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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RAIL AND
ROAD TRANSPORT III COMMONWEALTH
TROPICAL AFRICA
John F. Due
Transportation Research Paper #14
#392
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urb ana-Champaign
April 6, 1977
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RAIL AND
ROAD TRANSPORT III COMMONWEALTH
TROPICAL AFRICA
John F. Due
Transportation Research Paper #14
#392
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RAIL AND ROAD TRANSPORT IN
COMMONWEALTH TROPICAL AFRICA
The railway systems of tropical Africa were products ini-
tially of the colonial period, with minor exceptions, being inaugurated
around the turn of the century and progressing slowly, primarily built
inward from the ports, without connections to adjacent countries.
They were built partly for noneconomic reasons, partly to facilitate
export of minerals and agricultural products. They were built
cheaply, with light rails — some no more than 35 pound — and
universally with a gauge less than the 4'8%" standard of western
Europe and North Ameiica. Primarily they are either metre or the
1.067 metre gauge that began in the Cape Colony in South Africa.
Inadequate as the rail lines were — they never constituted a "system"
except in the southern third of the continent — they were playing a
significant role in the economies of the countries at the time of
independence. Road systems, while greater in mileage at independence,
were largely unsurfaced and unsuitable for heavy traffic.
The purpose: of this paper is to survey the development of the
lines, with primary emphasis on post-independence policies, to consider
The author is greatly indebted to the officials of the Ministries
of Transport and the railways in the various countries. Any views
expressed are solely those of> the author unless otherwise indicated.
^e first railway in tropical Africa was built in 1885 between Dakar
and St. Louis in Senegal.
the relationships between rail and road transport and economic viability
of the rail lines, and to review the studies of the effects of
the railways upon economic development.
Emphasis is placed upon the Commonwealth countries of East and Centra].
Africa and the neighboring areas, with brief reference to Commonwealth
West Africa. No claim is advanced that the paper reflects original
research; it is based upon existing puMished material, some not widely
known, and interviews in the respective countries in the early months
of 1976.
EAST AFRICAN RAILWAYS
In the late 1950s, the East African Railways (EAR) was the
»jodel railroad of tropical Africa and the d2veloping world, with 3300
miles of line, most of it in first class shape, modern equipment, plans
for complete dieselization, and a heavy volume of traffic relative to
most African lines. A decaie later, EAR, as an entr'ty, had disinte-
grated; the railroad is essentially operated in three portions and is
in the process of bocoaing virtually chree separate roads. It has lost
substantial traffic and is desperately she rt of equipment to handle
the traffic ±c n-s retaicad. Bat it still remains an important artery
of commerce in East Africa and there ire hopes for major improvements
in the constituent parts.
A summary of regional studies of transportation in tropical Africa
prior to 136t is provided in African Development Bank, Survey of
African Regional Transport Studies, 1968: 2 vol.
- 3 -
The Origins
EAR was developed from three separate and originally discon-
nected systems.1 The major route, the Uganda Railway, was built by the
British, in part for political reasons, from the port of Mombasa,
beginning in 1896, to link Uganda with the outside world. Track
reached the site of Nairobi in 1899; Kisumu, the lake port, with
connecting steamer service to Uganda, in 1902; and directly to Kampala
in 1931. Major extensions were completed to Kasese, in the west of
Uganda, in 1956, and to Pachwach, on the Nile in Northern Uganda, in
1964. The main line, Mombasa to Kampala, is 844 miles in length;
the total from Mombasa to Kasese, 1052.
The second element was the Tanganyika Railway, started by
the Germans westward from Bar es Salaam in 1905; it reached Morogoro
in 1907, Tabora in 1912, Kigoma in 1914 to play a role in World War
I, and from Tabora to Mwanza in 1928. This is known as the
Tanganyika (now Tanzania) Central line. The third element, the first
to be started, was built west from the port of Tanga in 1896 but did
not reach Moshi until 1911 and Arusha in 1929. This line was
connected to the Mombasa-Nairobi main line in 1916, and the Tanzania
Central line in 1960.
The lines were merged in 1945 to become the East African
Railways, an element of the East African Common Services Organization,
later the East African Community, and thus jointly owned by the
Hi. Hill, Permanent Way (Nairobi: East African Railways and Harbors,
2 vol., 1949 and 1957), provides a detailed history of the lines; a
semi-popular but excellent volume, relating the railroad to overall
development, is that by Charles Miller, The Lunatic Express (New
York: Ballentine, 1971) .
Figure 1:
Railways in East Africa
.1 ill.— ■ . '. n~« East African Railways
«._•«»_ TA2ARA Railway
o » • » » • Abandoned lines
50 0 100
- 4 -
governments of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The administrative head-
quarters, main repair shops, and training school were located in
Nairobi.
Traffic
The total freight traffic increased steadily up to a high in
the year of 1970, as shown in Table I.
Table I
Total Freight Ton Mies
East African Railways, Selected Years
millions of
year gross ton miles
1948 769
1957 1,454
1964 1,986
1968 2,545
1970 2,768 (peak year)
1973 2,676
1974 2,500 (approx.)
1575 2,250 (approx.)
Source: Annual reports, EAR, and information supplied
by railway sources
Passenger traffic rose through 1973 and then dropped slightly.
The total mileage in 1975 was 3,663; the gross ton miles per
mile of line in 1970 therefore was 730,543. The net figure would be
slightly less than half this figure. This' is light by comparison with
the United States, but high relative to the railways in most developing
countries. The average figure is misleading because of the great
variation by line. For 1968 (in subsequent years the relative figures
for most lines would not differ greatly) the figures were as follows:
Source: Annual Reports, East African Railways,
- 5 -
Main Kenya-Uganda Line
Mombasa-Voi
Voi-Nairobi
Nairobi-Nakuru
Nakuru-Eldoret
Nakuru-Kisumu
Tanzania Central Line
Dar es Salaam-Morogoro
Morogoro-Dodoma
Dodoma-Tabora
Tabora-Mwanza
Tabora-Kigoma
Tanga Line
Tanga-Moshi
Connecting links
Voi-Moshi
Karogu-Ruvi
Selected branches
Nanyuki
Kasese
Pachwach
Mpanda
Gross
lies
Ton
miles per mile
(000s)
104
8,750
226
8,471
112
6,652
125
4,358
136
2,631
126
164
240
236
251
218
107
129
100
208
313
207
3,216
2,594
2,308
1,215
1,027
937
1,075
502
1,222
410
240
123
Thus the main line Mombasa-Nairobi carries .nearly three times
the traffic of the Tanzania Central line; the Tanga line has relatively
light traffic, as do most of the branches.
The principal traffic categories were petroleum products
(which have yielded about 25% of the total revenue), grain, cement,
sugar, coffee, and cotton.
Passenger traffic is substantial but a minor source of total
revenue. As of 1973 daily service was operated Mombasa-Kampala, requir-
ing about 38 hours; daily service Dar es Salaam to Mwanza (and four
- 6 -
times a week to Kigoma) , twice a week Dar es Salaam to Arusha and to
Nairobi; and service on the branches varying from three trains a day to
a train twice a week.
Tariffs and Rates
In 1969, the average revenue was 18 Kenya cents per ton mile,
or roughly 2h U.S. cents, compared to a figure of 1.3 cents in the
United States in that year, but low by comparison with the light
traffic railways of most LDCs. But this figure is misleading, in view
of the wide range of rates under the differential tariff. The develop-
ment and nature of East African tariffs has been analyzed in detail by
Arthur Hazlewood. The tariff originally was built entirely on a value
of service basis, with the deliberate objective of aiding exports and
placing high rates on imported goods, with rates ranging at one time
as high as a shilling per ton mile. As early as the 1930s the develop-
ment of road transport led to some squeezing together of the rates, but
as of 1960 the rates charged ranged from 13.2 EA cents on export
traffic to 36.5 EA cents for top rated commodities, per ton mile on
medium distances. The range in 1969 was 10.9 EA (Kenya) cents to 38.5 EA cents.
While the intent was to aid exports — as a form of export subsidy —
Hazlewood concluded that, given cost differences (the relatively low
cost of handling the bulk commodity exports) , there was in fact no
"subsidization" of most export crops.
By the late sixties it was recognized that the rate structure
was obsolete in light of conditions, and lengthy studies were
^Lail and Road in East Africa (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964).
The monetary units of the three countries, which are kept at par, are
the successors to the East African currency unit.
- 7 -
undertaken to revise the structure in line with costs, to which little
attention had been paid in earlier years. But progress was slow; the
governments, particularly that of Tanzania, wanted retention of low
rates on fertilizer, maize, and livestock, and Tanzania was unwilling
to approve changes until it received concessions on greater regionaliza-
tion of the system. One consequence of the delay was that rates were
virtually frozen from 1969 to 1974 despite sharp increases in costs,
particularly of fuel.
Ultimately, basic changes were agreed upon. First, the taper
for distance was revised drastically. The Hazlewood studies showed
that the taper was not nearly steep enough initially (with the short
distance rates too low), but continued much too far, on the basis of
costs. Thus the rates on short hauls were raised sharply. Secondly,
the differencial between the high rates and low rates was reduced,
with the attempt to raise on commodities with figures below out of
pocket cost and reduce the top rated goods to lessen road transport
competition. Finally, lower rates were provided for large volume ship-
ments to provide incentive to ship in larger amounts. The general
effect was to shift substantially from a value of service oriented
tariff structure to one more closely related to costs, and to raise the
overall level in view of higher fuel costs. The net effect of the change
was to cause some loss in traffic but to raise revenues. There still
remains considerable differential among commodities, some based upon
value of service.
Rail and Road, op. cijC., Chapter 7.
- 8 -
After deficits in early years of the constituent parts, East
African Railways earned a profit continuously up until 1967, when
small deficits began to occur. But basically the system was much
more successful financially than that of many developed countries, as
well as LDCs. But it was generally believed that the high density
profitable Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala line subsidized the lighter
traffic Tanzania Central and Tanga lines.
Rail Operations
The system was operating as of 1960 with a wide variety of
steam locomotives, from ones dating back to the German days in
Tanganyika to a group of Beyer-Garretts, built by Manchester in England,
in the mid-1950s, among the most powerful steam locomotives in the
2
world, used on the high traffic, lines.
Some diesels were introduced in the early 1950s, and in the
3
early sixties plans were made for complete dieselization. But this
was never completed, for reasons noted below. As of 1976, for example,
on the Tanzania lines there were 50 line and 16 switching diesels, and
98 steam locomotives, of which 50 were Beyer-Garretts. Some of the
others were as much as 60 years old. As the steam locomotives become
In 1970, for example, K sh. 36 million; or about 4.3 million dollars.
% ,,
The Beyer-Garrett is essentially two locomotives in one, designed to
distribute the weight of the engine on the light-rail lines of the
developing countries.
3
As of 1957, there were 129 Beyer-Garretts, 222 standard steam loco-
motives, 56 tank locomotives (used for switching) and 46 diesels.
(John R. Day, Railroads of Northern Africa. London: Arthur
Barker, 1964, p. 39.)
_ 9 -
older, repair costs increase, and the advantages of dieselization are
being lost. East Africa has no coal; if it did, and the steam locomo-
tives were coal burning, there would be some incidental benefit in
retaining them. There are still, of course, plans to dieselize in
both countries; Kenya plans complete dieselization by 1980-81.
Passenger equipment is relatively modern on the Nairobi line,
but in Tanzania, most of the coaches date back to the mid 1920s.
The mainline Mombasa -Kampala track remains in good condition,
the other Kenya lines in satisfactory condition but many needing heavier
rail. The main Tanzania lines are in fair condition, but the Central
line was built cheaply, and the management believes that complete
rebuilding is essential . Some of the branch lines in Uganda are reported
to be virtually inoperable.
