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S. Hrg. 104-40 

THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 



Y4.R 86/2: S. HRG. 104-40 

The Snithsonian Institution Hanagen 



AINGS 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON 
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 

MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 







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Printed for the use of the Committee on Rules and Administration 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON: 1995 



For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-047266-0 



S. Hrg. 104-40 

\ \ THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 

MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 

Y 4. R 86/2: S. HRG. 104-40 =— ^— — 

The Snithsonian Institution nanaqen 

AINGS 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON 
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 



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MAY n AND 18, 1995 



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Printed for the use of the Committee on Rules and Administration 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON: 1995 



For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-047266-0 



COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION 
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman 



MARK O. HATFIELD, Oregon 
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina 
JOHN WARNER, Virginia 
ROBERT DOLE, Kansas 
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky 
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania 
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma 



WENDELL H. FORD, Kentucky 
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island 
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York 
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 



Albert L. McDermott, Staff Director 

Mark C. Mackie, Chief Counsel 

Virginia C. Sandahl, Chief Clerk 

James O. King, Democratic Staff Director 

Lana R. Slack, Professional Staff Member 



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(II) 



CONTENTS 

May 11, 1995 

Opening statement of: 

Hon. Ted Stevens, chairman. Committee on Rules and Ad- 
ministration 1 

Hon. Wendell H. Ford, ranking member. Committee on Rules 

and Administration 3 

Testimony of: 

Maj. Gen. Charles W. Sweeney, USAF (Ret.) 4 

Col. Charles D. Cooper, The Retired Officers Association ... 13 

Mr. Herman G. Harrington, The American Legion 17 

Mr. R. E. Smith, Air Force Association 28 

Mr. Bob Manhan, Veterans of Foreign Wars 31 

Prepared statement of: 

Maj. Gen. Charles W. Sweeney, USAF (Ret.) 8 

Mr. Herman G. Harrington, The American Legion 20 

Mr. Bob Manhan, Veterans of Foreign Wars 32 

May 18, 1995 

Opening statement of: 

Hon. Ted Stevens, chairman. Committee on Rules and Ad- 
ministration 41 

Hon. Wendell H. Ford, ranking member. Committee on Rules 

and Administration 43 

Statement of Hon. John Warner, member. Committee on Rules 

and Administration 51 

Testimony of: 

Hon. Sam Johnson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas 44 

Prof. Edward T. Linenthal, the University of Wisconsin-Osh- 

kosh 46 

Hon. I. Michael Heyman, Secretary, the Smithsonian Institu- 
tion 67 

Dr. Thomas D. Crouch, chairman. Aeronautics Department, 

National Air and Space Museum 72 

Dr. Maxine F. Singer, chairman. Commission on the Future of 

the Smithsonian Institution 102 

Prepared statement of: 

Dr. I. Michael Heyman, Secretary, the Smithsonian Institu- 
tion 70 

Dr. Thomas D. Crouch, chairman. Aeronautics Department, 

National Air and Space Museum 76 

Dr. I. Michael Heyman, Secretary, the Smithsonian Institu- 
tion 101 



(III) 



IV 

APF'ENDIXES 

Appendix I. Statement of Dr. Martin Harwit, former director. 

National Air and Space Museum Ill 

Appendix II. Additional statements submitted for the record: 

Evan S. Baker, president. Navy League of the United States . 116 

Louis R. Coatney, Macomb, Illinois 120 

Victor Fie, Tokyo correspondent, Asian Defense Journal .... 124 

Historians' Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima 132 

Gen. Jack N. Merritt, USA (Ret.), president. Association of the 

United States Army 154 

Appendix III. Enula Gay Chronology 1993-1995, submitted by R. 

E. Smith, Air Force Association 157 

Appendix IV. Letter from Dr. I. Michael Heyman, Secretary, 
Smithsonian Institution, to Hon. Sam Johnson, U.S. House of 

Representatives 161 

Appendix V. Responses of I. Michael Heyman, Secretary, 
Smithsonian Institution, to questions submitted by Hon. Jesse 
Helms, member. Committee on Rules and Administration .... 182 
Appendix VI. Letter from Dr. Maxine F. Singer, Chairman, Com- 
mission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution, to Chair- 
man Stevens, transmitting the report of the Commission 187 



THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION: 
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 



THURSDAY, MAY 11, 1995 

U.S. Senate, 
Committee on Rules and Administration, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in Room 
106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens, 
chairman, presiding. 

Present: Senators Stevens, Ford, and Pell. 

Staff Present: Christine Ciccone, Deputy Chief Counsel; 
Mark C. Mackie, Chief Counsel; Virginia C. Sandahl, Chief Clerk; 
and Kennie L. Gill, Special Counsel for the Minority. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, CHAIR- 
MAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA 

The Chairman. I want to welcome our distinguished panel of 
witnesses. General Charles Sweeney, the only pilot who flew on 
both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki missions and was the 
commander of the Nagasaki mission; Colonel Charles Cooper, 
the director of publications for The Retired Officers Association; 
Mr. Herman Harrington, the chairman of the National Internal 
Affairs Commission of The American Legion; Mr. R. E. Smith, 
national president of the Air Force Association; and Mr. Bob 
Manhan, assistant director of legislation for the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars. 

The hearing today and the one next Thursday on the 
Smithsonian's future management practices are held as a result 
of the controversy over the Smithsonian's Enola Gay exhibit 
originally scheduled to open this month. Museums play a crucial 
role in our society. The processes of our democracy enable 
succeeding generations to judge actions taken by those who 
exercised sovereign power before they arrived. Museums are 
essential to this process and we must preserve the artifacts of our 
past. Those artifacts, together with facts proven at the time of the 
decisions, permit judgments of history to be fair and unbiased. 

We are here today because the Smithsonian decided to 
present an interpretation of the history of the Enola Gay's historic 
flight. The veterans in this country reacted strongly, for good 

(1) 



reason, to the scripts that emerged from the Smithsonian. In the 
50 years since World War II ended, and recently, there has been 
a constant erosion of the truth of what really happened during 
that war. This type of erosion is one of the reasons that the 
Holocaust Museum, which was built with private funds, is so 
important. It is there to ensure that history is not rewritten and 
that the atrocities committed against Jews and others in the Nazi 
death camps will never be forgotten. 

On March 24 last year I initiated, along with Senator Ford, 
who was chairman then. Senator Dole, Senator Helms, Senator 
Cochran, and Senator McConnell, a letter to Dr. Harwit, the 
director of the Air and Space Museum at that time, expressing 
our concern that the Smithsonian's Enola Gay exhibit not lead to 
a revisionist view of history. It is not clear whether our concerns 
were taken seriously by the museum. It was only a couple of 
months after our letter that the proposed script attracted 
national attention due to the efforts of veterans groups. 

This week we remember one of the most devastating periods 
in world history. We are here today to review what went wrong 
with the Smithsonian's process, particularly what led the 
Smithsonian to propose a view of the events that took place at 
the end of World War II that is contrary to the memory of those 
who lived through the war. 

There are two people who have worked diligently over the 
last year to provide this committee, veterans, and the public with 
information on the exhibit. I want to express our thanks to Mr. 
Frank Rabbitt, a volunteer guide of 9 years at the Smithsonian's 
Paul Garber Restoration Facility. Mr. Rabbitt, who is here in the 
audience, is partially responsible for uncovering the museum's 
bias in the original scripts and bringing that bias to the attention 
of this committee. 

In addition, we are indebted to Colonel Robert Schuh who 
provided the committee with other information and guidance. 
Unfortunately, the colonel met a tragic death last week. His 
family should know our thoughts are with them and we thank 
them for their efforts to continue the colonel's work. 

A number of veterans groups have been involved with this 
issue. Due to time constraints they cannot all testify today. 
However, we have asked those organizations to submit written 
statements which will be included in the official hearing record. 

lAdditional statements are included in the Appendix.] 

The Chairman. Next Thursday we will receive testimony 
from the Smithsonian, and an individual who is both a scholar 
and a historian. The purpose of these hearings is not to tear down 
the Smithsonian but to ensure continuing public support of that 
great institution. This committee has oversight jurisdiction of 
the Smithsonian. I believe it is our duty to preserve the 
Smithsonian as the central depository of the artifacts of our 
Nation's history. I think the public should know that we waited 



until now to hold these hearings at the specific request of the 
Smithsonian. We delayed them at the Smithsonian's request. 

Our first witness is General Charles Sweeney. We are going 
to hear the testimony of all of the witnesses first and then we will 
ask questions from the panel. Gentlemen, would you take the 
seats at the table and let me call on my good friend, Senator Ford. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WENDELL H. FORD, 
RANKING MEMBER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE 
OF KENTUCKY 

Senator Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. Since 
its founding more than a century ago the Smithsonian Institution 
has created exhibits about a great number of subjects and events 
in its effort to carry out the provisions of James Smithson's will 
"for the increase and diffusion of knowledge." As might be 
expected of an institution with such a broad mission, some of its 
exhibits may be controversial and raise concerns or objections by 
some people. 

Last year I heard from people who were concerned about the 
proposed Enola Gay exhibit. Many of those who expressed 
concerns were veterans of the Second World War whose lives 
were especially affected by the events to be covered by that 
exhibit. I was impressed by the sincerity and depth of the feeling 
of those who conveyed their concerns to me. I felt that their 
concerns should be brought to the attention of and addressed by 
the Smithsonian. 

Consequently, last year I joined with you, Mr. Chairman, as 
you already stated, and other members of this committee in a 
letter to the former director of the National Air and Space 
Museum regarding this exhibit. We requested that the 
Smithsonian be sensitive to the memory of those who gave their 
lives for our continued freedom. Although the Smithsonian has 
substantially revised the proposed exhibit some questions 
remain unresolved. 

These hearings will serve the useful purpose of providing a 
public forum for the presentation and consideration of the issues 
and concerns that were raised regarding the planning of the 
exhibit. Mr. Chairman, the issues raised in these hearings touch 
on broader issues of Smithsonian management. It is important 
that these concerns be aired so that this matter can be put behind 
us and the Smithsonian can continue to move forward. I hope 
that these hearings will be beneficial to all parties and serve as 
a basis for moving on with our relationship with the Smithsonian 
in a positive and constructive manner. 

I thank you for the opportunity to make this statement. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. As I am sure most 
people realize, every member of this committee is either a 
chairman or ranking member of some committee. I know that 
Senator Hatfield has other committee meetings. Senator Cochran 



expresses his regrets that he cannot be here. He is chairing a 
conference committee. I am not certain how many people will 
show up here this morning, gentlemen. It is a bucy period for the 
Senate, but we do appreciate your coming to appear before us. 

Let me state that we have asked witnesses to limit their oral 
presentations to 10 minutes. We will print your full written 
statements in the record. We are going to waive the time limit, 
however, for General Sweeney. We feel that his role is so historic 
in this matter, and both Senator Ford and I have read the 
statement he has given the committee. So with your indulgence, 
we are going to give the general complete leeway to present his 
statement in the way he wishes to do so, and put the 10-minute 
limitation on the rest of you if that is all right. Thank you. 

General? 

Senator FORD. That is called discrimination. 

[Laughter. 1 

The Chairman. That is discrimination, but in view of the 
historic role that General Sweeney played in this controversy, I 
would wish that the public at large could hear every word of 
what he has written, but it is even longer than 15 minutes. 
General, we turn the time over to you, please, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES W. 
SWEENEY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, RETIRED 

General Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of 
the committee. I am Major General Charles W. Sweeney, United 
States Air Force, retired. I am the only pilot to have flown on 
both atomic missions. I flew the instrument plane on the 
Hiroshima mission, and 3 days later on August 9, 1945 
commanded the second atomic mission over Nagasaki. Six days 
after Nagasaki the Japanese military surrendered and the Second 
World War came to an end. 

Fifty years ago millions of my fellow citizens served our 
country in a time of national crisis — a crisis which engulfed our 
panel; a crisis in which the forces of fascism were poised to 
extinguish the democracies of the world. It was a crisis in which 
the forces of evil were clearly defined, or at least I thought so 
until last fall when I read the first accounts from the Air Force 
Association of the proposed script for the exhibit of the Enola Gay 
at the Smithsonian Institution. 

It was obvious to me that the Enola Gay was being used to 
advance a theory about atomic missions and the United States' 
role in World War II that transformed the Japanese into victims 
and cast the United States as a vengeful aggressor engaged in a 
war to destroy an ancient culture. My first reaction was, as you 
can imagine, personal disbelief. I just could not believe that the 
Smithsonian, an institution whose very name signifies honesty 
and integrity in the preservation of American artifacts, could be 
so wrong. 



Like the overwhelming majority of my generation I did not 
want a war. We are not a Nation of warriors. There is no warrior 
class, no master race, no Samurai. Yet during the years when my 
generation and our parents were struggling through the Great 
Depression, the Japanese were engaged in the conquest of their 
neighbors. That is an unfortunate fact of history. Without the 
slightest remorse or hesitation the Japanese military slaughtered 
innocent men, women, and children. In the end, they would kill 
over 20 million of their Asian neighbors. 

The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, timed for Sunday morning 
to inflict the maximum loss of ships and human life, thrust the 
United States into a war in the Pacific whose outcome then was 
far from certain. Seventeen hundred sailors are still entombed in 
the hull of the U.S.S. Arizona that sits on the bottom of Pearl 
Harbor. Many, if not all, died without ever knowing why. 

The fall of Corregidor and the resulting treatment of Allied 
prisoners of war dispelled any remaining doubt about the 
inhumaneness of the Japanese army even in the context of war. 
The Japanese military considered surrender a dishonor to one's 
self, one's family, one's country, and one's God, and thus they 
showed no mercy. 

This was the true nature of the enemy we faced. This was the 
reality which President Harry Truman confronted as he 
considered sending yet even more American soldiers, sailors, 
and airmen into the horror of the war in the Pacific. Declassified 
transcripts of the secret codes which we had broken during the 
war and were available to President Truman and his military 
advisors underscore the Japanese attitude 50 years ago. The 
transcripts show the Japanese had no intention of surrendering 
unconditionally. They were stalling for time and fully prepared 
to continue to sacrifice their own citizens. And as time passed 
more Americans died. 

The Japanese military was fully prepared to fight on, even 
after the Hiroshima mission. In fact, even after the Nagasaki 
mission, some Japanese military leaders were still advocating 
fighting on. 

We know that in a pre-invasion meeting at the White House 
on June 18, 1945 Admiral William Leahy predicted to President 
Truman, based on the experience of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, 30 
to 35 percent of the 770,000-man invasion force would be killed 
or wounded in the first 30 days of an invasion of the Japanese 
mainland. That calculates out to about a quarter of a million 
American men. President Truman remarked that the invasion 
would create another Okinawa from one end of Japan to the 
other; one of the most horrendous battles we ever fought. Now 
it would be expanded the whole length of Kyushu, the southern 
island of the four main islands of Japan. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed. General MacArthur's chief 
surgeon. Brigadier General Guy Dennett, estimated that in the 
120-day campaign to invade and occupy only the island of 



Kyushu, 395,000 casualties would be sustained. For President 
Truman, for me and for my crew, the probability of so many 
casualties was not an abstraction but a sobering reality. 

The world is a better place because German and Japanese 
fascism failed to conquer. Japan and Germany are better places 
because we were benevolent in our victory. The youth of Japan 
and the United States, spared from further needless slaughter, 
went on to live and have families and grow old. Today millions 
of people in America and Japan are alive because we ended the 
war when we did. This is not to celebrate the use of atomic 
weapons. Quite the contrary. It is my fervent hope that my 
mission is the last such mission ever flown. But that does not 
mean that back in 1945, given the events of the war and the 
recalcitrance of our enemy. President Truman was not obliged to 
use all the weapons at his disposal to end the war. 

Now, 50 years later after their defeat, some Japanese officials 
claim they were the victims, ignoring the clear evidence of their 
own brutality and mind set. Incredibly, how can any American 
academic support such a proposition, thus aiding and giving 
support to a 50-year attempt by the Japanese to rewrite their own 
history and ours in the process. Such an effort to rewrite history 
does a disservice to both countries. There is an entire generation 
of Japanese who do not know the full extent of their country's 
conduct during World War II. 

By forgetting our own history we contribute to Japanese 
amnesia, to the detriment of both nations. Unlike the Germans 
who acknowledge their guilt, the Japanese persist in the fiction 
that they did nothing wrong. That they were the victims of 
circumstances. This only forecloses any genuine prospect that 
the deep wounds suffered by both nations can be healed. We 
must know and remember history. 

I have always had the utmost respect for the Smithsonian 
Institution and its mission. I do not understand how it could 
have planned to so unfairly mistreat the United States' role in 
World War II, to denigrate the bravery of our American soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen and the courage of President Truman. By 
canceling the proposed exhibit and simply displaying the Enola 
Gay, has the truth won out? Maybe not. Maybe this exhibit 
reveals a deeper problem. 

Imagine taking your children or grandchildren to the original 
proposed exhibit. Would they learn of the sacrifices their fathers 
and grandfathers endured in that war in the Pacific so that all of 
us could be free in 1995, free to visit the Smithsonian or 
anywhere else we choose? Would they understand the important 
historical context which led the President of the United States to 
make the decision to end that brutal conflict using all the 
weapons at his disposal? I think not. 

In the end, what would our children and grandchildren think 
that their country stood for? In trying to understand the reason 
why the Smithsonian did this I certainly do not get any clue from 



the stated reason the director gave for canceling the proposed 
exhibit. As I recall, he said the Smithsonian realized that it had 
been too ambitious by combining a highly emotional 
commemorative event for veterans with an historical analysis. 
This reason is at best condescending to the veterans. I suggest 
that the forces behind the revisionism of our history at the 
Smithsonian were flat out wrong in their analysis, and they 
should have said so. 

The soul of a nation, its essence, is its history. It is that 
collective memory which defines what each generation thinks 
and believes about itself and its country. For this reason the facts 
must always be preserved. This does not mean debate should be 
stifled. It does mean that any debate must be founded upon a 
recognition of all the facts. At the Smithsonian there was an 
absence of some rather basic facts and a conclusion which was 
unsupported by those basic facts. 

My fellow veterans and I were impelled to ask how could the 
Smithsonian have been so terribly wrong about the true nature 
and meaning of the war in the Pacific and the atomic missions? 
Fortunately, this threat to our national identity was aired out in 
the open because the proposed exhibit of the Enola Gay was so 
devoid of factual support. Other historic events may be too 
subtle to be seen as clearly. Certainly the country was fortunate 
that millions of veterans of the war, and citizens of the United 
States who are not necessarily veterans, were still alive to report 
on what really happened. I might point to one specific class of 
Americans, and they are the ones whose husbands, sons, loved 
ones were poised to conduct, to participate in that invasion. 

So I come before this committee to ask you as Members of 
Congress to do all in your power to protect and preserve the 
integrity of the process by which our national identity is formed 
and debated. Our history is a precious asset. In a free society 
such as ours there must always be an ongoing debate about who 
we are and what we stand for. 

The key question, however, is what role is appropriate for the 
Smithsonian in this ongoing debate and what process is to be 
employed in making decisions about historic interpretation at 
the Smithsonian? Of course, this assumes that the Smithsonian 
should expand its role beyond the preservation and exhibition 
of significant American artifacts — American artifacts. 

The fact that you are holding these hearings is an encouraging 
sign for many Americans that such an inquiry will prevent future 
attempts to revise, rewrite, or slant our historical record in any 
way by any Government-supported agency. I would like to ask 
this committee to help the American people understand how the 
decisions as to what history the Smithsonian will display are 
made. Are these decisions based on ideology or some agenda, or 
are they the product of careful review and presentation of 
historical facts? 



The issue is not that a group of pesky, aging veterans raised 
questions about a proposed exhibit. The issue is one of trust. Can 
the American people trust the Smithsonian ever again to be 
objective and unencumbered by ideology? This is an important 
debate and I thank this committee for holding these hearings. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Sweeney follows:] 

Statement OF Major General Charles W. Sweeney, USAF (Ret.) 

I am Maj. Gen. Charles W. Sweeney, United States Air Force, Retired. I am the 
only pilot to have flown on both atomic missions. I flew the instrument plane on 
the right wing of General Paul Tibbets on the Hiroshima mission and 3 days later, 
on August 9, 1945, commanded the second atomic mission over Nagasaki. Six 
days after Nagasaki the Japanese military surrendered and the Second World War 
came to an end. 

The soul of a nation, its essence, is its history. It is that collective memory which 
defines what each generation thinks and believes about itself and its country. 

In a free society, such as ours, there is always an ongoing debate about who we 
are and what we stand for. This open debate is in fact essential to our freedom. 
But to have such a debate we as a society must have the courage to consider all 
of the facts available to us. We must have the courage to stand up and demand 
that before any conclusions are reached, those facts which are beyond question 
are accepted as part of the debate. 

As the 50th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki missions approaches, 
now is an appropriate time to consider the reasons for Harry Truman's order that 
these missions be flown. We may disagree on the conclusion, but let us at least 
be honest enough to agree on basic facts of the time, the facts that President 
Truman had to consider in making a difficult and momentous decision. 

As the only pilot to have flown both missions, and having commanded the 
Nagasaki mission, I bring to this debate my own eyewitness account of the times. 
I underscore what I believe are irrefutable facts, with full knowledge that some 
opinion makers may cavalierly dismiss them because they are so obvious — be- 
cause they interfere with their preconceived version of the truth, and the meaning 
which they strive to impose on the missions. 

This evening, I want to offer my thoughts, observations, and conclusions as 
someone who lived this history, and who believes that President Truman's 
decision was not only justified by the circumstances of his time, but was a moral 
imperative that precluded any other option. 

Like the overwhelming majority of my generation the last thing I wanted was 
a war. We as a nation are not warriors. We are not hell-bent on glory. There is no 
warrior class — no Samurai — no master race. 

This is true today, and it was true 50 years ago. 

While our country was struggling through the great depression, the Japanese 
were embarking on the conquest of its neighbors — the Greater East Asia Co-Pros- 
perity Sphere. It seems fascism always seeks some innocuous slogan to cover the 
most hideous plans. 

This Co-Prosperity was achieved by waging total and merciless war against 
China and Manchuria. The Japanese, as a nation, saw itself as destined to rule 
Asia and thereby possess its natural resources and open lands. Without the 
slightest remorse or hesitation, the Japanese Army slaughtered innocent men, 
women and children. In the infamous Rape of Nanking up to 300,000 unarmed 
civilians were butchered. These were criminal acts. 

THESE ARE FACTS. 

In order to fulfill its divine destiny in Asia, Japan determined that the only real 
impediment to this goal was the United States. It launched a carefully conceived 
sneak attack on our Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor. Timed for a Sunday morning it 
was intended to deal a death blow to the fleet by inflicting the maximum loss of 
ships and human life. 



1,700 sailors are still entombed in the hull of the U.S.S. Arizona that sits on the 
bottom of Pearl Harbor. Many if not all, died without ever knowing why. Thus 
was the war thrust upon us. 

The fall of Corregidor and the resulting treatment of Allied prisoners of war 
dispelled any remaining doubt about the inhumaneness of the Japanese Army, 
even in the context of war. The Bataan Death March was horror in its fullest 
dimension. The Japanese considered surrender to be dishonorable to oneself, 
one's family, one's country and one's god. They showed no mercy. Seven thou- 
sand American and Filipino POW's were beaten, shot, bayonetted or left to die 
of disease or exhaustion. 

THESE ARE FACTS. 

As the United States made its slow, arduous, and costly march across the vast 
expanse of the Pacific, the Japanese proved to be a ruthless and intractable killing 
machine. No matter how futile, no matter how hopeless the odds, no matter how 
certain the outcome, the Japanese fought to the death. And to achieve a greater 
glory, they strove to kill as many Americans as possible. 

The closer the United States came to the Japanese mainland, the more fanatical 
their actions became. 

Saipan — 3,100 Americans killed, 1,500 in the first few hours of the invasion 

Iwo Jima — 6,700 Americans killed, 25,000 wounded 

Okinawa — 12,500 Americans killed, total casualties, 35,000 

These are facts reported by simple white grave markers. 

Kamikazes. The literal translation is DIVINE WIND. To willingly dive a plane 
loaded with bombs into an American ship was a glorious transformation to 
godliness — there was no higher honor on heaven or earth. The suicidal assaults 
of the Kamikazes took 5,000 American Navy men to their deaths. 

The Japanese vowed that, with the first American to step foot on the mainland, 
they would execute every Allied prisoner. In preparation they forced the POW's 
to dig their own graves in the event of mass executions. Even after their surren- 
der, they executed some American POW's. 

THESE ARE FACTS. 

The Potsdam Declaration had called for unconditional surrender of the Japan- 
ese Armed Forces. The Japanese termed it ridiculous and not worthy of consid- 
eration. We know from our intercepts of their coded messages, that they wanted 
to stall for time to force a ne gotiated surrender on terms acceptable to them. 

For months prior to August 6, American aircraft began dropping fire bombs 
upon the Japanese mainland. The wind created by the firestorm from the bombs 
incinerated whole cities. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese died. Still the Jap- 
anese military vowed never to surrender. They were prepared to sacrifice their 
own people to achieve their visions of glory and honor — no matter how many 
more people died. 

They refused to evacuate civilians even though our pilots dropped leaflets 
warning of the possible bombings. In one 3-day period, 34 square miles of Tokyo, 
Nagoya, Kobe and Osaka were reduced to rubble. 

THESE ARE FACTS. 

And even after the bombing of Hiroshima, Tojo, his successor Suzuki, and the 
military clique in control believed the United States had but one bomb, and that 
Japan could go on. They had 3 days to surrender after August 6, but they did not 
surrender. The debate in their cabinet at times became violent. 

Only after the Nagasaki drop did the Emperor finally demand surrender. 

And even then, the military argued they could and should fight on. A group of 
Army officers staged a coup and tried to seize and destroy the Emperor's re- 
corded message to his people announcing the surrender. 

THESE ARE FACTS. 

These facts help illuminate the nature of the enemy we faced. They help put 
into context the process by which Truman considered the options available to 
him. And they help to add meaning to why the missions were necessary. 

President Truman understood these facts as did every service man and woman. 
Casualties were not some abstraction, but a sobering reality. 

Did the atomic missions end the war? Yes . . . they . . . did. 

Were they necessary? Well that's where the rub comes. 



10 

With the fog of 50 years drifting over the memory of our country, to some, the 
Japanese are now the victims. America was the insatiable, vindictive aggressor 
seeking revenge and conquest. Our use of these weapons was the unjustified and 
immoral starting point for the nuclear age with all of its horrors. Of course, to 
support such distortion, one must conveniently ignore the real facts or fabricate 
new realities to fit the theories. It is no less egregious than those who today deny 
the Holocaust occurred. 

How could this have happened? 

The answer may lie in examining some recent events. 

The current debate about why President Truman ordered these missions, in 
some cases, has devolved to a numbers game. The Smithsonian in its proposed 
exhibit of the Enola Gay revealed the creeping revisionism which seems the rage 
in certain historical circles. 

That exhibit wanted to memorialize the fiction that the Japanese were the 
victims — we the evil aggressor. Imagine taking your children and grandchildren 
to this exhibit. 

What message would they have left with? 

What truth would they retain? 

What would they think their country stood for? 

And all of this would have occurred in an American institution whose very 
name and charter are supposed to stand for the impartial preservation of signif- 
icant American artifacts. 

By cancelling the proposed exhibit and simply displaying the Enola Gay, has 
truth won out? 

Maybe not. 

In one nationally televised discussion, I heard a so-called prominent historian 
argue that the bombs were not necessary. That President Truman was intent on 
intimidating the Russians. That the Japanese were ready to surrender. 

The Japanese were ready to surrender? Based on what? 

Some point to statements by General Eisenhower years after the war that Japan 
was about to fall. Well, based on that same outlook Eisenhower seriously under- 
estimated Germany's will to fight on and concluded in December, 1944 that 
Germany no longer had the capability to wage offensive war. 

That was a tragic miscalculation. The result was the Battle of the Bulge, which 
resulted in tens of thousands of needless Allied casualties and potentially al- 
lowed Germany to prolong the war and force negotiations. 

Thus the assessment that Japan was vanquished may have the benefit of hind- 
sight rather than foresight. 

It is certainly fair to conclude that the Japanese could have been reasonably 
expected to be even more fanatical than the Germans based on the history of the 
war in the Pacific. 

And, finally, a present-day theory making the rounds espouses that even if an 
invasion had taken place, our casualties would not have been a million, as many 
believed, but realistically only 46,000 dead. 

ONLY 46,000! 

Can you imagine the callousness of this line of argument? ONLY 46,000 — as if 
this were some insignificant number of American lives. 

Perhaps these so-called historians want to sell books. 

Perhaps they really believe it. Or perhaps it reflects some self-loathing occa- 
sioned by the fact that we won the war. 

Whatever the reason, the argument is flawed. It dissects and recalculates events 
ideologically, grasping at selective straws. 

Let me admit right here, today, that I don't know how many more Americans 
would have died in an invasion— AND NEITHER DOES ANYONE ELSE! 

What I do know is that based on the Japanese conduct during the war, it is fair 
and reasonable to assume that an invasion of the mainland would have been a 
prolonged and bloody affair. Based on what we know — not what someone sur- 
mises — the Japanese were not about to unconditionally surrender. 

In taking Iwo Jima, a tiny 8 square mile lump of rock in the ocean, 6,700 marines 
died — total casualties over 30,000. 



11 

But even assuming that those who now KNOW our casualties would have been 
ONLY 46.000 I ask 

Which 46,000 were to die? 

Whose father? 

Whose brother? 

Whose husband? 

And, yes, I am focusing on American lives. 

The Japanese had their fate in their own hands, we did not . Hundreds of 
thousands of American troops anxiously waited at staging areas in the Pacific 
dreading the coming invasion, their fate resting on what the Japanese would do 
next. The Japanese could have ended it at any time. They chose to wait. 

And while the Japanese stalled, an average of 900 more Americans were killed 
or wounded each day the war continued. 

I've heard another line of argument that we should have accepted a negotiated 
peace with the Japanese on terms they would have found acceptable. I have never 
heard anyone suggest that we should have negotiated a peace with Nazi Ger- 
many. Such an idea is so outrageous, that no rational human being would utter 
the words. To negotiate with such evil fascism was to allow it even in defeat a 
measure of legitimacy. This is not just some empty philosophical principal of the 
time — it was essential that these forces of evil be clearly and irrevocably de- 
feated — their demise unequivocal. Their leadership had forfeited any expectation 
of diplomatic niceties. How is it, then, that the history of the war in the Pacific 
can be so soon forgotten? 

The reason may lie in the advancing erosion of our history, of our collective 
memory. 

Fifty years after their defeat, Japanese officials have the temerity to claim they 
were the victims. That Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the equivalent of the 
Holocaust. 

And, believe it or not, there are actually some American academics who sup- 
port this analogy, thus aiding and giving comfort to a 50-year attempt by the 
Japanese to rewrite their own history, and ours in the process. 

There is an entire generation of Japanese who do not know the full extent of 
their country's conduct during World war II. 

This explains why they do not comprehend why they must apologize — 

• for the Korean comfort women, 

• for the Medical experimentation on POW's which match the horror 
of those conducted by the Nazi's, 

• for the plans to use biological weapons against the United States by 
infecting civilian populations on the West Coast, 

• for the methodical slaughter of civilians, 

• and for much more. 

In a perverse inversion, by forgetting our own history, we contribute to the 
Japanese amnesia, to the detriment of both our nations. 

Unlike the Germans who acknowledged their guilt, the Japanese persist in the 
fiction that they did nothing wrong, that they were trapped by circumstances. 
This only forecloses any genuine prospect that the deep wounds suffered by both 
nations can be closed and healed. 

One can only forgive by remembering. And to forget, is to risk repeating 
history. 

The Japanese in a well orchestrated political and public relations campaign 
have now proposed that the use of the term "V-J Day" be replaced by the more 
benign "Victory in the Pacific Day". How convenient. 

This they claim will make the commemoration of the end of the war in the 
Pacific less "Japan specific." 

An op-ed piece written by Dorothy Rabinowitz appearing in the April 5 Wall 
Street Journal accurately sums up this outrage: 

The reason it appears, is that some Japanese find the reference disturbing — and 
one can see why. The term, especially the "J" part, does serve to remind the world 
of the identity of the nation whose defeat millions celebrated in August 1945. In 
further deference to Japanese sensitivities, a U.S. official (who wisely chose to 
remain unidentified) also announced, with reference to the planned ceremonies. 



12 

that "our whole effort in this thing is to commemorate an event, not celebrate a 
victory." 

Some might argue so what's in a word — Victory over Japan, Victory in the 
Pacific — Let's celebrate an event, not a victory. 

I say everything is in a word. Celebrate an EVENT! 

Kind of like celebrating the opening of a shopping mall rather than the end of 
a war that engulfed the entire Earth — which left countless millions dead and 
countless millions more physically or mentally wounded and countless more 
millions displaced. 

This assault on the use of language is Orwellian and is the tool by which history 
and memory are blurred. Words can be just as destructive as any weapon. 

Up is Down. 

Slavery is Freedom. 

Aggression is Peace. 

In some ways this assault on our language and history by the elimination of 
accurate and descriptive words is far more insidious than the actual aggression 
carried out by the Japanese 50 years ago. At least then the threat was clear, the 
enemy well defined. 

Today the Japanese justify their conduct by artfully playing the race card. They 
were not engaged in a criminal enterprise of aggression. No, Japan was simply 
liberating the oppressed masses of Asia from WHITE Imperialism. 

Liberation!!! Yes, they liberated over 20 million innocent Asians by killing 
them. I'm sure those 20 million, their families and the generations never to be, 
appreciate the noble effort of the Japanese. 

I am often asked was the bomb dropped for vengeance, as was suggested by 
one draft of the Smithsonian exhibit. That we sought to destroy an ancient and 
honorable culture. 

Here are some more inconvenient facts. 

One, on the original target list for the atomic missions Kyoto was included. 
Although this would have been a legitimate target, one that had not been bombed 
previously. Secretary of State Henry Stimson removed it from the list because it 
was the ancient capital of Japan and was also the religious center of Japanese 
culture. 

Two, we were under strict orders during the war that under no circumstances 
were we to ever bomb the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, even though we could have 
easily leveled it and possibly killed the Emperor. So much for vengeance. 

I often wonder if Japan would have shown such restraint if they had the 
opportunity to bomb the White House. I think not. 

At this point let me dispel one of many longstanding myths that our targets 
were intended to be civilian populations. Each target for the missions had signif- 
icant military importance — Hiroshima was the headquarters for the southern 
command responsible for the defense of Honshu in the event of an invasion and 
it garrisoned seasoned troops who would mount the initial defense. 

Nagasaki was an industrial center with the two large Mitsubishi armaments 
factories. In both Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Japanese had integrated these 
industries and troops right in the heart of each city. 

As in any war our goal was, as it should be, to win. The stakes were too high 
to equivocate. 

I am often asked if I ever think of the Japanese who died at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki? 

I do not revel in the idea that so many on both sides died, not only at those two 
places but around the world in that horrible conflict. I take no pride or pleasure 
in the brutality of war whether suffered by my people or those of another nation. 
Every life is precious. 

But it does seem to me such a question is more appropriately directed to the 
Japanese war lords who so willingly offered up their people to achieve their 
visions of greatness. They who started the war and then stubbornly refused to 
stop it must be called to account. Don't they have the ultimate responsibility for 
all the deaths of their countrymen? 

Perhaps if the Japanese came to grips with their past and their true part in the 
war they would hold those Japanese military leaders accountable. The Japanese 



13 

people deserve an answer from those that brought such misery to the nations of 
the Far East and ultimately to their own people. Of course this can never happen 
if we collaborate with the Japanese in wiping away the truth. 

How can Japan ever reconcile with itself and the United States if they do not 
demand and accept the truth? 

My crew and I flew these missions with the belief that they would bring the 
war to an end. There was no sense of joy. There was a sense of duty and 
commitment that we wanted to get back to our families and loved ones. 

Today millions of people in America and in southeast Asia are alive because 
the war ended when it did. 

I do not stand here celebrating the use of nuclear weapons. Quite the contrary. 

I hope that my mission is the last such mission ever flown. 

We as a nation can abhor the existence of nuclear weapons. 

I certainly do. 

But that does not then mean that, back in August of 1945, given the events of 
the war and the recalcitrance of our enemy. President Truman was not obliged 
to use all the weapons at his disposal to end the war. 

I agreed with Harry Truman then, and I still do today. 

Years after the war Truman was asked if he had any second thoughts. He said 
emphatically, "No." He then asked the questioner to remember the men who died 
at Pearl Harbor who did not have the benefit of second thoughts. 

In war the stakes are high. As Robert E. Lee said, "it is good that war is so 
horrible, or we might grow to like it." 

I thank God that it was we who had this weapon and not the Japanese or the 
Germans. The science was there. Eventually someone would have developed this 
weapon. Science can never be denied. It finds a way to self-fulfillment. 

The question of whether it was wise to develop such a weapon would have 
eventually been overcome by the fact that it could be done. The Soviets would 
have certainly proceeded to develop their own bomb. Let us not forget that 
Joseph Stalin was no less evil than Tojo or his former ally Adolf Hitler. At last 
count, Stalin committed genocide on at least 20 million of his own citizens. 

The world is a better place because German and Japanese fascism failed to 
conquer the world. 

Japan and Germany are better places because we were benevolent in our 
victory. 

The youth of Japan and the United States, spared from further needless slaugh- 
ter, went on to live and have families and grow old. 

As the father of ten children and the grandfather of 21, I can state that I am 
certainly grateful that the war ended when it did. 

I do not speak for all veterans of that war. But I believe that my sense of pride 
in having served my country in that great conflict is shared by all veterans. This 
is why the truth about that war must be preserved. We veterans are not shrinking 
violets. Our sensibilities will not be shattered in intelligent and controversial 
debate. We can handle ourselves. 

But we will not, we cannot allow armchair second guessers to frame the debate 
by hiding facts from the American public and the world. 

I have great faith in the good sense and fairness of the American people to 
consider all of the facts and make an informed judgment about the war's end. 

This is an important debate. The soul of our nation, its essence, its history, is 
at stake. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, General. 
Colonel Cooper? 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL CHARLES D. COOPER, DIREC- 
TOR OF PUBLICATIONS, THE RETIRED OFFICERS ASSO- 
CIATION 

Colonel Cooper. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members, 
this statement is submitted on behalf of The Retired Officers 



14 

Association (TROA) which has its national headquarters at 201 
North Washington Street in Alexandria, Virginia. TROA has a 
membership of more than 400,000 active duty, retired, and 
reserve officers of the seven uniformed services, including 
approximately 65,000 auxiliary members who are survivors of 
former members of that association. 

On behalf of all the TROA members we would like to thank 
the chairman and the other distinguished members of the Senate 
Committee on Rules and Administration for holding these 
important hearings and inviting us to share our concerns with 
you. 

The Retired Officers Association became involved in the 
Enola Gay issue in the spring of 1994 after many of its members, 
especially the World War II veterans, including Colonel Schuh, 
became aware of the direction that was being taken by the 
curators at the National Air and Space Museum. In April of 1994, 
Admiral Tom Kilcline, president of The Retired Officers 
Association, contacted Dr. Martin Harwit, director of the 
National Air and Space Museum, to discuss the issue. Dr. Harwit 
suggested a luncheon meeting at the Smithsonian with some of 
the curators to talk about what they were planning to do. 

Admiral Kilcline requested that representatives of the other 
veterans associations be included in that discussion. That 
meeting came to pass on July 13, 1994. In attendance at that 
meeting were representatives of the Air Force Association, the 
American Legion, Disabled American Veterans, the Military 
Order of the World Wars, The Retired Officers Association, and 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars as well as staff members of the Air 
and Space Museum, the Department of Defense 50th 
Anniversary Commemorative Committee, and the House 
Veterans Affairs Committee. 

Following a briefing by the curatorial staff, a lively 
discussion of the then-existing show script ensued, but since the 
Air Force Association and The Retired Officers Association were 
the only two outside organizations that were privileged to have 
copies of the script in hand, the discussion was rather limited 
and very non-productive. Scripts were later provided to the 
other associations with a request to get back to NASM with 
comment. 

The Retired Officers Association responded on July 19 
providing Dr. Harwit with extensive, in-depth written 
recommendations that dealt with historical accuracy, context, 
and objectivity. Specifically, we were concerned with the lack of 
historical background to define the events that led up to the 
decision to use the A-bomb. We were disturbed by the lack of 
balance in imagery portraying the casualties of the Hiroshima 
bombing as compared to the brutal deaths from Japanese 
aggression that preceded America's entry into the war as well as 
the escalating battle deaths as the war proceeded. Finally, we 
were appalled by the extensive section expounding upon the 



15 

post-war heritage of the nuclear age that was totally unrelated 
to the advertised theme of the display, "The Final Act." 

On September 8 the curators provided a third script. While it 
offered some minor tweaks it still failed to address the basic 
philosophical disagreements that had been raised in our earlier 
communications with the museum. On September 23 Admiral 
Kilcline met with the Undersecretary of the Smithsonian, 
Constance Newman, who explained that she was assuming the 
role of oversight for the Enola Gay exhibit "to get the 
Smithsonian off the front page of the news." Newman also 
advised Kilcline of her separate and ongoing negotiations with 
the American Legion. 

In a September 27 letter to Dr. Harwit, Admiral Kilcline 
provided an extensive list of ongoing concerns raised by the 
third script that were still being ignored. He further expressed 
the Association's concern that the reputation of the Air and 
Space Museum was being placed in jeopardy by the recalcitrance 
of the museum staff. 

Version four of the script came out on October 3, 1994 and 
again there was some progress. But things that had been fixed in 
earlier versions were put back in. At the invitation of the 
Undersecretary, representatives of the Air Force Association and 
The Retired Officers Association met at the Smithsonian and 
additional fine-tuning was applied to address specific 
philosophical and factual problem areas. 

On October 26 Undersecretary Newman provided script 
revision five. While we could still not fully endorse it, significant 
progress was being made. During these many months, and 
especially since Newman had assumed the active role in the 
discussions, the earlier offensive script had been bowdlerized. 
Gone were the references to the U.S. "war of vengeance against 
a nation attempting to preserve its unique culture." Gone were 
the controversial political arguments of the post-war nuclear 
age. Finally we thought we saw a glimmer of hope that an 
excellent exhibit was close at hand. 

In early December, at the insistence of several associations 
negotiating with the Smithsonian, scripting for a new 
4,000-square-foot introductory display was produced. This new 
section defined the course of events from the early 1930's to just 
before the Hiroshima bombing. Those changes provided the 
essential historical background of Japan's brutal aggression, 
clarification of the driving forces behind the nuclear decisions, 
and a modicum of balance to the planned visual materials. 

An added video finale to the exhibit incorporated the 
remembrances of the actual crew members, bringing a poignant 
personal perspective to the story of this fateful mission. With 
these modifications there was a growing consensus, at least 
among the reviewers of the Air Force Association, The Retired 
Officers Association, and the VFW, that the exhibit would have 
been found acceptable by most veterans. This sense was 



16 

conveyed to Undersecretary Newman and Dr. Harwit at a joint 
meeting at the Smithsonian on December 15, 1994. 

Sadly, any sense of mutual agreement and understanding was 
shattered in early January when Dr. Harwit fired yet another 
shot across the bow of our Nation's veterans. In a letter sent only 
to the American Legion, excluding the other military-related 
associations that had been striving to work to bring this exhibit 
to fruition, Harwit without a "by-your-leave" or "let's talk about 
this", reinserted into the show script new and radically 
minimized casualty numbers for the planned invasion of the 
Japanese home islands. This clear breach of faith cast grave 
doubt upon his perspective and leadership ability and provided 
further evidence of his lack of sensitivity to the Smithsonian's 
reputation for integrity. 

At this point the discussions between Harwit and the Legion 
went to critical mass. Upon receipt of the letter the Legion 
abruptly and publicly called for the outright cancellation of the 
exhibit and raised the ante calling for these congressional 
hearings. We share the Legion's frustration in trying to deal with 
Dr. Harwit's recurring recalcitrance. Nonetheless, we believe 
that with the continued patience of Job that some of the 
associations had shown we were at the point where a satisfactory 
solution could have been reached. But regrettably, that door was 
slammed shut. There would be no further opportunity for 
discussion to rebut the so-called newly found information. 

On January 30, Secretary Heyman called an end to the 
rancorous debate over the planned Enola Gay exhibit. Rather 
than continue the controversial effort to conduct a 
wallboard-and-artifact academic extravaganza during this 
significant World War II commemorative year, he announced his 
intention to take personal charge of the exhibition. His plan 
called for the simpler, scaled-back display limited to only the 
already restored fuselage, appropriate signage, and possibly a 
video treatment reflecting some of the crew comments. 

While we understand the secretary's rationale. The Retired 
Officers Association sincerely regrets the need for that decision. 
As a result of the severe gutting of the display, future 
generations of Americans and the world have lost a golden 
opportunity to learn anything more except the barebones history 
of the Enola Gay and its role in bringing to an end a brutal and 
emotional war, one of the defining events in world history. 

Further, because of this dragged out brouhaha, the high 
stature of our Nation's most respected institution and its 
funding has been unnecessarily put to a test. While the 
eviscerated Enola Gay exhibit has put the role of America's 
national museum squarely in a spotlight of distrust and distaste. 
The Retired Officers Association stands ready to work with the 
Smithsonian to restore to its prestigious pedestal this gem of 
America's historical tiara. 



17 

That concludes my presentation, Mr. Chairman, and I am 
prepared to answer questions from you and the distinguished 
members of the committee. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Colonel Cooper. 

We have been joined by Senator Pell. Senator, did you have 
an opening statement? 

Senator Pell. No opening statement. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harrington? 

TESTIMONY OF HERMAN G. HARRINGTON, CHAIRMAN, 
NATIONAL INTERNAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION, THE 
AMERICAN LEGION 

Mr. Harrington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 
committee, my name is Herman Harrington. It was my privilege 
to serve as National Commander William Detweiler's designated 
representative during the line by line review and discussions of 
the Air and Space Museum exhibit. I would be remiss if I did not 
extend to you the commander's sincere regrets that he is unable 
to be here today. As you may know, he is in Moscow as a member 
of the President's official party participating in the 
commemoration of V-E Day. 

We appreciate this opportunity to present our views on the 
controversy, its causes and possible remedies for the future. We 
have submitted our written testimony for your consideration 
and for the next few minutes I would only draw attention to our 
more prominent concerns and recommendations. 

It is altogether apparent from the events surrounding the 
planned display of the historic aircraft, the Enola Gay, that the 
institution has sustained serious blows to its reputation, the 
causes of which unless discovered and corrected will only be 
repeated to the detriment of the Smithsonian, the Nation, and 
our society. We were accused of censorship, but it was not we 
who wanted only one view included. And we were accused of 
political arm-twisting, but we did little more than seek from our 
Government a redress of grievance. Our involvement is proof 
that our system works. It should be an inspiration and not a 
threat to those who value constitutional government and the 
democratic process. 

Our first involvement canne when we agreed to listen to the 
museum's point of view and were not convinced. We later agreed 
to suspend our opposition to the exhibit pending a line by line 
review of the script. We spent nearly 40 hours on three separate 
occasions clarifying language, questioning artifacts and 
narratives, arguing historical fact and exchanging research. 

We ended our discussions only when it became apparent that 
the curators, and most especially the director, could not be relied 
upon to honor their commitments to us and that any script that 
we agreed upon could be, and most likely would be, changed 
without our knowledge right up to the opening of the exhibit. 



Our approach was open, honest, and scholarly. We have 
included in our written testimony some of the sources we relied 
on. Yet despite our efforts the answer to one question eluded us: 
Why? Why did this Nation's most revered, most respected, most 
visited museum undertake such an exhibit? Why was an exhibit 
devoted to international concerns over the proliferations of 
nuclear arms spawned in a museum dedicated to America's 
achievements in flight and space exploration? Even if the answer 
is never given. Congress nevertheless can ensure that the 
institution uses its position and the funds Congress provides in 
a manner consistent with the institution's congressional 
mandate. 

What is most disconcerting to the American Legion and 
perhaps most telling to the mind set of those at the institution is 
that when challenged for failing to present the service and 
sacrifice of American servicemen and women as described in 
Title 20, Section 80a of the U.S. Code, officials claimed that their 
museum is not required to comply with that language. 

The American Legion was also condemned for questioning 
the museum's employment of a non-citizen in a key curatorial 
position. We have done so only because we see it as further 
evidence of the Air and Space Museum's disdain for, and 
defiance of congressional oversight. Title 20, which we have 
cited in our written testimony, clearly requires U.S. citizens to 
have preference in hiring for key positions unless no U.S. citizen 
is qualified. We still wonder why the Nation's historians have 
not complained about that, given its implications. 

The American Legion recommends that Congress take steps 
immediately to either conform its mandate to the realities of the 
Smithsonian Institution or to enforce its intent and mandates as 
contained in Title 20 as they pertain to personnel practices. At a 
minimum, the American Legion recommends that Congress, 
among other measures: One, clarify the personal and 
professional goals of future museum directors; two, receive 
regular information on the use to which museum resources are 
put; three, ensure that docents and volunteers are treated with 
dignity and respect; and four, be aware of the relationship of the 
National Air and Space historians to a particular school of 
historic and political thought when such relationships become 
exclusive of knowledge rather than inclusive. 

We also strongly recommend that this committee ask why the 
archives concerning Stimson, Marshall, Truman, and MacArthur 
were not contacted, and why the acknowledged experts and 
biographers of such men were not consulted. The American 
Legion successfully contacted many such institutions and 
individuals in the course of its research and found them to be 
accessible and readily cooperative. 

At the center of this controversy rests the history of B-29 
Enola Gay. Much has been said and written about casualties. 
President Truman's motives, the military and diplomatic 



19 

intentions of the Imperial Japanese Government and whether or 
not lives were indeed spared by the mission of Enola Gay. But 
little has been said about the cynical use of this aircraft to justify 
the presence of an exhibit in the National Air and Space Museum 
that fails to conform to the museum's broad mandate. 

Is it the intent of Congress that after 46 years this aircraft be 
shelved for another 10 years until those alive when she flew are 
gone? The American Legion recommends that Congress direct 
the loan or the transfer of the Enola Gay to another Federal 
facility where it can be displayed properly without commentary 
or controversy. We respectfully suggest that Enola Gay join her 
sister ship, Bock's Car, at the Air Force Museum at 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. Or failing 
that, at any of the other facilities that have expressed an interest 
in displaying the aircraft. 

The American Legion is not in the business of tearing down 
American institutions nor do we concern ourselves with the 
persons or personalities of those involved in vital national 
enterprises. But we are in the business of protecting and 
preserving our American heritage. As the battle over the Enola 
Gay has demonstrated, we are willing to invest our time, our 
money, and if need be, our reputation, to fight for the principles 
we espouse. 

We believe in honesty, in integrity, in fair play. We believe in 
honoring the service and sacrifice of those who took up arms in 
defense of the Nation. We believe in passing a sense of America's 
unique role in world history and a sense of its greatness on to 
future generations. And we believe the National Air and Space 
Museum consciously and intentionally violated every one of 
those principles by setting out to alter our citizens' view of 
themselves. We believe that those responsible for the exhibit did 
so in a most cynical and insensitive way by using the very 
aircraft that thousands of World War II veterans credited with 
saving them from death on the beaches of japan, to suggest that 
their lives were purchased at the price of vengeance of racism. 

In summary, the American Legion's recommendations for the 
future of the Smithsonian Institution and for the management 
guidelines are simple, common sense safeguards. We 
recommend: One, congressional oversight and review of the 
museum's plans and practices; two, periodic review by 
independent professionals and knowledgeable laypersons; 
three, tighter review and control over the use of appropriated 
funds; four, improved management controls and establishment 
of reporting disciplines; and five, redefinition and clarification 
of the roles of the Smithsonian museums in American society and 
the establishment of measures to guarantee compliance. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes the testimony of the American 
Legion and I would at this time be happy to answer any 
questions you may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harrington follows:! 



