SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY
Y 4. F 76/1: SO 5/7 ==_ == ^===
Sonalia: Prospects for Peace and St...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 16, 1994
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
At>n f /
1995
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
85-771 CC WASHINGTON : 1995
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office. Washington. DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-046850-7
T)
1 SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY
4.F 76/1: SO 5/7
lalia: Prospects for Peace and St...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 16, 1994
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
^•WAr/fctot,,,
*m r i
1995
45SSS*8SaSs
rr»SD^
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
85-771 CC WASHINGTON : 1995
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington. DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-046850-7
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LEE H
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
DON EDWARDS, California
FRANK MCCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DAVID A. LEVY, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
Michael H. Van Dusen, Chief of Staff
Deborah M. Hickey, Staff Associate
Subcommittee on Africa
HARRY L. JOHNSTON. Florida. Chairman
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
DON EDWARDS, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
DAN BURTON, Indiana
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
(Vacancy)
CLIFFORD KltCHAN, Staff Director
GlLEAD Kapen, Republican Professional Staff Member
ANNE-MAREA GRIFFIN, Professional Staff Member
Ted Dagne, Professional Staff Member
DAVID F. GORDON, Professional Staff Member
(ID
CONTENTS
WITNESSES
Page
Hon. David Shin, Director for East African Affairs, Department of State 4
APPENDED
Prepared statements:
Hon. Harry Johnston 27
Hon. Donald Payne 34
Hon. David Shin 41
Article entitled, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia", by Walter S.
Clarke, submitted by Hon. Donald Payne and a transcript of an interview
with Ted Koppel and General Shali 45
(III)
SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND
STABILITY
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 1994
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Africa,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Harry Johnston (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Johnston. We can call this meeting to order.
We have the luxury today of having one panel and one witness.
I would like to welcome you to the Subcommittee on Africa's
hearing on Somalia: Prospects for Peace and Stability.
The objective of this hearing is to assess current condition in So-
malia and to explore prospects for peace and stability after the
pull-out of U.S. troops.
I called this hearing to look toward the future and to explore
ways in which we can constructively help the people of Somalia
and not to dwell on past mistakes and point fingers. Certainly
there are lessons we can learn from our mistakes and we will find
an appropriate forum for such a discussion.
Prospects for peace and stability in Somalia remain elusive in
the face of continued skirmishes and growing banditry in the coun-
tryside. In Kismayu, the security situation has deteriorated signifi-
cantly over the past several months. Meanwhile, the security situa-
tion in Mogadishu seems uncertain.
Unfortunately, after billions of dollars and several thousands of
casualties, Somalia is far from recovering. The humanitarian situa-
tion could deteriorate in the coming months unless a political set-
tlement is achieved soon. According to some relief officials, pockets
of famine have begun to reappear in some parts of Somalia.
Recent peace efforts by Somalis and Somalia's neighbors have
been promising. The Aideed-led peace initiative in Nairobi seems
hopeful. Most importantly, the Imam-led initiative in Mogadishu
has brought the warring Hawiyee clans together. We are encour-
aged by this new development.
Meanwhile, another new initiative has been launched this week.
President Mubarak of Egypt, the current chairman of OAU, held
talks this week with the uroup of Twelve, General Aideed's rivals,
in Cairo. I am not optimistic about this initiative and it may be
counterproductive since it could potentially undermine the two on-
going peace efforts.
(l)
While the international community continues to focus on south-
ern and central Somalia, the northwest section known as
Somaliland has largely been neglected by the international commu-
nity. Since the declaration of independence in May of 1991, assist-
ance to Somaliland has been limited. I hope the Clinton adminis-
tration will become more engaged in that part of Somalia as well.
This afternoon, we will hear from Ambassador David Shinn, Di-
rector of the East African Bureau and a former Somalia coordina-
tor. We are pleased to have you here this afternoon, Ambassador
Shinn.
We had also requested the Defense Department to send a rep-
resentative to appear before this subcommittee. Unfortunately, our
request was rejected.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
your effort to keep the focus on Somalia during this critical period
as the United States withdraws from the U.N. peacekeeping mis-
sion in Somalia.
In order to discuss today's topic, prospects for peace and stability,
it may be helpful to our past actions in historical perspective.
When President Bush committed U.S. troops in December 1992
to help the starving people of Somalia, there were several flaws in
this policy. By the very nature, Operation Restore Hope was always
more than a simple humanitarian operation.
As Walter Clark, former charge at the U.S. liaison office in So-
malia and now professor of international relations at the United
States War College stated in "Parameters", the War College quar-
terly, the introduction of a substantial international force directly
affected the internal lines of communication and balance of political
forces of local leaders who had been at war with another for nearly
2 years.
It as only a matter of time before a violent response developed
to this intervention unless, of course, the warlords could satisfy
their political ambitions by working with the foreign forces.
Clark further goes on to point out that the UNITAF mission
would be judged not by how many people it helped to feed but by
the political situation it left behind. Further, that contrary to the
assertions of certain Bush administration officials indicating dis-
belief in the existence of legitimate political forces in Somalia, U.S.
diplomats in Mogadishu continued to receive pleas for action
against the warlords.
Because of my own knowledge of the existence of these political
forces, I was one who support U.N. General Secretary Boutris
Boutris-Ghali's plea that the U.S. forces disarm the warring fac-
tions in early December 1992. Several defense experts I discussed
the matter with said that coming off the victorious Gulf War we
had the psychological and military advantage to do this with a
minimum of casualties.
I was interested to hear General Shali, as President Clinton calls
him, on Ted Koppel's show last night. In answering Ted's question
about what went wrong in Somalia, he agreed we need to better
articulate our policy. General Shali said I think I have said repeat-
edly that we need to do a much better job in articulating why it
is important for the United States not to stand idly by when it
comes time to help implement a peace plan but also what the risks
would be involved in our involvement in such an operation.
In looking back on our own congressional process, we could also
have done a better job of informing the American people that such
operations could mean casualties as we should be prepared to make
the sacrifice if we allow ourselves to become involved in that it will
not be an operation that can be done absent casualties.
Later in the program, General Shali agreed that if the United
States commits ground troops in Bosnia, we should be prepared for
the possibility of casualties. That is what it is all about. It is unfor-
tunate but it is reality and it is truth and if we are going to be
true to the American people and true to ourselves, there will be
casualties.
I like General Shali's closing comments. Americans have under-
stood perhaps better than most that freedom is not free and that
to gain the sort of world that we all hunger for for our children,
we sometimes have to make that sacrifice.
Possibly if we had prepared the American people better, there
would have been the political will to stay the course for a more or-
derly withdrawal in Somalia. I was one who also opposed a date
certain for withdrawal long before the incidents occurred.
Recent reports of violence again between Indian troops under the
U.N. and warring factions, as well as uncoordinated peace talks
that are unable to achieve consensus, do not bode well for the fu-
ture in Somalia.
I hope Mr. Shinn can give us some encouraging words and I am
disappointed that the Defense Department saw fit to cancel the ap-
pearance of Mr. Slocum here today.
Mr. Chairman, because of the significance of Mr. Clark's article
and the transcript of Mr. Koppel's interview with General Shali
last night, I would appreciate the opportunity to submit both docu-
ments as part of the record of this meeting.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Donald Payne and information
referred to appear in the appendix.]
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnston. Thank you very much. Do you have a copy of the
transcript from last night?
Mr. Payne. Yes.
Mr. Johnston. How in the world did you get that?
Mr. Payne. High Tech.
Mr. Johnston. If I could get a copy of it, too, I would appreciate
it.
And I adopt everything you say, Congressman Payne. The Amer-
ican public does not realized that in the 13 months that we were
in Somalia we lost 30 troops, all of whom volunteered. It is not like
Vietnam where they were drafted. All of whom volunteered again
to be in the Rangers, which is a combat operation, and we saved
400,000 Somalis from starving to death.
We lost just as many in 5 days in Panama and 9 days in Gre-
nada but the American public has not the slightest idea of that
content.
After all that pontification on my part, Ambassador, we appre-
ciate your coming today. Our next vote is at 7 o'clock, so you have
4 hours and 50 minutes.
Mr. Shenn. Mr. Chairman, I have a 2-minute statement and I
will take questions for 3 hours and 58 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, EAST AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Shinn. Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, I want to thank you for
this opportunity to discuss Somalia today. Your continued interest
in this difficult problem is very welcome to us and I say that sin-
cerely. It is always a pleasure to meet with the Foreign Affairs
Committee and particularly the Subcommittee on Africa.
We are quickly approaching another threshold in American in-
volvement in Somalia. In the post-March 31 period in which we
will no longer be militarily involved, in reaching this new stage, we
have taken stock of what has gone before and we find that we have
every reason to be proud of what the United States has done in So-
malia.
Our involvement was prompted by a human disaster of massive
proportions, largely the result of an enormously destructive civil
war. There is no longer widespread starvation. In mid-1992, before
we became involved, anywhere from 1000 to 3000 people were
dying daily from starvation. There are now only isolated cases of
starvation-related deaths. Through food distribution programs,
167,000 people receive food daily. Before our involvement and that
of the United Nations, 80 percent of the relief food for Somalis was
stolen. Now, well over 80 percent reaches the intended population.
Before our intervention, agricultural production had completely
ceased. Now crops are grown and harvested throughout much of
the country. In mid- 1992, less than five hospitals were functioning
and there were no maternal and child health care centers. There
are now 32 hospitals and 81 maternal child health care centers in
operation. In mid-1992, no schools were operating; 234 are operat-
ing now.
The March 31 withdrawal of American combat troops from Soma-
lia was announced by President Clinton in a statement last Octo-
ber 7. That was nearly 6 months ago, during which President Clin-
ton said Somalis would be given a reasonable chance to rebuild
their country but the outcome would be determined by Somalis
themselves. "It is not our job to rebuild Somalia's society," he said,
"or even to create a political process that can allow Somalia's clans
to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for them-
selves. The United Nations and many African states are more than
willing to help but we — we in the United States — must decide
whether we will give them enough time to have a reasonable
chance."
We have since been working on the things the President said we
would do to help Somalis make use of that time in order to gain
control of their destiny. Recognizing that a continued U.N. military
role would be essential in protecting humanitarian assistance, we
have encouraged others to do their part in providing forces to
UNOSOM, the United Nations Organization in Somalia.
We have provided equipment to support UNOSOM military con-
tingents and to help prepare them for carrying on work our forces
have done. After March 31, the UNOSOM force is expected to have
about 18,000 non-American troops which will be largely engaged in
protecting major seaport and airports and keeping routes open for
the delivery of relief supplies.
We have continued our humanitarian assistance. The humani-
tarian conference convened by the United Nations in Addis Ababa
late last November brought together nearly all the Somali factions
and the international aid donors. The donors were able to describe
to the Somalis what assistance would be lost if violence continued
unchecked. The donors collectively agreed that the future of Soma-
lia is in the hands of Somalis themselves, a position which has
since been repeatedly emphasized.