The gauge is one metre, and thus differs from the track in
all of Southern and Central Africa, which is 1.067 metres. The
problem will be discussed below.
1
The Deterioration
In the late sixties a major development plan for the railway
was prepared, involving change in the tariff structure, and new equip-
ment and other features. But this was not to be implemented, except
for the tariff changes noted; the system began to deteriorate in 1973
and the process culminated in 1975 in the breaking up of the system
into two and to some extent three parts. The source of the difficulty
A detailed description of the disintegration of the East African
Community is provided by Arthur Hazlewood, Economic Integration: the
East African Experience (New York: St. Martins, 1975).
10 -
was political, not to any extent economic or technical. Relations
among the three member states of the East African Community became
increasingly strained. Under military dictatorship Uganda became
increasingly disorganized economically for essentially political
reasons, beginning with the expulsion of the Asians, and increasingly
hostile to Kenya, culminating in claims to a portion of Kenyan
territory early in 1976. At times Kenya railroad employees were
reportedly mistreated in Uganda; Kenya at times stopped rail (and road)
service to Uganda; and, after Uganda had built up large debts,
restricted exports to Uganda. The issues became very complicated, in
part a result of Uganda's volatile behavior. But one net effect was a
decline in both import and e xport rail traffic to Uganda and passenger
travel .
The difficulties between Kenya and Tanzania involved less in
the way of personalities than differences in political-economic
philosophy, and the long standing belief that Kenya benefitted at
Tanzania's expense as a result of the common market. Socialist
Tanzania became more and more unhappy with essentially free-enterprise
Kenya and more and more determined to make its economy self sufficient.
There was now a belief in Tanzania that the Tanzania lines were subsi-
dizing the main Nairobi line, partly because Kenya was favoring road
transport.
There were several consequences of these political differ-
ences (which affected other issues as well and culminated in 1977 in
the liquidation of East African Airways).
1. The countries could not agree on the provision of funds
to EAR for major capital improvements, and foreign lenders were inclined
- 11 -
to provide funds to the countries rather than the Community.
2. Tanzania and Uganda failed to remit to headquarters in
Nairobi funds collected from shippers in their countries. Partly this
reflected the desperate foreign exchange positions in which both coun-
tries found themselves.
3. Tanzania began to divert the Moshi-Arusha traffic to
Tanga and Dar es Salaam rather than to Mombasa, the more logical outlet
and the dominant one even as late as 1970 for this area.
4. Following Tanzania's action in barring Kenya road trans-
port from hauling goods from Mombasa to Zambia (by setting uneconomically
low weight limits) , and belief that Tanzania was not returning freight
cars, in 1975 Kenya cut the Voi-Moshi line at the border by removing
two sections of rail, and the rail connection between the two parts of
the system ended.
5. Disputes among the three countries resulted in the
ending of all ship service on Lake Victoria, thus bringing to an end
the operation of the two car ferries and rail service to Musoma, which
has rail lines for loading cars to go on the ships, but no overland
rail connections.
Thus by 1975 management control over the system came to an
end. The Tanzania portion operated on its own, managed by regional
personnel in Dar es Salaam, but cut off from the training school and
the main repair shops. The portion is doing the best that it can in
its own shops in Morogoro (steam) and Dar es Salaam (diesel) . The
main line is managed from the old headquarters in Nairobi, but the
control over the Uganda portion is tenuous at best. There are other
problems as well. There is a serious shortage of motive power and
- 12 -
cars, the major elements of the system unable to handle the traffic
available. The steam locomotives are becoming increasingly obsolete;
the sight of a great Beyer-Garrett taking the Moshi passenger train
out of the old Dar station in March of 1976 was impressive — but not a
mark of efficiency. Several have, however, been completely rebuilt.
There is a serious lack of parts, aggravated in Tanzania by the
extreme shortage of foreign exchange, which makes it difficult for the
railway to acquire needed items. Failure to modernize as planned,
acute shortages, and obsolete equipment constitute an increasingly
serious problem. Morale of employees declined sharply as the system
disintegrated. The decline should not be exaggerated; the trains
do run, and substantial volumes of freight and passengers are carried.
But the deterioration is serious.
The system has suffered as well from increased road trans-
port competition. Part, as noted, has resulted from inadequate capacity
of the railroad, deterioration in service, and the value-of-service
tariff. Road transport could easily take the high rate merchandise
traffic even though its costs v?ere higher than overall rail costs.
Kenya and Tanzania, and particularly the latter, had followed, in
colonial and early post-colonial periods, a very strict road transport
licensing policy to protect rail traffic. But a few years after
independence this policy was abandoned. Kenya encouraged African
entrepreneurship in the road transport field, stressed the building of
trunk roads competitive with the railroad lines, and let weight limits
go unenforced. The result was a shift of much of the high rate traffic,
including petroleum., from rail to road. Tanzania, with its stress on
cooperatives, encouraged cooperative trucking ventures. Uganda had
- 13 -
never employed restrictive licensing of road transport. Furthermore,
in both Kenya and Tanzania, the road licensing control was tending to
break down with the development of more and more private carrier
operations, with goods often handled illegally for other firms on the
back haul.
As noted, these shifts should not be exaggerated. A 1976
estimate of the Tanzania government is that 42% of all traffic moves
by rail, 54% by road, and 3% by water, although much of the country is
not served by the railway. The volume of traffic on the Kenya line
remains heavy — but now is substantially less than in 1970.
The Immediate Solutions
With the collapse of FAR as an operating entity, the railroads
have essentially, in fact, become direct agencies of the three govern-
ments (little is known of what has actually happened in Uganda). Both
Kenya and Tanzania have provided funds to cover operating
deficits and limited funds for improvements. (Tanzania provided sh. 37
million in 1976.) This trend will undoubtedly continue. A World Bank
sponsored study by a Canadian firm, completed in 1976, concluded that
regionalization of the system was essential, given political realities.
Separation into three elements does not necessarily mean great loss in
operating efficiency, especially if cooperation is resumed among them,
and the separation offers one great advantage. In the past, while
roads and road transport were regarded as a national activity, EAR was
not — to the inevitable neglect by each government of rail transport
and overstress on road transport. With both rail and road instruments
of each government, it should be much easier to attain an appropriate
balance.
- 14 -
Separation, of course, will not solve the problem of loss of
traffic arising out of political difficulties — the ending of the
ship service on Lake Victoria, the. Tanzania-Kenya service, the collapse
of the Uganda economy. It is unlikely that the Moshi traffic will
ever flow through Mombasa again to any extent. But some intercountry traf-
fic may be restored in time if the three countries again begin to cooperate.
Road Transport
Road transport in East Africa began at an early date,
certainly by the 1930s, but it developed slowly, partly because of
very inadequate roads, partly because of general shortage of capital,
partly because of highly restrictive road licensing policy on the part
of Kenya and Tanganyika. The relatively long distances likewise deterred
the growth. Only in Uganda, with its early development of good roads,
no restrictive licensing, and relatively short hauls did road trans-
2
port develop to any extent prior to independence. Since the early
'sixties, there has been a very rapid increase in road transport
throughout Ease Africa, both in non-rail areas and in competition with
the railroad, particularly in Kenya, on the important Mombasa-
Nairobi segment. General economic development, rapid construction
of trunk roads, to which Kenya gave particular attention until 1975
(surfacing of the Nairobi-Mombasa road was completed in 1968)» ending
The volume by Rolf Uofmeier, Transport and Economic Development in
Tanzania (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1973) stresses road transport
in Tanzania.
2
E. Hawkins, , Roads and Road Transport in an Underdeveloped Country:
A Case Stud3>T of Uganda '.London: Colonial Research Study #32), 1962,
- 15 -
of the restrictive road licensing policy, failure to enforce weight
limits in Kenya, deliberate governmental encouragement of cooperatives
in Tanzania and of African entrepreneurship in Kenya, lack of adequate
rail capacity and deteriorating rail service all contributed to the
rapid growth.
The structure of the road transport industry differs among
the countries. The dominant firm in Kenya is KENATCO, owned by the
government of Kenya, but with much of its hauling done by independent
private contractors. There are a number of inde-
pendent firms. In Tanzania there have been several attempts to develop
cooperative trucking enterprises; and considerable trucking is carried
on by the various cooperatives and parastatals. There are some private
firms, but many of these, it is reported, have been squeezed out in
recent years by rising costs and fixed rates. Uganda has had much
more of a private enterprise regime in trucking.
There has been little rail-road coordination. East African
Railways developed an extensive road transport network (freight and
bus) only in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania, particularly in the
Mbeya-Iringa area, not reached by a rail line, There has been no
piggy back development and little use of containers. It is argued
that, given the cheapness of labor, there is little gain in containeriza-
tion; in addition, there is a serious directional unbalance of traffic.
But the trend to containerization in ocean freight is strong, and there
is obvious potential gain for the railway from increased container use.
The road transport sector was the setting for one of the most
bitter disputes in the East African Community. In 1974, because of
the congestion in the harbor in Dar es Salaam, Kenya and Zambia arranged
- 16 -
for road transport of substantial Zambia traffic from Mombasa. In
1975 Tanzania brought this traffic to a halt by limiting road trans-
port vehicles to 19.4 tons, without a trailer, making the traffic
uneconomic. There were several motives. The announced reason, which
was probably at least a partial one, was the damage being done by these
trucks to the Tanzania roads. But a more significant one was the
desire by Tanzania to ensure that the traffic to Zambia passed through
Dar es Salaam or Tanga. In addition, there was a good bit of criticism
of Kenya capitalism; while KENATCO had the contract, much of the
trucking was done by private firms as subcontractors. One consequence
of the action was Kenya's action in severing the rail link west of Vol.
Relative Rail and Truck Costs
Good general data on relative costs of rail and road trans-
port are difficult to obtain. The most exhaustive study was that
undertaken by the Economist Intelligence Unit for the East African
Community, under World Bank sponsorship, in 1969. 1 The basic rail
cost figure is well known - in the early seventies, about 20 K cents
per ton mile. Revenues are as low as 11 cents on median hauls and 8
cents on long ones. This suggests that the direct costs are at least
this low, under the assumption (not necessarily correct) that the
railway has not set rates below out of pocket cost. An estimate by
Hazlewood for road transport in Kenya was K40 cents per ton mile;
c tt j„ TT^rs „Drt<-a if t-hpr° ^s traffic only oneway,
O'Connor estimates, for Uganda, hbO cents it enere
1Kast_ African Transport Study (London: 1969)
2Rail and Road, op. cit., p. 66,
- 17 -
30 cents if there is traffic both ways. Some estimates, however,
indicated costs for road transport as low as 8 cents — a figure not
generally believed to be accurate, While these figures are somewhat
obsolete in an absolute sense, the relationships between road and rail
have probably not changed much.
Other studies suggest similar figures. East African Railways
road services in Tanzania charge from 30 to 35 Tanzanian cents a ton
mile for larger shipments. Costs of moving rice from Mbeya to Dar es
Salaam were shown by Hofmeier to be 25 cents a ton mile,'' of shipments
from Dar to Arusha, 28 cents, whereas rail charges were as low as 7.6
cents on long haul bulk movements. Other figures for Tanzania show
read costs as low as 15 cents per ton mile with a full load in both
directions, 28 cents with an empty return.
The net conclusions of these and other studies are that
average rail costs are lower than truck costs, but the differences are
not tremendous. The great difference is between road transport costs
and long distance bulk rail commodity rates, some of which, of course,
may be below marginal cost. The very rapid growth in road transport in
East Africa, therefore can be explained only partly in terms of lower
rates; the other major factors have been inadequate rail capacity to
handle the traffic (this was particularly important in shifting
petroleum from rail to road between Mombasa and Nairobi), deteriorating rail
service with delivery time cf from two to three weeks; the greater
flexibility of trucking, the emphasis of the Kenya government upon the
Railways and Development, op_. cit. , p. 128,
'Transport, op . cit. , pp. 193, 196.
