THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
BY GENERAL
SIR IAN HAMILTON, G.C.B.
Author of
" A Staff-Officer's Scrap Book,"
" Gallipoli Diary," etc.
LONDON
EDWARD ARNOLD & CO.
1921
[AU rights rtserved]
College
Library
u
Hi 755
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I STRANGERS YET ! 1
II KNOWLEDGE OF ARMIES 18
HI HIGHER ORGANISATION 24
IV ORGANISATION GENERALLY .... 52
V MILITARY ORGANISATION 67
VI DISCIPLINE 91
VII TRAINING 146
VIII NUMBERS 177
IX GENIUS 187
X PATRIOTISM 206
XI APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION . . 226
XII APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO THE TROOPS . 259
XHI APPLICATION OF DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, PATRIOTISM 291
vii
1141500
CHAPTER I
STRANGERS YET!
The Romans knew what they wanted when they
set about making an Army. The very name they
gave to the weapon to be handed to a Consul or
pro-Consul embodied a clear-cut idea. " So sensible
were the Romans of the imperfections of valour
without skill and practice that, in their language,
the name of an Army was borrowed from the word
which signified exercise."1 Exercitus was the Roman
notion of an Army — a body trained to do in peace
what they would have to do in war. ST/HXTO? is
the word the Greeks employed to convey their
notion. Not with them a nation determined to
win as a result of sheer, straightforward work,
but a confederacy trusting to art, to generalship,
to inspiration, expecting victory to crown the more
brilliantly led. The quick-witted Greeks relied upon
that reflection cast by Divinity upon the sensitive
soul, that flash of light we call Genius ; the matter-
of-fact Romans upon putting their backs into the
business. Or, to put it more technically, the
Greek spirit led its leaders to study strategy, the
art of manoeuvring into some position from which
the greatest possible results would follow upon
victory ; whereas, the Romans aimed at the victory
itself and concentrated rather upon tactics.
1 Gibbon.
1 B
2 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Some day the historian may endeavour to recon-
struct our dead Empire (as the antediluvian may be
built again from one bone) by following Gibbon's
example and cogitating upon that little word
" Army." Did those master-builders of empire,
the British, he may ask, look to skill or work,
numbers or quality, free service or forced service,
when they fashioned their imperial instrument,
the military forces of the Crown ? Were they so
far-sighted that their famous legionaries were always
just half a lap in advance of the times ? What
was actually the yolk whose eggshell was formed
by those four primitive signs ARMY?
Heaven knows into what patterns our slant-
eyed historian that is to be will weave his fancies
over our graves, but the truth is that before '14 the
people of these islands knew nothing about their
Army. They never got a chance. Their school
syllabus was as silent upon the subject of soldiering
as if some indelicate secret rendered an Army
unfit for children's ears. The censorship laid upon
experts was, and remains, more severe than in any
other Army in the world ; stricter than even in the
Japanese Army. There could hardly be a better
proof of lack of interest. The freest people and
Press in the world are the most hoodwinked by
military regulations for secrecy made in their own
War Office ! If the public had been keen about
their Army they would never for a moment have
stood orders framed to shield the War Office from
independent criticism. In those half-dozen years
before the war, at any rate, much greater freedom
of discussion existed in the stiffly- disciplined German
ranks than in our otherwise easy-going Service. As
STRANGERS YET! 3
the Bavarian Press sarcastically remarked on the
occasion of the issue of our amended muzzling regu-
lations in 1908, "the British public are evidently
so well educated hi military matters that they do
not mind gagging their instructors."
In the nineteenth century the people were not
all-powerful, so they were allowed to hear and see.
By the beginning of the present century, however,
it was clear that Demos was out to rule in fact as
well as in name. He could only be dodged by the
politicians as the man with the handkerchief over
his eyes is dodged during the game of blind man's
buff. So it came about that anti-Press, anti-
publicity, Official Secrets Acts have kept step with
loud professions of belief in open diplomacy and the
wisdom of the sovereign people. Contrast the
regulations which were thought good enough when
the people had not much power, with the regulations
framed against the eyes and ears of the people,
i.e. their Press, when their will was apparently
law. In a word — our regulations governing the
publication by soldiers of their views on military
matters (Appendices I and II) are veritable Lettres
de Cachet, consigning the intellects of our Democracy
to the Bastille of ignorance.
Yet, surely, if the watchdogs already began to
wear muzzles in those days before the war, there
was still the common sense of the nation ? They
saw their Army daily. They were hi personal touch
with the officers or the rank and file, each in his
own grade. In the great towns of the Midlands
and of the North, towns which supplied the Army
with its recruits, the drab streams of humanity
flowing up and down the pavements on a winter's
4 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
night would be brightened here and there by a
bit of "England's bloody red" lending colour to
the life of a mill-girl ; by the band of the regiment,
the glitter of the bayonets; by the Army making
itself at home.
What an idea ! Our famous regiments had
nothing to do with the people, and so, in the loneliest
tracts hi the kingdom, at the Curragh of Kildare
and on Salisbury Plain, hideous barracks were
built at vast expense to make the lives of the men
dull as ditch-water, and to encourage enlistment by
keeping the people at arm's length from their Army
until they really half forgot that it existed.
These would be some of the facts which a yellow
historian might strike upon when he was preparing
for his digest of the pre-war British and their method
of maintaining a vaster system of voluntary service
than that of Imperial Rome. At first there would
seem to be no method, nothing but madness ; but,
as he went on, he might discover a little bit of
statecraft half hid under this semblance of insanity.
The British Empire has been raised to its present
dizzy height by the profound imaginings of a mere
handful of great men. Consider the slowly- acquired
scientifically- dispersed chain of fortresses binding
Hong-Kong to London and holding back Asia from
the Antipodes. Give Napoleon or Von Moltke a
clean map of the world, a free hand, and a year to
think matters over, and they could not improve
upon what a lot of rather heavy Britishers have
.Appeared to do by chance.
Cardwell was one of the great men ; or, if not,
I at least he was greatly advised. Consider that
exquisitely cunning device, that system of his, which
STRANGERS YET I 6
guarantees the sovereign sheep against their own
sheepishness ; which silences their baas and bleats
whenever and wherever they endeavour to increase
the pennies in their purses (and thereby the tempta-
tions to robbers) at the expense of the numbers of
their watchdogs. When Cardwell came in he found
a system of overseas armies of occupation built
on the classic model of the old Roman frontier
garrisons except that our regiments had not been,
since the Indian Mutiny, permanently localised
like the Legions. The weakest point of the Roman
model was that if one of the frontiers was hard
pressed it could only be reinforced by withdrawing
troops from another point on the circumference.
Cardwell determined to provide a central, home-
service reserve, and he did it this way : the foreign
service units were duplicated at home, and these
home battalions could be quite truthfully described
by Cardwell to his pacifist, liberal colleagues and
constituents, as being nothing more formidable or
militaristic than the necessary recruits who were
being trained to keep the overseas garrisons up to
strength. But they were so well trained (not in
depots, as formerly, but in skeleton battalions)
that when, on mobilisation being ordered, their
cadres were filled up by the reservists, these modest
units became Contemptibles — best soldiers in the
world bar none. To get the reservists short service
had to be brought in, and to get the duplication of
units battalions had to be linked, and the old, famous
numbers had to be scrapped. The present generation
could never have been brought to imagine the
savage outburst of rage with which these two pre-
cious gifts of Cardwell's were received by the Tories,
6 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
the Military Clubs and the regimental officers,
had they not themselves witnessed an even greater
stroke of military policy than CardwelTs, followed
by an even fiercer outburst of wrath. If Cardwell
was the Castor of our military firmament, Haldane
was its Pollux. How splendidly did he shine out
during those dark nights when we might all of us
" sleep in our beds " -and a long last sleep it would
have been had Haldane really believed in soporifics-
Cardwell had left the Army in the following
state :
(1) Bare minimum garrisons for India and the
overseas territories and fortresses ;
(2) Reserves for these foreign service troops which,
by his clever organising skill, were represented
to the taxpayer as being mere depots, whereas
they were really duplicate training battalions
capable of quickly taking the field as fighting units ;
(3) A disorganised mass of militia, yeomanry and
volunteers, supposed to be adjuncts to the martello
towers of the South Coast, as defenders of our hearths
and homes.
Came Haldane the Organiser, and cut, pruned,
shuffled, grafted, drafted until he had grouped (2)
into an Expeditionary Force of six Divisions whilst
making (3) partly into a special reserve for that
Expeditionary Force and partly into fourteen fight-
ing divisions, complete with engineers, artillery,
cavalry, transport, supply and medical services.
When I look back on this period and think of the
jungle filled with hissing adders which Haldane
broke up into a symmetrical and delectable garden,
I do really feel uplifted to think I was privileged
to watch his address, his artistry, his perseverance,
STRANGERS YET! 7
and even to lend at times a hand. The war was
won when Haldane stepped into the War Office :
most miserably must we have lost it had he failed
us. To say this is common justice — no more. We
abound in Ministers who can spend more and produce
less : Haldane spent less and less, yet quadrupled
the value of the outfit ! Be it carefully borne in
mind, these skeleton battalions and batteries of
recruits which formed Haldane' s skeleton divisions
were so modestly tucked away into holes and corners
of the country that it was impossible for the average
citizen to work up much interest in their existence
or to imagine that they could possibly play a part
amidst the enormous conscript Armies of the Conti-
nent. Democracy is inclined by nature to believe
in quantity rather than quality ; before the war
they were indeed provokingly humble-minded about
the fighting value of their own troops, which were
probably — I say probably — the best the world has
ever seen. The nation forgot them, clean forgot
them, and what martial enthusiasm the people
possessed, and what spare cash also, was preserved
in loving and undisputed allegiance to the spear-
head of their attack and their last ditch's defence
—the navy ; to the bluejackets who were, in the
public eye, propagating good opinions as well as
young ideas in every port in the Empire.
We see, then, that it was not so easy for the
citizen to get into touch with his Army, and we see,
further, it was as well he did not do so, as it might
have weaned him prematurely from his mother,
the Navy. Since then, it may be said, all has
changed, for the nation itself has been run through
the mill of the Great War, and what it does not know
I
8 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
about its Army cannot be worth knowing ! If that
is being said- and I have heard something like it-
nothing could be more wide of the mark. Quite
true, after four and a half years of war, our people
recognize differences between an Army Corps and
the Army Service Corps. The girls have worn khaki
and served overseas ; they can spot a V.C. — likewise
an O.B.E. But those who have listened to conver-
sations innumerable may agree perhaps with me
that as soon as ex-Service men and women get
outside their own little circles they are lost : they
have seen nothing, heard nothing, know nothing of
the working of the enormous piece of machinery of
which they had formed part. They think they
know everything because they have felt certain
cogs catch and play upon other cogs ; the relations
of a Government to its Army they really realise
no more than a fly on a coach wheel realises the
relations between the driver and his horse. The
strongest contrast to this conceited ignorance is
found in the humble pose taken towards the Navy.
Politicians, whether of the House of Commons or
house of bitters variety, though they may gaily
start off armies to march without transport into
the Balkans, would think twice or three times before
they took liberties with an ironclad. As to women,
their experiences on steamers bound for Margate
incline them to extreme reticence on saltwater
topics. So the Scapa Flow mists hang impenetrable
around our brave sailors and, in some ways, the
Senior Service scores. The Admiralty is the only
surviving department of Government which still
dares tell a newspaper combine to go to h . I
dare not myself write down that wicked word in
STRANGERS YET! 9
the same sentence with a highly respected, indeed
almost sacred, body — and what's more, I won't.
The War Office has to surrender at discretion, for
the Army has become a plaything to P.M.'s, M.P.'s
and P.O., by which I mean Public Opinion. Soldier-
ing seems familiar : sailoring is an occult science.
But the truth is rarely what it seems. Just as
civilians are apt to know less about the Army than
they think they do, so they probably know more
about the Navy than they think they do, for the
simple reason that the Navy is much more simple
than the Army. Any Admiralty clerk can order
so many weeks' supply of munitions, petrol, food,
drink, to be shoved on board a battleship, and there
she is ready, in the material sense, for anything !
No line of communications, no transport question,
no worry about water, weather, or bread and butter.
The ship carries everything in her belly, including
most of the anxieties and conundrums which break
the heart of a longshore fighter.
Quite plainly, I do not think the average voter
of Great Britain has grasped the significance of an
Army, and I feel that the half knowledge he has
gathered from his own experiences during the war
may tend to become more dangerous than the
pre-war no knowledge, which still holds good as
regards the Navy. Otherwise, it would be impossible
that in Midsummer, 1921, our organisation should
remain essentially what it was in Midsummer, 1914,
although meanwhile the factors to be encountered
by that organisation no longer exist. There is no
balance of power in Europe ; there is no question
of an invasion of these islands ; the whole problem
is entirely and utterly changed since Haldane
10 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
created the Expeditionary Force, the special reserve
battalions and the fourteen Territorial Divisions.
Weapons, too, are on the move, and yet we are resting
on our oars ; seem to think that because there are
difficulties in the way, because Ireland, Mesopota-
mia and Germany have put too great a strain on
our troops to enable us to work experimental Bri-
gades, that, therefore, there is nothing to be done.
There is everything to be done, yet the only original
step we have taken is to stick a compulsory service
clause into the Territorial agreement — like a sting
in the business end of a scorpion.
The worst of it is that, under existing regulations,
no serving soldier can tell his fellow-countrymen
anything about an Army which is not, (1) quite
commonplace ; (2) an expression of the views of
the Authorities of the moment. If he is very senior,
and feels he has friends at Court, he may, of course,
break the rules and take the risk : but his example
is very bad for discipline. If, again, he is a brilliant
junior, he may break the rules by stealth and put
forth his views anonymously ; but our best officers
would not break the rules by stealth, and the residue
who might do so would find that a nameless article
would pan out like a brushless fox — not worth
following. I began this paragraph by saying " the
worst of it is," but there is a worser. The " Authori-
ties of the moment " are the P.M., the S. of S. for
War, and the C.I.G.S., of whom the last, the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff, is the actual, vigilant,
responsible custodian of the gates that lead from
the Army to the public. Is it not putting almost
too great a strain upon a great and overworked
man to ask him to decide yes or no about a book
STRANGERS YET! 11
which might select him to be the paladin of its
romance ? Suppose, further, it should so have
chanced that, in the very same volume, several of
his rivals and enemies have been severely trounced,
— his better nature — his chivalry — must rise up in
arms against the idea of passing so invidious a
work — and yet — the book might be well worth
publishing ! I have said there was a worser, but
worser may be followed by " and worser." How
if an Artful Dodger had determined at all costs to
slip through the Customs with his State monopoly
contraband, and had prepared to that very end a
honey cake for Cerberus at the gate — prepared it
so artfully that poor Cerberus never got farther
than the honey, but, overcome by a mellifluous
drowse, let all the rest of the gall and vinegar go
past ? This would be bad — bad for Cerberus,
bad in the long run for the regulation dodger,
bad, most of all, for the public.
These regulations were intended to prevent the
public from hearing anything but the War Office
side of the story. Sweep away the whole of these
prussic acid gags ; permit officers to use their own
judgment and to shoulder a reasonable responsibility
like other grown-up human beings ; let them write
to the Press, or publish books, provided they put
their names to them. If they show independence
of mind in approaching a military question their
brother officers will make them suffer, for that is
the way of the herd, and there's no getting away
from it. But Authority must indeed be in a bad
way if it cannot stand the racket of a difference of
opinion with a subaltern. If, on the other hand,
the officer reveals what isn't his'n (i.e. State secrets)
i
!
12 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
he goes to prison. If he permits himself to be
cheeky or offensive, and says things which are sub-
versive of discipline, he can be tried by court martial.
I submit that here is the only way for a free demo-
cratic nation to make a clean wipe out of a bad
blot which has fallen on our military regulations
quite lately from the pen of Autocracy. For the
times are anxious ; the electors ought to be taught ;
they should be told at least nine-tenths of the con-
tents of drawers marked " secret " and guarded by
bureaucrats whose mothers don't trust them yet
with latchkeys.
What has just been written sounds like a foreword
to some sensational disclosures or the opening up
of wildly subversive doctrines. Nothing of the sort.
I am very sorry. This book is only an effort to
convey my experiences of the " points " of a dark
horse to his owners — the public. Trainers and
jockeys dislike a " knowing " owner ; the British
Government and its bureaucrats, whether they
wear spurs or stove-pipe hats, dislike a " knowing "
B.P., and that is why these Press and Publicity
Acts have been framed. Being late converts to the
Continental closure systems, as usual, we have gone
farther than our originals, the Prussians. In Prus-
sia every word written here might have been pub-
lished as a matter of course by any young officer
on full pay. Here, in pre-war England, he could
not have got it past the General Staff — not if he
had dedicated the work to Lord French himself—
because of its reflections (blasphemies they would
have been considered) on Cavalry. To-day, post-
war, there would have been an equal chance — i.e.
no chance — of a permit to publish because of the
STRANGERS YET! 13
reflections (blasphemies they are called) about
Compulsory Service. Now at last I am free and,
D.V., I am going to write freely, were it only because
an insider of fifty years' standing who has reached
the outsider stage without leaving his senses behind
him owes that last duty to the State. Did I know
of any treatise on the " being " of an Army, I could
take cover from the gadfly that stings sluggards
into effort. But I do not. There are thousands
of books on war, on strategy, on tactics, on battles :
— there are drill-books, field-service regulations,
and King's regulations, but these are kites of
another colour.
Perhaps the image I hold in the camera of my
skull cannot be developed in the open ? Perhaps
it has become too complicated ? A versailled
Europe is one vast camp. Babylon, Assyria, Greece
and Rome enjoyed no like spectacle. Even the
men of the Middle Ages who were indentured under
the feudal system to turn themselves into Armies
on the nod would be astonished could they see a
British Army of the Rhine, a French Army of
Silesia, a Belgian Army, an Italian Army, a Greek
Army, Poland an Army, Russia an Army, and,
as if this were not enough, an Army of Africans
" laming " the Germans to make bricks.
Why this beautiful peace treaty should need so
many Armies and warships to keep it going is not
my present concern. But the Armies themselves
are a study, although, just now, they are only doing
police work for war profiteers. I am sure that if
a philosopher wants to study his own or any other
nation his best way is to go on foreign service with
its Army. I do know this, because I am able to
14 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
see the pitfalls into which ladies and gentlemen
have fallen when they have attempted to distil
the genuine Japanese spirit from a jumble of books,
geishas, elder statesmen, merchants, peasants, or
the cosmopolitan society of Tokio. So the people
of the U.S.A. still keep buying^ Staff -Officer's Scrap-
Book after fifteen years, because their instinct
(aroused by danger) enables them to understand
that live Japs walk through its pages : and why
live ? Because they are microcosms of an Army
in the field, and an Army is always super-national.
The Armies thus differ more typically than their
nation, but where an Army is based upon voluntary
service it may be conceded that it represents that
part of the nation which has responded to a high
appeal, and in so responding has left the residue
below par. Our British Army was the pick of the
nation (speaking broadly), and the balance (still
speaking broadly) consisted of its leavings. The
whole of the young virility of town and country-side
flows into the ranks, and so, in war, an Army becomes
dominant to the civilian crowd left at home, who
are, in Mendelian phrase, recessive. The impact of
the opinion of a victoriously returning Army upon
the people who had remained behind should produce
the same result as the impact of a black bull upon
a red heifer : i.e. the black or dominant colour
should appear in the calf, or post-war policy, although
that calf may carry in it the factors, the germs,
the potentialities, of reasserting in time to come a
recessive character or colour.
This is the natural course of events, but Mr. Lloyd
George has thwarted Nature, and now she, outraged,
is taking her revenge. With us the dominant
STRANGERS YET! 15
opinion of the Army has never been allowed its
impact upon the recessive stay-at-homes. The calf
of my fable, therefore, the post-war policy, has been
a miserable little beast.
Through fear of the Army, a fear born of ignor-
ance, the more generous, manly side of our race
has been wiped off the political slate during the
last seven years. Why that desperate haste in
1918, that suddenness by which soldier voters were
taken unawares ? After the Elections the same
mistrust of the Army. First General Sir Horace
Smith-Dorrien tried to get the ex-Service men to
come together into one great League. They agreed ;
the politicians put a spoke in his wheel — the agree-
ment never ran, never came to anything. Later
on, in 1918, I presided over a conference which had
for its aim the bringing together, under one umbrella,
of all the organisations dealing with ex-Service
men ; for what had lately been one Army had by
then been allowed, nay encouraged, to drift into
groups, often antagonistic groups, instead of holding
together in one confederacy. For months we worked,
interviewing all sorts and conditions of ex-Service
men : deputations from the Grand Fleet ; deputa-
tions from Portsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham ;
deputations from the Comrades, from the Associa-
tion and from the Federation. The representatives
who came to argue out the matter with us sported
every shade of political colour from true blue Tory
to Extremist red. But whatever the tinge of their
neckties they had all a tie of another sort up their
sleeves — the Army, the Navy, united them in one
great family sentiment, a memory of dangers and
sufferings well and impartially shared.
16 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Right through those numerous gradations of
political opinion ran a vertical column of steel,
binding them together and making possible the
free agreement reached at the end. No one had
ever even once suggested at any of our meetings
(as had once or twice been suggested outside) that
members of this League should " drop politics."
Politics cannot be cut out of the life of a civilian,
for then he has no way of expressing his views
except by a brick-bat. All we wanted was to save
our old war comrades from being divided, so that
they would not, as a class, be ruled and be ruled
out of it by the stay-at-homes. Had they held to
their individuality, no party would have cared to
be unfair to them as a class — no trades union would
have dared. So at last all were agreed. The com-
pact was made and, at the eleventh hour, Authority
became persuaded that there was danger to the
Constitution in permitting four million of the best
men in the State to foregather in social friendship.
Now in May, 1921, at last the representatives of
the Associations have fixed up a combine. But
what a loss of force ; what splintering up of the
soundest views ; what hard luck both for the ex-
Service men and for their country. For small local
unions have crystallised into independence in the
meantime, and I doubt if there will ever be the
great association there might have been. I have
likened the opinion of an Army to a column of
steel running vertically through layers of classes
and syndicates, holding them together, lending
them a core of consistency. The Army was com-
posed of the best men in the country, and the
ex-Service men are still the best men in the country,
STRANGERS YET! 17
but the Unionists of the right wing and the Ex-
tremists of the left wing have equally been terrified
lest they should draw together.
During three parts of the European massacre
we alone possessed a Volunteer Army. We alone
possess ex-Service men who are, in the main, ex-
volunteers. In the days following the murder of
Caesar the letters of prominent Romans have a
constantly recurring phrase, " What will the veterans
think of it ? " Who here cares a tinker's dam
what the ex-Service men may think ? They have
been divided, split up, set against one another, lost.
We, more than any other people, possessed an Army
and possess ex-Service men whose spirit was worth
guarding and preserving. What have we done with
them ? Disorganised them, dispersed them, let
them creep back into trade (if they were lucky
enough to find favour in the eyes of the men who
jumped their jobs when they went to war) : as to
the rest — barrel-organs, monkeys, and German brass-
bands.
To-day we are paying the price for what, in effect,
is our ignorance of our own Army. We don't know
it now. We are afraid of the demobbed instead of
being afraid of the mob. A voluntary service Army
should be a mould for turning out good citizens,
good settlers : only, they must be understood,
they must be given a chance ; and the first step
that way is to study an Army hi the abstract.
CHAPTER II
KNOWLEDGE OF ARMIES
Never, in history, so far as we know it, have the
people had more variegated chances of studying
armies — their strong points and their weak points.
Never have they seemed so content to fold hands
and continue to accept armies at face value — so
many divisions, so much force.
The Japanese Army ? We are anxiously weighing
the pros and cons of the Japanese Alliance. Have
the Imperial Conference anxiously weighed the
value of the Japanese Army ? Have they thor-
oughly satisfied themselves of the relative " force "
represented respectively by a battalion of the
Grenadier Guards and a battalion of the Imperial
Japanese Guards ? Have they been well posted as
to the differences between the northern and southern
Japanese Divisions ; the Second, let us say, and
the Twelfth ? I should doubt it, and yet these
are the vitamins of politics. When we ally our-
selves to an Army which has followed Count Nogi
and Kuroki we are moored to the solid rock ; when
we try to fix up futures with the Count Okumas and
other tall talkers we cast our anchor into the quick-
is
KNOWLEDGE OF ARMIES 19
sands. The Army is Japan ; the politicians, mere
veneer ! A military compact comes under the
code of Bushido ; a political agreement comes under
the Chinese code of " Squeeze." As military allies
we may serve as a liaison between the Far East and
the Far West. If we cease to be military allies the
Pacific had better be re-named, for nothing will then
stand between the English-speaking union and
a Russo-Japanese-German counter-combine. Mr.
Harding may then die happy : — he will have gone
one better than Dr. Woodrow Wilson.
The future of our own Army ? How much does
that depend upon the feelings of the ex-Service
men who are being subjected to the very same
influences which brought about the ruin of the
returned Roman Legionaries ? The influence, I
mean, of the peace which has been built upon their
victory ! During the Second Punic War the sturdy
peasant proprietors of Italy were swept for seven-
teen years into the conscription machine. When-
ever they won a victory they took their indemnity
out, on the spot, in slaves. These swarms of
captives were sent to Italy, and when the ex-Service
men got back they found combines — Latifundia
they were called in those days— working groups of
farms, for nothing, with those very slaves their
feats of arms had put at the disposal of the Senators.
They could not compete ; so they drifted into
Rome to eke out a wretched existence on unemploy-
ment doles of corn. The situation repeats itself
to-day. The Entente Armies have conquered the
German Armies. There are railways nowadays, so
we don't bring the Germans actually to work for
us in Wales, But we make them dig out the coal
20 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
in their own country and hand it over to the French.
The French, getting their coal for nothing, sell it
abroad at a price which is rendering it impossible
for our ex-Service men to compete. So the soldiers
save their country and lose their living — Rome and
the Latifundia once again.
The Army of the U.S.A. ? What a change since
1903, when I went all over the country seeing
the sparse handfuls of regulars and manoeuvring
with the States Militia. There was no greater
change sprung upon the world when the Japanese
put off their chain armour and cashiered their
two-sworded Samurai than there is to-day when the
Americans have been led by self-determination
Wilson into battle. What is the value of their
Army ? Reader, you can't get near it without
devoting some time and study to the points of an
Army ; to the sweat and blood and science and
skill and spirit which go to the making of an Army !
Enormous economic movements are brought about
originally by Armies and must react on the future
of Armies. From many points of view there has
never been a moment when all the elements of the
art of war have been so much in the melting-pot
as at present. A little change in one direction
and quality gets the complete whip hand of quan-
tity ; a little change in another direction and the
hordes of Asia may swamp our Western civilisation ;
a tiny discovery in a third and the whole face of
war will be altered and all its historical machinery
be thrown upon the scrap-heap. Never, then, has
it been so essential as to-day that we should keep
our minds alert, elastic and open to the knowledge
of Armies. We shall best prepare those minds
KNOWLEDGE OF ARMIES 21
for the future by working up what we can learn
about the features of war in the first part of the
twentieth century, as we, I will not say know it,
but as we think we know it to-day. Let us make
a start by trying to lay down the factors which
seem to have played leading parts in the Great
War, leaving out sea and air factors, each a vast
subject in itself :
(1) Armies animated by great traditions, not
resting upon them, ever jealously keeping them-
selves in touch with rivals (information) ; armies
up to date in all their appointments, methods and
material ; armies upon which levies like our Terri-
torials and K. troops can form themselves.
(2) The patriotism ; the tenacity of the citizen
(tradition : education).
(3) Efficiency at the helm (selection : Commander-
in-Chief versus Chief of General Staff).
(4) Numbers, material, wealth, position, com-
munications.
(5) Pre-war organisation, whereby shape and
balanced harmony could be given, when needed, to
the national assets under (2) and (4).
These five axioms will be traversed from various
points of view. Axioms may be — always. Read,
for instance, the opening twelve words of the vital
Chapter VII in our Field Service Regulations, Part
I, printed reverentially, as might be a super-axiom
or the views of the twelve Apostles, in large deeply-
leaded type :
" Decisive success in battle can be obtained only
by a vigorous offensive." Here the War Office in
one sentence lays down its sine qua non for success,
and shows at the same time that it does not under-
22 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
stand the special fighting character of the British
soldier. As it turns out, there would have been
as much sense, neither more nor less, in saying,
" Decisive defeat in battle can only be gained by
a vigorous offensive." The phrase entirely begs
the question of an everlasting controversy : Napo-
leon— Von Moltke versus Wellington — Von Clause-
witz. So long as it stands enthroned there in its
leaded type it is a dogmatic denial of everything
that happened in a war where all the worst defeats
were sustained by a vigorous offensive : i.e. Loos,
Passchendaele, Verdun, and that final overthrow
which began on March 21, 1918 ; not to mention
that the whole war was a German offensive, and that
Germany was defeated whilst actually in France.
Another super-axiom, always in the mouths of
the Westerners during the war, was that the only
objective in war should be the main Army of the
enemy. Cribbed from the Continent, this axiom,
so-called, became an absurdity in the mouth of a
British soldier. Did we beat Philip of Spain or
Louis of France by overthrowing their main Armies ?
Did we not beat Napoleon by seizing and defending
a morsel of Portugal ? Did we not beat Russia by
seizing and defending a morsel of the Crimea ?
Had not Japan in the last great war defeated Russia
by besieging Port Arthur ? Was it the defeat of
the German main Army or the overthrow of the
Turkish and Bulgarian Armies which brought the
great war itself to a close ?
So much for axioms. I only hope ten years
hence my axioms may stand better.1
1 A new F.S.R. has just been brought out, but the argument
as to axioms still holds good.
KNOWLEDGE OF ARMIES 23
So now let us get on and consider number (1) —
an Army, the essential subject of my book, a
subject so big that it must be taken bit by bit :
first organisation, next discipline, then training.
For these are the trinity which go to make an Army
(systems — codes — education) ; they are methods
which we can think out, discuss, apply. When we
have done with them the back of this book ought
very nearly to be broke — certainly the back of the
writer ; but there will still remain three other
factors — three other features of Army-making —
which do not fall so obviously as the first three
within range of our prevision or improvisation : —
(1) Numbers, the gift of women.
(2) Genius, the gift of God.
(3) Patriotism — morale — Religion— Fanaticism :—
force without a name — fire stolen from Heaven,
in virtue of which naked, half -armed, undisciplined
Fuzzy-Wuzzy may break, has at least penetrated,
that arch-essence of organisation, discipline and
training — a British Infantry square.
CHAPTER III
HIGHER ORGANISATION
An Army is to a nation what a " life-preserver "
is to a citizen — so long as the burglar does not get
hold of it it preserves. Put in another way : an
Army is a lethal weapon forged by a Government
for the hand of a Commander ; and, just as there
are weapons no end, so also there are several sorts
of Armies, Governments and Commanders.
Governments lie beyond my ken. The General is
still caviare to the General. Here, greatly daring, I
have taken an Army as my theme — that mould of
steel which fixes bodies and souls into another pattern
from those of agriculture or commerce.
We pride ourselves on belonging to a mechanical
age ; we live like lamps upon oil ; we gloat upon
our science ; we puff ourselves up considerably
about petrol. When our rare skulls are ranged in
the museums of a colder and more slowly-spinning
world, we shall probably be classified as the racial
spendthrifts who tore from the bowels of mother
earth her hoarded heritage of coal and sucked from
her veins the very last drops of her stores of liquid
sunlight. No matter ; we've got to go ahead, if
only to escape the deluge. Armies, too : they
must be re-baptised in oil ; they must learn to
salute their own engines ; they will only be escorts
24
HIGHER ORGANISATION 25
to engines in the days now upon us — or else, they
will be destroyed by some foreign Army whose
General Staff anticipated instead of being dragged
along, reluctantly, by the scruff of the neck, so to
say, in the wake of Science.
Seeing these things are to be, let me open my
outline of an Army, as it now is, by a mechanical
parable. Imagine an immense railway system,
created but not in use, held in reserve to meet a
definite emergency which may emerge on any
indefinite date, a date certain (with the British) to
be fixed by the Directors of another, and a rival,
system, instead of by its own. Once a year, and
once a year only, the railway is allowed to be parti-
ally opened to traffic for a week (manoeuvres) :
for the remaining fifty-one weeks not only are there
no train services, but the locomotives are stripped,
many of their essential parts being stacked in out-
of-the-way parts of the Kingdom. Yet, let the
signal be given, and in four days' time the parts of
the engines have to be assembled, wheels have to
be fixed to dismantled trucks, cushions have to
be fixed to the first-class carriages, the personnel
must be at their posts, the coal — mountains of
it — has to be on the spot, and a huge, complicated,
most rapid and crowded process of transportation
and movement comes straightway into being —
provided — the rival company has not sandbagged
the manager or dropped a few bombs upon the
terminus.
Take now a piece of that system — a locomotive—
and for further illustration compare it to a battalion.
A Colonel wants to create a battalion ; a manu-
facturer wants to make a machine.
26 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
BATTALION.
Raw lads are enlisted.
They are dressed in uni-
form and formed into
small squads.
The squads are formed
into sections and are
roughly knocked into
shape.
The sections are formed
into platoons and com-
panies and drilled.
The companies are
formed into the
battalion.
The battalion is held
together by Orderly
Room, N.C.O., and
discipline.
A many-headed mob
has become a battalion.
The Colonel's word will
act upon it as the autumn
wind upon a heap of
dead leaves when it lifts
up the multitude and
impels them whither it
listeth. One word and
it will spit fire ; another
word and it will advance
to the conquest of num-
bers.
In either case atoms, insignificant in themselves,
have been fashioned, grouped and welded until
MACHINE.
Ore is brought to the
surface. Metal is run off
into ingots of uniform
size.
Parts of the machine
are roughly knocked into
shape.
The various parts are
grouped and perf ectioned.
The finished parts are
assembled.
The machine is held
together by clamps,
rivets and steel frame-
work.
A heap of rubbish has
become a locomotive. At
the driver's touch it will
belch forth steam, ad-
vance to the conquest
of space.
HIGHER ORGANISATION 27
they have assumed an infernally significant aspect.
My battalion and my machine are only helps.
A simile is not a photograph ; at best it is only
a coincidence between silhouettes. Neither image
gives any clue to the genesis of either the battalion
or the locomotive. Some one some inventor — must
originally have conceived the idea : other minds
must since have worked upon that original con-
ception. There have, as a matter of history, been
many minds at work on the business of Army-
making, and at least two types of mind:
(a) The organising mind — the planning mind —
which runs backwards and forwards between the
particular and the principle ; classifying, putting
two and two together ; saying to itself the balance
of power is shifting, we must make new friends ;
we have too much of that thing, we must get rid
of some of the other thing ; this is unsymmetrical,
that is an excrescence ; cavalry will have to make
way for aeroplanes, we can't afford both, so let
us away with the old-fashioned ; first-class carriages
are anachronisms ; the tank is a legitimate descen-
dant of Hannibal's barded elephants, we must
keep a flock of them ; the idea has been tested,
there is a great future in it; or, vice versa, oil is
going to run dry ; stud farms should be started
forthwith for the resuscitation of the horse. This,
in modern parlance, is a G.S. mind.
(b) The administrative mind which goes turning
away at the grindstone without going beyond the
emergencies of the moment and the expedients
necessary to cope with them ; without pausing to
take stock and reflect whether the energy might
not be better applied on some quite different system.
28 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Both of these minds are staff minds : they are
staffs to support the footsteps of the Commander, a
person who is, or was supposed to be until 1870,
gifted with inspiration, magnetism and impulse.
From 1870 until the 14th April, 1918, the mantles
of great Commanders have fallen mainly upon
the shoulders of Staff-Officers ; but this will not
endure, and in any case, one of the chief functions
of whoever holds the post of Commander is to
dovetail these two types of Staff Officers so that
each may work without friction within its own
sphere.
Recent history gives us a very good sample of
Army-making in a hurry and on the grand scale.
In 1870 Japan determined to adopt Western civilisa-
tion. To that end the first requisite was a modern
Army, and as, with her distinguishing practical
good sense, she knew she possessed no inventor, she
decided to copy. The moment was fraught with
vital issues to the unconscious continents of Europe
and America. Japan had the wide world at her
feet to choose from. The wide world was hers to
choose from because she possessed force. Force
was hers because she possessed an officer-caste
ready made in the Samurai, and an unrivalled
material for rank and file or lower-deck ratings in
a people brave by tradition and made trebly more
brave by patriotism and religion.
The tremendous question Japan had to ask
herself was this : Would she remain an island,
choose overseas empire, and equip herself for that
task by a voluntary service army and an unrivalled
fleet ; or, would she decide in favour of becoming
a vast continental power, and equip herself for
HIGHER ORGANISATION 29
the work by just as much fleet as she could afford
after paying the crushing taxes, direct and indirect,
for a nation in arms ?
There were several continental armies on view,
and Japan did toy awhile with the French type,
but Sedan settled that question definitely in favour
of Germany. As to the Overseas Empire concept,
there was only one model — Great Britain. History
holds nothing resembling what is undoubtedly
England's own great political invention — nothing
nearer, that is to say, than Greater Greece and her
colonies from 600 B.C. to 400 B.C. The Russians,
Germans, French, like the ancient Romans, aimed
at continuity of dominion, and like country squires
were always dreaming of the acreage of an estate,
contained and self-supporting, within a ring fence.
The British, for their part, made no account of the
interposition of foreign countries between the home-
land and the outlying provinces ; partly because
they took a more imaginative and spiritual view
of Empire, regarding it as a union of hearts rather
than as a Zollverein or a taxable area ; partly
because they looked upon the seas of the world as
links, not as breaks ; mainly because, under their
wonderful voluntary system, their Army was keen
to see the world, and as ready to take on a ten
years' tour in the tropics as to mount guard over
the Tower of London.
Thinking over things very carefully since my
long stay with the Japanese Armies in Manchuria,
it now seems clear to me that Japan ought to have I
copied England, but was not imaginative enough. /
A great deal of imagination would have been needed,
for in 1864 we had played a despicable part and,
30 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
in 1870, our attitude was at best feeble. Prussia
and her Hohenzollern star had shone forth brighter
and brighter on each of those unhappy occasions.
Fortunate indeed was it for the union of the English-
speaking races that this was so, and that the rays
of the rising sun were caught by the flash of a
mailed fist in the West. Else, had Japan taken
the island imperium as her model, had she raised
a voluntary service, overseas service, -type of Army,
she was bound to come into fell collision with
Greater Britain and the United States. Successful,
the Pacific and its islands were hers ; the Chinese
Ports, the Yangtse River, the Malay States and
Ceylon were inevitably hers ; North America west
of the Rockies ; India — Australasia ! Who knows ?
Did she choose the Roman type of an Empire,
swelling out continuously and solidly from its core,
broadly based on the absorption, colonisation and
social organisation of Korea and South Manchuria,
the choice was equally bound to bring her into
collision first with China, next with Russia ; to
absorb her energies, her capital, and her people
into Korea and Manchuria ; to tempt her into
Siberia. The worst of this method was that it
involved compulsory service, which must draw
both interest and cash from the fleet1 and must
hamper her at every turn if she should ever wish
to garrison an overseas conquest.
But at that time and for long afterwards, as I
can bear witness, the Japanese, apt pupils of Prussia,
saw nothing of the weak sides of Conscription,
and looked upon it as a positive advantage. So
1 Just before the outbreak of the great war, Japan was forced
to reduce her naval estimates by seven millions sterling.
HIGHER ORGANISATION 31
the Army was made, and the policy inevitably followed
the type of Army.
Since Paris awarded the apple, no choice more
embarrassing. On the one hand, there was always
the greater homogeneity of spreading slowly from
the centre, of making good the Japanisation of
Korea before launching out into distant conquests,
i.e. of giving the Japanese girls a broader foundation
on which to build their pyramid of slant-eyed
children. This might well have seemed the more
prudent course to a prudence-loving council of
elder statesmen ; and there was always the hope,
by keeping the main force of the nation intact, of
capturing China by one magnificent coup. On
the other hand, world empire is glorious ; in ten
years' time some rich trophies, very pleasing to
the national prestige and pride, might have been
expected to adorn overseas adventures : the con-
tinental system of absorbing Korea and Manchuria
must take, at the lowest estimate, a hundred years
to carry into effect ; and as to China, had not
former conquerors mysteriously lost their own
identities even as they took their seats, complacent,
on the Dragon Throne ? Who sets to work to
swallow the Celestial octopus had better be sure
he has the bigger swallow. Thus did the Japanese
waver but once, the Prussian model had been copied ;
Japan only seemed to have a choice of policy :
actually she had lost the option.
In comparing these rival systems I have hazarded
the suggestion that the Japanese may have made a
bad choice. But what shall be said of us who failed
at the supreme moment to make use of our own
traditional method ?
32 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Amphibious warfare, combined with voluntary
service, is the peculiar strength which is our own
special patent, and yet we do not understand it ;
we have never got at the root of the secret of our
triumph over Napoleon and the continental system
one hundred years ago, otherwise, surely, we would
have developed that same plan more swiftly and
forcibly both in the Baltic and hi the Black Sea hi
'14, '15. But I believe myself that slowly the
lesson of the Dardanelles will make itself felt, and
that, whether sea or air be the medium, we will
muster up, next time, sufficient courage and faith
in ourselves to give the ideas of Pitt an adequate
recognition and an adequate peace-time organisa-
tion.
Anyway, Japan made her choice, and what was
a gain to Anglo-Saxondom became, for the moment,
a loss to China and Russia. After some hesitations
she copied the German Army. No half measures :
she copied it as closely as a forger copies the deposi-
tor's signature. " En gens pratiques que nous
sommes, nous avons juge que le meilleur moyen . . .
etait de suivre au pied de la lettre" said one of their
General Staff-Officers, and when it is remembered
that their supply and transport regulations were
translated verbatim from the German, and that
the deployment for the battle of the Yalu was
precisely that of a German Army Corps at a cut-
and-dried field day, it will be understood that no
dangerous originality was allowed to intervene.
What we have to learn, therefore, from this last
and greatest experiment by the Japanese in army-
manufacture had better be learnt from the original ;
but before I go on to try and draw lessons from the
HIGHER ORGANISATION 33
creation of the modern German Army, I want to
save myself from a charge of having overlooked
the undoubted political advantages gained by an
old nation which, in a matter of that sort, is chosen
as a model by a new nation. The original, in that
case, gets a grand opportunity to drive its roots
well down into the vitals of the plagiarist : the
keenest and best-educated of the new Army, i.e.,
of the nation, learn to think and speak German ;
the unarmed part of the nation — the women and
children — also, during the process, have to gravitate
towards the German ideal. The German military
officer has proved himself a most active and highly
successful proselitising agent. In 1908, when I was
in Constantinople, there was a reaction in favour
of England, but it was fore-doomed : the German
Army system, the Great German General Staff
delegates and Krupp's agent at the Golden Horn
had got too good a grip of the Turkish Army — the
only part of that Empire which mattered. In
Manchuria during 1904, 1905, three-fourths of the
Japanese General Staff were German-trained, Ger-
man-speaking men. In Kuroki's First Army there
was only one Staff- Officer speaking Russian and
French ; one speaking English ; all the rest were
not only German-trained, German-speaking, Ger-
man-thinking men, but were spoken of in German
slang terms by the young regimental officers as
Kaisermdnner. As in the case of any Conscription
country, the Army was the National League of
Youth, the vital part of Japan ; the Navy was
British in sentiment, but, counting heads, that was
a negligible quantity. This penetration of the
German ideal into the farthest East was military ;
34 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
it has yet to bear its fruits, and do not let us fall
into the mistake of overlooking a principle because,
owing to an almost superhuman effort and our
fine racial tenacity, we have smashed those who
had espoused it.
Who created this model, copied by the Japanese,
admired by some amongst ourselves ? Von Roon,
War Minister1 of the Prussian Army. He, in his
great brain, conceived the machine as a whole,
and planned it out into its smallest details. There
is no useful purpose to be served in going back
farther, to Alexander, Caesar, Frederick the Great,
or Napoleon. In that force, created by Von Roon,
a force which expired, so we hope, on the llth
November, 1918, we have the latest word on army
manufacture — the typical army — and, for its own
especial purpose of a short range, short time,
weapon, it stood supreme, enabling the German
Empire to throw every iota of its strength into
the contest from the moment the word mobilisation
went forth. When the range and the time drew
out longer and longer, the machine, and with it
the nation, was, for the time being, absolutely
used up — finished !
Von Roon's Army was the greatest Army the
world has ever seen: built only for a six-months'
spurt, it held the best half of the world at bay
for years. The conception was, in many respects,
original. How did Von Roon come to find him-
self free to concentrate upon constructing a new
1 In continental armies the War Minister corresponds exactly
with our Adjutant-General, so far as organisation is concerned.
In addition, he shoulders the administrative duties performed,
with us, by the Quartermaster-General.
HIGHER ORGANISATION 35
machine ? How on earth did he do it ? The
father of the gods begot Minerva by a thought :
did Von Roon shut both eyes and compress his
brow until, full-armed, an Army broke out from
his brain ? Not exactly ; very few things in our
modern world are as original as the birth of the
Goddess of Wisdom. Von Roon took his stand
upon the Cabinet Order of 1821, which was not
original at all, but was borrowed — translated —
cribbed from Wellington's Peninsular system. An
exactly parallel instance to the invention of aniline
dyes ; an Englishman got the idea ; English Govern-
ment let the idea drop ; the Germans got hold of
it and worked it for all it was worth. (N.B. — In
both these cases the idea was worth a good deal.)
