai in the first week of December,
1917.

GENERAL SITUATION

1. The broad facts of the change which took place in the general
war situation at the close of 1917, and the causes which led to it, have
long been well known, and need be referred to but shortly*

The disappearance of Russia as a belligerent country on the side
of the Entente Powers had set free the great bulk of the German
and Austrian divisions on the Eastern Front, Already at the begin-
ning of November, 1917, the transfer of German divisions from the
Russian to the Western front had begun. 2 It became certain that the
movement would be continued steadily until numerical superiority
lay with the enemy.

It was to be expected, moreover, that large numbers of guns and
munitions formerly in the possession of the Russian Armies would
fall into the hands of our enemies, and at some future date would be
turned against the Allies.

Although the growing Army of the United States of America
might be expected eventually to restore the balance in our favour, a
considerable period of time would be required to enable that Army
to develop its full strength. While it would be possible for Germany
to complete her new dispositions early in the new year, the forces
which America could send to France before the season would permit
active operations to be recommenced would not be large.

Transition from an Offensive to a Defensive Policy

2. In view of the situation described above, * * * * it became
necessary to change the policy governing the conduct of the operations

1 This Despatch was published as a Supplement to the London Gazette of the 2ist
October, 1918.

2 Prior to this date, many thousands of fresh troops had been brought from the
Eastern front as drafts.

177

i 7 8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

of the British Armies in France* Orders accordingly were issued early
in December having for their object immediate preparation to meet
a strong and sustained hostile offensive* In other words, a defensive
policy was adopted, and all necessary arrangements consequent
thereon were put in hand with the least possible delay*

Extension of the British Front

3* Since the month of September, 1917, pursuant to a decision
taken by the British Government towards the end of that month,
negotiations had been proceeding with the French authorities re-
garding the extension of the front held by the British Armies* After
considerable discussion on the subject, it was finally decided that
the British should relieve the French troops on my right as far as
the vicinity of the village of Barisis, immediately south of the River
Oise* The additional front to be taken over by me amounted to over
twenty-eight miles*

This relief, which was to have taken place in December, was
delayed until January in consequence of the further development of
the Cambrai battle* In the meantime, the French forces which had
co-operated so successfully on the left of the British in Flanders had
been withdrawn, and French troops again assumed responsibility
for the coastal sector at Nieuport*

By the end of January, 1918, the relief of the French as far as
Barisis had been completed without incident* At that date the
British Armies were holding some 125 miles of active front*

Man-power and Training

The strenuous efforts made by the British forces during 1917 had
left the Army at a low ebb in regard both to training and numbers,
It was therefore of the first importance, in view of the expected
German offensive, to fill up the ranks as rapidly as possible and
provide ample facilities for training*

So far as the second of these requirements was concerned, two
factors materially affected the situation* Firstly, training had hitherto
been primarily devoted to preparation for offensive operations*
Secondly, the necessity for maintaining the front line systems of
defence and the construction of new lines on ground recently cap-
tured from the enemy had precluded the development of rear line
systems to any great degree*

Under the new conditions the early construction of these latter
systems, involving the employment of every available man on the

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 179

work, became a matter of vital importance. In consequence it was
difficult to carry out any elaborate course of training in defensive
tactics. On the other hand, in the course of the strenuous righting in
1916 and 1917, great developments had taken place in the methods of
conducting a defensive battle. It was essential that the lessons
learned therein should be assimilated rapidly and thoroughly by all
ranks,

* * * * At the same time a change took place in the organisation
of the forces. Under instructions from the Army Council, the
reorganisation of divisions from 313 battalion to a 10 battalion basis
was * * * * completed during the month of February, Apart from
the reduction in fighting strength involved by this reorganisation, the
fighting efficiency of units was to some extent affected. An un-
familiar grouping of units was introduced thereby, necessitating new
methods of tactical handling of the troops and the discarding of old
methods to which subordinate commanders had been accustomed.

The difficulties with which we were faced * * * * were accent-
uated by the increase in the British front described in the preceding
paragraph. Meanwhile, in marked contrast to our own position, the
large reserves in the Western theatre, which the enemy was able
to create for himself by the transfer of numerous divisions from
the East, enabled him to carry out extensive training with units
completed to establishment,

Preparations for Defence

5, Orders issued early in December, as stated above, had defined
the defensive policy to be adopted and the methods of defence, A
vast amount of work was required to be done in the construction of
defences, old systems had to be remodelled and new systems created.
The construction of new communications and the extension of old,
more especially in the area south-east of Arras which the enemy had
devastated in his retirement last year, involved the building of a
number of additional roads and the laying out of railways, both
narrow and normal gauge. Work of this nature was particularly
necessary on the Somme battlefield and in the area recently taken
over from the French.

All available men of the fighting units, with the exception of a
very small proportion undergoing training, and all labour units were
employed on these tasks. Though the time and labour available were
in no way adequate if, as was suspected, the enemy intended to com-
mence his offensive operations in the early spring, a large portion of
the work was in fact completed before the enemy launched his great
attack. That so much was accomplished is due to the untiring energy

i8o SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

of all ranks of the fighting units, the Transportation Service and
the Labour Corps*

Arrangements for Co-operation with the French

6. In addition to our own defensive schemes, completion of
arrangements for the closest possible co-operation with the French
was recognised to be a matter of great importance and urgency* A
comprehensive investigation was undertaken into the various pro-
blems connected with the co-operation of the two Allied forces.
Plans were drawn up in combination with the French military
authorities, and were worked out in great detail to meet the different
situations which might arise on different parts of the Allied front*
Measures were taken to ensure the smooth and rapid execution of
these plans.

Among the many problems studied by the Allied Staffs, those
involved by a hostile offensive on the line of the Somme River and
the passage of that river by the enemy had been worked out. The
plans applicable to such a situation had been drawn up and were
ready to be put into execution when required.

Operations during the Winter

7. In order to ensure the greatest possible concentration of effort
upon training, reorganisation and defences, and also in order to
allow my divisions the maximum amount of rest after the continu-
ous fighting of 1917, only such minor enterprises were undertaken
by the British forces during the winter months as were essential to
keep us informed regarding the dispositions and intentions of the
German forces opposed to us. Special attention was directed to dis-
posing our forces in line in such manner as would best promote
economy in men and reduce casualties.

On the enemy side, some little activity continued until the end of
the year, and local attacks were made by him both on the Cambrai
front and in the Ypres sector ; resulting in certain small modifications
in the line held by us. In these engagements, the policy followed by
me was to avoid involving troops in struggles for non-essential
positions, and subordinate commanders were instructed accordingly.

The first of the enemy *s minor attacks took place on the I2th
December in the neighbourhood of Bullecourt, and after sharp
fighting led to the loss of the point of the salient held by us east of
that village, with a consequent shortening of our line. Other local
attacks on the I4th and 22nd December at Polderhoek Chateau and
astride the Ypres-Staden Railway also resulted in small and unim-
portant withdrawals of portions of our outpost line in these localities.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 181

On the 3Oth December a somewhat more serious attempt was
made by the enemy against our positions on Welsh Ridge, on the
Cambrai front. The attack, made in the early morning on a front of
over two miles from La Vacquerie northwards towards Marcoing,
was delivered in considerable strength, and elaborate precautions
were taken by the enemy to effect surprise* 1 South of Marcoing, the
enemy gained possession of a somewhat isolated trench sited on the
northern slopes of Welsh Ridge, compelling our troops to fall back
to a sunken road lying across the base of the salient, where they
organised a successful resistance. At the southern end of the ridge
near La Vacquerie the enemy's attack succeeded in over-running not
only our forward posts but also the trench line on the crest of the
ridge, with all its advantages of observation. During the afternoon,
however, an admirably executed counter-attack by two companies
of the 63rd Division drove the enemy from the crest of the ridge and
regained all the essential parts of our former positions.

On the 5th, and again on the 8th January, the enemy made two
other local attacks east of Bullecourt, both of which were unsuccessful.

Early in March there was a recrudescence of hostile activity in
the northern sector. Following upon an unsuccessful attack on the
Belgian advanced positions north of Dixmude on the 6th March, two
local attacks were made by the enemy two days later on the British
front, the one south and north of the Menin Road, and the other on
a front of over a mile south of Houthulst Forest, Both these attacks
were repulsed after sharp fighting and our line maintained or re-
established by counter-attacks.

During the whole of this period hostile raiding parties displayed
greatly increased activity, but the vigilance of our troops prevented
them from achieving any success in more than a small proportion of
instances. On our side, during the earlier part of the winter, raiding
activity was deliberately cut down to the lowest limits consonant with
the maintenance of an adequate knowledge of the enemy's dispositions*
In the three and a half months extending from the morning of the 8th
December, 1917, to the opening of the German offensive, some 235
raids were attempted by the enemy. Not more than 62 of these were
successful in obtaining any identification from our lines, while in 67
cases his raiding parties left prisoners or dead in our hands. During
the same period some 125 raids were carried out by us, 77 of which
were successful in obtaining prisoners or identifications ; while in 31
other cases the enemy's trenches were found to have been evacuated.

Besides raids, considerable patrolling activity took place on both
sides. In this form of warfare our troops maintained a marked

1 The leading parties of the enemy were clad in white in order that theyjnight be
the less readily seen against the background of snow.

i8a SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

superiority over the enemy on almost all occasions and secured
many prisoners, in addition to inflicting frequent casualties on
hostile patrols and working parties*

THE STORM GATHERS
Indications of the Coming Attack

8* Towards the middle of February, 1918, it became evident
that the enemy was preparing for a big offensive on the Western
front* It was known from various sources that he had been steadily
increasing his forces in the Western theatre since the beginning of
November, 1917* In three and a half months 28 infantry divisions
had been transferred from the Eastern theatre and 6 infantry divi-
sions from the Italian theatre* There were reports that further rein-
forcements were on their way to the West, and it was also known
that the enemy had greatly increased his heavy artillery in the Western
theatre during the same period* These reinforcements were more
than were necessary for defence, and, as they were moved at a time
when the distribution of food and fuel to the civil population in
Germany was rendered extremely difficult through lack of rolling
stock, I concluded that the enemy intended to attack at an early date.

Constant air reconnaissances over the enemy 's lines showed that
rail and road communications were being improved and ammunition
and supply dumps increased along the whole front from Flanders
to the Oise* By the end of February, 1918, these preparations had
become very marked opposite the front held by the Third and Fifth
British Armies, and I considered it probable that the enemy would
make his initial effort from the Sensed River southwards* 1 As the
2ist March approached it became certain that an attack on this
sector was imminent, and counter-preparation was carried out
nightly by our artillery on the threatened front* By the 2ist March
the number of German infantry divisions in the Western theatre
had risen to 192, an increase of 46 since the ist November, 1917*

British Dispositions to Meet the Enemy's Offensive

9* In making the necessary distribution of the forces under my
command to meet the threatened German attack, the enemy's
possible objectives and the relative importance of ground in the
various sectors had to be taken into consideration* These objectives

1 No small interest was aroused about this time by the appearance in the fields near
St. Quentin of great numbers of small objects that, from the tracks leading to them,
were at one time thought to be German tanks. It is probable that they were dumps of
ammunition brought up on tractors*

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 183

and their bearing on the distribution of the troops are set forth
below :

(i) In the northern portion of the British area lie the northern
Channel ports of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, the security of
which necessitated the maintenance of sufficient troops in the
neighbourhood. Little or no ground could be given up on this
front, and therefore the necessary reserves must be kept in close
proximity*

Although, as a rule, the state of the ground would preclude
a general offensive in this sector early in the year, the weather
had been exceptionally dry, and preparations for an attack by
the enemy astride the Menin Road were known to be in an
advanced state.

(ii) In the central portion lie the northern collieries of
France and certain important tactical features which cover our
lateral communications.

Here, also, little or no ground could be given up, except in
the Lys Valley itself.

(iii) In the southern portion of the British area south-east of
Arras, in contrast to the central and northern portions, ground
could be given up under great pressure without serious conse-
quences, the forward area of this sector consisting chiefly of a
wide expanse of territory devastated by the enemy last spring in
his withdrawal.

As shown in paragraph 8, it was evident that the enemy was
about to make a great effort south of Arras. An attack on this
front would undoubtedly have as its object the separation of
the French and British Armies and the capture of the important
centre of communications of Amiens. To meet this eventuality
more than half my available troops were allocated to the defence
of this sector, together with the whole of the cavalry. In addi-
tion, as previously stated, arrangements had been made for the
movement of a French force to the southern portion of the
British area north of the River Oise in case of need.

(iv) Arrangements were made in detail for the rapid trans-
port by rail or bus of a force of such British divisions as could
be held back in reserve to meet any emergency on any sector of
the British front.

The Situation on the Eve of the Attack

10. On the igth March my Intelligence Department reported
that the final stages of the enemy's preparations on the Arras-
St. Quentin front were approaching completion, and that from

./ K '

I "'

184 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

information obtained it was probable that the actual attack would be
launched on the 2Oth or 2ist March, On our side our dispositions
to meet the expected offensive were as complete as the time and
troops available could make them.

The front of the Fifth Army, 1 at that date commanded by General
Sir H, de la P. Gough, extended from our junction with the French
just south of Barisis to north of Gouzeaucourt, a distance of about
forty-two miles, and was held by the III,, XVIIL, XIX, and VII.
Corps, commanded respectively by Lieut,-General Sir R, H, K.
Butler, Lieut,-General Sir F. I, Maxse, Lieut,-General Sir H, E,
Watts, and Lieut,-General Sir W, N, Congreave, Over ten miles of
this front between Amigny Rouy and Alaincourt were protected by the
marshes of the Oise River and Canal, and were therefore held more
lightly than the remainder of the line ; but on the whole front of
this Army the number of divisions in line only allowed of an
average of one division to some 6,750 yards of front.

The Third Army, under the command of General the Hon. Sir
J, H, G, Byng, held a front of about 27 miles from north of Gouzeau-
court to south of Gavrelle with the V,, IV,, VI, and XVII, Corps,
under the respective commands of Lieut,-General Sir E, A. Fan-
shawe, Lieut .-General Sir G, M, Harper, Lieut,-General Sir J. A, L.
Haldane, and Lieut,-General Sir C, Fergusson, Bt, The average
length of front held by each division in line on the Third Army front
was about 4,700 yards.

The general principle of our defensive arrangements on the
fronts of these Armies was the distribution of our troops in depth.
With this object three defensive belts, sited at considerable distances
from each other, had been constructed or were approaching com-
pletion in the forward area, the most advanced of which was in the
nature of a lightly-held outpost screen covering our main positions.
On the morning of the attack the troops detailed to man these various
defences were all in position.

Behind the forward defences of the Fifth Army, and in view of
the smaller resources which could be placed at the disposal of that
Army, arrangements had been made for the construction of a strong
and carefully-sited bridgehead position covering Peronne and the
crossings of the River Somme south of that town. Considerable
progress had been made in the laying out of this position, though at
the outbreak of the enemy 's offensive its defences were incomplete.

The Enemy's Dispositions

u. From the information at my disposal, it was expected that
the enemy's heaviest attack would fall between the Sensee River and

Vide Map No. 6.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 185

the neighbourhood of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, and on this
front of some 16,000 yards eighteen German divisions are known
to have been employed in line and in immediate reserve on the 2ist
March* It was correctly anticipated that the Flesquieres salient
itself would not be directly attacked in strength, but that the attack
would be continued in great force from the southern flank of the
salient to St. Quentin. On this front of some 48,000 yards, from
Gouzeaucourt to the Oise River at Moy, forty German divisions
were set in motion on the first day.

An event which, having regard to the nature of the ground, was
not considered probable, was that the enemy would be able to extend
the flank of his attack in any considerable strength beyond Moy. The
rapid drying of the marshes, due to an exceptionally dry spring, in
fact enabled the enemy to attack this lightly-held front with three
fresh divisions, in addition to the three divisions already in line.

Comparison of Forces Engaged

12. In all, at least sixty-four German divisions took part in the
operations of the first day of the battle, a number considerably ex-
ceeding the total forces composing the entire British Army in France.
The majority of these divisions had spent many weeks and even
months in concentrated training for offensive operations, and had
reached a high pitch of technical excellence in the attack.

To meet this assault the Third Army disposed of eight divisions
in line on the front of the enemy's initial attack, with seven divisions
available in reserve. The Fifth Army disposed of fourteen divisions
and three cavalry divisions, of which three infantry divisions and
three cavalry divisions were in reserve. The total British force on
the original battle front, therefore, on the morning of the 2ist March
was twenty-nine infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions, of
which nineteen infantry divisions were in line.

Launched on a front of about fifty-four miles on the 2ist March,
the area of the German offensive spread northwards on the 28th
March, until from La Fere to beyond Gavrelle some sixty-three
miles of our former line were involved. On this front a total of
seventy-three German divisions were engaged during March against
the Third and Fifth Armies and the right of the First Army, and
were opposed in the first place by twenty-two British infantry
divisions in line, with twelve infantry divisions and three cavalry
divisions in close reserve*

As soon as it became evident that the enemy had thrown prac-
tically the whole of his striking force against this one battle front, it
became both possible and necessary to collect additional reserves

186 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

from the remainder of my front, and hurry them to the battlefield.
Plans previously drawn up to meet such an eventuality were put into
execution at once, and before the end of March, by which date the
principal German effort had been broken, a further force of eight
British divisions was brought south and sent into the fight. Prior
to the gth April four other British divisions were engaged, making
a total of forty-six British infantry divisions and three cavalry
divisions employed on the Somme battle front.

THE SECOND SOMME BATTLE

The Attack Opened

13, Shortly before 5.0 a,m, on the 2ist March a bombardment
of great intensity, with gas and high explosive shell from all natures
of artillery and trench mortars, was opened against practically the
whole fronts of the Fifth and Third Armies from the Oise to the
Scarpe River, while road centres and railways as far back as St, Pol
were engaged by high velocity guns. Violent bombardments were
opened also on the French front in wide sectors east and north-east
of Reims, and on portions of the British front between the Scarpe
River and Lens, Our positions from south of the La Bassee Canal to
the River Lys were heavily shelled with gas, and battery areas between
the Scarpe and the Ypres-Co mines Canal were actively engaged*
Dunkirk was bombarded from the sea.

The hour of the enemy's assault varied in different sectors, but
by about 9.45 a.m, a general attack had been launched on a battle
front of fifty-four miles between the Oise and the Sense*e Rivers,
Later in the day, as visibility improved, large numbers of low-flying
aeroplanes attacked our troops and batteries.

Favoured by a thick white fog, which hid from our artillery and
machine gunners the S,O,S, signals sent up by our outpost line, and
in numbers which made loss of direction impossible, the attacking
German infantry forced their way into our foremost defensive zone.
Until 1,0 p,m, the fog made it impossible to see more than fifty
yards in any direction, and the machine guns and forward field guns
which had been disposed so as to cover this zone with their fire were
robbed almost entirely of their effect. The detachments holding the
outpost positions were consequently overwhelmed or surrounded, in
many cases before they were able to pass back information concern-
ing the enemy's attack.

The attack being expected, reserves had been brought forward
and battle stations manned. On all parts of the battle front garrisons

SECOND SOMME BATTLE;

German Attack, 21 st March, 1918.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 187

of redoubts and strong points in the forward zone held out with the
utmost gallantry for many hours* From some of them wireless
messages were received up to a late hour in the day, giving informa-
tion of much value* The losses which they were able to inflict upon
the enemy were undoubtedly very great, and materially delayed his
advance. The prolonged defence of these different localities, under
conditions which left little hope of any relief, deserves to rank among
the most heroic actions in the history of the British Army,

So intense was the enemy's bombardment that at an early hour
our communications were severed, and so swift was his advance
under the covering blanket of the mist that certain of our more
advanced batteries found the German infantry close upon them
before they had received warning from their own infantry that the
expected attack had been launched. Many gallant deeds were per-
formed by the personnel of such batteries, and on numerous occa-
sions heavy losses were inflicted on bodies of hostile troops by guns
firing over open sights at point-blank range.

Ponssoy Captured

14. During the morning reports were received that the enemy
had penetrated our front line opposite La Fere, and had also broken
into our forward positions north of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road,
and opposite Lagnicourt and Bullecourt. The first indication that
the progress made by him was developing a serious aspect was the
news that at noon German infantry were entering Ronssoy. This
meant that in this sector the attack had already reached and pene-
trated a considerable distance into the second defensive belt which
constituted our battle positions.

The enemy's success at this point was followed up vigorously.
Templeux-le-Guerard fell into his hands shortly afterwards, while
the villages of Hargicourt and Villeret, attacked simultaneously in
flank and rear, were practically surrounded, and were entered about
midday.

Thereafter the enemy was held up by the resistance of our troops
in the rear defences of the battle zone, greatly assisted by the very
gallant action of the 24th Division in Le Verguier and the aist
Division at Epehy, on the two flanks of his advance. Both
these divisions, under command respectively of Major-General
A. C. Daly, and Major-General D. G. M. Campbell, held out
throughout the day against repeated attacks delivered in great
strength, and killed large numbers of the enemy. In this fight-
ing parties of German troops who had entered Peiziere on the
northern outskirts of Epeliy were driven out by our infantry, with

i88 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the assistance of tanks, which on this and many subsequent
occasions did valuable and gallant work*

The Situation at Midday

15. At midday the enemy's infantry had reached the first line of
our battle positions in strength on practically the whole front of his
attack, except at the Flesquieres salient, where his assaults were not
pressed with the same weight as elsewhere* Save in the neighbour-
hood of Ronssoy, however, and at certain other points in a less
serious degree, our battle positions themselves had not been entered,
while at numerous localities in front of them fierce fighting was
taking place around strong points still occupied by our troops.

Assisted by the long spell of dry weather, hostile infantry had
crossed the river and canal north of La Fere, and south of St, Quentin
had penetrated into the battle zone between Essigny and Benay. At
Maissemy also our battle positions were entered at about noon, but
the vigorous resistance of the 6ist and 24th Divisions, assisted by
troops of the ist Cavalry Division, prevented the enemy from
developing his success.

On the Third Army front also the attack had succeeded by
midday in breaking into the battle zone at certain points, and
heavy fighting was taking place all along the line from the Canal
du Nord north-westwards to the Sensee River. Astride the canal
the enemy was held up by the lyth Division, under command of
Major-General P. R, Robertson, and made no progress. Farther
west he had entered Doignies and had taken Louverval, In
Lagnicourt and to the south of it the 6th Division, under com-
mand of Major-General T, O, Marden, were still maintaining a
gallant fight for the possession of the first line of their battle posi-
tions ; but beyond that village the battle zone had been entered at
Noreuil, Longatte and Ecoust St. Mein, all of which places had
fallen into the enemy's hands,

The Struggle for the Battle Zone

16, Fighting in and in front of our battle positions continued
with the greatest intensity throughout the afternoon and evening.
Except for certain small gains, the enemy were held by our defence,
and even driven back in places by our counter-attacks. Reports
received from all parts of the front testified to the unusual severity
of his losses.

The most serious progress made by the enemy during this part
of the struggle was on the right, south of St. Quentin. At Fargnier,

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 189

having reached the eastern portion of the village by 4.0 p.m., during
the remainder of the day his troops pressed on to the Cro^at Canal
and captured Quessy. North of this point the i8th Division, under
command of Major-General R. P. Lee, reinforced by troops of
the 2nd Cavalry Division, still held their battle positions intact,
though threatened on both flanks by the enemy's progress at Quessy
and at Benay, and successfully restored the situation in the neigh-
bourhood of Ly-Fontaine by a counter-attack* Many of the strong
points in the forward zone on the front of this division were also
holding out, though surrounded. Wireless messages from their
gallant defenders were received as late as 8.30 p.m., and rifle fire
was heard in their vicinity until midnight.

Between the neighbourhood of Benay and the Somme Canal, the
enemy by the evening had forced back our troops, after heavy fight-
ing, to the rear line of their battle positions. Parties of our infantry,
however, were still holding out east and north-east of Essigny, and
certain of our keeps in front of this line were still intact.

About Roupy and Savy all hostile attempts, in which tanks were
used, to break into the battle positions of the 3oth Division, under
command of Major-General W. de L. Williams, were repulsed
with the heaviest losses, our troops carrying out a number of
successful counter-attacks. In this sector, the advancing German
infantry frequently bunched together and offered good targets to
our artillery and machine guns.

On the remainder of the Fifth Army front our battle positions
still held, the gth Division, under command of Major-General
H. H. Tudor, retaining also nearly the whole of their forward positions,
having twice retaken by counter-attack the important local feature
on their right flank known as Chapel Hill,

On the Third Army front, our line in the Flesquieres salient had
not been heavily attacked, and was substantially intact. Beyond this
sector, fierce fighting took place around Demicourt and Doignies,
and north of the village of BeaumeU-lez-Cambrai. In this area the
5ist Division, under command of Major-General G. T. C. Carter-
Campbell, was heavily engaged, but from noon onwards practi-
cally no progress was made by the enemy. A counter-attack
carried out by two battalions of the igth Division, Major-General
G* D. Jeffreys commanding the division, with a company of
tanks recovered a portion of this ground in the face of strong
resistance, and secured a few prisoners, though it proved unable to
clear the village of Doignies.

Lagnicourt fell into the enemy's hands during the afternoon,
and heavy attacks were made also between Noreuil and Croisilles.
At one time, hostile infantry were reported to have broken through

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the rear line of our battle positions in this sector in the direction of
Mory. By nightfall the situation had been restored ; but meanwhile
the enemy had reached the outskirts of St. Leger and was attacking
the 34th Division, under command of Major-General C. L. Nichol-
son, about Croisilles heavily from the south-west* A strong attack
launched at 5.0 p.m. against the 3rd Division, under command of
Major-General C. J. Deverell, north of Fontaine-les-Croisilles on
the left bank of the Sense*e River, was broken up by machine gun
fire.

At the end of the first day, therefore, the enemy had made very
considerable progress, but he was still firmly held in the battle zone,
in which it had been anticipated that the real struggle would take
place. Nowhere had he effected that immediate break-through for
which his troops had been training for many weeks, and such pro-
gress as he had made had been bought at a cost which had already
greatly reduced his chances of carrying out his ultimate purpose.

The First Withdrawals

17. In view of the progress made by the enemy south of St.
Quentin, the thinness of our line on that front, and the lack of
reserves with which to restore the situation in our battle positions,
the Fifth Army Commander decided on the evening of the 2ist
March, after consultation with the G.O.C. III. Corps, to withdraw
the divisions of that Corps behind the Crozat Canal. The move-
ment involved the withdrawal of the 36th Division, on the right of
the XVIII. Corps, to the line of the Somme Canal.

The enemy's advance south and north of the Flesquieres salient
rendered a withdrawal by the V. Corps and by the gth Division on
its right necessary also. Orders were accordingly issued to the
divisions concerned for a line to be taken up, as a first stage, along
the high ground known as Highland Ridge, and thence westwards
along the Hindenburg Line to Havrincourt and Hermies.

These different withdrawals were carried out successfully during
the night. The bridges across the Crozat and Somme Canals were
destroyed, though in some cases not with entire success, it being
probable that certain of them were still practicable for infantry.
Instances of great bravery occurred in the destruction of these
bridges. In one case, when the electrical connection for firing the
demolition charge had failed, the officer responsible for the destruc-
tion of the bridge personally lit the instantaneous fuse and blew up
the bridge. 1 Many of the bridges were destroyed in the close presence
of the enemy.

1 By extraordinary good fortune, he was not killed.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE igr

As by this time it had become clear that practically the whole of
the enemy's striking force had been committed to this one battle,
my plans already referred to for collecting reserves from other parts
of the British front were put into immediate execution. By drawing
away local reserves and thinning out the front not attacked, it was
possible, as pointed out above, to reinforce the battle by eight divi-
sions before the end of the month. Steps were taken also to set in
operation at once the schemes previously agreed upon with the
French for taking over a portion of the battle front*

The Second Day of the Battle

1 8. On the morning of the 22nd March the ground was again
enveloped in thick mist, under cover of which the enemy renewed
his attacks in great strength all along the line. Fighting was again
very heavy, and short-range fire from guns, rifles and machine guns
caused enormous losses to the enemy's troops. The weight of his
attack, however, combined with the impossibility of observing
beforehand and engaging with artillery the massing of his troops,
enabled him to press forward.

The Fight for the Crozat Canal

19. In the south the enemy advanced during the morning as far
as the line of the canal at Jussy, and a fierce struggle commenced
for the passage of the canal, his troops bringing up trench mortars
and machine guns, and endeavouring to cross on rafts under cover
of their fire. At i.o p.m. he succeeded in effecting a crossing at
Quessy, and made progress during the afternoon in the direction of
Vouel. His further advance in this sector, however, was delayed by
the gallant resistance of troops of the 58th Division, under com-
mand of Major-General A. B. E. Cator, at Tergnier, and it was not
until evening, after many costly attempts and much sanguinary
fighting, that the enemy gained possession of this village. During
the afternoon hostile infantry crossed the canal also at La Montagne
and at Jussy, but in both cases were counter-attacked and driven
back by troops of the i8th Division and 2nd Cavalry Division,
Major-General T. T. Pitman commanding the 2nd Cavalry Division.

Le Verguier and Epehy Lost

20. In the centre of the battle front the enemy made a strong
and determined effort to develop the success gained at Templeux-
le-Guerard on the previous day, and in the early morning captured
Ste. fimilie and Hervilly. Hervilly was retaken by troops of the ist

i 9 2 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Cavalry Division (under command of Major-General R. L. Mullens),
assisted by tanks, at 9*0 a^m* 1 At midday, after heavy fighting
in the neighbourhood of Roisel, the 66th Division, under command of
Major-General N, Malcolm, still held their positions in this sector,
having for the time being definitely stopped the enemy's advance,

To the south and north, however, the progress of the German
infantry continued. Constantly attacked from almost every direction,
Le Verguier fell into the enemy's hands at about 10,0 a.m*, after a
most gallant defence. On the left bank of the Cologne River the cap-
ture of Ste, fimilie was followed by the fall of Villers Faucon, and both
Roisel and Epehy were threatened with envelopment from the rear.

Accordingly, our troops about Roisel were withdrawn during the
afternoon under orders, the enemy making no attempt to interfere,
and were directed to reorganise behind the line of our third defensive
belt between Bernes and Boucly, which was already manned by the
5oth Division, temporarily commanded by Brig.-General A, F, U,
Stockley, Later in the afternoon the troops of the 2ist Division
in Epehy also fell back under orders, though with more difficulty,
as parties of hostile infantry were west of the village. To the
north the 9th Division held their battle positions practically
intact until the late afternoon, when they were withdrawn under
orders to the rear line of defence between Nurlu and Equancourt,
This retirement also was made with great difficulty,

The Battle on the Third Army Front

2i The divisions holding the Flesquieres salient were not
seriously involved during the morning of the 22nd March, but in
the evening strong attacks were made both at Villers Plouich and at
Havrincourt, All these attacks were repulsed with great slaughter.

Farther north fighting was severe and continuous throughout
the day. Shortly before noon the enemy attacked Hermies strongly
from the north-west, and repeated his attacks at intervals during
the remainder of the day. These attacks were completely repulsed
by the iyth Division, Heavy losses were inflicted on the German
infantry in the fighting in this area, the leading wave of a strong
attack launched between Hermies and Beaumetz-lez-Cambrai being
destroyed by our fire,

In the neighbourhood of Beaumetz the enemy continued his
assaults with great determination, but was held by the 5ist Division
and a brigade of the 25th Division until the evening (Major-
General Sir E. G, T, Bainbridge commanding the 25th Division),

1 The capture by the enemy of Hervilly itself at this hour is disputed. It is certain
that we had troops east of Herb6court until after midday.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 193

Our troops were then withdrawn under orders to positions south of
the village* Very severe fighting took place at Vaulx Wood and
Vaulx Vraucourt, as well as about St. Leger and north of Croisilles,
which latter village our troops had evacuated during the night.

At Vraucourt the enemy broke through the rear line of the battle
zone and penetrated into the village. There he was counter-attacked
by infantry and tanks, and driven out. Farther west, after heavy
fighting, his troops forced their way into our positions along the line
of the Croisilles Henin-sur-Cojeul Road. On the left of this attack
troops of the 34th Division maintained themselves in St. Leger until
the afternoon, when they fell back to a line of trenches just west of
the village. To the north the 3rd Division brought back their right
flank to a line facing south-east, and in this position successfully
beat off a heavy attack.

The Break Through at St. Quentin

22. With Maissemy already in the enemy's hands, the fall of Le
Verguier greatly weakened the defence of the centre of the Fifth
Army* The rear line of our battle positions was held during the
morning, in spite of unceasing pressure from large hostile forces, but
as the day wore on the great concentration of German divisions
attacking west of St. Quentin had its effect. During the early after-
noon our troops east of Holnon Wood were forced to withdraw from
their battle zone trenches ; while after repulsing heavy attacks
throughout the morning, the 3Oth Division were again attacked
during the afternoon and evening and compelled to give ground.
Our troops, fighting fiercely and continuously, were gradually
forced out of the battle zone on the whole of this front, and fell back
through the 2Oth Division, under command of Major-General W.
D. Smith, and the 5oth Division holding the third defensive
zone between Happencourt, Villeveque and Boucly, in the hope of
reorganising behind them.

In this fighting the action of the ist Battalion Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers, 36th Division, deserves special mention. This battalion
held a redoubt in the forward zone near Fontaine-les-Clercs through-
out the whole of the first day of the battle, and on the following day,
after the troops on their right had withdrawn in accordance with
orders, still maintained their position, although surrounded by the
enemy. After a magnificent fight, in which all the enemy's attacks
were repulsed with great loss, at 3*0 p*m. the officer commanding
the battalion sent back a small party of troops, who succeeded in
getting through to our lines. The remainder of the battalion
continued the fight to the end.

194 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

By 5.30 p.m. the enemy had reached the third zone at different
points, and was attacking the 5oth Division heavily between Vill-
eVeque and Boucly. Though holding an extended front of some
10,500 yards, the division succeeded in checking the enemy's
advance, and by a successful counter-attack drove him temporarily
from the village of Coulaincourt. At the close of the engagement,
however, the troops of the 5oth Division about Poeuilly had been
forced back, and by continued pressure along the south bank of the
Omignon River the enemy had opened a gap between their right
flank and the troops of the 6ist Division, under command of
Major-General C. J. Mackenzie, and of the 2oth Division farther
south. At this gap, during the late afternoon and evening, strong
bodies of German troops broke through the third defensive zone
about Vaux and Beauvois.

All available reserves at the disposal of the Fifth Army had
already been thrown into the fight, and except for one French divi-
sion and some French cavalry in the IIL Corps area, no further
support was within reach of the fighting line* There remained,
therefore, no course open but to fall back on the bridgehead
positions east of the Somme*

The Withdrawal to the Somme

23. Accordingly, at 11.0 p.m., on the 22nd March, orders were
issued by the Fifth Army Commander that the troops of the XVIIL
Corps should fall back during the night behind the line of the Somme
south of Voyennes, in touch with the III. Corps on their right ;
while the XIX. and VII. Corps endeavoured to secure the main
Peronne bridgehead on the line Croix Molignaux Monchy Lagache
Vraignes, and thence northwards along the third zone of defence
to the junction with the Third Army about Equancourt.

These withdrawals were carried out under constant pressure
from the enemy, covered by rearguards of the 2oth, 5oth and
39th Divisions (Major-General E. Feetham commanding the
last-mentioned division), which were continually in action with
the German troops.

On the Third Army front also, certain necessary readjustments
of our line were carried out during the night. On the right, the
evacuation of the Flesquieres salient was continued, our troops with-
drawing to a line covering Equancourt and Metz-en-Couture in
touch with the Fifth Army about Equancourt, In the centre, the
troops still in advance of the third defensive zone were brought
back to that system. On the left, our troops withdrew from the
remainder of their forward positions south of the Scarpe, taking up

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 195

the rear line of their battle positions between Henin-sur-Cojeul and
Fampoux.

As on the southern portion of the battle front, the enemy followed
up our troops closely, except on the left, where for a time he was
unaware of what we had done. Elsewhere, more or less continuous
fighting took place throughout the night, and in the early morning
parties of the enemy succeeded in rinding a gap in our new line
about Mory.

The Decision to Abandon the Peronne Bridgehead

24. Reports that the enemy had forced the line of the Crosat
Canal, combined with the loss of the Vaux-Poeuilly positions, and
information obtained by the Air Service that the German front as
far back as Mont D'Origny was packed with advancing troops, led
the Fifth Army Commander to reconsider his decision to offer
battle afresh east of the Somme. Considering that if involved in a
general engagement his tired troops might be exposed to a decisive
defeat before help could arrive, and that the situation might then be
exploited by the enemy to a disastrous extent, he decided to continue
the withdrawal at once to the west bank of the Somme.

On the morning of the 23rd March, therefore, confirming in-
structions previously given by telephone, orders were issued by the
Fifth Army to the XIX, Corps to carry out a gradual withdrawal to
the line of the Somme. The VIL Corps was directed to conform to
this movement, and to take up a position on the general line Doingt-
Nurlu*

This order involved the abandonment of the main Peronne
bridgehead position* It greatly shortened the time available for
clearing our troops and removable material from the east bank of
the river, for completing the necessary final preparations for the
destruction of the river and canal bridges, for re-forming west of
the river the divisions which had suffered most in the previous
fighting, and generally for securing the adequate defence of the
river line*

The Crozat Canal Crossed

25. Meanwhile, the enemy had recommenced his attacks. The
footing obtained by him on the west bank of the Crozat Canal was
gradually increased, in spite of counter-attacks by British and French
troops at Tergnier and at other points. During the morning, he
forced the passage of the canal at Jussy, where he was reported to
have employed tanks east of the canal. Shortly afterwards hostile
infantry crossed at Mennessis, though suffering great loss from the

196 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

fire of a machine gun detachment of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade*
By midday our troops had been pressed back from the line of the
canal to the wooded ground to the west, where fierce confused fight-
ing continued throughout the afternoon about Noureuil, Faillouel
and Cugny, infantry and cavalry offering a most resolute resistance
to the enemy's advance and performing many gallant actions*

The Crossing at Ham

26* In the course of the withdrawal to the Somme on the previous
night, a gap occurred in our line in the neighbourhood of Ham, and
the enemy, following closely upon our troops, entered the town
during the early morning* Before midday bodies of German infantry,
though at first only in small numbers, succeeded in crossing the
river about Ham and Pithon, where the bridges had not been com-
pletely destroyed. In the afternoon these forces increased in strength,
gradually pressing back our troops, until a spirited counter-attack
by troops of the 2Oth and 6ist Divisions about Verlaines restored
the situation in this locality* To the east of this point, heavy fighting
took place around Ollezy, which the 36th Division, under command
of Major-General O* S* W, Nugent, regained and held until a late
hour, and around Aubigny and Brouchy, both of which villages,
however, fell into the enemy's hands before night*

Farther north, the withdrawal to the west bank of the Somme
was carried out successfully during the morning and early afternoon,
effectively covered by troops of the 5oth Division* By 3*15 p*m, all'
troops were across the river, and the bridges for the most part
destroyed*

All bridges over the canals and rivers in the Fifth Army area had
been carefully listed early in February and reconnoitred for demoli-
tion* The necessary explosives were stored in the neighbourhood of
each bridge, and a definite party of Royal Engineers detailed for its
destruction* As has been seen, however, owing to the effects of the
enemy's artillery fire, which blew up some of the charges and cut
the leads of others, the destruction of the bridges was in certain
cases incomplete*

None the less, the situation on the Somme front north of Ham
was for the time being not unsatisfactory* In the course of the
afternoon, strong attacks at Offoy and Bethencourt were repulsed
with heavy loss by rifle and machine gun fire* In the evening, the
enemy's attempts to come down the open slopes on the east bank of
the river were heavily punished by artillery fire, as they were on
several subsequent occasions* It is believed that north of Ham
none of the enemy succeeded in crossing the river before nightfall*

Scale

.5 miles

APPROXIMATE
BATTLE SITUATION
Night 23rd March
*

F I F,t>T H BAB u Y-tW^Si

SECOND SOMME BATTLE ;
Stages of Retreat.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 197

The Northern Front Firm

27* Meanwhile, very heavy fighting had been taking place on the
northern portion of the battle front. The enemy pressed closely upon
our troops, as they withdrew to the line of the ridge running from
north of Peronne to Nurlu and Equancourt. Heavy attacks de-
veloped at an early hour between these two places, and also between
Le Bucquiere and Beugny, and at Mory.

On the Third Army front, where our resources were greater, the
enemy was held in check, though he gained possession of Le
Bucquiere and Beugny after a prolonged struggle* In this fighting
the gth Battalion, Welsh Regiment, igth Division, greatly distin-
guished itself in the defence of Beugny, which it held till dusk,
thereby enabling the other battalions of its brigade in position to the
north of the village to extricate themselves successfully from what
would otherwise have been a hopeless situation.

No less than six separate attacks, in two of which the enemy
brought up cavalry and guns, were repulsed by the I24th Brigade
of the 4ist Division, Major-General Sir S. T. B. Lawford ' com-
manding the division, opposite Vaulx Vraucourt. The fighting
in this sector of the front was very severe, but here and at all points
north of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road our line was maintained.
About 3*30 p.m. the enemy again attacked five times from the direc-
tion of Vaulx and five times from Beaumets-lez-Cambrai, and on
each occasion was repulsed* The 4oth Division, under command of
Major-General J. Ponsonby, regained Mory during the afternoon
by successful counter-attacks, and the 3ist Division, under command
of Major-General R. J. Bridgford, drove off the attacks of two
German divisions about St. Leger with heavy loss.

The Retreat to the Tortille

28. At the junction of the Third and Fifth Armies the situation
was less satisfactory, and as the day wore on it became critical.

During the morning, the divisions of the V, Corps had pro-
ceeded with their withdrawal, and, covered by rearguards who were
heavily engaged, had fallen back from the Mets-en-Couture salient
to the defences of the third zone about Ytres. The left of the VII.
Corps, however, had been withdrawn under orders during the
morning from the Nurlu positions to the line of the Canal du Nord,
north of Moislains. As the result of this movement a gap was formed
between the flank divisions of the two Corps, and this gap the enemy
rapidly exploited. Though vigorous efforts were made to re-
establish touch both by the 47th Division, under command of Major-

198 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

General Sir G, F, Gorringe, and by a brigade of the 2nd Division,
Major-General C, E, Pereira commanding the division, they were
unsuccessful* The right of the V, Corps was forced back by pressure
from the south-east, first to the neighbourhood of Four Winds Farm,
south of Ytres, where troops of the 47th Division made a gallant
stand in the open until nightfall, and later to a position east of
Rocquigny,

The divisions of the VIL Corps, after heavy fighting during the
afternoon, were forced back west of Peronne, and across the line of
the River Tortille to the high ground about Bouchavesnes and
Government Farm, south of Sailly-Saillisel, At dusk, however, the
line was still in movement. Small parties of the enemy searched
constantly for gaps, and, having found them, bodies of German
infantry pressed through in force and compelled our troops to make
further withdrawals*

The Extension of the French Front

29* From the time when the indications of an offensive on my
front first became definite I had been in close touch with the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the French Armies* 1 On different occasions, as
the battle developed, I discussed with him the situation and the
policy to be followed by the Allied Armies, As a result of a meeting
held in the afternoon of the 23rd March, arrangements were made
for the French to take over as rapidly as possible the front held by
the Fifth Army south of Peronne, and for the concentration of a
strong force of French divisions on the southern portion of the
battle front.

For my own part, after consultation with the First and Second
Army Commanders, General Sir H, S, Home and General Sir
H, C, O, Plumer, concerning the situation on the fronts of their Armies
and the possibilities of attacks developing there also, I arranged for
the formation from the troops under their command of a special
force of reserve divisions for action as occasion might demand.
Measures were also taken to permit of the employment of the Canadian
Corps for counter-attack, in the event of the enemy succeeding in
piercing my front,

In this connection I desire to express my deep appreciation of
the complete unselfishness with which the needs of their own fronts
were at all times subordinated by the Army Commanders to the
more pressing demands of the battle, A variety of considerations
made it necessary for me at this date to draw particularly heavily
upon the resources of the Second Army, All my demands were

1 General Petain.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 199

met by the Second Army Commander in the most helpful and
disinterested spirit*

The Retreat Across the Somme Battlefield

30, During the night of the 23rd/24th March the situation on
the battle front remained unchanged as far south as the neighbour-
hood of Ytres. Beyond that point divisions and brigades had lost
touch in the course of their frequent withdrawals, and under the
constant pressure of the enemy the rearward movement continued.
At dawn German infantry had already reached Bus, Lechelle and
Le Mesnil-en-Arrouaise, and during the morning of the 24th March
entered Saillisel, Rancourt and Clery. It became necessary to order
the evacuation of Bertincourt, and gradually to swing back the right
of the Third Army in conformity with the movement farther south*
To the north of Bertincourt, though the enemy gained possession of
Mory in the early morning after continuous fighting throughout the
night, our troops substantially maintained their positions, the Guards
Division under the command of Mijor-General G. P. T. Feilding,
and the 3rd and 3ist Divisions in particular, beating off a succession
of heavy attacks* 1

The enemy's advance at the junction of the Third and Fifth
Armies was not made without heavy sacrifice. In the retirement of
our troops there was no panic of any sort. Units retreated stub-
bornly from one position to another as they found them turned and
threatened with isolation ; but at many points fierce engagements
were fought, and wherever the enemy attempted a frontal attack he
was beaten off with loss.

During the early part of the morning the troops of the zyth Divi-
sion drove off four attacks east of Barastre, and the 47th Division
held the village of Rocquigny from sunrise until well into the after-
noon, beating off all attacks with rifle and machine gun fire, until
the enemy worked round their flank between Rocquigny and Le
Transloy and forced them to withdraw.

South of this point, however, the enemy pressed forward rapidly
through the gap which he had made, and succeeded in isolating a
part of the South African Brigade, 9th Division, near Marrieres
Wood, north of Clery. These troops maintained a most gallant
resistance until 4.30 p.m., when they had fired off all their ammuni-
tion and only about 100 men remained unwounded. Early in the
afternoon German infantry entered Combles, and having gained

1 After one of these attacks, 400 dead Germans were counted in front of one machine
gun position west of Henin. Ludendorff refers specially to the losses of Von Below's
i yth Army on the Arras front, stating that by the 25th March that Army was quite
exhausted.

200 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the high ground at Morval were advancing towards Les Bceufs.
Their continued progress threatened to sever the connection between
the Fifth and Third Armies, and the situation was serious.

In view of this situation the V, and IV, Corps were ordered to
fall back to the general line, Bazentin Le Sars GreVillers
Ervillers. Meanwhile the leading troops of the 35th Division,
under command of Major-General G. McK. Franks, which was
arriving at Bray-sur-Somme, and certain composite battalions
composed of all available troops in the Albert area, and including
tanks personnel with Lewis guns, were hurried forward along the
north bank of the river to the support of the VIL Corps, During the
afternoon, also, units of the ist Cavalry Division 1 reached Montauban.

The enemy had already passed Clery, and was pressing the
remaining troops of the gth and 2ist Divisions hard when these
various bodies of troops came into action. The I5th Battalion,
Cheshire Regiment, and the I5th Battalion, Notts and Derby Regi-
ment, of the 35th Division, checked the enemy by a successful
counter-attack, and thereafter a line was taken up and held from the
river at Ham to Tr6nes Wood and Longueval, For the moment the
danger in this sector was averted.

The withdrawal of the right and centre of the Third Army was
carried out during the afternoon and evening in circumstances of
great difficulty, as on the right flank bodies of German infantry were
already between our troops and the positions to which they were
directed to fall back. In this withdrawal valuable service was
rendered by twelve machine guns of the 63rd Division Machine
Gun Battalion in Les Boeufs. These guns held up the enemy *s
advance from Morval at a critical period, firing 25,000 rounds into
the enemy's advancing masses, and by their action enabling their
division to reach the position assigned to it.

By nightfall the divisions of the V. Corps had taken up their
line successfully between Bazentin, High Wood, Eaucourt TAbbaye
and Ligny-Thilloy, Before midnight the troops of the IV, Corps,
who had carried out their withdrawal by stages in the face of con-
stant attacks, were established on the line assigned to them west of
Bapaume, between Le Barque and Ervillers* Touch between the
several divisions of the V, Corps and between the V, and IV. Corps,
however, was not properly established.