Following agreements reached at this conference, the donors
have organized under U.N. leadership a more effective mechanism
for coordinating assistance.
We have actively encouraged political reconciliation among So-
malis, both through our own efforts and support for those of the
United Nations. Talks underway in Nairobi have the potential for
significant progress.
There have been other talks, most particularly in Addis Ababa
last March and again in December, which have laid a reasonable
foundation for establishing an interim central government. But the
necessary political concessions have not yet been made. Somali
leaders seem too preoccupied with pursuing narrow agendas and
insufficiently dedicated to the cause of rebuilding their country.
The immediate focus of the talks in Nairobi is an initiative to ob-
tain a peace agreement for Kismayu. At the urging of Ambassador
Lansana Kouyate, the U.N. Secretary General's acting Special Rep-
resentative in Somalia, the leaders of the factions concerned in the
strife in Kismayu are meeting in Nairobi this week. A settlement
on Kismavu could lead to broader discussions on national peace ob-
jectives. A proposal for an interim government has been tabled by
the Group of Twelve headed by Ali Mahdi. We anticipate that So-
mali National Alliance leader General Aideed will issue his own
proposal in Nairobi.
These talks are complimented by discussions in Mogadishu under
the aegis of the Iman of Herab, whose traditional position of influ-
ence spans the Hawiyee sub-clans to which both Ali Mahdi and
Aideed belong. The Imam's initiative has constructively added the
voices of highly respected religious leaders and elders to those of
many other Somalis weary of strife and who now want to get on
with the rebuilding of their country.
While March 31 brings an end to our military role, it by no
means brings an end to our involvement in Somalia. We intend to
stay engaged for as long as security conditions permit. We will
maintain a diplomatic and AID presence in Mogadishu. We will
provide a base for maintaining contact with Somalis and for con-
tinuing to encourage political reconciliation.
We are increasing the number of AID personnel working on So-
malia programs, particularly to take advantage of reconstruction
and development opportunities in suitable areas away from
Mogadishu, and including Mogadishu if necessary. We have made
available approximately $65 million this year for iood aid and other
forms of humanitarian and economic assistance. Up to $45 million
is committed to help U.N. efforts to rebuild Somalia's police force.
Along with other countries, we are providing personnel to help
train the police. We are also meeting the U.N.'s request to provide
personnel to help UNOSOM with contracting and logistics.
As President Clinton said, it is up to Somalis to seize this oppor-
tunity. Both positive and negative factors are at work. There is still
considerable violence and lawlessness. Large parts of Somalia are
generally peaceful but there is a disturbing trend in the increasing
number of armed attacks on the nongovernmental organizations
through which international assistance is distributed, including
that provided by the United States. This is most noticeable in the
southern and central parts of Somalia where employees of non-
governmental organizations are sporadically attacked, sometimes
with loss of life, forcing in some cases at least temporary suspen-
sion of operations.
We are impressing on Somali leaders that the departure of these
organizations would end the means by which humanitarian assist-
ance is distributed.
__ The southern port city of Kismayu has been the site of recent
fighting. That has abated, although the factions concerned appear
prepared for further combat if the current peace initiative fails.
Nothing in Somalia, however, compares with Mogadishu where
the stakes are greatest and the threat of strife is constant. Last
week, inter-clan fighting resulted in the brief closing of the airport.
Positions held by UNOSOM military contingents have been under
increasing fire. The trend toward greater violence adds urgency to
the reconciliation efforts, a point we have repeatedly stressed.
We are proud of our record in Somalia. We intend to remain en-
gaged there and will continue to demonstrate our interests in So-
malia's political and economic reconstruction.
In economic terms, our emphasis along with other donors will be
on helping those Somalis who are willing to provide the necessary
security and cooperation for assistance programs to work.
In political terms, we are making it clear to Somalis that the fate
of their country is in their hands. The United States and other
countries cannot decide their future for them.
Mr. Chairman, with those remarks, I would be happy to answer
any questions that you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shinn appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Johnston. We are very pleased to have the ranking member
of the full committee with us today, Congressman Gilman.
Do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Gilman. I welcome the Ambassador to our committee and
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for arranging this at an appropriate
time as our troops get ready to leave Somalia. I think it is ex-
tremely important that we take a look at what the future holds for
Somalia and what the options are for our own nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnston. Let me, if I may, just kind of go through your tes-
timony.
We are still feeding 167,000 people daily?
Mr. Shinn. Yes. That is an estimate, of course, and the figure is
going to vary a little bit from day to day. And most of that is going
on outside of Mogadishu. A lot of this, there is a fair amount of
pipeline food that is either in Somalia or is perhaps still trickling
in although I suspect most of it is in warehouses on the ground!
That number is far smaller than what it used to be. I cannot give
you the old figure but it is a much diminished number.
Mr. Johnston. What are the prospects of weaning them off that?
Last year, they said they had one of the best crops after the
drought was over.
Mr. Shinn. Well, unfortunately — you are right. Last year was a
good crop year but unfortunately this year is turning out to be a
near disastrous year throughout the greater Horn of Africa area.
In fact, it is one of the issues that we are now talking about in the
Department of State for doing some heads-up briefing on the Hill
because the picture is just starting to become clearer to us.
The situation in Somalia, quite frankly, is not as bad as it is in
some of the neighboring countries. And I know we are not here to
talk about those areas today but the fact remains that spotty,
drought-related rain lacking areas of Somalia are resulting in a
poorer crop this year. Some areas are not too bad but some areas
are rather poor.
The biggest problem, however, is going to be the security issue.
Even in those areas where the crops are growing, if the farmers
cannot safely move that crop from the area where it has been
grown to areas where it can be sold and profitably used by people,
you have basically the same problem. It will be wasted grain on the
ground if there are transportation problems.
There are not serious problems in this regard yet but this could
create another difficulty.
Mr. Johnston. Well, it appears to be starting on a serious vein
when there is a 20 percent attrition rate of the food from the time
it hits the country before it is distributed.
Mr. Shinn. You are right. It is a problem. The only thing I can
say is that it is a far less problem than it was at the beginning of
this operation where an enormous percentage, roughly 80 percent
of the food, was simply not getting to the people to whom it really
should be getting.
Somebody was obviously eating the food. It is not as though it
were being totally wasted. But it was not getting to the people who
needed it most.
There still is a fallout factor in the food that is going in and I
think in any massive program of this kind, in an area where you
still have considerable instability, a 20 percent rate is probably
within the realm of the acceptable.
Mr. Johnston. When we leave in 2 weeks, there will still be
18,000 troops in Somalia from other countries. What will be the at-
trition rate of these troops? How many Indians, how many Egyp-
tians, how many Pakistanis will stay?
Do we have any long-term commitment from the other countries?
Mr. Shinn. Well, it depends how you define long-torm. If you are
talking mid-summer as long-term, and I suspect you are not, there
are very few commitments that go beyond mid-summer. That is,
the July, August, September timeframe. In fact, there may be only
one or two commitments that go that far ahead. But this is not un-
usual. None of these countries is willing to commit way out ahead.
And even if they did, it would not be a terribly realistic commit-
ment. If things were to go very sour in the country, they would
clearly pull their troops out whether they had committed or not.
8
What I can say, though, is that the figure of 18,000 is a figure
which is a virtual certain figure for up until the end of April. Now,
out of that 18,000, it is likely that the Moroccans who constitute
1375 may not remain much beyond the end of April. That is a fair-
ly significant drop at the end of April.
On the other hand, offsetting that, we think, will be new deploy-
ments from Indonesia some time between now and into April from
Indonesia of 250, Pakistan an additional 1500 and Zimbabwe 1000.
These are not necessarily hard and fast and there could be some
fallout on these increments but as far as we know they are still on
track. So that would take the figure actually above 18,000 again if
they all showed up.
There are no other major countries among the current troop con-
tributors whom we are aware of that plan to leave in the May-June
timeframe. The other major contributors are Pakistan, India, Ma-
laysia and Zimbabwe and as far as we know they are firm into the
summer in any event.
Mr. Johnston. Let me talk to you about spending $45 million
and committing help to rebuild a police force in a country as unsta-
ble and has no governmental infrastructure as Somalia does. You
are handing guns to people who belong to some clan, probably all
to the same clan in a particular geographic area. What is the wis-
dom of this policy?
Mr. SHINN. If I could spell out just very briefly what our program
consists of then and I will answer your question directly.
Mr. Johnston. Please.
Mr. Shinn. The total American commitment to rehabilitating the
police force in Somalia is approximately $45 million figure and it
breaks down into $25 million worth of DOD equipment and the
transportation of that equipment, mainly vehicles, but as you
pointed out including weapons and including ammunition for those
weapons.
It includes a $6 million grant to the United Nations to set up the
justice system. When we say police program, we are really talking
about three different components of it: police, penal and the justice
system. We are not doing anything on the penal side but we are
in both justice and police.
It includes $2 million that has already been given to the United
Nations to pay for police salaries and it includes a $12 million
package out of the peacekeeping fund which is a training program
and a rehabilitation of police stations program which is being done
by ICITAP out of the Department of Justice. This makes a grand
total of $45 million.
Now, the wisdom of reestablishing the police in Somalia? First
off, I take your point that it is in effect a calculated risk. As you
point out, this is not something that is going to happen without dif-
ficulties. There will be problems along the way. We are starting to
see some of them already.
The fact remains, though, that with the drawdown of the
UNOSOM force, with the departure particularly of the Americans,
it was realized a long time ago, in fact, way back in the beginning
when Robert Oakley was on the ground under UNITAF, one of the
first things we had to do was to get a Somali component to the se-
curity apparatus in Somalia.
When Oakley was there, they actually reconstituted some of the
formerly existing police and managed to get a few uniforms from
the Italians and a handful of weapons that had been confiscated
from some of the warring clans and handed out a few of these
weapons to the policemen. So the police have in effect been in exist-
ence in Somalia throughout the period from December 9, 1992
when we sent our troops in but they have not been particularly ef-
fective and they have been usually unarmed.
Enormous efforts have been made ever since the early months of
UNITAF to try to create a professional police force and to increase
their numbers. Their numbers got up to about 5,000 on this vol-
untary basis or by being paid with a little food and a little money.
As I understand it, the numbers today are around 7,000. The
idea is to get them up to around 10,000. And eventually to turn
over to them the vehicles, the weapons. These have not been
turned over yet because the administrative apparatus is not ade-
quate yet to ensure that the program has a reasonable chance of
working.
But I would be the first to admit that even when we think that
it is at the point of working, there are going to be some occasional
missteps here. You are going to have the occasional member of the
police force who misuses his weapon or decides to pass the weapon
on to someone else. You are probably going to have a few vehicles
lost in this process with bandits or someone attacking the police.