In this order the actual recruitment, organisation
and maintenance of the Army — the business of the
Army — was definitely entrusted to a special depart-
ment, whilst the more abstract consideration in
the evolution of Armies — the dangers to be appre-
hended, the best way to meet them, the scale
of preparations — the adoption or rejection of innova-
tions in training, weapons, etc., etc., — was confided
to another special department. Only in virtue of
this specialisation was Von Roon enabled to devote
his whole energy to army -making ; only in virtue
of this specialisation was Von Moltke enabled to
focus clear, untroubled rays of thought upon training
his War Staff and covering futures in war risks.
Under the German system we may imagine the
General Staff saying to the War Minister that their
new schemes demanded the creation of an extra
Army Corps. The request would probably be
accompanied by a rough estimate of cost. The
36 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
War Minister l would criticise the scheme from
every point of view. Almost certainly he would
find the cost underestimated. The Kaiser and his
Imperial Chancellor would listen to the War Minister1
on that point, for he is the responsible official
who will have to create the Army Corps. Eventu-
ally, let us suppose, he agrees the thing can be
done ; sanction is given, and the War Minister sets
to work. When he has finished all recruit training,
and has, in fact, created the Corps, he hands it over
to the General Staff, who take up its war training
and work the new formation into their various war
schemes.
The term General Staff is something of a pitfall
for the unprofessional professor or amateur war
correspondent. Even now, after the war, G.S.
remain to some extent an exotic pair of capitals
in England, and when our writers are by way of
expounding their true meaning it often transpires
that they have only been studying von Schellendorf,
and that they lack intimate understanding. They
are too much inclined to run away with the idea
that the great General Staff does everything. They
may, under the heading " policy," poke their fingers
into almost any pie. But the ideal great General
Staff should, in peace time, do nothing ! They
deal in an intangible stuff called thought. Their
main business consists in thinking out what an
enemy may do and what their own Commanding
Generals ought to do, and the less they clank their
spurs the better that business will be done.
The General Staff have to be broad— wide. They
1 With us the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General
combined.
HIGHER ORGANISATION 37
ought to be as wide as the wide, wide world. They
should start from a study of the science of life.
They should realise that the spiritual necessity of
living dangerously is as exacting to nations as is
the physical necessity to man's body of a thyroid
gland. The incurable aimlessness of hand-to-mouth
politicians is their enemy at home — their enemies
abroad are, potentially, the rest of the world. So
they must keep weighing the chances and watching,
lest we succumb some day to a League of Nations
Combine with a monopoly of aeroplanes and tanks.
To weigh their resources against the resources of
friendly nations and say what is wanted — new
formations, an alliance, aeroplanes — to redress the
balance whenever it sinks against them, that is
their main business. As human beings, as Christians,
our minds may sympathise warmly with the states-
men who say war with such and such a nation is so un-
thinkable, so unnatural, that they refuse to prepare for
it even to the extent of thinking of it. But the General
Staff- Officer is an historian. No more need be said.
Policy in war, the elucidation of all pending
military problems, is their special function and,
working back from it, we get to peace policy and
preparation in peace for war. During peace the
General Staff is, or should be, partly a thinking
department, partly a preparing department. The
Adjutant-General is the head of a doing department.
The General Staff think of things ; the Adjutant-
General makes them ; the Quartermaster-General
moves, houses, feeds them.
The command and staffing of armies lies beyond
the scope of this treatise ; also, the methods by
which supply, equipment or ordnance are provided
38 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
or fortresses built. I have confined myself to
indicating, in outline, the relative functions of the
two great officers responsible for determining,
broadly, the size and type of Army and the methods
of training it (the Chief of the General Staff) ; and
for organising, raising and discipling an Army
(the Adjutant-General). Also, I may suitably add
here my own firm opinion that these two officers
should, under the Secretary of State, be " heads " and
that ordnance, supply, finance, should be " tails."
During peace the General Staff should touch
solid earth only in the matter of training the troops.
Their metier is to reflect, aim, plan, plot, weigh,
co-ordinate and suggest. They are not expected
to be practical — if their demands keep short of
insanity, that will do. They may ask the Adjutant-
General to give them the moon — the onus lies on him.
The Adjutant-General walks ; he has no wings.
The C.I.G.S. (Chief of the Imperial General Staff)
may clamour for guns, aeroplanes, tanks, a new
rifle ; he (the A.-G.) may know quite well that a
cubit can only be added to the existing stature of
the Army by melting a limb or cutting down its
girth. Ordinarily he does not, as Adjutant-General,
question desirability. That lies outside his province.
He confines himself to feasibility. He may, for
instance, only be able to add to the artillery by
robbing the arteries : i.e. the guns can only be
manned at the expense of the supply and transport ;
or, he may be able to state positively that the men,
or the cash, do not exist, when — cadit qucestio \
But, if the ways and means admit of it, he agrees
and sets to work. The moment the work is finished
the General Staff take delivery.
HIGHER ORGANISATION 39
To a studious soldier, I and my remarks may
seem like a parrot repeating ABC. To a civilian
they may seem fresh, but it will be the freshness of
something quite apart from his own daily bread,
fortune, career. So let me suggest to the soldier
that if these military axioms are stale, he had
better see to it in future that they are acted upon ;
and, as to the civilian, let me here assure him that
he would be a happier, richer, more contented
citizen to-day, belonging to a more closely-knit,
more famous Empire, if all the truisms put forward
here by me had not, just before the war, been
flouted — swept to one side — as if Wellington, Von
Roon, Von Moltke, Lord Roberts, had never existed.
Our world exists not only for soldiers and civilians
but also for women, who, we are told, are the most
striking phenomena in actuality, who take, amongst
other things, an impartial view of man, as man,
whether he wears uniform or mufti. Let me put
this parable up to them : after all, when women do
do a thing, they do it to do that thing, not because
they want to do other things. Suppose a woman
was running a big house. Suppose also that her
cook (Chief of the General Staff) takes the oppor-
tunity of a particularly important dinner-party to
dish up a disgusting Irish stew which gives so many
stomach-aches to the assembled guests that she,
the mistress, is positively forced to make a show
of getting rid of her. So now the edict of the sack
goes forth, and the good lady of the house finds
herself in a fix : the shooting season is coming on
—and no cook ! What do you imagine she does ?
She says to herself, " Our last parlourmaid (Adjutant-
General) was a pattern of all the virtues. There
40 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
has never been any parlourmaid in my house to
touch her — she was so honest, hard-working, exact ;
a grand disciplinarian, never a button awry — silver
polished up to the nines ; the house used to go like
clockwork ; all the other servants respected her.
I have it ! ! I'll make her cook ! ! ! " And a
splendid cook that parlourmaid was, so long as
there were no dinners to cook — but then came the
first engagements of the shooting season !
There stands my appeal to women's good sense :
I ask, would any woman be so foolish as the lady
of the house I have described ; and yet, what she
is supposed to have done is exactly what the British
Government did do in 1914. When, in the spring
of that year in Ireland, Hubert Gough forced
the P.M. to shelve the Heads of the War Office,
a new C.I.G.S. had to be selected. Then it was
that Mr. Asquith remembered the ex-Adjutant-
General to the Forces, and put in Charles Douglas.
Now, as a brother officer, as one who had known,
admired and respected Douglas for forty-five years,
I say to civilians (the Army knows) that my
parable of the parlourmaid does not exaggerate this
appointment. Douglas was Adjutant to our Regi-
ment, the Gordons, during the Afghan War. He
was Adjutant in the first Boer War. He became
a Deputy Assistant-.4dJ/wto7^-General ; then an
Assist&nt-Adjutant General at Aldershot ; then an
Assistant-Adjutant-General at the War Office ; then
a Deputy- A djutant General ; then the best Adjutant-
General we have ever had at the War Office, although
that great post had been held by great men, namely,
Wolseley, Buller and Evelyn Wood. But Douglas
was not only the only Adjutant-General we have
HIGHER ORGANISATION 41
ever had who served out his full time in that post, he
was a better Adjutant-General than any of them,
because he had not, like those other three men,
any other fish to fry, any hankerings after policy,
intelligence, or coming campaigns to disturb his
mind from its lifelong concentration on regulations,
discipline, recruiting and recruit-training. All his
energies and hopes ever since he, a youth of two
and twenty, used to drill me, a boy of nineteen, had
centred on keeping what he had in apple-pie order ;
in doing what he was told, and seeing that others
did what they were told ; never a moment wasted
on the why and wherefore or future ; all for attention
to the business that lay to his hand until, as a
reward for his fine services as Adjutant-General to
the Forces, he was given the Command on Salisbury
Plain, and then the Inspector-Generalship to the
Forces, in which two posts it became evident that
he was through and through an Adjutant ; that
his great and unquestioned value to the Army was
as a disciplinarian and administrator.
What made Mr. Asquith put Sir Charles Douglas
into a post so foreign to his character, predilection
and experience ? What made Douglas accept it ?
Mr. Asquith may not have realised the differences
I have been trying to set forth — the essential
differences between General Staff and Adjutant-
General qualifications ; he may not have known
his man ; he may just have thought that what
the Army most wanted at that moment was a firm,
just, unbiased disciplinarian, and that nothing else
much mattered. The last reason I think it must
have been, for, surely, both Lord Haldane and
Colonel Seely would have fully informed him on
42 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
the two former ? As to Douglas himself, the
notion of becoming a General Staff-Officer had
never, I believe, crossed his mind. As an Adju-
tant of the most strait-laced type, he had never
gone to the Staff College. On my way back from
New Zealand I received a letter from him at
Rio de Janeiro, in which he told me he knew
I would be astonished at his appointment, and
that he had only accepted it because discipline had
broken down under mismanagement, and because
he had been assured that the Army at large would
welcome his taking up the reins. He had no personal
ambition, he added, and I know that was true.
Lord Kitchener has been criticised because he
wanted to do too much himself, through the agency
of a secretary or aide-de-camp, or through officials
or friends not directly responsible for the question
at issue, instead of delegating to the heads of respon-
sible departments. No doubt this was his tendency ;
no doubt at all ; and yet, there is no doubt either
that, had he wished (as he did sometimes wish)
to curb this natural tendency, he had no one to
turn to in the War Office as it had been handed
over to him. Except Sir John Cowans, the
Quartermaster-General, and General Callwell, who
had been put in to run the Intelligence, there
was no senior officer, so far as I am aware, who,
when summoned to K.'s room, walked into it
with the firm conviction of an expert who is
master of his job, and is prepared to stick to his
own views, if necessary, in the teeth of the great
man's opinion. I am glad my pen has led me to
review these extraordinary events, because I have
thus given myself a chance of amplifying a remark
43
I made in my Gallipoli Diary, which, I think, did
Lord K. less than justice. In that work, which
consisted of a series of impressions grouped round
documents, cables, and other fixed data, I say of
the Secretary of State: "So we put him into the
War Office, in the ways of which he is something
of an amateur, with a big prestige and a big power
of drive. Yes, we remove the best experts from
the War Office and pop in K. like a powerful engine
from which we have removed all controls, regulators
and safety valves. Yet, see what wonders he has
worked ! " That was quite true, but I go on to
say of Lord Kitchener: " He has surpassed himself,
in fact, for I confess, even with past experience to
guide me, I did not imagine our machinery could
have been so thoroughly smashed in so short a
time." Now, the impression conveyed by these
words and in my own mind when I wrote them
was that Lord K. had smashed the machinery.
But to-day, looking back in cold blood, I feel it
is up to me to say that although, no doubt, Lord
K. was " a smasher " when he chose, yet in this
case the War Office machine was pretty well
smashed already before we invited our greatest soldier
of the day to step in.
When I wrote my Gallipoli Diary I was only
noting some facts which had, so to say, knocked
at my door : I was not analysing the situation,
the main feature of which was that there was no
Chief of the General Staff. A Chief of the General
Staff with his doctrine and his scheme is the compass
to the ship of State. Lord K.'s compass had gone :
he had to do his best to sail an up-to-date, thirty-
thousand-ton, thirty-knots-an-hour steamer by the
44 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
itars ; and the heavens were very cloudy, the fog
of war hung low. A smaller S. of S. for War would
at once have recalled Sir Douglas Haig from France
to the War Office to help him. K. would not do
that.
Take the question of the interview of the Secretary
of State with Sir John French on the 1st of Septem-
ber, '14. Lord French has given us the full story in
his book, claiming that Lord K.'s action in coming
over to Paris to issue orders to him was unwarranted.
Quite true. In South Africa no one was more sensitive
than Lord Kitchener himself to any intervention.
In those days there was no Chief of the Imperial
General Staff. Since then that great office has
been created. In the melting pot of war the rela-
tive powers of Governments, Commanders and
Chiefs of Staff became fluid. The Germans' Von
Moltke and Falkenhayn were supreme till they
merged in the Hindenburg-Ludendorf combine.
The Joffre regime is followed by something less
personal till it ends in the personality of Generalis-
simo Foch. With us the powers of the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff were what he could
make them. If he could gain the P.M.'s ear and
handle the Army Council it was for him to co-
ordinate the Eastern and Western fronts. Wish-
ing to arrest the retreat of the British Army he
could have called a meeting of the Army Council and
have armed Lord Kitchener for his journey with
alternative sets of orders signed by the Secretary,
War Office. Then, whether K.'s action was right
or wrong, at least it would have been valid. His
orders might have been disobeyed on plea of tactical
urgency, as Steinmetz disobeyed the orders of Von
HIGHER ORGANISATION 45
Moltke, but there could have been no question as
to their legitimacy.
A deadly error lay at the foundations of our
War Office like the wire-worm that waits and waits
till spring sends sap through the roots. This was
the idea, that the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff should, on the outbreak of war, be made
into the Commander-in-Chief in the field, his place
being filled by an improvisation. Just imagine if
the Prussians in 1870 had, on the declaration of
war, given Von Moltke command of an Army, and
had appointed, say, the Red Prince to be Chief of
the General Staff ? Well, it was our settled plan
to do what we cannot even imagine the Germans
being so foolish as to do ; only, miraculously,
Providence arose when the appointed hour drew
nigh — Providence, the firm ally of the British, who,
assuming the semblance of Hubert Gough, caused
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John
French, to be removed some months before the
outbreak of war. French was thus set free to rest
a little before taking up the command of the Forces
in France, whilst time was given for a successor to
be chosen, a successor who would be able to get
some grip of the reins, and to look round him ere
the storm burst. Providence, in fact, had stepped
in at the eleventh hour. War was almost on us.
The stage had been cleared so that we might set
our scenery in order for the critical last act of the
drama. So we set to work and, for reasons which
could only have been political and peace-time reasons,
put in an Adjutant-General to fill the vacant post.
Even our pocket Providence, long-suffering, indul-
gent, could not quite swallow that !
46 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Lord Kitchener had a quick, impatient tempera-
ment ; he often expected his staff to construct his
whole thought out of a few key-words ; he had no
use for men who were slow in the uptake. With
him it was really a case of "he who hesitates
is lost." In his own A.-G. work, Douglas was
always ready, but when it came to a G.S. question,
he wanted time to take advice and to reflect, because
he was not a real Chief of the General Staff but
only a mouthpiece. Be it remembered, Douglas
had just been made head of a department whose
workings were unfamiliar to him ; also that,
by the time Lord Kitchener got to work, this
headless department had been eviscerated by the
departure of its second string, Sir William Robert-
son, who had been sent as Quartermaster-
General to the Army in France, although his life-
work had been exclusively General Staff as that of
Sir Charles Douglas' had been on the Adjutant-
General's side. So Kitchener was thrown back on
his real self — a great master of expedients, a neophyte
at the War Office — and the direct results were :
(1) The unhappiness, illness and death of Sir Charles
Douglas, who, for the first time in his life, failed
to give satisfaction to himself or to his chief,
although he, a glutton for work all his life, had
never in his life worked so hard before ; (2) the
handicapping of Lord Kitchener in a way which
can only be paralleled in imagery by the idea of
hamstringing an elephant ; (3) the astonishing,
complete disappearance of the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, who ought, according to plan and
book, to have been the biggest man in Britain.
Not once only but many times I have heard a
HIGHER ORGANISATION 47
question asked and seen Douglas fumbling with his
papers whilst the impatient Secretary of State rang
the bell for Callwell ; not once only but several
times I have heard an absolute outsider being
consulted whilst the Chief of the Great General
Staff sat silent ; time and again Charles Douglas
deeply mortified ; time and again the whole British
military machine plunging wildly forward in the
dark, responding sometimes to the calls of French,
sometimes to the cries of the French General Staff,
sometimes to the politicians at home ; and all because
our Army, just before Lord Kitchener took over the
helm, had been deprived of its Chief of the General
Staff, of the Deputy-Chief of the General Staff, and of
its Adjutant-General, and that these posts had been
filled as if any "good officer" would do !
Sad as was the fate of Douglas, a misused servant
of the State, who, well used, might have rendered
magnificent service, that of Lord Kitchener was
still more tragic. Here was our greatest soldier,
who had reached the " set " sixties without having
ever served at home or having any knowledge, first
hand or second hand (he made no time for study), of
the geography of the United Kingdom, of the consti-
tution of our home forces or of the War Office. He
hated the English climate, and was never himself
amidst the complexities of Western civilisation. His
ideas were magnificently primitive. When the Vice-
roy of India was bombed on his elephant going
down the most famous street in the East, the
narrow Chandni Chowk of Delhi, Lord K. said
to me he wished he could be Viceroy for half an
hour. I asked him why. He said he would pull
down the Chandni Chowk, and make its rich
48 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
gold and silversmiths rebuild, at their own expense,
a wide street unsuitable for bombing. But you
can't tackle Lombard Street that way, and it
was life and death to our country that this
strange energy should be exceptionally well
fitted and bitted with the best of Staff-Officers.
Most vital was it that his Chief of the General Staff
should possess wide General Staff knowledge, and
be an authoritative exponent of its doctrine, a
man of prestige and distinction in the realm of
General Staff work. A great Staff-Officer so gifted
would have been able himself to make Lord Kitchener
understand.
As it was, I really despair of conveying an idea
of what happened to our Army Power House when
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had been
replaced by an ex- Adjutant-General ; when the Adju-
tant-General (Ewart) who knew the War Office
intimately had been replaced by a new man who
knew nothing about that office ; when the Deputy-
Chief of the General Staff had also been removed,
and when into this swept and garnished' depart-
ment rushed the prodigious K. Possibly a passage
from my wife's diary may give just a glimpse.
At that time, be it remembered, I was directly
responsible for the defence of London, and for
making every urgent preparation to frustrate a
landing in the South or South-east of England :
" Wednesday, 12th August, '14. Ian has gone to York, sent
there and all sorts of other places1 by Lord K., who is playing
hell with its lid off at the War Office — what the papers call
standing ' no nonsense,' but which often means ' listening to
no sense.' Anyway, Ian has now been despatched to interrupt
1 Edinburgh, Perth, etc.
HIGHER ORGANISATION 49
all the train arrangements for the Expeditionary Army, to get
together Lord K.'s new Army of 100,000 men. Poor Ian is
very sad about his Territorials, as Lord K. intends his new Army
to play second fiddle and Territorials third."
Was this " the fault " of the distinguished officers
then at the War Office ? Certainly not ! If anyone
thinks these remarks are meant critically towards
Lord Kitchener, Sir Charles Douglas, or any other
soldier, he has missed the point I have been striving
throughout this chapter to hammer in. All I want
to point out is, that if we are going to learn anything
from the late war we must remember that good
men become bad men when they are put into the
wrong billet, and that Lord Kitchener was dreadfully
handicapped in a way that the public and even
the Army so far hardly realise. Imagine any real
Chief of the Imperial General Staff consenting to
co-exist for one hour with an executive Commander
who, independently of him, quitting his own job,
careers about the country extemporising General
Staff work ! The explanation is as simple as the
occurrence is extraordinary : there was no Chief of
the Imperial General Staff. He was out of the
picture. He had been wafted away, leaving the
British Secretary of State for War minus that potent
influence which ought to have held serenely and
powerfully on its own preconceived way, shielding
him from the British Commander-in-Chief in France,
the Commander of the Central Striking Force, the
French Chief of the General Staff, and last but not
least the French and British politicians.
Thus, in a few days, was the higher organisation
of the British Army destroyed — an organisation
evolved through long years of practice by the Duke
60 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
of Wellington and his Staff-Officer, Murray ; for-
gotten by the Victorians ; copied and elaborated
by the Prussians ; recognised as a prodigal son
and welcomed back with fatted calves by the Esher
Commission in 1904 ; strengthened by Haldane,
whose work tended more and more to make the
Chief of the General Staff right hand of the Govern-
ment and brain of the Army ; carried on by Seely,
whose quick sympathy and soldierly instincts helped
to hold every one together — knocked out of gear
at one stroke with the best of good intentions but
the most hell-paving results. For the mischief was
cumulative and carried on. Sir Charles Douglas, by
his death, bequeathed a bankrupt office to his suc-
cessor. Sir James Wolfe Murray was an able
soldier and a courteous gentleman, but he knew
little of General Staff work, and he was com-
pletely bewildered by the kaleidoscopic Kitchener.
During his tenure the greatest appointment in the
British Army lay dormant — produced nothing — not
even thistles : another fine character and career
spoilt by being put into the wrong place ; strange
to the work ; strange to Lord Kitchener ; finding
everything already passed out of his hands ; he
who should have been It became it.
Not until Sir Archibald Murray, essentially a
General Staff-Officer, well trained in those duties
during peace and under the stress of the South
African War — not till Murray (who, by a happy
coincidence bore the same name as the Peninsula
War Office organiser of the General Staff scheme)
came back from France in March, '15, as Deputy-
Chief of the General Staff, did the moribund depart-
ment begin, bit by bit, to show signs of life. But
HIGHER ORGANISATION 51
the meaning of the great appointment Haldane and
Seely had meant to be the lever of our war machine*
did not make itself apparent to our civilian War
Cabinet until Lord Kitchener left for the Dardanelles,
when, for the first time, the Army Council met and
began to function whilst the General Staff raised
its head and began to work hourly in touch with
the Admiralty. No man did better work during
the war than Sir Archibald Murray during the three
months he was Chief of the Imperial General Staff ;
at last the round peg was fitted in the round hole,
and so Murray was eulogised in the House and
packed off to an executive command !
CHAPTER IV
ORGANISATION GENERALLY
So much for our theory of higher organisation
together with an example of our practice.
The course of civilisation follows the succession
of compromises effected between two categories :
(a) the man attracted by expediency, tradition and
all the lines of least resistance ; (b) the man driven
along by some inherited principle of discontent to
quarrel with fat people and good things ; the man
forced by some restless demon to attack expediency,
tradition, fashion, convention.
The clash between these two types is ceaseless,
and the dust they raise is commonly called progress.
Any magazine, any newspaper will furnish examples.
I am writing in the month of March, and the February
number of the Royal United Service Institution
Journal is lying at my elbow : sure enough it con-
tains quite a good sample of my meaning. " Sub-
stance or Shadow " is the title of one of its articles ;
a good title expressive of the way in which type (a),
the solid man in possession, looks at type (6), that
everlasting, that lean and hungry shadow of his
which will never leave him alone to sit down and
digest the good things of this life in comfort. The
motif of the said article runs thus :
52
ORGANISATION GENERALLY 53
" The trend of expert opinion of the present day seems to veer
rather in favour of the mechanical war machine replacing the
human army . . . the stodgy-minded Briton will do well while
accepting the tank as a very important adjunct, to bank on
the ' last 50,000 bayonets produced,' being the factor which will
win the next war. ... In conclusion, the cavalry will never
be scrapped to make room for the tanks ; in the course of time
cavalry may be reduced as the supply of horses in this country
diminishes. This greatly depends on the life of fox-hunting, for
which the class of horse required in the cavalry is used. It may
therefore be necessary in the course of time to stock Government
farms for this purpose or import from Australia. The stodgy-
minded Britisher, as they call him, does not mean to catch at
the shadow and lose the substance."
Once the existence of the (a) type of human
beings, i.e., about ninety-five per cent, of the inhabi-
tants of these islands, has been recognised, they may
be left alone, as they would like to be left alone.
They are so much dead weight, but dead weight
counts in the tug-of-war. They find leaders of
their own species to represent them ; they don't
want to do more than exist, for they don't dream
at nights ; the howl of the wolves in the forest
does not frighten them for they don't hear it ; the
gleam of the Celestial City does not distract them
from the pursuit of the fox for they can't see it :
so they carry on and are in fact every bit as
necessary to human progress as is a brake to a
motor-car. Yes ; it is a curious reflection but
worth noting that the first thing you've got to
think about if you want to go fast is however you
are going to stop. But in England, on that point,
we need be under less apprehension than most
people.
The (6) five per cent, men cannot be left alone,
for they are an insistent, cut and come again sort
54 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
of person. It is not my purpose here to analyse
their attributes. All I wish to say is that they
may be divided into two sub-types — (1) the warm-
blooded crank or " plausible enthusiast," as the
man of substance calls him in the article from which
I have quoted ; the artist who jumps at conclusions
by intuition ; (2) the cold-blooded scientist who
crawls into revolution on the back of his theories ;
who collects masses of evidence and facts, and
shows, as he believes logically, the trend of actual
movements as yet quite invisible to the somnolent
ninety-five. This second type is common in Ger-
many, but with us is very rare. It digs out reams
of precedents and then goes on to suggest organisa-
tions in futures. One reason (which would alone
be sufficient for any but my own fellow-countrymen)
why organisation should rank first in the scale of
the constituents of an Army is that, in any sane
or civilised system, it must come first. A hard
saying, this, to the Anglo-Celt. He and his American
cousins will always (if you don't watch them closely)
make units first and then try and fake up a scheme
to fit them into afterwards.
The U.S.A. States Militia, as they were when,
in 1903, I was privileged to travel round and see
them, furnish the best example I can quote of
systematic disorganisation. Far from there having
been any notion of raising the units on some sym-
metrical or balanced plan, there was not any vestige
(not, at least, any apparent to a visitor) of any co-
ordinating authority either outside or inside the
State. The units just grew. One State might have
the fancy for Engineers ; another for Cavalry.
When I ventured to suggest that each State might
ORGANISATION GENERALLY 55
raise its quota of some particular service so that
when war came they might club together and produce
complete divisions, the suggestion was quoted as
an amusing instance of an outsider's ignorance of
the American Constitution.
But we dare not laugh ; that would not be good
manners seeing we have suffered so much and so
lately from the beam that is in our own eye. Even
to-day there are people walking about outside of
Colney Hatch, sitting in a House supposed to be
the negation of Colney Hatchism, who discuss and
pass Army Estimates without insisting first on
being given a list of every unit in the Army with a
marginal statement explaining the precise purpose
this most expensive item is intended to serve.
I say it is folly to raise a single company, squadron
or battery before it is known exactly what place it
is to take in some definite organisation authorised
for some definite purpose. The feeblest unit takes
time and money and energy to produce and it is
wicked to expend assets so precious, only to find,
when at length an Army is organised, that some
of their parts are superfluous. Our Territorial
Force was well organised by counties so that groups
of counties or towns, by putting their units together,
made complete divisions — divisions which were
actually assembled and trained every now and then.
So far so good. But how many divisions were
there ? Fourteen. Why fourteen ? Into what
organised Army or Armies were these fourteen
Divisions to fit ?
No one surely should be so well equipped to
answer that question as the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff — and, as a matter of fact, he has
56 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
done so. On 1st December, 1920, he spoke as
Chairman at a Lecture on Man Power published in
that very same useful number of the Journal of
the Royal United Service Institution from which I
have already culled the attack made by a man of
substance upon his own shadow. Here are the
words of the Field-Marshal :—
" One other thing. This country of England believes, almost
alone in the world, in a voluntary army. There are a great many
advantages in a voluntary army ; there are a great many disad-
vantages in a voluntary army. But whatever the advantages,
and whatever the disadvantages, there is this constant factor in
a voluntary army : it solves no military problem alone — none.
If you have an enormous number of volunteers you get an enor-
mous army : you may not want it. If you have no volunteers
I imagine you would get a very small army ; you may want one.
But in 1914, if we take that year, there was not one single cam-
paign that the wit of man could imagine where the right answer
was : ' Six Regular divisions and fourteen Territorials.' This
country has gone back to the voluntary system. It has many
advantages, but it has not the advantage and it cannot have the
advantage of solving any military problem either of peace or of
war."
So the pre-war Army Council 'pretended that
fourteen divisions of Territorials were demanded by
a scientific defensive organisation planned by the
General Staff, whereas really the number might
just as well have been four or forty. Presumably
the number fourteen could not have been fixed by
the General Staff at all, because (we are told)
" there was not one single campaign that the wit
of man could imagine where the right answer was :
Six Regular divisions and fourteen Territorials ! ' '
Presumably the number of these unemployable
Territorial divisions must have been fixed by that
dull dog the Adjutant-General, because fourteen was
the maximum he could raise for the money ?
ORGANISATION GENERALLY 57
But how, I ask, if this very force of six Regular
divisions and fourteen Territorial divisions did
happen to fit into the one single campaign that did
actually take place ? What abaht it ? How if
these twenty divisions were a carefully thought out,
well-organised force, carried in strength to the verge
of what the radical economists would stand ; of
just sufficient weight to be thrown into either of
the scales of the Continental balance of power so
as to make the opposite side kick the beam, kick
the bucket, or however a knock-out may be best
expressed. No ! it is all very well to rub it in
that we are bad organisers — blind, stupid and all
the rest of it : it's a way we have in the Army ;
it's what Queen Elizabeth did after her carefully
organised Regular Navy had defeated the scratch
team of Spaniards, many of them on hired Portu-
guese ships, called the Armada ; it is our pet
plant, but I do think the men who have triumphed
through those six Regular divisions and fourteen
Territorial divisions, and who would have been beat
to a frazzle if they had been caught mid-stream
swapping them for an untried Swiss system, should
not be too hard upon Haldane.
So now, just to show my impartiality, let me say
that I do not quite recognise Haldane the Organiser
when, speaking on his own subject recently in the
House of Lords, he said that we did not need a
supreme Ministry of Defence to co-ordinate Army,
Navy and Air Service, because " the Staffs of the
Army and Navy would always be brought up in a
different way and would always deal with problems
of which the others were not even conscious."
Twice, be it observed, he introduces the word
58 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
" always," thereby arrogating to himself the role of
prophet, and I hope, in this instance, of false prophet.
The Staffs of the Army and Navy will always be
brought up in a different way until they are brought
up in the same way. But the sooner they are
brought up in the same way, the better for all of
us. They should have a common doctrine and
similar methods and, speaking as one who has
worked in closest touch with the Navy both in
peace and war, I assert positively that there is no
more reason the Army and Navy should be " uncon-
scious " of one another's problems than that Infantry
and Artillery should be unconscious of one another's
problems. Navy and Army were formerly under
one head — the King. The finest Admiral, bar Nel-
son, who ever trod a quarterdeck was Colonel
Blake, a very distinguished soldier. The functions
of the Fleet are (1) to cut the communications of
the enemy nation; (2) to keep open the communi-
cations of its own nation. The royal road to success
in these endeavours is to defeat the enemy's grand
fleet. The functions of an Army are : (1) to defeat
the enemy's main force ; (2) to seize upon his vitals.
The royal road to success in these endeavours is to
cut the communications of the enemy Army whilst
keeping open its own communications. Passing
from " function " to " action," there is no difference
of principle in an encounter between squadrons of
battle cruisers and an encounter between squad-
rons of cavalry with the horse artillery. After
years of thought I feel sure that nothing will make
the several British Services become " conscious " of
one another's problems until we get one Minister
responsible for the whole scheme of defence.
ORGANISATION GENERALLY 59
Politics have been the bane of our organisation
for years, but we might hope that a Defence Minister
with a strong United Services Staff would exercise
a non-party influence, spinning like a gyroscope,
not on the Government benches but on the top of the
Speaker's mace. The truth of it is that for years and
years we have raised or disbanded regular or auxiliary
corps, not at all on military grounds, not in the
least because we had or had not the money, but
entirely on political grounds. Those who have
pressed for expansion have not perturbed them-
selves as to where, how, or in what order, the new
parts were to fit ; those who have pressed for reduc-
tion have not worried as to how the complete mili-
tary organism would be affected when a going part
of it was capriciously picked out for scrapping.
The history of the relation of successive British
Administrations towards the organisation of their
own military forces is a history of almost incredible
improvidence. Penny wise in times of preparation,
pound foolish in the hour of danger, whether in
their economies or extravagances equally careless
of the effects their action might have upon the
organism, they furnish to mankind the supreme
example of a people escaping through other good
qualities the penalties for apparent complete lack
of an orderly faculty. But with what effort — by
what desperate expedients — do we achieve those
successive hairbreadth escapes ?
Lack of organising capacity is by no means char-
acteristic of individual Britons. The Englishman
has it in him to be a good organiser and as soon as
competition pinches him, he very quickly shows it.
A British railway is better organised, right through,
60 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
than a German, French or Russian railway. I
speak as one who has travelled over the rails of
each of the said countries longer mileage than most
of their native inhabitants. Foreigners have ingeni-
ous methods of ear-marking and identifying baggage ;
it constantly gets lost. British porters would seem
to have no method. They dab on a label anyhow
—anywhere — and chuck the precious portmanteau
like so much ballast into the van : invariably it
comes to hand ! So, too, our shipping companies.
No sooner did the German ring begin to squeeze
them than they fell into line and organised as natur-
ally as a duck takes to the water. Even our coal-
mining industry, now the black sheep of our flock,
used until the war to be taken as a model of method
both in Europe and America.
Why, then, should the present Government make
so poor a showing at organisation, not only in the
War Office and the Admiralty, but in all other
Departments ? Why is it that we have hardly
begun to think of applying some of the lessons of
a war period to peace preparations ? Because the
voters do not want to be organised. So strongly
does their instinct for freedom move them that they
refuse to permit Government organisation of the
national services, military, naval, postal, educa-
tional, and what not to be one iota more highly
developed.
The presiding genius of the British race is not a
logical deity. Sealed pattern schemes mortgaging
future liberty of action are anathema to it. " Carry
on " ; " Muddle through " ; " Sufficient unto the
day is the evil thereof " may have reckless rings,
but, to the Anglo-Celt, they embody a philosophy.
ORGANISATION GENERALLY 61
Following the Roman example, France and Ger-
many make a colony to order : churches, wharves,
theatres. Out go bands of officials, troops organised
to finger-tips, details worked out down to the opera
troupe. Contempt pours upon the hugger-mugger
British whose steam cranes and ballet girls arrive
years after the ships and their skippers. But, some-
times, trade slumps ; colonists stay away. Then
the churches, wharves and theatres remain empty.
So there is something to be said for these strange
British merchants and planters, who only beg their
Officials and Government for God's sake to leave them
alone. The mailed fist is all very well, but they would
rather the State kept it in her pocket ; their own
plain fingers and thumbs are good enough for them ;
they know that a highly organised nation implies
the regulation, registration and regimentation they
detest : they are extremely sensitive to any attempt
to turn them into machines ; they seem to realise
by instinct that it must, in the long run, bring about
a paralysis of the individuality and go-as-you-please
which are to them as the very salt of life.
In the early 'nineties one of the triumvirate, then
supreme at the War Office, made to a young officer
the memorable remark, " Organise the British Army
and you ruin it." The subordinate, who had been
working heart and soul to that very end, looked so
sad that the great man condescended to amplify,
affirming that organisation destroyed initiative and
weakened character. My friend, who was then
young, put down that remark to senile irritability.
Now he is grown old himself he begins to suspect
there might have been something in it. In precise
proportion as highly organised systems increase the
62 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN AKMY
cohesion and momentum of their mass, so they must
flatten out the idiosyncrasies and clog the alertness
of each of the component particles of that mass.
In precise proportion as the machine becomes effec-
tive, so do the chances of evolving an engineer of
initiative become smaller.
If a man is too long on a groove, he, like the
horse that goes his daily round in a mill, becomes
dull and dispirited. His powers of making an
independent choice are weakened. The organiser
thinks out a system whereby the component parts
of the whole will be specially adapted to deal with
the tasks which will ordinarily confront them and
equips them with every adjunct of machinery which
will facilitate their work and render it, so far as is
humanly possible, automatic. The primary object
of organisation is to shield people from unexpected
calls upon their powers of adaptability, judgment
and decision. At the post pillar box they are
reminded to stamp their letters ; in the railway
carriage they are warned not to let their heads get
knocked off by tunnels. The worker in a well-
organised concern is put just exactly where he will
feel himself most at home ; where the probable
contingencies are of a class with which his character
will be well fitted to cope ; where the strain is
measured to his strength. He is not there to devise
impromptu means of dealing with unrehearsed
situations.
One hundred employees working in a combine,
each in the special branch that best suits his capacity,
will knock out two hundred small shopkeepers.
But, at the end of the struggle, defeated though
they have been, each of the two hundred should
ORGANISATION GENERALLY 63
be better, readier, braver fellows than any of the
combine servants, bar two or three of its bosses.
Inspection, regulations and tail-twisting are, in
theory, educative ; in practice, the direct hard
knocks of the world make character.
Take agriculture. Suppose two virgin reserva-
tions to be opened for the first time to cultivation.
Tract " A " is handed over to an organiser who
hires servants and fixes up the whole estate in
symmetrical form, so that there is neither overwork
nor idleness ; so that no waste as is caused by a
farmer keeping a horse and cart when, for the best
part of the year, there is only work for three-fourths
of a cart and horse. Tract " B " is cut up into
small freeholds which are given to small men to
work with the aid of their families. From the
economic point of view there is no comparison
between the rival systems. Tract " A " will yield
half as much again as " B " at one-fourth less
total cost of energy. Nor is there any comparison
from the point of view of humanity. Tract " A "
will have produced, say, one gentleman, two
bailiffs, half a dozen overseers, and one hundred
hewers of wood (by order) and drawers of water
(by order). Tract " B " will have produced one
hundred and twenty-five yeomen — the stuff empires
are founded upon — backbones of society — sound —
independent — resourceful — such men that a society
stiffened by twenty per cent, of them remains
morally well nourished and capable of pulling through
slumps, strikes, wars.
A member of a gang of three (or four) riveters
spends a life-time holding a rivet to be hammered,
or hammering a held rivet. He makes better
64 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
money than the village blacksmith who is ready to
mend a baby's pram, ring a bull, shoe a horse. The
riveter probably would consider the blacksmith to be a
jack of all trades, master of none, but a Commander
prefers the citizen who has worked the whole of his
brain and not only one corner of it.
If the blows aimed at our livelihood by the " gener-
ous emulation of commerce " 1 force us to it, we must
go on organising, I suppose, but do not let us imagine
that the dose we have already swallowed has brought
us any closer to the Angels. Fishwives in Edin-
burgh, trying to dispose of their herrings call, them
" souls of men," meaning that their men had jeo-
pardised their lives to catch them. Yes, but the
seafaring man, constantly pitting his wits and
courage against the elements, is making his soul
every single time he boldly takes his life in his
hands. If the sellers of piece goods and grey shirt-
ings were to advertise their wares as souls of men,
that would be more to the point.
One more try to strip tinsel off organisation
before settling down to weigh its real merit and place
in an Army.
What is a newspaper ? The will of the Proprietor
flowing through a hundred pens into all sorts of
flowers of speech. Who is this modern Proteus ?
What, sort of man ? He may be a very human
creature ; fond of small children and attractive to
them ; kind to his relations ; a man often hated
but not by those who come in contact with him ;
a man with a clear touch of genius in his composition
and armed with a strange flickering kind of courage
which challenges fortune ; dares the devil to do his
1 See The Millennium ? page 32.
ORGANISATION GENERALLY 65
utmost ; and then, seems suddenly to go to sleep.
I love him myself — as Brutus loved Caesar. Or, he
might be a lower type altogether. A man, say, of
whom it suffices to look at his face ; or another,
say, of whom it suffices to read up his record. But
all of them, good or bad, have one gift in common
or they simply could not exist : they are organisers ;
not so much organisers of bodies or of energies — their
managers do that — but of minds. Now, normally,
the editors, sub-editors, leader-writers, and reporters
who barter their brains with those bosses are as
independent as most men. They clothe the para-
mount will as they like and so trick it out with the
play of their own fancy that half the time they can
forget they are writing to order. Whilst loyally
working up to the policy of the paper, they manage
to secure, in fact, a fair amount of elbow-room for
their own personalities. If the screw is put too
heavily upon the convictions of any one of them,
he can escape with his self-respect to the shelter of
a rival paper.
Now set organisation to work. The boss has
bought up so large, so representative, a group of
papers, that he may be said to have cornered the
market. What is the effect ?
In the first instance, the power of the press is
enormously augmented. Previously, poison and
antidote lay side by side on the bookstall ; now it
is only the colour, size, type, and general politics of
the papers that still appear to differ. No longer
are victories won by oratory or logic, but by closuring
the opposition, by boycotting their letters, by refus-
ing to report their speeches, by a process of sand-
bagging, in fact. On any vital question of the day—
66 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN AKMY
temperance, let us suppose, or compulsory service—
the whole, of the arguments laid before the people
become ex parie. Yet, ultimately, as in the case
of all other over-organisation, the powers of the
individual newspapers decline. Unless the pen is
handled with conviction it will not long convince ;
unless the other side gets a hearing the public lose
interest. At last the people begin to take so many
pinches of salt to their leading articles that, by
degrees, they become " salted " like horses in South
Africa and are immune to the propaganda bacillus.
And what happens to the journalists ? What of
Viscount Morley's dictum that " In literature the
salt of the whole thing is to be independent." The
calamity does not overwhelm at once. Slow but
sure is the suppression of the man by the method,
of the individual by the organisation. The big
writers who have climbed to the top of the tree,
they survive awhile, but in the long run !
A brilliant journalist, writing of the troubles of
foreign countries, remarked,1 " In spite of the obvious
weaknesses of English political organisation . . .
there are still vast elements of moral, as of economic,
strength in this country." Will he forgive me if I
suggest to him that instead of saying " in spite of "
he should have said " because of " ?
And now to apply these general theories to an
actual Army.
1 The Observer, 7th December, 1913.
CHAPTER V
MILITARY ORGANISATION
In the early 'eighties England made her first
conscious effort to emerge from military chaos and
a young officer was actually paid to consider a
certain abstract law of proportion called organisation.
As may be imagined the bow and arrow Generals
were very much upset, but there was one fine old
soldier, ex-holder of some of the highest adminis-
trative posts in our Army, who was so far sympathe-
tic that he came round a few weeks later to size up
the sweeping of this new broom. He asked if there
would be anything to do ? The young officer replied
that, barring the Cardwell system, which gave a
certain coherence to the Regular Army, the whole
field was a jungle, nothing but a jungle, full of
overgrowths and undergrowths, and that the sweep-
ing to be done was immense. At this the shocked
veteran rose, " Why, whatever do you mean ? In
'78, when we were about to send a Field Force to
Turkey, every single detail was correct, in order,
to hand ! " He honestly believed, the old boy did,
we had perfected our organisation for war in the
days of Disraeli. So did the Duke of Cambridge
until General Sir Henry Brackenbury went within
an ace of giving His Royal Highness the Field-
Marshal a fit of apoplexy by telling him that, on
67
68 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Continental standards, not even the first step had
been taken towards organising a small expedition
against savages — let alone war !
Organisation is a relative condition of being.
Marshal Leboeuf was quite sincere when he said
that the Army was ready down to the last gaiter
button. Only, he expressed himself rhetorically.
What he should have said: " Our gaiter buttons are
ready — compared with our previous condition of
anarchy this marks prodigious progress." Which
doubtless it was !
Haldane was the first War Minister since Cardwell
who poured thought and science upon the British
military muddle (as a cook may pour white of egg
upon a thick soup). In the interval the many good
men and capable men who ruled the War Office
did not include, I respectfully submit, an organiser.
Luckily for England, Haldane' s cranium was Von
Roon-shaped. England didn't deserve Haldane. Eng-
land deserved an orator, a politician, a rich noble-
man or perhaps even a " business " man. Haldane
saved England — though himself he could not save —
by his philosophical and organising instincts. In
dealing with a part Haldane always saw the whole.
Most politicians only see a part — their own part.
In all the luck of England she never had a finer
stroke of luck than that Scotchman. The Fates
never span a more impish web for the two Kaisers
than they span when, into Arnold Forster's vacant
chair, slipped — with his singular, side-long step—
Haldane ! His Mother, magnificent specimen of
Northumbrian femininity, had an inbred horror of
the Germans. A cousin by marriage of her mother's
was French, and this lady had told old Mrs. Haldane
MILITARY ORGANISATION 69
when she was a small child that she and her sisters
were locked up in the cellars whenever the Prussians
passed, although they were allowed to look out of
the windows at the troops of any other nation.
This story had so great an effect upon the child's
mind that when she grew up she determined that
no children of hers should ever have truck with
these terrors. As usual the parental prohibition
created the craving. Nothing would satisfy little
Richard and Elizabeth but Hegel, and a habit of
thinking carried out to the absolute nth. So into
the big room at the War Office, and on to the chair
where so many budget-to-budget, expedient-seeking
Anglo-Celts had sat, was ushered a philosopher who
started from the assumption that Being = nothing !
Great fun, that, really ; a first-class celestial joke !