20 

Statement OF Herman G. Harrington, Chairman, National 
Internal Affairs Commission, The American Legion 

The American Legion considers the future management and oversight of the 
Smithsonian Institution and its subordinate museums, most particularly the 
National Air and Space Museum, to be a matter of singular significance to the 
people of the United States. For that reason, we welcome the opportunity to bring 
the views of our organization before the committee. It is our hope and intent that 
the net effect of these hearings will be to restore the Smithsonian Institution to a 
position of respect and reverence among all our citizens, and to preserve the 
bonds of our common history which bind us as a nation. It is altogether apparent, 
from the events surrounding the planned display of the historic aircraft, Enola 
Gay, that the institution has sustained serious blows to its reputation, the causes 
of which, unless discovered and corrected, will only be repeated to the detriment 
of the Smithsonian, the Nation, and our society. 

This testimony of The American Legion has been prepared at the direction of 
and under the review of our National Commander, William M. Detweiler, who 
currently is among the President's official entourage in Moscow where he will 
participate in commemorations of the 50th anniversary of V-E Day. Commander 
Detweiler participated in all face-to-face discussions between the National Air 
and Space Museum and The American Legion. He communicated and corre- 
sponded directly with both the Secretary and the Under Secretary of the 
Smithsonian Institution, and presented the position of The American Legion time 
and again to the media, professional historians, the general public and members 
of The American Legion. His experience on this issue is real, and this testimony 
has his full support and approval — and thus, represents the position of the more 
than 3.1 million men and women who comprise Legion membership. 

The American Legion comes to these hearings in precisely the same spirit with 
which it participated in the discussions and review process with officials of the 
National Air and Space Museum. It was then our stated goal to work with NASM 
officials to protect the legacy of those who fought and died during World War II; 
to assure future generations of Americans access to historically accurate informa- 
tion and artifacts; and to assist in the restoration of public confidence in the 
institution. Today, in the wake of the controversy, the admission by the Secretary 
that the original exhibit was "flawed from the beginning," and the cancellation 
of the original exhibit, it also is among the goals of The American Legion to do 
what it can to help identify and establish safeguards which can reasonably be 
expected to prevent such future catastrophes. 

That, in our opinion, can best be accomplished by identifying what went wrong 
and what factors contributed to it. The American Legion will present to you 
applicable information gained from our participation in the review process, but 
further, will recommend lines of inquiry in instances where our efforts to gather 
information were unsuccessful. 

The qualifications of The American Legion and those who participated in the 
discussions — the very idea of the participation of The American Legion in this 
controversy — has been questioned and soundly criticized in many circles. Most, 
if not all, criticism contains implications which are both offensive and repugnant 
to those who truly respect our Jorm of government. The American Legion was 
qualified by rights guaranteed to all Americans, and credentialed by dint of 
diligent effort and sound reliance on divinely granted talents and abilities. 

We have been accused of censorship, but most certainly we do not have the 
power to censor. 

What is curious is that those who most loudly accuse us of censorship are the 
very ones most opposed to including our views in the discussion and the display. 
It remains a fact that the original exhibit proposed one interpretation of history 
at the exclusion of all others. We asked only that all views be included, ours as 
well as theirs. Who sought to censor whom? 

We have been accused of historical naivete, at best; ignorance at worst. 

But what is curious is that the very historians whose task it is to record and 
pass on our history, the very men and women whose books we read and whose 



21 

research we poured over, seem to have little confidence in how well they are 
doing their job. Where is the freedom of thought and inquiry and to whom would 
they have it reserved? 

We have been accused of grandstanding the news media. 

Again, what is curious is that those who so vociferously oppose our public 
statements are those who so totally depend on the freedom of expression by 
which their books are published, their speeches made and their academic courses 
free from restraint. Where would they have truth and falsehood grapple? 

We have been accused of political arm-twisting. 

Even again, what is curious is that only the successful effort to enlist Congres- 
sional support is seen as arm-twisting. It was not only our side seeking the 
support of the peoples' elected representatives. We were aggrieved by the action 
of an arm of our government, and we petitioned the government for redress of 
that grievance. Our critics were aggrieved by us, yet they sought redress not from 
us, but from government — a blatant and repugnant effort to silence dissent. 

What right did we have to do what we did, question who we questioned and 
say what we said? We claim the rights of every citizen, successfully and aggres- 
sively exercised. Our success, painful as it may have been to those whose real 
intent was to prevent the expression of any view but their own, is proof that our 
system works. It should be an inspiration, not a threat, to those whose very 
livelihoods depend on our fundamental freedoms. 

Our involvement came at the request of the Under Secretary of the Smithsonian 
Institution who, when the exhibit began to encounter rising opposition from the 
Air Force Association and other groups of veterans, wisely sought to establish 
communication and consensus among the exhibit's critics and supporters. The 
effort came too late. Many groups were increasingly suspicious of NASM offi- 
cials, and increasingly frustrated by the lack of response and progress. The 
American Legion was on record in opposition to the exhibit, but standing apart 
from the fray. Once the controversy erupted into public disgust with the mu- 
seum, we became deeply concerned that not only was the reputation of World 
War II veterans at risk, but also that the entire institution was losing ground 
among the general public. 

We first agreed to listen to the museum's point of view, and were not con- 
vinced. We later agreed to suspend our opposition to the exhibit pending a 
line-by-line and face-to face review of the script with the curators and the 
museum director. We spend a total of 36 hours in three separate sessions, clari- 
fying language, questioning artifacts and narratives, arguing historical fact, and 
exchanging research. 

We did not at any time object to the portrayal in the exhibit of the effects of 
nuclear detonation. We asked only for balance and the elimination of needlessly 
repetitious images. We did not object to objects or narratives unless their validity 
could not be established, and where such was the case, objects were removed. We 
presented facts born of original and other research which raised legitimate 
questions of interpretation and conclusion, and requested their addition to the 
script. We successfully argued for a longer view of history than the original script 
presented, including the history of Japanese aggression and expansionism which 
planted the seeds of the Pacific war. That portion of the exhibit was being 
prepared when our discussions broke down. 

We ended our discussions with NASM officials only when it became apparent 
that they would not conform to the directions of their superiors and only after 
we learned, in correspondence from the former director, that he intended to 
include unilateral changes to the script that violated agreements and understand- 
ings we had reached with him. By the end of the discussions. The American 
Legion fully understood that the curators and director could not be relied upon 
to honor their commitments to us and that any script that we agreed upon could 
be — and most likely would be — changed without our knowledge right up to the 
opening of the exhibit. 

We could not let our support or lack of opposition be so cynically manipulated 
and remain true to our responsibilities to our members and to the thousands of 
veterans who were relying on us. 



22 

Our approach was open, honest and scholarly. Our research included, but was 
not limited to, the sources listed below: 

The Making of the Atomic Bomb 

Rhoades, Richard; Simon and Schuster, New York; 1986 

The Last Battle 

Ryan, Cornelius; Simon and Schuster, New York; 1966 

Manhattan Project 

Groueff, Stephane; Little, Brown and Company, Boston & Toronto; 1967 

The Great Decision 

Amrine, Michael; G P. Putnam's Sons, New York; 1959 

James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age 

Hershberg, James; Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New "^ork; 1993 

The Invasion of Japan 

Skates, John Rav; University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, S.C.; 1994 

The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in German and Japan 

Baruma, Ian: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New \ork; 1994 

Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States 
and Japan 

Sigal, Leon \'.; Cornell Lniversitv Press, Ithaca and London; 1988 

MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945 

Drea, Edward J.; Lniversitv Press of Kansas; 1992 

Brassey's Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography 

Margiotta, Franklin D. Ed.; Brassevs, Washington and London; (annual) 

Codename Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan — and Why Truman 
Dropped the Bomb 

Allen, Thomas B. and Polmar, Norman; Simon & Schuster, New York; 1995 
(Publisher's Proof) 

Marching Orders: The Untold Story of World War II 

Lee, Bruce; Crown Publishers, Inc., New York; 1995 

In addition. The American Legion researched a number of original sources, 
some uncovered in original research and others provided bv historians, muse- 
ums, biographical libraries and archives, and the NASM curators themselves. 
Thev include: 

— Copies of documents and minutes from official meetings of government 
leaders 

— Copies of military orders, communiques, and intelligence reports 

— Accounts of diplomatic and tactical code-breaking operations 

— Direct conversations with the Army and Air Force Historians 

— Conversations with and written reports from other historians 

— Conversation and correspondence with veterans of the 509th Composite 
Bomb Group 

— Professional Journals 

— Scholarly Papers 

It is singularly significant that very little among our research documents is of 
Japanese origin. The explanation is simple: The Japanese government continues 
to restrict release and access to its archives of the time, not onlv to us, but to most 
of the world's historians. We repeatedly pointed out to NASM curators that, as 
a result of Japanese recalcitrance, only half the history can be known. NASM 
officials, like paleontologists building a dinosaur from a jawbone, had no choice 
but to fill in the gaps from best guesses, speculation and incomplete understand- 
ing of Japanese intentions in the summer of 1945. Those gaps now are being filled 
by new research, and the picture being painted of Japanese actions and intentions 
points to significantly different conclusions than those drawn by NASM for this 
exhibit. 

Yet, during our own research, we gained the answers to many questions about 
the exhibit and the history it sought to portray. We learned something about the 
curators and others who informed the exhibit. But one question remains unan- 
swered: Why? 

Why did this Nation's most revered, most respected, most-visited museum 
undertake such an exhibit? Why was the museum permitted to proceed so far into 
the realm of conjecture and condemnation? Why was an exhibit devoted to 



23 

international concerns over the proliferation of nuclear arms spawned in a mu- 
seum dedicated to America's achievements in flight and space exploration? And 
why were Americans, through their tax dollars, expected to underwrite such 
propaganda parading as history? 

The people of the United States deserve answers to these questions. As their 
representatives, you deserve answers. And as lawmakers entrusted with the 
stewardship of our wealth, you have a responsibility to ensure that the Smithson- 
ian Institution's museums use the funds Congress provides for the purposes and 
in a manner consistent with the Institution's Congressional mandate. 

That mandate is contained in 20 U.S.C, Chapter 3. The Smithsonian as a whole 
is charged with an approach to its collections, displays and educational activities 
that not only informs, but enriches and uplifts. What is most disconcerting to The 
American Legion — and perhaps most telling of the mindset of some at the Insti- 
tution — is that, when challenged for failing to present the service and sacrifice of 
American service men and women as described in 20 U.S.C. 80a, NASM officials 
claimed that they are not required to comply with that language since, they say, 
it applies to an as yet unbuilt museum. 

Nevertheless, the language is clear and specific, applying itself not to some 
obscure museum of the future, but to the entire Institution: 

The Smithsonian Institution shall commemorate and display the contributions 
made by the military forces of the Nation toward creating, developing and 
maintaining a free, peaceful, and independent society and culture in the United 
States of America. The valor and sacrificial service of the men and women of the 
Armed forces shall be portrayed as an inspiration to the present and future 
generations of America . . . The extensive peacetime contributions the Armed 
Forces have made to the advance of human knowledge in science, nuclear energy, 
polar and space exploration, electronics, engineering aeronautics, and medicine 
shall be graphically described. (Emphasis added.) 

NASM's argument that it is not subject to that language is an astounding 
defense and a tacit admission that it does not so complv. NASM's position is not 
that it does so portrav the service positive contributions of American veterans, 
but that it is not required to. Nevertheless, it is the position of The American 
Legion that the language in 20 U.S.C. 80a, Subsec. (a), is quite clear in applying 
that standard to "the Smithsonian Institution" and not to just one of its museums. 
Perhaps the best question is what compels NASM to want to do otherwise? 

The American Legion recommends that the Congress closely review the lan- 
guage of the applicable codes, clarify its intent and direct all museums of the 
Institution to comply with it. 

The American Legion has been condemned for inquiring as to the propriety of 
the National Air and Space Museum's employment of a non-citizen in a key 
curatorial position. Is this latent xenophobia? Evidence of jingoism? Not at all. It 
is simply a question of why the National Air and Space Museum did not comply 
with another of the strict intents of Congress, as stated in 20 U.S.C. 46a: 

The Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, subject to adequate secu- 
rity and other investigations as he may determine to be appropriate, and 
subject further to a prior determination by him that no qualified United 
States citizen is available for the particular position involved, is authorized 
to employ and compensate aliens in a scientific or technical capacity . . . 
(Emphasis added) 
Clearly, in light of that language only three explanations exist: 

1. Management was ignorant of its duties and responsibilities; 

2. The museum disdains and defies the intent of Congress; 

3. No U.S. citizen is as well educated, trained, and experienced as 
the Canadian historian who was one of two primary curators on 
the exhibit — an explanation that reasonably could be expected to 
raise the concern of American historians, but so far doesn't seem 
to have done so. 

Not one of those explanations is sufficient for The American Legion, nor do we 
believe any should be sufficient to the American people or to Congress. 



24 

The American Legion once again simply recommends that Congress take steps 
immediately to either conform its mandate to realities at the Smithsonian Insti- 
tution or to enforce its clear intent and mandate. 

During the course of our discussions with NASM we became aware that, 
although NASM curators have repeatedly declared the original script was never 
meant for public consumption, the museum itself sent the script to the Japanese 
peace museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki for review and comment pending 
loan of artifacts to NASM. Officials described it as nothing more than a courtesy, 
but it was, in fact, more than that. It was deceit, either of the Japanese or of the 
American people. 

If the script was not to be taken as the basis for the exhibit, then the Japanese 
were being asked to make decisions about the loan of artifacts on an incomplete 
understanding of what they were being asked to do. On the other hand, if the 
script was a legitimate basis on which the Japanese were to reach a lending 
decision, then subsequent statements downplaying the first script were disingen- 
uous. NASM cannot have it both ways. 

Moreover, NASM denies the existence of a prior agreement or understanding 
between the Nagasaki and Hiroshima museums regarding the original exhibit. 
However, it is generally understood by informed members of the public — and 
most certainly by professional historians and museum curators with interna- 
tional connections and experience — that those museums are, in effect, Japanese 
"Holocaust" museums, and that no artifacts would be loaned to museums or 
exhibits that did not conform to their philosophy and message. NASM curators 
and officials surely knew what was expected of any exhibit that benefited from 
loans of artifacts from those museums, and it can be concluded that if they did 
not intend to conform to the Japanese perspective, they would never have sought 
the artifacts in the first place. 

It is known that the former director and one, if not both, primary curators 
visited Japan and the peace museums many times in preparation for this exhibit. 
What is not known is the frequency, cost and purpose of those visits, and the 
extent to which that purpose conforms to the intent of Congress. 

The American Legion strongly recommends that this Committee open that line 
of inquiry and based on what is discovered, set guidelines requiring the disclo- 
sure of the purpose and outcome of such travel. 

More disturbing, however, and a line of inquiry which The American Legion 
was wholly unsuccessful in following, is whether or not the conditions of the 
cooperative agreement between the Nagasaki and Hiroshima museums were put 
into writing. This Committee should be given every opportunity to review any 
such document, should it be proven to exist. 

The American Legion recommends that this committee seek information to 
either confirm or put to rest this recurring speculation among a number of 
veterans organizations and news reporters. 

It is not and never has been The American Legion's practice to pursue individ- 
uals in the course of policy or issue disagreements. Throughout this controversy, 
we have refrained from asking for resignations or suggesting motives for one 
course of action or another. Still, it seems to us that a prudent course of action 
for Congress to take is to review the personnel policies and practices at the 
Smithsonian Institution to insure that employees and volunteers there not only 
meet their responsibilities but also retain and enjoy their rights as citizens. 

At a minimum. The American Legion recommends that: 

1. The personal and professional goals of future museum directors 
be clarified and determined to conform to the intent of Congress 
before their visions are permitted to affect the direction of a 
museum. It is clear that, in the case of the former NASM director, 
his goals, plans and intentions to reform the museum were rea- 
sonably well known inside the museum and to readers of The 
Washington Post at the time of his appointment, and may well 
have led to the controversy over the Enola Gay. 

2. Congress oversee and seek regular information on the use to 
which museum personnel, physical resources and funds are put. 



25 

with an eye to containing the lines of inquiry to those included in 
the museums' charge. 

3. Congress insure that docents and volunteers retain their rights 
and dignity as essential resources for the efficient operation of 
museums, and not sanctioned for their opinions. 

4. Congress be aware of the relationship of NASM historians to a 
particular school of historic and political thought, when such 
relationships become exclusive of knowledge, rather than inclu- 
sive. 

5. Congress review periodically the role of experienced military 
professionals in informing the displays and exhibits mounted by 
NASM, and take appropriate measures to assure a balance be- 
tween practical knowledge of history and academic understand- 
ing, both in hiring and in the utilization of human resources. 

6. Congress implement review procedures by which only those cu- 
rators with professional and academic credentials applicable to 
the subject of an exhibit be assigned to curate a display. 

7. Congress solicit from among the employees and volunteers at 
NASM comments and experiences relating to the way in which 
the museum has been administered, heed their concerns and take 
immediate steps to assure that the museum operates in confor- 
mity with sound management and personnel practices. 

Additionally, The American Legion notes with some concern that much of the 
outside information and analysis brought to bear on the Enola Gay exhibit came 
from a limited number of historians and specialists whose expertise have little or 
nothing to do with air and space, but more to do with diplomacy, ethics, and 
philosophies of government and intergovernmental relationships. It is notewor- 
thy that historians exclusively from the revisionist school were consulted on the 
Enola Gay exhibit — historians such as Alperovitz, Bird, Bernstein and others — 
and that the curators made little or no contact with historians and institutions 
which might have provided information and analysis contrary to the exhibit they 
were planning. 

The American Legion strongly recommends that this Committee inquire as to 
why no contact for the exhibit was made with the archives concerning Stimson, 
Marshall, Truman or MacArthur, and why few, if any, of the acknowledged 
experts and biographers of such men were contacted. The American Legion 
successfully contacted many such institutions and individuals in the course of its 
research and found them to be accessible and readily cooperative. 

Finally, The American Legion is deeply concerned about future use of the 
canceled exhibit's artifacts and script, and the future of the historic aircraft itself. 

It is the view of our organization that the exhibit, declared "flawed from the 
beginning" by Secretary Heyman himself and admitted by former NASM Direc- 
tor Harwit to contain many errors, should not be resurrected and presented by 
any other institution, unless and only after it is subjected to rigorous review by 
a broad cross-section of acknowledged historians. This is not an effort to restrain 
freedom of expression, but rather an effort to quash propaganda presented in the 
guise of history — propaganda researched and prepared at the expense of the 
American people. 

At a minimum. The American Legion recommends that Congress satisfy itself 
as to the status of the script and artifacts, and determine if plans to loan the 
exhibit to institutions such as The American University for public display, con- 
form to Congress' view of the best interest of our country. 

At the center of this controversy, and often overlooked as the central cause by 
many commentators, rests the historic B-29, Enola Cay. Much has been said and 
written about casualties. President Truman's motives, the military and diplo- 
matic intentions of the Imperial Japanese Government, and whether or not lives 
were indeed spared by the mission of Enola Gay. Those are legitimate lines of 
academic inquiry which may never be settled to the agreement of all historians. 

But little has been said about the cynical use of this aircraft to, in our view, 
justify the presence of an exhibit in the National Air and Space Museum that 
otherwise fails to conform to the museum's broad mandate. And little has been 



26 

said about the Smithsonian's thinly-veiled efforts to hold the aircraft as ransom 
for future appropriations and, in the process, withholding it from the view of the 
public and a generation of veterans which has waited for half a century to see it 
displayed proudly. 

First, the Smithsonian Secretary's insinuation that failing to approve the FY 
1996 appropriations request would further jeopardize the planned NASM exten- 
sion at Dulles International Airport is disturbing. That certainly was the message 
he brought to hearings in the House concerning future Congressional funding. 
Perhaps it is true. But there is no need whatsoever for the Enola Gay to repose 
unreassembled and undisplayed until some distant date in the future when the 
now twice-delayed Dulles facility is complete. The Enola Gay has undergone a 
complete restoration, at a cost far in excess of what would have been necessary 
if the aircraft had been properly cared for when it was delivered, fully opera- 
tional, by then-Col. Paul Tibbets in 1949. 

The extensive restoration is described in a NASM video production and the 
original exhibit script contains a description of the restoration in which the 
aircraft was characterized as completely restored, but not re-assembled. The 
exhibit of Enola Gay now planned for the Air and Space Museum will include only 
56 feet of the forward fuselage, perhaps an engine or two, and some other 
components. 

However, is it the intent of Congress that after 46 years, this aircraft repose 
another 10 or more years — until all those alive when she flew are gone — in either 
pieces or obscurity? Does the Congress feel the same sense of shame about this 
historic aircraft that the Smithsonian Institution seems to have felt for nearly half 
a century? 

The American Legion recommends that Congress direct, and provide funding 
specifically for, the loan or transfer of Enola Gay to another federal facility with 
the will and the means to display it properly without commentary and contro- 
versy. We respectfully suggest that Enola Gay join her sister ship Bock's Car at the 
Air Force Museum at Wright Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, or 
failing that, at any of the other facilities that have expressed an interest in doing 
so. 

We are aware that Smithsonian officials have rejected this option, but we also 
believe that NASM's misuse of the aircraft and the Smithsonian's historic disdain 
for it disqualify officials there from having the final say. Just as those officials 
have argued that loan and exchange of artifacts between museums is a common 
practice — so held in defense of their efforts to surround Enola Gay with artifacts 
from Hiroshima and Nagasaki — we would argue that loan of this particular 
artifact to another American museum poses no threat to the aircraft. 

Thousands of World War II veterans believe, with solid justification, that they 
owe their lives to Enola Gay and her historic mission. They have asked repeatedly 
that they be given an opportunity to see her and to reflect on the meaning of her 
mission in their lives. The American Legion strongly urges the Congress to fund 
and direct such a loan of the aircraft. There is an entire generation soon to pass 
from the scene which has waited long enough. 

In this, the 50th anniversary of their victory over the enemies of freedom, it 
would be a fitting and inexpensive tribute. It would protect this artifact from the 
Smithsonian's feared deterioration due to underfunding. And more important, it 
would be a gesture of good faith by the Institution. For the Smithsonian to 
unselfishly make this aircraft available for our people to visit, immediately, 
would go a long way to restoring the American people's faith in an institution 
described by Secretary Heyman in his testimony before the Appropriations Sub- 
committees on the Interior as, "a unique and revered institution which represents 
the best of America and its people. The Smithsonian is the mirror in which we, 
as Americans, see our history and culture from the past, in the present, and 
towards the future." 

The American Legion is not here to address any aspect of funding for the 
Smithsonian Institution other than that specifically concerning the display of 
Enola Gay. We do not ask for or support the idea of withholding legitimate 
funding for the Smithsonian. The American Legion is not in the business of 
tearing down American institutions, nor do we concern ourselves with the per- 



27 

sons or personalities of those involved in vital national enterprises. But we are 
in the business of protecting and preserving our American heritage. As the battle 
over Enola Gay has demonstrated, we are willing to invest our time, our money 
and, if need be, our reputation to fight for the principles we espouse. We believe 
in honesty, in integrity, in fair play. We believe in honoring the service and 
sacrifice of those who took up arms in defense of the Nation. We believe in 
passing a sense of America's unique role in world history, and a sense of its 
greatness, on to future generations. 

And we believe the National Air and Space Museum consciously and intention- 
ally violated every one of those principles, by setting out to alter our citizens' 
view of themselves. We believe that those responsible for the exhibit did so in a 
most cynical and insensitive way: by using the very aircraft that thousands of 
World War II veterans credit with sparing them from death on the beaches of 
Japan, to suggest that their lives were purchased at the price of vengeance and 
racism. 

If such as we believe is proven to be the case, then it is our view that the 
National Air and Space Museum has forfeited, for the time being, any legitimate 
claim on the generosity of the American people. The museum ceases to be an 
American museum and becomes something else entirely — and as such should 
depend for its funding on those who share its views. It should not enjoy the 
support of our citizens, and indeed, evidence is mounting that this exhibit, along 
with several others in recent history, has resulted in a drastic reduction in 
Smithsonian memberships, individual and corporate contributions, and even the 
willingness of major contributors to be publicly associated with their donations. 

Nevertheless, we encourage Congress to be skeptical of Smithsonian claims 
that prudent cuts in the institution's funding levels would adversely affect its 
ability to care for its collections. Recent revelations of the disappearance of World 
War I artifacts would indicate that even with full funding, the museums are doing 
a poor job of protecting their collections. Certainly, the nearly $300,000 spent on 
the Enola Gay exhibit, and now gone for nearly no good purpose, would indicate 
room for improvement under tighter funding controls. And the cancellation of 
many of the Institution's near-term plans and exhibits suggests more funds 
expended for nothing. It is our opinion that tighter funding should not adversely 
affect the collections, but should instead impose some discipline on free-spend- 
ing curators and administrators. 

We see no reason to fund the Smithsonian Institution according to its whims 
under the thinly veiled threat that failure to do so would result in deterioration 
of collections or decline in the physical plant or plans, until such time that the 
Institution has demonstrated the will and the ability to manage its finances more 
responsibly. 

In summary. The American Legion's recommendations for the future of the 
Smithsonian Institution and for management guidelines are few in number and 
relatively simple, common sense safeguards common to prudent management of 
any public institution. They are: 

1. Congressional oversight and review of museum plans and prac- 
tices 

2. Periodic review by independent professionals and knowledgeable 
lay persons 

3. Tighter review and control over the use of appropriated funds 

4. Improved management controls and establishment of reporting 
disciplines 

5. Redefinition and clarification of the role of Smithsonian museums 
in American society, and establishment of measures to guarantee 
compliance 

This concludes the testimony of The American Legion, presented on behalf of 
its more than 3 million members and, we trust, of countless other Americans. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Harrington. 
Next we will hear from R. E. Smith, president of the Air Force 
Association. Mr. Smith? 



28 



TESTIMONY OF R. E. SMITH, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, AIR 
FORCE ASSOCIATION 

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 
committee, ladies and gentlemen. I am Gene Smith, national 
president of the Air Force Association and I appreciate the 
opportunity to give you the Air Force Association's view on the 
controversy at the National Air and Space Museum. 

AFA was the first major group to challenge the museum and 
its parent organization, the Smithsonian Institution, on their 
plans for the exhibition of the Enola Gay, the B-29 that dropped 
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945. AFA has also been the 
source for much of the data that has been cited in the course of 
this debate. We would like to submit for inclusion in the record 
of this hearing a compendium that we have assembled of 
relevant reports, memos, letters, statements, and other 
documents. I believe this material will help you determine the 
facts of what happened. 

[The materials are maintained in the committee's files.] 

AFA's involvement dates back to August 1993 when our staff 
began checking up on reports from a small group of B-29 
veterans who told us the Air and Space Museum was going 
wrong with its plans for exhibition of the Enola Gay. We 
discovered that the B-29 veterans were right. The museum was 
working up an exhibit that was blatantly biased and severely 
lacking in balance and historical context. 

For the next several months we tried talking and reasoning 
with the museum director and the curators. But like others 
before us, we found that our comments did not count for much. 
We decided that the only way to get change was to take our case 
to the public, which we did beginning in March of 1994. We did 
this first in a report and then in a condensed version in our 
monthly journal. Air Force Magazine. 

You will hear it said that we jumped prematurely on a raw 
first draft of the exhibition plan and that the curators would have 
fixed it themselves if we had let them alone. In fact, the script we 
exposed was the fourth planning document, not the first. It 
flowed directly from, and picked up the worst features of, the 
three concept plans that went before. Museum officials showed 
no inclination to change. To the contrary. They fought change 
until the pressure from public opinion and Congress became too 
great to bear. 

In April 1994, at the request of a congressional subcommittee 
we did our first detailed content analysis of the Enola Gay script. 
We have done similar analyses of every script the museum has 
produced. These analyses have supplied many of the statistics 
that have been cited in the news. I will mention two examples for 
the benefit of those who have not been through the documents 
package. 



29 

We reported, for example, that an earlier script had 49 photos 
of Japanese casualties but only 3 photos of American casualties, 
demonstrating the emphasis the curators put on Japanese 
suffering. Analyzing a revised script found that the curators had 
given less than 1 text page out of a total of 295 text pages to 
Japanese military activity prior to 1945. That was the extent of 
the context in their plan on Japan's 15-year war of atrocity and 
aggression. Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, the torture 
and killing of POW's, and all the rest. 

Our position, which we began stating early in the debate, was 
that the exhibition would not be acceptable if it continued to 
emphasize any of the following themes that were apparent in the 
first script: one, that the Japanese were victims in World War II, 
defending their nation and culture against western aggression; 
two, that the Americans were ruthless invaders, driven by 
racism, revenge, and blood lust; three, that the death, suffering 
and horrors of war were borne unilaterally or unfairly by a 
passive Japan; and four, that the roles of Japan and the United 
States in World War II were morally equivalent. 

At no time did AFA seek to dictate the exact details of the 
script, and we consistently declined to be part of line-by-line 
negotiating on the script. Our standards were balance, context, 
and fairness. 

The issue caught fire in August 1994 when about 30 members 
of Congress issued statements saying that the exhibit planned 
was biased. The Smithsonian took a more direct hand in the 
matter after I. Michael Heyman became secretary in September. 
The salvage effort broke down in January. Mr. Heyman cancelled 
the exhibition that was planned. He said that the museum would 
show the forward fuselage of the Enola Gay in a simpler, 
straightforward display that he would oversee personally. We 
have not seen the details of that exhibit but we are hoping for the 
best. 

Despite that, we are concerned. The question does not end 
with the Enola Gay exhibit. What about the next exhibit and the 
one after that? We would like to see the museum putting its main 
effort on its primary mission which is to collect, preserve, and 
display historic aircraft, spacecraft, and aeronautical artifacts. 

There are most certainly indications of change; the main one 
being the resignation of the director of the Air and Space 
Museum. It was unfortunate that matters came to that, but it was 
probably inevitable. We welcome new leadership at the museum 
and the chance the museum now has to learn from the lessons of 
the past and rebuild for the future. It is important, though, to be 
sure that the Smithsonian and the museum learn the right lessons 
from this experience. 

When Secretary Heyman cancelled the problem exhibit he 
said, "I have taken this action for one overriding reason: I have 
concluded that we made a basic error in attempting to couple a 
historic treatment of the use of atomic weapons with the 50th 



91-056 0-95-2 



30 

anniversary commemoration of the end of the war." In our 
opinion, Secretary Heyman made the right decision for the 
wrong reason. The problem was not the coupHng of history with 
commemoration. It was that history had been given a 
counter-cultural spin. The problem was not that the exhibit was 
analytical. The problem was that the analysis was distorted. 

The theme of "history versus nostalgia" has been picked up 
and elevated to extreme levels by activists in the academic 
community. They use language like "historical cleansing" and 
"censorship." They would have you believe that the issue is a 
contest between honest scholarship and blind patriotism. That is 
simply not true. Our concerns from the start have always 
centered around balance and context. 

It is rare that we find ourselves on the same side of the issue 
as The Washington Post, so it is worth noting that the editorial 
for January 20, 1995 reaches the same conclusion we do in this 
regard. The Post said that the earlier drafts of the Enola Gay script 
were "incredibly propagandistic and intellectually shabby." It 
also said that the curators had repeatedly made the controversy 
worse by their "misplaced condescension and refusal to see their 
criticisms as anything but the carping of the insufficiently 
sophisticated." The problem with the Enola Gay exhibit in many 
ways was the result of refusal by the curators to accept 
constructive criticism from a wide range of experts, including 
but not limited to military historians and scholars, who put forth 
a mainstream view of the circumstances surrounding President 
Truman's decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Instead they put great reliance and undue weight on 
the radical scholarships and assessments that are, to put it 
mildly, not universally shared by those who are well informed 
on the subject. 

As we pointed out in our very first report on the Enola Gay, 
this is not the first flawed exhibit at the Air and Space Museum 
or within the Smithsonian complex. We believe that actions 
should be taken to ensure that curators in our national museums 
have the benefit of review and comment by a full range of 
recognized experts and that mechanisms be put into place to 
ensure that this happens. Only then will the American public be 
assured that our national museums reflect the broad scholarship 
that might reasonably be expected. 

We applaud the efforts taken to date by Secretary Heyman. 
He has initiated a management review of the Air and Space 
Museum and has shown himself willing to hear advice. As we 
see it, a consensus is developing that says curators need to pay 
particular attention to their audiences. 

Finally, let me say that we, like most Americans, regard the 
Smithsonian as a national treasure. As you might imagine, our 
highest regard has traditionally been for the National Air and 
Space Museum. For those of us in the aerospace community this 
museum is special beyond compare. Our natural position is to be 



31 

in strong support of the Air and Space Museum, not fighting 
with it. We sincerely hope that a new era is about to begin at Air 
and Space, and with it a rededication to the principles and 
purposes that will allow us to once again become an advocate for 
the museum, not its adversary. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Our next witness is Mr. Bob Manhan, who is the assistant 
director of the National Legislative Service for the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars. Mr. Manhan? 

TESTIMONY OF BOB MANHAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, VETERANS OF FOR- 
EIGN WARS 

Mr. Manhan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 
inviting Veterans of Foreign Wars to appear here this morning. 

Of our 2.1 million members, approximately half of them are 
veterans of World War II. While all of them did not necessarily 
see service in the Asiatic-Pacific theater of operation, our entire 
membership unanimously agrees that President Truman on the 
14th of June 1945 made the correct political, strategic decision to 
drop atomic bombs on Japan. The facts that were available to 
President Truman then are still well-documented today. In 
essence it boils down to the fact that Imperial Japan was not 
ready to unconditionally surrender and that a physical land 
invasion of Japan would cause horrifying American casualties. 

My own qualification for being here this morning is the fact 
that I participated in reviewing four of the Smithsonian's scripts, 
I participated in a working luncheon one-on-one with Dr. Martin 
Harwit, and I attended three working sessions at the 
Smithsonian headquarters. In addition, about 2 months after Dr. 
Heyman cancelled the exhibit I did attend the jointly sponsored 
symposium at the Ann Arbor campus of the University of 
Michigan wherein Dr. Heyman conducted a post-mortem study 
on what went wrong with this exhibit. 

Having said that, and having the opportunity now to be the 
last one up at the plate, I want you to know that the VFW agrees 
with everything that my predecessors have said up until this 
point. This allows me to touch on our own very brief seven-page 
written testimony that we submitted. It is structured, as you 
have already seen, to provide you with four basic managerial 
questions that you may consider asking next week when the 
Smithsonian tells their side of the story. 

Our first question is: How could scholars and technicians at 
the Smithsonian have offered their flawed initial broad-based 
concept without receiving any peer group pressure or review? 
And once it was obvious that they were controversial, why 
weren't managerial corrections made sooner? 



32 

The second question: Why was Dr. Martin Harwit chosen in 
the first place for this particular exhibit? 

The third question: What roles were played by Dr. Michael 
Neufeld and Chairman Tom Crouch throughout this exhibit? 
Both are Air and Space Museum employees and were involved 
to some degree in the first script. The first script was not made 
available at any time to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. 

The fourth and last question is: Why didn't Dr. Heyman, the 
Secretary of the Smithsonian, take action sooner to correct the 
exhibit rather than to simply cancel the show? 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This concludes the 
VFW's presentation. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Manhan follows:] 

Statement of Bob Manhan, Assistant Director of Legislative 
Services, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States 

Thank you for inviting the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW) 
to participate in this very important hearing. Because of the thrust of this hearing 
the VFW offers four basic managerial questions that impact directly on the Enola 
Gay Exhibit. We believe the answers, which can only be provided by the 
Smithsonian, will help establish guidelines to preclude that institution from 
again getting bogged down in a similar incident; i.e., one that confuses feelings 
with facts and lacks leadership. The questions are: 

1. How could scholars and technicians at the Smithsonian have of- 
fered their flawed initial broad-based concept without receiving 
any peer group review and, once in trouble, why weren't manage- 
ment corrections made? 

2. Why was Dr. Martin Harwit chosen in the first place for this 
particular exhibit? 

3. What roles were played by Dr. Michael Neufeld and Chairman 
Tom Crouch throughout this exhibit? Both are Air and Space 
Museum employees and were involved to some degree with the 
first script. 

4. Why didn't Dr. Heyman, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, take 
action sooner to correct the exhibit rather than to simply cancel 
the show? 

The remainder of our testimony is structured to provide background informa- 
tion on each of these questions. 

About half of our 2.1 million members are veterans of World War II. While all 
did not necessarily fight in the Asiatic-Pacific theatre of operations, all members 
firmly believe that President Truman on June 14, 1945, made the correct decision 
to authorize the dropping of Atomic bombs on Japan. The facts that were known 
fifty years ago are still well documented today. In essence, we knew that the 
Japanese would never surrender unconditionally and that a military invasion 
would inflict horrifying casualties on American troops. 

The VFW qualifications to participate at this hearing are based on the fact that 
we worked with all the principles on the Smithsonian Institution's Air and Space 
Museum's planned exhibit titled. The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of 
World War II, from May 1994 to January 30, 1995, and a representative attended 
the post-mortem symposium sponsored jointly by the Smithsonian Institution 
and The University of Michigan in mid-April of 1995. During this eleven month 
period of time the VFW provided corrections and commentaries to exhibit scripts 
two and three. We then reviewed script number four which was primarily an 
American Legion effort that proved unsatisfactory to all concerned, including the 
Legion. The VFW again worked with The Air Force Association (AFA) and The 
Retired Officers Association (TROA) on the Smithsonian's script number five and 
a follow-on new sixth introductory section of the military situation in the Asian- 



33 

Pacific area from the 1930's to December 1944. This last script was issued on 
December 15, 1994, and Secretary Heyman cancelled the entire effort about a 
month later on January 29, 1995. During this same period of time the VFW 
attended three meetings at "The Castle" or Headquarters of the Smithsonian 
Institution. Under Secretary Constance Newman was at every meeting. Secretary 
Heyman was at one meeting, and Dr. Martin Harwit also attended one of these 
sessions. The veterans organizations attending all three meetings were the VFW, 
the AFA, and TROA. As an aside, in mid-October Dr. Martin Harwit invited just 
myself and Bob Currieo, the Executive Director of the VFW, to a working lun- 
cheon at the Air and Space Museum. Also present was the Smithsonian's Director 
of Government Relations, Mr. Mark Rodgers. In summary, the VFW's position 
was to tell Dr. Harwit that after going through three scripts we believed that the 
media was becoming involved on the side of historical accuracy rather than 
accepting the revisionist approach the Smithsonian was taking at that point in 
time. The VFW also added that there was a real possibility the Republican Party 
would be the majority in the new 104th Congress and that Republicans generally 
would support a strong national defense and would be less likely to accept a 
revisionist concept for the Enola Gay exhibit. Dr. Harwit agreed with both com- 
ments. 

Secretary Heyman cancelled this exhibit on January 30, 1995. This was an- 
nounced at the third and last meeting at "The Castle." The rationale of doing this 
boiled down to this one overriding reason; "I have concluded that we [the 
Smithsonian Institution] made a basic error in attempting to couple an historic 
treatment of the use of atomic weapons with the 50th anniversary commemora- 
tion of the end of the war. Exhibitions have many purposes, equally worthwhile. 
But we need to know which of many goals is paramount, and not to confuse 
them." 

There was general agreement between the VFW, AFA, and TROA that the fifth 
script was a fairly decent package but not yet to the point where any of us would 
endorse it. However, after all the time, effort, and money that had been expended 
up to this point on presenting a balanced exhibit. Dr. Heyman's decision was a 
surprise, at least to the VFW. 

The symposium held about two and a half months later on the campus of the 
University of Michigan was titled "Presenting History: Museums In A Demo- 
cratic Society." This all day affair was divided into the following three sessions: 

Exhibiting Controversial Subjects; 

The Enola Gay Exhibit: A Case Study in Controversy; and. 

Museums in a Democratic Society. 

It is interesting to note that Thomas D. Crouch, the Chairman of the Department 
of Aeronautics at the National Air and Space Museum, was the "Smithsonian's" 
person during the Enola Gay case study session. Please recall that Dr. Harwit had 
not yet resigned. A total of some 26 eminently qualified scholars, researchers, 
and historians participated in the symposium. It was the collective judgment of 
this group that whenever and wherever it is possible to deal with persons who 
participated in an historical event they should be interviewed and their posi- 
tion(s) clearly stated. In focusing on the Enola Gay Exhibit the group felt the effort 
was handled poorly throughout. Oddly enough, Tom Crouch did not concur. In 
the judgment of the VFW his position was simply that one can't make the 
American veterans "feel good" and, at the same time, present a meaningful 
exhibit on the use of atomic bombs in 1945. 

First, how could scholars and technicians at the Smithsonian have offered their 
initial broad-based concept without any peer group review? Please recall the title 
was "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II." Ostensibly, 
this was to have been scheduled for a late May 1995 opening date to commemo- 
rate, well, the end of World War II. However, the VFW concluded that the portion 
titled The Atomic Bomb was to be the vehicle the Smithsonian would use to make 
the case that nuclear weapons should never be used and that America was 
absolutely wrong in doing so. They were to make their case by presenting the 
results of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the victim's viewpoint. 

Second, just what real role did Dr. Martin Harwit play as a revisionist historian 
or as an opponent of atomic weapons? It is a fact that he was formerly a professor 



34 

of Astronomy at Cornell University and had been Director of the National Air 
and Space Museum since 1987. It is also true that while serving in the U.S. Army 
from 1955 to 1957, Dr. Harwit was assigned to work on nuclear weapons testing 
at Eniwetok and Bikini. Dr. Harwit had said that this experience inevitably 
influenced his thoughts about the Enola Gay exhibit. Knowing this, was Dr. 
Harwit in charge or was he being used as a front-man for someone else's agenda? 
Also, knowing Dr. Harwit's views, why was he given this exhibit mission in the 
first place and subsequently allowed to struggle with four or five revised scripts? 
Third, what roles were played by Dr. Michael Neufeld and Tom Crouch? Both 
were associated with the National Air and Space Museum and the first Enola Gay 
script which was never shown to any veterans service organization but was 
reviewed by unknown parties in Japan. Another facet to this question is, what 
was the managerial role of the Chairman Tom Crouch to the Director, Martin 
Harwit? 

Fourth and last, why didn't Dr. Heyman, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, take 
a more immediate and decisive position earlier in this controversy? In all fair- 
ness, we know that Dr. Heyman joined the Smithsonian in September of 1994; 
however, he certainly should have been aware of the on-going Enola Gay contro- 
versy if only by reading newspaper editorials and surely by receiving informa- 
tion from his Under Secretary, Ms. Constance Newman, who was present for most 
of the Enola Gay campaign. While it is a fact that Dr. Heyman was previously a 
law professor and chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, he is no 
stranger to power and politics of Washington, DC. He was once counselor to 
Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy 
in the Department of the Interior. It is also a fact that Secretary Heyman received 
congressional criticism beginning in mid-December 1994 from members of the 
House of Representatives, to include Sam Johnson, Peter Blute, Duncan Hunter, 
and Bob Dornan among others. Then, on January 19, 1995, Congressman Sam 
Johnson and Peter Blute issued a press release that was extremely critical of the 
National Air and Space Museum's attempt to revise previously agreed upon 
American casualty estimates for a land invasion of Japan. The following day, 
January 20, 1995, the Air Force Association issued their own press release that 
also eloquently summarized the VFW's position by stating: 

We (the Air Force Association] have continued our discussions with 
senior Smithsonian officials in the hope that the Enola Gay exhibit could 
be salvaged. We had been assured that no unilateral actions would be 
taken by curators and official s of the National Air and space Museum, 
in whom we lost faith long ago. It now appears that, on the side and 
behind the scenes, the curators are still working their political agenda. 
This is unacceptable. Museum officials have failed in their stewardship 
and responsibilities. 
Apparently, Dr. Heyman took this statement and the congressional criticism to 
heart and 10 days later cancelled the exhibit. This action, in the VFW's opinion, 
was not justified when we recall the expended time and effort and the fact the 
Air and Space Museum received about $13 million in 1994 from Congress. Cer- 
tainly all this money didn't go into the Enola Gay fiasco, but for $13 million we 
do expect first-class management that as a minimum has an objective in mind and 
a timetable to meet deadlines and make decisions. This brings us full circle for 
the requirement to have Congress conduct an inquiry into how and why this 
debacle was ever allowed to happen in the first place. 

This concludes the VFW's formal statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to 
respond to any questions you or the committee members may have. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Manhan, I shall 
ask those questions next week. We will get their answers on the 
record. 

Mr. Manhan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Let me just make a few comments and turn 
the questioning over to my colleague, the former chairman. We 
have lived through this process together. I appreciate the 



35 

restraint that you gentlemen have used with regard to the 
problems we have had on this exhibit with the Smithsonian. 

First let me ask you. General Sweeney, were you contacted by 
any of the historians at the Smithsonian with regard to your 
participation in these historic flights before it became a 
controversy publicly? 

General Sweeney. No, sir, I was not. 

The Chairman. You said that you learned about it first 
through a publication, the Air Force Association's publication? 

General Sweeney. Yes, when I first learned — 

The Chairman. We need your microphone. General. 

Senator FORD. We are frugal. We do not have one for 
everybody. 

[Laughter. 1 

General SWEENEY. Your question was, I first learned about it 
through a publication, the Air Force Association publication, the 
Air Force Magazine, which is true. Mr. Correll wrote an article 
in there and just sent signals to my eyes when the Smithsonian 
is purported — and I am sure it did say that the script 
said — implied — I think said that we were trying to destroy 
another nation's culture and that we were an imperialistic 
Nation. 

Now to the latter I say, I do not think we wanted any of their 
territory or any other territory in Asia. I do not think we were 
setting up satellites in other parts of the world or that we were 
fighting for that reason. 

Then as to the culture, we certainly were not trying to do 
anything with their culture. We were trying to preserve it and 
not destroy it. We were just trying to get our men home; get the 
war over with and get our men home. I must suggest to you and 
remind perhaps everybody that on the original list of targets for 
the nuclear weapons, Kyoto somehow or other appeared on 
there. Secretary Stimson struck that immediately because that is 
considered to be the seat of Japanese culture, religious culture, 
or whatever you want to call it. So Secretary Stimson struck that 
from the list immediately. 

Also, every bomber pilot in the 20th Air Force in the theater 
in the Pacific had orders not to ever bomb the Imperial Palace, 
even as a target of opportunity. Certainly we could have wiped 
out the Imperial Palace — I do not mean our group, but some 
group could very easily have wiped out the Imperial Palace if we 
were trying to destroy their culture. Secretary Stimson said no, 
never; no pilot will ever, no crew will ever go near that Imperial 
Palace. 

Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. You raise a very interesting point for me. I 
was on the Burma Road between Chongqing and Xian taking a 
convoy of gas trucks up to Chengdu which was a new base to fly 
B-29's out of. We were preparing to have an assault on Japan 
flying in from the west. I know full well the impact of the word. 



36 

the feelings we had, when we learned that you had dropped the 
bomb. General. You are right, it was just 8 days later that we 
were turned around and told to go to another destination, the 
war was over. 

Someone asked me the other day, how can you remember all 
that? You just do not forget that. 

General SWEENEY. Yes, how can you forget? 
The Chairman. Colonel Cooper, I note that you also are 
distinguished with your record of over 9,000 hours of flying in 
the Air Force. I do appreciate your attendance. I do not have any 
questions for you. I want to thank you for coming. 

Mr. Harrington, I think the role of the Legion in this from the 
very first was constructive in trying to bring about a 
presentation that did comply with the law. I am alarmed that the 
Smithsonian Institution indicated it does not feel bound by the 
provisions of Section 80 of Title 20 of the U.S. Code. I just want 
to read it into this record and we will put the complete history 
of this section in the hearing. 

We intend to have these hearings printed, because I think that 
we should preserve a record of this attempt to change the history 
of the Enola Gay. 

The law provides that the Smithsonian Institution is a study 
center of historical collections. 

The Smithsonian Institution shall commemorate and 
display contributions made by the military forces of 
the Nation towards creating, developing, and main- 
taining a free, peaceful, and independent society and 
culture in the United States of America. The valor and 
sacrificial service of the men and women of the Armed 
Forces shall be portrayed as an inspiration to the pres- 
ent and future generations of America. The demands 
placed upon the full energies of our people, the hard- 
ships endured, and the sacrifice demanded in our con- 
stant search for world peace shall be clearly 
demonstrated. The extensive peacetime contributions 
the Armed Forces have made to the advance of human 
knowledge in science, nuclear energy, polar and space 
exploration, electronics, engineering, aeronautics, and 
medicine shall be graphically described. The Smithson- 
ian Institution shall interpret through dramatic dis- 
play significant current problems affecting the 
Nation's security. It shall be equipped with a study 
center for scholarly research into the meaning of war, 
its effect on civilization, and the role of the Armed 
Forces in maintaining a just and lasting peace by pro- 
viding a powerful deterrent to war. In fulfilling its 
purposes, the Smithsonian Institution shall collect, 
preserve, and exhibit military objects of historical in- 
terest and significance. [20 U.S.C. 80a] 



37 

Now, that was passed originally on August 30, 1961. 

As I understand it, those of you who had negotiations with 
the Smithsonian have indicated that you called the attention of 
the Smithsonian to that law and they said they were not bound 
by it? 

Mr. Harrington. It was our understanding, sir, that they 
insinuated that that section of the law applied to a museum that 
was being contemplated and had been put on the back burner for 
the time being and did not apply to the institution in general. 
That is my understanding, sir. 

The Chairman. Next week we shall get the background of 
who gave them the opinion that they are not bound by that 1961 
law. Mr. Harrington, on behalf of the committee I want to thank 
you for your persistence in pursuing this matter. We have taken 
note of your recommendations. I am not sure that this committee 
has the jurisdiction to pursue all of the recommendations, but we 
shall review them. 

Mr. Harrington. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Mr. Smith, many of us were involved behind 
the scenes in trying to straighten this out, but it was your 
association that really brought it to the forefront. I must say, I 
join in the regret that the Smithsonian's exhibit will not be as 
robust as it should have been. It has now been scaled down. The 
result of the controversy is that it appears they just want this 
subject to go away. So I hope that you will continue to maintain 
your concern about the exhibit and help us eventually bring 
about an exhibit that is meaningful with regard to this event. 

Lastly, Mr. Manhan, as I indicated to you, we will ask those 
questions next week and we will see to it that you get answers 
to them. They are very good questions. I really do not have any 
questions because I was in agreement with you from the very 
beginning. 

Senator Ford? 

Senator FORD. We both signed the letter so I guess we were in 
agreement also. Let me tell you what bothers me some right now. 
I have five great, wonderful grandchildren and before me is 
history, personal, real, you can put your hand on it. I think our 
responsibility is to be sure that this real reflection on what 
actually happened — and I underscore real and personal — is 
projected into the future and not sanitized. 

And I could bring up a little something that if we had term 
limits, Senator Stevens would not be here. He would not be 
chairman if we had term limits. Here is a man who participated 
in World War II, General, and got his mission changed because 
you were successful. He was going to back you up and come from 
the other way. We were getting ready to flank them; the strategy 
was laid out. I was there. I am a veteran of World War II, not as 
active as some, more active than others maybe. 

So somehow or another I want the institutional memory to 
stay as long as we can till we get it right. That is my problem 



38 

today, and that is what I am going to try to work on with my 
good friend — and he is my good friend — the chairman of the 
committee. 

I would like to ensure that the Smithsonian does not repeat 
the errors that it has made in developing the Enola Gay exhibit. 
Based upon the experience of this group here, do other panel 
members — I believe the American Legion and the VFW have set 
out specifics — have suggestions or questions that we might use 
next week as it relates to the Smithsonian? Mr. Smith? 

Mr. Smith. The Air Force Association feels just exactly like 
they did. We have discussed those 

Senator FORD. I think that was kind of a mutual agreement, 
but I wanted to be sure 

Mr. Smith. Yes, it was. Let me build on what you said. Senator 
Ford, too. I think we missed a wonderful opportunity to display 
appropriately one of the significant events in the last 100 years 
for our grandchildren to learn from, and we did it wrong. That 
is what this is all about. That is why John Correll, who is the 
editor of the Air Force Association, who I would like to make 
sure that this committee knows was the one that actually 
discovered the script the first time and started the work that we 
did. 