- 18 -
need for African entrepreneurship in the road transport industry', and
the advantages of private carrier operation to many business firms.
The Kenya line is faced with drastic loss in traffic — as
much as 20% — ■ with the completion of the pipe line from Mombasa to
Nairobi by the end of 1977. Originally all of this traffic moved by
rail; in recent years a substantial amount shifted to road, partly
because of shortage of rail tank cars, the available supply being
reserved for the longer haul to Uganda. The pipe line will bring an
end to all rail, as well as truck, movement; the cost reduction is
estimated to be between 64 and 74 percent of present rail and road
costs. The line will carry initially 1.44 million tons of petroleum
a year, ultimately 5.12 million tons. There has been some controversy
in Kenya over this project, but the general attitude of the government
has been that the pipeline will free rail capacity for other purposes
and the cost reduction will more than offset any loss to the railway.
But the immediate effect is certain to be adverse to EAR.
Some Policy Issues
Some major issues relating to transport remain to be resolved
in East Africa, and the future is by no means clear, partly because it
depends to such a great extent on political relationships among the
three countries.
1. Future rail vs. road relationships. This issue is common
to all African countries and will be analyzed in the overall summary
section. The particular problem of the past in East Africa was that
there was no coordination of road investment and road hauling control
policy, whereas the railroads were unified. If there are to be three
- 19 -
separate railroads in the future, this problem will be avoided, but
overall coordination of transport in East Africa will be much more
difficult.
2. Possible extension of rail lines. In the last decade,
Tanzania has been much more enthusiastic about construction of new
rail lines than Kenya (most of the new mileage since 1960, other than
the TAZARA, has actually been in Uganda) . But currently the one project
that is under serious consideration (bids have been requested) is for
a line in the Kerio Valley in Kenya, extending from Kampi ya Moto to
Tenges (10 miles), Kimwarer, and Koloa, a total of 62 miles, designed
to serve fluorspar and other mineral deposits. A cut off from the main
Kenya line to the Arusha line to shorten the distance to Nairobi has
long been considered but is unlikely to be built, given present condi-
tions. A much more serious project is one from the Moshi line to
Musoma, on Lake Victoria, to enable the traffic from Musoma to move
directly by rail through Tanzania, and give Uganda a route to the sea
independent of Kenya (no great advantage at the moment, since relations
between Uganda and Tanzania have been worse than those between Uganda
and Kenya) .
3. Improvement of the rail lines. While the main Kenya line
remains in good physical shape, the branches are in need of heavier
rail, and the entire Tanzania Central line requires substantial rebuild-
ing, it is reported by the Tanzanian authorities.
4. The problem of the light traffic branch lines. There are
a number of lines with relatively light traffic — under 300,000 net
ton miles per mile per year. The Mpanda branch in Tanzania is the
worst, with less than 50,000 net ton miles per mile; built to serve
There has also been discussion of a line to connect Kenya with the
Sudan railways.
- 20 -
lead mines that have ceased operating, it has been kept in service by
direct subsidy of the Tanzania government because of limited road
facilities in the area . But the long Kasese and Packwach branches in
Uganda have traffic under 300,000 net ton miles. Studies elsewhere
indicate that such services are particularly likely to be sources of
deficits — yet they may be important for regional development purposes.
5. Gauge. As discussed in the following section EAR and
TAZARA gauges are different and no interchange of traffic is possible.
The Effects of the Railways upon Economic Development in East Africa
Two studies in the last decade have considered the question
of the effects that the building of railway lines have had in East
Africa, that by A. M. O'Connor on Uganda, and of Rolf Hofmeier in
2
Tanzania. The studies suggest that the building of the Kenya-Uganda
line from Mombasa to Kisumu, with the steamer connection to Uganda,
the Tanga-Moshi, and the Tanzania Central lines all significantly aided
economic development, by allowing the development of export-oriented
agriculture and other activities and importation of manufactured goods.
In doing so they perpetuated the export-of-materials, import-of-
manufactured-goods approach to development, from which a break has been
made only in recent years. The whole pattern of economic activity of
Tanzania centered around the two rail lines," whereas the Southern
Highlands, with many economic advantages, lagged badly. The
Kenya-Uganda railway was almost solely responsible for the existence
Railways and Development, op. cit.
2
Transport and Economic Development, op. cit.
- 21 -
and dominance of Nairobi.
But there is strong evidence that later rail building had
much less economic effect, even the rail line from Kisumu to Kampala.
Economic activity in Uganda never has clustered around the railway as
in many other African countries. The Kasese line in Uganda, while
allowing the development of copper mining, contributed little to
overall economic development of western Uganda, given the availability
of road transport. The Mpanda line in Tanzania did little to create
activity, and the Manyoni-Kinyangari line built in the 'thirties in
central Tanzania into the Singidi region had so little effect that it
was abandoned in 1947. The extreme case was the line from Mtwara
to Nachingwea and Masasi in southern Tanzania. Built as an element
in the groundnut scheme, it had so little effect on development that it
was abandoned in 1962, eight years after building (and 4 years in the
case of Masasi branch), following the end of the scheme. Abandonment
may have been premature but certainly there was no evidence of stimulus
to economic activity.
ZAMBIA AND OUTLETS TO THE SEA
The development of few if any African countries has been
influenced as much by the railroad as Zambia. Virtually all commercial
activity has developed in the narrow belt up through the center of the
country known as "line of rail". Furthermore, no other country has had
its pattern of rail traffic so d,isruPted in recent years as Zambia, and
it has shared with Tanzania the most important rail construction project
in the developing world in the last several decades .
.
'
99
Development of Railways to Zambia
Unlike other tropical African railways, the line reaching
Zambia was not built directly in from the nearest port, but came north
out of southern Africa. In the early 1890s, the South African railway
system reached Maf eking (famous for the great siege in the Boer War)
and the Rhodes interests (British South Africa Co.) pushed a line
across the deserts of Bechuanaland (now Botswana) to reach Bulawayo in 1897.
Already there were European settlers in Southern Rhodesia. The line, later
called Rhodesia Railways (RR) » was designed in part to provide access to the
settlers and the farm land, but Rhodes was also lured by the known but
as yet undeveloped mineral resources in what are now Zambia and Zaire,
and by his dream of a Cape to Cairo railway. The line reached the coal
mines of Wankie in 1903, crossed the Zambesi into Northern Rhodesia at one
of the few feasible spots, just below Victoria Falls in 1903, and reached
the lead-zinc mining area of Broken Hill (now Kabwe) in 1906. A
siding about half way up through Northern Rhodesia was labeled Lusaka; three
decades later (1935) the site was designated to become the capital of the
colony. A line also was extended north from Bulawayo to Salisbury, (1902) and
in 1899 another BSA railroad had reached Salisbury from the port of
Beira in Mozambique. In 1909 in an effort to obtain an outlet for
copper mines they were developing in Katanga in the southern Congo,
British interests headed by Sir Robert Williams built south from the
Congo to join Rhodesia Railways at Broken Hill. This line, as far as
the Congo border, was taken over by RR in 1928. Rhodesia Railways was
an element in the great BSA complex in Central Africa; BSA ruled
Northern Rhodesia politically as well as economically until 1924, when
the area became a crown colony.
A survey of the development of the rail lines to Zambia is provided In
the chapter by R. M. Bostock, "The Transport Sector", in C. Elliott, ed.,
.Constraints on the Economic Development of Zambia (Nairobi, Oxford Univ.
Prpss. 10711 rm T77-Qfi
Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd., the Williams enterprise, also
built the Benguela Railway, extending from the port of Lobito in
Angola to the Congo border, reached in 1931, connecting with the
Congo lines, thus providing the Katanga mines and those of ,
Zambia with another outlet to the sea. Likewise in 1928, Belgian
interests completed a line from the Katanga area to Port Francqui (now
Ilebo) on the Kasai River, from which water transport was available. In 1947
Rhodesia Railways was nationalized; after 1949, under a statutory authority
of the countries involved, and following the formation of the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1954, the system was transferred to the
Federation. The center of operations and the main shops were in
Bulawayo. Another route to the sea from the Bulawayo-Salisbury line
to Lourenco Marques in Mozambique — providing a less congested route
for Zambia traffic than the Beira line — was completed in 1955.
Thus at the' time of independence of Zambia in 1964,
virtually all import traffic (including petroJeum) and export traffic
to Zambia was handled by Rhodesia Railways; few countries in the
world were so completely dependent en rail transport for their access
to the outside world. Most Zambia traffic moved via Beira and Lourenco
Marques; there was likewise substantial through rail traffic between
Zambia and South Africa, traditionally the supplier of processed foods
and many other commodities for the country . There was only a limited
Even the heaaquarters of Zambia Customs and "xcise was (and still is)
located in Livingstone.
Lake
.Victoria
\
ZAIRE \ WKigoma
^ ^ Kaleraie T „, .
~'~"} ^C>% ' Tanganyika TANZANIA
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ZAMBIA
■**' Malawi Vila <£>"
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Livingstone
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j BOTSWANA
to South Africa
to Maputo
Fig. 2
Railways of Central Africa
0 50 100 250
t ,. 8 —I t i t
Miles
- 24 -
amount of road transport, primarily with Rhodesia, Initially after
independence Rhodesia Railways was owned and controlled jointly by
Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, still a Crown colony. The Lobito route
2 -
via the Benguela handled little Zambia traffic. Zaire copper moved
partly via the Benguela, partly via the Port Francqui route, under
pressure from the Zaire government. Most of the Benguela* s traffic
came from within Angola.
Disruption of Traffic Patterns
The twelve year period from 1965 through 1976, and particularly
1973-1976 saw several major disruptions in access routes to the sea
and in traffic patterns within the country. These disruptions resulted
entirely from political events, which can be noted briefly:
1. In 1965 Rhodesia declared itself independent from Great
Britain. UDI — Unilateral Declaration of Independence, as it was
called — under a white regime was viewed with great disfavor in Zambia.
Zambia forced the dissolution of Rhodesia Railways as a joint venture
as of July 1, 1967, and took over operation of the portion north of
the Victoria Falls bridge, but with loss of most of the employees (the
great majority were white and most preferred to stay in Rhodesia), and
3
wfth an inadequate share of rolling stock and engines. For a time
The rail distance from Lusaka to Salisbury was almost three times the
road distance. A direct rail link, crossing the Zambesi at Chirundu,
was long planned.
2
This was a product of agreements between the railways and the copper
companies. In 1936 the copper companies agreed to ship entirely via
RR in exchange for low rates. In 1957 under pressure of the companies,
RR agreed to let a specified amount of copper move out via Lobito, but
then quoted such a low rate on this segment that it also moved via Rhodesia.
3
The first year of Zambia Railways operation was one of chaos, derail-
ments, and inability to keep coal moving to the mining complex. Toronto
Globe and Mail, October 11, 1968, p. 2.
- 25 -
all engines had to be sent to Bulawayo for repair, until Zambia
completed its own repair shops at Kabwe (formerly Broken Hill) . Even
the billing was done from Bulawayo for a time. Zambia was committed to use
RR for all rail traffic or pay a penalty on any traffic diverted, under
the terms of the breakup.
Secondly, the government began to divert a substantial amount
of traffic via truck transport to Dar es Salaam, under great difficul-
ties because of the bad condition of the Great North Road, and via the
Benguela. After Rhodesia cut off petroleum supplies, the country was
drastically short of petroleum products, which had to be trucked from
Dar es Salaam until a pipe line was completed from Dar es Salaam to
Ndola in 1968. Despite these changes, however, a substantial portion
of the copper exports and imports of necessity still came via Rhodesia
Railways (Table 2) . There were endless feuds with Rhodesia over car
supply — in general Rhodesia would permit only the same number of cars
to go into Zambia as returned from Zambia.