This is inevitable that this happen a few times. The goal is to
keep it to an absolute minimum but in the meantime recreate a
viable police force for which Somalia has a good history. The na-
tional police force in Somalia was one of the better institutions in
the country but it is going to mean retraining. It is going to mean
getting a better mix of people into the police force. It is going to
mean weeding out some of those that are there now. Some of them
are too old to be effective; some of them are perhaps too linked to
factional politics to be effective. There has to be a weeding process
and this is what is supposed to be going on from this point forward.
But it is a calculated risk.
The alternatives are not very good. It means no local Somali se-
curity apparatus and we think that would be a mistake.
Mr. Johnston. You know, my questioning is going to be on a
vein of cynicism and I am sorry but I see a jeep and a gun in So-
malia, I see a technical and that is just history.
If I were a police officer in Bidoa or Kismayu, who would be my
superior? What is the chain of command? What is the criminal jus-
tice system in these two towns?
I have ignored Mogadishu because that is kind of an aberration
of lawlessness.
Mr. Shinn. What you have in Somalia now is a system where
there are some enormous variations and the ability of the police to
function reasonably well or not to function much at all. You also
have something of a variation in terms of the authority structure.
The initial idea under the police program was to turn over author-
ity to the district councils which would have been set up through-
out much but not all of the country.
After working on that premise for some months, it was decided
that that was probably not the best way to go, that in some cases
10
the district councils did not adequately represent local authority. In
some cases, they simply were not appropriate. They were not up to
the job. And therefore people started looking around for a new way
to deal with the creation and the standing up of the police.
What they have decided to do initially, as a stop-gap measure,
is to have the police work much more closely with the UNOSOM
forces in the field, to do joint patrols with them, to do some joint
training with the UNOSOM troops, to work hand in glove with
them. Only at some later date the police will be turned over to local
Somalia political authority because they are just not at a position
to do that yet.
The UNOSOM headquarters operation has a justice division
which will oversee the administrative aspects of the program. That
is, getting the money out to the field and making sure the police
get paid. But the real hard part during the short term, perhaps
even going into the medium term is going to be working very close-
ly with UNOSOM troops in the field.
Mr. Johnston. Congressman Payne.
Mr. Payne. Yes. Thank you.
The situation in Somaliland, what is functioning there and are
things still as normal as they have been all along?
And then, actually, finally, I guess, what is the future, in your
opinion of the so-called Somaliland?
Mr. Shinn. The situation has not significantly changed in recent
months. I would say it is essentially the same. Somaliland, also re-
ferred to as Northwest Somalia, has been generally more peaceful
than the southernmost part of Somalia. I would not say that it has
been any more peaceful than the northeastern part of Somalia but
if you compare it with the area south of the road that goes from
Belet Weyne to Mogadishu it has been more peaceful. But it has
not been free of difficulty. All you have to do is go into the airport
and have money extorted by local militia there before you can go
on into Hargeysa to realize that the airport at Hargeysa, which is
the capital of Somaliland, is not totally under the authority of the
political rulers in Hargeysa.
There also are occasional problems involving kidnapping of expa-
triate personnel in Somaliland or extortion of funds from the
demining operation because people are unhappy with the salaries
they pay. But all in all, it has been a generally containable situa-
tion as compared to what has been happening much further south.
Mr. Egal, who is the leader in Northwest Somalia at the request
of the local congress, local assembly that was held there some time
ago, has made very clear his view of the future of Somaliland. He
would like it to secede from the rest of Somalia and to become inde-
pendent. He is arguing very strongly for that position, not only
with other Somalis, but with foreigners.
Our position on this is very clear. We think this is not the time
to be talking about the independence of any piece of Somalia until
such time as one has a government or at least a semblance of a
Somali Government organized in the South. It seems that it would
be inappropriate to make an irrevocable decision upon what hap-
pens to a former part of the country in the Northwest.
So our position from the very beginning on the northwest part
of Somalia has been that we prefer to take no position which would
11
prejudice the future outcome of Northwest Somalia. In other words,
we will not do anything that implies independence on the one hand
nor will we do anything which indicates that it must become part
of Somalia on the other.
As far as my own view as to where it is likely to go in the future,
I think that it is perfectly reasonable at some point to have a na-
tionwide plebiscite on Somaliland. What the result of that would
be, I have no idea. But I think that if the vote were held on a na-
tionwide basis as opposed to just the people of Northwest Somalia
voting, there probably would be considerable opposition to inde-
pendence.
Mr. Payne. OK Thank you.
Mr. Johnston. The Congressman has graciously yielded to the
ranking member.
Mr. Gilman. I thank the gentleman for yielding and since I have
to attend another meeting I did want to get a couple of questions
in.
I want to welcome Ambassador Shinn before us.
To date, how many peacekeepers have been killed in Somalia,
our forces and other forces?
Mr. Shinn. I will ask one of my colleagues if he has that figure.
In combat, 30 Americans have been killed and I think I remember
a figure of — my recollection is, and I saw that figure not long ago,
120 sticks in my mind but I would have to get hack to you, Con-
gressman, to be absolutely precise. But that is close.
Mr. Gilman. All right. If you could just notify the committee and,
Mr. Chairman, I would like to include an accurate figure.
Has anti-American sentiment grown or declined in recent months
in Somalia?
Mr. Shinn. I would say there has been essentially no change in
recent months. Certainly there has been an improvement since mid
October in terms of our relationship with General Aideed and the
SNA. The anti-Americanism that was very clear and very loud
leading up to that period has disappeared.
I do not see any indications of anti-Americanism per se in the
country. There is occasionally what you might call an antiforeign
attitude by some Somalis and I am sure there are some Somalis
who have lost loved ones in the fighting since the arrival of
UNITAF and UNOSOM who harbor grudges. But beyond that, I
think it would be inaccurate to say that there is any significant
outpouring of anti-Americanism today.
Mr. Gilman. Will our U.S. mission remain open after our troops
leave, Ambassador?
Mr. Shinn. Yes. It will remain open, obviously security condi-
tions permitting. But we are operating on the assumption that it
will be open, that security conditions will permit. We are anticipat-
ing that the American Government presence in Somalia after
March 31 will be approximately 100 and let me break that down
for you.
Half of that number would be a security contingent to protect the
AID and the diplomatic presence that remains there. It is the same
group that is there right now, what we call the FAST Marines and
they now number 50. That group would stay on for 3 months, at
least 3 months, beyond March 31. The other 50 persons would con-
12
sist of the AID and the diplomatic presence plus the ICITAP police
training presence, although they consist of TDYers coming and
going. Because one is always replacing another, they for all prac-
tical purposes are there in a permanent capacity. And the last re-
maining group, probably about a dozen, would be people assigned
on the UNOSOM staff in an expert capacity, totally noncombat but
there would be probably about a dozen of them. The grand total
being just about 100 official Americans left, both military and civil-
ian.
Mr. Gilman. We have an arrangement to build a Somali police
force and rebuild their justice department, do we not?
Mr. SfflNN. That is correct.
Mr. Gilman. Will that be ongoing and will that continue after
our troops leave?
Mr. SfflNN. Absolutely. In fact, it is really only now just getting
underway. There have been an awful lot of delays in this program
and we have been very disappointed with the slowness in getting
it set up but it is very much ongoing.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Ambassador, how much is the United States
providing to support the police force program?
Mr. Shinn. We are providing $45 million.
Mr. Gilman. How many people are we training?
Mr. Shinn. I cannot tell you how many we, the United States,
are training because a lot of other countries are involved in the
training. There will be a grand total of about 10,000 police, it is
anticipated, when they all are trained over a 2-year period of time.
Because ours is the biggest program, we will train clearly the big-
gest chunk of that 10,000 but I cannot break it down. But countries
like Italy, Germany, the U.K., Botswana, even Ghana, Egypt, Nige-
ria, Zambia
Mr. Gilman. They are all involved in training?
Mr. Shinn. Are all involved in training with small numbers of
people. Two, three, four, five persons each.
Mr. GlLMAN. Who is administering the training with all of those
countries involved?
Mr. Shinn. The overall administration is being done by the
UNOSOM justice division.
Mr. GlLMAN. I see. Are we contributing to the support of the new
justice program for the government?
Mr. Shinn. We contributed $6 million for creating the justice pro-
gram in Somalia. That has been turned over to the United Nations
and that program has been very slow to get off the mark.
Mr. Gilman. Do these programs have the support of the Somali
leaders, whoever they may be?
Mr. Shinn. I can say yes to that in a generic way. All of the So-
mali leaders, Aideed, Ali Mahdi, Morgan, all of the others have em-
phasized to us the absolute essentiality of recreating the Somali po-
lice force. That is one of the relatively few things that I have seen
Somalis agree on in Somalia.
Now, they may have different ways of going about it. Aideed has
his own proposal for standing up the police and I suspect the oth-
ers have a slightly different idea and I do not want to suggest that
there is total agreement on how you go about it. But on the general
concept of recreating the police, I think there is unanimity.
13
Mr. Gilman. There has been some criticism about supporting a
police force without a government in place. How do you feel about
that?
Mr. SfflNN. Congressman, all I can say is I am not sure there is
any better alternative. It is not an ideal arrangement, clearly. Just
as though it is not ideal to recreate a penal and a judicial system
before you have legitimized political authority. But is the old chick-
en and the egg question. One has to get started and security is just
so critical to getting on with anything in the country. We think
that the police will make a major contribution to reestablishing se-
curity; we see no alternative to it. In the ideal world, one would
not do this but we simply do not have the ideal world here.
Mr. Gilman. Some observers have suggested that the recruit-
ment process for the new police force is largely focused on the
former Somali police. Do you share that view?
Mr. Shinn. That is an accurate statement and it is one of the
things that to some extent has to change. There are too many of
the former Somali policemen who are too old, who are not really
up to the task any more. They must be carefully vetted. Some of
them removed. And this is part of the ongoing process that is just
getting underway now.
Mr. Gilman. What would be the dangers to our personnel in our
embassy once our troops are gone? Will there be a major threat to
them?
Mr. SfflNN. We do not think so. The biggest threat at the mo-
ment is s more general breakdown of law and order unrelated to
any interactional fighting. But if the sort of atmosphere develops
that the only way to make a living is to go out and steal something
and use your weapon to do it, then there will be serious problems.
We are working on the assumption that most Somalis do not, in
fact, the vast majority of Somalis, do not accept that as a way of
life and they will help to reestablishing the police and, with the
UNOSOM forces, to prevent that kind of a breakdown. But that is
the biggest threat we face today.
Mr. Gilman. One last question. I thank the chairman for allow-
ing me.
According to the press reports, and you indicated also Egyptian
President Mubarak has launched a new Somali peace initiative.