Senator FORD. I think everybody understands that we are all 
on the same wavelength. We are together, and prevention is 
going to be important in the future. I do not mind somebody 
disagreeing with me. We all have interpretations, and that is 
what I have been doing up here for a few years now. We do not 
agree all the time. But we still try to work things out. And where 
we do agree, we go gung-ho. 

I do not mind having different opinions and different 
interpretations. But it is awfully hard to refute General Sweeney. 
It is awfully hard because he was there, and he seems to be of 
sound mind and all that here today. I feel comfortable with his 
testimony. I believe if he signed his will today it would be a good 
one. So under those circumstances, I believe what you tell me, 
and I want that in the record and I want that unsanitized. 

Colonel Cooper. Senator Ford, if I may? 

Senator FORD. You sure may. Get me started and it is hard to 
stop me sometimes. 

Colonel Cooper. It has been brought to my attention by an 
associate who was deeply involved with the National Air and 
Space Museum directly that at the present time there are three 
major galleries in the downtown museum that have no actual air 
or space artifacts in them. Yet just this week we opened a Barbie 
doll display at the National Air and Space Museum, which I have 
a little bit of a problem figuring out just what the important 
aviation artifact is 

Senator Ford. Was Barbie a female pilot? 

ILaughter.j 

Colonel Cooper. I really cannot answer that question, sir. 



39 

The Chairman. The general has given us a copy of his new 
video, which is one of the 50th Anniversary commemorative 
videos on the war's end. We thank you for that. General. I hope 
to see that we get one of these for each member of the Congress. 
We will talk to you about that. 

Mr. Harrington. Mr. Chairman, if I may please, before you 
conclude. There was mention made of the Smithsonian's 
deviation and dereliction from Title 20 of the United States Code. 
We do have a letter from Secretary Heyman citing that particular 
exemption that he claims is applicable to the institution and we 
would be glad to provide that to you, sir. 

The Chairman. Yes, we would like to have that. The scope of 
this hearing, as I said at the beginning, is to look into the 
decision-making processes of the Smithsonian to see if we can 
find a way to be assured that the intent of Congress in helping 
to create the Smithsonian is met. It is on the Smithsonian's future 
management practices. 

This is not the first time that this committee has had difficulty 
with the Smithsonian. We had difficulty over one exhibit that 
was called "The Underclass", which in order to enter it, one had 
to lie down on a slab like it was a morgue and go through a wall. 
It was a very traumatic experience really for children that were 
going through that exhibit. 

Secondly, we had difficulty with the Smithsonian over its 
insistence on assisting Professor Luis Fuentes in getting national 
recognition of his theory that our Government stole California, 
Arizona, and Texas from the Mexican people and ought to look 
into finding some way to redress the wrongs. With the increasing 
Mexican population in those areas, you can understand our 
concern about anyone who might be fomenting great 
dissatisfaction in that area of our country. 

We have had a series of these revisionist concepts with the 
Smithsonian, and it is a management concern. Two members of 
our committee are on the board of directors, but it is such an 
enormous institution now and there seems to be such great 
leeway in determining how the space is to be used for exhibits, 
and in the content of the exhibits, that it raises serious 
management questions. I think this is a management problem; 
the problem of determining whether the research that was 
conducted prior to planning the exhibit was adequate. We hope 
that we are understood here. 

I am pleased, as I said, that you gentlemen have joined in the 
concept of trying to demonstrate our concern about the future of 
support for the Smithsonian. Had this exhibit gone on as it was 
originally brought to my attention, I swear that no veteran of the 
United States would have ever contributed to the Smithsonian 
again. Now that is what the board must understand. It was not 
true history. It was a distorted reflection of the endeavors of 
General Sweeney pursuant to the Commander-in-Chief's orders. 



40 



You have contributed to our process of trying to bring about 
some change in the management practices of the Smithsonian 
and I want to thank each of you for attending here today. Thank 
you very much. 

Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the committee was adjourned. 



THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION: 
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 



THURSDAY, MAY 18, 1995 

U.S. Senate, 
Committee on Rules and Administration, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in Room 
301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens, chairman, 
presiding. 

Present: Senators Stevens, Warner, Cochran, Ford, Pell, and 
Feinstein. 

Staff Present: Christine Ciccone, Deputy Chief Counsel; 
Mark C. Mackie, Chief Counsel; Virginia C. Sandahl, Chief Clerk; 
and Kennie L. Gill, Special Counsel for the Minority. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, CHAIR- 
MAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA 

The Chairman. Let me make a preliminary statement here, if 
I may. Part of it is procedural. We have had a decision now from 
the Supreme Court that indicates that unsworn statements 
before the Congress cannot be the subject of further action. I 
intend to send a letter to all of the chairmen and ranking 
members of Senate committees to put them on notice that, in my 
judgment, that means that if there is any question that might be 
raised concerning testimony, that my advice to them — and I 
think my good friend, the Vice Chairman and Senator from 
Kentucky, will join in this — that the advice is that witnesses 
appearing before the committees who have not been sworn in as 
we have, should be. Members of Congress and Federal 
employees are under oath when they appear before our 
committee. We will start the practice of asking witnesses who 
appear before this committee to take an oath. 

Again, I want to say, I believe that members of the Federal 
Government have taken an oath, as we have taken an oath, and 
are subject to prosecution if we do not testify truthfully here. I 
hope that those who appear before us will understand. It is my 
intention to ask witnesses who have not taken an oath, as 
employees or otherwise, to take an oath. I remind those who 



(41) 



42 

appear before us that they are under oath when they testify if 
they are members of the Federal Government. 

Our first witness this morning is the Honorable Sam Johnson, 
who is a member of the Smithsonian Board of Regents. Professor 
Edward Linenthal, Professor of Religion and American Culture 
at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh will follow 
Congressman Johnson. Mr. Linenthal served on the advisory 
board of the Enola Gay exhibit. 

We shall also hear testimony from the Secretary of the 
Smithsonian, Michael Heyman; Dr. Tom Crouch, the curator on 
the Enola Gay exhibit; and Dr. Maxine Singer, chairman of the 
Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian. 

Now this is the second hearing which we have called 
regarding the Smithsonian's future management practices. Last 
week we heard from several veteran's groups. I want to reiterate 
what I said at that hearing last week. These hearings are not 
being held to tear down the Smithsonian. We believe, I believe, 
it is our duty to help preserve the Smithsonian as the central 
depository of the artifacts of our Nation's history. 

Those artifacts, together with the facts proven at the time of 
the decisions, permit judgments of history to be fair and 
unbiased. They allow succeeding generations to learn from 
history and to question it. 

What happened with the Enola Gay, in my judgment, is that 
the Smithsonian produced an exhibit that was not fair or 
unbiased. It was a revisionist view of the events that took place 
at the end of World War II. Some of those individuals who took 
part in those events, and I am one of them, are still around to 
challenge the Smithsonian's account. 

The exhibit resulted in an intense public controversy and has 
created a chasm, again in my opinion, between a major segment 
of the public, particularly the veterans of this country, which 
account for 26.5 million people. That is approximately 10 percent 
of the population and when you add their families and friends 
that number adds up very quickly. 

In addition, the whole controversy has now resulted in the 
resignation of one of the Smithsonian's top officials. Dr. Martin 
Harwit, the director of the Air and Space Museum. 

Sadly, the Enola Gay exhibit is not the first exhibit at the 
Smithsonian that has raised public concern. There were also the 
"West as America" exhibit, the "Etiquette of the Underclass" 
exhibit, and the "Buried Mirror" video that featured Carlos 
Fuentes. Each time that an exhibit shocks the sensibilities of the 
general public, support for the Smithsonian is diminished. 

Approximately 85 percent of the Smithsonian's budget comes 
from the Federal treasury. The balance is from non-appropriated 
funds, such as private gifts and donations. Since the 1950's, the 
percentage of the Smithsonian's budget that comes from private 
sources has diminished from 31 percent to 15 percent. Each year 



43 

the Smithsonian projects its budget request and the request is 
consistently for increased Federal funding. 

In 1992, the projection that was presented to this committee 
was that the Smithsonian would need $1.1 billion in Federal 
money between 1992 and the year 2001 to fund their projects. 
Since that time, they have lowered their projections, but at the 
same time the portion of the Smithsonian's budget that comes 
from private sources continues to drop. In a time when we face 
in this country, and particularly here in the Federal Government, 
severe budget cuts, the Smithsonian will be in greater need of 
increased private donations to sustain its operations. 

Eroding public support threatens the ability of the 
Smithsonian to continue to be the central depository of our 
nation's artifacts. It is my hope that these hearings will set the 
record straight, and quiet down this controversy concerning this 
exhibit and the events of the past. 

We want to provide the Smithsonian with a public forum to 
explain what went wrong with their management practices, and 
to reassure us that steps have been taken to correct what I would 
call the revisionist and politically correct bias that was contained 
in some of these exhibits of the past, particularly the original 
script for the Enola Gay exhibit. 

I hope that will be done, and if it is done, we will put this 
behind us. 

Senator Ford, do you have an opening statement, sir? 

Senator FORD. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WENDELL H. FORD, 
RANKING MEMBER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE 
OF KENTUCKY 

First, let me say I support your opening statement as it relates 
to swearing in of witnesses. Several of the committees on which 
I serve do that automatically, and I do not think it would be an 
extension too much of what is now the practice. So I will support 
that effort, and witnesses should be alerted to the Supreme Court 
decision. 

Mr. Chairman, last week this committee heard testimony 
from a number of individuals and groups representing both 
active and retired military who had been involved, in various 
ways, with the development of the Enola Gay exhibit. That 
testimony raised some very disturbing issues about how the 
Smithsonian management went about soliciting input on this 
important exhibit and determining the scope of the exhibit. 

I recognize that Secretary Heyman came to the Smithsonian 
at the end of this process. Testimony by some of the witnesses 
last week indicated that he made a valiant, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, effort to resolve this controversy and get the 
exhibit back on track. 



44 

I commend the Secretary for his efforts. However, I am afraid 
that the experience with the Enola Gay exhibit is not an isolated 
example and indicates a general misunderstanding of the 
relationship between the Smithsonian and the American public. 
Experiences such as that with the Enola Gay undermine the broad 
support for the Smithsonian and jeopardize its unique role, and 
I underscore unique role, as America's museum. 

It is vital to the continued congressional support of the 
Smithsonian that the management flaws that led to this situation 
not be repeated. The Smithsonian must understand that, as an 
institution supported with Federal funds, it is ultimately 
accountable to the American public, whose lives and history its 
exhibits reflect. 

I look forward to hearing the response of the Smithsonian to 
the issues raised last week, and the Secretary's proposals to 
prevent a recurrence of such a controversy in the future. It will 
also be helpful to our consideration of this matter to hear from 
the other witnesses who bring different perspectives to this 
discussion. The Smithsonian will not be able to move forward 
until we have fully aired these issues and management has taken 
steps to ensure that this situation will not be repeated. 

I thank the Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Feinstein, do you have an opening 
statement? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I do not, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Congressman Johnson, as I stated, I believe 
that we who serve in the Congress are all under oath. We will be 
happy to have your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. SAM JOHNSON, A REPRESEN- 
TATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it, and I thank you 
for giving me the opportunity to participate in this very 
important hearing. 

From what has been said already, I just want to emphasize 
that you represent those who fought for us in World War II and 
were able to respond to the Enola Gay episode, I think, more 
emotionally than some of the Americans who were not involved 
in that conflict. Being a military man, I appreciate the posture 
that you have taken and I thank you for your patriotic approach. 
I think that the Smithsonian does reflect, and will reflect in the 
future, the values that America so greatly loves. 

Last summer, amid great controversy, I became involved in 
the development of the Enola Gay exhibit. I became involved 
because I was, like you, disturbed by the biased and unbalanced 
text of the script, and by the assumptions that were made by a 
few individuals questioning America's actions in ending World 
War II. 



45 

Through the tenacity and perseverance of Members of 
Congress, staff, veterans, and outside groups, a series of 
constructive negotiations were held and I felt that some progress 
was being made to rewrite the script. I was wrong. 

The problems continued and were exacerbated by the 
uncooperative spirit of the museum's director and curators, and 
their inability to understand the reasons for the opposition 
toward the exhibit. It seemed that they were willing to disregard 
history in order to promote their own ideological agenda. 

While the revised scripts did move closer to a balance, the 
museum director and curators persisted with their questioning 
of American intentions, while maintaining the innocence of the 
Japanese. When these differences could not be reconciled. 
Secretary Heyman, who became Secretary as you know only in 
September, responded quickly and responsibly. He cancelled the 
exhibit as planned and put himself personally in charge of 
revising the Enola Gay exhibit. 

At that same time, I was honored when the Speaker appointed 
me to sit on the Smithsonian's Board of Regents. Unfortunately, 
over the past few years, I believe that the Board of Regents was 
not as diligent as it should have been in its oversight and 
guidance of the various museum directors, curators, and other 
Smithsonian personnel. We must remember that it is the Board 
of Regents in whose hands the Institution and all its museums 
have been entrusted, with the help of the Secretary. 

Today, however, I am pleased to tell you that it is a very 
different Smithsonian than the one that existed just a few months 
ago. There is a renewed interest and energy on behalf of the 
Secretary and the Board of Regents that I am proud to be a part 
of. 

Although we found that the Enola Gay was not the only 
exhibit that had been overcome by political correctness and 
revisionism, which you stated, I do want to stress that the 
majority of the exhibits at the Smithsonian are very impressive 
and historically accurate. I am confident that under the 
leadership of Secretary Heyman, the entire Smithsonian 
Institution will get back on track. 

I would like to outline a few of the Secretary's reforms. First, 
he has initiated a full management review of the entire 
Smithsonian Institution. Second, he has taken a hands-on role by 
placing himself in the position to oversee and ensure that every 
exhibit is of the highest caliber. Finally, he has renewed and 
stressed that the Board of Regents take an active role in the 
operations of the Smithsonian. That is what has been the 
problem — there has been no involvement. I feel secure about the 
direction of the Smithsonian's future with Dr. Heyman at the 
helm. 

I think we must be extremely mindful in our oversight and 
management of the Smithsonian Institution and its exhibits, 
because we are talking about our national museum. It is vitally 



46 

important, in my view, that all of the exhibits are factually 
correct and properly reflect the values that this great country is 
based upon. Most importantly, museums have an incredible 
responsibility to our nation's children. Our national museums 
must, at the very least, surround and teach them, I believe, what 
is good about America. 

I am proud to say that after working with Secretary Heyman 
and the other regents, I am confident and excited about the 
prospects for this great institution in the future. We recognize 
the financing problems and we are out, along with the Secretary, 
to find some private funding to help us get over the hump. We 
are on the path to restoring the Smithsonian to its once 
prominent state and we, as regents, have a solemn trust to the 
nation to do that, and I am very honored to be a part of it. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for having these hearings, 
and allowing me to participate. I would be happy to answer some 
of your questions. 

The Chairman. Thank you. We are proud, too, that you are 
there. I am delighted to have your statement. We have found the 
same relationship with the Secretary, and I hope that we can put 
this issue behind us. 

Do you have any questions? 

Senator FORD. I have no questions for the Congressman. We 
do thank you for being here and thank you for your fine efforts. 

Mr. Johnson. Thank you for allowing me to be here. 

The Chairman. Mr. Johnson, let me tell you that the legal 
advisor to the Senate has just sent me word, through my staff, 
that I am incorrect. Members of Congress take an oath to support 
the President of the United States, but they do not take an oath 
to testify truthfully at every instance. 

So, do you swear that the testimony you have just given is the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 

Mr. Johnson. I do. 

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

Our next witness is Dr. Edward Linenthal. Professor, you are 
going to be the first one to do this before us officially. 

Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Linenthal. I do. 

The Chairman. Thank you. We are happy to have your 
statement. Professor, please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD T. LINENTHAL, PROFESSOR OF 
RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF 
WISCONSIN-OSHKOSH, OSHKOSH, WISCONSIN 

Mr. Linenthal. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the 
Committee, I am very pleased to be here this morning. 



47 

I served on the advisory committee for the National Air and 
Space Museum's proposed exhibit, "The Last Act: The Atomic 
Bomb and the End of World War 11" because of my engagement 
with a number of controversial historic sites and issues, 
particularly the changing interpretation of the Little Big Horn 
Battlefield National Monument, my experience working at the 
U.S.S. Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor during the 50th 
anniversary events, and a recently published book on the 
creation of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. 

The Little Big Horn is one of the great success stories of 
American public history, as visitors learn that different, often 
clashing, stories can be told at a historic site and that these 
clashing voices deepen rather than impoverish our 
understanding of the events of 1876. At Pearl Harbor and at the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, I felt the power of 
the commemorative voice which speaks with the authority of the 
witness, "I was there. I know what happened because I saw it 
and felt it." As a historian, part of my obligation is to attend to 
this voice, to listen carefully in this instance to Pearl Harbor 
veterans and Holocaust survivors. 

Scholars, including museum professionals, are obliged to 
provide a comprehensive and balanced rendering of the human 
experience. Frequently, there is a tension between the 
commemorative voice and the historical voice, which seeks to 
discern motives, understand actions, and discuss consequences 
that were impossible to analyze during the event itself. It is a 
voice that to some can feel condescending, even when no 
condescension is intended. It can feel detached, even when those 
who speak out of this voice view their work as a way to deepen 
our understanding of an event. 

The National Air and Space Museum tried, unsuccessfully, to 
represent both these perspectives in one exhibit. In hindsight, 
there were too many complicating factors — the presence of what 
many considered a sacred relic, the Enola Gay itself; the 
expectations of many that 50th anniversary events should 
privilege the commemorative perspective; the strongly held and 
sometimes irreconcilable belief about the use of atomic weapons; 
and fundamental disagreements about the function of the 
National Air and Space Museum. Should it be a place for 
uncritical celebration of technological prowess, or should it 
inform the public about the economic, social, and political 
context of the museum's artifacts? In my opinion, it is certainly 
not "gratuitous social commentary," as some have charged, that 
the museum, for example, reminds visitors that the V-2 rocket is 
more than a "milestone in the progress of rocket technology," 
what an old label read. Rather, that thousands of concentration 
camp prisoners died building it, and that it "killed 7,000 people 
and terrorized millions." 

The museum tried to balance what historian John Dower has 
called the heroic and tragic narrative of the Bomb. Veterans and 



48 

many others envisioned and expected an exhibit that portrayed 
the use of the Bomb as the culmination of the Pacific war, saving 
many lives. The appropriate historical context was the pre-Bomb 
horror of the Pacific war. The commemorative message was, 
"remember what we did and what it cost." The tragic narrative, 
clearly dominant in the museum's exhibition, sought to freeze a 
moment widely considered a turning point in history, in much 
the way the Holocaust Museum froze an event for examination. 
While acknowledging the Bomb's role in ending the war, one 
appropriate historical context in this tragic narrative was the 
post-war legacy of the nuclear arms race, and a host of 
controversial issues that had occupied historians for 50 years. 
The commemorative message was "never again." Historians' 
perspective on the Bomb emerge out of both of these stories. 
Some emphasize the fact that the Bomb ended the war and view 
it as a positive act. Others see it also as the first act of the Cold 
War and view it much more ambivalently. 

The first script, which was just that, a draft, understood by 
its creators to be subject to revision and ensuing consultations, 
became a lightning rod for criticism. In the spring and summer 
of 1994, there was thoughtful criticism from military historians, 
including those of another review body appointed by Martin 
Harwit, the "Tiger Team," which included several Air Force 
veterans and was chaired by retired Air Force Brigadier General 
William Constantine. There were several major concerns: one, 
that its sections about historical controversies were too 
speculative and, for some, tendentious; two, that a much fuller 
presentation of the Pacific war was necessary in order to help 
visitors appreciate the decision to drop the Bomb; and three, that 
there was an imbalance in the script because of this lack of 
context, evident in many more photographs of Japanese Bomb 
victims than American combat casualties, an imbalance that 
fostered forgetfulness of the Japanese as perpetrators of barbaric 
acts in the war, and remember them only as victims of the Bomb. 

Over the summer of 1994, the script underwent substantial 
changes. For example, of the 42 specific recommendations of the 
Tiger Team, 30 were fully implemented, 7 were partially 
implemented, 5 were not. Other military historians were also 
consulted, and their advice taken seriously. On July 14, 1994, 
retired Brigadier General David A. Armstrong, the Director for 
Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
and also a professional historian, wrote Dr. Alfred Goldberg, 
historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Substantial 
revisions have been made . . . Some attempt has been made to 
address virtually every criticism raised at the April 13 meeting 
between Joint History and Service historians and Smithsonian 
curators, although in some cases the fixes have been minor." 
Several months later, on September 19, 1994, Alfred Goldberg 
wrote, "The first three sections of this draft should dispose of 
most of the negative criticism of the first two drafts. They 



49 

present an informed and balanced picture of events. The issue of 
racism, strategic bombing policy, decision to drop the bomb, and 
invasion plans and casualties, are handled with acceptable 
objectivity. The section on the effect of the atomic bombs will no 
doubt continue to draw critical comment as being too long, too 
detailed, and too sympathetic to the Japanese, but the exhibit 
would be incomplete and much less meaningful without it." 
Despite these changes, media criticism and the campaign 
organized by the Air Force Association intensified. 

Media coverage of this issue has been distressingly 
irresponsible. The museum and curators were accused of 
anti-American impulses, of creating a script that exhibited 
disregard for veterans. Interestingly, however, the museum's 
strongest critic, the Air Force Association, noted early on that the 
first script treated the men of the 509th, "extensively and with 
respect." Let me offer one example of the way the press poisoned 
the debate. The Wall Street Journal spoke of the "oozing 
romanticism with which the ... show's writers describe the 
kamikaze pilots ... These were, the script elegiacally relates, 
'youths, their bodies overflowing with life.'" The Journal has 
taken a quote from a kamikaze pilot in the script and implied 
that these are the curators' words. The curators included this 
quote to provide, they commented, "insight into [the 
kamikaze's] suicidal fanaticism, which many Americans would 
otherwise find incomprehensible." Ken Ringle of The 
Washington Post quoted the Journal's paragraphs, repeating for 
his readers the false accusation. 

As script after script deleted material about historical 
controversies regarding the decision to drop the bomb, added 
photographs of mushroom clouds and structural damage, and 
removed most photographs of dead Japanese, historians and 
peace activists met with museum officials to argue for what they 
believed should be restored or newly incorporated. The scripts 
were a kind of Rorschach test. People were concerned with 
different questions, paid attention to different "facts," and 
interpreted the same facts differently. In the end, everyone 
believed their history had been "stolen," resulting either in a 
"revisionist" exhibit or in one showing a disregard for the 
complexity and irony of history. 

Reaction to the exhibit remains troubling in many respects. 
Some critics folded this exhibit into the culture wars, into an 
anti-intellectual attack, arguing that elite historians had "stolen" 
the "people's" history, and that the museum had fallen victim to 
the delusions of "revisionism." This argument conveniently 
ignores the fact that historians have opened up American history 
to the voices of many different Americans. It also seeks to 
portray "revisionism" as a morally dubious activity, akin to the 
practices of Holocaust deniers (formerly called Holocaust 
revisionists). And yet, is it not the job of historians to continually 
reconstruct the past in great detail, to continually revise our 



50 

interpretations of the past according to new research and new 
insight? Are we not pleased when Ken Burns deepens and 
broadens, therefore revises, our understanding of the Civil War 
or the history of baseball when he allows so many forgotten 
people to speak? Do we not see this as an act of historical 
enrichment, reminding us of the fact that history is never as 
simple as it seems, but as complex, ironic, and therefore 
endlessly fascinating? 

It was also troubling that our advisory committee and the 
museum failed to be more sensitive to the passions aroused by 
this story, troubling that the museum failed to respond publicly 
to the media caricature of script and curatorial motive, and 
troubling that the museum was willing to enter into negotiations 
with the American Legion, which had virtual veto power over 
the content of the exhibit. Museums, particularly public 
museums, have a responsibility to listen carefully to voices of 
various groups in the shaping of public exhibitions, but the 
integrity of the scholarly enterprise, be it in a book or a museum 
exhibit, that seeks careful rendition of the past, is threatened 
when any interest group becomes an arbiter of public history. 

In recent years, many museums have succeeded in engaging 
visitors in conversation about controversial issues in order to 
help fill the much lamented "naked public square" in American 
life. The cancellation of this exhibit sets a chilling and dangerous 
precedent, if the message is that only "officially" sanctioned 
history is acceptable. With all due respect to Representative 
Peter Blute of Massachusetts, I am troubled by his comment 
about the Enola Gay exhibit. He said, "I don't want 16-year-olds 
walking out of there thinking badly of the U.S." Surely 
Representative Blute would agree that the presentation of 
history is not to function as therapy, used to puff up the 
self-esteem of individuals or nations. Surely Representative 
Blute would object to the very idea that there should be a 
patriotic litmus test for a public museum in the Nation's Capital, 
or that young people should not be confronted with the 
complexities of history. I am sure that Representative Blute 
would never mean to imply that such a test could lead to 
opposition for appropriated funds for the Holocaust Museum. 
There, visitors learned that Americans encountered and 
liberated the camps and many Holocaust survivors found a home 
in America. They also learn, however, about official 
anti-Semitism that kept thousands of European Jews from legally 
emigrating to this country. They learn that the S.S. Saint Louis 
was turned away from American shores in 1939, resulting in the 
deaths of many passengers in the Holocaust. At that museum, 
visitors are judged to be mature enough to be able to confront a 
complex story. Surely they had the ability to do the same at the 
National Air and Space Museum. 

Unlike totalitarian countries, we never want to give fuel to 
the impulse to sanitize history, to turn away from engaging our 



51 

past in all of its complexity. This would be anathema to the 
democratic principles we all hold sacred. Surely, we can find 
ways to both honor the commemorative voice and respect the 
historical voice as we continue to create public history exhibits 
designed to both inspire and challenge. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. I noticed that two of 
our colleagues have arrived. Senator Cochran is also a member 
of the Smithsonian Board. Do you have a statement. Senator? 

Senator COCHRAN. No, 1 do not. 

The Chairman. Senator Warner, do you have a statement? 

Senator WARNER. I have one I would like to insert in the 
record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:! 

Statement of Hon. John Warner, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

Virginia 

I would like to thank the chairman for holding this very important hearing. 

As a member of the Smithsonian Institution Board of Regents during the period 
in which the Enola Gay exhibit controversy developed, I worked closely with the 
Institution and with various military groups as they strove to resolve their 
differences. Progress was being made until mid-January of this year when dis- 
cussions between the parties broke down and The American Legion called for the 
cancellation of the planned exhibit. 

Following that, on January 20, 1995, Senator Dole and I wrote to Chairman 
Stevens requesting hearings focused on the controversy surrounding the Enola 
Gay exhibit. Ten days later, on January 30, 1995, Smithsonian Secretary Heyman 
announced that the planned exhibit had been cancelled and replaced with a 
smaller display featuring the forward section of the Enola Gay and a limited 
script. 

The cancellation of the exhibit and all of the controversy surrounding it has, 
unfortunately, damaged the Smithsonian Institution's reputation. We now have 
a responsibility to the American people to ensure that such an incident never 
occurs again. We must then put this unfortunate chapter behind us and look to 
the future. 

The Smithsonian Institution is a national treasure that belongs to us all. We 
must address the mistakes that were made, correct them and then immediately 
focus our attention on how we can all work together to strengthen the Institution. 
To do otherwise would be a disservice to all Americans. 

The Chairman. Senator Pell? 

Senator Pell. No opening statement, thank you. 

The Chairman. I understand you are writing a history on this 
controversy. Is that right? 

Mr. Linenthal. That is correct. 

The Chairman. A book on this whole subject we are 
exploring? 

Mr. Linenthal. My own contribution will be a chapter of the 
history of this controversy in a book of essays that will explore 
other museum controversies, but will focus on the Enola Gay 
exhibit. 

The Chairman. Do you believe that when the Smithsonian 
prepares an exhibit on an event in military history that military 



52 

historians and the records of the Department of Defense ought 
to be consulted? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. I think that in the creat'on of any public 
history exhibit, a wide variety of voices, particularly of people 
who are invested in the story, should be consulted. I have 
wondered, this is of course a hypothetical question, and it is a 
different museum so it is hard to draw precise analogies, but at 
the Holocaust Museum, there was a content committee made up 
of museum people, historians, and Holocaust survivors. That 
content committee had something to do with evaluating the 
script, making suggestions. 

I have wondered, in retrospect, given the volatile nature of 
this story, whether some kind of a content committee for this 
exhibit might, in fact, have allayed some of the anger of veterans 
and others who felt that their voices were not a part of this 
originally, and that they did not own the story in the ways that 
they wanted to. 

The Chairman. Professor, do you believe that the committee 
that met on the Holocaust should have included Nazis? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. No, I do not. 

The Chairman. Do you believe that this group, who prepared 
this exhibit, should have gone to Japan to consult with Japanese 
veterans before they consulted with American veterans? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. I do not know that that is the case. Senator. I 
know that the museum went to Japan on several occasions and, 
from the materials that I have seen from the Smithsonian — and I 
still have documents to go through, of course — the materials that 
I have seen, the Smithsonian went there to consult with the 
mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and several museums about 
artifacts. I am not aware of consultation with Japanese veterans. 

I do know, as well, that there were some discussions with 
Japanese victims. I also know, and you perhaps have the dates 
of this, that early on in this process, the men of the 509th were, 
in fact, a part of this process as well. 

The Chairman. The information we have is that military 
historians were not consulted until the summer of 1994. In your 
history, do you know how many scripts were actually prepared 
on this exhibit? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. I have a number of scripts in my office. 

The Chairman. Can you tell me how many? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. Quite a few. I have six or seven in my office. 

The Chairman. We have asked for all of them to be delivered 
to this committee. I hope that we have the same scripts that you 
have. 

You stated that the American Legion had veto power over the 
context. 

Mr. LINENTHAL. The content. 

The Chairman. The content. I thought you meant content and 
context of this exhibition. If that is so, why did it take so many 



53 

drafts before they got to the point that it reflected any part of 
their opinion? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. Well, the American Legion was asked by the 
Smithsonian to come in rather late in this game. I think, frankly, 
that given what very distinguished military historians in 
Washington said about two of the earlier scripts — particularly I 
believe it was August of 1994 — that that script was one that 
displayed, as Alfred Goldberg and David Armstrong said, an 
acceptable balance that included many voices. 

By the time the American Legion became involved, and they 
were asked to become involved, so it was at that point something 
they were willing to do, the public situation was, as you know, 
the controversy had erupted already. I simply think that while 
museums must take great care to include a variety of voices in 
the creation of scripts so that various people are engaged in and 
own the story in various ways, in situations of duress, when any 
interest group — whether it be the American Legion or the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation — are in positions to dictate what 
goes in scripts, that that is a bad precedent set. 

So here I am not simply picking on the American Legion. I 
would feel the same way were it any group with a particular 
agenda telling a public museum what should and should not be 
in an exhibit. 

The Chairman. One should not get too personal about these 
things, but I remember when I was a high school student in 
Senator Feinstein's beautiful state, that right after Pearl Harbor 
we lost 40 percent of the students in our high school because they 
were Japanese. They were my good friends. Those of us who 
lived at that time were able to draw a distinction between how 
we felt about the Japanese military and how we felt about 
Japanese people. 

Do you think this exhibit demonstrated that feeling at the 
time, which was not anti-Japanese, but anti-Japanese military? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. 1 am not entirely sure that that was the case 
as the war went on. 

The Chairman. I am talking about this exhibit. Do you think 
it exhibited the feeling in the United States at the time, of just 
total antipathy towards those who controlled Japan, as 
compared to the Japanese people, per se? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. Well there were, in the first script, certainly 
statements about the activities of the Japanese in China and their 
activities toward American prisoners of war. I think, speaking 
personally, that the issue of context, that since so many 
Americans — especially younger people, the Smithsonian found 
out — did not have the proper context into which to put this story, 
the idea of placing this in the wider context of the Pacific war 
was, in fact, a wise one. And the Smithsonian moved, I think, 
relatively quickly to do that. So I think that was very wise. 

As I said, working out of the tragic narrative of the bomb, the 
Smithsonian tried to show what the bomb did on the ground. 



54 

Many people thought that this helped kind of "misremember" 
this — that the Japanese were being remembered only as victims. 

The way I read that part of the script, with pictures of the 
dead Japanese, it did not make me misremember the war. I had 
no trouble remembering what the Japanese did in China, at the 
rape of Nanking, or the beheading of Australian prisoners of 
war, the barbaric treatment of American prisoners of war. I saw 
those photographs as representing really the civilian victims of 
World War II throughout the theaters, and also in some ways the 
first victims of the nuclear age. 

So that is very much how I read those. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Tiger Team? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. No, I was not a member of the Tiger Team. 

The Chairman. Do you know how many times the Tiger 
Team met? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. No, I have the Tiger Team's reports. I do not 
know how many times they met. 

The Chairman. If I told you I was advised that the advisory 
board only met once, and that six of the nine members attended, 
no notes were taken, and no report was ever issued, could you 
question that in terms of your history? 

Mr. LINENTHAL. I could, indeed. 

The Chairman. Can you tell me what your history shows? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. I have a history of what the Tiger Team did. 
There's a large report that the National Air and Space Museum 
has, that I have in my files, that shows what the Tiger Team did, 
and what the various issues were that the Tiger Team took up, 
what issues were negotiated between the museum and the 
members of the Tiger Team. So I do have that. Senator. 

The Chairman. I do not want to monopolize this. I will just 
ask you two more questions. Have you read Manchester's 
"Goodbye Darkness"? 

Mr. LINENTHAL. I have, indeed. 

The Chairman. Do you question his judgment of history, as 
one who participated in it? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. I do not question — Senator, I was asked at the 
50th anniversary ceremonies at Pearl Harbor, there was a 
conference in Honolulu on the legacy of Pearl Harbor, in which 
I participated. And after I was done with my talk, which was a 
history of the changing interpretation of the U.S.S. Arizona 
Memorial at Pearl Harbor, the son of a survivor of the Bataan 
Death March asked me a question from the audience, "What 
would you tell my father about reconciling with the Japanese?" 

I said to him what I hope I would be wise enough to say and 
have, in fact, responded to Holocaust survivors — that there are 
some things you do not comment on out of human decency. That 
I had no business telling someone who had survived the Bataan 
Death March anything about reconciliation with the Japanese. 

I have, as a member of the advisory board, had people say 
that I had forgotten who were the good guys and the bad guys 



55 

in World War II. When I was writing my history of the U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, I walked on the ashes of my 
family members at the death camp at Auschwitz and 
Buchenwald. My father was a doctor during the war who helped 
work on quinine, to develop medicine for malaria that saved 
many lives. 

I have absolutely no problem remembering what was at stake 
at World War II and what would have happened had the 
darkness descended. 

I think that historians and people like William Manchester 
and yourself, who were involved in this and bring the feel and 
texture of history, both of those voices are necessary. And it is 
my moral obligation as a historian to pay attention to those 
voices, to listen to those voices; and also my obligation as a 
historian to say that there is a sense of perspective and a sense 
of insight that can be gained years after working in archives, 
working with materials from a distance. 

The history without either one of those voices is incomplete 
and shallow. 

The Chairman. My last question, and then I will be happy to 
yield, is this. We are holding this hearing to determine how we 
can be assured that these events cannot happen again. We want 
to protect the Smithsonian from the loss of support, as 1 said. 

We were not consulted on the other exhibits I mentioned to 
you. All of them caused substantial controversy. When we got 
notice of this proposed exhibit. Senator Ford and I, and several 
others here, joined together and asked the Smithsonian to review 
it and give us information about it. That request was literally 
ignored. 

What would you do to this management system to assure that 
the interests whom you indicate should have been consulted, are 
in fact consulted. Veterans were not consulted until this thing 
went off the wall. Military historians were not consulted until it 
was a matter of substantial public controversy. Congress was not 
consulted until we had veterans groups and a lot of other groups 
banging at our door. 

Now, we are responsible for oversight of this institution. 
What would you do to the system to assure that, as you say, these 
people are properly consulted and their viewpoints are taken 
into consideration? I would add, as a footnote to this, that if this 
exhibit had not been interrupted, it would have hit the public 
right about the time that we were commemorating the victory of 
the United States after 50 years. If it resounded throughout the 
whole United States community the way it did within the small 
community that did get hold of it, I think the Smithsonian would 
have faced overwhelming opposition to its even continuing in 
existence. 

What would you do to change this management scheme? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. Let me say first off, I think that there were 
veterans, I think 20th Air Force and men of the 509th, were 



56 

consulted about this. I do not know the details of that 
consultation. Perhaps Secretary Heyman and certainly Martin 
Harwit and Tom Crouch who will testify later today can say 
something about that. 

I also will not be pompous enough to say what I would do 
were I in charge of a museum. However, after having written the 
history of the Holocaust Memorial Museum and appreciated 
very much the tremendous difficulties and volatility of placing 
a memory like that on American soil, and all of the issues of 
location and representation that come up, and the sensitivity 
with with Holocaust survivors looked at the story, there was a 
balance. And often many clashes, enduring and bitter clashes, 
between Holocaust survivors, museum professionals, and 
historians that were often not a question of right or wrong but a 
question of sensibility. 

Should women's hair from Auschwitz be displayed in the 
permanent exhibition? Well, for a historian like myself and for 
museum people, the clear answer was yes. This showed one of 
the revolutionary aspects of the Holocaust, that the Nazis mined 
the bodies of their victims for insulation in submarines, socks for 
the Wehrmacht. This is what hair was used for, and the Russians 
found thousands of kilos of it in Auschwitz. 

The museum brought some of that hair to Washington when 
they were collecting artifacts, and wanted to put it in the 
permanent exhibition. As a historian, it seemed clear to me that 
this was important and dramatic and part of the pedagogical 
importance of the museum. 

Some survivors on the content committee objected bitterly on 
the grounds that this simply was wrong to do. One woman said, 
on the committee, a survivor, this could be my mother. You 
cannot display my mother at the museum. I think wisely, Shaike 
Weinberg, the director of the museum, left the hair out of the 
permanent exhibition. 

Now when I talk about this in the book, and also when I 
lecture about the museum, people say was this a right decision 
or a wrong decision? It was a decision of honoring a certain kind 
of sensibility. 

The Chairman. But I do not see that sensibility in this at all. 
Professor. I hope you write the history, in part at least, in the way 
that the veterans see it because we veterans were ignored when 
we raised the question here in the Congress. And as far as I can 
see, the veterans organizations were ignored until we got into it 
even further. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. I think that in any museum, particularly in a 
public museum, particularly in the Nation's Capital, and 
particularly in a museum whose very purpose is contested, one 
has to be very careful about the inclusion of many voices in the 
creation of the exhibit. 

The Chairman. We will have to go on some other people. 
Senator Ford? 



57 

Senator FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was enjoying the 
questions and response of the professor. 

Several weeks ago I had a very emotional moment. That 
emotional moment was a statement made by Senator Bumpers 
from Arkansas relating to the 50th anniversary of the Marines. 
Senator Heflin stood; he was wounded. We had Senator Inouye, 
who lost an arm. We had Senator Dole, who was injured 
seriously, and others. Looking around that Senate chamber and 
having a memory of World War II and what transpired there, I 
knew that the ability to relate that history to this institution was 
dwindling. 

I thought to myself, my children will understand it because I 
could relate it to them. My grandchildren can understand it 
some, because I can relate it to them. They are more of the 
Vietnam era. We are spending lots of money in my home town 
to put in a museum. I thought if they would pattern it after the 
Smithsonian as best they could, my home town folks would be 
well served. 

Then I listened to your statement here this morning. 
Professor, and I just want to tell you I respectfully disagree, I 
appreciate your perspective, but I respectfully disagree with 
your conclusion that Congressman Blute's concerns are 
misplaced. I think it is appropriate that a 16-year-old leave this 
exhibit, or would have left this exhibit, or any other exhibit as a 
matter of fact, understanding the full ramifications of the war, 
but still somehow feeling good about the role that the United 
States played in ending the war. 

That is precisely the role of the Smithsonian management, I 
think, to balance the perspectives but remember that this is our 
history. We mix it all up, I guess, but it is our history as we see 
it. When you start mixing in other countries' perspectives and so 
forth, I wonder. I want our citizens to have it all, because history 
is awfully important, and those who opposed war the most are 
those who served. 

I just wanted to add that, too, because I saw that in the next 
2 years we will lose the distinguished Senator from Alabama as 
a member of the United States Senate. Senator Heflin has 
announced that he will not seek reelection, so there is someone 
with a valuable institutional memory that we will lose. 

We all have our problems, and there has to be a final decision. 
So what we are trying to do here today is to be of assistance when 
that final decision is made, so that it will meet the standards that 
all of us would like to have as it relates to history. 

But as I say, I appreciate your position. I regret that I must 
disagree with it, or disagree with your conclusions, as you 
agreed with something and then you said that the decision made 
at the Holocaust Museum was the proper one. We all have to 
make a decision, and we have been used to that around here. 
Sometimes they are good and sometimes they are bad, and we 
pray that they are all good. 



58 

So I thank you for a very interesting statement this morning. 
I enjoyed it. I understand it, I think. I understand where you are 
coming from. Let us hope that we can all lay these things out on 
the table and that the ultimate decision is the right one. I thank 
you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Pell? 

Senator Pell. I just find myself interested in the discussion. 
Seeing the model for the Holocaust Museum I think back to the 
World War 11 days. I came back myself in a hospital ship sick, 
not wounded. I remember my feelings when 1 heard that the 
bomb went off. I happened to be on Pennsylvania Avenue and 
right opposite the White House by coincidence, and wondered if 
we, too, might expect the same. 

I have no strong view one way or the other. I think you are 
doing the best you can, and I wish you well. 

The Chairman. Senator Cochran? 

Senator CoCHRAN. Professor, I am curious. Who selected you 
to be on the Advisory Board of the Enola Gay exhibit? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. I was asked by Martin Harwit. I had come to 
know one of the curators who I had consulted with when I was 
writing my book on the Holocaust Museum, because 1 was 
interested in the way the museum presented the bombing of 
Auschwitz and the interpretation of that in the Holocaust 
Museum. So I talked with one of the curators who had, in fact, 
had a panel on this at the National Air and Space Museum, 

After 1 got to know him some, and also Martin Harwit a little 
bit, I was asked, given my work on some of these other 
controversial historic sites, to be on the advisory committee and 
1 said yes. 

Senator CocHRAN. Had you served on any other advisory 
boards for the Smithsonian Museums before? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. No, I have not. I have done some consulting 
work with the National Park Service in training sessions for park 
historians and managers on how to interpret controversial 
historic sites. 

Senator COCHRAN. I am interested in the parallel that you 
seem to draw between the victims of the Holocaust in Europe 
and the victims of the holocaust in Japan. To you there is a 
parallel, is there not? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. I do not know that I would draw a direct 
parallel. I guess the parallel I was trying to draw was how the 
Holocaust Museum had to struggle and deal with what I have 
called these different voices, all of whom are passionately 
involved in the story. 

Senator CocHRAN. And all of whom were victims. You were 
talking about the victims, were you not, in the Holocaust 
Museum? The victims of the mass murder. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. The Holocaust Museum, in fact, one of the 
interesting interpretive dilemmas they had was that many of the 
survivors really did not want a Nazi presence in the permanent 



59 

exhibition at all. What that did was to leave the permanent 
exhibition as if the Jews were going to the death by themselves. 
There were no 

Senator CocHRAN. Did you come to conclude that the 
perpetrators of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were on a parallel with 
Nazi Germany? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. No, absolutely not. Absolutely not. 
Absolutely not. That thought would never enter my mind. 

Senator Cochran. I have no further questions. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. The thought would never enter my mind. 

The Chairman. Senator Warner? 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I look at this issue from two perspectives, one personal. I 
enlisted in World War II just following the Battle of the Bulge 
with a great many others from my high school class. Given at that 
time, there was such uncertainty on both fronts of the future of 
our military campaigns and there was a need to have a very 
heavy influx of young people at that time. 

Of course, in the course of events in 1945, the spring of 1945, 
hostilities ceased both in Europe and eventually in Japan. But my 
particular group of naval persons were headed into the invasion 
of Japan. We were explicitly trained for that invasion. One of the 
most controversial features of this regrettable chapter was the 
level of casualties that were likely to be shouldered by the 
American public and other allies as a consequence of a full scale 
invasion of Japan. 

Did you work on that issue? And were you able to reconcile 
some of the differing views? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. On the Enola Gay exhibit? 

Senator Warner. Yes, on the casualty levels. 

Mr. LINENTHAL. Yes. I will tell you how I feel about the 
casualty issue, which I think is a very regrettable controversy in 
this whole thing. It seems to me that the arguments over the 
number of casualties is close to obscene. That if the number of 
casualties would have been very low, an American president still 
would have been justified in deciding to use the bomb. It does 
not matter whether it is 10,000 or 800,000 or 350,000. These 
arguments became symbolic of the much larger struggle that was 
going on over the exhibit and the fact that there were historical 
correctives made and these numbers were seen to be very 
important by certain people, 

I think this is not a happy story. I am quite comfortable myself 
believing that everybody knew that there would be casualties, 
that the casualties would be high, and a specific number was not 
terribly important. These casualty numbers, when we deal with 
these volatile historical issues, become icons in themselves. 

When the great Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg lowered the 
figures slightly in his magisterial work in 1961, "The Destruction 
of the European Jews", from 6 million to I think he said 5.1 



60 

million, he was virtually called a Holocaust denier because he 
had challenged the sacred figure. 

Chinese and Japanese are involved in bitter debates over the 
numbers of deaths in Nanking. I think there the Chinese say 
anything less than 300,000 

Senator WARNER. Without going into all that detail, there is 
no doubt that the potential casualties by the U.S. and our allies 
w^ould have been very, very high. 

Mr. LINENTHAL. [Nodding affirmatively.] 

Senator WARNER. And it is no doubt that that invasion did not 
take place as a direct consequence of the utilization of this 
weapons system by President Truman. 

Mr. LINENTHAL. Certainly one of the hot buttons in the exhibit 
were the historical controversy panels in section 200, 1 believe. 
And yet, even in the first script, if one looks at what the curators 
said in their ultimate judgment about these things, they basically 
say many historians believe that the primary judgment had to do 
with ending the war and saving lives, but that there were a 
number of subsidiary issues here as well. 

I think that the casualty issue became one, again, in which 
veterans saw that the museum was trying to take away their 
story. And I do not think the museum meant to do that at all. 

Senator WARNER. One other facet of this, we have in the 
Rotunda of the United States Capitol today, a flag symbolizing 
America's great concern for POW's. There was much written 
with regard to the potential destruction of those lives in those 
camps if that invasion had taken place. Did you do any research 
to verify that? 

Mr. LINENTHAL. I have read accounts in oral histories of 
World War II about that, that a number of people in camps said 
that we were told or we knew that the minute the invasion took 
place we were going to die. So yes, I have read that, indeed. 

Senator WARNER. I thank the witness and I thank the 
chairman. 

The Chairman. As a footnote to history, I flew on the first 
plane into Peking after World War II and was there when the 
Doolittle flyers came out of their prison camp. I believe almost 
every one of them said to us if that bomb had not dropped, they 
would have been killed. 

Mr. LINENTHAL. Senator Stevens, it has occurred to me, in 
response to one of your earlier questions about the veterans' 
voice in this exhibit. Everyone I have talked to who has seen the 
final film, which was a very short film about the men of the 509th 
talking about their own stories, that will now not be a part of the 
exhibit, has said it was an absolutely stunning and powerful 
film. 

Senator CocHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I think it will be a part of 
the exhibit. 



61 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. Not the old one, I understand. Perhaps I am 
mistaken. So that was one way that the museum did try certainly 
to include the veterans' voice. 

The Chairman. Senator Feinstein? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I find this a 
very, very challenging discussion. 

When I was the mayor of San Francisco, I had a small incident 
somewhat similar. This leads to the question. It was when we 
were building a convention center. A bust of my predecessor, 
who had been assassinated, was selected. It was done by a very 
famous contemporary sculptor by the name of Arneson. But the 
bust in itself had editorial comment. It had blood on it, 
"Twinkies defense," epithets, et cetera. A firestorm developed. 

I grappled with that firestorm, and I elected to have the Art 
Commission remove the bust from the convention center with 
the view that it was appropriate for a private collection or a 
private museum, but this was a taxpayer supported convention 
center, and with it came some different values. 

That is really what I want to talk to you about for a moment. 
Professor. It seems to me that where institutions get into these 
troubles is where there is opinion, interpretation, and editorial 
comment. You mentioned in your last statement, and I quote, 
"What the curator said, in his ultimate judgment." 

My question to you is, is it really the role to interpret history, 
rather than just simply to put forward historical facts based on 
the validity of the fact and the historical value? It seems to me 
that I would look at a curator to determine historic value and 
validity of that value, but not to interpret, not for their editorial 
comment. It seems to me in public facilities we have to begin to 
grapple with that, because we are seeing more and more. 
Whether it is NEA moneys for a Mapplethorpe, or this situation, 
or my little situation back there, the public role of a museum is 
a different thing than the private role. 

I wonder if you would comment on that? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. Certainly. It is an interesting question and 
deals with a number of things, the role of history, the relation of 
fact and interpretation, curatorial responsibility and freedom. 

First of all. Senator, I think there are certainly things that we 
could consider incontrovertible fact. That Paul Tibbets piloted 
the Enola Gay is an incontrovertible fact. When you begin to put 
any story into a narrative of any kind, you are already doing 
interpretation. Do you select a heroic narrative of the bomb? Do 
you select the tragic narrative? 

At the Holocaust Museum, what narrative do you pick? Does 
it focus on the victim's stories? Does it focus on the process of 
extermination? There is already interpretive work going on. Any 
time you ask, I think, the meaning of events, you are already into 
the realm that all historians practice, and that is interpretive 
history. 



91-056 0-95-3 



62 

The question is whether the Smithsonian is a university in 
which curators have the same kind of freedom, say that I do, to 
write a book? Whether there is a different kind of responsibility 
in a public exhibition funded by public monies. And perhaps 
there is a different kind of code. Yes, perhaps realistically that is 
the case. Perhaps in controversial historical exhibits, I think the 
curatorial voice is very important and there needs to be a 
scholarly freedom. Perhaps as part of the exhibits that are 
controversial, the history of the exhibit itself should become part 
of the exhibit so that various voices are represented. 

Perhaps there needs to be a curatorial code of ethics. Now I 
do not think the curators did anything wrong in this exhibit. I 
think all of us on the advisory committee were insensitive to the 
nature of the 50th, to the passions that were held, and that is part 
of this. So that is one response to that. Curators, museums have 
responsibilities to the public the same way I, when I write my 
books, have responsibilities to the materials. All history is, in 
many ways, interpretive. It is put into a narrative, into a 
framework of meaning. 

When you are working in a public museum, obviously you 
must be very sensitive to the inclusion of many voices in the 
creation of this. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But I think, you know I have seen history 
change. I was a history major. In the days when I studied history 
the text, for example, on American diplomatic history by a very 
famous professor by the name of T.A. Bailey, was essentially a 
recitation of fact, leaving the reader to draw their own analysis. 
Now what you see is a writer's interpretation of fact, which is 
different. 

I think in a sense what happened with the Enola Gay was 
interpretation. People really reacted to that interpretation in a 
very violent way. I wonder about the wisdom in presenting any 
interpretation. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. I understand. The example that I used in my 
presentation this morning, how do you present the V-2 in the 
National Air and Space Museum? You can either frame it, as the 
Air and Space Museum did, in a section on civilian space 
technology and talk about booster rockets and how it led to the 
evolution of booster rockets. Well, that is a way of talking about 
the V-2 that deals with certain kinds of facts. 

The way the museum now displays it, which I think is 
eminently more responsible, is to put it into the context that the 
V-2 was a horrendous weapon used by Nazi's. That many more 
concentration camp prisoners died building it than died at the 
other end. Those are also facts about the V-2. 

I also think, in response to several comments, that 
controversy over volatile stories is, in many ways, inevitable. We 
could easily memorialize and remember what we do not really 
care about. Could you create a U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum 
without a certain level of controversy because of the passionate 



63 

engagement? Was there a way to create an exhibit on the 
dropping of the atomic bomb and the end of the war without 
certain kinds of controversies? Probably not. 