Here was a man who took nothing for granted —
not even a Sergeant-Ma j or. His mind instinctively
recoiled from the existing, or " being," and ran
backwards to the " nothing " or starting point.
He first took the Rules and Regulations and created
in his mind a model Sergeant-Ma j or ; thence, by
process of thought, he kept improving him until,
suddenly, he ran up against a live Sergeant-Major,
and no doubt found that he was by no means all
he should have been.
Subjected to this critical analysis several things
began to happen to the British Army. For the
first time Authority had the ordinary pluck to face
up to the object of our having an Army at all. To
the Gladstone type of mind which had ruled the
roost for so many, many years there was no worse
crime than to be blunt ; to state plainly, for instance,
that an Army was meant to do anything so pro-
70 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
foundly immoral as to fight. Haldane went far
beyond that : he actually had the nerve to frame
a scheme on the tacit assumption that we were
going to fight on one side or another of the delicate
equipoise of Europe— in Belgium or Flanders!
That very moment everything began to fall into
its place. The appalling hotch-potch of regulars,
militia, yeomanry, and volunteers could at least, and
at last, be measured and weighed, not in vacuo,
but against and in comparison with a specific con-
tingency. For the first time Authority itself got
(to grips with the strength, composition and object
of the forces of our first line, and if the voters re-
mained ignorant that was entirely owing to their
own accursed indifference. As soon as Authority
realised where it stood, Authority began to lop off
excrescences and wipe out deficiencies — amidst
shrieks and curses no doubt ; but still the axe
worked on. As an example of a progress unexampled
during a hundred years of War Office, be it noted
that, whereas in 1899 we sent out to South Africa
one single Brigade of Infantry, and one only, organised
exactly as it had been in peace, we had, when war
was declared in August, '14, eighteen regular infantry
brigades organised precisely as they had been during
the preceding year and ready to send out.
The civilian may find it difficult to grasp the full
significance of that advance, especially as its value
diminishes with every week that passes in war-time.
The old, rough-and-ready arrangement which held
the field during the South African War and with
which it must be compared, consisted in the flinging
together of four battalions, drawn from anywhere,
and appointing to command them, say, a popular
MILITARY ORGANISATION 71
favourite, or the son of somebody, or a clever admin-
istrative officer from the War Office assisted by some
young Staff Officers who had never been through the
Staff College. I have inferred that in 1899 we had
only one Brigade of Infantry to send out. This
is not quite correct. We might have sent out three,
but we deliberately broke them up — all but one —
so as to extemporise a Highland and a Fusilier
Brigade. We deliberately smashed up two little
pieces of real organisation to make two sentimental
organisations. Apparently the last word in dis-
organisation had been said. Yet, strange to relate,
these queerly associated crowds would generally
harden down into solid, homogeneous blocks within
a few weeks of taking the field. The son of Somebody,
and the popular favourite, rose to their responsi-
bilities and faced the music of the Mauser like
men. The clever administrator went sick or was
" unstuck," and made way for a war soldier. The
start had been deplorable — the recovery was rapid.
Good batteries and battalions as a basis, favoured
by stress of war and the genius of a race drilled by
generations of casual rulers to improvise things for
themselves, had worked what would seem to be
miracles to a German.
Now look at the matter this way : for the first
month's fighting in '14 each of the new brigades was
fifty per cent, more valuable for attack than the
brigades we had in South Africa. For defence
it was, say, ten per cent, better. After that month
the superiority of the new Haldane brigades would
tend quickly to disappear. But the first pitched
battle may pitch the war away and is spoken of by
serious writers as being equivalent to " half the
72 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
campaign." Fifty per cent, of half a campaign is
a quarter of the whole campaign. Quarter of a
campa.ign gained by Haldane's rearrangement of
existing figures and words ! Yes, that is an actual
fact. At no cost at all ; by a few pen strokes the
first striking force of our Infantry was increased to
an extent incalculable in terms of cash. Had
French's force at Mons consisted of the identical
men, guns, horses, and had they been hastily thrown
together on the 1899 plan, I say most confidently
there would have been no Mons Star. Put it more
bluntly: Had the Great War broken out before
Haldane's work had taken shape we must have begun
it by losing our foothold on the Continent. We
have all heard the story of the military policemen
standing at the cross-roads and calling out to the
stream of retreating men, " 3rd Division to the
right, 5th Division to the left," and of how that
stream divided itself and fell at once from disorder
into order. This happens to be a true story and I
have an eye-witness who can authenticate it. Well,
under the 1899-1906 conditions the men would not
have learnt yet to which division they belonged and
the disorder would have become irremediable. No
end of instances might be given, did space admit,
to show that the B.E.F. could never have held
together under the strain of that retreat if the
divisions and brigades had not been thoroughly
homogeneous, thoroughly welded together, thor-
oughly organised.
So far I have spoken of brigades, and brigades
are big things : divisions are bigger still and
divisions are formed of brigades — but only in part.
Here is one of Haldane's principal claims to a statue,
MILITARY ORGANISATION 73
namely, that he created the self-sufficing, self-
contained division which is the ark of the covenant
of our Army. He alone did it. On his head he
did it. Off his own bat he did it ; lopping off ex-
crescences, adding guns, sappers, signallers, field
hospitals, and all A.S.C. administrative services.
This work was carried through without any
active backing from his perfectly indifferent col-
leagues hi face of a bitterly hostile Tory opposition
and alone it would have entitled any War Minister
to fame. Yet it was only the A. B.C. of Haldane's
achievement. Let it be granted he was in luck in
getting a virgin forest for his potato patch — even
so, what a crop ! An Expeditionary Force of six
Regular divisions ; 120,000 men instead of Arnold
Forster's 5,000 men ; there is the sort of round
figure that should crash like a bullet into the brain
of the good citizen who has been hypnotised with
that well-rubbed-in phrase about Haldane's spiritual
home. He made ready an advance guard of 160,000
men to attack that " spiritual home " ; his pre-
decessor had aimed at preparing (for he never really
prepared them) 5,000 men ! Each into their proper
spheres Haldane set : first line (Regulars) ; special
reserve to first line (Militia) ; second line (Territorials
and Yeomanry) ; third line, a machine for stamping
out reserve formations for the second, i.e., County
Associations. He failed in nothing except the
Cadet Corps, and there it was his nerve that failed.
Officers' Training Corps, that was a great success,
but the Cadet Corps would have added a cubit to
the stature of every Briton. I must not say any
more or else I will break the thread — none too
tenacious in any case — of my argument. So I will
74 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
only point out in conclusion that the philosophic
lawyer who did these things had organised victory.
Obviously we cannot afford to dispense with
organisation. No sane soldier would dream of
breaking up our brigades and divisions in order
that we might go back to the old mob of batteries
and battalions. Yet great as has been the gain, it
is not unmixed. Formerly the Commander of a
Battalion was a big dog. No Emperor has ever felt
the sense of power tingle more vividly through his
veins than these Tritons amongst minnows. The
sovereign people take months to make some petti-
fogging law. The Judge is bound to listen for hours
to rigmaroles and lies. The Lieutenant-Colonel of
old had the habit of formulating ukases between
each puff of his pipe. Every moment questions
involving the whole future of some human being,
were it only a Lance-Corporal, trembled in the
balance of his brain. And, in solving them, his own
character was being surely tested also — it was being
strengthened to meet the heavier calls which might
be made upon it in the future. Now, organisation
has, at a stroke, dimmed his glory — lowered his
standards. Formerly Battalion Commanders were
masters, subject only to an occasional inspection.
Now they are servants to the Brigade Commander,
who takes the lion's share both of the glory and
responsibility. What is the result ? In knowledge
and education the Lieutenant-Colonel gains benefit
by working under the eye and at close quarters to
a Colonel, who should be the pick of the men of his
standing, but, all the same, the numbers of the
character-forming billets in our Army have been
reduced by three-fourths and it seems reasonable to
MILITARY ORGANISATION 75
suppose that, in ten years' time, we shall pay for our
higher level of education amongst senior Lieutenant-
Colonels by there being few men of bold, independent
judgment amongst them from whom to select our
Generals.
The subordinate, too, is subtly affected by the
more thorough apportionment of each part of the
machine to the tasks it may have to perform. In
the good old days a British subaltern thought
himself equal to every task on God's earth. He
was Athos, Porthos and Aramis rolled up into one.
Give him the office and he would gaily sally forth,
equipped with nothing more formidable than a
toothbrush, to bring off any sort of coup in any
known or unknown corner of the globe. With
smiles, kicks, promises, he would raise some band of
scallywags and, aided by them, would in due course
present a thoroughly ungrateful country with a
Nigeria or an Oudh. To-day, the toothbrush touch
is at a discount. Young soldiers know that the
contingency has already been thought out for them
by others and their minds do not turn readily to the
idea of improvisation. Mesopotamia, German East
Africa and the Dardanelles show that they are still
eager enough to try their hands at making bricks
without straw, but by the time they feel assured that
a plan has been pigeon-holed for the conquest of
Greenland and Terra del Fuego, then they will look
to the plan rather than cudgel their own brains, a
result which may land us a generation hence full of
followers but short of leaders.
The Japanese had a marvellously organised, a
very great Army. They had no great Commander.
Generals of character, chivalry, courage, and calm
76 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
they had ; also a highly trained, closely organised
General Staff system, for which very reason, I feel
sure, the High Command shed its personality in
the anonymity of its own bureaux. They had not
one man who would have put the telescope to his
blind eye. Had they, instead of Kuropatkin the
administrator, met that Commander, that latest
reaction from super-organisation and General Staffing,
called Foch — they were done ! Foch took form
before system began to crush personality ; so did
the only other two men on all this overcrowded
contemporary canvas who wear the aura of greatness
— Hindenburg and Kitchener.
The new model brigade is only a sample of what
was going on everywhere in our War Office between
1905 and 1912. Under those conditions we got to
know, from Divisional General to drummer boy, the
exact strength, composition and object of the forces
of our first line. And we could, and did, lay hands
on every man Jack of them — from drummer boy
to Divisional General.
Thus (1) we knew we had resources in hand
to keep the Expeditionary Force fed through the
first months of war.
(2) We had an idea, less defined, but still some
idea, of what we wanted in the way of the Territorial
Force, our second line. We knew, but we had
not the nerve to say, that we wanted eighteen
divisions instead of fourteen. There would have
been no difficulty in raising them, given better pay.
The cause of our timidity was not so much the
political or Treasury obstruction as the strong
hostility of the London Press, and of a great mass
of gentlefolk who ought, normally, to have been
MILITARY ORGANISATION 77
the backbone of county-raised forces. Still, though
short in cadres and under strength in those cadres,
there was confidence that when a crisis arose
the great voluntary idea would come to the
rescue ; fill up the fourteen weak divisions and then
duplicate them and triplicate them with the overflow.
(3) Whilst we had our County Associations'
machine ready for stamping out third, fourth,
fifth lines we realised, only too acutely, that we
had no men pledged in advance, and prepared
for in advance, to step in and be stamped out by
that machine : we had no civilians ear-marked to
enter the depots — each man the right depot — the
moment war was declared. Whilst detesting con-
scription under whatever smooth alias it might
masquerade, we felt, some of us, that all the man-
hood of the land should be registered as waiting
men ; not necessarily drilled or trained, or in any
other way touched by their military obligations ;
but simply pledged and, on paper, organised to
stand by ready to fill up the depots of every class
of unit as soon as the imminence of danger seemed
to justify so decisive a step.
No one has had greater faith than I have had in
the volunteer ; no one has fought harder for the
voluntary idea than I have ; no one has suffered
more for his faith in it, whether in his public career
or in his private friendships.
The Great War has now come along and clinched
my belief into certainty ; my belief, namely, in
the ultimate willingness of every sane, able-bodied
Englishman and Scotsman to step forward with
his life in his hand when his country calls upon
him for the sacrifice. But where is he to step
78 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
to ? That point should be fixed up beforehand,
for it takes a generation to work it out.
The only sane objectors were those who did not
realise exactly where, when and why they were
being called up. They knew they possessed certain
talents valuable to the State and their common sense
and patriotism were equally revolted by the thought
that they were going to be misused, broken and
flung aside — all to no purpose — less than no purpose
— by a conscienceless, stupid machine. Had they
known beforehand that their value had been already
intelligently weighed and that their careers and
lives, even if they were lost, would not be wasted,
why then, there would have been even less hanging
back than there was.
Given a little more intelligence and good will,
the voluntary system might have beaten its wonder-
ful best and seen us through the war. If Haldane's
organised machinery of the County Associations
had been used, as it was intended to be used, to
stamp out the New Armies one after the other,
the recruits would have been handled with greater
knowledge of their personal concerns and capabilities
and, therefore, with more tact and discrimination :
also, pride of county or of town would have been
harnessed to the recruiting car ; also, it is clear
that the increases in pay given to keep a compulsory
service Army in a good temper in 1919 would have
stimulated recruiting in 1916 !
By creation of the part we begin to comprehend
the whole. Organisation is the art, or science, of
building up a symmetrical whole by a number of
parts, just as the human frame is built up by heart,
liver, brain, legs, etc. It is not until you have a
MILITARY ORGANISATION 79
forefinger that you clearly grasp the advantage
of a thumb. When the six complete divisions
were created, they pointed the way towards a
supporting organisation of similar Territorial divi-
sions. Now that this system is complete in itself,
it points the way towards an organisation of the
balance of our manhood.
Had our national registers been prepared before
1914, and had depot arrangements been worked
out for the reception of men to be called up — why
then the County Associations could smoothly and
rapidly have raised Second, Third, Fourth and
Fifth editions of the first fourteen Territorial divi-
sions. Also, by their depot units they could have
maintained, in a regular and discriminating manner,
a flow of drafts for the whole of these divisions,
as well as for all the ancillary services of the National
Armies in the Field. Instead of our actual efforts
in making the new K. Armies with as many mistakes,
flounderings, wastages as if military forces had
never before in our history been raised, the County
Associations, who knew all about making, clothing,
feeding and keeping troops, would have stamped
out duplicates, triplicates and quadruplicates of
their original quotas of Territorial troops, without
too much friction or effort ; they would, indeed,
have turned out the fifty-six divisions we required
quite comfortably.
A man hesitates to tackle a picture puzzle. He
feels tired when he looks at the heap of queer-shaped,
jagged oddments whose relatedness does not lie
on the surface or jump to the eye. One day the
spirit moves him, or his children move him, to set
to work and he succeeds in fitting together part
80 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
of the pattern. The deep-seated, the symmetrical,
constructive instinct is now fairly aroused : the
desire to complete the picture becomes over-power-
ing : if, for some reason, part of the work must be
undone, he is careful to leave the backbone, the
clue, to the general design.
When Haldane left the War Office he left his
successor with his half-finished puzzle, and all
seemed shaping very nicely. The Army Council
of 1913 had their six divisions of Regulars, their
fourteen Territorial divisions, and had begun to
feel that if they were required to expand, they
could do so, in such a way as to perfect the whole ;
that, if they were ordered to reduce, they could
do so with a minimum of damage. Suddenly
arose the Irish storm, struck the good ship War
Office and, in a jiffy, overboard goes the pilot, the
skipper and the navigating lieutenant. Their places
are filled — nohow, anyhow. Hardly are they filled
when a frightful tornado strikes lightning-like on
that ill-fated barque. The whole of the trained
crew, mates, engineers, stewards, tumble into a
lifeboat and row for dear life and medals to the
Continent. Overboard goes the new pilot ; over-
board goes the old pilot who is recalled and seems
for a moment to handle the helm, and on to the
bridge of that poor derelict vessel is thrust a Master
Mariner of Eastern Seas, one who has never yet
guided any ship in European waters.
All seems lost, but, to the British, all things seem
possible: so great are their reserves of energy and
adaptibility that they have as many lives as a cat.
The fourteen Territorial Divisions are shelved ;
they and their Associations stand down ; everyone
MILITARY ORGANISATION 81
plays up ; the tour de force of replacing a fine organi-
sation by a sheer improvisation becomes possible
(owing to the breathing space guaranteed us by our
Fleet) to a great national hero of resistless push.
He # * * *
The first thing is to think ; the second thing is
to write ; the third thing is to lobby. No Parliament
(remember) accepts the organisation or reorganisa-
tion of anything without a long, hard struggle, for
(as is too often forgotten) Parliaments are out all
the time to protect vested interests.
The genius of our race does not run to " order."
There is a strong tendency amongst us to sneer at
the student of method, or theory, and to smile upon
the man of action, the " business " man. If you
hear an Englishman say A is a theorist and B a
practical man, you know he would prefer B for his
son-in-law. He might be wrong. But all I say here
is, each one in his place, and, in Army making, first
place for organisation which can put an Army in
hand in the same way that in an egg you may hold
in hand the sharp spurs and gallant soul of a game
cock. If, when war breaks out, you have thought so
little about the problem that you cannot lay your
hand straightway upon fighting men — not even in
embryo — then, indeed, despair. Given time, an
Army may get as far as the egg state at next to no
cost and without interfering in any way with the
ordinary, everyday avocations of the citizens who
may be ear-marked by the organiser as potential
food for powder, whilst nothing is further from their
thoughts.
If the Adjutant-General knows exactly who and
what are required and can lay hands on " who "
o
82 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
and " what " the moment they are required — if
methods have been thought out carefully before-
hand for the armament, equipment, housing of all
this raw personnel and material the moment it rolls
in, why then, the Army is already on the stocks, and
if you have a first line Expeditionary Force ready to
go anywhere, a big Regular Sea Fleet to take it
there, and a big Territorial Force Air Fleet to pre-
vent you from being rushed, you ought, with luck,
to have time enough to get that paper Army on
foot.
These views will be queried by many good officers.
So eager are some of my comrades for perfection
that they think it practical to say they have no use
for imperfection — that if they cannot get highly
trained troops they would prefer to have none at
all ! Many things are militarily desirable, financially
practicable and politically impossible. Messrs. Coats
might as well sneer at raw cotton as an Adjutant-
General turn up his nose at a bumpkin. A firm of
timber merchants have hanging over their heads a
contract binding them to be ready to deliver, when-
ever called upon, a larger number of planks than
they can well afford to stock on the off-chance.
Being in a quandary, they are offered a lien on the
forests of the country, to become operative the
moment the heavy demand is made upon them. Is
it thinkable that they would quarrel with the offer :
saying that trees in the rough, not even trimmed of
their branches, were of no use to them ? Would
they, as practical men of business, reject such an
option because in normal times it lay dormant ?
So with an Army. A well-thought-out paper or-
ganisation may seem valueless in peace time — to
MILITARY ORGANISATION 83
the minds which the catch phrase captures. A
" paper " transaction, preparation, promise, is held
in very poor esteem by rascals and asses ; all the
same, it is the basis of progress and of civilisation,
and if the name of every likely lad in the country
is committed to paper and ear-marked for the class
of job that best suits him, why then, one touch of
the button and their services are secured. Untrained
the lads may be, but, as I shall presently prove, if
the machinery for training them is got ready in
advance, they themselves are already half ready.
Colonel Goethals, of the United States Army, lately
commanded thirty-five thousand men who, with
thirty-five thousand of their dependents, were strung
along the Panama Canal. The country produced
nothing. Every morning these seventy thousand
beings were provisioned for the day from the seaboard
with their own national bill of fare, from the pick-
aninny's pap to the Spaniard's olla podrida. Neither
food nor drink of the right sort ever failed a single
mother's son of the said heterogeneous seventy
thousand. The medical, sanitary, supply, transport
services were scientifically allotted to the groups
along the line — in proper proportion. The Ordnance
could make anything in their shops form a watch
to a locomotive. Nothing was left to chance. All
was foreseen, arranged and ordered. The workers
were told off into four sections, what we in the
Army would call divisions, and commanders (three
of them military officers) and staffs were appointed
over them so as to secure the due co-operation of
these several sections in working towards the one
central purpose of slicing America in two. Each
section was subdivided on the military idea of
84 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
brigades, battalions and companies, under manager,
deputy manager and foremen. Each commander
and each staff officer had been taught to realise his
own power, as well as the limitations placed upon
that power, first, by the measure of his comrades'
responsibilities ; secondly, by the measure of his
chief's responsibilities. Down through these avenues
passed the central driving power of Colonel Goethals'
will, reaching, nimbly as the electric spark, into the
brains of the humblest black labourers on the
isthmus.
Most people would agree that these groups of
peaceable labourers working between Colon and
Panama were the very antithesis of an Army. They
wore no uniform. Few of them possessed arms.
Since the Lord came down to confound the language
of the world at the building of the Tower of Babel
no harsher cackle of strange tongues jangling has
been heard than the lingo current in and about the
great Culebra Cut. The nasal drawl of the Yankee
— the exasperating aspirates of the Cockney — the
quick, sharp snap of French phrases — the smooth
rotundity of South American patois — the gutturals
of the Teuton — the vivacious chatter of the negroes—
a motley jumble if ever there was one — and yet, out
of this very jumble, organisation, great crystalliser,
had begun her formulative work.
The rudiments of an Army were emerging from an
artificial amalgam of human beings unbound by
personal motive or racial sentiment. Whatever
that force could accomplish, which would not have
been equally well done by an equal number of day
labourers, must be placed to the credit of organisa-
tion.
MILITARY ORGANISATION 85
Suppose now, at his breakfast one day, Colonel
Goethals had got a cypher cable telling him that
the Venezuelan Army was advancing northwards to
attack Mexico ; or, if preferred, let it be the other
way on. What could he have done ? Had he
organised a mere simulacrum of an Army, or, did it
possess any military quality ?
Well, within one hour of his getting that message,
he could have his whole force of 35,000 men digging
a chain of redoubts along the heights from the
Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean. By the next after-
noon these would be wired in and would have had
their approaches studded with dynamite mines
cleverly connected up with central observing stations,
thus furnishing any garrison that could be put into
them with some shelter from rifle or gun fire, or
even a bayonet charge. The workshops might,
meanwhile, have fitted out each North American or
British worker with a couple of hand grenades ; a
certain number of rifles available would also have
been issued to those who could use them, a number
which, in the case of the British (before the war)
had been calculated as one in every three. Next
day the small force of Marines stationed near Culebra
Cut would be reinforced from Key West or Guan-
tanamo and these troops would find a pretty fair
line of entrenchments ready for them to walk into.
The professional, fighting Commander would appre-
ciate what had been done, but he would also have to
find grave fault with the sites chosen for the redoubts.
Their field of fire, command, etc., etc., would
certainly be most faulty. His censure would be
justified by the facts, but undeserved as addressed
to Colonel Goethals, for the organisation created by
86 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
him between Colon and Panama was purely an
administrative and peace organisation. It had no
special thinking department for war — no General
Staff. Otherwise, the positions and profiles of all
those defensive works would have been puzzled out
scientifically in advance.
The labour force organised under military chiefs
on the Isthmus of Panama was not an Army, but it
had begun to shape that way. In its administrative
services it was, in fact, an Army. Although the
fighting men only existed here and there as chance
individuals, still, even as it was, Colonel Goethals'
force could have made short work of twice its own
number of unorganised populace. Also, let it be
remembered that to whatever extent this said force
exhibited the characteristics of an Army (as against
the mere mob who would perish miserably of hunger
the second day out of Colon) it owed none of this
power to military discipline, training, homogeneity,
or moral. The disciplinary code of the Canal was
notably less strict than in an English coal mine.
Any black labourer could demand, any forenoon,
an interview with Colonel Goethals himself, and be
ushered into his presence right away, without
intermediary. The rank and file were the clear
negation of homogeneity. Moral had no place in a
mere money-making engagement. And yet, so
wonderful was the effect of a well-thought-out,
perfectly-organised system, that, of itself, it gave a
distinct touch of discipline, cohesion and esprit
de corps to the whole motley concern.
Now let me try to show lack of organisation at
work. In all her long history England had never
sent forth a more splendid body of troops than those
MILITARY ORGANISATION 87
she embarked for the Crimea in the spring-time of
1854. The rank and file were long service men
drawn from a population which had not yet had its
eyes picked out by the emigration agents. Nor
had London or Lancashire yet gained scope and
power to sweat hundreds of thousands of peasants
through their grimy mills. As to the officers, they
were the fine flower of our smaller country gentry
— our Western Samurai. The drill, discipline
and interior economy of corps were the best of
their kind then existing on earth. Behind those
forces stood the traditions of the Peninsula and
Waterloo undimmed as yet by any intervening
failure.
They landed : for a while it seemed as if the fair
prognostics of the past were to be fulfilled. At the
Alma the line of battle was coolly and cleverly
formed and the advance under fire was, take it all in 1
all, every whit as spirited and as determined as any
of Wellington's day. At Inkerman the superior
command, the intelligence department and the
Staff work scarcely reached the standards of a
nigger tribe, but the units, fighting as units, without
cohesion or common purpose, behaved with so much
initiative, gallantry and devotion that England had
cause for pride. The first assault on the Redan
brought with it for the first time unrelieved
failure, but this was attributed to bad Staff
work — very plausibly so, for the Staff work was
horrible. After the second assault disguise became
no longer possible; the Army was no longer the
Army of Wellington. Its indomitable spirit hadV
been broken. Charles Gordon, a good judge and
a generous, says, writing home, " We should have
88 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
carried everything before us if the men had only
advanced."
What had happened ? The whole heart and soul
of the War Office had run into spit and polish. No
forethought was to be found there. On the spot
G.H.Q. had failed to develop even so much initiative
as to jog the minds of the British Government and
remind them that, although the distance from the
beaches to the front was only five miles — 8,800
yards — say 10,000 paces (about the same as in the
Southern theatre at the Dardanelles), yet neither
flour nor blankets could fly over even that short
distance. No genius imagined a metalled road ;
no superman had the happy thought of a rail-
way. So the flower of the Army sank into their
graves and the proud hearts of those left were
broken.
Not the skill of Todleben, not the fighting
qualities of the Russian soldiers, not G-eneral
January or February, not pestilence, not superior
armament, but just the good old British national
Generalissimo, Sir Muddle T. Somehow, K.G., O.M.,
G.C.B., marched our poor fellows off by battalions
into another and, let us hope, better organised
world.
Colonel Goethals and his Commissary, Major
Wilson, would have tackled that five miles line of
communication, giving it precedence over everything
except the actual fighting ; treating it in precisely
the same anxious spirit as that with which a diver
examines the tube that is to bring down the vital
air into his helmet. The chance of snow and rain
falling in the Crimea would have struck them.
MILITARY ORGANISATION 89
Having been educated at West Point they would
have heard how winter, plus the rotten roads of
Russia, had combined to cut short the careers of
Charles XII of Sweden and of the Emperor Napoleon.
Being organisers they would have understood right
away that if a lot of men were to be employed digging
trenches in very beastly weather, they must be fed
and clothed at least half as well as convicts. Indeed,
I will be bound, had they been sitting in a London
office and had they there been shown a plan of
harbour and camp, their very first anxiety and instruc-
tions would have been directed towards the estab-'
lishment of a good and durable road between the
ships and the Army in the trenches. But then, as
I have said, they are organisers. We, also, had
organisers amongst us in the " 'fifties" —for example
Florence Nightingale. But the Civil or Military
departments who ruined our Army in the Crimea
had not even an inkling of what I am here
endeavouring to explain — the part played, namely,
by Organisation and her handmaiden, Administra-
tion, hi the life, strength and victories of
Armies.
From the Crimea to 1914-18 is a far cry and we
ought to have learnt to avoid the more costly and
colossal of the blunders I have described. Have we ?
Let each one think for himself. As for me I feel
I should only weaken my argument if I opened it
to the raging of contemporary controversies. But
as to the future, we must be of good courage and
resolve to do better — resolve next time to have
the man, the men and the machines — ready. To do
this with any degree of success we must think out
90 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
exactly, in advance, the shape and size of the
machines, the framework. This point will be dealt
with in the last chapters on the application of my
theories to our actual Army.
CHAPTER VI
DISCIPLINE
The moment organisation grips an individual it
tends to produce a certain habit ; the habit a part
acquires of harmonising itself with the whole. In
my simile of the machine the parts were held together
by rivets — that is to say, by discipline. From
family to Empire no association of human beings
can dispense with discipline.
This is the theory ; nay, more, it is the firm
belief of nine men out of ten. But when it comes
to practice ? . . . We are all willing to serve God ;
but who is to interpret Him to our senses ? Actu-
ally, we Anglo-Celts apply our belief in discipline
to those over whom we have, in some way or another,
got a pull. With infinite pains we have trained
the horse to be a useful servant — tamed wolves into
dogs — taught lightning to work telephones. Are
they to be free ? Certainly not ! With infinite
pains the State has educated us into civilised beings.
Are we to be free ? Certainly !
Those are our principles and there is a great deal
to be said for them; a very great deal which can
be put into four words. The war is won. Yes ;
the free Briton has beaten the social-communal
German ; elastic individualism has smashed the
rigid organisation.
91
92 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
That is not to say that the British were quite
uncontrolled. Clearly that would not be correct.
Uncontrolled energy is like steam in a cloud up in
the sky. You can't use it. If it dissolves in rain,
more likely than not that rain falls on to the new-
mown hay — I speak feelingly. But stick the vague
thing into a machine and it works. The war has
forced us to crib from the enemy ; the " sort of
peace " of 1921 finds us more organised, more
disciplined, less in the clouds, than we were when
we started ; and we hate it.
Some races have worn the habit of discipline so
long that it has become to them what her corsets
are to a fine lady — a support. To the Anglo-Celt
it presents itself rather as an enemy to freedom — an
irksome restraint — a curb. Though he may long
for a job, the moment discipline steps in and orders
him to work, he longs rather to jib. If England
has escaped reactions on the large scale against
discipline since the days when the pressed crews of
our Fleet mutinied, it is because voluntary service
has taken the wind out of the sails of indiscipline
and has, at the same time, supplied us with the
most admirable amalgam, from a disciplinary stand-
point, of officers possessing the prestige of good
education and social status whilst the rank and
file are drawn mainly from the most easily impres-
sioned classes.
Everyday education is busy swelling young heads
with self-importance. As M. Paul Bert, Gambetta's
Minister of Education, said once in the Chamber
of Deputies, " The spread of material prosperity,
the progress even in education, render citizens more
susceptible to all sorts of enjoyments and tend to
DISCIPLINE 93
lead them towards an egotistical indifference.
Further, the spread of the sentiment of individual
independence, consequent upon universal suffrage
and the frequent exercise of sovereign power, is by
no means calculated to strengthen respect for
discipline or even respect for law. The military
curriculum appears to me the most potent method,
I do not say to create, but to maintain the moral
standard, inculcating as it does reasoned obedience
and legitimate sacrifices."
All who may at one time or another have made
an effort to dive beneath the surface of that infor-
mation-hunt called education must realise that the
penetrating mind of this Frenchman has made its
way through a maze of theories and rules to the
real issue. State education and the exercise of [
civil rights do lead straight to selfishness, and the
first task of any Military Officer in dealing with
young civilians is to try and knock the "Is" out '
of the egoist.
Two classes of our community form an exception
to the undisciplined majority. By acting as a
species of reservoir of order they have done much
to counteract the disruptive tendencies of competi-
tive examinations and all similar exercises in the
gentle art of fratricide.
Miners and seafaring folk possess a very sound
code of discipline of their own which manifests
itself in a habit of orderly, cool obedience to recog-
nised authority, well suited to those Saxon founda-
tions upon which the British temperament is built.
The behaviour of British miners when things go
wrong underground has been very favourably com-
pared by unprejudiced experts with the conduct of
94 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
the miners of other nations under a similar trial.
No rushing — no cries — no accusations against the
company. If such ideas arise they are kept for
next day. There is no class in the country of whom
we should be so proud as our miners, and that
mainly because of their discipline. How do they
get it ? By the organisation which at the same
time classifies and unites ; by appreciation, brought
home to them individually several times in the
week, of the superior knowledge and experience of
their managers and foremen ; by comprehension
of the common, ever-present menace from the
lurking forces of nature and of the fact that union
is strength.
Parenthetically, I may here remark that I am
trying to consider my subject in a detached and
philosophical spirit. The very discipline and soli-
darity of the miners is now being used, in the opinion
of some people, to get more than their due share
of the national income. All I mean to say here
is, that I am not entering into these matters ; that
they must not arrest my argument ; that they do
not affect its truth.
Organisation, as I began by saying, in itself pro-
duces discipline, and although miners may be
organised on the large scale and fishermen on the
small scale, yet, as a nation, we are, as I have shown,
consciously unorganised. Colonet Ardant du Picq
says, " Organisation and discipline work towards
the same end, and often the former, if it is rational,
amongst people with a good conceit of themselves
like the French, and possessing French sociability,
will reach the goal without its being necessary to
apply the coercive methods of the second." A law
DISCIPLINE 95
ordering a man to serve in a certain contingency —
asserting the right of the State, that is to say, to
make him do something he may not like — contains
in it a germ of discipline even if it is never applied.
Yet more unmistakably is this disciplinary effect
produced when organisation quits paper and takes
the field.
In 1885, during what was called the Pendjeh
scare, Mr. Gladstone was above all things anxious
to distract the attention of the public from the
death of Gordon and from the Quixotic idea that
we should go up to Khartoum to show that national
heroes should not be speared. So, in a species of
cold frenzy (clever political scheming masked as
burning sympathy for Central Asian scoundrels),
the drum was beat, the bugle was blown, and certain
categories of the Army Reserve were summoned
to the Colours.
Now this was the first time the reserves had ever
been called out : indeed, until the 'eighties, there
had never been any reserves to call. Perhaps then
belief that the men would actually put in an appear-
ance was not so implicit as was pretended. Cer-
tainly the arrangements made for their reception
were altogether inadequate. But the men did turn
up in full force ; there was no sufficient organisation
ready to take them in hand, and it will be in the
memory of many that there was a good deal of
indiscipline and crime.
In 1899 the reserves were again called out, but
this time the organisation was ready for them. They
were met at the railway stations ; taken off to the
depot with the band playing at their head ; clothed ;
equipped and given a hot meal, before they could
96 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
ejaculate " Jack Robinson." No one — not even
the bitterest of our critics — has ever said one word
against the conduct of those men either before they
embarked, on their voyages, during the war or after
they came home. Bad organisation had bred bad
discipline in 1885 and good organisation had bred
good discipline in 1899. As to 1914 — it can only
be said that the first hundred thousand were delib-
erately deprived of the organisation made ready
by Haldane for their reception and that their sur-
vivors know better than most what lack of organisa-
tion means in breeding discomfort ; disease ; ineffi-
ciency. If they triumphed over these miseries
—unnecessary miseries — it was because of a redhot
enthusiasm which rivers of cold water and acres
of mud were entirely unable to damp. But these
men do know what a heart-breaker muddle can be,
and they will understand as Britons would not have
understood ten years ago how the entire lack of
organisation manifested by the French mobilisation
of 1870 must have lessened the discipline of the
reservists by a percentage equivalent to an Army
Corps.
" Military " discipline — Wellington's stand-by-
Napoleon's sheet anchor (not his propeller) — subjects
the minds and bodies of organised men to a special
course of instruction, part moral, part physical.
Up to the end of the nineteenth century discipline
took the form of bodily exercises and appealed more
to the physical and instinctive than to the spiritual
and intellectual. This type of discipline was incul-
cated by curses, blows and punishments so that
only the lower range of moral qualities — pride,
shame, fear, and habit — were played upon. The
DISCIPLINE 97
monotonous character of the drill, whereat, year
after year, command played with obedience and
crushed initiative, excluded independence of thought
— and was so intended. The martinet aimed at
getting control of the instinct ; about the reason
he did not care.
In its results that old rigid discipline took the
form of a mechanical, subconscious obedience to
the percussive shout of the commander ; a bark-like
sound violently ejected, propelling lines or columns
of men against one another with almost as little
volition on the part of the individual as is felt by
a projectile dispatched from the mouth of a cannon. ;
Or, the obedience was passive but equally divorced
from the ordinary emotions and inclinations of
humanity. " Stand there till you are relieved ;
happen what may ; lava belching forth from the
mountain, the tide pouring in from the sea, a city
rising in its wrath, the entreaties of the girl you
love, the orders of your own Emperor ; sentry —
stand there ! "
Where action was by shock of soldiers marching
shoulder to shoulder, the more mechanical the move-
ment the more irresistible the effect. Men's bodies
respond to instinct more effectively than to will.
The quickest, the handiest steersman and poleman
going up the Nile to the relief of Charles Gordon
were those who could neither read nor write. An
involuntary sneeze is more explosive and violent
than a voluntary blowing of the nose. A hand
inadvertently touching a hot iron is jerked back
more quickly than the same human being can move
it by his will.
Therefore, the first great object of Commanders,
98 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
from Frederick the Great's time to the Revolution,
was to have their men half-hypnotised by habit so
that the Mesmerist (the Commander) could fling
them, as cohesively, as unthinkingly, as if they
had been a salvo of cannon-balls, straight upon the
bayonets of the enemy. Generals did not so much
aspire to direct and to control the intellects of their
soldiers as to manipulate their limbs without any
disconcerting interposition by the intellects of the
victims.
To this end the rank and file were removed as
far as possible from the influences of family life.
They were not encouraged to be either moral or,
in the larger sense, patriotic. A fanatical loyalty
to the person of the Reigning Sovereign and an
intensely sectarian esprit de corps were the nearest
they were allowed to approach to elevating motives.
Who, precisely, invented this character mould it
is impossible now to discover. The process was in
full action when I myself joined the Army and it
still survives, an anachronism, but a lucky one for
Authority. When the lesson had been mastered
by the soldiers they passed muster and, in course
of time, when they had been mastered by the lesson,
then, at last, a brutal routine had created a machine
which would trample down the noblest enthusiasm.
A thousand men standing up in the open with arms
in hand, each anxious to fight himself but each
uncertain of how far his fellows meant to fight,
were liable to be scattered like chaff by a mere
handful of soldiers hypnotised by habit into respond-
ing as one individual to the orders of their sergeant.
Although based on the ignoble idea of making men
dread their captain more than the enemy, more
DISCIPLINE 99
than the Devil himself l ; although founded on the
illogical principle of obtaining bravery by teaching
terror ; the incidental results of that old, iron
discipline were in many respects admirable.
Discipline waged constant war against dirt, irregu-
larity and slackness. Discipline could turn to good
account not only the willing and keen but also the
dull and apathetic, curbing these, spurring those.
Good discipline was proof against panic. I have
seen one isolated company of a well-disciplined
regiment stand to their arms and hold their ground
steady as a rock when, crying out with terror,
hundreds of men suddenly startled from their sleep
and imagining that the dervishes were upon them,
rushed past them down to the boats. The instinct
of the organism was so cultivated that the common
men in the ranks were able to override the weakness
and cowardice of humanity. By inculcating impli-
cit, abject obedience ; by inspiring each man with
confidence that he would not be left in the lurch ;
discipline gave the mass ten times the weight of
the aggregate of its atoms. Napoleon has told us
how two Mameluks would beat three French soldiers,
but that one thousand French soldiers would beat
one thousand five hundred Mameluks. Yet the
Mameluks had some tincture of discipline ; they
were accustomed to fight together. Indeed discipline
has seemed to some capable even of creating quali-
ties ; or, if this is considered impossible, it can at
least develop out of all recognition qualities latent
1 " It was an inflexible maxim of Roman discipline that a
good soldier should dread his own officers far more than the
enemy." — Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
Chap. I.
100 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
until it touched them. But its penalties were
cruel ; its methods damaging to initiative and
self-respect.
A well-known example :
During the Silesian Campaign, Frederick the
Great was going the rounds of his camp after " lights
out." Observing the glimmer of a taper coming
from a tent he entered and found Captain Zietern
engaged in sealing up a letter. The culprit fell on
his knees and begged for forgiveness. " Take a
seat," said Frederick, " and add a few words to
what you have already written." Captain Zietern
obeyed, and wrote at the dictation of the hero of
Prussian history, " To-morrow I die on the scaffold."
Next day he was duly executed, in the interests
of discipline, and also no doubt that the bon mot
of the monarch might be underlined in red.1
The method of Frederick the Great had been
Caesar's and Alexander's before him and, long before
those heroes took the field, Sun Tzu, the Chinaman,
had shown them the way.
By this type of discipline the backbone of the
British Army was fortified (and mortified) from the
time it was first raised until the year 1881. In
1857, 112 of our soldiers had the privilege of dividing
between them a total of 5,249 lashes. Looking over
returns of admissions to hospitals in the Mediterra-
nean garrisons I came across the following tit-bits.
At Malta in 1863 there were twenty-two admissions
to hospital as the result of corporal punishment.
i The irony is not levelled at the penalty. Where disobedience
or carelessness may sacrifice the lives or liberty of perhaps 20,000
comrades, they become great crimes. But the occasion did not
lend itself happily to epigram.
DISCIPLINE 101
At Gibraltar in the same year, 1863, there were
twenty-nine admissions to hospital as a result of
corporal punishment. Although the actual floggings
were done away with amidst the threats and head
shakings of the martinets, the theories of Sun Tzu
and Co. remained on the code until the last year
of last century.
Of all the rich windfalls garnered by Greater
Britain from the South African War one of the best
was her new Discipline. Lessons learnt amongst
the nullahs and jungle during the Tirah Campaign
of 1896-1897 against the Afridis had prepared our
minds for the change, and the fresh experiences of
kopje and veldt soon convinced our officers that,
in open country and during daylight, the ancient,
mechanical discipline of the intensive, iron type
simply could not be applied to the new tactics.
Armament, necessitating (as it seemed then) wide
extensions, isolated the individual. Neither by
voice nor revolver could the captain of the opening
year of this century dominate a firing line extended
at five to ten paces interval through the uproar
and confusion of the battle.
We have come to the last little bit of safe cover for
close formations. The scouts have reported on the
ground lying open to our front. The captain makes
up his mind to break cover, open out and rush. The
order is given. Desperately the human souls dart
forward — flights of bullets whistling past their ears ;
shrapnel cracking in the air above their heads — each
bent double, going all he knows. Many fall by the
way, some dead, some wounded, some shamming.
But our one little bit of humanity is a chip from some
old Norman or Viking block. He gets there — drops
102 THE SOUL AND BODY OP AN ARMY
in the heaven of shelter behind a rock — and finds
himself alone. He is safe— for the moment ! The
bullets go on pouring through the air — did he put his
cap on the end of his rifle and hold it up it would
soon be as full of holes as a pepper castor. But — so
long as he keeps his head down he is safe. No captain
or subaltern, not even a sergeant or corporal, to
give him an order — and, if they did give him an
order, how could he hear it?
In that position, any man trained to depend so
implicitly on orders that his independent ideas have
degenerated into instincts — the man whose bravery
consists in terror of his officer — is at liberty to sit
tight, and does so ; for he never gets the kick of
his accustomed word of command.
The magazine rifle with its low trajectory and
smokeless powder, spoke volumes to the captain
of 1899-1902. It told him he could still conduct
his company into the zone of aimed fire, but that,
having got them there, he must either—
(1) Keep his direct command at the cost of
double losses.
(2) Let each little group understand the common
objective. Then leave them to the promptings of
their own consciences of what was right rather than
to the dread of doing wrong.
Since the South African War trench warfare has
come into being and its bearing upon military ethics
will be discussed later on. But it may be stated
here that although from the material and practical
standpoints it has given breathing space and renewed
possibilities to (1), yet in our Army we have never
since South Africa looked back or ceased to strive
for the principle exemplified in (2).
DISCIPLINE 103
Now what, under that principle, happens to our
lonely soldier, aged twenty, lying in momentary
precarious shelter from the ceaseless attempts of
terrible people called the enemy to deprive him of
his life ? If discipline has become a matter of
conscience he will still, though he can only see one
or two of his comrades and speak to none, feel
himself surrounded and upheld by those comrades.
Abstract ideas of duty and patriotism do not help
a young man in such a tight corner — not much.
Fear will not help him — not at all. The self-
disciplined mind ; the proud superhuman feeling ;
" These bullets and shells won't stop me ! " The
knowledge — the conviction — that the captain means
to rush forward again upon these cursed foreigners
and that the company will follow him to a man :
there is his loadstar of conduct.
So it comes that the balance point of discipline
has, at least in the British Army, insensibly shifted/
during the past twenty years. Soldiers of all ranks \
are being taught the reason why orders must be I
obeyed ; why an unwise command wisely and \
unanimously carried out will carry further than a \
wise order hesitatingly executed ; why individuals \
must stoop if they wish the nation to conquer.
Force of habit of mind has replaced force of habit
of body. The momentum of the opinion of comrades
has been enlisted on the side of duty, and although
punishment cannot be altogether dispensed with as
a factor, yet our officers have decided to seek
discipline for the future more largely in the domain
of respect than of fear ; in the effect of good example ;
in the upholding of a high level of camaraderie ;
in being wiser, better men themselves and thus
104 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
deserving, earning the confidence of their sub-
ordinates ; in the intelligent comprehension by the
rank and file of the why and wherefore of an order
and in their keenness to carry it out ; above all,
in the gradual conversion of their subordinates to
the belief that self-assertion plays no part in their
scheme of creating discipline : that they, the officers,
are just merely so many humble servants of the
State, but that, whenever they issue an order, they
voice the will of the nation.
Once more, there are two sorts of discipline,
distinct in principle although sometimes they may
overlap in practice.