Can you tell us if there is any substance to that initiative and have
we endorsed that initiative? Do we encourage President Mubarak
to move ahead in that manner? And what are the prospects for his
success?
Mr. Shinn. I am not sure I would characterize what happened
in Cairo as a new peace initiative. What he did was to invite ulti-
mately all representatives of all 15 of the factions that signed the
Addis Ababa agreement in March to come to Cairo and to sit down
and talk.
Now, in the final analysis, only the Group of Twelve, the group
that is opposed to General Aideed, sent representatives and inter-
estingly they sent precisely the same 12 representatives who
signed the Addis Ababa document in March of 1993. The signa-
tures are identical.
The other four groups who are aligned with General Aideed did
not show up. Actually, one representative of one group showed up
14
but he was in Cairo, he was not in the meetings. Therefore, what
came out of Cairo was a position paper by the Group of Twelve and
as a position paper I think it is fine. It represents the position of
that group. But it is not a document from which General Aideed
is willing to work. He will present, we assume, his own position
paper. You will have the two on the table and then someone has
got to try to narrow the gaps in the positions. And that is what you
have there.
We were not party to the meeting that took place in Cairo. When
we learned about it, we had some serious reservations about it. It
went ahead anyway. And I think that the outcome still conceivably
could be positive it it is treated as nothing more than a G— 12 posi-
tion.
Mr. Gilman. Are we willing to be a catalyst in that area?
Mr. Shinn. Well, we not only are willing to be a catalyst but we
continue to try to be. The last visit made by Ambassador Oakley
was, I guess, 4 weeks ago now or maybe 5. Ambassador Dobbins
led a small group out to the area accompanying General
Shalikashvili this past weekend. He was in Nairobi earlier this
week meeting with all of the Somali factional leaders together with
Ambassador Bogosian from our USLO operation. I will be going out
to the region later this week and will be in Somalia just after
March 31. I will also be in and out of Nairobi a number of times
and hope to meet with factional leaders in Nairobi. So we very
much are willing to play the role of the catalyst but it is at the
point where in our view the key is for Somalis to sort this out
themselves. There is only so much that outsiders can do at this
juncture and I think we nave to be careful about mucking around
too much in their business. We want to know what is going on, we
want to monitor the situation, we want to nudge a little bit where
we can be helpful but we have to be careful about how deeply in-
volved we are at this juncture.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnston. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.
We appear to have a lot of students in the audience today. Just
to tell you what we are doing, we are the Subcommittee on Africa
of the Foreign Affairs Committee. We are having a hearing today
on Somalia and what happens to Somalia after the end of this
month when the American troops withdraw. Our witness today is
Ambassador Shinn, who is the Under Secretary of State for East-
ern Africa who has, what, 12 countries under your jurisdiction?
Mr. Shinn. I have 12 countries but you just promoted me enor-
mously. My title is Director of East African Affairs. I will be happy
to accept trie promotion any day.
Mr. Johnston. Congratulations, Ambassador. I am trying to puff
you up for the students out here. We will have you Warren Chris-
topher before the day is over.
Mr. Shinn. That is fine, too.
Mr. Johnston. Congressman Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Just in regard to the meeting that Representative Gilman was
talking about, who coordinated the meeting?
Who asked for it? Who called for it?
15
Was it under U.N. jurisdiction that Mr. Mubarak as a member
of the OAU called it or OAU meeting, U.N. also then since it is sort
of a sub-body?
Could you enlighten us about that?
Mr. Shinn. I will enlighten you to the extent that I am knowl-
edgeable about it. To the best of my knowledge, the U.N. had no
role in that meeting. Now, it is conceivable something happened
that I am unaware of in which they were involved but I do not be-
lieve so.
This was a meeting that was discussed between the Egyptians on
the one hand and one or more of the members of the Gr-12 on the
other, probably not all of them but certainly several of them, and
the agreement was to have the meeting in Cairo. We got involved
in the act rather late when we heard that it was taking place. We
emphasized to the Egyptians and emphasized to all the Somali par-
ties that any future Government of Somalia must be all-inclusive,
that it really does not make any sense to pursue a government
which excludes a critical element of the body politic and it looked
to us at the beginning that that meeting might be headed in that
direction.
It is our understanding that the Government of Egypt did invite
all of the factions, all 15 factions, although as I say only the 12
showed up and participated in the deliberations.
Mr. Payne. Would not it be kind of difficult, I guess, for — al-
though Egypt being the largest and probably one of the strongest
Middle East countries or Islamic countries that would relate to So-
malia, because of the previous relationship between Egypt and the
former dictator and the manner in which Boutris Boutris-Ghali
seemed to be despised in Somalia, it would seem that the person
fighting against the former dictator that both the United States
supported and Egypt because I guess — since we were helping them
out financially, I suppose their role was to support the U.S. posi-
tion. Does that make it difficult for Egypt to really broker Aideed
who was the major opponent of the former government?
Mr. Shinn. Well, certainly in the eyes of some Somalis and in-
cluding those who I think are supporters of General Aideed. Yes,
it does make matters very difficult. It makes it very hard for the
Egyptians to play a neutral role.
Clearly the Gr-12 factions have no problem with this. I mean,
they willingly went to Cairo and participated in the talks there.
But, yes, you are absolutely right, it does pose a difficulty for
Aideed and probably some otners, too.
Mr. Payne. Just one and I will let the chairman have the time
back. About how many refugees? We visited refugees down in the
Mombasa area and all through northern Kenya. Do you know the
number of refugees still out of Somalia, either in Kenya or in
Yemen and all around, Djibouti and Kenya?
Mr. Shinn. I may be able to if I can read quickly here and iden-
tify a number.
OK There are currently over 545,000 Somali refugees. In Kenya,
out of that number, are 300,000, Ethiopia 140,000, Yemen 55,000
and Djibouti, 50,000. Now, I hope that math adds up because I
have not checked this before giving you those numbers, but that
should be 545,000.
16
Now, these numbers are month or two old. I doubt if they have
changed very much since then. We are not aware of any significant
refugee movements.
Mr. Payne. OK. That was going to be my other question. Do you
know whether at one point there was a movement back? But I as-
sume that is slowed down?
Mr. Shinn. It is not significant. There is a slow filtering back,
particularly from Kenya, but those numbers have not been terribly
significant.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnston. The refugees we interviewed in Mombasa almost
to a person said that they would not return to Somalia until Aideed
had been neutralized, to coin a term.
We are still debating what we learned from our intervention in
Vietnam. What did we learn from Somalia?
Mr. Shinn. It is interesting you should ask that. I spent all of
yesterday afternoon at a lessons learned session that was organized
by OFDA of AID looking specifically at the humanitarian side. But
we went far beyond the humanitarian side and we did not get any-
where close to exhausting in just the half-day that I was there, it
was an all-day session, the lessons learned. They are numerous,
some of them are major, some of them are not so major.
The major ones would include such things as — and I ask this as
a legitimate rhetorical question, I do not know the answer to it and
I am not suggesting a response one way or the other, can the Unit-
ed Nations take on a Chapter VII operation of this magnitude, is
it really feasible, and should we ever expect the U.N. to do this
kind of thing again?
I would like to think we could answer that in the affirmative but
someone has to ask a very real question as to whether it can be
done.
Now, I would argue that the Somali experience in many ways is
unique. Not in all ways but in many ways is unique and perhaps
is more difficult than the vast majority of any foreseeable Chapter
VII operation. It is a very big question, particularly when the U.N.
was trying to do 17 peacekeeping operations at the same time. It
was clearly overextended and we left them an enormous burden
when we left after the end of UNIT AF.
Another major lesson learned out of all of this is the command
and control issue. If the U.N. is going to do it, there has to be a
far better understanding among all the troop contributing countries
as to what the command and control rules are and an agreement
to follow them. Every country had a somewhat different under-
standing about command and control. In some cases, it was clear
cut and clearly understood from the beginning, as in the case of the
United States. In other countries it was neither understood from
the beginning nor was any U.N. policy really followed once they ar-
rived.
One of the lessons learned is better consultation with the Hill.
There have been periods where we should have — where even
though the Hill was not necessarily asking us to come up, in retro-
spect, we should have been more proactive. We should have come
up here and collared people and said, hey, you have got to hear
17
what is going on whether you really want to hear it or not. And
I think we should have done more of that.
I think on some elements of this Somalia exercise there has been
very good consultation with the Hill and generally a pretty solid
understanding on both sides. But there have been other periods
where it has not been very good, when things sort of broke down
from our optic over an apparent lack of interest.
Now, maybe it was, maybe it was not, that does not excuse us
from the fact that we could have come up and asked for hearings
or asked for briefings.
Mr. Payne. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?
Mr. Johnston. Certainly.
Mr. Payne. On the question that you mentioned at the early part
on the troops and the command, we saw that when we were there
on a couple of occasions, that a command would be given to the
Italian unit and they wanted to call Rome and get the legislators
to discuss it and get back to the headquarters in Rome and then
back about a command. Do you think that there is a possibility or
whether it would be wise to have a different kind of an operation
of sort of a really volunteer volunteer U.N. force that would be
under the command of the U.N. and not under the command of 28
different capitals around the world? I do not know, sort of like —
I guess a bad example but the old French Foreign Legion. You
know, if you just got there, that was it. You were there. Has there
ever been any notion to that so that you would simply have a com-
mander that would command and not be second-guessed?
Mr. Shinn. We are getting a little bit beyond my area of exper-
tise. I am really focused on Somalia and one can draw some lessons
from Somalia. I can say that the option that you just laid out has
been discussed. It is one of many options that is being looked at
by a group that I am not involved in. It is looking at peacekeeping
generally based on experiences around the world, not just Somalia.
And since I have not been party to those discussions, I am a little
reluctant to say very much about it.
My impression is that people were less enthusiastic about that
particular option than some of the other options under consider-
ation. For example, I think another option is to have designated
units where they do not join the U.N., they are not part of the
U.N., but they are preidentified and there might be some training
by these units and if there were a problem conceivably they could
be drawn upon. But this is really an area that goes well beyond
my expertise, I am afraid.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Johnston. You have stated that Somalia is a unique situa-
tion. Is that because there was no governmental structure there
when we arrived?
Mr. Shinn. That is the most obvious reason for it being unique
but I think it is unique in another way, Mr. Chairman. That is this
whole question of the importance of the structure of clans. I do not
know of any other country in the world that has quite that kind
of ethnic structure which is so complex and so important to the so-
ciety and so difficult for an outsider to understand. I do not think
that any of us ever, and certainly not today, will fully appreciate
the importance of the clan structure and what it means for every-
18
day decisions. I have spent my entire career working on Africa so
the terms ethnicity and tribalism I understand fairly well. To me
the situation in Somalia is infinitely more complex and difficult
than those ethnic structures that I know reasonably well in other
African countries. I doubt if there are very many academics who
have spent much of their life studying Somalia who really thor-
oughly understand the clan structure nationwide. If they are an-
thropologists, they might know one element of it quite well but not
necessarily another. And I think the combination of the clan struc-
ture on the one hand, the fact there was no government there on
the other, puts Somalia in what may be virtually a unique cat-
egory.