I suppose this is another issue, whether controversy is 
altogether a negative thing. I know that, Senator Stevens, you 
were a strong opponent of the "West as America" show, and I 
have, in the museum world, interesting friends some of whom 
detested the show, that it was preachy and tendentious and told 
people what they had to think now about these works, as 
opposed to how they were presented before; others who thought 
it was stimulating and important. 

From my perspective, what was more important than either 
of those voices, was the very fruitful discussion that went on in 
the public about history, about the history of the American West, 
about how we are to look at it. That that, in a sense, was a kind 
of unintended, positive outcome of what was a very 
controversial museum exhibit. 

The Chairman. Are you finished. Senator? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Ford, did you have another question? 

Senator Ford. I just wanted to make a comment and follow 
up on my friend's question and the position she was in. It seems 
the professor now is writing a chapter as it relates to this 
controversy. Whoever reads it is going to have his interpretation 
of who the bad guys are and who the good guys are, who wore 
the black hats and who wore the white hats. 1 think I have got a 
pretty good idea from listening to your comments this morning 
who the white hats are going to be and who the black hats are 
going to be. 

Your interpretation of this incident is going to be read by a 
lot of people, and they are going to believe it because it is the 
only one they have read. I understand what the distinguished 
Senator from California is saying. I could almost write it down 
on a piece of paper and put it in an envelope and seal it and, from 
your comments this morning, know what the outcome and your 
interpretation is going to be. 

I hope I am wrong, but I do not think so. So I just want to let 
you know that is part of the problem that the distinguished 
Senator has brought out. You start interpreting what happened 
here from all the reading, and we have some information, you 
have other information. Maybe we both do not have the same 
information. So you write yours from yours, and we make our 
judgment from ours. 

And you will not, in your chapter, talk about the information 
we have, and what our distinguished chairman relates, and his 
experience. Do not forget that you have a chairman here who has 
pretty good experience as it relates to this and understands it 
probably better than most. 



64 

We are all caught in a Catch 22, and the politician will get the 
blame. You will get a royalty, and I hope that it is controversial 
enough that you make a lot of money. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. Senator, 1 would never claim, as a historian, 
to have the last word on anything. And 1 have always been 
interested 

Senator FORD. You will have the last word in that chapter. 
You might write another one. It is like Harry Truman said, he 
wanted a one-armed economist. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. My job as a historian in this is certainly to 
make my own judgments about this event, but also to lay out 
what I see as the variety of issues that arose here, to help people 
understand the texture and the complexity of this issue. There is 
a difference between writing a history and an op-ed piece. I take 
that responsibility very seriously. 

The Chairman. Professor, let me read you one comment from 
your statement today. "Museums, particularly public museums, 
have a responsibility to listen carefully to voices of various 
groups in the shaping of public exhibitions. But the integrity of 
the scholarly enterprise, be it in a book or a museum exhibit, that 
seeks a careful rendition of the past is threatened when any 
interest groups become an arbiter of public history." 

I have two questions for you. One is, are you saying to us that 
public funds, taxpayers' money, could be used and ought to be 
used without any comment, by people who seek to be 
revisionists as far as the accepted view of history? And 
secondly — this is personal — I have a Japanese daughter-in-law 
and I have a grandson. I know that in her country they are 
teaching that in the history of World War II, we were, in fact, the 
aggressors. I am going to bring my grandson to this museum. I 
have taken all my children, and now I am going to start taking 
my grandchildren to this museum. I do not want my grandson to 
walk out of that museum and ask me why I was one who was the 
aggressor, and why did I try to kill Japanese babies. 

Now, on what basis do you justify an interpretation of the 
history of this event so different from those of us who lived 
through it? On the basis of scholarly enterprise? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. The way that I read even the first script, I 
never interpreted the first script in that way. It would never have 
occurred to me, in reading that first script, to look at Americans 
as aggressors. Of course, public museums have a responsibility 
to those who pay the bills. And those who pay the bills, I would 
hope, would trust those who are charged with creating public 
exhibitions with a certain level of professional expertise. 

The Chairman. Wait a minute now. Let us get very specific. 
The statement in the script was "For most Americans it was a war 
of vengeance. For most Japanese, it was a war to defend their 
unique culture against Western imperialism." 

Mr. LINENTHAL. Right. 



65 

The Chairman. Do you want my grandson to read that and 
look me in the eye and say Grandpa, why did you do that? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. Can I speak to that issue? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. First of all, everyone recognized that that 
was a very clumsy and badly written label. It went out after the 
first script. And yet, for months and months thereafter, that 
phrase was used by the media to show what they called the 
pro-Japanese bias of the curators. 

Now what I would like to do briefly. Senator, is to address 
each of those issues, because 1 think frankly, standing on their 
own, each one of those statements is not anywhere near 

The Chairman. I would like you to defend your own 
statement, that we should allow taxpayers' funds to be used to 
support a book or a museum exhibit on the basis of scholarly 
enterprise, despite the fact that it goes against the commonly 
accepted viewpoint as to the interpretation of the history of the 
event? 

Mr. LINENTHAL. The question of 

The Chairman. That is what you are telling me in that 
statement, is it not? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. History is always contested. 

The Chairman. But you say in that statement that I should 
have stayed out of this, because scholarly judgment should rule 
in the use of public money, to support the exhibition if it is 
accepted by the people who have been selected to supervise this 
presentation from a scholarly point of view? 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. No, 1 do not think you needed to stay out of 
it at all. 1 think that there are ways 

The Chairman. But it gets around to that point of view, 
because that is what you are saying to us. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. No, I think there are ways of being involved 
that may have asked, for example, the museum or the curators 
what was meant by this. Now that last statement, that this war 
was a war of vengeance and that the Japanese were defending 
themselves against Western imperialism and all of this, at the 
end of the war almost every public opinion poll cited said that 
roughly 13 percent of the American population wanted the 
Japanese exterminated as a race. 

Was there not good reason, during the war, for a sense of 
righteous vengeance on the part of Americans for what had been 
done in Nanking, for Pearl Harbor, for the Bataan Death March, 
for the barbaric treatment of American prisoners of war? The 
beloved war correspondent Ernie Pyle, when he went to the 
Pacific Theater near the end of the war, said this is a very 
different war and we look upon this enemy in a very different 
way than we do in Europe. In Europe, we saw them as human 
beings, here we do not. 

Now that is Ernie Pyle speaking and not me. Virtually every 
Pacific 



66 

The Chairman. You fail to differentiate between the way we 
felt about the Japanese military and the way we felt about the 
Japanese people. That is an unfair interpretation of the history 
of my generation. We did not hate the Japanese. We do not hate 
the Japanese. We did hate the people who were conducting that 
war in such a brutal way. There is a distinction, I think, that 
veterans still feel today, in the way we feel about the former 
Japanese military and the way we feel about the Japanese people. 
And that poll reflected the way we felt about the Japanese 
military. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. Well, all I can say. Senator, every Pacific war 
veteran that I have interviewed said to me that they understood 
this war as fundamentally different from the war in Europe. 
Edwin C. Bearss, a very respected historian, a Pacific war combat 
veteran who was a member of our advisory committee and 
someone I am proud to claim as a friend, for whom I worked at 
the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, said to me you know, for 
all of us in the Pacific war, the war was to the knife, and the knife 
was to the hilt. 

So what I am saying to you is that that phrase was meant to 
suggest that the war in the Pacific had a particular kind of anger 
and vengeance of the racist policies of the Japanese toward other 
Asians and toward Americans, with American views of the 
Japanese. 

And the second part of that, that this was a war for the 
Japanese to defend themselves against American imperialism 
was a very clumsy way of the curators trying to say this is why 
the Japanese were fighting so ferociously and almost senselessly 
at the end of the war. Now put together in the way that it was, 
it could in fact have been read as an indictment. And everybody 
recognized that and said look, this is going to be misinterpreted, 
this is going to be read wrong. You have got to take it out. The 
curators understood it themselves. 

That phrase went out after the first script and 6, 7, 8 months 
later that phrase was still being used by people to pillory the 
museum and the curators. That, I think, is unfair. 

Yes, of course, you have a responsibility and an obligation to 
be involved. I would have hoped that the involvement of the 
public would have first have been to think perhaps about the 
volatility of these issues, these different narratives that the 
Smithsonian was trying to balance, the heroic and the tragic, and 
not immediately jump to accusing the curators as being 
anti-American. I think that was unfortunate. 

The Chairman. Professor, that is what this hearing is about. 
The question has to be why is the Smithsonian, the pre-eminent 
depository of our history and the artifacts thereof, hiring 
someone who writes that first draft? You do not see it the way 
we do. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. No, I do not. 



67 

The Chairman. The first draft was not scholarly, it was 
revisionist and did not belong in the Smithsonian to start with. 
And that has been admitted by the changes. 

We will go on to the next witness. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. LiNENTHAL. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Now we are going to turn to Secretary 
Heyman, Dr. Crouch, and Ms. Newman, please. Do you swear 
the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Heyman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. 

Ms. Newman. Yes, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF I. MICHAEL HEYMAN, SECRETARY, 
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC, AC- 
COMPANIED BY CONSTANCE B. NEWMAN, UNDER SEC- 
RETARY, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, AND THOMAS 
D. CROUCH, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR AERONAUTICS, 
NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM 

Mr. Heyman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of 
the committee. I am Michael Heyman, Secretary of the 
Smithsonian Institution, and I am accompanied by Constance 
Newman, who is the Under Secretary, and Thomas Crouch, who 
is the Assistant Director for Aeronautics of the National Air and 
Space Museum, and was involved with the Enola Gay exhibition. 
On the next panel, 1 will be joined by Dr. Maxine Singer, chair of 
the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution. 

Before answering questions, I would like to make a few 
observations. As you know, I became Secretary of the 
Smithsonian on the 19th of September of 1994, so I have been 
there about 8 months. I began my tenure at a time of considerable 
controversy over the exhibition of the Enola Gay. I had some 
great concerns about and disagreement with the first script. In 
fact, it was not any secret to anyone because I commented in my 
installation address that our first script was deficient. I believed 
then, and I believe now, that too much of the context of the use 
of the atomic bomb was taken for granted, and that the proposed 
exhibition was out of balance, hence appearing to be historically 
inaccurate. 

It was my view that in late October we had turned that corner. 
We benefitted by a long consultation with knowledgeable 
representatives of the American Legion, observations by other 
veterans organizations, and a substantial revamping by 
curatorial staff of the proposed exhibit that produced a much 
more balanced script. The revamped exhibit included a new 
4,000 square foot section on the war in the Pacific, and extensive 
revisions to the script throughout. While these organizations did 
not endorse the exhibit, in part waiting for its finishing touches, 
they did not oppose it. Thus in January, I believed that we could 



68 

mount that exhibit. I was wrong. Shortly thereafter, a 
controversy once again erupted between the Smithsonian and 
the American Legion over the changing of one of the labels 
dealing with potential casualties. At that point, it became clear 
to me that we could not proceed, given renewed efforts to have 
the exhibition cancelled. I recognized that the problem was more 
than a question of balance and our efforts to achieve balance 
would not resolve the issue. The fundamental flaw, in my view, 
lay in the concept of the exhibition itself. The basic error was 
attempting to couple an historical dialogue centering on the use 
of atomic weapons with the 50th commemoration of the end of 
the war. 

I have observed here today what I observed during this whole 
controversy, that people, especially those who were participants 
in the Second World War, remembered with vividness and with 
emotion their participation and their sacrifice, what happened to 
their lives in relationship to that. I think when you are dealing 
with a subject matter of this sort, where those who have in fact 
experienced have to be looked to, and you have to — if you are 
going to have a commemoration exhibition — you have to 
organize it consistently with those remembrances and those 
recollections. Moreover, in terms of the exhibition itself, as has 
been already testified, we could not escape the negative 
characterizations of the original script, which repetitively 
appeared in the media. 

On January 30, I shared with the Board of Regents my 
decision to replace the Enola Gay exhibition. The central feature 
of the new exhibition, which is scheduled to open sometime in 
June or early July, will be a display permitting the Enola Gay and 
its crew to speak for themselves. In addition, it will contain 
materials on the history of the B-29 aircraft, and the restoration 
of the Enola Gay by the Smithsonian. It will include memorabilia 
from the 509th, and it will include a video of interviews with 
survivors of the 509th, which is not yet finished but ought to be 
finished in the next week and a half, or at least put into rough 
form so that I can take a look at it. I also announced that I would 
undertake a management review of the Air and Space Museum, 
paying particular attention to an examination of the museum's 
mission. That review is being conducted already by the National 
Academy of Public Administration, and those findings will come 
to us in September for consideration of the regents and the 
administration at the Smithsonian. 

It is evident that I have to have, and I do have, concerns 
beyond the one controversial exhibit that we are talking about. 
The Institution has an obligation to be historically accurate and 
balanced in all of its exhibitions. We have an obligation to 
consider the opinions of the interested public in the framing of 
the exhibitions. To that end the Smithsonian needs to establish 
policies on exhibitions. We are doing that right now. We are 
developing guidelines that will establish appropriate 



69 

parameters within which museum directors and curators will 
collaborate on the choice and design of exhibitions, the processes 
for review and intervention, including a role for the Secretary's 
office, the extent to which historical exhibitions should speak 
within the context of the time, and ways to assure that our 
multiple audiences feel that their own ideas are being respected. 

When I decided to replace the Enola Gay exhibition, I 
indicated that the Institution had much to learn from the 
experience. On April 19, the University of Michigan 
co-sponsored, with the Smithsonian, a day-long symposium 
entitled, "Presenting History: Museums in a Democratic 
Society." Participants included representatives from the 
historical community, veterans organizations, journalists and 
museum professionals. The purpose of the symposium was to 
examine issues surrounding controversial exhibitions. 
Discussions ranged from the evolution of the role of museums, 
and their responsibilities, including the differentiation 
potentially of the responsibilities of public museums and private 
museums, their responsibilities to various constituencies, and 
how to define controversy. These discussions, which we are 
summarizing right now, will help the Institution in putting 
together our guidelines. 

I obviously have a number of regrets about this whole 
situation. One is that it has gotten in the way of the 
commemoration of our nation's victory over aggression 50 years 
ago. We at the Smithsonian did not want this controversy to 
overshadow the recognition that our veterans so richly deserve. 

In that vein, we will be opening a display at the Museum of 
American History in June that focuses both on the war front and 
the home front during World War II. That museum has worked 
with the Center for Military History to design a unique exhibit 
where primary focus is to elicit memories and personal 
experiences from those who lived during the war years. In this 
way, the exhibit will become part of the history itself by 
capturing and preserving personal histories that otherwise 
might be lost to the ages. 

In addition to that, there are other exhibits in American 
History and elsewhere, and other programs commemorative of 
the end of the Second World War. 

I also regret that the Enola Gay controversy has led some to 
doubt the value of historical inquiry by museums. I believe that 
important artifacts of American history ought to be exhibited in 
historical context. I think that it makes them much more 
understandable. I think that great care has to be taken in the 
definition of that context and the reviewing process which I 
indicate is the manner in which to assure that that occurs. 

Finally, an important point to be made is that in singling out 
a few examples of the Smithsonian's exhibitions and public 
programs, it is possible to draw a conclusion that does not reflect 
the fact that the Institution produces hundreds and hundreds of 



70 

exhibits and programs each year which are well received by the 
general public. Taken in their entirety, they provide a balanced 
and stimulating array of viewpoints on a myriad of subjects. 
More importantly, the Institution has great respect for its 
visitors and their abilities to appreciate the museum experience 
in their own way. 

Dr. Crouch has a brief statement and 1 thought it best, with 
your permission, if he gave that statement and then we began to 
answer questions, if that is all right with you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman follows:! 

Statement OF Ira Michael Heyman, Secretary, The Smithsonian 

Institution 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am Michael 
Heyman, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. Today, I am accompanied by 
Constance B. Newman, Under Secretary, and Thomas Crouch, Assistant Director 
for Aeronautics, the National Air and Space Museum. On the next panel I will be 
joined by Dr. Maxine F. Singer, Chair of the Commission on the Future of the 
Smithsonian Institution. 

Before answering your questions, let me make a few observations. As you 
know, I became Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution on the 19th of September 
of 1994. I began my tenure at a time of considerable controversy over the exhib- 
iting of the Enola Gay. I had great concerns about and disagreement with the first 
script. In fact, this was no secret to anyone because I commented in my installa- 
tion address that our first script was deficient. I believed then and I believe now 
that too much of the context for the use of the atomic bomb was taken for granted 
and that the proposed exhibition was out of balance, hence appearing to be 
historically inaccurate. 

It was my view that a month later we had turned the corner regarding the 
controversy. Working throughout the summer and fall, the staff had substantially 
revamped the proposed exhibit, producing a fifth script that was more balanced. 
The revamped exhibit included a new 4,000-square foot section on the war in the 
Pacific and extensive revisions to the script throughout. I believed that we could 
mount that exhibit. I was wrong. Shortly thereafter, a controversy once again 
erupted between the Smithsonian Institution and The American Legion over one 
of the labels dealing with potential casualties. At that point, it became clear to 
me that we could not proceed given renewed efforts to have the exhibit cancelled. 
I recognized that the problem was more than a question of balance and our efforts 
to achieve balance would not resolve the issue. The fundamental flaw, in my 
view, lay in the concept of the exhibition itself. The basic error was attempting 
to couple an historical dialogue of the use of atomic weapons with the 50th 
commemoration of the end of the war. In this important anniversary year, veter- 
ans and their families were expecting, and rightly so, that the nation would honor 
and commemorate their valor and sacrifice. We did not give enough thought to 
the intense feelings surrounding such an event. 

On January 30 of this year, I shared with the Board of Regents my decision to 
replace the Enola Gay exhibition. The central feature of the new exhibition, which 
is scheduled to open in June, will be a display, permitting the Enola Gay and its 
crew to speak for themselves. In addition, it will contain materials on the history 
of the B-29 aircraft and the restoration of the Enola Gay by the Smithsonian. I also 
announced that I would undertake a management review of the National Air and 
Space Museum, paying particular attention to an examination of the museum's 
mission. The review is being conducted by the National Academy of Public 
Administration. The Academy will present its findings by the end of September 
of this year. 

I, however, have concerns beyond the one controversial exhibit at the National 
Air and Space Museum that is now a part of the public debate. The Institution 
has an obligation to be historically accurate and balanced in all of its exhibitions. 



71 

We have an obligation to consider the opinions of the interested public in the 
framing of the exhibitions. To that end, the Smithsonian needs to establish 
policies on Exhibitions. And we are doing just that. We are developing guidelines 
that will establish appropriate parameters within which museum directors and 
curators will collaborate on the choice and design of exhibitions; the processes 
for review and intervention, including a role for the Secretary's office; the extend 
to which historical exhibitions should speak within the context of the time; and 
ways to assure that our multiple audiences feel that their own ideas are being 
respected. 

When I decided to replace the Enola Gay exhibition, I indicated that the Insti- 
tution had much to learn from our experience. On April 19, the University of 
Michigan co-sponsored with the Smithsonian, a day-long symposium entitled, 
"Presenting History: Museums in a Democratic Society." Participants included 
representatives from veterans organizations, historians, journalists, and museum 
professionals. The purpose of the symposium was to examine issues surrounding 
controversial exhibitions. Discussions ranged from the evolution of the role of 
museums and their responsibilities to their various constituencies, to freedom of 
speech, and defining "controversy." Those discussions will help the Institution 
in its development of the guidelines. 

On May 2, Dr. Martin Harwit, Director of the National Air and Space Museum, 
resigned believing that the welfare and future of the museum required that 
action. In his resignation announcement he noted that 3 months after the cancel- 
lation of that planned exhibition, the controversy still continued. He said: 
I believe that nothing less than my stepping down from the directorship 
will satisfy the museum's critics and allow the museum to move forward 
with important new projects, such as the extension to be built at 
Washington's Dulles International Airport to provide better care for the 
collections. 
I want to express my gratitude to Dr. Harwit for his contributions to the 
Smithsonian over the 8 years that he served as the Director of the National Air 
and Space Museum. That museum is the most visited museum in the nation with 
over 8 million visitors annually. During his tenure. Dr. Harwit most notably 
broadened the museum's agenda, especially in deepening research and exhibi- 
tions concerning scientific aspects of space and the cosmos. 

I have a number of regrets about this situation. One is that it has gotten in the 
way of the commemoration of our Nation's victory over aggression 50 years ago. 
We at the Smithsonian do not want this controversy to overshadow the recogni- 
tion that our veterans so richly deserve. 

In that vein we will be opening a display at the Museum of American History 
in June that focuses both on the warfront and homefront during World War II. 
The NMAH has worked with the Center for Military History to design a unique 
exhibit where primary focus is to elicit memories and personal experiences from 
those who lived during the war years. In this way, this exhibit will become part 
of the history itself by capturing and preserving personal histories that otherwise 
might be lost to the ages. 

I also regret that the Enola Gay controversy has led some to doubt the value of 
historical inquiry by museums. I believe that important artifacts of American 
history ought to be exhibited in an historical context. I believe that is what the 
American public expects of this great national institution and they deserve no 
less. 

Finally, an important point to be made is that in singling out just a few 
examples of the Smithsonian's exhibitions and public programs, it is possible to 
draw a conclusion that does not reflect the fact that the Institution produces 
hundreds upon hundreds of exhibits and programs each year which are well 
received by the general public. Taken in their entirety, they provide a balanced 
and stimulating array of viewpoints on a myriad of subjects. More importantly, 
the Institution has great respect for its visitors and their abilities to appreciate 
the museum experience in their own way. 

Dr. Crouch has a brief opening statement. Then we are prepared to answer your 
questions on the exhibition. 



72 

Senator FORD. Mr. Chairman, if I understand, the Secretary's 
statement is broken down into two phases, with a first panel and 
a second panel. Now we are not going to have the testimony that 
way, as I understand. We are just going to have testimony on 
Enola Gay and then we are going to have— then they are going to 
come back? We have kind of jockeyed back and forth. I have 
some questions and 1 did not want to lose you. 

Mr. Heyman. No, I will be on that second panel also. So long 
as I can make a 2:50 plane to San Francisco where I have to give 
a speech tonight if that is at all possible. Or would you prefer to 
have questions first 

The Chairman. As long as you are prepared to come back 
next week. Doctor. 

Mr. Heyman. No, I am prepared to stay here for a good period 
of time. I just wanted you to know 

The Chairman. We have other things scheduled, too. That is 
all right, we will proceed with Dr. Crouch if that is your desire. 

Mr. Heyman. Then I thought we would both answer 
questions. 

The Chairman. I intend to continue this until we get answers 
to our questions and until we get some understanding of what 
the management situation is at the Smithsonian. If you wish to 
have Dr. Crouch testify now. Dr. Crouch, we will listen to you. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS D. CROUCH, ASSISTANT DIREC- 
TOR FOR AERONAUTICS, NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE 
MUSEUM 

Mr. Crouch. Thank you. Senator. I am grateful for this 
opportunity to discuss matters related to the exhibition that was 
to be entitled, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of 
World War II." Those of us who were involved with that project 
hoped to tell the story of the Enola Gay and the bomb that it 
carried in a full, honest, balanced fashion. We sought to explore 
a moment in time, a turning point in the history of our world, an 
event that ended one era and inaugurated another. At the very 
least, we were guilty of having failed to understand the depth 
and intensity of American attitudes toward Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. To all of those who have been hurt or angered by this 
controversy, I apologize for that misjudgment. 

The committee has asked me to clarify the roles and the 
responsibilities of the individuals involved in developing the 
content of the exhibition. As head of the department of 
aeronautics, I supervised the work of the curatorial team. 
Michael Neufeld, the lead curator, reported to me and 
supervised the two curatorial assistants assigned to the project. 
I reported to Martin Harwit, director of the National Air and 
Space Museum who established the general direction of the 
project and approved the various documents produced by the 
curators. 



73 

I certainly acknowledge that the first draft of the script 
completed in January 1994 was imperfect. It was short on 
context, although not so short I think as some of the critics have 
suggested. The Rape of Nanking and other Japanese atrocities 
against Asian people, the Japanese reliance on slave labor, and 
their brutal treatment of prisoners-of-war. Pearl Harbor, 
biological experiments on human subjects were all noted in the 
script. The fanaticism of Japanese troops, their preference for 
death rather than surrender, the kamikaze campaign, and rising 
Allied casualties in the Pacific in 1944 and 1945 were focal points 
of the first unit. 

Still, it is clear that we should have provided much fuller 
coverage of those subjects and underscored the roots of Japanese 
militarism and imperialism. 

In addition, the introductory unit and some other sections of 
the scripts contained a number of sentences that became genuine 
hot buttons. Believe me, I wish they had never seen the light of 
day. Those sentences were removed from the script at the time 
of the first review. 

I would ask the committee to recognize the fact that the script 
was genuinely a first draft subject to a process of careful revision 
that began with the appointment of an extraordinarily strong 
advisory committee. That group included Pulitzer Prize winning 
authors. It included an ex-president of the American Historical 
Association. It included some of the leading scholars in the field; 
individuals who had spent their lives studying the topic. 

We also wanted to ensure that a variety of points of view 
would be represented on the advisory committee. Richard 
Hallion, chief historian of the Air Force and his deputy would 
speak for the Air Force. Dr. Ed Bearss, a distinguished military 
historian, wounded veteran of the war in the Pacific, and chief 
historian of the Park Service was also represented on the panel. 
Ed Linenthal, who had worked closely with the Park Service, the 
Holocaust Museum, and other organizations seeking to 
understand the nature of commemoration was present for the 
same reason. We were honestly confident that this group could 
assist us in developing an accurate script, and also help us to 
understand how it might be received by a wide range of visitors. 

While the group offered useful suggestions for improving the 
draft script, they were also very generous in their praise of the 
document. The comments of Harvard professor Akira Iriye, 
ex-president of the American Historical Association are typical. 
"I do think that you and your colleagues have been subject to 
unfair criticism. The script as originally drafted was an excellent 
one reflecting current historical scholarship. I applaud your 
valiant effort to present an informative, balanced story of the 
atomic bombing." 

Ed Bearss, historian of the Park Service concurred with that 
judgment. "As a World War II combat veteran I commend you 



74 

and your colleagues." And so on and so forth. I will not read all 
of the quotes here. They are in the written testimony. 

The Chairman. You are not reading your whole statement. 
Do you want it to appear in the record as you presented it or as 
you are reading it? 

Mr. Crouch As presented. Senator. I am cutting it down 
because of the length of time. I do not want to try the committee's 
patience. 

In spite of the work of the advisory committee, as early as 
1993 leaders of the Air Force Association had registered strong 
opposition to the draft proposal describing the exhibition. This 
is before the script was issued. The group received a copy of the 
script at the same time that it went out to the advisory committee 
along with a request for comment and an invitation to discuss 
concerns and participate in the process of revision. The Air Force 
Association published the first of a series of critical articles in 
the April 1994 issue of Air Force Magazine that in one way or 
another 1 think represented the beginning of the deep 
controversy at any rate. 

Determined to respond to the criticism in an open and 
positive way, the museum turned to the Pentagon-based World 
War II Commemorative Committee which assisted us in 
obtaining the advice and comment of historians employed by the 
military services. In addition to those efforts. Dr. Harwit created 
a Tiger Team, the six members of which were asked to identify 
any signs of imbalance in the script. 

The new script issued in June 1994 incorporated a very high 
percentage of the changes suggested by all of the group which 
had read the document to date. Some of the leading military 
historians and several members of the Tiger Team expressed 
satisfaction with the new version. Dr. Alfred Goldberg, the 
historian of the Office of Secretary of Defense remarked, "My 
overall impression of the Enola Gay script was favorable. It 
shows evidence of careful research and an effort to realize a 
balanced presentation." 

But the new script did not satisfy the most vocal critics. In 
mid-July a veterans review committee composed of 
representatives of the Air Force Association and leading U.S. 
veterans organizations was invited to give the script an 
additional review. From mid-summer to the end of the year 
continued discussions with all of these organizations led to a 
steady stream of additional script changes. 

The Smithsonian now attempted to regain control of the 
situation. A large introductory unit very much expanded our 
coverage of the Pacific war, which had been growing at any rate 
through the earlier script modifications. The videotape 
recollections of atomic mission crew members, originally 
intended to appear inside the gallery, was moved to a theater at 
the exit where it would draw more attention. 



75 

Finally, the under secretary of the Institution and the director 
of the museum invited leaders of the American Legion to sit 
down with those of us on the exhibition team and work our way 
through the script. That effort produced the final version, as you 
know, which some critics regarded as acceptable. But it did not 
resolve the controversy. As a result. Secretary Heyman cancelled 
the original project in January. 

Most of our critics, obviously, blame the failure of the project 
on the deficiencies of the original script. As I have 
acknowledged, the first draft was imperfect and I am sorry for 
that. I would remind you, however, that that document had the 
support of the members of the distinguished advisory committee 
and a substantial number of other authorities in the field. The 
revised script issued in June attracted even broader support. I 
believe that the very positive comments of leading scholars 
refutes the charge that early versions were bad history. 

Criticism of the script has centered on the question of 
balance. Those of us who developed the exhibit certainly believe 
that the experience of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is 
an essential element in the whole telling of the story. I think most 
of our critics agree with that point of view. Moreover, all of us 
can certainly agree that the atomic bombing of Japan has to be 
understood within the context of the justice of the Allied cause 
and the incredible heroism of those who fought and died to push 
the forces of Japanese tyranny back across the Pacific. 

Professor John Dower of MIT expressed the hopes and the 
intentions of the curatorial team when he commented that, "The 
original script had a great potential to convey a larger dimension 
of tragic ambiguity without denying the bravery of individual 
American fighting men or the worthiness of the fight against 
Japan. It would have been an immense challenge to pull this off, 
but I thought the first script gave every promise of doing so." 

Our critics took issue with the ambiguity to which Professor 
Dower refers. While the exhibit was never intended to attack the 
justification for the use of the bomb, for example, it did suggest 
that the decision had been the subject of considerable study and 
analysis over the past half-century. Most of all, I think, we failed 
to appreciate the deep and powerful links that bind memory of 
the bomb to the incredible sense of joy and relief at the end of 
the war. As individuals and as an institution, those of us at the 
museum have paid a high price for that misjudgment. 

In closing, I simply want to assure you that I remain 
committed to the mission of the National Air and Space Museum 
and to the mandate of the Smithsonian to increase and diffuse 
knowledge. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and 
will do my best to answer any questions the committee may 
have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crouch follows:l 



76 

Statement of Tom D. Crouch, Chairman, Department of 
Aeronautics, National Air and Space Museum 

I am grateful for this opportur\ity to discuss matters related to the exhibition 
that was to be entitled, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of WW II." 
We hoped to tell the story of the Enola Gay and the bomb that it carried in a full, 
honest, and balanced fashion. We sought to explore a moment in time; a turning 
point in the history of our world; an event that ended one era and inaugurated 
another. At the very least, we were guilty of having failed to understand the 
depth and intensity of American attitudes toward Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To 
all of those who have been hurt or angered by this controversy, I apologize for 
that misjudgment. 

The Committee has asked me to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the 
individuals involved in developing the content of the exhibition. As head of the 
Department of Aeronautics, I supervised the work of the curatorial team. Michael 
Neufeld, the lead curator, reported to me, and supervised the two curatorial 
assistants assigned to the project. I reported to Martin Harwit, Director of the 
National Air and Space Museum, who established the general direction of the 
project, and approved the various documents produced by the curators. 

The first draft of the exhibition script, completed in January 1994, was produced 
by the four members of the curatorial team. I was the primary author of one of 
the five units of the document. Dr. Neufeld prepared two of the units. The other 
two units of the script were the product of joint effort. As curator of the exhibi- 
tion. Dr. Neufeld edited all of this material into a coherent document. 

I certainly acknowledge that the first draft, completed in January 1995, was 
imperfect. It was short on context, although not as short as some of our critics 
have suggested. The Rape of Nanking and other Japanese atrocities committed 
against Asian peoples, the Japanese reliance on slave labor and their brutal 
treatment of prisoners of war. Pearl Harbor and biological experiments on human 
subjects were all noted in the script. The fanaticism of Japanese troops, their 
preference for death rather than surrender, the Kamikaze campaign, and rising 
Allied casualties in the Pacific in 1944 and 1945 were focal points of the first unit. 
Still, I acknowledge that we should have underscored and provided fuller cover- 
age of the roots and earlier phases of the struggle to defeat Japanese militarism. 

In addition, the introductory unit contained two "hot button" sentences that I 
wish had never seen the light of day. "For most Americans, this war was funda- 
mentally different than the one waged against Germany and Italy — it was a war 
of vengeance. For most Japanese, it was a war to defend their unique culture... 

While both nations had other goals, surely Americans were justifiably deter- 
mined to avenge Pearl Harbor and the Bataan Death March, and the Japanese, 
facing defeat in 1945, were determined to protect what they regarded as their 
unique culture. Moreover, those two sentences appeared in a label calling atten- 
tion to the "naked aggression and extreme brutality of Japanese expansionism." 
Still, they were very clumsy and did not express the thought intended. We 
removed them from the script immediately after the first review. 

The script was a first draft, subject to a process of careful revision that began 
with the appointment of an extraordinarily strong advisory committee. That 
group included Akira Iriye, Richard Rhodes, Martin Sherwin, Stan Goldberg, 
Barton Bernstein and other leading scholars in the field. 

We also wanted to insure that a variety of points of view would be represented. 
Richard Hallion, Chief Historian of the USAF, and his deputy, Herman Wolk, 
would speak for the Air Force; Ed Bearss, a distinguished military historian and 
a wounded veteran of the War in the Pacific, had, as chief historian of the 
National Park Service, handled veterans complaints regarding programs at Pearl 
Harbor; Ed Linenthal has worked closely with the Park Service, the Holocaust 
Museum and other organizations seeking to understand the nature of commem- 
oration. We were confident that this group could assist us in developing an 
accurate script, and also help us to understand how it might be received by a 
wide range of visitors. 



77 

While the group offered useful suggestions for improving the draft script, they 
were also very generous in their praise of the document. The comments of 
Harvard Professor Akira Iriye, an ex-president of the American Historical Asso- 
ciation, one of our most distinguished students of the Pacific War, and a leading 
member of the advisory committee, are typical. 

I do think that you and your colleagues have been subject to unfair 
criticism. The script as originally drafted was an excellent one reflecting 
the current historical scholarship. I . . . applaud your valiant effort to 
present an informative, balanced story of the atomic bombing. 
Ed Bearss, Chief Historian of the National Park Service, concurred with that 
judgement. 

As a World War II combat veteran, I commend you and your colleagues 
who have dared to go that extra mile to address an . . . internationally 
significant event in an exhibit that, besides being enlightening, will 
challenge its viewers .... The superior quality of the label texts and of 
the objects and illustrations. . . sets a pattern that all aspire to but few 
achieve. 
Professor Barton Bernstein of Stanford University regarded the script as: ". . . 
fair, balanced, and historically informed," noting that it "reflected current schol- 
arship on the war, the bombing and the use of the atomic bombs. . . ." Stanley 
Goldberg has called attention to "the unanimous agreement at the advisory board 
meeting that the initial approach of the curators was sound," and congratulated 
members of the team on "a careful and professional job." A great many other 
scholars who were not initially involved in the project have also expressed their 
support for the early drafts. 

As early as November 1993, however, leaders of the Air Force Association (the 
AFA) had registered strong opposition to a draft proposal describing the exhibi- 
tion. The group received a copy of the script at the same time that it went out to 
the advisory committee, along with a request for comment and an invitation to 
discuss their concerns and participate in the process of revision. The AFA replied 
in April 1994 with the first of several critical articles in Air Force magazine. 

Determined to respond to the criticism in an open and positive way, the 
museum turned to the Pentagon-based World War II Commemorative Commit- 
tee, which assisted us in obtaining advice and comment from historians em- 
ployed by the military services. In addition to these efforts. Dr. Harwit created 
a "Tiger Team," the six members of which were asked to identify "any signs of 
imbalance" in the script. 

A new script issued in June 1994 incorporated a very high percentage of the 
changes suggested by all of the groups which had read the document to date. 
Some of the leading military historians and several members of the "Tiger Team" 
expressed satisfaction with the new version. Dr. Alfred Goldberg, the historian 
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, remarked: "My overall impression of 
the Enola Gay script is favorable. It shows evidence of careful research and an 
effort to realize a balanced presentation . . ." 

But the new script did not placate the most vocal critics. In mid-July a Veterans 
Review Committee, composed of representatives of the AFA and leading U.S. 
veterans organizations, was invited to give the script an additional review. From 
mid-summer to the end of the year, continued discussions with all of these 
organizations led to a steady stream of additional script changes. 

The Smithsonian now attempted to regain control of the situation. A large 
introductory unit expanded our coverage of the Pacific War. The video-taped 
recollections of atomic mission crew members, originally intended to appear 
inside the gallery, was moved to a theater at the exit where it would draw more 
attention. Finally, the Undersecretary of the Smithsonian and the Director of 
museum invited leaders of the American Legion to sit down with members of the 
exhibition team and work their way through the script. That effort produced a 
final version of the script which some critics regarded as acceptable, but it did 
not resolve the controversy. As a result. Secretary Heyman cancelled the original 
project in January 1995. 

Most of our critics blame the failure of the project on the deficiencies of the 
original draft script. As I have acknowledged, the first draft was imperfect. I 



78 

would remind you, however, that the document had the support of most of the 
members of a distinguished advisory committee and a substantial number of 
other authorities in the field. The revised script issued in June attracted even 
broader support. I believe that the very positive comments of leading scholars 
refutes the charge that the early versions of the script were "bad history." 

Criticism of the script has centered on the question of balance. Those of us who 
developed the exhibition believe that the experience of the people of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki is an essential element of any full telling of this story. 1 think most 
of our critics agree with that point of view. Moreover, all of us agree that the 
atomic bombing of Japan must be understood within the context of the justice of 
the Allied cause, and the incredible heroism of those who fought, and died, to 
push the forces of Japanese tyranny back across the Pacific. 

Professor John Dower of MIT expressed the hopes and intentions of the cura- 
torial team when he commented that: "the original script had a great potential to 
convey . . . [aj larger dimension of tragic ambiguity . . . without denying the 
bravery of individual American fighting men, or the worthiness of the fight 
against Japan. It would have been an immense challenge to pull this off, but I 
thought the first script gave every promise of doing so." 

Our critics took issue with the ambiguity to which Professor Dower refers. 
While the exhibition was never intended to attack the justification for the use of 
the atomic bomb, it did suggest that the decision has been the subject of consid- 
erable study and analysis over the past half-century. Moreover, we failed to 
appreciate the deep and powerful links that bind memory of the bomb to the 
incredible sense of joy and relief at the end of the war. As individuals and as an 
institution, those of us at the museum have paid a high price for that misjudge- 
ment. 

In closing, I want to assure you that I remain committed to the mission of the 
National Air and Space Museum, and to the mandate of the Smithsonian Institu- 
tion to increase and diffuse knowledge. I appreciate the opportunity to appear 
today, and will do my best to answer any questions that the Committee may have. 
Thank you. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

Secretary Heyman, I want you to know we recognize that you 
came into this matter after it started and if you want to defer to 
others to answer questions, we would be happy to have you do 
that. I will try to limit mine on the first round here, but I do have 
a series of questions I want to get answers to, if we can. 

Does the Smithsonian intend now to display the Enola Gay on 
a permanent basis anywhere after the scaled-down exhibit is 
over? 

Mr. Heyman. We certainly intend to exhibit it, sir, when we 
have a place to exhibit it. We cannot put it in the Air and Space 
Museum because it is too big. So the intention has been to exhibit 
it at Dulles as the extension begins to be built out. 

The Chairman. There are members of the groups that have 
criticized the Smithsonian who have urged that you place it on 
display at another prominent area. There are several prominent 
areas for display of artifacts of the air war of World War II. Have 
you considered doing that? 

Mr. Heyman. My view about that is that when we take this 
exhibit down, if there is an opportunity to lend the Enola Gay to 
another place and we can work out the expenditures for getting 
it there and getting it back and its maintenance, we would 
certainly take quite seriously a request for it to be lent and 
exhibited elsewhere. 



79 

The Chairman. Then you would be receptive to a request 
from these organizations that it be displayed just as an artifact 
somewhere in the country? 

Mr. Heyman. Yes, sir. But we would like to retain ownership 
of it for its eventual display as part of our collection. 

The Chairman. Do you envision someday the museum would 
be large enough to hold that as a permanent exhibit? 

Mr. Heyman. I think if we build out what we intend to build 
out at Dulles, the extension of the Air and Space Museum, we 
will have the requisite room. That is the plan. 

The Chairman. I do not really view the Dulles site and 
facility as being very accessible to many people. But that is 
another question; we will deal with that later. 

In your letter to Congressman Johnson you stated that you 
were conducting an examination of how the exhibits are framed 
philosophically at the outset. Could you tell us the status of that 
examination? 

Mr. Heyman. What I am trying to put together is a procedure 
so that prospective exhibitions are quite well reviewed. The first 
step in that, in my view, is for those within a museum to deal 
with, to be consulted on, to discuss fully the plan of any curator 
or curators for an exhibition, to look at what the purpose is, to 
get a full explication of how it is supposed to work, and to start 
to make judgments with regard to whether or not it is framed 
properly in order to be accurate and full and balanced. 

Let me give you an example. My biggest problem with the 
first script of the Enola Gay is how it was framed. It was an 
inquiry into the use of atomic weapons with a sidebar, a 
secondary look at the Enola Gay and the use of the atomic 
weapons in ending the Second World War. I think that, at least 
now that I have become more sophisticated about this, if I had 
been involved at all at the outset, and if I had thought about it 
very hard, I think I could begin to predict some of the problems 
that would arise if that is the way an exhibit was to be framed to 
be held at the time that it was. 

I want the museums in the first instance to really take that 
seriously. I want to be put on notice whenever an exhibit is 
begun to be discussed which could be a controversial exhibition 
in the terms that we are talking about or perhaps other ones. 
Then secondly, I want those procedures to state quite clearly 
that — and we are talking about historical exhibitions here 
basically — that not only should we be putting together an 
historian's committee to assure accuracy, but that if there are 
special groups that are specially affected by an exhibition, that 
they are consulted meaningfully too, and early enough so that 
that consultation affects the design of the exhibition. 

I want to put those in writing. We are getting close to being 
able to do that. I want an elaboration of them from each of the 
museums. I want accountability with regard to whether or not 
they are being followed. And I want to be informed personally. 



80 

and certainly persons other than me who are on staff in the 
Secretary's office, with regard to whether there are exhibitions 
contemplated that raise special problems of this sort. I want to 
know about that early in the game. 

The Chairman. What is the status of this examination to find 
out how the exhibits are framed philosophically at the outset? 

Mr. Heyman. I do not know if philosophically is the right 
word, but I really mean 

The Chairman. It is not my word; it is yours. 

Mr. Heyman. What I mean by that is, how — I gave the 
example for the Enola Gay. I would like to know what the 
purpose and the story line of the exhibition is, and I would like 
explicit conversation about that at the outset. 

The Chairman. You also said that you are satisfied there has 
been no fundamental effort at the Air and Space Museum, or any 
Smithsonian museum, to do exhibitions only of the newer sort. 
What is the "newer sort"? 

Mr. Heyman. I think that was the discussion Senator 
Feinstein was having. Let me just give this as a little bit of 

The Chairman. Is it what we would call revisionist 

Mr. Heyman. No. 

The Chairman. or politically correct? What is "newer 

sort"? 

Mr. Heyman. "Newer sort" is — let me start this way. 
Historically, at least in my view, what our museums and 
museums in general have done is to show objects. And they have 
shown objects with not a lot of signage. It has essentially been, 
you look at the object. You get a little bit of an idea what it is. 
You bring to that object and you understand that object in 
relationship to seeing it. 

The newer sort is what is occurring now in a lot of museums 
around the country where in historical exhibitions we are 
beginning to write books on the wall. We are beginning to have 
so much signage that it overwhelms, at least in my view — and 
this is a lively argument — but it overwhelms the objects that are 
the centerpieces of the exhibition. That is the tendency. That is 
the trend. 

I have some problems, all aside of what the messages are, 
whether or not exhibitions that are primarily made up of an 
awful lot of text that is put up on the wall are very effective 
exhibitions with respect to visitors. 

The Chairman. Have you looked into the question of 
copyright? Does the Smithsonian have the copyright to scripts 
that are prepared by people you hire with Federal money? 

Mr. Heyman. I believe we do. 

The Chairman. That it not my understanding. It is my 
understanding that the work of Federal employees under your 
control is not copyrightable; that under the authority of the 
Smithsonian there is no copyright protection for scripts that are 
written for the Government. 



81 

Ms. Newman. I will have to get the general counsel's ruling 
on that, but my understanding is 

The Chairman. Respectfully, Ms. Newman, I do not want 
your legal opinion. I want to know what you have been doing. 
Are these scripts copyrighted? 

Ms. Newman. Yes, some of them are. 

The Chairman. When? 

Ms. Newman. At what point in time? 

The Chairman. At what point in time do they become Federal 
property with copyright protection? 

Ms. Newman. At the point that the script is final and the 
exhibit is going on the wall. 

The Chairman. They are copyrighted then? 

Ms. Newman. But it varies. I know, Mr. Chairman, that you 
do not want me to talk to the general counsel about this, but the 
reason I 

The Chairman. No, 1 just do not want another opinion. I want 
to see what has been done. 1 am told it has not been done. 

Ms. Newman. What I have to do is — frankly, there are some 
issues before the courts now that affect this question of yours 
and I do not want to put us in an awkward position with regard 
to our issues before the court. So I would like, respectfully 

The Chairman. I respect that. But we have been told that you 
have copyrighted these, and there is a serious question here as 
to protection of public property. 

Ms. Newman. May I explain? What has happened is a number 
have gone into texts that are published by the press. Some of the 
scripts have gone into texts published by the press in catalogs, 
and that is copyrighted. 

The Chairman. I believe that you should get an opinion of 
your counsel. I think your law is not adequate to give us the 
protection we should have for scripts prepared at public expense 
under your jurisdiction. Because of the unique status of the 
Smithsonian, I am told that you have not sought copyright 
protection in some instances, and that is one of the things we 
should look into while we are looking into the management 
concepts of the Smithsonian. 

Mr. Secretary, you appointed Mr. Hoffman, the acting 
provost, as the temporary director of the Air and Space Museum. 
Did you discuss this exhibit with Mr. Hoffman in connection 
with that appointment? 

Mr. Heyman. The Enola Gay exhibit, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Heyman. We have been so close for the 8 months that I 
have been here, we have discussed the Enola Gay exhibit a lot of 
times. So I did not have a special conversation with him at the 
time I appointed him as the temporary director. 

The Chairman. What role did the Air and Space Museum 
advisory board have in the preparation or review of these 



82 

scripts? I am told there are 10 members of that; 3 appointed by 
the President. 

Mr. Heyman. I do not think much of a role, cir. I met with the 
advisory committee this past week. As a matter of fact, I asked 
them and they will take a preliminary look at the exhibition that 
I am in charge of, the new Enola Gay exhibition. But I know they 
discussed the Enola Gay exhibition at their last meeting. They 
only have historically met once a year. But I do not think they 
went through the script in any detail. 

The Chairman. What is the role of this advisory group? Were 
they consulted. Dr. Crouch, at the beginning of this exhibit? 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, Senator. There were repeated discussions 
of the exhibition at advisory committee meetings over a period 
of at least 2 years. 

The Chairman. Is there any record of their expression of 
views? 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, Senator. In the minutes of the advisory 
committee. 

Mr. Heyman. Are you speaking of the statutory advisory 
committee? 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. On that group was Lieutenant General 
William Forester, who is military deputy assistant to the 
Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the 
deputy chief of staff for aviation. Rear Admiral William C. 
Donnell, Rear Admiral Brent Binnett, General John Daly. Were 
they consulted at the beginning of this exhibit? 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. The plans for the exhibition were 
discussed at meetings of the mandatory advisory committee. 

The Chairman. They saw the script in the beginning? 

Mr. Crouch. I do not believe so. Senator. 

The Chairman. That is what we are getting at in terms of 
management. At what point do the advisors who are appointed 
to try and protect you against this kind of controversy come into 
this process. Doctor? 

Mr. Heyman. If you had been at the meeting that I had with 
the advisory committee this week, which obviously you would 
not, I told them that I really looked forward to a rather deep, 
consultative relationship between that advisory committee and 
NASM, and we are going to do that. 

The Chairman. You have a series of directives, regulations, 
et cetera. Is there any sort of directive to those who are managing 
the Air and Space Museum that they shall consult with these 
advisors before they undertake matters of public controversy? 

Mr. Heyman. I do not know, but the under secretary says that 
we do not have stated policies that directly give that directive. 

The Chairman. I think that it is unfortunate, when you have 
high-caliber public members such as Mr. Thomas Hall, Susan 
Woo, and several others, who are there in order to give advice to 
the museum to prevent the kind of controversy that developed. 



83 

and they are not involved. I urge you to discuss it and give us 
some response on how the advisory committee is going to be 
used. If it is not going to be used, maybe we should abolish it. 
But the real problem is that they were not used. 

Now tell me this. I am sure you heard the comments that were 
made last week by the veterans organizations. What percent of 
the Air and Space budget has been spent on actual restoration of 
aircraft or aerospace vehicles over the past 3 years? Do you have 
any idea? 

Ms. Newman. I would have to submit that for the record. 
There was $1 million spent on the restoration of the Enola Gay. 
But if you are asking for all of the dollars spent on restoration, I 
would have to submit that for one other reason. Some of the 
restoration is done by third parties. We get the aircraft to them 
and they expend their resources. So I would have to split it out 
for you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Tell me this, any one of you who wants to 
answer — In a period when we are trying to celebrate the history 
and the contributions to the preservation of our democracy made 
by those who lost their lives in World War II — those of us who 
served do not feel we require any recognition. We survived. We 
are trying to remember those who gave their lives — Why do we 
have a Barbie doll exhibit in the Air and Space Museum instead 
of exhibits commemorating those who gave their lives? What is 
the Barbie doll doing there in the first place? 

Mr. Crouch. The curator would have to answer that question 
directly. Senator. When it comes to exhibitions of this sort at the 
museum, a curator proposes an idea for a project. That proposal 
is discussed at an exhibition committee meeting which includes 
the leading managers of the museum. Decisions are made and 
passed on as advice to the director. 

The Barbie doll exhibit is a very small case exhibit. I would 
call your attention too to the fact that 1 week ago tonight we had 
a marvelous Charles Lindbergh memorial lecture 
commemorating victory in Europe, particularly those who 
participated in the air war in Europe. We filled the Langley 
Theater in the museum, in fact to overflowing. We had to move 
in extra seats. 

I think if you look at the record of our museum over the past 
years in terms of exhibitions 

The Chairman. Doctor, if you do not see the difference 
between having a Lindbergh lecture in a theater and a permanent 
exhibit proposed on the Enola Gay which would portray us as the 
aggressors, I do not think we are going to get very far in this 
hearing. 

Mr. Crouch. Our next exhibition, I would point out. Senator, 
is the F6F Hellcat, a World War II Navy fighter. 

Mr. Heyman. Senator, on the Barbie dolls. I do remember a 
little bit about it. It is two small cases. It is temporary. It is about 
$6,000 that was paid by outside sources, or most of it was. The 



84 

notion was to have something there that got young people's 
attention. Largely what it is, by looking at the dolls — I am told, 
although I have not seen it — you can see an evolution of the role 
of women in aviation and aeronautics simply by the way that 
Barbie dolls were clothed over a 20-year period. It is not a very 
central exhibition, but it seems to — but that is its intention. 

The Chairman. I am going to have to yield in a minute. But 
let me ask. Doctor, what is the exhibit, "Beyond the Limits"? 
What is that exhibit? 

Mr. Crouch. It is an exhibition that has to do with computers, 
electronics, avionics. Senator, in modern aviation; the way in 
which they have revolutionized flight technology. 

The Chairman. You sought and obtained four contributions 
from Japanese interests and Japanese nationals to put that in our 
national museum. Why? 