The one is born in coercion and sets the soldier
outside the ring of homely sentiment which sur-
rounds the ordinary citizen from his cradle to his
grave. On parade the Prussian martinet wished to
stop the men's breathing because it made the points
of their bayonets tremble : off parade these same
martinets try to control the heart's beats. This
type of discipline isolates the soldier in barracks :
prevents him from marrying : gives him pride of
caste : teaches him to think of the rest of his country-
men as civilians : places the honour of the corps
above personal ambition or politics : detaches his
generous enthusiasms from himself and his fellows
to pin them securely on to the regimental colours.
All through it is a narrowing, but it is also an inten-
sive, process. When someone is shooting at him
round the corner, the average man is not endowed
with either the wealth of imagination or force of
energy wherewith to grasp a great Empire in his
purview. Coercive as the old discipline may be,
it by no means despises the moral factor. It tries
DISCIPLINE 105
to make a religion of something very near and real,
yet, at the same time, high, intangible, romantic
— the Regiment ! Under Frederick William I, the
Sergeant King, this science attained its highest refine-
ment, for he, the said William, went so far as to
breed his own Grenadiers. Since Napoleon's day
the tendencies, whether of society or armament, or
organisation, have been against it : yet, certainly
it would be too much to say that any Army can
dispense with it entirely.
The other sort of discipline aims at raising the
work-a-day virtues of the average citizen to a higher
power. It depends :
(1) Upon a sense of duty (res puhlica).
(2) Upon generous emulation (force of example).
(3) Upon military cohesion (esprit de corps).
(4) Upon the fear a soldier has of his own
conscience (fear that he may be afraid).
Therefore, the modern discipline possesses the
merit of being practically a continuation class of
that patriotism which is, in a sound and healthy
body politic, being constantly taught by mothers
and hi the schools. Had our British scheme of
State Education been framed by idealists, instead
of by materialists, there would be no break in the
moral training, no friction or loss of time in teaching
a new mechanical trick of implicit obedience when
a lad joined the Army. For once a corps is animated
through all its members by a wish to act towards
the same end : and once they have realised that
their officer is best qualified to show them how to
achieve that end : then, as regards that act the
corps are already disciplined. All they need now
is time wherein to let this reliance upon their officers
106 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
and their comrades develop into a habit of mind :
habit being the instinctive refuge of every one in
trouble. Had we only universal Boy-Scouts Service,
follow-my-leader and shoulder-to-shoulder would
have quite a familiar ring to the young recruit.
The Centurion has to be the better man, and he
has to prove himself so to his legionaries every
single time that an occasion happens to arise. This
is the idea in a nutshell and it is a good idea.
From a moral standpoint there is no question as
to which of these two disciplines is the finer — and
I have already shown that, from an infantry stand-
point also, the new discipline fits in with the condi-
tions of the modern battlefield better than the old.
But the tactical bearing of discipline differs in the
several branches of our military service, and I will
try to make clear my meaning by giving an example.
The hands of the Officers of the Royal Navy and
Royal Artillery have not been forced, as have those
of the Officers of the Infantry, by the tactical necessity
for very wide extensions. With them the principles
of tactics remain constant : only the mechanical
conditions have altered. In a battleship all hands
are still concentrated under authority, and through
his telephone the voice of the actual commander
dominates every hole and cranny even more com-
pletely than was possible in the days of Nelson.
Gun detachments also, in the field, work in as close
order and are as much under the officer's control as
ever they were. The soldier of the line has a different
set of problems to solve from the sailor or gunner.
Whenever he gets away from the ken of his officer,
i.e., whenever he comes under heavy aimed fire or
is sent out as a scout, he has to act on his own
DISCIPLINE 107
initiative and use his own judgment as to what he
ought to do. But a seaman or artilleryman is told
what he is to do ; he has to use his wits, not as to
what he ought to do, but as to how a specified job
is to be done. A private of the line, aged twenty,
may be on patrol and may have to decide for himself
whether to advance ; stand fast ; fall back ; remain
concealed or shoot. All sorts of alternatives open
out before him in one second and on his decision
may depend the fate of an Empire. A seaman
ensconced in the bowels of a ship gets a message
to send up a common shell. The hoists are jammed.
He has got to get the shell up somehow. He knows
what to do, but he may have to use ingenuity in
doing it.
The bluejacket has more responsibility than he
used to have, and discipline is maintained more by
love of the Service, pride of ship and emulation of
crew than it used to be. But the very fact that
in the Navy and Royal Artillery an officer is always
close at hand in peace, and will be close at hand
in war must, and does, affect the temper and tone
of the discipline. If my readers want to know how
—I can only say this, that its aim is not so lofty,
but that a low trajectory is more likely than a high
trajectory to hit the mark.
Just as, with us, the Navy and Royal Artillery
remain nearest the old type of discipline, so the
Royal Engineers have got further than any other
corps in trying to work out their salvation by the
new type. No more interesting study in the science
of discipline than to watch parties of bluejackets
and sappers working side by side building bridges
for the embarkation of big guns. The one Service
108 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
(popularly supposed to be so free, easy and go-as-
you-please) under the strictest control and super-
vision. The other, pipes in mouth, laughing, talking,
but all the time putting their backs well into their
work and responding like one man to the occasional
orders of their officer. These are no odious com-
parisons ; both services are, to my thinking, equally
admirable; they are examples illustrating the elas-
ticity of discipline.
Some further illustrations, drawn this time from
abroad. Cultivated in the hothouse atmosphere
of very short, very arduous service, Continental
units grow up symmetrical, pleasing to the eye,
and as like as two peas — superficially ! Take them
out for a campaign in the open ; expose them to
heat, drought, tempests ; it will be found that their
tap roots strike down into two essentially different
strata for their discipline.
Continental Armies are modelled either on the
French or upon the Prussian system. In the spring
of 1 914 there was no longer any fundamental cleavage
between the two systems as regards organisation,
training or patriotism. There were divergencies,
hotly debated divergencies, especially as to tactical
methods, but each Army employed numerous officers
who believed rather in the theories of the other
Army than in their own.
The radical difference between the French and
the Prussian systems did not show up in peace.
The roots of a tree are hidden from the casual
observer and in calm weather a deep or a wide
spread root seems to serve their purposes equally
well. But the difference was there and it lay in
the sharply contrasting temperaments of the two
DISCIPLINE 109
nations. Before the Boer bullets had knocked new
ideas into our British skulls the French had begun
to depend, perhaps too confidingly, upon the new
discipline, the discipline of camaraderie ; respect
and self-respect. Not so the Prussians; not even
to-day when they attribute more than ever the
great fight put up by their Army against the World
to its old world discipline, the discipline of coercion.
When I see the queer mistakes made by eminent
Continental writers about our little Army, I realise
how hard it is to put oneself into a foreigner's shoes.
The absurd errors these authors have often com-
mitted are warnings to Britishers to be careful.
So I will explain my claims to have any opinions
at all. At the impressionable age of 17-18, I spent
a year — the year 1 — in Saxony amidst a purely
military society. Visits were made by me during
that time to the French prisoners, to whom (under
a less ferocious aspect of war than that of to-day)
I was allowed to make little presents, when, natur-
ally, I seized the opportunity of hearing as much
as I could of their adventures and battles. Later
on, I went through three manoeuvres with German
troops, including a precious three weeks in Saxony
when, very generously, I was allowed the privileges
of a Divisional Staff Officer. A year was spent by
me in intimate contact with the Army of Japan,
and from April, 1904 to the middle of next February
I was on active service in the field. In 1903 I was
privileged by the kindness of Mr. Roosevelt to inspect
a number of regular U.S.A. units and to see man-
oeuvres with the State Militia in the Middle West. In
1906, 1 took part in the Teschen manoeuvres with the
1 1870-71.
110 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Austrian Army (Bosnian, Hungarian, Polish, Czech
and German troops). Two years later I saw the
partial mobilisation for war of Austria, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey. Finally, I have made
three visits to Russia seeing divisional and Army
manoeuvres. During these many visits, every chance
was seized of seeing the company or battalion
training. Later on, at the Dardanelles, two French
divisions served under my command. So much
experience should surely afford some foundation, I
do not say for comprehension, but certainly for
that sort of impression which is left by long and
close contact with any foreign body. That, at
least, is my claim and my excuse.
Abroad the Army is the nation. In each com-
pany Socialists, pacifists, men who have no stomach
for a fight (every nation has them), elbow lawyers,
artists, swells, clodhoppers and the very highest
martial types. Some of these must often, in the
nature of the case, be cleverer ^than their own
officers. Few of them stand there of their own
free will.
THE FRENCH TYPE OF ARMY. — To achieve leader-
ship by sheer weight of personality over the crowd
of cannon-fodder I have sketched is a tall order,
for the time is short — one, two, or at the most
three years. These free-thinking French rank and
file cannot, in so short a service, lose their heads
and be re-equipped with don't-think-but-do-as-you-
are-told minds. Nothing would be more wholesome
to the Gallic constitution than a good strong dose
of " don't think," but the short-service conscript
Army is an epitome of the nation and the very
least that would serve to break it clean off from
DISCIPLINE 111
its matrix is seven years of service with the Colours.
The sine qua non to real success in France (as
in Australia and New Zealand) is that the officer
should be conspicuous by his character, his personal
disinterestedness, his zeal, devotion and technical
knowledge. I speak here mainly of peace training :
in wartime a shining and distinctive courage will
cover many other shortcomings, and this is so well
understood that I have known very senior officers
play up to the gallery by swank effects ; by pitching
their camp in the middle of a hot corner ; by climb-
ing as if unconcernedly out of the trenches.
Put in another way this means that the officer
must be the salt of the nation — chosen from the
nation, without favour or affection, on his personal
merits. In France (with which I again in this
connection bracket Australia and New Zealand) it
gives a man no pull over his troops to be wealthy
or to be an aristocrat — rather the contrary. There
is nothing left then for the officer to fall back upon
but his own sheer self. Now, in these armies very
many officers are promoted from the ranks under
the impression that, somehow, this is a democratic
proceeding. But, if a nation wants to get the
best, why in the name of fortune limit the field of
choice ? To give then* own system a fair chance
the least they can do is to be truly democratic and
choose then: officers from the whole of the nation,
not from that section of the nation called the Army.
The democratising ot an Army does hot mean
handing over its conduct to a Soviet, to a body
without experience of the world or of its manners
and customs. The long and the short of it is this—
the new style of discipline works splendidly where
112 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
the officers are exceptional men ; where the rank
and file are amenable, young, patriotic. But
where the officer is mediocre and where the reserv-
ists come back to the Colours animated by a critical
or hostile spirit, then the new discipline, left to its
own resources, discloses some ugly fissures : then
the Commander begins to look over his shoulder
to the old days and to wish he had at his back a
little of the old coercive prestige. The new discipline
is the only possible discipline for the truly demo-
cratic peoples, but at present it leaves too much
upon good will — bonne volonte — and upon the myth
that men are brave naturally and that all will do
their best.
THE GERMAN TYPE OF ARMY. — Whereas, in
France, the corps of officers are just as mixed as
their men, and whereas they are thus debarred
by birth, so to say, from posing as rigid, superior
inaccessible beings, the Prussian officer may be
said to be born in spurs and a helmet. Being so
" born " (geboren : the word is so vital and so
incessantly used in the German system that it is
usually abbreviated " geb ") — being once so " born,"
I say, he has won half his life's battle in advance
and the nation he springs from is quite ready to
accept him as a leader if only he will work twelve
hours a day and despise profiteers, both of which
he does. The people have a penchant for discipline :
they have feudalised for so many hundred years
that they have developed a taste for it : the officer
who would establish sincere human relations with
them will not be met half-way ; the rank and file
feeling more comfortable when treated in the good
old de haut en bos style. The officer corps in Prussia,
DISCIPLINE 113
Bavaria, Saxony, Austria, the countries I knew
best, constituted a veritable caste apart. By that
fact alone their disciplinary problem became totally
different from the problems of France, Australia
and New Zealand where, as I have said, the officers
have to rely very largely upon good-will which
may not always be on tap. The Prussians make
no mistake here : they believe in men doing what
they are told to do and no why or wherefore. Not
that they ignore changed conditions, as the following
reminiscence will show. On my way back from the
Russian Manoeuvres, on the 30th August, 1909,
at Berlin, I put on my uniform and went to call
upon General von Moltke, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff ; I had not seen him to talk to since
the Frankfurt-on-Oder Manoeuvres in September,
1902, when the question of his being brainy enough
to succeed to the Command of the Guards Division
was hanging by a hair. His Excellency was a
kindly giant and had no enemies ; these were his
prime qualifications : in other respects he was as
far removed from the genus General Staff as he
was from the genius of his great namesake.
Amongst other interesting subjects (including my
own summing up of the training of my own troops
on Salisbury Plain, dated 27th October, 1908,
which he had by him, reprinted in German) we
discussed the twentieth-century discipline and the
colossal difficulties of running obedience to superiors
and independence of character in double harness.
At the end of our conversation he said he would
send me out by motor to look at some company
inspections. I gladly accepted.
Whether by design or by accident, I struck on
114 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
as well-marked an instance of the new discipline
as anyone could desire.
About a dozen miles out of Berlin we came to a
big fir-wood and were guided through the trees to
where a company of the Queen Augusta Regiment
were grouped about their piled arms. I was intro-
duced to the Captain who, though he must have
felt it outrageous to be pestered by a foreigner at
a moment of so great a tension, had the self-control
to seem pleased to meet me. The signallers now
reported the approach of the redoubtable Regi-
mental Commander and the Captain fell in his
Company. Having done so, he proceeded to address
them in a very friendly way, and something to the
following effect : "So now, my lads, we are about
to be examined. What I want you to remember
all the time is that you have got to keep cool and
not lose your heads. I ask this of you not only
for your own sakes and for my sake, but for a much
higher thing, the honour of the Company. Please,
boys, don't go and forget all the infinite pains I
have taken with your education ; for my part, I
promise you I will give every order feeling sure
each one of you is not only going to carry it out
to the letter but is going to go one better if he can."
The response was enthusiastic. The Regimental
Commander duly appeared and was heavily defeated.
The Company was Colonel-proof and would have
been equally fire-proof had war been declared that
moment.
The experience was the exception which makes
the rule. No doubt, there is a sincere wish on the
part of the more thoughtful of the Prussian Officer
class to get into human touch with their men, but
DISCIPLINE 115
compulsory lessons are not the best jumping-off
ground for that purpose, and the task is doubly
difficult. I always remember the Japanese soldier
who outraged the senses of patriotism and duty in
his superior officer by saying, " In Osaka I would
get five yen for digging this gun pit ; here I only
get criticism." When people lightly speak of an
aristocratic caste breaking through century-old
barriers and gaining, instead of the old-fashioned
respect and fear, the affection and confidence of
their men, they are only visualising one side of the
equation. They forget that the men also are
" born " with the hierarchic stamp of mind — the
Briton must keep these facts hi the foreground, or
he will become unfair to the Junkers. If the
officer feels it infra dig. to step down, neither is
it the " place " of the N.C.O. or man to step up.
Another obstacle to the development of that " off
duty " spirit which pervades all ranks of our British
voluntary services is that there is no " off duty "
in the German Army. The mass of technical work
to be got through is in itself an almost insurmount-
able barrier to social intercourse. Every year the
Company officers are given a huge batch of recruits
to turn into trained soldiers by next manoeuvres.
The time may be just sufficient to impart the actual
training ; it leaves no margin for amenities ; in
fact, training is one thing ; camaraderie, as well
as discipline, are other things. A perplexing number
of personalities of all grades of intellect — ranging
from perfectly illiterate Poles who speak no German
to the still more troublesome Socialists who speak
too much German — have been caught by the meshes
of universal service and have been handed over
11« THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
to the Regiment as captives. A certain effect has
to be produced at the inspection of the Company.
The captain, therefore, sets to work feverishly in
much the same spirit as a writer who has promised
his publisher to deliver a biography within a year
begins to unpack and re-arrange portmanteaux
full of the bills and old love-letters of the defunct.
How is the author going to cope with the sheer
mechanical side of his job — in the time : how is
the captain to make a real, lasting moral impression
by his own personality — in the time ? Quite apart
from the conventions of feudalism he has not
leisure, as in our Army, to play football and cricket
with the young soldiers and teach them good temper,
" give and take " and the sporting side of life — in
his shirt sleeves. So, in four out of five cases, he
falls back on the letter of the law ; on rule of thumb
interpretations thereof : on parades and on field
training. In the course of his work he may incident-
ally gain affection as he generally establishes respect.
But when all is said and done, I am sure I am right
in saying that in the very large majority of cases a
continental soldier belonging to the Prussian type
of Army passes to the reserve regarding his officer
as nothing more or less than a particularly glorified
and awe-inspiring Sergeant-Ma j or. This sort of
awe may make a man spring to attention at the
clank of a sword on the barrack square ; it may
keep a grip upon him in the trenches ; it will not
help him much in the open field.
I remember a magnificently drilled and dis-
ciplined British battalion. The non-commissioned
officers and men were the smartest in Asia. By
their very gait, by the way they held themselves,
DISCIPLINE 117
by their salutes, you could distinguish its soldiers
from any others a quarter of a mile away. But
the Brigade went on an expedition. The pressure
could not be kept up : slackened — everything went
to pieces. The best in barracks became the worst
in war. The discipline had been of too intensive
a type. The peg upon which the habit had been
hung was fear ; fear of one man, as it happened ;
and that peg had snapped. In no sense spontan-
eous ; on the march, in column, it might serve —
it did not survive a few skirmishes over ground
where the dominating eye could not follow. Now
had that one man who dominated the battalion
been able to jam them into a trench he could have
maintained his discipline with the best of them, ;
but I am speaking of the Black Mountain whenji
extensions were at least five paces.
The trench ! There we find the main factor which
enabled the Prussian discipline to stand firm for
years against the most tremendous all-round ham-
mering. The reason is simply tactical and, prob-
ably, non-recurrent. Trench warfare favoured the
system which was based on the baser elements of
human nature. The first battle of Ypres was the
last occasion when men in those open formations
which give individualism and the new discipline
fair play met the close-order formations which
are so necessary if direct control is to be given to
the captains and to their old " by order " discipline.
The results are historical. From that time onwards,
both sides went underground, and underground men
can still be held together under the eye, tongue
and auto-pistol of the captain, whereas the indivi-
duality, which had been three-quarters of the battle
118 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
in the wide extensions of a war of movement, was
now wrapped up in a napkin. But trench warfare
is already dead. The tank and aeroplane are
inaugurating an era of economic strategy which
was demanded indeed by the situation during the
last war, but was demanded, alas, in vain. Next
war, machines will no longer be denied, and wide
encircling movements, followed by distant battles
fought between comparatively small forces, will
be the order of the world to come. No longer will
the British Fleet sit like a hooded falcon upon
Britannia's wrist. The old days will be revived
and the coast line of the enemy, wherever it may
be, Black Sea, Yellow Sea, Red Sea, will be our
frontier. These ideas pertain properly to the chap-
ter on training : I only refer to them here to show
that, movement and distance being prime factors,
the encouragement of initiative, i.e. of the new
discipline, is more than ever essential. Trench
warfare, in fact, gave Frederick the Great his last
chance, and we must not allow ourselves to be
misled by the very good use der alte Fritz made
of it to believe in it as a living force for the future.
The upshot of the whole matter is this : under a
system of Universal Service it is difficult for the
officers of the French type of army to gain sufficient
coercive hold over troublesome men, whereas for
the officers of the Prussian type of army it is difficult
to secure the close human touch demanded by the
new discipline. The different degrees and levels
in the intellects, characters and social status of
the men, the national temperaments and the short-
ness of the time, are causes constantly at work to
prevent either type of army availing itself to the
DISCIPLINE 119
full of all available resources wherewith to build
up discipline.
THE BRITISH TYPE or ARMY. — Tirah and South
Africa taught us their lessons, Manchuria put her
seal upon them. The first of these campaigns was
wireless and trenchless ; the second used up all
the barbed wire and all the horses in the world,
and guns of position came into the field ; but, the
trench and the horse fitted badly together and
spadework was rather the exception ; the third
employed trenches, barbed wire, machine-guns
and big guns more and more with each successive
battle from the Yalu to Mukden. Still, even up
to the end, they had not quite paralysed movement
or put the stopper upon wide extensions. Up to
the end, extensions of attacking infantry, though
never on the South African scale, were tending to
increase in their width. One after another of
these wars of swift movement and wide extensions
came to teach us that we must recast discipline;
that we must manage so as to make our discipline
carry on although personal touch with the officer
had been temporarily lost. Fear of the officer,
we had to recognise, could no longer be the main
motive of an attack, unless indeed close formations
were to be adhered to and human lives be looked
upon as trifles. Obstinately we shut our eyes to
the trench which yawned at us more and more
widely from the fields of each successive battle;
the trench which was going to grant a fresh lease
to the old " by order " system. No one is more
to blame than I. I saw those trenches with my
own eyes, and yet — I might just as well have been
blind. Before the Royal Commission on the South
120 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
African War, I was the only witness who urged
that masses of guns of position should accompany
our infantry into the field. Whilst the Battle of
Liao Yang was actually raging, I sent home a
dispatch saying the only thing the cavalry could
do in face of machine-guns was to cook rice for
their own infantry and in a set phrase announced
the death of shock cavalry for purposes of European
war. I relate these perceptions as pleas in mitiga-
tion for not grasping with my mind what the revival
of the entrenchments of Queen Anne's reign might
mean, and how they must affect discipline, tactics,
everything. That is the sort of experience which
makes a man ask himself, "Am I not perhaps
to-day again staring at tanks, aeroplanes, seaplanes
and not seeing them ? " Anyway, the trench
system did develop into a monstrous retrogression
in war, and thrice fortunate was it for the British
Army that it had, whilst throwing itself unreservedly
into the new discipline, retained almost as firm a
grip upon the essentials of the old discipline as
those central European Powers who had held on
to it all the time. For, although we aim now at
enlisting discipline, "the main force of armies,"
less by constraint than by consent, the unique
conditions of our society and of our service auto-
matically exalt the authority of the officer and
render his two-fold task easier than that of his
continental comrades.
The Army with us is not the nation — nothing
resembling it. During the war it became so, but
already that phase has passed completely except
for a diminishing proportion of officers who have
risen from the ranks. The youths now at Woolwich
DISCIPLINE 121
and Sandhurst are practically identical in type
with their predecessors who worked there in 1913
and did so well during the war. In the ranks are
few of those men of Belial known as sea-lawyers;
and certainly no pacifists nor C.O.'s. Gunners,
drivers and men of the line come from poor but
honest parents, so it should be easy as shelling
peas for an officer who has had a much better
start in life to become guide and philosopher to
his young friends. Half our Army serves abroad
where the rank and file are withdrawn from associa-
tion with tub-thumpers, flappers and other similar
distractions. Then, again, we have seven to eight
years' service and ten per cent of these men (veterans,
according to continental standards) may go on to
complete twenty- one years with the Colours. Thus,
automatically, our Army remains brimful of
esprit de corps. This spirit is not, as used to
be the case in Germany, brewed by the State.
Clerks in the War Office used to be always on
the nibble at any speciality in custom or dress
upon which corps took a particular pride. Nor,
in posting to corps, did the Military Secretary
treat ancestors very nicely. On the contrary
three generations in a regiment count for less in
the eyes of our Army Council than three miserable
marks in a miserable competitive exam. Still,
the spirit is brewed and flows in, so to say, on its
own. Officers as well as men manage to get back
into the old corps in which served their fathers
and grandfathers. Units have their own private
gala days ; uniforms and colours blossom out with
roses again on each 1st of August hi memory of
the battle amongst the roses at Minden in 1759;
122 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
badges are fixed to the back of the helmet to com-
memorate 1801, when cavalry were beaten off by
the rear rank facing " about " instead of forming
square ; mourning lace is worn by the corps which
took part in the burial of Sir John Moore at Corunna
or of Wolfe at Quebec. In fact, in any and every
possible way, tradition puts its marks upon some-
thing of which helmets, lace and nicknames are
only the outward and visible signs. One way or
another the roots of tradition strike down deep.
The soldier feels the regiment solid about him.
The Regiment ! It is impossible for the foreigner
to realise what that word means to a British soldier.
The splendour — the greatness — the romance of this
awe-inspiring, wonderful creation in which he him-
self is privileged to have his being ! At the end of
five years' reserve service the Highlander (I speak
of what I know best) belongs more to the old corps
than he did when he was serving with it : forty
years later he has become still more enthusiastic ;
he will travel a hundred miles for the pleasure of
meeting one of his old officers.
In the autumn of 1884, my company took their
seats in eleven small row-boats to struggle hundreds
of miles up the Nile and save Charles Gordon : a
vague and typically British adventure — just like
a fairy tale. We carried with us food for 110
days : white lead, tacks, sheet tin and tow were
stowed for repairs ; 200 rounds per rifle were in
reserve. Our feelings were nearly as possible those
of a party of Boy Scouts dressed up like Red Indians
and let loose in a flotilla of canoes. Each boat of
eight rowers, a poleman and a coxswain was — and
had to be — a self-supporting, independent unit.
DISCIPLINE 123
At the best, the company got together about once
in ten days, when the negotiation of a cataract
called for combined effort on the drag ropes or for
a portage of stores. If a boat failed to put in an
appearance at the rendezvous, the captain had to
unload his own boat, and thus lightened row back
down the river to find the lame duck and help it
along. The tale has the ring of a glorious adventure,
and so it was, only, at the time, incessant toil ;
much of it waist deep in water, bad food, broken
nights, the lack of any drink but sand and water ;
the resultant scurvy ; all these wore health and
nerves to fiddle-strings. Never in their whole
lives had the men worked so hard. The very
thought of the work would make a Labour Union
strike ! Yet, there was no crime, no stinting of
effort, no grumbling ; no, not even if after spending
two days struggling inch by inch painfully up a
cataract boats had to be sent flying down again to
the rescue of wrecked companions.
Part of the preserves loaded into each boat were
taboo ; delicacies, not to be looked at, much less
touched until we got into the zone of the actual
fighting. Australian boiled mutton, cheese, jam
and such-like wonderful baits to a poor man with
a sweet tooth : cases, also, labelled hospital comforts
which contained — it was an open secret — two bottles
of port wine. All these were forbidden fruit,
although we had to handle them continually, but
we were encouraged in continence by an order
emanating from Headquarters to say that when
we got to Korti we should get these good things
as our regular rations.
Hearing that in some cases, isolated boat's crews
124 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
belonging to another regiment had prematurely
sampled their consignments, I thought it well to
fall the company in along the bank and say a word
of warning to them. I pitched it in as strong as I
could, saying the port wine was meant to save the
lives of wounded comrades and it might save their
own lives ; also, that if we were so wicked as to
eat the boiled mutton now we could not eat it
afterwards, in the heat of the conflict, when we
should want it much more. After I had done, an
old soldier named Cameron asked the Colour- Ser-
geant to bring him up as he had something to say.
What he said to me was, " Some of us would like
you to know, sir, that though we mean to obey
the order, we have served too long to believe that
that jam or cheese will ever come the way of our
bellies." Nothing I could say would persuade
him that the Guards and the cavalry would not
get hold of it, but, in fact, not a pot of jam or
an ounce of cheese was short when, on arriving at
last at Korti, we were ordered to hand it over to
the cavalry and Guards and were duly filled up
again with the weary stuff from Chicago and the
weevily biscuit. Once again the aristos and that
old, cold shade of the Peninsular war !
Now what was the force which kept the half-
starved men of the Gordons going dry for weeks,
whilst the port wine gurgled at their feet ?
Reason had nothing to do with it, for they did
not believe the order, saying they were bringing up
the stuff for themselves. Fear may be set aside
at once. Punishment was impossible, and they
knew it. An exhausted, underfed soldier could
not be set by his captain to tramp up and down
DISCIPLINE 125
the bank in heavy marching order through the
night watches when that same captain wanted to
squeeze every ounce of energy out of that same
soldier next day, starting with the first streak of
dawn. At the most an entry might be made
on the man's defaulter sheet, and who cares
about a black mark on paper when a battle is
coming along which will square all accounts for
ever ?
The ordinary disciplinary apparatus had disap-
peared. No Lieutenant-Colonel : no Adjutant : no
Sergeant-Major. A single boat was often separated
for days and nights from the others, and might be
in charge of a Corporal. As for duty or patriotism,
there was small scope for these high motives in a
punitive expedition so remote in every sense from
home and home interests. The imagination of the
junior officers and of the rank and file had not yet
been in any sense touched by the idea of Gordon
or of his peril. The thought that the British
Cabinet had elaborately worked out this stupendous
campaign so that every one should just be too late
had not dared present itself to our humble and
somewhat trusting minds. Yet " D " Company of
the Gordon Highlanders worked feverishly — crime-
lessly — incessantly. The worst characters worked
hardest and gave least trouble because they had
most character, but all played up. Had every
soldier been going to his bridal he could not have
been in a greater hurry than he now appeared to
be to exchange his bullets with the spear-thrusts
of swarms of exceedingly nasty fanatics. By what
pull — by the use of what leverage — did the captain
obtain so much for so little ?
126 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
By working upon the men's esprit de corps, upon
their religion — the honour of the Regiment.
The special type of discipline we possess at this
moment is excellent. Whereas one Continental
form depends too much upon good will, and the
other not enough on good will, and whereas both
of these forms must expect to be half-submerged
on the first outbreak of trouble by the flow of outer
civilian sentiment into the ranks, our own discipline
will be strengthened by the reservists. Our own
discipline has fairly solved the problem of a real
camaraderie between officers and men and, on the
other hand, it was Haldane who managed, one
drowsy afternoon, in the House of Commons, with
me, the Adjutant-General, perspiring in the back-
ground, to carry a measure entirely against the
trend of the times and the sentiment of the voters
by doubling the Commander's legal powers of
punishment ; not with a view to his inflicting
severer punishment, but with the idea (and it has
proved well-founded) of doing away with the need
for any punishment at all ! What this has done
for discipline, and how much it helped us to win
the Great War, is quite unsuspected by the young
soldiers now serving with the Colours.
Here stands our Army ready to take from the
nation the poor and unsuccessful and give to their
characters the coping-stone of courage and to their
minds the stimulus of travel and of great traditions.
We use any patriotism or civil virtue we can find,
but strive to focus them on the Corps ; on something
definite instead of something vague. We do big
spadework in fields which should long ago have
been ploughed and sown by the Education Depart-
DISCIPLINE 127
ment and by the Church. But we have a lot to
do, for neither Church nor State schools nor parents
impart to British youth the high type of patriotism
on which, for instance, the Swiss boys and girls are
brought up. Our lads come to the recruiting
sergeant with a crude notion that they are better,
wiser and braver than foreigners, but national
conceit is but bastard patriotism at best. Still,
we take that raw material and work wonders with
it, establishing, as we go, a happier, more brotherly
tone between officers and men than obtains in any
other European Army.
A British military unit is a standing object lesson
to the civil population in order, cleanliness, politeness,
punctuality, and good feeling. It exemplifies the
Socialists' dream, only that the officers are imposed
from outside. How, then, if they were drawn,
like the non-commissioned officers, from within ?
I have said that the new discipline demands of
an officer that he should prove himself a better
man than his men. But, in peace, how ? At his
job ? Yes ; more thorough knowledge of the
business in hand ; greater force of character and
competency ; a higher standard of education ;
these tend to give their possessor the whip hand
over his associates. And whereas, as I have tried
to show, this should be easier for our officers to
achieve than for their Continental comrades, yet
every year that passes the standards go up. British
non-commissioned officers are now well read, clear-
thinking individuals, and what would have satisfied
a sergeant fifteen years ago will hardly, to-day,
pass muster with a corporal. Our officers will have
to play up for all they are worth to maintain this
128 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
moral ascendency over men who already are some-
. times their superiors in technical knowledge of the
\ detail of their profession. Why, then, should not
the non-commissioned officers themselves be
promoted regularly into the commissioned ranks ?
Because of the temperament of the British crowd
which must here be diagnosed ; for no General
dare neglect it. An increasing number of us look
out upon the world with eyes of another colour,
but I am talking of the class from which we draw
our soldiers, and what I say is true as regards three
out of four of them.
In England social position is an aid to discipline :
in Scotland gentle birth. In the Commonwealth or
the Dominions these are rather handicaps than
helps : in the United Kingdom they still carry
some of their ancient prestige. The English soldier
is extraordinarily immune to the stings of envy
or the serpent's tooth of contrast : no more generous
disposition and (if a disposition can be large-minded ?)
no more large-minded disposition exists anywhere
in the world. Where the German, Frenchman,
Spaniard, Russian, and Japanese are always asking
themselves bitterly, " Why should So-and-so have
this and I only get that ? " the British soldier sings
quite philosophically to the mess bugle, " Officers'
wives have puddings and pies, but soldiers' wives
get skilly." He states an interesting fact and
that's all about it. He is not anxious that the
status of his officer should be lowered ; on the
contrary, it tickles his sense of proprietorship that
his captain should cut a dash with his polo ponies
and be a man of quality and class. There are
masses of people going about the world — frightful
DISCIPLINE 129
snobs themselves in their own special way — who
will call this rank snobbery. They would call
Christ a snob for saying " Render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's." Anyway, the truth is
the truth, so why not be brave enough to bring it
out ?
The Scottish soldier for his part — very likely a
Socialist by conviction — keeps up his sleeve a queer,
old-engrained liking for the Laird (if he is real ; not
a Carnegie or a Me Abraham). When one thinks
of the thousands of radical school-mistresses striving
to eradicate sentiment and tradition from their
pupils and to plant in their places a paltry egoism,
the fact seems supernatural, but fact it undoubtedly
remains.
Social distinctions with us carry right away down
in very fine gradations from Throne to Workhouse.
In an English Yeomanry corps it is difficult to
make the man whose father employs two labourers
upon his farm a non-commissioned officer over the
head of a man whose father employs eight labourers.
The Commanding Officer may insist, of course, but
only at the expense of discipline.
In the maintaining of a high standard of discipline
nothing should be neglected, least of all race. We
Northerners have a cult for heroism, for imagination
and for legislation. But amongst us are embedded
strangers from the South. These, too, have their
great virtues and their cult for intelligence as
opposed to imagination and for commerce as opposed
to law. We like these sojourners who have come
to stay. We admire them as true and patriotic
citizens. But (if we do not know it already we
should know it) they find it difficult to maintain
130 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
discipline over British soldiers. There are excep-
tions. Amongst the Australians there was a notable
exception during the war. On the whole, admirable,
devoted as they may be as officers, they can neither
say " come " nor " go " as a British Centurion
ought to say them to a British soldier. If, there-
fore, they are employed as combatant officers it
must be at the expense of discipline ; although
they may fill the top notches of staff work to the
admiration of other officers in the Army.
Again, the British soldier will not accept an
Asiatic officer even in peace-time. He declines to
salute him. In a narrow sense this is unfortunate.
It cuts us off from the Russian methods of satisfying
the legitimate aspirations of dark-skinned races. A
General Alikhanoff is, as yet, an impossibility to
us. Still, there it is ! Personal Pride is half the
battle in a drawing-room, but racial pride is the
whole battle in an Empire. If it were not for that
pride we, the rulers of millions of Asiatics, would have
contaminated the purity of our blood and have
already let ourselves down into half-castes. If
the North Americans had not inherited some of
that sin from us, they would already have ruined
the New World by marrying ten million negroes.
Too many promotions from the ranks strain
discipline. One of the grounds on which these
have been advocated is that the officer who has
been through the mill (like the butler who has been
through the pantry) knows all the ropes ; all the
tricks, and that is exactly — so it happens — the
main argument against him : the ranker knows
too much. He gets on the nerves of the men :
does not handle them as tactfully as do the graduates
DISCIPLINE 131
of universities and of Sandhurst ; is harder on them
all round. In short, it is not likely ever to be
desirable, on military grounds, to change the present
system of commissioning a privileged class of
officers. For, whereas the theorist can pick a
hundred holes hi the method, the truth remains
that British soldiers steadily refuse to think by the
rules of logic, and, whereas the democrat is out-
raged by inequality, the British soldier is suspicious
of his equal. Yet, as nothing but smashing disaster
will stop a political trend, some day, probably, the
present system will be revised. When that day
comes may the guardian angel of the British Empire
whisper into the ear of whoever may be at its helm-^
democratise the Army if you must, but if so, do it
by promotion from the ranks of the nation ; not,
except as a special reward for a special service,
from the ranks of the army.1
If birth ; social position ; manners ; and a public
school education in character and leadership are to
be cast aside — do let us at least have the one and
only military merit we can, to some extent, gauge
and guarantee. Do let us have brains and let the
competition be thrown right open to the nation.
As to the future career of the democratic competition
wallah we have our model at Duntroon in Australia.
1 In case anyone should remind me of my personal respon-
sibility for the arrangement whereby the names of three non-
commissioned officers were secretly noted for promotion to
Commissions from the ranks of each unit in case of war, I would
anticipate such criticism by pointing out that these were to be
nominations by the Commander and were to be based on charac-
ter and manners, not on an examination in which all the orderly-
room clerks would come out on top and all the fighting leaders
be at the bottom.
132 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
From the moment the boys pass they must not cost
their parents one sixpence. They must be fed,
clothed, educated free, and must be given State
pocket-money into the bargain. They should be at
least three years at the Military College and when
they join they must be paid a living wage. These
should be good value, and that is more than could
ever be said for old non-commissioned officers,
who fall short, be they French or be they British,
through lack of the sense of perspective. No matter
how clever ; how brave ; how successful ; here is
the rock which wrecks them in the end. They
can't distinguish between the vital and the trivial ;
the significant and the insignificant. Nine times
out of ten the command of a battalion is their
limit.
Finally, lest anyone should quote the Marshals of
Napoleon, it may be as well to remind him that they
rose, not of a peace-time Army, but from a nation
in arms. Those splendid adventurers, sons most of
them of the smaller bourgeoisie, would never have
sprung from the ranks of a small voluntarily enlisted
Army ; to a man France had entered for the baton.
Popularity helps discipline. In Napoleon's Army
affection was ever a stronger lever than apprehen-
sion. In 1831 a gunner of the Imperial Guard
wrote thus to General Drouot under whom he served
in 1810 :
" The main thing, say I, is to make oneself liked by the soldier,
because, if the Colonel is disliked, no one is extra keen to get
himself killed by the order of someone he detests. At Wagram,
where it was as hot as they make it and where our regiment did
so famously, do you suppose that if you had not been popular,
the gunners of the Guard would have manoeuvred so well as
they did ? As for me, my General, never have I found another
DISCIPLINE 133
Colonel who knew, as you did, how to speak to a soldier ; you
were severe, certainly, but just ; no word louder than the other,
no cursing, or flying into a temper ; in short, you used to speak
to a soldier as if he had been your equal. There are officers
who speak to soldiers as if they were equals of the soldiers, but
that is no good at all, is what I say." 1
A human document this, proving that no great
chasm yawns between the French and British
private soldier. The cosmopolitan codes of the
immaculate crowds who talk all languages and
wear the same cut of clothes may mask totally
different outlooks upon life ; the rank and file of
Armies, although they cannot speak to one another,
although they eat different food, wear different
uniforms and possess different manners and customs,
are yet very much of the same way of thinking.
The remarks of Drouot's gunner will appeal to many
a British red-coat. No man is so much disliked as
the man who talks down to his men. Condescension
breeds curses. So too, speaking loud at inspections
so that all may hear the feeble joke, " that is no
good at all, is what I say." Popularity with our men
is a mystery. After a life spent watching, I am
none the wiser, except that I begin to believe that
a mass of men can read a man when individuals
cannot ; and, also, I do see clearly enough that the
sure way to lose popularity is to seek it.
Courage is supposed by civilians to be the soldier's
sine qua non. Were I mischievous, I could quote
one or two examples to the contrary and especially,
I think, I could prove that, owing to their upbringing,
moral courage is rarer amongst soldiers in high
place than it is amongst any other class of the
1 Taken from Notre Armee, by Commandant Emile Manceau.
134 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
British community. As to physical courage, although
sheer cowardice (i.e., a man thinking of his own
miserable carcass when he ought to be thinking
of his men) is fatal, yet, on the other hand, a reputa-
tion for not knowing fear does not help an officer
in his war discipline : in getting his company to
follow him as the Artillery of the Guard followed
Drouot at Wagram. I noticed this first in Afghanis-
tan in 1879 and have often since made the same
observation. If a British officer wishes to make
his men shy of taking a lead from him let him stand
up under fire whilst they he in their trenches as
did the Russians on the 17th of July at the battle of
Motienling. Our fellows are not in the least im-
pressed by bravado. All they say is, " This fellow
is a fool. If he cares so little for his own life, how
much less will he care for ours."
Up to a point fear of ridicule is a potent disciplinary
agent. The officer who can score off a soldier
inclined to be sulky or cheeky and make his com-
rades laugh at him holds a powerful weapon. But
he must remember always that the arrows of his
wit strike a man who is defenceless in so far as he
cannot retort in kind.
" Discipline makes the main force of Armies,"
say the French regulations ; " An Army is a people
who obeys," said Napoleon ; and although Marshal
de Saxe struck a truer note when he said victory
must be sought in the hearts of human beings, yet
discipline does stand supreme amongst all the
technical aids. Confidence in the superior skill,
experience and character of the Commander ; re-
spect for his personality ; devotion to the regiment ;
reliance upon comrades ; habit ; these give the type
DISCIPLINE 135
of discipline that will stand the wear and tear of
time. As Colonel Ardant du Picq well remarks :
" Discipline is not made to order, cannot be created
off-hand ; it is a matter of the institution of tradition.
The Commander must have absolute confidence in
his right to command, must have the habit of com-
mand, pride in commanding. It is this which gives
a strong discipline to Armies commanded by an
aristocracy, whenever such a thing exists." And,
if the aristocracy of birth does not exist, or is not
to be permitted to play its part, let an aristocracy
of intellect be created.
In denning the modern type of discipline on
page 105 it may be remembered that I put first
amongst its factors " a sense of duty (res publica}"
Also, it may have been noticed that beyond that
bald statement I have said nothing whatever
about duty. The reason is that hardly a flicker of
a sense of duty exists in Greater Britain — exists,
I mean, as a working basis for business. This
discovery came to me with something like a shock,
only as a result of pondering over the factors of
discipline.
Why, it may be urged, did I then enumerate the
motive and even give it the place of honour in my
definition ?
Because, even as I write these words, I still believe
in a strong sense of duty. Because Nelson's proud
signal must incline any man of our race to think the
same. Because there is hardly a foreign military
work which does not make duty the backbone both
of Command and of obedience. Because I know
that the Japanese, in the last great war but one,
relied more upon a sense of public duty than upon
136 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
any other force whatsoever, whether moral or
material. The following letter of challenge from
Captain Broke to Captain Lawrence shows that duty
was a live motive in Nelson's times :—
" As the Chesapeake appears now ready for sea, I request you
will do me the favour to meet the Shannon with her, ship to ship,
to try the fortune of our respective flags. ... I entreat you,
sir, not to imagine that I am urged by mere personal vanity to
the wish of meeting the Chesapeake or that I depend only upon
your personal ambition for your acceding to this invitation. We
both have nobler motives. You will feel it as a compliment if
I say, that the result of our meeting may be the most grateful
service I can render to my country ; and I doubt not that you,
equally confident of success, will feel convinced, that it is only
by repeated triumphs in even combats that your little Navy can
now hope to console your country for the loss of that trade it
can no longer protect. Favour me with a speedy reply. We
are short of provisions and water, and cannot stay longer here."
" Duty," in its most perfect manifestation, as
personified seventeen years ago by the Japanese
Officer, lies in an extreme simplicity — in a total
absence of self-consciousness, pose or attempt to
make capital out of self. The officer who has to
give an order feels he has got to express to his
subordinates not his ideas but the wishes (as far as
he can imagine them) of the State. The private
soldier is not so much the captain's subordinate as
in other Armies. They may exchange cigarettes
"off duty." But "on duty" both are equally
State servants ; equally, in a sense, important ;
equally, in a sense, worthy of respect; equally, in
a sense, mere atoms of transient dust ; also, by
the will of the Emperor, it happens, at that moment,
to be the duty of one selected servant to point out
the path of duty to another selected servant.
DISCIPLINE 137
The slant-eyed children of the old pirates of the
Yellow Sea have been bred for duty just as short-
horn breeders have produced milk out of a breed
which used to aim only at beef. The dues of others ;
the privileges of others ; the sinking of the atom in
the mass ; these are what have been scrubbed into
their round little craniums from babyhood. The
British have bred all along for independence. " Our
noble selves " ; " those outsiders " ; " 'eave 'alf a
brick at that furriner " ; " this villa, I beg to inform
you, sir, is a castle," etc., etc., etc. So you may as
well flog a dead horse as boom duty to Britishers.
Vestiges remain. Selection Boards try to forget
their favourites and to do what is best for the Service.
But, in the Army generally, there is no doubt that
duty, as a word, has lost caste. An officer says,
" Oh, d — it, I'm on duty to-morrow ! " A soldier
" doing duty " is working away at the routines of
musketry, guards, parades, route marches, whereas
his comrade, the lucky man, is " struck off duty."
The word is worn out — tired. Nelson wrote it in
coloured bunting on the sky ; teachers scribble it
on to blackboards ; poets — " Stern Daughter of
the voice of God ! O Duty " : it never gets a rest.
We must try to console ourselves by the thought
that if the horizons of our Armies had been limited
to what was their sheer duty, their greatest victory
would have been their worst defeat. In war we have
all got to do more than our duty — and that is the
lesson the British individual must learn.