The Fight for the Somme Crossings

31. South of Peronne the night of the 23rd/24th March passed
comparatively quietly ; but with the dawn powerful attempts were
1 These had been brought up from the battle south of the Somme.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 201

made by the enemy to force the crossings of the Somme, and these
attempts were by no means confined to the recognised points of
passage* Owing to the dry weather, the river and marshes did not
constitute a very formidable obstacle to infantry, while the trees and
undergrowth along the valley afforded good cover to the enemy, and
limited the field of fire of the defenders,

In the early morning, hostile forces which had crossed the river
at St. Christ and Bethencourt, were attacked and driven back by
troops of the 8th Division, under command of Major-General
W. C. G. Heneker, and of the 2oth Division : but at Pargny the
enemy succeeded in maintaining himself on the west bank of the
river, and the flanks of the 8th and 2oth Divisions were no longer in
touch. During the remainder of the day the enemy repeated his
attacks at these and other points, and also exercised strong pressure
in a westerly and south-westerly direction from Ham. Our troops
offered vigorous resistance, and opposite Ham a successful counter-
attack by the i/5th (Pioneer) Battalion, Duke of Cornwairs Light
Infantry, 6ist Division, materially delayed his advance.

At nightfall the line of the river north of Epenancourt was still
held by us, but the gap opposite Pargny had been enlarged, and the
enemy had reached Morchain. South of that point the 2Oth Division,
with its left flank in the air and having exhausted all reserves in a
series of gallant and successful counter-attacks, fell back during the
afternoon to the line of the Libermont Canal, to which position the
great weight of the enemy's attacks from Ham had already pressed
back the troops on its right.

The Retreat from Chauny

32* In the area between the Somme and the Oise the enemy's
attacks had recommenced at dawn in thick fog, and were pressed
with great energy. Troops of the 2oth and 36th Divisions at Eau-
court and Cugny found their retreat endangered by the progress
made by the enemy on their flanks, and extricated themselves with
difficulty, falling back on Villeselve, and ultimately to the neigh-
bourhood of Guiscard. The withdrawal of the troops at Cugny was
made possible by a brilliant mounted charge by a squadron of the
6th Cavalry Brigade, which broke through the German line, taking
over 100 prisoners and sabring a large number of the enemy.

Throughout the whole of the fighting in this area very gallant
work was done, both mounted and dismounted, by units of the
2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, Major-General A. E. W. Harman
commanding the 3rd Cavalry Division, in support of our own and
the French infantry. The work of the mounted troops, in particular,

202 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

was invaluable, demonstrating in marked fashion the importance of
the part which cavalry have still to play in modern war* So urgent
was the demand for more mounted men that arrangements were
made during the progress of the battle to provide with horses several
regiments of Yeomanry who had but recently been dismounted for
employment with other arms. In common with the rest of the
cavalry, these Yeomanry did excellent service. Without the assist-
ance of mounted troops, skilfully handled and gallantly led, the
enemy could scarcely have been prevented from breaking through
the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded ground before
the French reinforcements had had time to arrive.

Though French troops were coming rapidly to the assistance of
the III, Corps, which on this day passed under the command of the
Third French Army, the Allied forces were not yet in sufficient
strength to hold up the enemy's advance. After heavy righting
throughout the morning to the east and north of Chauny, our line
was gradually forced back to the south and west of that town. In
the course of the night the French and British troops immediately
north of the Oise were withdrawn to the ridge above Crepigny,
whence the line ran across the high ground covering Noyon to the
neighbourhood of Guiscard and Libermont,

The Ancre Crossed

33, During the night of the 24th/25th March constant fighting
took place on the northern portion of the battle front about Sapignies
and Behagnies, where the enemy made determined but unsuccessful
efforts to break through.

On the following day the enemy maintained great pressure on
this front from Ervillers to the south. Shortly after dawn a very
heavy attack on our positions east of the Arras-Bapaume road between
Favreuil and Ervillers was repulsed with great loss, and a counter-
attack by the 42nd Division, under command of Major-General A.
Solly-Flood, drove the enemy out of Sapignies, Later in the morning
the 2nd Division beat off an attack at Ligny-Thilloy, and our positions
to the north of this point were maintained practically unchanged
until midday.

At noon fresh attacks developed in great force, and under the
weight of the assault the right of the IV, Corps, with which the
divisions of the V, Corps were not in touch, was gradually pressed
back. The enemy gained GreVillers, in which neighbourhood the
i gth Division was hotly engaged, and also Bihucourt, North of
this point our positions were substantially maintained, and at the
end of the day our troops still held Ervillers, where the ist/ioth

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 203

Battalion, Manchester Regiment, 42nd Division, had repulsed eight
attacks*

On the north bank of the Somme also, between the neighbour-
hood of Hem and Trdnes Wood, all the enemy's attacks were held*
Though their left flank was constantly in the air, the various forces
operating in this sector maintained a gallant and most successful
resistance all day, counter-attacking frequently* Prisoners from five
German divisions were taken by us in the course of this fighting,
and the enemy's casualties were stated by them to have been
abnormally heavy.

Between Montauban and the neighbourhood of Gre*villers,
however, our troops had been unable to establish touch on the line
to which they had withdrawn on the 24th March, After heavy
fighting throughout the morning and the early part of the afternoon,
in which the 63rd Division in particular, under command of Major-
General C. E, Laurie, beat off a number of strong assaults, divisions
commenced to fall back individually towards the Ancre, widening
the gap between the V, and IV, Corps,

During the afternoon the enemy reached Courcelette, and was
pressing on through the gap in our line in the direction of Pys and
Irles, seriously threatening the flank of the IV, Corps, It became
clear that the Third Army, which on this day had assumed command
of all troops north of the Somme, would have to continue the with-
drawal of its centre to the line of the River Ancre, already crossed
by certain of our troops near Beaucourt, All possible steps were
taken to secure this line, but by nightfall hostile patrols had reached
the right bank of the Ancre north of Miraumont and were pushing
forward between the flanks of the V. and IV, Corps in the direction
of Serre and Puisieux-au-Mont, In view of this situation, the IV,
Corps fell back by stages during the night and morning to the line
Bucquoy-Ablainzevelle, in touch with the VI, Corps about Boyelles,
On the right the remaining divisions of the Third Army were with-
drawn under orders to the line Bray-sur-Somme Albert, and thence
took up positions along the west bank of the Ancre to the neigh-
bourhood of Beaumont Hamel,

In spite of the dangerous gap about Serre the general position
on the Third Army front, though still serious, gave less cause for
anxiety. Considerable reinforcements had now come into line, and
had shown their ability to hold the enemy, whose troops were becom-
ing tired, while the transport difficulties experienced by him in the
area of the old Somme battlefield were increasing. Other reinforce-
ments were coming up rapidly, and there seemed every hope that
the line of the Ancre would be secured and the enemy stopped
north of the Somme,

204 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

The Situation South of the Somme

34. South of the Somme the situation was less satisfactory. The
greater portion of the defensive line along the river and canal had
been lost, and that which was still held by us was endangered by
the progress made by the enemy north of the Somme* All local
reserves had already been put into the fight, and there was no
immediate possibility of sending further British troops to the
assistance of the divisions in line.

On the other hand, the French forces engaged were increasing
steadily, and on this day our Allies assumed responsibility for the
battle front south of the Somme, with general control of the British
troops operating in that sector. The situation still remained critical,
however, for every mile of the German advance added to the length
of front to be held, and, while the exhaustion of my divisions was
hourly growing more acute, some days had yet to pass before the
French could bring up troops in sufficient strength to arrest the
enemy *s progress.

The Enemy in Noyon

35. During the night the enemy had gained possession of
Guiscard, and, in the early morning of the 25th March, strongly
attacked the Allied positions on the wooded spurs and ridges east
and north-east of Noyon. The position of the French and English
batteries north of the Oise Canal became hazardous, and they were
accordingly withdrawn across the canal at Appily. Dismounted
troops of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade actively assisted in covering
this withdrawal, which was successfully completed at 1.0 p.m.
Shortly afterwards another heavy attack developed in this sector
and was checked after hard fighting. At the close of this engagement,
troops of the i8th Division retook the village of Babceuf by a brilliant
counter-attack, capturing 150 prisoners. Early in the fight French
armoured cars rendered valuable service and killed a number of
the enemy*

Meanwhile the enemy's progress south and west of Guiscard
had continued, and that night his troops entered Noyon. The
French and British troops to the east of the town were therefore
ordered to withdraw southwards across the Oise, and by the morning
of the 26th March this had been successfully accomplished.

After this date, the troops of the III. Corps were gradually
relieved by the French reinforcements and sent north to rejoin the
Fifth Army.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 205

The Retreat from the Somme

36, On the Fifth Army front, also, fighting had recommenced
at an early hour* Hostile attacks at Licourt and to the south of it
widened the gap between the XVIIL and XIX* Corps, and the
enemy entered Nesle, forcing the French and British troops back
to the high ground on the south bank of the Ingon River, south-
west of the town. To the south of this point his troops crossed the
Libermont Canal, while to the north the right of the XIX, Corps
was slowly pushed back in the direction of Chaulnes, Marchelepot
was burning, but our troops at midday were reported to be still
holding the line of the canal east of Villers Carbonnel and Barleux.

In view, however, of the situation to the south and the progress
made by the enemy on the right bank of the Somme west of Peronne,
it was impossible for this position to be maintained. Accordingly,
our troops were gradually withdrawn during the evening to the
general line Hattencourt-Estrees-Frise, the 3gth Division delivering a
counter-attack south of Biaches to cover the withdrawal in that area*

A gap still existed between the XVIIL and XIX, Corps west of
Nesle, and the Germans had already reached Liancourt Wood,
when the 6ist Brigade of the 2oth Division, which had hitherto been
engaged with the 36th Division farther south, was brought up in
buses to the neighbourhood of Liancourt, Though reduced to
some 450 rifles in its previous fighting, the brigade successfully
held up the enemy's advance and made it possible for the remainder
of its division to withdraw unmolested through Roye on the morning
of the 26th March.

Carey's Force

37, The whole of the troops holding the British line south of
the Somme were now greatly exhausted, and the absence of reserves
behind them gave ground for considerable anxiety. As the result of
a conference held by the Fifth Army Commander on the 25th March,
a mixed force, including details, stragglers, schools personnel,
tunnelling companies, Army troops companies, field survey com-
panies, and Canadian and American engineers, had been got together
and organised by General Grant, the Chief Engineer to the Fifth
Army* On the 26th March these were posted by General Grant, in
accordance with orders given by the Fifth Army Commander, on the
line of the old Amiens defences between Mezieres, Marcelcave and
Hamel, Subsequently, as General Grant could ill be spared from
his proper duties, he was directed to hand over command of his
force to General Carey, 1

1 At this time General Carey was on his way back from England to take command
of the soth Division, and was therefore available.

206 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Except for General Carey's force there were no reinforcements
of any kind behind the divisions, which had been fighting for the
most part continuously since the opening of the battle* In considera-
tion of this fact and the thinness of our fighting line, the Fifth Army
Commander did not deem it practicable for our troops to attempt to
maintain the Hattencourt-Frise positions if seriously attacked.
Accordingly, orders had been given on the night of the 25th March
that, in the event of the enemy continuing his assaults in strength,
divisions should fall back, fighting rearguard actions, to the approxi-
mate line Le Quesnoy-Rosieres-Proyart. This line was intended to
link up with the right of the Third Army at Bray*

The Attempt to Sever the Allied Armies

38. On the morning of the 26th March the enemy recommenced
his attack in strength south-westwards and westwards from Nesle,
in the double hope of separating the French and British Armies and
interfering with the detraining arrangements of our Allies by the
capture of Montdidier.

Heavy attacks developed also about Hattencourt, in the neigh-
bourhood of the St. Quentin-Amiens Road, and at Herbe'court.
Under the pressure of these assaults our divisions commenced to
withdraw slowly in accordance with orders to the line indicated
above. This was taken up successfully and maintained, a number of
hostile attacks during the afternoon and evening being beaten off by
counter-attacks in which local commanders displayed great energy
and initiative.

As the British forces retired westwards, however, the French
troops on their right were gradually forced back in a south-westerly
direction beyond Roye, leaving a gap between the French and British
Armies of which the enemy took immediate advantage. To fill this
gap the 36th and 3Oth Divisions, which on the previous day had
been withdrawn to rest, were put once more into the battle and
speedily became involved in heavy fighting about Andechy and to
the north of that place. Though the enemy had penetrated behind
them and had taken Erches, the troops of the 36th Division at
Andechy maintained a most gallant resistance until the afternoon of
the 2yth March, thereby playing no small part in preventing the
enemy from breaking through between the Allied Armies.

On this part of the battle front a very gallant feat of arms was
performed on this day by a detachment of about 100 officers and
men of the 6ist Brigade, 2Oth Division, at Le Quesnoy. The detach-
ment was detailed to cover the withdrawal of their division, and under
the command of their Brigade Major, Captain E. P. Combe, M.C.,

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 207

successfully held the enemy at bay from early morning until
6,0 p.m., when the eleven survivors withdrew under orders, having
accomplished their task*

At the end of the day, although the enemy's thrust west of
Roye had pressed back our right somewhat beyond the positions
to which it had been intended to withdraw, the British forces south
of the Somme were in touch with the French, and the general line,
Guerbigny Rouvroy-en-Santerre Proyart, had been taken up
successfully*

The Northern Advance Stopped

39. Meanwhile, north of the Somme the battle was entering upon
its final stages ; though the enemy's effort was not yet fully spent
and his troops were still capable of powerful attacks*

During the morning of the 26th March our troops continued the
taking up of the Ancre line without much interference from the
enemy, but between Hamel and Puisieux the situation was not yet
clear. A gap still existed in this area between the V* and IV* Corps,
through which bodies of German infantry worked their way forward
and occupied Colin camps with machine guns* These machine guns
were silenced by a section of field artillery of the 2nd Division,
which gallantly galloped into action and engaged them over open
sights. Early in the afternoon troops of the New Zealand Division,
under command of Major-General Sir A* H. Russell, retook Colin-
camps, while a brigade of the 4th Australian Division, Major-General
E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan commanding the division, filled the gap
between Hebuterne and Bucquoy. In the fighting in this area our
light tanks 1 came into action for the first time and did valuable
service.

With the arrival of fresh troops, our line on this part of the front
became stable, and all attempts made by the enemy during the day
to drive in our positions about Bucquoy and to the north were
repulsed with great loss*

The Withdrawal from Bray-sur- Somme

40. Farther south, the Bray-sur-Somme Albert line had been
taken up successfully on the night of the 25th /26th March, and
fighting of a minor character occurred during the morning, parti-
cularly at Meaulte, where troops of the gth Division beat off a
strong attack* Owing, however, to a misunderstanding, the Bray-sur-

1 These light tanks, or " whippets/' were mistaken by some of our troops for German
machines, and gave rise to a local report that the enemy had broken through towards
Souastre.
o

208 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Somme Albert line was regarded by the^ local commander as
being merely a stage in a further retirement to the line of the Ancre,
south of Albert* Accordingly, on the afternoon and evening of the
26th March, the withdrawal was continued, and when the higher
command became aware of the situation the movement had already
proceeded too far for our former positions to be re-established.

By the time the withdrawal had been stopped, the right of the
Third Army rested on the Somme about Sailly-le-Sec ; while the
Fifth Army still held the south bank of the Somme north of Proyart,
about five miles farther east* The left flank of the Fifth Army, there-
fore, was dangerously uncovered, being protected merely by the
natural obstacle of the river and an improvised force of 350 men
with Lewis guns and armoured cars which had been sent up to hold
the crossings.

General Foch appointed to take Command of the Allied Forces

41. On this day, the 26th March, the Governments of France
and Great Britain decided to place the supreme control of the opera-
tions of the French and British forces in France and Belgium in the
hands of General Foch, who accordingly assumed control. 1

The Enemy in Albert

42. During the night of the 26th /2yth March, the enemy had
gained possession of Albert after some fighting with our rearguards
in the town, and obtained a footing in Aveluy Wood. His efforts to
force our positions on the high ground west of the Ancre, however,
met with no success, and several attempts made by him on the
ayth March to debouch from Albert were driven back with heavy
loss to his troops.

About midday, a series of strong attacks commenced all along
our front from about Bucquoy to the neighbourhood of Hamelin-
court, in the course of which the enemy gained possession of Ablain-
Zevelle and Ayette. Elsewhere, all his assaults were heavily repulsed
by troops of the 62nd Division, under command of Major-General
W. P. Braithwaite, and of the 42nd and Guards Divisions. On
the remainder of our front north of the Somme, save for minor
readjustments of our line at certain points, in the course of which
we captured a number of prisoners and machine guns, our positions
remained unchanged.

1 The appointment of a Generalissimo was made imperative by the immediate
danger of the separation of the French and British Armies.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 209

The Fight for the Rosier es Line

43. South of the Somme, meanwhile, the enemy had recom-
menced his attacks at about 8*30 a.m. on the greater part of the Fifth
Army front and against the French* The line occupied by our troops
at this time, had it been maintained, would have preserved Amiens
from serious bombardment, and orders were issued that every effort
was to be made to hold our positions. In the fighting which followed,
troops of all divisions, despite the weakness of their numbers, and
the tremendous strain through which they had already gone, dis-
played a courage and determination in their defence for which no
praise can be too high.

At 10,0 a.m. the 8th Division at Rosieres had already repulsed a
heavy attack, and the enemy was pressing hard against our positions
in the neighbourhood of Proyart. The results of the unfortunate
withdrawal from Bray now became apparent* The enemy was not
slow to take advantage of the position held by him along the north
bank of the Somme in the rear of our troops, and in spite of our
efforts to destroy or hold the river crossings, began to pass strong
parties of infantry to the south bank at Cerisy.

Being heavily attacked in front and with bodies of the enemy
established south of the river in their immediate rear, our troops at
Proyart and to the north were compelled to fall back. The enemy
gained Framerville, Proyart and Morcourt, and endeavoured to
advance southwards behind our line.

In view of the absence of reserves behind this front other than
the composite force already referred to, the situation was serious.
Troops of the ist Cavalry Division were hurried across the river and
occupied Bousencourt, in which neighbourhood they had sharp
fighting. A very gallant and successful counter-attack carried out
with great dash by the 2nd Battalion Devon Regiment and the 22nd
(Pioneer) Battalion Durham Light Infantry, both of the 8th Division
(which was itself heavily engaged at the time at Rosieres), supported
by troops of the 5oth Division, at this date under command of
Major-General H. C. Jackson, held up the enemy a short distance
south-west of Proyart. A counter-attack by the 66th Division
restored the situation about Framerville, and at nightfall our troops
were still east and north of Harbonnieres, whence our line ran
north-westwards to Bouzencourt.

South of Harbonnieres, the 8th Division held the village of
Rosieres against all attacks and killed great numbers of the enemy.
South of this point, as far as Arvillers, troops of the 24th, 3Oth and
20th Divisions maintained their positions substantially unchanged

3io SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

throughout the day, though beyond their right flank the enemy
passed Davenscourt and captured Montdidier*

The Amiens Defences

44. During the night of the ayth/aSth March, parties of the
enemy worked their way southwards from Morcourt and Cerisy
and entered Bayonvillers and Warfusee-Abancourt, astride the
main Amiens road* Our troops east of these places were seriously
endangered, and in the early morning of 28th March were directed
to withdraw to the line Vrely-Marcelcave. Our line from Marcel-
cave to the Somme was manned by Carey's Force, with the ist
Cavalry Division in close support. During the evening, the enemy
concentrated heavy artillery fire on Marcelcave and forced these
troops to withdraw a short distance to the west of the village*

The position of our troops at Arvillers and Vrely, however, in
the deep and narrow salient between the Avre and Luce Rivers,
was rapidly becoming untenable. The enemy was pushing south-
wards from Guillaucourt, and beyond our right flank had entered
Contoire and was pressing the French troops back upon Hangest-
en-Santerre. A gallant attempt by troops of the 6ist Division to
regain Warfusee-Abancourt and lighten the pressure from the
north proved unsuccessful, and in the course of the afternoon and
evening our troops fell back through the aoth Division, which
during the evening was disposed on the line Mezieres-Demuin.
At nightfall we held approximately the Amiens defence line on the
whole front south of the Somme from Mezieres to Ignaucourt and
HameL

The nature of the fighting on the southern portion of the battle
front, where our troops had been engaged for a full week with an
almost overwhelming superiority of hostile forces, had thrown an
exceptional strain upon the Fifth Army Commander and his Staff*
In order to avoid the loss of efficiency which a continuance of such
a strain might have entailed, I decided to avail myself of the services
of the Staff of the Fourth Army, which was at this time in reserve.
General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, Bt., who had but recently given up
the command on appointment to Versailles, accordingly returned to
his old Army, and at 4.30 p.m. on this day assumed command of
the British forces south of the Somme. At the same time the con-
struction of new defence lines made necessary by the enemy's
advance called for the appointment of an able and experienced
Commander and Staff to direct this work and extemporise garrisons
for their defence. I accordingly ordered General Gough to undertake
this important task.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 211

A BREAK IN THE CLOUDS
The Attack on Arras

45* Meanwhile, between 7*0 and 8,0 a*m* on the morning of the
28th March, fighting of the utmost intensity had broken out north
of the Somme from Puisieux to north-east of Arras. Finding him-
self checked on the northern flank of his attack, the enemy on this
day made a determined effort to obtain greater freedom for the
development of his offensive, and struck in great force along the
valley of the Scarpe at Arras*

This development of the battle, which had been foreseen as
early as the 23rd March, involved the right of the XIIL Corps,
under command of Lieut-General Sir H* de B* de Lisle, on the
right of the First Army, and represented a considerable extension
of the original front of attack* A German success in this sector
might well have had far-reaching effects* There is little doubt that
the enemy hoped to achieve great results by this new stroke, and
that its failure was a serious set-back to his plans. 1

After a bombardment of great violence three fresh German
divisions advanced to the assault along the north bank of the
Scarpe River against the positions held by the 4th and 56th British
Divisions, under the command respectively of Major-General
T* G* Matheson, and Major-General F* A* Dudgeon, and were
supported in their attack by the two German divisions already
in line* According to captured documents, the enemy's immediate
object was to gain the general line Vimy Bailleul St* Laurent-
Blangy, when three special assault divisions were to carry the
Vimy Ridge on the following day. Immediately south of the Scarpe
four German divisions were engaged, to two of which were as-
signed the tasks of capturing Arras and the heights overlooking the
town* This assault, the weight of which fell on the 3rd and i5th
British Divisions, Major-General H* L* Reed commanding the
latter division, was supported by powerful attacks, in which eleven
hostile divisions were engaged, along our whole front southwards
to beyond Bucquoy* Still farther south, as far as Dernancourt,
strong local attacks were delivered at different points* The methods
followed by the enemy on this occasion were the same as those
employed by him on the 2ist March, but in this instance the thick
fog which had played so decisive a part on that day was absent* In

1 A German prisoner on the XVIL Corps front was found to be carrying six days'
rations, two blankets and a new pair of boots. Ludendorff states that the capture of the
Vimy Ridge was to have been followed by an attack by the German Sixth Army to carry
the high ground east of Lens. He attached the highest importance to both these attacks.

212 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

consequence, our artillery and machine guns were given every
opportunity to engage the German infantry both when assembling
and while advancing to the attack, and the heaviest losses were
inflicted on them by our fire*

Immediately prior to the assault, masses of German infantry
with artillery in rear of them were observed drawn up in close for-
mation on Greenland Hill, and were shelled by our artillery. North
of the Scarpe, about Roeux, great execution was done at point-
blank range by single guns which we had placed in forward posi-
tions close up to our front line* 1 The enemy's infantry in this sector
are reported to have advanced almost shoulder to shoulder in six
lines, and on the whole front our machine gunners obtained most
favourable targets*

The weight and momentum of his assault and the courage of
his infantry, who sought to cut their way through our wire by hand
under the fire of our machine guns, sufficed to carry the enemy
through the gaps which his bombardment had made in our outpost
line* Thereafter, raked by the fire of our outposts, whose garrisons
turned their machine guns and shot at the enemy's advancing lines
from flank and rear, and met by an accurate and intense fire from all
arms, his troops were everywhere stopped and thrown back with
the? heaviest loss before our battle positions*

A second attack launched late in the afternoon north of the
Scarpe, after a further period of bombardment, was also repulsed at
all points* At the end of the day our battle positions astride the
Scarpe were intact on the whole front of the attack, and in the even-
ing successful attacks enabled us to push out a new outpost line in
front of them* Meanwhile, the surviving garrisons of our original
outpost line, whose most gallant resistance had played so large a
part in breaking up the enemy's attack, had fought their way back
through the enemy ; though a party of the 2nd Battalion, Seaforth
Highlanders, 4th Division, remained cut off at Roeux until success-
fully withdrawn during the night*

On the southern portion of his attack, the enemy's repulse was,
if possible, even more complete than on the new front east of Arras*
Attacks on the Guards Division and on the 3ist Division were
defeated after all-day fighting* The 42nd Division drove off two
attacks from the direction of Ablainsevelle, and the 62nd Division
with an attached brigade of the 4th Australian Division also beat off
a succession of heavy attacks about Bucquoy with great loss to the
enemy*

1 The detachments of certain forward i5-pounder guns, after firing all their ammu-
nition and destroying their guns, got away safely on bicycles along the main Douai road
to Arras,

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 213

Less important attacks at different points between He*buterne
and Dernancourt were in each case repulsed, and led to the capture
of a number of prisoners by our troops,

The End of the First Stage

46, With this day's battle, which ended in the complete defeat
of the enemy on the whole front of his attack, the first stage of the
enemy's offensive weakened and eventually closed on the 5th April*
During these days hostile pressure continued south of the Somme,
and after much fierce and fluctuating fighting in this area, accom-
panied by a number of strong local attacks also on the northern
portion of the battle front, the enemy on the 4th and 5th April made
final unsuccessful efforts to overcome the resistance of the Allies,
These attacks, however, though formidable, lacked the weight that
had made his earlier successes possible, while the strength of the
Allied positions increased from day to day.

During the night of the aSth/agth March, our outpost line
between Arleux-en-Gohelle and Avion was withdrawn to conform
to our positions farther south. Except at minor points, no further
ground was gained by the enemy north of the Somme ; while by
successful local operations on the 3oth March and the night of the
2nd/3rd April, the New Zealand Division advanced their line at
Hebuterne, capturing 250 prisoners and over 100 machine guns,
and the 32nd Division, under command of Major-General C, D.
Shute, retook Ayette with 192 prisoners. A number of prisoners
were taken by us also in local fighting at other points.

The Fighting in the Avre and Luce Valleys

47, During these latter days the problem south of the Somme
was to disengage the divisions which had been fighting since the
2ist March, and give them an opportunity to reorganise, 1 Profiting
by the great weariness of our troops, the enemy was making

1 A marked feature of almost all reports sent in by liaison officers during the battle
was the good spirit of the men in the fighting line and their confidence that they had
given a good account of themselves. The following passage from the report of an officer
who visited the front south of the Somme on the 28th March is worth quoting, as giving
a first-hand impression of the spirit prevailing at that time : " From what I saw and
from the people with whom I talked, there seems little doubt that although our men are
dog-tired they have not lost heart, and I was told that they are all convinced that we are
winning. During the earlier stages of the battle they fought exceedingly well, and killed
large numbers of the enemy. Even now portions of the line are putting up a very good
fight and even at times counter-attacking with success. Divisions are very much dis-
organised and have with them men of all sorts of divisions, and all Divisional Commanders
with whom I have spoken have said that once they are able to re-organise they think
they will find their divisions much stronger than they expect. ... I have not heard
any ' grousing ' from anybody."

214 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

progress by local attacks rather than by general attacks in force, and
there is little doubt that, had it been possible to put in fresh troops
a few days earlier, the enemy's advance could have been stopped
and even turned back without much difficulty*

The divisions of the IIL Corps, which had already been heavily
engaged, were on their way to reinforce our line* These troops,
however, had not yet arrived, and on the 2gth March the greater
part of the British front south of the Somme was held by Carey's
Force, assisted by the ist Cavalry Division and such troops of the
divisions originally engaged as it had not yet been found possible
to withdraw* In rear of these troops, a few of the divisions of the
Fifth Army were given a brief opportunity to reassemble*

Hostile pressure recommenced during the morning of the
29th March from Demuin southwards, and in spite of vigorous
counter-attacks our troops and the French were forced back from
Mezieres*

During the night the enemy established a footing in Moreuil
Wood, and on the following morning attacked on both sides of the
River Luce* Our line in Moreuil Wood was restored by a brilliant
counter-attack carried out by the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, sup-
ported by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, but the enemy gained possession
of Demuin* North of the Luce also the enemy made some progress,
but in the afternoon was held up and finally driven back into Auber-
court by counter-attacks carried out by troops of the 66th Division
and the 3rd Australian Division, Major-General Sir J, Monash
commanding the latter division* In this operation a squadron of
the 2nd Cavalry Division co-operated very finely* In the evening a
most successful counter-attack by troops of the 2Oth and 5oth
Divisions re-established our line south of the Luce and captured a
number of prisoners*

Other hostile attacks on both banks of the Somme were repulsed
with heavy loss to the enemy by the ist Cavalry Division and the
3rd Australian Division, a battalion of United States Engineers
rendering gallant service south of the river*

The fighting between the Avre and the Luce continued during
the evening of this day, and in the afternoon of the 3 ist March
developed into strong attacks between Moreuil and De*muin* Power-
ful assaults were delivered also on the French front as far south as
Montdidier* In both cases the enemy made progress after heavy
fighting, at the close of which troops of the 8th Division carried out
a successful counter-attack, thereby considerably improving the
situation west of Moreuil Wood* At the end of the day our line ran
from Moreuil Station to Hangard* and thence to our old line west
of Warfusee-Abancourt t

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 315

On the following morning troops of the 2nd Cavalry Division
and of the 8th Division again attacked, and as the result of a very
gallant action effected a further improvement in our positions in
this neighbourhood* On the 2nd April, for the first time since the
opening of the enemy's offensive, no attack took place on the British
front south of the Somme*

The Final Effort

48* On the 4th and 5th April the enemy made a final effort to
prevent the French and British line from becoming stable*

The principal attack on the 4th April was made south of the
Somme, and involved the whole of the British front between the
river and Hangard, where we joined the French, and also the French
Army on our right* The first assault, delivered at 7*0 a.m., after a
comparatively short bombardment, was completely repulsed on the
right of our line, but on the left obliged our troops to fall back to
the west of Hamel and Vaire Wood* During the afternoon the
enemy again attacked heavily on the right, and caused our line to be
withdrawn a short distance in the neighbourhood of Hangard Wood*

The enemy attacked in dense formation, and his infantry afforded
excellent targets for our artillery and machine guns* Particularly
heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy by the artillery of the
3rd Australian Division, on the north bank of the Somme, which
engaged his troops across the river over open sights with excellent
effect*

The attack on the French front succeeded in making some
progress on both sides of the Avre River,

On the 5th April the principal German effort was made north
of the Somme, the enemy attacking heavily on practically the whole
front from Dernancourt to beyond Bucquoy* Strong local attacks
were made also south of the Somme about Hangard, where the
French and British troops had severe fighting until late in the day,
and in the sector immediately south of the river, where the attack-
ing German infantry were stopped by our artillery and machine
gun fire*

North of the river, except for minor readjustments of our line
at certain points, particularly in the neighbourhood of Bucquoy,
where he gained the eastern portion of the village, the enemy's
efforts were entirely without result. His troops, held or driven back
at all points, lost heavily, and any hope that he may have enter-
tained of opening the road to Amiens at the eleventh hour ended in
an exceedingly costly repulse*

In the neighbourhood of Rossignol Wood the enemy's attack
was entirely disorganised by a local attack carried out at a somewhat

216 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

earlier hour by the 37th Division, under command of Major-General
H, B, Williams, as the result of which our positions were improved
and over 130 prisoners captured by us*

With the failure of his attacks on the 4th and 5th April the
enemy's offensive on the Somme battle front ceased for the time
being, and conditions rapidly began to approximate to the normal
type of trench warfare, broken only by occasional local attacks on
either side*

Reason for Retirement on the Right of the Battle Front

49* Though the enemy's progress had been stopped, this result
had been obtained only by the sacrifice of a very considerable area
of ground and by a great expenditure of reserves* This latter factor
was to have a material influence upon the course of the subsequent
fighting on the northern portion of the British front* Before pass-
ing, therefore, to the operations on the Lys, it will be convenient
to give some account of the causes to which the retirement on the
Fifth Army front and the right of the Third Army can be attributed,

(i) In the first place, the forces at the disposal of the Fifth Army
were inadequate to meet and hold an attack in such strength as that
actually delivered by the enemy on its front*

The reason for this state of affairs has already been pointed out
in paragraph 9 of this report, in which the relative importance of
the various portions of the line held by the British Army was ex-
plained* The extent of our front made it impossible, with the forces
under my command, to have adequate reserves at all points
threatened. It was therefore necessary to ensure the safety of
certain sectors which were vital, and to accept risks at others*

In certain sectors, particularly in the northern and central
portions of my front, it was of vital importance that no ground
should be given up to the enemy. In the southern sector alone it
was possible under extreme pressure to give ground to some extent
without serious consequences, over the area devastated by the
enemy in his retreat in the spring of 1917* The troops holding
this latter part of the front could fall back to meet their reinforce-
ments, which need not necessarily be pushed forward so far or so
rapidly as elsewhere* Moreover, the southern sector could be rein-
forced with French troops more easily than any other portion of
the British line* I therefore considered it unsound to maintain a
considerable force of British reserves south of the River Somme,
while it was yet unknown where and to what extent the enemy would
commit his reserves.

The Fifth Army was instructed early in February to act accord-

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 217

ingly, both in regard to defensive preparations on the ground and
in the actual conduct of the defence*

(ii) The front south of the River Omignon was only taken over
by the British some seven weeks before the enemy's attack, a period
insufficient to ensure that the scheme of defence would be in an
efficient state of preparation* During the winter it had been possible
to hold the defences in this sector very lightly, and they were
consequently in themselves inadequate to meet any serious form
of attack.

Much work, therefore, had to be carried out by the Fifth Army,
and strenuous efforts were made with such resources as were avail-
able to improve the defences as rapidly as possible* Great difficul-
ties, however, were met with in the devastated area* The roads were
in a bad condition, there was no light railway system, the broad
gauge system was deficient, and there was a serious lack of accom-
modation for the troops* The amount of labour at our disposal
being limited, all available labour units in rear of the forward defen-
sive zones were allotted to the construction of the Peronne Bridge-
head defences, which were considered of primary importance, with
the result that practically no work had been carried out with the
object of securing the line of the River Somme itself*

(iii) The thick fog which enveloped the battlefield on the morn-
ings of the 2ist and 22nd March undoubtedly masked the fire of
artillery, rifles and machine guns* Where the troops on the ground
were more numerous this was not of such extreme importance ;
but where the defences were more lightly held, as in the southern
sector of the Fifth Army front, and depended for their mainten-
ance on the cross fire of artillery and machine guns, the masking of
our fire enabled the enemy to penetrate and turn the flanks of
certain important localities*

(iv) On the extreme right, the valley of the River Oise, normally
marshy and almost impassable during the early spring, was, owing
to the exceptionally dry weather, passable for infantry almost every-
where, and formed no serious obstacle* This applies equally to the
valley of the River Somme, which in the latter stage of the battle
was easily negotiated by the hostile infantry between the recognised
points of passage* A much larger number of troops would therefore
have been required to render the defence of these rivers secure*
These forces, however, were not available except at the expense of
other and more vital portions of my front, and as the exceptional
weather conditions could not have been foreseen by the enemy at
the time when the preparations for his offensive were undertaken,
there was a strong possibility that he would not be able to take
advantage of them*

2i8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

(v) For some time prior to the aist March it was known that
the enemy had been making extensive preparations for an offensive
on the Reims front, and that these preparations were already far
advanced. As pointed out above, the bombardment on the battle
front had been accompanied by great artillery activity on both sides
of Reims* It could not be determined with certainty that this was
a feint until the attack upon the British had been in progress for
some days* The enemy might have employed a portion of his
reserves in this sector, and the knowledge of this possibility neces-
sarily influenced the distribution and utilisation of the French
reserves.

THE STORM-CLOUD IN THE NORTH

The Situation on the Northern Front 1

50* The possibility of a German attack north of the La Bassee
Canal, for which certain preparations appeared to have been carried
out, had been brought to my notice prior to the 2ist March. In-
dications that preparations for a hostile attack in this sector were
nearing completion had been observed in the first days of April,
but its extent and force could not be accurately gauged.

There were obvious advantages for the enemy in such a course of
action. In the first place, the depth of his advance on the southern
portion of the battle front had left him with a long and dangerously
exposed flank between Noyon and Montdidier. The absence of
properly organised communications in the battle area made this
flank peculiarly vulnerable to a counter-stroke by the French. To
prevent this, and preserve the initiative in his hands, it was essential
that he should renew his attack without delay.

In the second place, the heavy and prolonged struggle on the
Somme had placed a severe strain on the forces under my command
and had absorbed the whole of my reserves. Further, to meet the
urgent demands of the battle, I had been forced to withdraw ten
divisions from the northern portion of my line, and to replace
them by divisions exhausted in the Somme fighting, which had
only just been made up with reinforcements recently sent out from
home. The divisions thus withdrawn had been chiefly taken from
the Flanders front, where, in a normal year, the condition of the
ground could be relied upon to make offensive operations on a large
scale impossible before May at the earliest.

A strong additional reason for drawing these divisions princi-
pally from tne north was furnished by conditions on the central
portion of my front between the Scarpe and the La Bassee Canal.

1 Vide Map No. 7.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 219

Should urgent necessity arise it would be possible to give ground to
a limited extent in the north, while still preserving strong lines of
defence, which could in part be covered by inundations* 1 On the
other hand, a break through on our centre, about Vimy, would
mean the realisation of the enemy's plan which had been foiled by
our defence at Arras on the a8th March, namely, the capture of
Amiens and the separation of the bulk of the British armies from
the French and from those British forces acting under the direction
of the latter*

The enemy's preparations for an offensive in this central sector,
the extreme importance of which will readily be understood, had
been complete for some time* The admirable and extensive railway
system serving it made it possible for him to effect with great rapidity
at any moment the concentration of troops necessary for an attack*
My own forces in this sector, therefore, could not greatly be reduced*

In consequence of these different factors, the bulk of the divi-
sions in front line in the northern battle, and in particular the 4Oth,
34th, 25th, i gth and 9th Divisions which on the 9th April held the
portion of my front between the Portuguese sector and the Ypres-
Comines Canal, had already taken part in the southern battle* It
must be remembered that before the northern battle commenced
forty-six out of my total force of fifty-eight divisions had been
engaged in the southern area*

At the end of March, however, the northern front was rapidly
drying up under the influence of the exceptionally rainless spring,
and, in view of the indications referred to, the possibility of an early
attack in this sector became a matter for immediate consideration.
Arrangements for the relief of the Portuguese divisions, which had
been continuously in line for a long period and needed rest, were
therefore undertaken during the first week of April, and were to
have been completed by the morning of the loth April* Meanwhile,
other divisions which had been engaged in the Somme fighting,
and had been withdrawn to rest and reorganise, were moved up
behind the Lys front. Arrangements had already been made for
the evacuation of the salient at Passchendaele should circum-
stances require it, a measure which would both upset any prepara-
tions which the enemy might have made for an offensive there and
economise a few troops for use elsewhere*

The steps which I could take, however, to meet a danger which
I could foresee, were limited by the fact that, though the enemy's
progress on the Somme had for the time being been stayed, the
great mass of hostile divisions still concentrated on that front

1 These lines included the Wieltje Pilckem Ridge, the Ypres Canal line, the Vlamer-
tinghe line, and the Ouderdom -Brandhoek line.

220 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

constituted a threat to the safety of the British^ Armies of an im-
perative character. The enemy was in a position to take immediate
advantage of any weakening of my forces in that area,

The Lys Battle Opened

51, The persistence of unseasonably fine weather and the rapid
drying up of the low-lying ground in the Lys Valley enabled the
enemy to anticipate the relief of the 2nd Portuguese Division.

On the night of the yth April, an unusually heavy and prolonged
bombardment with gas shell was opened along practically the whole
front from Lens to Armentieres, At about 4,0 a*m, on the gth April
the bombardment recommenced with the greatest intensity with
both gas and high explosive shell.

The enemy's attack in the first instance was launched on the
northern portion of the front of General Sir H, S, Home's First
Army, held by the XL and XV, Corps under command respectively
of Lieut,-General Sir R, C, R, Haking, and Lieut-General Sir
J, P. Du Cane, On the loth April the right of General Sir H, C, O.
Plumer's Second Army, held by the IX, Corps under command of
Lieut,- General Sir A, Hamilton Gordon, was also involved. In the
early stages of the battle the XV, Corps was transferred to the Second
Army, and at later dates the extension of the battle front led to the
intervention of the I, Corps, under command of Lieut,-General Sir
Arthur Holland, on the First Army front, and of the XXII, Corps,
under command of Lieut,-General Sir A, J, Godley, on the Second
Army front. Subsequently the IL Corps of the Second Army, under
command of Lieut.-General Sir C, W, Jacob, became involved in
the withdrawal from the Passchendaele salient.

At about 7,0 a,m, on the gth April, in thick fog which again
made observation impossible, the enemy appears to have attacked
the left brigade of the 2nd Portuguese Division in strength and to
have broken into their trenches, A few minutes afterwards, the
area of attack spread south and north. Shortly after 7,0 a,m. the
right brigade of the 4oth Division reported that an attack had
developed on their front and was being held, but that machine
gunners near their right-hand post could see the enemy moving
rapidly through the sector to the south of them.

Communication with the divisions in line was difficult, but
during the morning the situation cleared up, and it became apparent
that a serious attack was in progress on the front of the 55th Divi-
sion, under command of Major-General H, S, Jeudwine, and of
the 2nd Portuguese and 4Oth Divisions from the La Basse'e Canal
to Bois Grenier, Meanwhile, shortly after the opening of the bom-

Situation morning 9th April

evening

M evening 10th April - -
Final line - 3Qth * acres

THE LYS BATTLE ;

German Attacks of 9th & loth April, 1918.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 221

bardment, orders had been given to the 5ist and 5oth Divisions to
move up behind Richebourg St. Vaast and Laventie and take up
their positions in accordance with the pre-arranged defence scheme .
Both these divisions had also been heavily engaged in the Somme
battle, and had but recently arrived in the neighbourhood. The
ist King Edward's Horse and the nth Cyclist Battalion had been
sent forward at once to cover their deployment.

Between 8,0 a.m. and 9,0 a.m. the enemy succeeded in occupying
the forward posts of the right battalion of the 4oth Division and
attacked northwards along the Rue Petillon and Rue de Bois. Our
machine gun posts in this area continued to fight until all but one
of their machine guns were destroyed, and by their fire greatly
delayed his progress. At 10.15 a.m., however, his troops were
already in Rouge de Bout, more than 2,000 yards in rear of the head-
quarters of the 4oth Division's right battalion, which, at this hour,
were still holding out at Petillon. Later in the morning, the 4oth
Division was pushed back by pressure on its front and flank to a
position facing south between Bois Grenier, Fleurbaix and Sailly-
sur-la-Lys, its right brigade in particular having lost heavily.

South of the Portuguese sector, the 55th Division was heavily
attacked on its whole front, and by 10.30 a.m. its left brigade had
been forced back from its outpost line. The main line of resistance
was intact, and a defensive flank was formed facing north between
Festubert and a strong point just south of Le Touret, where touch
was established later with troops of the 5ist Division.

Throughout the remainder of the day, the 55th Division main-
tained its positions against all assaults, and by successful counter-
attacks captured over 750 prisoners. The success of this most gallant
defence, the importance of which it would be hard to over-estimate,
was due in great measure to the courage and determination dis-
played by our advanced posts. These held out with the utmost
resolution though surrounded, pinning to the ground those parties
of the enemy who had penetrated our defences, and preventing
them from developing their attack. Among the many gallant deeds
recorded of them, one instance is known of a machine gun which
was kept in action although the German infantry had entered the
rear compartment of the " pill-box " from which it was firing, the
gun team holding up the enemy by revolver fire from the inner
compartment.

To the north of the positions held by the 55th Division, the
weight and impetus of the German attack overwhelmed the Portu-
guese troops, and the enemy's progress was so rapid that the arrange-
ments for manning the rear defences of this sector with British
troops could scarcely be completed in time.

223 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

The ist King Edward's Horse and the nth Cyclist Battalion,
indeed, occupied Lacouture, Vieille Chapelle and Huit Maisons,
and by their splendid defence of those places enabled troops of the
5ist and 5oth Divisions to come into action east of the Lawe River
between Le Touret and Estaires. East of Estaires our troops found
the enemy already in possession of the right bank of the river, and
touch between the 5oth and 4oth Divisions could not be established.
After heavy fighting the right of the 4oth Division was forced back
along the Lys, and early in the afternoon withdrew across the river
at Bac St. Maur.

The remainder of the 4oth Division, reinforced by troops of
the 34th Division, established themselves in a position covering the
approaches to Erquinghem and Armentieres, between Fort Rompu
on the Lys and our old front line north-east of Bois Grenier. Here
they successfully maintained themselves, although the line was not
readily defensible and was constantly attacked. In this fighting very
gallant service was rendered by the i2th Battalion, Suffolk Regi-
ment, 4oth Division, who held out in Fleurbaix until the evening,
though heavily attacked on three sides.

During the afternoon troops of the 5ist and 5oth Divisions
(chiefly composed of drafts hurriedly sent up to join their regiments)
were heavily engaged east of the Lawe River and were gradually
pressed back upon the river crossings. The enemy brought up guns
to close range, and in the evening crossed at Estaires and Pont
Riqueul, but in both cases was driven back by counter-attacks. At
the end of the day the bridgeheads were still held by us as far east
as Sailly-sur-la-Lys.

In the course of the night our troops at Estaires and in the sector
to the south were withdrawn to the left bank of the Lawe and Lys
Rivers, after sharp fighting about Pont Riqueul. The bridges across
both rivers were blown up, though, as had been the case in the
Somme battle, in some instances their destruction was incomplete.

The Crossing at Bac St. Maur

52. East of Sailly-sur-la-Lys the enemy had followed closely the
troops of the 4oth Division who had crossed at Bac St. Maur and,
though here also the bridge had been blown up, at about 3.0 p.m.
succeeded in passing small parties across the river by an emergency
bridge under cover of machine gun fire. During the remainder of
the afternoon and evening the strength of his forces north of the
river steadily increased, and pushing northwards they reached
Croix du Bac. At this point they were counter-attacked early in the
night by a brigade of the 25th Division, and pressed back. Our troops

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 223

were unable, however, to clear the German infantry completely
from the village, and during the night the enemy established himself
firmly on the north bank of the river.

The Struggle for Estaires

53. Early in the morning of the loth April, the enemy launched
heavy attacks covered by artillery fire about the river crossings at
Lestrem and Estaires, and succeeded in reaching the left bank at both
places ; but in each case he was driven back again by determined
counter-attacks by the 5oth Division*

The enemy continued to exercise great pressure at Estaires, and
fierce street fighting took place, in which both sides lost heavily.
Machine guns, mounted by our troops in the upper rooms of houses,
did great execution on his troops as they moved up to the attack,
until the machine guns were knocked out by artillery fire. In the
evening the German infantry once more forced their way into
Estaires, and after a most gallant resistance the 5oth Division with-
drew at nightfall to a prepared position to the north and west of the
town.

East of Estaires the enemy had already crossed the Lys in
strength, with artillery in close support of his infantry, and by the
evening had pressed back our troops to a position north of Steen-
werck. Thereafter, the arrival of British reinforcements for the time
being held up his advance.

The Attack at Messines

54. Meanwhile, after an intense bombardment of our front and
support lines and battery areas between Fre'linghien and Hill 60,
strong hostile attacks had developed at about 5.30 a.m. in this sector
also.

The outpost positions of the 25th and igth Divisions in line north
of Armentieres and east of Messines were driven in, and during the
morning the enemy worked his way forward under cover of mist
along the valleys of the Warnave and Douve Rivers, on the flanks of
our positions in Ploegsteert Wood and Messines. By midday he had
gained Ploegsteert Village, together with the south-eastern portions
of Ploegsteert Wood, and had captured Messines. North of that
village the area of attack extended during the afternoon as far as the
north bank of the Ypres-Comines Canal. In this new sector the
enemy carried our forward positions as far as Hollebeke, pushing
back our line to the crest of the Wytschaete Ridge.