Mr. Crouch. It was not my exhibition. Senator. I could not 
respond to that question. 

The Chairman. I would like to know. I will have some other 
questions later. I will yield to my colleagues. I do want you to 
know. Dr. Crouch, that those of us who lived through World War 
II have great admiration for Lindbergh's accomplishment in 
flying across the Atlantic; but we have no regard whatsoever for 
his position as a collaborator with our enemies during World 
War II. 

Senator? 

Senator FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Doctor, I want to 
bridge over here just a little bit. I want you to look at me as a 
friendly enemy because I do not want to do anything to 
downgrade the Smithsonian because it is too valuable. The only 
thing I want to do here is to help you improve it. So not being a 
professional, I come as a member of the jury. It appears that you, 
sir, recognize the direction of the Enola Gay exhibit was 
inappropriate from the start, and perhaps in hindsight you agree 
that the exhibit did not reflect the experience of those who lived 
in this history. 

I understand. Doctor, that the Museum of American History 
will display an exhibit this summer to commemorate the end of 
the war. What assurance can you give this committee and the 
public that the American History Museum exhibit has been 
developed differently so as to avoid the problems we faced in 
this one? And have you applied your new procedures to this 
exhibit? 

Mr. Heyman. I have read the script. Senator Ford, and I am 
satisfied with it. 

Senator FoRD. How did you apply your new procedures to it? 

Mr. Heyman. These procedures are being formulated 
presently. Certainly in the interim I am asking if we are going to 
have an exhibit in an area that might be controversial that the 
script of it be shared with me. This was and I have — it is a 
relatively short script. I have read it and I think it is quite good. 



85 

Senator FORD. This could be another sensitive thing and I 
want to be sure that we are going in the right direction. 

Mr. Heyman. I do not think you will find it is. It is one that 
really has paintings and objects that really evoke memories. It 
does not tell stories. It really is very object-based and not one in 
which there are a lot of wallboard labels. 

Senator Ford. Doctor, let me step into your next panel if I may 
for minute. I apologize for having to do that but I am an hour 
late to where I was supposed to go. You mentioned trends a 
while ago as it related to history and that sort of thing — trends. 
I did not know we had any "trends" in history, unless it was the 
improvement of knowledge or additional facts that would be 
added on, not interpretation. But you mentioned the word 
"trends" and that bothered me a little bit, whether it is politically 
correct or not or whatever. 

Now the study of NAPA that you referred to in your 
statement, was that in process before you came on board? 

Mr. Heyman. No, sir, that was instituted after I came aboard. 

Senator Ford. That is just the Aeronautics and Space Museum 
and not anything else? 

Mr. Heyman. That is correct. 

Senator FORD. I read in here that during the tenure of Dr. 
Harwit he most notably broadened the museum's agenda, 
especially in deepening research and exhibitions concerning 
scientific aspects of the space and the cosmos. Now also you say 
in here, that the Smithsonian's usefulness to our citizens should 
not be about that one class visit in the 10th grade. Without taking 
on the impossible, we must be about carrying our mission across 
the country. We must find ways to deliver to the American 
people, wherever they live, the wonders of the institution they 
have supported for over one and a half centuries. 

Now I am troubled. I am troubled because of the Barbie doll 
exhibit. I do not know if they are all dressed up in aviation 
uniforms and all that, but the Barbie doll, we have to get that 
straightened out. Communication is probably the hardest thing 
we have to do. You have an art section and you have a batik cloth 
exhibit with abstract paint; is that correct. Dr. Crouch? I saw you 
inhale real quick. Is that correct? 

Mr. Crouch. We did. Senator, have an exhibition batiks 
created by artist Mary Edna Frazier. They are based on aerial 
photography. The artist is a pilot who makes use of those 
images 

Senator FORD. You tell me that it looks like, and I am not a 
professional. If you have a stream and some trees behind it, I 
understand it. You may understand abstract art. But it was on 
batik cloth, right? 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. 

Senator FORD. And it was abstract; is that correct? 

Mr. Crouch. Well, they are based on aerial photographs. 
Senator. What the artist sees from the sky as she flies. 



86 

Senator FORD. All right. You are going to have to draw me 
another picture because I did not understand it that way. Doctor. 
I do not think many people who come through there understand 
it either. You may understand it and sit up there in that 
six-by-six with a 60-watt bulb and green shade on and say, the 
world is great out there. But there are a lot of people who come 
through that Aeronautics and Space Museum, one of the most 
visited museums in the world, and it has to be the best. No 
question about that, it has to be the best. And the best you can 
do is when people leave there they understand it. They do not 
understand batik cloth and abstract paint, most of them. 

Now we get back to the education. Doctor, spreading it out. 
I understand that in the educational realm of Aeronautics and 
Space you are being community selective. You are going into 
communities, maybe where they are unfortunate or I do not 
know what the level is that you picked, and you are 
concentrating on that. Now you say here you want to spread it 
out all over to the country, but you are selecting the communities 
and it is not a national effort. That bothers me some. 

Mr. Heyman. First of all 

Senator FORD. I have talked to the people that do it. Doctor, 
so do not try to 

Mr. Heyman. No, I am trying to tell you what I was saying in 
the document from which you read. What I am saying is that we 
are seeking to take the Smithsonian into the electronic world and 
have our exhibitions and a lot of information that is contained in 
the Smithsonian available in electronic form. We just went on the 
Internet with about 20 or 25 — more than that — a huge amount of 
information that is being built up in the various museums, also 
including a very good exhibition called, "Ocean Planet." In the 
first 3 or 4 days that we were on the Internet we recorded over 2 
million visits. In other words, 2 million people tuned in. 

I see that — it is still a limited audience. There are about 30 
million who are on the Internet around. But I see that, probably 
as it combines with the television medium, as being a very 
extraordinary way to reach an awful lot of people so that they 
can, in a way, partake of what we have at the Smithsonian and 
not have to be there. 

The other is that we are taking what I think is going to be an 
absolutely wonderful exhibition as part of our 150th anniversary 
called, "America's Smithsonian." We are going to travel that 
around the country and that is going to contain a lot of our really 
fine objects. I think that people who have not been able to come 
to Washington are going to be able to get a very good sense of 
the Smithsonian by visiting that. That is what I meant in those 
references from which you were reading. 

Senator Ford. Do you have any knowledge, or do your 
colleagues there have any knowledge, of the selected 
communities now? 



87 

Ms. Newman. I know. Senator, throughout the institution 
there is an effort to work with school systems around the 
country. We have a math and science program. Each of the 
museums has a program. What has happened is that some of the 
museums, and Air and Space in particular, have programs for the 
Washington area, just because it is physically easier to get the 
students in the Washington area into the museums. But if you 
are suggesting that it is selective in that they are not interested 
in all of the schools in the area, that is not true. 

Senator FoRD. I am talking about the country. This is a 
national museum, not an area. 

Ms. Newman. Within the country, the programs that I talked 
to you about on the science and math are throughout the country. 
We have curriculum materials that go throughout the country. I 
can show you by each State which of the schools are benefiting 
from these various programs, and I would like very much to do 
that. 

Senator FORD. Fine, I will be glad to accept it. But when you 
select the communities and the criteria you have by which you 
select the communities disturbs me because the programs ought 
to be universal and not selective. And the criteria that you have 
down there for your people who make these decisions, the 
criteria they go by limit the where and how much of the exhibits 
and the education and the communication. So I hope that maybe 
my questions today will give you an opportunity to revisit some 
of those things and perhaps redirect it. 

Now, Doctor, you have got a raft of assistants at Air and 
Space Museum. Do you think you need all of them or are you 
going to wait until the NAPA comes? You have got half a dozen 
there or more. 

Mr. Heyman. I am clearly going to wait until I get a really — I 
will keep you posted. Senator. 

Senator FORD. It is like the football coaches in my hometown. 
They never fired them, they became assistant superintendents. 
We had a lot of football coaches that retired from coaching and 
became assistant superintendents. They do that all over the state. 
Somehow or another, we just like to take care of our sports 
figures. I do not want you to get loaded up with a lot of 
assistants, and then you get five different points of view. That 
may be good, but somehow, at some point you have got to say, 
we can be more efficient. You have a director, and he has an 
assistant and they have certain things to do. Then you can put 
that big shadow over their shoulder. 

Mr. Heyman. Right. Senator, I think we are beginning now to 
try to look at these issues since obviously we are going to start 
to — I have to live on leaner budgets. Clearly, 85 percent or so of 
our budget is in personnel. Clearly, if we are going to have to 
tighten our belts it is going to have to be that we are going to 
have to thin out numbers of people. 

Senator FORD. So it may come automatically. 



88 

Mr. HeymaN. Yes. One of the things though I do want to — this 
is just really by way of information. I am sitting on 17 museums 
and galleries and 4 or 5 very large research institutes. So I just 
want you to know that these efforts are going to have to be 
systematic. 

Senator FORD. I understand that. As I said earlier, if I am 
viewed as an enemy, I would like to be a friendly enemy because 
I think what you are doing is so important. If I am critical, I hope 
it is constructive. What I have done is talked personally to 
people. I have not just taken a piece of paper and read it and this 
is the report. I have talked to people at the Air and Space 
Museum who participate every day in what you do down there. 

So I have not just come here with a piece of paper staff shoved 
under my nose and said, you ask him these questions. I have got 
them personally because I thought it was so important. 

Mr. Heyman. I understand that. 

Senator FORD. At some point we will grade you. When I first 
came here your board was never brought before the Congress. 
They would just send the names up and we would approve them. 
Senator Mathias decided we ought to see who is going on the 
board, and get their background, have a little financial statement 
like all the rest of the appointments around here, because you do 
handle a lot of money and you are important to the country. Now 
we are beginning to give you some oversight, and you are going 
through some of the problems other agencies are going through. 

Mr. Heyman. I realize that, sir. But do not forget my Board of 
Regents because they are — 

Senator Ford. I understand your Board of Regents. I hear 
from your Board of Regents almost daily. I want to tell you, they 
are on your side. And I happen to be on their side because we are 
trying to do the same thing. They defend you strongly. When 
that defense goes away you had better 

Mr. Heyman. I will be in trouble. 

Senator Ford. You will. 

The Chairman. Senator Pell, do you have any questions? 

Senator PELL. Yes, thank you. Speaking of the regents, I think 
one of the stupidest things I have ever done was when I thought 
I had a conflict of interest and resigned from the board. I have 
regretted it ever since, sought to get on it and have not 
succeeded. I think that the exhibition you are talking about is 
great. As one who was in the North Atlantic convoy duty in the 
North Atlantic, I would hope that you might honor the 
anti-submarine warfare there as well, have an exhibition. 

I also note your statement that the Smithsonian has "an 
obligation to consider the opinions of the interested public" in 
framing your exhibitions. My question is, are there limits to the 
extent to which the Smithsonian should be responsive to public 
opinion? And does the Smithsonian reserve for itself an area of 
judgment that will honor opinions that might not necessarily be 



89 

popular? I realize I am coming at it from a slightly different angle 
than you have received so far. 

Mr. Heyman. Senator Pell, 1 think any institution of our sort 
has to reserve the final decision. But I think we have to be 
sensitized to viewpoints that otherwise we might not get if we 
did not make the kinds of consultations and seek the sort of 
advice that I am speaking about there. But no, we have got to 
make the final decision. 

Senator PELL. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman. Senator Cochran? 

Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Crouch, you may have heard Mr. Linenthal say when he 
was talking about an exhibit of the V-2 rocket that in order to 
really show what the V-2 rocket was all about, what it did 
needed to be shown and was shown to fully explain the context 
of that artifact. I suppose that the same kind of thinking went 
into the development of the Enola Gay exhibit, that to show the 
context of the airplane that dropped the bomb, you had to show 
the results. 

Is this something that has been followed over time at the Air 
and Space Museum? And do you see it as something that will 
continue to be a part of every exhibit? For example, you 
mentioned the Hellcats. I just wondered, are you going to show 
the damage and the results of the weapons system that the 
Hellcat was in order for people to understand why it was made, 
and what it was for, and how it was used? Is that going to be an 
important part of that exhibit, or any part at all? 

Mr. Crouch. I think exhibitions perform a great many 
functions. Senator. When people ask me what I think the 
National Air and Space Museum does best, I usually say that we 
inspire wonder and awe and an appreciation for the past. But the 
museum also teaches, I think, something about the context in 
which those objects that people see in the museum were used. 

The Hellcat exhibit is commemorative, for the most part. It is 
the airplane, labels, and images of the airplane in use, and the 
men who flew it. 

Senator Cochran. No dead people lying around in 
photographs? 

Mr. Crouch. No, sir, not that I 

Senator CocHRAN. None at all? 

Mr. Crouch. Not that come to mind. 

Senator CocHRAN. Why not? Why would you consider it to 
be a complete exhibit if you do not show the people it killed or 
the damage that was done by the use of the Hellcat? Why is that 
different? 

Mr. Crouch. I think the exhibition of the Hellcat does show 
the complete story of that airplane. It is a fighter airplane. 
Senator. That exhibition was not designed to deal with a turning 
point in history. 



90 

Senator Cochran. I do not remember when I have gone 
through the museums that it is commonplace to show the victims 
of weapons systems in ways that would be repulsive or alarm or 
disgust or enrage, all the other emotions that we get when we see 
someone who has been killed, particularly in a pretty graphic 
scene. The Vietnam War is a very good example of what happens, 
I think, to all of us when we see that kind of thing on television 
or in photographs or pictures. It has quite an impact. 

Is the Air and Space Museum going to consider, for example, 
in the future showing some of the airplanes that were used in 
Vietnam and what was done in the use of those planes, the 
napalm? Are these things that we can look forward to in the 
future? 

Mr. Crouch. No, Senator. An exhibition on the air war in 
Vietnam has been under discussion. It is on hold at this point. 
We still have to reach a decision with regard to that one, as the 
Secretary has commented in the past. 

I really thought and think of the exhibition on the Enola Gay 
as a genuine departure from what had come before at the 
museum, and did see it as an attempt to tell a story, perhaps in 
a different way than the museum had before. 

Senator CoCHRAN. I am disturbed about the possibility of a 
trend setting in where this is the kind of thing that we can expect 
at the Air and Space Museum. I certainly disapprove of that mind 
set and that attitude. We all regret war. We regret we have to 
defend ourselves and spend all the money we do for national 
defense. But the security of our country is important, and our 
citizens security is uppermost in the minds of this Congress. It 
is probably the number one obligation that we have as a 
Government. 

To see it ridiculed, or those who have been involved in 
protecting the security of our country demeaned in some indirect 
way — even though there certainly may not be a conscious effort 
to do that — by our own national museum is very disturbing. I 
think that is what comes from this experience. 

I hope that those who are involved in thinking about what the 
role of the museum is, and what the goals are, and the mission, 
use good common sense and good judgment for a change. I think 
that is what we are asking you to do. All the regulations and 
guidelines and everything are going to be helpful maybe. But I 
think just good common sense and good judgment will be 
required. 

Mr. Crouch. Senator, I have been at that museum for 21 years 
and it is today, as it was on the day we opened, the most popular 
museum in the world. Certainly no one wants to endanger that 
or to alter the fundamental course of that museum. There is 
nothing related to this controversy that I regret more than the 
suggestion that that Institution which I love, which I helped to 
build, has somehow devalued the heroism and sacrifice of 
American veterans. That was certainly, and I hope obviously. 



91 

never the intention. My own father is a veteran of the Pacific war 
and I would never, and neither would anyone else involved in 
this project, wish to do anything other than to honor the soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen who defeated Japanese tyranny. 

Mr. Heyman. Do not forget the Marines. 

Mr. Crouch. I am sorry, Mr. Secretary. I apologize for that. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I have to get back to the 
statutory authorization for the National Air and Space Museum. 
I want to call your attention to that. It says, in Section 11 , Title 
20 of the U.S. Code, "There is hereby established under the 
Smithsonian Institution a bureau to be known as the National Air 
and Space Museum, which shall be administered by the 
Smithsonian Institution with the advice of a board to be 
composed of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or his designee, 
the Chief of Naval Operations, or his designee, the Chief of Staff 
of the Army, or his designee, the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, or his designee, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, or 
his designee, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, or his designee, the Administrator of the 
Federal Aviation Administration, or his designee, the Secretary 
of the Smithsonian Institution, and three citizens of the United 
States appointed by the President from civilian life . . ." 

Now, as I understand it, before this exhibit started there was 
no reference to that board for advice. Is that correct? 

Mr. Heyman. I cannot really tell you. I can only tell you that 
at the meeting that we had this week it was told to me by 
members of that advisory committee that at the meeting they had 
had the last year, which I guess was in April or May of last year, 
there was discussion at that meeting about the Enola Gay 
exhibition. I do not know what the nature of that discussion was. 
I do not know the extent to which what that exhibit was to be or 
looked like in the first draft was discussed. I just do not know 
the nature of it. I just can tell you that is what they told me when 
I saw them this week. 

The Chairman. I think you miss my point. My point is, the 
statute says you run this with the advice of this board. It is a 
specifically designated advisory board, composed primarily of 
the military advisors to the President of the United States. They 
are the chairmen of the individual services, the chiefs of staff. 
But I do not see anything in your procedure which follows this 
law. You do not get their advice except once a year. 

Mr. Heyman. I do not know whether our procedures state it. 
They probably do not. We will rectify that. But I want you to 
know that my own intention, which I discussed with them this 
week, was of a much closer advisory relation between that board 
and the museum. So you and I are on the same wavelength. 

The Chairman. I hope we are. You and I are not going to be 
here forever, and I do not want the Smithsonian to be destroyed 
by revisionists or people who are seeking some way to express 
their own point of view to the world despite the official policy 



92 

of the United States when using taxpayer money. Now the 
problem with this is that the law also says this is the function of 
the museum. This is the law that gave you the authority to build 
this museum and spend taxpayers' money to support it: 

The National Air and Space Museum shall memorial- 
ize the national development of aviation and space 
flight; collect, preserve and display aeronautical and 
space flight equipment of historical interest and signif- 
icance; serve as a repository for scientific equipment 
and data pertaining to the development of aviation and 
space flight; and provide educational material for the 
historical study of aviation and space flight. 

Now, Dr. Crouch, how do you go about planning an exhibit 
which primarily is to raise the question of the use by the United 
States of atomic weapons under that statute? You were involved 
in this. 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I do not think he was there at that time, but 
you were there when it started. I do not think you have any 
authority under this law to proceed with the exhibit that you 
planned, which basically was to raise the issue of the correctness 
of our use of atomic weapons at the close of World War II. That 
has nothing to do with the Enola Gay. 

But I do not think you get our point. Suppose we gave you 
the F117 today, which was the classic weapon used in the Persian 
Gulf. Are you going to show pictures of the people who were in 
the way of those weapons they used so effectively and 
efficiently? Are you going to show those people who 
unfortunately suffered death because of the policy of their 
government in Iraq? Or are you going to show it to be a scientific 
instrument, really one of the best weapons in history and one of 
the key functions of our system to win the war in the Persian 
Gulf? Are you going to go out on the streets of Iraq and get 
pictures of babies it killed or are you going to show the pilots 
who flew it? 

Mr. Crouch. Senator, we did an exhibition on the air war in 
the Persian Gulf. 

The Chairman. I saw it. But you miss the point. As Senator 
Cochran said, I do not remember seeing pictures of dead Iraqis. 

Mr. Crouch. Agreed, sir. I do not think there were. 

The Chairman. So your exhibit was an exhibit that tried to 
raise the issue of the correctness of the decision of the President 
of the United States to use atomic weapons to end World War II. 

Mr. Crouch. No, Senator. We did not regard the exhibition 
that way. This was an attempt to say something about the 
airplane as a player in a turning point in world history. I do not 
think you can understand the meaning of that airplane, which 
has become such a symbol of so many things for people, without 
seeing it as having an historic role. 



93 

The Chairman. It delivered the final weapon of World War 
II, but there are a lot of other weapons that killed many more 
people than it did; the Hellcats for example. How many people 
were killed by the Hellcats strafing operations? 
Mr. Crouch. I am sure a great many. Senator. 
The Chairman. But you are not going to show those. What 
were you doing in terms of the Enola Gay exhibit? We want to 
know, how are we going to prevent the kind of judgment that 
was made to use taxpayer's money beyond the authority of the 
Smithsonian and beyond the authority that created the museum 
that you spent 21 years in? 

Mr. Crouch. I can assure you. Senator, we did not think we 
were going beyond the authority of the museum or the 
Smithsonian. I tried to indicate the sorts of procedures that we 
passed through in the development of the project. 

The Chairman. Let me read you another portion of the law, 
and I am sure I will get the answer I have gotten before. In the 
middle of President Kennedy's first year, I believe he actually 
sent this language to Congress and asked that it be enacted: 
The Smithsonian Institution shall commemorate and 
display the contributions made by the military forces 
of the Nation towards creating, developing, and main- 
taining a free and peaceful and independent society 
and culture of the United States. The valor and sacrifi- 
cial service of the men and women of the armed forces 
shall be portrayed as an inspiration to the present and 
future generations of America. The demands placed 
upon the full energies of our people and the hardships 
endured, the sacrifice demanded in our constant 
search for world peace shall be clearly demonstrated. 
The extensive peacetime contribution that the armed 
forces have made to the advance of human knowledge 
in science, nuclear energy, polar and space explora- 
tion, electronics, engineering, aerospace, and medicine 
shall be graphically displayed. The Smithsonian shall 
interpret through dramatic display significant current 
problems affecting the Nation's security. It shall be 
equipped with a study center for scholarly research 
into the meaning of war, its effect on civilization, and 
the role of the armed forces in maintaining a just and 
lasting peace by providing a powerful deterrent to 
war. In fulfilling its purpose, the Smithsonian shall 
collect, preserve, and exhibit military objects of histor- 
ical interest and significance. 
Now, Mr. Secretary, I am informed that section was never 
complied with. Is that right? 

Mr. Heyman. It is complied with in many ways. There are a 
lot of exhibitions at the Smithsonian that fulfill exactly the 
purposes that are stated there. 



91-056 0-95-4 



94 

The Chairman. I understand that. But did you ever develop 
such an armed forces display? 

Mr. Heyman. No, and we also never got an armed forces 
museum which was the subsection under which that statute was 
included. 

The Chairman. But you did get the Air and Space Museum. 

Mr. Heyman. Yes, we had gotten the Air and Space Museum 
before that statute was enacted. 

The Chairman. You did not get it before 1961. I beg to differ. 

Mr. Heyman. Then 1 am incorrect. I guess the authorization 
for the Air and Space Museum had been passed before that 
because there's reference in that statute, as I recall, that it does 
not affect the provisions relating to the Air and Space Museum. 

But putting all that aside, I believe that we will do our best 
to 

The Chairman. I think you are right. I think you got the 
authorization for the Air and Space Museum in 1946. You did not 
get the actual museum until substantially later. 

Mr. Heyman. That is correct, sir. What I am saying is that 
putting aside technical arguments about applicability of that 
statute, we really do try, and I think successfully so in many 
regards, to fulfill the statements that are in that section. We 
could submit, sir, if you would like for the record, a history of 
exhibitions that we think are related to the words in that section. 

The Chairman. I think I am going to put in the record the 
letter that you wrote to Congressman Sam Johnson on April 4 of 
this year when he raised the same question. 

[The letter is included in the Appendix.] 

The Chairman. 1 understand that the position of the 
Smithsonian is that the legislative language quoted pertaining to 
the National Armed Forces Museum was authorized but never 
funded, and you take it that this section that I just read was not 
intended to apply to the National Air and Space Museum. I have 
to tell you, we will correct the statute. I believe the intention of 
President Kennedy was one the American public wanted to see 
in that Air and Space Museum. 

Now let me go back, if I may, to questions on the future. What 
policies are you establishing that will change old policies with 
regard to advice from advisory committees that have been 
authorized by Congress or the President pertaining to new 
exhibits? 

Mr. Heyman. Sir, I know what I want to do but I have not 
written them yet. We are going to write them this summer and I 
will submit them to this committee for information and for 
advice. But my intention is what I stated before which is, 
certainly in the case of statutory advisory committees, that they 
play a very real role in terms of the policies that are established 
respecting the museums for which they are created. This is true 
with the Hirshhorn. This is true at the Freer. This is true on a 
number of the museums where we have — the Museum of the 



95 

American Indian — where there are specific statutes that create 
specific advisory boards and the same is true. 

It could well be, sir, and I certainly would follow the kind of 
advice you are giving, that we should state the procedures by 
which that becomes effective rather than just leave it to the 
statutory language. 

The Chairman. Do you have directives or regulations that 
pertain to the use of Federal funds or Smithsonian funds to 
travel? Who approves the travel of museum directors, curators, 
and other Smithsonian employees? Who approves the hiring of 
people in the separate museums? Are there regulations and 
directives on that? 

Ms. Newman. Mr. Chairman, there are regulations. There are 
delegations from the Secretary to responsible officials. There is 
a system in place that assures that the travel is in accordance 
with the Federal laws. We do have a system whereby the 
directors notify the provosts or me of their plans to travel. Now 
with the new Secretary, those are often discussed with the 
Secretary. And I have a sign-off. 

The Chairman. Are you aware of the complaint of the various 
veterans and aviation organizations that the employees hired at 
the Air and Space Museum by Dr. Harwit had no background in 
aviation, aviation history, aviation engineering, or air and space 
museum management? They were in fact going towards a 
revisionist concept of history. How do we protect against that if 
it is true? 

Ms. Newman. There is a system whereby panels review the 
qualifications of people who are hired by the institution, and 
there is to be a matching of their credentials with the job 
requirements. You are telling me something that I had not heard: 
that there are large numbers of people who are in positions for 
which they are not qualified, which is different from saying that 
they may not agree with their position on certain issues. 

The Chairman. That is correct. They are saying that a large 
number of the employees of the Air and Space Museum had no 
background in either aviation, aviation history, aviation 
engineering, or air and space museum management, and that 
they were hired for the purpose of this exhibit. Is that true. Dr. 
Crouch? 

Mr. Crouch. May I make a comment. Senator? The last 
curator I hired is a retired Air Force colonel, an SR-71 pilot, who 
retired after a full career in the Air Force. We were happy to get 
him. His operational experience, his knowledge of aircraft, and 
his cockpit time and so on and so forth are obviously the kinds 
of skills and experiences that the National Air and Space 
Museum has to have to do its work. There are other kinds of 
skills as well, and when you need those you advertise for a 
different sort of person. 

The Chairman. Were you the lead curator on the Enola Gay 
exhibit? 



96 

Mr. Crouch. No, sir. Dr. Neufeld was. I am his supervisor. 

The Chairman. Who? 

Mr. Crouch. Michael Neufeld. I am his supervisor. 

The Chairman. You were the supervisor of the lead curator? 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What did you believe was the basic purpose 
of that exhibit? 

Mr. Crouch. As I said. Senator, to tell the story of that 
turning point in human history in the most honest, balanced way 
we could. 

The Chairman. Who created the name, "A More Perfect 
Union" for the exhibit? 

Mr. Crouch. I misunderstood. Senator. I thought you were 
still talking about the Enola Gay. You are talking about the 
exhibition, "A More Perfect Union" in American History? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, I was the lead curator for that exhibition. 

The Chairman. It is my understanding that because of that 
exhibit you were selected to lead the Enola Gay exhibit. Is that 
not right? 

Mr. Crouch. No, sir, that is not true. Let me correct, now that 
I understand your question. I was 

The Chairman. "A More Perfect Union" was concerned about 
the Japanese who were placed in camps in our own country, 
right? 

Mr. Crouch. Japanese Americans, yes, sir. I was the curator 
of that exhibition, yes. 

The Chairman. Who determined the scope and title of the 
exhibit that caused this controversy? 

Mr. Crouch. This one? 

The Chairman. The Enola Gay exhibit. 

Mr. Crouch. The scope and ? 

The Chairman. title of the exhibit. 

Mr. Crouch. The final title of the exhibition went through 
various iterations. It was the result of a group decision that 
everyone, including then-Secretary Adams, was willing to 
accept. The scope of the exhibition developed through early 
planning documents and discussions. 

The Chairman. Is it true that members of your staff are now, 
either in an official or unofficial capacity, assisting American 
University and others in a teach-in or some program for use of 
the artifacts and materials that were in the original plan of the 
Enola Gay exhibit and that this exhibit will be farmed out, in 
effect, to other universities in other areas in the country? 

Mr. Crouch. Not to my knowledge. Senator. I am aware that 
someone at American University has been reported in the 
newspapers as doing that. But certainly to my knowledge, we 
have not been involved. 



97 

The Chairman. That is not with any help from the 
Smithsonian or the personnel who assisted in the creation of this 
exhibit? 

Mr. Crouch. Again, not to my knowledge. Senator. 

Mr. Heyman. I asked specifically the curator of the exhibit, 
Michael Neufeld, and he indicated to me that he is playing 
absolutely no role and having no discussions with the people at 
American University. 

The Chairman. Do we know who was the author of the 
statement in the script that said, "For most Americans it was a 
war of vengeance; for most Japanese it was a war to defend their 
unique culture against western imperialism"? Who authored 
that? 

Mr. Crouch. I am really not sure. Senator. In terms of 
authorship, I supervised the project but I also wrote one unit; not 
the one in which that statement appeared. Dr. Neufeld wrote two 
units. The remaining two units of the exhibition were the result 
of a joint effort between Dr. Neufeld and the curatorial 
assistants, and that statement was in one of those units. 

The Chairman. You took the trips to Japan and you were the 
one who requested the loan from the city of Nagasaki of the 
artifacts to be displayed, the head of an angel, an infant's dress, 
a Madonna and child, leaflets dropped from American planes, 
pictures of the keloid scars of individuals rather than surgically 
removed keloid scars? You are the one who made the decision to 
obtain those for the exhibit, right? 

Mr. Crouch. No, those decisions were group decisions. I 
signed the letter. 

The Chairman. Was there a group of you in Japan, Doctor? 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How many? 

Mr. Crouch. Well, we did not make that decision in Japan. 
The first trip Dr. Harwit led and I went with him. On the second 
occasion I took the curator and the designer of the exhibition to 
Japan to look at materials and to gather information about 
objects that we might request for loan. But the decisions were all 
made after we had returned. 

The Chairman. Did you meet Mr. Takahashi on your trips to 
Japan? 

Mr. Crouch. I believe so. Hiroshima? 

The Chairman. Do you agree with what Dr. Harwit wrote to 
him, "For most of us in America the Enola Gay is an 
uncomfortable symbol. It represents a destructive act which 
many of us feel to be incompatible with our perceived national 
character"? He also states that you will be visiting with Dr. 
Takahashi. Did you meet with him to discuss that letter? 

Mr. Crouch. I met with him, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you discuss that point of view expressed 
by Dr. Harwit? 

Mr. Crouch. No, not in those words, sir. 



98 

The Chairman. Were you aware of it? 

Mr. Crouch. Someone read that letter to me yesterday and I 
did not recall having 

The Chairman. When you went over there were you familiar 
with the correspondence that had been sent by your superior to 
Japan? 

Mr. Crouch. For the most part, Senator. But that was a couple 
of years ago. I honestly do not remember having seen that letter. 

The Chairman. Did you give the mayors of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki a promise that they could film a statement in which 
they were free to say anything they chose for inclusion in the 
exhibit? 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You object to the statements of American 
veterans, and they have been accused of trying to seek a veto, yet 
you gave the mayors of two Japanese cities a free license to say 
whatever they wanted to. Is that right? 

Mr. Crouch. No, Senator. No, it is not correct. 

The Chairman. It is not right? 

Mr. Crouch. When we first went to Japan, one of the first 
questions that was posed to Dr. Harwit was, will this exhibition, 
in one way or another, express opposition to the use of nuclear 
weapons? Dr. Harwit told the Japanese that, of course, we could 
not do that. The National Air and Space Museum does not make 
national policy. But he said he would consider the possibility of 
filming short statements from both mayors in which they could 
express their own point of view, and those statements would be 
used in a videotape that would include opposition points of 
view, also unedited. So that visitors to the exhibition 

The Chairman. American veterans were to be able to put 
their views in this exhibit unedited. Is that your statement? 

Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You made that offer to the veterans groups? 

Mr. Crouch. I believe that Dr. Harwit did, or intended to. 

Ms. Newman. Mr. Chairman, may I intervene here just for a 
second? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Ms. Newman. But I, on the other hand, made it clear that if 
the videos covered subjects and matters that were of concern to 
the institution that the videos would not play. Dr. Harwit was 
present with me in discussing that matter with representatives 
from Japan. 

The Chairman. Again I get back to management, Ms. 
Newman. How are the veterans groups to understand that the 
commitment made by the curator is not the policy of the 
Smithsonian unless we have some responsibility somewhere? I 
get the feeling I am playing with a feather pillow. Every time we 
ask a question we are told, no, it is over here. Then we go over 
here and ask Dr. Crouch and they say, oh no, over here, I vetoed 
that. Do you see our problem. Dr. Heyman? 



99 

Mr. Heyman. Yes, I understand, sir. 

The Chairman. Is it a valid one? I am getting pilloried at 
home by some people who believe that I am somehow attacking 
the Smithsonian. I got that viewpoint too when I questioned the 
exhibit on the west, and I got that when I questioned the 
statements and the toadstool you gave to Professor Fuentes. It is 
part of the life we lead. 

But I think you need some management structure. You run 
the equivalent of two divisions in the Army, and it appears that 
all your regiments are going off in different directions. Is that 
wrong? 

Mr. Heyman. It is very hard for me to answer that. I do not 
know whether it is wrong or not. I can tell you that the 
Smithsonian has been a place that has been analogized, and 
certainly was by my predecessor, very much to a university in 
which museums and research institutes are viewed like schools 
in colleges that make an awful lot of their own decisions for 
themselves. 

I think the undertaking that I am making at the moment, for 
instance, with regard to exhibition policy and exhibition review 
is a little shocking to a number of my colleagues, and we are 
going to have an awful lot of conversation with respect to that. 
As I am doing this, if I come across, in relationship to what you 
are saying, processes that really ought to be put on paper, we 
will put those on paper if they are not on paper yet. 

The Chairman. I thank you for that. 

Mr. Heyman. But I do understand your frustration. I really 
do. 

The Chairman. I do thank you for that. I am worried, because 
we are going to discuss the budget for the next 5 years, and there 
is not room in that budget for the projection you have made to 
manage the institution you have. I am sure you know that. I 
believe you should have the money, and we have to find ways to 
raise money from the public. 

Let me tell you, I believe you should have the money you 
outlined in your last presentation — not the one in 1992, but the 
last one — for the management of the facilities you have and for 
the exhibits that you have planned. I do not know how we are 
going to get it from the public. I can tell you, you will not get it 
from this Congress if we have controversies like this. You cannot 
expect to have dramatic increases in funding at the time of 
controversies of this size. 

I am worried that you seem to be turning to foreign sources 
for support of the Smithsonian. I do not want to get into that 
now, but there are lots of rumors running around here now about 
the extent to which you are turning to foreign sources for the 
support of our institution. That is a unique American institution. 
I have to tell you, I think the American people will be very, very 
upset if it is determined that substantial foreign contributions 
are made in a way that might influence exhibits like this. 



100 

Mr. Heyman. My view is that contributions ought not to 
influence any exhibit. 

The Chairman. You have three exhibits in Japan now, right? 

Mr. Heyman. We just have one on gems. 

The Chairman. I thought you had three going over there. Are 
the others back now? 

Mr. Heyman. Yes. 

The Chairman. Were they paid for by Japan? 

Ms. Newman. Yes. 

The Chairman. Were the same curators who went over there 
on the Enola Gay exhibit also a part of those exhibits? 

Ms. Newman. No. The one exhibit that was in Japan that was 
funded by NHK and Yomiuri Shimbun took many of our major 
objects and talked about American culture based on a desire on 
the part of the funding that this generation of Japanese do not 
understand the culture and the contributions of this Nation, of 
the United States, to science and technology. Therefore, they 
funded completely the exhibit that took the ruby slippers and 
things like that to Japan. That exhibit no longer exists. That was 
for a short period of time in 1994. 

The Chairman. Have you any further questions. Senator? 

Senator CoCHRAN. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I am still disturbed by the 
letter you sent to Congressman Johnson indicating that you 
believe the law applies to a museum that was never funded when 
it specifically says the Smithsonian Institution shall take action. 
That has been on the books for over 30 years. I do believe it is a 
function that is required. 

I am going to ask the Congress to modify the statute to make 
clear our intent because I believe it might help settle this 
controversy if we did have a fulfillment of the original 
instruction of the Congress and the President to the Smithsonian 
to take the action required to commemorate the service of the 
men and women of the armed forces, and to portray them as an 
inspiration to present and future generations. That is not me. 
That is, as I recall. President Kennedy's request to the Congress. 

I do not know what it is going to take to have you live up to 
that law, but I do think that would go a long way towards 
meeting the problem that has been brought out by this hearing. 
Do you have any further comments, sir? 

Mr. Heyman. No, I do not, sir. But we were going to make 
another presentation on the Commission for the Future. We 
could do that at another time if you wish, or we could do it now. 

The Chairman. I think Dr. Singer is here and we are prepared 
for that, yes. 

Mr. Heyman. Fine, thank you. This is Dr. Maxine Singer, 
president of the Carnegie Institution, who has been the chair of 
our Commission on the Future which is a commission of 26 
people of enormous quality, intellectually and otherwise, who 
undertook to look at the Smithsonian in its present form, and to 



101 

try to look at the future and to try to give ideas and directions 
with respect to how the Smithsonian most profitably, for the 
benefit of the country, should face that future. 

I had a longer prepared statement, but I would just put that 
in the record, sir, and just introduce Dr. Singer. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman follows:] 

Statement of I. Michael Heyman, Secretary, Smithsonian 
Institution 

I would like to have Dr. Maxine Singer join me. Dr. Singer served as the Chair 
of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution. In September 
1993, the Board of Regents established the Commission and charged it with the 
task of examining the Institution, its mandate and roles. The Commission was 
additionally charged to examine the cultural, societal, and technological factors 
that influence the Institution's capacity to act. I would like to thank Chairwoman 
Singer and the members of her commission for their invaluable service to the 
Institution. I am committed to studying these recommendations and to working 
with the Regents, the administration and my staff in the months ahead to respond 
to the challenges presented in the report. I will ask Maxine Singer to provide the 
committee with the highlights of the report. However, I'd like to comment briefly 
on several initiatives that are responsive to the Commission's recommendations. 

We are committed to developing institution-wide an ability to make our collec- 
tions and information available to more of America, directly and through tech- 
nology. 

On May 8, 1995, the Smithsonian officially went "on-line" with our "home 
page" to the Internet. This single event takes a giant step toward my goal of a 
"Smithsonian without walls" and delivers the Institution's vast resources to 
Americans throughout the country. People around the world can now view 
portions of our collections as well as enjoy those exhibitions which we are putting 
on line in their own homes. 

Moreover, teachers can design curriculum relying upon our extensive collec- 
tions, research, and exhibitions. This ability will be enhanced as more of our 
materials are put in digital form. I'm pleased to report that the Smithsonian home 
page on the World Wide Web logged over 2 million "visitors" since its first day. 

While a great number of visitors come to the Mall each year, we recognize that 
many Americans can never get here and those who do can manage the trip at best 
once or twice in a lifetime. The Smithsonian's usefulness to our citizens should 
not be just about that one class visit in the 10th grade. Without taking on the 
impossible, we must be about carrying our mission across the country; we must 
find ways to deliver to the American people, wherever they live, the wonders of 
the institution they have supported for one and a half centuries. 

One of my first decisions as Secretary was to authorize the creation of an 
exhibition of some of the Institution's treasures that we can take around the 
country beginning in our 150th anniversary year, 1996. With the aid of corporate 
support which we are now seeking, we will bring "America's Smithsonian" to 
locations around the United States. This is as it should be if we are to "increase 
and diffuse knowledge." 

Thank you. I would like to ask Dr. Singer to make a few remarks. 

The Chairman. Let me, if I may, correct the record to a certain 
extent. In June of 1961, the Kennedy Administration did support 
the bill that led to the direction to the Smithsonian to authorize 
an expansion to portray the contributions of the armed forces of 
the United States. That idea, however, was based on a report 
from President Eisenhower to the Committee on the American 
Armed Forces Museum. He had stated very succinctly the 
reasons for such action by the Smithsonian, but it was apparently 



102 

an idea that was carried over from 1960 into 1961, and was 
supported by both administrations. 
Dr. Singer? 

TESTIMONY OF MAXINE F. SINGER, CHAIRMAN, COMMIS- 
SION ON THE FUTURE OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITU- 
TION, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF 
WASHINGTON 

Ms. Singer. Good morning, sir. I thank you for giving me this 
opportunity to speak to the committee. Like all the members of 
the commission, I come from the world outside the Smithsonian. 
I myself am a biochemist, and as Secretary Heyman has told you, 
I am the president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington 
which is an independent institution that carries out research in 
astronomy, biology, and earth sciences. The institution is based 
here in Washington, DC, where I reside. 

Two years ago I was asked by the regents of the Smithsonian 
to chair a commission of private citizens charged with an 
examination of the Smithsonian, its mandate, and its roles, and 
an examination of the cultural, societal, and technological 
factors that influence its capacity to act. Based on these 
examinations we were to provide alternative approaches to the 
issues facing the Smithsonian rather than making specific 
recommendations. Nevertheless, with a commission composed 
of a large number of independent people, making some 
recommendations was a temptation that the commission found 
impossible to resist. 

The names of the 22 commission members are listed on page 
3 of our report which we submitted to the regents earlier this 
month, and copies of the report have been submitted to the 
committee in lieu of written testimony. I thank the committee on 
behalf of the commission for this opportunity to describe the 
results of our work. I would like to summarize how we organized 
our efforts and the major points in our report. 

Funds for the commission's work were provided by grants 
from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and 
the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. At our first meeting in 
September of 1993 we determined the scope of our work and 
established three independent working groups to investigate 
in-depth three major areas: First, programs; second, outreach, 
audience and electronic communication; and third, 
management, administration and finance. The entire 
commission met on three additional occasions to hammer out a 
consensus. 

In addition, members of the commission visited comparable 
institutions in Canada, England, and France. Throughout we had 
the full cooperation of the Smithsonian's Secretary and staff in 
providing information. Our study was broad and our focus was 



103 

on the future. We tried to peer out 10 to 20 years, although we 
recognized that we had no reliable crystal ball. 

Remarkably, in view of the range of geographic and 
professional, not to mention social and political experiences, 
represented among the commission members we reached 
consensus. Perhaps this was because the Smithsonian represents 
to all of us our great and vibrant Nation in all of its perplexities 
and complexity. Perhaps this is also the reason that we found 
Twyla Tharp's words such an apt title for the report, "E Pluribus 
Unum: This Divine Paradox." 

Our Nation, of course, has thousands of public and private 
museums, as you have already pointed out. But the Smithsonian 
is distinctive because it is the Nation's institution. It is also a part 
of a vast international network of cultural and scientific 
institutions and we can be proud of its outstanding reputation 
abroad for the excellence of its collections, exhibitions, research, 
collaborative efforts with many scholars in countries all over the 
globe, and exemplary training programs for young scholars and 
museum professionals. 

Our Nation is a very different one from the young country 
that it was in 1846 when the Congress accepted James Smithson's 
bequest and established the Smithsonian as an institution for the 
"increase and diffusion of knowledge." Those words 
nevertheless remain sound guides, although the Smithsonian too 
has changed enormously and will continue to do so as the Nation 
and the world change. 

Among the changes at the Smithsonian is a shift in the 
emphasis given to these two aspects of Smithson's instruction. 
Fifty years ago, the emphasis was on scholarly research; the 
increase in knowledge. Today there is more of an equilibrium 
between research and the diffusion of knowledge; that is, 
education. The commission supports this shift. 

Because enhancing the education of both children and adults 
is a high priority need in our country, the commission would 
even emphasize new educational initiatives, especially ones that 
reach out across the Nation. These can be through modern 
electronic means, partnerships, traveling and collaborative 
exhibitions, and public programs. We stress the opportunities 
provided by electronic information technology and urge that 
they be made a priority throughout the institution. We can see 
the beginnings of that effort, in fact, in Speaker Gingrich's 
participation last week in the inauguration of the Smithsonian 
home page on the Internet as well as some of the things that 
Secretary Heyman has already mentioned to you this morning. 

Education is one of the four interrelated core activities of the 
Smithsonian. The other three are collections, research, and 
exhibitions. The commission believes that the collections that 
have been amassed over the last 150 years are central to all the 
activities and to the significance of the institution. But already 



104 

storage and care of the collections is a major headache because 
of limited space and funds. 

Moreover, the collections will not stand still. They will grow 
as the great events and discoveries of the future expand our 
Nation's history and accomplishments. A master plan for future 
collections management is essential. Criteria and timetables that 
are flexible with respect to intellectual and financial 
considerations will be needed. 

Without research, the objects in the collection are of little 
educational, cultural, or scientific value. This does not mean, 
however, that the way research is organized and carried out need 
be stagnant. America now has many excellent research 
organizations. The Smithsonian should emphasize its unique 
research opportunities, including the collections, areas of 
particular excellence, and long term global projects that are hard 
to do in other places. 

Outstanding research requires an excellent research staff. The 
commission asks whether the current rigidities of Federal 
personnel practices can be replaced by a more flexible system 
that better balances the interests of the institution and the 
individual researchers; for example, by facilitating temporary 
appointments of scholars interested in particular collections. 
This could help the institution face the often painful issue of how 
programs and people that have already realized their potential 
or failed in their tasks can be redirected or released. 

Priorities need to be established for restoration, renewal and 
expansion of existing permanent exhibitions. The need is acute. 
In addition, there are now so many specialized museums around 
the country that the Smithsonian can use its resources for unique 
exhibitions that are not possible in those other settings. 

Museums in general, and the Smithsonian in particular are, 
as we certainly heard this morning, increasingly flashpoints in 
the debates that characterize our Nation's transition from a 
society that depends for coherence on a single accepted set of 
values and practices to one that derives its strength and unity 
from a deep tolerance of diversity. This happens because 
museums, to fulfill their missions, must prepare exhibitions that 
record and illuminate this transition. Sometimes this engenders 
acrimonious and contentious debate. 

The Smithsonian's position, as we have seen this morning 
and in the past months, is especially challenging because it is a 
national institution. The commission suggests several ideas that 
might help forge a more tranquil path while still allowing a full 
and fair debate. For example, we hope that the institution will 
increasingly be recognized as an intellectual forum rather than a 
cultural or scientific authority, or even a home for 
congratulations. 

Also, a mechanism for broader and independent review of 
proposed exhibitions could be established, striving for balance 
between constructive judgments and criticism of an exhibition's 



105 

content and the desirable independence of the curators and 
scholars who are responsible for the exhibition. Such a process 
should distinguish between the need to protect the intellectual 
freedom of those individuals in their own scholarly work and 
publication and the public responsibilities of the Smithsonian in 
its exhibitions. Such mechanisms and others that we mention in 
the report could help release the tension within the institution 
regarding how it responds to the public, the Congress, and the 
media on controversial issues. 

Mindful of the programmatic issues, the commission 
addressed questions of governance, management, and financial 
need and resources. We recognize the ongoing need for the 
regents' guidance to the fullest possible extent. For this reason, 
we urge creation of standing committees of regents and that 
individual regents interface with one or more of the advisory 
boards to the museums and centers on a regular basis. 

We also suggest in our report, which echoes some of the 
things that were said this morning, that advisory boards be 
appointed for all the museums and centers, and that the regents 
define the role of those boards, thereby strengthening them and 
their ability to provide both the Secretary and the directors of 
the individual museums and centers with the advice and support 
they need as well as enhancing fund-raising capabilities. It is 
only by giving the advisory boards a clear and useful role that it 
will be possible to attract highly talented leaders from around 
the country to serve on them. 

The commission examined internal organizational structures 
and considered whether they were optimal for the coming 
decades. In particular, we were concerned with the appropriate 
balance of responsibility between the Secretary and the central 
administrative staff and the directors of the individual 
components. Each of the Smithsonian's major museums is the 
size and complexity of many independent institutions. Each has 
a different mission and a different culture. The Secretary must 
preside over all. Moreover, the Secretary also deals with an 
institution that depends both on public appropriations and 
private funds, including fund-raising. 

Built into any system this complex is the tension between 
central control and unit autonomy. There was broad agreement 
in the commission that in this situation much is to be gained by 
decentralizing decision-making authority. The more 
autonomous the decision-makers in the various museums and 
centers, the easier it will be to recruit outstanding individuals to 
lead those entities, and the better the resulting decisions. In 
addition, the decisions and the people making them will be more 
accountable. 

Of course, this oversimplifies a very complex matter. The 
commission recognized how difficult it is to weigh the cost and 
benefit of standardization against the potential payoffs from 
local initiatives, but we think this needs to be done. Obviously, 



106 

there are things the central administration must do. Foremost, 
the Secretary must articulate a broad vision and convey that 
vision effectively to the Smithsonian's various constituencies. 

The Secretary must guide the development of strategies and 
priorities with the advice of regents. Equally important are the 
responsibilities to attract and select the very best people to direct 
the museums and research centers and to allocate human and 
financial resources among the several units. The commission 
also points out ways to improve the assessment procedures in 
the institution in order to assure better quality. 

Virtually all of the commission's comments were made with 
an eye to assuring the future of this marvelous national resource 
in an era of stringent financial considerations. This is why, for 
example, we put so much emphasis on outreach by electronic 
means and partnerships with other institutions, museums, 
research centers, and K through 12 education programs rather 
than building new Smithsonian outposts around the country. 
Similarly, the commission calls for a moratorium on the 
construction of new museums in Washington except where firm 
legislative and financial commitments exist as in the case of the 
National Museum of the American Indian. 

Rather, we stress the need to devote resources to the 
rehabilitation and maintenance of the aging existing facilities. 
The magnificent vista along the Mall hides major needs for 
renovation, restoration, and modernization. Without prompt 
attention to this, the Smithsonian risks becoming a dilapidated 
monument to the past. We also believe that new exhibition space 
can be generated if facilities for the storage of collections were 
constructed outside of central Washington. This approach could 
also provide modern storage for precious items. 

Nevertheless, the growth of the Smithsonian in size and 
complexity over the past several decades has outpaced the 
resources available to sustain the high quality of the very 
programs that we all enjoy. This problem is exacerbated by 
inflation, by federally mandated expenditures such as pay 
increases, and a decrease in revenues from activities that depend 
on a healthy economy. Very significant decreases in staff and 
postponements of maintenance have already been made. This 
gap really needs to be made up if there is to be incentive for 
making the necessary difficult choices. 

Changes in federally mandated rules can, as I pointed out, 
help increase efficiency. At the same time, the commission 
stresses that additional expansion of the facilities and programs, 
even if the funds were available, is not necessarily the best way 
to assure the institution's critical role in our national life. 

Even with all these internal measures, the commission found 
that additional funds for operations and capital needs are 
required over and above the current budgets. We analyzed all 
possible sources of funds. We urge, for example, increased and 
optimized efforts to attract private funds. There was on the 



107 

commission substantial collective experience in fund-raising. 
We concluded that in the present economic climate of the Nation, 
even with the very best of efforts and maximum possibility of 
success, it is unrealistic to think that private fund-raising can 
meet the institution's needs. 

We also studied the financial implications of charging 
entrance fees. Our information suggests that it is highly 
problematic whether fees would generate really substantial net 
gains, especially in view of the virtual certainty that such fees 
would effectively discourage many Americans from visiting an 
institution that in fact belongs to them. We also offered 
suggestions for enhancing the yields of commercial enterprises, 
particularly by restructuring them to capture the advantages of 
entrepreneurial endeavors. 

But all of these efforts together will not do even the restricted 
job that we outline. The Smithsonian cannot achieve the Nation's 
expectations on its own. It requires the full understanding and 
support of the American people and the Congress. The actual 
incremental amount of funds needed is a very small proportion 
of the Federal budget; about $125 million annually. Currently, 
Federal Government appropriations amount to less than $1.50 
for each of the 262 million people in the country. If we could raise 
that to $1.96 — a bargain price to most Americans — the extra $125 
million would be available. 