Mr. Johnston. When I first took over this committee, I had the
Congressional Research Service come over to brief me and they had
this chart showing the clans and the sub-clans. It looked like the
Department of Energy organizational chart. I have never seen any-
thing as complex in my life.
Let me name eight African countries that have problems right
now: Algeria, Liberia, Burundi, Angola, Mozambique, Western Sa-
hara, Zaire, Sudan. Do you see us committing American troops in
any of these countries?
Mr. Shinn. Again, Mr. Chairman, you are getting a long way
away from my area of expertise.
Mr. Johnston. As an African specialist.
Mr. Shinn. It seems to me that the Somalia experience will
cause one to look long and hard before we make that kind of com-
mitment. Of the countries you named, the only one that I person-
ally deal with now is Sudan and I know that situation quite well.
I know some of the others as a result of having traveled there or
having lived next to them in any event. In the case of Sudan, it
is an even more difficult issue than Somalia. And if we have as
much difficulty as we did in Somalia, the concept of putting troops
in a place like Sudan really staggers the imagination.
Mr. Johnston. In December of 1992, when President Bush com-
mitted our country there and said originally that we would be out
by Christmas. He then said we would oe out by Inauguration Day,
January 20, 1993. On Inauguration Day there were 28,000 Amer-
ican troops there. I have elevated you now to the President of the
United States. In hindsight, what should have been our policy for
the next 6 months?
Mr. Shinn. On Inauguration Day?
Mr. Johnston. Yes, sir. When vou inherit 28,000 troops in Soma-
lia, what should have been the foreign policy of the United States
when you took office? And the procedure for the next 6 months.
Mr. Shinn. Well, I think where the difficulties came were not so
much the decisions that were made just before, on or immediately
after Inauguration Day. I think they came a little bit further down
the line and I will get into that in just a second.
Things were starting to look like they might work out reasonably
well by Inauguration Day. There were still a lot of question marks
but we had a fairly good feel for the way the trend was going. And
by the time we got to early March and then through March and
April, it was really fairly quiet indeed. This was also a period of
time when there was very little discussion up here. It was a time
19
when people were not coming to us and we were not going to any-
one else to talk about Somalia because everyone thought that it
was going to work out quite well.
And put in that context, the decision to draw down our troops
come May 4 to about 5,000, they were actually closer to 6,000 on
May 4 rather than 5,000, but that was certainly a reasonable deci-
sion. And even with the benefit of hindsight, I am not sure I would
disagree with that.
One can ask some questions about our policy on disarmament,
and that was one of the major things we were second guessing yes-
terday. There was indeed something of a debate whether under
UNITAF more should have been done to disarm and the decision
was made, no. That was seen as mission creep. We did not want
to get into that and, in fact, we really did not get into that in any
significant way.
And I am not even sure in retrospect that I would change that
decision because the kind of disarmament we were talking about
at the time was heavy weapons, artillery pieces, technicals. And
they were not the problem, really, later on. The problems were
caused by the hand-carried weapons, by the shoulder-carried weap-
ons. And I think we have learned clearly since the early part of last
year that there is no way a foreign force is going to identify, pick
up and get rid of most of those arms that can be carried by one
person and hidden or buried or whatever. That was wishful think-
ing if anyone ever really thought that could happen.
So until about May 4, I think essentially the decisions that were
being made were not far off the mark at all. Where the problem
really came was once there had been the attack on the Pakistani
peacekeepers on June 5 with 24 of them being killed and with the
enormous concern about the precedent this would create for Chap-
ter VII peacekeeping anywhere in the world in the future. There
was also very strong feeling in this country and the United Nations
and in Pakistan that something had to be done and, as you recall,
it was only 24 hours before there was a Security Council resolution
introduced by Pakistan to catch the perpetrators of that act. That
was followed up a week or two later by an arrest warrant issued
by UNOSOM in Mogadishu aimed at General Aideed and his fol-
lowers. Even that, I think, one could say in retrospect was perhaps
reasonable if one assumes that the evidence was fairly clear that
it was them which perpetrated the killings.
Mr. Johnston. Let me stop you right there. In other words, you
do not fault the arrest warrant for Aideed?
Mr. Shinn. Not per se. No. There were some elements of it, I
mean, the reward and this kind of thing that one could perhaps be
critical of but the arrest warrant per se, if you put it all back in
the context of what happened at the time, it made sense. And even
if you look at it totally in hindsight and forget what the atmos-
phere was at the time, I could still make the argument.
But where we went terribly wrong was in persisting for so long
to try to arrest Aideed and unsuccessfully, obviously. We should
have realized that this policy was getting us nowhere and for just
plain practical reasons it was imperative to come up with some
other alternative much sooner than we did. And, of course, as you
20
know, we paid a heavy price for that on October 3. That is where
things went badly awry.
Mr. Johnston. The former ambassador once, Frank Krigler, sat
in your chair and defended Aideed and said that the attack on the
radio station by the Pakistanis or trying to close down the radio
station was an aggressive act and his forces were warranted in
shooting the Pakistanis.
Mr. Shinn. Well, I know Mr. Krigler very well and I respect his
judgment but I am not sure he has his facts entirely correct there.
What actually happened on the day of the attack on the Pakistanis
is that the Pakistanis went to the radio station in search of arms.
They found none. They were leaving the radio station, in fact, had
left the radio station when the attacks began to take place. They
were leaving at that point.
Now, it is true the radio station was issuing vituperative anti-
UNOSOM and anti-U.S. propaganda at the time and it clearly was
under the control of General Aideed. We were all concerned about
that. But on that particular day, there was no attempt to shut it
down and no attempt to destroy it. It was an attempt to search for
arms; that is when everything went awry.
Now, Aideed may not have known tnat. He may have thought
that something else was happening. His interpretation of it may
have been rather different. But I think that is the fact of the mat-
ter.
Mr. Johnston. OK. He could never explain the fact that Aideed
would put women and children in front of his forces when he was
firing on the Pakistanis.
Mr. Shinn. There are a lot of things to answer to in Somalia.
Mr. JOHNSTON. That is right. Let me go back to Somaliland just
briefly. Here is a large area of the country that has an intellectual
past, a peaceful past, was bombed terribly by the previous govern-
ment, has no infrastructure, no running water and no electricity.
Can we devote some aid to this area of the country? When you
think how much has gone into southern Mogadishu versus
Somaliland, there is just nothing going into this part of the area.
An area which I think is salvageable and can be a viable commu-
nity. I am not saying support Somaliland's independence but I am
saying that they have been ignored because no one is starving
there.
Mr. Shinn. I think the answer to your question is, yes, one can
do some relief in Somaliland and indeed one should do some. I am
not sure I can put my finger immediately upon what we have done
there so far. We have done a little up there. It has not been very
significant, I would be the first to agree.
Part of the problem has been that being focused in Mogadishu
for so long and only fairly recently moving outside of Mogadishu
and with Hargeysa being as far away as it is, just logistically there
is something of a problem.
There also is this difficulty, this practical problem of getting in
and out of the airport there and going through this extortion busi-
ness which is a nuisance. It is not necessarily much more than
that.
But, as I say, we have provided some minimal assistance in that
area and I think the goal is to provide more in the future. It is one
21
of the areas that we see where one can focus more assistance and
we fully intend to do that, security conditions permitting.
Mr. Payne. Just getting back to the June 5 attack on the Paki-
stanis after they left the radio station, it would appear to me, and
I was there, we left maybe around June 1 or 2 from Mogadishu,
my third trip there, it would appear to me that one of the problems
that Aideed saw at the time was that Bidoa was really almost nor-
mal as compared to 6 months prior to that when we were there
when hundreds of people were dying daily at that city. And the lit-
tle local merchants were back out, there was a lot of normalcy. The
technicals were off the street, some of the little preschool classes
were going on. And it appeared that things were moving back to
a normal situation, no chaos, very little confusion.
Do you think that that was one of the driving forces, using the
radio station as an excuse but that Aideed flourishes best when
there is chaos and killing and war-like situations rather than peo-
ple returning to normalcy?
What is your opinion on that?
Mr. Shinn. My own analysis of the situation, and I think it is
shared fairly widely among those of us who have been working the
question but it is certainly not unanimous is that General Aideed
was beginning to realize what U.S. and U.N. policy was doing dur-
ing the months of March, April and May. And that was in large
part an effort to permit wide elements of Somali society to take
part in creating their own government, to bring in, as it were, ele-
ments of society that had traditionally been a part of that govern-
ment.
To do that, you had to reduce the power of the factional groups,
the people with the guns. And of all the groups with guns, certainly
in Mogadishu, Aideed was the most powerful. He is a smart man.
He realized what was going on. We refer to it as marginalizing the
political factions, if you will. He saw that slowly, day by day, his
power might be marginalized, might be reduced. And my own hy-
pothesis is that he finally reached the point where that was just
unacceptable, where there might be too little power left, not only
for him but for other factional leaders who for whatever reason
were not willing to go as far as he was willing to go. I think he
took action in response to this policy.
Now, that is one hypothesis, one analysis. You will find other
people who will have different analyses but I am not sure I have
heard a better one.
Mr. Payne. Well, that basically, I guess, is more or less even
what I was saying. I did not use the marginalization but we used
to talk about a normalization. Maybe that was too general a term.
But that there was another rule other than the rule of the gun,
that normalcy, people came out, people were in the streets, people
were going to school, people were dealing in commerce. And there-
fore they were empowered. Women were really becoming organized,
the women's movement, and that might have been somewhat new
although the Somali women have always been strong. But during
that period they became very vocal. I mean, they were actually the
only ones that used to violate the green line anyway but they were
organizing and really as they would say up in Newark, they were
bad mouthing the old warlords, you know, the factional leaders and
22
they were saying we do not need any of them. And so it seemed
that this marginalization, I concur wholeheartedly with that analy-
sis. That is basically the way I saw it.
Just getting back to disarmament and the fact that if you were
President, I conclude from your comments that you are feeling that
disarmament would not have been very successful because you are
only talking about the large heavy armament but I think that ini-
tially when the troops went in, I do not necessarily call a jeep with
a machine gun mounted on the back as something that is a nega-
tive or should be considered in the small arms. And I think initially
when we went in there was no attempt actually to deal with that,
to ask them to dislodge the guns or at least to even keep those
jeeps or trucks quarantined but it was just after, I guess, 3 or 4
weeks we asked them to take the tanks and heavy Bradley-type
trucks outside the city limits.