Messines was retaken early in the afternoon by the South African

224 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Brigade, 9th Division, During the night this division cleared
Wytschaete of parties of German troops. North of Hollebeke our
positions astride the Ypres-Comines Canal were substantially
unchanged, and on this front the 9th Division killed great numbers
of the enemy,

The Withdrawal from Armentieres

55, The enemy's advance north of Armentieres made the posi-
tion of the 34th Division in that town very dangerous. Though it
had not yet been attacked on its own front, its available reserves had
already been heavily engaged in protecting its southern flank. As
the northern flank also had now become exposed, it was decided to
withdraw the division to the left bank of the Lys, The early stages
of the movement were commenced shortly after midday. Though
the operation was closely followed up by the enemy and pressed by
him on all sides, it was carried out with great steadiness and in good
order, and by 9,30 p,m, had been completed successfully. All the
bridges across the river were destroyed,

The Fall of Merville

56, On the morning of the nth April the enemy recommenced
his attacks on the whole front, and again made progress. Between
Givenchy and the Lawe River the successful resistance of the past
two days was maintained against repeated assaults. Between Locon
and Estaires the enemy, on the previous evening, had established a
footing on the west bank of the river in the neighbourhood of Fosse,
In this area and northwards to Lestrem he continued to push west-
wards, despite the vigorous resistance of our troops.

At Estaires, the troops of the 5oth Division, tired and reduced in
numbers by the exceptionally heavy fighting of the previous three
weeks, and threatened on their right flank by the enemy's advance
south of the Lys, were heavily engaged. After holding their posi-
tions with great gallantry during the morning, they were slowly
pressed back in the direction of Merville,

The enemy employed large forces on this front in close forma-
tion, and the losses inflicted by our rifle and machine gun fire were
unusually heavy. Our own troops, however, were not in sufficient
numbers to hold up his advance, and as they fell back and their
front gradually extended, gaps formed in the line. Through these
gaps bodies of German infantry worked their way forward, and at
6.0 p,m, had reached Neuf Berquin, Other parties of the enemy
pushed on along the north bank of the Lys Canal and entered Mer-
ville. As it did not appear possible to clear the town without fresh

fTHE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 225
)rces, which were not yet available, it was decided to withdraw
ehind the small stream which runs just west of the town. This
rithdrawal was successfully carried out during the evening.
The Withdrawal from Nieppe and Hill 63
57. Heavy fighting took place on the remainder of the front
south of Armentieres, and the enemy made some progress. In this
sector, however, certain reinforcements had come into action, and
in the evening a counter-attack carried out by troops of the 3ist
Division, recently arrived from the southern battlefield, regained
the hamlets of Le Verrier and La Becque.

Meanwhile, north of Armentieres strong hostile attacks had
developed towards midday and were pressed vigorously in the direc-
tion of Nieppe and Neuve figlise. In the afternoon, fierce fighting
took place about Messines, which the enemy had regained. Beyond
this his troops were not able to push their advance, being checked
and driven back by a counter-attack by the South African Brigade*
South of Hollebeke the gth Division had again been heavily attacked
during the morning, but had held their positions.

Owing to the progress made by the enemy in the Ploegsteert
sector, the position of the 34th Division at Nieppe, where they had
beaten off a determined attack during the morning, became un-
tenable. Accordingly, in the early part of the night our troops at
Nieppe fell back under orders to the neighbourhood of Pont
d'Achelles. Still further to shorten our line and economise men,
our troops between Pont d'Achelles and Wytschaete were with-
drawn to positions about 1,000 yards east of Neuve figlise and
Wulverghem. This withdrawal involved the abandonment of Hill 63
and of the positions still held by us about Messines.

The Southern Flank Steady

58. Though our troops had not been able to prevent the enemy's
entry into Merville, their vigorous resistance, combined with the
maintenance of our positions at Givenchy and Festubert, had given
an opportunity for reinforcements to build up our lines in this sector.
As troops of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 3ist, 6ist and ist Australian Divisions
began to arrive, the southern portion of the battle front gradually
became steady. Time was still required, however, to complete our
dispositions, and for the next two days the situation in this area
remained critical. 1

A sudden attack just before dawn on the i2th April broke through

1 There is evidence that the German troops that had entered Merville got out of
hand, and instead of pressing their advantage wasted valuable time in plundering the
town. On the lath the 5th Division arrived and secured this front.

226 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the left centre of the 5ist Division about Pacaut and Riez du Vinage,
and, but for the gallantry and resource of two batteries of the 255th
Brigade, R,F,A,, commanded respectively by Major T, Davidson,
D,S,O,, and Major F, C, Jack, M,C,, might have enabled the enemy
to cross the La Bassee Canal, Each of these batteries as it retired
left a gun within 500 yards of the canal and, assisted by a party of
gunners who held the drawbridge with rifles, worked with them to
such good purpose that the enemy's advance was stopped. The
3rd Division was already in action on the right of the 5ist Division
about Locon, where, though forced to fall back a short distance, our
troops inflicted very heavy casualties upon an enemy greatly superior
in numbers. On the left of the 5ist Division, the 6ist Division was
coming into action about the Clarence River, Both the 3rd and the
6ist Division had been engaged in many days of continuous fighting
south of Arras ; but with the arrival of these troops, battle-weary
though they were, the enemy's progress in this sector of the front
was definitely checked.

At Merville also, our troops, though compelled to give ground
somewhat during the morning, thereafter maintained themselves
successfully,

The Thrust towards Hazebrouck

59, Meanwhile, a situation which threatened to become serious
had arisen north of Merville, At about 8,0 a,m, the enemy attacked
in great strength on a front extending from south of the Estaires
Vieux Berquin Road to the neighbourhood of Steenwerck. After
very heavy fighting, in the course of which the ist Battalion Royal
Guernsey Light Infantry, 29th Division, Major-General D, E,
Cayley commanding the division, did gallant service, he succeeded
in the afternoon in overcoming the resistance of our troops about
Doulieu and La Becque, forcing them back in a north-westerly
direction. As the result of this movement, a gap was formed in our
line south-west of Bailleul, and bodies of the enemy who had forced
their way through seized Outtersteene and Merris,

In the evening a brigade of the 33rd Division, Major-General
R, J, Pinney commanding the division, with a body of cyclists, a
Pioneer battalion, and every available man from schools and rein-
forcement camps, came into action in this sector. On their left,
troops of the 25th, 34th and 49th Divisions, Major-General
N, J, G, Cameron commanding the last-mentioned division, though
heavily attacked, maintained their positions to the south and south-
east of Bailleul, and before midnight our line had been re-formed.

Next day, the enemy followed up his attacks with great vigour,
and the troops of the 29th and 3ist Divisions, now greatly reduced

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 227

in strength by the severe fighting already experienced, and strung
out over a front of nearly 10,000 yards east of the Foret de Nieppe,
were once more tried to the utmost* Behind them the ist Australian
Division, under command of Major-General Sir H. B. Walker,
was in process of detraining, and the troops were told that the line
was to be held at all costs, until the detrainment could be completed*

During the morning, which was very foggy, several determined
attacks, in which a German armoured car came into action against
the 4th Guards Brigade on the southern portion of our line, were
repulsed with great loss to the enemy. After the failure of these
assaults, he brought up field guns to point blank range, and in the
northern sector with their aid gained Vieux Berquin. Everywhere
except at Vieux Berquin, the enemy's advance was held up all day
by desperate fighting, in which our advanced posts displayed the
greatest gallantry, maintaining their ground when entirely surrounded,
men standing back to back in the trenches and shooting in front
and rear. 1

In the afternoon the enemy made a further determined effort,
and by sheer weight of numbers forced his way through the gaps in
our depleted line, the surviving garrisons of our posts fighting where
they stood to the last with bullet and bayonet. The heroic resistance
of these troops, however, had given the leading brigades of the
ist Australian Division time to reach and organise their appointed
line east of the Foret de Nieppe. These now took up the fight, and
the way to Hazebrouck was definitely closed.

The performance of all the troops engaged in this most gallant
stand, and especially that of the 4th Guards Brigade, on whose front
of some 4,000 yards the heaviest attacks fell, is worthy of the highest
praise . No more brilliant exploit has taken place since the opening of the
enemy's offensive, though gallant actions have been without number.

The action of these troops, and indeed of all the divisions
engaged in the fighting in the Lys Valley, is the more noteworthy
because, as already pointed out, practically the whole of them had
been brought straight out of the Somme battlefield, where they had
suffered severely and had been subjected to a great strain. All these
divisions, without adequate rest and filled with young reinforce-
ments which they had had no time to assimilate, were again hurriedly
thrown into the fight and, in spite of the great disadvantages under
which they laboured, succeeded in holding up the advance of greatly
superior forces of fresh troops. Such an accomplishment reflects
the greatest credit on the youth of Great Britain, as well as upon
those responsible for the training of the young soldiers sent out
from home at this time.

1 The 5th Division were also attacked heavily, but held their ground.

228 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

The Struggle for Neuve Eglise

60, On the afternoon of the I2th April sharp fighting had taken
place in the neighbourhood of Neuve figlise, and during the night
the enemy's pressure in this sector had been maintained and extended,
By the morning of the i3th April his troops had forced their way
into the village, but before noon were driven out by troops of the
33rd and 49th Divisions by a most successful counter-attack in
which a number of prisoners were taken.

In the course of this day, also, a succession of heavy attacks were
driven off with great loss to the enemy by the 33rd and 34th Divi-
sions about Meteren and La Creche, In the evening further attacks
developed on this front and at Neuve figlise. The pressure exercised
by the enemy was very great, and bodies of German infantry, having
forced their way in between La Creche and Neuve figlise, began a
strong encircling movement against the left of the 34th Division
north and east of the former village. During the early part of the
night our troops maintained their positions, but before dawn on the
I4th April withdrew under orders to a line in front of the high
ground known as the Ravelsberg Heights between Bailleul and
Neuve figlise, the enemy having been too severely handled to
interfere.

At Neuve figlise the enemy again forced his way into the village,
and heavy and confused fighting took place throughout the night, A
party of the 2nd Battalion Worcestershire Regiment, 33rd Division,
maintained themselves in the Mairie until 2,0 p,m, on the I4th
April, and during the morning of this day other troops of the same
division were reported to have cleared the village with bombs. The
enemy persisted in his attacks, however, and by midnight Neuve
figlise was definitely in his possession. Other attacks delivered on
the I4th April between Neuve Eglise and Bailleul and south-east of
Meteren were repulsed.

Farther south, local fighting had taken place meanwhile both
on the 1 3th and i4th April at a number of points between Givenchy
and the Foret de Nieppe, In these encounters the enemy had met
with no success. On the other hand, a local operation carried out
by the 4th Division on the evening of the i4th April resulted in the
recapture of Riez du Vinage with 150 prisoners.

The Capture of Bailleul

6 1. On the morning of the i5th April the igth Division repulsed
hostile attacks about Wytschaete. Late in the afternoon fresh assaults
in great strength, in which the Alpine Corps and two other fresh

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 239

German divisions were engaged, developed against Bailleul and
the Ravelsberg Heights* After heavy righting the enemy gained a
footing on the eastern end of the high ground and, though driven
back by a counter-attack, re-established his position there and
worked west along the ridge. By 7,0 p.m. the whole of it was in his
possession, and the retention of Bailleul itself became very difficult.
Two hours later, hostile infantry forced their way into the town,
and our troops, who were being heavily attacked from the east and
south, were compelled to fall back to positions between Meteren
and Dranoutre.

The Withdrawal at Passchendaele

62. In order to set free additional British troops for the battle and
to delay the execution of any plans which the enemy might be enter-
taining for extending the flank of his attack to the north, I approved
of putting into execution the scheme for the gradual evacuation of
the Ypres salient. The first stage in this withdrawal had been carried
out on the night of the I2th/i3th April, since which date our posi-
tions on the Passchendaele Ridge had been held by outposts only.

On the night of the 1 5th/ 1 6th April the withdrawal was carried
a stage further, our troops taking up positions along the line of the
Steenbeek River and the Westhoek and Wytschaete Ridges.

The Arrival of French Troops

63. The constant and severe fighting on the Lys battle front,
following so closely upon the tremendous struggle south of Arras,
had placed a very serious strain upon the British forces. Many
British divisions had taken part both in the northern and southern
battles, while others had been engaged almost continuously from
the outset of the German offensive. I had represented the state of
affairs to General Foch, Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Forces,
and had pointed out to him the necessity of relief for the British
troops and their need of an opportunity to rest and refit. General
Foch had complied with my request without delay. Certain French
forces were moved to the north, and by this date were already in
position close behind the British front in Flanders.

The First Attacks on Kemmel

64. At different times on the i6th April a number of strong
local attacks were made by the enemy on the Meteren-Wytschaete
front, which were for the most part repulsed with heavy loss to him
by the 25th, 34th and 4gth Divisions. At Meteren and Wytschaete,

230 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

however, he succeeded in penetrating our positions, and after much
rather confused fighting established himself in both villages Counter-
attacks delivered during the evening by British and French troops
failed to eject him, though at Wytschaete a battalion of the gth
Division reached the eastern edge of the village, and our line was
ultimately established close up to its western and northern outskirts.

These attacks were followed on the morning of the iyth April
by a determined attempt on the part of the enemy to capture the
commanding feature known as Kemmel Hill. The assault was
launched after a preliminary bombardment of great intensity, and
was accompanied by strong attacks in the Meteren and Merris
sectors.

The enemy's attacks in the Kemmel sector were pressed with
great determination, but ended in his complete repulse at all points
by troops of the 34th, 49th and igth Divisions, his infantry being
driven out by counter-attacks wherever they had gained a temporary
footing in our line. The attacks at Meteren and Merris were also
beaten off with heavy loss by the 33rd Division and the ist Australian
Division,

On this day also the enemy launched a strong assault upon the
right of the Belgian Army about the Ypres-Staden Railway, This
attack, the object of which was to capture Bixschoote and advance
beyond the Yser Canal, ended in complete failure, and left over 700
prisoners in the hands of our Allies,

Operations North of Bethune

65, On the i8th April the enemy made a fresh effort to overcome
our resistance on the southern flank of his attack. After a heavy
bombardment, which at Givenchy is reported to have exceeded in
intensity even the bombardment of the gth April, his infantry attacked
on nearly the whole front from Givenchy to west of Merville, At
Givenchy and Festubert they succeeded at certain points in entering
our positions, but after severe and continuous fighting, lasting
throughout the day, the troops of the ist Division, under command
of Major-General E. P, Strickland, regained by counter-attacks
practically the whole of their original positions. Elsewhere the
enemy failed to obtain even an initial success, being repulsed with
exceedingly heavy loss at all points by the 4th and 6ist Divisions.

For nearly a week following the failure of these attacks the battle
on the Lys front died down, though sharp fighting of a minor
character took place from time to time at different points, particu-
larly in the neighbourhood of Festubert, where a strong point,
known as Route " A " Keep, changed hands more than once before

/ './ .?''"

7t t 'Approximate

' situation

* ' 4 p.m. 24th

VILLERS BRETONNEUX ;

23rd-25th April, 1918.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 231

remaining finally in our possession* Further west, the 4th Division,
in co-operation with the 6ist Division, carried out a series of success-
ful local operations north of the La Bassee Canal, resulting in the
capture of some hundreds of prisoners and a considerable improve-
ment of our positions between the Lawe and the Clarence Rivers*

During this period, also, the French troops which had already
come into line in the neighbourhood of Meteren and opposite Span-
broekmolen gradually relieved the British troops between these
two points, and by the morning of the 2ist April had taken over
the whole of the Kemmel sector.

THE STORM PASSES

The Attack on Villers Bretonneux

66, Local attacks, meanwhile, had taken place from time to
time on both sides of the Somme battle front, particularly in the
vicinity of Hangard, where our line linked up with the French, and
about Aveluy Wood. On the 24th April a more serious attack, in
which four German divisions were employed against the British
forces alone and German and British tanks came into conflict for
the first time, took place on the Allied front between the Somme
and the Avre Valleys*

At about 6.30 a*m*, after a heavy bombardment lasting about
three hours, the enemy advanced to the assault on the whole British
front south of the Somme, under cover of fog. In the ensuing
struggle, German tanks broke through our line south-east of Villers
Bretonneux, and turning to north and south, opened the way for
their infantry. After heavy fighting, in which great losses were
inflicted on his troops both by our infantry fire and by our light
tanks, the enemy gained possession of Villers Bretonneux ; but
was held up on the edge of the wood just west of that place by a
counter-attack by the 8th Division, South of Villers Bretonneux,
some of our heavy tanks came into action and drove back the German
tanks, with the result that the enemy's infantry were stopped some
distance to the east of Cachy Village, which formed their objective*
North of Villers Bretonneux, all attacks were repulsed.

At 10,0 p*m, on the night of the 24th /25th April, a counter-
attack was launched by a brigade of the i8th Division and the
1 3th and I5th Brigades of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions,
Major-General Sir J, J, T* Hobbs commanding the latter divi-
sion, and met with remarkable success, A night operation of this
character, undertaken at such short notice, was an enterprise of

232 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

great daring* The instant decision to seize the opportunity offered,
and the rapid and thorough working out of the general plan and
details of the attack on the part of the III, Corps Commander and
divisional and subordinate commanders concerned, are most worthy
of commendation, while the unusual nature of the operation called
for the highest qualities on the part of the troops employed. It was
carried out in the most spirited and gallant manner by all ranks. The
1 3th Australian Brigade, in particular, showed great skill and reso-
lution in their attack, making their way through belts of wire running
diagonally to the line of their advance, across very difficult country
which they had no opportunity to reconnoitre beforehand.

At daybreak Villers Bretonneux was practically surrounded by
our troops. During the morning two battalions of the 8th Division
worked their way through the streets and houses, overcoming the
resistance of such parties of the enemy as were still holding out.
That afternoon Villers Bretonneux was again completely in our
possession. In this well-conceived and brilliantly-executed opera-
tion nearly 1,000 prisoners were captured by our troops. A German
tank was left derelict in our lines and was salved subsequently.

The Capture of Kemmel Hill

67. These operations on the southern front were followed on
the 25th April by a renewal of the enemy's attacks in great strength
north of the Lys.

Following upon a very violent bombardment, at about 5,0 a,m*
the enemy attacked the French and British positions from Bailleul
to the Ypres-Comines Canal with nine divisions, of which five
were fresh divisions and one other had been but lightly engaged.
The main object of the attack was the capture of Kemmel Hill by a
direct assault upon the French, combined with an attack upon the
British right south of Wytschaete, aimed at turning the British right
flank and separating it from the French. At that date the British
right flank lay on the Messines-Kemmel Road, at a point about
half-way between Kemmel and Wytschaete.

After very heavy fighting, the German infantry worked their
way round the lower slopes of the high ground, and at 10.0 a.m.
had succeeded in capturing Kemmel Village and Hill ; though
elements of French troops held out until a late hour on the hill and
in the village.

The weight of the attack in the British sector fell on the gth
Division and attached troops of the 4gth Division, who at 7.0 a.m.
were still holding their positions about Wytschaete intact, though
heavily engaged. Fierce fighting continued in this neighbourhood

W :g
^ ex

PQ
C/3

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 233

for some hours later, and great numbers of Germans were killed by
rifle and machine gun fire at short range. Later in the morning the
right of the gth Division was forced to fall back fighting stubbornly
to Vierstraat, but at i.o p.m. our troops still held the Grand Bois
north of Wytschaete.

In the afternoon the attack spread northwards along the front
held by the 2ist Division. By the evening our troops had been
gradually pushed back from their forward positions, and held a line
running from Hill 60 to Voormezeele, whence it passed north of Vier-
straat to our junction with the French about La Clytte. The Allied
line had not been broken, and reinforcements were hurrying up.

Next day fighting continued fiercely. In the early morning a
very gallant counter-attack by the 25th Division, with attached
troops of the 2ist and 49th Divisions, undertaken in conjunction
with the French, penetrated into Kemmel Village, taking over 300
prisoners. Our troops then found themselves exposed to heavy
machine gun fire from the flanks, and were unable to maintain
their positions.

Later in the morning the enemy renewed his attacks in strength,
but, in spite of repeated efforts, was only able to make small pro-
gress at certain points. Troops of the 2ist, 3Oth, 3Qth and 4gth
Divisions (Major-General C. A. Blacklock commanding the 3gth
Division), and the South African Brigade of the Qth Division, had
heavy fighting, and made several gallant counter-attacks. It will not
have been forgotten that each of the 2ist, 3oth and 3gth Divisions
had experienced severe and prolonged fighting in the battle of the
Somme.

Successful counter-attacks were carried out also by the French,
in the course of which the village of Locre was recaptured in a very
gallant action.

The capture of Kemmel Hill seriously threatened our positions
in the Ypres salient, the communications and southern defences of
which were now under direct observation by the enemy, while his
continued progress to the north-west in the Voormeseele sector would
make the extrication of troops east of Ypres most hazardous. A
further readjustment of our line in the salient was accordingly
carried out on the night of the 26th /2yth April, our troops with-
drawing to the general line Pilckem Wieltje west end of Zillebeke
Lake Voormezeele.

The Enemy* s Advance Stayed

68. On the 28th April local fighting took place in the neighbour-
hood of Locre and Voormezeele without material change in the
situation ; but on the following day, encouraged by the capture of

234 SIR DOUGLAS HAI-G'S DESPATCHES

Kemmel Hill, the enemy made a determined effort to improve his
success.

After a bombardment of exceptional intensity, which started at
3.10 a.m., a series of strong attacks were launched about 5,0 a.m.
against the French and British positions from west of Dranoutre to
Voormezeele. Very heavy fighting rapidly developed on the whole
of this front, and ended in the complete repulse of the enemy with
the heaviest losses to his troops*

At Locre and to the north of that village the enemy made desperate
attempts to overcome the resistance of our Allies and gain possession
of the high ground known as the Scherpenberg. At one time parties
of his troops entered Locre, and penetrated to the cross roads between
the Scherpenberg and Mont Rouge, but in both localities successful
French counter-attacks drove him out after bitter fighting*

On the British front the positions held by the 2ist. 49th and
25th Divisions were strongly attacked between 5,0 a.m. and 5,30 a.m.
On the failure of these attacks bodies of German infantry advanced
at 6,0 a.m. in mass formation, with bayonets fixed, against the
49th Division, and were repulsed with the heaviest losses. The
25th Division was again attacked at 8.35 a.m., and during the morn-
ing repeated attacks were made without result on this division and
the 49th Division, as well as on the 2ist Division and attached
troops of the 3oth and 39th Divisions. At all points the attack was
pressed vigorously with massed bodies of troops, and the losses
suffered by the German infantry were very great. Throughout the
whole of the fighting our infantry and artillery fought magnificently,
and in more than one instance our troops went out to meet the
German attack and drove back the enemy with the bayonet.

At the end of the day, except for a small loss of ground about
Voormezeele, our line was intact, and the enemy had undergone a
severe and decided check.

In concert with this operation, the Belgian positions astride the
Ypres-Staden Railway were again attacked, and once more vigorous
counter-strokes by Belgian troops promptly ejected the German
infantry from such ground as had been gained by them in their
first assault. Here also the enemy's failure was complete.

On the 30th April the French retook Locre early in the morning,
but beyond this no infantry action of importance took place, and
the month closed with the enemy definitely held on both the southern
and the northern battle fronts.

The Task of the British Armies

69. It has been seen that in the Somme battle, by the end of
March, in addition to some ten German divisions engaged against

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 235

the French, a total of 73 German divisions were engaged and fought
to a standstill by 42 British infantry divisions and three cavalry
divisions* In order to complete the comparison between the forces
engaged and to enable the nature of the task accomplished by our
troops to be realised, it will be of value to give similar figures for the
battle of the Lys.

In the Lys battle, prior to the 3Oth April the enemy engaged
against the British forces a total of 42 divisions, of which 33 were
fresh and 9 had fought previously on the Somme. Against these 42
German divisions 25 British divisions were employed, of which
8 were fresh and 17 had taken a prominent part in the Somme
battle.

In the six weeks of almost constant righting, from the 2ist March
to the 3Oth April, a total of 55 British infantry divisions and 3
cavalry divisions was employed on the battle fronts against a force
of 109 different German divisions* During this period a total of
141 different German divisions were engaged against the combined
British and French forces.

Our Troops

70. The splendid qualities displayed by all ranks and services
throughout the Somme and Lys battles make it possible to view
with confidence whatever further tests the future may bring.

On the 2ist March the troops of the Fifth and Third Armies had
the glory of sustaining the first and heaviest blow of the German
offensive. Though assailed by a concentration of hostile forces
which the enemy might well have considered overwhelming, they
held up the German attack at all points for the greater part of two
days, thereby rendering a service to their country and to the Allied
cause the value of which cannot be over-estimated. Thereafter,
through many days of heavy and continuous rearguard fighting,
they succeeded in presenting a barrier to the enemy's advance until
such time as the arrival of British and French reinforcements enabled
his progress to be checked.

In the battle of the Lys, as has been pointed out above, many of
the same divisions which had just passed through the furnace of
the Somme found themselves exposed to the full fury of a second
great offensive by fresh German forces. Despite this disadvantage
they gave evidence in many days of close and obstinate fighting
that their spirit was as high as ever and their courage and deter-
mination unabated. Both by them and by the divisions freshly
engaged every yard of ground was fiercely disputed, until troops
were overwhelmed or ordered to withdraw. Such withdrawals as

236 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

were deemed necessary in the course of the battle were carried out
successfully and in good order*

At no time, either on the Somme or on the Lys, was there any-
thing approaching a breakdown of command or a failure of morale.
Under conditions that made rest and sleep impossible for days
together, and called incessantly for the greatest physical exertion
and quickness of thought, officers and men remained undismayed,
realising that for the time being they must play a waiting game, and
determined to make the enemy pay the full price for the success
which for the moment was his.

In the course of this Report it has been possible to refer to a
very few of the many instances in which officers and men of all
arms and services have shown courage and skill of the highest order.
On countless other occasions officers and men, of whose names there
is no record, have accomplished actions of the greatest valour, while
the very nature of the fighting shows that on all parts of the wide
battle fronts unknown deeds of heroism were performed without
number.

Infantry

The British infantryman has always had the reputation of right-
ing his best in an uphill battle, and time and again in the history of
our country, by sheer tenacity and determination of purpose, has
won victory from a numerically superior foe. Thrown once more
upon the defensive by circumstances over which he had no control,
but which will not persist, he has shown himself to possess in full
measure the traditional qualities of his race.

Artillery

The part of the artillery in a defensive battle is at once a most
important and a most difficult one. The conditions under which
guns are fought in trench warfare make a certain loss of material
unavoidable when, in a defensive battle, a sudden change takes
place to a war of movement. Yet, even in such circumstances, in
which, moreover, the affording of artillery support to our infantry
till the last moment is of paramount importance, much can be done
and on countless occasions much was done, by swift and resolute
action, to prevent guns falling into the hands of the enemy. The
loss of artillery in the series of battles, though considerable, might
well have been much greater but for the courage, skill and resource
displayed by all ranks of the artillery, both heavy and field, and but
for the constant efforts made to maintain close co-operation between
artillery and infantry.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 237

Of the courage and devotion of the artillery numerous instances
could be given, but one example must suffice* On the occasion of
the attack east of Arras on the 28th March, a six-inch howitzer
battery was heavily engaged by the enemy's artillery* After all the
gun detachments had been either killed or wounded and all the
guns but one had been destroyed, the remaining four officers of the
battery continued to serve their last gun, until two of them were
killed and the other two wounded,

Cavalry

On the southern battle front, and particularly in the fighting
about Noyon, cavalry were once more employed with great effect,
and proved their extreme value in warfare of a more open nature,
On more than one occasion they were able by rapid and successful
action to restore a doubtful situation, while their appearance in the
battle gave great encouragement to the infantry,

Royal Air Force

The work of the Royal Air Force, under command of Major-
General J. M. Salmond, in co-operation with the other arms, has
been brilliant. Throughout the period of active operations our
airmen have established and maintained a superiority over the
enemy's air forces without parallel since the days of the first Somme
battle. Not content with destroying the enemy in the air, they
have vigorously attacked his infantry, guns and transport with
bombs and machine gun fire, and in the fighting south of the Somme
in particular gave invaluable assistance to the infantry by these
means on numerous occasions. In addition, the usual work of
reconnaissance, photography, artillery co-operation and bombing
has been carried out vigorously and with remarkable results.

Tank Corps

Reference has been made more than once in the body of this
Report to the very valuable work accomplished by tanks and tank
personnel in the course of the Somme battle. Throughout the whole
of this fighting, tanks took part in numerous successful counter-
attacks, many of which were instrumental in checking the enemy's
progress at critical points. On these occasions tanks have shown
that they possess capabilities in defence little, if at all, less than
those which they have already proved in attack. In their first en-
counter with German tanks, officers and men of the Tank Corps
displayed with success under conditions new in warfare the same
energy and resource which have always characterised their action.

238 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Machine Guns and Trench Mortars

The experience of the Somme and Lys battles has emphasised
once more the great value of the machine gun in defensive warfare,
when handled by brave, skilful and resolute men. In the course of
the recent fighting officers and men of the Machine Gun Corps
have furnished innumerable examples of the utmost resolution,
courage and skill in the use of their weapons. They have been
largely instrumental in defeating the enemy's determined efforts to
break through, and have inflicted on him very severe losses.

The same conditions of warfare on the battle fronts which handi-
capped the work of the artillery affected trench mortars in an even
greater degree. Despite the disadvantages under which they
suffered, the personnel of trench mortar batteries of all natures
have performed on numberless occasions the most valuable service
in the defence of strong points and defended localities, serving their
weapons with effect though surrounded by the enemy, and giving
the greatest possible assistance to the infantry and machine gunners.

Royal Engineers

The work of the Royal Engineers, both during and subsequent
to the retreat on the Somme and on the northern battle front, has
been particularly arduous. In addition to the heavy demands made
upon them in the destruction of roads and bridges and such-like
matters during retreat, and the labour entailed in the construction
of new positions, they have frequently been called upon to take their
place in the firing line. On such occasions their various units have
behaved with the greatest steadfastness and courage, and, in cir-
cumstances such as those in which the 25ist Tunnelling Company
greatly distinguished itself at Givenchy, have added to the high
reputation of their service.

In this connection, a generous recognition is due to the gallant
conduct of the various composite battalions which on different
occasions took their place in the firing line.

During the long periods of active fighting the strain placed
upon the Signal Service was immense. The frequent changes of
headquarters and the shifting of the line entailed constant labour,
frequently attended with great danger, in the maintenance of com-
munications ; while the exigencies of the battle on more than one
occasion brought the personnel of the signal units into the firing
line. The Signal Service met the calls upon it in a manner wholly
admirable, and the efficient performance of its duties was of
incalculable value.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 239

On different occasions, and particularly on the Third Army
front at the commencement of the German offensive, personnel of
the Special Brigade (Gas Services) became involved in the infantry
battle, and behaved with a like gallantry to that which they have
always displayed in the performance of their special duties.

Other Services

The enormous amount of additional work thrown upon the
different branches of my Staff and upon the Administrative Services
and Departments by such fighting as that of March and April can
readily be imagined. The evacuation of great masses of stores,
hospitals, rolling-stock, agricultural implements, non-combatants,
labour units and civilians from the battle area, and the supplying of
the troops in constantly changing places with food and ammunition
called for the highest powers of organisation, the most constant
forethought and supervision, and the most devoted labour* That
all this work was carried out so smoothly and successfully under
circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, and that there was never
any lack of food or ammunition for the troops reflects the very
highest credit on all concerned.

Upon the Transportation Services, moreover, and particularly
upon the Omnibus Park, the rapid movement of reserves placed a
peculiarly heavy strain, which the different units concerned never
failed to meet successfully.

Much additional work, also under circumstances of unusual
difficulty and danger, has necessarily been thrown upon the medical
and nursing services. The conduct of the Royal Army Medical
Corps and Medical Corps of the Overseas Dominions has again been
beyond all praise, while the efficient organisation of the medical
services as a whole proved itself fully equal to the occasion. I take
this opportunity to acknowledge the lasting debt due in this
connection to Lieut.-General Sir A. T. Sloggett, until recently
Director-General of Medical Services, with whom the work of the
medical services has so long been identified.

Commanders and Staffs

I desire to express my deep appreciation of the loyal and devoted
work of the Commanders and Staffs of all formations of the British
Army serving under me in a period of exceptional stress. In defen-
sive battles of such magnitude as those which have just been fought
to a successful conclusion the part played by subordinate com-
manders and staffs is frequently of decisive importance, demanding

240 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

great strength of character and a high standard of ability, while the
physical and mental strain is correspondingly great* That mistakes
should occur in such circumstances is almost inevitable* That they
should have been so few as they were and that control should at all
times have been so well maintained reflects the greatest credit upon
the individuals concerned, upon the staff arrangements of all
formations, and the Army as a whole.

The part played by the various Branches of the Staff of an Army
in the organisation and control of battles such as those referred to
in this Despatch is one of the utmost importance, and the strain
thrown upon the individual officers composing them is very great*

I wish to thank the heads of the various Branches of the Staff
and of Departments and Services for the essential share that they
and their subordinates have taken in preventing the realisation of
the enemy's plans.

I am glad to acknowledge the great assistance given me at all
times by my Chief of the General Staff, Lieut*-General the Hon.
Sir H A* Lawrence, whose cool judgment, equable tempera-
ment and unfailing military insight were of the utmost value in
circumstances demanding the exercise of such qualities in a peculiarly
high degree*

The rapid incorporation of reinforcements and reorganisation of
exhausted units without which the battle could scarcely have been
maintained was most ably carried out by the Adjutant-General,
Lieut*-General Sir G* H Fowke, and his Branch*

The work of my Quartermaster-Generars Branch under Lieut*-
General Travers Clarke, in the provision and replacement of
munitions and supplies of all kinds was of the highest importance,
and was performed with the greatest ability and success*

The large and incessant demands made upon the Transporta-
tion Services in the course of the battle were met in the most
admirable manner by my Director-General, Brigadier-General
S D'A* Crookshank, and those working under him*

My thanks are due also to the subordinate members of my Staff
at General Headquarters, whose heavy and responsible duties were
discharged throughout the period under review with most com-
mendable smoothness and efficiency. In particular I desire to
mention the services of my Artillery Adviser, Major-General Sir
J. F* N* Birch ; my Engineer-in-Chief, Major-General G* M,
Heath ; the head of the Operations Section, Major-General
J. H* Davidson; the head of the Staff Duties Section, Major-General
G, P. Dawnay ; the head of my Intelligence Section, Brigadier-
General E* W. Cox; and my Director of Army Signals, Major-
General Sir J* S, Fowler*

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 241

Home Authorities and the Royal Navy

My thanks, and those of all ranks of the British Armies in France,
are due also to the different authorities at home, whose prompt and
energetic action enabled the unavoidable losses of personnel and
material incurred during the battle to be replaced with such rapidity.
We are glad also to place on record once again our deep appreciation
of the work of the Royal Navy, upon whose unceasing efforts depends
the maintenance of the British Forces in France.

Owr Allies

71. I cannot close this Report without paying my personal
tribute to the ready and effective assistance given me by the French
and Belgian Higher Commands in the course of the Somme and Lys
battles. Reference has already been made to the schemes for mutual
co-operation and assistance between the French and British Armies
which formed so important a part of the Allied plan for the year's
campaign. These schemes have been carried out with absolute
loyalty. The support rendered by French troops south of the Somme
and north of the Lys, and by Belgian troops in taking over the
responsibility for the greater part of the line previously held by
British troops north of Ypres, has been of incalculable value.

I desire also to express my appreciation of the services rendered
by the Portuguese troops who had held a sector of my front con-
tinuously throughout the winter months, and on the gth April were
called upon to withstand the assault of greatly superior forces.

Finally, I am glad to acknowledge the ready manner in which
American Engineer Units have been placed at my disposal from
time to time, and the great value of the assistance they have rendered.
In the battles referred to in this Despatch, American and British
troops have fought shoulder to shoulder in the same trenches, and
have shared together in the satisfaction of beating off German
attacks. All ranks of the British Army look forward to the day when
the rapidly growing strength of the American Army will allow
American and British soldiers to co-operate in offensive action.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

D. HAIG, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY

2 is* December,
MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit the following Report on the opera-
tions of the forces under my command since the successful termina-
tion of the great defensive battles on the Somme and Lys Rivers,
which were described in my last Despatch*

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

State of the British Armies

i. At the end of April, 1918, though the onrush of the German
Armies had been stemmed for the time being, the situation on the
Western Front, and particularly on the British portion of it, was
still critical.

The immense weight of the enemy's first and heaviest onslaughts
in March and April, and the unprecedented masses of men and
material employed by him, had called for practically the whole
strength of the British Armies to withstand them, and had left our
forces greatly weakened. Although prompt steps had been taken
by the home authorities to dispatch to France as rapidly as possible
all reinforcements then available in England, as well as to recall
considerable bodies of troops from other theatres of war, these
reinforcements required time to arrive, A further period was needed
to complete their training and equipment, to allow troops brought
from abroad to become acclimatised, and to enable the new drafts
to become assimilated within their various units.

Meanwhile it had become impossible to maintain at an effective
strength the full number of our divisions. At the beginning of May
no less than eight divisions 2 had been reduced to cadres and were
temporarily written off altogether as fighting units. Two other
divisions were holding positions in line with reduced cadres which
it was not yet possible to bring up to establishment,

1 This Despatch was signed by Sir Douglas Haig in England, and for this reason
bears no address of origin. It was published as a Supplement dated the yth January,
1919, to the London Gazette of the 3rd January, 1919.

* The i4th, i6th, 3ist, 34th, 3gth, 4oth, 59th and 66th. The 3Oth and 6ist were
in line, but not made up to establishment.

245

246 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Arrangements had been made at the end of April to hand over
to the French for employment on a quiet part of their front a further
five divisions, comprising the IX, Corps (see para. 10 below).
These had only just been reconstituted, and, being badly in need
of rest and training, were not yet considered fit to hold an active
sector. In return for these five British divisions, and in accordance
with Marshal Foch's views, presently explained, regarding the
enemy's intentions, the French had dispatched a number of their
divisions to be held in reserve in rear of the British right and to
strengthen the Flanders front.

There remained available for operations on the British front
forty-five British infantry divisions, most of which were below
establishment. Fully three-fourths of them had been heavily
engaged in one or other of the enemy 's offensives, if not in both. All
were urgently in need of rest ; they contained a large number of
young, partially trained and totally inexperienced recruits, and
subordinate commanders had had little or no opportunity to become
acquainted with their men.

The Position of our Allies

2. The French, though as yet they had been less heavily engaged
than ourselves, had none the less been obliged to employ a substan-
tial proportion of their reserves in the fighting south of the Somme
and north of the Lys.

The American Army, though rapidly increasing in numbers
and efficiency, was not yet ready to take the field in sufficient strength
materially to affect the situation. In short, the German attacks,
though they had failed to break the Allied line, had stretched the
resources of the Allies to the uttermost ; while before Amiens and
Hazebrouck they had brought the enemy within a short distance of
strategic points of great importance. In these circumstances, the
possibility of an immediate renewal of the enemy's offensive could
not but be viewed with grave anxiety.

The Enemy's Position

3. On the other hand, the enemy had undoubtedly paid heavily for
his successes, and had used up a great number of divisions, among
them his best and his most highly trained. The reserves which he
was known to have had at his disposal at the beginning of the year
would suffice, indeed, to make good his losses ; but in his case,
also, time would be required before the divisions which had suffered
most would be fit to undertake a fresh attack against prepared
positions.

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 247

At the commencement of the period under review the enemy
was estimated to possess seventy-five divisions in reserve on the
Western Front, 1 It was evident that further German attacks could
not long be postponed if the enemy was to achieve a decision before
the weight of the American Army was thrown into the scale,

The Enemy's Intentions

4, At this period, early in May, the Allied High Command
repeatedly expressed the opinion that the enemy would renew his
attack on a large scale on the front Arras- Amiens-Montdidier, The
strategic results to be obtained by the capture of Amiens, the separa-
tion of the French and British Armies, and an advance towards the
sea along the Valley of the Somme were very great, and might well
have proved decisive. The enemy's opening offensive had already
brought him within a measurable distance of success in this direction,
and had carried his Armies through practically the whole of our
organised lines of defence.

Since the conclusion of his attacks on this front in the first week
of April, the enemy had had a considerable period of time in which
to re-establish communications through the devastated area, and
make his preparations for a fresh advance. This period of delay
had also afforded us some opportunity, of which full use was being
made with all the means and resources in our power, to lay out new
trench lines and reconstruct such old systems as already existed.
This work, however, was still far from complete, and our defences
could not be compared with those which the enemy had already
over-run.

The Policy of the British Armies

5. In short, the enemy still possessed a sufficient superiority of
force to retain the initiative, and it was known that he would be
compelled to act within a comparatively limited time if he were to
turn his superiority to account before it passed from him. These
were the two main factors which had to be taken into consideration
when deciding the policy of the British Armies during the late
spring and early summer. The common object of the French and
ourselves was to tide over the period which must still elapse until
the growth of the American Armies and the arrival of Allied rein-
forcements placed the opposing forces once more on a footing of
equality.

The situation was an anxious one, but it was confidently expected
that, if all measures open to us were undertaken promptly and
1 This was probably rather an over-estimate.

248 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

executed with the energy and seal demanded by the occasion, the
enemy's future assaults would be met and overthrown as those had
been which he had already made* If the Allies could preserve their
front unbroken until August at the latest there was every hope that
during the later portion of the year they would be able to regain the
initiative, and pass to the offensive in their turn.

The period under review accordingly divides itself naturally
into two main sections. During the first, the policy governing the
action of the forces under my command was the maintenance of an
active defence, whereby our line might be preserved unbroken, while
every opportunity was taken to rest and train our sorely-tried divi-
sions. As the strength and efficiency of our divisions were restored,
minor operations of gradually increasing scope, but with limited
objectives, could be carried out with greater frequency. These would
serve to keep alive the fighting spirit of the troops, and could be
used to effect local improvements in our line, where such improve-
ment was considered necessary either for defence or for attack.

The second period arrived when the swelling list of German
casualties and the steady influx of American and Allied reinforce-
ments had produced an equilibrium of strength between the oppos-
ing forces. The complete success of the Allied counter-attack on
the 1 8th July near Soissons marked this turning-point in the year's
campaign, and commenced the second phase of the Allied opera-
tions. Thereafter the initiative lay with the Allies, and the growing
superiority of their forces enabled them to roll back the tide of
invasion with ever-increasing swiftness. At this point and in this
connection I should like to pay my personal tribute to the foresight
and determination of the French Marshal in whose hands the co-
ordination of the action of the Allied Armies was placed*

PART I

THE PERIOD OF ACTIVE DEFENCE
Reorganisation

6. During the period following the breakdown of the German
attacks on the Lys the military centre of gravity moved to the south,
and, as regards the British front, the months of May, June and July,
though full of incident of a minor character, in which the different
troops concerned showed great gallantry and skill, can be dealt with
comparatively shortly.

At the outset of this period, the most pressing need after that

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 249

of filling up the gaps in our divisions, was to close the breaches
which the German advances had made in our successive defensive
systems. This work had been begun, indeed, in the early days of
the Somme offensive, but much still remained to be accomplished
before our positions could be regarded as reasonably secure*

Further, the depth to which the enemy had penetrated in the
Somme and Lys Valleys had disrupted important lateral lines of
railway, and had created a situation of extreme gravity with regard
to the maintenance of communications in Northern France, At
Amiens, Bethune and Hazebrouck much-used railway junctions
had been brought under the effective fire of the enemy's guns, while
the railway centre at St. Pol was threatened* To relieve the situation
a comprehensive programme of railway construction was under-
taken by us in conjunction with the French, so as to provide three
separate routes for North and South traffic, which should be
independent of 'Amiens* This involved extensive doublings and
quadruplings of existing railways and the building of new lines, for
which some 200 miles of broad gauge track was laid during the
period April- July*

All these various constructional needs threw an immense amount
of work upon the staff of the departments concerned, and called for
the employment of great quantities of skilled and unskilled labour.
All available resources of men and material were concentrated upon
satisfying them, and by the time that the great change in the general
military situation had taken place, the essential part had been satis-
factorily accomplished* In particular, a complete series of new
defensive lines had been built, involving the digging of 5,000 miles
of trench,

Minor Operations in May and June

7* While intense activity prevailed behind the lines, our fighting
troops were not idle. Full use was made of harassing tactics by all
arms, and in the Lys salient in particular the German troops crowded
into this exposed area were continually subjected to a most effective
system of artillery harassing fire.

The losses suffered by the enemy in the Lys sector and the
destruction caused to his artillery and material were very great.
Convincing evidence of this was obtained from prisoners' state-
ments and was furnished also by the extensive German graveyards *
afterwards found in this area, by the condition of the roads, and the
litter of all kinds found near them and near battery positions and
dumps. These tactics undoubtedly postponed the renewal of the

1 In a single vast graveyard near Sailly-sur-la-Lys over 5,000 Germans are buried.

250 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

German offensive on this front until the Allied counter-offensive
made it impossible*

The chief centres of infantry activity during this period were on
the fronts of the Fourth and Second Armies* Early in May small
operations improved our line about Morlancourt. These were
followed on the igth May by an admirably executed operation in
which the and Australian Division (Major-General N, M, Smyth)
took Ville-sur-Ancre with 400 prisoners. Later, on the loth June,
the same division in a highly successful night attack on a front of
about two miles south of Morlancourt, effected a substantial advance,
taking over 300 prisoners,

On the Second Army front, Locre Hospice and the small woods
south-east of Dickebusch Lake, known as Scottish and Ridge Woods,
were the scenes of very lively fighting, in which French forces took
part, A successful minor operation by the French on the 2Oth May
resulted in a valuable gain of ground in the neighbourhood of Locre
Hospice and the capture of over 500 prisoners, though the Hospice
itself was not secured by us till the first week in July, Ridge Wood
changed hands several times prior to its final capture with 350
prisoners by the 6th Division (Major-General Sir T, O, Marden)
and 33rd Division (Major-General Sir R. J, Pinney) on the I4th July,

A material improvement in our line was also effected by the
capture on 3rd June of the small hill known as the Mont de Merris,
west of Merris village, with nearly 300 prisoners, by the ist Australian
Division (Major-General Sir H, B, Walker) and troops of the 29th
Division (Major-General D, E. Cayley), At other points there was
much fighting of a minor character, notably about Aveluy Wood
and in the neighbourhood of the Lawe River and Merville,

Operations in July ; Hamel Captured

8, Two months of comparative quiet worked a great change in
the condition of the British Armies, The drafts sent out from
England had largely been absorbed, many of the reinforcements
from abroad had already arrived, and the number of our effective
infantry divisions had risen from forty-five to fifty-two. In artillery
we were stronger than we had ever been.

Though the general situation did not warrant the adoption of a
definitely offensive policy, in view of the concentration of the bulk
of the enemy's large reserves in Prince Rupprecht's Group of Armies
opposite the British front, I now felt strong enough to undertake
operations of a somewhat larger scope, which would at once strengthen
pur position for defence and fit in with future schemes.

The first of these, carried out at the end of June, east of Nieppe

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 251

Forest, aimed at establishing our main line of resistance farther in
advance of the wooded ground, which was constantly being shelled
with gas. The assault, launched at 6,0 a.m. on the 28th June by the
5th Division (Major-General R. B. Stephens) and 3ist Division
(Major-General J. Campbell), without preliminary bombardment,
took the enemy by surprise and was completely successful ; the
German defences west of the Plate Becque stream, on a front of
6,000 yards from Pont Tournant to La Becque, being captured,
together with some 450 prisoners,

A necessary preliminary to any operation to disengage Amiens
was the recapture of our old positions east of Hamel and Vaire
Wood and the clearing of the Villers Bretonneux Plateau* This was
accomplished on the 4th July by the Australian Corps (Lieut.-
General Sir J. Monash), with the aid of four companies of the 33rd
American Division and sixty tanks.

The most striking characteristic of the attack was the close and
effective co-operation between tanks and infantry. Moving up and
down behind the barrage, the tanks either killed the enemy or forced
him to take shelter in dug-outs, where he became an easy prey to
the infantry, Hamel was taken by envelopment from the flanks and
rear, the enemy was driven from Vaire Wood, and at the end of the
day our troops had gained all their objectives and over 1,500 prisoners,

Our success at Hamel was followed by a series of admirably
executed operations north of the Lys.