The Smithsonian is the result of a lucky and glorious 
accident; James Smithson's gift. Parts of it are the result of 
subsequent generous gifts; the Freer and Sackler Galleries, the 
Hirshhorn Museum. We expect that other magnificent gifts will 
be forthcoming in the future. But the core of support must be 
from the Nation's people by appropriations and contributions. 

Like the expansion of our Nation, future expansion of the 
Smithsonian's programs must come from our human and natural 
resources, not from real estate. Our modern world offers ways to 
do this that past generations could not even imagine. By using 
them, the Smithsonian will assure its vital role as a teacher, a 
recorder, and a shaper of our vibrant national outlook. 

Thank you. Senator. 

[See Appendix VI for information on how to obtain a copy of 
the report of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian 
Institution.] 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. That is a positive note 
to end our hearings. We are very familiar with the commission 
that you chaired and want to congratulate you and the members 
of that commission for spending the time you did on the future 
of the Smithsonian. I have seen a copy of your report before, and 
I have another in front of me now. 

You did ask for establishing operating principles. You asked 
to establish a framework for setting institutional priorities, 
including regular meetings with assembled leaders of the 
museum and other Smithsonian components; to reinvigorate the 



108 

advisory boards and museums and other Smithsonian 
components; to engage citizens throughout the Nation. You 
urged the development of procedures for rigorous review and 
advice on plans for major new exhibitions to help ensure the 
quality and balance of the exhibitions as well as the integrity of 
staff scholarship. You have also asked that there be a procedure 
to establish priorities and to remember the lessons of history in 
terms of the value of research. 

I think this is a very wonderful report. My closing comments 
would be, Mr. Secretary, that I think I will still be chairman next 
year. We shall have an oversight hearing next year and we will 
want to hear from you, what you have done to comply with the 
commission's suggestions. They are some of the same 
suggestions we have had this morning. I think ours have been 
more subjective and theirs have been more objective; but as a 
practical matter, we are on the same wavelength. To assure the 
future of the museum you have to find some way to assure that 
controversies of the types we have been through in the last few 
years are avoided to the maximum extent possible. 

We are going to have conflicts within our society, but if 
people want to be revisionist, if people want to have an 
opportunity to have politically correct exhibits, then I think they 
should get private sector money to do it. As long as we are 
dealing with public money I think we have to be responsible to 
the public process. In effect, I think that is what Dr. Singer's 
commission is telling the Smithsonian. 

I also agree with her that we ought to find some way to 
increase the money that is flowing towards you. As I said, I do 
not expect that we can envision that in this 5 years ahead of us. 
It may be that we can work it out. I think that the budget 
proposals being considered by both houses reduce your funds. 
So as a practical matter, those of us who have tried to support 
the future of the Smithsonian have a tough job. 

I know a lot of you do not think I believe in the Smithsonian. 
I bet I have spent more time in the Smithsonian in my time here 
than any other Member of the Senate. We do not go and get you 
to take us through; we wander through with our kids or our 
friends. My friends who come in from Alaska all want to go to 
the Air and Space Museum. The one place they have to visit 
while they are here that is more relevant in our life than many 
Americans, is the Air and Space Museum. 

So I hope you will be ready a year from now, Mr. Secretary, 
to show us. With the assistance of my colleague here from 
Mississippi, I am sure that the board of regents will reflect a 
similar request — that we establish some procedures, particularly 
procedures for establishing priorities, and that we use these 
advisory committees for advice so we do not end up appearing 
to criticize you from committee tables like this. Instead we can 
go argue with our colleagues about increasing the money so you 



109 

can continue to do what we think is necessary with regard to the 
institution. 

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, may I make just a brief 
statement before you adjourn, if you are about to adjourn? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir, please do. 

Senator Cochran. I want to join you in commending Dr. 
Singer for her statement and for being here today to present this 
description of the excellent report of the Commission on the 
Future of the Smithsonian. I also want to compliment Dr. 
Heyman and Connie Newman for their contributions to our 
hearing, and to commend Dr. Heyman especially for his 
conscientious effort to take charge of this institution and set it 
on a course that responds not only to its historic mission, but to 
make it a more prominent national resource in the years ahead. 

Thank you. 

The Chairman. Thank you. I must tell you that on this 
committee, unfortunately for the chairman, every member is 
either chairman or ranking member on a full committee or an 
important subcommittee and we hardly ever have full 
attendance. 

We have had requests from several senators that we keep the 
record open for 10 days in order that they may submit questions 
to you for your response for the record. We also want to keep the 
record open for 10 days for additional statements from you or 
others who were witnesses, and we will review any other 
statements we receive in that 10 days to see whether they should 
be made a part of the record. 

Do you have any last comments. Dr. Heyman? 

Mr. Heyman. No, sir, I do not. I thank you for the attention 
you have paid and I look forward to seeing you next year. 

The Chairman. I hope I see Connie Newman sitting next to 
you next year, too. I hear vicious rumors she is about ready to 
leave us again and go somewhere else. 

Mr. Heyman. That is an absolutely vicious rumor. That is 
incorrect. 

The Chairman. The District of Columbia can get along 
without you, Ms. Newman. We need you where you are. 

Mr. Heyman. We might have to share her, but we are not 
going to lose her. 

The Chairman. I would not even share her. I think this is a 
critical period for the Smithsonian, Dr. Heyman. We know the 
plans you have for expansion of some of these museums, and we 
know the problem you have that has been mentioned by Dr. 
Singer that every Federal agency faces — the problem of 
accumulated maintenance and repair and upgrading. You 
certainly are going to be in the position of asking us for more and 
more money each year and I hope we can find it. 

But clearly, we have to establish some procedures that will 
get the public the greatest possible institution for the least cost. 
As Senator Ford said, the days of just approving your regents 



110 

without question and approving your budget request without 
question are unfortunately over. So we would like to work with 
you. 

Dr. Singer, as I said, I admire your work and that report. I 
wish we could send a copy of it to every American citizen as a 
matter of fact. It might help the institution. 

Ms. Singer. Sir, in response to that. The report is on the 
Internet. It is one of the things that is available through the 
Smithsonian home page. 

The Chairman. That is good. I agree with you also about 
using the Internet and World Wide Web. I think that through the 
Library of Congress you have the greatest access to the world 
that we have ever had. We want you to be able to continue to 
meet those demands, but also not neglect the preservation of our 
artifacts because of this incessant demand for information from 
the people who come onto the Internet. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:56 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 



[To obtain a copy of the script of the proposed exhibit, "The 
Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II," make 
your request in writing to Mr. James Douglas, Office of the 
General Counsel, Smithsonian Institution, MRC 028, 
Washington, DC 20560. Due to its substantial size, there is a 
charge of $37.00 to cover the costs of reproduction, binding and 
mailing. Make checks payable to the Smithsonian Institution.] 



Ill 



APPENDIXES 



APPENDIX I 



Martin Harwit 

511 H Street, SW 

Washington, DC 20024 

(202) 479-6877 

May 15, 1995 

Statement of Martin Harwit 

Former Director of the National Air and Space Museum 

For the Committee on Rules and Administration 

United States Senate 

104th Congress 

Hearings on 

The Smithsonian Institution's 

Future Management Practices 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

In testimony delivered before you on May 11, 1995, the National Air and Space Museum, 
and I, as its Director during the planning of the exhibition The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and 
the End of World War II, were accused of mounting an exhibition that dishonored the memory of 
the brave young Americans who fought for truth and liberty in World War II. We were accused 
of portraying the Japanese as victims and the United States as the aggressor. These are 
distortions of the record which must be retuted because they are an injustice to one of the nation's 
greatest museums. 

I attach four pages of detailed quotations from the final script of the exhibition as it stood 
on January 30, 1995, the day the exhibition was canceled They speak for themselves If members 
of the Committee doubt that they are representative of the document as a whole, the entire script 
can be made available, at the Committee's request. 

One further note may be in order. The American Legion's testimony accuses me of 
intending to "include unilateral changes to the script that violated agreements and understandings" 
reached with them I want to point out that I proposed the cited changes only on finding that a 
historian, whose research the script was quoting, had misinterpreted the minutes of a June 18, 
1945 meeting on casualties expected in an invasion of Japan ~ attributing to Chief of Staff Fleet 
Admiral William D Leahy, a casualty estimate which directly contradicted both Leahy's diary 
entry for that day and his later memoirs. Had I wished to perpetrate some kind of deceit, we at the 
Museum could have made the changes without immediately notifying the Legion. However, I 
knew of the Legion's interest and felt I should let them know, as soon as possible, that the label 
as previously discussed was now likely to be attacked as inaccurate. In concluding my letter to 
them I wrote, "If you have any concerns or comments, I'd greatly appreciate your letting me 
know." I do not know how else I could have broached the subject. 



Sincerely yours, 



112 



"THE LAST ACT: THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE END OF WORLD WAR II" 

The following are verbatim excerpts from the FINAL label 
script (Jan. 18, 1995) of the exhibition planned for the National 
Air and Space Museum. The exhibition was cancelled at the urging 
of critics who claimed that the script was "pro-Japanese" and 
"portrayed the United States as a racist aggressor and Japan as 
the victim" in the war. [Note: the first digit in brackets is 
the script section, followed by the page number. ] 

•Japanese expansionism was marked by naked aggression and extreme 
brutality. . .Civilians, forced laborers, and prisoners of war were 
subject to brutal mistreatment, biological experiments, and 
execution. [001] 

• [In] the Chinese capital of Nanking. . .Japanese soldiers went on 
an unprecedented rampage. Some 200,000 to 3 00,000 Chinese were 
slaughtered (more than were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
combined), and 20,000 women of all ages were raped. The staff of 
the German Embassy in Nanking reported on the atrocities and 
described the Japanese army as "bestial machinery." [005] 

• [Photo captions] (1) A December 1937 issue of the Tokyo Daily 
News reported that these two Japanese sergeants, competing in a 
contest, beheaded 105 and 106 Chinese civilians in Nanking. (2) 
Chinese being buried alive in Nanking. [005] 

•The Pearl Harbor attack plunged the United States into a just 
war against Japanese aggression in the Pacific. [007] 

•[Photo caption] Only 289 of the 1,466 men aboard the USS Arizona 
survived the attack. Of the 1,104 Navy men and 73 Marines 
killed, only 150 bodies were recovered. More than 900 others 
remain entombed in the hull of the ship. [007] 

•The Japanese were brutal toward the American and Filipino sol- 
diers captured at Bataan. . .More than 600 Americans and 5,000 to 
10,000 Filipinos perished during what became known as the March 
of Death. Of almost 20,000 Americans captured during the fall of 
the Philippines, over 40 percent would never return. [013] 

•[Photo captions] (l) Treated by their captors with a mixture of 
contempt and cruelty, American prisoners await their fate during 
the Bataan Death March. (2) American dead during the Bataan 
Death March. [014] 

• [Photo caption] A burial party prepares graves for fellow 
Marines who died during the battle on Bougainville. The fight 
cost the Marines 423 dead and 1,418 wounded. [025] 

•[Photo caption] American dead, Peleliu, September 1944. The 
Marines and Army suffered 9,804 casualties, including 1,794 dead. 
Only 301 of 10,695 Japanese surrendered. [038] 



113 



• [Photo caption] . . .Japanese troops systematically destroyed [Ma- 
nila] and slaughtered about 100,000 civilians out of a population 
of 1 million. Men, women, and children alike were burned to 
death, blown up, bayoneted, shot, or beheaded in their homes, 
hospitals, churches, schools, and streets. [044] 

•"In a shallow defilade to our right... lay about twenty dead 
Marines, each on a stretcher and covered to his ankles with a 
poncho — a commonplace, albeit tragic, scene to every veter- 
an... Every crater was half full of water, and many of them held a 
Marine corpse. The bodies lay pathetically just as they had been 
killed, half submerged in muck and water, rusting weapons still n 
hand. Swarms of big flies hovered over them." E.B. Sledae. 1st 
Marine Division, describing a scene on Okinawa. 1945 [105] 

• The Two-Thousand-Yard Stare by Tom Lea, a painting made during 
the vicious fighting on the island of Peleliu. Lea's note 
states: "He left the States 31 months ago. He was wounded in his 
first campaign. He has tropical diseases. . .He half-sleeps at 
night and gouges Japs out of holes all day. Two thirds of his 
"company has been killed or wounded... he will return to attack 
this morning. How much can a human being endure?" [114] 

•Starting in June 1945, American aircraft dropped millions of 
leaflets like this one over dozens of Japanese cities, including 
Hiroshima, warning people to leave cities that were to be bombed. 
The leaflets were intended to save lives and counter Japanese 
accusations of "indiscriminate bombing of civilians." [133] 

•The Japanese government turned to slave labor to ease severe 
manpower shortages and provide prostitutes for its troops. Some 
667,000 Koreans and 38,000 Chinese who had labor contracts to 
work in Japan ultimately became slave laborers or were forced to 
be "comfort girls." ...Protests were punished by beating, flog- 
ging, and execution. During the war, an estimated 67,000 Korean 
and Chinese laborers died in Japanese custody. By 194 5 some 
10,000 of almost 26,000 American prisoners of war had died or 
been executed. Those held in Japan were also treated as slave 
laborers. Like their compatriots in Japanese camps overseas, 
they were often starved, beaten, tortured and executed. [144] 

•Truman saw the bomb as a way to end the war and save lives by 
avoiding a costly invasion of Japan. He wanted, he said, to 
prevent casualties on the scale of "an Okinawa from one end of 
Japan to the other." [201] 

•...there is little doubt that if Japan (or Germany) had been 
able to construct such [an atomic] weapon, it would have been 
used against the Allies. [206] 

• [Truman] saw the atomic bomb principally as a means to end the 
war quickly and save American lives. [221] 

•American military intelligence [learned] in the summer of 1945 



114 



that the Japanese had achieved an alarming buildup of forces in 
southern Japan — precisely in the area American forces were 
scheduled to invade late in the year. Thus, despite the peace 
initiative, Japan was preparing to fight to the bitter end. [229] 

•Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb was based on saving 
American lives and shortening the war. [231] 

•Estimates of the number of American casualties — dead, wounded 
and missing — that the planned invasion of Japan would have cost 
varied greatly. In a June 18, 1945, meeting, General Marshall 
told President Truman that the first 30 days of the invasion of 
Kyushu could result in 31,000 casualties. But Admiral Leahy 
pointed out that the huge invasion force could sustain losses 
proportional to those on Okinawa, making the operation much more 
costly. Had the Kyushu invasion failed to force Japan to surren- 
der, the United States planned to invade the main island of 
Honshu, with the goal of capturing Tokyo. Losses would have 
escalated. [250-51] 

•After the war, Truman often said that the invasion of Japan 
would have cost half a million or a million American casualties. 
The origin of these figures is uncertain, but Truman knew that 
Japan had some two million troops defending the home islands. He 
believed, along with the many Americans who would have had to 
invade Japan, that such a campaign might have become, in his 
words from June 18, 1945, "an Okinawa from one end of Japan to 
the other." Added to the American losses would have been several 
times as many Japanese casualties — military and civilian. The 
Allies and Asian countries occupied by Japan would also have lost 
many additional lives. For Truman, even the lowest of the 
casualty estimates was unacceptable. To prevent an invasion and 
to save as many lives as possible, he chose to use the atomic 
bomb. [250-51] 

•[Document] These pages from the original minutes of the June 18, 
1945 meeting between President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff discuss the American losses expected in "Operation Olym- 
pic". On the second page. General Marshall endorses a figure of 
about 31,000 casualties for the first 30 days of the Kyushu 
invasion. , .On the third page. Admiral Leahy asks whether this 
figure is too low, based on the bloody battle for Okinawa. [252] 

• [Photo caption] For aircrew, capture meant imprisonment in 
horrible conditions and even execution. Like this Australian 
intelligence officer, Allied flyers were sometimes beheaded. 
[321] 

•A HERO' S RETURN . Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz awards Paul Tibbets the 
Distinguished Service Cross for his historic flight. [370] 

•This leaflet, warning of the atomic bomb, was dropped on Nagasa- 
ki and two other Japanese cities the day before the second atomic 
bomb. It was largely disregarded because the Japanese people did 



115 



not yet understand what had happened to Hiroshima. [374] 

♦ HIROSHIMA: A MILITARIZED CITY ...the Second General Headquar- 
ters, which was to plan and lead the defense against the expected 
American invasion, was established in Hiroshima. Supplies for 
Imperial forces in China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific had 
passed through the... port throughout World War II. [405] 

' NAGASAKI AT WAR . Nagasaki. . .was a major industrial center. One 
of the most important shipyards in the nation was located in the 
harbor. The great naval base of Sasebo was nearby. . .The city was 
also home to a variety of factories critical to the war effort, 
including the Mitsubishi Steel Works. The torpedoes used in the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 were manufactured in 
Nagasaki. [411] 

• "The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the 
Japanese war. It stopped the fire raids, and the strangling 
blockade; it ended the ghastly specter of the clash of great land 
armies." Secretary of War Henrv L. Stimson [501] 

•Prime Minister Suzuki told his American interrogators after the 
war that the atomic bomb had enabled his military colleagues to 
surrender honorably. To surrender when one's powers of resis- 
tance remained was dishonorable; to surrender to a force of 
overwhelming power was acceptable without loss of face. No 
brigades of children with bamboo spears, no kamikazi attacks, no 
spiritual strengths could overcome such might... The bombs dropped 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the prospect of more to come, 
compelled Japan to surrender, lest it be destroyed forever. This 
was the argument that Hirohito made in council to his government, 
and it ended the war. [511] 

• "When the atom bombs were dropped and the news began to circu- 
late that. ..we would not be obliged in a few months to rush up 
the beaches near Tokyo assault-firing while being machine-gunned, 
mortared and shelled... we broke down and cried with relief and 
joy. We were going to live. We were going to grow to adulthood 
after all." Paul Fussell. U.S. Army infantryman in Europ e, from 
"Thank God for the Atom Bomb" [512] 

•The introduction of atomic bombs and their first use at Hiroshi- 
ma and Nagasaki left a powerful legacy. For the Allies and 
Japan, a horrendous war was brought to an abrupt end. For the 
world, the new weapon was a double-edged sword. It offered both 
the hope of preventing another global war and the danger that a 
failure of deterrence could destroy civilization. . .The atomic 
bomb cannot be uninvented. But the atomic bombings that ended 
World War II provide grim evidence of the devastating potential 
of these weapons — and perhaps the most compelling reason why 
they have not been used since. [516] 



116 



APPENDIX II 



STATEMENT OF 
THE NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this committee: 

I am Evan S. Baker, president of the Navy League of the United 
States, a patriotic organization dedicated to educating the 
American people about the importance of sea power, both naval and 
commercial, and about the continuing need for a strong national 
defense program across the board. I thank you, on behalf of the 
Navy League and its more than 68,000 members throughout the United 
States and overseas, for inviting the Navy League to submit a 
written statement during these important hearings. 

My statement reflects my personal views. But I am convinced, 
from correspondence received at our national headquarters, and from 
conversations I have had with several past national presidents, 
most of our current national officers, and numerous Navy League 
council presidents, that it accurately reflects the views of the 
vast majority of our members as well. 

From the beginning, those members have been concerned, as I have 
been, with the way in which the Smithsonian Institution handled the 
Enola Gay exhibit — which, as originally planned, was not only an 
Insult to the dignity and honor of the many brave American and 
Allied servicemen who fought and died in the war with Japan, but 
also an affront to truth. Fortunately, this abortive attempt to 
distort truth and make it more politically correct was quickly 
recognized for what it was — a covert attempt by a small group of 
revisionist intellectuals to rewrite history to fit their own 
preconceived and devoutly held political agendas. 

Thanks to the alertness and public-spirited efforts of such 
patriotic organizations as the Air Force Association and the 
American Legion, these intellectuals eventually failed in this 
effort. It is nonetheless instructive to consider in detail what 
they were trying to do. By virtually ignoring the fact that Japan 
had started the war by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and by 
playing down both the Japanese record of atrocities throughout 
occupied Asia and the Japanese military's suicidal use of its own 
troops in last-ditch defenses of Saipan, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and 
other islands, they gave undeserved and disproportionate prominence 
to a number of revisionist theories and suppositions about supposed 
U.S. "responsibility" for the war in the Pacific and about 
President Truman's courageous decision to use the atomic bomb as 
perhaps the only way to end the war quickly, thus saving many 
hundreds of thousands of Japanese as well as American lives. 



117 



There were numerous other distortions in the planned exhibit of 
what really happened during the war- -and even more errors of 
omission. Following are but a few examples: The portraying of 
Japan's actions, particularly toward the end of the war, as simply 
a reaction to American "imperialism"; the glossing over of Japan's 
brutal attack on China, and other nations in the "Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere"; the outright murder of hundreds of thousands 
of Chinese and other Asian civilians, many of them women and 
children, both before U.S. entry into the war and on an even more 
massive scale during the war; the previously mentioned surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, a date that will remain 
in infamy; the prominent display of the anguished victims of the 
Hiroshima bomb — but no parallel display of the thousands of 
military prisoners tortured, mutilated, and killed — often by 
beheading — by the Japanese, or of the estimated tens of thousands 
of Asian women and teenage girls forced to serve the Japanese 
military as "comfort girls". 

I commend the Senate for its unanimous passage, on 23 Sieptember 
1994, of the Sense of the Senate Resolution Introduced by Sen. 
Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.), and I concur wholeheartedly in the 
Resolution language that describes the revised Enola Gay script as 
being, even with some minor cosmetic changes included, 
"revisionist, unbalanced, and offensive." And I commend the members 
of this committee for seeking to determine not only what happened, 
and why, but also what corrective actions might need to be taken to 
protect the public interest in any similar situations that might 
occur in the future. 

And there is a very real, extremely significant public interest 
Involved in what has become known as the Enola Gay controversy. The 
Smithsonian Institution receives 77 percent of its funding from the 
federal government and, while it operates with a remarkable degree 
of autonomy, is ultimately accountable to Congress and, through 
Congress, to the American people. Millions of Americans, and 
hundreds of thousands of foreign visitors, visit the Smithsonian 
each year. They have a right to expect that the exhibits they see, 
and the information they are provided — whether in print, visual, or 
graphic form--be both accurate in its content and balanced in its 
context. Neither the original Enola Gay script nor any of the 
several revisions drafted under the pressure of public outrage 
could reasonably be described as either objective or balanced. 

The decision made by the Smithsonian's senior officials to 
abandon any further attempts to revise the script and to scale down 



118 



the exhibit to a simple presentation, virtually without commentary, 
of a few artifacts, including part of the Enola Gay fuselage, may 
have defused the controversy to some extent, but it also, in my 
opinion, introduces an error of another kind. Rather than 
distorting history, it seeks to avoid history, insofar as possible. 



This policy is in my mind almost as reprehensible as the 
Smithsonian's earlier Enola Gay policy and once again perverts 
truth in the name of diplomacy and in the end will do much more 
harm than good. It is one thing simply to ignore the lessons of 
history — and we as a nation have done just that, many times in the 
past. It is another and much more serious matter to deliberately 
conceal history from ourselves and our posterity. 

Americans, and foreign visitors to our nation's capital, 
traditionally have regarded the Smithsonian's Museums as the 
storehouse of our nation's history. They do not expect the 
Smithsonian to allow itself to be corrupted by politically correct 
revisionists who seek to further their own preferred political or 
social agendas by distorting the presentation of historical events 
or eras. 

But that Is what has happened with distressing frequency — and 
specifically at the Smithsonian, which In recent years has allowed 
Itself to be used numerous times by special Interest groups, and 
which has displaced some of its major traditional displays for 
others of less historical significance, but which are deemed by the 
Institution's anonymous arbiters to be more socially or politically 
fashionable. 

But even that is not the worst aspect of the Enola Gay 
controversy. Danger to the institution aside, the real danger of 
this attempt to manipulate history is that it undermines the 
people's confidence in, and respect for, all public institutions. 
The Enola Gay issue is but one instance of what seems to be a 
continuing trend along these lines. Two other instances that 
immediately come to mind are the President's Pearl Harbor 
Commemoration announcement that made no mention of the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, and the more recent White House statement 
that the term "V-J Day" would not be used in U.S. observances 
commemorating the end of World War II in the Pacific. 

It has been reported numerous times that Americans are 



119 



frustrated and disillusioned with their institutions and 
government. If they are, it is at least partially because of the 
disrespect, bordering on contempt, for public opinion that is 
demonstrated by misguided and ill-advised attempts, such as those 
enumerated here, to manipulate and distort history. 

The American people have a right to insist that, if their tax 
dollars are going to be used to provide financial support for 
Institutions like the Smithsonian, those institutions display 
American history in a way that reflects mainstream American views . 
That Is not what happened In this instance. Instead, Smithsonian 
officials seem to have decided, in planning the original Enola Gay 
exhibit, that concerns over the sensitivities of the Japanese 
government outweigh the scholarly need for accuracy and the moral 
obligation to portray American decision makers of the WWII era 
fairly and in context. 

Today, Japan is an ally and friend of the United States. But it 
was not always so. History must reflect what was, not what certain 
intellectual elites think should have been, or what they would have 
liked it to be. This precept is desirable, if not legally 
enforceable, in privately funded museums; it is mandatory in 
museums, such as the Smithsonian, funded by taxpayer dollars. 

On behalf of the Navy League of the United States, I thank you 
again for the opportunity to comment on this important public 
issue. 



120 



May 15, 1995 



Chair and Members 
U.S. Senate Rules Comnittee 
Russell Bldg, Rm 305 
Washington, DC 20510 



Dear Ccxrmittee Members: 



As am individual, longtime member of the World War 11 Studies Association — 
formerly the American Comnittee on the History of the Second World War--I was deeply 
concerned by the inplications of the Smi thsonieiri Institution's intended, distorted 
depiction of the Asian Pacific War and our dropping of the atom bombs. (For an 
excellent article on Hirohima and the historical battles cibout it, please see Penn 
State professor Robert J. Maddox's "The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the 
Atomic Bomb," in the May- June 1995 issue of American Heritage magazine.) The 
exhibit text's intimation that Japanese militarism was simply a reaction to the 
racism of E>aropean colonialism would have been utterly ludicrous, considering the 
even worse racism the Japanese aggressors exhibited toward the Chinese and other 
Asian peoples they were supposedly "liberating"--to say nothing of the ruthless 
sexism demonstrated by their enslavement of Asian and European "comfort women." 

The Japanese' barbaric treatment of prisoners (and, on occeision, of their own 
would-be rescuers/captors) and their penchaint for suicide estciblished the savage, 
no-mercy tone of the entire war. Their Pearl Harbor "sneak attack," on a Sunday 
morning even while they were conducting peace negotiations in Washington, revealed a 
dimension of viciousness and treachery by the Japanese' governing militarists which 
earned the profound — if not permanent --rage and distrust of the American people and 
their leaders. 

Travesties like the Smithisonian's intended omission of these essential facts 
are not only bad history: coming from a governmental agency, they have additional 
weight and credibility. A distortion of the motives for our use of the atom bombs 
by an "official" historian/ agency, like this, can lead many Japanese people to 
consider themselves victims of the Allies rather than of their own militarists. 
This could relieve much of the Japainese people's postwar recrimination against 
militarism which has so far stifled any resurrection of that evil. 

Unfortunately, this kind of "emissive history" is becorrdng all too typical of 
the historical profession in the United States. At the American Historical 
Association convention in Chicago in January, I stood uf to challenge the "one- 
sided, hind-sighted, and all too "academic"' panel presentation on Hiroshima, 
chaired by Dartmouth professor. Dr. Marty Sherwm. (The panel's presenters abetted 
various "revisionist" claims: that the American people didn't support unconditional 
surrender, that a substantive Japanese peace overture had been made and was known to 
President Truman, that a primary reason the bombs were dropped was that their 
creators simply wanted to see if they worked--ergo, regardless of the human grief/ 
consequences--etc. ) 

While "liberal" professors probably outnumber "conservative" in academia, they 
have generally respected and encouraged a diversity of opinion in their classes, to 
judge by my own experience as a graduate student at Western Illinois University in 
Macomb. However, the new generation of historians teJ^ing over the profession 
exhibits far less perspective, balance, and tolerance, and "politically correct" 
history is proliferating throughout American education cind bureaucracies. This 
cancer to truth will require decisive measures to monitor and remedy. 



121 



EXfen on a few of the Internet discussion groups for academic historians, I have 
seen (and experienced) editorial hia^/censorship against conservative viewpoints, on 
occasion--despite the efforts of people (like "H-Net" organizer Richard Jensen of 
the University of Illinois, for examfile) to make sure issues like Hiroshima are 
being addressed in a balanced and tolerant msuiner . (The power of Internet is 
inestimable!, and it has moved the United States to the position of ultimate 
leadership of international academic/intellectual life. Congress would do well to 
support it fully, as a public works institution, while making sure that the open cuid 
balanced freedom of ideas eind expression is maintained.) 

To ftHA's credit, I was given fair opportunity to raise questions and 
participate frcni the floor. However, it is easy for some of the more extreme 
/outrageous "acadenvic exercises" being held there to be given undue credence in the 
media, at home and abroad. Indeed, Dr. Sherwin has made trips to Japan, presumably 
to publicize and coordinate his Hiroshima "teach-ins" being held on canpuses 
over here. 

Not to ftHA's credit, exasperation was expressed at our meeting of the World War 
II Studies Association--attended by such irdlitary history luminaries as Dr. Gerhard 
Weinberg and Marine Corps historian Ben Frank — about the conterrptuous way our 
request for a "50th anniversary" military history panel (on amphibious warfare) was 
denied by the AHA. (The "unofficial" panel put on by the World War II Studies 
Association itself, then, was excellent — including presentations on Carlson's 
"Marine Raiders," Tarawa, and other topics.) 

It is very easy for other countries and peoples to become confused and misled 
by the contradictory dialogues of our country's "open forum" approach to academic 
and political discourse and debate. Congress' passage of the prewar Draft by only 
one vote was a key factor which led Japanese militarists to believe that Americans 
wouldn't have the stomach to wage war in the Pacific and would capitulate to 
Japanese demands after a knockout blow at our Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

This is why I have proposed an International Historical Commission on the Asiar. 
Pacific War. (Please see the attachment.) It is irrportant that Pacific nations 
achieve a final "official" resolution and reconciliation of the truth about that 
tragic war and its various issues. Japan is on the verge of strategic superpower 
status, and it is vital that the Japanese people understand that it is not just 
Americans who need them to acknowledge and forswear--in their educational programs, 
as well as the rest of their society--the evil of their World War II militarism. 
Any veto by Japan of the historical findings of this commssion (or of the 
educational dissen-dnation of those findings) should directly impact any 
consideration of Japan for U.N. Security Council status. 

Thank you for your time and consideration cf my concerns. 

Respectfully 




Louis R. Coatney 
626 Western Ave. 
Macomb, IL 61455 
(309)836-1447 
mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu 



122 



Louis Coatney January 5, 1995 

626 Western Ave. 

Maconb, IL 61455 

309/836-1447 

rtis 1 r c^uxa . ecn . bgu . edu 

PROPOSAL: An International Historical Conmission on the Asian Pacific War 

Fifty years ago, the soldiers sind civilians of rrany nations died in the Pacific 
War. The peoples of China, the Philippines, and Japan suffered especially. The 
battles were many and reflected the bitter antipathy of the adversaries. 
Regrettcibly , much of that bitter amtipathy remains as a poison to Pacific nations' 
relations and future. 

The Japanese government eind educational system has frequently refused to 
acknowledge responsibility for the initiation of the Pacific War or for atrocities 
perpetrated by Japanese militarists against not only Allied servicepeople but also 
against civilians in Asian lands. Filipino deaths alone, due to Japanese atrocities 
and the war, have been estirrated as high as one million. Instructional emission or 
misrepre-sentation by Japanese educators of important Pacific War events like "The 
Rape of Nanking" (1937) have raised international concerris. 

Meanwhile, some people believe the American dropping of the atom bombs to have 
been unjustified and to have been crimes against humanity as serious in principle as 
any others in the Pacific War. In the United States, the intellectual Left is 
marshalling its forces to prove Hiroshirra was an unnecessary and possibly racist 
tragedy. This may lead Japanese to consider themselves victims of the Allies rather 
than of their own militarists, and it could relieve much of the postwar public 
feeling and pressure against militarism in Japein which hais so far stifled any 
resurrection of that monster. 

Similarly, rumors of Allied atrocities — against Okinawan civilians in 1945, for 
exarple — should be investigated objectively and resolved fairly. 

In general, the German people and government have done far more to remember and 
condemn the aggression and atrocities of the Nazis, than the Japanese have done m 
regard to In^erial Japanese militarism. Recent revelations in Russia about the 
Soviet Union's aggression and atrocities during World War II have shown a 
willingness by Russians to face some unpleasant truths about Soviet conduct and its 
consequences . 

In 1991, lingering bitterness led some American veterans to refuse Mitsuc 
Fuchida--the strike comnnander of the Japanese naval air squadrons which attacked 
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941--direct participation in the 50th year rriemorial 
service. This happened despite Fuchida's postwar conversion to Christianity and l^.v 
repentance for his role in that massacre of 3,000 young Americari servicemen and 
civilians. An important opportunity for reconciliation was lost. 

In America, the World War II generation rightly takes great pride in having woi. 

"The Just War"- -sometimes even overlooking credit due to the World War I generation 

for its leadership and planning. However, the "blood, sweat, toil and tears" of the 

actual battles and victories will all be lost , if their cruelly earned lessons are 
distorted and/or forgotten. The true history of war is the most important memc.'.ia; 

to those who have suffered the ultimate price for it. As survivors of the Jewish 

Holocaust would tell us, "Never again!" means "Never forget!" Thus we are now 
engaged in a second World World War 11: for the Truth. 



123 



The Proposed Coiimssion 

I therefore suggest that an international historical comnission be convened to 
investigate the basic facts and issues of the Asian Pacific War, to achieve a final 
resolution of those, and to produce a basic position paper and video presentation 
for continuing dissemination to students of all the participating countries by their 
governments. A similar commission constructively addressed historical differences 
between the Polish and Soviet peoples in the mid-1980s. 

With regard to war efforts, roles, and losses, the comnnission should be 
conposed of five major, voting blocs: China, Japan, Pacific Rim Allies, other 
nations /peoples of Asia and Oceania, and European Allies. Each bloc could exercise 
veto power against any final consensus. However, in view of the United Nations' 
birth from the struggle against Axis militarism and aggression, Japan's exercise of 
its veto power on this historical cammission should directly and decisively irrpact 
any present or future consideration of it for membership on the UN Security Council. 

Although, logically, historians should make up most of the delegations' 
membership, room should be allowed for actual veterans, journalists, etc. Members 
should be truly reprentative of their countries and selected by their national 
legislatures. Decisions within the blocs could be by simple or two-thirds majority. 
The blocs' membership could be composed as follows: 

China : 15 members 

People's Republic of China and Hong Kong 10 
Republic of China 5 



Japan and Okinawa 



12 



Pacific Rim Allies 12 

Canada 1 

Russia/ Comnonwealth of Independent States 1 

United States 10 



Other Asian and Pacific nations: 
Australia 
Philippines: 
Burma 
India 
Indochina 
Indonesia 
Malasia 
New Zealand 
North and South Korea 
Oceania 

Pakistan/Bengl adesh 
Singapore 
Thailand 



16 



European Allies 
France 

Great Britain 
Netherlands 



62 



A country could request membership in a different bloc. 

For membership in the United States delegation, for exarrple, I would expect 
Congress to draw heavily from a professional association like the World War II 
Studies Association. 

Questions, criticisms, and conments on this proposal are welccme. 



I 



124 



FACTS ON W.W. II AND JAPAN RELEVANT TO HEARINGS ON 
SMITHSONIAN EXHIBIT 

FROM: VICTOR FIC 

TOKYO CORRESPONDENT 
ASIAN DEFENSE JOURNAL 

TRUTHS ABOUT HIROSHIMA 

1) THE IMPERATIVE OF ACCURACY 
Hiroshima was such a pivotal event in human history that it 
will still spur discussion centuries from now. I would like to 
contribute to a proper interpretation of the bombing because: 

a) the men who ordered and carried out the bombing have a right 
to be judged fairly, and not be wrongly considered guilty of 
errors and crimes for ages to come. In any free society, a 
person has the inalienable right to be declared guilty or 
innocent according to the evidence, and those who wield the gavel 
have an obligation to ensure objectivity and fair-mindedness. 
But surely these nostrums have added significance in this case, 
as an unfounded condemnation could lead to the blackening of a 
name for ages hence. 

b) humanity must understand the accurate moral and political 
lessons of the bombing, such as the inherent dangers of despotic 
rule, the suicidal ramifications of mindless conformity, and the 
need for good to resist evil. If propaganda or falsehoods reign, 
future generations will lack the clear lenses for seeing the 
diplomatic and moral challenges they face. 

c) Japan wants a warped interpretation of the bombing to prevail 
to buttress its immoral conviction that it was the victim of 
American racism and aggression in the war. Opposing Japan on 
W.W. II is important to me simply because: 

i) any professional analyst must seek the truth; 
ii) the prevailing Japanese view of Hiroshima and W.W. II is 
driven by a self-pity and an Orwellian propensity to manufacture 
"truth", among other dysfunctional values (please note enclosed 



125 



short articles on this theme) . These characteristics will not 
encourage Japan to be a responsible actor on trade, security or 
human rights issues. Whenever Japan displays these tendencies, 
whether on Hiroshima or car imports, the U.S. must signal to 
Japan that it will be exposed and rebuffed, firmly yet fairly, 
in the name of veracity, stability or equity. 

2) THE CORRECT VIEW OF HISTORY 
i) Why Japan Would Not Surrender 
a) Social Structure Promotes Public Fictions and Conformity 

Revisionist historians assert that in mid-1945, Japan was 
"already defeated and on the verge of surrender", or words to 
such effect. This is not true. 

The revisionists cardinal error is assuming that the 
Japanese think and feel like Americans do, and so were about to 
exit the war because of their depleted military might and 
widespread suffering. That is, they made a rationalistic 
cost/gain/risk calculation, undergirded by norms that exalt life 
over death, compromise with foes and diplomatic pragmatism. 

The simple truth is that the Japanese have always behaved 
like Japanese. Japanese society even in peacetime is 
intrinsically conformist in the name of harmony, the supreme 
virtue. People face intense social pressures to maintain 
societal taboos, think, speak and behave like others (some 
Japanese high schools, in the 1990 's, still force girls with 
natural red or brown hair to carry cards certifying that they did 
not use dye to look different) . They are socialized from birth 
to perceive and to espouse the public fiction and to keep secret 
- very secret - their sense of the reality behind that fiction. 



91-056 0-95-5 



126 



The public facade is known as "tatemae", while the sincere 
conviction is called "honne". 

During the war, these social values assumed pathological 
dimensions. While many in 194 5 knew or suspected that Japan 
lacked the weapons and men to win, they suppressed their 
sentiments. Instead, they acted on the public, nation-wide 
fiction that Japan, with its samurai spirit and divine 
protectors, would defeat the mongrel-raced Americans. 

Japanese are not Americans - their radically dissimilar 
social structure and mass attitudes have a 1,500 year history. 
It is intellectually debased to speculate or predict what the 
Japanese would have done in 1945 by imputing to them a value 
system derived from Judeo-Christian ethics, the legacy of the 
Western European enlightenment, and the individualistic spirit 
of post-agrarian America. 

b) Paranoid Fear of the Americans 

Yet another factor compelling the Japanese to resist to the 
bitter end was the propaganda that had made the entire nation 
paranoid about their post-defeat fate. The authorities had 
drummed into the people's heads that when American troops land, 
they will forcibly prostrate women and children in a line and 
crush them under tanks. Obviously, this hideous scenario would 
induce people to pray to the war gods for superhuman prowess - 
unless unfathomable force, rendered more painful because of its 
surprise value, made capitulation seem like the lesser of two 
evils. 

c) The Japanese Hero is Self-Abnegating 



127 



For centuries, Japanese literature, drama and philosophy 
have propagated the ideal of the self -abnegating hero. The 
archetypical American hero follows his conscience, is true to 
himself, and is willing to confront a disapproving majority. 

However, the Japanese hero is someone torn between duty to 
the self and to the group, be it the family, business firm, 
military unit or nation. He agonizes over the choices, generally 
in a private world, before ultimately submerging his 
inclinations, even those rooted in primordial human instinct for 
survival and comfort, for the collective. Japanese is full of 
proverbs that warn that American-style heroes will be castigated; 
"the nail that sticks up gets hammered down" is the best known, 
and is told to kindergarten students. 

To be sure, the Japanese model of the hero, held explicitly 
or implicitly in the minds of millions, bred a "never surrender" 
outlook. The kamikaze pilots were the very apotheosis of this 
ideal: many wrote regretfully about their imminent death, their 
natural desire to return to their sweethearts, and the 
hopelessness of the kamikaze strategy. Some even had to climb 
into the cockpit drunk to force themselves to overcome their love 
of life and revulsion at a futile self-annihilation for the 
group. But almost none of them abandoned their post, or turned 
back; virtually every one elected to make the fiery crash that 
snuffed out his young life the very symbol of his love for Japan. 

It required unbearable pain in the form of the atomic bombs 
for this ideal to be supplanted with the elemental urge for 
survival and comfort. 

d) Survival is Shameful... 



128 



A corollary to the hero model is the notion that Japanese 
people who escape suffering should feel embarrassed or even 
ashamed. The West also has the phenomenon of survivors guilt, 
but in Japan, this emotion is infinitely more commonplace and 
embedded in the minds of average people. Survivors of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki have written or said that they felt extremely guilty 
that they had survived the bombings to the point of wanting to 
hide away. 

This psychology also colored views of the home front towards 
the soldiers still fighting in the Pacific. It was a powerful 
impediment to the masses choosing life through surrender, given 
the privation that their rifle-bearing sons and brothers were 
enduring, and the misery of their fellow citizens being pounded 
by hordes of deadly B-29 bombers. 

e) The Left Wing Joins the Fight 

As the militarists seized power in the 1930 's, and during 
W.W. II, the Japanese left not only failed to protest and oppose 
what it was seeing, it actively supported the new jack-booted 
regime headed by Tojo. Japanese communists, including Stalinists 
and Trotskyites, labor leaders, pacifists and intellectuals 
underwent the process of "tenko" . This means a dramatic 
recantation of beliefs, involving the soul as well as the mind, 
and the embracing of a previously opposed ideology. For about 
twelve years, ending in 1945, the left jettisoned its principles 
to herald the dawning of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. 

Of course, in American politics, one can also cite instances 
of defections. But the Japanese example is different in degree 
and implication: hardened leftists, champions of international 



129 



socialist revolution and world peace, became among the most 
impassioned defenders of an imperialistic war that left some 30 
million Asians dead. 

Admittedly, some leftists never defected; they suffered 
social persecution, torture and execution. Others broke down 
under ghoulish torture. But a great many abandoned their life 
long commitment to proselytizing socialism and pacifism. They 
asserted in their public utterances, diaries, articles and 
broadcasts that they realized they had been like errant children, 
but were now rushing to be embraced again by the warm and tender 
arms of the national Mother. 

Along with the leftists, Christian groups, centralist 
intellectuals and journalists also advocated the national war 
aims. A few retreated into hapless silence as a means of non- 
violent resistance. The Buddhists' conformity was especially 
appalling, as Japan was then killing co-religionists in countries 
- China and Korea - that were the very womb and cradle of 
Japanese civilization. Imagine Americans uncritically supporting 
the United States in the 1940 's as the Marines feverishly 
massacred the British, forced British women into prostitution, 
and conducted diabolical medical experiments on British 
prisoners. 

There are several conclusions to be drawn: 

a) the forces of conformity were so powerful in Japan as it 
fought the war that they overrode almost every deductive, moral 
principle derived from religion, ideology or intellectual theory. 

b) if even Stalinists were willing to support the emperor system 
and an imperial war, it is safe to surmise that the average 
Japanese person, inculcated with nationalistic propaganda from 



130 



birth, was even more of a die hard. This observation does not 
point to the conclusion that the Japanese were on the verge of 
making a rational decision to surrender in 1945, when there were 
still 80 million people on the home front, armed with weapons, 
driven by patriotism mixed with wrenching fear. 

ii) Why Truman Could Not Guarantee the Emperor 
Several historians, like Professor Barton J. Bernstein of 
Stanford, have argued that Japan was putting out peace feelers, 
and that it would have quit the war if the U.S. had agreed with 
the Japanese request that the emperor system be preserved. This 
view is wrong. 

It would have been impossible for Truman to back away from 
the pledge made by all allied leaders at the war's outset, and 
again at Potsdam, for an unconditional surrender of fascism. He 
could not have left in power a man, namely Hirohito, denounced 
as an Asian Hitler any more than Churchill could have agreed to 
a Nazi capitulation on the proviso that Hitler would remain the 
undisputed leader of Germany. 

True, after the war, Hirohito was left on the throne. But, 
by then, passions had cooled: America had won the war; the 
fascist dragon was dead for good in Japan and elsewhere; the 
emperor was needed as a figurehead to implement the Occupation; 
and the public's attention shifted rapidly to demobilization and 
prosperity at home. Finally, Americans were prepared to manifest 
the magnanimity and generosity towards defeated opponents which 
is a hallmark of the American character. 

iii) Casualties from Invasion 



131 



Invasion deaths would have been astronomical . At the very 
least, 400,000 men would have died, because Tokyo had ordered the 
wardens of p.o.w. camps to slaughter all prisoners upon an 
invasion. Even if not a single invading allied soldier have been 
killed, the prompt death toll among the Western armies would 
still have been four times higher than the 100,000 or so who died 
instantly at Hiroshima. 

There is also ample evidence that the Japanese were planning 
a defense to the death of their homeland. Kenzaburo Oe, the 
Nobel prize winning writer, for example, has written that after 
Emperor Hirohito made his surrender broadcast, Japanese people 
began to wrap up swords and hunting rifles, which they furtively 
buried in forests. He has recalled how high school students 
practiced charging at straw dummies with pointed bamboo poles. 
And he recollects that when teachers asked him as a boy what he 
would do if Emperor Hirohito commanded him to die, he shouted, 
"I would cut open my belly." 

The very survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have asserted 
in books like Hiroshima and The Bells of Nagasaki that they were 
swinging sharpened bamboo spears in the days before the atomic 
attacks, and that they never thought they would hear their divine 
leader calling upon the benighted "fatherland" to surrender. 
These same survivors have been lionized as heroes by the so 
called peace movement, but in fact, they were ardent supporters 
of fascism; they were willing to commit suicide in resisting the 
expected American invasion, taking with them to the next world 
as many Marines as they could skewer eight inches above the 
testicles. The atomic bombings, however tragic and gruesome, 
saved countless numbers of American - and Japanese - lives. 



132 




istorians' 

ommittee for Open Debate on Hiroshima 



Co-Chaiis 

KaiBird 

Martin J. Sherwin 

Executive Director 
Laura C. Yamhure 

Gar Alperovitz 

Joyce-Appleby 

Scott Annstrong 

Barton J. Bernstein 

[>ougLas Brinkley 

Noam Chomsky 

Bruce Cumings 

John Dower 

Carolyn Eisenberg 

Thomas Ferguson 

EricFoner 

Catherine Fbrslund 

Carole Gallagher 

Irene Gendzler 

Todd Gidin 

Stanley Goldberg 

Fraser Harbutt 

James Hershberg 

Walter L Hbcon 

Joan Hoff 

Stanley Hoffman 

Michael J. Hogan 

Richard Immcrman 

Michael Katrunen 

Stanley N. Katz 

Michael Kazin 

Linda K. Kerber 

Walter LaFebcr 

William Lanouette 

Melvyn P. Leffler 

Robert Jay Lifton 

Edward T. Unenthal 

Leon F. Litwack 

EMsdlla Johnson McMillan 

Robert L. Messer 

Greg Mitchell 

Gary B. Nash 

Tom Powers 

Richard Rhodes 

Leo Ribuf fo 

Ruth Rosen 

Emily F. Rosenberg 

Norman L. Rosenberg 

Michael Schaller 

Deborah Shapley 

Gaddis SnUth 

Anders Stephanson 

Charles Weiner 

Jon Wiener 

Blanche Wiesen Cook 

Alfred Young 

Marilyn B. Young 



May 18, 1995 



Sen. Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

Committee on Rules & Administration 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 



Dear Sen. Stevens, 

With the undierstanding that the Committee has 
agreed to -accept written statements for the record, 
we wish to submit the enclosed memo and several 
published articles. The memo is a chronological 
analysis of the Washington Post's coverage of the 
Enola Gay/Smithsonian controversy. The memo 
demonstrates how the media in general has 
inappropriately framed the debate over the 
Smithsonian's planned exhibit on the Enola Gay. It 
was recently sent to the Washington Post, whose 
editorial director, Meg Greenfield, replied to us in 
a letter dated May 10, 1995 defending her newspaper's 
editorials. (Since then, this copy of the memo has 
been slightly edited for two minor factual errors.) 

Given the fact that you have found time for only 
one historian to testify in proceedings which are of 
a major concern to professional historians, we 
request that these materials be printed together with 
any other testimony pertaining to this Senate 
hearing. 



Sincerely, 




^ai Bira & Martin Sherwin 
Co-Chairs 



1914 Biltmore Street, NW • Washington, DC 20009 
phone: (202) 328-9659 • fax: (202) 332-4919 • e-mail: kai@apc.org 



133 
May 18, 1995 

Washinoton Post Coverage of the Enola Gay Controversy 

(Submitted by the Historians' Committee for Open Debate on 
Hiroshima to the Senate Rules and Administrative Committee 
Hearings on the Smithsonian Institution.) 

Summary ; 

The Post's coverage of the Enola Gay was unbalanced: the 
newspaper reported the controversy as a dispute between thousands 
of veterans — armed with their irrefutably authentic memories — and 
a handful of wooly-headed curators. The Smithsonian's curators 
are described as men of a younger generation who never saw 
combat, and in some cases were not even American-born or citizens 
of America. The curators, according to the Post, were influenced 
by left-wing revisionists, the anti-Vietnam war movement and a 
latent anti-Americanism. The script they produced was 
sympathetic to the Japanese and painted the Americans as villains 
in a "war of vengeance." In the Post's coverage, historians were 
rarely quoted, and the historical evidence was rarely cited. 
(See the attached quotes from various archival documents and 
memoirs which are well known to any university student studying 
the end of the Pacific war, but which were never quoted in the 
Post's reporting on this controversy over a contentious 
historical event.) In stark contrast to the Post, the New York 
Times editorialized that the curators should be left alone to do 
their job, and the Times reporters frequently quoted both 
historians about the controversy and quoted from some of the key 
archival documents. 

Chronology of Articles with Commentary 

May 31, 1994: Guy Gugliotta reports that "curators also are 
contending with skeptical veterans..." The basis of the story is 
the fact that the editor of Air Force Magazine . John T. Correll, 
has accused the museum of "politically correct curating." 
Gugliotta interviews Martin Harwit, the director of the museum 
and one of the curators, Tom Crouch. But no historian of the 
Hiroshima decision is quoted. Gugliotta concludes his reporting 
by saying, "...it is clear the museum will continue to have 
difficult and perhaps impossible time presenting any atom bomb 
display that will satisfy the vets. This is probably 
understandable. A sizable percentage of American males spent 
nearly four years of their youth getting frightened out of their 
wits in horribly unpleasant places because of Imperial Japan. 
Forgive, maybe. Forget, never. On the other hand, for the 
United States a nation that has never been fire-bombed, strafed. 



134 



napalmed, rocketed or mini-gunned in anger, there is something to 
be said for an exhibit that suggests that warplanes are not 
simply expensive sporting devices to be used for movie props or 
flyovers at presidential funerals." 