2. In 1973, Zambia closed the border completely with
Rhodesia, following temporary closing by Rhodesia, as a result of
political disputes. This resulted in immediate and drastic changes in
traffic patterns, as two thirds of the imports and over half the
exports were still moving via Rhodesia. Most of the exports and a
large portion of the imports formerly going- via Rhodesia were shifted
to the Benguela route, causing serious congestion at the port of Lobito. This
pattern continued through the first half of 1975. Road transport to
Dar es Salaam, Malawi, and Mombasa in Kenya rose sharply in 1973.
3. In 1975, the Benguela route was disrupted and finally
closed in August by hostilities in Angola.
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- 27 -
At the same time, in October of 1975, the new TAZARA rail was
opened for limited service, as explained in detail below. But initially
TAZARA had only limited carrying capacity, and Zambia was forced to
increase reliance on the Dar es Salaam and Malawi truck routes substan-
tially — in a period when equipment had been declining in anticipation
of opening of TAZARA.. To complicate matters still further, late in
1974 Tanzania effectively halted road transport from Mombasa — the
most efficient port in the entire region.
The rerouting following the border closing in 1973 had increased
transport costs by an estimated Kwacha 20 million (about $30 million
U.S. dollars) in that year, and K 30 million in 1975 — adding to
inflationary pressures in Zambia.
Zambia Railways
The internal rail system of the country is now entirely
operated by Zaabia Railways (ZR) , wholly owned by the government, but
operated as a saperate gcvernn^it corporation, in the same "fashion as
Zambia Airways. Its own line is 650 mil?s in length, and it alco operates
abcut 75 miles of the fcri^r Zambesi Sawnf 11?* Railway, as an sgent for
the government. The main Z5 line extends in a general north -south
direction from the connection on the Victoria Falls bridge with Rhodesia
Railways via Lusaka to the Copper Belt, specifically, via Ndola and
Kitwe and Chililabomwe to Konkola, on the Zaire border, with branches,
In the period 1973 until May of 1976 K = U.S. $1.55; after devaluation
that month K = U.S. $1.25. For some years piior to 1973 K - U.S. $1.40.
■■.-.-. .•
- .
- 28 -
all In the Copper Belt, to Mufilira, to Luanshya, and from Ndola to Sakaraia to
connect with the Zaire lines. There are no other branches except a short
one serving the Maamba coal mines. The former Zambezi Sawmills Railway,
built to serve the timber industry in the Southern province, extends
northwestward from Livingstone to Mulobezi. The line once extended
another 50 miles to Kataba for the handling of logs, but this portion
is not now operated (though shown on most maps).
ZR was built to the 1.067 metre gauge — known as Cape Gauge —
used by all main lines from Zambia and Zaire south. Track is in good
condition; the sawmills line, which had deteriorated, has been rebuilt
in the last two years. ZR is entirely dieselized, with 80 diesels; 10
were received in 1975 and 8 more are on order. These are U.S. General
Electric built engines, with which the system is well satisfied. A
number of the Beyer-Garretts inherited from Rhodesia Railways are still
in the yards in Livingstone awaiting ultimate scrapping. A number of
new freight cars (wagons) have been acquired, typically with 40 ton capac-
ity, and another 1000 are on order. Cars are freely interchanged — in
normal times — with the Benguela and Zaire, Rhodesian, South African,
and Mozambique lines.
Gross revenue of the railway in 1975 was K 27.9 million; in
1976 an estimated K 35 million. Despite the complete disruption of
traffic patterns in recent years (when copper moves out via the
Benguela, ZR receives little revenue, and not much more with TAZARA) ,
the great increase in road transport on the import-export routes, the
petroleum pipe line, and the shift to petroleum from coal by the
mining complex for many purposes, the road has avoided large deficits
(the figure in 1975 was only K 600,000) and hopes to be covering all
n * 3 ■■- --. r
■ ■ ■
.
... ,.
1 r p r
..,..
•*■(
- 29 -
costs in the immediate future.
Since independence the road has been assisted in many ways by
Canadian National Railways. A formal management contract expired in
November 1975, with management entirely Zambianized, but CNR still
provides technical assistance. Almost the entire staff of employees
has been new since 1967. Headquarters and main shops are in Kabwe.
The traffic patterns, as noted, have shifted dramatically.
Prior to 1967 virtually all imports came in via Livingstone and were
taken north almost the entire distance of the line to the Copper Belt
and over half of the entire line to Lusaka. This traffic included very
heavy volumes of petroleum products coming from Beira, coal from the
Wankie mines in Rhodesia, and products from South Africa, including t
fertilizer, coke, farm and mining equipment, processed foods, etc. The
copper and other exports (copper constitutes about 95% of the total)
came down the entire distance from the Copper Belt to the Victoria
Bridge. Currently nothing for Zambia comes in at Victoria Falls,
although in the last two years the road has handled substantial transit
traffic for Zaire from Rhodesia (copper going out, particularly after
the closing of the Benguela , coal and maize coming in). By agreement
with Zaire, Zambia handles this traffic, although it will not handle
any Zambia traffic from Rhodesia.
The principal ZR traffic items in recent years have been
copper, hauled the relatively short distance to the Zaire border and
now to the junction with TAZARA at Kapiri Mposhi; some lead and zinc
from Kabwe to Kapiri; substantial movements of maize, mostly from
southern Zambia points to the Copper Belt and for export to Zaire and Tanza-
nia; and coal, from the Maamba mines to the Copper Belt. The government has
- 30 -
been moving all petroleum products within the country by road, but some
of this is likely to be returned to rail. In 1975, 59 percent of ZR
traffic was domestic, the rest, export traffic.
Traffic volume was 1,323 million ton miles in 1973, 1,105
million in 1974, and about 1,300 million in 1975, or 2.2 million ton
miles per mile of line. The revenue is about 2.6 ngwee per ton kilo-
meter, compared to an estimated average of 5 to 6 ngwee for heavy
volume trucking. The 2.6 figure is roughly equal to 4.6 U.S. cents
per ton mile at current exchange rates. The traffic volume is not as
heavy as on the main Mombasa-Nairobi line of EAR, nor the expected
volume on TAZARA when it is in full scale operation; it is somewhat
comparable to that of the Tanzania Central line and adequate to allow
reasonably low cost.
The tariff is basically a class tariff comparable to that of
East African Railways in many respects, ' with 14 classes, classification
based on cost, value of service, and essentiality considerations, plus
separate rates for tank cars and mineral products (the lowest figures)
and special rates on copper. There has been less concern thus far
about the loss of high rate commodities to road transport than in some
countries because transport is so completely controlled by the govern-
ment, given the scarcity of facilities.
For many years, daily passenger service was operated
Lusaka -Livings tone, and overnight 3 times a week Lusaka to the Copper
Belt. The initial equipment after independence consisted of ancient
wooden open vestibule cars of Rhodesia Railways. These were replaced
by diesel motor trains, and in 1975 by new equipment manufactured in
■ .
■• ■
- 31 -
Japan. Since that time two trains a day are operated each day, the
relatively fast Kafue and the slower Luangwa. The former provides
three classes — sleeper, standard, and economy, the latter standard
and economy. In 1976, the sleeper fare Livingstone-Lusaka was K 16.60;
standard K 8.30; economy K 5.50. These are roughly 6, 4, and 2 U.S.
cents a mile fares. About 1,200,000 passengers are carried per year.
Internal Road Transport
Road transport in Zambia is dominated by Contract Haulage,
formerly Central African Road Services, a parastatal organization. CH
maintains a fleet of its own trucks and contracts with private trucking
firms. It also handles the Malawi export- import road service as a part of
the Dar es Salaam traffic as a subcontractor. Rates range (1974) from
1.2 to 4.6 ngwee.per ton kilometer. Both CH and private firms contract
with NAMBORD, which controls all farm product marketing, for transport
of farm products, on a set rate schedule, which in 1974 was as follows:
fertilizer and maize: ng per t/KM 7.50 up to 80 km, 6.75, 81-160 km;
6 over 160; cotton, ng per t/m 9. NAMBORD' s policy is to use rail
wherever feasible, partly because it is cheaper, partly because of
general government policy.
In the days before independence, the Federation restricted
road competition with the rail system drastically, and while present
policy is less restrictive, there is no free competition, and so much
of the total traffic is by or for parastatal organizations that the
- 32 -
picture differs markedly from that of Kenya.
The Export Routes
The major export routes noted above can be described briefly.
1. Rhodesia Railways to Beira and Lourenco Marques (Maputo)
As noted, this route carried virtually all traffic, import
and export, prior to 1967. The line was well built
and the equipment modern. The revenues rose steadily up until 1966, but
the operating ratio was relatively high, averaging 84 in this period.
Rate policies were influenced by the desire to hold the copper traffic
from the Benguela, but the usual pattern was to keep copper rates at
relatively high figures, except on the marginal traffic that could, by
agreement, go via the Benguela. This amounted to a type of profits
tax on the railway, benefitting the Federation and reducing the amount
that Northern Rhodesia and then Zambia could raise by an income tax
on the copper companies' profits. Particularly high rates were charged
at times on Zaire copper, but the Zaire firms could not effectively
avoid it because they had to rely on RR for their coal from Wankie.
After years of profit, except in the 1962-63 period, the loss
of traffic and rising costs resulted in small deficits in the early
1970s; in 1974, the first full year after closure of the border, the
system incurred a net loss of K 10 million (about $15.5 million), and
in 1975 K 21 millions ($31 million) . Guerilla warfare has resulted in
A. R. Prest, Transport Economics in Developing Countries (New York:
Praeger, 1969), p. 95.
- 33 -
some damage to the lines .
From a longer range standpoint, African rule of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)
will undoubtedly result in some resumption of traffic from Zambia via
Victoria Falls and Mozambique ports, and trade between Zambia and
Zimbabwe, although the Salisbury-Lusaka-Copper Belt traffic except in
bulk commodities is almost certain to go by road. Opening of the border
at Victoria Falls would also result, in all likelihood, in resumption
of rail traffic in fertilizer from South Africa, and in beef and other
products from Botswana. But never again is this likely to be a major
route for exports and imports for Zambia
2. The Benguela Railroad, via Zaire and the port of Lobito
•
This route involves, in traffic from the Copper Belt, a
relatively short haul on Zambia Railways, thence via the Zaire system
(SNCZ) through Lubumbashi to Tenke, on the main line to Port Francqui,
and westward to Dilolo, and thence westward on the Benguela to the port of
Lobito. The Benguela has been a subsidiary of Tanganyika Concessions,
Ltd., a British firm, and unique in its reliance on wood burning steam
locomotives. The line was to revert to Portugal in the 1980s; its
present status is not clear, but undoubtedly it has been
or will be nationalized. This route offers one very significant
advantage: since Lobito is on the Atlantic, the total haul is substan-
tially less than via Indian Ocean ports, and substantial time — as
much as two weeks — is saved. This is particularly important on
imports. But use of the route was long restricted by the agreements
between the mining companies and Rhodesia Railways and by rate policies
of the latter; by the fact that the port of Lobito was less satisfactory
( /-&'* £■*■ / '
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- 34 -
in handling cargo than Beira; by limitations on capacity on outbound
traffic because of the handling of large quantities of Angolan
manganese and iron ore; and, in the period between Zambian and Angolan
independence, the reluctance of the Zambian government, for political
reasons, to make use of this route.
Once Zambia closed the Rhodesia route completely, it was
forced as a practical matter to make greater use of the Benguela, in
part because Lobito alone could handle some types of heavy cargo.