On the nth July troops of the ist Australian Division gave a
striking example of their ascendancy over the German infantry
opposite to them. At n,o a,m, on this day, four men went out on
patrol near Merris and returned with between thirty and forty
prisoners. Other patrols, pushed forward both by the ist Australian
and 3 ist Divisions, secured in two days no fewer than 223 prisoners
and established a number of new posts well in advance of our former
line.

Surprise played an important part in the successful attack by
which the gth Division (Major-General H, H, Tudor) took Meteren
on the igth July, with some 350 prisoners. The village stood on
high ground close to our line, and its capture provided greater
depth to our defence.

For some time prior to this attack gas was discharged, in con-
junction with a smoke and high-explosive shell > bombardment.
When at 7,55 a,m. on the igth July our infantry advanced behind a
barrage of smoke and high explosive the enemy was expecting only
a gas discharge, and had in many cases put on gas masks.

The capture of Meteren was followed shortly after midnight on
the 28th /29th July by a boldly-conceived operation by the ist

352 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Australian Division, which resulted in the capture of Merris, with
187 prisoners,

Operations on the French Front

9. By the end of July the re constitution of the British Armies
had been completed. The spirit of the men was as high as ever, and
the success of their various local operations had had a good effect. I
had once more at my command an effective striking force, capable
of taking the offensive with every hope of success when the proper
moment should arrive.

Meanwhile, events of the utmost and most critical importance
had been taking place on the French front.

The British General Staff had always held the opinion that
before the resumption of the enemy's main offensive on the Arras-
Amiens-Montdidier front the attack on our northern flank in
Flanders would be followed by a similar attack on the southern flank
of the Allied Armies. This view had proved correct. Though pro-
bably delayed by his unexpectedly extensive commitments in the
Lys battle, at the end of May the enemy had developed his plan of
operations on the lines which we had foreseen, and had launched a
violent surprise attack on the Aisne front. In this attack certain
British divisions which had been sent there to rest became
involved from the outset.

Operations of the IX. Corps in the Aisne Battle

10. At the end of April and early in May the 8th, aist, 25th and
5oth Divisions, subsequently reinforced by the igth Division, and
constituting the IX. British Corps, under command of Lieut.-
General Sir A. Hamilton Gordon, had been placed at Marshal
Foch's disposal as noted above. These divisions had been dis-
patched by him to the French Sixth Army, to take the place of
certain French divisions concentrated behind Amiens.

Of these divisions, the igth (Major-General G. D. Jeffreys),
2ist (Major-General D. G. M. Campbell), 25th (Major-General Sir
E. G. Bainbridge) and 5oth Divisions (Major-General H. C. Jack-
son) had taken part in both the Somme battle and the battle of the
Lys. The 8th Division (Major-General W. C. G. Heneker) had
been involved south of the Somme in some of the heaviest fighting
of the year, and had behaved with distinguished gallantry. All these
divisions had but lately been filled up with young drafts, and,
despite their high spirit and gallant record, were in no condition to
take part in major operations until they had had several weeks* rest.
During the first fortnight in May three of these divisions the 2ist,

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 253

8th and 5oth were put into line on a front of about fifteen miles
between Bermicourt and Bouconville, north-west of Reims,

About the 26th May, prisoners taken by the French gave the
first definite information regarding the great offensive launched by
the enemy on the Aisne front on the morning of the 2yth May,
This attack, delivered by twenty-eight German divisions supported
by tanks, was directed against the Sixth French Army on a front of
about thirty-five miles north-west of Reims, It involved the whole
of the IX, British Corps, as well as the French Corps holding the
Chemin des Dames on the left of the British sector.

Preceded by an artillery and trench mortar bombardment of
great intensity, the German infantry broke into the battle positions
of the Allied divisions. The enemy gained a footing on the Chemin
des Dames at an early hour, and pressing on in the centre of his
attack in overwhelming strength, forced the line of the Aisne on a
wide front. By nightfall he had crossed the Vesle west of Fismes,
and in the British sector, after very heavy and determined fighting,
had compelled the left and centre of the IX, Corps, now reinforced
by the 25th Division, to swing back to a position facing west and
north-west between the Aisne and the Vesle,

On the 28th May and following days the enemy launched fresh
attacks in great force on the whole battle front, pressing back our
Allies to west of Soissons and south of Fere-en-Tardenois, The IX,
British Corps, greatly reduced in numbers by severe and incessant
fighting, was forced to withdraw across the Vesle, and thence gradu-
ally pressed back in a south-easterly direction between the Vesle and
the Ardre, During the night of the 28th/29th May the igth Divi-
sion was brought up in buses, and put in to fill a gap in the French
line across the Ardre Valley, deploying with great skill and steadiness.
By the evening of the 3Oth May, at which date in the centre of his
attack the enemy had reached the Marne, the rate of his advance in
the British sector had begun to slacken.

During the next few days, however, fighting was still intense,
On the southern and western portions of the battle front the enemy
made deep progress, gaining the north bank of the Marne from
Dormans to Chateau Thierry and advancing astride the Aisne to
the outskirts of the Villers Cotterets Forest, and across the high
ground north-east of Attichy, On the eastern flank of the salient
created by the enemy's advance the British forces, at this date under
command of the French Fifth Army, withdrew gradually to the line
Aubilly-Chambrecy-Boujacourt, where they were able to con-
solidate. Though the enemy's attacks continued persistently for
some time longer, and on the 6th June culminated in two determined
attempts upon the important position known as the Montagne de

254 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Bligny, which commands the valley of the Ardre, all these attacks
were most gallantly repulsed, and the enemy's advance definitely
stayed.

Throughout this long period of incessant fighting against greatly
superior numbers the behaviour of all arms of the British forces
engaged was magnificent. What they achieved is best described in
the words of the French General l under whose orders they came,
who wrote of them : " They have enabled us to establish a barrier
against which the hostile waves have beaten and shattered them-
selves. This none of the French who witnessed it will ever forget."

The Second Battle of the Marne'

n. While our troops were still engaged in the fighting south-
west of Reims a fresh battle had broken out on the yth June on the
French front between Noyon and Montdidier. In this case the
enemy did not succeed in effecting a surprise, but the strain thrown
upon the French Armies by these two attacks was considerable, and
the situation was such that the German Command might reasonably
be expected to endeavour to develop it with all the means at their
disposal.

While, on the one hand, at the beginning of July it was known
that Prince Rupprecht's reserve group of divisions about Douai
and Valenciennes were still intact and opposite the British front, on
the other hand, for a number of reasons it was believed at French
General Headquarters that the Germans were about to attack in
strength east and west of Reims. It was apprehended, indeed, that
the attack might spread even farther east into the Argonne and
might endanger a wide sector of the French position. Marshal Foch
accordingly withdrew the whole of the French forces, some eight
divisions, from Flanders, and transferred them southwards to the
French front. In addition he asked that four British divisions might
be moved, two of them to areas south of the Somme and two to
positions astride that river, so as to ensure the connection between
the French and British Armies about Amiens and to enable him to
move four French divisions farther east to his right flank. After
carefully weighing the situation, I agreed to this proposal, and
immediate orders were given for the movement.

On the 1 3th July a further request was received from Marshal

1 General Maistre. In a farewell letter to General Hamilton Gordon, dated the
3rd July, 1918, he wrote : " Avec une t6nacite, permettez-moi de dire, toute anglaise,
avec les debris de vos divisions decimees, submergees par le flot ennemi, vous avez
reforme, sans vous lasser, des unites nouvelles que vous avez engagees dans la lutte,
et qui nous ont enfin permis de former la digue ou ce flot est venu se briser. Cela aucun
des t&noins franfais ne i'oubliera ! "

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 255

Foch that these four British divisions might be placed unreservedly
at his disposal, and that four other British divisions might be dis-
patched to take their places behind the junction of the Allied Armies,
This request was also agreed to, and the I5th, 34th, 5ist and 62nd
British divisions, constituting the XXII, Corps, under command of
Lieut, -General Sir A, Godley, were accordingly sent down to the
French front.

Meanwhile, on the I5th July, the enemy had launched his
expected attack east and south-west of Reims, and after making some
progress at first and effecting the passage of the Marne, was held by
the French, American and Italian forces on those fronts. On the
1 8th July Marshal Foch launched the great counter-offensive which
he had long been preparing on the front between Chateau Thierry
and Soissons, supporting this successful stroke by vigorous attacks
also on other parts of the German salient. In this fighting the XXII.
British Corps speedily became involved.

Operations by the XXII. Corps

12,. On the 2Oth July the 5ist and 62nd Divisions of the XXII,
Corps, under command of Major-Generals G, T, C, Carter-Camp-
bell and W, P, Braithwaite respectively, attacked in conjunction
with the French on the eastern side of the salient south-west of
Reims, The sector assigned to the British troops covered a front of
8,000 yards astride the Ardre River, and consisted of an open valley
bottom, with steep wooded slopes on either side. Both valley and
slopes were studded with villages and hamlets, which were for the
most part intact and afforded excellent cover to the enemy,

On this front our troops were engaged for a period of ten days in
continuous fighting of a most difficult and trying nature. Through-
out this period steady progress was made, in the face of vigorous
and determined resistance. Marfaux was taken on the 23rd July,
and on the 28th July British troops retook the Montagne de Bligny,
which other British troops had defended with so much gallantry and
success two months previously. In these operations, throughout
which French artillery and tanks rendered invaluable assistance,
the 5ist and 62nd Divisions took 1,200 prisoners from seven different
German divisions and successfully completed an advance of over
four miles.

Meanwhile, on the 23rd July, the I5th and 34th Divisions, under
command of Major-Generals H. L. Reed and C. L. Nicholson
respectively, attacked on the west side of the salient in the neigh-
bourhood of Ber^y-le-Sec and Parcy-Tigny, south-west of Soissons,
These divisions also had many days of heavy and continuous fighting

256 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

on different parts of this front until withdrawn during the first
days of August, and acquitted themselves very gallantly side by side
with their French comrades in arms* Many prisoners were taken
by both divisions, and the I5th Division in particular earned dis-
tinction in the fierce struggle for Buzancy, 1

PART II

THE PERIOD OF OFFENSIVE ACTION
The Situation at the End of July

13. The definite collapse of the ambitious offensive launched by
the enemy on the I5th July, and the striking success of the Allied
counter-offensive south of the Aisne, effected a complete change in
the whole military situation. The German Army had made its
effort and had failed. The period of its maximum strength had been
passed, and the bulk of the reserves accumulated during the winter
had been used up. On the other hand, the position of the Allies in
regard to reserves had greatly improved. The fresh troops made
available during the late spring and early summer had been incor-
porated and trained. The British Army was ready to take the offen-
sive ; while the American Army was growing rapidly and had
already given convincing proof of the high fighting quality of its
soldiers.

At a conference held on the 23rd July, when the success of the
attack of the i8th July was well assured, the methods by which the
advantage already gained could be extended were discussed in
detail. The Allied Commander-in-Chief asked that the British,
French and American Armies should each prepare plans for local
offensives, to be taken in hand as soon as possible, with certain
definite objectives of a limited nature. These objectives on the
British front were the disengagement of Amiens and the freeing of
the Paris-Amiens Railway by an attack on the Albert-Montdidier
front. The role of the French and American Armies was to free
other strategic railways by operations farther south and east.

In addition to the disengagement of Amiens, the situation on
the British front presented strong arguments in favour of certain
other schemes, such as the disengagement of Hazebrouck by the
recapture of Kemmel Hill, combined with an operation in the

1 The lyth French Division generously erected a monument to the i5th Division
on the highest point of the Bjzancy plateau, where was found the body of the Scottish
soldier who had advanced the farthest in the attack of the 28th July,

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 257

direction of La Basse'e* If successful, such an operation would have
the effect of improving our position at Ypres and Calais. The Lys
salient would be reduced and the safety of the Bruay coal mines
become less threatened.

These different operations had already been the subject of
correspondence between Marshal Foch and myself, as well as of the
earnest consideration of the British General Staff. Ultimately, I
had come to the conclusion that of the tasks assigned to the British
forces the operation east of Amiens should take precedence, as
being the most important and the most likely to give large results.

It would depend upon the nature of the success which might be
obtained in these different Allied operations whether they could be
more fully exploited before winter set in. It was subsequently
arranged that attacks would be pressed in a converging direction
towards Me&eres by the French and American Armies, while at
the same time the British Armies, attacking towards the line St.
Quentin-Cambrai, would strike directly at the vital lateral com-
munications running through Maubeuge to Hirson and Mezieres,
by which alone the German forces on the Champagne front could
be supplied and maintained.

As a secondary result of the advance of the British Armies
towards the all-important railway centres about Maubeuge, the
group of German Armies in Flanders would find their communica-
tions threatened from the south, and any operations which it might
be possible for the Allies to undertake in that theatre at a later date
would be powerfully assisted thereby. It was obviously of vital
importance to the enemy to maintain intact his front opposite St.
Quentin and Cambrai, and for this purpose he depended on the
great fortified zone known as the Hindenburg Line.

General Scheme of British Operations 1

14. The brilliant success of the Amiens attack was the prelude
to a great series of battles, in which, throughout three months of
continuous fighting, the British Armies advanced without a check
from one victory to another. The progress of this mighty conflict
divides itself into certain stages, which themselves are grouped into
two well-defined phases.

(A). During the first part of the struggle the enemy sought to
defend himself in the deep belt of prepared positions and successive
trench systems which extended from the spring-tide of the German
advance, about Albert and Villers Bretonneux, to the Hindenburg

1 Vide Maps No. 8 and 9.

258 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Line between St. Quentin and the Scarpe. From these positions,
scene of the stubborn battles of the two preceding years, the German
Armies were forced back step by step by a succession of methodical
attacks which culminated in the breaking through of the Hindenburg
Line defences.

(B). Thereafter, during the second period of the struggle our
troops were operating in practically open country against an enemy
who endeavoured to stand, on such semi-prepared or natural
defensive positions as remained to him, for a period long enough to
enable him to organise his retreat and avoid overwhelming disaster.
The final stages of our operations, therefore, are concerned with the
breaking of the enemy's resistance on these lines.

Throughout this latter period, the violence of our assaults and
the rapidity of our advance towards the enemy's vital centres of
communication about Maubeuge threatened to cut the main avenue
of escape for the German forces opposite the French and American
Armies. The position of the German Armies in Flanders, them-
selves unable to withstand the attacks of the Allied forces operating
under the King of the Belgians, was equally endangered by our
progress behind their left flank. To the south and north of the area
in which our victorious Armies were driving forward through his
weakening defence, the enemy was compelled to execute hasty
withdrawals from wide tracts of territory.

The second phase had already reached its legitimate conclusion
when the signing of the Armistice put an end to hostilities. Finally
defeated in the great battles of the ist and 4th November, and utterly
without reserves, the enemy at that date was falling back without
coherent plan in widespread disorder and confusion.

FIRST PHASE : THE FIGHTING IN ENTRENCHED
POSITIONS

THE BATTLE OF AMIENS (8th- 1 2th August)
Plan of Operations

15* The plan of the Amiens operation was to strike in an easterly
and south-easterly direction, using the Somme River to cover the
left flank of our advance, with the object in the first place of gaining
the line of the Amiens outer defences between Le Quesnel and
Me*ricourt sur Somme, thereby freeing the main Paris-Amiens
Railway. Having gained the Amiens defence line, the attack was to
proceed without delay towards Roye, and to include the capture as

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 259

soon as possible of the important railway junction of Chaulnes,
thereby cutting the communications of the German forces in the
Lassigny and Montdidier areas. If all went well, French troops
would be in readiness to co-operate by pressing the enemy south-
cast of Montdidier.

Preliminary instructions to prepare to attack east of Amiens at
an early date had been given to the Fourth Army Commander,
General Rawlinson, on the I3th July, and on the 28th July the
French First Army, under command of General Debeney, was
placed by Marshal Foch under my orders for this operation. Further
to strengthen my attack, I decided to reinforce the British
Fourth Army with the Canadian Corps, and also with the two
British divisions which were then held in readiness astride the
Somme.

In order to deceive the enemy and to ensure the maximum
effect of a surprise attack, elaborate precautions were taken to mis-
lead him as to our intentions and to conceal our real purpose.

Instructions of a detailed character were issued to the formations
concerned, calculated to make it appear that a British attack in
Flanders was imminent. Canadian battalions were put into line on
the Kemmel front, where they were identified by the enemy. Corps
headquarters were prepared, and casualty clearing stations were
erected in conspicuous positions in this area. Great activity was
maintained also by our wireless stations on the First Army front,
and arrangements were made to give the impression that a great
concentration of tanks was taking place in the St. Pol area. Training
operations, in which infantry and tanks co-operated, were carried
out in this neighbourhood on days on which the enemy's long-
distance reconnaissance and photographic machines were likely to
be at work behind our lines.

The rumour that the British were about to undertake a large and
important operation on the northern front quickly spread. In the
course of our subsequent advances convincing evidence was obtained
that these different measures had had the desired effect, and that
the enemy was momentarily expecting to be attacked in strength in
Flanders.

Meanwhile, the final details for the combined British and French
attack had been arranged early in August, and the date for the
assault fixed for the morning of the 8th. The front held by the
Australian Corps on the right of the British line was extended south-
wards to include the Amiens-Roye Road, 1 and the Canadian Corps
was moved into position by night behind this front. The assembly of

1 This extension of the British front was discovered by the enemy, but was taken to
indicate that the front was to become a quieter one.

260 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

tanks and of the Cavalry Corps was postponed until the last moment
and carried out as secretly as possible.

Partly as the result of successful minor operations of the Allies,
and partly in consequence of the change in the general situation, the
enemy during the first days of August withdrew from the positions
still held by him west of the Avre and Ancre rivers* These move-
ments did not affect our plans, but, on the other hand, a strong local
attack launched by the enemy on the 6th August south of Morlan-
court led to severe fighting, and undoubtedly rendered the task of
the III. Corps more difficult*

The Troops Employed

1 6* The front of attack of General Rawlinson's Fourth Army
extended for a distance of over eleven miles from just south of the
Amiens-Roye Road to Morlancourt exclusive* The troops employed
were : On the right the Canadian Corps, under command of Lieut.-
General Sir A* W Currie, with the 3rd, ist and 2nd Canadian Divi-
sions in line, and the 4th Canadian Division in close support ; in
the centre the Australian Corps, under command of Lieut .-General
Sir J* Monash, with the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions in line and
the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions in support ; on the left, north
of the Somme, the III* Corps, under the command of Lieut .-General
Sir R* H* K, Butler, with the 58th and i8th Divisions in line and
the 1 2th Division in support*

The attack of the French First Army, under General Debeney,
was timed to take place about an hour later than the opening of the
British assault, and was delivered on a front of between four and
five miles between Moreuil inclusive and the British right* As the
Allied troops made progress, the right of the French attack was to
be gradually extended southwards until the southern flank of the
Allied battle front rested on Braches*

Behind the British front the British Cavalry Corps, consisting
of three cavalry divisions under command of Lieut *-General Sir
C* T* McM* Kavanagh, was concentrated at zero hour east of Amiens*
A special mobile force of two motor machine gun brigades and a
Canadian cyclist battalion, under command of Brigadier-General
Brutinel, had orders to exploit success along the line of the Amiens-
Roye Road*

The Battle Opened

17. At 4,20 a.m. on the 8th August our massed artillery opened
intense fire on the whole front of attack, completely crushing the
enemy's batteries, some of which never succeeded in coming into
action. Simultaneously British infantry and tanks advanced to the

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 261

assault* The enemy was taken completely by surprise, and under
cover of a heavy ground mist our first objectives, on the line Demuin,
Marcelcave, Cerisy, south of Morlancourt, were gained rapidly*

After a halt of two hours on this line by the leading troops,
infantry, cavalry and light tanks passed through and continued the
advance, the different arms working in co-operation in the most
admirable manner* At the close of the day's operations our troops
had completed an advance of between six and seven miles* The
Amiens outer defence line, including the villages of Caix, Harbon-
nieres and Morcourt, had been gained on the whole front of attack,
except at Le Quesnel itself. Cavalry and armoured cars were in
action well to the east of this line, and before dawn on the gth August
Le Quesnel also had been taken. North of the Somme the enemy
was more alert as the result of the recent engagements in this sector,
and succeeded by heavy fighting in maintaining himself for the
time being in the village of Chipilly,

East of the line of our advance the enemy at nightfall was blow-
ing up dumps in all directions, while his transport and limbers were
streaming eastwards towards the Somme, affording excellent targets
to our airmen, who made full use of their opportunities. Over
13,000 prisoners, between 300 and 400 guns, and vast quantities of
ammunition and stores of all kinds remained in our possession*

The brilliant and predominating part taken by the Canadian and
Australian Corps in this battle is worthy of the highest commenda-
tion* The skill and determination of these troops proved irresistible,
and at all points met with rapid and complete success. The fine
performance of the cavalry throughout all stages of the operation
also deserves mention. Having completed their assembly behind
the battle-front by a series of night marches, on the first day of the
attack they advanced 23 miles from their points of concentration,
and by the dash and vigour of their action, both on this and subse-
quent days, rendered most valuable and gallant service. The general
success of all arms was made possible by the good staff work of my
own Staff at General Headquarters, and of the Staffs of the Armies
concerned. Under the able and experienced direction of the Fourth
Army Commander, General Rawlinson, the preparations for the
battle, including detailed artillery arrangements of an admirable
nature, were carried out with a thoroughness and completeness
which left nothing to chance. Without this excellent staff work
neither the rapid concentration of troops, unknown to the enemy,
nor the success of our initial assault and its subsequent development
could have been accomplished.

Meanwhile, at 5,5 a*m,, the attack of the French First Army had
been launched successfully, and gained the line Pierrepont, Plessier,

262 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Fresnoy, all inclusive, in touch with Brutinel's Force on the Amiens-
Roye Road west of Le Quesnoy. Three thousand three hundred
and fifty prisoners and many guns were taken by the French forces
on this day,

The Advance Continued

1 8. The sweeping character of this success, which in one day
had gained our first objective and disengaged the Pans-Amiens
Railway, opened a clear field for the measures of exploitation deter-
mined upon to meet such an event.

The attack was continued on the gth August. After meeting
with considerable opposition on the line Beaufort- Vrely-Rosieres-
Framerville, the enemy's resistance weakened under the pressure of
our troops, and once more rapid progress was made. The 8th
Hussars, ist Cavalry Division (Major-General R. L. Mullens), took
Meharicourt at a gallop ; l the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions (Major-
Generals T. T. Pitman and A. E. W. Harman) also passed through
our advancing infantry, capturing a number of prisoners and gaining
much ground. That night we held Bouchoir, Rouvroy, Morcourt and
Framerville, and were on the western outskirts of Lihons and Proyart.

North of the Somme the III. Corps, including the i2th Division
(Major-General H. W. Higginson) and a regiment of the 33rd
American Division (Major-General G. Bell), attacked in the late
afternoon and gained a line east of Chipilly, Morlancourt and
Dernancourt.

During the following days our operations continued successfully
in close co-operation with the French. By the evening of the i2th
August our infantry had reached the old German Somme defences
of 1916, on the general line west of Damery, east of Lihons, east of
Proyart, having repulsed with severe loss determined counter-
attacks in the neighbourhood of Lihons. North of the Somme we
were on the western outskirts of Bray-sur-Somme.

Montdidier had fallen to the French two days earlier, and on
the whole front from the Oise River to the Roye Road at Andechy
our Allies had made deep and rapid progress.

On the night of the I2th August, as has been seen, our advance
east of Amiens had reached the general line of the old Roye-Chaulnes
defences. The derelict battle area which now lay before our troops,
seared by old trench lines, pitted with shell holes, and crossed in all
directions with tangled belts of wire, the whole covered by the wild
vegetation of two years, presented unrivalled opportunities for
stubborn machine gun defence.

1 The capture of Meharicourt is claimed also by the 2nd Canadian Division. The
report of the Cavalry Corps is as stated above.

c c c c

t. O C, 4>
O > O >

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 263

Attacks carried out on the i^th August 1 proved the strength of
these positions, and showed that the enemy, heavily reinforced, was
ready to give battle for them. I therefore determined to break off
the battle on this front, and transferred the front of attack from the
Fourth Army to the sector north of the Somme, where an attack
seemed unexpected by the enemy. My intention was for the Third
Army to operate in the direction of Bapaume, so as to turn the line of
the old Somme defences from the north. The French First Army
now ceased to be under my command.

Meanwhile, south of the Somme, our pressure was to be main-
tained, so as to take advantage of any weakening on the part of the
enemy and encourage in him the belief that we intended to persist in
our operations on that front. During the succeeding days, local
attacks gave us possession of Damery, Parvillers and Fransart, and
made progress also at other points.

The Results of the Battle of Amiens

19. The results of the battle of Amiens may be summarised as
follows. Within the space of five days the town of Amiens and the
railway centring upon it had been disengaged. Twenty German
divisions had been heavily defeated by thirteen British infantry divi-
sions and three cavalry divisions, assisted by a regiment of the 33rd
American Division and supported by some four hundred tanks.
Nearly 22,000 prisoners and over four hundred guns had been
taken by us and our line had been pushed forward to a depth of
some twelve miles in a vital sector. Further, our deep advance,
combined with the attacks of the French Armies on our right, had
compelled the enemy to evacuate hurriedly a wide extent of territory
to the south of us.

The effect of this victory, following so closely after the Allied
victory on the Marne, upon the moral both of. the German and
British troops was very great. Buoyed up by the hope of immediate
and decisive victory, to be followed by an early and favourable peace,
constantly assured that the Allied reserves were exhausted, the
German soldiery suddenly found themselves attacked on two fronts
and thrown back with heavy losses from large and important portions
of their earlier gains. The reaction was inevitable and of a deep
and lasting character. 2

1 Already on the loth August, in the course of a visit to the 32tid Division east of
Le Quesnel, the Commander-in-Chief had personally satisfied himself that the enemy's
opposition on this front had really stiffened.

* Ludendorff describes the 8th August as " the black day of the German Army in
the history of this war." He ascribes directly to it the defection of Bulgaria an.d the
general discouragement of Germany's Allies.

264 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

On the other hand, our own troops felt that at last their oppor-
tunity had come, and that, supported by a superior artillery and
numerous tanks, they could now press forward resolutely to reap
the reward of their patient, dauntless and successful defence in
March and April* This they were eager to do, and as they moved
forward during the ensuing months, from one success to another,
suffering, danger and losses were alike forgotten in their desire to
beat the enemy and their confidence that they could do so.

Meanwhile, as a further and immediate result of our successes,
the enemy was thrown back definitely upon a defensive policy, and
began to straighten out the salients in his line* Between the i 4 th
and i yth August he withdrew from his positions about Serre, and
farther north indications multiplied of an intention shortly to
abandon the salient in the Lys valley. Our patrols were already
beginning to push forward on this front, and on the night of the
I3th/i4th August established posts south and east of Vieux Berquin.
On the 1 8th and igth August the capture of Outtersteene village
and ridge, with some 900 prisoners by the 3ist, agth and gth Divi-
sion of the Second Army, hastened the enemy's movements on
the Lys.

THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME feist August ist September)

Scheme of Operations

20. In deciding to extend the attack northwards to the area
between the rivers Somme and Scarpe I was influenced by the
following considerations.

The enemy did not seem prepared to meet an attack in this
direction, and, owing to the success of the Fourth Army, he occupied
a salient the left flank of which was already threatened from the
south. A further reason for my decision was that the ground north
of the Ancre River was not greatly damaged by shellfire, and was
suitable for the use of tanks. A successful attack between Albert and
Arras in a south-easterly direction would turn the line of the Somme
south of Peronne, and gave every promise of producing far-reaching
results. It would be a step forward towards the strategic objective
St. Quentin-Cambrai.

This attack, moreover, would be rendered easier by the fact
that we now held the commanding plateau south of Arras about
Bucquoy and Ablainzevelle which in the days of the old Somme
fighting had lain well behind the enemy's lines. In consequence we
were here either astride or to the east of the intricate systems
of trench lines which, in 1916, we had no choice but to attack

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 265

frontally, and enjoyed advantages of observation which at that date
had been denied us,

It was arranged that on the morning of the 2ist August a limited
attack should be launched north of the Ancre to gain the general
line of the Arras-Albert Railway, on which it was correctly assumed
that the enemy's main line of resistance was sited. The day of the
22nd August would then be used to get troops and guns into position
on this front and to bring forward the left of the Fourth Army
between the Somme and the Ancre* The principal attack would be
delivered on the 23rd August by the Third Army and the divisions
of the Fourth Army north of the Somme, the remainder of the
Fourth Army assisting by pushing forward south of the river to
cover the flank of the main operation. Thereafter, if success at-
tended our efforts, the whole of both Armies were to press forward
with the greatest vigour and exploit to the full any advantage we
might have gained.

As soon as the progress of the Third Army had forced the enemy
to fall back from the Mercatel spur, thereby giving us a secure
southern flank for an assault upon the German positions on Orange
Hill and about Monchy-le-Preux, the moment arrived for the First
Army to extend the front of our attack to the north. Using the River
Sense*e to cover their left, in the same way as the River Somme had
been used to cover the left of the Fourth Army in the battle of
Amiens, the right of the First Army attacked east of Arras, and by
turning from the north the western extremity of the Hindenburg
Line compelled the enemy to undertake a further retreat. It was
calculated correctly that this gradual extension of our front of attack
would mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall, and
would cause him to throw in his reserves piecemeal*

Opening Attacks. Albert

21* At 4.55 a.m. on the 2ist August the IV. and VI* Corps of
General Sir Julian Byng's Third Army, under command respec-
tively of Lieut*-General Sir G* M* Harper and Lieut .-General Sir
J* A* L* Haldane, attacked on a front of about nine miles north of
the Ancre, from Miraumont to Moyenneville*

The opening assault was delivered by the divisions then in line 1
namely, the 42nd, New Zealand and 3yth Divisions of the IV*
Corps, and the 2nd and Guards Divisions of the VI. Corps, sup-
ported by tanks, and carried the enemy's foremost defences rapidly
and without difficulty. The 5th Division and 63rd Division (Major-
General C* E* Lawrie) of the IV* Corps, and the 3rd Division
1 See Sketch Map facing page 263 above.

266 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

(Major-General C, J, Deverell) of the VL Corps then passed through,
and continued the advance. During this stage the thick fog, which at
first had favoured us, led to some loss of direction* None the less,
after much hard fighting, particularly about Achiet-le-Petit and
Logeast Wood, where the enemy counter-attacked vigorously, our
troops reached the general line of the railway on practically the
whole front, capturing the above-named village and wood, together
with Courcelles and Moyenneville, east of which places they crossed
the railway,

The 2ist Division of the V, Corps assisted by clearing the north
bank of the Ancre about Beaucourt, and as a result of the whole
operation the positions we required from which to launch our prin-
cipal attack were gained successfully, with over 2,000 prisoners.

Early next morning the III, Corps of the Fourth Army, assisted
by a small number of tanks, attacked with the 4yth, i2th and i8th
Divisions, the 3rd Australian Division and the 38th Division co-
operating on either flank. By this attack, in which the i8th Division
(Major-General R, P, Lee) forced the passage of the River Ancre
and captured Albert by a well-executed enveloping movement from
the south-east, our line between the Somme and the Ancre was
advanced well to the east of the Bray- Albert Road, The left of the
Fourth Army was brought forward in conformity with the remainder
of our line, and over 2,400 prisoners and a few guns were taken by us,

The Main Attack Launched

22* These preliminary attacks cleared the way for the main
operation. This was opened on the 23rd August by a series of strong
assaults on practically the whole front of thirty-three miles from
our junction with the French north of Lihons to Mercatel, in which
neighbourhood the Hindenburg Line from Queant and Bullecourt
joined the old Arras- Vimy defence line of 1916, About 100 tanks
were employed by us on different parts of this front, and were of
great assistance, particularly in overcoming the enemy's machine
gunners. Many of these fought with great determination, continuing
to fire until their guns were run over by the tanks,

On the eve of these operations I issued a Note of instructions to
the forces under my command, in which I drew attention to the
favourable change which had taken place in the conditions under
which operations were being conducted, and emphasised the neces-
sity for all ranks to act with the utmost boldness and resolution.
Wherever the enemy was found to be giving way, there the pressure
was to be increased.

To this appeal all ranks and all Services responded during the

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY

367

strenuous fighting of the succeeding weeks with a whole-hearted
and untiring devotion, for which no words of mine can adequately
express my admiration and my gratitude. Divisions, which in the
worst days of the March retreat had proved themselves superior to
every hardship, difficulty and danger, once more rose to the occasion
with the most magnificent spirit. Over the same ground that had
witnessed their stubborn greatness in defence they moved forward
to the attack with a persistent vigour and relentless determination
which neither the extreme difficulty of the ground, nor the obstinate
resistance of the enemy, could diminish or withstand.

At 445 a.m. the Australian Corps attacked south of the Somme,
employing the 32nd Division (Major-General T. S. Lambert),
composed of men of Lancashire, Dorset and Scotland, and the
ist Australian Division (Major-General T. W. Glasgow), and cap-
tured Herleville, Chuignolles and Chuignes, with over 2,000
prisoners. The fighting about Chuignolles, on the Australian front,
was very heavy, and great numbers of the enemy were killed.

At the same hour the i8th Division and the right brigade of the
38th Division of the III. and V. Corps recommenced their attacks
about Albert, and by a well-executed operation, entailing hard
fighting at different points, captured the high ground east of the
town known as Tara and Usna Hills. At the same time two com-
panies of the Welsh Regiment, part of the left brigade of the 38th
Division, waded the Ancre in the neighbourhood of Hamel, and
with great gallantry maintained themselves all day east of the river
against constant counter-attacks.

Meanwhile, at different hours during the morning, the other
divisions of the V. Corps and the IV. and VI. Corps (comprising
respectively the iyth and 2ist Divisions ; the 42nd, New Zealand,
5th and 3yth Divisions ; and the 2nd, 3rd, Guards, 56th and 52nd
Divisions) attacked along the whole front north of Albert, directing
the chief weight of their assault upon the sector Miraumont Boiry
Becquerelle.

Our troops met with immediate success. On the right, progress
was made by light forces of the ijth and 2ist Divisions along the
left bank of the Ancre north of Thiepval, but in this sector no deep
advance was attempted during the day.

North of the Ancre, the attack of the VI. Corps was opened at
4.0 a.m., at which hour the 3rd Division took Gomiecourt with 500
prisoners. During the morning the attack spread along the front of
the IV. Corps also. The enemy's main line of resistance was stormed
and, penetrating deeply beyond it, our troops captured Bihucourt,
Ervillers, Boyelles and Boiry Becquerelle, together with over 5,000
prisoners and a number of guns. Under the continued pressure of

268 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

our attacks the enemy was becoming disorganised, and showed
signs of confusion,

Our troops were now astride the Arras-Bapaume Road, and
closing down upon the latter town from the north and north-west.
The position of the German divisions in the pronounced salient on
the Thiepval Ridge was becoming perilous.

At i.o a,m, on the night of the 23rd/24th August the Third and
Fourth Armies again attacked, and during the early morning the
advance was resumed on the whole front from the Somme to Neu-
ville Vitasse, On the right, the 3rd Australian Division took Bray-
sur-Somme, and the 47th Division (Major-General Sir G, T, Gor-
ringe), the i2th and i8th Divisions of the III. Corps carried our
line forward across the high ground between Bray and La Boisseile,
In the neighbourhood of the latter village and at certain other points
heavy fighting took place, and a number of prisoners were taken.

On the front of the Third Army, the same divisions which had
delivered the attacks on the previous day again moved forward
against the beaten enemy and pressed him back rapidly. The German
positions on the Thiepval Ridge were carried by a well-conceived
and admirably executed concentric attack, directed upon the high
ground about Pozieres from the south-west and north-west. In this
brilliant operation the brigade of the 38th Division attacking on the
right crossed the Ancre at Albert during the early part of the night,
and formed up close to the German lines on a narrow front between
the Albert-Pozieres Road and the marshes of the Ancre, The left
brigade of the same division waded breast deep through the flooded
stream opposite Hamel, under heavy fire, and formed up in the
actual process of a German counter-attack along the line held by
the two companies who had crossed on the previous morning. At
the given hour, the brigades of the 38th Division advanced in concert
with the other divisions of the V, Corps on their left, and drove the
enemy from the high ground about Ovillers and Thiepval. Con-
tinuing their advance, the divisions of the V, Corps gained Pozieres,
Courcelette and Martinpuich, Miraumont, which for three days
had resisted our attacks, was taken by the 42nd Division (Major-
General A, Solly-Flood) with many prisoners, and pressing forward
the same division seized Pys, The 5th Division (Major-General
J, Ponsonby) having captured Irles, cleared Loupart Wood in co-
operation with the New Zealand Division (Major-General Sir
A. H, Russell), tanks rendering valuable assistance to our infantry in
both localities. New Zealand troops having taken Grevillers, reached
Avesnes-les-Bapaume, and assisted also in the capture of Biefvillers
by the 3yth Division (Major-General H. B. Williams), Strong
opposition was encountered on the high ground between Sapignies

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 269

and Mory. Our troops pressed the enemy in these villages closely,
and farther north the Guards Division (Major-General G. P. T.
Feilding) gained possession of St. Leger. On the left, troops of the
56th Division (Major-General Sir C. P. A* Hull) had heavy fighting
about Croisilles and on the high ground north-west of that village
known as Henin HilL Important progress was made, and on their
left the 52nd Division (Major-General J. Hill) took Henin-sur-
Cojeul and gained a footing in St. Martin-sur-Cojeul.

Several thousand prisoners, many guns and great quantities of
material of every kind were captured by us on this day.

Bapaume Taken

23* During the next five days our troops followed up their
advantage hotly, and in spite of increasing resistance from the
German rearguards, realised a further deep advance. The enemy
clung to his positions in the later stages of this period with much
tenacity. His infantry delivered many counter-attacks, and the
progress of our troops was only won by hard and determined
fighting.

During these days the 37th Division cleared Favreuil late in the
evening of the 25th August, after much confused fighting. On the
same day the 2nd Division captured Sapignies and Behagnies, taking
a number of prisoners, and the 62nd Division drove the enemy from
Mory.

On the 27th August the i8th Division secured possession of
Trones Wood, after an all-day struggle in the course of which
troops of the 2nd Guard Division, fresh from reserve, made strong
but unsuccessful counter-attacks. Next day the i2th Division and
58th Division (Major-General F. W. Ramsay) captured Hardecourt
and the spur south of it, overcoming strong resistance. Both on the
27th and 28th August the 38th (Welsh) Division (Major-General
T. A. Cubitt) was engaged in bitter fighting about Longueval and
Delville Wood, and made progress in company with the I7th Divi-
sion (Major-General P. R. Robertson) attacking towards Flers.

Yielding before the persistent pressure of our attacks, in the
early morning of the 29th August the enemy evacuated Bapaume,
which was occupied by the New Zealand Division. On the same
day the i8th Division entered Combles, while to the north of
Bapaume a gallant thrust by the 56th and 57th Divisions penetrated
the enemy's positions as far as Riencourt-les-Cagnicourt. Though
our troops were unable at this time to maintain themselves in this
village our line was established on the western and northern out-
skirts of Bullecourt and Hendecourt.

370 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

By the night of the 3oth August the line of the Fourth and Third
Armies north of the Somme ran from Cl&y-sur-Somme past the
western edge of Marrieres Wood to Combles, Lesbceufs, Bancourt,
Fr&nicourt and Vraucourt, and thence to the western outskirts of
Ecoust, Bullecourt and Hendecourt. Any further advance would
threaten the enemy's line south of Peronne along the east bank of
the Somme, to which our progress north of the river had already
forced him to retreat.

This latter movement had been commenced on the 26th August,
on which date Roye was evacuated by the enemy, and next day had
been followed by a general advance on the part of the French and
British forces between the Oise and the Somme. By the night of
the 29th August, Allied infantry had reached the left bank of the
Somme on the whole front from the neighbourhood of Nesle, occu-
pied by the French on the 28th August, northwards to Peronne.
Farther south the French held Noyon.

The Fight for Mont St. Quentin and the Capture of Peronne

24* During these days an increase in hostile artillery fire and
the frequency and strength of the German counter-attacks indicated
that our troops were approaching positions on which the enemy
intended to stand, at any rate for a period. In the face of this in-
creased resistance, by a brilliant operation commenced on the night
of the 3oth/3ist August, the 2nd Australian Division (Major-
General C. Rosenthal) stormed Mont St. Quentin, a most important
tactical feature commanding Peronne and the crossings of the Somme
at that town. Being prevented by floods and heavy machine-gun
fire from crossing the river opposite Mont St. Quentin, the 5th
Australian Infantry Brigade was passed across the Somme at Feuil-
lieres, two miles farther west, by means of hastily constructed
bridges. By 10.15 p.m. on the 3Oth August, the brigade had captured
the German trenches east of Cle"ry, and was assembled in them
ready for an assault which should turn the German positions from
the north-west. At 5.0 a.m. on the 3ist August the assault was
launched, and, despite determined opposition, was completely
successful. Both in the attack itself and in the course of repeated
counter-attacks, delivered with great resolution by strong hostile
forces throughout the remainder of the day and the greater part of
the following night, fighting was exceptionally severe, and the taking
of the position ranks as a most gallant achievement.

In this operation nearly 1,000 prisoners were taken, and great
numbers of the enemy were killed. On the ist September, as a
direct consequence of it, Australian troops captured Peronne.

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 271

In support of the operation against Mont St. Quentin, on the
morning of the 3ist August the left of the Fourth Army (the 3rd
Australian, 58th, 4yth and i8th Divisions) attacked towards Bouch-
avesnes, Rancourt and Fregicourt, and by successful fighting on
this and the following day captured these villages with several
hundred prisoners. On the Third Army front also there was hard
fighting on both of these days. At the close of it we held Sailly
Saillisel, Morval, Beaulencourt and Riencourt-les-Bapaume, and
were established on the ridges east of Bancourt, Fremicourt, Vaulx
Vraucourt and Longatte. Troops of the XVIL Corps, under com-
mand of Lieut.-General Sir C. Fergusson, completed the capture of
Bullecourt and Hendecourt, and, following up their advantage,
during the night took Riencourt-lez-Cagnicourt with 380 prisoners.

The Results of the Battle of Bapaume

25. The ist September marks the close of the second stage in
the British offensive. Having in the first stage freed Amiens by our
brilliant success east of that town, in the second stage the troops of
the Third and Fourth Armies, comprising 23 British divisions,
by skilful leading, hard fighting and relentless and unremitting
pursuit, in ten days had driven 35 German divisions from one side
of the old Somme battlefield to the other, thereby turning the line
of the River Somme. In so doing they had inflicted upon the enemy
the heaviest losses in killed and wounded, and had taken from him
over 34,000 prisoners and 270 guns. For the remarkable success of
the battle of Bapaume, the greatest credit is due to the excellence of
the staff arrangements of all formations, and to the most able conduct
of the operations of the Third Army by its Commander, General
Byng.

In the obstinate fighting of the past few days the enemy had been
pressed back to the line of the Somme River and the high ground
about Rocquigny and Beugny, where he had shown an intention to
stand for a time. Thereafter, his probable plan was to retire slowly,
when forced to do so, from one intermediary position to another ;
until he could shelter his battered divisions behind the Hindenburg
defences. The line of the Tortille River and the high Nurlu Plateau
offered opportunities for an ordered withdrawal of this nature,
which would allow him to secure his artillery as well as much of the
material in his forward dumps.

On the other hand, the disorganisation which had been caused
by our attacks on the 8th and 2ist August had increased under the
pressure of our advance, and had been accompanied by a steady
deterioration in the moral of his troops. Garrisons left as rearguards

272 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

to hold up our advance at important points had surrendered as soon
as they found themselves threatened with isolation. The urgent
needs of the moment, the wide extent of front attacked, and con-
sequent uncertainty as to where the next blow would fall, and the
extent of his losses had forced the enemy to throw in his reserves
piecemeal as they arrived on the battle front. On many occasions in
the course of the fighting elements of the same German division
had been identified on widely separated parts of the battle front,

In such circumstances, a sudden and successful blow, of weight
sufficient to break through the northern hinge of the defences to
which it was his design to fall back, might produce results of great
importance. At this date, as will be seen from the events described
in para. 27, our troops were already in position to deliver such
a stroke*

The Withdrawal from the Lys Salient

26, Meanwhile, during the process of the great events briefly
recorded above and in immediate consequence of them, other events
of different but scarcely less importance were taking place on the
northern portion of our front.

The exhaustion of the enemy's reserves resulting from the Allied
attacks made the shortening of the German line imperative. The
obvious sector in which to effect such a shortening was the Lys
front. The enemy had only maintained himself in the Lys salient
under the constant fire of our guns at the expense of heavy casualties,
not only to his infantry in line, but to his artillery and troops in back
areas. With the abandonment of his projected offensive against the
Channel Ports all reason had gone for remaining in so costly a salient,
while the threat, carefully maintained by us, of a British attack
provided an additional reason for withdrawing.

Accordingly, from about the 26th July the enemy had been
actively employed in removing the ammunition and stores accumu-
lated for his offensive, and as early as the 5th August he had begun
to effect local withdrawals on the southern flank of the salient.

The development of our own and the French offensives hastened
this movement, although immense quantities of ammunition still
remained untouched. On the i8th August our patrols, whose
activity had been constant, were able to make a considerable advance
opposite Merville. Next day Merville itself was taken, and our line
advanced on the whole front from the Lawe River to the Plate
Becque.

During the following days, various other small gains of ground
were made by us on the southern and western faces of the salient,
but on the northern face the enemy as yet showed no signs of with-

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 273

drawal, the various local operations carried out by us meeting with
strong resistance. On the night of the 29th/3Oth August, however,
impelled alike by the pressure exerted without remission by our
troops on the spot and by the urgency of events elsewhere, the
enemy commenced an extensive retirement on the whole of the
Lys front*

In the early morning of the 3Oth August our troops found Bailleul
unoccupied, and by the evening of that day our advanced detach-
ments had reached the general line Lacouture, Lestrem, Noote
Boom, east of Bailleul.

Thereafter, the enemy's withdrawal continued rapidly. At
certain points, indeed, his rearguards offered vigorous resistance,
notably about Neuve figlise and Hill 63, captured with a number of
prisoners by the 36th and 29th Divisions ; but by the evening of
the 6th September the Lys salient had disappeared. Kemmel Hill
was once more in our hands, and our troops had reached the general
line Givenchy, Neuve Chapelle, Nieppe, Ploegsteert, Voormezeele.

THE BATTLE OF THE SCARPE (26th August 3rd September)

The Retaking of Monchy-le-Preux

27. By the 25th August our advance had formed a salient of the
German positions opposite Arras, 1 and the proper moment had there-
fore come for the third stage of our operations, in which the First
Army should extend the flank of our attack to the north. By driving
eastwards from Arras, covered on the left by the Rivers Scarpe
and Sensee, the First Army would endeavour to turn the enemy's
positions on the Somme battlefield, and cut his system of railway
communications which ran south-westwards across their front.

At 3.0 a.m. on the 26th August, the Canadian Corps, Lieut.-
General Sir A. W. Currie commanding, on the right of General
Home's First Army, attacked the German positions astride the
Scarpe River with the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions (commanded
by Major-Generals Sir H. E. Burstall and L. J. Lipsett) and the
5ist Division. This attack, delivered on a front of about 5^ miles
and closely supported by the left of the Third Army, was com-
pletely successful. By noon we had taken Wancourt and Guemappe,
and had stormed the hill and village of Monchy-le-Preux. This
latter position was one of great natural strength, well organised for
defence, and commanded observation of much importance. Many
prisoners were taken, and later in the day substantial progress was
1 See Sketch Map facing page 262.

274 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

made to the east of these three villages, a strong counter-attack east
of Monchy being successfully repulsed* North of the Scarpe the
5ist Division pushed forward their line towards Rceux, so as to
secure an easily defensible base of departure for this advance, and
by a successful attack during the evening captured Greenland Hill.
Their opening success was followed up by the troops of the
First Army with the greatest energy, and on the following day
Cherisy, Vis-en-Artois, the Bois du Sart, Rceux and Gavrelle were
taken* By the end of the month they had gained the high ground
east of Che'risy and Haucourt, had captured Eterpigny, and cleared
the area between the Sensee and Scarpe Rivers west of the Trinquis
Brook. North of the Scarpe, Plouvain was held by us. Our progress
brought our troops to within assaulting distance of the powerful
trench system running from the Hindenburg Line at Queant to
the Lens defences about Drocourt, the breaking of which would
turn the whole of the enemy's organised positions on a wide front
southwards.