July 21, 1994: Eugene L. Meyer writes in his lead sentence, "The 
Smithsonian Institution has failed to mollify critics of its 
controversial exhibit..." Correll, Harwit and Crouch are again 
guoted. Richard Hallion, an Air Force historian is quoted as 
being critical of the planned exhibit. But Meyer fails to report 
that Hallion, who was a member of the exhibit advisory board of 
historians, had previously approved the museum's basic draft 
script of January 1994. In written remarks given to the museum, 
Hallion actually wrote of the script, "Overall, this is a most 
impressive piece of work, comprehensive and dramatic, obviously 
based upon a great deal of sound research, primary and 
secondary. " 

Several other veterans are quoted, including Col. Paul W. 
Tibbets. Retiring Smithsonian Secretary Robert McC. Adams, is 
reported as raising guestions about the exhibits balance. But no 
other historians are quoted. Meyer flatly asserts, "In fact, 
some military planners estimated upwards of 800,000 American 
casualties would result from a planned two-stage invasion in the 
fall of 1945 and spring of 1946." When queried over the phone 
about where this figure came from, Meyer said it came from an Air 
Force document. But a phone call to the Air Force historian who 
provided the document revealed that the document in question was 
written in 1994 and was merely this Air Force historian's 
personal estimate, extrapolated from casualty rates suffered 
during the battles of Okinawa and Iowa Jima. Kai Bird sent a 
letter to the editor correcting this "fact" but it was never 
published. Shortly after Meyer's piece was published, Kai Bird 
sent him a copy of J. Samuel Walker's survey of the scholarly 
literature on the Hiroshima bombings, published in Diplomatic 
History . Meyer never referred to the Walker essay in any of his 
subsequent reporting. As chief historian for the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Walker is certainly not a revisionist, but 
he concluded in his survey of the scholarly literature, "Careful 
scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over 
the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why 
the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan. 
Experts continue to disagree on some issues, but critical 
questions have been answered. The consensus cimong scholars is 
that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to 
end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that 
alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers 
knew it. . . It is certain that the hoary claim that the bomb 
prevented one-half million American combat deaths is 
unsupportable. " Meyer decided this expert opinion was not 
newsworthy, even to provide a context for the debate taking place 
between the veterans and the museum's curators. 



135 



August 7, 1994: Martin Harwit Op Ed piece. 

August 14, 1994: Washington Post Editorial attacks Harwit, the 
Smithsonian and "fashionable and wrong academic notion that all 
presentations of complex issues must be politically tendentious." 

August 14, 1994: Five letters to the editor are published, 
including one by John T. Correll, the editor of Air Force 
Magazine. All five letters are critical of the exhibit. 

August 19, 1994: Charles Krauthammer, columnist, charges that the 
museum has "fallen to the forces of political correctness and 
historical revisionism. " 

August 23, 1994: Chalmers M Roberts, retired Post reporter, 
publishes Op Ed, justifying atomic bombing based on casualty 
estimates given Truman in the event of an American invasion. 

August 30, 1994: Ken Ringle reports Smithsonian acts to "defuse 
criticism." Ringle quotes Congressman Peter Blute, a critic of 
the museum, the Wall Street Journal, Smithsonian Secretary Adeiros- 
--and not a single historian. Worse, he repeats a factual error 
published by a Wall Street Journal editorial of the previous day. 
The Journal editorial found it "especially curous to note the 
oozing romanticism with which the [exhibit's] writers describe 
the k£unikaze. . .suicide pilots [as] 'youths, their bodies 
overflowing with life.'" Ringle reproduces this quote from the 
Journal in its entirety. The quote "youths, their bodies 
overflowing with life" is attributed to the curators, when 
actually this is a quote from a written Japanese source, which 
the curators were using in an attempt to explain how the Japanese 
militarists motivated such young men to volunteer for these 
suicide missions. It is an outrageous distortion to attribute 
this quote to the curators, and clearly demonstrates that Ringle 
once again has not read the script. 

Sept. 30, 1994: Eugene Meyer reports "Smithsonian Bows to 
Critics..." Quotes Harwit, American Legion internal affairs 
director Hubert R. Dagley II, Air & Space Museum spokesman Mike 
Fetters, an aide to Sen. Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.), Rep. Peter 
Blute, Stephen P. Aubin (communications director of the Air Force 

Association and one historian. Gar Alperovitz. The historian 

quoted. Gar Alperovitz, is the author of Atomic Diplomacy , one of 
the major critical studies of the Hiroshima decision. But Meyer 
did not bother to identify Alperovitz and merely quoted him 
innocuously saying that the Smithsonian was bowing to "a great 
deal of pressure." Meyer also reports as fact, "Earlier scripts 
had glossed over the estimated losses from a two-stage invasion 
of the Japanese home islands..." This was incorrect. Meyer's 
report leaves the impression that the Smithsonian was merely 
correcting an historical script which "some critics believed 
would portray the Japanese as innocent, even noble victims of 



136 



Americans hellbent on revenge •for Pearl Harbor." Again, no 
reading of the first, second or third scripts could possibly 
leave any one with this impression. Meyer does not seem to have 
read the scripts, and has instead relied on the Air Force 
Association's and American Legion's characterization of the 
scripts as sympathetic to the Japanese. 

Sept. 20, 1994: Colman McCarthy, columnist, says that while he is 
of the opinion that the United States "committed unprovoked war 
crimes that caused the slaughter of 200,000 Japanese, mostly 
civilians .. .But I hold with deep regard the feelings of those who 
see Hiroshima and Nagasaki differently." Paraphrasing David 
McReynolds from the War Resisters League, McCarthy then suggests 
that "debating the history of 1945 is futile." 

Sept. 26, 1994: Ken Ringle: reports in a front-page story that "2 
Views of History Collide Over Smithsonian A-Borab Exhibit." 
Ringle says that for the curators who designed the exhibit the 
Hiroshima decision is "old history, a scholarly abstraction 
composed of archival records, argumentative books and the fading, 
flickering images on black and white film. For veterans like 
Grayford C. Payne, 74, of Annandale, who survived the Bataan 
death march... and slave labor in five Japanese prison camps, it 
was something else." Ringle then quotes Payne on how there was a 
notice posted in his POW camp signed by Japanese Prime Minister 
Hideki Tojo. The notice announced that all POWs would be shot 
the moment American forces landed in Japan. Payne is then 
quoted as saying that is why "all of us who were prisoners of war 
in Japan. . .revere the Enola Gay. It saved our lives." Powerful 
reporting, you might say, except for the fact that by the time 
the Enola Gay dropped its weapon on Hiroshima, Tojo had been 
ousted as prime minister for nearly four months. Ringle doesn't 
report this fact, or the fact that the Truman Administration's 
Japanese experts, including Acting Secretary of State Joseph 
Grew, had characterized the new Japanese government as being led 
by a moderate faction opposed by the hardline militarists. For 
Ringle, the only history that counts is the view from the foxhole 
(or the POW camp); what the President of the United States might 
be saying in his diary or what his aides might be telling the 
president about how to end the Japanese war is "old history, a 
scholarly abstraction composed of archival records, argumentative 
books..." And certainly for Ringle there is no space in his 
reporting for any description of that archival evidence. 

Ringle reports, "The first script ... laid heavy emphasis on 
the horrors of the atomic bombing, little on the Japanese 
aggression and atrocities that produced it." This is stated as 
fact when it is clearly Ringle's opinion. Again, any one who has 
read the entire script would be hard put to come to this 
conclusion, which suggests that Ringle, like Meyer, probably 
relied on the veterans' characterization of the script. Recall 
that even Air Force historians Richard Hallion and Herman Wolk 
initially praised the early script. 



137 



Ringle's long piece quotes Harwit, the various curators. 
Secretary Adams, Harry Truman's memoirs (but not his 
contemporaneous diary). Air Force historian Richard Hallion, the 

Air Force Association and David McCullough. The author of a 

highly admiring biography of Harry Truman, McCullough is quoted 
at length. Martin Sherwin, the author of the critically 
acclaimed A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand 
Alliance , is not quoted, but is referred to by curator Tom Crouch 
as having thought that "any display whatever of the Enola Gay was 
obscene because it would amount to a celebration of the bombing." 
Ringle does not bother to identify Sherwin as the author of a 
book which Time magazine called "definitive" and which is used in 
many college courses on the end of the war. (Sherwin was a 
member of the museum's historical board of advisors.) 

Instead, Ringle chooses to quote McCullough at length 
justifying the bombing based on the argument that Truman was 
given high casualty estimates which persuaded him that the bomb 
would save lives. Ringle does not report in this story or any 
where else that McCullough has gone on the record to retract a 
crucial footnote in his book which wrongly suggested that Truman 
was given a military estimate of 500,000 to one million lives 
saved if an invasion was avoided. McCullough incorrectly 
attributes this archival document to say that it "shows that 
figures of such magnitude were then in use at the highest levels" 
when in fact the document in question actually shows that 
military leaders at the highest levels labeled such figures as 
exaggerations. Since the veterans groups often relied on 
McCullough 's book to sustain their critique of the Smithsonian, 
this is no small matter. Ringle never addresses it in his 
reporting. (Note, however, that a reporter for Defense Week , 
Tony Capaccio, published a piece which reported all of the above 
facts about McCullough's retraction.) 

Neither can Ringle claim ignorance. Like Meyer, he too was 
sent a copy of the J. Samuel Walker survey of the scholarly 
literature. He neither responded to a letter from Kai Bird nor 
referred to any of the scholarly literature cited by Walker in 
his reporting. 

Ringle's piece also contains basic errors of logic: he 
reports for instance that the initial script "devotes many pages 
to academic speculation about whether the bomb was really 
necessary to force a Japanese surrender." Logically, however, 
the same word--"speculation"--can be used to describe the entire 
argument of those veterans who say there would have been an 
invasion if the bomb had not been dropped. Both arguments rest 
on a "what if." The invasion of the Japanese home islands never 
happened. But historians have documented that many of Truman's 
aides were telling him that the Japanese were ready to surrender. 
That did happen, and should have been treated by Ringle as part 
of the historical evidence and part of any historical context for 
an exhibit attempting to depict what happened at Hiroshima. 

Ringle further suggests that the first script failed to note 
that the Strategic Bombing Survey--which concluded that the 



138 



Japanese would have surrendered without the atomic bomb, without 
the Soviet entry into the war, and without an invasion--was 
"based" on the "escalation of massive conventional 
f irebombing. . . " This is simplistic. A decision was made to end 
the firebombing of cities late in the summer of 1945, partly 
because the U.S. Army Air Force was running out of suitable 
targets, and partly because military planners has concluded that 
it would be more effective to target railroads. (see USSBS 
report, "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy" 
released in December 1946, p. 65, footnote 13.) 

Instead of reporting the controversy as a debate over 
historical evidence , Ringle chooses to report it as a 
"generational" conflict between veterans who have authentic 
memories and a younger generation motivated by their anti-Vietneira 
war sentiments and their fear of atomic holocaust. 

In short, Ringle is clearly biased in his reporting; he is 
determined to portray what the veterans remember as historical 
"fact" and what the historians write as "scholarly abstraction" 
at best and "left-wing", "anti-American" and "historical 
revisionism" at its worst. Again, why is your reporter 
ostensibly reporting on an event of historical controversy, 
refusing to interview and quote the historians who have studied 
this issue? 

October 16, 1994: Gar Alperovitz, op ed on the "historians' new 
consensus." The first piece published in the Washington Post 
which gives their readers any sense of the historical scholarship 
on this issue. Notice, however, that the editors of the Outlook 
Section decide to package the Alperovitz piece with another Op Ed 
by Chalmers Roberts, entitled, "Our Boys or the Bomb?" (This is 
Roberts' second op ed piece on the subject.) 

October 21, 1994: Eugene Meyer reports that "anti-war activists" 
are now weighing in on the controversy. He reports, "Until now, 
the anti-war counter-attack has been mainly in the form of 
letters to the editor and Op-Ed page pieces that have appeared 
in recent weeks in the New York Times and the Washington Post . " 
Here, Meyer is vaguely referring to Op-Eds written by Kai Bird in 
the Times and Alperovitz in the Washington Post ? These are the 
only Op Eds published on this issue and Meyer labels them "anti- 
war." Why? Why are either historians--who happen to have written 
important books in the field that deal with these is6ues--labeled 
as "anti-war"? Like Ringle, Meyer clearly wants to suggest that 
critics of the Hiroshima bombing, even if they be historians, are 
nevertheless motivated by some kind of generational, 1960s anti- 
war sentiments. (For the record, Alperovitz 's book was written 
in the early 1960s and published in 1965, long before the anti- 
Vietnam war movement was more than blip on the horizon. In 1965- 
66, Alperovitz was an official in the State Department.) 

November/December issue of Bulletin of Atomic Scientists : Eugene 
Meyer writes a signed opinion piece on the Enola Gay controversy. 



139 



Meyer says the veterans groups were right, the museum's script 
needed to be rewritten. 

Nov. 18, 1994 - Eugene Meyer: "Academics Blast Revised Script" / 
Meyer reports on news conference organized by historians critical 
of the museum's cave in to "historical cleansing." Here is 
Meyer's opportunity to give the other side, but his reporting is 
brief and perfunctory. He does not bother to report the news — 
contained in the letter released at the press conference — that 
the Executive Board of the Organization of American Historians 
has issued a forceful condemnation of the Smithsonian's action. 
He doesn't report that even conservative historians — including 
historians like John Lewis Gaddis who believe the Hiroshima 
bombing was probably necessary — signed the letter protesting the 
museum's censorship. No effort is made to report any of 
historical evidence used by critics of the Hiroshima bombing: 
Eisenhower is not quoted. Admiral Leahy is not quoted, Truman's 
diary is not quoted. All these quotes were referred to by the 
historians at this press conference. But in the judgment of 
Meyer, this was not news. 

Nov. 30, 1994: Robert P. Newman, Op Ed, "What New Consensus?" 
attacks Gar Alperovitz's previous op ed, taking up a full half- 
page. 

Dec. 16, 1994: Eugene Meyer / reports on "peace activists" 
meeting with Air & Space Museum officials and their 
disappointment with the results of the meeting. 

Jan. 19, 1995: Eugene Meyer, reports "veterans asked museum to 
cancel the Enola Gay exhibit." Meyer reports: "But in the 
months since, critics of the early exhibit scripts have grown 
increasingly restive as some historians and anti-war groups have 
mounted a counter-attack, meeting with curators and holding news 
conferences to denounce what they termed 'historical cleansing.' 
At least one of those contacts bore fruit when Barton Bernstein, 
a Stanford University academician , convinced Martin Harwit, 
director of the Air and Space Museum, that the anticipated 
casualty figures in the revised exhibit text were too high." 

Jan 20, 1995: Washington Post editorial: describes the 
Smithsonian becoming "bogged down from the first in denunciations 
of its incredibly propagandistic and intellectually shcUaby early 
drafts and then in denunciations of the denunciations from 
defenders of those drafts on the other side." The editorial goes 
on to describe the initial drafts as "tendentiously anti-nuclear 
and anti-American." 

"...Never mind how a museum of the Smithsonian's stature and 
seriousness could have slipped into the absurdity of negotiating 
its labels. What it needs to do now is clear this mess off its 
screen... Get a couple of respected historians of the period, a 
military expert or two and some people who know about mounting 



140 



good exhibits , and charge them with getting a reasonable 
commemorative exhibit to the museum. " 

The editorial writers seem unaware that what they are 
proposing actually happened: initially, the museum had a few 
knowledgable curators write a script in consultation with a board 
of historical advisors representing a broad range of views and 
institutional constituencies. 

Jan 20, 1995: Ken Ringle and Eugene Meyer: report that three 
congressmen are calling for Harwit to resign, calling the exhibit 
script an "insult" to veterans. The story casts Harwit 's 
predicament entirely from the perspective of the veterans groups: 
"For more than a year, veterans groups and others have charged 
that the Enola Gay script written by Harwit and other Air and 
Space Museum curators tends to present the Japanese as hapless 
victims of American aggression and racism in World War II instead 
of as militarists who brought on the atomic bomb by starting the 
war." This characterization of the script, and the debate, is 
factually inaccurate and slanderous. But since it is what the 
veterans organizations think, perhaps it should be reported. But 
why didn't Ringle and Meyer report what other parties to this 
dispute think? Why was no effort made to balance this statement 
by quoting a historian? If they had picked up the phone and 
'asked Martin Sherwin, who sat on the museum's advisory board for 
the script, they could have easily obtained a quote which would 
have provided some balance. Or any of a dozen other historians 
who have written on this subject and followed the Enola Gay 
controversy. But this is typical of Ringle 's and Meyer's 
reporting. They could have reported that from the perspective of 
a great many knowledgeable individuals. Dr. Harwit was clearly 
being hounded by a biased interest group (the American 
Legionnaires) and several right-wing, know-nothing Congressmen 
who haven't read any books on the subject and have no idea what 
they are talking about. But they preferred to report what these 
politicians said as fact. 

Jan 26, 1995: George Will, columnist, praises the Washington 
Post's coverage of the Enola Gay controversy, which should be 
prime evidence of bias: "Washington knows what the Smithsonian is 
up to, thanks to the reporting of the Post's Ken Ringle and The 
Post's editorials." 

Jan 27, 1995: Eugene Meyer: "Smithsonian May Drop A-Borab Exhibit" 
Meyer reports, "When Harwit lowered the number [the casualty 
estimate number], based on a single historian's interpretation of 
one document, the American Legion last week demanded cancellation 
of the entire exhibit." Meyer is suggesting that Harwit 
capriciously amended the casualty estimate, and did so based on 
the advice of merely one historian. He fails to report that 
Harwit really had no choice unless he wished to consciously 
include in the exhibit a "fact" which he now knew to be untrue. 
Meyer fails to report that the historian in question. Barton 

8 



141 



Bernstein, is the author of the single roost authoritative journal 
article on this rather narrow and obscure question: what was 
Harry Truman told about casualty estimates and when? His work on 
this question has been thoroughly debated and inspected and still 
is considered the authoritative judgment on the matter. Meyer 
completely misses a great story here. He could have reported how 
Bernstein persuaded Harwit. It was in fact quite dramatic. 
Bernstein turned to Harwit in the November meeting with the 
delegation of historians and said, "We have our documents [on 
this casualty estimate question], where are yours to justify your 
figure?" Harwit had to admit he didn't have any documents. To 
suggest, in this context, that Harwit was caving in to the 
opinion of merely "one historian" is an outrageous distortion of 
what happened. 

Jan 30, 1995: Eugene Meyer: an admiring profile of Paul Tibbets: 
"Target: Smithsonian / The Man who dropped the bomb on Hiroshima 
wants Exhibit scuttled." This piece is full of invective against 
"revisionist arguments" and makes no attempt to balance its 
admiring portrait of an admittedly likeable guy (Tibbets) with 
any questions about his obviously questionable view of historical 
events. It is a presentation of history from the perspective of 
the foxhole (or in this case, the cockpit) with no attempt to 
portray how the battle looked from the perspective of those 
making decisions in the White House. It is one-sided. For 
ex£unple, Meyer writes, "'It was a beautiful military target,' 
Tibbets says, referring to Hiroshima. It sounds harsh, but this 
is above all a military man speaking. " A military man speaking? 
This is a great quote and Meyer is fully right to include it. 
But what are the facts? He quotes Tibbets saying Hiroshima was 
"the center of everything being done to resist an [Allied] 
invasion." Now is this true? What do historians think of this 
assertion? Well, if Meyer had called any of the historians who 
have written any of the books on this subject in the last twenty 
years, he would have been told that Tibbet's assertion was 
questionable, debatable at the very least, and probably an 
outright falsehood. Hiroshima did have some munitions factories 
on the outskirts of the city. But Tibbets was instructed to 
target the bomb on the center of the city. Hiroshima did contain 
one military headquarters for one of the home island armies. But 
its militairy significance can be judged by the fact that the city 
remained at the bottom of the Air Force's target list throughout 
the war. Hiroshima, in fact, beceime a target for the atomic bomb 
precisely because of its low military significance; it had been 
untouched by previous bombings and was therefore an ideal target 
on which to demonstrate the destructive force of the new weapon. 
Meyer is clearly ignorant of all of this. In his ignorance he is 
reduced to being a pure propagandist for an official version of 
history. 

Jan 31, 1995: Eugene Meyer: "Smithsonian Scuttles Exhibit" 

Meyer quotes the reaction of one military historian, one 



142 



member of a "peace group" but no historians of the atomic 
bombings. They are clearly irrelevant. 

Feb. 1, 1995: Washington Post editorial: "The Smithsonian Changes 
Course" This editorial begins by admitting that the 
cancellation "is an intellectual abdication..." But the edit 
then says, "It is important to be clear about what happened at 
the Smithsonian. It is not, as some have it, that benighted 
advocates of a special interest or right-wing point of view 
brought political power to bear to crush and distort the 
historical truth. Quite the contrary. Narrow minded 
representatives of a special interest and revisionist point of 
view attempted to use their inside track to appropriate and 
hollow out a historical event that large numbers of Americans 
alive at that time and engaged in the war had witnessed and 
understood in a very different --and authentic--way. " In fact, 
the Post editorial writer got it backwards. The know-nothings 
did use political power to distort history, and worse to censor 
historical documents from a tax-payer funded museum. Why they 
did so with the support of The Washington Post's editorial board 
is a mystery. 

Feb. 1, 1995: Joel Achenbach : "The Pablura Museum" In an 
otherwise funny feature on the cancellation, this reporter 
writes, "For some reason academics have a natural lefty bent. 
They're intellectual southpaws: They throw left, catch left, 
teach left, think left. What is considered left by most people is 
considered orthodox in many academic circles. Gar Alperovitz, a 
historian who argues that it was unnecessary to drop the bomb on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, contended yesterday that his view is 
raainstreeim in academia." He then quotes Alperovitz, and 
concludes, "Regular people don't want to see America trashed at 
the Air and Space Museum." This is all very amusing. 
Unfortunately, its affect is Joe McCarthy doing a comic routine. 
The aim here is clearly to marginalize Alperovitz, label him as a 
lefty, anti-American, intellectual insanely bent on trashing 
America. It warns readers that anyone with such historical views 
risks being labeled in the same manner. 

Feb. 4, 1995: Gar Alperovitz, op ed, "taking exception" replies 
two months later to the attack on him in Robert Newman's Nov. 
30th op ed. It is certainly commendable that the Post found room 
to publish the author of one of the classic books on the decision 
to drop the bomb. But by using only Alperovitz, and by not 
soliciting op eds from Sheirwin, Goldberg, Messer, et al. they 
make it easier for to suggest that Alperovitz is a party of one. 
(Why, for instance, didn't the editors or reporters of the 
Washington Post interview McGeorge Bundy or ask him for an op ed 
on? If they had, they would have learned that Bundy, the author 
of the first defense of the bombing decision, published in 
Harper's in 1947, now has retracted much of what he wrote nearly 
fifty years ago. That would have been interesting and news- 

10 



143 



worthy. But it would not have fit into the perspective the Post 
editors obviously wanted to push on the Enola Gay controversy.) 
This is hammered into the reader of Alperovitz's reply by 
the fact that the Post editors decided to package his piece with 
yet another Op Ed by Edwin Yoder, Jr. entitled, "...Or Hiroshima 
Cult?" Yoder 's thesis is a continuation of Acherbach's comic 
McCarthyism. For Yoder, who is actually relying on Newman, those 
historians who are critical of the Hiroshima bombings are merely 
part of a "Hiroshima Cult." "Those who are content with cults, 
whether celebratory or derogatory, will worship as they like. 
Those who want history will read Newman." Yoder regurgitates 
Newman's thesis that "revisionist views of Harry Truman and the 
atomic bomb sprang from the tragic national division over 
Vietnam..." In fact, revisionist arguments about the bomb began 
much earlier and ceune directly as a consequence of the 
declassification or release from private archives of such 
critical pieces of archival evidence as Henry Stimson's diary 
(released by McGeorge Bundy in 1960) and Harry Truman's diary 
(discovered in 1978), Yoder's piece is merely a McCarthyite 
attempt to label critics of the Hiroshima decision as 
illegitimate. (Does Yoder believe Mac Bundy — or for that matter, 
Gen. Eisenhower — is part of this "Hiroshima Cult"?) 

Feb. 7, 1995: Colman McCarthy, columnist, commenting on the 
cancellation, McCarthy writes, "Faced with posturing politicians 
and ranting militarists, the Smithsonian caved. . .Why this 
catering to American Legionnaires and similar groups who demand a 
one-sided version of history?" 

Feb. 19, 1995: James Van de Velde, Op Ed, "Enola Gay Saved Lives, 
Period. " 

March 30, 1995: Eugene Meyer attends a panel discussion and press 
conference on the Enola Gay controversy at the annual meeting of 
the Organization of American Historians. But he publishes 
nothing. A tape-recording of this event is available and clearly 
demonstrates that this was an electrifying event attended by over 
three hundred historians who listened as a panel of historians 
lacerated the Smithsonian's censorship and the Washington Post's 
shoddy reporting. A letter with over a hundred signatories 
calling for a national teach-in on Hiroshim was released. 
Another letter was released by a delegation of Japanese 
historians which called for exhibits in Japan depicting Japanese 
atrocities during the war and exhibits in America depicting the 
tragic victims of the world's first atomic bombing. None of this 
was reported on by Meyer. 

April 15, 1995: Washington Post editorial: "Apologies for 
Hiroshima?" The editorial writers assert without any evidence, 
"The chances of an early and voluntary surrender in the homeland 
were poor." They argue, "The nuclear bombs were a success in the 
crucial sense that they were followed by an immediate end to the 

11 



144 



fighting with no further American deaths." No apologies are 
necessary and President Clinton need not have even added the 
"cautious qualification" that President Truman made the correct 
choice 'based on the facts he had before him.'" In other words, 
there should be no doubts raised about the decision. 

*********** 



12 



145 

istorians' 
I ommittee for Open Debate on Hiroshima 



QUOTES EROM VARIOUS DOCUMENTS AND MEMOIRS ON HIROSHIMA 



Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chair of the Joint ChieCs of Staff 

It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was 
of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already 
defeated and ready to surrender... 

My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical 
standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in 
that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children...' 



Joseph C. Grew, Undersecretary/Acting Secretary of State 

The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that 
this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the 
institution of the Throne. If some indication can now be given the Japanese that they 
themselves, when once thoroughly defeated and rendered impotent to wage war in 
future, will be permitted to determine their own future political structure, they will be 
afforded a method of saving face without which surrender will be highly unlikely. 

The President said that he was interested in what I said because his own thoughts had 
been following the same line....^ 



Shmiichi Kase, Japanese Mister to Switzerland 

A May 12, 1945 memorandum from O.S.S. Chief "Wild Bill" Donovan to President Harry S 
Truman detailing an approach by the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, notes that Kase 
reportedly: 

believes that one of the few provisions the Japanese would insist upon would be the 
retention of the Emperor as die only safeguard against Japan's conversion to 
Communism. Kase feels that Under Secretary of State Grew, whom he considers the 
best US authority on Japan, shares this opinion.' 



1914 Biltmore Street, NW • Washington, DC 20009 
phone (202) 328-9659 • fax: (202) 332^19 • e-mail: kaiOapcxirg 



146 



General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 

The first full public statement by Eisenhower (beyond the brief mention in Crusade in 
Europe) is contained in the book the president wrote immediately after leaving office, his 
1963 Mandate for Chanee . In it Eisenhower also recalled the meeting at which Stimson told 
him about plans to use the bomb— and added the following information: 

During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of 
depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief 
that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely 
unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking 
world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer 
mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at 
that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of "face." 
The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude, almost angrily refuting the 
reasons I gave for my quick conclusions." 

In an interview with Newsweek reporter Jacquin Sanders Eisenhower said: 

We'd had a nice evening together at headquarters in Germany, nice dinner, 
everything was fine. Then [Secretary of War Henry L.] Stimson got this cable saying 
the bomb had been perfected and was ready to be dropped. The cable was in code, 
you know the way they do it, "The lamb is born" or some damn thing like that. So 
then he told me diey were going to drop it on the Japanese. Well, I listened, and I 
didn't volunteer anything because, after all, my war was in Europe, and it wasn't up 
to me. But I was getting more and more depressed just thinking about it. Then he 
asked for my opinion, so I told him I was against it on two counts. First, the Japanese 
were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing. 
Second, I hated to see our country be the first to use such a weapon. Well ... the 
old gentleman got furious. And I can see how he would. After all, it had been his 
responsibility to push for all the huge expenditure to develop the bomb, which of 
course he had a right to do and was right to do. Still, it was an awful problem.' ' 



Army Air Force General Henry H. Arnold 

In his 1949 memoirs Gen. Arnold observed that 

...it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese 
were already on the verge of collapse.' 

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War 

Byrnes was opposed to a prompt and early warning to Japan...' 



' Emphasis and ellipsis boih in the original. 

Historians ' Committee 

for Open Debate on Hiroshima 



147 



Harry S Truman, President 

After his initial pre-conierence meeting with Stalin on July 17— and after Stalin reported on 
his negotiations with Chinese Foreign Minister T.V. Soong on the Yalta understandings 
concerning the Far East-the president observed: 
Most of the big points are settled... 

Truman then went on to record Stalin's confirmation that: 
He'll be in the Jap War on August 15. 

Finally, the president noted his own judgment: 
Fini Japs when that comes about.' 

The next day Truman wrote in a private letter to his wife: 

... I've gotten what I came for— Stalin goes to war August 15 with no strings on it. 
He wanted a Chinese settlement-and it is practically made-in a better form than I 
expected. Soong did better than 1 asked him. ...I'll say that we'll end the war a year 
sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed! That is the important thing.' 

The president's journal entry of July 18, 1945: 

P.M. [Churchill] & I ate alone. Discussed Manhattan (it is a success). Decided to 
tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for 
peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold 
up before Russia comes in.'° 



Ralph Bard, Undersecretary of the Navy 

Ralph Bard is the only person known to have formally dissented from the use of the atomic 
bomb without advance warning. In a June 27, 1945 memorandum Bard declared: 

Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the 
bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning 
for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a 
great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is 
responsible in the main for this feeling. 

During recent weeks 1 have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese 
government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a 
medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this 
country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and 
make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them 
some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever 
assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and 

Historians' Committee 

for Open Debate on Hiroshima Page 3 



148 



the treatment of the Japanese nation following uncx>nditional surrender. It seems quit 
possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking 
for." 



John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War 

At Potsdam, John J. McCloy heard of another Japanese peace feeler, this time delivered to 
Allen Dulles, the U.S. O.S.S. representative in Geneva. As Dulles reported it, Tokyo was 
hesitating only over the term "unconditional surrender": 

They wanted to keep their emperor and the constitution, fearing that otherwise 
a military surrender would only mean the collapse of all order and of all 
discipline...'^ 

John J. McCloy diought this report so significant that he had Dulles flown up to Potsdam to 
report personally on the peace feeler. He noted in his diary of July 27, 1945: 

Maybe the Secretary's big bomb may not be dropped-the Japs had better 

hurry if they are to avoid it. " 

On May 28, 1945 McCloy recommended tliat the phrase "unconditional surrender" be 

eliminated: 

I feel that today Japan is struggling to find a way out of the horrible mess she 
has got herself into;... Unconditional surrender is a phrase which means loss of 
face and I wonder whether we cannot accomplish everything we want to 
accomplish in regard to Japan without the use of that term....'* 

McCloy later recalled that the day before the June 18, 1945 White House meeting: 
I said, Mr. Stimson, it seemed to me that we were now at a point where our 
superiority was so vast over the Japanese; there were no more cities to bomb, no 
more carriers to sink or battleships to shell; we had difficulty finding targets; we had 
this tremendous moral and physical ascendancy which resulted from our win in 
Germany and our moving across the Pacific from the treachery of Pearl Harbor to th< 
very doors of Japan; and I thought there must be some other means that ought to be 
explored in terminating the war without further bloodshed.... he said he was inclined 
to think that this was right.... '^ 

McCloy expressed ethical concerns about the bomb: 

God give us the intelligence and character to use it for good purpose.'* 

We should have given the Japs warning at least of what we had.'^ 



Historians ' Committee 

for Open Debate on Hiroshima Page 



149 



General of the Army George C. Marshall 

In a memo dated May 29, 1945, Marshall stated that the atomic bomb should: 

first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation....'* 

And that if the Japanese still did not capitulate: 

we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which people 
would be warned to leave— telling the Japanese that we intended to destroy such 
centers.... every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear.... We must 
offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from ill- 
considered employment of such force..." 

Leo Szilard, Manhattan Project Physicist 

Mr. Byrnes did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the 
cities of Japan in order to win the war.. .Mr. Byrnes's...view [was] that our 
possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russia more manageable 
in Europe..." 



Historians' Committee 

for Open Debate on Hiroshima Page 5 



150 



ENDNOTES 

1. Reel Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Suff to Presidents 
Roosevelt and Truman. Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, NY; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, loc., 1950), p. 441. 

2. Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years 1904-1945. Vol. n (Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 1429-1431. 

3. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers . 1945, Vol. VI, p. 481. 

4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change. 1953-1956 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 
Inc.), pp. 312-313. 

5. "Ike on Ike," Newsweek . November 11, 1963, pp. 107-110, cited material on p. 107. 

6. H.H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1949), p. 598. 

7. Stimson Diary, July 17, 1945, Stimson Papers, Yale University. 

8. Roben H. Ferrell, ed.. Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Penguin, 1982), 
p. 53. 

9. Roben H. Ferrell, ed.. Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman. 1910-1959 (London: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1983), p. 519. 

10. Robert H. Ferrell, ed.. Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Tnmian (New York: Penguin, 
1982), pp. 53-54. 

11. Memorandum on the use of S-1 bomb, Ralph A. Bard, June 27, 1945, File 77. Roll 6, H-B Files. M1108, 
National Archives; reprinted in Stoff, Fanton, Williams, The Manhattan Project , p. 162. 

12. Allen Dulles's foreword to Per Jacobsson's pamphlet The Per Jacobsson Mediation. Balse Centre for 
Economic and Financial Research, ser. C, no. 4, published about 1967, on file in Allen Dulles Papers, box 22, 
folder John J. McCloy 1945, Princeton University. 

13. McCloy Diary, July 27, 1945, McCloy Papers. Amherst College Archives. 

14. Memorandum for Colonel Stimson, from John J. McCloy, May 28, 1945, Stimson Safe File, (Japan), Entry 
74A, RG 107, National Archives. 

15. John J. McCloy interview with Fred Freed for NBC White Paper, "The Decision to Drop the Bomb," 
(interview conducted sometime between May 1964 and February 1965), Roll 1, p. 11, File 50A, Box SP2, 
McCloy Papers, Amherst College Archives. 

16. McCloy diary, 7/21/45, DY box 1, folder 18, John J. McCloy, Amherst College Archives. 

17. "Dr. Freeman's Impressions," McCloy diary, box DY 1/3. folder 19, John J. McCloy; Amherst College 
Archives; McCloy interview with Kai Bird, Sept. 14, 1984. 

Historians' Committee 

for Open Debate on Hiroshima Page 6 



151 



18. John J. McCloy, 'Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshall, May 29, 1945-11:45 a.m.," 
Sdm-.a Safe File (S-1), RG 107, National Archives. 

19. John J. McCloy, "Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshall, May 29, 1945-11:45 a.m.," 
Stimson Safe File (S-1), RG 107, National Archives. 

20.Leo Szilard, "A Personal History of the Atomic Bomb," University of Chicago Roundtable . No. 601 
(September 25, 1949), pp. 14-15. Sec also Gar Alperovitz. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New 
York, NY: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 290. 



Historians ' Committee 

for Open Debate on Hiroshima Page 7 



152 



The Nation. 



May 15. 1995 



^ FORGETTING THE BOMB 

The Assault 
On History 

MARTIN J. SHERWIN 

On January 30. 1. Michael Hcyman, Secretary of (he 
Smithsonian Institution, bowing to pressure from 
veterans' organizations and Congressional critics, 
announced the drastic revision of a controversial 
exhibit at the National Air and Space Museum. "The Last 
Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II " Per- 
haps no other public controversy in recent times demonstrates 
so clearly how much influence the sensibilities of 1945 still 
have on the politics of 1995, and how fifty years of the cold 
war have kept the need alive for Americans to be defined by 
World War II and. in turn, to protect its reputation. 

To Americans, the defining characteristic of World War II 
was its lack of ambiguity. It was not just "the good war," 
it was the model war, the ideal war. the unifying war. Most 
Americans, public opinion polls conclusively demonstrated, 
were happy about how it ended. The atomic destruction of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed an appropriate and just 

fmale to a war against a vicious enemy that had launched a 
surprise attack on American territory 

But that atomic ending soon raised troubling questions. 
John Mersey's Hiroshima created sympathy for the victims. 
Reports that the Japanese had been seeking ways to surren- 
der created doubts about the necessity of using atomic bombs. 
Hanson Baldwin, military editor of The New York Times. 
Norman Cousins, cdiior of the Saturday Review of Literature . 
and David Law rencc. editor of C/S. News, discussed alterna- 
tives 10 boih ilic iiiomic bombings and an invasion 

By the fall of 1946 questions about the atomic bombings 
had become so prevalent that James Conant, the president of 
Harvard University and the former senior science administra- 
tor of the Manhattan Project, urged former Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson 10 write an article explaining why the atomic 
bombings were both justified and necessary. Stimson's anicle. 
"The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," was published in the 
February 1947 issue of Harper's Magaime. Arguing that the 
bomb was used to end the war quickly m order to save Ameri- 
can lives. Stimson neglected to make reference to the manv 
notations in his diary — which he otherwise relied upon — ihai 
suggested the advantages of using the atomic bomb during 
the war in order to deal more effectively with the Soviet Union 
afterward. Nor did he comment in this article— as he did in 
his autobiography published a year later— on the option of 
ending the war just as quickly, without using the atomic bomb, 
by modifying the demand for unconditional surrender. "It 
IS possible, in the light of the final surrender." Stimson wrote 
in Ort Active Service in Peace and War. "ihai a clearer and 
earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Em 
peror would have produced an earlier endinf; to the war" 
(Emphasis added.) The suggestion that the war could have 
ended earlier, without the use of the atomic bomb, was as 
upsetting in 1947 as it is in 1995. 



The ambiguities introduceij into the discussion of the atomic 
bondi in 1946 by Herscy, Baldwin, Cousins, Lawrence and 
Slimson, among others, were quickly submerged by the rising 
tide of the cold war, McCarihyism and the Korean War. The 
cold war foiced everything that questioned "the good war" 
inioihc far left corner of our political basement. The critical 
hlsioncs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that were written were 
either ignofd by the mainstream press or tainted as leftist and 
revisionist. The natural discussion of thisimportani issue was 
sliflctL Thus the battle over the Enola Gay exhibit was not 
a debate over interpretations of history. It was, as Edward 
LinenihaJ has written, a struggle between popular memory 
and history, between the commemorative and (he hislorical, 
cut off by fifty years of ►he cold war. 

I was a member of the historical advisory board for the 
Enola Gay exhibit. My strong impression of the first draft of 
thescnpt fof the exhibition, which I shared with the other ad- 
viser^ was that lis historical section was inadequate. No one 
taking the trouble to study carefully the documents that were 
to be displayed would understand why so many historians 
challenge what President Truman and Secretary of War Stim- 
son told the public about why the atomic bombs were used. 
The draft script offered only a glimpse into the declassified 
lop-seoa documents that have compelled historians to rewrite 
the wartime history of the atomic bomb project. To those of 
us familiar with those documents it appeared as if the curators 
were giving undue attention to established myths at the expense 
of historical research. In a word, the draft script was cautious. 
which explains why the Air Force historians on the committee 
inquiry praised it as "a most impressive piece of work." 

This view of the exhibit was not shared by John Correll. 
the editor of /I (/-Force Mojo;me. Furious at director Martin 
Harwii for presumably masterminding the transformation of 
the Air and Space Museum from an Air Force showcase into 
something more serious, he published a critical review of the 
exhibit, "War Stories at Air and Space." in the April 1994 issue 
of AFM. Counting pictures of dead Japanese versus dead 
Americans, and affirming that veterans believed thai the mu- 
seum had become "an unpatriotic institution," Correll con- 
demned the exhibit as pro-Japanese. Editorialists for The 
Washington Star znd. astonishingly, for TTie Washington Post 
as well, swallowed Correll's bait, encouraging politicians run- 
ning for re-election to join ihe attack. 



Lhe attack on the Enola Gay 
exhibit is part of the 'culture wars' 
raging through America. 



By means of a Senate resolution, and a threatening letter 
from Ihe relevant committee chairman and his colleagues, ihe 
two houses of Congress joined forces to threaten the curators' 
jobs and the museum's funding. In taking this action. Rep- 
resentative Pcier Bluie of the Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation. Senator Nancy Kassebaum and the other 
Congressional critics of the Enola Gay historical exhibit laid 
the foundations for a post-cold war form of McCarthyism 



153 



May li. 1995 The NatJOM. 



in which the Japanese were substituted for the Soviets. Old 
McCarthyite smears such as "unpatriotic" "left wing" and 
"anti-American" were recycled in this deceitful campaign 
to decree an official history of the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

To say that this assault on a cautious presentation of the 
history of the debate over the atomic bombings is part of the 
turmoil within our political culture, or part of the "culture 
wars" that are raging through America, is to sute the obvious. 
It is one with the general attack by the right on the news media, 
the National Endowment for the Arts, the National Endow- 
ment for the Humanities, the Corporation for Public Broad- 
casting and the National History Standards report. It is an 
assault on the professional standards of a new generation of 
curators, whose training (not their politics) in history and cu- 
ratorial science obliges them to present new and competing 
scholarly perspectives along with the expected and familiar. 

Conservatives have been attacking the Smithsonian's mu- 
seums regularly since 1988. arguing that the museums arc mere- 
ly "the nation's attic," where anifacts should be displayed but 
not evaluated, interpreted or context ualized. Those who have 
followed this campaign will recall, perhaps with a touch of 
irony, that the first target was the 1988 exhibit. "Toward a 
More Perfect Union." which documented the forced removal 
of Japanese-Americans to relocation camps during World 
War II. Thus another objection of the museum's critics is the 
subjects themselves: America's dirty laundry should not be 
hung in Washington, they insist. 

In light of the events surrounding the Enola Gay exhibit, 
we might want to consider revising Saniayana's famous apho- 
rism: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned 
to repeal it." A more appropriate formulation for ihc current 
state of affairs might read: "Those who insist only on iheir 
memories of the past are condemning the rest of us to avoid 
it." Of course, that is exactly the objective of the 1995 attacks 
on the history of 1945. D 



Martin J. Sherwin is director of the John Sloan Dickey Cen- 
ter for International Understanding at Dorimcuih College 
and Walters. Dickson Professor of History al Tufts Univer- 
sity. He IS the author of A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and 
the Origins of the Arms Race (Ranrtnm Hniitci 




154 



?^ ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 

242S WILSON BOULEVARD. ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22201-3385 (703)841 4300 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK N. MERRITT, USA RET., PRESIDENT 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this committee: 

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) is pleased to 
have the opportunity to submit a written statement on behalf of its 
115,000 members giving voice to concerns about the Air and Space 
Museum's handling of the special Enola Gay exhibit. 

AUSA has been associated with the Air Force Association and the 
American Legion's effort to get the Air and Space Museum to put forth 
an exhibit which demonstrated balance, put the Enola Gay in the 
proper context of the period, and included fairness when dealing with 
the decision of the political and military leaders of the time. We 
applaud the cancellation of the original exhibition and we are 
encouraged that the museum will now show a forward fuselage of the 
Enola Gay in a simpler, straightforward display. We hope the new 
exhibit will have the balance, context, and fairness that the brave 
Americans who participated in the events that the Enola Gay stands 
for truly deserve. 

I want to applaud the Senate for its unanimous passage, on 23 
September 1994, of the Senate Resolution which described the Enola 
Gay script as being "revisionist, unbalanced, and offensive". The 
American people who think of the Smithsonian Institution as its 
repository of America's history have a right to expect that displays 
and information provided will be balanced in context and accurate in 
content. 



155 



AUSA is in complete and unqualified support for the decisions of 
President Harry Tniman and the direction and execution of the 
resulting missions by our military leaders. We offer no apology, no 
contrived justification for the two concluding acts that brought an 
end to the conflict. We believe that lives were saved, that greater 
and more populous areas of Japan were spared wartime carnage, and 
that the treasure of many nations was conserved by ending the drain 
of resources caused by combat operations. 

We at AUSA, reflecting the convictions and sentiments of its 
World War II veterans, believe that only the shock promulgated among 
the Japanese people by the nuclear holocaust, could have caused their 
leaders to surrender precipitately. Conventional weapons, 
firestorms, and obscene casualty figures had not changed Japanese 
policy. We can speculate that a last-ditch sacrifice of the Japanese 
nation in a pattern with the Germany of Adolf Hitler was the promised 
alternative. 

For these reasons, AUSA believes that the employment of atomic 
weapons at the termination of World War II was momentous and deserves 
special historical note by the Smithsonian. We believe that a 
factual presentation of what was done and the results achieved need 
not be qualified or embellished by what might have been or, in some 
views, should have been. We believe that President Tniman, based 
upon what he knew at the moment, demonstrated the willingness to 
decide that is the mark of the great leaders of history. 



156 



Perhaps the greatest tragedy associated with the events that 
have surfaced with this exhibit is the perception given to the 
American people that another public institution cannot be trusted. 
We cannot stand by and allow anyone who would distort history to 
their own political agenda go unchallenged. The American people have 
a right to expect that any institution which receives tax payer 
dollars for support must be responsible enough to show accuracy and 
balance when writing about or demonstrating history. 

On behalf of the Association of the United States Army, I thank 
you for providing an opportunity to comment on this important issue. 



157 



APPENDIX III 



Enola Gay Chronology 1993-1995 



August 20, 1993 



September 10, 1993 
November 23, 1993 

January 31, 1994 
Februarys, 1994 
March 15, 1994 
March 16, 1994 

March 22, 1994 
April 1, 1994 

April 1, 1994 
April 15, 1994 
April 16, 1994 

May 4, 1994 



The Air Force Association Executive Director discusses the 
planned exhibit with the Director of the Air & Space Museum. 
The Director of the Air & Space Museum sends the Air Force 
Association a copy of the first planning document for our review 
and suggestions. 

The Air Force Association Executive Director expresses concerns 
over lack of balance to the Director of the Air & Space Museum. 

Air Force Association and Air & Space Museum officials meet to 
discuss the lack of balance in the exhibit. Museum officials counter 
that the exhibit is balanced. 

The Director of the Air & Space Museum forwards a copy of the 
first script to Air Force Association. 

The Editor of AIR FORCE Magazine interviews the Director of 
the Air & Space Museum for an article on the exhibit. 

The Air Force Association releases the first special report on 
Script 1. 

Air Force Association Press Release — 

"Politically Correct Curating at the Air & Space Museum." 

The Director of the Air & Space Museum submits a letter to the 
editor of AIR FORCE Magazine, which was accepted. 

AIR FORCE Magazine feature article on the Enola Gay exhibit. 
"War Stories at the Air & Space," by John T. Correll, editor 
in chief 

AIR FORCE Magazine historical campanion piece, "The Decision 
That Launched the Enola Gay," by John T. Correll, editor in chief 

Air Force Association directors meet with 
Congressional committee. 

The Director of the Air & Space Museum in an internal memo 
agrees with critics that the exhibit does lack balance. 

The American Legion adopts a resolution condemning the exhibit. 



91-056 0-95-6 



158 



September 1, 1994 AIR FORCE Magazine feature article on the Enola Gay exhibit. 

"The Last Act at Air & Space," by John T. Correll, 
editor in chief. 



September 1, 1994 

September 9, 1994 
September 12, 1994 

September 12, 1994 

September 27, 1994 

October 1, 1994 

Octobers, 1994 
October 17, 1994 

October 19, 1994 

October 20, 1994 

October 26, 1994 
October 28, 1994 



Smithsonian and Air & Space Museiim officials travel to the 
American Legion National Convention to request Legion 
participation in a line-by-line review process of Script 3 . 

Air Force Association analysis of Script 3. 

Air Force Association Press Release — "AFA Says Enola Gay 
Revisions Must Go Further." 

Delegates to the Air Force Association 1994 Convention 
unanimously adopts a resolution calling Script 3 "the beginning of 
a continuing process of revision." 

Air Force Association Executive Director letter to the Director of 
Air & Space explaining time is ruiming out and it is time to fix the 
flawed exhibit. 

AIR FORCE Magazine follow-up article on the Enola Gay exhibit. 
"Museum Promises to Change Enola Gay Exhibition," by John T. 
Correll, editor in chief. 

Air & Space Museum releases Script 4. 

Air Force Association completes analysis of Script 4 and forwards 
with letter of explanation to the Under Secretary of the 
Smithsonian. 

Air Force Association, The Retired Officers Association and the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars meet with Smithsonian and Air & Space 
leadership to discuss ways to make Script 4 less political and 
more historical. 

Air Force Association Press Release — "Enola Gay Exhibit 
Improved, but Significant Work Remains." 

Air & Space Museum releases Script 5. 

Air Force Association analysis of Script 5. 



159 



May 25, 1994 The Tiger Team, an internal independent group assembled by 

the Air and Space Museimi releases its critique of Script 1 . 

May 31,1 994 The Air & Space Museum releases Script 2. 

June 9, 1994 General Tibbetts, the pilot of the Enola Gay, calls the exhibit "a 

package of insults." 

June 21, 1994 Dr. Neufeld of the Air & Space Museum in a letter proclaims 

Script 2 final unless there are minor suggestions. 

Jlwe 23, 1 994 Air Force Association finally receives a copy of Script 2. 

June 28, 1994 Air Force Association analysis on Script 2. 

July 1 2, 1 994 Office of Air Force History questions the lack of balance and 

context in Script 2. 

August 10, 1994 Air Force Association Press Release — "Air & Space Museum 

Continues Revisionist Line on World War II." 

August 10, 1994 Congressmen Blute and Johnson with two dozen members of 

Congress send a letter to the Secretary of Smithsonian condemning 
the exhibit and urging solutions be found. 

August 17,1 994 Senior Air Force officials. Air Force Association leadership, the 

Director of the Air & Space Museum and senior military historians 
meet at the Pentagon to discuss the problems with Script 2. 

August 22, 1994 Air Force Association releases an update paper on 

the developments concerning Script 2. 

August 23 , 1 994 Letter fi-om the Director of the Air & Space Museum to 

the Executive Director of the Air Force Association requesting 
line-by-line change recommendations to Script 2. 

August 24, 1994 Air Force Association Executive Director responds by letter to the 

Director of the Air & Space Museum accusation that the 
Association has not clearly specified the problems with the script. 
AFA declines to make line-by-line changes. 



August 31, 1994 



Air & Space Museum releases Script 3. 



160 



November 1, 1994 AIR FORCE Maga2dne article on the Enola Gay exhibit. 

"The Three Doctors and the Enola Gay," by John T. Correll, editor 
in chief. 

November 3, 1994 Letter from the Air Force Association Executive Director to the 

Under Secretary of the Smithsonian with analysis of Script 5. 

November 1 7, 1 994 Concerned historians write to the Director of the Air & Space 

Museum voicing their concerns that veterans groups are promoting 
propaganda versus history. 

November 23, 1 994 Air Force Association meets with the Under Secretary of the 

Smithsonian to discuss ways to make the exhibit less political and 
more historical. 

December 1 , 1994 AIR FORCE Magazine editorial on the proposed Enola Gay 

exhibit, "Airplanes in the Mist," by John T. Correll, 
Editor in chief 

December 13, 1994 Congressmen convey deep concem to Smithsonian and request to 

see a sixth script in February. 

December 1 5, 1994 Air Force Association, TTie Retired Officers Association and the 

Veterans of Foreign Wars meet with Smithsonian and Air & Space 
leadership to discuss ways to make the exhibit less political and 
more historical. 

January 9, 1995 Air & Space Museum changes label on number of estimated 

invasion casualties. 

Janojary 18,1 995 American Legion calls for cancellation of exhibit. 

January 19, 1995 Eighty-one Congressmen ask for the resignation of the Director of 

the Air & Space Museum. 

January 20, 1995 Air Force Association Press Release -- "AFA Blasts the Air & 

Space Museum on Enola Gay Reversal." 

January 20, 1 995 Air Force Association calls for cancellation of the exhibit. 

January 30, 1995 Smithsonian scraps the Enola Gay exhibit. 