It would appear to me that when we went in initially if even the
technicals, even if you keep your truck but take the gun off, and
if we had in my opinion made it clear that it was not the accepted
practice to walk around with weapons on your arm, that if there
had been a strict enforcement of law and order, I still feel that we
would have had much more positive results than we had by looking
the other way.
Mr. Shenn. Congressman, as you may recall, initially when we
went in, we were not quite sure what to expect. Quite honestly, we
all thought there would be far more American casualties in those
first couple of days than there were and we were very pleasantly
surprised with the outcome in the first week or so.
A number of technicals were taken out in that first week, in
large part as a result of the efforts on the ground by Ambassador
Oakley and his team which preceded the arrival of the military by
several days, in talking with people like Aideed and Ali Mahdi and
telling them not to engage us, let us come in, we are trying to come
here to deliver food.
He was largely successful in those efforts but not with everyone.
There were still some renegade elements that were running around
town taking potshots at troops or doing nasty deeds. And when our
military, when UNITAF encountered those kinds of elements, they
took them out. I do not know what the number is, I have forgotten,
but a not insignificant number were removed.
It is true that it was weeks later when we started what we called
cantoning the technicals, the artillery pieces, a few tanks, armored
cars, that kind of thing, under the control of both Aideed and Ali
Mahdi and perhaps for a few other of the factions. They were
cantoned primarily in the greater Mogadishu area. Again, memory
fails me as to what the numbers were in these cantonments but
they were not insignificant. One of the lessons learned out of all
of this was that these cantonments were often done on the honor
system. In other words, we cantoned these pieces of equipment out
in the desert somewhere in a graveyard and left them. Then when
things went sour again, come June 5, militia members collected as
many of them as they could. A fair number of them were actually
destroyed before they could be moved, but some were not. Some
were put back into use again by the militias. And that is a lesson
23
learned. You should not have voluntary cantonment sites on the
honor system in a situation like this.
Mr. Payne. Without development assistance after the United
States withdraws and some of the other countries withdraw, it ap-
Eears to me that what you are saying is that there will eventually
e — in your opinion, will there be — say come September, how many
U.N. peacekeeping troops do you think will be in Somalia?
Mr. Shinn. Come September, I would estimate there will be be-
tween 16,000 and 18,000. And that is an estimate. We are doing
a certain amount of guesswork going that far out.
Mr. Payne. Do you expect things to be normal or do you think
that if the warring factions get back to warring again, will the
troops stay?
Mr. Shinn. If there ever were a situation where relative comes
into play, it is referring to Somalia as being normal. I think there
is a good chance that the situation in Somalia come September will
be sufficiently stable and secure that one can go on with one's
work. And if that is normal, then I guess the answer to your ques-
tion is affirmative.
But that does not mean it is going to be anywhere near trouble
free and that there are not going to be bandits still lurking about
and causing trouble. Occasional inter-clan conflicts I suspect will be
going on. And this is probably a best case scenario, not a worst
case. In a worst case scenario, I can give you some pretty horrible
options. We do not think that will happen but one cannot rule it
out.
But I think a figure of 16,000 to 18,000 troops is reasonable to
predict at this point.
Mr. Payne. And you do expect there will be this 10,000, you said
10,000-person police force?
Mr. Shinn. Yes, but in all honesty, come September, that police
unit is not going to be in a position where it can do what it really
should be doing. This is a 2-year program and it is really only now
getting underway.
Come September, it will be more useful than it is today. It will
not be a 10,000-person unit. It will be a functioning police unit in
certain locations. And it already is, actually, in certain locations.
There have been a couple of interesting cases lately where people
were robbed by bandits with automatic weapons ana where the po-
lice intervened, caught the robbers and returned the money and in
one case, substantial amounts of money. There are not very many
of these cases but it is an interesting development. We are starting
to hear this for the first time now.
There is going to be more and more of that with the police. But
come September, it will still be a long way from being completed.
Mr. Payne. They have had a previous history of having a sub-
stantial police department. I mean, this is traditional. It is nothing
new to Somalia, right?
Mr. Shinn. And a very good one and one that at least at the
leadership level was not based on clan lines.
Mr. Payne. Just kind of winding down, who will these policemen
work for? Who do they report to? The U.N.?
Mr. Shinn. Well, the ad hoc arrangement at the moment is that
their training will be done by a variety of different countries, in-
24
eluding us, working very closely with UNOSOM troops in the field
but taking administrative advice and administrative management
from the UNOSOM justice division in Mogadishu. It is a bit of a
Rube Goldberg operation, but then that is nothing new to Somalia
either.
Mr. Payne. Well, probably the place that you might be able to
compare it to, Somalia about what is normal and what is not nor-
mal, is that in Haiti they have a police department in one city only,
though, in Port-au-Prince and the chief of police is a fellow named
Michel Francois, who is also the drug smuggling baron but he is
a police chief and he is also, though, in the army but he is under
General Cedras who runs the army but Michel Francois, who has
a brother who is even worse, is stronger than the general under
whom he serves. You are talking about we are dealing with some
complicated situations, that is one that really boggles the mind,
this police versus military in Haiti and they actually had two dif-
ferent groups, the army that was going to retrain the military and
the Canadian Mounties that were going to work with Francois.
That was under the so-called Governor's Island accord.
But just concluding, I just hope that were some lessons learned.
I think that finally the real tragedy of all of this is that for 30
years we had one goal in mind, or 40, maybe, since World War II
and that was to defeat the Communists. And as long as you were
not a Communist, you were all right with us and we just took
bums and murderers and thieves and crooks as our allies, like
Mobuto in Zaire and Doe that we looked the other way in Liberia
when he took over by killing the President and his family and Libe-
ria received more funds during that 10 years than they had ever
gotten before. And the support of Barre after he even bombed his
own country when I was first here in the Congress early 1989,
1990. And for us to build one of the largest embassies that we have
anywhere in Africa was this dictator was fighting communism and
therefore our policy is simply look the other way, I think that is
the real tragedy because what we did was to drive people to con-
tinue to do what they wanted to do.
I mean, when Ethiopia decided to go the other way, we needed
someone to fight communism so we elected Barre in Somalia and
they fought the bad Communists that were the new bad guys in
Ethiopia. And so hopefully as we move into this new world order,
and that is not such a good term either. You know, that is what
they called it in 1930's, Hitler called it — I do not know if people re-
alize it but that is what he called it, the new world order, so I do
not use that. I hope that we move into a more sound foreign policy
where we have more than one basic goal and I guess we did, we
beat the Communists so we are the victors, I guess. But in the
process we really messed up a lot of places.
Mr. Johnston. Ambassador, there are 50 Quick Marines that
will be
Mr. Shinn. FAST Marines.
Mr. Johnston. FAST.
Mr. Shinn. All the same.
Mr. Johnston. Excuse me. I could come out with a rather sala-
cious joke about this but I shall not. I am sure they would be flat-
tered to be described as that, too.
25
Mr. Shinn. I am sure they are quick, too.
Mr. Johnston. When he was in Somalia recently, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that several Marines would re-
main offshore. I think about 1,500. Do you know what the criteria
would be to commit them back to the mainland?
Mr. Shinn. Well, the amount of time they are going to be off-
shore is not yet determined. It is my understanding it will certainly
be through April and probably a little beyond. After April you start
doing a lot of guesswork.
They would be available if there were a breakdown of law and
order where Americans are present, which is essentially in
Mogadishu, to be able to conduct their safe evacuation from the
country. That would be the primary purpose of their being there.
Mr. Johnston. OK. We have American NGO's there that are
starting to be victims of burglary. We have technicals that are com-
ing back, seeing more and more of them. You are having crops that
are being ravaged and you have also had a bad season. I see every-
thing down the future, for the next 6 months to a year, very much
like the condition right before we went in there.
Mr. Shinn. Well, with one maior exception. You do not have the
starvation today that we had wnen we went in initially. In other
words, in December of 1992, huge numbers of people were dying
every day and that is simply not happening today.
Mr. Johnston. But they were dying because we could not get the
wheat from point A to point B because in the port they were extort-
ing everybody just to unload a mere ship of food to feed their own
people there. Everybody was on the take in this country. There was
no rule of law. And, as I said, in 6 months from now, I feel that
we are back where we were in 1991.
Mr. Shinn. Well, that is certainly a scenario. I would place it in
the worst case scenario. One cannot rule out that something along
these lines might happen. I mean, when we look at the various op-
tions that might be facing us, it is one of them that we look at.
We tend to think, and perhaps we are by nature optimists, that
it will not follow that scenario, that it will be something consider-
ably less destructive and harmful than that. It is not going to be
an easy future under the best of circumstances. There are just too
many problems to overcome. But we really do think there is a rea-
sonable chance that if enough Somalis realize that this is not a
very good way to live, there are better alternatives than a return
to that kind of a situation, and I think the vast majority of Somalis
do believe that. Unfortunately it is a minority that chooses the
other path. That huge majority of Somalis is going to have to neu-
tralize somehow that minority. We tend to think that is a doable
thing.
Mr. Johnston. For my own edification, could you name the 12
countries that you have jurisdiction over?
Mr. Shinn. Yes. Starting in Sudan in the North, Ethiopia,
Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mau-
ritius, Comoros. We have British Indian Ocean Territory, which is
not really a country.
Mr. Johnston. You have Comoros, you say?
Mr. Shinn. Comoros, yes.
Mr. Johnston. You have all the islands, then.
26
Mr. Shinn. Except for the Maldives. Maldives belongs to South
Asia. And Somalia. I forgot Somalia.
Mr. Johnston. A Freudian slip.
Mr. Shinn. Sometimes I would like to forget Somalia.
Mr. Johnston. Does the State Department have a clan chart for
the State Department?
Mr. Shinn. No, but we need one.
Mr. Johnston. You do not have something that I could pick up
and look at?
Mr. Shinn. Oh, you mean a breakdown of
Mr. Johnston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Oh, yes. Sure. Of course.
Mr. Johnston. Could you
Mr. Shinn. You mean the breakdown by country as to who is re-
sponsible for what?
Mr. Johnston. Yes.
Mr. Shinn. Oh, sure. Yes.
Mr. Johnston. All right. If I could have one of those.
Mr. Shinn. By all means.
Mr. Johnston. So I do not make too many more mistakes.
Mr. Payne. Do you have Eritrea?
Mr. Shinn. I am sorry. Eritrea, too. Yes, I do.
Mr. Johnston. Thank you very much. You have been very help-
ful and on a very, very tough subject and you are very kind to come
today.
Mr. Shinn. I devote a lot of energy to it.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
THE HONORABLE HARRY JOHNSTON,
CHAIRMAN
HEARING ON SOMALIA
MARCH 16, 1994
I would like to welcome you to the
Subcommittee on Africa's hearing on
"Somalia: Prospects for Peace and
Stability.11 The objective of this hearing
is to assess current conditions in
Somalia and to explore prospects for
peace and stability after the pullout of
U.S. troops. I called this hearing to
look toward the future and to explore
(27)
28
ways in which we can constructively
help the people of Somalia and not to
dwell on past mistakes and point
fingers. Certainly, there are lessons we
can learn from our mistakes and we will
find an appropriate forum for such a
discussion.