Individualism ? The Kaiser is a queer fellow to
quote — part devil, part dilettante, the people have
been taught to think him — but he had his points :
he knew and admired England ; he knew and
138 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
dreaded Russia. So it interests me now to recall
what he said to me about individualism. " Each
nation its own characteristics : the way to destroy
Russia is to encourage the individualism of the
peasants ; the way to destroy Britain is to throw
over the individualism which begot you." The
idea amused me almost as much as his other idea of
regenerating Ireland by making motor spirit out of
potatoes, but now that the bureaucratic dragon is
rattling its tail of three hundred thousand type-
writers, I begin to think there was something in it.
So much for discipline, but before pressing on to
training it will be better to give a couple of examples,
drawn from our own lives, of the fighting value of
" the main force of Armies." If ever there was a
war made to illustrate the value of discipline, that
war was fought in South Africa through 1899-1902.
At the start no one could class our organisation
higher than " indifferent." Discipline was admir-
able and, according to European or Indian Frontier
standards, units were highly trained in the arts of
reconnaissance, security, attack, defence, and mus-
ketry. The Boer Commandos were well enough
organised for the very special conditions of their
environment. They possessed no discipline. The
civil law created the Commando and handed it over
in the raw to the Field Cornet. As to training,
officers and men had been born and bred for the
unique purpose of veldt and kopje work over a vast
semi-desert, sub-continent in a way that made each
individual Boer the equal of half a dozen European,
American or Japanese soldiers on that particular
theatre. The rival organisations then may fairly
be struck out as more or less equally balanced, and
DISCIPLINE 139
the Boer superiority as an individual warrior in his
own country may be taken to be neutralised by our
great superiority of numbers. As to their morale,
the Boers were animated by an intense patriotism,
whereas there was nothing beyond esprit de corps,
love of adventure and medals to inspire our British
soldiers. Here, as I hope to make clear later, was an
immense advantage to the enemy. We have already
struck out organisation and training on either side
of the equation and so we are left now with morale
against us and only our discipline to the good :
our other advantages have been wiped out on the
cross-account and our discipline stands face to face
with the patriotism of the Boers.
Well, it was discipline won against patriotism.
If any Commando leader could have relied on any
number of his men to obey his orders exactly and
implicitly we should have lost that war and with it,
by now, after hideous Indian and Sudanese mutinies,
our Empire.
On the 6th January, 1900, at 1 p.m., the British,
worn out by close fighting for eleven consecutive
hours, were surprised by the sudden charge of a hand-
ful of the enemy supported by a heavy covering fire
and were knocked clean off an outpost of the defence
of Ladysmith called Waggon Hill Point. Discipline
rallied our fellows at the foot of the hill and led
them back, up rocks, through thorn bushes, to the
counter-attack. Just under the crest those who
were careless were picked off by the enemy ; those
who were more careful saw them and will not
easily forget that tiny forlorn hope of the Burgers ;
several, firing as fast as they could at the leaders of
the British rally ; several with their heads turned
140 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
the other way shouting to their own men close below
for God's sake to come up, that the " Point " was
captured and now had only to be held. A word of
command, a charge and within ten seconds these
heroes had bit the dust ; Waggon Hill was once
more in our hands and our grip even a little
extended.
Without discipline Waggon Hill had been lost!
From Waggon Hill Point, Waggon Hill proper
could be taken in reverse at fixed-sight range.
As Waggon Hill Point stood towards Waggon Hill,
so did Waggon Hill to Caesar's Camp. The whole
southern outwork of Ladysmith town was, therefore,
virtually gone and with it many of the lives and
all the stamina and resolution of the three thousand
men holding it. Whether this would have involved
the fall of Ladysmith next day no man living can
say. As a question of morale I myself firmly believe
that it would. But my point is that, at Waggon
Hill Point, several hundred Boers were lying amongst
the grass and rocks close below, within speaking
distance of those gallant leaders (not more than a
dozen) who had made good the summit ; several
thousand more crouched within rifle range. The
Point had been fairly rushed, though only by a
tiny forlorn hope, and it could have been held
against all of us (for our forces on the spot were
weak and very tired) had it only been possible for
the Boer leaders to order up their supports instead
of having to ask, to entreat, and to entreat, God
be praised, in vain.
My second example is chosen on a vice versa
principle from Elandslaagte. At that engagement
the Boers were pinned down to their position by a
DISCIPLINE 141
frontal attack which was not pressed home whilst
the main attack was thrown by a wide encircling
march against their left flank. After taking the
frontal attack'to its ground, the Infantry Commander
and his staff ran across and cut into the track of
the flank attack. Coming to a wire fence about
300 yards from the fight then raging with extreme
violence, he was painfully impressed by the long
lines of dead and wounded who lay on either side
of this obstacle. Close by him the Commanding
Officer of the Gordon Highlanders, who had been
severely wounded, was struggling to rejoin his
battalion, whilst a hospital orderly was endeavouring
to keep him back. As the Infantry Commander
and his staff paused to take in this sad scene, and
just as Captain Ronnie Brooke, his A.D.C., was
pointing out that the heavy loss must have been
due to the exact range of the wire fence being known
to the enemy — suddenly, one of these corpses, that
of a sergeant, started to its feet and began to run
towards the firing line. Another rose also, dashed
forward some twenty yards desperately and again
threw itself flat upon the ground. The mystery
was explained. Two-thirds of these men were
shamming dead. In a couple of minutes they were
running as fast as their legs would carry them
into the thick of the bullets. More were picked
up on the way and so the Commander got to close
quarters with something like a hundred rifles, not
at his back but in front of him. Once fairly plunged
into the melee these lads — who had merely been
stunned — paralysed — by their first introduction to
the Mauser bullet — fought as well as anybody else.
Had our soldiers been Boers, i.e., undisciplined men,
142 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
not one of them would have moved — why should
they ? — and a touch-and-go affair would have ended
in " go."
In this matter of discipline our British Army
stands second to none ; no, that is not putting it
strongly enough — it stands an easy first amongst
the nations, on firm ground well reconnoitred through
many hundred years. The Army insists on discipline
and our chief concern in these flabby times is to
safeguard the prestige of authority. To that end
the authority must be specially selected as possessing
qualities of judgment and impartiality. Also, once
the Commanding Officer l has been thus selected,
power must be placed at his disposal, not so much
for use but rather to be held in reserve as a deterrent.
Only let the Commander be secure in his prestige
and then the rank and file can be handled without
resort to punishment. Once they have got used to
it, to discipline, it will become less hard for them
to act as if they were brave than to behave frankly
like cowards ; less difficult to be orderly, punctual
and respectful than to be irregular, sluggardly or
insubordinate. Discipline thus administered and
accepted means certainly that the troops subject
to its influence will behave creditably under any
test fortune may have in store for them. The
1 On the 1st May, 1910, the powers of British Commanding
Officers were doubled at one stroke. The measure was sharply
opposed by estimable persons who honestly believed the best
way to create an Army was to administer it on civilian principles.
Horrible abuses were foretold. Up to date they have not occurred.
But, since then, great battles have been won by discipline and
our Empire has perhaps been saved by the higher standards
secured to the Army by Haldane. — IAN H.
DISCIPLINE 143
French nation were led straight into the jaws of
destruction by their denial of the lessons of history
on this matter. Some two years before the grand
debacle M. Jules Simon made in the French Chamber
the following inimitable appeal to all the enemies of
his country to be bold and to violate her with
impunity.
M. Jules Simon : " When I say that the Army we wish to
create is to be an Army of citizens and that it is to possess no
particle of military spirit, I am not making a concession, I am
making a declaration, and a declaration of which I am proud,
for it is in order that there should be no military spirit that we
wish to have an Army of citizens invincible at home and impo-
tent to carry war outside their own borders. ... If there is no
such thing as an Army 1 without a military spirit, I beg that
we may have an Army which is not an Army." (Laughter and
disturbance.)
M. Eugene Pelletan : " Down with the Pretorians ! " (Up-
roar.)
1 The same old story — the same old idea — was alive in England
but yesterday. No barrack square. Officers from the ranks.
A million bayonets invincible at home and not only " impotent "
for carrying out war outside their own borders, but legally
debarred from doing so. Observe the programmes of the various
Leagues and Associations. Read, also, this extract from the
Labour Leader of the last week in February, 1913 : —
" ALL OR NONE.
" We are glad it (the Territorial Force) has broken down.
We are for all or none. Military service is either a necessity or
it is not. We want no professional Army as a body of janissaries
to serve the master class against the people. Every soldier a
citizen and every citizen a soldier, or no soldiers at all."
As I have pointed out already in these essays there is no worse
motto than All or None. By getting All in this instance the
value of the Army as a defensive instrument against foreigners
would be 0 !
144 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
There is warning to us in these words — in these
rotten words — invincible at home and impotent
outside their own borders. For offence or for defence ;
on the line of march or in the bivouac ; overseas
or in England there is no such thing now, and never
was nor will be, as an Army good at home and bad
abroad. In the 'sixties M. Simon was talking already
as the Poles and Jews are talking in Glasgow to-day.
An Army is good everywhere or it is bad everywhere,
and the force that makes it insensible to the local
atmosphere is just atmosphere.
*****
Since this chapter was written I have come across
The Times Literary Supplement of 22nd April, 1920.
In this is a critique of the monumental work by
Major-General Sir Archibald Montgomery on the
work of the Fourth Army during the Battles of
Hundred Days. The critique, after giving reasons
for our victory, ends thus : —
" Above all, as General Montgomery with just emphasis
declares, British military discipline has no equal in the armies
of Europe, being based on mutual confidence and respect between
officers and men."
CHAPTER VII
TRAINING
Organisation and discipline have now been ex-
pounded, feebly perhaps, but faithfully. The one
gives order, proportion, method ; the other, cohesion,
confidence in comrades. Of the artificial, applied
characteristics of an Army there remains training ;
i.e., the course of instruction and exercises whereby
^/-confidence is imparted to the individual soldier
by letting him feel that his mind and body have
been well prepared to play their part with credit
in God's grand competitive examination of the
nations ; in the art of using space and time, ground
and weapons like a professional as opposed to an
amateur.
A variety of causes combine to give the public
an exaggerated idea of the value of training to the
rank and file of an Army. I say rank and file
because training, i.e., practice in handling masses
of men and material, is most precious to Generals
and Staff. They are aware of that fact and they
boom training. Subalterns, again, who are judged
mainly by their quickness and savvy in the field ;
the men who draw honour and profit from marks-
manship and skill at arms — nay, those numerous
students who study war by its battles, or the Great
145 L
146 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
General Staff themselves who deal with and live
by training ; all these are in the habit of speaking
as if training was soldiering and a trained band an
Army.
In other words, training, by being the most
obvious of the attributes of an Army, has come
to have its importance overrated. As a wholesome
corrective, therefore, it is desirable to bear in mind
that, after all, the Afridi tribesman or the Red
Indian of the prairie is better trained to fight over
his own ground than any regular soldier : and yet,
regular soldiers defeat these partisans with ease !
Marshal Bugeaud, most practical of nineteenth
century commanders, has said that the technical
training of soldiers can be compassed in three
months, and this is the same Bugeaud who declared
that three years was not long enough to create those
soldiers " loving the colours, confident in their
chiefs and in their comrades to the right and left
of them . . . who form Armies fit to gain battles at
the outset of a campaign." " All apprenticeship "
(meaning thereby training of infantry) " can be
got through in a few months," is the dictum of
another well-known Continental authority.
As a Commander gains experience he realises that
of battles, real and sham, it may truly be said, you
never know your luck, but that the best way to be
lucky is to be plucky. He accepts the battle with
joyous relief as the final test of his troops and of
himself ; he knows he must be prepared to be judged
and to stand or fall by that test ; yet, he knows
also all the time that battles are rare events and
that, meanwhile, the Army lives, marches, works,
and has its being by organisation and discipline.
TRAINING 147
Further, after his first general action he will be
surprised, if he thinks it over, to recollect how very
great a part organisation and discipline, or their
absence, had to say to success or failure.
Organisation in the guise of internal economy
gave the men a cup of hot coffee before they entered
upon the thirty hours' struggle on the heights— a
cup of coffee without which their skill at arms would
certainly have failed them. Discipline enabled him
to control his fire even in the tumult and confusion
of the night attack — discipline which saved the
situation when the men had begun to use their
" training " to shoot one another.
All my own bias is in favour of training. The
best energies of my life have been devoted to fire
tactics and the cult of marksmanship. The signifi-
cance of our own lives is strangely hidden away
from us. Since the Ingogo when Sir George Colley,
the British Commander, distracted to see his young
troops missing a whole Commando of Mounted
Boers at close range, seized a rifle from the hands
of a soldier and exclaiming, " Good God, you can't
hit a haystack ! " shot one of the enemy ; since
the battle of Majuba Hill, when the British lost two-
thirds of their force and the Boers only lost one
man ; when I myself was crippled for life as a
penalty for being a bit slow in taking aim ; ever
since those days I have preached and fought and
begged and prayed for musketry. Were my work
to be remembered after me for a few years, I fondly
hoped it might be in connection with the marksman-
ship of the British Army, yet now that my member-
ship of the Large Black Pig Society gives me some
leisure for reflection, I do really believe my one
148 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
year's work as Adjutant-General accomplished more
through the media of organisation and discipline
than my lifetime spent at tactics and training.
Organisation and discipline are deeper things than
training, and I call to mind the first order issued
by Bonaparte to the Army he was going to lead
across the Alps to the superb victory of Marengo :
" In every demi-brigade, to-morrow, the conscripts
must be made to fire several shots, so that they
may know with which eye to take aim and how
to load their musket." Once again, if training
was supreme, how could any regular troops hold
their own for a moment in the hills against the
Afridis. We do not dominate them by superior
training. If a British soldier or a Sikh gave a
lifetime to it he could never use the terrain of the
mountain-side, never conceal himself, never shoot,
never move, advance, retire, charge, like an Afridi!
Organisation and discipline are the weapons of
civilisation, and these, handled with wisdom and
courage, win as against training.
The following microscopic, " one man " instance
of failure to rise to the occasion may enable an
opinion to be formed of the relative values of
training versus other military qualities when the
soldier finds himself at bay upon the edge of eternity.
A raw, young militiaman went out on his first trek
in 1900 and, with the rest of his company, held a
ridge against the enemy. When the company had
to " git " he was left behind because he had fallen
fast asleep behind a rock and could not be found.
In the evening he made his way back to camp,
but it was deserted. The column had marched
bag-and-baggage away. So he decided to stay
TRAINING 149
where he was for the night, and fell asleep again in
one of the trenches on the perimeter. Early next
morning, when he awoke, three Boers were within
a few yards of him searching the empty camping
ground for dropped rounds of ammunition. Their
rifles were slung and they had no suspicion a British
soldier was within miles. He, the local representa-
tive of the greatest, most famous Empire of history,
was armed ; ready ; and under cover. The game was
in his hands and so, he stood up — and surrendered !
Afterwards, under examination, the lad turned out
to be destitute of any soldierly virtue. He was not
a conscientious objector, but it had never occurred to
him that he could possibly do anything but surrender.
No amount of tactical training would have made
this product of our State educational system —
this unfortunate militiaman — into a soldier ! All
that the best instruction over ground might have
taught him could not have put him into a better
position, relatively to his enemy, than that in which
he proved himself so impotent. He did possess an
elementary knowledge of musketry and the range
was so short that he could not have missed. Had
he been a first-class marksman, perhaps his morale
might have been heartened by the fact. Realisa-
tion of skill at arms may reflect itself in courage.
Thus a bad shot requires great pluck if he is to track
up a wounded tiger, whereas a man who can make
a right and left every time at the running deer gains
a certain self-confidence and need not put it all
upon his nerves. Still, having said so much for
training, it must be confessed that it was some-
thing deeper than lack of training which was amiss
with this misfire in the field. Neither his mother
150 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
nor his school teacher had ever prepared him for
so stern an ordeal — the fate of many another.
Six months under a keen Captain, that's what
he wanted ; something to put some spirit into
him ; something to give him a notion of what a
great nation expects of those who wear its uniform
and represent it amongst foreigners and enemies.
Another " one man " instance from South Africa :
when day broke in the morning of 27th February,
1881, the handful of British soldiers and sailors
who had climbed the precipitous flanks of Majuba
Hill were greatly and justly elated. The key to
the enemy's position was held in their hands just as
firmly as if they had surprised the citadel of a besieged
city. From the lofty summit towards which during
the whole long night they had been climbing they
now looked down upon the Boer laagers from the
rear and it was plain to everyone that the enemy
had been out -manoeuvred. All that remained was
for the main force at Mount Prospect to advance
and "make good."
A little later and the moral atmosphere was
changed. Nothing had happened ; nothing of
importance. The Boers were still down below ;
we were still up on top. Only a single shot had been
fired by the enemy, a very long shot for those days
of 1,000 yards, mortally wounding Commander
Romilly who had climbed to the top of a mound
to get a better view ; clearly the shot had been
aimed. Our fellows could not shoot like that. The
whole 370 or whatever their number was — myself
amongst them — felt depressed.
Striking examples of the triumph of training
are not easy to give, first, because training does not
TRAINING 151
in point of fact tell so much in deciding campaigns
as is usually imagined ; secondly, because what
seems to be good training, according to tradition
and the accepted standards, may prove disastrous
when it is put to the test against a fresh enemy,
or after a long peace. We ought in this summer of
1921 to be hard at work evolving an entirely new
system of training for an entirely new Army. We
are not doing anything. Well, some other powers
may be doing something, and if they do evolve a
new model battalion it will probably prove capable
of knocking spots off a brigade organised and trained
as were the brigades which wound up the war.
Volley-firing in its day and place was very superior
to independent firing. Every volley which was
fired by order was a reassurance of the grip of disci-
pline over the ranks and, in a regular battle, the
collective method had been proved over and over
again to be the more deadly. But the day came
when it was out of place. At Monongahela, Brad-
dock kept his men in their ranks and made them
fire regular volleys into the forest to their front,
whilst all around them, from behind every tree
trunk, Indians and French voyageurs were blazing
away into their exposed mass. The whizz of a
bullet brings sense into the thickest skull and some
of the red-coats, taking a leaf out of the Redskins'
book, got under cover and were beginning to make
a fight of it. But to Braddock this was blasphemy
against the drill book x ; an outrage upon all prin-
1 At Meerut, in the 'eighties, a Senior Officer gave his views on
fire tactics to the Battalion Commanders. On leaving, one of
them, much scandalised, said to a companion, " He spoke
against the Book ! " meaning thereby the Drill Book. A
152 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
ciples of training. Death before dishonour. With
oaths the skirmishers were recalled to their role
of being targets in the middle of the ring and after
standing it a while — they bolted !
The part played by training is more easily disen-
tangled from the skein of the incidents of a sea-fight
than it is from encounters which take place on dry
land. Inanimate things and mechanical appliances,
with the handling thereof, have counted until now
for far more on a ship than in bivouacs, in column
of route or in attack or retreat over terra -fir ma.
Therefore, also, the part played by practice in this
art of handling things (which includes the ship
herself as well as her gear) becomes more vital to
a Navy than to an Army. Even in gunnery and
musketry, where it might be imagined conditions
were equal, high training is more essential to the
bluejacket. There is no use drawing a bow at a
venture on the high seas, though we have Biblical
testimony as to its occasional value on shore. Thus,
a sailor misses his ship and there's no chance of
anything else except perhaps a whale. A soldier
misses a Corporal and, a mile away, hits a General.
A very good case for training is furnished by the
famous fight between the Shannon and the Chesa-
peake on the 1st June, 1813.
" And as the war they did provoke,
We'll pay them with our cannon ;
The first to do it will be Broke,
In the gallant ship the Shannon."
Presbyterian Divine of sixty years ago, defending the Holy Bible
against an atheist, could not have displayed more concern for
the finality of his doctrine than did this Old Boy (who afterwards
attained to most respectable heights in his career) for a compila-
tion by British plagiarists.
TRAINING 153
Certainly, Broke was the first "to do it," and
none too soon either ! In 1812 our Navy was at the
zenith of its glory. Never, since the. days of the
Carthaginians, had the Empire of the Sea more
splendidly been made good. Impressed English
sailors had met Continental conscript sailors and
had beaten them wherever they did meet them.
"Between 1793 . . . and May, 1812 . . . out of 200
actions between single ships, we were only defeated
five times, and on each of those five occasions our
vessels were of inferior force to the enemy." l But
British frigates " manned by pressed men " * were
now to meet those crews which had " enlisted freely
in the American ships." 2
In the first seven months of the war five " single
ship " contests took place in succession between
voluntary service Americans and pressed English-
men (three frigate contests and two sloop encounters)
and in each of them the British were whipped. We
have a perfect genius for forgetting the apprentice-
ship of defeats through a regular series of which it
is our practice to emerge , in virtue of our tenacity,
to the victories embroidered on our colours. Often
the defeats were the memorable happenings, the
famous victories mere walks over for lucky dogs
who came in at the end when the backs of the enemy
had been broken : no matter ! The defeats are
so clean wiped off the national slate that only by
digging into dusty old chronicles and newspapers is
it possible to realise the prodigious effect of naval
actions which caused The Times to commence a
leader with the words " Good God ! " Here indeed
1 Captain H. J. G. Garbett, R.N.
2 Clowes, History of the Royal Navy.
154 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
was a shrewd set-back for the politicians ; ignorant,
then as now, of the human heart and its bearing
upon battles, they were dumbfounded to see their
wonderfully disciplined crews strike their flags to a
rabble of Americans, many of them British deserters,
just because they happened to have the free will
to fight. Then, at last, on the top of so much
depression ; so much (in the words of The Times)
" disgrace to our naval character," came the perfect
summer's day when, in a setting which must have
thrilled even a conscientious objector, the Chesapeake
of 50 guns and 440 men met the Shannon of 330
men and 50 guns l ; when the flotilla of pleasure
boats put out from Boston to see the great capture,
and when —
" Brave Broke he waved his sword
And says he, my lads aboard."
But it was not bravery — it was not the sword a that
won this victory of conscripts against volunteers.
The Americans were equally brave, as their casualties
showed. Nor was it discipline, although the hearts
of these Englishmen on board the Shannon had been
won to a deeper, truer discipline than compulsory
1 " They were tolerably well matched in size, the Chesapeake
being only 70 tons larger than her antagonist and her broadside
only 50 pounds heavier. The greatest disparity was in their
respective crews, the American force out-numbering the. British
by 110 men." — Arcadian Recorder, January 16th, 1813.
* " Nor was the American commander (Lawrence) inferior to
his opponent in courage and weight of character. He had a short
time previously, while in command of the U.S. sloop-of-war
Hornet, captured, after a short and gallant contest, the sloop-of-
war Peacock, one of the finest ships of her class in the British
Navy." — Arcadian Recorder.
TRAINING 156
service usually reaches by the fact that their
commander was" beloved for gentleness and equani-
mity." 1 No ; it was training did it ; training in
gunnery and marksmanship. Broke' s own modest
dispatch speaks of his crew and of " the tremendous
precision of their fire." From the day in which he
joined her " the Shannon began to feel the effect
of her Captain's proficiency as a gunner." a Whereas
some British warships did not fire at targets once
in three years, Captain Broke trained his men on
the guns every day for one and a half hours and
twice a week he had ball practice both of big guns
and musketry. Any man making a bull's-eye got
a pound of tobacco. It was his custom suddenly
to heave an empty cask overboard and order the
first gun that could be brought to bear upon it to
sink it — quite an irregular sort of fellow it may be
noticed. And now see the result of all this training
in action.
On an afternoon of dreamlike beauty, on the
1st June, 1813, " the Shannon with her foresail
brailed up, and her maintop-sail braced flat and
shivering, surged slowly through the quiet seas,
while the Chesapeake came down with towering
canvas, and the white water breaking under her
bow." " On board the Shannon the captain of the
fourteenth gun, William Mindham, had been ordered
not to fire till it bore into the second main-deck
port forward. At 5.50 it was fired." At 5.53
" the men in the Shannon's tops could hardly see
the deck of the American frigate through the cloud
of shivered and splintered wreck that was flying
1 Gentleman's letter in Naval Chronicle, 1813.
a James.
166 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
across it. The quarter-deck of the Chesapeake
was clean swept by a storm of round shot and
musket balls. Man after man was killed at the wheel
including the fourth Lieutenant, the Master and
the boatswain. " Six minutes after the first gun
had been fired the Chesapeake 's jib-sheet and foretop-
sail tie were shot away," and " at 6 o'clock the two
frigates fell on board one another." Broke then
" stepped from the Shannon's gangway rail on to
the muzzle of the Chesapeake' s aftermost carronade
and thence over the bulwark on to her quarter-
deck followed by about twenty men." After a
struggle the quarter-deck was cleared, when up
on to it rushed the Americans from the main-
deck. " Captain Broke was still leading his men
with the same brilliant personal courage he had all
along shown. Attacking the first American who
was armed with a pike, he parried a blow from it
and cut down the man ; attacking another, etc.,
etc." " At 6.5, just fifteen minutes after the first
gun had been fired, and not five minutes after Captain
Broke had boarded, the colours of the Chesapeake
were struck."
Losses : Chesapeake — 61 killed ; 85 wounded.
Shannon — 33 killed ; 50 wounded.
" Beyond question, Broke' s men were far more
skilful in the handling of the guns ; but this was
only one of the factors which went to make up the
victory." l Naturally. Still, it was a prime factor,2
1 These extracts are taken from Colonel Theodore Roosevelt's
account in Clowes' History of the Royal Navy.
2 The Shannon scored 362 body hits to the 158 hits made
by the Chesapeake.
TRAINING 157
and this precis of a fine story has been given just
to make that very fact quite clear.
The battles between Suffren and Hughes in Eastern
waters must also be put to the credit of British
training. In strategy and tactics Suffren was always
the better man, yet he never once won, because, in
sheer training (i.e. seamanship ; the art of handling
ships in combination ; fleet drill, in fact), Hughes
was his master. Sufifren had always depreciated
fleet drill, but fleet drill ended by depreciating
him.
Agincourt, won essentially by the application of
new tactical principles, owed its completeness and
brilliancy to marksmanship ; i.e. to training.
Neither in their lineage nor in their skill in the
tournament was there much to choose between the
military virtues of the French and English men-at-
arms. On this occasion the spirit of the French
ran high ; the English certainly thought they were
going to be beaten. And small wonder ! Ten
thousand islanders (6,000 archers; 1,000 knights
and men-at-arms and 2,000 to 3,000 infantry) were
confronted by 50,000 Frenchmen. The French
attacked and had all the advantage of the initiative.
" When from a meadow by,
Like a storm suddenly,
The English archery
Struck the French horses." l
Result: English losses — 13 men-at-arms. French
losses — 5,000 knights of noble birth killed ; 1,000
more taken prisoners. An indefinite but enormous
1 Ballad of Agincourt,
158 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
number of men-at-arms, infantry and cross-bowmen
killed and wounded.
Frederick the Great owed some of his finest
victories to training (i.e. to perfect drill ; lines
formed from column of route without confusion,
gap or overlap ; arms handled with rapidity and
precision : volleys fired as if the triggers of a batta-
lion had been pulled by one forefinger). His Army
was capable of marching right across the front of
the embattled enemy and of then deploying and
rolling up that enemy's distant flank before they
could conform to his movement, which, by the
way, is precisely what our own infantry did at
Elandslaagte. Here, also, the root of the victory
must be sought for in the idea, but this idea had
to be carried out by the agency of soldiers and it
must be remembered that, as his opponents would
be working on interior lines, Frederick dared not
have adventured (any more than our infantry Com-
mander at Elandslaagte) had he not possessed
confidence in the marked superiority in quickness
and handiness imparted to his troops by their
training. His famous oblique order attack was still
being practised when I joined the Army, and has
been the means of drawing down more curses upon
my head than a youth of this new, polite world is
likely to hear in his life-time. We used to advance
in echelon from the right or left of a line, whereby
one flank was refused whilst the other outflanked
the enemy. So the matador fascinates the bull
with his gaudy flag whilst he manosuvres himself
into position to destroy his lumbering adversary
by one desperate lunge. The " oblique order "
was the highest perfection of drill in action. So
TRAINING 159
long as its adversaries trusted also to training, it
triumphed.1
In all history, the cleanest- cut case to be put to
the credit of training seems that of the Spanish,
Libyan, Numidian, Gallic and every other sort of
species of mercenary who fought under Hannibal
during the second Punic War ; and be it understood
that in praising the training of the Carthaginian
troops I detract hi no wise from the undying fame
of the greatest of the Carthaginians, a fame not
second to Napoleon's, than whom no Commander
in the whole of history has owed more to the heroes
he had the privilege to lead.2
Hannibal, crossing the Alps into Italy, got there
with 20,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and a few ele-
phants of whom only one survived the December
frosts. Starting with these at his back he went
near to destroying the proud Republic of Rome
which, a few years previously, had mustered over
700,000 conscripts. What number of these were
actually thrown into line of battle against Hannibal
no one now knows. We are told of enormous
superiority of force. We believe that at Cannae
the two Roman Consuls offered battle with 90,000
1 Yet, whenever the French brought fiery human souls against
these clever combinations carried out with clockwork puppets,
the oblique, and every sort of order, very quickly resolved itself
into the order of devil-take-the-hindmost. Vide Chapter on
the morale of Armies.
a Anyone anxious to pursue this point and to realise tho
incalculable assistance it was to the Corsican to be able to base
his calculations upon the indomitable spirit which animated each
or any French detachment should read (if he can read crabbed
Austrian German) that admirable work, Oeist und Stoff, by C,
von B k,
160 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
legionaries of whose lives Hannibal took toll to the
extent of 50,000. We get a glimpse of the Romans
standing at bay in their own country against this
band of voluntarily enlisted professionals with
21 legions (over 200,000 men), of whom some 80,000
directly faced Hannibal himself whilst 20,000
remained to cover the everlasting City from a coup
de main in case he evaded or overthrew the forces
opposed to him in the field. We know that later
on the Republic was so far put to it that she had
to create a Legion of liberated slaves,1 and those
who will consider this act in all its bearings, political,
social and military, both at the moment and for
the future, will gain some idea of her desperate
straits. The facts seem at first sight incomprehen-
sible. For the Roman name stood high. What a
testimonial had not the famous Pyrrhus granted
the legionaries in perpetuity ! Only sixty-three
years before the meteor star of Hannibal rose sinister
over the marshes of the Campagna, Pyrrhus saw the
Legions form line to the front from column of route
after they had crossed a river and, astonished, had
exclaimed, " In war, at any rate, these barbarians are
not barbarians " : or again (when he saw the Roman
dead lying with their wounds in front), " If these were
my soldiers, or if I were their General, we should con-
quer the world." The organisation of the Roman
Army was excellent. The composition of the type of
legion encountered by Hannibal, with its volites,
kastati, triarii,2 had been scientifically thought out.
1 Jahns, Heeresverfassungen und Volkerleben.
2 The Hastatus wore a breast-plate, brazen greaves and a
brazen helmet with a plume of black or scarlet one and a half
feet high. His defensive arm was an oblong shield and he carried
TRAINING 161
Cavalry, slingers and light-armed auxiliaries were
apportioned with method and with ingenuity. The
supply, transport and ordnance services were rudi-
mentary according to our notions but advanced
beyond anything until then witnessed by the world.
Discipline, considering the conditions, was wonder-
fully good. " Rome's greatness," says Ratzenhofer,
" depended upon the solidarity of her people with
the State." Direct action by a section of the
citizens was at that epoch unthinkable. The Roman
character was naturally disciplined and lent itself
not only to making laws but to observing them
when made. I have said " considering the con-
ditions," and here we must rub our eyes and
wonder if we are awake when we reflect that at the
outbreak of war these famous Roman Legions took
the field with less military training and fewer
chances of applying military discipline or gain-
ing military cohesion than our pre-war Territorial
forces.
In peace-time, the two Legions for each Consul
were levied fresh each year ; i.e. they would consist
of one year's service men instead of as in the case
of the Territorials, four years' service men. During
their year they were often not embodied at all.
They were, in fact, very much a paper organisation ;
much what our Territorial Force would be if they
were compulsorily enrolled on the outbreak of war
without having had the chance of practising any
preliminary battalion or camp training. They would
have learnt to handle their arms and, in the majority
a cut-and-thrust sword and two javelins, one light, the other
massive. The Triarius carried a spear instead of the javelins. —
POLYBIUS.
162 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
of cases, would have acquired a little skill volun-
tarily, as school cadets, from some ex-legionary of
the wars. Of course, a legion embodied throughout
a long war by degrees became professional. Of
course, also, for a long time after a war, the legions,
though freshly raised, would contain veterans hi the
ranks of the Triarii or sometimes perhaps even
amongst its Principes. Just so our Territorial Force
did still contain a sprinkling of veterans trained hi
the South African War as late even as 1914. But,
in normal tunes, the old compulsory service Militia
were half-trained ; a different force in that respect
from the voluntary service legions of highly- trained,
long-service professionals created afterwards by
Marius as an instrument of Empire.
So the Roman Armies facing Hannibal at the
beginning of the war were well organised, moderately
disciplined and collectively untrained. Except that
they were compulsorily enlisted, had no annual
fortnight in camp and had only a quarter the length
of service, they were very like our pre-war Terri-
torials. But our Territorials used to be told once
a week or oftener that they could neither march,
shoot, nor obey orders, that the whole Force was a
" farce " and that they would take to their heels
at the sight of a foreign uniform ; whereas the
Legionaries were patted on the back by what corres-
ponded hi those days to the Daily Mail, the Military
Clubs and the Flappers.
They did consider themselves fine fellows ; very
much so. Not yet had they encountered the Numi-
dian Horse. The cloud of dust upon the flank of
the line of march drawing swiftly near and dis-
charging a shower of javelins ere it sparkled out
TRAINING 163
into a row of glittering lance points. Yes, down
there by the Ticinus the Romans first felt fear :
they felt — they recognised — their masters. Till then,
their morale had held up its head under every trial.
The whole of the earlier history of Rome is one
running comment upon the boldness and self-
confidence of her soldiers, no matter what the odds.
Arms of those days offered an immense margin for
regular practice ; i.e. for professionalism : they
offered small margin for new ideas — for the shatter-
ing surprise of needle-gun versus muzzle-loader.
Always excepting the elephants. The Punic equiva-
lent to Napoleon's massed artillery was the charge
of a hundred elephants in double rank. The solid
earth trembled beneath the onrush of these monsters.
Empires, too, they trembled like aspen leaves in
suspense as the enormous mass of bronze-clad
Tuskers, maddened with wine and incense, bore
down upon the field at a long, shambling trot. From
each mighty chest projected a gigantic spear, and
flashing steel scimitars were lashed to the ivory
tusks. Indigo painted ears cocked forward, writhing
trunks smeared vermilion, tusks festooned with
entrails, cleaving their way through the cohorts,
the elephants of Hannibal transfixed the young
soldiers in horror until they were transfixed indeed
by the rain of fiery darts pouring down from the
leathern howdahs.
Here was the great set piece of Carthaginian
tactics — the idea — the invention. Whether in
Sicily, Africa or Spain, the manoeuvre was ever to
draw on the enemy ; to envelop them and pen
them in, until, jammed together in that awful
crush of battle, they could hardly use their sword
164 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
arms, much less open out a passage. Then the
Mahouts, dressed like Indians1 and crowned with
diadems of feathers, lifted restraining hooks from
their monstrous chargers. Urged on with raucous
cries in that strange elephant language still in use
though its origin is lost in primeval mists ; kicked
violently behind their blue-stained, flapping ears ;
"Invincible," "Victory," "Thunderer," "Swal-
low " 2 and all the Tusker company began, with
many a shrill trumpet, slowly to advance. How
small and weak the legionaries must have felt as
they faced them : and then came the crash : tramp-
ling faces into smudges with their feet, smashing
chests with their knees, transfixing with their tusks,
strangling with their trunks, obliterating, disem-
bowelling, dismembering ; on swept the elephants ;
so passed the wrath of Baal over the stricken fields
of war.
The war galley and the war elephant were prime
factors in the tactics of the Carthaginians. Only,
in Italy they were wanting ! The Romans had
command of the sea,3 the elephants had died of
cold. These priceless creatures brought from India
across Egypt via Gibraltar to Spain and thence by
1 They were, actually, Indians except in Egypt. The Indian
elephant also was generally used, being braver than his African
relative.
1 Actual names of war elephants unearthed by Flaubert.
3 Note here an instructive point ; one of the very few in which
modern civilisation has altered a fundamental war factor. The
Carthaginians started with absoluta command of the sea. The
Romans, starting from copies of a Carthaginian galley, created
a navy during the time of war and then by boarding tactics
wrested away from Carthaginia naval supremacy. How nearly
did submarines make history repeat itself !
TRAINING 165
some miracle of effort over the Pyrenees and Alps
where, amidst glaciers and precipices, the startled
chamois beheld again the Mastodon, and so, through
terrible battles with hill tribes : leaving a trail of
huge carcasses to taint the air of pine forests for
months ; they had perished and one only, only one,
emerged upon the Lombardian Plain. Better had
it been for the bold little band of invaders had they
never learnt to enlist the brute force of nature in
its most terrible manifestations to aid them in the
battle. No surprise superiority could be theirs.
They were in the position of modern troops cam-
paigning against spearmen when they run out of
ammunition and have to meet cold steel with their
bayonets : they were in the position of the British
General who has based his plan upon a tank attack
and finds he has run out of petrol.
The leader then ? Yes, he is a prime factor, but
here I am writing only of the leader's instrument,
the Army. Were we to speak of Hannibal it would
be with awe ; awe of what he did, for we only know
for certain of one thing that he said.1 Of Hamilcar,
his father,2 it has been written, " I saw him go by
in his great cloak, with his arms raised, towering
above the dust cloud like an eagle flying beside the
cohorts ; at his very nod they closed up or rushed
forward ; the crowd swept us towards one another ;
he looked me in the face. I felt a chill in my heart
1 When he heard a sophist explaining the art of war to a royal
personage he remarked, " It is all very clever, but it is all non-
sense."
2 When, at the age of twenty-six, Hannibal became Commander-
in-Chief, " the old soldiers thought they beheld the youthful
Hamilcar once more." — LIVY.
166 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
as though a sword had pierced it." x This was the
blood and breeding of the hero, and has not Napoleon
himself declared, " It was Hannibal, not the Cartha-
ginian Army, who made the Republic of Rome
tremble at its gates." Hannibal stood as far above
Alexander the Great as Napoleon stands above
Charles XII.
When Hannibal already led armies, Alexander
had been gone but one hundred years. Doubtless,
the Carthaginian often spoke of the great King and
admired his prowess as we to-day admire Napoleon.
But of those three names of dread and wonder,
a Trinity of War Gods, Hannibal's looms largest.
Alexander inherited an Army made for him by his
father. His men were Europeans, the enemy they
overthrew Asiatics. Eliminate fire-arms ; give us
the good old weapons ; a British division to-
morrow, with the right sort of leader at their head,
would repeat the performance of the ten thousand.
Napoleon we know and his genius. Yet, until
we wore out the spirit of his men, they towered
everywhere like Gods above the dull slaves of
Feudalism they encountered. No such fortune was
Hannibal's ! If ever 'it could be said of mortal
leader, alone he did it, that might be said of the
Carthaginan. Only, it can never, never, never be
said !
We British should be the last to deprecate leader-
ship. For is it not a fact that out of a population
numbering a quarter of the inhabitants of the
globe, we could in 1900 dig out only an old man ;
one small old man : survivor of unhappy, half-
forgotten wars : one out of 400,000,000 to bring
1 Flaubert.
TRAINING 167
purpose and energy to bear upon our troops who
were wandering along, sheep without a shepherd,
towards that Valley of Humiliation which borders,
it may be remembered, upon the Valley of the
Shadow of Death. There was no one else to do it
but Bobs ; little Bobs ; but he himself could not
have done it without foothold and an instrument.
There was the nation standing firm behind him ;
in front of him there was the Army eager above
everything to be used.
Despite every wish to give full weight to the
genius of the Commander, we must fain recognise
that there are immutable bounds set to what any
individual can achieve. We know what a Lee can
do against the good, ordinary General ; yet — there
are the appointed limits — as Gettysburg showed.
A thrust is well-timed and deadly ; the over-tasked
blade breaks in the hand of the master. The stroke
remains a master stroke ; it did not penetrate, that
was all ! Records we have, indeed, in plenty of
Europeans meeting and defeating Asiatics out-
numbering them ten-fold, twenty-fold. The greater
their number, the more they got in one another's
way, the more of them were killed. But the series
of victories in which Hannibal, between the Ticinus
and Cannae, killed or captured in battle 120,000
Romans l and in the fifteen years of his Italian cam-
paigns not less than 300,000 — these victories were
won with a mixed Spanish, Lybian force of veteran
infantry 20,000 strong and 6,000 Numidian cavalry
supplemented and expanded as the war went on by
auxiliaries certainly not so good as the legionaries.
A soldier can hardly write of these victories and
1 Jahns, Heere&verfas&ungen und Volkerleben.
168 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
defeats as simply as the history books which smooth
away all complications in one glib sentence by saying
the second Punic War was a contest between the
individual genius of Hannibal and the combined
energies of the Roman people. The Armies had
something to say to the decision, and those two
Armies were of totally different temper and com-
plexion. We have seen that the Roman legions of
that period were, at the outbreak of a war, well
organised, moderately disciplined and quarter
trained. They were raised by compulsion and,
therefore, it is safe to suppose that (allowing for
the martial type of population evolved by Roman
traditions and Roman education) one-fifth of them
would rather have stayed at home. The Cartha-
ginian mercenaries were, as citizens, immeasurably
the inferiors of their adversaries. " The thief
expelled from his tribe, the parricide wandering
about the roads, the criminal pursued by the Gods
as the author of sacrilege — all who were desperate
or starving — strove to reach the port where the
recruiting officer of Carthage was enlisting soldiers." l
Against this we may take it that their organisation
was extraordinary, or they could not have marched
*" The Carthaginian Army was an assemblage of the most
opposite races of the human species from the farthest points of
the globe. Hordes of half-naked Gauls were ranged next to
companies of white-clothed Iberians, and savage Ligurians next
to the far-travelled Nasomones and Lotophagi. Carthaginians
and Phcenici-Africans formed the centre ; while innumerable
troops of Numidian horsemen, taken from all the tribes of the
Desert, swarmed about on unsaddled horses and formed the
wings ; the van was composed of Balearic slingers ; and a line
of colossal elephants, with their Ethiopian guides, formed as it
were a chain of moving fortresses before the whole Army." —
HEEBKN.
TRAINING 169
from New Carthage in Spain to the plains of Northern
Italy ; crossing the Pyrenees and the Alps ; subduing
and incorporating whole provinces by the way ;
in the five months occupied by the transit. This
feat alone stamps Hannibal as a magician and his
Army as a miracle. Discipline was stern. It was
death to drink a cup of wine in the Carthaginian
Camp, wherein " the order and silence which reigned
throughout were alarming." But it was in training
that the best armies of the Carthaginians excelled.
The troops were unmercifully drilled. Swiftness in
execution and cohesion of shock were the ideas, but
of the detail, even the German pedants and book-
worms can tell us very little. Finally, the men
were volunteers. Whatever their former crimes,
however low they had sunk, each of them loved
war, otherwise, why not choose some other way of
escape from the vengeance of God or man than the
Army of Hannibal ?
Take the battle of the Thrasymene Lake. The
Consul Flaminius lay at Fcesulse in his camp.
Hannibal trailed his coat close by and drew him
out of his covert in hot pursuit. The road along
which Hannibal seemed to fly ran between rocky
hills on the one hand and the waters of the lake on
the other. As the head of the Roman pursuing
force was about to debouch into the open it was
held up by a detachment. At that moment the
main body was charged in flank by the bulk of the
Punic Army. That Army had not passed through
the defile, but had lain in ambush on the heights
whence they had watched the legionaries march in
column of route across their front. Was there no
reconnaissance ; were there no flanking patrols ?
170 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
If so, the training of the Romans was one degree
worse than seems probable. Were the subordinate
ranks of the Carthaginians able to let these light-
armed detachments almost step upon them without
betraying themselves, or did they manage noise-
lessly to capture or kill every one ? If so, one
more point to the credit side of the training of the
force. Anyway, we all know the result. The
Roman Army was wiped out of existence.
Simple — is it not ? Just the sort of trap one
party of Baden Powell's scouts might lead another
into. Any ordinary schoolboy could conceive the
clever trick ! Yet, stay. Is there not some one
who has said, in war all is simple, but it is the simple
that is difficult ? Yes — the same man who said,
"It is enough to tell a French soldier a thing is
difficult to find it is quite easy."
I have marched miles upon miles with a Japanese
division following a Russian division along a narrow
road between a river on one side and a mountain-
side covered with brushwood on the other. Why
was there not a new battle of Thrasymene ? Was
it because there was no Russian Hannibal ? Well,
certainly there was no Russian Hannibal. Yet, if
there had been he could not have fought over again
the battle of Lake Thrasymene because his troops
were not fit to carry out that staggering coup.
There were no troops in Europe in 1914 fit to do
what the troops of Hannibal did for him at the
Thrasymene Lake. The pick of our British over-
seas battalions ; a certain number of French Colonial
battalions ; a few Gurkha battalions or the trans-
frontier companies of some Punjabi regiments ;
otherwise none in the world.