Furthermore, Angolan independence was by then assured. In 1972 this
route handled only 14% of Zambia's imports and exports; in 1974, about
50%. In that year, for example, the port handled some 104,000 tons of
wheat for Zambia; 51,000 tons of coke; 259,000 tons of general import
cargo. But this sudden shifting of traffic onto the Benguela coincided
with substantial unrest in Angola as independence approached and loss
of Portuguese technicians, which led to congestion in the port,
surcharges by the shipping firms, and delay in handling cargo. Then
came the final breakdown in late 1975 as military action resulted in
severe damage to the line, and destruction of two major bridges, at
Lumeje, west of Luso, and at Luau, close to the Zaire-Angola border.
Continued unstable conditions resulted in delays in rebuilding the line
and bridges. About 800 Zambia Railway freight cars were stranded in
Angola, new diesels for the railway, and substantial quantities of
copper .
Up until recent disorders, the Benguela has been a consis-
tently profitable venture, with an average operating ratio for 1955-60
of 60, and consistent dividend payments. Partly, of course this was a
Prest, op_. cit. , p. 96.
- 35 -
product of the absence of road transport competition; there are no
roads of any kind between Zambia and Katanga (now Shaba) and the Atlantic.
Secondly, it handles a substantial volume of traffic, although much of
it is of low value and rates.
Over time, the Benguela should again become a significant
outlet to the sea for Zambia, particularly for import traffic, given
the importance of speed. While Zambia is committed in principle to
concentrate traffic on the Dar es Salaam route, there is substantial
feeling that the country should never allow itself to be dependent
solely on one route. Possible completion of an all-Zaire route would
hurt the Benguela to some extent, but renewed development in Angola
should in time more than offset this.
The capacity of the Benguela was greatly increased by the
completion, in 1974, of the Cubal variant, 128 km of relocated line
beginning about 350 km east of Lobito, built to eliminate severe grades
that reduced train speed and length drastically.
The lines in Zaire were built by several private firms, allied
with the mining complex in Katanga and to some extent with the Benguela.
The most important was BCK (Bas-Congo au Katanga), later KDL (Kinshasa-
Dilolo-Lubumbashi) , the main route from the Zambia border to Port
Francqui (now Ilebo) . A second major route extends northeastward from
Kamina, on the Ilebo line, to Kindu as a part of rail-water-rail route to
Kisangani and of the original all-Congo route to the ocean. From Kabalo
a branch (built in 1915) extends eastward to Kalemi (Albertville) on
The portions from Lubumbashi to Kamina and the junction at Tenke to
Mutshatsha are electrified — the only electified system in all
Tropical Africa.
- 36 -
Lake Tanganyika. This system was not connected with BCK between
Kabalo and Kamina until 1957. These lines have been nationa-
lized in recent years, consolidated as the Societe Nationale de Chemins de
Fer Zairois (SNCZ) . The all Congo route to the sea requires transfer
to steamer at Ilebo on the Kasai River, transfer back to rail at
Kinshasa, and to ocean going vessels at Matadi, Zaire's only ocean port.
There have been extensive discussions about the building of a connecting
link from Kinshasa to Ilebo, through difficult terrain. Completion of this
link would result in substantial diversion of Zaire traffic from the Benguela.
Thus far Zaire has been unable to obtain financing for this project.
Apart from the export traffic to Lobito, there is a consider-
able volume of traffic between Zambia and Zaire, consisting largely of
maize exported to Zaire. Some 41,000 tons were reported in 1975. As
of 1977, some Zaire copper traffic is moving to the ocean via Zambia
and TAZARA, as noted below. From a longer range standpoint, there is
substantial traffic potential between the two countries. The road
system of Zaire is very limited.
3 . The Kenya Route
The port of Mombasa is one of the most modern in the world,
one of the few good natural harbors in all Africa. It has not been
congested in recent years, in part because of the diversion of the
Arusha-Moshi traffic to Tanzanian ports. In 1973 KENATCO, the Kenya-
government-owned road transport firm, commenced to haul Zambian
copper out, primarily sulphur and lubricants in, to the point at which
This line was operated by the Compagnie de Chemins des Fer du Congo
Superior aux Grands Lacs Africains.
- 37 -
it was handling about 9 percent of the Zambia traffic. Much of the
hauling was done by private Kenya firms under contract to KENATCO. As
noted, in late 1974 Tanzania put an abrupt end to this traffic by
setting a 19.4 ton maximum load and banning trailers, thus making road
haulage uneconomic.
4 . The Malawi Route
The original rail line to Malawi (then Nyasaiand) was built
north from Beira via Blantyre to Salima, on Lake Nyasa , In 1970 a
line was completed east and west from Nova Freixo on the rail line from
the port of Nacala and Mozambique (city) to Vila Cabral, in Mozambique
east of Lake Nyasa to connect with this line north of Blantyre, at Nayuci.
The Malawi route with road transport to Salima was used for Zambia traffic
to some extent from 1967 on. After the closure of the border with Rhodesia and
the serious port congestion at Dar es Salaam, greater use of this route was
undertaken, primarily for the handling of fertilizer, which comes from
South Africa — and Tanzania will not handle any traffic originating in
South Africa. By 1975, 75% of all fertilizer was coming by this route,
and considerable general cargo, and about 10% of the export of copper.
Several problems arose very quickly: lack of freight cars by Malawi
Railways and congestion in the ports of Nacala and Beira, due in part
to loss of Portuguese technicians after independence. The hauling to
the railhead has been done by Contract Haulers, owned by the Zambia
government, but it has been possible to handle only 12.5 ton loads,
given the roads. Extension of Malawi Railways to Lilongwe has
shortened the road haul somewhat. There has also been some road hauling
from Zambia to Moatize, near Tete, the rail head in Mozambique, but the
- 38 -
road conditions are particularly unsatisfactory.
From a longer range standpoint, this route, with improved
roads and/or a rail connection, as noted below, may have some potential,
but for the Copper Belt traffic it can scarcely be competitive with
TAZARA.1
5. Kazengula Route
With the Rhodesian border closed, Zambia was cut off from
direct contact with both Botswana and South Africa except by the Zambezi
River crossing at Kazangula. The state of roads in Botswana prevented
this road route from being a significant avenue of commerce, but it has
been used for the handling of some mining equipment and supplies from
South Africa, which, together with fertilizer, have been the only items
Zambia has been purchasing from that country. This traffic in general
moved through by road to the Copper Belt destinations.
6. The Lake Tanganyika Routes
A route which traditionally was used for some traffic to
Zambia involved rail movement on EAR's Tanzania Central line to Kigoma,
transfer to steamer for the trip down Lake Tanganyika, and road
transport from Mpulungu at the south end of the lake. In the late
sixties, for example, considerable copper moved out this way, and
gasoline for northern Zambia came by this route. But it was a slow
route at best, requiring twice the time of the road haul to Dar es
Malawi Railways, with relatively short hauls, has not been highly
profitable; the operating ratio 1960-65 averaged 80, with an upward
trend. Prest, op_. cit. , p. 95.
- 39 -
Salaam, and two transfers. Use came to an end when the engines of the sixty-
year old EAR steamer Liemba, the only vessel in the service, gave out in
the early 'seventies. An alternative route, involving rail movement
through Zaire to Kalemie, crosslake transfer, and EAR from Kigoma, has
not been a viable one.
7 . Air Freight
For a time, following the initial attempt to restrict traffic
via Rhodesia and the petroleum shortage, air transport between the
Copper Belt and Dar es Salaam was used to haul copper out and supplies
in. But this proved to be very costly, and improvements in the Great
North Road allowed the cessation of this traffic. Air freight, however,
continues to be important for importation of some goods from Europe
and Kenya, and meat from Botswana. It amounted to only 2.8% of the Zambia
imports in 1975 and yet required 17 percent of the country's payments
for external freight traffic.
8. The Dar es Salaam Route — Road Transport
At the time of independence in Zambia, the Great North Road
to Dar es Salaam was a bare trek through the semi-desert, impossible in
bad weather. Following UDI in Rhodesia, the government of Zambia began
an organized effort to haul copper out and imported goods in by road
transport over this road. The result was a sharp increase in cost and
very substantial damage to imported goods — but a substantial volume
of goods flowed both ways. Gradually, with U.S. aid, the road was
surfaced and the flow became much more regular. But it never handled
mere than half of the total flow of traffic. In the year 1974, 70,000
- 40 -
tons of steel, 40,000 of chemicals and fertilizer, 16,300 tons of
timber, 145,000 tons of general merchandise were hauled in. In that
year there were 11,625 trips out, 12,613 in, or about 30 a day each
way. Some 245,000 tons of copper were carried out, and 73,000 tons of
maize to Tanzania. Zambia-Tanzania Road Services (ZTRS), owned by the
two governments and an Italian firm, had the basic contract and carried
about half the traffic in its own trucks; Contract Haulage (CH), owned
by the government of Zambia, a portion; and private subcontractors the
remainder. ZTRS used trucks in the 25 to 30 ton range, averaging 23.1,
Contract Haulage, 21.5 (net cargo). ZTRS was using 442 trucks; CH,
105; and the other subcontractors, 419. The vehicles averaged from 1.3
to 1.7 round trips per month. As of 1974, the rate on copper was K 54
per ton, on general cargo, K 49. The latter rate was 2.45 ngwee per
ton kilometer, the equivalent of about 6.7 cents per U.S. ton mile at
1975 exchange rates or 5.3 cents at the more realistic 1977 exchange
rate. All in all, this was a very impressive performance, particularly
considering the fact that it was started from almost nothing, on the
one hand, and phasing out, or at' least great reduction, was ultimately
p lanned .
9. TAZARA — The Dar es Salaam Rail Route
The idea of a railroad from the Copper Belt directly to the
Ocean had been considered long before Zambian independence. The first
serious study was made by a consultant for the British Colonial office,
published in 1952; after independence, studies were made by the World
United Kingdom Colonial Office, Report on Central African Rail Link
Development Survey, 2 vol. (London: KMSO, 1952).
41 -
Bank (1964) and the Economic Commission for Africa, which found such a
1
railroad to be uneconomic. But the government of Zambia was extremely
anxious to end reliance on the Rhodesian outlet, and Tanzania was
highly sympathetic to a rail line across the southern part of the
country. The presidents of the two countries agreed on the desirability
of the line in 1964. While the World Bank, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union all rejected requests to assist, a Canadian study (1966)
indicated the economic feasibility of the line, even if the other
2
routes could be used. In 1967 Zambia and Tanzania reached an agreement
3
with mainland China to build the line. The original plan to build to
a connection to EAR was abandoned because of the gauge difference, and
the final plans called for a line all the way to the Dar harbor. Con-
struction began in 1970, the Zambia border was reached in 1973, and a
connection with Zambia Railways at Kapiri Mposhi was completed in
4*
October of 1975. The railroad is known as TAZARA.
The route passed through Mbeya (but not Iringa, the other major city in
southern Tanzania), and Kasama and Mpika in Zambia. The final length
was 1852 kilometres, or 1158 miles, to the junction; thus the distance
to Lusaka is about 1275 miles. Many observers were skeptical for
several years that the line would be built, and there were rumors that
A Brookings Institution study was also very critical on the grounds of
unnecessary duplication. See E. T. Haefele and E. B. Steinberg.
Government Controls of Transport _ — An African Case (Washington:
Brookings, 1965).
^British-Canadian Report on an Engineering and Economic Feasibility
Study for a Proposed Zambia-East Africa Rail Line (London: 1966) .
3
A good survey of this development is to be found in Richard Hall, The
High Price of Principles (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1969), Chapter 14,
and George T. Yu, "Working on the Railroad: China and the Tanzania
Zambia Railway," Asian Survey, Vol. 11 (Nov. 1971), pp. 1101-15.
For Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority. It is owned jointly by the two
governments.