The Storming of the Drocourt-Queant Line

28. On the 2nd September the Drocourt-Que'ant Line was
broken, the maze of trenches at the junction of that line and the
Hindenburg System was stormed and the enemy was thrown into
precipitate retreat on the whole front to the south of it. This gallant
feat of arms was carried out by the Canadian Corps of the First
Army, employing the ist and 4th Canadian Divisions and the 4th
English Division, and the XVII. Corps of the Third Army, employ-
ing the 52nd, 5yth and 63rd Divisions. 1

The assault of the Canadians was launched at 5.0 a. m. on a front
of about 4^ miles south of the Trinquis Brook, our infantry being
supported by 40 tanks of the 3rd Tank Brigade and assisted by a
mobile force of motor machine gun units, Canadian Cavalry and
armoured cars. The attack was a complete success, and by noon
the whole of the elaborate system of wire, trenches and strong points
constituting the Drocourt-Queant Line on the front of our advance
was in our hands.

On the right the attack of the XVII. Corps, launched at the
same hour by the 52nd and 5yth Divisions, directed its main force
on the triangle of fortifications marking the junction of the Hinden-
burg and Drocourt-Queant lines north-west of the village of Queant.
Pressed with equal vigour it met with success equally complete.
There was stern fighting in the network of trenches both north and
south of Queant, in which neighbourhood the 52nd (Lowland)
Division performed distinguished service and by the progress they
1 See Sketch Map facing page 262*

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY

275

made greatly assisted our advance farther north* Early in the after-
noon our troops had cleared the triangle, and the 63rd Division
(Major-General C. A, Blacklock) had passed through to exploit the
success thus gained*

During the afternoon our further progress met with considerable
resistance from machine gun nests sited in woods and villages and
on the reverse slopes of the Dury Ridge. There was hard fighting
until dusk, especially on the front of the 63rd Division and of the
4th Division (Major-General T. G. Matheson). By nightfall this
opposition had been overcome, the 63rd Division had reached the
railway east of Queant, and the 5yth Division, swinging to the right,
was threatening that village and Pronville from the north. Our
troops had pushed forward to a depth of over three miles along the
Arras-Cambrai Road, and had reached the outskirts of Buissy.
Cagni court, Villers-les-Cagni court and Dury were in our hands.
During the day 8,000 prisoners had been taken and many guns.

Troops of the Third and Fourth Armies prolonged the line of
attack as far south as Peronne. At all points important progress was
made, though fighting was severe.

In the battle of the Scarpe, as in the battles of Amiens and
Bapaume and the victories that followed them, staff work of a high
order played an important part in our success. The greatest credit
is due to the First Army Commander, General Home, and his Staff
for the excellence of their arrangements.

The Enemy in Retreat

29. The result of the battles of Amiens, Bapaume and the Scarpe
now declared itself.

During the night of the 2nd/3rd September the enemy fell back
rapidly on the whole front of the Third Army and the right of the
First Army. By the end of the day he had taken up positions along
the general line of the Canal du Nord from Peronne to Ytres and
thence east of Hermies, Inchy-en-Artois and Ecourt St. Quentin to
the Sensee east of Lecluse. On the following day he commenced to
withdraw also from the east bank of the Somme south of Peronne,
and by the night of the 8th September was holding the general line
Vermand, Epehy, Havrincourt and thence along the east bank of
the Canal du Nord.

The withdrawal was continued on the front of the French forces
on our right. On the 6th September French troops occupied Ham
and Chauny, and by 8th September had reached the line of the
Crozat Canal.

Throughout this hasty retreat our troops followed up the enemy

276 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

closely* Many of his rearguards were cut off and taken prisoner ;
on numerous occasions our forward guns did great execution among
his retiring columns, while our airmen took full advantage of the
remarkable targets offered them* Great quantities of material and
many guns fell into our hands*

In the battle of the Scarpe itself, in which ten British divisions
attacked and overthrew thirteen German divisions, thereby giving
the signal for this general retreat, our total captures amounted to
over 16,000 prisoners and about 200 guns*

THE BATTLE OF HAVRINCOURT AND EPHY (i2th-i8th September)

30* North of Havrincourt, the Canal du Nord, behind which
the enemy had taken shelter, with the open slopes leading down to
it swept by the fire of the German positions on the east bank, could
scarcely be taken except by a carefully organised attack*

From the neighbourhood of Havrincourt, southwards, the
enemy's main line of resistance was the well-known Hindenburg
Line, which, after passing through that village, ran south-east
across the Beaucamp, La Vacquerie and Bonavis Ridges to the
Scheldt Canal at Bantouselle, whence it followed the line of the
canal to St* Quentin* In front of this trench system strong German
forces held formidable positions about Havrincourt and Epehy,
which had to be taken before a final attack on the Hindenburg Line
could be undertaken. By successful operations carried out during
the second and third weeks of September these different defences
were secured and our line advanced to within assaulting distance
of the enemy's main line of resistance.

On the I2th September the IV* and VI* Corps of the Third
Army attacked on a front of about five miles in the Havrincourt
sector, employing troops of the New Zealand, 37th, 62nd and 2nd
Divisions* The villages of Trescault and Havrincourt were taken
by the 37th and 62nd Divisions respectively, and positions were
secured which were of considerable importance in view of future
operations*

On the right of the British front the IX* and Australian Corps
continued to push forward with light forces* By the evening of the
1 7th September, as the result of skilful manoeuvring and well-
executed local attacks, they had captured Holnon Village and wood
and Maissemy, and were closely approaching Le Verguier and
Templeux-le-Guerard *

Next day, at 7.0 a.m*, on the i8th September, the Fourth and
Third Armies attacked in heavy rain on a front of about seven-
teen miles from Holnon to Gouseaucourt, the First French Army

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY

277

co-operating south of Holnon, A small number of tanks accompanied
our infantry, and were of great assistance, 1

In this operation, our troops penetrated to a depth of three miles
through the deep, continuous and well-organised defensive belt
formed by the old British and German lines. On practically the
whole front our objectives were gained successfully, the ist, I7th,
2ist and 74th Divisions (Major-General E, S, Girdwood command-
ing the 74th Division), and the ist and 4th Australian Divisions (the
latter commanded by Major-General E, Sinclair-Maclagan) distin-
guishing themselves by the vigour and success of their attack. On
the extreme right and in the left centre about Epehy the enemy's
resistance was very determined, and in these sectors troops of the
6th, I2th, 1 8th and 58th Divisions had severe fighting. Before
nightfall, however, the last centres of resistance in Epehy were
reduced, and both in this area and on our right about Gricourt local
actions during the succeeding days secured for us the remainder of
the positions required for an attack on the main Hindenburg defences.

At the close of these operations, in which fifteen British divi-
sions defeated twenty German divisions and completed the fourth
stage of our offensive, we had captured nearly 12,000 prisoners
and 100 guns*

The Development of the Allied Plan 2

31* The details of the strategic plan outlined in para, 13 upon
which future operations should be based were the subject of careful
discussion between Marshal Foch and myself. Preparations were
already far advanced for the successful attack by which, on the
1 2th September, the First American Army, assisted by certain
French divisions, drove the enemy from the St, Mihiel salient and
inflicted heavy losses upon him in prisoners and guns. Ultimately,
it was decided that as soon as possible after this attack four conver-
gent and simultaneous offensives should be launched by the Allies
as follows :

By the Americans west of the Meuse in the direction of Mezieres ;

By the French west of Argonne in close co-operation with the
American attack and with the same general objectives ;

By the British on the St. Quentin-Cambrai front in the general
direction of Maubeuge ;

By Belgian and Allied forces in Flanders in the direction of Ghent.

By these attacks, it was expected, as already indicated, that the
important German forces opposite the French and Americans would
be pressed back upon the difficult country of the Ardennes, while

1 This was one of the occasions on which dummy tanks were used, with great success,

2 See the folding map at the end of the book.

278 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the British thrust struck at their principal lines of communication* 1
In Flanders, it was intended to take advantage of the weakening of
the German forces on this front to clear the Belgian coast by a
surprise attack. Success in any one of these offensives might compel
the enemy to withdraw to the line of the Meuse.

The Role of the British Armies

32. The results to be obtained from these different attacks
depended in a peculiarly large degree upon the British attack in
the centre* It was here that the enemy's defences were most highly
organised. If these were broken, the threat directed at his vital
systems of lateral communication would of necessity react upon
his defence elsewhere.

On the other hand, the long period of sustained offensive action
through which the British Armies had already passed had made
large demands both upon the troops themselves and upon my avail-
able reserves. Throughout our attacks from the 8th August onwards,
our losses in proportion to the results achieved and the numbers of
prisoners taken had been consistently and remarkably small. In the
aggregate, however, they were considerable, and in the face of them
an attack upon so formidably organised a position as that which now
confronted us could not be lightly undertaken. Moreover, the
political effects of an unsuccessful attack upon a position so well
known as the Hindenburg Line would be large, and would go far
to revive the declining moral not only of the German Army but of
the German people.

These different considerations were present to my mind. The
probable results of a costly failure, or, indeed, of anything short of a
decided success, in any attempt upon the main defences of the
Hindenburg Line were obvious ; but I was convinced that the
British attack was the essential part of the general scheme, and that
the moment was favourable. 2

Accordingly, I decided to proceed with the attack, and all pre-
paratory measures, including the preliminary operations already
recounted, were carried out as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible.

The Hindenburg Line

33. Between St. Quentin and the village of Bantouzelle the
principal defences of the Hindenburg system lie sometimes to

1 See Map No, 9.

2 On a visit to England on the gth September, the Commander-in-Chief had indicated
that a change had taken place in the character of the war. A decision might be obtained
in the very near future.

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 279

the west, but more generally to the east of the line of the Scheldt
Canal.

The canal itself does not appear to have been organised as the
enemy's main line of resistance, but rather as an integral part of a
deep defensive system, the outstanding characteristic of which was
the skill with which it was sited so as to deny us effective artillery
positions from which to attack it* The chief role of the canal was
that of affording cover to resting troops and to the garrisons of the
main defensive trench lines during a bombardment* To this end
the canal lent itself admirably, and the fullest use was made by the
enemy of its possibilities*

The general configuration of the ground through which this
sector of the canal runs produces deep cuttings of a depth in places
of some sixty feet, while between Bellicourt and the neighbourhood
of Vendhuille the canal passes through a tunnel for a distance of
6,000 yards. In the sides of the cuttings the enemy had constructed
numerous tunnelled dug-outs and concrete shelters* Along the top
edge of them he had concealed well sited concrete or armoured
machine gun emplacements* The tunnel itself was used to provide
living accommodation for troops, and was connected by shafts with
the trenches above* South of Bellicourt the canal cutting gradually
becomes shallow, till at Bellenglise the canal lies almost at ground
level* South of Bellenglise the canal is dry,

On the western side of the canal south of Bellicourt two thoroughly
organised and extremely heavily wired lines of continuous trench
run roughly parallel to the canal, at average distances from it of
2,000 and 1,000 yards respectively* Except in the tunnel sector the
double line of trenches known as the Hindenburg Line proper lies
immediately east of the canal, and is linked up by numerous com-
munication trenches with the trench lines west of it*

Besides these main features, numerous other trench lines, switch
trenches and communication trenches, for the most part heavily
wired, had been constructed at various points to meet local weak-
nesses or take advantage of local command of fire. At a distance of
about 4,000 yards behind the most easterly of these trench lines lies
a second double row of trenches known as the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme
line, very thoroughly wired and holding numerous concrete shelters
and machine gun emplacements* The whole series of defences, with
the numerous defended villages contained in it, formed a belt of
country varying from 7,000 to 10,000 yards in depth, organised by
the employment of every available means into a most powerful
system, well meriting the great reputation attached to it*

280 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI AND THE HINDENBURG LINE
fcyth September 5th October)

34* The battle of Cambrai, which on the 5th October culminated
in the capture of the last remaining sectors of the Hindenburg Line,
was commenced by the First and Third Armies,

Between the neighbourhood of St. Quentin and the Scheldt the
Fourth, Third and First Armies in the order named occupied on
the evening of the 26th September a line running from the village of
Selency (west of St. Quentin) to Gricourt and Pontruet and thence
east of Villeret and Lempire to Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt,
both exclusive* Thereafter the line continued northwards to Havrin-
court and Mceuvres, and thence along the west side of the Canal du
Nord to the floods of the Sensee at Ecourt St. Quentin*

On the First and Third Army fronts strong positions covering
the approaches to Cambrai between the Nord and Scheldt canals,
including the section of the Hindenburg Line itself north of Gouzeau-
court, were still in the enemy's possession. His trenches in this
sector faced south-west, and it was desirable that they should be
taken in the early stages of the operation, so as to render it easier for
the artillery of the Fourth Army to get into position. On the Fourth
Army front, where the heaviest blow was to fall, the exceptional
strength of the enemy's position made a prolonged bombardment
necessary* I therefore decided that a very heavy bombardment,
opened during the night of the 26th/2yth September along the
whole front of all three armies, should be followed on the morning
of the 2yth September by an attack delivered only by the First and
Third Armies. In this way the enemy might be deceived as to the
main point of attack, the First and Third Armies would be enabled
to get nearer to their final objective, and the task of the Fourth
Army artillery would be simplified.

The Battle Opened

35. On the morning of the 26th September French and American
forces attacked on both sides of the Argonne, between the Meuse
and the Suippe rivers.

At 5.20 a.m. on the 2yth September the Third and First Armies
attacked with the IV., VI., XVII. and Canadian Corps in the direc-
tion of Cambrai on a front of about 13 miles from Gouseaucourt to
the neighbourhood of Sauchy Lestree* The success of the northern
part of the attack depended upon the ability of our troops to debouch
from the neighbourhood of Mceuvres, and to secure the crossings
of the Canal du Nord in that locality* The northern portion of the

Line

Morning "2:7 th
Evening "

BATTLE OF CAMBRAI & THE HINDENBURG LINE

Cambrai Attack, 2yth September, 1918.

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 281

canal was too formidable an obstacle to be crossed in the face of the
enemy. It was therefore necessary for the attacking divisions to
force a passage on a comparatively narrow front about Mceuvres,
and thereafter turn the line of the canal farther north by a divergent
attack developed fan-wise from the point of crossing. This difficult
manoeuvre was carried out successfully, and on the whole front of
attack our infantry, assisted by some sixty-five tanks, broke deeply
into the enemy's position.

The attack proceeded according to plan from the commence-
ment. On the right strong resistance was encountered at Beaucamp,
Several strong counter-attacks were made during the day in this
neighbourhood, but in spite of them troops of the 5th and 42nd
Divisions successfully established the right flank of our attack
between Beaucamp and Ribecourt. The 3rd Division moved for-
ward with the Guards, forcing the crossings of the canal in face of
heavy fire from machine guns and forward field guns, and captured
Ribecourt and Flesquieres, The Guards Division (Major-General
T, G, Matheson) took Orival Wood and reached the neighbour*-
hood of Premy Chapel, where the 2nd Division (Major-General
C, E. Pereira) took up the advance,

In the centre the 52nd Division (Major-General F, J, Marshall),
passing its troops across the canal by bridgeheads previously estab-
lished by the 57th Division, 1 on the opening of the assault carried
the German trench lines east of the canal and gained the high ground
overlooking Graincourt, On their left the 63rd Division and the
4th and ist Canadian Divisions (under command of Major-Generals
Sir D, Watson and A. C, MacDonell) moved under cover of dark-
ness down the west bank of the canal between Mceuvres and Sains-
lez-Marquion, In the half light of dawn these three divisions
stormed the line of the canal itself, and advanced on Graincourt,
Anneux, Bourlon and the slopes to the north of the latter village.

As soon as the line of the canal had been secured our engineer
troops commenced the construction of bridges, completing their
task with remarkable speed and working with great gallantry under
the fire of the German guns. Greatly assisted by their efforts our
advance continued. Obstinate resistance was met with at Grain-
court, and it was not until late in the day that the village was finally
surrounded and captured by the 63rd Division, The 5yth Division
(Major-General R, W, R, Barnes) meanwhile had passed through
and carried the line forward east of Anneux to Fontaine-Notre-
Dame, Bourlon had been carried by the 4th Canadian Division,
and the 3rd Canadian Division (Major-General F, O, W, Loomis)

1 This is incorrect. There were no bridgeheads at this time and the crossings were
forced by the 52nd Division at the opening of their attack.

282 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

had passed through at Bourlon Wood, which was wholly in our
possession*

On the left the ist Canadian Division, having seised Sains-les-
Marquion early in the attack, advanced with the nth Division
(Major-General H. R, Davies) and took Haynecourt, while the
latter division captured Epinoy and Oisy-le- Verger, On the extreme
left the 56th Division of the XXIL Corps crossed the canal and
having cleared Sauchy Lestre*e and Sauchy Cauchy, moved north-
wards towards PallueL

At the end of the day our troops had reached the general line
Beaucamp Ribecourt Fontaine-Notre-Dame east of Haynecourt
Epinoy Oisy-le- Verger, and had taken over 10,000 prisoners and
200 guns.

Next day the advance on this front was continued, and Gouzeau-
court, Marcoing, Noyelles - sur - TEscaut, Fontaine-Notre-Dame,
Sailly and Palluel were taken. At Marcoing our troops established
themselves on the east bank of the Scheldt Canal and on the northern
flank entered Aubencheul-au-Bac.

The Hindenburg Line Broken

36, The heavy and continuous bombardment opened on the
morning of the 27th September, had been maintained by the Fourth
Army along its whole front without intermission for two days. The
intensity of our fire drove the enemy's garrisons to take refuge in
their deep dug-outs and tunnels, and made it impossible for his
carrying parties to bring up food and ammunition.

At 5,50 a,m. on the 2gth September, under an intense artillery
barrage, General Rawlinson's Fourth Army attacked on a front of
12 miles, between Holnon and Vendhuille, with the IX,, II, Ameri-
can (General G, W. Read commanding) and III, Corps, a strong
force of tanks, manned by British and American crews, accompany-
ing the infantry. On the right of the Fourth Army the French First
Army continued the line of attack in the St, Quentin sector. On the
left the V, and IV, Corps of the Third Army had attacked at an
earlier hour between Vendhuille and Marcoing, and had heavy fight-
ing about Villers Guislain, Gonnelieu and Welsh Ridge,

On the Fourth Army front, the 46th Division (Major-General
G, F, Boyd) greatly distinguished itself in the capture of Bellenglise,
The village is situated in the angle of the Scheldt Canal, which, after
running in a southerly direction from Bellicourt, here bends sharply
to the east towards the Le Tronquoy Tunnel, Equipped with life-
belts, and carrying mats and rafts, the 46th Division stormed the
western arm of the canal at Bellenglise and to the north of it, some

Lfne morning 29th Sept.
evening "

Scale . .* b. ..^q mile.

BATTLE OF CAMBRAI & THE HINDENBURG LINE
Hindenburg Line Attack, 29th September, 1918.

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 383

crossing the canal on footbridges which the enemy was given no
time to destroy, others dropping down the sheer sides of the canal
wall, and, having swum or waded to the far side, climbing up the
farther wall to the German trench lines on the eastern bank. Having
captured these trenches, the attacking troops swung to the right and
took from flank and rear the German defences along the eastern arm
of the canal and on the high ground south of the canal, capturing
many prisoners and German batteries in action before the enemy
had had time to realise the new direction of the attack. So thorough
and complete was the organisation for this attack, and so gallantly,
rapidly and well was it executed by the troops, that this one division
took on this day over 4,000 prisoners and 70 guns.

On the remainder of the front, also, our attack met with remark-
able success. South of Bellenglise, the ist Division (Major-General
E. P. Strickland), with the 6th Division covering their flank, crossed
the ridge north-west of Thorigny and reached the west end of the
Le Tronquoy Tunnel. Here they gained touch with the 32nd Divi-
sion, who had passed through the 46th Division and taken Lehau-
court and Magny la Fosse. 1 North of Bellenglise, the 3oth American
Division (Major-General E. M. Lewis) having broken through the
deep defences of the Hindenburg Line, stormed Bellicourt and
seized Nauroy. On their left the ayth American Division (Major-
General J. F. O'Ryan) met with very heavy enfilade machine gun
fire, but pressed on with great gallantry as far as Bony, where a
bitter struggle took place for the possession of the village.

Fighting on the whole front of the II. American Corps was
severe, and in Bellicourt, Nauroy, Gillemont Farm, and at a number
of other points amid the intricate defences of the Hindenburg Line,
strong bodies of the enemy held out with great obstinacy for many
hours. These points of resistance were gradually overcome, either
by the support troops of the American divisions or by the 5th and
3rd Australian Divisions (Major-Generals Sir J. J. T. Hobbs and
J. Gellibrand), which, moving up close behind the American troops,
were soon heavily engaged. 2 On the left of the attack the I2th and
1 8th Divisions cleared the slopes above Vendhuille.

Meanwhile the Third Army captured Masnieres and secured the
crossings of the Scheldt Canal between that village and the out-
skirts of Cambrai, while the Canadian Corps made progress north-
west of that town, taking St. Olle and Sancourt.

For the next two days our attacks continued on all fronts. On

1 Both these villages were taken by the 46th Division. The 32nd Division continued
the attack upon Levergies and captured Le Tronquoy on this day, not the joth as
stated in the text. The Sketch Map is also incorrect in this particular.

* The original plan was for the Australian divisions to go through the Americans
to secure more distant objectives. This became impossible.

284 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the 30th September the gap in the Hindenburg Line was enlarged
by the capture of Thorigny and Le Tronquoy by the ist and 32nd
Divisions, thus securing possession of the Le Tronquoy Tunnel, On
this day the enemy abandoned Villers Guislain and Gonnelieu, being
threatened with envelopment, and withdrew behind the Scheldt Canal,

Next day, the IX, and Australian Corps attacked in conjunction
with the French First Army, who occupied St, Quentin, Levergies
was taken by the 32nd Division and Australian troops captured
Joncourt, Estre'es and Bony, establishing our line well to the north
and east of the latter village.

In the Cambrai sector, the New Zealand and 3rd Divisions took
Crevecoeur and Rumilly, while north of Cambrai the Canadian
Corps cleared the high ground west of Ramillies and entered Bl-
court. The fighting on the Canadian front at this period was particu-
larly severe, and our troops displayed great courage and determination.
The enemy employed large forces, amounting to at least eleven
divisions in the space of five days, in his attempt to check our
advance, and counter-attacked frequently and in strength,

Montbrehain and Beaurevoir

37. During the first week of October the Cambrai battle was
completed by a series of successful minor operations, in which the
breach driven through the Hindenburg Line, and such prepared
defences as lay behind it, was widened,

On the 3rd October the Fourth Army attacked between Seque-
hart and Le Catelet and captured those villages and Ramicourt,
together with the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line on that front. In this
operation the 5oth Division took Gouy and Le Catelet after heavy
and prolonged fighting, in which a number of counter-attacks were
beaten off.

In the course of the next two days, other local improvements
were effected in our line in this sector, and the villages of Mont-
brehain and Beaurevoir were captured after hard fighting, in which
tanks did good service. Our advance compelled the enemy to evacuate
the high ground about La Terriere, in the bend of the Scheldt Canal
between La Catelet and Crevecceur, with the result that on the
5th October the right of the Third Army was able to cross the
Scheldt Canal and occupy the Hindenburg Line east of it, thereby
greatly simplifying our arrangements for our next attack,

Results of Breaking the Hindenburg Line

38, The great and critical assaults in which during these nine
days of battle the First, Third and Fourth Armies stormed the line

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 285

of the Canal du Nord and broke through the Hindenburg Line mark
the close of the first phase of the British offensive. The enemy's
defence in the last and strongest of his prepared positions had been
shattered. The whole of the main Hindenburg defences had passed
into our possession, and a wide gap had been driven through such
rear trench systems as had existed behind them. The effect of the
victory upon the subsequent course of the campaign was decisive.
The threat to the enemy's communications was now direct and
instant, for nothing but the natural obstacles of a wooded and well-
watered country-side lay between our Armies and Maubeuge.

In the fighting of these days, in which thirty British and two
American infantry divisions and one British cavalry division were
engaged against thirty-nine German divisions, over 36,000 prisoners
and 380 guns had been captured. Great as were the material losses
the enemy had suffered, the effect of so overwhelming a defeat upon
a moral already deteriorated was of even larger importance.

Combined with the events in Flanders presently narrated, the
advance we had made opened a new threat to the German positions
on the Lys front.

THE BATTLE IN FLANDERS

39. As indicated above in para. 13, the general strategic plan of
the Allies contemplated the development of operations on the Flanders
front. The details of these operations were settled at a conference
held by the Commander-in- Chief of the Allied Armies at Cassel on
the gth September. The force to be engaged was to be placed under
the command of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, and was to
consist of the Belgian Army, some French divisions, and all the
artillery and a certain number of divisions of the Second British
Army, commanded by General Sir H. Plumer. To the definite plan
then laid down I gladly gave my assent.

Accordingly at 5.30 a,m. on the 28th September the XIX. and
II. Corps of the Second Army attacked without preliminary bom-
bardment on a front of some 4^ miles south of the Ypres-Zonnebeke
Road. The I4th Division (Major-General P. C. B. Skinner), 35th
Division (Major-General A. H. Marindin), 29th and 9th Divisions
delivered the initial assault, being supported in the later stages of
the battle by the 4ist Division (Major-General Sir S. T. B. Law-
ford) and the 36th Division (Major-General C. Coffin). On the left
of the II. Corps the Belgian Army continued the line of attack as
far as Dixmude.

On both the British and Belgian fronts the attack was a brilliant
success. The enemy, who was attempting to hold his positions with
less than five divisions, was driven rapidly from the whole of the

386 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

high ground east of Ypres, so fiercely contested during the battles of
1917* By the end of the day the British divisions had passed far
beyond the farthest limits of the 1917 battles, and had reached and
captured Kortewilde, Zandvoorde, Kruiseecke and Becelaere. On
their left Belgian troops had taken Zonnebeke, Poelcapelle and
Schaap Baillie, and cleared the enemy from Houthulst Forest.

South of the main attack, successful minor enterprises by the
3ist, 3oth (Major-General W. de L. Williams) and 34th British
Divisions carried our line forward to St. Yves and the outskirts of
Messines. Wytschaete was captured, and after sharp fighting our
troops established themselves along the line of the ridge between
Wytschaete and the canal north of Hollebeke.

During the succeeding days, despite continuous rain and great
difficulties from the scarcity of practicable roads, the British and
Belgian forces followed up the defeated enemy with the utmost
vigour. On the 29th September our troops drove the German rear-
guards from Ploegsteert Wood and Messines and captured Terhand
and Dadiseele. By the evening of the ist October they had cleared
the left bank of the Lys from Comines southwards, while north of
that town they were close up to Wervicq, Gheluwe and Ledeghem.
On their left the Belgian Army had passed the general line Moorslede-
Staden-Dixmude.

In these most successful operations and their subsequent develop-
ments the British forces alone captured at light cost over 5,000
prisoners and 100 guns.

The Withdrawal from Lens and Armentieres

40. Once more the effect of our successes showed itself rapidly.

At the beginning of September the enemy had withdrawn from
his outpost positions astride the La Bassee Canal, and the activity
of our patrols led to sharp fighting, in which the i6th (Major-General
A. B. Ritchie), 55th (Major-General Sir H. S. Jeudwine) and igth
Divisions advanced our line close up to the outskirts of La Bassee.
Thenceforward the situation on the Lys front had remained prac-
tically unchanged until the 3Oth September, when the divisions of
General Sir W. R. Bird wood's Fifth Army made certain small
advances south of the Lys. On the 2nd October, however, the
enemy once more began an extensive withdrawal, falling back on
the whole front from south of Lens to Armentieres. In the sector
south of Lens, indeed, patrols of the 2Oth Division (Major-General
G. G. S. Carey) met with considerable resistance on this day about
Acheville and Meri court, but progress was made. During the next
two days the movement continued, under vigorous pressure from

, Line

Worning 8tb Oct.
%ening
Iryninc loth Oct

FINAL BRITISH OFFENSIVE SECOND BATTLE OF LE CATEAU
8th October, 1918

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 287

our troops. By the evening of the 4th October north of Lens we
had reached the general line Vendin le Vieil-Wavrin-'Erquinghem-
Houplines, where the increasing strength of the enemy's resistance
indicated that he intended to stand at any rate for a time. South of
Lens the withdrawal slackened about this date on the general line
Fresnoy-Sallaumines- Vendin le Vieil, but shortly afterwards the
development of our operations on the St. Quentin-Cambrai front
forced upon the enemy a further retreat in this sector*

SECOND PHASE : THE FIGHTING IN OPEN COUNTRY
THE SECOND BATTLE OF LE CATEAU (8th-i2th October)

41. The second and concluding phase of the British offensive
now opened, in which the Fourth and Third Armies and the right of
the First Army moved forward with their left flank on the canal line
which runs from Cambrai to Mons, and their right covered by the
French First Army. This advance, by the capture of Maubeuge
and the disruption of the German main lateral system of communi-
cations, forced the enemy to fall back upon the line of the Meuse
and realised the strategic plan of the Allied operations.

The fighting which took place during this period, being in effect
the development and exploitation of the Hindenburg Line victory,
falls into three stages, the breaks between the different battles being
due chiefly to the depth of our advances and the difficulties of re-
establishing communications*

In the first of these stages, the battle of Le Cateau, certain incom-
plete defences still held by the enemy were captured, and his troops
compelled to evacuate Cambrai and fall back behind the line of the
Selle River. In the second stage, the Selle River was forced, and by
a development of this operation our front pushed forward to the
general line Sambre Canal west edge of the Mormal Forest
Valenciennes, where we were in position for the final assault upon
Maubeuge.

42* Having completed their arrangements, at 4.30 a.m. and
5.10 a.m. respectively on the 8th October the Third and Fourth
Armies attacked on a front of over 17 miles from Sequehart to south
of Cambrai. French troops continued the line of attack on our right
as far south as St. Quentin. Farther south, French and American
troops attacked on this day east of the Meuse and in Champagne,
and made important progress.

On the British battle front our infantry and tanks penetrated

288 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

the enemy's positions to a depth of between three and four miles,
passing rapidly over the incomplete trench lines above referred to
and gaining the open country beyond* Strong at the outset of our
attack, during the later stages opposition weakened. Brancourt and
Pre*mont were taken by the 3oth American Division, while to the
north of them the 66th Division (Major-General H. K. Bethell),
attacking beside the 25th Division (Major-General J. R. E. Charles),
captured Serain. Villers Outreaux was cleared by the 38th Division
with the assistance of tanks after heavy righting, and late in the
afternoon Malincourt was captured. The New Zealand Division
passed through Lesdain and took Esnes, while on the left of the
attack, the 3rd, 2nd and 63rd Divisions captured Seranvillers,
Forenville and Niergnies after very heavy fighting, in the course of
which the enemy counter-attacked with tanks. On the extreme left
the 5yth Division made progress in the southern outskirts of Cambrai.

As the result of this attack the enemy's resistance temporarily
gave way. His infantry became disorganised and retired steadily
eastwards, while our airmen reported that the roads converging on
Le Cateau were blocked with troops and transport. Several thousand
prisoners and many guns fell into our hands. During the following
night the Canadian Corps captured Ramillies and crossed the Scheldt
Canal at Pont d'Aire. Canadian patrols entered Cambrai from the
north and joined hands with patrols of the 5yth Division working
through the southern portion of the town. Next morning at 5.20 a.m.
the Fourth and Third Armies resumed the attack on the whole
front, cavalry assisting in the advance. By nightfall our troops were
within two miles of Le Cateau, had captured Bohain, and were
attacking Caudry from the south. Cambrai was in our hands, and
our troops were three miles to the east of the town.

In this day's fighting cavalry again did valuable and gallant
work, hurrying the enemy in his retreat and preventing him from
completing the destruction of the railway which runs from St.
Quentin to Busigny and Cambrai. When our infantry were held up
by heavy machine gun fire from Cattigny Wood and Clary, a dashing
charge by the Fort Garry Horse gained a footing in Cattigny Wood
and assisted our infantry to press forward. Farther east, Dragoon
Guards and Canadian Cavalry were instrumental in the capture of
Honnechy, Reumont and Troisvilles.

On the loth October our progress continued, though the enemy's
resistance gradually stiffened as our troops approached the line of
the river Selle, and attempts made by the cavalry to cross that
stream had to be abandoned. That night we had reached the out-
skirts of Riquerval Wood, and held the west bank of the Selle river
thence as far as Viesly, whence our line ran past St. Hilaire and

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 289

Avesnes, taken by the Guards and 24th Divisions, to the Scheldt at
Thun St* Martin*

During these days the French First Army on our right advanced
its line east of St* Quentin, clearing the west bank of the Oise-
Sambre Canal as far north as Bernot*

The Withdrawal from Laon

43* By this advance, in which 20 British infantry divisions, two
British cavalry divisions, and one American infantry division routed
24 German divisions and took from them 12,000 prisoners and 250
guns, we gained full possession of the important lateral double line
of railway running from St* Quentin through Busigny to Cambrai*
During the repair of such portions of it as had been destroyed and
the removal of delay action mines left by the enemy, our line was
carried forward by local operations* By the i3th October we had
reached the Selle river at all points south of Haspres, and had
established bridgeheads at a number of places*

Meanwhile, on the yth October, under close pressure from our
troops, the enemy had extended the flank of his withdrawal south
of Lens, and on that day the 8th Division had captured Biache St*
Vaast and Oppy, with some hundreds of prisoners* After the launch-
ing of our attack on the 8th October, this movement continued with
increased rapidity* By the evening of the i3th October, our troops
had reached the western suburbs of Douai, and were close up to the
west banks of the Sensed Deviation and Haute Deule Canals on the
whole front from Arleux (south of Douai) to Vendin le Vieil,

During this period also our Allies had been pushing forward
steadily on both sides of the Argonne* Held by their attacks on his
southern flank, while to the north the British offensive was driving
forward rapidly behind his right, the enemy was forced to evacuate
his positions in the Laon salient* Signs of a widespread German
withdrawal were reported on the nth October, and by the evening of
the 1 3th October Laon was in French hands*

The Advance in Flanders Resumed

44* While these great events were taking place to the south of
them, the Allied Forces in Flanders were busily engaged in re-
establishing adequate communications in the area of the old Ypres
battles* By dint of great exertions, and the most careful organisation
of traffic routes, by the end of the second week in October the restora-
tion of the Allied systems of communications was sufficiently far
advanced to permit of a resumption of the offensive*

290 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Accordingly, at 5*35 a.m. on the iqth October, the British,
Belgian and French forces under command of His Majesty the King
of the Belgians, attacked on the whole front between the Lys River
at Comines and Dixmude.

The British sector extended for a distance of between nine and
ten miles from Comines to the hamlet of St. Pieter, on the Menin-
Roulers Road* The assault was launched by the X., XIX,, and II.
Corps of General Plumer's Second Army, under command respec-
tively of Lieut.-General R. B. Stephens, Lieut.-General Sir
H. E. Watts and Lieut.-General Sir C. W. Jacob, employing
respectively the 3Oth and 34th Divisions, the 4ist and 35th
Divisions, and the 36th, agth and 9th Divisions,

The Allied attack was again attended by complete success. The
two southern British Corps advanced their line according to pro-
gramme to the southern edge of the rising ground overlooking
Wervicq, Menin and Wevelghem, in spite of very considerable
resistance. Meanwhile, the II, Corps, after heavy righting, pene-
trated to a depth of between three and four miles eastwards, captur-
ing Moorseele and making progress beyond it to within a short
distance of Gulleghem and Steenbeek, On our left Belgian troops
reached Iseghem, French troops surrounded Roulers, while farther
north other Belgian divisions took Cortemarck,

During the ensuing days our success was vigorously exploited,
By the afternoon of the i6th October we held the north bank of the
Lys from Frelinghien to opposite Harlebeke, and had crossed the
river at a number of points. To the north of us our Allies also had
made striking progress. Before nightfall on the I5th October Thour-
out was surrounded, and next day the enemy retired rapidly, Ostend
fell on the zyth October, and three days later the northern flank of
the Allied line rested on the Dutch frontier.

In these operations and others of a lesser nature, carried out on
the last day of the month after the withdrawal next mentioned, the
British forces operating on this battle front captured over 6,000
prisoners and 210 guns,

The Evacuation of Lille

45, Our advance north of the Lys had brought our troops far
to the east of the Lille defences on the northern side, while our
progress on the Le Cateau front had turned the Lille defences from
the south. The German forces between the Sensee and the Lys
were once more compelled to withdraw, closely followed by our
troops, who constantly drove in their rearguards and took a number
of prisoners. The enemy was given no opportunity to complete the

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 291

removal of his stores and the destruction of roads and bridges, or to
evacuate the civil population*

The movement began on the I5th October, when, in spite of
considerable opposition, our troops crossed the Haute Deule Canal
on a wide front north of Pont-d-Vendin. By the evening of the I7th
October the 8th Division of General Sir A, Hunter Weston's
VIIL Corps had entered Douai and the 57th and 59th Divisions
(Major-General N. M. Smyth) of Lieut.-General Sir R. C. B.
Haking's XL Corps were on the outskirts of Lille. At 5.50 a.m. on
the 1 8th October our troops had encircled Lille, which was clear of
the enemy. During the day our line was carried far to the east of
these towns and east of Roubaix and Tourcoing, occupied by the
4Oth and 3ist Divisions (Major-General Sir W. E. Peyton com-
manding 4oth Division) of Lieut.-General Sir H. de B. de Lisle 's
XV. Corps. Thereafter our troops pressed forward steadily, until
by the evening of the 22nd October they had reached the general
line of the Scheldt on the whole front from Valenciennes to the
neighbourhood of Avelghem.

THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE RIVER (iyth-25th October)
The Forcing of the River Crossings

46. Meanwhile, communications on the Le Cateau front were
improving, and it was possible to recommence operations of a more
than local character for the forcing of the Selle positions and the
attainment of the general line Sambre et Oise Canal west edge of
the Foret de Mormal Valenciennes. This advance would bring
the important railway junction at Aulnoye within effective range of
our guns. 1

Our operations were opened on the iyth October by an attack
by the Fourth Army on a front of about ten miles from Le Cateau
southwards, in conjunction with the French First Army operating
west of the Sambre et Oise Canal. The assault launched at 5.20 a.m.
was delivered by the IX., II. American and XIII. Corps, employing
respectively the 46th, ist and 6th Divisions, the 3Oth and 2yth
American Divisions, and the 5oth and 66th Divisions.

The enemy was holding the difficult wooded country east of
Bohain and the line of the Selle north of it in great strength, his
infantry being well supported by artillery. During the first two
days his resistance was obstinate ; but the attacking British and
American troops made good progress. By the evening of the I9th

1 At Aulnoye the main line from Mezidres and Hirson links up with the main line
to Maubeuge, Charleroi and Germany.

292 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

October, after much severe fighting, the enemy had been driven
across the Sambre et Oise Canal at practically all points south of
Catillon, whence our line followed the valley of the Richemont east
and north of Le Cateau.

This success was followed at 2*0 a. m* on the 2oth October by an
attack upon the line of the Selle river north of Le Cateau* The
troops employed were the 38th, lyth, 5th, 42nd, 62nd, Guards and
1 9th Divisions of the Third Army, and the 4th Division on the right
of the First Army in that order from right to left*

On this occasion also the enemy's resistance was serious, and he
had been able to erect wire entanglements along the greater part of
the line* Our advance was strongly contested at every point, fre-
quent counter-attacks being made* Supported by a number of
tanks which had successfully crossed the river, our infantry, after
severe fighting about Neuvilly, Amerval, Solesmes and Haspres,
gained their objectives on the high ground east of the Selle, pushing
out patrols as far as the river Harpies* North of Haspres other
troops of the First Army continued to make progress on both sides
of the Scheldt Canal, reaching the slopes overlooking the left
bank of the ficaillon River and occupying Denain*

47* The capture of the Selle positions was followed almost
immediately by the larger operation for the attainment of the re-
quired general line above-mentioned running from the Sambre
Canal along the edge of the Mormal Forest to the neighbourhood
of Valenciennes,

The original front of attack stretched from east of Masinghien
to Maison Bleue, north-east of Haussy, a distance of some fifteen
miles* The assault was opened by the Fourth Army at 1,20 a*m
on the 2^rd October and was delivered by the IX* and XIII* Corps,
employing respectively the ist and 6th Divisions and the 25th and
1 8th Divisions* The Third Army again attacked with the V*, IV,, VI.
and XVII* Corps, employing respectively the 33rd and 2ist Divi-
sions, the 5th, 42nd, 37th and New Zealand Divisions, the 3rd
and 2nd Divisions and the igth Division* On the second day the
6ist Division of the XVII, Corps and the 4th Division and 5ist
Division of the XXII, Corps, First Army, extended the line of
attack for a further five miles northwards to the Scheldt,

The unfavourable weather of the preceding day had made it
difficult to locate the enemy's batteries, and during the earlier stages
of the battle hostile artillery fire was heavy. Despite this, and in
spite of determined opposition at many points from the German
machine gunners, in two days our infantry and tanks realised an
advance of six miles over difficult country. About many of the

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY

393

woods and villages which lay in the way of our attack there was
severe fighting, particularly in the large wood known as the Bois
I'fiveque and at Pommereuil, Bousies Forest and Vendegies-sur-
ficaillon* This latter village held out till the afternoon of the 24th
October, when it was taken by an enveloping attack by troops of
the igth Division and 6ist Division*

At the end of that day the western outskirts of the Fort dc
Mormal had been reached, our troops were within a mile of Le
Quesnoy and to the north-west of that town had captured the villages
of Ruesnes and Maing* Local operations during the following three
days gave us Englefontaine and established our line well to the north
and east of the Le Quesnoy- Valenciennes railway, from the out-
skirts of Le Quesnoy, past Sepmeries and Artres to Famars.

The Enemy's Position at the End of October

48, By this time the rapid succession of heavy blows dealt by
the British forces had had a cumulative effect, both moral and
material, upon the German Armies* The difficulty of replacing the
enemy's enormous losses in guns, machine guns and ammunition
had increased with every fresh attack, and his reserves of men were
exhausted* In the Selle battle the twenty-four British and two
American divisions engaged had captured a further 20,000 prisoners
and 475 guns from the thirty-one German divisions opposed to
them, and had advanced to a great depth with certainty and pre-
cision* Though troops could still be found to offer resistance to our
initial assault, the German infantry and machine gunners were no
longer reliable, and cases were being reported of their retiring
without fighting in front of our artillery barrage*

The capitulation of Turkey and Bulgaria and the imminent
collapse of Austria consequent upon Allied successes which the
desperate position of her own armies on the western front had
rendered her powerless to prevent had made Germany's military
situation ultimately impossible. If her armies were allowed to with-
draw undisturbed to shorter lines, the struggle might still be pro-
tracted over the winter* The British Armies, however, were now in
a position to prevent this by a direct attack upon a vital centre, which
should anticipate the enemy's withdrawal and force an immediate
conclusion*

THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE (ist-nth November)

49* The principal British attack was to take place at the beginning
of November, as soon as possible after the capture of Valenciennes,

294 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

which I regarded as a necessary preliminary* In view of the likeli-
hood of fresh withdrawals, time was of importance* Accordingly, at
5*15 a,m* on the ist November, the XVIL Corps of the Third Army
and the XXIL and Canadian Corps of the First Army attacked on a
front of about six miles south of Valenciennes, and in the course of
two days of heavy fighting inflicted a severe defeat on the enemy*
During these two days the 6ist Division (Major-General F, J.
Duncan), 49th Division (Major-General N, J, G, Cameron) and
4th Division (Major-General C, H, T, Lucas) crossed the Rhonelle
river, capturing Maresches and Preseau after a stubborn struggle,
and established themselves on the high ground two miles to the east
of it. On their left the 4th Canadian Division captured Valenciennes
and made progress beyond the town*

As a consequence of this defeat the enemy on the 3rd November
withdrew on the Le Quesnoy- Valenciennes front and our line was
advanced. There were indications that a further withdrawal was
contemplated both in the Tournai salient, where the line of the
Scheldt was turned by our progress on the battle front, and also in
the area to the south of us, where the enemy's positions were equally
threatened by our advance. Our principal attack was ready,

50, The front of the decisive attack delivered by the Fourth,
Third and First Armies on the 4th November extended for a dis-
tance of about thirty miles from the Sambre, north of Oisy, to
Valenciennes,

The nature of the country across which our advance was to be
made was most difficult. In the south the river had to be crossed
almost at the outset. In the centre the great Forest of Mormal,
though much depleted by German wood-cutting, still presented a
formidable obstacle. In the north the fortified town of Le Quesnoy,
and several streams which ran parallel to the line of our advance,
offered frequent opportunities for successful defence. On the other
hand cur troops had never been so confident of victory or so assured
of their own superiority.

After an intense bombardment our troops moved forward to the
assault at about dawn, under a most effective artillery barrage, and
very soon had penetrated the enemy's positions on the whole battle
front. Throughout the day their pressure was never relaxed, and
by the evening they had advanced to a depth of five miles, reaching
the general line Fesmy Landrecies centre of Foret de Mormal
Wargnies-le-Grand five miles east of Valenciennes Onnaing
Scheldt Canal opposite Thiers,

On the right of the attack the ist Division of the IX, Corps,
under the command of Lieut, -General Sir W, P, Braithwaite,

BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE
4th November, 1918

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY

295

starting at 545 a.m., captured Catillon, and proceeded to pass troops
across the Sambre at this place and at the lock some two miles to the
south of it. This difficult operation was accomplished with remark-
able rapidity and skill, and by 745 a.m. the ist Battalion Cameron
Highlanders and the ist Battalion Northampton Regiment were
east of the river. Bois 1'Abbaye, Hautreve and La Groise were
captured in turn, and though held up for a time at Fesmy, our troops
took this place also in a renewed attack at 4.0 p.m., subsequently
advancing well to the east of it.

The 32nd Division on the left of the IX. Corps met strong resist-
ance all along the river line. By hard fighting they forced a crossing
at Ors, and, pushing forward, took Mezieres and Heurtebise, reach-
ing the outskirts of La Folie. Later in the day other troops of this
division, having crossed the river south of Landrecies, moved
against La Folie from the north, and the village was captured.

Meanwhile the XIII. Corps, under command of Lieut .-General
Sir T. L. N. Morland, had attacked at 6.15 a.m. with the 25th, 5oth
and 1 8th Divisions, and quickly over-ran the enemy's positions,
despite strong opposition, which at Preux-au-Bois was maintained
until the village was completely surrounded by our infantry and
tanks. Severe fighting took place also about Landrecies, where a
battalion of the ist Guard Reserve Division had been specially
detailed to hold the bridgehead. Troops of the 25th Division, having
overcome this resistance, crossed the Sambre north and south of
Landrecies by means of rafts, and captured the town.

The divisions of the Third Army in the centre of the attack
also encountered stiff resistance at first, but when this was overcome
made rapid progress. The 38th and ijth Divisions of the V. Corps,
under command of Lieut.-General C. D. Shute, pushed far into the
Forest of Mormal. Before dawn on the 5th November, the 38th
Division had reached the eastern edge of the forest, while the iyth
Division, after sharp fighting about Locquignol, had penetrated a
mile to the east of that village.

On the IV. Corps front the 37th and New Zealand Divisions
repulsed a counter-attack north of Ghissignies early in the battle
with great loss to the enemy. Thereafter the 37th Division took
Louvignies and Jolimetz, with over 1,000 prisoners, and during the
late afternoon and evening pushed on to the centre of the forest. By
8.0 a.m. the New Zealand Division had already surrounded Le
Quesnoy. Without attempting to take the town by direct assault,
the New Zealand troops swept past and far to the east of it, captur-
ing Herbignies by the evening. Meanwhile we had gained a footing
on the ramparts surrounding Le Quesnoy, and at 4.0 p.m. the
German garrison over 1,000 strong surrendered.

296 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Opposite Orsinval the 62nd Division of the VL Corps attacked
at 5,20 a,m*, and as soon as that village had been taken the Guards
Division of the same corps attacked on the left of them* Both divi-
sions had hard fighting, but made good progress, capturing Frasnoy
and Preux-au-Sart, and reaching the western outskirts of Comme-
gnies. On the front of the XVIL Corps on the left of the Third Army
the enemy's resistance was less vigorous, though sharp fighting took
place about Wargnies-le-Petit, This village and Wargnies-le-Grand
were taken by the 24th Division (Major-General A, C. Daly) during
the afternoon, while the igth Division captured Bry and Eth.