TRAINING 171
At Majuba in 1881 a mixed detachment scaled
at night a lofty, rugged height whence, when day
broke, they saw the Boer laager at their feet and
saw, too, that they had taken the enemy's entrench-
ments in reverse. The idea attributed to our
General (it was never given to the troops, so no
one can say for certain) was that we were to remain
thus hidden about a mile from the Boer right flank,
behind it and overlooking it, until a force attacked
them in front when we would rush down, take them
between two fires and roll them up. A very pretty
plan, quite on the Hannibal lines.
Before our very eyes, the unsuspecting Boers lit
their fires and drank their morning coffee. Before
our very eyes patrols mounted their horses, their
wives bustling about them as they left the laager
and rode out in various directions. One of them
passed beneath us at close range. Half-way round
the hill they rode chatting gaily, and hi another
minute they would have been gone — when suddenly,
bang, bang, bang — from our lines. One Boer horse
killed. The rest galloping away with their riders
crouching down to offer as small a mark as possible
to the wild hail of bullets which followed them. The
whole Boer camp in a turmoil like a hive of angry
bees and the projected battle of Lake Thrasymene
had gone wrong ! And yet, some of these British
soldiers were of the Carthaginian type ; long-service
professionals, although it is fair to say it was
not they who began the shooting. Sir George
Pomeroy Colley would have brought off a second
Thrasymene Lake victory had his troops been as
well trained as were those of the Carthaginian
Leader, for he would, at Majuba, have saved
172 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
his country the South African War of 1899-
1902.
To turn and take up their position at night so
that none of the country people should see them
and give them away — to get into their correct
alignment in the darkness amongst rough and
broken ground — to have such knowledge of the
contours of the terrain that not a gleam from a
shield, not the careless raising of a lance should
betray them — to remain glued to the spot for hours,
motionless, and, finally, to see the enemy marching
past them within bow-shot and yet not one man
out of 20,000 make one sign : there was high train-
ing grafted on to stern discipline — there was a
specimen of " nerve " !
Think of it. The legionaries marching rapidly
in column of route ; the great plumes of their helmets
rising and falling in measured cadence as they swing
gaily along to the rhythmic time beat of their flutes
in all the jovial excitement of an Army in pursuit.
And there, crouching in the brushwood, the Cartha-
ginian veterans, still as stone, tense as drawn bow-
strings, watching, waiting in a sort of agony, the
signal of their Chief. Hark ! From the head of
the pass a sound comes borne on the wind, a clash
as of iron on bronze, the distant yell of battle !
A sudden convulsive stiffening movement passes
along the trailing length of the Roman column,
the ranks begin to close up, the officers are running
to their posts — and then — oh ! see, for it is a sight
for the Gods, the fierce array of Carthage swoop
down ! Supple as a chain of iron and as hard ;
swift as a volley of arrows ; solid as the phalanx
of Macedon. The silver bucklers gleaming, the
TRAINING 173
dancing of the naked sword blades, the thunder of
the Captains, and the shouting. The tremendous
impact of steel upon steel as the shock falls full
against the flank of the legions. Awhile these
struggle in a sort of bewilderment to form front
against the terrible onslaught. Brave men grind
their teeth — hurl the pilum — strive to free their
sword arm from the crush of disordered comrades
who impede. Awhile the Triarii stand yet shoulder
to shoulder and shout to the youngsters to be steady.
Too late. The Militia in armour feel themselves
but sheep in wolves' clothing against the lightning
dash and cohesion of the Punic professional soldiers.
Prayers arise to Jupiter Stator, the Stayer of Flights
— in vain. Panic flies eagerly from rank to rank ;
to each Roman she whispers that here he is over-
matched. The legion wavers ; a shudder passes
through its mighty frame as a nameless terror never
felt before freezes the life blood in its veins : it
totters — it is riven — it breaks — it is lost — we turn
our eyes from the rout — the slaughter — the blood-
soaked silence of the stricken field.
Fables arose. They said amongst themselves,
" The sword of him that layeth at him cannot hold :
the spear, the dart, nor the habergeon." We under-
stand better than before how next time the Romans
heard the trumpets sounding the assault and saw
the waving standards, the plumes, lances, bucklers,
and breastplates glittering in the sunlight ; saw the
whole serried mass advancing marvellous and formid-
able ; we understand how fear drained the heart
of the legion of its blood and forced it in agonised
humility to recognise its master and overlord in
that polyglot crew of adventurers — Numidians,
174 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Lybians, Gauls, Lusitanians, Campanians, Etruscans,
Umbrians, whom singly, they singly, would have
spurned beneath their feet — but who, collectively,
were trained.
" Amen ! " the pious student may exclaim, " but,
if it be so, why do you shun the light ; why work
like a mole under the ruins of the ages ? Hannibal
is half myth : the Shannon ; the Chesapeake ;
Majuba, too, are fading into legends. You yourself
are not dead yet ; not yet ; you played your part
in the very latest thing in wars : why give both
France and the Dardanelles the go-by ? "
My reply is simple. Training counted for more
when men depended more upon themselves. Spears,
javelins, longbows, pikes needed a lifelong appren-
ticeship before a militiaman could pass muster as
a regular. The Welsh Archer could shoot half as
far again, twice as fast and three times straighter
than the French bowmen or the Genoese cross-
bowmen. Before the war I have seen a raw Terri-
torial battery make good practice on Salisbury
Plain. No regulars, who had devoted years to the
business, could have gone fifteen per cent, better.
The ancient world pinned its faith upon the veteran,
and small wonder ! After Caesar was murdered
Cicero writing to Atticus, the Senators writing to
one another, do not trouble their heads about the
hundreds of thousands of half -trained Territorials:
the people they worried over were " the veterans " :
how do " the veterans " feel about the stroke that
was struck in the Forum ? Whatever are " the
veterans " going to do ? The issue proved them
right. The young legions raised by the republicans
couldn't put up any sort of fight at all against the
TRAINING 175
old soldiers from Dalmatia, Gaul and Spain. I
have spent study in trying to find out why, and I
am certain the main reason is that, for instance,
the magazine fire-arm is much more easily handled
than the longbow ; the howitzer than the catapult ;
the bomb than the javelin. In no other way can
be explained the successes of Spartacus with his
gladiators against organised, disciplined legions.
The gladiators were individually better trained.
Never in those ancient days could we have heard
it said as military writers say now, " 1866 was won
by the needle gun " ; " 1870 was lost by the French
artillery." The latest date on which it can be
claimed that training made a real hit was the date
of Mons and of the first battle of Ypres, when the
Germans were led by the terrific rapidity and pre-
cision of the British musketry into mistaking our
professional marksmen for machine guns. That is
the greatest compliment anyone can nowadays
pay a man — mistake him for a machine ! From
Ypres onwards trenches and barbed wire fastened
their paralysing grip upon the field. Movement
died away and with it went the best half of the
value of training. From that date war sank into
the lowest depths of beastliness and degeneration.
The wonder of war, the glory of war, the adventure
of war, the art of war all hung on its shifting scenery.
For years the Armies had to eat, drink, sleep amidst
their own putrefactions. Bit by bit the old cam-
paigner's memories and young soldier's dreams were
engulfed in machinery and mud. In the higher
spheres intuition, nerve and quick decision were
about as much use as a cavalry regiment in a barbed
wire entanglement. In the lower spheres our rank
176 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
and file who, for generations, have had a tradition
of skilled marksmanship behind them, came down to
barbarism — to bludgeon work with bombs ! Train-
ing was at a discount ; there was a big premium
upon numbers !
CHAPTER VHI
NUMBERS
At the word " numbers " the politicians pricked
up their ears. So then a battlefield was only another
sort of ballot box. What asses they had been to
let those dull soldiers impose upon them with their
grand word " Army " ! They would form a Dardan-
elles Committee of the Cabinet. Gallipoli was an
amphibious sort of place they would make all safe by
appointing Colonel Hankey, of the Marines, to be their
Secretary. Elections had shown them how victories
should be organised ; the walls of Constantinople
would go down to the tune of " Numbers will tell " —
" The weight of numbers " — " The majority has it " —
" Carried by acclamation " — " Voxpopuli, vox Dei ! v
But there were several points about numbers
which were overlooked both at the first war meeting
of the Cabinet and at the Dardanelles Committee
afterwards.
(1) There is no use having the numbers if use is
not to be made of them. Every one must under-
stand, for instance, that numbers cancel one another
if they pull different ways.
(2) Supposing the numbers to be united, they
must be planked down. To bury them in a napkin
is to lose them. Clause witz says, " The first rule
is to enter the field with an Army as strong as
m v
178 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
possible." This sounds so easy ! It is not at all
easy : it demands nerve !
Was the whole of our Expeditionary Force of six
Divisions sent off to France complete, as had been
intended, the moment it was ready ? No, it was
not. The nerves of several very important people
gave way and it was not sent.
Was our Army of 70,000 men sent to overthrow
the great military Empire of Turkey and occupy
its capital " as strong as possible " ? No, it was not.
Nerve was needed to spare another 20,000 men from
the defence forces of the United Kingdom. Nerve,
we must suppose — a little nerve, was needed to
release the East Lancashire Division and Cox's
Indian Brigade from making Cairo considerably
safer than London so that the landing at Gallipoli
might be made " with an Army as strong as possible."
But no : that Army was not on any account to be
" as strong as possible " ; the Army was to be just
" big enough," the " big enough " being based
(as it turned out) upon fallacy. England and
Egypt between them had the numbers and bottled
them up, dealing them out grudgingly, in a slow,
even, just- too-late succession, afterwards to be
successfully met by the somewhat less slowly arriving
Turkish reinforcements. Had our rulers studied
Clause witz they might have " entered the fields "
(of France and Gallipoli) with Armies " as strong
as possible " ; but, as it was, we did not !
(3) Suppose for the moment that the advantage of
numbers is with us, that our numbers are united
and that they actually " enter the field " —what
then ? Are " majority " and " superiority " equiva-
lent terms ? We know that in war they used not
NUMBERS 179
to be so ; that, at the time of the Jacquerie, one
highly trained Knight in armour of proof could
take on several hundred badly armed peasants.
Are they then — are strength in numbers and strength
in efficiency tending, under the working of education,
and machines, to become equivalents ? This is a
question of life and death, for the numbers of our
present generation are past praying for. You cannot
increase the size of your grandmother's family by
taking thought.
Let us see. What with plebiscites, referendums
and other inventions of the Evil One, the numbers
boom is so much in evidence just now that a solitary
quotation should suffice to show the trend of modern
thought. M. Geraud, writing in the Echo de Paris,
in February, 1919, says, speaking of the League,
" They talk of disarmament ; there is one arm
which cannot be suppressed, now that Armies can
be improvised : the numerical superiority of a
people." Quite true as a fact, but was his inference
true — the inference that the military domination of 1
the Continent by France was out of the question ? I
Was it true ? Perhaps ; but not, I think, solely or '
even mainly, on account of shortage of numbers,
or because it was correct to say that Armies could
be improvised.
Armies cannot be improvised ; minorities can
dominate ; but there is every excuse for M. Geraud
or for the thousands who agree with him in the
events of the late war and in the attitude of many
of the Generals during that war. I have heard
them myself, with my own ears, declare with empha-
sis, with passion, that the only way to win the war
was to " kill Germans." But in trench warfare,
180 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
it was impossible to kill Germans without killing
just about as many British. So we get back to
butchery, to numbers being equivalent to victory.
Clearly, as manoeuvre was impossible, and as three-
quarters of Generalship was therefore useless, num-
bers and yet more numbers were the sole recipe !
Probe this thought a little deeper. Trench warfare
arose out of the numbers on each side. But a
" nation in arms " poorly supplied with machines
is a fleeting phenomenon of the moment. A future
" nation in arms " will merely be so much additional
fodder for the machines.
Fu Chien, Prince of Ch'in, boasted his Army was
so enormous they could dam up the Yangtsze River
by throwing their whips into the stream : he was
grievously defeated. Xerxes led numbers innumer-
able— to join the majority! Sooraj-oo-Dowlah
and 68,000 men with an enormous river between
them and the hostile Army of 900 Europeans and
2,100 Sepoys felt tolerably secure. Yet neither
his numbers nor his position had the smallest
influence on the result of the Battle of Plassey.
But Gideon, the son of Joash, despised numbers.
When his Army got within range of the Midianite
host " which lay along the valley like grasshoppers
for multitude," he did not howl for reinforcements.
No ; he gave the order, " Whosoever is fearful and
afraid, let him return and depart early for Mount
Gilead; and there returned of the people twenty
and two thousand, and there remained ten thou-
sand." It was Home, sweet Home for two-thirds
of his Army and the results are written in the
Bible.
The Bruce, Henry II and the Black Prince were
NUMBERS 181
men of the Gideon persuasion : at Bannockburn
25,000 Scots overthrew 100,000 English. At Cregy
20,000 English defeated 60,000 French. At Poictiers
7,000 English beat three or four times their number
of French troops of the first quality.
As time went on the European tribes borrowed ideas
and armaments freely from one another. The
more alike they became in their methods the less
scope was there for the great surprises of war. At
Leuthen Frederick the Great was still able to beat
80,000 Austrians with 30,000 Prussians, at Rosbach
to beat 50,000 French with half their number of
Prussians. Napoleon at Arcola won with 13,000
Frenchmen against 40,000 Austrians, at Rivoli
with 25,000 Frenchmen against 60,000 Austrians,
and at Auerstadt with 25,000 Frenchmen against
60,000 Prussians. So it was ungrateful of him to
make that phrase about Providence being on the
side of the big battalions. He forgot, in making the
phrase, his own — "It is not the men that count in
war, it is the Man."
Yet, mark the pursuing Nemesis : sarcastic Neme-
sis, so tenacious, so mindful of our slips. As Napoleon
amassed men, got together the big battalions, Provi-
dence (who cares nothing for phrases) turned him
down. As the size of his Armies and of his units
waxed, so did his star wane. Had the Grand Army
been half the strength and composed of the troops
of 1805, Napoleon would have moved with twice
the rapidity ; manoeuvred with four times the
confidence ; and would infallibly have beaten the
Russians to pieces wherever and whenever he met
them. At Eylau ; Wagram ; Borodino ; the Bere-
sina ; these big battalions made their first appear-
182 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
ances. The attempt to impose by masses — an
attempt significant of the fatigue of Napoleon
and of the using up of his trained troops — was sheer
degeneration. But — as is well said by Colonel
Ardant du Picq — when, hi 1814, Napoleon, on his
last legs, fought his star campaign, we hear no more
>of these barbarous bludgeon strokes.1
/ So the problem stands facing us fair and square
X —quantity v. quality. Do character and courage
/ hold their own ; or, are we going to put our trust
\ 1 hi the fertility of our females ?
N Victory comes to the Army which is superior at
the decisive point. To get there it is up to the
Commander to make his enemy think that the bulk
of his force is committed to an enterprise upon
which he does not intend to embark (strategy) ;
or, that the bulk of his force has reached a sector of
the battlefield whereon he has really but few troops
and no intention of using them (tactics). If num-
bers are unlimited there will be less call upon the
Commander to exercise these ingenuities, for he can
then be superior everywhere ; actually so as well as
in the mind of his adversary — superior that is to
say in numbers.
If numbers are anything more than a factor — if
they can be translated to mean " victorious force "
—then our Armies, faced as they are by Africa and
Asia, not to speak of Russia, are played out. But
my belief stands firm that we own other fields than
I those of numbers upon which we can sow the seeds
of a formidable Army. I hold that efficiency can,
1 60,000 Frenchmen against something like 300,000 invaders
fight fourteen battles and win twelve victories in the space of
thirty days.
NUMBERS 183
must and will learn how to cope with numbers before
numbers can overthrow efficiency. The true reason
why the world has remained at a deadlock since
Homer is that successive civilisations established
and embellished by individuals are successively
swamped by numbers. Released from external
pressure (dread of rival powers) the subsoil (numbers)
comes up to top and good-bye to the beauty of the
garden. Lately I read a book, written in 1912,
which started with a pronouncement of contempt for
"mere numbers," and went on to say, "Never-
theless it must be admitted that the conditions, in
warfare and in industry, of life to-day, as compared
with life in past centuries, have increased the value
of numbers and of a faculty of blind obedience, and
have proportionally decreased the relative value of
individual character. An Asiatic Army to-day is
relatively more efficient."
There is some truth in this. Counting by rifles,
low-grade Armies have become relatively more
dangerous and it is the rifles which have made them
so. Rifles, simple machines, easily grasped and
manipulated by savages.
The fact of the matter is that we have just reached
an epochal turning-point in the career of arms, a
point where the Armies of civilisation have got to
choose between making a big imaginative effort
and getting clean away from the Armies of barbarism,
or else — plod on and go down taking with them their
worn-out civilisation. Up to a point the undeveloped
races can copy ; certainly up to the point where we
stand now. We have to carry on into regions where
they cannot follow us without themselves becoming
so civilised that their Armies will no longer be
184 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
a menace. The world, in fact, will be Anglicised.
Militarily speaking, we are still working on in our
war-worn, worm-eaten uniforms and have only used
our machines and inventions to buttress moribund
formations : therefore, the mechanical side of our
Army has been growing at the expense of the human
and romantic side of our Army : therefore, numbers
are counting for more ; characters for less.
When a thing is unreal the life goes out of it.
Cavalry has been dead as the dodo for twenty long
years, though the people who look at the effigies in
Whitehall or stuffed specimens in Natural History
museums have not yet, in either case, tumbled to it.
What about infantry ? Are they not too marching
towards their grave in some battle of machines,
due, perhaps, about twenty years hence ? Unless
quality crawls up out of the sea in its submarine
or traverses rivers and mountains in its tank ; unless
heroes in bright armour are rushing by thousands
in their roaring aeroplanes across the tortured sky ;
the fate of Armageddon will depend on numbers,
and numbers will not be with us.
We must fix our minds upon the thought that just
as men seemed to be on the very point of obliterating
the Man — up he got ; seized hold of an aeroplane
in one hand and of a tank in the other ; plucked
individualism out of the mud and set it once more
upon its feet, in the open field, where numbers and
blind obedience are going to have less and less of
an innings against science and efficiency.
Outwardly the battle of the future will resemble
battles which took place before the birth of Christ
rather than those fields of sinister desolation and
solitude where we have suffered. The area of the
NUMBERS 185
conflict ; the use of tanks and motors as the pivot
of the forces where formerly elephants and war
chariots manoeuvred will have more affinity to B.C.
500 than to A.D. 1917.
The tank combines mobility, fire-power, shock-
power, and armour. I do not see how the heavy
artillery and the heavy munitions are to keep pace
with them. I do not see how the infantry, either,
are to work with them unless their swiftness is to
be sacrificed. Therefore, there will be no infantry
except escorts in cars ; tank followers.
What an immense future do not these inventions
hold out to the British ? l The future beckons us
on ; the very same circumspect types who funked
going Nap with their numbers on the Western
Front and at Gallipoli are hanging on to our coat-
tails. As Pasteur says to an obstructionist who
might well have been a British official, " Vous dites
que dans Veldt actuel de la science il est plus sage de
ne pas avoir d' opinion ? " Exactly ; it is more
prudent to look wise and express no views. Uncom-
fortable fellows who press for progress have a bad
time of it in London ; but bad time or good time
we must have prompt, bold, big changes as a result
of our experiences during the war, or, it may so
happen, we shall have bled and suffered and won,
only to bleed and suffer and lose !
Can it be true that a British division is still \
organised as it was in 1914 ? That Cavalry horses
still devour oats ? That swords are being forged,
scarlet tunics being embroidered in gold, and spurs
being polished with plate powder ? Why have we
not had a manoeuvre of a new division of tanks and
1 The Millennium ? pages 23, 24, 25.
18C THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
aeroplanes trained to work together, say total
strength 2,000 mechanics against a 1914 division
of 20,000 horse, foot and guns ; the capture or
defence of some important city being the objective ?
One invention do I believe might at present easily
be barred by a common consent, which would be
more binding than treaties extorted from fallen
foes by holding a knife to their throats. If our
Prime Minister were to approach every nation on
the globe, civilised or semi-civilised, and propose
to them that it be made a criminal offence, punishable
by death, for anyone to experiment with, propose
to make, stock or use poison gas, there is not one
nation that would say him nay. Well ; why does
he not do it ? Quick !
From inventions we get to inventors : from inven-
tors to the rare beings who can grasp the scope
and bearing of an invention ; not an improvement,
an invention. So long as an invention remains
a brain wave its value can only be measured by a
brain equal or superior to the wave. When one
man tots up the sum of the contents of another man's
brain we get a recognition by one intellect of another
intellect. But a fly cannot recognise an elephant.
A fly cannot even see an elephant although the ele-
phant can only too well see the fly. There is no
good, therefore, hi being angry with the Jacks-in-
Office who spurn the, to them, entirely meaningless
maggot brought to them by an unfortunate inventor.
They are congenitally incapable of visualising the
imago or perfected creation which must one day
emerge from that envelope. The higher a man flies
the smaller does he appear to the man who cannot
fly — unless he has the vision of genius.
CHAPTER IX
GENIUS
Genius ? " Transcendent capacity for taking
trouble " is the popular definition, and naturally
so, for it tickles the self-conceit of Tom, Dick and
Harry to think that they, too, by taking thought
could add some cubits to their statures.
Judging by an interview published in the Daily
Mail of 19th April, 1919, Marshal Foch is of the
same opinion as Carlyle. " The stroke of genius
that turns the fate of a battle ? " says Marshal
Foch, " I don't believe in it. A battle is a compli-
cated operation, that you prepare laboriously. If
the enemy does this, you say to yourself I shall do
that. If such and such happens, these are the steps
I shall take to meet it. You think out every possible
development and decide on the way to deal with
the situation created. One of these developments
occurs ; you put in operation your pre-arranged
plan, and everyone says, ' What genius to have
thought of that at the critical moment ! ' whereas
the credit is really due to the labour of preparation
done beforehand."
On the 23rd April, 1919, Sir John Monash, in
private life a business man of Melbourne City, in
public life the tenacious and capable Commander
of the Australian Corps, followed suit. " Modern
187
188 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
warfare was not a matter of genius or of brain
waves. It was hard, slogging, methodical, matter-
of-fact work."
When authorities so famous have slammed the
door so violently in the face of genius some hardi-
hood is needed by anyone who would reopen it,
but the thought that the Marshal, like most great
men, is modest and is anxious to disclaim any
transcendental gift gives me courage. So I take
the liberty of saying that although the outside
public may often mistake what is merely the result
of hard work for the stroke of genius, this does
not itself exclude the genuine stroke of genius which
fashions creations out of nothing without any appar-
ent hard work. Nor do I think that Napoleon would
have gone so far as his fervid admirer Foch, although
it has been stated that his favourite work was a
book of logarithms.1 To me it seems that even
in the most mechanical seeming battles of the late
war of machines, the stroke of genius did occur
and won those battles, although, very possibly, no
higher grade than that of a Lieutenant-Colonel of
Infantry may have been illuminated by its flash.
For rank has no more affinity to genius than has
laborious preparation. Marshal Foch put two and
two together — as he now tells us — very effectively.
In the case of genius, God puts two and two together
in the subconscious regions of the being, and He
does it more effectively.
There is no question here of a genius for friend-
ship, or of a genius for finance, or of a genius for
poetry, or of a genius for growing turnips. I am
writing about Genius, the faculty ; the intuitive
1 By Sir Walter Scott.
GENIUS 189
perception ; the piercing power of comprehension ;
the innate originality and, above all, the intrepidity
which takes all these and uses them ; the intrepidity
without which they would merely amount to ima-
gination. That genius about which I write is made
up of four parts : one part imagination, one part
energy, one part enthusiasm, and one part courage.
Marshal Foch has shown the happy results of
material calculations as employed (it must be
admitted) against materialists. He says, indeed, in
this same interview that the Germans " were great
organisers. In this war they had no men of insight
or genius." Later on, I will prove that no nation
can at the same time be very highly organised and
possess men of insight or genius. Meanwhile, let
me contrast with this triumph of material calculation
an affair which we have been taught by politicians,
not by soldiers, to think disastrous from start to
finish — and yet a stroke of genius !
Antwerp ! Did the men of plans and calculations,
did the Allied War Councils or War Offices, realise
Antwerp ? One or other of their laborious " If-
the-enemy-does-this " forecasts must surely have
fitted the actual situation pretty closely at various
junctures in the opening phases of the war. Did
none of those forecasts stress the need, the anxious
need, the enemy High Command must be under to
guard the right flank of their own Army against
an outfall from Antwerp ? Or, had they pored
over the map for as long as the Israelites wandered
in the wilderness without grasping the meaning of
Antwerp to the German right flank or the effect
of the naval operations which might ensue if the
Germans got to Antwerp ?
190 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
The truth is that Foch's game for dull boys, the
game of " if -he-does- this-I-shall-do-that," had not
worked in the field quite as well as it used to work
at the Academy. After the first move or two the
permutations and combinations had become too
complicated. The strategical and tactical fields
were no longer in orthodox order ; they resembled
rather a Rabelaisian game of chess where the board
has a million squares and the pieces consist of a
dozen Kings and Queens, a thousand Castles, ten
thousand Knights and so many pawns that no one
can exactly count them. Faced by this situation,
our Allies lost their heads, shortened their line and
thought of nothing but saving Paris ; decided to
evacuate Paris ; pulled themselves together ; gained
the victory of the Marne ; advanced to the Aisne ;
began to move via St. Omer to an attack upon
Lille. The Channel Ports were at stake and with
them the war. Dark was the outlook, when, of a
sudden, the whole strategic field lit up to the bright
flash of genius. One man had seen what hung
upon our holding our ground — if only for a day or
two — at Antwerp ; one man had acted with all the
force and swiftness at his command to enforce
that view ; one man had understood that, whether
the fortress could be held or could not be held, the
honour of England demanded that at least the
attempt be made ; one man had the courage to
step fearlessly forward with what tiny force of raw
troops happened by his own prescience and God's
mercy to lie at his own disposal to show British
uniforms on Belgian soil. Jealousy may have
succeeded in hoodwinking the people to-day ; the
historian will class this feat of Winston Churchill's
GENIUS 191
as one of the two acts of intuition of the war. Public
opinion lags ten years behind acts of genius like
the purchase of the Suez Canal shares or the move
upon Antwerp. Ordinary folk can only gradually
absorb the truth from experts, and the experts are
ashamed to expose the professionals. The more
this coup de main of Churchill's is considered, the
more vividly it stands out. No ordinary First
Lord would have had infantry under his orders !
As yet our people have not heard that tale of coura-
geous, pertinacious struggle against Sea Lords and
War Earls which took place before even a start
could be made to form this Royal Naval Division —
and then, scarce emerged from that combat, the
Division themselves scarce clothed, Churchill handles
them as if he were Napoleon and they the Old
Guard ; he flings the R.N.D. right into the enemy's
opening jaws at Antwerp !
The facts are beyond dispute. The Marine
Brigade of the R.N.D. entered Antwerp on the
night of October 3rd ; they fought on October 4th ;
they animated the Belgian defence ; the 7th Divi-
sion and the 3rd Cavalry Division didn't begin to
disembark at Ostend till October 6th and, had the
saving of Antwerp been left to them, it would
have fallen a week earlier than it did fall ; Ypres
would have spelt another story ; the Belgian main
Army must have been scuppered and the Channel
Ports would have gone by the board. Whilst this
masterstroke was being played, clubs, offices and
drawing-rooms were in an uproar. How indecent
of a man in charge of the Navy to shove his oar into
a land battle ! Murder, my dear, sheer murder ;
the poor Marines were so young and raw, their
192 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
bayonets were tied on to their belts with bits of
string — imagine, my dear, bits of string ! Yet, in
a good hour, be it said, string or no string, the
R.N.D. saved the Belgian Army — and more than
the Belgian Army — the Channel Ports — and more
than the Channel Ports — the honour of our Arms.
Opposed to genius stand the men of logarithms,
who, by their " if -he-does- this-I-shall-do- that,"
attempt to exhaust the cache of chances which
God keeps stocked far away in starland. Genius
is God's secret, that is all. Foch thinks he won
the war because he " calculated," as the Yankees
say. He forgets that the Germans equally pride
themselves on calculations. He either forgets, or
he is too modest to tell us, that he has in him like
a burning fire a passion for sheer fighting, a fire of
passion which burnt up all his sums and figures
when the moment came. But if the great Marshal
had only told us this, we should have known what
weight to attach to his "If he does this I shall do
that."
Anyway, let us take this " war of siege," won—
so the prize boy of the school tells us — by calcula-
tions, and compare it with another stroke of genius
that failed. Only one condition do I make with
my reader : namely, that he should first make a
real effort to heave himself out of the " nothing
succeeds like success " frame of mind. In time of
war and under democratic rule there is no escape
from the success test, I admit ; but now that there
is a sort of peace going on, let us get back to maps
and common sense.
After Antwerp had saved the Channel Ports a
state of stalemate ensued which is thus described
GENIUS 193
by the best authority, Field-Marshal Sir Henry
Wilson : —
" France became after the first two or three months a war of
siege, and nothing else — no movements at all. We had some
four years solid of siege work. There were many reasons for
that, but two anyhow will probably continue to exist unless the
League of Nations steps in. One was the enormous numbers
employed on either side, which meant a great frontage — and the
other was that this frontage was so great that one flank rested
on a neutral and the other on salt water. That gave no ragged
edge for either side to fasten on to."
So there we have it. The soldiers who had become
so obsessed with the thought of the frontiers of
France that they would spend their pennies and
their holidays bicycling over it ; studying its rivers,
mountains, woods, roads, towns ; there they were
at last, dreams come true ; camping on the familiar
ground : unable to get away from it : their minds
as well as their thoughts hemmed in by it ; Sir
Henry Wilson's " neutral " on the one side and
his " salt water " on the other the farthest horizons
to their thoughts. But whilst they had been
studying their battle-ground that was to be, science
had been marching. Space had shrunk in relation
to human activities. The sacred war area had
somehow got too smaU. No matter : there they
settled themselves down in the mud ; no elbow-
room ; no outlet ; no " ragged edges " ; nothing
for it but " four years solid of siege work."
Suddenly, once again that lightning flash of
genius ! The dark horizons recede. The idea
sparkles out that in war the great thing is to have
battles — decisions : that, win or lose, the one
great thing for either side is to get done with the
bloody business : that if space has shrunk so that
194 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
the whole of France gives no ragged edges, then
the real ragged edge might lie outside France,
over the neutral hills and far away beyond. The
Dardanelles !
I had written twenty pages to show to tempers
now grown cooler that there was no other issue
from that awful " four years of solid siege work "
between the neutral and the salt water except via
that same salt water to Constantinople. But I
have reflected that it would be wiser to have a
little more patience and leave the Dardanelles to
those close-thinking students, the Germans, who,
if they hate, will at least do so with impartiality.
Fas est et ab hoste doceri, and I have no doubt at
all of the result.
The Antwerp stroke was prompted by an impera-
tive impulse to threaten the enemy's right, and
to hold up his advance on the Channel Ports if
only for two or three days. The Dardanelles
move was calculated to save Russia by piercing a
deep-sea, warm-sea passage to her heart, clean
through the enemy's left. Both enterprises were
efforts to get outside of an overcrowded area ; were
inspired by genius and were worked from start to
finish in face of an outcry from France. Yet, so
true was the aim of these two strokes that, although
the " four-years-of-solid-siege-work," " kill-German "
school did all that men could to deflect them, each,
during its time, did more than any of the great
" set-piece " siege battles towards carrying the war
on to victory.
Imagination forms one of the four parts of genius
and has itself two clearly marked attributes : the
one, fancy or the power of ornamenting facts as,
GENIUS 195
for instance, making the wolf speak to Little Red
Riding Hood or describing the Battle of Le Cateau ;
the other, inventions ; not fairy tales but machines.
Inventions do not often make their first bow to
armies on the battle-field. They have been in the
air for some time ; hawked about the ante-chambers
of the men of the hour ; spat upon by common
sense ; cold-shouldered by interests vested in what
exists ; held up by stale functionaries to whom
the sin against the Holy Ghost is to " make a prece-
dent " — until, one day, arrives a genius who by
his imagination sees ; by his enthusiasm moves ;
by his energy keeps moving ; by his courage cuts
the painter of tradition.
So long as a statesman is orthodox he is safe.
Some infernal, uncomfortable fellow has put forward
the notion that shock cavalry are obsolete. Away
with him ! A Secretary of State for War is not
put in to try experiments ! So the only windfall
which came in the way of the War Office during
the last few years before the war was spent on
cavalry horses : not in machine-guns or howitzers ;
oh, dear no ! on cavalry horses \
That the aeroplane was coming into its kingdom
was almost as clear, in September, 1914, as it is
to-day. The power of reason was not denied to
the War Office : they believed the war would last
three years : they strongly suspected that they
ought to back their own opinions by committing
the public to a really big programme of aeroplane
building. But there was no genius there to see, to
move or to strike.
In those first war days a scheme supported by
Lord Fisher was laid by a young naval officer,
196 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Neville Usborne, before the War Office ; a scheme
which seemed then to involve a big plunge. The de-
mand was for ten million sterling, at once, simply
and solely to lay foundations broad and deep for
eventual supremacy in the air. The paper lay
for some time on the table of the man who could
have given it currency by putting his initial upon
it. He was taken with the scheme ; he passed it
on with the remark that, although sound in principle,
the amount was four times too much. Four times
too much for what ? Too much for the war ? Too
much for the Treasury ? Too much for him ?
Lack of the nerve which goes with genius was
shown in another way on the other side. When
the Germans made up their minds to go Nap upon
the submarine, that was a bold decision. The
prize might be the scuppering of British sea suprem-
acy ; the penalty might be war with the neutrals.
The one thing there was no room for was half-
heartedness. That was certain to fail in destroying
Britain and to succeed in annoying the U.S.A.
Whether as a question of lulling the British or of
keeping neutrals in a good temper, equally the
situation demanded a pause in the campaign until
a big fleet of submarines was ready.
All these points must have been clear to the
intelligent Germans. Then why so uninspired, so
hand to mouth, so stupid ? They had organised
genius ; put a strait-waistcoat on to it : not one
touch of transcendentalism ; that was what was
the matter with them.
So much for the aeroplane and the submarine;
now for the tank. By December, 1915, the whole
of the western fronts of both armies were swathed
GENIUS 197
in barbed wire ; movement was paralysed ; the
Generals on both sides were hanging on to their
regulations as a blind man does to his dog ; the
last three years of the stalemate had begun. Then
it was that the idea of the tank which had lain
dormant since 1903, the date of the Royal Com-
mission on the South African War,1 began to bestir
itself again hi men's minds.
A fleet of landships had been let loose upon the
realms of fancy by Mr. H. G. Wells ; now men of
faith and skill began to submit inventions and to
urge action. Over there, in France, was the " hold-
up " ; over here were tanks " on paper " capable
of breaking through " on paper." The tank, in
fact, was still a scientist's plaything ; a mechanical
elephant had been drawn to scale by men of talent.
The monster had been conceived but, before it
could be born and waddle across no man's land to
browse upon the barbed wire of the Germans, it
had first to get through the wire of the bureaucrats
of London ; the barbed wire of the bureaucrats
whereon fluttered still the poor rags once worn by
dead inventors.
There had been no clamourings for tanks from
the soldiers. No sort of prompting or support
came from G.H.Q. in France. The War Office
and Admiralty were calmly and contemptuously
sceptical. Under ordinary statesmen the tank would
have remained a departmental toy for twenty
years ; a generation would have passed away before
1 Index to Vol. II. Minutes of Evidence, Report of the Royal
Commission on the War in South Africa : " Shields, steel,
placed on wheels, equipment of infantry battalions with, advo-
cated, 13,941 (page 112). (Witness: Sir Ian Hamilton.)"
198 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
it could have developed into a line of battle tanks.
But there was a man not yet ostracised by the
oysters — a man of genius — a brave man — whose
two and twos were pulled together elementally —
not by logarithms. He knew by the awkward
way in which his journalistic and political admirers
shook hands with him that they were carrying
stilettos up their sleeves : he only had to read to
be able to see with the inward eye rows of pious
folk praying on their bended knees to the Devil
that he might slip : he plunged bald-headed into
a tank with the purse of the public in his hand.
With money entrusted to him and to his advisers
for good and profitable and safe investment by
that testy Mrs. Britannia, he, on his own individual
responsibility, undivided and entirely unshared by
those " responsible advisers," gave imperative orders
to a sober, scientific person to make a huge, steel-
clad monster to gambol and snort before himself
and his friends over the banks and braes of Hatfield
Park. The sober, scientific person agreed, but
the sum was a tidy one — £70,000 to wit. Our
Genius had a wife, a son, a career, some expensive
tastes including two sweet little daughters : in
what queer street would they all have found them-
selves had that monster jibbed or bolted at his
trials ? Imagine Winston Churchill's position before
a Royal Commission trying to explain how he,
First Lord of the Admiralty, came to embark naval
funds on a business clearly pertaining to the War
Office. He would have been alone ; his " respon-
sible advisers " chuckling in the background ; not
a signature, no single scraplet of writing to implicate
them.
GENIUS 199
But plenty of this sort of backing, I daresay : —
" I regret that owing to pressure of current work these interest-
ing papers have lain on my table for a month. Having no
military experience, I am unable to offer any opinion upon them. —
B. F." J
* * * * *
" I venture to submit that we have enough to do in carrying
on our own business without trespassing upon Lord Kitchener's
preserves. The tank crank is becoming a nuisance : birds of a
feather, etc. ; let him join the ' flock ' at the War Office. Sup.-
pose we take up tanks and they turn turtle — it is we who will
find ourselves in the soup ! My reasoned opinion is that the
consideration of tanks ought to be postponed until the termina-
tion of the war, but that, as dangers lurk also in a downright
negative, we should refer the whole question to a mixed committee
of sailors, soldiers and manufacturers. By this method at
least we shall gain time. — K. F. M." 2
* * * *
" In principle, I find myself in entire agreement with pre-note,
but, as to the Committee, would it not be best to let it be com-
posed of officials ; manufacturers appearing only as witnesses ?
Departmental Committees can be controlled, but a mixed com-
mittee might lead to publicity ; publicity might lead to the
Press ; the Press to pressure. Experto crede ! — Q. P." 3
*****
" I concur, but I hope it will be clearly understood that in so
doing I express no opinion as to the desirability, the feasibility,
or, I may say, the propriety of these tanks. The one thing I
deprecate is haste. Three courses are open to us : (1) a depart-
mental committee ; (2) a mixed committee ; (3) no committee ;
and whichever course we pursue I foresee we shall regret it. —
W. 8." 4
Lest anyone should be scandalised by my daring
to publish State documents, I would explain that,
having seen cartloads of this sort of stuff written
1 The initials are those of Mr. Bottle the File.
* The initials are those of Mr. Keep the File Moving.
* The initials are those of Mr. Queer the Pitch.
4 The initials are those of Mr. Wait and See.
200 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
by the type of Government servant who succeeds,
I have been able to conceive them for myself. No
one who has been through the mill but knows that
the British bureaucrat has managed to transform
inertia from a negative into a positive force.
Bureaucracy is one huge "sit tight" club. In
every Government Office should be hung up a text
from the great Clause witz : " It is even better to
act quickly and err than to hesitate until the time
of action is past " ; and at the other end of the
room, " He who makes no mistakes makes nothing."
Howbeit, our genius did produce his eighteen
A 1 tanks ; and now came the question of t using
them. A new weapon is put into a Commander's
hands. Is he going to stake his country's fortunes
on the dark horse which has run so marvellously in
the trial ; or, is he going to hedge and have another,
and this time, a public trial ? For the first method
he must collect a number of the new engines and
make them the backbone of his battle ; for the
second, some of the new engines must be attached
as auxiliaries to an independent scheme. For the
one, nothing less than 500 tanks will do; for the
other, the fewer the better. I merely put the case.
To be a fair critic a man should know. I do not
know the ins and outs of the game played during
the third phase of the battle of the Somme between
Joffre and Haig on the one hand, and the politicians
and Nivelle on the other. There may have been
good grounds for giving away the tanks : the fear
of the enemy getting away ; or some or any motive
greater than, and perhaps independent of, the
motive of getting full value out of a great surprise.
So a few tanks were dribbled out and the cat made
GENIUS 201
its escape from the bag. It seems a pity. The
past had its inventions and when they coincided
with a man who staked his shirt on them the face
of the world changed. Scythes fixed into the axles
of the war chariots ; the moving towers which
overthrew Babylon ; Greek fire ; the short bow,
the cross bow, the Welch long bow and the huge
balista ; plate armour ; the Prussian needle gun ;
the Merrimac and Ericsson's marvellous coincidental
reply. The future is pregnant with inventions,
but where is the use of the invention birth-rate of
the United Kingdom heading the world roster
when the Exchequer will not put the new-born
ideas out to nurse and the General Staff won't
adopt them ? If we are going to be as cautious as
in 1917, we may live to see the disinherited children
of our brains marching against us in strange uni-
forms, commanded perhaps by those Asiatics who
can copy and fight though, thank God, they cannot
invent.
The year 1914 marks the end of the old order. We
are living in a new age and behaving as if Haldane
had reorganised our army after the war instead of
before it. Our General Staff seems to be saying,
" Let some of the other nations show the way and
then, when they have tried it, we will chip in."
That way lies perdition. The only chance for a
nation like ours is to keep on leading with a strong
inventive originality ; otherwise we shall be run
over and trampled underfoot by the imitators.
In the last part of this book I mean to apply my
theories to our present old-fashioned army. Many
of our best soldiers will disagree. " Our Army,"
they will say, " has come magnificently through a
202 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
prolonged, fiery trial. When you have a good
thing, stick to it." This is, no doubt, the prevailing
mood. It is quite all wrong. Not only is our
Army out of date to-day ; it was already behind
the times on the outbreak of war. Had the Navy
'not had a Churchill and a Beatty, we should now
be sitting in sackcloth and ashes. The original
organisation was good, but hardly had the war
begun when it was smashed. The Territorial Force
was the basic part of our pre-war organisation ;
the experienced T.F. Associations should have
stamped out new Divisions, comparatively smoothly
and without effort : we all know what happened.
There were inventions in those days ; our mili-
tary attaches had told the War Office all about
them. The most vital of all perhaps, the maxim-
gun, was well known to us. Report after report
came in on the use the Germans were making of
it. We nibbled at it as we did the first time we
used the tank. Before the Royal Commission
on the South African War, masses of heavy artillery
were advocated.1 The year 1 914 came along : the idea
had been ours : the big guns belonged to the Ger-
mans. The uselessness of shock cavalry in European
warfare had explicitly been foretold 2 : all these
ideas and many others fell upon stony ground and
1 Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South
Africa, page 111, Vol. II., Minutes of Evidence.
2 Military Attache's Reports on the War in Manchuria
(omitted in the version printed for the public) : " For my part
I maintain it would be as reasonable to introduce the elephants
of Porus on to a modern battle-field as regiments of lancers and
dragoons who are too much imbued with the true cavalry spirit
to use fire-arms and too sensible, when it comes to the pinch,
to employ their boasted arme blanche." — SIB IAN HAMILTON.
GENIUS 203
died. Our small, professional, expensive Army
ought to have been far ahead of the huge German
Army when war broke out. To give an extra
two machine-guns to each battalion in the German
Army was a most serious financial proposition ;
to do the same in our Army was a flea-bite ; but it
was the German Army, not ours, that got the extra
machine-guns, as was pointed out by me after the
Saxon Manoeuvres in 1908.
What is the moral of these reflections ? Can we
do better next time ? I don't know ; but we can
at least examine how it has been that we have, up
to date, escaped the results of our own shortsighted-
ness, not to speak of all these short bows, cross bows,
machine-guns, heavy guns and poison gases, and how,
by continuing on the same lines, they may be able to
go on keeping their end up against heat rays, super-
Zepps. submarine dreadnoughts and whatever other
charming surprises the future may have in store.
For some characteristic trait has stood us British
in good stead during our past, else how do we find
ourselves poised, at this moment, upon that very
fluid and precarious point, the top of the wave ?
This I say well knowing it is the fashion of our
cousins to say that America has swallowed us.
That's what the whale thought it had done to
Jonah !
The nations are astonished. " Where," they
ask, " does the guiding Daemon of England reside
so that we may pay him homage ? " In the soil
—amongst the nurseries — at the schools : is it on
the wings of their detestable East wind that these
heavy islanders have nipped on to the omnibus
and taken the front corner seat on the near side ?
204 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Who can answer ? . . . I will. The guiding
Daemon of England resides in the tenacity of Mister
Thomas Atkins. If only he could get a genius to
lead him, the whole world would have to jabber
English. And why is Thomas Atkins so stiff ?
His breeding and his pride in it, his family, county,
country traditions ; in a word, his patriotism.
CHAPTER X
PATRIOTISM
Organisation gives the Army form — existence ;
discipline lends it force — cohesion ; training im-
parts self-confidence — teaches it to inflict more
loss than it suffers. None of these touch the heart
of an Army. To say, as has been said, that the
Japanese were carried to victory by sheer discipline,
is to say what may seem to be, but isn't. I can
quite understand how largely discipline must have
loomed in the eyes of one who at Port Arthur saw
the defile of battalions march in sombre procession
against iron and concrete forts. But, in the open
field, where individuality could spread and assert
itself, there was another side to the medal. To
show genuine enthusiasm for the enemy when they
defended themselves gallantly ; to make light of a
bad wound lest the next day's battle might be missed ;
to be so anxious to meet the Russian bullets that
officers had to impress upon their commands that
death was not the object of a battle — all these
show that some transcendental motive had gripped
the rank and file.