- 42 -
the U.S. aid for surfacing the Great North Road was designed to head
off construction of the railroad.
TAZARA operates to a separate set of docks in the Dar. es
Salaam harbor used exclusively for Zambia cargo.
Operations began on a limited scale in October of 1975, as a
trainload of wheat for NAMBORD reached Kapiri Mposhi as the first cargo.
Initially operations were confined to one freight train a day, with 30
cars, and operations were gradually stepped up. In December 1975
20,000 tons of copper were carried, and in June 1976, 58,000 tons. By
late 1976, the typical copper traffic was 42,000 tons a month. In the
first 12 months of operation, 350,000 tons of freight were carried and
293,000 passengers; in the first eleven months of 1976, 610,000 tons. The
initial capacity, once full scale operations are under way, will be 2
million tons in each direction per year — about twice the present needs
of Zambia, In recent years slightly under 1 million tons have moved each
way, exclusive of the pipeline traffic, which is almost as great as the
surface imports in tonnage. Ultimately capacity is planned to reach 4.3
million tons each way, and finally, 7 million. This would require 17
freight trains a day each way. At present 5 trains each way per day are
operated. The entire emphasis in this early period has been upon outbound
movements of copper, inbound of bulk shipments, leaving much of the manu-
factured goods traffic to road transport for the moment. This will be
phased down, but some may be retained. Much of the road transport fleet
is near the end of its useful life.
Two books have already appeared on TAZARA; by R. Hall and H. Peyman,
The Great Uhuru Railway (London, Callanz, 1976) and M. Bailey, Freedom
Rai Iway (London: Collings, 1976).
- 43 -
Currently the line is also handling a substantial amount of
Zaire copper traffic, because of the problems with the Benguela. It is
expected that some Zaire products will continue to move over TAZARA*
There is also substantial traffic within Tanzania, particularly to the
Mbeya area- On July 14, 1976, the road was turned over by the Chinese
contractors to the TAZARA authority, but about 1,000 Chinese will
remain to aid in instruction, gradually being phased out over the next
two years.
While TAZARA connects with Zambia Railways at Kapiri Mposhi,
and the gauges are the same, immediate free interchange of equipment was
impossible. Zambia Railways, like the entire network of rail lines of
central and southern Africa, uses vacuum brakes- rather than air brakes,
whereas TAZARA equipment was designed with air brakes — as is East
African Railways and most of the rest of the world. ZR converted several
of its diesels to air brakes, and thus has been able to bring TAZARA
trains to the Copper Belt and to Lusaka. But the cars cannot be mixed
in trains and substantial traffic has been off loaded on to road trans-
port at Kapiri Mposhi. The intent is ultimately to change entirely to
air brake operation — but this requires change by the other countries
in southern Africa as well.
TAZARA headquarters are in Dar es Salaam, shops are in Dar
es Salaam and Mpika.
Tariff
The preliminary tariff, to be replaced in 1977 by a permanent
tariff, was based upon that of Zambia Railways. Goods are grouped into
14 classes plus separate mineral and tank car rates. A negotiated rate
- 44 -
on copper is not included in the tariff. Sample figures are shown in
the table below:
Dar es Salaam to
Kapiri Mposhi Mbeya
(1852 KM) (850 KM)
Rates per 1000 Kilograms,
Kwacha
First class 65.40 42.10
Fourteenth class 9.58 4.74
Minerals 8.58 4.25
Tank car 30.06 19.32
Copper 42.04
1 Kwacha = U.S. $1.25 (1977)
The minerals rate is about 8 mills per U.S. ton mile, and this
is comparable to U.S. rail rates on similar movements. The first class
rate is about 7 U.S. cents per ton mile. A tapering rate structure
is used though the degree of taper varies with the classes. The degree
of tapering is much less than is typical in the U.S.
Rates are established for carload minimum weights only, plus
a separate tariff for parcels. The first class rate is above the ZTRS
rate, but most of the class rates and the special rates are lower.
There are as yet no joint rates with Zambia Railways, although these
are expected in time.
Passenger Service and Fares. Passenger service was commenced
almost immediately upon the opening of the line, the train leaving Dar
es Salaam at 10 in the morning, arriving in Mbeya at 9:05 the next
morning, Mpika at 11 o'clock that night, and Kapiri at 7 the next
morning — about 40 hours, averaging little better than 20 miles an
hour, but with a total of 55 stops. By the end of 1976, two trains
were being operated, one in 36 hours and one in 42 hours. The third
- 45 -
class fare is K6.65 -- about $8.30 for a 1100 mile trip. The first
class fare is K28.36 — about .!"; — extremely cheap by comparison
with air fares, and a much lower basis than Zambia Railways.
Change
is necessary at Kapiri; ultimately cars may be run through to Lusaka,
but the brake problem arises here as well. Zambia Railways has been
reluctant to run the trains through, partly because of shortages of
diesels, partly because of questions about crews.
Additional Traffic Potential. In addition to the through
traffic destined to and from the Copper Belt and Lusaka, there is other
traffic potential. A truck assembly plant is being established at
Kasama in northeast Zambia. Considerable agricultural product traffic
to and from the northeast province is almost certain to develop. To
Zambia Railways, traffic coming from TAZARA bound for southern Zambia,
and maize traffic coming from the south bound for Tanzania are particu-
larly attractive.
Within Tanzania there are potentials as well. Already the
railway has taken over traffic from road transport in the Mbeya area.
While some claims about future effects of the railway upon the Kilombero
Valley are exaggerated, there is bound to be considerable influence.
One of the greatest potentials is provided by the coal and iron deposits
in the Njombe district, if a branch line were built from Makumbako via
Njome to Liganga . The Njombe area is also an important agricultural
area, particularly in the production of tea. On the other hand, the
line may spell the doom of EAR's Kidatu branch, the previous railhead
into the Kilombero Valley.
- 46 -
The possibility of interchange of traffic with East African
Railways is restricted by two factors, technical and political. TAZARA
uses the 1.067 metre gauge of the southern lines; EAR, metre. It is
impossible to lay a third rail, as could be done with the standard and
3 foot gauge lines in the United States, as there is insufficient
clearance. There has long been discussion of changing EAR to the broader
gauge; currently there is considerable discussion of this question in
Dar es Salaam, but none at ail in Nairobi. It is not impossible that
the Tanzanian lines might be changed while the Kenya lines were not.
The task of changing is not an impossible one although some disruption
of service would result. Much EAR equipment acquired in recent years
has been so designed that an equipment change can easily be made. The
main task Is to move one rail out three inches.
The main obstacle to through traffic, however, is political.
The greatest potential for trade, in the next decade or so, is between
Kenya and Zambia, in view of the former's progress in manufacturing in
many fields. Even now, Kenya has to some extent replaced South Africa
as the supplier of processed foods, butter, tin cans, and other products
in the Zambia market. But given the unfriendly relations between Kenya
and Tanzania, there is little hope of Tanzania's encouraging rail
interchange. From a longer range standpoint, however, there is poten-
tial for free movement of commodities among all three countries (and
possibly Uganda as well) .
Other Potential Rail Lines
Given the emphasis placed on rail transport in Central Africa,
there has been substantial discussion of the building of additional
- 47 -
lines, although in all likelihood f these will come to fruition:
1. A line to connect i with Malawi Railways at
Lilongwe. This would facilitate trade between the two countries and
give Zambia another rail outlet to the sea, although one not as good
as TAZARA.
2. In conjunction with a line to Malawi or as a separate
one built independently, a line from Lusaka to the railhead of the
Mozambique system near Tete, crossing into Mozambique at Feira-Zumbo.
This would provide a much more direct outlet to Beira than the route
via Rhodesia.
3. The so-called Luso variant, a line extending from the
Copper Belt through northwestern Zambia, to connect with the Benguela
at or near Luso, thus reducing the distance and avoiding the haul via
Zaire. This would also facilitate the development of mineral resources
in the northwest province of Zambia.
4. As noted above, with an independent Zimbabwe, a direct,
route from Lusaka to Salisbury, crossing the Zambesi at Chirundu, where
the highway crosses .
5. As noted, an all rail outlet to the sea in Zaire.
Conclusion
Zambia now has a good rail route to the coast, with rates less
than those available for many years (in real terms, the lowest rates
ever available). TAZARA is capable of handling all import and export
traffic once full operations are underway, although some traffic will
likely continue to move by road, and other routes once opened will
undoubtedly be used to some extent . Since the government of Zambia
- 48 -
controls the routing of all freight, it is in a position to determine
routes and methods of transport. The volume of traffic on TAZARA will
be sufficient, on the basis of studies elsewhere of the relationship of
volume of traffic and cost per ton mile and the ch" rectionally balanced
traffic, to be economically viable and more economical than road trans-
port, although the importance of speed and handling may dictate the
routing of some traffic via road.
No studies have been made of the effects of railways upon
economic development in Zambia, so far as is known, partly because the
results have been so obvious. Without the railway outlet to the sea,
the copper complex in Zambia could not possibly have developed when it
did. Given high world copper prices, it could operate without railroad
access today, given a good road to Dar es Salaam and present
road transport operation and costs. But the development of the industry
would have been delayed for several decades at least. The significance
of the railway for the economy, however, extended far beyond the copper
industry. Along the "line of rail"., the narrow belt on each side of the
railroad, developed commercial agriculture, trade, and limited manu-
facturing, while the rest of the country for the most part remained in
subsistence agricultre. The line of rail became the dominant segment in
the economy of the country, although it had no other particular
advantages; it just happened to lie in the path of a rail line from
Victoria Falls to the Copper Belt. An estimated 85% of all economic
activity in the country is in this narrow belt. Over time this small
area may lose ground relatively, but it is likely to dominate the
economy for a long time to come.
- 49 -
Supplementary Tables
Table 3 shows the distances to the various ports from Lusaka %
Table 3
Distance to the Ports from Lusaka
Ki
lometers
Mile
via
3enguela
2683
1678
.Rhodesia Railway and Beira
2040
1275
Malawi and Beira
1653
1033
Malawi and Nacala
1750
1093
Dar es Salaam Road
2090
1306
TAZARA
2040
1275
Mombasa
2350
1469
The distance from Ndola is about 200 miles less via Lobito, 150 miles
less via Dar es Salaam, and 200 miles greater via Beira.
Table 4 provides samples of rates on copper for export at
various times .
Table 4
Transport Rates on Copper to Ports,
Selected Years
1957
All three ports
K 29.70
1960
via "Rhodesia oa portion allowed
to go via Benguela
19.00
1962
Rail via Rhodesia
30.67
1965
Rail via Rhodesia
30.67
1967 (Oct.)
Kail via Rnodesia
40
1967
Lobito
42.20
1967
Beira via Malawi
54.20
1967
Dar es Salaam Road
43.16
1967
Dar es Salaam, Air
113. CO
1968
Road via Dar es Salaam
44.80
1968
via Lobito
45.81
1968
via Rhodesia
45.98
1976
Road via Dar es Salaam
54.
1977
via TAZARA
42.04
COMMONWEALTH WEST AFRICA — NEGLECT AND DETE1 C >RA 1 !
Of the four Commonwealth West African countries, one. Gambia,
has never had a railroad; the Sierre Leone system has now been abandoned;
the Ghanaian and Nigerian systems have, from all indications, declined
substantially in their importance in the economies — to a much greater
extent than in East Africa, and k contrast to the picture in
Central Africa.
Nigeria
As the largest country in population in Africa, Nigeria experi-
enced the development of a relatively substantial rail system, a total of
2178 miles (3505 kilometres), but the system's present role in the economy,
compared to road transport, is not nearly as great as might be expected.