On the front of the First Army the XXII, Corps and the Canadian
Corps advanced against little opposition, except on their right. Here
the nth and 56th Divisions, having crossed the Aunelle River and
captured the villages of Le Tries, Sebourg and Sebourquiaux, were
counter-attacked on the high ground east of the Aunelle and pressed
back slightly. The 4th and 3rd Canadian Divisions on their left
reached the outskirts of Rombies, and the eastern side of the marshes
north of Valenciennes,

In these operations and their developments twenty-six British
divisions utterly defeated thirty-two German divisions, and captured
19,000 prisoners and more than 450 guns. On our right the French
First Army, which had continued the line of attack southwards to
the neighbourhood of Guise, kept pace with our advance, taking
5,000 prisoners and a number of guns,

The Return to Mons

51, By this great victory the enemy's resistance was definitely
broken. On the night 4th/5th November his troops began to fall
back on practically the whole battle front. Throughout the following
days, despite continuous rain which imposed great hardships on
our troops, infantry and cavalry pressed forward with scarcely
a check, maintaining close touch with the rapidly retreating
Germans,

On the 5th November the troops of the Fourth Army realised a
further advance of some four miles, penetrating beyond Prisches
and Maroilles, On the Third Army front the 5th, 2ist and 33rd
Divisions pushed forward well to the east of Mormal Forest, while
farther north by the evening we were approaching Bavai, Only on
the First Army front was the resistance encountered at all serious.
Here, after regaining during the morning the ridge east of the Aunelle,
and capturing Roisin, Meaurain and Angreau, the divisions of the
XXII, Corps were held up for a time in front of Angre and along the
line of the Honnelle River,

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 297

Throughout the day the roads packed with the enemy's troops
and transport afforded excellent targets to our airmen, who took full
advantage of their opportunities, despite the unfavourable weather.
Over thirty guns, which bombs and machine gun fire from the air
had forced the enemy to abandon, were captured by a battalion of
the 25th Division in the fields near Le Preseau.

On the 6th November considerable opposition was again en-
countered on the front of the First Army, as well as on the left of
the Third Army* Angre, however, was captured, and the Honnelle
River crossed, while Canadian troops took Baisieux and QuieVre-
chain. During the night of the 6th/yth November the enemy's
resistance again weakened, and early on the morning of the yth
November the Guards Division entered Bavai. Next day Avesnes
fell into our hands, Hautmont was captured, and our troops reached
the outskirts of Maubeuge.

Meanwhile to the north of the Mons-Conde Canal our success
was bearing fruit* During the night of the yth/Sth November
numerous explosions were observed behind the German lines, and
on the following morning the VIII. Corps and I* Corps (Lieut.-
General Sir Arthur Holland) of the First and Fifth Armies were
able to move forward, occupying Conde" and crossing the Scheldt on
a considerable front south of Antoing. Farther north the enemy
abandoned his bridgehead at Tournai, and the western portion of
the town was occupied by our troops.

On the gth November the enemy was in general retreat on the
whole front of the British Armies. The fortress of Maubeuge was
entered by the Guards Division and the 62nd Division (Major-
General Sir R. D. Whigham), while the Canadians were approach-
ing Mons. The progress of the Fifth Army was accentuated, and
Peruwelz, Antoing and Tournai captured. The Second Army
crossed the Scheldt on its whole front and reached the outskirts of
Renaix.

Next day, the advance of the five British Armies continued,
cavalry and cyclists operating in advance of the infantry. Only in
the neighbourhood of Mons was any substantial opposition met
with. Here the Canadians advancing towards the town from
south and west, and working round it on the north, encountered an
organised and tenacious machine gun defence. Farther north our
cavalry were on the outskirts of Ath, and our line was far to the
east of Tournai. Renaix had been captured and our troops were
approaching Grammont.

In the early morning of the nth November the 3rd Canadian
Division captured Mons, the whole of the German defending force
being killed or taken prisoners.

298 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

The Armistice

53. At 1 1.0 a.m. on the nth November, in accordance with
instructions received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied
Armies, hostilities were suspended* At that hour the right of the
Fourth Army was east of the Franco-Belgian frontier and thence
northwards our troops had reached the general line Sivry Erquel-
innes Boussoit Jurbise Herchies Ghislenghien Lessines
Grammont.

The military situation on the British front on the morning of the
nth November can be stated very shortly. In the fighting since the
ist November our troops had broken the enemy's resistance beyond
possibility of recovery, and had forced on him a disorderly retreat
along the whole front of the British Armies. Thereafter, the enemy
was capable neither of accepting nor refusing battle. The utter
confusion of his troops, the state of his railways congested with
abandoned trains, the capture of huge quantities of rolling stock and
material, all showed that our attack had been decisive. It had been
followed on the north by the evacuation of the Tournai salient, and
to the south, where the French forces had pushed forward in con-
junction with us, by a rapid and costly withdrawal to the line of
the Meuse.

The strategic plan of the Allies had been realised with a com-
pleteness rarely seen in war. When the armistice was signed by the
enemy his defensive powers had already been definitely destroyed.
A continuance of hostilities could only have meant disaster to the
German Armies and the armed invasion of Germany. 1

The Work of the Troops

53. In three months of epic fighting the British Armies in France
have brought to a sudden and dramatic end the great wearing-out
battle of the past four years.

In our admiration for this outstanding achievement, the long
years of patient and heroic struggle by which the strength and spirit
of the enemy were gradually broken down cannot be forgotten. The
strain of those years was never ceasing, the demands they made upon
the best of the Empire's manhood are now known. Yet throughout
all those years, and amid the hopes and disappointments they brought

1 The reasons which decided the Allies not to continue hostilities are referred to
in the final Despatch, page 316 below. Supply difficulties would have very greatly delayed
our advance. Widespread damage would have been caused to the country through
which we passed, and further casualties must have been incurred. On the other hand,
the Armistice in effect amounted to complete surrender by the enemy, and all that
could have been gained by fighting came into our hands more speedily and at less cost.

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 299

with them, the confidence of our troops in final victory never wavered.
Their courage and resolution rose superior to every test, their cheer-
fulness never failing, however terrible the conditions in which they
lived and fought* By the long road they trod with so much faith and
with such devoted and self-sacrificing bravery we have arrived at
victory, and to-day they have their reward.

The work begun and persevered in so steadfastly by those brave
men has been completed during the present year with a thorough-
ness to which the event bears witness, and with a gallantry which
will live for all time in the history of our country. The annals of war
hold record of no more wonderful recovery than that which, three
months after the tremendous blows showered upon them on the
Somme and on the Lys, saw the undefeated British Armies advanc-
ing from victory to victory, driving their erstwhile triumphant
enemy back to and far beyond the line from which he started, and
finally forcing him to acknowledge unconditional defeat.

The great series of victories won by the British forces between
the 8th August and the nth November is the outstanding feature
of the events described in this Despatch, At Amiens and Bapaume,
in the breaking of the Drocourt-Queant and Hindenburg systems,
before Le Cateau and on the Selle, in Flanders and on the Sambre,
the enemy was again and again brought to battle and defeated.

In the decisive contests of this period, the strongest and most
vital parts of the enemy's front were attacked by the British, his
lateral communications were cut and his best divisions fought to a
standstill. On the different battle fronts 187,000 prisoners and
2,850 guns were captured by us, bringing the total of our prisoners
for the present year to over 201,000. Immense numbers of machine
guns and trench mortars were taken also, the figures of those actually
counted exceeding 29,000 machine guns and some 3,000 trench
mortars. These results were achieved by 59 fighting British divi-
sions, which in the course of three months of battle engaged and
defeated 99 separate German divisions.

This record furnishes the proof of the skill of our commanders
and their staffs, as well as of the fine fighting qualities of the British
regimental officer and soldier. It is a proof also of the overwhelm-
ingly decisive part played by the British Armies on the western front
in bringing the enemy to his final defeat,

It is an accepted military doctrine that in good defensive posi-
tions any given force can hold up an attacking force of considerably
greater numbers. This doctrine was proved in the fighting of March
and April of this year, when, despite the enormous superiority of
force which the enemy was able to concentrate against the right of
the British Armies, all his efforts to effect a definite break-through

300 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

were frustrated by our defence. Yet, as has been seen, when the tide
of battle turned and the British Armies advanced to the attack,
throughout practically the whole of the long succession of battles
which ended in the complete destruction of the German powers of
resistance, the attacking British troops were numerically inferior to
the German forces they defeated.

It would be impossible to devise a more eloquent testimony to
the unequalled spirit and determination of the British soldier, of all
ranks and Services. We have been accustomed to be proud of the
great and noble traditions handed down to us by the soldiers of
bygone days. The men who form the Armies of the Empire to-day
have created new traditions which are a challenge to the highest
records of the past and will be an inspiration to the generations who
come after us.

Infantry

Despite the enormous development of mechanical invention in
every phase of warfare, the place which the infantryman has always
held as the main substance and foundation of an army is as secure
to-day as in any period of history. The infantryman remains the
backbone of defence and the spearhead of the attack. At no time
has the reputation of the British infantryman been higher, or his
achievement more worthy of his renown. During the past three
months, the same infantry divisions have advanced to the attack day
after day and week after week with an untiring irresistible ardour
which refused to be denied. No praise can be too high for the valour
they have shown, no gratitude too deep for the work they have
accomplished,

Artillery

Four years of scientific warfare have seen a consistent and pro-
gressive development in the power and influence of artillery, both
in the actual infantry battle and in all the stages which lead up to it.
Despite the handicap under which we started the war, British artil-
lery has played a large part in that development and of late has
dominated the enemy's artillery to an ever-increasing degree. The
influence of this fact upon the moral both of our own and the enemy's
troops could scarcely be exaggerated.

During the present year the greater number of guns available
for our use and the amount and regularity of our ammunition supply,
combined with the enemy's weakened powers of resistance, due to
the bitter fighting of the past two years, have for the most part led
to the substitution of sudden and intense outburst of fire for the
prolonged destructive bombardments which preceded our attacks

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY

301

in 1917* All ranks of the artillery have adapted themselves to these
new conditions with complete success, and in the rapid movements
of the latter stages of our advance have shown the highest technical
skill and most indefatigable energy. The accuracy and intensity of
our barrages, frequently arranged at short notice and with little
opportunity being given for ranging or previous reconnoitring of
the ground, have contributed largely to the success of our infantry
attacks. The intimate co-operation between artillery and infantry,
which is the first requisite in modern war, has been a marked feature
of our operations,

Cavalry

The more open character of the recent fighting at once brought
prominently to notice the fact that cavalry is still a necessary arm in
modern war. On a number of occasions, to some of which short
reference has been made in this Report, important results have been
obtained by the use of cavalry, particularly in combination with light
tanks and mobile machine gun units* Such increased opportunities
as have been offered them have been seized and utilised by the
cavalry with promptness and effect* Both in the development of the
successes of our infantry attacks and in following up the various
withdrawals thereby forced upon the enemy, the different cavalry
units have performed work of the highest value.

Royal Air Force

During the past year the work of our airmen in close co-operation
with all fighting branches of the Army, has continued to show the
same brilliant qualities which have come to be commonly associated
with that Service ; while the ever-increasing size of the Royal Air
Force and the constant improvement in the power and performance
of machines, combined with the unfailing keenness of pilots and
observers, have enabled intense activity to be maintained at all
times.

Some idea of the magnitude of the operations carried out can be
gathered from the fact that from the beginning of January, 1918, to
the end of November, nearly 5,500 tons of bombs were dropped by
us, 2,953 hostile aeroplanes were destroyed, in addition to 1,178
others driven down out of control, 241 German observation balloons
were shot down in flames, and an area of over 4,000 square miles of
country has been photographed, not once but many times.

The assistance given to the infantry by our low-flying aeroplanes
during the battles of March and April was repeated during the
German offensives on the Aisne and Marne, on both of which

302 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

occasions British squadrons were despatched to the French battle
front and did very gallant service. During our own attacks, hostile
troops and transport have been constantly and heavily attacked
with most excellent results.

Both by day and night our bombing squadrons have continually
attacked the enemy's railway junctions and centres of activity, recon-
naissance machines have supplied valuable information from both
far and near, while artillery machines have been indefatigable in
their watch over German batteries and in accurate observation for
our own guns. In these latter tasks our balloons have done most
valuable work and have kept pace with admirable energy and prompt-
ness with the ever-changing battle line.

Tanks

Since the opening of our offensive on 8th August, tanks have
been employed in every battle, and the importance of the part
played by them in breaking the resistance of the German infantry
can scarcely be exaggerated. The whole scheme of the attack of the
8th August was dependent upon tanks, and ever since that date on
numberless occasions the success of our infantry has been power-
fully assisted or confirmed by their timely arrival. So great has been
the effect produced upon the German infantry by the appearance of
British tanks that in more than one instance, when for various
reasons real tanks were not available in sufficient numbers, valuable
results have been obtained by the use of dummy tanks painted on
frames of wood and canvas,

It is no disparagement of the courage of our infantry, or of the
skill and devotion of our artillery, to say that the achievements of
those essential arms would have fallen short of the full measure of
success achieved by our Armies had it not been for the very gallant
and devoted work of the Tank Corps, under the command of Major-
General H, J, Elles,

Trench Mortars

Throughout the period under review the personnel of the trench
mortar batteries, both heavy, medium and light, have continued to
discharge their duties with skill and efficiency whenever opportunity
offered for the effective use of their arms. During the period of
trench warfare the heavier types of trench mortars well maintained
their superiority over the enemy, while during the war of movement
later in the campaign numerous instances were reported when the
lighter types have been used with effect well forward in the attack in
overcoming the resistance of hostile strong points.

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 303

Machine Gun Corps

The high reputation earned by the different units of the Machine
Gun Corps during the defensive battles of the spring has been well
maintained under the changed conditions of the latter part of the
year. The great value of the machine gun in the attack, when handled
with energy and decision, has been proved again and again. The
consistent failure of the enemy's frequent counter-attacks has been
due in no small degree to the skilful use of these weapons,

Royal Engineers

Reference has already been made to the vast amount of work
carried out on new defences during the earlier part of the period
under review* In the construction of the 5,000 miles of new trench
20 million cubic yards of earth were shifted, while the wire entangle-
ments erected in front of the trench lines consumed 23,500 tons of
barbed wire and 15 million wooden or steel pickets.

During the period of our offensive all branches of the Royal
Engineers and the Engineer units of the Dominions have shown the
greatest energy and skill in the discharge of their different tasks. On
many occasions, particularly in the construction of bridges under
fire and in the removal of mines, they have shown courage of the
highest order. In the course of our advance some 700 road bridges,
exclusive of pontoon bridges, were constructed. Many of these, and
in addition a large number of foot-bridges for infantry assault, were
constructed under heavy shell and machine gun fire. Notable in-
stances of the cool pluck and determination displayed in this work
were furnished by a field company of the 38th Division, which in
the crossing of the Selle River lost 50 per cent, of its effectives, yet
completed its bridge, and by the fine performance of Engineer
troops of the ist Division at the crossing of the Sambre on the
4th November,

The work of the tunnelling companies has demanded equally with
that of the field companies great courage and skill. In the period
from the 8th August to the termination of hostilities nearly 14,000
German mines and traps of various descriptions, totalling over 540
tons of explosives, had been discovered and rendered harmless by
the different tunnelling companies, while a further amount of nearly
300 tons of explosives had been withdrawn from our own demolition
charges and minefields.

The provision of water for the troops presented a problem of
great difficulty, which was met with equal energy and success.
Many miles of new water mains were laid, and over 400 mechanical

304 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

pumping plants, giving a daily yield of some 20 million gallons of
water, were installed as our troops advanced* In addition to work
of the kind performed by the transportation services, Engineer
troops were responsible also for the repair of some 3,500 miles of
roads, including the filling in of some 500 road craters.

Gas Services

Prior to the commencement of the advance several important
gas operations, in which large quantities of gas were discharged, were
carried out successfully by the Special Brigade. After our advance
had begun, immediate advantage was taken of any temporary stabili-
sation of the line to carry out a large number of useful operations
of a lesser character, wherever it was possible to do so without
danger to the lives of French civilians.

Some idea of the magnitude of the work performed and of the
energy and zeal displayed by all ranks can be gained from the fact
that the 21 Special Companies, with the assistance of two American
companies attached for instruction, discharged during the period
March-November a total of over 2,250 tons of gas. Between the
nth March and the yth October gas was discharged on 119 nights
out of 210, and no less than 301 separate operations were successfully
carried out, in addition to a large number of others, which, when all
preparations had been completed, had to be abandoned in conse-
quence of changes in the tactical situation. In all these different
operations all ranks of the Gas Services have shown their accustomed
courage and devotion to duty.

Signal Services

The constant movement of the line and the shifting of head-
quarters has again imposed an enormous strain upon all ranks of the
Signal Service. The depth of our advance, and the fact that during
the latter part of it the whole of the British Armies were simultane-
ously involved, made the maintenance of signal communications
most difficult. The fact that in such circumstances the needs of the
Army were met reflects the highest credit upon the zeal and efficiency
of all ranks.

Transportation Services

Attention has already been drawn to the work thrown upon the
Transportation Services as the result of the German advances during
the early part of the year. From the commencement of the British
offensive in August the situation became reversed. Defensive
measures were abandoned, and the energies of all concerned were

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 305

centred upon the reconstruction of the railway system recaptured
from the enemy* In spite of the fact that the enemy, as he withdrew,
used every modern artifice for the destruction of railways, roads,
bridges and water supplies, the Railway Construction troops were
able to meet all demands and accomplished successfully an un-
paralleled programme of railway reconstruction* By the end of
October no less than 1,050 miles of line, much of which had been
destroyed, had been brought into service for our Armies* This
included 485 miles of new track and some 4,000 feet of bridging.

The following is an instance of the speed with which the work
of reconstruction was carried out* On the iyth October, Lille was
evacuated by the enemy. On the 25th October the first train of
supplies for the civil population entered the city, the railway having
been carried across the Lys River at Armentieres by a bridge con-
structed in the short space of four days. Some idea of the extent of
the traffic dealt with can be gathered from the fact that in a period of
six months nearly seven million officers and other ranks were carried
by the broad and metre gauge railways. The number of ton miles
worked by the light railway systems during a similar period amounted
to over 21 millions.

The troops engaged upon this work have been drawn from the
British Railway Companies and from Canada* They have worked
continuously for months under great pressure. The energy and
efficiency displayed in administration and execution are beyond all
praise* I desire to acknowledge the great assistance rendered by
the British railways and local authorities at home in supplying
personnel, locomotives, wagons and plant, the valuable service of
Canadian railway troops, and the loyal co-operation and assistance
of the French railways*

A similar expansion is to be noticed in the work of the Roads
Directorate* In June, 1917, the mileage of roads maintained was
1,640 ; in October of 1918 it was 4,412. During a period of six
months of the present year 1,500,000 tons of road stone and 685,000
sleepers and pit props were used upon the roads* The enormous
demand for material is reflected in a greatly^increased output from
the quarries and forests worked by us.

The work at the Base Ports has been discharged during the past
year with an efficiency and dispatch undiminished by the fact that
the ports have been persistently and heavily attacked by hostile air-
craft* During the period under review the Channel Train Ferry
Service, opened in February last, has proved of inestimable value*
fef As T the result of the enemy's advance in the spring, the length of
Inland Waterways operated by the British fell to less than 250 miles.
By October, however, the mileage operated had risen to 464 miles,

306 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

and, throughout our advance, every effort has been made to open up
for navigation the waterways uncovered by the enemy's retreat. Very
satisfactory results have been obtained and very valuable and im-
portant service has been rendered by the personnel concerned.

Supply Services

The demands made by our Armies upon the Supply Services
throughout the period under review were great and increasing.
Every advance made supply more difficult, and during the later
stages of our offensive the work was complicated by the necessity of
feeding many thousands of liberated civilians in the reconquered
territories. Despite the magnitude of their task, these services rose
magnificently to the demands made upon them. It is in no small
degree due to their excellent organisation and administration that
our Armies in the Field have never lacked food, clothing, equipment,
guns or munitions. The greatest testimony to the efficiency of these
services is the rapidity of our advances, which otherwise would have
been impossible. Their work was unostentatious, but its effect was
far reaching.

Forestry

During the twelve months ended on the 3ist October, 1918, over
two and a half million tons of timber have been cut for the use of the
British and French Armies by the different units under the control
of the Forestry Directorate. The work has been carried out with
admirable thoroughness and efficiency in close co-operation with
the Forestry Authorities of other Allied Armies, and has resulted in
a very material saving of transport.

The Omnibus Park

In my last Despatch I referred to the invaluable work performed
by the Auxiliary Omnibus Park throughout the German offensive.
During the period under review further heavy calls have been made
upon it in connection with our advance. In all, a total of nearly
800,000 troops have been carried and over 2,500,000 miles have
been run by the Omnibus Park. In accomplishing this task all ranks
concerned have once more shown the same zeal and devotion to
duty which distinguished their previous conduct.

The Labour Corps

Throughout the period under review the demands upon the
Labour Corps were incessant. The British labour companies were

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 307

composed entirely of men medically unfit for active operations, and
more than half their number owed their incapacity to wounds or
sickness incurred while serving with fighting units. The men of
the Corps, however, made light of their disabilities. Many com-
panies worked for months on end under shell fire, long marches were
willingly undertaken, and the essential work entrusted to them was
cheerfully performed often under conditions entailing all the hard-
ship and strain without the excitement of actual fighting. The suc-
cessive British advances imposed upon all ranks daily increasing
work and responsibilities. It is to the credit of the Corps and of the
excellent system of command and administration developed in it
during the earlier part of the year that the labour companies have
invariably answered all demands made upon them.

Medical Services

During the period under review the Medical Services, under the
direction of Lieut.-General C. H. Burtchaell, deserve special com-
mendation for the initiative, energy and success which have charac-
terised all branches of their work. The rapid advance of the troops and
the extended front on which operations were carried out during the
final stages of the offensive created problems in connection with
the collection, evacuation and treatment of wounded which had not
been met with in the earlier phases of the war. These difficulties
were met with the most admirable promptness and efficiency.

My thanks are due to the consulting surgeons and physicians for
the invaluable assistance given by them in the application of new
methods to the treatment of wounds and disease ; to the R.A.M.C.
Officers and Permanent Staffs of the Convalescent Depots for work
which enabled many thousands of men to be restored to the fighting
ranks ; to the untiring and devoted work of the British Red Cross
Society, the Order of St. John and all members of the Nursing
Services, whose unremitting kindness and constancy has done much
to alleviate the sufferings of the sick and wounded ; and finally for
the very valuable services rendered by the Base Hospital Units and
. by individual officers of the Medical Corps of the United States of
America, attached to the British Army.

The Chaplains' Department

Under the direction of the Principal Chaplain, the Rev. J. M.
Simms, and the Deputy Chaplain-General, The Right Rev. Bishop
Gwynne, the clergy of all denominations ministering to the Army
have earned the admiration and affection of all ranks. I desire once

3 o8 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

more to express on behalf of all officers and men my profound
appreciation of their unfailing devotion and self-sacrifice*

Administrative Services and Departments

To all other Administrative Services and Departments I desire
to express the thanks of the fighting forces for the loyal and efficient
manner in which they have carried out their essential tasks. During
a period of great strain and incessant work they have contributed in
their various spheres to the smooth working of the Army machine
and are entitled to a full share in the victory of our arms*

The Navy and Home Authorities

The thanks of all ranks of the British Armies in France and
Flanders are once more due to the Royal Navy and Mercantile
Marine for their magnificent work, which throughout the heavy
demands of the past year has at all times enabled our needs to be
supplied.

We thank also the different Home Authorities and the workers
in the great munition factories, both men and women, for the magni-
ficent support they have given us through all stages of the war. We
understand and appreciate the value of the work they have done,

Our Allies

At the moment when the final triumph of the Allied cause is
assured, we and all others of the Allied and Associated Armies can
look back on the years that have gone with a satisfaction undimmed
by any hint of discord or conflict of interest and ideals. Few alliances
of the past can boast such a record. Few can show a purpose more
tenaciously and faithfully pursued, or so fully and gloriously realised,
If the complete unity and harmony of our action is to be ascribed
in part to the justice of our cause, it is due also to the absolute loyalty
with which that cause has been pursued by all those entrusted with
the control of the different Allied Armies that have fought side by
side with ours.

I propose to submit at a later date a further and final Despatch
dealing with the advance of the British Armies to the Rhine and the
occupation of the Cologne Bridgehead.

I have the honour to be,

my Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient servant,

D, HAIG, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

THE FINAL DESPATCH

General Headquarters, 1

British Armies in France,

list March, 1919*
SIR,

I have the honour to submit the following final Despatch in
which is described the advance of the British Forces into Germany
and the occupation of the bridgehead east of the Rhine at Cologne.
I include in this Despatch a brief review of the chief features of
military interest which stand out among the operations of the British
Armies on the Western front during the time I have been in command
of them. I take this last opportunity also to refer by name to some
few of the many able and gallant officers who have assisted me in
my task, and to thank them personally*

PART I

THE ADVANCE INTO GERMANY
(nth November, 1918 3ist December, 1918)

Arrangements for the Advance

i. At 11.00 on the nth November, 1918, at which hour and
date the Armistice granted to Germany by the Allies took effect, the
British front extended over a distance of about 60 miles from the
neighbourhood of Montbliart, east of Avesnes, to just north of
Grammont (vide Map No. 10). This front from south to north
was held by troops of the Fourth, Third, First, Fifth and Second
British Armies, all of whom were in hot pursuit of the enemy at the
moment when the armistice came into operation.

The provisions of the Armistice had settled in general terms the
course to be followed subsequently by the belligerent groups of
Armies. To co-ordinate the action of the Allied Armies, instructions
of a more detailed character were issued by Marshal Foch to all
concerned, and these formed the basis of the orders given by me
during the period covered by this Despatch.

Troops were at once directed not to advance east of the line

1 This Despatch was published as a Supplement, dated the icth April, 1919, to the
London Gazette of the 8th April, 1919.

311

312 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

reached by them at the time when hostilities ceased, and certain
parties of Germans taken prisoner after that hour were returned
to the enemy* Outposts were established along this line both for
the sake of military security and in order to prevent all possibility
of fraternisation* Behind these outposts the remainder of our forces
were grouped and concentrated.

It was arranged that the forward movement of the different
Allied Armies should be carried out by certain definite stages,
through separate zones of action* The zone allotted to the British
Armies extended from the front then held by us in an easterly
direction as far as the German frontier, whence it continued in a
north-easterly direction to the Cologne Bridgehead. The boundaries
of this zone and the stages of the advance are shown on the attached
map. 1

In order to permit the enemy to withdraw his troops from the
area immediately in front of us, our positions were maintained
unchanged until the morning of the iyth November* Thereafter,
to avoid all possibility of collision between the opposing forces, the
movement of troops towards the frontier was regulated so as to
preserve a safety zone of 10 kilometres in depth between our advanced
detachments and the enemy's rearguards*

The general advance into Germany was directed to begin on the
ist December* On the i2th December, French, American and
British forces would cross the Rhine at Mayence, Coblentz and
Cologne, and commence the occupation of bridgeheads having a
radius of 30 kilometres from the crossings at those towns* By that
date, the enemy was bound by the terms of the Armistice to have
withdrawn his military forces a distance of 10 kilometres from the
right bank of the Rhine and from the perimeter of the Rhine
Bridgeheads.

Re-adjustment of the British Forces

2. As we progressed eastwards, the front held by the British
Armies, already short, would automatically be decreased. On the
other hand, the maintenance of supply across and beyond the battle
areas presented difficulties which would grow rapidly as our com-
munications lengthened. These two considerations made it both
feasible and necessary to effect a redistribution of troops, so that
the extent of the forces advancing into Germany should be no more
than was absolutely necessary to meet military requirements.

I decided that the opening stages of our advance should be
carried out by the Second and Fourth Armies, under command of
the two senior Army Commanders General Plumer and General

1 Map No. 10.

THE FINAL DESPATCH 313

Rawlinson, and that each Army should consist of four Corps each
of four divisions. To ensure rapidity of movement and to facilitate
supply, the artillery and auxiliary arms and services accompanying
these Armies were cut down to a minimum, and all surplus units
then attached to them were transferred to the First, Third and Fifth
Armies, Arrangements were made for reorganising these last men-
tioned Armies and for withdrawing them to areas farther west.

The Advance to the German Frontier

3, At 05,00 on the morning of the iyth November the and
Cavalry Division covering the front of the Fourth Army, and the
ist and 3rd Cavalry Divisions covering the front of the Second Army
crossed the line reached on the nth November and commenced
the march to the German Frontier, The leading infantry divisions
moved forward on the following day

The advance was carried out under active service conditions,
cavalry leading and all military precautions being taken. Among all
arms, the general bearing, smartness and march discipline of the
troops were of a high order, reflecting credit on the Army and the
nation. All traces of the desperate fighting and forced marches of
the previous months had been removed, and men, horses, guns and
vehicles appeared as though turned out for parade. Throughout
the advance, despite long distances covered under difficult con-
ditions, indifferent billets and the absence of the usual opportunities
for bathing or renewing clothes, the same general standard of ex-
cellence was maintained in a remarkable degree.

The first troops to complete the portion of our advance which
lay through Belgium were patrols of the and Cavalry Division, who
arrived on the German Frontier in the neighbourhood of Beho on
the night of the 28 /29th November, Next day the frontier was
reached by the ist Cavalry Division along the whole front of our
advance. The infantry, who had been marching steadily in rear of
the cavalry, closed up behind them in readiness for the advance into
Germany,

During this part of our march the various stages above referred
to were strictly observed, except that in front of our general advance
detachments of cavalry had been sent forward to keep order in
Charleroi and Namur in response to requests received from the
local authorities, 1 Everywhere our troops were received with the
utmost enthusiasm by the population of the liberated districts,

In every town and village streets were festooned with flags and
spanned by triumphal arches bearing messages of welcome. Men,
1 These detachments were not required to take any action.

314 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

women and children thronged to meet our troops and exchange
greetings in French and English, Nor was their gratitude confined
to demonstrations such as these. Wherever our men were billeted
during their advance everything possible was done for their comfort.
In many cases refreshment was pressed upon them without payment,
and on all sides, despite the shortage of food from which the occupied
districts of Belgium had long suffered, the generosity of the civil
population found means to supplement the rations of our troops.

During this period large numbers of released prisoners of war,
French and British, came through our lines and were passed back
to collecting stations. The enemy seems to have liberated the majority
of the Allied prisoners west of the Rhine without making any provi-
sion for their feeding and conveyance. The result was that much
unnecessary suffering was caused to these unfortunate individuals,
while a not inconsiderable additional burden was placed upon our
own transport and supplies,

Supply Difficulties

4. Throughout the whole of the advance, and especially in the
stage which followed the crossing of the German frontier, very
great, but unavoidable, difficulties were encountered in connection
with supply.

At the time of the Armistice railheads were on the general line
Le Cateau, Valenciennes, Lille, Courtrai, and for many miles in
front of them bridges had been broken and track torn up or destroyed
by mines. Even after the cessation of hostilities delay-action mines,
which the enemy had laid in the course of his retreat without pre-
serving exact record of their location, went up from time to time,
causing serious interruption to traffic. The clearing of these mines
was a work of considerable risk, and the fact that comparatively
so few mines exploded after trains had begun to run is entirely due
to the great courage and skill with which officers, non-commissioned
officers and men of the Tunnelling Companies performed the difficult
and dangerous task of detecting them and rendering them harmless.
The work of reconstruction, therefore, was most arduous, continuing
day and night. The speed with which it was completed reflects
great credit upon all ranks of the British Railway Companies and the
Canadian Railway Troops Corps, as well as on the Railway Con-
struction Engineers who controlled their work. Credit is due also
to the personnel of the Railway Operating Division, who were called
upon to keep traffic open with scarcely any of the ordinary traffic
facilities.

Though roads had been pushed farther ahead, the same general

THE FINAL DESPATCH

conditions applied to them, while the extraordinary amount of
traffic which it was necessary to direct along them made maintenance
very difficult. Up to the night of the 25/s6th November, on which
date the railway was carried across the gap between Valenciennes
and Mons, the Corps of the Second Army were still based on the
railheads west of the River Scheldt, and supplies had to be brought
forward by double and treble echelons of lorries. At the close of
this period divisions were being fed by means of narrow one-way
roads at distances of from 80 to 100 miles from their railheads. This
imposed a great strain on the personnel of the Motor Transport Units
and Mobile Repair Shops, who were compelled to work long hours
under very trying and anxious conditions, I am glad to express my
deep appreciation of the devoted service rendered by all ranks.

Until roads and railways could be got through to the areas which
the enemy had not damaged, the progress of our troops was necessarily
limited by our ability to supply them. Only by the greatest effort
on the part of the departments concerned with reconstruction and
supply, and at the expense of considerable hardship to the leading
troops of the Fourth and Second Armies, and in particular the
cavalry, could the programme of our advance be maintained. Troops
were denied frequently and for long periods comforts which they had
been accustomed to obtain even under battle conditions. Nothing
beyond bare necessities could be got forward to them. Even these
were at times short in some units, and on more than one occasion
the only available supplies of food were the current day's issues
carried on the man.

Many other causes conspired to render the problem of supply
one of serious difficulty throughout our advance. At the date of the
Armistice the amount of available rolling stock had been no more
than sufficient to meet the requirements of our Armies, The advance
to the Rhine added over 200 miles to the distances to be covered,
and greatly reduced the amount of rolling stock available by largely
increasing the time required for each train to complete its journey.
The necessity for supplying the civil population of the territories
through which the Allied Armies were advancing and the resumption
of French civilian traffic put an additional strain upon our pooled
resources. This strain was not met by rolling-stock taken over from
the enemy, which came in very slowly, and was much of it unfit for
immediate service,

In this connection it is not out of place to refer to the work done
by the British Army in providing food and medical attendance for
the civil population of the liberated districts through which we
passed, a population which in France alone amounted to nearly
800,000 persons. This duty, though very willingly accepted by us,

316 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

none the less made no small demands upon both rail and road
transport* In France it entailed the supply and distribution of more
than 5,000,000 rations during a period exceeding six weeks, until
the French were able to complete their arrangements for relieving
us of the task* The service we were able to render in the name of
humanity has been most generously acknowledged by the French
Authorities*

The fulfilment of our programme under such conditions would
have been impossible without the exercise of great patience and
whole-hearted co-operation on the part of the troops* Nor was it
less dependent upon the untiring energy and efficiency displayed by
commanders and staffs, in the methodical arrangement of the details
of our advance and the concentration of our resources* I desire to
place on record my appreciation of the careful forethought of the
Staff and of the excellent conduct of all ranks under very trying
conditions.

It will readily be understood from the foregoing that had our
advance been conducted against active opposition, even from a
beaten and demoralised enemy, our progress must have been greatly
delayed. The difficulties of supply would have been enormously
increased in many ways, among which would have been the necessity
of bringing forward large quantities of ammunition* Bridges, railways
and roads would have been destroyed in front of us, or blown up after
we had passed by delay-action mines. Immense loss would have
been caused to property of all descriptions and incalculable suffering
inflicted upon the inhabitants of the invaded districts of Belgium,
France and Luxembourg,

Further Re-adjustment of Troops

5, Towards the close of the advance to the German frontier,
a further re-adjustment was effected in the disposition of my troops*

The sector allotted to the British Forces in the general scheme
for the occupation of the Rhine Provinces was too narrow to admit
of the employment of more than a single Army Command, I there-
fore directed that the German territory to be occupied by us should
be held by General Plumer's Second Army, which for this purpose
should be composed as follows : The II* Corps (gth, 29th and New
Zealand Divisions), the VI* Corps (Guards, 2nd and 3rd Divisions),
the IX, Corps (ist, 6th and 62nd Divisions), the Canadian Corps
(ist and 2nd Canadian Divisions), and the ist Cavalry Division,
The various changes and transfers necessary to give effect to this
arrangement involved the taking over by the Second Army of the
whok of the British front of advance, and the gradual withdrawal

THE FINAL DESPATCH 317

of the troops of the Fourth Army to the area west of the frontier
and about Namur.

The Advance into Germany

6* On the morning of the ist December, a date for ever memor-
able as witnessing the consummation of the hopes and efforts of
4! years of heroic fighting, the ist Cavalry Division crossed the
frontier between Belgium and Germany, On the same day the 2nd
and ist Canadian Divisions of the Canadian Corps and the 29th
and gth Divisions of the IL Corps resumed their march towards
the frontier.

On this date, however, the supply situation became critical,
trains due on the 3Oth November failing to arrive until the night
of the ist /2nd December. In consequence for two days the Army
remained practically stationary, and it was not until the 4th December
that progress was resumed.

In this stage of our march the line of our advance traversed the
northern portion of the Ardennes, and, particularly on the right in
the Canadian Corps area, the country through which our troops
were passing was of a most difficult character. Practicable roads were
few, villages were far apart, and facilities for billeting very limited.
Our way lay across a country of great hills rising to over 2,000 feet,
covered by wide stretches of forest, and cut by deep and narrow
valleys, along the steep sides of which the roads wound in countless
sudden curves* Marches were long, while the surface of the roads
which had already borne the traffic of the retreating German Armies
suffered anew under the passage of our columns. Even under con-
ditions approximating to those of peace, severe demands were made
upon the spirit and endurance of the troops.

British Troops in Cologne

7. On the 6th December, in response to a request previously
made by the German authorities, and in order that the town might
not be left without troops after the withdrawal of the enemy's military
forces, the 2nd Brigade of the ist Cavalry Division was sent forward
to Cologne. A detachment of armoured cars of the i7th (A.C.)
Battalion, Tank Corps, escorted the General Officer Commanding
ist Cavalry Division into Cologne, and thereafter picketed the
bridges, being the first British troops to cross the Rhine. A great
concourse of people thronged the streets of the city to watch the
arrival of our troops. Next day, the 28th Infantry Brigade of the
9th Division arrived at Cologne by rail, and on the 8th December
the ist Cavalry Division reached the Rhine on the whole British
front, securing the crossings of the river.

318 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

While during the following days our infantry continued their
movement, on the nth December the Military Governor, Lieut,-
General Sir Charles Fergusson, arrived by train at Cologne, Accom-
panied by an escort of the gth Lancers, he proceeded through crowded
streets to the Hotel Monopol, where he took up the duties of his
office. As the Military Governor reached the entrance to the hotel,
the Union Jack was hoisted above the building and floated out for
the first time over the roof-tops of the city,

The Occupation of the Cologne Bridgehead

8* On the i2th December, the day fixed for that event by the
general scheme of advance, the ist Cavalry Division crossed the
Rhine and commenced the occupation of the Cologne Bridgehead,
the perimeter of which they reached on the following day,

On the 1 3th December the 2nd and ist Canadian Divisions and
the agth and gth Divisions of the Canadian and II, Corps passed
across the Rhine at Cologne and Bonn respectively in four columns,
each of the strength of a division. During the following three days
they pushed forward to the bridgehead perimeter, gradually relieving
the cavalry, and by the evening of the i6th December had completed
the occupation of the bridgehead.

Before Christmas Day the troops of the Second Army had
reached their final areas in the occupied territories of Germany*
The military organisation of the bridgehead, so as to secure the
crossing of the Rhine and render possible the rapid deployment of
troops for action east of it, had been commenced, and was proceeded
with steadily during the remainder of the year. In the course of this
work, on the 28th December the perimeter of the bridgehead was
slightly amended (vide Map No, 10), so as to accord with the
boundaries of the German Communal Districts and thus simplify
the work of administration.

Conduct of the Troops

9, In concluding this part of my Despatch, I desire to acknow-
ledge with gratitude and pride the exemplary conduct of the troops,
both throughout the different stages of their arduous advance and
since its successful completion.

Among all Services and in all Armies, both those which took
part in the advance and those which remained behind, the period
following the armistice has indeed been one of no little difficulty.
For those that went forward, the real hardships of the long marches,
poor billets, and indifferent food constituted a strange contrast to

THE FINAL DESPATCH 319

ideas which had been formed of victory* For all, the .sudden relax-
ation of the enduring tension of battle, and the natural desire of the
great majority for an early return to civil life, could not but lead at
times to a certain impatience with delays, and with the continuance,
under conditions of apparent peace, of restrictions and routine
duties gladly borne while the future of their country was at stake.
Despite these disturbing factors, and the novelty of finding them-
selves masters in a conquered country, instances of misbehaviour
have been remarkably few, and chiefly of a minor character. The
inborn courtesy and good temper of the British soldier have guided
them in their attitude towards the inhabitants of the occupied
districts. The spreading of a better understanding of the causes of
the temporary shortage of supplies, of the difficulties of demobili-
sation and of the continued necessity for keeping a strong Army in
the field, has generally dispelled any incipient feelings of discontent.
The discipline, self-respect and strong sense of responsibility
which carried our men through to victory, have in general been
fully maintained amid changed conditions and new surroundings.

PART II

FEATURES OF THE WAR

A Single Great Battle

10, In this, my final Despatch, I think it desirable to comment
briefly upon certain general features which concern the whole series
of operations carried out under my command. I am urged thereto
by the conviction that neither the course of the war itself nor the
military lessons to be drawn therefrom can properly be compre-
hended, unless the long succession of battles commenced on the
Somme in 1916 and ended in November of last year on the Sambre
are viewed as forming part of one great and continuous engagement,

To direct attention to any single phase of that stupendous and
incessant struggle and seek in it the explanation of our success, to
the exclusion or neglect of other phases possibly less striking in their
immediate or obvious consequences, is in my opinion to risk the
formation of unsound doctrines regarding the character and require-
ments of modern war.

If the operations of the past 4! years are regarded as a single
continuous campaign, there can be recognised in them the same
general features and the same necessary stages which between forces
of approximately equal strength have marked all the conclusive

320 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

battles of history* There is in the first instance the preliminary stage
of the campaign in which the opposing forces seek to deploy and
manoeuvre for position, endeavouring while doing so to gain some
early advantage which might be pushed home to quick decision.
This phase came to an end in the present war with the creation of
continuous trench lines from the Swiss frontier to the sea.

Battle having been joined, there follows the period of real struggle
in which the main forces of the two belligerent Armies are pitted
against each other in close and costly combat. Each commander
seeks to wear down the power of resistance of his opponent and to
pin him to his position, while preserving or accumulating in his
own hands a powerful reserve force with which he can manoeuvre,
and, when signs of the enemy becoming morally and physically
weakened are observed, deliver the decisive attack. The greatest
possible pressure against the enemy's whole front must be main-
tained, especially when the crisis of the battle approaches. Then
every man, horse and gun is required to co-operate, so as to complete
the enemy's overthrow and exploit success.

In the stage of the wearing-out struggle losses will necessarily
be heavy on both sides, for in it the price of victory is paid. If the
opposing forces are approximately equal in numbers, in courage,
in moral and in equipment, there is no way of avoiding payment of
the price or of eliminating this phase of the struggle.

In former battles this stage of the conflict has rarely lasted more
than a few days, and has often been completed in a few hours. When
Armies of millions are engaged, with the resources of great Empires
behind them, it will inevitably be long. It will include violent crises
of fighting which, when viewed separately and apart from the general
perspective, will appear individually as great indecisive battles.
To this stage belong the great engagements of 1916 and 1917 which
wore down the strength of the German Armies.

Finally, whether from the superior fighting ability and leadership
of one of the belligerents, as the result of greater resources or tenacity,
or by reason of higher moral, or from a combination of all these
causes, the time will come when the other side will begin to weaken
and the climax of the battle is reached. Then the commander of the
weaker side must choose whether he will break off the engagement,
if he can, while there is yet time, or stake on a supreme effort what
reserves remain to him. The launching and destruction of Napoleon's
last reserves at Waterloo was a matter of minutes. In this World
War the great sortie of the beleaguered German Armies, commenced
on the 2ist March, 1918, lasted for four months, yet it represents
a corresponding stage in a single colossal battle.

The breaking down of such a supreme effort will be the signal

THE FINAL DESPATCH 331

for the commander of the successful side to develop his greatest
strength, and seek to turn to immediate account the loss in material
and moral which their failure must inevitably produce among his
opponent's troops* In a battle joined and decided in the course of a
few days or hours, there is no risk that the lay observer will seek to
distinguish the culminating operations by which victory is seized
and exploited from the preceding stages by which it has been made
possible and determined. If the whole operations of the present
war are regarded in correct perspective, the victories of the summer
and autumn of 1918 will be seen to be as directly dependent upon
the two years of stubborn fighting that preceded them.

The Length of the War

n. If the causes which determined the length of the recent
contest are examined in the light of the accepted principles of war,
it will be seen that the duration of the struggle was governed by and
bore a direct relation to certain definite factors which are enumerated
below*

In the first place, we were unprepared for war, or at any rate
for a war of such magnitude. We were deficient in both trained men
and military material, and, what was more important, had no machin-
ery ready by which either men or material could be produced in
anything approaching the requisite quantities. The consequences
were two-fold. Firstly, the necessary machinery had to be improvised
hurriedly, and improvisation is never economical and seldom satis-
factory. In this case the high-water mark of our fighting strength
in infantry was only reached after 2 J years of conflict, by which time
heavy casualties had already been incurred. In consequence, the
full man power of the Empire was never developed in the field at
any period of the war.

As regards material, it was not until midsummer, 1916, that
the artillery situation became even approximately adequate to the
conduct of major operations. Throughout the Somme Battle the
expenditure of artillery ammunition had to be watched with the
greatest care. During the battles of 1917, ammunition was plentiful,
but the gun situation was a source of constant anxiety. Only in 1918
was it possible to conduct artillery operations independently of any
limiting considerations other than that of transport.

The second consequence of our unpreparedness was that our
Armies were unable to intervene, either at the outset of the war or
until nearly two years had elapsed, in sufficient strength adequately
to assist our Allies. The enemy was able to gain a notable initial
advantage by establishing himself in Belgium and northern France,

322 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

and throughout the early stages of the war was free to concentrate
an undue proportion of his effectives against France and Russia*
The excessive burden thrown upon the gallant Army of France
during this period caused them losses, the effect of which has been
felt all through the war and directly influenced its length* Just as
at no time were we as an Empire able to put our own full strength
into the field, so at no time were the Allies as a whole able completely
to develop and obtain the full effect from their greatly superior man
power. What might have been the effect of British intervention on
a larger scale in the earlier stages of the war is shown by what was
actually achieved by our original Expeditionary Force,

It is interesting to note that in previous campaigns the side which
has been fully prepared for war has almost invariably gained a rapid
and complete success over its less well prepared opponent. In 1866
and 1870, Austria and then France were overwhelmed at the outset
by means of superior preparation. The initial advantages derived
therefrom were followed up by such vigorous and ruthless action,
regardless of loss, that there was no time to recover from the first
stunning blows. The German plan of campaign in the present war
was undoubtedly based on similar principles. The margin by which
the German onrush in 1914 was stemmed was so narrow, and the
subsequent struggle so severe, that the word " miraculous " is hardly
too strong a term to describe the recovery and ultimate victory of
the Allies,

A further cause adversely influencing the duration of the war
on the Western front during its later stages, and one following
indirectly from that just stated, was the situation in other theatres.
The military strength of Russia broke down in 1917 at a critical
period when, had she been able to carry out her military engagements,
the war might have been shortened by a year. At a later date, the
military situation in Italy in the autumn of 1917 necessitated the
transfer of five British divisions from France to Italy at a time when
their presence in France might have had far-reaching effects.

Thirdly, the Allies were handicapped in their task and the war
thereby lengthened by the inherent difficulties always associated with
the Combined action of Armies of separate nationalities, differing
in speech and temperament, and, not least important, in military
organisation, equipment and supply.

Finally, as indicated in the opening paragraph of this part of my
Despatch, the huge numbers of men engaged on either side, whereby
a continuous battle front was rapidly established from Switzerland
to the sea, out-flanking was made impossible and manoeuvre very
difficult, necessitated the delivery of frontal attacks. This factor, com-
bined with the strength of the defensive urider modern conditions f

THE FINAL DESPATCH 333

rendered a protracted wearing out battle unavoidable before the
enemy's power of resistance could be overcome. So long as the
opposing forces are at the outset approximately equal in numbers
and moral and there are no flanks to turn, a long struggle for
supremacy is inevitable.

The Extent of our Casualties

12, Obviously, the greater the length of a war the higher is
likely to be the number of casualties incurred in it on either side.
The same causes, therefore, which served to protract the recent
struggle are largely responsible for the extent of our casualties. There
can be no question that to our general unpreparedness must be
attributed the loss of many thousands of brave men whose sacrifice
we deeply deplore, while we regard their splendid gallantry and
self-devotion with unstinted admiration and gratitude.