Prospects for peace and stability in
Somalia remain illusive in the face of
continued skirmishes and growing
banditry in the countryside. In Kismayu,
the security situation has deteriorated
29
significantly over the past several
months. Meanwhile, the security
situation in Mogadishu seems uncertain.
Unfortunately, after billions of dollars
and several thousands of casualties,
Somalia is far from recovering. The
humanitarian situation could deteriorate
in the coming months, unless a political
settlement is achieved soon. According
to some relief officials, pockets of
famine have begun to reappear in some
parts of Somalia.
-
30
Recent peace efforts by Somalis and
Somalia's neighbors have been
promising. The Aideed-led peace
initiative in Nairobi seems hopeful.
Most importantly, the Imam-led initiative
in Mogadishu has brought the warring
Hawiyee clans together. We are
encouraged by this new development.
Meanwhile, another new initiative has
been launched this week. President
Husni Mubarak of Egypt, the current
chairman of the OAU, held talks this
31
week with the group of 12, General
Aideed's rivals, in Cairo. I am not
optimistic about this initiative and it may
be counterproductive, since it could
potentially undermine the two ongoing
peace efforts.
While the international community
continues to focus on southern and
central Somalia, the north-west section,
known as Somaliland, has largely been
neglected by the international
community. Since the declaration of
32
independence in May 1991, assistance
to Somaliland has been limited. I hope
the Clinton Administration will become
more engaged in that part of Somalia as
well.
This afternoon, we will hear from
Ambassador David Shinn, Director of
the East Africa Bureau and a former
Somalia Coordinator. We are pleased to
have you here this afternoon. We had
also requested the Defense Department
to send a representative last week to
33
appear before this Subcommittee.
Unfortunately, our request was rejected
34
OPENING STATEMENT
CONGRESSMAN DONALD M. PAYNE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA HEARING
SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
MARCH 16, 1994
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your
efforts to keep the focus on Somalia during this
critical period as the United States withdraws
from the UN Peace Keeping Mission in Somalia.
In order to discuss today's topic, "Prospects
for Peace and Stability" it may be helpful to put
our past actions in historical perspective.
When President Bush committed US Troops in
December 1992 to help the starving people of
Somalia there were several flaws in this policy.
35
By its very nature, Operation Restore Hope
was always more than a simple humanitarian
operation.
As Walter Clarke, former Charge' a" Affairs,
at the US Liaison Office in Somalia and now
Professor of International Relations at the US
Army War College stated in Parameters, the War
College Quarterly, "the introduction of a
substantial international force directly affected the
internal lines of communication and balance of
political forces of local leaders who had been at
war with one another for nearly two years.
It was only a matter of time before a violent
response developed to the intervention.
36
Unless, of course, the warlords could satisfy
their political ambitions by working with the
foreign forces."
Clark further goes on to point out that the
UNITAF mission would be judged not by how
many people it helped to feed, but by the political
situation it left behind. Further, that contrary to
the assertions of certain Bush Administration
officials indicating disbelief in the existence of
legitimate political forces in Somalia, US
diplomats in Mogadishu continued to receive
pleas for action against the warlords.
37
Because of my own knowledge of the existence
of these political forces I was one who supported
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's
plea that the US Forces disarm the warring
factions in early December 92. Several Defense
experts I discussed the matter with said that
coming off the victorious Gulf War we had the
psychological and military advantage to do this
with a minimum of casualties.
I was interested to hear General Shalikashvili
(Gen. Shalli, as President Clinton calls him) on
Ted Koppel's show last night. In answering Ted's
questions about what went wrong in Somalia he
agreed we need to better articulate our policy.
38
Gen. Shalli said "I think I have said repeatedly
that we need to do a much better job in
articulation why it is important for the United
States not to stand idly by when it comes time to
help implement the peace plan, but also what the
risks would be involved in our involvement is
such an operation."
In looking back on our own congressional
process we also could of done a better job of
informing the American people that such
operations could mean casualties, and we should
be prepared to make the sacrifice, if we allow
ourselves to become involved.
39
Later in the program Gen. Shalli agreed that if the
US commits ground troops in Bosnia, we should
be prepared for the possibility of casualties. I
liked Gen. Shalli's closing comments "Americans
have understood, perhaps better than most, that
freedom isn't free and that to gain the sort of
world that we all hunger for for our children we
sometimes have to make that sacrifice."
Possibly, if we had prepared the American
people better, there would have been the political
will to stay the course for a more orderly
withdraw in Somalia.
40
Recent reports of violence again between
Indian Troops under the UN and warring factions,
as well as uncoordinated peace talks that are
unable to achieve consensus do not bold well for
the future in Somalia. I hope Mr. Shinn can give
us some encouraging words, and I am
disappointed the Defense Dept. saw fit to cancel
the appearance of Mr. Solcombe today.
Mr. Chairman because of the significance of
Mr. Clark's article and the transcript of Mr.
Koppel's interview with General Shalli last night I
would appreciate this opportunity to submit both
documents as part of the record of this meeting.
Thank you Mr. Chairman
41
TESTIMONY OF DAVID SHINM
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
BEFOPK THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
ON
SOMALIA
MARCH 16, 1994
Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Foreign Affairs
Subcomrr itte* on Africa:
I want to than}; you for this opportunity to discuss Somalia
today. Your continued interest in this difficult problem is
very welcome to us It is always a pleasure to meet with the
Foreign Affairs Coisnittee.
We are quickly approaching another threshold of American
involvement in Sen ilia, the post-March 31 period in which we
will no longer be ailitarily involved. In reaching this new
stage we have taken stock of what has gone before, and we find
that we have every reason to be proud of what the United States
has done in Soma!- a. Our involvement was prompted by a human
disaster of massiv* proportions, largely the result of an
enormously destructive civil war. There is no longer
widespread starvation. In mid-1992, before we became involved,
anywhere fiom 10C0 to 3000 people were dying daily from
starvation. There are now only isolated cases of
starvation- relate*] deaths. 167,000 people receive food daily
through toed distribution programs. Before our involvement and
that or: the United Nations, 80\ of the relief food for Somalia
was stolen. Now veil over 80% reaches the intended population.
Before our intervention, agricultural production had
completely ceased. Now crops are grown and harvested
throughout. In mid-1992, less than 5 hospitals were
functioning, and there were no maternal end child health care
centers, "here me now 32 hospitals and 81 MCH centers in
operation. In mid-1992, no schools were operating. 234 are
operating now.
The March 31 withdrawal of American combat troops from
Somalia wa:i announced by President Clinton in a statement last
October 7. That was nearly six months ago, during which,
President Clinton said, Somalis would be given a reasonable
chance to cebuili their country. But the outcome would be
determined by Somalia themselves. "It is not our job to
rebuild Somalia's society," he said, "or even to create a
political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and
work in peace, rhe Somalis must do that for themselves. The
United Nations and many African states are more than willing to
help. But we - w>: in the United States - must decide whether
we will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance."
42
We have since been working on the things the President said
we would do to he:, i Somalis make use of that time in order to
gain control of their destiny. Recognising that a continued UN
military role would be essential in protecting humanitarian
assistance, we h*v-» encouraged others to do their part in
providing forces tea UNOSOM - the United Nations Organization in
Somalia. Ke havf provided equipment to support UNOSOM military
contingents and :o help prepare them for carrying on work our
forces have done. After March 31/ the UNOSOM force is expected
to have abcut 18.030 troops which will be largely engaged in
protecting major saa ports and airports and keeping routes open
for the delivery of relief supplies.
We have continued our humanitarian assistance. The
humanitarian conference convened by the United Nations in Addis
Ababa late last ii:vember brought together nearly all the Somali
factions and the international aid donors. The donors were
able to describe to the Somalis what assistance would be lost
if violence; continued unchecked. The donors collectively
agreed thai: the future of Somalia is in the hands of Somalis
themselves, a position which has since been repeatedly
emphasized Folic wing agreements reached at this conference,
the donors have organized under UN leadership a more effective
mechanism Hot coordinating assistance.
We have actively encouraged political reconciliation among
Somali:;, both through our own efforts and support for those of
the UN. T.ilks underway in Nairobi have the potential for
significant progress. There have been other talks - most
particular ly in Vcldis Ababa last March and again in December -
which have laid a reasonable foundation for establishing an
interim ceitral government, but the necessary political
concession! have not yet been made. Somali leaders seem too
preoccjpiel with pursuing narrow agendas and Insufficiently
dedicated co the cause of rebuilding their country.
ThD imnediate focus of the talks in Nairobi is an
initiative to obtain a peace agreement for Kismayo. At the
urging of *unbass!i:lor Lansana Kouyate, the UN Secretary
General' 3 acting Special Representative in Somalia, the leaders
of the factions concerned in the strife in Kismayo are meeting
in Naitobi this week. A settlement on Kismayo could lead to
broader discussions on national peace objectives. A proposal
for an interim government has been tabled by the Group of
Twelve, headed by Ali Mahdi. We anticipate that Somali
National Alliance (SNA) leader General Aideed will issue his
own pioposal in Nairobi.
43
These talks 91:13 complemented by discussions in Mogadishu
under the aegis cf the Imam of Herab, whose traditional
position of influence spans the Hawiye sub-clans to which both
Ali Mahdi and Aiif.eed belong. The Imam's initiative has
constructively added the voices of highly-respected religious
leaders and eldei* to those of many other Somalia weary of
strife and who waafc to get on with the rebuilding of their
country .
Wh; Lie March 31 brings an end to our military role, it by no
means brings an end to our involvement in Somalia. We intend
to st a;' enqaged fcr as long as security conditions permit, we
will maintain a diplomatic and AID presence in Mogadishu. It
will provide a bare for maintaining contact with Somalia and
for continuing to encourage political reconciliation.
We &re increasing the number of AID personnel working on
Somalia programs, particularly to take advantage of
reconstruction and development opportunities in suitable areas
away from Mogadishu. We have made available approximately $65
mil lien this year for food aid and other forms of humanitarian
and economic assistance. Up to $45 million, is committed to
help UN efforts to rebuild Somalia's police force. Along with
other countries we are providing personnel to help train the
police. Me are also meeting the UN's request to provide
personnel to help UNOSOM with contracting and logistics.
A;; President Clinton said, it is up 'to Somalia to seize
this opportunity. Both positive and negative factors are at
work, rht.-re is still considerable violence and lawlessness.