The system was an outgrowth of two separate lines, one from
Lagos, one from Port Harcourt, joining at Kaduna, the British-created
capital of the former Northern Region. The line was started north from
Lagos in 1896, reached Ibadan in 190 ar the crossing of the Nigei at
Jebba in 1909, anc in 1912 »as conn* : >ci i ta to the line from Baro,
on the Niger, via to no in 1912. The Port
Harcourt line was start tbward frc cj y Li L913, reached the
coal mines of Enugu ir, 1916., the Be tver in 1924. iuna in 1926,
with a branch to ^os in 1927." Branches -.vert extended to Kauru STamoda
from Zaria in 1929, to Nguru from FCano in 1930, and in a major construc-
tion project, from Jos to Maiduguri in B ' . One of the major
deficiencies is the lack of an east-west line — while passenger trains
""A 2 '6" gauge line was built from Zaria to Jos in 1914 to serve the tin
mines. This was abandonee; in 1957, since the Jos area was served mere
effectively by the main line.
y
N
./•>
• Kaura Namoda^"
PORT
HARCl ■
Fig. 3
0 50 100 150
1 « j j
les
NIGERIAN RAILWAYS
- 51 -
ran through from Lagos to Port Harcourt, for example, ov ce lin da; or
the week, the time was much greater than in a din^ct route. The pri-
mary traffic item has beer;, ground nui Lng from the north for export,
and cola nuts, cotton, timber, and cattle have been among the othc
major items moved, plus petroleun nets and manufactured goods bound
tor the north. The system used a :: •anber of Beyer-Garretts, but
primarily it relied on 2-8-2 steam locomotives, many built in the 194
and 1950s. Tn 1S55 all motiv - was :- earn (218 line, 55 shunting):
by 197''-. there were 133 stearr. and 133 diesel line engines, 43 steam and
3S diesel shunting.
While in earlier years th sten is relatively profitable,
the eai .. i - - ratic.
• tic L955-6) to 113 [1965-66) aging 96.
Ei| s wis 107 in 1970, 1 n 197 } en, a io; t
ir i'ttt r ■ '. ••. -" ; 96° -64,
. _/ ' [10,3 mills >n , ■
$.]
: ■-
m peal if an »n
tons in cht - ' raor i than h« I
7 ■ , ,:■'■-.
-."» in
Prt .- . v
:
l Nige i a! ivj I [ ment Pla ._
: der a 1 M: ■ ■
p. 214 1 Nai i =
- 52 -
1961-62. The declines in tonnage and ton miles have been comparable.
Passenger traffic has fallen sharply, from 11 million in 1961-62 to 4 . 7
million in 1973-74, »s agef miles --hila
falling after 1970, were greater in 1974 than in the early sixties. The
freight traffic in 1973-74 was 439,853 net ton miles per mile, a rela-
tively low figure. The average length of haul is about 600 miles. The
freight revenue is about 3 U.S. cents per ton mile (1972).
The Third National Development Plan, issued in 1975, provides
a detailed analysis of the decline in traffic and operating deficits
2
(apart from the effects of the Biafran war):
1. Decline in agricultural production, particularly for
export, a major source of traffic.
2. Sharp decline in coal production.
3. Deterioi-ation in rail transport services. As stated in
the Development Plan:
Year Ended 31st March Net Ton Miles
(thousands)
1960 1,249,840
1961 1,181,101
1962 1,412,165
1963 1,410,950
1964 1,554,793
1965 1,221,025
1966 ' 1,215,058
1967 1,004,000
1968 986,000
1969 1,094,000
1970 950,147
1971 981,793
1972 750,129
1973 ' 844.000
1974 958,000
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria: Annual Abstract of Statistics
1972; Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1975.
2
Third National Development Plan, 1975-1980, op. cit.
53
In fact, for the past ten years the volume of traffic moved
by rail has been limited by the Railways' capacity to carry
it. The Railways have even lost considerable long distance
bulk traffic to the roads in spite of the fact that they
would carry this for a lower charge and at a lower cost to
the country's economy. This situation is largely attributable
to the unreliability, slowness and inadequacy of Railway
goods transport services .
There were several elements responsible for this:
a. Unbalanced traffic, with greater up than down traffic.
b. Rapid decline in wagon (freight car) utilization due
to inadequate coordinated scheduling of car use.
c. High downtime of both steam and diesel locomotives. In
1974, availability times were only 17% for the former,
54% for the latter. In general, usable motive power is
entirely inadequate.
d. Slow train speeds, due to the excessive curvature and
inadequate track maintenance. The maximum speed allowed
anywhere on the system is 40 miles per hour, and
restrictions as low as 10 miles an hour are common.
e. Inadequate communications, due in part to constant
thievery of the copper x^Ire of the communications lines.
4. Substantial increase in road transport at the expense of the
railroad, including long distance transport from the north. There was
little restriction on road transport and weight limits were not
enforced. The increased road transport added seriously to congestion
(the two roads from Ibadan to Lagos are regarded as death traps by
many drivers) . The government pushed its investment in roads and rail
was relatively neglected.
- 54 -
In the third development plan, issued in 1975, a major over-
haul of the railway system was proposed, involving, essentially, the
building of a completely new system, to standard (4 '8. 5" gauge), serving
the same points as the present system, built parallel to it, and being
phased in gradually. The plan calls for building about 320 kilometres
per year, and thus the plan will not be completed until well into the
1980s. Some N 885 million was allocated to the rail system 1975-80, out
of a total of N 4 billion for transport, of which N 714 million will be
allocated to the first stage of the new system. Meanwhile, some basic
improvements will be made to the present system, and new rail commuter
service in the Lagos area will be established.
The plans are based upon a study by consultants completed in
1973; the government is convinced that, given potential growth in the
economy, improved rail service will allow lower cost transport than
primary reliance on road transport. Whether the proposed system will in
fact be carried to completion remains to be seen.
Ghana
The Ghana Railways has suffered much the same fate as
Nigerian Railways. The system is essentially A shaped, lines extending
from the ports of Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra northward and nortwestward,
respectively, joining at Kumasi. These two lines in turn are linked
by an east-west line paralleling the coast, permitting relatively
direct service between Accra and Second!. The western line was started
northward from Sekondi in 1898, primarily to facilitate gold mining in
the area around Tarkwa , reaching that city in 1901 and Kumasi in 1903,
168 miles from the ocean. In 1909 a line was started north from Accra
to Kumasi, but did not reach the latter until 1923. The total distance
Accra-Sekondi was 363 miles. A long branch was built from the Tarkwa
/»- — ■
I
\
/
(■ Tamale
GHANA
i
)
/
i
i
i
)
/
f
i
/
KUMASI
/
Awaso
SEKONBI
TAKORADI
Fig. 4
GHANA RAILWAYS
0 . 5. 10 20 ?0
Miles
- 55
area to Kade, completed in 1927, and this was connected to the
Accra-Kumasi line in 1956. Like Nigerian Railways, 3'6" gauge is
used. Dieselization began in 1954 and continued slowly.
The main line of the system is the Western line, Takoradi to
Kumasi, 171 miles, which handles about 90 percent of all the traffic.
The Eastern line, from Accra and the port of Tenia to Kumasi, is 214
miles in length. The Central line, which connects the other two is
120 miles. There are three branches, to Prestea in the west, to Awaso
in the northwest, which handles the bauxite traffic, and to Kade, in
central Ghana; total mileage is 592 (953 kilometers) .
Total traffic in the early seventies was about 1.7 million
tons, and 190 million ton miles (1970) — but, as noted, 90% of this
is concentrated on the Western line, to give this line a reasonably
high ton mi/m figure of about 1 million. But the rest of the system
handles only 200,000 tons, with a ton mi/mi figure of 45,000 — low by
any standards. Over 90 percent of the traffic is southbound, and
about 90 percent of the revenue comes from four commodities — cocoa,
timber, manganese, and bauxite. Most of the imports and manufactured
goods traffic is by road. The operating ratio averaged 89 from 1958 to
1964, but was increasing.
Marginal cost per ton mileage is estimated to be .86 np
(for direct train operating costs), 2.36 np. overall. These figures
with exchange rates of the period were equal to about .8 U.S. cents
and 2 U.S. cents respectively.
The rate structure has been such as to provide relatively
high rates on manufactured goods traffic and on cocoa, the principal
export crop, and very low rates on bauxite, designed to make the
- 56 -
Ghanaian bauxite competitive in world markets.
About 7 million passengers were being carried per year in
the early 70s, for an average trip of 40 miles. 98% of the traffic
was third class.
The general picture of the system since independence has been
one of deterioration, despite some improvements. There has been very
substantial loss of traffic to road transport. For example, once all
cocoa was hauled by rail; by 1966, 30% was moving by road; by the
early seventies, nearly half. The high rate, — NC 12.51 per ton —
2
was 50% greater than the cost of hauling by road, NC 8." The shift to
road was also encouraged by substantial ownership of lorries (trucks)
by the cocoa buying agents, and by the inability of the railroad to
handle all of the traffic offered. This limited capacity was also an
important factor leading to the loss of other export traffic as well,
particularly of logs. Inadequate funds were provided for new equip-
ment, and equipment maintenance was often neglected. The result has
been continuing deficits and continuing loss of traffic. An inherent
source of difficulty is the relatively short haul — the maximum about
200 miles. Thus road transport has important advantages.
The problem of transport in Ghana has not gone unnoticed by
the government. Around 1970, funds were provided for new equipment
and improved signalling, particularly to increase capacity. In
1969-70, a major study was undertaken of the entire transport sector
Edward Vickrey, "Pricing Rail Transport Services in Ghana for Increased
Efficiency," Economic Bulletin of Ghana, Vol. 1 (No. 4), 1971, pp.
28-46.
2
Ibid . , p. 46.
- 57 -
by Robert Nathan Associates.
A detailed study of the rate structure by Edward Vickrey,
using Nathan data, concluded that much of the difficulty lay in the
use of rates that were far in excess of cost for cocoa, somewhat exces-
sive for logs and manganese, and far too low for bauxite (and
passenger traffic). At the same time, rates for northbound manufactured
goods and other imported goods were greatly in excess of the appropriate
cost figures on this backhaul traffic, for which only short run
marginal cost is relevant. Thus substantial rate reductions were
proposed; much of the traffic loss, in Vickrey' s view, was attributable
to rates that were far too high relative to road transport costs and
2
rail costs .
What is the long range potential? The evidence suggests
that on the heavy traffic Western line, rail costs (not existing rail
rates) are less than road costs; the rail line should be maintained
and improved to be able to handle the available traffic. But the
Eastern line has so little traffic as to be uneconomic; all Kumasi
traffic can easily be handled on the Western line. The Central line,
despite low traffic, has greater future potential, in the handling of
bauxite to the refinery at Tema. The refinery has thus far operated
primarily with Jamaican bauxite, but under the terms of the agreement
with Ghana, the company is committed to phase in use of Ghanaian
bauxite.
There are several related issues. Unlike in many developing
countries, road users as a whole are apparently more than covering
"Ttfathan Consortium for Sector Studies, Ghana Railways, 2 vols. (Accra,
1970).
Pricing Rail Transport, op. cit.
- 58 -
road costs. But there is little good information on the relative
burdens on large vehicles, and there is considerable evidence that the
heavy lorries are causing substantial destruction of the roads, particu-
larly in the handling of logs. Vickery has noted, incidentally that
rail costs are artificially inflated by the success of a strong union
in pushing up wages, although reduced somewhat below opportunity costs
by exchange control regulations. One other problem of the system is
the seasonal nature of the cocoa traffic, resulting in need for more
equipment than otherwise would be required.
In 1976 the Government of Ghana began to take action to
improve the situation. The 1976 budget provided NC 20 million (about
the same number of dollars at current fixed exchange rates) for new
freight cars and engines, and the government obtained World Bank
assistance for a study of transport requirements. The general philo-
sophy of the government is to retain the rail system, or at least much
of it, for the handling of bulk commodities. There is little thought,
apparently, that much of the manufactured goods traffic can appro-
priately be returned to rail. The severe shortages of foreign
exchange, however, restrict improvements in the system.