Given, however, the military situation existing in August, 1914,
our total losses in the war have been no larger than were to be expected.
Neither do they compare unfavourably with those of any other of
the belligerent nations, so far as figures are available from which
comparison can be made. The total British casualties in all theatres
of war, killed, wounded, missing and prisoners, including native
troops, are approximately three millions (3,076,388), Of this total,
some two and a half millions (2,568,834) were incurred on the
Western front. The total French losses, killed, missing, and prisoners,
but exclusive of wounded, have been given officially as approximately
1,831,000, If an estimate for wounded is added, the total can scarcely
be less than 4,8oo,ooo, 1 and of this total it is fair to assume that over
four millions were incurred on the Western front. The published
figures for Italy, killed and wounded only, exclusive of prisoners,
amount to 1,400,000, of which practically the whole were incurred
in the Western theatre of war.

Figures have also been published for Germany and Austria.
The total German casualties, killed, wounded, missing and prisoners,
are given at approximately six and a half millions (6,485,000), of
which the vastly greater proportion must have been incurred on
the Western front, where the bulk of the German forces were con-
centrated and the hardest fighting took place. In view of the fact,
however, that the number of German prisoners is definitely known
to be considerably understated, these figures must be accepted with

1 The number of French wounded is now shown to be 2,560,000, making the total
French casualties 4,291,800. It may be noted that the proportion of wounded to killed
shown by the French casualty figures is considerably lower than the proportion in OUT
own Army.

324 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

reserve* The losses of Austria-Hungary in killed, missing and
prisoners are given as approximately two and three-quarter millions
(2,772,000)* An estimate of wounded would give a total of over
four and a half millions.

The extent of our casualties, like the duration of the war, was
dependent on certain definite factors which can be stated shortly.

In the first place, the military situation compelled us, particularly
during the first portion of the war, to make great efforts before we had
developed our full strength in the field or properly equipped and
trained our Armies. These efforts were wasteful of men, but in the
circumstances they could not be avoided. The only alternative was
to do nothing and see our French Allies overwhelmed by the enemy's
superior numbers.

During the second half of the war, and that part embracing the
critical and costly period of the wearing-out battle, the losses pre-
viously suffered by our Allies laid upon the British Armies in France
an increasing share in the burden of attack. From the opening of
the Somme Battle in 1916 to the termination of hostilities the British
Armies were subjected to a strain of the utmost severity which never
ceased, and consequently had little or no opportunity for the rest
and training they so greatly needed,

In addition to these particular considerations, certain general
factors peculiar to modern war made for the inflation of losses. The
great strength of modern field defences and the power and precision
of modern weapons, the multiplication of machine guns, trench
mortars and artillery of all natures, the employment of gas and the
rapid development of the aeroplane as a formidable agent of destruc-
tion against both men and material, all combined to increase the
price to be paid for victory.

If only for these reasons, no comparisons can usefully be made
between the relative losses incurred in this war and any previous
war. There is, however, the further consideration that the issues
involved in this stupendous struggle were far greater than those
concerned in any other war in recent history. Our existence as an
Empire and civilisation itself, as it is understood by the free Western
nations, were at stake. Men fought as they have never fought before
in masses.

Despite our own particular handicaps and the foregoing general
considerations, it is satisfactory to note that, as the result of the
courage and determination of our troops, and the high level of
leadership generally maintained, our losses even in attack over the
whole period of the battle compare favourably with those inflicted
on our opponents. The approximate total of our battle casualties in
all arms, and including Overseas troops, from the commencement

THE FINAL DESPATCH 335

of the Somme Battle in 1916 to the conclusion of the Armistice is
2,140,000* The calculation of German losses is obviously a matter
of great difficulty. It is estimated, however, that the number of
casualties inflicted on the enemy by British troops during the above
period exceeds two and a half millions. It is of interest, moreover,
in the light of the paragraph next following, that more than half
the total casualties incurred by us in the fighting of 1918 were
occasioned during the five months March- July, when our Armies
were on the defensive.

Why we Attacked whenever Possible

13. Closely connected with the question of casualties is that of
the relative values of attack and defence. It is a view often expressed
that the attack is more expensive than defence. This is only a half
statement of the truth. Unquestionably, unsuccessful attack is
generally more expensive than defence, particularly if the attack is
pressed home with courage and resolution. On the other hand,
attack so pressed home, if skilfully conducted, is rarely unsuccessful,
whereas in its later stages especially, unsuccessful defence is far
more costly than attack.

Moreover, the object of all war is victory, and a purely defensive
attitude can never bring about a successful decision, either in a
battle or in a campaign. The idea that a war can be won by standing
on the defensive and waiting for the enemy to attack is a dangerous
fallacy, which owes its inception to the desire to evade the price of
victory. It is an axiom that decisive success in battle can be gained
only by a vigorous offensive. The principle here stated has long
been recognised as being fundamental, and is based on the universal
teaching of military history in all ages. The course of the present
war has proved it to be correct.

To pass for a moment from the general to the particular, and
consider in the light of the present war the facts upon which this
axiom is based.

A defensive role sooner or later brings about a distinct lowering
of the moral of the troops, who imagine that the enemy must be the
better man, or at least more numerous, better equipped with and
better served by artillery or other mechanical aids to victory. Once
the mass of the defending infantry become possessed of such ideas,
the battle is as good as lost. An Army fighting on enemy soil, especially
if its standard of discipline is high, may maintain a successful defence
for a protracted period, in the hope that victory may be gained
elsewhere or that the enemy may tire or weaken in his resolution
and accept a compromise. The resistance of the German Armies

326 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

was undoubtedly prolonged in this fashion, but in the end the
persistence of our troops had its natural effect.

Further, a defensive policy involves the loss of the initiative,
with all the consequent disadvantages to the defender* The enemy
is able to choose at his own convenience the time and place of his
attacks* Not being influenced himself by the threat of attack from
his opponent, he can afford to take risks, and by greatly weakening
his front in some places can concentrate an overwhelming force
elsewhere with which to attack. The defender, on the other hand,
becomes almost entirely ignorant of the dispositions and plans of
his opponent, who is thus in a position to effect a surprise. This was
clearly exemplified during the fighting of 1918. As long as the enemy
was attacking, he obtained fairly full information regarding our
dispositions. Captured documents show that, as soon as he was
thrown once more on the defensive and the initiative returned to
the Allies, he was kept in comparative ignorance of our plans and
dispositions. The consequence was that the Allies were able to effect
many surprises, both strategic and tactical.

As a further effect of the loss of the initiative and ignorance of
his opponent's intentions, the defender finds it difficult to avoid a
certain dispersal of his forces. Though for a variety of reasons,
including the fact that we had lately been on the offensive, we were
by no means entirely ignorant of the enemy's intentions in the spring
of 1918, the unavoidable uncertainty resulting from a temporary
loss of the initiative did have the effect of preventing a complete
concentration of our reserves behind the point of the enemy's attack.

An additional reason, peculiar to the circumstances of the present
war, which in itself compelled me to refuse to adopt a purely defensive
attitude so long as any other was open to me, is to be found in the
geographical position of our Armies. For reasons stated by me in
my Despatch of the aoth July, 1918, we could not afford to give much
ground on any part of our front. 1 The experience of the war has shown
that if the defence is to be maintained successfully, even for a limited
time, it must be flexible.

T he End of the War

14. If the views set out by me in the preceding paragraphs are
accepted, it will be recognised that the war did not follow any un-
precedented course, and that its end was neither sudden nor should
it have been unexpected. The rapid collapse of Germany's military
powers in the latter half of 1918 was the logical outcome of the
fighting of the previous two years. It would not have taken place
but for that period of ceaseless attrition which used up the reserves

1 See page 183 above.

THE FINAL DESPATCH 327

of the German Armies, while the constant and growing pressure of
the blockade sapped with more deadly insistence from year to year
at the strength and resolution of the German people* It is in the
great battles of 1916 and 1917 that we have to seek for the secret of
our victory in 1918*

Doubtless, the end might have come sooner had we been able
to develop the military resources of our Empire more rapidly and
with a higher degree of concentration, or had not the defection of
Russia in 1917 given our enemies a new lease of life*

So far as the military situation is concerned, in spite of the
great accession of strength which Germany received as the result
of the defection of Russia, the battles of 1916 and 1917 had so far
weakened her Armies that the effort they made in 1918 was in-
sufficient to secure victory* Moreover, the effect of the battles of
1916 and 1917 was not confined to loss of German man power. The
moral effects of those battles were enormous, both in the German
Army and in Germany. By their means our soldiers established over
the German soldier a moral superiority which they held in an ever-
increasing degree until the end of the war, even in the difficult days
of March and April, 1918*

The Value of Cavalry in Modern War

15. From time to time as the war of position dragged on and the
enemy's trench systems remained unbroken, while questions of man
power and the shortage of shipping became acute, the wisdom or
necessity of maintaining any large force of mounted men was freely
discussed. In the light of the full experience of the war the decision
to preserve the Cavalry Corps has been completely justified* It has
been proved that cavalry, whether used for shock effect under
suitable conditions or as mobile infantry, have still an indispensable
part to play in modern war. Moreover, it cannot safely be assumed
that in all future wars the flanks of the opposing forces will rest on
neutral States or impassable obstacles* Whenever such a condition does
not obtain opportunities for the use of cavalry must arise frequently*

Throughout the great retirement in 1914, our cavalry covered
the retirement and protected the flanks of our columns against the
onrush of the enemy, and on frequent occasions prevented our
infantry from being over-run by the enemy's cavalry* Later in the
same year at Ypres, their mobility multiplied their value as a reserve,
enabling them rapidly to reinforce threatened portions of our line*

During the critical period of position warfare, when the trial
of strength between the opposing forces took place, the absence of
room to manoeuvre made the importance of cavalry less apparent.

328 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Even under such conditions, however, valuable results may be
expected from the employment of a strong force of cavalry when,
after there has been severe fighting on one or more fronts, a surprise
attack is made on another front* Such an occasion arose in the
operations before Cambrai at the close of 1917, when the cavalry
were of the greatest service ; while throughout the whole period of
trench fighting they constituted an important mobile reserve*

At a later date, when circumstances found us operating once
more in comparatively open country, cavalry proved themselves of
value in their true role. During the German offensive in March,
1918, the superior mobility of cavalry fully justified their existence.
At the commencement of the battle, cavalry were used under the
Fifth Army over wide fronts. So great, indeed, became the need for
mounted men that certain units which had but recently been dis-
mounted were hurriedly provided with horses and did splendid
service. Frequently, when it was impossible to move forward other
troops in time, our mounted troops were able to fill gaps in our line
and restore the situation. The absence of hostile cavalry at this
period was a marked feature of the battle. Had the German command
had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions,
a wedge might have been driven between the French and British
Armies, Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly
to the difficulties of our task,

In the actions already referred to east of Amiens, the cavalry were
again able to demonstrate the great advantage which their power of
rapid concentration gives them in a surprise attack. Operating in
close concert with both armoured cars and infantry, they pushed
ahead of the latter and by anticipating the arrival of German reserves
assisted materially in our success. In the battle of the 8th October,
they were responsible for saving the Cambrai Le Cateau St,
Quentin Railway from complete destruction. Finally, during the
culminating operations of the war when the German Armies were
falling back in disorganised masses, a new situation arose which
demanded the use of mounted troops. Then our cavalry, pressing
hard upon the enemy's heels, hastened his retreat and threw him
into worse confusion. At such a time the moral effect of cavalry is
overwhelming and is in itself a sufficient reason for the retention of
that arm.

On the morning of the Armistice, two British cavalry divisions
were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before the orders to stop
reached them they had already gained a line ten miles in front of
our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the advance of
the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's disorganised
retreat would have been turned into a rout.

THE FINAL DESPATCH 329

The Value of Mechanical Contrivances

1 6, A remarkable feature of the present war has been the number
and variety of mechanical contrivances to which it has given birth,
or has brought to a higher state of perfection*

Besides the great increase in mobility made possible by the
development of motor transport, heavy artillery, trench mortars,
machine guns, aeroplanes, tanks, gas and barbed wire have in their
several spheres of action played very prominent parts in operations,
and as a whole have given a greater driving power to war* The
belligerent possessing a preponderence of such mechanical con-
trivances has found himself in a very favourable position as compared
with his less well provided opponent. The general superiority of
the Allies in this direction during the concluding stages of the recent
struggle undoubtedly contributed powerfully to their success. In
this respect the Army owes a great debt to science, and to the dis-
tinguished scientific men who placed their learning and skill at the
disposal of their country,

It should never be forgotten however that weapons of this
character are incapable of effective independent action. They do
not in themselves possess the power to obtain a decision, their real
function being to assist the infantry to get to grips with their oppo-
nents. To place in them a reliance out of proportion to their real
utility, to imagine, for example, that tanks and aeroplanes can take
the place of infantry and artillery, would be to do a disservice to
those who have the future of these new weapons most at heart by
robbing them of the power to use them to their best effect.

Every mechanical device so far produced is dependent for its
most effective use upon the closest possible association with other
arms, and in particular with infantry and artillery. Aeroplanes must
rely upon infantry to prevent the enemy from over-running their
aerodromes, and, despite their increasing range and versatility of
action, are clearly incapable in themselves of bringing about a
decision. Tanks require the closest artillery support to enable them
to reach their objectives without falling victims to the enemy's
artillery, and are dependent upon the infantry to hold the position
they have won.

As an instance of the interdependence of artillery and tanks, we
may take the actions fought east of Amiens on the 8th August, 1918,
and following days, A very large number of tanks were employed
in these operations, and they carried out their tasks in the most
brilliant manner. Yet a scrutiny of the artillery ammunition returns
for this period discloses the fact that in no action of similar dimen-
sions had the expenditure of ammunition been so great.

330 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Immense as the influence of mechanical devices may be, they
cannot by themselves decide a campaign* Their true role is that of
assisting the infantryman, which they have done in a most admirable
manner* They cannot replace him* Only by the rifle and bayonet
of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won*

Close and Complete Co-operation between all
Arms and Services

17* This war has given no new principles ; but the different
mechanical appliances above mentioned and in particular the rapid
improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes* the use of immense
numbers of machine guns and Lewis guns, the employment of vast
quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous expan-
sion of artillery and the provision of great masses of motor transport
4iave introduced new problems of considerable complexity con-
cerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and services.
Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new
devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery
already working*

The development of the Air Service is a matter of general know-
ledge, and figures showing something of the work done by our airmen
were included in my last Despatch* 1 The combining of their operations
with those of the other arms, and particularly of the artillery, has
been the subject of constant study and experiment, giving results
of the very highest value* As regards machine guns, from a pro-
portion of one gun to approximately 500 infantrymen in 1914, our
establishment of machine guns and Lewis guns had risen at the end
of 1918 to one machine gun or Lewis gun to approximately 30
infantrymen. This great expansion was necessarily accompanied
by a modification of training and methods both for attack and defence,
and resulted ultimately in the establishment of the Machine Gun
Corps under an Inspector-General.

During the same period, the growth of our artillery was even
more remarkable, its numbers and power increasing out of all pro-
portion to the experience of previous wars* The 486 pieces of Light
and medium artillery with which we took the field in August, 1914,
were represented at the date of the Armistice by 6,437 guns and
howitzers of all natures, including pieces of the heaviest calibre*

This vast increase so profoundly influenced the employment of
artillery and was accompanied by so intimate an association with
other arms and services that it merits special comment.

In the first place, big changes were required in artillery organ-

1 Page 301*

THE FINAL DESPATCH 331

isation, as well as important decisions concerning the proportions
in which the different natures of artillery and artillery ammunition
should be manufactured. These changes and decisions were made
during 1916, and resulted in the existing artillery organisation of
the British Armies in France*

In order to gain the elasticity essential to the quick concentration
of guns at the decisive point, to enable the best use to be made of
them and to facilitate ammunition supply and fire control, Artillery
Commanders, acting under Army and Corps Commanders, were
introduced and Staffs provided for them. This enabled the large
concentrations of guns required for our offensives to be quickly
absorbed and efficiently directed* The proportions required of guns
to howitzers and of the lighter to the heavier natures were determined
by certain factors, namely, the problem of siting in the comparatively
limited areas available the great numbers of pieces required for an
offensive ; the " lives " of the different types of guns and howitzers,
that is the number of rounds which can be fired from them before
they become unserviceable from wear; and questions of relative
accuracy and fire effect upon particular kinds of targets.

The results attained by the organisation established in 1916 are
in themselves strong evidence of the soundness of the principles upon
which it was based. It made possible a high degree of elasticity, and
by the full and successful exploitation of all the means placed at its
disposal by science and experience, ensured that the continuous
artillery battle which began on the Somme should culminate, as it
did, in the defeat of the enemy's guns.

The great development of air photography, sound ranging, flash
spotting, air-burst ranging 1 and aerial observation brought counter-
battery work and harassing fire both by day and night to a high state
of perfection. Special progress was made in the art of engaging
moving targets with fire controlled by observation from aeroplanes
and balloons. The work of the Field Survey Sections, in the location
of hostile battery positions by re-section and the employment of
accurate maps, was brought into extended use. In combination with
the work of the Calibration Sections in the accurate calibration of
guns, and by careful calculation of corrections of range required to
compensate for weather conditions, it became possible to a large
extent to dispense with registration, whereby the chance of effecting

1 " Sound ranging " is an electro-mechanical means of recording the sound waves
set up by the discharge of a gun and so computing its position. " Flash spotting "
aims at the same result by taking cross bearings of a gun flash. " Air-burst ranging "
is a method of bringing fire to bear upon concealed targets already located. Ranging
shells are burst high above the target and the position of the burst ascertained by
cross observation. From this is calculated the small correction necessary to bring
fire to bear accurately upon the target.
Y

332 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

surprise was greatly increased. In the operations east of Amiens on
the 8th August, 1918, in which over 2,000 guns were employed, practi-
cally the whole of the batteries concentrated for the purpose of the
attack opened fire for the first time on the actual morning of the assault.

The use of smoke shell for covering the advance of our infantry
and masking the enemy's positions was introduced and employed
with increasing frequency and effect. New forms of gas shell were
made available, and their combination with the infantry attack care-
fully studied. The invention of a new fuze known as "106," which
was first used in the battle of Arras, 1917, enabled wire entanglements
to be easily and quickly destroyed, and so modified our methods of
attacking organised positions. By bursting the shell the instant it
touched the ground and before it had become buried, the destructive
effect of the explosion was greatly increased. It became possible to
cut wire with a far less expenditure of time and ammunition, and the
factor of surprise was given a larger part in operations.

Great attention was paid to the training of personnel, and in
particular the Chapperton Down Artillery School, Salisbury Plain,
was formed for training artillery brigade commanders and battery
commanders, while Artillery Schools in France were organised for
the training of subalterns and non-commissioned officers,

A short examination of our principal attacks will give a good idea
of the increasing importance of artillery. On the first day of the
Somme Battle of 1916 the number of artillery personnel engaged was
equal to about half the infantry strength of the attacking divisions,
On this one day a total of nearly 13,000 tons of artillery ammunition
was fired by us on the Western front. Our attacks at Arras and
Messines on the 9th April and yth June, 1917, saw the total expenditure
of artillery ammunition nearly doubled on the first days of those
battles, while the proportion of artillery personnel to infantry steadily
grew.

During the period following the opening of the Somme Battle,
the predominance of our artillery over that of the enemy gradually
increased, till at the time of the Arras Battle it had reached a maximum.
In the course of the summer and autumn of 1917, however, the
enemy constantly reinforced his artillery on our front, being enabled
to do so owing to the relaxation of pressure elsewhere.

The battle of Ypres in the autumn of 1917 was one of intense
struggle for artillery supremacy. By dint of reducing his artillery
strength on other parts of the Western front, and by bringing guns
from the East, the enemy definitely challenged the predominance
of our artillery. In this battle, therefore, the proportion of our
artillery to infantry strength was particularly large. In the opening
attack on the 3ist July our artillery personnel amounted to over

THE FINAL DESPATCH 333

80 per cent, of the infantry engaged in the principal attack on our
front, and our total expenditure of artillery ammunition on this day
exceeded 23,000 tons. During the succeeding weeks the battle of the
rival artilleries became ever more violent. On the two days 2oth
and 2ist September, about 42,000 tons of artillery ammunition were
expended by us, and in the successful attack of the 4th October,
which gave us the main ridge about Broodseinde, our artillery per-
sonnel amounted to 85 per cent, of the infantry engaged in the assault.

During the winter of 1917-1918 the enemy so greatly added to
his artillery strength by batteries brought from the Russian front
that in his spring offensive he was able temporarily to effect a definite
local artillery superiority. This state of affairs was short lived. Even
before the breakdown of the German offensive, our guns had regained
the upper hand. In the battles later in the year the superiority of
our batteries once more grew rapidly, until the defeat of the German
artillery became an accomplished fact. From the commencement
of our offensive in August, 1918, to the conclusion of the Armistice,
some 700,000 tons of artillery ammunition were expended by the
British Armies on the Western front. For the fortnight from the 2ist
August to the 3rd September our average daily expenditure exceeded
11,000 tons, while for the three days of crucial battle on the 27th,
28th and 29th September nearly 65,000 tons of ammunition were
fired by our artillery.

The tremendous growth of our artillery strength above described
followed inevitably from the character of the wearing-out battle
upon which we were engaged. The restricted opportunities for
manoeuvre and the necessity for frontal attacks made the employment
of great masses of artillery essential.

The massing of guns alone, however, could not have secured
success without the closest possible combination between our batteries
and the infantry they were called upon to support, as well as with
the other arms. The expansion was accompanied, therefore, by a
constant endeavour to improve the knowledge of all ranks of both
artillery, infantry and the air service concerning the work and
possibilities of the other arms.

An intelligent understanding of " the other man's job " is the
first essential of successful co-operation. To obtain the best results
from the vast and complex machine composing a modern army,
deep study of work other than one's own is necessary for all arms.
For this study much time is needed, as well as much practical appli-
cation of the principles evolved, and for reasons already explained,
opportunity sufficient for adequate training could not be found.
None the less, the best possible use was made of such opportunities
as offered, and much was in fact accomplished.

334 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

The Signal Service

1 8, As a natural corollary to the general increase of our Forces,
the Signal Service, required alike for the proper co-ordination of
supply and for the direction and control of the battle, has grown
almost out of recognition* From an original establishment of under
2,400 officers and men, trained and equipped chiefly for mobile
warfare, at the end of 1918 the personnel of the Signal Service had
risen to 42,000, fully equipped with all the latest devices of modern
science to act efficiently under all conditions as the nervous system
to the whole vast organism of our Army*

The commencement of trench warfare and the greater use of
artillery led to a rapid development of the signal system which, as
fresh units were introduced, became more and more elaborate* At
the same time, the increase in the power and range of artillery
made the maintenance of communications constantly more difficult.
Many miles of deep trenches were dug, in which cables containing
50 to 100 circuits were buried to gain protection from shell fire*
The use of wireless communication gradually became more widely
spread and finally constituted part of the Signal establishment of
all formations down to divisions* To provide an alternative method
of communication with front line troops, in 1915 carrier pigeons
were introduced and a special branch of the Signal Service was
formed controlling ultimately some 20,000 birds* In 1917 a Messen-
ger Dog Service was started for similar purposes and did good work
on a number of occasions.

The expansion of the work of the Signal Service in the more
forward areas was accompanied by a similar development on the
Lines of Communication, at General Headquarters, Armies and
Corps* Construction and Railway Companies were formed, and about
1,500 miles of main telegraph and telephone routes constructed in
the Lines of Communication area alone, in addition to many miles
in Army areas. Provision had to be made for communicating with
London, Paris and Marseilles, as well as between the different Allied
Headquarters* On the advance of our forces to the Rhine, telephone
communication was established between General Headquarters at
Montreuil and our troops at Cologne* Signal communication,
entailing the putting up of many thousands of miles of wire, was
provided also for the control of railway traffic ; while to supplement
electric communication generally a Despatch Rider Letter Service
was maintained by motor cyclists*

The amount of Signal Traffic dealt with became very great, and
on the Lines of Communication alone more than 23,000 telegrams
have been transmitted in twenty-four hours* Similarly, at General

THE FINAL DESPATCH 335

Headquarters as many as 9,000 telegrams have been dealt with in
twenty-four hours, besides 3,400 letters carried by Despatch Rider ;
an Army Headquarters has handled 10,000 telegrams and 5,000
letters in the same space of time, and a Corps 4,500 telegrams and
3,000 letters. In addition to telegrams and letters, there has been at
all times a great volume of telephone traffic.

Something of the extent of the constructional work required, in
particular to meet the constant changes of the battle line and the
movement of Headquarters, can be gathered from the fact that as
many as 6,500 miles of field cable have been issued in a single week.
The average weekly issue of such cable for the whole of 1918 was
approximately 3,300 miles.

Rearward Services and Personnel. Transportation

19, The immense expansion of the Army from 6 to over 60
infantry divisions, combined with the constant multiplication of
auxiliary arms, called inevitably for a large increase in the size and
scope of the services concerned in the supply and maintenance of
our fighting forces.

As the Army grew and became more complicated the total feeding
strength of our forces in France rose until it approached a total of
2,700,000 men. The vastness of the figures involved in providing
for their needs will be realised from the following examples. For the
maintenance of a single division for one day, nearly 200 tons dead
weight of supplies and stores are needed, representing a shipping
tonnage of nearly 450 tons. In an Army of 2,700,000 men, the addition
of one ounce to each man's daily rations involves the carrying of an
extra 75 tons of goods.

To cope with so great a growth, the number of existing directorates
had gradually to be added to or their duties extended, with a corre-
sponding increase in demands for personnel. The supervision of
ports was entrusted to the Directorate of Docks which controlled
special companies for the transhipping of stores. By the end of
November, 1918, the number of individual landings in France at
the various ports managed by us exceeded loj million persons.
During the n months January to November, 1918, the tonnage
landed at these ports averaged some 175,000 tons per week.

To the Directorate of Transport, originally concerned with the
administration of horse vehicles and pack animals, fell the further
duty of exploiting mechanical road traction. Despite the employment
of over 46,700 motor vehicles, including over 30,000 lorries, the
number of horses and mules rose greatly, reaching a figure exceeding
400,000. The replacement, training and^distribution of these animals

336 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

was the duty of the Directorate of Remounts, The Directorate of
Veterinary Services reduced losses and prevented the spread of dis-
ease, while the Inspector of Horse Feeding and Economies ensured
that the utmost value was obtained from the forage and grain con-
sumed,

To meet the requirements of mechanical and horse traffic, the
upkeep or construction of a maximum of some 4,500 miles of roadway
was entrusted to the Directorate of Roads, Some idea of the work
involved may be obtained from the fact that for ordinary upkeep
alone 100 tons of road material are required per fortnight for the
maintenance of one mile of road. Under this Directorate were
organised a number of Road Construction Companies, together with
Quarry Companies to supply the necessary metal. In the month of
October, 1918, over 85,000 tons of road material were conveyed
weekly by motor transport alone, involving a petrol mileage of over
14,000,000 weekly. The total output of stone from the commence-
ment of 1918 to the date of the Armistice amounted to some 3,500,000
tons.

For the working of the existing railways and for the construction
or repair of many miles of track, both normal and narrow gauge,
railway troops of every description, Operating Companies, Con-
struction Companies, Survey and Reconnaissance Companies,
Engine Crew Companies, Workshop Companies, Wagon Erecting
Companies, and Light Railway Forward Companies had to be
provided. Under the Directorate of Railway Traffic, the Directorate
of Construction, and the Directorate of Light Railways, these and
other technical troops during 1918 built or reconstructed 2,340
miles of broad gauge and 1,348 miles of narrow gauge railway.
Throughout the whole period of their operation they guaranteed the
smooth and efficient working of the railway system. In the six months
May to October, 1918, a weekly average of 1,800 trains were run for
British Army traffic, carrying a weekly average load of approximately
400,000 tons, while a further 130,000 tons were carried weekly by
our light railways. The number of locomotives imported to deal
with this traffic rose from 62 in 1916 to over 1,200 by the end of
1918, while the number of trucks rose from 3,840 to 52,600,

The Inland Water Transport section were organised under a
separate Directorate for the working in France and Flanders of the
canal and cross-channel barge traffic. On Inland waterways alone
an average of 56,000 tons of material were carried weekly during
1918, the extent of waterways worked by us at the date of the
Armistice being some 465 miles.

The wonderful development of all methods of transportation
had an important influence upon the course of events. No war has

THE FINAL DESPATCH 337

been fought with such ample means of quick transportation as were
available during the recent struggle. Despite the huge increase in
the size of Armies, it was possible to effect great concentrations of
troops with a speed which, having regard to the numbers of men and
bulk of material moved, has never before been equalled. Strategic
and tactical mobility has been the guiding principle of our trans-
portation arrangements ; but this was itself at all times vitally
affected by questions of supply and by the necessity of providing for the
evacuation and replacement on a vast scale of the sick and wounded.

The successful co-ordination and economic use of all the various
kinds of transportation requires most systematic management, based
on deep thought and previous experience. So great was the work
entailed in the handling of the vast quantities of which some few
examples are given above, so complex did the machinery of transport
become and so important was it that the highest state of efficiency
should be maintained, that in the autumn of 1916 I was forced to
adopt an entirely new system for running our Lines of Communi-
cation. The appointment of Inspector General of Communications
was abolished, and the services previously directed by that officer
were brought under the immediate control of the Adjutant-General,
the Quartermaster-General and the Director-General of Trans-
portation. The last mentioned was a new office created with a
separate Staff, composed for the greater part of civilian experts, to
deal specifically with transportation questions. At the same time, the
command and administration of the troops on the Lines of Communi-
cation were vested in a " General Officer Commanding the Lines of
Communication Area."

The huge bulk of the supplies to be handled was due not merely
to the size of our Army. It arose also from the introduction of new
weapons and methods of war, and from the establishment of a higher
standard of comfort for the troops. The incessant demands of the
fighting forces for munitions were supplied by the Directorate of
Ordnance Services, combined with a great expansion of Ordnance
Workshops ; while the Directorate of Engineering Stores provided
on a vast scale the materials required for the construction of trench
defences and kindred purposes. For the comfort and well-being of
the troops, the Directorate of Supplies stored and distributed in
sound condition fresh food, to take the place as far as possible of
tinned rations. Through the agency of an Inspectorate of Messing
and Economies, regular schools of cookery gave instructions to nearly
25,000 cooks, and careful measures were taken for the recovery of
kitchen by-products. In August, 1918, over 860,000 Ib. of dripping
were received from Armies and consigned to England, while the cash
value of the by-products disposed of from all sources has exceeded

338 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

60,000 in a single month. Provision was made for baths, and a new
Inspectorate supervised the running of Army laundries on up-to-date
lines.

The Expeditionary Force Canteens made it possible to obtain
additional comforts close up to the front. During 1918, the value
of the weekly sales in the different canteens averaged 8J million
francs. These canteens were valuably supplemented by the various
voluntary institutions ministering to the comfort and recreation of
our troops, such as the Y.M.C.A., the Church Army, the Scottish
Churches Huts, the Salvation Army, the Soldiers' Christian Asso-
ciation, the Catholic Women's League and Club Huts, the United
Army and Navy Board, the Wesleyan Soldiers' Institute and the
British Soldiers' Institute. In many cases these organisations carried
on their work almost in the actual righting line and did much to main-
tain the high moral of our Armies. To permit the troops to avail
themselves of the opportunities so offered, methods devised by the
Paymaster-in-Chief enabled soldiers to obtain money anywhere in
the field. Parcels and letters from home have been delivered by the
Army Postal Service with remarkable regularity.

As the effects of the enemy submarine warfare began to be felt
and the shortage of shipping became more and more acute, so it
became increasingly necessary for the Army in France to be more
self-supporting. To meet this emergency vast hospitals and con-
valescent depdts, capable of accommodating over 22,000 men, were
erected west of the Seine at Trouville. Additional General Hospitals
with accommodation for over 7,000 patients were established in the
neighbourhood of Boulogne, Staples, and elsewhere. Between
January, 1916, and November, 1918, the total capacity of hospitals
and convalescent depdts in France grew from under 44,000 to over
157,000 persons.

Great installations were set up for the manufacture of gun parts
and articles of like nature, for the repair of damaged material, as well
as for the utilisation of the vast quantities of articles of all kinds
collected from the battlefields by the organisation working under the
direction of the Controller of Salvage. The Forestry Directorate,
controlling over 70 Canadian and other Forestry Companies, worked
forests all over France, in the North- West, Central and South- West
Departments, the Vosges, Jura and Bordeaux country. As the result
of its work our Armies were made practically independent of over-
seas imported timber. The Directorate of Agricultural Production
organised farm and garden enterprises for the local supply of vege-
tables, harvested the crops abandoned by the enemy in his retreat
and commenced the reclamation of the devastated area.

At the same time, a great saving of shipping was effected by the

THE FINAL DESPATCH 339

speeding up of work at the docks. The average tonnage discharged
per hour in port rose from 12 J tons in January, 1917, to 34 J tons
in July, 1918 ; while the average number of days lost by ships waiting
berth at the ports fell from some 90 ship days per week at the
beginning of 1917 to about 9 ship days per week in 1918,

For the accommodation of so wide a range of services, installations
of all kinds, hutments, factories, workshops, storage for ammunition,
clothing, meat and petrol, power houses and pumping stations,
camps and hospitals, had to be planned and constructed by the
Directorate of Works, Our business relations with the French, the
obtaining of sites and buildings, called for the establishment of a
Directorate of Hirings and Requisitions ; while my Financial
Adviser in France assisted in the adjustment of financial questions
connected with the use of French railways and harbours, the ex-
ploitation of French forests and similar matters. The safe-guarding
from fire of the great number of buildings erected or taken over by
us and of the masses of accumulated stores was entrusted to a definite
Staff under the supervision of a Fire Expert,

The creation and maintenance of the great organisation briefly
outlined above made big demands upon our available supply of
personnel. Though these demands so far as possible were met,
under the supervision of the Controller of Labour, by imported
labour or prisoners of war, it was not practicable at any time to supply
more than a proportion of our needs in this manner. Many fit men
who might otherwise have reinforced the fighting line had also to be
employed, especially during the earlier stages of the war.

As, however, our organisation arrived at a greater state of com-
pletion and its working became smooth, so it began to be possible
to withdraw considerable numbers of fit men from the rearward
services. In many cases it was possible, where replacement was
necessary, to fill the places of the fit men so withdrawn by women or
unfit men. In this way when the man-power situation became acute
a considerable saving was effected. During the great British attacks
of 1918, of a total male feeding strength of a little over aj millions,
ij millions were in front of railhead. Even so, as has been found to
be the case in the Armies of all other belligerents, so in our Army
the number of fit men employed in the rearward services has at all
times been large, and necessarily so,

It is hardly too much to assert that, however seemingly extrava-
gant in men and money, no system of supply except the most perfect
should ever be contemplated. To give a single example, unless our
supply services had been fully efficient the great advance carried
out by our Armies during the autumn of last year could not have
been achieved.

340 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Wars may be won or lost by the standard of health and moral
of the opposing forces. Moral depends to a very large extent upon
the feeding and general well being of the troops. Badly supplied
troops will invariably be low in moral and an Army ravaged by
disease ceases to be a fighting force. The feeding and health of the
fighting forces are dependent upon the rearward services, and so
it may be argued that with the rearward services rests victory or
defeat. In our case we can justly say that our supply system has
been developed into one of the most perfect in the world,

Replacement, Discipline and Welfare of the Troops

20. The preceding paragraph illustrates the demands which
the conduct of operations made on the Staff and Directorates con-
trolled by the Quartermaster-General, The parallel development
of the Adjutant-General's Branch, while concerned with matters
less patent to the casual observer has been no less remarkable. The
problem of ensuring the supply of reinforcements at the times and
places at which they will be required to replace casualties is present
in all warfare, and is difficult in any circumstances. In operations
conducted on the scale reached in this war it is exceedingly intricate.
The successful solution of this problem alone entitles the Adjutant-
General and his Staff to the greatest credit. It has formed, however,
but a small part of their work.

Owing to the impossibility of foretelling what claims would be
made on man-power by industry or by other theatres of war, it was
necessary to prepare elaborate forecasts of the personnel likely to
be required at various future dates, and to work out in advance the
best manner of utilising reinforcements in the event of their being
available in greater or less numbers. We were faced with an un-
expected contraction in man-power in the winter of 1917 and an
unexpected expansion in the summer of 1918, Both these develop-
ments were encountered with a success which could only have been
attained by the greatest forethought and application on the part of
the Staff concerned*

To reduce to cadre a depleted division, to fill it up when men
became available, to break up a battalion and redistribute its per-
sonnel, to comb out a certain number of fit men from the rearward
services, all sound simple operations. In reality each requires an
immense amount of sympathetic treatment and clerical labour, the
extent of the work involved being instanced by the fact that in the
month of April, 1918, over 200,000 reinforcements were sent up to
the fighting forces. The carrying out of measures of this nature was
made more difficult by the continual formation of new types of unit

THE FINAL DESPATCH 341

to meet new requirements* It was necessary to find the personnel
for those units with the least possible dislocation elsewhere, and with
an eye to the most advantageous employment of the individual in
regard to his medical category and special qualifications. The
following figures will give some indication of the magnitude of the
task. The Adjutant- General's office at the Base has prepared over
8 million records containing the military history of individual
soldiers in France, and has received and dispatched over 22 million
letters.

Whatever the quality of the troops, a just and efficient adminis-
tration of military law is an indispensable adjunct to a high standard
of discipline, I gratefully acknowledge the care with which officers
of the Adjutant-General's Branch in all formations have ensured the
observation of every safeguard which our law provides against
injustice. They have seen to it that every plea which an accused
or convicted soldier wishes to bring forward is heard, and that
Commanders are advised as to the suitability of sentences, I take
this opportunity of recording my satisfaction at the success which
has attended the operation of the Suspension of Sentences Act.
The number of men under suspended sentence, who by good
conduct and gallant service in the field have earned remission of
their sentence, has been most encouraging.

Closely related to the administration of military law is the work
of the military police under the Provost-Marshal, and of the military
prisons in the field. In the battle zone, where frequently they had
to do duty in exposed positions under heavy fire and suffered severe
casualties, the military police solved an important part of the problem
of traffic control, by preventing the unavoidable congestion of troops
and transport on roads in the vicinity of active operations from
degenerating into confusion. In back areas, their vigilance and zeal
have largely contributed to the good relations maintained between
our troops and the civilian population.

Although the number of soldiers undergoing sentences of im-
prisonment in France has at no time amounted to i per thousand,
the size of the Army has necessitated a considerable expansion of
the Military Prisons in the field. The Director of Military Prisons,
his Governors and warders have sought, not retribution, but to
build up the self-discipline of the prisoner. They have been rewarded
by seeing a large percentage of the men committed to their charge
subsequently recover their characters as good soldiers.

Under the general control of the Adjutant-General, the Base
Stationery Depot, which went to France in 1914 with a personnel of
ten, has expanded into the Directorate of Army Printing and Sta-
tionery Services, employing over 60 officers and 850 other ranks.

342 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

In addition to the printing and distribution of orders and instructions,
it undertook the reproduction on a vast scale of aerial and other
photographs, the number of which grew from 25,000 in 1916 to two
and a quarter million in 1918* Other examples of administrative
success are the Prisoners of War Section, and the Directorate of
Graves Registration and Enquiries,

Of the care taken for the physical and moral welfare of the troops
I cannot speak too highly.

In the former domain, the achievements of the Director-General
of Medical Services and his subordinates have been so fully recorded
by me in previous despatches that they need no further emphasis,
It is sufficient to say that, in spite of the numbers dealt with, there
has been no war in which the resources of science have been utilised
so generously and successfully for the prevention of disease, or for
the quick evacuation and careful tending of the sick and wounded.

In the latter sphere, the devoted efforts of the Army Chaplains
of all denominations have contributed incalculably to the building
up of the indomitable spirit of the Army. As the result of their
teaching, all ranks came to know and more fully understand the great
and noble objects for which they were fighting.

Under the immediate direction of the Adjutant-General in matters
concerning military administration, the Principal Chaplain for
members of all churches except the Church of England, and the
Deputy Chaplain-General for members of the Church of England
adminster in the greatest harmony a very complete joint organisation.
Provided with a definite establishment for armies, corps and divisions,
as well as for the principal base ports, base camps, hospitals and
certain other units, they ensure that the benefit of religion is brought
within the reach of every soldier.

In all the senior offices of this joint organisation, down to divisions,
the Principal Chaplain and Deputy Chaplain-General have each
their representatives, the appointments to those offices in the Prin-
cipal Chaplain's section being apportioned between the different
Churches, Protestant and Roman Catholic, in proportion to the
numbers of their following in the Army as a whole. This organisation
has worked for the common good in a manner wholly admirable and
with a most noteworthy absence of friction. It has undoubtedly been
much assisted, both in its internal economy and in its relations with
commanders and troops, by being at all times in direct touch with
the Adjutant-General's Branch,

No survey of the features of the war would be complete without
some reference to the part played by women serving with the British
Armies in France, Grouped also under the Adjutant-General's
Branch of the General Staff, Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military

THE FINAL DESPATCH 343

Nursing^Service, the Nursing Sisters of the Canadian Army Medical
Corps and of the Australian, New Zealand, South African and
Territorial Force Nursing Services, and the British Red Cross
Society, have maintained and embellished a fine tradition of loyalty
and efficiency. These services have been reinforced by members
of Voluntary Aid Detachments from the British Isles, the Oversea
Dominions and the United States of America, who have vied with
their professional sisters in cheerfully enduring fatigue in times of
stress and gallantly facing danger and death.

Women in the British Red Cross Society and other organisations
have driven ambulances throughout the war, undeterred by dis-
comfort and hardship. Women have ministered to the comfort of
the troops in huts and canteens. Finally, Queen Mary's Auxiliary
Army Corps, recruited on a wider basis, responded with enthusiasm
to the call for drafts, and by the aid they gave to our declining man-
power contributed materially to the success of our arms.

Training and Organisation

21* The experience gained in this war alone, without the study
and practice of lessons learned from other campaigns, could not
have sufficed to meet the ever-changing tactics which have char-
acterised the fighting. There was required also the sound basis of
military knowledge supplied by our Training Manuals and Staff
Colleges.

The principles of command, Staff work, and organisation elabor-
ated before the war have stood the test imposed upon them and are
sound. The militarily educated officer has counted for much, and
the good work done by our Staff Colleges during the past 30 years
has had an important influence upon the successful issue of the war.
In solving the various strategic and tactical problems with which we
have been faced, in determining principles of training and handling
of troops and in the control and elaboration of Army organisation
generally, the knowledge acquired by previous study and application
has been invaluable* Added to this have been the efficiency and
smoothness of working resulting from standardisation of principles,
assisted in many cases by the previous personal acquaintance at the
Staff College of those called upon to work together in the field*

The course of the war has brought out very clearly the value of
an efficient and well-trained High Command, in which I include not
merely commanders of higher formations, but their Staffs also.

This has been the first time in our history that commanders
have had to be provided for such large forces. Before the war, no
one of our generals had commanded even an Army Corps such as

344 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

has been used as a subsidiary formation in the battles of the last
few years. In consequence, commanders have been faced with
problems very different to those presented by the small units with
which they had been accustomed to train in peace. That they exer-
cised their commands with such success, as most of them did, shows,
I venture to think, that their prior training was based on sound
principles and conducted on practical lines.

Similarly as regards the Staff, the magnitude of our operations
introduced a situation for which no precedent existed. The Staff
Colleges had only produced a reserve of Staff officers adequate to
the needs of our Army on a peace footing, and for the mobilisation
of the Expeditionary Force of six divisions. Consequently, on the
expansion of the Army during the war many officers had to be
recruited for Staff appointments from good regular officers chiefly,
but also from officers of our new Armies and trained for the new
duties required of them. Though numbers of excellent Staff officers
were provided in this way, it was found as a general rule that the
relative efficiency in Staff duties of men who had passed through the
Staff Colleges, as compared with men who had not had that advan-
tage, was unquestionably greater.

Good Staff work is an essential to success in all wars, and parti-
cularly in a struggle of such magnitude as that through which we
have just passed. No small part of the difficulty of achieving it lies
in the possibility that officers on the Staff of higher formations may
get out of touch with the righting forces, and so lose sense of pro-
portion and become unpractical. Every endeavour was made to
avoid this by maintaining a constant interchange of such officers
with others from the front, so that all might keep abreast with the
latest ideas and experience both in the fighting line and elsewhere,
In pursuance of this principle, in addition to 18 officers from Army
or Corps Staffs and other officers from the Intelligence Corps or
General List, there were brought in during the period of my command
some 50 officers direct from active duty with divisions or smaller
units to hold for longer or shorter periods appointments in the
General Staff Branch at G,H,Q,

It may be accepted as a general rule that previous organisation
should be upset as little as possible in war. As each war has certain
special conditions, so some modification of existing ideas and practices
will be necessary, but if our principles are sound these will be few and
unimportant. In the present war, new organisations and establish-
ments for dealing with the demands of both the fighting and the
rearward services have been brought into being continually, and added
to or absorbed by our existing organisation and establishment.

The constant birth of new ideas has demanded the exercise of

THE FINAL DESPATCH 345

the greatest care, not only to ensure that no device or suggestion of
real value should be overlooked or discouraged, but also to regulate
the enthusiasm of the specialist and prevent each new development
assuming dimensions out of proportion to its real value* As the result
of our own experience and that of the French during the fighting
of 1915, all kinds of trench weapons were invented, bombs, bomb
throwers, mortars, and even such instruments as trench daggers*
In those days, the opinion was freely expressed that the war would
be finished in the trenches and every effort was made to win victories
in the trenches themselves. In consequence, rifle shooting was
forgotten and was fast becoming a lost art* Similarly as regards
artillery, the idea of dominating and defeating the hostile artillery
before proceeding to the infantry attack was considered an impos-
sibility.

Then followed the experience of the battle of the Somme in
1916, which showed that the principles of our pre-war training were
as sound as ever. That autumn, a revival of old methods was in-
augurated. Musketry shooting was everywhere carried out, and
bayonet fighting was taught as the really certain way of gaining
supremacy in hand-to-hand fighting. At the same time, as pointed
out in para. 17 above, the greatest care was devoted to artillery
shooting, as well as to the training of all arms for open fighting. The
events of the next two years fully confirmed the lessons drawn from
the battle of the Somme. In short, the longer the war has lasted the
more emphatically has it been realised that our original organisation
and training were based on correct principles. The danger of altering
them too much, to deal with some temporary phase, has been greater
than the risk of adjusting them too little.

22. Some idea of the extent of the organisation built up during
the war for the training of our Armies can be gathered from a survey
of the different schools actually established.

In the Armies important schools were maintained for the in-
struction of officers and non-commissioned officers of infantry and
artillery in their several duties, for training in scouting, observation
and sniping, in the use of trench mortars, in signalling, musketry
and bayonet fighting, anti-gas precautions, mining and defence
against tanks. The different Corps controlled a similar series of
schools. Added to these were the special schools of the Cavalry
Corps, including a School of Equitation ; the Tank Corps Mechan-
ical School ; and the different courses instituted and managed by
divisions, which were largely attended whenever the battle situation
permitted.

Other schools under the direct supervision of General Head-
quarters provided instruction in the machine gun, Lewis gun and

346 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

light mortar, in anti-aircraft gunnery, in observation for artillery,
in sound ranging and flash spotting, wireless, bridging and other
engineer duties, in firing and bombing from aeroplanes, and in
physical and recreational training* At the Base depots, big training
and reinforcement camps were set up for infantry, artillery, cavalry, t
engineers, machine gunners, cyclists, Tank Corps, Signal and Gas
personnel* Further, a regular succession of Staff officers and others
were sent home to take part in the various schools and courses
established in England*

In the course of the past year, it was found desirable to make
provision for the more thorough co-ordination of effort among these
various schools, and also for assisting commanders, especially during
battle periods, in the training and instruction of such troops as
might from time to time be in reserve* For this purpose an Inspec-
torate of Training was established. Training and organisation must
always go hand-in-hand ; for while tactical considerations dictate
the organisation of units and methods of training, upon sound
tactical organisation and training depend the development and
effective employment of good tactics,

In the early spring of 1918, the foundations were laid of an
educational scheme which might give officers and men throughout
the Army an opportunity to prepare themselves for their return to
civil life. Delayed in its application by the German offensive and the
crowded events of the summer and autumn of that year, since the
conclusion of the Armistice the scheme has been developed with
most excellent results under the general direction of the training
sub-section of my General Staff Branch, and generously supported
in every possible way by the Educational Department at home.
Divided into a general and a technical side, every effort has been
made both to give opportunities for the improvement of general
knowledge and to enable trained men to " get their hands in " before
returning to civil life. In this way, between 400,000 and 500,000
persons have been brought under instruction, while the number of
attendances at lectures has approached a million in the course of
a month.