Large parts of iScmalia are generally peaceful, but there is a
disturbing trend in the increasing number of armed attacks on
the n:tr>-governnn»rtal organizations through which international
assistance is distributed, including that provided by the
United States, this is most noticeable in the southern and
central p.irts of Somalia, where employees of non-governmental
organizations acv sporadically attacked, sometimes with loss of
life, forcing in some cases at least temporary suspension of
operations. We ire impressing on Somali leaders that the
departure of these organizations would end the means by which
humanitarian assistance is distributed.
The southern port city of Kismayo has been the site of
recent fightin<] That has abated, although the factions
concerned appeai: prepared for further combat if the current
peace initiative fails. Nothing in Somalia, however, compares
with Mogadishu •• where the stakes are greatest and the threat
44
of 3trjfe s constant. Last week inter-clan fighting resulted
in the briof closing of the airport. Positions held by UNOSOM
military contingar-ts have been under increasing fire. The
trend t:3wa:rds greater violence adds urgency to the
reconciliation efforts, a point we have repeatedly stressed.
We are proud of our record in Somalia. We intend to remain
enga9e'l thure and will continue to demonstrate our interest in
Somalia's politicnl and economic reconstruction. In economic
terras/ cut emphasis - along with other donors - will be- on
helping those Senilis who are willing to provide the necessary
securi :y a. id cooperation for assistance programs to work. In
political :erras, ve are making it clear to Somalia that the
fate of thsir com. try is in their hands. The US and other
countries tannot decide their future for thera.
45
mS -a .s | 2
> "fl
.I'll- 1
ililifi
lilf.ll1
Mill*'
•o s 3 g ■ -
■9 8 1 1 « i
JMli
*eoi 1 s
~ ^ v> ■* „ o S
1 1ll
'*J1
a
a o
I 0 II
<L>
£
O
a>
^
^
c/)
T3
T3
O
£
0)
5
sting
s
o
00
H
.S
I
s
IIs!
*~ « « -S
"S.9 K 2
u 2 8 °
o a * ^
-is*
t a s.a
•a s 2 I
3030
a. a .2 >
S'Stj «
c « -o
O O Ml M
_ U O u
S >>2 §
1 2"s 5
< .9 ° *>
v E 'C- b.
•S 5 -5 00
3 a a
.8.2S
* JO H O
:|1B£
B § § JL
S « ■ ■
@a g e
l,^ I §
sill
•UiI
-° 1 5 o
1 § <*2
If.5 «
15
3 ■ £ 2
111 ill
.2 o -9 §
° "3 2 a a *
jliiii
I 2 2 1 1 o
6 > 8. a a
a a*. 8^ -5'
II
1 2
« a t> S
-s-S
.3 »
1 1 it i
IJfl
«> .5
1 a "3 = °
5 5 -s 5 w
o * > o «J
46
47
•i
48
1 1*1 i
s
1
.iMrsn tun tioi"vm
49
I
v a
"1
5.2
8 "8
I III
o _ 55 -o
„ ii o !
9 8.2 *
tA C (A V
.2 -o
.5 °
■o
■ | .a a
s|sa
a. g o o
II
o
R *
BI
ill
111
3 Ex
v a 5
g-S!
•2 £«
I§§
u B I
" i3 I
2? o S
iii
l> O w
e a. j:
B J» "
i?
S "» >
hi
S.2.8
O J=
8 I
II
J> «
c
o j»
11
II
s a
• *
1,3;
o •
■a I
If
a a
si
E g
r i
^
13
fi
O.
n v
0.-S
50
tfil
_ o H eg 6
ills s- 1
I* ill!'
? §
"ill-838 1
■a £■! kl fe
8. a a J s J f
•lull's1
J II,
liiiJli
. i IS
1 1! It"
S lis
3 &■*$
£ x s « ° § a
J*! Ill
S3J5
s S 8 •§ 8.
f 8 = 5 S
* I a 1 1 1 J
_ a * S-g «
3 Bj 9- £ g<2 «'
■ mill
:s o 3 S. o. .,
— 2 3 S p c 4
8.5 81 Us*
51
1 1
Z .5
■o e
2 o
■ - -a
c
^ s
■£ «
u
C Xi
o
Q .§
Q. B
O —
B 3
(4 .O
I o
E 2
.a »i
*■* (/)
D. u
O 3
!
•it
S.3.I
ill
.s *
? >> B
■° 2
T3 —
S u -s
U « S "•» *
Z*Z a.
- "a 6
J! O..
o
X
■s « I 5
in — s
— — u
■s >,■
!■»•
o c
■ &L a
52
139 REUTERS 03-16-94 08:37 AET
BC-ABC-NL-GEN-SHALI 1STADD
THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT
ABC NIGHTLINE/GEN. SHALI PAGE 4 03/15/94
.STX
xxx spreading.
MR. KOPPEL: If after American troops are on the ground and
peace does not hold -- and that does seem like a reasonable
question, and I'm sure it's one you've considered -- what do
U.S. troops do? Do they become involved or do they pull out
again?
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI : I think that the degree to which you
send in a force that is on the very clearly defined rules of
engagement, very robust chain of command, that the forces
themselves are structured to be able to take care of themselves
and the rules of engagement make it certain that how you will
react to a threatening situation. You first of all, through all
of that, greatly minimize the chance that someone will take you
PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.
on or threaten the peacekeeping force, and that even minor
skirmishes will break out into larger fights. So I think it's
very important to understand that you want to send in a force
that is militarily robust enough to do what you asked it to do,
and militarily robust enough to protect itself.
MR. KOPPEL: Is not the lesson of Somalia that even a
fellow like Mohamed Aideed can, with a relatively small lightly
armed force, extract enough casualties that the political
pressure on the United States then to withdraw its forces will
be so great that they cannot be resisted?
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: I think that much of that depends on
whether that is true. It depends how well you have articulated
before you went in the dangers and the risks involved. The less
you've done that, the Less you've convinced the people of the
merits of involvement, and the less you've convinced Congress of
the merits of involvement , the more the chance that what you
postulate will happen.
MR. KOPPEL: You surely don't think that that has been
done?
PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: No, I don't think it has been done. I
think I have said repeatedly that we need to do a much better
job in articulating why it is important for the United States
not to stand idly by when it comes time to help implement the
peace plan, but also what the risks would be involved in our
involvement in such an operation.
53
MR. KOPPEL: General Shalikashvili, let's take a break.
When we come back, I'm going to ask precisely those questions
and give you an opportunity to enunciate those answers . Thank
you. We'll be back in a moment.
.ETX
ABC NIGHTLINE/GEN. SHALI PAGE 5 03/15/94
.STX
(Announcements . )
MR. KOPPEL: And we're back once again with the chairman of
PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Shalikashvili, you raised the
questions, now you see if you can answer them. What needs to be
conveyed to the American public is what will happen if American
troops are sent into Bosnia, and then if they come under attack?
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: I think that's a question that you
need to ask before. We're all are always very good at asking
what happens if we take a certain action, what happens if we go
into Bosnia. You also have to think your way through what
happens if we don't go into Bosnia. I think that if we
understand the implications of inaction, then it is easier to
understand why some argue that the instability that continued
conflict in Europe would have warrants America's involvement. We
have in fact an interest, a very core interest, in European
stability. We have a core interest in preserving the credibility
of the alliance.
MR. KOPPEL: General, I'm still saying to you that if half
a dozen young Americans die in Bosnia sometime in the next year
or so, then I'm not sure that what you have set forth here will
be a sufficient explanation to the American public as to why
American interests are at stake over there.
PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: I think that Americans understood very
well the risks that they needed to take, and they took them, to
build half of Europe that now is the anchor of stability, our
greatest trading partner. I'm asking --
MR. KOPPEL: And they understood -- and, General, if you'll
forgive me for interrupting -- they understood it because at
that time the world was bifurcated between two great powers:
there were the Communists on one side represented by the Soviet
Union, and there were the democratic nations on the other side.
Than kind of a reality doesn't exist any more.
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: 'And the world today is even more
complex and in many ways more dangerous today because of all of
the uncertainties, the conflicts that rage around the periphery
of the former Soviet Union. And if we do not manage those well
we can destroy not only any chance in Eastern Europe, in Central
54
Europe, in the former Soviet Union for peace and stability, that
surely is in our best interests, but it will also have an impact
on Western Europe that we have spent so much energy and so many
resources in building.
PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.
I think it is in our best interest to continue to work to
reduce the conflicts there now and to bring the stability and
the peace to all of Europe -- not just part of Europe -- so all
of Europe can become that strong partner of ours that now
Western Europe is.
MR. KOPPEL: General, no one has any trouble with the
prospect of peace -- that's always accepted. My concern is
whether you think that
.ETX
ABC NIGHTLINE/GEN. SHALI PAGE 6 03/15/94
.STX
the political will exists now, or will exist in the near future,
in this country if and when young Americans start dying in
Bosnia.
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI : I think we must not be frivolous about
it. We must not ask Americans to give their lives needlessly.
PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.
But Americans have understood, perhaps better than most, that
freedom isn't free and that to gain the sort of world that we
all hunger for for our children we sometimes have to make that
sacrifice .
MR. KOPPEL: So, unlike Somalia where clearly a political
decision was made that the deaths of a relatively few Americans
was such that we had to withdraw our troops from over there,
because our vital national interest was not involved -- if I
understand you correctly, you are telling me that it is your
perception that in Bosnia America's vital interests are
involved, and even if Americans start losing their lives over
there it is essential that they remain there until peace is
established?
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: I think America's core interests are
involved in Europe, the stability of Europe. Peace on the
European continent is one of America's core interests, and we
have never shied away after we have thought our way through to
doing that which needs to be done to preserve that core
interest .
PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.
MR. KOPPEL: So is the answer to my question yes?
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI : I think that in Bosnia we have
55
sufficient core interests involved that justify the commitment
of 25,000, or whatever the number is, of Americans to help
implement the peace plan. Yes, I believe that.
MR. KOPPEL: With the understanding though that that can
lead to casualties and that Americans may die?
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI : Yes, clearly.
MR. KOPPEL: General -Shalikashvili , thank you very much.
You've been very gracious.
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: Thank you.
END
.ETX
PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.
140 REUTERS 03-16-94 08:43 AET 222 LINES
BC-DAYBOOK3-2NDADD-MARCH16
xxx NEW TIME
THE HOUSE (Cont. )
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -- 2 p.m. -- Africa subcommittee holds
hearing on Somalia. David Shinn, director for east African
affairs at the State Department, testifies. 2172 Rayburn
Contact: 202-226-7807 or 202-225-5021
JUDICIARY -- 9:30 a.m. -- Meets to mark up H.R. 3626,
Antitrust and Communications Reform Act, and pending crime
legislation, including H.R. 3981, the x,three strikes, you're
out'' bill. The following crime bills are also scheduled for
consideration: H.R.--, Victims of Crime Act; H.R. 3979,
Mandatory Minimum
o
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 9999 05982 032 2
ISBN 0-16-046850-7
9 780160
468506
90000
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11