There has long bean discussion of extension of the railway
about 250 miles north from Kumasi to Tamale, the major city in
northern Ghana and the center of an important agricultural area.
Sierra Leone
While other West African commonwealth countries have witnessed
the decline of their rail systems, Sierra Leone has, under pressure
from the World Bank, phased out its system, which consisted of 311
SIERRA LEONE
Makeni
FREETOWN
Fig. 5
RAILWAYS IN
SIERRA LEONE
Sierra Leone Government Railway
2 ' . 6 " guage (abandoned)
Mineral Railway
3 ' 06" guage
0 10 30 40 50
*-i-j — i a i . s
Miles
- 59 -
miles of line.
Construction started from the Freetown area in 1896, reached
Bo, the second largest city, in 1903, and pushed rapidly on to Baiima
in 1905 and Pendembu in 1908 — 225 miles from Freetown. At the time
this was one of the longest railways in Tropical Africa. A branch
was completed to Makemi in 1914 .
The line was, for economy reasons, built with 35 pound rail
to a 2 '6" gauge, miniature by any standards. Much of the line traversed
mountainous country, with numerous bridges and grades. A number of
Beyer-Garretts were used, the later ones of 66 ton weight. Palm
kernels and chrome ore provided most of the traffic. The road was a
source of operating losses over most of its history. In the period
1959-1964, for example, the operating ratio averaged 145 — expenses
of operation were nearly 50% greater than revenues. Finally, under
strong World Bank pressure tied to grants for highway improvement, the
government, despite considerable opposition, agreed to phase out the
system. This began in 1968, the main portion from Kenema via Bo to
Freetown being retained until late in 1974.
Distinct from this line was the 52 mile line from a point on
the river above Freetown to the iron mines at Marampa. The line was
completed in 1933. The closing of the mines, in 1976 leaves the
future of this road in doubt.
A Note on Cameroon and Gabon
Two ex-French African countries have major rail construc-
tion projects underway. One is Cameroon. The coastal portion of this
country is highly mountainous and heavily wooded, and construction is
- 60 -
difficult. The first line, built by the Germans between 1902 and
1908, was in the far north, extending from the river across from
Douala on the coast to Nkcng^amba, 100 miles. The central line was
started eastward from Douala in 1908, but construction was stopped by
the war, and did not reach Yaounde, the capital, until 1927. The two
lines were joined by a bridge at Douala in 1955. There had been plans
for decades to build northward from Yaounde, and finally, construction
began in the mid-sixties. The line is intended to aid in opening up
the northern part of the country, which contains important mineral
deposits.
The other major project is in Gabon, which adjoins
Cameroon on the south. Work was commenced in 1975, linking the ports
of Owendo and Santa Clara via Booue' with Franceville, the location of
manganese deposits. It will also be extended to Belinga, location of
iron ore deposits. The line, ultimately 930 kilometers, will cross
virtually the entire country. The portion to Franceville is expected
to be completed by 1980, the entire system by 1985.
Major reconstruction of the Congo-Brazzaville line,
connecting Brazzaville with the port of Peinte Noire, through moun-
tainous country, is underway by an Italian firm.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY ISSUES
Table 5 summarizes the traffic data of the systems.
The costs, converted to cents per ton mile, should be regarded
as only very rough figures, because of the artificiality of the rates
of exchange in many instances.
- 61 -
Table 5
Summary of Traffic and Costs
Ap
proximate
Net
Ton Miles
Cost
per Net
Railroad
Mileage
Year
per
Mile of Line
Ton Mile,
000s
US
cents
East African
system
3663
1975
731 gross
2.5
Nairobi-Mombasa
330
530
8500 gross
Tanzania Central
2700 gross
Zambia
650
1975
2190
4.6
TAZARA "
1158
1977
20002
3
n.a.
Nigerian
2178
1974
440
3
Ghana
system
592
1970
170
2
Western line
171
1000
other lines
421
45
Dar es Salaam — Tabora portion
2
Estimated. Capacity is about twice this great.
3
Likely around 2c. Existing road transport Zambia to Dar
es Salaam, 5.3c.
Conclusions
Out of this brief survey, some general conclusions can be
drawn:
1. The volume of traffic on the main lines — Mombasa-Kampala;
Tanzania Central; Zambia; TAZARA, the Western line of Ghana Railways,
and portions of the Nigerian system — are adequate to allow reasonable
attainment of the economies from density of traffic. Studies in the
United States indicate that much of the economies are attained at
1 million net ton miles per mile (roughly 2 million gross), and most
by 2 million, even though the full economies are not attained until
- 62 -
traffic reaches about 10 million (20 million gross) .
2. The cost per ton mile would appear to be lower on the
main lines than the cost of heavy volume road transport, but the
latter has obtained substantial traffic, partly because of inadequate
railway equipment, partly because, of the value-of-service rate struc-
tures of the railways.
3. A much better picture of relative rail and road costs
will be available after a few years of experience with TAZARA, which
is replacing heavy volume road transport.
4. There is a substantial mileage, in East Africa and Ghana,
of relatively light traffic lines — with traffic under 100,000 net
ton miles per mile. Experience in the United States shows that such
lines have substantially higher cost than main lines and that road
transport is cheaper.
5. While all of the systems have survived dramatic readjust-
ments in recent decades, they have all (except Zambia Railways)
suffered from general deterioration in the last few years, for a
number of reasons: governmental emphasis on road development;
shortages of equipment due to lack of foreign exchange and governmental
neglect; loss of traffic to road transport because of obsolete tariff
structures and other reasons; lack of trained personnel in some
instances.
6. General attitudes toward the railways differ widely among
the countries, from particular neglect in West Africa to strong emphasis
in Zambia. In Central Africa broadly defined, including Zambia, Zaire,
Angola and Mozambique, the railway remains the dominant transport
form, in part, in some areas, because of the lack of intercity roads.
R. G. Harris, "An Empirical and Institutional Analysis of Excess Capacity
in the Rail Freight Industry", University of California, Department of
Economics Working Paper No. SL-7602, Berkeley 1976.
- 63 -
7. The initial railway tariffs were designed to obtain as
much as possible from "luxury" imports and from exports of primary
items, allowing low rates on exports of low-value commodities and
imports of items regarded as necessary for development. The structures
did not universally favor exports, as is commonly argued — as witness
the high rates on copper from Zambia, on cocoa in Ghana. Of the
imports, in some instances particularly heavy rates were placed on
petroleum products. One consequence of this value of service type of
tariff was to encourage loss of traffic to road transport as roads
were built. Readjustment of the tariffs in light of changing condi-
tions has been slow.
8. Political considerations have played a major role in
railway development. As is well known, the political problems of
southern Africa resulted in dramatic shifts in traffic patterns; the
political difficulties among the three East African countries have
seriously injured East African Railways.
9. From the various studies that have been made, it is
clear that the early railway lines had major impact upon economic
development in the countries and the shaping of modern present day
locational patterns: Nairobi, in mary respects the most important city
in all tropical Africa, owes its existence to the railway. But there
is now clear evidence that under present conditions, the building of
railway lines may have little impact upon development, particularly
of agriculture, since, on relatively light traffic lines, rail costs
are no lower, and may be higher, than road transport costs, and road
transport is adequate.
- 64 -
10. The importance of petroleum products in total transport
is phenomenally high. The tonnage of petroleum products imported into
Zambia by pipe line is about the same as all surface transport import
tonnage. For years East African Railways has received about 25% of its
revenue from petroleum traffic.
11. Air transport of freight has proven to be very costly,
and while important in some instances has not expanded rapidly.
12. Passenger traffic on the railways has changed little in
recent years; loss of higher-income and tourist traffic to air and
road transport has been offset by increased total passenger travel.
Third class dominates the traffic completely today, at fares that are
extremely low by comparison with other countries.
Major Policy Issues
The African countries face several policy issues in the
transport field:
1. Should new rail lines be built? As suggested above, rail
lines are not a magic solution to economic development; there
are probably relatively few instances in which new lines are warranted.
One is to allow development of mineral products providing substantial
volume of traffic. The other is to allow better routes where existing
traffic is high — as in the case of TAZARA and possible connection of
Zambia Railways with those of Malawi and Mozambique.
2. Should existing rail lines be preserved? The answer
appears to be clearly in the affirmative so far as the main lines are
concerned — partly because costs are lower than those of road trans-
port at existing levels, partly because failure to do so would result
- 65 -
in rapid destruction of the typical African road. In other words,
there is reason to believe that heavy road transport does not pay
adequately for the damage it does to roads. Taxes on diesel fuel are
typically low under the argument that low rates aid economic develop-
ment. To build roads adequate to allow heavy volume road transport
without prohibitive maintenance costs would add tremendously to
highway costs. From all indications, preservation and improvement of
the heavy-density rail lines will be much more economical.
Doubt can be raised, however, about some of the longer light
traffic lines, whose high costs per ton mile raise overall costs and
drain the resources of the railway system. But premature abandonment
of a line before roads have been developed and before opportunities for
economic development have been fully explored may be even more unwise.
4
A substantial portion of the mileage may be more or less
marginal. In comparison of rail and road costs for purposes of deter-
mining economic viability of these lines, it is important that
true opportunity costs, not simply monetary costs be used. On the
one hand, costs for which road transport is responsible but for which
it does not pay (additional road costs above those covered by user
charges), for example, must be included. Relative drain on foreign
exchange at artificially maintained exchange rates should be considered,
as well as future relative energy costs, particularly in countries
lacking petroleum. The railway is a more efficient user of fuel if
traffic is above a relatively low level; if total traffic is no more
than a few cars per train, rcaa transport is more efficient.
Another element to consider is the artificial inflation of
railway wages in seme countries due to strong unions and previous
holding of the jobs by non-Africans. Road transport, especially
- 66 -
with owner-operators, is not subject to this effect. The economic
cost of railway labor is not the actual wages paid but the oppor-
tunity cost — what these workers could earn in another occupation —
and this is often much lower.
3. When railroads are retained, how can an optimal balance
between road and rail transport be attained? First, as noted, tariff
structures have resulted in uneconomic diversion of traffic from
rail to road in many instances; shift away from value of service to
cost related tariffs is obviously required, as noted and as is
recognized in most of these countries.
Secondly, experience in other countries suggests that, for
a substantial volume of traffic, costs of shipping by rail and road,
considering not only transport costs but speed, handling, and loss and
damage elements, are much the same. Should governments seek to ensure that
this traffic moves by rail rather than road, by restrictive licensing or
other means, to lower rail costs per ton mile and avoid deficits?
There is obviously some merit in doing so. But the policy is difficult to
implement and can easily be overdone, forcing traffic to move by rail
when road is far more efficient. In some African countries, in which
much of the traffic is controlled by marketing boards ancl parastatal
enterprises, it is relatively easy to ensu t this marginal traffic
is moved by rail. But in more strictly free enterprise economies,
attempts to restrict road transport by licensing are not likely to be
successful; the rules are difficult to enforce, and firms will develop
their own road transport fleets — a practice few countries seek to
curtail.
- 67
In general the best solutions to reasonably optimal division
of traffic appear to be the following:
1. Revision of tariffs to reflect cost rather than *alu oi
s i vice
2. k policy that all government enterprises use rail
rather than ro?d when costs ate comparable
3. Establishment of reas weight limits on road trans-
port and enforcement of them
A. Adequate charges on road transport for road use
5. Outright subsidy by government of rail transport
in certain instances (to cover costs of a line retained,
for example, Tor regional development purposes, or of
p . service if the government seeks to make cheap
p; s t sport aval lab C than requicing the
rail systems to cove costs iron revenue.
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