There can be no real Army without some form of
discipline, and yet discipline alone does not make a
redoubtable Army. Discipline makes a stubborn
defence. Discipline will bring the attack up to fixed-
205
206 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
sight range. Discipline lends the faint-hearted a
mask with a good face painted upon it whereby
they will seem to keep their countenances when
faced by an ugly situation : it does not, and cannot
of itself, create fortitude in a nation ; energy in an
Army.
A shell bursts within a foot of a poor, undisciplined
Japanese coolie, who has been carrying bentos of
rice to the firing line. He escapes by a miracle and
flings a stone into the smoking crater saying, " Take
that, you Devil ! " The Japanese officers used to
boast — no — used to declare with reason that after
two or three weeks' drill any one of their common
rickshaw men would be ready to run a neck-to-neck
race with a veteran of the Yalu straight for the
enemy's guns. This was not, could not have been,
in virtue of his military discipline or training.
Napoleon, materialist in many ways, was yet
always ready to doff the martinet's cocked hat to
the invisible — the incalculable. Discipline, yes.
That was a goodly attribute. Training, organisation,
equipment and supply, how well they were thought
out and applied ! But amongst those very Grena-
diers so petrified by discipline that each appeared a
mere duplicate automaton of his fellows ; amidst
these faultlessly aligned figures seeming to be nailed
to their precise place in the ranks, — were hearts
that had throbbed in unison with the wild cadence
of the Marseillaise. Hearts of oak, say we — but
hearts aflame were at the service of the Little
Corporal. Burning within the breasts of the old
Guard ; driving forward through the mitrail, " les
hauls tambours-majors aux panaches enormes," was
the cult, the religion of la gloire. Advancing like a
PATRIOTISM 207
pillar of fire by night and a pillar of smoke by
day these shapes strode forward at the head of the
old Guard, and no mortal power could stand against
them — nothing was ever to resist them — until the
white clinging snowflakes of Russia had congealed
the last drop that had flowed through these valorous
hearts. Take the battles of Jena and Auerstadt —
French against Prussians. Before a shot was fired
Napoleon had so manoeuvred his Army that, by
his victory, he stood to win infinitely more than an
ordinary general could have won by an ordinary
victory. But, even so, victory had still to be won
and the Prussians did not realise their bad strategy
during the battles. Both battles were, actually
and tactically, straightforward, hard, front to front,
rough and tumble struggles. The Prussian troops
were beautifully drilled, thoroughly disciplined ;
whilst their parade movements and their performance
of the firing exercises had filled all contemporary
experts with admiration. The Generals meant
fighting ; the regimental officers did fight, as
to-day, admirably. The Staff and departments were,
according to the light of those times, well organised
although their supply arrangements were clogged by
that very feudal formalism which Napoleon was
engaged in destroying.1 Last, but not least, that
secondary moral force, the martial pride produced
in an Army by a memory of Rosbach and Frederick
and by a consciousness of their own material effi-
ciency, stood every bit as high as it did before the
1 The troops were absolutely starving in the midst of abun-
dance. Requisitions were put in to the responsible local authority,
the great Goethe. No answer was returned and the troops con-
tinued to starve.
208 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Battle of the Marne. The Prussian Army was
indeed enormously, almost uncannily, self-confident.
It snapped its fingers at the Grand Army, and lo, with
one kick, the Grand Army sent it flying.
The fruits of this debacle may fairly be ascribed to
the magic of Napoleon's leadership, but not the
debacle itself. Auerstadt was a worse, altogether
more infernal, defeat than Jena, and Auerstadt was
won by the stout Davout and his famous Third Corps.
To read the memoir of Davout is to understand that
the organisation, discipline and training of the
Prussians was met by organisation, discipline and
training scarcely, if at all, inferior to it, plus some-
thing else, something swift, imponderable, winged.
The Prussians could not face the French. Was it
haply that something which enabled the man of
destiny to overthrow Army after Army — Nation
after Nation — until only a handful of British aristo-
crats stood between him and the immensity of the
Imperial idea ?
At the Battle of Lake Regillus there appeared two
forms of more than mortal stature, mounted on
white chargers, leading the chivalry of Rome. The
warriors to whom that vision was vouchsafed became
forthwith invincible, and so it is now and will be
evermore. The immortals still mingle sometimes
in the earthly conflict and not always do they choose
the side of the big battalions. It is the spirit, the
spirit that quickeneth.
An Army is something more than a marching,
shooting machine working in the grip of a Draconian
Code. Obviously, the troops must learn to shoot
and to manoeuvre ; the officers to command, the
rank and file to obey. Practice in those exercises and
PATRIOTISM 209
habits begin to bear fruit during the brief course of
a summer's camp and the longer the camp goes on
the richer will be the harvest. But, if there is any
truth in what has been said so far, it is certain,
not only that Napoleon's pronouncement on moral
values was true when it was made, but that, from now
onwards, it will tend to become truer. During the
last three-quarters of the twentieth century, in fact,
the moral factor will transcend the physical, not as
three to one but as four to one.
Moral forces may take a back seat at Committees
of Imperial Defence or in War Offices ; at the front
they are put where Joab put Uriah. There is a
steady bias towards material in every administrator's
mind ; there is a steady bias towards numbers in
every politician's mind, so that, at last, they forget
the soul. But things forgotten do not thereby in
any sense cease to exist : they are still there waiting
till time gives them their revenge, like a latchkey
left lying on a dressing-table whilst its owner, heed-
less, far distant, whirls with his inamorata in the
mazy evolutions of the valse.
The latchkey to success in war is a sound moral
outfit, and by " war " I do not refer merely to the
clash of armies, but use the word to denote the
instinct of every nation to expand like an oak
stretching her branches to the sky striving against
the undergrowth to make Tuum Meum.
When, earlier in this essay, genius — ideas — in-
ventions— imaginations were placed at the head of
the winning factors in war, campaigns would have
been a better word to use. A campaign is quickly
over, war is everlasting, and as everlasting qualities
are to be found only in moral fibre, so also the means
p
210 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
of salvation for a people, whether in war or peace,
must be sought in their persuasion that they do
possess brains, hearts, laws, experiences which war-
rant them before God and man in playing some
definite part in the development of the world.
The moral outfit of an army is the same but with
a difference. We have no word in English to express
the moral outfit of an Army and so we borrow the
French words morale or moral. But, although we
put them into italics, they still retain a savour of
the English " moral " which we apply to matters of
virtue or goodness. The simplest way out of it (for
we must have a word to express this special military
significance) is to take the word morale out of its
italics and adopt it into our language.
The morale of an Army is compounded of enthu-
siasm for the national cause and of belief in its own
arms. The value to an Army of a righteous cause is
no new discovery. William the Conqueror man-
oeuvred for years to put Harold morally in the wrong
before he began to move his Knights ; he succeeded
and robbed Harold of his Bishops before the game
began. William, in fact, made much the same use
of Harold's oath on the relics of the saints as North-
cliffe did of Kaiser William's solemn engagement to
protect Belgium. The Papal Bull secured by the
art of William the Conqueror was worth to him five
thousand coats of mail, and the loss William the
Conquered suffered by the scrapping of his signature
was five million fighting men — no less ! The
materialistic Germans of 1914 deliberately, quite
deliberately, put geographical and technical advan-
tage above clean consciences ; had they not done
so they would have won.
PATRIOTISM 211
Throughout History religious or philosophical
men have constantly been perceiving truth ; i.e.
the reality of God, and have even from time to time
succeeded in gaining a theoretical acceptance for
their view from the ordinary Pagans who form what
is called the Ruling Class. Yet, let the Storm arise,
and brute instinct reasserts itself. In 1914 the
German Great General Staff had reckoned by all
the most profound calculations of science they must
win, provided they started off on a dishonoured
cheque. Had there been one righteous man ; one
prophet like Isaiah ; in Germany he would have
pointed out to them that they would thus raise the
powers of the unseen world to fight in the enemy
ranks — invisible forces — incalculable forces. But
since 1871 the Germans had, bit by bit, divested
themselves of their belief in things they could not
see, smell, taste, or touch. They wrote about them
and spoke about them ; their Field Service Regula-
tions paid lip service to them : they had far less
belief in them than we had. In other words, they
were doomed — or damned ; it doesn't much matter
which way you write it.
Although our William the Norman took more
trouble to conform to the ethics of his time than
did William the German in his, we need not conclude
that there has been any slump in moral values be-
tween A.D. 1066 and 1914. Ideal wars have been
fought in the interval as, for instance, the Crusades ;
also, there have been armies like those of Frederick
the Great, whose grenadiers cared no more whether
they were in the right or in the wrong of it than the
Zulu impis when they sallied forth at Cetewayo's
bidding to wash their spears. There have, in fact,
212 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
been ups and downs ; yet, take it all in all, as
civilisation has advanced, the morale of Armies has
drawn more and more of its strength from conscience,
and so, politicians also have been more and more
forced to cut their best friend, the Devil, when they
meet him in public. Leaving ourselves outside the
question, we can see now that although the leaders
of the Germans had coldly determined to sacrifice
the chivalry of war, and even its rules, upon the altar
of practical expediency, they had to try and conceal
their crime from the rank and file of their own Army.
It was all very well to take the honour and chivalry
of the old Teutonic knights and nail them up dead,
as a gamekeeper nails vermin to a tree ; there is
always an advantage in getting a free hand : but it
would not do at all if those simpletons, Michael and
Fritz, were to suspect what had happened. So the
Great General Staff had to pretend that the shooting
of occasional batches of innocent civilians was a plan
for reducing the sum total of human misery ; that
it was, in fact, a philanthropic act; that (as Mr.
Wells puts it when vindicating the Bolshevists) they
" did on the whole kill for a reason and to an end " ;
that the Kaiser had only anticipated the French
when he broke the neutrality of Belgium, etc., etc.
These persuasions were effectual, for the German
Army could never have made its very fine fight
for Kultur if it had not genuinely believed that the
German soldier was a better human being as well
as a better fighter than the French or the Russian.
Hence propaganda. The devil, unfortunately, is
immortal. Whenever God takes a step forward;
look out ! For sure as Fate the devil is at His elbow.
Like the battle between big guns and armour, there's
PATRIOTISM 213
no end to it. Armies develop consciences — curse
them ! A dope must be invented for the consciences !
Propaganda, as inverted patriotism, draws nourish-
ment from the sins of the enemy. If there are no
sins, invent them ! The aim is to make the enemy
appear so great a monster that he forfeits the rights
of a human being. He cannot bring a libel action,
so there is no need to stick at trifles. So he boils
down his dead comrades for their fat : horrible !
He is excommunicated. To kill him becomes a meri-
torious act. See-saw ; so we go ; and the problem
facing our statesmen to-day is how, in peace, we
may best knit together those beliefs of our rank and
file in their own country and thus, in war, reproduce
that flash like a naked sword which came in 1914
from the invincible soul of our Army. For that we
must turn to Patriotism.
Patriotism ! What is it ?
Patriotism is an outfit of recollections, aspirations
and ideals peculiar to the bulk of the inhabitants of
some region ; or even, as in the case of the Jews,
held independently of any existing city or land.
But I think there must be a territorial basis, if not
in actuality, then at least in old sagas or dreams, and
that it is this which makes the distinction between
patriotism amd religion. Religion is the patriotism
of an angel : she wishes to extend the Kingdom of
Heaven by prayer, by sacrifice. Patriotism is more
earthy in its texture and yet retains, or should
retain, a wish to do good at its heart. The patriot
is not out for oil, he is out for " live and let live."
The cleaner cut the area of the native land, the
stronger the patriotism, as we see in the cases of
islands like the United Kingdom, Japan, Switzer-
214 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
land and Ireland. This makes me feel that Mr.
Wells for all his brilliant intellect and all his righteous
judgments has never fathomed patriotism. The
idea underlying " the enlargement of Patriotism
to a World State " will remain clever nonsense,
until, that is to say, his own Martians make their
long-deferred attack upon our planet.
Almost always patriotism is founded on a common
history illuminated by acts of more or less mythical
heroes and expounded in the traditional style by
mothers and schoolmistresses. Once grafted on
to the young idea the sentiment is exploited by
ballad makers and singers ; by writers, artists and
politicians. Hence arises a public or national belief ;
in the case of England, a belief in a God of twin
forms : (1 ) John Bull, a jolly old farmer, all for sport,
hospitality and fair play : (2) Britannia, a severe and
heavily-armed female who is not going to stand
any nonsense. John Bull and Britannia are every
bit as good as the Roman Gemini and stand broadly
for freedom, go-as-you-please, my-house-is-my-castle,
and voluntary service as against, for instance, the
German creed of order, obedience, my-house-is-the-
property-of-the-State and compulsory service.
Patriotism is like a plant whose roots stretch
down into race and place subconsciousness ; a plant
whose best nutriments are blood and tears : a plant
which dies down in peace and flowers most brightly in
war. Patriotism does not calculate, does not profi-
teer, does not stop to reason : in an atmosphere of
danger the sap begins to stir ; it lives ; it takes
possession of the soul.
Inherited traditions of sacrifices endured, of
tyrannies overcome ; a present determination that
PATRIOTISM 215
these sacrifices, these victories, must and shall be
lived up to and maintained, plus common associa-
tions with the mountain and vale, the river, forest,
plain and city of the actual native land — these are
the emotions which awaken suddenly from years
and years of slumber to the call of the tocsins of
war. Sedan binds together the Hanoverians and
the Prussians ; also, in another way, the French
aristocrat and the French Socialist, lending by a
common and yet how different a memory, a touch
of passion to the patriotism of two great countries.
So, too, the mighty Rhine bears on its bosom to each
German a rich sentimental cargo of Rhine maidens,
Loreleis, Rhine gold ; precious unalterable posses-
sions ; whereas, to the French, the same river is an
emblem of military conquests and glory ; an emblem
to which they still hold and, in holding, hold also
France herself together. When Field-Marshal Foch
arrived at Cologne and entered a room filled with
British officers of high rank waiting to have the
honour of being presented to him, he walked right
past them as if they did not exist to the window
which opened upon a wonderful prospect of the
Rhine. Throwing it open, he gazed at the classic
river as if he would drink it up with his eyes and
then, stretching out his arms, exclaimed in a voice
vibrating with emotion : " Le Ehin ! "
Scottish women play their part right well. Where
is the Scot with soul so dead that he does not accept
the heritage bequeathed him by the Bruce when
with his battle-axe he cracked the skull of "the fierce
De Boune " ? It happened a good while back, but your
true Scot can still hear the impact of that blow.
Or else ; they may prefer to watch with the eyes
216 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
of their hero the seven times renewed efforts of the
famous spider to forestall Messrs. J. & P. Coats
and Co. with a web into which all the world must
fall. Whichever way you take it, a Scotsman pos-
sessing family traditions of that sort has no excuse
at all if he fails to get the better of less fortunately
ancestored folk. He, of all men, is born with an old
silver apostle spoon in his mouth. The banks and
braes o' Bonnie Doon — the Gaudie " rinning "
—still rinning — at the back of Bennachie — they
are his, those lovely streams ; they are his own
ever-living waters in quite another sense from the
Nile or Ganges which might seem more actually to
belong to him ; they slip away through the fingers
of the actual sporting tenants as evasive as the snow-
flakes which fall upon their surface : they are Scotch ;
they are absolutely ours.
A common dislike makes almost as good a basis for
a combine as a taste held in common. In our wars
against the French the propaganda used against them
was their habit of toasting frogs just as, lately,
against the Germans, the propaganda was their habit
of roasting their fallen comrades for fat. The pre-
judices of race are as useful in keeping the rank and
file shoulder to shoulder against the foreigner as
its virtues.
In the days between 1791 and the fall of Napoleon,
the Swiss, though militarily entirely overwhelmed,
over-run ; though they were given " resolute govern-
ment " no end; came out of their ordeal more Swiss
and less French than ever they had been. In the
sphere of the spirit I think there is no process corre-
sponding with the process of material absorption ;
i.e. a boa constrictor swallowing a donkey. When
PATRIOTISM 217
Napoleon tried to swallow the Swiss they escaped
quite easily by ignoring the verdicts of the magis-
trates set over them and by accepting tacitly instead
the verdicts of other magistrates, outwardly simple
fellow citizens, whom they, surreptitiously, had
agreed amongst themselves to consider as their real
rulers. But what's the use of danger signals ?
If only we would look back a bit and think, we
would see that although it is wrong to say that the
Force which can kill a tyrant is "no remedy," yet
it is quite true that " force is no remedy " against
patriotism ; on the contrary, it is a stimulant.
Force cannot kill the legend of Tell or the legend of
Charles the Bold. Swelled head is the Nemesis of
success, and a swelled head turns naturally to
Force ; but if any coolness remains do not let us
use it on patriotism. Free trade, fostering of native
industries, etc., have been vaunted as solvents of
patriotisms. There were many writers writing just
before the war who prophesied that " reciprocity "
could, and would, convert the inhabitants of Canada
into Yankees. But reciprocity never got past a
certain challenging double sentry ; the ghosts of
Wolfe and Montcalm.
Still, business relations, Zollvereins, are instru-
ments, no doubt, and an enduring patriotism will
usually be found to include some identical interest,
shared by the patriots but threated by foreigners.
Patriotism unites a multitude (1) in remembrance ;
(2) in danger ; (3) in aspiration ; (4) in the posses-
sive mood. The more frequent the play of these
sensations the more enduring the mood of the patriot.
Therefore, patriotism needs time just like that velvet
lawn in the quadrangle of Oxford which a millionaire
218 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
wanted for Harvard. Heredity — age — gives us an
advantage. For us ten thousand memories, sad
or splendid, mingle with the song of the thrush,
the colour of the primrose, the scent of the sweet
briar to give us higher guidance than busy common
sense can offer in times of danger. Other races may
take the destruction of the Legions of Varus as their
lode-star — or the victories of the Revolution — or
else they have been reared on tales of clan combats
fought by gnome-like cavaliers clad in chain
armour, and believe the cherry blossom to be more
lovely than the rose. Well, let them hug their fond
traditions and welcome ! We have no quarrel with
those worshippers of strange gods so long as they
leave us our own altars unprofaned. But when
they approach us in minatory guise and bid us bow
down and worship in the house of Rimmon — why
then we pull ourselves together and realise that,
viewed in relation to these strangers, all those our
countrymen we had imagined to be nobles and
esquires, butchers, bakers, bankers, soldiers, sailors,
tinkers, and tailors are just quite simply Britons.
Yes, we pull ourselves together and say we are
shoulder to shoulder here and that we have died
by the million there and are ready to die by the
million again sooner than abdicate from the mighty
Empire of fact and still mightier Empire of thought
bequeathed to us by our ancestors. Here is at
the same time the touchstone and the whetstone of
patriotism. All our love of country, love of one
another, is as tinkling brass and sounding cymbals
unless we are prepared to lay down our lives for
them.
Once more, the winning quality in war is the
PATRIOTISM 219
cohesion of all sorts and conditions of men brought
about by the spiritual cement ordinarily called
patriotism. The solidarity of a free people with
their own free state. Where this exists it must
manifest itself in the conduct of the Army ; in the
leading of the officers ; in the devotion of the rank
and file.
Seeing then the inestimable value of patriotism
can we not intensify its force ? We know that the
quality is often lacking to people otherwise excellent.
Take the Chinese. Work and output are preached
to us day in and day out as the only true road
towards national salvation. Well, the Celestials
have been sweating their guts out for at least one
thousand years ; yet China seems further away from
peace, comfort, wealth, happiness — not to say from
setting a mark upon the world — than she was one
thousand years ago. Why ? The Japanese say,
1 * Because she cannot breed good officers. ' ' Probably
the Japanese are right, but as she breeds much
better merchants than the Japanese their theory
leaves something to be solved.
The fundamental cleavages between the character,
" form " and outlook of the upper classes of the
various nations — of the classes who travel about —
has tended to conceal from mankind the close kin-
ship existing between their lower classes. The
cosmopolitan veneer with which all aristocracies are
equally coated misleads in the one direction, whilst
the fact that peasants are the guardians of national
dress, habits and ceremonies leads observers astray
in the other. But look into their hearts, and no
gulf at all separates the German and British pea-
santry. Even the Turk and Chinaman are nearer to
220 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
us, in that stratum, than is generally imagined. I
an not theorising here ; I am speaking from personal
experience picked up by living in farmhouses in
Saxony and Bavaria and by months spent in Chinese
cottages. It is when you come to the men in the
tall hats and frock-coats ; superficially as like as
two pins ; that the contrast in ideals becomes
startling.
Still, there is one very real variation in type
between Chinese and, let us say, Japanese. Take
one of those excellent, honest hard-working Man-
churian farmers, or one of the commercially upright,
high-principled Chinese merchants of Hankow and
make him into a Lord High Admiral, and he loads
shell with saw-dust instead of expensive high ex-
plosive and pockets the difference. Now take the
commonest little cheating Japanese shop-keeper and
he would far sooner die than do that !
Had China possessed real patriotism instead of
a false spirit of vainglory, Japan could never have
conquered those millions by a few thousands even
though the eunuchs had expended the whole of the
Naval Estimates in rebuilding the summer palace at
Pekin. The truth is that China has arrived at Mr.
Wells' winning post of the enlargement of patriotism
to a World State and has, in the process, lost both
the patriotism and the State ! A big issue is
utterly lost on the Chinaman ; he can't see the wood
for the trees ; he can't see the State for the estate.
These people may be conscious, and are conscious, of
something pleasing to them in the society of their
own folk as compared with foreign devils ; they are
conceited and exclusive, but they won't risk a scratch
to maintain the independence of this, to them,
PATRIOTISM 221
pleasing social group. They will make sacrifices for
a master, for a brother, but the idea of the State is
beyond them. In the domain of statesmanship, they
are a thoroughly mediocre lot. They can do small,
ordinary things ; they cannot produce even a few
selected men, as the Japanese can, who will grasp
and grapple with great principles. Therefore, China
is not, in the proper sense of the word — a nation at
all. It is a mere agglomeration of men and, being
wanting in moral force, has no entity, no being, no
power of progress. The Chinaman cannot credit a
public functionary, a Mandarin, with decent motives,
and he is right. Let philosophers enquire what the
root cause of this vast fiasco — this huge blank
wasted area on the globe may be — filled it is true
with 400,000,000 human beings possessing good
brains ; good bodies ; high individual principles
and gifts all doing nothing to help on the world ;
let them enquire ; to us, on the face of it, the imme-
diate reason is simply lack of patriotism.
The period 1870-1914 incubated the ideas engen-
dered by the Franco-German War ; politically,
socially, agriculturally, and industrially they grew
up and led surely — quite surely — to the greatest
war of all. The older historians are now proved to
have been quite right in giving a greater weight
and space to wars than to questions of politics or
commerce ; they were right because, as we living
men can see more clearly than our fathers, steps of
progress, or retrogression, are punctuated by wars
until we get to the fullstop or death of a nation,
which also is always a war. During that epoch
1870-1914 it was my fortune to see many lands and
peoples, and it seemed to me then clear that the
222 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Prussians, Bulgarians and Japanese grasped the
extent of their individual responsibilities towards
the Fatherland more fully than other races. When
Von Moltke was asked in 1908 what in his opinion was
the first qualification for an officer of the General
Staff, he replied, " The first qualification ever since
the day of my namesake has been not so much the
possession of any quality as the absence of a quality
— the quality of ambition. When, with us, an
officer of the General Staff is a climber — well — we
have no further use for him." Every one of the
Japanese Commanding Generals in 1904-1905 was
entirely free from any thought of self. I cannot say
as much for the European-trained officers of the
General Staff ; but of the old-fashioned Commanding
Generals I do say with complete confidence that it
was so. The Bulgarians were not on so high a
plane as the Japanese, but, still, they resembled
them curiously in many ways and especially in the
burning, sleepless quality of their patriotism.
In Great Britain patriotism did not seem to stand
on the German or Japanese level. This was because,
with a system of voluntary service, the State was not
working upon the patriotism of its citizens all day
and every day for all it was worth as, for instance,
by conscription. Apparently, we had buried our
gifts in a napkin, but, as I wrote in an essay on
Voluntary Service at that time, " the vital current
still flows strongly under the surface where, for any-
thing we know to the contrary, it may be filling
vast reservoirs " — and it was ! Those were the
days when millionaires and profiteers used to write
to The Times deploring the fact that our older
universities did not train our youth to business !
PATRIOTISM 223
But, praise be to the Lord of Hosts, Oxford and Cam-
bridge, the one by its instinct and tone, the other
with the whole force of its intellect, have stood out
against the standards of Capitalism and the counting
house and exalted against money bonds the bonds
of gentle culture and of a common birthright. The
ideal of our great universities has been rather the
Public Servant than the Commercial Traveller.
Many British officers used to serve, not for their
starvation pay, but for love of their country and
on the off-chance of being able to defend it with their
lives. Some of them were deep-thinking, assiduous
men of business, drawing hundreds a year when they
might have made as many thousands elsewhere.
They were aware of the fact and remained well
satisfied with the hundreds. Our British Samurai, in
fact, men of high honour and noble tradition, were
bound up with the life-history of their race and of
their regiments. They deliberately, indeed joyously,
faced up to a life of adventure, roving, action, exile,
and poverty because it satisfied and reposed their
souls, because it redeemed them from the sterility
of a Chinese career — a life of sheer egoism. May
they rest in peace these hundreds upon hundreds of
younger comrades whom I have inspected on
countless parades and field-days, have trained at
Hythe and at the Indian Schools and have served
with in so many wars. They sleep where the waters
of the blue ^Egean reflect a land very beautiful with
lilies and all sorts of flowers ; they sleep in France
and Macedonia ; in Palestine where Richard Lion-
hearted and their ancestors fought before them ;
in Africa-East and Africa-Southwest, all over the
world their graves stand as monuments of honour
224 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
to their race. For they are dead : so many of them
are dead that as a class they have passed away.
Alas ! for those thousands of gallant souls whose
spirit was as a mirror wherein could be seen reflected
the glory of imperial England. They are gone :
so I thought — and then — I saw Woolwich and
Sandhurst !
I saw Woolwich and Sandhurst, and lo ! the sun
was rising again over the dark horizon of our islands
—the sun — and all was well with the world. The
new boys are the old boys to the life ; the same
type, the same class, the same ideals — only, there
are many more of them. France has lent us
five Officer Instructors to each of our Colleges ; they
are picked men who have made their mark in the
war and are now making another mark upon Wool-
wich and Sandhurst. What do they say of our
lion cubs ?
They say that whether from the moral point of view
or from the physical point of view they did not
know, till they came here, that there existed any-
thing quite so fine as these two bodies of English
cadets. From the intellectual point of view and
from the educational point of view, on the other hand,
they could not, so they declare, have conceived so
great a waste of good stuff as was exemplified by
those same cadets.
Be it so ! Let the rest of the world have the brains
provided we keep the character. If our Empire is to
endure let us rejoice in our possession of a coming
class of officers who are so strong and so sane in
body and soul that they astonish some of the best
soldiers of France. We have, we must have, a
singular system of education if we produce speci-
PATRIOTISM 225
mens so singular ; and, in effect, it is so singular
that no foreigners and only about one-hundredth of
our own people really understand it. The essential
difference between British patriotism and, let us
say, German patriotism, is that the former aims
at spreading the standards of the good Public school-
boy; i.e. the ideals of fair- play, of playing the game,
of telling the truth. Its object is not merely to
aggrandise Britain, to paint the map red, but to get
backward or less fortunate races to learn the value
of a cricket ball and of an honest umpire. Many of
those who go out into the utmost parts of the
Empire could not, or would not if they could, put
their ideals into words, but, they act on them ! Our*"
patriotism lives because it is not narrow or selfish,
aiming solely at gaining for one country and that its
own country. The first time this high ideal was
betrayed was at Versailles. May it be the last.
Patriotism which is narrow is bound to fall in the end,
just as Dives who forgot Lazarus is bound to fall.
These ideas lie behind Wells' mind, but, marvel-
lous as are his gifts of expression, he loses touch
somehow here : — I think he was not at a public
school and his doctrinaire socialism leads him
astray. The same thought is behind Nurse Ca veil's
" Patriotism is not enough." She saw plenty of
German patriots, but she had not the knowledge
public schoolboys have of the other kind. In my
chapter on the " Application " of my theories to
our new-model Army I shall have a word or two
more to say on the cultivation of British Patriotism.
CHAPTER XI
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION
Shelley, after discoursing to a fair lady upon
the beautiful flirtations of mountains, rivers, oceans,
and whatnots, suddenly pops out with his —
" What are all these kissings worth
If thou kiss not me ? "
I am quite sure the lady agreed with Shelley
that they were no d d use at all unless they
led up to an application, and so I will go right on
with only one word of warning ; let the machinery
be of the best, but, make it as good as you like,
you can't get away from the Man. Taking our
ramshackle, patchwork constitution as it is, a great
Prime Minister can still work wonders with it. By
making a couple of simple changes in Mr. Lloyd
George's outfit he could afford, as he cannot now
afford, to dispense with good machinery. Or else,
take Mr. Asquith. Imagine a hard-working Mr.
Asquith with initiative, and you have imagined a
P.M. who could easily do without aid from the
mechanism of a modernised staff.
There is no way of illustrating personality except
by personalities. Every one knows something of
the examples I have chosen ; either we must get
some one better than either or else we must improve
our machinery.
22«
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 227
As to the machinery do not please imagine that
the splendid model created by Haldane between
December, 1905, and June, 1912, remains abreast of
the times. Although still in good working trim it
stands, in relation to what should by now have
been launched upon the Empire, exactly as a 1910
motor-car does to a 1921 issue by the same firm.
But there is no new output. The War Office con-
tains clever men but — no Haldane.
Until, hi December, 1905, Haldane emerged out of
the blackness of a record fog, clutching his famous
seals of office, the War Office was without form and
void. The Army Council had expanded Arnold
Forster's 5,000 men into 80,000 and had some
forty field batteries to send with them. This was
the best they could do in the way of an Expedi-
tionary Force. Haldane came like the first chapter
of Genesis. By skilful reorganisation he doubled
the available number of rifles and guns without
adding one to their actual number, and then went
on to create, out of a chaos of Militia and Volunteers,
a great special reserve for the Expeditionary Force
as well as fourteen new divisions of Territorials
supported by one hundred and fifty Territorial
batteries ; he made officers' training corps, and
many other things as well, and spent less money !
That splendid Army has served its purpose.
To-day the purpose is quite different. No balance
of power to redress : no defence of hearths and
homes. But those were the objectives of Haldane's
organisation !
What do we want to-day ? My ideas on the
subject will come out as we go on. All I would
suggest just here is that we want smaller, more
228 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
compact, more mobile, more highly machined forma-
tions, each sufficient unto itself, capable of bringing
the last word of science and skill to bear upon areas
containing less skilled, less powerfully armed, people.
Also, that something drastic must be done to weld
together the old Services of Army and Navy and to
see that the new adjuncts of air, under-sea and tanks
do not break away from the main organisation and
group themselves into separate Services.
To reorganise the Army alone would be like patch-
ing shoddy with broadcloth : the defence fabric would
not stand it. As we get on with the Army it will
become evident that the Navy, Air Service, Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence, and Cabinet are equally
crying out for repairs.
The intense vitality of military tradition, in so
many ways an asset to an Army, is a drawback in
this one way at least — that it predisposes soldiers
against change. But now that so many civilians
have been through the mill there is a chance that
we may for once take time by the forelock and meet
half-way the unpleasant surprises with which the
Versailles Treaty is pregnant.
For my part, I say, now is the time. Ideas,
like fluttering birds, are hovering on the dim thres-
holds of lif e. Why wait ? So, listen to me ! Re-
organise the Army from top to bottom ; as well
as, incidentally, the Navy and the Air Service.
Were we each to live one hundred years longer
we would not be likely to obtain a more lively
experience of war in all its forms than that which
some of us have survived. The hour is now : for
energy directed by reflection ; for foresight ; for back-
sight ; for using yesterday's inventions.
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 229
Any military reorganisation should conform to
certain set principles : —
(1) Power must go with responsibility.
(2) The average human brain finds its effective
scope in handling from three to six other brains.
If a man divides the whole of his work into two
branches and delegates his responsibility, freely
and properly, to two experienced heads of branches
he will not have enough to do. The occasions when
they would have to refer to him would be too few
to keep him fully occupied. If he delegates to
three heads he will be kept fairly busy whilst six
heads of branches will give most bosses a ten hours'
day. Those data are the results of centuries of
the experiences of soldiers, which are greater, where
organisation is in question, than those of politicians,
business men or any other class of men by just
so much as an Army in the field is a bigger concern
than a general election, the Bank of England, the
Standard Oil Company, the Steel Trusts, the Rail-
way Combines of America, or any other part of
politics or business. Of all the ways of waste there
is none so vicious as that of your clever politician
trying to run a business concern without having
any .-notion of self-organisation. One of them who
took over Munitions for a time had so little idea of
organising his own energy that he nearly died of
overwork through holding up the work of others ;
i.e. by delegating responsibility coupled with direct
access to himself to seventeen sub-chiefs !
Now, it will be understood why a battalion has
four companies (and not seventeen) ; why a brigade
has three or four battalions (and not seventeen).
Organisations are run by rule then ; a rule whereby
from three to six " hands " are shepherded by one
" head," each " head " in turn being member of a
superior group of from three to six who are being
wheeled into line by one. Fit this axiom upon any
ordinary organisation and if it does not " click,"
turn down that organisation. Who of us has not
in his time found himself, for his sins, a member
of a committee of a dozen or even more ? All
equal — all pulling different ways — a body outside
the laws of organisation — an amorphous mass — a
bag of jellyfish — a hopeless instrument. The only
chance the chairman has is to assume one or two
general principles ; to assume hesitation gives
consent ; and then to break up the meeting, sine
die, into the typical working groups of from three
to six. As to whether the groups are three, four,
five or six it is useful to bear in mind a by-law : the
smaller the responsibility of the group member, the
larger may be the number of the group — and vice
versa. That is to say, one N.C.O. in charge of three
private soldiers would be too idle ; one lieutenant-
general in charge of six divisional generals would
be too busy. The nearer we approach the supreme
head of the whole organisation, the more we ought
to work towards groups of three ; the closer we get
to the foot of the whole organisation (the Infantry
of the Line) the more we work towards groups of
six.
The Secretary of State for War has been described
as being (under the King) the " very head " of the
Army. That is the convention, but actually there
are the Cabinet and the Committee of Imperial
Defence above him, and it is easier to begin reorgani-
sation at the top of the tree than set to work lopping
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 231
the branches. A Cabinet consists, now, of about
twenty members, all nominally co-equal except that
one holds a bag and that the others want to empty
it. This clumsy machine is as much out of date
as would be a mastodon in the Mall. During the
Boer War it was already as dead as that mastodon.
The country had never voted to put these twenty
into power ; the country had voted for the P.M.
and for perhaps four or five of the best known of
his adherents. Actually, the P.M. and his four or
five notables did run the show ; a very small group
was really responsible for the policy ; but this was
irregular ; the irregularity is now become a bad
habit embodied in a form unknown to the constitu-
tion and, in short, we are being governed on false
pretences.
Only two years ago the Army was the State, and
it is more vital perhaps to the military forces of
the Crown than to any other body of citizens that
the supreme Direction of our native force (including
" the forces " of the Crown) should cease to mas-
querade as a Committee of twenty and, in some
form or other, should come out into the open. The
way we are going at present is straight to the sham
or ineffectual government which heralds and indeed
justifies revolution. The Cabinet is too big for
business, so it does not attempt governing or policy,
but each Minister contents himself with administer-
ing his own Department. Meanwhile, the Prime
Minister with a small band of picked adherents,
what we should have called " favourites " in the
days of the Tudors, runs the Empire. If we like
autocracy, well, we have it : if we don't, the Cabinet
should forthwith be reorganised.
232 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
The few words I mean to say on this subject will
not be written down at random. I know something
of its " Defence " and " Imperial " sides. I have
attended many meetings of the C.I.D. and, in my
four years' travel as I.G. Overseas Forces, I heard
what impressions overseas statesmen had carried away
with them. For what it may be worth my opinion
is that the overseas Premiers will not for long be
content to attend any hocus-pocus inner Cabinet ;
or Committee of Imperial Defence. They have no
wish to find themselves seated in a small room with
highbrows, talking " policy." They are business
men themselves and when they come to meet states-
men they want to meet the actual "Government."
They want to shake hands with the King and to
transact business with the actual, responsible,
governing body of the Empire.
Is it too much to ask that we should put
our own house at least so far in order that
we can say, " Gentlemen, here you are. There
is no idea of treating you as strangers by calling
any special or extraordinary committee to do
business with you. What you see is our own Govern-
ment Machine, just the same as yours ; so now let
us five nations, equal under the King, sit down and
see how we can draw up regulations for better trade,
communications and Defence."
The Cabinet of the future should consist of about
half a dozen Ministers. If we have a working
Cabinet of half a dozen of our best men, then our
visitors from overseas would learn that we still
carry heavy guns over here. As to the members
I should say: (1) the Leader of that House to which
the P.M. does not belong. (2) The Chancellor of
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 233
the Exchequer. (3) The Minister of Defence. (4)
The Minister of Home Affairs. (5) The Minister of
Foreign Affairs. ( 6 ) The Minister for the Dominions .
(7) The Minister for the Dependencies.
Were I to enter into a full explanation of the
foregoing paragraph I would have to write five
more books and I am too old for the job. But to
those who are young and have energy I would
point out that we always follow Rome ; that we
are predestined some day to fall into an Empire
of the East and an Empire of the West, and that
already the time is ripe for India, Egypt, Palestine,
Mesopotamia, British East Africa to be governed
by one officer. So now, let me turn to my own
subject, the Defence Minister.
The crying need of the moment is that the three
fighting Services of the Empire should be placed
under one Defence Minister, who will dominate and
co-ordinate Sea, Air and Land and all that therein
fight. He alone should have a seat in the Cabinet
and the elements he controls must be administered
by Under Secretaries of State. The defence of
our Empire is surely a matter which must imply
co-ordination between the Commonwealth — the
Dominions, the Dependencies and the Motherland ;
and, unless that Mother makes a start by co-ordin-
ating her own defence services, how in the name of
common sense can she expect her children to embark
their private capital in the old firm ?
No one who has breathed even a gasp or two upon
our astonishing whirligig can expect to take the
bloom off fourteen magnum bonum political plums
without raising Cain ; no one politically weaned will
feel hopeful that a Prime Minister who can work
234 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
his will with any man or subject by picking a small
sub-committee, ad hoc, is likely to create a Minister
who will have a huge power and will be almost
as big, therefore, as himself. All the same the
change will come. When it does we shall get our
Defence Minister and, with him, our land, sea and
air forces will become one and indivisible. The
strategy and tactics of land and sea have been
divorced for many, many years. Just at the
moment when the younger generation of soldiers
and sailors have begun to understand that the
" overlapping, competition and waste " l which took
place during the war between these two stranger
bodies, the Army and the Navy, must never happen
again and that sea and land services must by some
means or another be welded together ; just at this
moment arises the Air Service and demands a share
(which many of us believe should be the lion's share)
in the new combine.
The Times issue of 21st January, 1921, discourses
weightily in its leading article upon various sugges-
\ tions for working the Air Ministry and, after urging
that an independent portfolio be established for that
Department, goes on to say, " But other courses
have their champions, who see the opening for
pressing their views which Mr. Churchill's departure
for the Colonial Office presents, and are making the
most of it. The most worthy of serious argument
are those who advocate a Ministry of Defence,
supreme over the Navy, the Army and the Air
Ministry, and representing the three in the Cabinet.
This may be the counsel of logic and symmetry.
It is not, we believe, the counsel of common sense
1 Letter from Major-General Brancker to The Times.
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 235
and practicability. In theory a Ty[i'niftt.|y of Defence
may be admirable ; but we believe that in pracHi
it would break down, if only through the sheer
impossibility of finding any one man competent for
the mass of work which would fall on the unhappy
shoulders of a Minister of Defence."
Yielding to no man in my deep respect for that
Titanic institution, The Times ; believing as I do
in Northcliffe, Campbell Stuart and Wickham Steed
—for how else indeed could I be saved — I must still
affirm that this latest fulmination from our Olympus
is of the nature of one of those rare nods of
Homer rather than of the irrevocable decrees of
omnipotence. In making the above quoted remarks
The Times has bestowed its benediction upon a
heresy which strikes at the very root of the principle
of organisation. Let us see :
In 1896 I was Deputy- Quartermaster- General at
Simla ; then, perhaps still, one of the hardest worked
billets in Asia. After a long office day I used to
get back home to dinner pursued by a pile of files
three to four feet high. The Quartermaster-General,
my boss, was a clever, delightful work-glutton. So
we sweated and ran together for a while a neck and
neck race with our piles of files, but I was the younger
and he was the first to be ordered off by the doctors
to Europe. Then I, at the age of forty-three,
stepped into his shoes and became officiating Quarter-
master-General in India. Unluckily, the Govern-
ment at that moment was in a very stingy mood.
They refused to provide pay to fill the post I was
vacating and Sir George White, the C.-in-C., asked
me to duplicate myself and do the double work.
My heart sank, but there was nothing for it but
236 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
to have a try. The day came ; the Q.M.G. went
home and with him went the whole of his share of the
work. As for my own share, the hard twelve hours'
task melted by some magic into the Socialist's dream
of a six hours' day. How was that ? Because,
when a question came up from one of the Depart-
ments I had formerly been forced to compose a
long minute upon it, explaining the case, putting
my own views, and endeavouring to persuade the
Quartermaster-General to accept them. He was a
highly conscientious man and if he differed from
me he liked to put on record his reasons — several
pages of reasons. Or, if he agreed with me, still
he liked to agree in his own words and to " put
them on record." Now, when I became Q.M.G.
and D.Q.M.G. rolled into one I studied the case as
formerly, but there my work ended : I had not to
persuade my own subordinates : I had no superior
except the Commander-in-Chief, who was delighted
to be left alone : I just gave an order — quite a
simple matter unless a man's afraid : " Yes," I
said, or " No ! "
The moral of my reminiscence is plain : the higher
up the ladder you climb the less you have to do ;
provided: (1) you have some courage; (2) you
have some trust ; (3) you have your office so
organised that you don't have to deal with more
than three or four responsible heads. If a " mass
of work " fell upon " the unhappy shoulders of a
Minister of Defence " it would be his own fault.
// big men are overwhelmed with detail it is always
their own fault. If, for instance, Mr. Winston
Churchill undertook the duties of Minister of Defence
he would surely have less work. in his new office
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 237
than in his old, seeing he would only deal with three
subordinate Ministers instead of, as formerly, with
some seven or eight Army Councillors ; and would
only have to persuade the P.M. plus five or six
Cabinet Ministers instead of the P.M. and twenty
Cabinet Ministers, two of them (Sea and Air) most
jealous and most obstructive rivals.
One more point about the new model Cabinet
before passing on to the C.I.D. The P.M. should
be supported by a Chief of the Staff without vote
or voice ; a sort of Roman Augur seeking signs
of the times, not in the entrails of dead birds, but
by sounding the deep currents of human thought
and by listening to the songs of the live little birds
who nestle in the bosoms of supermen : a Chief
of Staff drawing £5,000 a year for collating intelli-
gence and for casting horoscopes : a political expert
freed from the executive worries of the whips ;
from speeches, banquets and propaganda work ;
who would assemble the shadows of coming events
into his ink bottle and with them draft out plans
of campaign to meet each successive danger as it
is disclosed by the ceaseless invasion of the future
by the past. Bolts out of the blue would be dis-
counted by this mentor to a P.M. and unprepared-
ness might cease to be endemic in British Cabinets.
In a word, the mind of this modern Augur would
be released from personal anxiety or responsibility
as to the daily bread of Parliament and would be
focussed entirely on baking loaves for the morrow.
He would cease to be a hewer of wood or drawer
of water like the ordinary secretary to a Committee
but would plant acorns or dig wells. He would be
a General Staff man, in short, and neither an Aide-
238 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
de-Camp nor an Adjutant. To " practical politi-
cians " this idea may seem impracticable ; actually,
whenever a soldier or a sailor is brought into close
touch with big politicians his criticism is that they
do not seem to have a thought to spare for the
cloud no larger than a man's hand. Let anyone
look back and they will see how we get into one
scrape after another owing to our hand-to-mouth
politics. Politics and the Navy equally suffer from
having no General Staff. Take the Suffrage trouble :
had Asquith had a political Chief of the General
Staff, the moment the law was broken that officer
would have laid before his P.M. alternative sets of
operation orders drafted so as to force the Govern-
ment to make up their minds at once whether they,
as Liberals, should conciliate the women or control
them. Actually, there were no orders ; the foolish
rank and file of the party were allowed to toy with
the lovely nettles instead of grasping them, and
the result was a loss of face not only by the liberal
party but by the whole masculine gender. Once,
in pre-war days, I took the opportunity of crossing
from Whitehall Gardens to Downing Street with Mr.
Asquith to put my idea of the glorified Staff Officer
to him direct. He listened with his usual affability
and replied that if he could only lay his hands on a
man of the calibre I had indicated to him he would
be glad to pay him not £5,000 a year but £10,000.