161 



APPENDIX IV 




SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 

H4f/4.7.y to/i. D C. 20560 
USA 



April 4. 1995 



Honorable Sam Johnson 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515-4303 

Dear M^r^hnson: 

Your letter of March 22 provides the Smithsonian with an opportunity to set the 
record straight with respect to the several remaining issues stemming from our once-planned 
exhibition on the end of Word War EI, better known as the Enola Gay exhibition. As you 
know, on January 30, 1995, I announced the replacement of that exhibition with a more 
straightforward display of the airplane and ancillary materials on its mission and its crew. 

To provide as complete a record as possible, I will repeat each of your questions and 
reply to them in the order they were asked. 

1 . To what extent did the now canceled exhibit conform to the charge of the Smithsonian Institution, as stated 

in 20 use. Ch. 3 Paia A80? NASM officials respond to that requirement to present 'the service and 
sacrifice of America's service men and women as an inspiration to the future generations" applies only to 
the National Armed Forces Museum - which was never built. However, the language in the cited section 
clearly states that "The Smithsonian Institution shall...." Absent case law to clarify the intent of the 
legislation, no prevailing interpretation of that language exists, it appears that NASM is citing an 
interpretation designed to free their hands from responsibility as probably intended by Congress. 

The legislative language quoted pertained to a National Armed Forces Museum which 
was authorized but never funded. The statute containing it specifically provided that that 
statute was not intended to apply to the National Air and Space Museum. As stated in 20 
use §80: 

The provisions of this subchapter [Subchapter X- National 
Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board] in no way rescind 
subchapter VII of this chapter, which established the National 
Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution, or any 
other authority of the Smithsonian Institution. 



162 



It is worth noting at this point the language from Subchapter VII §77 which addresses the 
"functions" of the National Air and Space Museum as follows: 

The national air and space museum shall memorialize the 
national development of aviation and space flight; collect, 
preserve, and display aeronautical and space flight equipment of 
historical interest and significance; serve as a repository for 
scientific equipment and data pertaining to the development of 
aviation and space flight; and provide educational material for 
the historical study of aviation and space flight. 

As you know from my statement on January 30, I am undertaking a management review of 
the National Air and Space Museum, and one of our goals is to review a mission statement 
for the Museum to make sure that it is responsive to this statutory provision. I will discuss 
with the Regents the parameters of this management review on May 8, 1995, and I expect to 
have the review completed by September 1995. 

2. To what extent did the municipal museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki enter into a prior agreement with 

NASM concerning the now<ancelled exhibit? It was reported in the Washington Times, without 
verification or citation, that a prior, four-point agreement was extant. We have not been able to put our 
hands on that agreement. The Mayor of Nagasaki, in an AP dispatch published around the nation last 
month, is reported to have said if NASM will not display 'their exhibit' they will find another museum that 
will. This tends to underscore the significance of the Nagasaki Peace Museum catalog, which parallels the 
original NASM exhibit beyond an extent explicable by coincidence. 

I am assured that no formal agreement ever was drawn up between the National Air 
and Space Museum and the municipal museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However the 
Air and Space Museum wished to borrow a number of artifacts from the two municipal 
museums, and those museums were willing, in principle, to loan them. Both sides, however, 
saw difficulties. The Air and Space Museum did not wish to cede authority over the script 
to the Japanese side, and the Japanese did not wish to make a loan if they did not agree with 
the thrust of the exhibition. Evenmally a tacit understanding was reached that: 

(1) The National Air and Space Museum would be the sole 
judge on the contents of the exhibition. NASM would write a 
script for the exhibition, which, if necessary, would be mounted 
without the use of any loans from Japan. 

(2) The Hiroshima and Nagasaki museums were under no 
obligation to loan artifacts to the Air and Space Museum if they 
did not find the proposed exhibition acceptable. On the 
assumption of a positive outcome, however, they were willing to 
receive a request listing artifacts, images and video tapes that 
might be used in the exhibition, so that they could rapidly 
prepare to loan materials to the National Air and Space 
Museum, if they chose to respond favorably. 



163 



- 3 



As it turned out, the Japanese did have objections to the script that never were clearly 
specified, even as late as January 1995, when the exhibition was cancelled. At that time, 
less than four months before the scheduled opening of the exhibition, no agreement on the 
loan of any materials had been reached. 

Initially, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki also asked that the destruction of 
their cities should serve the purpose of warning the world of the dangers of nuclear weapons. 
The Museum countered that it cannot be an advocate on such issues. As time went on, the 
Japanese seemed to lose interest in this request, and the Museum independently determined 
that a topic as complex as nuclear policy was beyond inclusion in an exhibition that already 
was growing in size and needed to be pared back. 

As you might expect, we incurred certain costs for the translation and transmission of 
draft scripts in the course of these discussions. At no time, however, were any monies paid 
to the municipal museums. The total cost of these services amounted to $15,898 which was 
considered a legitimate expense of developing the exhibitioD. 

3. How often, when, and why did NASM Curators travel to Nagasaki and Hiroshima in connection with this 
exhibit? We know that curators and the Director made at least three uips to Japan in connection with the 
exhibit, the first occurring in 1988. 

Three trips to Japan occurred in connection with this exhibition and the desire of the 
National Air and Space Museum to borrow objects from Nagasaki and Hiroshima. It is 
important to note, however, that at all times the Museum officials made it clear that there 
would never be in the hands of the Nagasaki and Hiroshima museums the authority to veto 
any portion of the script. The only power invested in the Japanese museums was to loan the 
objects or not. 

None of these trips took place in 1988. Museum Director Martin Harwit and 
Chairman of the Museum's Aeronautics Department, Tom Crouch, were in Japan in early 
April, 1993. Dr. Crouch, exhibition curator Michael Neufeld, and exhibition designer 
William Jacobs returned for a second visit in late May, 1993, and Martin Harwit made a 
final trip in August, 1993. 

4. What is the significance, if any. to NASM Director Martin Harwii's travel to the Netherlands in early 
December 1994? 

Martin Harwit has been a member of the Science Team working on the European 
Space Agency's Infrared Space Observatory, an astronomical satellite to be launched in 
September 1995. This is part of a NASA effort to minimize the costs of space ventures 
through international collaboration. Work by the science team began in 1985, and regular 
meetings have taken place four times a year since then. The December 1994 meeting was 
the 36th of these regulariy-held meetings. NASA funds Harwit's participation. 



164 



5. Why did NASM fund the exhibition tolally from non appropriated fuods? 

6. Were there specific donors for the exhibit? What is the source of the non-appropriated funds? 

Most of the Museum's exhibitions are funded largely through support from industry, 
although the salaries of staff working on the exhibitions are largely Federally funded. This 
exhibition was no exception in that regard. Half of the funds came from a Smithsonian 
Special Exhibition Fund administered centrally, and the other half was provided by the 
Museum, largely from unrestricted, non-appropriated funds. The Museum felt that for this 
exhibition it would be inappropriate to seek funding from an outside sponsor. The Museum 
wished to avoid the appearance that the exhibition's contents could in any way have been 
influenced by such a sponsor. The Museum's non-appropriated funds come largely from 
earnings from the operations of its wide-screen theater, from revenues generated by the 
museum shop and public restaurant, and from special events co-sponsored with professional 
associations and corporations. 

7. Why was Michael Neufeld, a Canadian National, hired by NASM? What are his philosophical and political 
underpinnings? 

I am informed that Michael Neufeld was hired for his broad knowledge of World War 
II, as displayed in his prize-winning book on the development of the V-2 rocket. The Rocket 
and the Reich, published in 1994. The book won the "best book of the year" award from the 
American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics, and was critically acclaimed in the New 
York Times Book Review (see Attachment A). 

Before embarking on the exhibition of the Enola Gay, Dr. Neufeld had already 
curated a World War 11 commemorative exhibition on the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, 
affectionately known as "The Jug." In the same commemorative series he curated a display 
on the German Arado, the first operational jet bomber which was used also for 
reconnaissance. 

I do not know Dr. Neufeld's political affiliations or philosophical propensities. These 
are not matters that the Smithsonian inquires about. 

8. Why was Tom Crouch, an early aviation history specialist, assigned as a curator? Why was he assigned to 

curate the American History Museum (exhibition] which focuses on the interrunent of Japanese American 
Citizens? Why is there language in the American History exhibit that is verbatim that which is contained in 
NASM"s now-caiKeled exhibit? 

Curators at the National Air and Space Museum are expected to be able to curate a 
wide variety of aviation or space-related exhibitions. Like most other museums, NASM does 
not have more than one specialist in any particular area. Large exhibitions, however, tend to 
require three or four additional curators working with one leading specialist. This was 
especially true of the "Last Act" exhibition, where Dr. Thomas Crouch and two other 
curators, Joanne Gernstein and Tom Dietz, aided Michael Neufeld on this project. 



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Tom Crouch joined the National Air and Space Museum as a curator, in the early 
1970s, and helped to install the initial galleries for the Museum's opening in 1976. In the 
mid-1980s, he made a career change, leaving NASM for a curatorial position in the National 
Museum of American History. There, at the request of NMAH's then Director, he curated a 
gallery on the internment of Japanese American citizens, among other projects. In 1989, he 
was recruited back to the National Air and Space Museum by Director Harwit as chair of the 
Department of Aeronautics. 

The Air and Space Museum has indicated that its very first script for the Enola Gay 
exhibition had a label on the Japanese American internment which used the same quote about 
American hatred of the Japanese as had been used in the exhibition in the American History 
Museum. It should be noted, however, that by May 31, 1994 (the second draft script for the 
Enola Gay exhibition) the quote was dropped from the script, and the entire matter of the 
internment of the Japanese Americans was dropped from the fifth draft script (October 1994). 



9. Why does Manin Haiwit mainiain an astrophysics laboratory in NASM, devoting sums and personnel to 

that endeavor, and dispatching staffer to Europe on related business when the Smithsonian already has a 
similar lab in Cambridge Massachusetts? 

Most of the Smithsonian Institution's Museums are directed by leading scholars, 
principally historians, scientists, and art scholars with various areas of expertise. Secretary 
Adams' decision to hire Martin Harwit as Director of the National Air and Space Museum 
was prompted by his desire to bring a recognized scholar into that position as well. This 
was not a radical departure from earlier practice. Among the three previous directors, 
Michael Collins was an astronaut, Noel Hinners a planetary geologist, and Walter Boyne a 
retired Air Force officer. 

The termis under which Martin Harwit was hired as director of tiie Museum sought to 
assure that he could continue providing scholarly leadership in space science and 
astrophysics, where many of the nation's most sophisticated and costly spacecraft currently 
are making the United States a world leader. His letter of appointment specified that he 
would be provided an astrophysics laboratory so that he and colleagues could bring to the 
Museum expertise in space research, which has made America this century's pioneer in the 
discovery of our place in the Universe. This team is now designing an exhibition, tentatively 
titled "Universe," in which space telescopes and instrumentation will be displayed together 
with clear explanations of the discoveries they have helped bring about to increase our 
understanding of the nature of space and the structure and evolution of the universe. In this 
fashion, the Air and Space Museum complements work carried out at the Smithsonian 
Astrophysical Observatory in Cambridge, Massachusetts, some of whose discoveries and 
achievements have already been displayed in the Museum's galleries. 



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10. Have ihe miliu^y veterans who are on suff as historical consultants and acknowledged military historians in 

their own rights been systematically excluded from the decision making on such exhibits as the one at issue'' 

The military veterans on the Museum's staff have made major contributions to the 
exhibitions mounted in the past few years: 

• Tim Wooldridge, a former aircraft carrier pilot and retired U.S. Navy captain, in 
recent years instituted a major modernization of the Museum's Sea-Air Operations 
Gallery, made possible with the support of the Association of Naval Aviation. 

• Tom Dietz, a young U.S. Navy veteran, was one of the four curators on the "Last 
Act" exhibition. 

• Tom Alison, a retired Air Force colonel, who had come to the Museum in late 
May, 1993, after the "Last Act" exhibition already was under way, was later asked to 
curate an introductory section to that exhibition. It covered "The War in the Pacific," 
and was added because the Museum found that many young people no longer know 
the history of World War II. 

• Working with Alison on this section were Tim Wooldridge and Lt. Col. Don 
Lopez (USAF Ret.), who had recently retired as Senior Advisor to the Museum's 
Director. 

1 1 Why did curators rely on historians only from the revisionist school, such as Bird, Alpcrvitz, Bernstein, and 

why did curators not contact esublished experts in Uie era and the key people involved? 

In compiling a list of Advisory Comminee members for the exhibition the Museum, 
tried to assemble a set of experts with a broad range of backgrounds and a variety of points 
of view. These established experts were initially brought in to provide the curators with 
constructive criticism and advice. They included; 

• Edwin Bearss, Chief Historian at the National Park Service, a decorated disabled 
veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign. He was in charge of the 50th anniversary 
commemoration at Pearl Harbor. 

• Barton Bernstein, a Professor of History at Stanford University. 

• Victor Bond is a radiation physiologist, expert on the radiation effects of atomic 
bombs. 

• Stanley Goldberg who is completing a biography on Gen. Leslie Groves, who 
headed the successful Manhattan project. 

• Richard Hallion, an Air Force Historian and a former curator at the National Air 
and Space Museum, with extensive experience in exhibitions. 



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• Akira Iriye is Professor of History at Harvard and a recognized expert on 20th 
century relations between the U.S. and Japan. 

• Edward Linenthal, a Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Wisconsin 
at Oshkosh. He had written about the controversies that attended the 
commemorations of the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor and was asked to serve in 
the hope that he could help the Museum anticipate and steer clear of such difficulties. 

• Richard Rhodes, a Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Making of the Atomic 
Bomb. 

• Martin Sherwin, an historian and Director of the John Sloane Dickey Center at 
Dartmouth College. 

Though they may have made their perspectives known in the media, Drs. Bird and 
Alperowitz had no role in developing the exhibition, nor were they ever invited to 
participate. Both men, however, often berated the Museum's script in the media. 

One might wonder, as I often do, how it was that with a balanced set of advisors we 
seemed to have developed a script which was imbalanced. I suspect that the explanation is 
not only complex but also entirely worthy of extensive exploration, which we intend to give 
it at the symposium we have planned with the University of Michigan, "Presenting History: 
Museum in a Democratic Society," Ann Arbor, MI, April 19, 1995. 

12. Why did Harwii fire decent Frank Rabbit, for speaking about the ejJiibit? 

Director Harwit informs me as follows: 

Frank Rabbitt, a long-time volunteer who gave guided tours at the National Air and 
Space Museum, was first suspended from his duties for interfering with legitimate inquiry 
into the exhibition of the Enola Gay by a Baltimore Sun journalist. While on duty at the 
Museum, he had heard the reporter tell him he had an appointment the next day to see 
General Tibbets in Columbus, Ohio. Rabbitt then called some of the General's friends to 
warn him not to see the reporter, and when the reporter appeared at General Tibbets's house, 
he was met at the door and sent away. 

Mr. Rabbitt's suspension was not aimed at his rights to free speech. The action was 
taken to reaffirm that individuals affiliated with the Museum have no right to interfere with 
legitimate inquiries into the Museum's activities by the press. 

Shortly after his three-month suspension, Mr. Rabbitt was found to be openly 
soliciting signamres in opposition to the Museum's exhibition of the Enola Gay. At that 
juncture, he was dismissed from his volunteer duties, since volunteers are brought to the 
Museum to help ongoing activities, not to oppose them. In abrogating his services, the 
Museum told Mr. Rabbitt in writing that it was not challenging his right to speak out as he 



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saw fit. His activities simply were seen as more of a hindrance than a help to the Museum. 
Service as a volunteer at the Museum is not a right; it is a privilege that many applicants 
seek and few are accorded. 

On January 30, 1995, immediately following the Secretary's decision to change the 
exhibition, Martin Harwit wrote Mr. Rabbitt, stating that there now was no reason to deny 
his return to the Museum, since the main object of his opposition had been removed, and 
since he had served the Museum loyally for many years. Mr. Rabbitt promptly accepted that 
offer to return and has been fully reinstated. 

13. Has i( l)cen Harwit's intent since his hiring to "radicalize" and "redirect" NASM? Does revision conform 

to the charge and intent of Congress? 

Director Harwit responds that the National Air and Space Museum, as initially 
conceived and realized by its first director. Astronaut Michael Collins, has been the most 
visited museum in the world, ever since it opened its doors to the public in July 1976. 
Given this popular appeal, it would make no sense to attempt any radical changes. 
Nevertheless, the Museum carmot stay static. It needs to comply with changing national 
demands. When the present director came on board, a number of alterations meeting new 
priorities seemed in order: 

a. At a time when many youngsters are turning away from careers in science 
and technology, and the number of licensed pilots in the United States is 
rapidly declining, it seemed incumbent on the Museum to show youngsters the 
opportunities for space exploration that might be open to them when they grow 
up. The "Where Next, Columbus?" gallery, opened in 1992, asks what 
explorers like Columbus might be doing in the next 500 years. What goals 
would they set? What challenges will have to be overcome for us to explore 
further and deeper in space? 

b. To date it has been possible to go through the entire Museum without ever 
learning what keeps balloons aloft, aircraft flying, and satellites from mmbling 
down to earth. For a nation that is placing renewed emphasis on science and 
technology education, that deficiency seemed in need of correction. A new 
gallery called "How Things Fly" has been in preparation for several years. It 
will answer those questions and feature numerous interactives that will help 
youngsters to understand the most fundamental scientific and technological 
aspects of flight. The gallery will open in the summer of 1996. 

c. The awe-inspiring machines exhibited at the Museum are more than 
technological wonders. They provide a cross section of America's history and 
our nation's contribution to human civilization in the twentieth century. 
Airplanes and spacecraft have radically altered the ways in which we travel, 
trade, wage war, communicate across the globe, predict weather, monitor the 
state of our planet, and view our place in the Universe. Each machine carries 



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a unique story in that regard, which the Museum should strive to tell. Flying 
machines are not just technology devised for its own sake. They provide 
opportunities and services to humanity that were never available before. 
America's history can be vividly told through these national treasures that the 
Museum displays. Their stories are fascinating and convey the essence of 
America's role in changing life in the 20th cenmry. In recent years, the 
Museum has attempted to place greater weight on those stories, in a balanced 
way, as it displays the artifacts. 

I would add that none of these changes are radical; rather, they are designed to enrich 
the Museum's offering to a public eager for additional information. Still, some exhibitions 
in the Air and Space Museum may appear to depart significantly from earlier ones; for 
instance, a few exhibitions have taken a new critical approach, but they are hardly 
characteristic of the whole museum. 

But when the question remains whether there is an appearance of some sort of bias in 
our museum presentations, the answer leads inevitably to an exploration of our exhibition 
review processes and, indeed, a thorough examination of how exhibitions are framed 
philosophically at the outset. I am conducting a study of these- matters across the board at 
the Smithsonian, but I am satisfied in the meanwhile that there has been no fundamental 
effort at the Air and Space Museum or at any Smithsonian museum to do exhibitions only of 
the newer sort. 

14. What comprises the exhibit now touring Japan, entitled "The Smithsonian's America"? 

The exhibit, "The Smithsonian's America," is not now touring Japan. However, 
from July 9 through August 31, 1994, there was on view such an exhibition created by the 
Smithsonian Institution for the American Festival at the Nippon Convention Center in the 
Chiba Prefecture near Tokyo. That exhibition used artifacts, historic images and film 
footage to tell the rich and complex story of the United States. Examples of the subjects and 
objects in the exhibition are as follows: 

• Photographs and artifacts representing American icons suggesting the cultural 
richness and ideals of the American people. 

• A high-definition television presentation introducing the American landscape and 
the ways in which Americans have explored its incredible beauty and enormous 
natural resources. Part of the exhibition covered the fact that America is a land of 
many faces and cultures with unifying experiences such as military service, popular 
culture, education and work. The highlights of that section of the exhibition included: 
a Crow feather headdress; a Mohawk baby carrier; a French spinning wheel brought 
to the United States in the early 1800s; and a vest embroidered in a traditional 
Hungarian style by a young immigrant. 



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• Other subjects covered in the exhibit included: the national popular culture; the 
Western Frontiers; conquering time and space; Americans at Home; Looking 
American (focussing on clothing); and a section on Commodore Perry's visit to Japan 
and subsequent events. 

• Some of the objects included were: the ruby slippers worn by Judy Garland in The 
Wizard of Of, a 19th-century ballot box; George Washington's mess kit; the compass 
used by Lewis and Clark; Apollo 15 spacesuit; a Morse telegraph key and receiver; a 
1920s cowboy hat made by Stetson; a hat from Commodore Matthew Perry. 

During the first two weeks of the American Festival, the Smithsonian presented a 
series of concerts from eight musical groups from bluegrass to Cajun to Native American 
music and from gospel to the blues. 

The Festival was sponsored by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) and The 
Yomiuri Shimbun. The Media International Corporation, an affiliate of NHK, coordinated 
the planning activities. 

In addition, an exhibition titled "The Smithsonian Exhibition of Grand Gems and 
Minerals" began touring in Japan in the fall of 1994 and will continue through January, 
1996. The exhibition was organized jointly by the Smithsonian's National Museum of 
Natural History, the Japan Frontier Association and the Association of Space Development 
and Information. 

15. What is the status of the companion volume on the now canceled exhibit? How does Secretary Heyman 

intend to slop this? What will happen to the 10,000 copies said by an unidentified spokesperson at the Press 
to exist? Do they? If so, have they been distributed to anyone? How will they be recalled? 

There has been no publication of the catalogue that was to have accompanied the 
Enola Gay exhibition. No catalogue has been printed, published or distributed that must be 
recalled. The Acting Director of the Smithsonian Press reports that the Press did not even 
keep copies of the draft manuscript. 

In response to my decision regarding the Enola Gay exhibition and the decision to 
cancel the publication of The Last Act, the Smithsonian Press took the following steps: 

• Sent a memorandum to all sales representatives throughout the world informing 
them of the cancellation. The same memorandum went to key wholesale accounts. 

• Placed a message in the system at the warehouse that automatically informs 
customers who order the book that it has been canceled. 

• Sent a letter to book reviewers and other media that informed them that the 
publication has been canceled. That information was included m a routine letter from 
the publicist to the key media contacts. 



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16. Does Secretary Heyman intend to honor his promise to cancel all related materials? More imponant, is he 
positioned properly to effectively control the actions of NASM personnel? 

I fully intend to honor my promise to cancel all related materials. The only material 
that may be in the public purview are copies of the various draft scripts that were out for 
comment prior to the decision to cancel the exhibition. The Institution has received some 
requests for the first and last scripts. We are referring those requests to the Office of 
General Counsel. There is, however, no basis to deny people access to the documents that 
had already been made public. To date there have been very few requests of the General 
Counsel to supply copies of any of the draft scripts. 

17. How has the Enola Gay controversy effected fund-raising? 

During the time of the controversy, there were concerns raised about the impact on 
our fund-raising ability. Some potential major donors waited to see the outcome before 
making a commitment to the Institution. However, the level of funds that have been raised 
this fiscal year has increased over the first quarter of last year and thus deleterious impact, if 
any, has been remedied. 

18. Why docs one major corporate donor insist on anonymity despite the Institution's offer of on-exhibit 
acknowledgements to all donors? 

I am not aware that any major corporate donor to any of our exhibitions or programs 
has insisted on anonymity. 

19. How many subscribers have withdrawn their membership and financial suppon? What is the extent of the 
loss? 

During the height of the controversy, we received letters from members and 
subscribers of the Magazine indicating that they intended to cancel their subscription and 
withdraw their support from the Institution. In each case, we explained what we were doing 
to respond to the criticism. In most instances, the members/subscribers decided to reserve 
judgment. You should know that there is always a percentage of the Magazine subscribers 
who do not renew their subscription. We do not know what percentage of those were 
affected by the Enola Gay controversy, but the number is not significant. 

It is worth noting that from February 16 to 19, 1995. Peter D. Hart Research 
Associates conducted a nationwide survey among a representative cross section of 1 ,003 
Americans. The poll has a margin of error of ±3.2%. Among its fmdings were the 
following: 

There has been much discussion and commentary about the Air and Space 
Museum's World War II exhibit that features the B-29 bomber Enola Gay, and 
the survey includes two questions designed to gauge the American public's 
familiarity with and reactions to this controversial exhibit. Sixty-one percent of 
Americans overall have heard of the story, while 38% have not heard about it. 



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The most significant finding reveals that the situation has made littJe or no 
difference to most adults' perception of the Institution: just 14% of Americans 
have a less favorable opinion of the Smithsonian because of the way it handled 
the Enola Gay simation, while 5% say they have a more favorable opinion of the 
Institution because of it. A plurality of the public say that the controversy has not 
really affected their opinion of the Smithsonian; 3 1 % say the situation did not 
affect their opinion of the Smithsonian, and another 7 % say that it did not make 
much difference either way. 

Despite the coverage of this controversy in the press, it seems to have 
made little difference to the American public, with 86% of adults saying the 
situation has not adversely affected their opinion of the Smithsonian, including 
39% who either have not heard or are not sure whether they have heard about the 
Enola Gay story. In the open-ended question about their impressions of the 
Smithsonian, a mere I % of adults volunteered Enola Gay comments. 

20. Are the safeguards and oversight sufficient to ensure the Smithsotiiaii Institution uses taxpayer dollars in (he 
way that Congress intends? 

The Institution is subject to and complies with all laws and regulations that govern the 
use of appropriated funds. We have an Inspector General who reports regularly to the 
Institution's Board of Regents through the Audit and Review Committee and responds to 
Congress, providing information through a semi-annual report as well as upon request. In 
addition, the Institution has an independent auditor who reports annually to the Audit and 
Review Committee of the Board of Regents on the fmancial management of the Institution. 
We also voluntarily comply with the provisions of the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 
as well as other fmancial requirements of federal agencies such as the Federal Managers 
Financial Integrity Act, even though we are not subject to them by law. 

All of these elements combine to provide a significant degree of oversight. I believe 
the Institution has put into place the safeguards that are essential to protect the Institution and 
to ensure that we are using all funds as they are intended whether they be appropriated by 
the Congress or generated in the private sector. We are also looking at our exhibition review 
processes to determine whether further measures are needed to ensure that our activities, 
including exhibitions, meet not only the letter but also the spirit of Federal expectations. 
Again, I expect that the April 19 symposium at the University of Michigan, with its focus on 
"Museums in a Democratic Society," will shed important light on these matters. 

21. Why did the Institution send all complaining members a 'fonn letter" that falsely implied no problem wiih 
the Enola Gay exhibit? 

I am not sure that I know the letter that is being referenced here. I do know that 
during the process of the controversy my predecessor attempted in various communications to 
explain what was being done to address the problem. Early in the process, there was a letter 
sent to some saying that the various advisory groups were in the process of reviewing the 
script and that problems would be addressed in that process. During the Fall of 1994, I, too, 



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wrote a letter indicating that the changes and the review by the American Legion made me 
very optimistic. I was wrong. Once I canceled the exhibition, the Insiioition informed those 
who had written about my actions and enclosed a copy of my statement. 

22. Why do Smithsonian personnel have business cards ihal have their name trarucribcd in Japanese on the back 
of them? 

Those Smithsonian personnel who travelled to Japan in connection with the American 
Festival in 1994 had business cards with their names transcribed in Japanese on the back. 
There were many negotiations regarding the exhibition with various business entities. As 
you know, the exchange of business cards in Japan is an important first step in a business 
meeting and American businessmen characteristically carry such cards. 

23. With regard to new employees, what is the hiring criteria with regard to background and experience in the 
air and space field? Is any on the job training occurring instead of hiring qualified and experienced 
personnel? 

New professional staff of the Air and Space Museum are hired according to criteria 
which vary in accordance with each position. The Museum seeks people with expertise 
appropriate to specific fields, and that expertise may be largely academic or more practical 
depending on the needs of the Museum at that time. The Museum sometimes hires and 
trains promising younger professionals right out of college or graduate school; this is often 
more economical than hiring fiilly experienced professionals. On the other hand, the 
Museum also hires professionals already in their mid- to late-careers, when the positions 
would benefit from their specialized experience and when those individuals' salary 
requirements can be met. 

24. Are any NASM staff currently teaching in the Washington DC. public school system? If so, how is this 
funded? 

As is typical of other major Smithsonian museums, the National Air and Space 
Museum, through its Educational Services Department, provides a range of public services to 
fulfill its educational mission. However, those services do not include teaching in schools, 
and we are not aware of NASM personnel serving as teachers in school classrooms. 

The Museum conducts workshops for teachers on-site at the Museum to help them 
strengthen their science and history teaching with current research and with interactive, 
inquiry-based approaches for students. It is rare for these workshops to happen in the 
schools. The Museum also produces aviation- and spaceflight-related curricula for use in 
the classroom. All produced to date have been funded with external support from 
corporations and foundations. 

In addition, through two other programs, also funded by external grants, the 
"Museum Explainers" and "Sin Limites: The Latin American Experience in Aviation," 
NASM has been able to allow schools to come to the Museum and experience a more 
extended relationship with the Museum. 



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Several partnership schools also work with NASM to test materials, integrate galleries 
and collections into school requirements, and view the IMAX films and public programs the 
Museum offers. Generally, the schools pay or external funders pay for any services that 
have attached costs. 

25. Have NASM personnel participated in visits to space shuttle launches? If so how often, and how arc they 
funded? 

Three or four members of the Museum's staff each year accept NASA invitations to 
attend Shuttle launches. Transportation to these events is on NASA-provided aircraft. 
Where occasional overnight stays have been necessary, the Museum has borne the per diem 
cost. Seeing at least one Shuttle launch seems entirely in line for Museum staff who daily 
deal with a public interested in aviation and space flight. 

26. Is it true that Mr. Harwii is working on a book addressing strategic bombing? If so, how is it funded, is it 
going to be an official Smithsonian publication and what will the review process be? 

Dr. Harwit is not working on a book addressing strategic bombing. 

However, attached is a copy of a book proposal on that subject by Tami Davis Biddle 
(see Attachment B). The book in question, The Legacy of Strategic Bombing, will be a 
collection of essays based upon papers given at a series of symposia on the topic, held at the 
Air and Space Museum between September 1989 and December 1990, and funded by the 
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The book will be edited by Ms. Biddle, 
who was a Museum fellow in 1989-90 and one of the organizers of the symposia. Ms. Davis 
is now an assistant professor of military history at Duke University and is completing a 
doctoral dissertation at Yale on the history of strategic bombing. 

Among the participants in the symposia who will have essays in the book are General 
Curtis LeMay, Freeman Dyson, Paul Nitze, John Kenneth Galbraith, Kurt Vonnegut, Max 
Hastings, and former Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 

Portions of the draft manuscript for The Legacy of Strategic Bombing were recently 
submitted to the Smithsonian Institution Press for a decision on publishing the book. The 
manuscript will undergo the usual review process at the Press, which includes review by 
outside scholars familiar with the topic but unaffiliated with the Smithsonian or the Air and 
Space Museum. No funds from the Air and Space Museum will be used in the publication of 
the book. 

27 How many people are currently employed by the NASM? How many are directly involved in restoration, 

preservation and display versus those involved on administration and side studies? Please itemize. 

The vast majority of the Museum's staff of 239 Federal employees, an additional 145 
largely part-time Trust employees, and roughly 420 volunteers are dedicated to restoration, 
preservation and display. 



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15 



The collections management staff, numbering 45, registers acquisitions, monitors the 
status of artifacts, recommends preservative measures, undertakes preservations and 
restorations, collects and archives supporting documentation, answers public and professional 
inquiries about individual artifacts, and ships and receives items that are loaned out to other 
museums that care for and display artifacts from the Museum's collections. Within the total 
of 45 collections management staff, 12 are devoted to airplane restoration, an additional post 
is filled by a supervisor, and several additional conservators advise the restoration staff on 
the work to be done. 

The exhibition staff of 41 designs and produces exhibitions in collaboration with the 
Museimi's curatorial staff, and oversees additional exhibitions produced for the Museum by 
external contractors. 

The building management staff of 82 cleans artifacts and has the enormous task of 
daily cleaning up and providing maintenance in the wake of the eight to nine million visitors 
who come to the Museum annually. 

A staff of roughly 20 provides educational services to teachers and students from all 
over the country coming to see the exhibitions and wishing to acquire educational materials 
to enrich their school curricula through the insertion of aviation and spaceflight, as displayed 
by the Museum. 

Staff dedicated to research and curatorial activities number 58. Curators are expected 
to spend approximately 30% of their time dedicated to the collections in their care, 30% to 
exhibitions for which they are responsible, 30% on research, and 10% on public service. 
While individual curators might spend close to 100% of their time on a major exhibition 
during the year of two before it opens and then spend a correspondingly large amount of 
time on their collections or research in subsequent years, these percentages indicate 
characteristic averages for the activities of this group. 

Approximately 100 part-time staff members also service the theater that daily shows 
popular wide-screen, IMAX films on aviation and space flight, which the Museum produces 
with support from NASA and the aerospace industry. 

Of the 420 volunteers, 220 work as docents, giving gnided tours through the 
exhibitions for visitors. About 120 others work behind the scenes as restorers or research 
aides, while about 80 more answer the thousands of public inquiries that pour in annually. 

The NASM administrative staff is comprised of 15 Federal employees and 15 trust 
employees. Computers throughout the Museum are served by an additional 7 staff members. 



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28. Why was the script of The Last Act, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II advenised in the 

Smithsonian's Spring Catalogue after I had been told by Under Secreury Newman that this advertisement 
would have a 'canceled" mark through it? 

The Spring Catalogue of the Smithsonian Institution Press anticipated such a volume 
and had already been printed and put in the distribution channel by the time of my January 
30 announcement. The Catalogue becoming available in mid- April will not include reference 
to the Enola Gay book. However, as I detailed in response to Question 15, in the interim 
there has been significant effort to inform people of the cancellation of this publication. 



I hope these responses are helpful to your greater understanding of the circumstances 
of the National Air and Space Museum. Like you, I trust they will assist us both in clearing 
up any misunderstandings that may be lingering in the wake of my cancellation of the 
exhibition. 

Sincerely, 



l\m 



I. Michael Heyman 
Secretary 



177 



Sins of the Rocketeers i 

Tlic Nnz] missile scientists ol 1944 became llie American space technologists of 1945 and efler 




\3wf/:0-' v 



178 

The Legacy of Strategic Bombing 

Taml Davla Blddle, editor 

Book Propoaal 

Concept 

From September 1989 to December 1990, the National Air and Space Museum 
sponsored (In conjunction with the John D. and Catherine T. HacArthur 
Foundation) o oyropoelum and lecture series on the history of strategic 
bombing. Invited to give lectures and panel presentations were not only some 
of the best scholars in the field of aviation history, but also some of the 
men who helped to shape the history of strategic bombing. This formidable 
list of individuals Included: General Curtis LeMay, Freeman Dyson, Paul Nltze, 
John Kenneth Galbraith, tyord Zuckerman, and former Supreme Court Justice Lewis 
F. Powell, Jr. Prominent scholars and writers participating Included: Paul 
Fuseell, Barton Bernstein. Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.. Max Hastings, Michael Sherry, 
Wesley Wark, and David Rosenberg. 

Over the course of the 16-month series, these individuals offered their 
thoughts and reflections on one of the most important military developments in 
modern times; the evolution of long-range bombardment. The purpose of the 
proposed volume is to bring their essays and speeches together in one place, 
and to bracket these contributions with a scholarly overview essay on the 
history of strategic bombing, and an up-to-date and detailed bibliographic 
essay on the scholarly literature on strategic bombing. 

In planning the lecture series, the Museum staff set itself an ambitious 
goal: to examine the history of aerial bombardment from Its roots in 
pre-World War I theory to its postwar manifestation as the agent of superpower 
armageddon. The contributions, which cover this entire time span, contain 
some unique additions to the literature. General LeHay's speech, for Instance, 
was the last one he gave In public before his death in October 1990. 

Contributors 

Contributors to the volume include some of the most prominent scholars in 
the field of air power history, as well as notable individuals who had 
important roles to play in that history. The attached proposed table of 
contents contains a complete list. 



The volume, which should appeal not only to general audiences but also to 
more specialized scholars as well, will consist primarily of: an introductory 
essay of about thirty-five pages; a series of individual essays which will 
vary In length from several pages (most) to up to fifteen pages (a few); and a 
bibliographic essay of roughly twenty pages. 

Order of Materials: 

--Biographies of the Contributors 

--Introductory Essay 

Taml Davis Blddle 

This essay by Blddle, a former historian at the National Air and Space 
Museum and now a professor at Duke University, will provide a comprehensive 
overview of the history of strategic bombing. The essay will not only offer 
on Important primer on the subject, but will tie together the many and varied 
essays which will appear in the pages to follow. Professor Blddle has 



179 



recently published an essay "Air Power and the Law of War,' In Michael Howard, 
et al., (eds.) The Laws of War , (Yale University Press, 1994), and she has a 
long essay on strategic bombing appearing in the spring 1995 issue of The 
Journal of Strategic Studies . She is currently at work on a book titled 
Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American 
Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1917-1945 . 

--Chronology of the History of Strategic Bombing 
Tami Davis Blddle 

--Contributions of the Symposium Participants (see Table of Contents) 

These will be presented in (rough) chronological order, from the pre-World 
War I era to the post -World War II era. 

--Bibliographic Essay 

Taml Davis Blddle 

This essay will offer an in-depth survey of the scholarly literature on 
strategic bombing that has been produced in Britain, the United States, Italy, 
and Germany between the late Victorian era and 1994. 

--Index 

- -Appendices 

Some statistics from the history of strategic bombing. 

Approach 

The final manuscript will be approximately 300 to 350 pages in length. 
The book will also Include one section of black and white photographs from the 
tluseum's collection, some never before published. These will be captioned by 
the editor. In addition, a tew ot the essays included in the main body will 
require graphs and charts. The volume should be produced in both a hardback 
edition, for libraries, and a paperback edition for students and Museum 
visitors . 

Market 

The book ought to have a strong market among general readers with an 
interest in military history, as well as scholars with a more detailed 
knowledge of the subject. As the history of the Second World War, and the 
history of strategic bombing in particular, of are interest to many people, 
the book should sell well. The volume will be broad in scope and accessible 
to the lay reader. In addition, the volume should be suitable as reading for 
college courses in military history. 

The Journal of American History , the Journal of Strategic Studies , and 
the Air Force Journal should be Interested in the book. The National Air and 
Space Museum tapped into huge interest (albeit negatively) in strategic 
bombing with the Enola Gay controversy. The combination of essays by people 
such ae LeMay, Vonnegut, Galbraith, Nitze, and Zuckerman as contributors is 
quite powerful. 

Editor 

While Professor Blddle will serve as the editor of the volume. It will 
also be overseen by Dr. Gregg Herken, chairman of the Museum's Space History 
Department, and the author of The Winning Weapon . Counsels of War and Cardinal 
Choices ; and Dr. Tom Crouch, chairman of the Museum's Aeronautics Department, 
and the author of A Dream of Wings , The Eagle Aloft , and The Bishop's Boys . 



180 



Table ot Contenta 

Preface 

Blographlefl of Contrlbutois 

Introduction: Overview of the HlBtory of Strategic Bombing 
Taml Davis Biddle 

Chronology of the History of Strategic Bombing 

Vislone and Predictions! Prehistory of Strategic Bombing 
Laurence Coldstein 

Cultural Origins of Strategic Bombing 
Bruce Franklin 

Strategic Bombing in World War I 
John Morrow 

Trenchard and the Royal Air Force 
Malcolm Smith 

Two Views on the Interwar Royal Air Force: 
Max Hastings 
Henry Probert 

The Development of the Luftwaffe in the Interwar Years 
Williamson Murray 

The Royal Air Force in World War II 
John Terra ine 

( Photographs) 

Circumstances that Affected Discussion of the Morality of Area Bombing 
Ronald Schaffer 

Bombing Japan: The Congruence of Fantasy and Reality 
Michael Sherry 

The Bombing of Dresden 

Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. 

Strategic Bombing in World War II 

General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF (Ret.) 

The Course of Bombing in World War II 

General T.R. Milton, USAF (Ret.) 

Intelligence and Bombing: An Overview 
Diane Putney 

Intelligence and Strategy for Air Warfare: Britain in the 1930'8 
Wesley War)c 

Electronic Warfare in Great Britain, Beginnings to 1945 
Alfred Price 

World War II: ULTRA and The Strategic Bombing Offensive 
Edward Thomas 



181 



ULTRA and Strategic Bombing 

Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 

Electronics in U.S. Strategic Bombing Operations In World War II 
■ Flank Voltaggio 

The Twentieth Air Force and the Bombing o£ Japan 
Gen. David A. Burchinal 

The Use of the Atomic Bomb 
Barton Bernstein 
Paul Fussell 

The History of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey 
David A. Macleaac 

Strategic Bombing: The Stern and Inconvenient History 
John Kenneth Galbralth 

Pacific Bombing Survey 
Paul Nitze 

The Accomplishments of Strategic Bombing: An Air Force View 
General Ramsay Potts, USAF (Ret.) 

The British Bombing Survey 
Lord Zuckerman 

Strategic Bombing In World War II and Today. Has Anything Changed? 
Freeman Dyson 

The Early Days of Strategic Air Command 

General Russell Dougherty, USAF (Ret.) 

Into the Nuclear Age 

David Rosenberg 

The Rivalry between Strategic Air Command and the Navy 
Vice Admiral Jerry Miller, USN (Ret.) 

Ideas, Budgets, and Weapons 
Carl Kaysen 

Bibliographic Essay 

Index 



182 



APPENDIX V 



RESPONSES OF DR. I. MICHAEL HEYMAN, SECRETARY, 
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY 
HON. JESSE HELMS, MEMBER, COMMFTTEE ON RULES AND 
ADMINISTRATION 



1. Question: Do you agree with the Commission on the Future of the 
Smithsonian Institution in its May 1995 report, "E Pluribus Unum: This Divine 
Paradox", that one of the primary goals of the Smithsonian Institution should 
be to "devote attention and resources to the rehabilitation and maintenance 
of existing facihties?" 

Answer: The Smithsonian's Board of Regents, which is the governing 
body of the Institution, has established a Committee on Policies and 
Programs. Its initial goal is to review the recommendations in the Report of 
the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution, which was 
appointed by the Board of Regents in 1993. Thus, while I am happy to 
respond to your questions, it must be understood that these responses reflect 
my personal view rather than any poUcy direction of the Board of Regents. 

With that in mind, I can say that I am in full agreement with the idea 
that the Institution must devote attention and resources to the rehabilitation 
and maintenance of easting facihties. I was a member of the Board of 
Regents when it approved the FY 1996 budget for the Institution that sought 
an increase of more than $10 miUion in order to accelerate its abiUty to deal 
specifically with rehabilitation and maintenance issues. 

2. Question: The Smithsonian Institution has been called "America's attic." 
Do you agree that the Smithsonian should be first and foremost a national—as 
opposed to a local Washington, D.C. and metropoUtan area-museum? 

Answen The Smithsonian Institution consists, of course, of a number of 
museums, many of which carry the word "National" in their titles. Although 
the provisions of Mr. Smithson's Will required that the Institution be 
established in Washington, his purpose— the increase and diffusion of 
knowledge among men-has from the outset been interpreted as being global 
in its application. In the course of my tenure, I hope to make the Smithsonian 
more truly national, taking it beyond the boundaries of the Mall into schools, 
libraries, and homes across the country by means of the new communications 
technologies that are increasingly available. 

3. Question: On page 3 of its report, the Commission states that "steps 
have been and are being taken to make the museums inviting, interesting, and 



183 



relevant to (visitors from Washington, D.C. and the surrounding area)." Do 
you agree? If so, what steps are you planning to ensure that the primary 
focus of the museiun as a national museum will be carried out? 

Answer Smithsonian museums must be interesting, inviting, and relevant 
to all of their visitors. We want people to visit our museums-electronically or 
on the Mall-knowing that they will be welcome and made comfortable by 
finding there ideas and objects that are familiar icons of America's heritage, 
as well as those that may be less so, but which will stretch the horizons of 
their imaginations. This, I believe, is more and more the case, particularly in 
the National Museums of American History and American Art that quite 
consciously reflect and extend the multiplicity of traditions that make us a 
nation. 

4. Question: Please provide a breakdown of the exhibitions which, 
accordii^ to page 12 of the Commission report, are in "need for restoration, 
renewal, and expansion." 

Answen I do not know which exhibitions the Commission had in mind 
in making the statement quoted. However, I can report that in the National 
Air and Space Museum and the National Museum of Natural History there 
are a number of areas that are out-dated in terms of design and the 
information that they convey. As an example, the HaU of Gems and Minerals 
in the latter currently is undergoing a major rehabilitation that, among other 
things, will include a section on plate tectonics, which has transformed our 
understanding of earth science in the last 30 or 40 years. In the National Air 
and Space Museum, which has been open for nearly 20 years, there has been 
nothing to explain the principles of flight to the general public in a clear and 
systematic way. That, too, is now being remedied. 

5. Question: The Commission states that "investments in these activities 
and facilities should have high priority." Do you agree? 

Answen I do agree. Museum exhibitions are the primary means by 
which the Institution shares knowledge with the public. Thus, investment in 
them is essential. However, permanent exhibitions are very expensive and 
require long periods of time to plan and create. As the previous examples 
illustrate, they must be based on the most current information available, and 
also suggest where new ideas might lead. Furthermore, they must be designed 
with the needs and interests of the visiting public in mind. 

6. Question: In regard to operating budgets, the Commission states that 
"The Institution has responded by significantly decreasing staff size and 
postponing needed improvements to facilities. The gap needs to be corrected; 
it is already threatening the vitality of the Smithsonian." The former Secretary 
of the Smithsonian, Dr. Adams, had also alluded to the need of downsizing 
at the Institution. In the Washington Times (September 24, 1993), he is 
quoted as saying, the downsizing is "affecting every aspect of what we do. 



184 



from the size and extent of our exhibition programs to the educational 
programs ... to our abihty to acquire objects.'' 

Please share with the Committee your plans for downsizing the 
Smithsonian. 

Answen At present I am engaged in a planning process to review 
various aspects of the Institution's operations and get a better sense of how 
we can most effectively deploy available resources in protecting the collections 
and fadUties of the Institution^ while also meeting our obligation to serve the 
pubUc on the Mall and beyond in a lively and intelligent manner. In addition, 
I have taken steps to remove layers of management and to consolidate 
functions where possible. Soon after I became Secretary, I reorganized the 
Institution's central administration into two major groups: operations, which 
are within the purview of the Under Secretary, and programs. The offices of 
three assistant secretaries were combined into a small, cohesive programmatic 
unit under a single Provost. A fourth assistant secretary position was 
eliminated. This approach to reorganization through consoUdation and 
delayering levels of management is intended to serve as a model for the 
various units of the Smithsonian as they imdertake their own reorganization 
efforts. 

7. Question: In light of the downsizing, do you believe the Smithsonian 
should engage in creating new museums? 

Answen The issue of creating new museums is closely tied to the needs 
of collections, overall Institutional priorities, and, most particularly, 
authorizations by the Congress. Certainly, new museums cannot be created at 
the rate of the recent past, but one should not foreclose that option in case 
imique opportunities arise. At this point, I have no plans to propose any new 
museums. However, I beUeve it is important to fulfill the obligations inherent 
in P.L.101-185, which authorized establishment of the National Museum of the 
American Indian, because an incomparable collection of immense significance 
to the American people is at risk. Not only must that collection be protected 
in a physical sense, it also must be articulated intellectually, so that the 
fullness of the heritage of America's original people can be understood. 

8. Question: The Commission also recommends "the elimination of 
(unspecified) programs or faciUties." Do you feel this is going to be 
necessary, and if so, what programs or faciUties do you think would have to 
be eliminated? 

Answen While it ultimately may be necessary to eliminate programs or 
close facilities in order to keep resources available for the core activities of 
the Institution, it is not possible at this time to say if and where that will 
happen. The Regents' considerations most certainly will be brought to bear 
on this matter, and my own views will be informed by the results of studies 
planned and now underway. 



185 



9. Question: I am concerned about what the Commission describes as a 
"large and growing" "deferred maintenance problem." What is this 
maintenance problem and what steps are you going to take to assure 
Smithsonian resources are used to maintain exhibits and artifacts already in 
the possession of the Smithsonian before actively pursuing new objects for 
new exhibits or museums? 

Answen The deferred maintenance problem to which the Commission 
referred is, I believe, that associated with the Institution's facilities and 
referenced in Question No. 1. Appropriations simply have not been siifGdent 
to cover the backlog of repair and restoration requirements. While I recognize 
the difficulties of the present fiscal environment, we will continue to seek 
adequate funding for this purpose. We also will continue to apply resources 
that are available to the care and protection of the collections with which we 
have been entnisted and to the maintenance of existing exhibitions. 

10. Question: On page 26 of its report, the Commission states "continued 
capital expansion in the early decades of the next century.. is out of the 
question. The Smithsonian should essentially assume a moratorium on new 
museums." Do you agree? 

Answen While the statement quoted is not an unreasonable one, as I 
indicated above, I would not want to foreclose the option of addressing an 
unique opportunity for the Smithsonian and the American people, should one 
arise. I am more in sympathy with the statement further on in the same 
paragraph on page 26 of the Commission Report that states: "New 
construction should be undertaken only if the funds are assured for capital 
and operating costs." 

11. Question: How much taxpayers' money is being spent on the 
Smithsonian m FY 1995 and what percentage of total Smithsonian receipts 
does this amoimt to? 

Answen For fiscal year 1995 $371.1 million has been appropriated. It is 
expected that this will be about 70% of the Institution's total net receipts. 

12. Question: In light of the need to reduce the size of the federal debt, 
which stood at $4,885,256,391,108.42 on May 18, 1995, how much money do 
you believe can and should be cut from the federal contribution to the 
Smithsonian for FY 1996? 

Answen The Smithsonian cannot sustain any reduction in the Federal 
contribution for its activities in fiscal year 1996 without correspondingly 
reducing its level of public services by limiting museum hours; riffing 
employees, among whom will be some of those who repair and maintain 
eidiibitions and facilities; and postponing needed repairs to the buildings on 
the Mall 



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 



186 3 9999 05984 200 3 

13. Question: What previously appropriated funds does the Smithsonian 
currently have in its base budget for general planning? 

Answen The Smithsonian currently has $1.1 million in previously 
appropriated funds for general planning. 

14. Question: Due to the current budget situation and the size of our 
federal debt, should such funds appropriated in prior years be used for 
current operating expenses, therefore reducing the ciurent federal 
contribution to the Smithsonian? 

Answer The Institution would welcome the availability of imexpended 
prior year appropriations. Instead of using those funds for current operating 
expenses, we would propose applying them to the backlog of repair and 
restoration requirements without reduction in the level of the current Federal 
contribution. 



187 



APPENDIX VI. 



c 



ARNEGIE INSTITUTION 



OF WASHINGTON Extending the Frontiers of Science 



OFRCE OF THE PRESIDENTT 

May 15, 1995 



Senator Ted Stevens 
ATTEN: Christine Ciccone 
305 Russell Office Building 
Committee on Rules and Administration 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 6325 

Dear Senator Stevens: 

I am pleased to enclose copies of the report of the Commission on the Future of 
the Smithsonian Institution, released earlier this month. This will stand as my written 
testimony for the hearing on the Smithsonian Institution: Management Guidelines for the 
Future, on Thursday, May 18, 1995. 

I had the honor to chair this Commission of independent citizens, which was 
established by the Regents of the Smithsonian. Commission members came from around 
the nation and represented many fields of endeavor. It met and worked over the last 20 
months, studying in depth various aspects of program, governance, finances, and 
administration of the Institution. The written report describes the Commission's final 
ideas about how the Smithsonian can best prepare for the future, considering a time frame 
of 15 to 10 years. 

In my oral presentation at the hearing, I will emphasize those aspects of the report 
that are pertinent to the management of the Institution. I thank you, on behalf of the 
Commission, for the opportunity to describe our findings. 

Sincerely, 




Maxine F. Singer 
MFS/sb 



5 



1530 P STREET. NORTHWEST . WASHINGTON, DC. 20005 1910 . 202 387 6400 . FAX 202-387 8092 



(For a copy of this report, contact the Office of Public Affairs, 
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC 20560. The report is 
also available on the Smithsonian's World Wide Web site 
(@www. si.edu). I 



ISBN 0-16-047266-0 



9 780160"472664 



90000