Our New Armies

23, The feature of the war which to the historian may well
appear the most noteworthy is the creation of our new Armies,

To have built up successfully in the very midst of war a great
new Army on a more than Continental scale, capable of beating the
best troops of the strongest military nation of pre-war days, is an
achievement of which the whole Empire may be proud. The total
of over 327,000 German prisoners captured by us on the Western

THE FINAL DESPATCH 347

front is in striking contrast to the force of six divisions, comprising
some 80,000 righting men all told, with which we entered the war.
That we should have been able to accomplish this stupendous task
is due partly to the loyalty and devotion of our Allies and to the
splendid work of the Royal Navy, but mainly to the wonderful
spirit of the British race in all parts of the world*

Discipline has never had such a vindication in any war as in the
present one, and it is their discipline which most distinguishes our
new Armies from all similarly created armies of the past* At the
outset the lack of deep-seated and instinctive discipline placed our
new troops at a disadvantage compared with the methodically trained
enemy* This disadvantage, however, was overcome, and during
the last two years the discipline of all ranks of our new Armies,
from whatever part of the Empire they have come, was excellent.
Born from a widespread and intelligent appreciation of the magnitude
of the issues at stake and a firm belief in the justice of our cause,
it drew strength and permanence from a common-sense recognition
of what discipline really means from a general realisation that
true discipline demands as much from officers as from men, and
that without mutual trust, understanding, and confidence on the part
of all ranks the highest form of discipline is impossible.

Drawn from every sphere of life, from every profession, depart-
ment and industry of the British Empire, and thrust suddenly into
a totally new situation full of unknown difficulties, all ranks have
devoted their lives and energies to the service of their country in
the whole-hearted manner which the magnitude of the issues war-
ranted* The policy of putting complete trust in subordinate com-
manders and of allowing them a free hand in the choice of means
to attain their object has proved most successful. Young officers,
whatever their previous education may have been, have learnt their
duties with enthusiasm and speed, and have accepted their responsi-
bilities unflinchingly*

Our universities and public schools throughout the Empire
proved once more, as they have proved time and again in the past,
that in the formation of character, which is the root of discipline,
they have no rivals* Not that universities and public schools enjoy
a monopoly of the qualities which make good officers* The life of
the British Empire generally has proved sound under the severest
tests, and while giving men whom it is an honour for any officer to
command, has furnished officers of the highest standard from all
ranks of society and all quarters of the world.

Promotion has been entirely by merit, and the highest appoint-
ments were open to the humblest, provided he had the necessary
qualifications of character, skill and knowledge* Many instances

348 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

could be quoted of men who from civil or comparatively humble
occupations have risen to important commands* A schoolmaster,
a lawyer, a taxicab driver, and an ex-Serjeant-Major have commanded
brigades ; one editor has commanded a division, and another held
successfully the position of Senior Staff Officer to a Regular division ;
the under-cook of a Cambridge College, a clerk to the Metropolitan
Water Board, an insurance clerk, an architect's assistant, and a police
inspector became efficient General Staff Officers ; a Mess Serjeant,
a railway signalman, a coal miner, a market gardener, an assistant
secretary to a haberdashers' company, a Quartermaster-Serjeant,
and many private soldiers have risen to command battalions ; clerks
have commanded batteries ; a schoolmaster, a collier, the son of a
blacksmith, an iron moulder, an instructor in tailoring, an assistant
gas engineer, a grocer's assistant, as well as policemen, clerks and
privates, have commanded companies or acted as adjutants*

As a body, and with few exceptions, new officers have understood
that the care of their men must be their first consideration, that their
men's comfort and well-being should at all times come before their
own, that without this they cannot expect to win the affection,
confidence, loyalty, and obedience of those they are privileged to
command, or to draw the best from them* Moreover, they have
known how to profit by the experience of others, and in common
with their men they have turned willingly to the members of the old
Regular Army for instruction and guidance in all branches of their
new way of life*

On their part, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of
the old Regular Army have risen to the demands made upon them
in a manner equally marvellous* Their leaven has pervaded the whole
of the mighty force which in 4^ years of war has gathered from all
parts of the world round the small highly trained Army with which
we entered the war. The general absence of jealousy and the readiness
to learn, which in the field has markedly characterised all ranks of
our new Armies, is proof both of the quality of our old Army and
of the soundness of our pre-war training* If further proof were
needed, it is found in the wonderful conduct and achievements of
our Armies new and old, and in the general pride with which they are
universally regarded*

In the earlier stages of the war the Regular Army was called on
to provide instructors and cadres round which the new Armies could
be formed* All that was best in the old Regular Army, its discipline,
based on force of character, leadership and mutual respect, its
traditions/ and the spirit that never knows defeat, have been the
foundations on which the new Armies have been built up* Heavy
demands were necessarily made upon our establishment of trained

THE FINAL DESPATCH 349

regular officers, most regrettably depleted by the heavy sacrifices of
the early days of the war* The way in which such demands have
been met by those who survived those days have justified our belief
in them.

Neither have the officers of the new Armies, whether drawn
from the British Isles or the Dominions, risen with less spirit and
success to the needs of the occasion. The great expansion of the
Army, and the length of the war, necessitated an ever-increasing
demand being made on them for filling responsible positions in
command, staff and administrative appointments. The call has been
met most efficiently. The longer the war continued, the greater
became the part played in it by the new Armies of the Empire,

PART III

My Thanks to Commanders and Staffs

24, In the body of previous Despatches I have found a welcome
opportunity to mention by name many distinguished officers, Com-
manders of Corps and Divisions, whose high soldierly qualities,
powers of leadership and knowledge of men have largely influenced
the course of the operations with which those Despatches have
dealt, I have also been able to refer to some few of the many able
and experienced Staff officers by whom I have at all times been
so greatly assisted. It is not practicable, in the text of this Despatch,
to set out the full list of those to whom I am indebted. I would say,
however, of all those already mentioned, as well as of those whose
names appear below and the many others whom the limits of space
compel me to exclude, that no Commander has ever had or ever
could wish for more loyal assistance given more ungrudgingly, or
with a more complete devotion to the noble cause for which we have
worked in common.

My thanks are especially due to the five Army Commanders
General Sir Herbert Plumer, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, General
Sir Henry Home, General the Hon, Sir Julian Byng and General
Sir William Birdwood whose names have become household words
throughout the length and breadth of our Empire, I desire to asso-
ciate with them the names of General Sir Charles Monro, who left
the command of the First Army to assume the Chief Command in
India ; of General Sir Edmund Allenby, who, after conducting the
operations of the Third Army in the battle of Arras, 1917, has since
led our arms to victory in Palestine ; and General Sir Hubert Gough,

350 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

who, after distinguished service as a Brigade, Divisional and Corps
Commander, commanded the Fifth Army (first known as the Reserve
Army) during the Battles cf the Somme and Ancre in 1916, east of
Ypres in 1917, and finally in the great and gallant fight of March,
1918, the story of which is fresh in the minds of all.

To the heads of the Sections of my General Staff Branch at
Headquarters, both past and present, I owe and readily acknowledge
a great debt of gratitude for the energy, ability and loyalty with
which they have discharged their important duties. Throughout
the long and difficult period of the wearing-out battles of 1916 and
1917, my former Chief of the General Staff, Lieut .-General Sir
Lancelot Kiggell, gave his great abilities and deep military learning
to the services of his country with a loyalty and devotion which
never spared himself, and in the end made demands upon his health
which compelled him to retire under medical advice from the respon-
sible position he had so ably held. His successor, Lieut .-General
the Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, has continued his work with a like
ability and with an unfailing insight, calm resolution and level
judgment which neither ill-fortune nor good were able to disturb.
My grateful thanks are due also to Lieut .-General Sir R. H. K.
Butler, who acted as Deputy Chief of my General Staff until his
appointment to the command of the III. Corps at the beginning of
1918.

Under the able, energetic and successful direction of Brigadier-
General J. Charteris, the Intelligence Section of my General Staff
Branch was developed into a far-reaching and most efficient organi-
sation for the rapid collection, sifting and dissemination of information
concerning the disposition, movements and intentions of the enemy.
The activities of the Intelligence Section were incessant, and the
knowledge obtained thereby of the utmost value. On the transfer
of General Charteris to other duties, his work was carried on with
great ability by Brig.-General E. W. Cox, and after the regrettable
accident resulting in the death of that distinguished officer, by Brig.-
General G. S. Clive.

Since the appointment of Lieut .-General Sir Nevil Macready
to be Adjutant-General at home early in 1916, the work of my
Adjutant-General's Branch has been most efficiently conducted
under the direction of Lieut .-General Sir George Fowke. The
problems of organising the supply of reinforcements to meet the
needs of our Armies while active operations were in progress, of
dealing with casualties and matters of discipline, have been succeeded
or supplemented since the conclusion of the Armistice by the scarcely
less difficult question of demobilisation. These different tasks have
been performed by all ranks of the Adjutant-General's Branch with

THE FINAL DESPATCH 351

great ability and success, despite the fact that in each instance they
were confronted by conditions without precedent in the history of
our Army*

Throughout 1916 and 1917 the duties of the Quartermaster-
General's Branch were ably directed during a period of constant
expansion by Lieut, -General Sir Ronald Maxwell. Since his retire-
ment the control of the vast organisation, some of the broad outlines
of which are described in paragraph 19 of this Despatch, has been
exercised by Lieut .-General Sir Travers Clarke, who has carried on
the same task in the most efficient manner.

The Director-General of Transportation's Branch was formed
under the brilliant direction of Major-General Sir Eric Geddes
during the autumn of 1916, as above stated. To the large number of
skilled and experienced civilians included by him on his Staff, drawn
from the railway companies of Great Britain and the Dominions,
the Army is deeply indebted for the general excellence of our trans-
portation services. Since the transfer of Sir Eric Geddes to other
duties his work has been ably conducted by his successors, Major-
Generals Sir F. A. M. Nash and S. D'A. Crookshank.

The important work of the Military Secretary's Branch has been
admirably carried out under the direction of Major-General Sir
W. E. Peyton and his successor, Major-General H. G. Ruggles-Brise.

The steady increase of our strength in artillery and the develop-
ment of the use of that important arm upon sound and successful
lines has been due in great measure to the efforts of my artillery
adviser, Lieut .-General Sir J. F. N. Birch and the able Staff
working under him, among them Colonel J. T. Dreyer and Colonel
S. W. H. Rawlins.

The wide range of services performed by the Royal Engineers
were successfully directed during the battles of 1916 and 1917 by
Major-General Sir S. R. Rice. Since that date they have been
controlled with great efficiency by his successor in the post of
Engineer-in-Chief, Major-General Sir G. M. Heath, formerly Chief
Engineer of the First Army, assisted by my Deputy Engineers-m-
Chief, Brig.-Generals J. E. Edmonds and H. Biddulph.

As indicated in a preceding paragraph, the activities of the
Signal Service have expanded greatly during the period of my
command. Under the direction of my Signal Officer-in-Chief,
Major-General Sir J. S. Fowler, and my Deputy Signal Officer-in-
Chief, Colonel E. V. Turner, the growing needs of the Army have
been fully met.

The office of the Inspector-General of Training, established in
the latter half of 1918, has been ably filled by Lieut.-General Sir
Ivor Maxse, assisted by my Deputy Inspector-General of Training,

352 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Major-General H* C* C* Uniacke, formerly commanding the artillery
of the Fifth Army, as hereinafter mentioned*

Second only to the work of the Army Commanders and heads
of Branches at General Headquarters in their influence upon the
conduct of operations have been the parts played by the Senior
General Staff officers of the several Armies* In their responsible and
arduous tasks they have been most ably seconded by the general
efficiency of the Army Staffs working with them, and in particular
by the heads of the " A " and " Q " Branches of Army Staffs, the
General Officers Commanding Royal Artillery within the Armies
and the Chief Engineers of Armies*

From the commencement of the preparations for the first battle
of the Somme and throughout all subsequent operations, the General
Staff work of the Fourth Army Staff has been directed with great
ability and success by Major-General Sir A. A* Montgomery* The
admirable work done by the head of the Administrative Branch of
the Staff, Major-General H* C* Holman, by Major-General C* E* D*
Budworth who has controlled the work of the artillery of that Army
with conspicuous success, and by the Chief Engineer of the Army,
Major-General R* U* H* Buckland, has also contributed very materi-
ally to the success of the many brilliant operations undertaken by
the Fourth Army,

The General Staff of the Army known during the Somme battle
as the Reserve Army, and later as the Fifth Army, was well directed
by Major-General N* Malcolm until the close of 1917* Major-
General H* N* Sargent, head of the " A " and " Q " Branch of the
Fifth Army Staff, Major-General Uniacke while commanding the
artillery of the Army, and Major-Generals R. P* Lee and P. G
Grant, successively Chief-Engineers of the Army, have also filled
their important and responsible positions with distinction and success*
Subsequent to the appointment of Major-General Malcolm to the
command of a division, the duties of senior General Staff Officer
of the Fifth Army were efficiently discharged by Major-General
J. S* J* Percy until his transfer to the Second Army, and thereafter
by Major-General Sir C* B* B* White, with whom have been asso-
ciated as head of the " A " and " Q " Branch and commander of
the artillery of the Army respectively, Major-General P O* Hambro
and Major-General C* C* Van Straubenzee*

During the battle of Arras, the office of senior General Staff
Officer of the Third Army was held by Major-General L. J, Bols.
This able officer, who at a later date followed his Army Commander
to' Palestine, was succeeded by Major-General L. R* Vaughan
(Indian Army), who has directed the work of the Third Army
General Staff with great efficiency throughout the whole of the

THE FINAL DESPATCH 353

subsequent operations of that Army* The able manner in which
have been performed the arduous duties devolving upon the head
of the " A " and " Q " Branch, Major-General A, F, Sillem, upon
Major-Generals R, St, C, Lecky and A* E, Wardrop, successively
commanding the artillery of the Army, and Major-Generals E, R,
Kenyon and W, A, Liddell, successive Chief Engineers of the Army,
is also deserving of the highest commendation.

The work of the General Staff of the First Army in the attack
and capture of the Vimy Ridge in 1917 and in all subsequent oper-
ations has been most ably directed by Major-General W, H, Anderson,
Major-Generals P. G, Twining and A, W, Peck, the successive heads
of the " A " and " Q " Branch of the Army Staff, Major-Generals
Sir H, F, Mercer and E, W. Alexander, successively commanding
the artillery of the Army, and Major-Generals G, M, Heath and
E, H. de V. Atkinson, successively Chief Engineers of the Army,
have also carried out their duties in a distinguished manner.

Throughout the operations of the Second Army at Messines and
east of Ypres during the summer and autumn of 1917, the elaborate
General Staff arrangements for that successful fighting were admir-
ably directed by Major-General C, H, Harington, When at a later
date General Harington was appointed Deputy Chief of the Imperial
General Staff at the War Office, his work was undertaken by Major-
General J, S, J, Percy, the present senior General Staff officer of
the Second Army, Major-General A, A, Chichester, head of the
"A" and "Q" Branch, Major-General G, McK, Franks and
Major-General C. R, Buckle, successively commanding the artillery
of the Army, and Major-General Sir F, M, Glubb, Chief Engineer
of the Army, have also accomplished the arduous and responsible
tasks associated with their respective appointments with great ability
and success,

I recall with gratitude the magnificent work done during the
fighting of 1916 and 1917 by Major-General Sir H, M, Trenchard,
at that time commanding the Royal Flying Corps, The influence
exerted by this able and distinguished officer upon the moral and the
development of the British Air Service and in the creation of its
splendid traditions can scarcely be exaggerated. Since his transfer
to another but kindred field of activity, his work has been most
ably and successfully carried on by Major-General Sir J, M, Salmond,
commander of the Royal Air Force on the Western front.

The rapid development of the tank as a most potent instrument
of war and the creation of the high traditions of the Tank Corps have
been due in great measure to the energy and inspiration of their
Commander, Major-General H, J, Elles,

The steady increase in the effectiveness of gas as a weapon of

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

offence is largely to be attributed to the able work of my Director
of Gas Services, Brigadier-General C. H. Foulkes.

Since the formation of the Machine Gun Corps and the creation
of the office of Inspector of Machine Gun Units, held successively by
Brigadier-Generals C. H. T. Lucas and L. F. Renny, the use of the
machine gun has received a new impulse* Very gallant and efficient
service has been rendered by all machine gun units, and not least
by the battalions of the Guards Machine Gun Regiment, lately
formed from personnel of the Household Cavalry Brigade and the
Guards Division*

The development of bayonet fighting and the high standard
generally attained by the troops in the use of this essential weapon
are due in great measure to the teaching and enthusiasm of Col.
R* B* Campbell, formerly Deputy Inspector of Physical and Bayonet
Training*

The general efficiency of our Mining Services, and in particular
the great success of the extensive mining operations carried out by
us preparatory to the battle of Messines, is largely owed to the work
of my former Inspector of Mines, Brigadier-General R. N* Harvey.

During the rapid and extensive troop movements of 1918 in
particular, the constant work of the Auxiliary (Omnibus) Park was
controlled with great ability by its commander, Lieut .-Colonel
G. L. H. Howell.

Among others responsible for the efficient work of the various
rearward services and Administrative Services and Departments, my
thanks are especially due to Lieut .-General Sir J. J. Asser, under
whose command a vast organisation with a numerous staff has been
built up on the Lines of Communication, involving the control and
administration of a wide extent of France, including the adminis-
trative areas of Abbeville, fitaples, Trouville and other places, and
important bases at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Havre,
Rouen, Cherbourg, Brest, and Marseilles ; to my Directors of
Medical Services past and present, namely, Surgeon-General Sir
A* T* Sloggett and Lieut *-General C* H* Burtchaell, with their
deputies, Surgeon-General Sir W* G* Macpherson and Major-
General J* Thomson; my Deputy Adjutant-Generals, Major-Generals
J. T* Burnett-Stuart and Sir E* R* C. Graham ; my Deputy Quarter-
master-Generals, Major-Generals R. Ford and R. S. May ; the
General Officer Commanding the Canadian Section at General
Headquarters, Brigadier-General J. F. L* Embury ; Lieut.-General
Sir E. Locke Elliot, Commanding the Indian Contingent ; my
Provost-Marshal, Brigadier-General H. S. Rogers ; my Director of
Supplies, Major-General Sir E. E. Carter ; my Director of Ordnance
Services, Major-General Sir C. M* Mathew ; my Director of

THE FINAL DESPATCH 355

Transport, Major-General Sir W. G. B. Boyce ; my Director of
Railway Traffic, Brigadier-General V* Murray ; the Officer Com-
manding the Railway Operating Division, Lieut .-Colonel C. W.
Paget ; my Director of Light Railways, Brigadier-General G. H.
Harrisson; my Director of Roads, Brigadier-General H. P. May-
bury ; my Director of Inland Water Transport, Brigadier-General
C. M. Luck ; my Director of Docks, Brigadier-General R. L
Wedgwood ; my Director of Works, Major-General Sir A* M.
Stuart ; my Director of Engineering Stores, Brigadier-General
J. W. S. Sewell ; my Director of Remounts, Brigadier-General Sir
F. S. Garratt ; my Director of Veterinary Services, Major-General
J. Moore ; my Director of Army Postal Services, Brigadier-General
W. Price ; my Controller of Labour, Brigadier-General E. G.
Wace ; my Director of Military Prisons, Brigadier- General P.
Umfreville, who with his Staff has performed very exacting duties
with great firmness and tact ; my Director of Agricultural Pro-
duction, Brigadier-General J., Earl of Radnor ; my Controller of
Salvage, Brigadier-General E. Gibb ; my Inspector of Quarter-
master-General^ Services, Horse Feeding and Economies, Major-
General J. Vaughan ; my Inspector of Quartermaster-General's
Services, Messing and Economies, Lieut.-Colonel E. Larken ; my
Director of Forestry, Brigadier-General Lord Lovat ; my Director
of Army Printing and Stationery Services, Colonel S. G, Partridge ;
my Director of Graves Registration and Enquiries, Major-General
Fabian Ware ; my Financial Adviser, Brigadier-General H. G.
Goligher ; my Paymaster-in-Chief, Major-General Sir C. A* Bray ;
my Director of Hirings and Requisitions, Major-General the Right
Hon. L. B. Friend ; and my Deputy Controller of Expeditionary
Force Canteens, Colonel E. Benson.

The duties of the Principal Chaplain and Deputy Chaplain-
General have been discharged by the Reverend J. M. Simms and the
Right Reverend Bishop L. H. Gwynne with a zeal and devotion for
which I wish to express to them my sincere gratitude* My thanks are
due also to Miss Lila Davy, the Chief Controller of the Women's
Auxiliary Army Corps in France, for the very valuable assistance
given by her and all ranks serving under her, and to Colonel the Hon.
Sir Arthur Lawley, who as Commissioner has supervised the wonder-
ful work done by the British Red Cross Society in France.

I desire also to take this last opportunity to record my personal
appreciation of the very valuable help rendered, during the great
events described in my Despatches, by other officers of my General
Staff Branch at Headquarters, and in particular by Major-General
Sir John Davidson, head of the Operations Section, and those who
worked under him, among them Brigadier-General J. G. Dill,

356 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Brigadier-General (at that time Lieut .-Colonel) E* Napper Tandy,
Lieut*-Colonel W* G* S* Dobbie, and Major J* H Boraston ; by
Major-General G* P* Dawnay, head of the Staff Duties Section ;
Brigadier-General K* Wigram, formerly head of the Operations (B)
Section ; Brigadier-General C* Bonham-Carter and Colonel H* F,
Baillie for their work in connection with the formation and develop-
ment of the scheme for General and Technical Education within
the Army ; and Lieut*-Colonel E. M* Jack, under whose direction
the work of the Field Surveying battalions, in the preparation and
supply of maps and the fixing of hostile battery positions, has been
of the greatest value to our artillery and other arms and services*

My relations with the Allied and Associated Armies, the co-
ordination of our operations, and the good feeling existing between
all ranks of our Armies and the civil population of France and Belgium
have been greatly assisted by the work of the different Inter-Allied
Missions. In this connection I desire to refer gratefully to the help
long given to me by Brigadier-General Clive in my dealings with
French General Headquarters ; to the valuable work done by
Lieut.-General Sir J* P. Du Cane, the Senior British Military
Representative at Marshal Foch's Headquarters; by the head of
the British Mission with Belgian Headquarters, Brigadier-General
the Earl of Athlone ; by my present Representative at French
General Headquarters, Brigadier-General F. W* L* S. H. Cavendish ;
by the head of the British Mission with the American Expeditionary
Force, Brigadier-General C* M* Wagstaff ; and by Brigadier-General
C* A. Ker, head of the British Mission with the Portuguese Ex-
peditionary Force*

I desire to refer also with deep gratitude to the invaluable assist-
ance given to me by the able and gallant officers who in turn acted
as Chief of the French Mission attached to my Headquarters, General
des Vallieres, who has since met a soldier's death, and his successors,
Colonel de Bellaigue de Bughas and General de Laguiche* My
thanks are due equally to Lieut.-General A. L* E* Orth, who as
Chief of the Belgian Mission attached to my Headquarters has
spared no pains to further the interests of our common cause ; to
Colonel C* Capello, Chief of the Italian Mission, and to Lieut*-
Colonel Robert Bacon, who as Chief of the American Mission
attached to my Headquarters has been able to give me advice and
assistance of the greatest value on many occasions*

Finally, my thanks are due to the officers of my Personal Staff,
and in particular to my Assistant Military Secretary, Lieut*-Colonel
A* F* Fletcher ; my Private Secretary, Major Sir Philip Sassoon,
and Commandant E, A* Gemeau, by whose loyal and devoted
assistance a great burden of work has been lifted from my shoulders*

THE FINAL DESPATCH 357

35. I desire to conclude this Despatch with a very warm and
sincere acknowledgment of the great debt owed by all ranks of the
Armies in France to our kinsmen and kinswomen of the British
Empire for the unfailing support they have given us by their thoughts,
their prayers, and their work throughout the long years of war* In
all those years their trust and confidence never wavered, their labours
never ceased, and no sacrifices, hardships or privations were too
great to be borne, provided that thereby the needs of the troops
might adequately be supplied* The dauntless spirit of the people
at home strengthened and sustained the invincible spirit of the
Army, the while their incessant toil on land and sea, in the mine,
factory and shipyard, placed in our hands the means with which to
fight*

Neither do we forget the gratitude due from us to the various
Home Authorities, and especially to the Ministry of Munitions, by
whose efforts, in conjunction with those of the Governments of the
Dominions, the working power and resources of the whole Empire
were so rapidly developed and co-ordinated for the more vigorous
prosecution of the war. The record of what they accomplished in
the space of four and a half years is indeed stupendous* If the Army
may justly be proud of a great victory, gallantly won at the end of
an uphill fight, we have good reason to be thankful, too, for their
devoted and patriotic work, which alone made it possible to continue
the struggle until a successful conclusion had been reached.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,

D* HAIG, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

ORIGINAL TEXT

MARSHAL FOCH'S INTRODUCTION

DE tout temps, le Commandant en Chef des Armees Britanniques
a adresse a son Gouvernement des Comptes-Rendus sommaires
des periodes principales d'une campagne* Le Marechal Sir
Douglas Haig s'est conforme a cet usage* II a redige, deux fois par
an en moyenne, un aper^u des faits les plus saillants des opera-
tions britanniques sur le front occidental* Les Comptes-Rendus
embrassent la periode ou il commandait en Chef et s'etendent par
suite de la fin de 1915 au debut d'avril, 1919.

Ces rapports, etablis avec un absolu souci de la verite et scrupu-
leusement exacts dans les moindres details, sont marques d'une
hauteur et d'une largeur de vue incontestables* Us constituent des
documents historiques de premier ordre, par les renseignements
qu'ils apportent non seulement sur les operations, mais aussi sur
Te'tat des troupes, leur formation successive, les modifications
apportees au cours de la guerre a leur instruction ; par les precisions
qui mettent en relief avec leur valeur, les caracteres propres a chaque
contingent de TEmpire, les travaux incessants des fitats-Majors ;
au total le labeur grace auquel chacun augmente rapidement son
experience de la guerre et son savoir professionnel pour les adapter
a une lutte pleine de nouveautes ; par le tableau de la tache ex-
traordinaire qui incomba aux differents services charges de pourvoir
aux besoins, grandissant sans cesse, d'une armee moderne.

Si parfois les rapports exposent les faits d'une touche legere et
sans approfondir les raisons determinantes ou certaines de leurs
consequences, c'est que, ecrits au cours de la guerre et adresses au
Gouvernement Britannique, ils vont a la nation elle-meme dont ils
doivent menager les nerfs, comme ils doivent egalement eviter de
fournir a Tennemi une documentation utile*

Neanmoins, on degage de leur lecture la remarquable continuite
de vues qui, appliquee a rentrainement des troupes, a la formation
des specialites servant les engins de plus en plus nombreux et varies
de la guerre moderne, a la production et au transport de munitions

358

MARSHAL FOCH'S INTRODUCTION 359

necessities par une consommation inconnue jusqu'alors, a la con-
struction ou au retablissement des communications, avait fait des
Armees Britanniques un magnifique outil de guerre des Tannee 1917*

Mais il n'y a pas d 'outil qui produise par lui-meme. II lui faudra
toujours la main qui sache Temployer* Quand les depeches se
bornent la-dessus a nous dire qu'apres la periode de decision, que
les Armees Allemandes epuisees, usees en 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917,
allaient etre battues en 1918, elles ne disent pas pourquoi Tusure a
dure si longtemps, et la decision si peu, encore moins pourquoi elle
s'est transformee en victoire des Allies, menee au pas de charge pour
aboutir a la capitulation de TArmistice ; elles font sommairement
connaitre des effets sans en expliquer les causes, elles omettent la
main qui mania ToutiL Qu'il nous soit permis de combler cette
lacune dans laquelle disparait Taction operante au premier chef, du
Commandement Britannique,

En fait, la periode d'usure avait correspondu a Timpuissance pour
les Allies, resultat d'une incomplete preparation a la guerre de leur
part, L 'Entente n'avait amene sur les champs de bataille de 1914
qu'une Armee Anglaise de 6 divisions, et une Armee Franaise sans
1'artillerie suffisante comme sans la quantite de munitions necessaire
pour la guerre moderne,

Avec ces moyens incomplets, nous avions bien arrete 1'invasion
des la premiere annee, mais tant que les insuffisances de nos effectifs
et de notre materiel n'etaient pas comblees, nous restions hors d'etat
d'entreprendre Toffensive etendue et soutenue seule capable de
conduire a une decision par les armes, nous etions reduits a des
actions partielles, momentanees* Au moins eut-il fallu pouvoir les
coordonner dans Tespace et dans le temps,

De la, la faiblesse des resultats obtenus par TEntente jusqu'en
1917, Heureusement pour elle, Tennemi oblige dans ces annees-la
de tenir tete aux Armees Russes, puis aux Armees Roumaines
d'Orient, n'avait applique en Occident qu'une insuffisante partie de
ses forces pour y vaincre definitivement, ou qu'une conception
etroite de Tattaque, comme a Verdun. Quoi qu'il en soit, les impuis-
sances face a face risquaient de faire durer longtemps encore ce que
Ton a appele la guerre d'usure cette lutte, sans avantage marque et
soutenu, qui use les deux armees sans profit pour Tune ou pour
Tautre, c'est-a-dire la guerre sans issue. II faudra bien toujours lui
trouver une autre forme si Ton veut aboutir a la victoire, Dans
cette course a la decision, toujours necessaire cependant, TAllemagne,
des Tannee 1917, se debarrasse du front oriental par la Revolution
russe comme par les Traites de Brest-Litowsk et de Bucharest, et
quand elle tourne la masse de ses armees fortes de plus de 200
divisions et d'un materiel formidable centre le front d'occident,

360 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

pour en faire sortir ses attaques violentes et au de*but victorieuses de
mars 1918 sur la Somme, puis d'avril sur la Lys, de mai au Chemin
des Dames, de juin sur 1'Oise, enfin de juillet sur la Marne, qui
pourrait y trouver les marques d'une usure decisive a son detriment
et les preludes d'une victoire de TEntente 1 Qui oubliera les dangers
de nouveaux progres ennemis sur la Somme, a Amiens, coupant les
Arme'es Bntanniques des Arme'es Franaises, ou vers St,-Omer et
Dunkerque, coupant les Arme'es Britanniques de la Grande-Bre-
tagne ; ou vers Paris, coeur de la France, et nceud de communications
indispensables a la Coalition i Que devenait ce soi-disant avantage
de Tusure des Arme'es Allemandes au cours des anne'es prec&ientes i
La bataille des amides, meme des meilleures, comme les Armees
Britanniques, ne risquait-elle pas de se solder par un desastre, sans
un Commandement capable de dominer la situation, de maitriser
les eV&iements et de reprendre ses troupes en main pour les re-
constituer, les mettre en position d'arrSter de'finitivement Tennemi
d'abord, de Tattaquer ensuite avec une violence, un aplomb, une
re'pe'tition de coups, qui jamais ne furent depasses t A tous les degre's,
ce Commandement et ces fiats-Majors se trouvaient a la hauteur
de leur ta*che. Par Tactivite' qu'ils allaient de*ployer apres les attaques
allemandes du printemps de 1918 et malgre* les pertes prouvees,
plus de 60 divisions britanniques, 10 fois plus qu'en 1914, seront
maintenues en etat de combattre jusqu'a la fin de Tannee* Elles
auront un moral plus eleve que jamais* Les lignes de resistance se
multiplient en avant d'Amiens, d'Arras, de B^thune, d'Ha^ebrouck,
de St*-Omer, de Cassel ; les inondations se prdparent e'galement,
car le terrain doit etre dispute' pied a pied, avec acharnement. Par
dessus tout, un jeu puissant de reserves allie'es est assure* ; il sera
pratique* avec la plus grande facilite entre toutes les armees, permet-
tant ainsi de relever avec les troupes fran9aises la V c Armee Britan-
nique au sud de la Somme au commencement d'avril ; de soutenir
la II C Armee Britannique dans les Flandres avec 7 divisions fran-
9aises dans le meme mois ; de renforcer la VI e Armee Fran9aise avec
5 divisions britanniques au Chemin des Dames, puis la V c Armee
Francaise dans la Foret de Reims, avec 2 divisions britanniques,
et la X c Arme'e Frangaise a Villers-Cotterets, avec deux autres divi-
sions qui prennent part a la centre-offensive du 18 juillet*

C'est ainsi que, gr2ce en particulier a Tactivit^ du Commandement
Britannique et a la comprehension des besoins, plus de 200 divisions
allemandes etaient de'finitivement arretees dans leur offensive, par
un nombre moindre de divisions allie'es et que notre defensive s'etait
montre*e victorieuse* II en est de meme, dans Toffensive, du concours
prete aux autres armies par les troupes britanniques.

Dans cette derniere periode, il suffit, pour mesurer Tardeur et

MARSHAL FOCH'S INTRODUCTION 361

Tendurance de ces troupes, de relever les dates et Timportance des
principaux evenements :

Bataille d* Amiens. Du 8 au 13 aout, dans laquelle la IV e Armee
conquit 22,000 prisonniers et plus de 400 canons*

Bataille de Bapaume. 21 aout au i er septembre, III e Arme'e et
gauche de la IV C ; 34,000 prisonniers, 270 canons.

Bataille de la Scarpe. 26 aout au 3 septembre, de la I e Armee ;
16,000 prisonniers, 200 canons,

Bataille d'Havrincourt et d'Epehy. 12 au 18 septembre, des
IV e et III e Arme'es; 12,000 prisonniers, 100 canons.

Bataille de Cambrai et de la Ligne Hindenburg. 27 septembre
au 5 octobre, IV e , III C , et I e Armee, aboutissant a la rupture
de la Ligne Hindenburg et la prise de 35,000 prisonniers
et de 380 canons*

Bataille des Flandres. 28 Septembre au 14 Octobre, de la II e
Armee*

Bataille du Cateau. 6 au 12 octobre, des IV e , III 6 et I e Armees*

Bataille de la Selle. 17 au 25 octobre* des IV e et III C Armees ;
20,000 prisonniers, 475 canons*

Bataille de la Sambre. i er au n novembre, des IV e , III 6 et I c
Armees ; 19,000 prisonniers, 450 canons*

Les effets de ces attaques britanniques, violentes et re*petees,
augmentaient grandement par leur concordance avec les actions
des autres arme'es alliees franaise, americaine, beige pour finir, qui
frappaient aussi puissamment dans un assaut convergent prepare
de la Mer du Nord a la Moselle.

Jamais, a aucun moment de Thistoire, les Armees Britanniques
n'avaient obtenu dans Toffensive de plus grands re*sultats que dans
cette attaque continue de 116 jours, du 18 juillet au n novembre,
C'e'tait bien la une victoire complete obtenue grace a la valeur des
Commandants d 'Arme'e et de grandes unite's, grace surtout au
de'sinte'ressement, a Tintelligente, loyale et energique volonte de leur
Commandant en Chef qui avait facilite* les plus grandes combinaisons
et permis les plus vastes et les plus longs efforts. Nettement eclaire
par Texperience, n'e'tait-il pas intervenu en effet, des Ie 24 mars
1918, pres de son Gouvernement, des Ie 26 pres des Gouvernements
Allies reunis a Doullens t pour que les Armees Francaise et Britannique
de France et des Flandres soient immediatement placees sous un

362 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

commandement unique, dut sa situation personnelle s'en trouver
reduite t Et par la suite ne se montrait-il pas avant tout soucieux
de marcher de Tavant et en parfait accord avec le plan general des
Allies trace par ce nouveau Commandement Supreme*

Sur ce point, les Depeches presentaient des lacunes qui ne
permettaient pas au lecteur de tenir toutes les causes de notre victoire.
Je devais a la verite de les completes

INDEX

ABLAINZEVELLE, 208, 212

Acheville, 286

Achiet-le-Petit, 266

Adjutant-General's Branch, 340, 341

Advance to Victory State of the
British armies, 245, 246 ; position
of Allies, 246 ; enemy's position,
246 ; enemy's intentions, 247 ;
policy of British armies, 247, 248 ;
reorganisation, 248, 249 ; minor
operations in May and June, 249,
250; operations in July Hamel
captured, 250, 251 ; operations on
French front, 252 ; operations of
IX. Corps in Aisne battle, 252-254;
second battle of the Marne, 254,
255 ; operations by XXIL Corps,
255 ; situation at end of July, 256,
257; general scheme of British
operations, 257, 258 ; battle of
Amiens (Aug. 8-12), 258-264;
battle of Bapaume, 264-273 ; battle
of the Scarpe, 273-276; battle of
Havrincourt and Epehy, 276-279 ;
battle of Carnbrai and Hindenburg
Line, 280-285 ; battle in Flanders,
285-287; second battle of Le
Cateau, 287-291 ; battle of the
Selle River, 291-293 ; battle of the
Sambre, 293-296 ; return to Mons,
296, 297; the Armistice, 298;
work of the Troops, 298-300;
Infantry, 300 ; Artillery, 300 ;
Cavalry, 301 ; Royal Air Force,
301, 302; Tanks, 302; Trench
Mortars, 302 ; Machine Gun Corps,
303 ; Royal Engineers, 303 ; Gas
Services, 304 ; Signal Services, 304 ;
Transportation Services, 304, 305 ;
Supply Services, 306; Forestry,

306 ; Omnibus Park, 306 ; Labour
Corps, 306, 307 ; Medical Services,

307 ; Chaplains' Department, 307 ;
Administrative Services and Depart-
ments, 308 ; Navy and Home
Authorities, 308 ; our Allies, 308

See also Amiens, battle of; Ba-
paume, battle of ; Cambrai and the
Hindenburg Line, battle of; Flan-
ders, battle in ; Havrincourt and
Epehy, battle of ; Le Cateau, battle
of; Sambre, battle of the; Scarpe,
battle of the; Selle River, battle
of the.

365

Agricultural Production, Directorate

of, 338

Air-burst ranging, 331 n.
Albert, 208, 266, 268
Alexander, Maj.-Gen. E. W., 353
Allenby, Gen. Sir E. H. H., 25, 87,

349

Ameral, 292

Amiens, 328, 329

Amiens, battle of (Aug. 8-12), xii,
361 ; plan of operations, 258-260 ;
troops employed, 260 ; battle opened,
260, 261 ; advance continued, 262,
263 ; results, 263, 264

Ancre, operations on the Enemy's
position, 65 ; operations commenced,
65, 66 ; Beaumont Hamel Spur,
66 ; Grandcourt, 66, 67 ; advance
against Serre, 67 ; advance towards
Miraumont, 68; Miraumont and
Serre evacuated, 69, 70 ; Le Barque
and Gommecourt, 70 ; Irles, 70 ;
the Loupart Line, 71 ; general
withdrawal, 71, 72 ; Bapaume and
Peronne, 72, 73 ; difficulty of com-
munications, 73, 74 ; enemy re-
sistance increasing, 74, 75 ; Hin-
denburg Line, 75 ; general review,
75-78

Andechy, 206, 262

Anderson, Maj.-Gen. W. H., 353

Angre, 94, 296, 297

Angreau, 296

Anneux, 156, 158, 281

Anthoine, Gen., 109

Anti-Aircraft and Searchlight Sections,

A I3 ?
Antomg, 297

Argonne, 280
Arleux, 99
Armentieres, 51, 224
Armistice, the, 298, 311, 312
Arras, battle of (April 9- June 7)
Preparations, 85 ; enemy's defences,
86 ; final preparations fight for
aerial supremacy, 86, 87 ; the
bombardment, 87 ; troops employed,
87, 88; method of attack, 88;
general attack, 89-91 ; advance
continued, 91, 92 ; Monchy-le-
Preux, 92, 93 ; Heninel, Wancourt
and the Souchez River, 93 ; with-
drawal of enemy, 94, 95 ; results of
first attacks, 95, 96; subsidiary

366 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCHES

Arras, battle of continued
operations, 96; attack resumed
Guemappe and Gavrelle, 97, 98 ;
policy of subsequent operations,
98, 99 ; final attacks Arleux, 99 ;
Fresnoy, 99, 100 ; situation re-
viewed, 100, 101 ; activity main-
tained, 101 ; Bullecourt and Rceux,
102

Arras Line (April 9, 1917), facing 89

Arrow Head Copse, 30

Arsiero, 19 m

Artillery, importance of, 332, 333

Arvillers, 210

Aschhoop, 131

Asiago, 19 n.

Asser, Lt.-Gen. Sir J. J., 354

Athies, 90

Athlone, Brig.-Gen. the Earl of, ,356

Atkinson, Maj.-Gen. E. H. de V., 353

Attichy, 253

Aubercourt, 214

Aubigny, 196

Aulnoye, 291 n.

Aunelle river, 296

Austro-German attack on Isonso front,
1520.

Aveluy Wood, 208, 231, 250

Avesnes, 268, 297, 298

Ayette, 208

Babington, Maj.-Gen. J. M, (Sir),

27, 107 n.
Babceuf, 204
Bac St. Maur, 222
Bacon, Col. Robert, 356
Baillescourt Farm, 67
Bailleul, 94, 226, 228, 229, 273
Baillie, Col. H. F., 356
Bainbridge, Maj.-Gen. E. G. T.,

20, 106 n., 192, 253
Baisieux, 297
Bancourt, 271
Bapaume, 46, 72
Bapaume, battle of (Aug. 2i-Sept. i),

xii, 361 ; scheme of operations,

264, 265 ; opening attacks Albert,

265, 266 j main attack launched,
266-269 ; Bapaume taken, 269,
270 ; fight for Mont St. Quentin
and capture of Peronne, 270, 271 ;
results, 271, 272; withdrawal from
Lys salient, 272, 273

Barastre, 73, 199

Barnes, Maj.-Gen. R. W. R., 67, 281

Barter, Maj.-Gen. Sir C, St. L.,

20, 41 n.

Bassevillebeek, 121
Battle Wood, 107
Bavai, 296, 297
Bayonyillers, 210
Bazentin-le-Grand, 29

Bazentin-le-Petit, 23, 29, 30

Beaucoup, 281

Beaucourt-sur-Ancre, 49, 50, 65, 66,203

Beaulencourt, 46, 271

Beaumetz, 74, 192, 197

Beaumont Hamel, 26, 47 n., 49, 50, 66

Beaurains, 73, 75

Beauregard Dovecot, 69

Beaurevoir, 284

Becelaere, 286

Behagnies, 269

Beho, 313

Belgians, H.M. the King of the, 290

Bell, Maj.-Gen. G,, 262

Bellenglise, 282

Bellevue Spur, 131

Bellewaarde Ridge, 114

Bellicourt, 283

Benay, 189

Benson, Col. E., 355

Bernafay, 27

Bertincourt, 73, 199

Bethell, Maj.-Gen. H. K., 288

Bethencourt, 196, 201

Beugny, 197, 271

Beugny-Ytres line, 73

Biache St. Vaast, 289

Biddulph, Brig.-Gen. H., 351

Biefvillers, 268

Bihucourt, 202, 267

Birch, Maj.-Gen. Sir J. F. N. (Lt.-

Gen.), 240, 351
Birdwood, Lt.-Gen. Sir W. R. (Gen.),

70, 96 n., 286
Bixschoote, 114, 230
Black Watch Corner, 122
Blackader, Maj.-Gen. C. G., 113 n.
Blacklock, Maj.-Gen. C. A., 233, 275
Blankaart Lake, 131
Blecourt, 284
Bluff, 5-7, 104
Bohain, 288
Boiry Becquerelle, 267
Bois du Sart, 274
Bois-en-Hache, 93
Bois Hugo, 117
Bois TAbbaye, 295
Bois TEveque, 293
Bois Rase, 117
Bois, Maj.-Gen. L. J., 107 n., 113 n.,

352
Bombing raids into Germany, 138

Bonavis Ridge, 155, 165
Bonham-Carter, Brig.-Gen.
Bonn, 318
Bony, 283, 284
Boraston, Maj. J. H,, 356
Bouchavesnes, 64, 198, 271
Bouchoir, 262
Bouleaux Wood, 38
Boulogne, hospital at, 338
Bourlon, 158-162, 168, 281

C., 356

INDEX

367

Bousies Forest, 293
Boyce, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. G. B., 355
Boyd, Maj.-Gen. G. F., 282
Boyelles, 267
Braches, 260

Braithwaite, Maj.-Gen. W. P. (Lt.-
Gen. Sir), 93, 155, 208, 255> 294
Brancourt, 288

Bray, Maj.-Gen. Sir C. A., 3
Bray-sur-Somme, 200, 262,
Bremen Redoubt, 122
Bridges, Maj.-Gen. G. T. M., 27,

65 n., 107 rc.

Bridgford, Maj.-Gen. R. J., 197
Brie Bridge, 73, 76
Briqueterie, 26, 27
British Offensive, opening of final

(Aug., 1918), following 262; second

battle of Le Gateau (Oct. 8), facing

287

British Red Cross Society, 343
Broenbeek, 128
Broodseinde, 125, 333
Brouchy, 196

Brussilov's Galician offensive, 20 n.
Brutinel, Maj.-Gen., 260
Bry, 296

Buckland, Maj.-Gen* R. U. H., 352
Buckle, Maj.-Gen. C. R., 353
Bucquoy, 207, 211, 212, 215
Budworth, Maj.-Gen. C. E. D., 352
Bughas, Col. de Bellaigue de, 356
Buissy, 275
Bullecourt, 93, 99, 102, I57> 180, 269,

271

Burnett-Stuart, Maj.-Gen. J. T., 354
Burstall, Maj.-Gen. H. E. (Sir), 89 n.,

273

Burtchaell, Lt.-Gen. C. H., 307, 354
Bus, 73, 199
Bussu, 73
Butler, Lt.-Gen. Sir R. H. K., 184,

260, 350
Buzancy, 256
Byng, Lt.-Gen. Sir J. H. G. (Gen.

the Hon.), 44, 87, 152, 173* 184,

265, 271, 349 ,

Cabaret Rouge, 5

Cachy, 231

Cagnicourt, 275

Caix, 261

Cambrai and the Hindenburg Line,
battle of (Sept. 27-Oct. 5), xii, 361 ;
battle opened, 280-282 ; Hinden-
burg Line broken, 282-284; Mont-
brehain and Beaurevoir, 284 ; results,
284, 285

Cambrai Line (Nov. 20, 1917), facing
154 ; (Nov. 30), facing 163 ; (Sept,
27, 1918), facing 280

Cambrai operations General plan,
151-153 ; enemy's defences, 153,
154; the attack, 154-157; advance
continued, 157, 158 ; position on
Nov. 21, 158, 159 ; decision to go
on, 159, 1 60 ; struggle for Bourlon
Wood, i6o--i62 ; German attacks-
early warnings, 162 ; our disposi-
tions for defence, 163 ; battle
re-opened, 164, 165 ; the northern
attack, 1 66, 167; fighting at Gonne-
lieu and Masnieres, 168, 169 ; with-
drawal from Bourlon, 169, 170 ;
results, 170; general review, 171-
173

Cameron, Maj.-Gen. N. J. G., 226, 294
Campaigns of 1917 General Allied
plan, 81-85; spring campaign,
85-102; summer campaign, 103-
132; general review, 133-1 35 J
defensive fronts, 135 ; our troops,

136 ; Infantry, 136 ; Artillery, 136,

137 ; Royal Flying Corps, 137-1 39 ;
Anti-Aircraft and Searchlight Sec-
tions, 139 ; Cavalry, 139 ; Special
Services, 139 ; Tanks, 139 ; Trench
Mortars, 139 ; Machine Gun Corps,
140 ; Royal Engineers, 140 ; Signal
Services, 141 ; Gas Services, 141,
142 ; Field Survey Companies, 142 ;
Meteorological Section, 142 ; Trans-
portation Services, 142, 143 ; For-
estry and Quarry Units, 143, 144 ;
Army Service Corps, 144 ; Ordnance
Corps, 144 ; Medical Services, 144,
145 ; Veterinary Corps, 145 ;
Chaplains' Department, 145 ; Army
Commanders, 145 ; Staff, 146 ;
Army's acknowledgments to the
Navy, 146; to Home Authorities,
147 ; to our Allies, 147