Five minutes previously the P.M. had been talking
to his own Secretary on the C.I.D., Sir Maurice
Hankey ; an officer possessing all the attributes
considered so rare, except the political flair. Not
double but hah* the £5,000 would have made him
passing rich. Since then this very officer, Hankey,
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 239
has been made Secretary to the Cabinet ! Perhaps
great minds have been thinking alike and my plan
has been put into operation, to the man and to
the letter, before I have had time to get out my
patent ? I hope so ; but I fear not ; I have no
knowledge, but I feel certain that Hankey is being
used to draw up agenda for meetings, collating stuff
bearing on the subject to be discussed and keeping
the great Departments aware of what is about to
happen at that Cabinet as well as what has happened
when it is over. These are big improvements and
in their way excellent. They make Hankey so
powerful that, if he had not the reputation of being
a saint, a cabal would have been formed long ago
to turn him out. But, if I am correct in my imagin-
ings, this is not the sort of appointment I advocate.
I mean some one else ; some one who has very
little to do with daily exigencies ; some one left
free to map out questions of policy hi advance ;
to ponder over the future. So I say once more,
it is not an Adjutant but a General Staff Officer
who is needed by the Cabinet machine : a man
entirely shielded from the impact of every-day
worries or every-day work so that when an emergency
arises he may step forward and say, " Here, gentle-
men, is a paper dealing with this matter ; drawn
up two years ago, it may save you trouble." So
there ! Let us turn to the C.I.D.
The C.I.D. was conceived hi the brain of Lord
Sydenham and was fondly nursed through its
infancy by Mr. Balfour. This was the biggest thing
he had ever handled and it promised to be the
biggest success. But, to my thinking, he is our A
Imperial Jonah. Though his beautiful ideas most
240 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
beautifully shoot up luck seems to be against them ;
not one of them can live through the winter and
become perennial. The C.I.D. did great work in
its day and looked as if it were going to be an excep-
tion. But now— - ! Alive, it still is, but on the
shelf, hardly used, since its organism was perverted in
1915 into a mere blunderbuss which the P.M. can
load how he likes, point where he likes and discharge
at what or whom he dislikes.
When Campbell-Bannerman came into his own
he was terribly afraid of the infernal machine left
behind him by Balfour. He was persuaded that
it might become a rival organism to his Cabinet
and that it would prejudice his own power. But
when that shrewd old Scot got into actual touch
with Balfour's abhorred legacy he awoke as with a
start to two facts :
(1) A Prime Minister is either alter ego to the
Minister of Defence or he is a sham.
(2) A Prime Minister can only be that by pre-
siding, frequently, at the C.I.D. or some similar
conference.
So C.-B. fathered the C.I.D. and became a good
friend to the fighting Services. In his short day
some excellent business was put through and the
fact that the P.M. was supposed to be next door
to a pacifist rather helped the Navy and Army
than otherwise. The C.I.D. was not executive, of
course: oh no, of course not! But if the C.I.D.
came to, let us call it a " view," with C.-B. sitting
at the head of the table it wasn't more than a brace
of shakes before he rose from that chair and sat
in another chair when instantly the " view " became
a vote. Here at once was the secret of the power
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 241
of the C.I.D. and the seed of its decay. The pro-
cedure was like this : the Secretary, with the P.M.'s
permission, would write a paper suggesting some-
thing offensive or defensive to be done involving,
perhaps, finance, India, foreign policy, home policy.
The C.I.D. would discuss the matter and the P.M.
would perhaps appoint a sub- committee to tackle
it. For that sub-committee the best men in the Empire
were available : Lord Morley, Haldane, Asquith. When
the sub-committee presented its report the matter
was again discussed and the decision, though only
a consultative opinion in theory, was, actually, an
executive decision. Not only was the decision
executive in fact, but it could be put in force very
quickly. Ministers outside the Cabinet, presented
with an agreement between the Prime Minister,
those of their colleagues who were more nearly
concerned and the military and naval experts, were
helpless. Though they might have fought, argued
or obstructed for sessions had the P.M. made the
proposal to them " off his own bat " they couldn't
stand at all against the organised effort of the C.I.D.
Hence the fatal idea began to fix itself in the minds
of these blokes that they must get themselves
summoned as often as possible to C.I.D. meetings !
Mr. Asquith was, in his easy-going way, keen on
the C.I.D. ; also, certainly, he showed up there to
great advantage. Just as the C.I.D. was Mr. Bal-
four's biggest achievement, so, to my thinking, Mr.
Asquith brought off some of his best coups, not in
the resounding halls of Westminster, but in the poky
second-floor flat of Whitehall Gardens. The way
he would cozen indignant Secretaries of State and
flustered Dominion Premiers out of their bad tempers
B
242 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
was very miraculous. Here were people ready to
fly at one another's throats and then, the P.M.
states the case, when lo ! each side thinks he is
stating their case !
" For he in slights and jugling feates did flow,
And of legierdemayne the mysteries did know."
Then we all used to go away saying to one another
what a tremendous fellow was Asquith, but the
business done was often insignificant ; for everything,
almost, was a compromise.
During Asquith' s tenure the dry-rot set in. When
he took over, and for some time afterwards, the
C.I.D. was small, safe and sound. The structural
principle on which it had been built up was that
it should form a common ground whereon the
leading sailors and soldiers of the day might fore-
gather and compare notes under the direct personal
supervision and guidance of the Prime Minister of
the day. Both the politicians and the military
profited. In that select society a P.M. could quickly
enough see for himself whether the sailors and
soldiers were whole-heartedly backing their political
chiefs. There was no cause for a sailor to differ in
public with his First Lord : in course of conversation
the P.M. could very quickly lay bare the situation.
On their side, the military met in surroundings less
formal than usual statesmen with wide views and
a highly cultivated talent for expressing those views.
The politicians learned that they didn't necessarily
know everything because they could talk about
anything ; they learnt, also, to grasp the difference
between a Service without a General Staff, each
man of it armed with his own private ideas only,
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 243
and a service with a General Staff who came down
imbued to a man with a common doctrine. Yes,
there were quite a few things taught and learnt
during straight talks at the C.I.D.
Those days passed and for several years before
the war the C.I.D. was undergoing a change. The
preparation by departments of the War Book gave
Secretaries of State an opening. The politicians
crowded in ; the three or four soldiers and sailors
could hardly find sitting room. If there was hardly
room for a sailor or soldier to sit there was still less
opening for him to talk ! The Royal Commissioners
on the Dardanelles were unable to picture the real
state of affairs and so they were vastly puzzled by
the direct conflict of evidence as to whether the
soldiers and sailors could have had any voice in
the decisions. Mr. Balfour and Mr. Asquith swore
one thing ; Lord Fisher swore the contrary. The
reason of the misunderstanding is simply that the
constitution of the C.I.D. had been steadily changing
and that the P.M. and Mr. Balfour had not realised
it was getting farther and farther away from the
soldiers and sailors and nearer and nearer to a
specially convened inner circle of Cabinet favourites.
What Mr. Balfour and Mr. Asquith said referred to
an earlier period and may have remained a pious
intention ; what Lord Fisher said, he had felt ;
and if he, a self-assertive man, had felt it, how
much more would the average shy sailor or soldier
feel it ? The changing moral atmosphere of the
C.I.D. coincided with a physical regrouping. Origi-
nally the First Lord and the Secretary of State for
War with their officers sat up close to the P.M.
and the four or five additional members, perhaps
244 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secre-
tary, or the Colonial Secretary were incidentals.
Later on the P.M.'s end of the table was stormed
by the politicians, the soldiers and sailors being
pressed to the far end towards the door. No soldier
or sailor ever spoke during a discussion in those
latter days, unless he was " billed " to make a
statement or first spoken to, but politicians would
eagerly break in on their own and deliver little
speeches. Searching in my memory for an instance
of either of the Services taking the initiative in a
discussion, the only exception I can recollect is my
own attempt to tell a big meeting about our amphi-
bious manoeuvres at Malta when the two battleships
had been sunk by submarines although they had
ample warning of the danger. I had to get this
story off my chest because I had promised Lord
Fisher I would do it, but the effort of barging in
upon these big men was so great that I should
have curled up half-way had not Colonel Seely
given me encouragement.
So the old C.I.D. merged first into the Dardanelles
Committee ; then into the War Committee ; then
into a War Cabinet and then into what they call,
I believe, a special Cabinet ; each a little more
autocratic than the other ; and now that the C.I.D.
idea is past mending it will be safer in every way to
end it.
The word " war " being left out the natural process
would seem to have been to have reverted to the
C.I.D., the parent organisation from which these
Committees and Cabinets were descended. But
although nominally alive it shows no sign of life.
The last act I know of the C.I.D. having perpetrated
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 245
must, I think, have poisoned it. In the autumn
of 1915 the C.I.D. paper was used to print, and
the secretariat were used to circulate, certain well-
timed slanders against British officers and rank
and file fighting then at the Dardanelles. The
slanders I repeat were printed in the C.I.D. best
style and must have seemed to the personages
favoured with them to carry the imprimatur of the
Prime Minister. The object was to create an acutely
painful impression of general debacle in which Mr.
Asquith specially would stand right up to his neck.
Being " fey " he let them use his own C.I.D. and
it downed him right enough — and itself, and many
good men and sound ideas besides.
Here was the end of the C.I.D. No Admiralty,
no War Office, no other Department of Government
worked by old-fashioned British machinery would
have allowed itself to be used for a piece of dark
trickery. A star chamber had been created : a
thing " holding for profitable that which pleased,
and for just that which profited."
* * * * *
If the C.I.D. excrescence has to be lopped off
we must have some new machinery to bring the
Services together and make their views permeate
to the Cabinet. A Defence Minister presiding over
a United Services General Staff should answer that
purpose admirably. At the head the Prime Minister
fixing policy in advance ; by his side the Defence
Minister in daily touch with the Under S. of S. for
the Army, the First Lord of the Sea and the Under
S. of S. for the Air. The Prime Minister would
have a closer grip of the National Executive than is
possible with twenty independent managers, for
246 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
the direct control would be in the hands of hah* a
dozen great Ministers with whom he would be
constantly in touch.
Take the Defence Minister. He would bring
Admirals and Generals out of their opposite corners
where, since the days of the Stuarts, they have
growled at one another, and make them work hand
in hand under his own eye. The eccentricities with
which four centuries of ploughing lonely furrows
have endowed the Admiralty and the War Office
would then be shown up. Instead of going into a
third corner or joining part the Navy and part the
Army, the new Air Marshals would fall in. Objec-
tors have argued that a Defence Minister would
lower the " status, authority and efficiency of the
Admiralty Board and Naval Staff." Why should
he be such an ass as to lower a part of his own
status ?
" Captains of Industry," so the newspapers say,
" are built on a perception of the advantages of
combining related undertakings, coal with iron,
and both with transport." Exactly. Then why
not repeat the process in another field and build
a " Captain of War " on a combination of the
" related undertakings " Army ; Navy ; Air Force ?
A critic of the suggested Ministry of Defence writes,
" A coal- mining company and a gas company are
both engaged in industry, but they do not require
a composite staff ! ': I myself assert that the
shareholders would be the better of it.
The moment a Defence Minister turned to his
new duties he would discover that :
(1) The Navy have no General Staff and are so
determined to be different that they are creating a
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 247
" war staff " instead. " A rose by any other name
. . . ? " I wonder ? Roses of two colours have
fought to the death, vide York and Lancaster :
anyway, the naval war staff are still a newly-formed
body, they have not had time yet to create a common
doctrine ; they would be greatly helped were they
brought into close everyday touch with the Army
General Staff ; a Defence Minister can bring this
about ; no one else.
(2) The Air Service have no General Staff ; a
General Staff takes ten years to create.
(3) The Army General Staff has been so busy
since the war with policy, politics, Ireland and
Mesopotamia that they seem to have had no time
to trouble about the Army. They have cold-
shouldered reorganisation by the usual means of
a Committee which blessed the old order and then
turned up its toes.
(4) No manual, so far as I can ascertain, deals
with the working together in war or peace of the
three Services. No one has laid down, authorita-
tively, the part to be assigned to each in a landing,
an advance along a coast or in working up a great
river, or even in an inland battle or a blue- sea battle
where only two of the three would be employed.
If our airships blow the forts of an enemy harbour
to pieces, what happens next ? Does the Navy
make good or the Army ? Are the Commanders
to waste a week discussing the good old puzzle as
to whether the position to be held is all, or only
in part, above high- water mark, and are spring tides
to count in fixing that dividing line upon which all
amphibious operations now hinge ? A sailor landing
with a box of ammunition at low water is respon-
248 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
sible for it for perhaps 150 yards inland, as far as
high-water mark. If the enemy captures it above
high- water mark, that is no business of his ; he has
discharged his business ; if the enemy capture it
on the beach, that has nothing to do with the Army.
Fortunately soldiers and sailors at sea and in the
field are more united than Admirals and Generals
at Whitehall. But is it really true that because
for once in a way dual control happened to work
at the Dardanelles we are, therefore, going to stereo-
type the principle so that, when an Air Marshal
appears upon the scene, our forces will be commanded
by a triumvirate ? At the Dardanelles those stran-
gers the Army and Navy were suddenly flung into
one another's arms and, in face of the Turks, they
behaved like members of one family. But why
that thankfulness and why that sense of surprised
relief ? Why shouldn't we have got on always
during the wars of the past ? Why shouldn't we
make sure we get on always in the wars of the
future ?
No one ; not John Fortescue himself, can fetch
me from anywhere a finer example of mutual good-
will and co-operation between the Services than
that furnished by the Dardanelles ; yet, even so,
no one will pretend we worked together from the
outset as we might have worked had there been a
United Services Staff. We ourselves manufactured
a United Services Staff whilst we were out there.
Admiral de Robeck lent us some very fine men
who mastered the whole of our military technique
and would, in consequence, be fit to take high
position in the War Office to-morrow. But the
process took weeks. At first the sailors and soldiers
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 249
were like foreigners talking different languages. I
do not refer so much to systems of signalling and
gunnery but to basic technical principles. This
should not be ; there is no necessity for it to be,
and under a Defence Minister supported by a United
Services Staff it would not be.
Lord Hugh, the first flying Cecil, writes to the
papers x to say that :
" Only those who had an opportunity of observing the Air
Service closely can really appreciate how entirely different it is
from both the Army and Navy, and how impossible it is for
distinguished naval and military officers in high command to
administer the Air Service."
I dare say most people would agree with Lord
Hugh that air, water and earth are absolutely
distinct and yet it is a funny thing but it is only
by mixing them up that we manage to live ! One
step farther and we shall specialise in fire. Engi-
neers will step into their watertight box and explain
" how impossible it is for distinguished naval and
military officers in high command " to poke the fire.
The whole of these distinctions are exaggerated.
Experts love to magnify the technical mysteries
of their trade to the non-expert ; vide the conse-
quential air with which a man tells his wife so and
so is a " matter of business." High-flying Lord
Hugh is justly proud of doing what neither Jim
nor Bob can do ; they and the mud-crushing public
are his little wife who has to be impressed and kept
quiet at home by the magic word " business " :
MY business ; not yours. But although we may
not all have had opportunities " of observing the
1 The Times, 27th January, 1921.
250 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Air Service closely," we do know, we mud-crushers
and little wives who stay at home, that there is
such a thing as observing a subject too closely ;
of being unable to see it because you are "it."
Having retired to a distance I can now focus my
gaze and see quite well that a man who can handle
a Cavalry Division in action can handle the Grand
Fleet in action ; in fact, he's just the fellow to do it.
If French had been as young as Beatty he would
have fought on Beatty lines at Jutland, and if Beatty
had been as old as French at Kimberley he would
have galloped the town. All that they would either
of them have needed would have been a Staff Officer
to put nautical terms into military and vice versa.
The same holds good for the Air Service except
that, as a squadron of ships moves faster than a
squadron of Cavalry, so the air squadrons will move
by so much faster again than a squadron of ships.
If Lord Hugh Cecil has Jellicoe and Haig in his
mind when he suggests that " distinguished naval
and military officers high in command " would not
prove good interpreters of the dashing, crashing
spirit of the air, he may be right. But that is not
because Jellicoe is a sailor and Haig a soldier. Would
Lord Hugh say that Roger Keyes, the sailor, and
Hubert Gough, the soldier, would not rise to the
stormy emergencies of the air ? If so, I entirely
disagree with him, a thing I do seldom.
The main, underlying reason which makes it so
important that at the present turning-point of our
Imperial history we should create a ministry of
defence is because there seems to be no other way
of correcting the centrifugal vice which has got
into the very life-blood of our Services. Only by
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 251
long-sustained efforts have the Artillery been pre-
vented— to some extent — from retiring into their
shells. Regimentally, the Cavalry are a force apart ;
there is as much outcry when an infantry officer
gets a cavalry command as if a Bishop was seizing
the Woolsack. But it turns out that a Cavalryman
is quite competent to command infantry, and these
things are strange when it is remembered that the
infantryman was more intelligent in his youth and
passed a long way over his head at the entrance
exams, into the Army ! The Guards at one time
had so worked and magnified their privileges that
they were almost as different from the rest of us
as the Cavalry. The Royal Engineers are, actually,
as distinct from their comrades of the Line and
mounted branches — as much shut away from them
in a watertight compartment — as are the Marines.
Directly the new Defence Minister was appointed
he would set about forming a United General Staff ;
not for the three branches of one Service as at
present, but for all three Services. And he would
stress urgency as it must take five years before the
strange elements shake down together and another
five years at least before they become a band of
brothers putting doctrine above the interests or
traditions of any one Service. An United General
Staff will be able to effect no real unification of
the aerial, naval and military staffs until the whole
of its members have been penetrated by a common
doctrine. A common doctrine can only be imparted
by an uncommon man. Even an uncommon man
needs two years if he is to indoctrinate a member
of an intensely conservative clique with broad-
mindedness. If possible an Admiral should be
252 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
chosen as the first Chief of the United Services Staff
upon which, it goes without saying, the forces of
the Commonwealth and Dominions would be strongly
represented.
When the selected experts from Air, Sea and Land
have been assembled they will profess common
principles. Principles remain steadfast whether they
are applied to the clouds, waves or fields, but the
methods of their application in combined operations
will require a new book. Naval and Air experts
will feel nervous lest the existing, more numerous,
General Staff of the land forces should swallow them.
Given an impartial Defence Minister there need
be no fear. I believe the Sea and Air will stand
together and that they will take the new united
Services idea more kindly than their military
brethren. Be this as it may, we must not be dis-
appointed if, for a time, our omnium gatherum of
experts give no output commensurate with the
sum of their intellects. They are not likely to do
so until recruits begin to come in from the new
United Services Staff College.
This U.S.S.C. is another sure sequel to a Defence
Minister. The Imperial General Staff must be drawn
from the three Services, Naval, Military and Aerial ;
so many annual vacancies allotted to each Service ;
one entrance and one final examination ; one resi-
dence ; one lot of lecture rooms ; one Commandant.
We made a big mistake when we created a separate
Staff College for India, thereby introducing confusion
into the spirit of the General Staff. We justly attach
importance to the personality of the Master of a
public school who has to put his own trade mark
upon four or five hundred boys. At a Staff College,
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 253
in place of a mixed lot of conscripted children,
drawn almost at random from their homes or from
private seminaries — instead of these we find ambi-
tious and capable volunteers; selections out of a
great Service, in the first flower of their prime ;
eager, impressionable, retentive. Upon this plastic,
fiery stuff the Commandant puts his stamp. If he
is worth his salt the whole of the Staff Officers
passed into the Army during his tenure will have
digested his doctrine. Suppose that, long after-
wards, in some battle, the Generalissimo's plan goes
wrong ; the enemy are weak where they were
expected to be strong ; there is heavy firing from
directions supposed to be clear ; the telephones are
dumb ; the aeroplanes do not return ; the fog of
war descends. Now a certain Staff College graduate
is commanding a British Corps ; a man of his year
has the Corps on his right, whilst a man of a later
batch, but taught by the same Commandant, is
Chief of the Staff on his left ; each of these three
will know what the other two will do and what they
will expect him to do.
When the Commandant changes the doctrine
changes. Therefore, a good Commandant should
hold a long tenure. Therefore, also, to have several
Commandants of several Staff Colleges, or different
Commandants for each Service, when, by a little
arrangement and expenditure, the whole of them
could be brought together, is akin to madness. I
mean every word I write when I declare here that
it would be better to trust to mother wit than to
have separate Staff or War Colleges for each of
the three Services. If we wished to breed discord
and confusion that's the way to do it.
254 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
When graduates pass out, their first billets should
be to another Service ; or, if that can't be done, at
least to another branch of the same Service. During
their two years at the College they would all have
been given more than a casual insight into one
another's work. The idea of young military and
ah* officers going to sea may seem strange, but, in
fact, it is quite simple, as simple as making a sailor
take up a divisional staff billet during manoeuvres
or attaching him for autumn manoeuvres to a battery
or infantry battalion ; both of which were done
by me on Salisbury Plain — done with a success in
every instance so outstanding that (unless it were
to be assumed that sailors were much better men
than soldiers) it looked as if some new, some secret
source of energy was being tapped. So it was : a
rediscovery had been made of an old truth — the
value of change !
In the mapping out of the lives of State servants,
the regulations never allow for the value to a human
being of change. Cabinet Ministers understand its
value to themselves ; it is evident that the most
powerful of them are those who exchange portfolios
most often. But so strong a hatred has the State
of change of work amongst subordinates that it will
break its own rules to avoid it. The Regulations
lay down that at stated intervals Staff Officers must
revert to regimental duty. Are these Regulations
obeyed by the men who made them ? Let some
member of Parliament ask for a return : he will find
that they have been systematically violated. Hence
the dislike to the red tabs, brass hats, etc. What
wonder if they fall foul of regimental ranks when,
by their remarks, actions, orders, and mere attitude
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 255
they show that they have worn those tabs and hats
too long ; that they look on themselves as a cut
above their regimental comrades.
This misfortune is accentuated by the fact that
alone in European Armies, our Staff College students
are between 30 and 35 years of age when they join ;
most of them 35. By the time they have passed
out and have done one Staff job, they have little
regimental service left. If we lowered the age and
made it 25-30: (1) we would have more trained
Staff Officers ; (2) we would have more officers
on the cadres of regiments who had been through
the S.C. and therefore more chance of having them
serve regimentally.
The Master of Wellington College found that boys
were joining who had been crammed with Latin
on rotten systems. As a result, they had lost
heart ; they would not try ; as Classics they were
ruined for life. So what does the Master do ?
Being an original character he asks the boys whether
they would like to drop Latin for a year and take
up Greek ? Greek is a grand old lingo, he tells them,
and Homer beats cock-fighting. Every boy drops
Latin for Greek ; sets to work with a will and usually
does very well. After a year some of them go back
to Latin and easily make good where they had been
so badly beaten. Just in the same way, change
of service from sea to land, and land to sea, would
be the saving of many young sailors and soldiers
who are bored stiff with the monotony of their duties.
No sadder sight. The human soul struggling with
red tape. The cavalryman sick of stables; the
sailor nauseated by night watches. At last those
agonies are over. The soul is dead. The desire
256 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
for change is dead. Another life ruined by routine !
Directly the Services begin to dovetail instead
of to overlap a whole series of economics and reforms
would spring to the eye of Common Sense. The
extravagance of the Naval Service could not exist
a year side by side with the economy practised in
the Army. All those defence problems now being
debated at random in press and Parliament would
be studied at the United Services Staff College by
the young experiences collected there and would be
carried to swift solutions. By the time Naval,
Military and Air officers become senior enough to
attend Cabinet committees, minds as well as arteries
have become rigid ; for a generation each of them
has stewed and sweated in the traditions of his own
Service, seasoned with a spice of contempt for other
Services. There is no free give and take then, there
is only at best a compromise ; not an agreement
between friends, but an arrangement where, like the
Dutch, each gives as little as he can and tries to
take too much.
An agreement between friends ! There we have
it. But you can't easily be friends with a man of
a stranger Service with which there is absolutely
no liaison, which is run by a fellow called the First
Lord, who is reported to be constantly exchanging
snarls with the Army Council. So when war comes
to throw the soldier and the sailor, for the first
time of their lives, into the same boat, they are apt
to get on one another's nerves merely through the
misfortune that they neither of them know the
ordinary little punctilios and etiquettes of the
sister service. Not until we remove the pegs
upon which we hang our bad habits will we
APPLICATION OF HIGHER ORGANISATION 257
get rid of them — and those pegs are separate Heads ;
separate staff colleges; separate, exclusive, differently
dressed, differently named, differently doctrined
General Staffs, starting actually from different
schools. Sandhurst, Woolwich and Dartmouth, what
could be more separate — what more separative?
Why not turn them into one great National School
where cadets would begin to be moulded to take
their place in that vast lethal machine which we
describe by the euphemism " Defence " ? Not until
they reached their last term would they be ear-
marked for sea, land or air. Up to that time the
system of education and the exams, would be identical
for all ; after that, towards the end, boys might be
allowed to specialise.
We know that men usually fail if they don't know
what they're driving at. Where are we going
to ? What is our imperial drift ? There is no
other word to express our movement. We are
allied to a race possessing intense concentration
and purpose, the Japanese. We are invited to a
conference where we shall be expected to bell the
cat for the U.S.A. What a chorus of joy and
enthusiasm ! Why ? Because we have never thought
this question out ; because we have no united
defence staff which could pool experiences gained
in the elements to the elucidation of the tangles
of policy ; because, owing entirely to our lack of
staff method, we do not know (1) the Japanese, (2)
the U.S.A., (3) our own minds. Shall we do best
for the U.S.A. by holding on to our treaty with
Japan ? Shall we do our best for Japan by merging
this treaty into some larger, looser, more ambiguous
arrangement ? Which course will be better for the
258 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
British Empire ? There are opinions. Lord North-
cliffe seems to wonder whether Mr. Lloyd George
and Lord Curzon will make into an impressive com-
bine at Washington. Others think they will work
wonders, seeing one of them knows nothing but his
fellow creatures and the other everything except
his fellow creatures. But how about the Japs ?
How far is it from Formosa to Hong Kong ; how
far from Nagasaki to Formosa ? No doubt our
representatives will be shepherded by a scratch
committee of soldiers, sailors and airmen ; but that
is a very different thing from starting off with the
matured doctrine of a united Services General Staff
behind them.
CHAPTER XII
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO THE TROOPS
\
Once we get a Defence Minister we shall begin to
move. But, as things stand, we can see for ourselves
that nothing more is being done than tinker up the
pre-war machine and try and keep it on the road.
So I propose to devote a few words to the changes
in our own Army, which must, I think, in some
form or another, take place as soon as we have
•*•
anyone in authority who has a little time for
thought.
In our Great War game, the Division proved itself
to be the organic piece. For this there were three
main reasons : (1) the Division with us marks that
first point in the evolution of an Army when officers
and men feel they belong no longer to a part, or
member, or branch, but to an entity. (2) The units
in a Division were, during the war, left together so
long that they grew together, whereas corps and
Armies kept on changing. (3) The Division has
thus become the formation round which the memories
and feelings of our Service and ex-Service men have
actually learnt to revolve. As the war dragged
slowly along, officers and men gradually sank first
their brigade and then their battalions into the
larger arrangement. There they stopped. The
division, not the Army Corps or the Army, became
259
260 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
the pivot of the battle ; sharp in its outline, vibrant
to the word of its Commander, crowned with, ever-
green traditions.
During the war a Division became to us exactly
what the Legion used to be to Imperial Rome. But,
in the palmy days of Rome, the Legion was never
broken up. So long as there was life in Rome there
was no talk of cohorts ; the Legion was the unit.
Even during the chaotic six months which followed
the murder of Julius Caesar, even at the time when
Mark Antony, Octavius, Decimus Brutus, Marcus
Brutus, Cassius, Dolabella, Planeus, Lepidus, Pellis,
Lucius Marcus had all taken the field, the only
things counted, and the only things that counted,
were the Legions.
The Frontier Force, the city garrison, the field
Armies, reliefs in peace-time, reinforcements in war-
time were all by Legions. Later on, when the
decline began, the Legions, although their names
remained on the Roman Army List, became greatly
disorganised. The Standards and Headquarters
became a mere depot, whilst the cohorts were sent
here, there and everywhere to meet the pressing
needs of the moment. Cohorts from one and the
same Legion are shown as serving on the same date
in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Constantinople, whilst
the Headquarters remained in Egypt — I had almost
written Aldershot !
Probably it was a matter of course to the War
Office that our old regular Divisions should be broken
up as soon as peace was signed.
(1) They had only taken shape a few years before
the war. When the war broke out the battalion
was still believed to be our basic unit.
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 261
(2) They had been framed upon so grandiose a
scale that it was impossible in the process of the
ordinary reliefs to keep the twelve infantry battalions
and the three brigades of Field Artillery, etc., etc.,
welded permanently together. The units comprising
the division could not with us, as was the case with
the Roman Legion, be constant : they were always
going abroad or coming home, their places being
taken by strangers : the shell remained ; the con-
tents were constantly shifting. Until the war had
lasted a year our Divisions did not get the chance
of becoming what the Legions of Rome used to be
on the outbreak of war.
Not only, then, are the traditions of the best known
Divisions, as for instance the Royal Naval Division,
the 29th Division and the 51st Division, scattered
to the four winds of heaven by the disbandment of
the famous cadre, but the old, original, home service
divisions, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th are not
really alive — will not become real, living entities
until they have been a year at war. How can they
be really alive when two years is about the limit
any unit will serve with them, whereas, at the precise
present moment, there are no Divisions at all ? I
mean to say, their Headquarters exist, but their
battalions are sown broadcast here and there, hap-
hazard, by battalions and by companies over Ireland,
Mesopotamia, the Black Sea, Egypt, Palestine, and
Lord knows where. In India also they have no
existence, the organisation in that country being
by mixed brigades of Europeans and Indians framed
into temporary formations which are only, so to
say, Divisions by courtesy. Although war experience
has proved up to the hilt that the heart, force, vitality.
A
262 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
of a British Army is best developed in its Divisions
and that the battalion is not big enough or complex
enough to generate the same fervour, we have actually
at this moment scrapped the Division idea and fallen
back upon the effete idea of the battalion ! Need this
be so ? Not at all. Our Divisions are the biggest
known ; let them become the smallest.
I myself was one of those Commanders-in-Chief
who voted originally for the big Division of three
brigades instead of the small Division of two
brigades. Now I have changed my mind. As a
pure abstract question of organisation two is better
than three. During the war it was borne in upon
many of us that groups of odd numbers of identical,
standardised formations are a mistake. These groups
should be divisible by two — always ! There are
arguments for the odd numbers ; two Brigades in
the trenches ; one Brigade in reserve. That looks
pretty on paper and will do very well for a week or
so. But when your two front-line Brigades both
get worn out and you want to relieve them, you
can only move one at a time. The subject is
arguable perhaps ; all I have space to say here is
that the balance of advantages seems to me to be
on the side of the even numbers, and I know that
during the war three Battalion Brigades were found
to be an unmitigated nuisance. A five-company
Battalion would also be a curse to its colonel unless
the Fifth Company were an administrative headquar-
ters Company which stood out from the regular
rosters for work and for fighting. War demands a
perfectly plain-sailing system of relief. One Brigade
in the trenches ; one Brigade resting in reserve ;
two Battalions in the trenches ; two Battalions in
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 263
reserve. This should be the aim. At the Dardan-
elles, more often than not, we were all out with no
one in reserve — but that was not from choice.
Therefore, I say two^Bxigadeg in a Division is
better than three,lmd I will go on to show that the
smaller Division would be an all-round gain :
(L) The Division is the organism which, more
than any other, responds to the character of its
Commander, and it should come comfortably within
the grasp of that officer, who should be able to make
his presence felt everywhere and every day. There
were one or two divisional Commanders who man-
aged to come near this ideal, but, with three big
Brigades, the task was well-nigh overwhelming.
With two Brigades the exercise of a close and
constant personal touch by the Commander would
become simple.
(2) The battles of an Empire are fought abroad.
There can be no question with us of waiting at home
for the enemy to visit London. We have to go for
him, to get to him, and smoke him out in his nest.
To make provision for any other course is to make
provision for starvation. Therefore, our Divisions
should be small enough to slip neatly into our ships
like swords going home into their scabbards.
We need no prophet, only a clear thinker, to tell
us that the military problems facing us to-day are
amphibious and that, behind them again — close
behind them — stand amphibious-aeronautical prob-
lems. Yet no people has hitherto been so hopeless
as ourselves in what may be called the General
Staff work of amphibious problems. I have tried
several times to explain exactly what is General
Staff work, but I will once more put it in a nutshell
264 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
by quoting the famous bull, " I smell a rat ; it looms
on the horizon ; let us nip it in the bud." How
did we nip the Turkish Army in the bud ; a rat we
had been sniffing around for months ?
The Admiralty had laboriously collected a fleet
of transports to convey our troops overseas. This
fleet was scattered to the four winds behind the
First Lord's back by a military officer (not a General
Staff Officer), who went down from the War Office
and told the Director of Naval Transport that Lord
Kitchener had no further use for the ships. I repeat,
the responsible naval authority had no knowledge
that his great fleet had been dispersed by a soldier.
So far so good. The next thing that happened was
the final Cabinet decision to embark the troops.
Between the date when it was finally decided to
send the 29th Division to the Dardanelles and the
date on which the Admiralty were able to reassemble
their transports there was an interval of three weeks.
These three weeks were, in so far as foresight could
then carry, or, in so far as afterthought can now
reason — so far indeed as might-have-beens can be
conjugated — fatal ! . . . Another sort of rat ; that
old, black rat ; that ancient British, watertight-
compartment rat had precisely nipped in the bud
the Dardanelles Enterprise. These are facts ; sworn
to on the Bible by witnesses before a Royal Commis-
sion. If this outrage upon organisation does not
move us to have one Defence Minister over the three
Services, then — what will ?
Remember the air ! Within a few years a Defence
Minister will be able to lend wings to a force of the
and weight of a small Division and will cast
off like a peregrine falcon to fly at the enemy's
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 265
eyes — his aerodromes, arsenals, ports. Think of
it ! Two thousand winged adventurers in aluminium
arms skimming like mallards over the ocean whilst
4,000 gallant airship fighters follow at eighty miles
an hour in their wake. We stand balancing on the
very verge of these vertiginous events ; they are
here if only we had eyes to see those shapes ; ears
to hear the drone of their engines, the swish of
then- gigantic wings. Forty-five years ago, when
the heavier-than-air machine was still safely tucked
away in the womb of Time, old Tennyson saw the
aerial navies grappling in the blue. Four hundred
and fifty years ago Leonardo da Vinci wrote into
his diary the words, " there shall be wings," and,
more prosaically, made drawings which still exist,
to show he was hot on the track of the grand secret.
Surely then we who have actually witnessed the
Germans doing star turns over London and the
second exodus of the Jews, surely we will be worse
than Thomas Didymus if we do not put the conquest
of the air on a par with the mastery of the sea ?
Empire depends on command of the best communica-
tions of the date. Rome fell because her area had
outgrown her straight-line roads. Air command I*
will bind an Empire : loss of air will asphyxiate an \\^
Empire. When we were ruling the waves ever so
majestically our imperium, if not our power, was
still limited by coastline. A backward, undeveloped
State stretching far away inland might snap her
fingers at the sea. But there is no breathing human
being who will snap his fingers at the air. There is
no room for barbed-wire entanglements in the air ;
there is nothing there but clouds to hang your .
torpedo nets upon. Our future lies in the air, yet
266 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
see this year's estimates ! Even now it is not too
late to stop these four giant warships we are building,
obsolete before they are begun, nine-million pounder
Noah's Arks ; to stop them ; to invest them in
air bonds.
A joy ride into cloudland ? Well ; call it names
if you will ; we are studying Armies and air is a
military element. Armies have ever been interested
in what was going on overhead ; now they will be
more interested. Divisions will have to be portable ;
say 6,000 all told ; Engineers, Artillery and all
other tools and engines of war.
Time flies. We must fly too or fall sheer into
the abyss of the might-have-beens. Yes ; Time
flies ; Time is like a bird upon the wing. If you
want to bring this thief of life to earth ; if you want
to pick the gay panache called glory from his plumage,
you must aim well in front of him. Every golden
lad who has slam his hecatomb of longtails knows
that!
The burning question is how to get the new wine
into the old bottle ; how to admit quantities of
new machines into the old model. At present
two-thirds of the whole of our Army are infantry
— civilised foot-soldiers left to depend upon their
inherited barbarian qualities when they encounter
barbarians. Unless other arms happen to be stand-
ing by him, the soldier of the line still relies in battle
less upon civilisation than on the old fighting blood
and his discipline. An Arab or an Afghan wields
as good a rifle and bayonet and has probably been
better schooled in their use. The same thing applies
to the cavalryman who depends upon his horse (very
likely no better than Bucephalus or White Surrey)
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 267
and his miserable spit which would make old William
Longsword shake his sides with laughter could
he rise from the dead and handle the degenerate
thing.
Bacon speaks of Infantry as the nerves of an Army ;
some one else, Napier I think, calls them the Queen
of Battles ; the steel-clad legionary and the heavily-
armed hoplite were the foundations of adamant
upon which arose the fabrics of Roman Law and Greek
art. As to the British Empire, it has been held
to be based upon its sailors, a steadfast lot amidst
the unstable sea. Yet it is a sure thing that without
the Man of the Line, the Contemptible, the white
ensign would not float to-day over the flotilla which
dominates the Rhine.
Setting aside the landing at Gallipoli as being
a feat too singular to serve as an instance, the first
battle for Calais at Ypres gives the cleanest-cut
sample of the" form " of our professional linesmen.
The enemy was more numerous, more enthusiastic,
just as brave, with a crushing superiority of machine-
guns and, in the earlier phases, of artillery. Who
won this battle, a victory as glorious to our arms
as that of the Spartans over the Persians ? Who
won it ? We may say, " Lord French," or, perhaps
we say, " The Worcesters by their flank attack
round about Cheluvelt." Is that true ? Was it
hi any remotest sense a manoeuvre battle ? What
were the Worcesters at that time ? Two or three
hundred exhausted, disordered Men of the Line.
How was it the troops, generally, as far as the eye
could reach reacted and advanced plying their
rifles like machine-guns ? Well, if you want to
know the truth, the Men of the Line on that day
268 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
as at Inkerman and on many another stricken field
were each one a leader to himself. This greatest
victory of British Infantry rank and file was won
the other day, and, certainly, up to that day, the
basis of the British Empire was the heavy-armed
foot-slogger, a terror in war, in peace an apostle
of good-humour and fair-play. Infantry have
ruled the military roost since the end of the
thirteenth century, but although they reaffirmed
their claim so lately as the battle for Calais we must
remember that this world moves in cycles^; that
cycles do not last for ever, and that, from A.D. 378
to Bannockburn — a long stretch of time — cavalry
were the arbiters of battle and infantry were looked
upon as a worthless arm which fell victim almost
without a struggle to the onset of any body of
horse. Usually — almost invariably — it takes the
sharp hammer stroke of a disaster to shatter an
opinion which has been six or seven hundred years
crystallising : nothing less than a charge of Gothic
Horse was able to topple over the eight hundred
years' renown of the Roman Legionary. But can
we not, for once, take time by the forelock : will
nothing less material than ten battalions of aero-
planes shake the sugared complacency of Whitehall ?
To show how solidly entrenched is the infantry soldier
— in paper — I need only quote one sentence from the
first leader of The Times of 30th August, 1920:
" When science and invention have done their
utmost, the infantry arm will still be the queen
of the battle-field, for the fundamental laws of war
are unchanging." This sentiment appeals to my
infantry heart : I wish it would also appeal to my
linesman's head ; I should like to believe it, but I
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 269
can't. I have studied my profession : I know too
well that the pre-eminence of one arm is not a
" fundamental law of war."
Infantry is threatened by science, and the only
way ouFTlegiments of the LmeTcan renew their
youth is by embodying mechanical auxiliaries into
their own cadres, instead of waiting to let them form
themselves into separate and outside bodies which,
once organised, will assuredly end by degrading the
infantry into being merely their servants and escorts.
The vital move now upon the board is to cut down
the proportion of men armed with rifle, bomb and
bayonet, the proletariat — no longer the queen of
battles — and to stiffen the balance with a proportion
of the new aristocrats of labour and of war, scientifi-
cally trained mechanics, equipped with the latest
outfits of military invention.
Infantry move, fire, charge, hold.
Cavalry move and charge, but they cannot hold,
and their fire is negligible when compared with
the target they themselves present to the enemy's
fire. Their movement is rapid compared with
Infantry, slow compared with aeroplanes or motor-
cycles. Though mobile themselves, yet by the
bulk of the forage they consume, they hamper the
mobility of an Army.
Aeroplanes move and fire, but they cannot charge
or hold.
Tanks move, fire, charge, hold and give protec-
tion from bomb, shrapnel and small-arm fire as well
as from bayonet or sabre charges.
Artillery can (some of it) move and (all of it)
fire. They can neither hold nor charge. In action,
their shields give protection from rifle fire and
270 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
shrapnel ; on the line of march they are helpless
before Infantry, Cavalry or Tanks.
British taxpayer — there you are ! You pays
your money and you takes your choice : around
what atom will you build your new Army ? Is
it to be the heavy-armed man of the line in the
steel helmet, gas mask : hung like a Christmas
tree with bombs, cartridges, water bottle, rations,
kit ; or, is it to be a cavalry soldier who transfers
all these impedimenta to his horse, which makes
up for it ten times over by the mountains of
forage it consumes : or, is it to be an aeroplane ;
or a heavy gun ; field gun ; machine gun ; or else,
is it to be that mixture of battering ram, battery,
fortress and chariot — a tank ? An Army must be
built up on some one or something — who, what,
which is it to be ?
Getting on for forty years ago, encouraged by the
great Lord Roberts, I first plunged out into print
with a booklet entitled, " The Fighting of the Future."
In those sanguine days I had no doubt whatever
as to the hub of the imperial coach wheel — Majuba
Hill had rubbed in that truth with a Boer bullet :
I believed as a man believes who has seen with his
own eyes and felt through his own wounded body
that the soldier trained in musketry, practised in
musketry — fed with ball cartridge as was no other
soldier in the world — would be the matrix stuff
out of which an invincible Army could be created.
At the time musketry was regarded as the fad of
a handful of notorious asses. The vague Magnificence
known to the Subaltern as " Horse Guards " was
believed to regard it as a tiresome affair upsetting
to the Trinity of Colonel, Adjutant and Sergeant-
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 271
Major ; interfering with the chief end of man,
barrack square drill. The Adjutant was a terrible
swell ; the musketry instructor was an infernal
nuisance and was always spoiling the smartness of
the battalion. That was the state of things in the
memory of this living writer, and it is pleasant now
to look back over those struggles and to think that,
working under the aegis of Lord Bobs, I had some
hand in realising the theoretical soldiers of my own
booklet and in turning an Army of bull's-eye missers
into real, live, rifle shots ; into the straightest
shooting, celerity and precision marksmen at a
moving target or head and shoulders the world has
seen since the bowmen of Agincourt and Crecy
transformed the Knights of those days into porcu-
pines. Even now, in spite of the bombing machine,
in spite of the big gun, field gun and machine gun,
no one can dispute the proven fact that, from the
start of the Great War to the finish, the infantry
soldier was still the arbiter of the fight. We have
heard the Artilleryman say with justifiable pride,
" Guns now win battles : infantry only occupy
ground," but with all respect this won't wash.
The occupation of the ground is the victory. The
guns may have swept the enemy underground ;
the machine guns may have kept him there ; the
aeroplanes may have made his life a misery ; the
tanks may have broken through his line ; but when
it came to making good the infantry stormed and
stuck it. Therefore, it is natural that most Generals
should say, as they do say, with quiet conviction
that the infantryman is the pivot round which,
upon which, the new model Army must be assembled.
Train him, say they, upon the old lines. Let him
272 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
be a first-class marksman. Arm him with an
automatic rifle which will fire I fear to say how
many rounds in a minute, and there you have an
ideal atom of the form of action known as force.
Organise those atoms into platoons ; companies ;
battalions ; brigades ; divisions. When you get
to that last stage, hook on to your division a pro-
portion of big guns, field guns, machine guns, trans-
port, medical services, trench mortars. Let Corps
and Army Headquarters be ready to lend it Cavalry,
aeroplanes, tanks, and then you will be ready for
the next war.
What are the alternatives ? Do the Cavalry
still dream of carrying the mimic battles of Salisbury
Plain, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, into the field ; mimic
battles when a handful of lancers, hussars or dragoons
affected to regard mere artillery and infantry as
game made for brave horsemen and complacent
umpires to hunt ? For one who had seen the impo-
tence of cavalry in Manchuria, the cavalry training
on Salisbury Plain during those years seemed to
be a prolonged and most pathetic attempt made
by middle-aged men to make believe we were still
in the Middle Ages.
The subject is painful to me ; one to be cut as
short as may be. Next to my book, Compulsory
Service, the act by which I have injured most
myself was the comparison I dared to draw, in a
report written during the battle of Liao Yang, be-
tween shock cavalry and elephants. Shock cavalry,
Liao Yang forced me to announce, were as dead to
the world of war as elephants (vide footnote on page
202). In Manchuria took place the death of Cavalry.
Sick since the South African Campaign they gave
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 273
up the ghost at Liao Yang. During that desperate
encounter the brave and thrusting Japanese riders
were as clean out of the picture as elephant mahouts.
They were so clean out of it that Kuroki, who hated
not to " use up " whatever he had, set them to
cook rice for his hard-pressed infantry. Quite a
sensible order, but, I heard the death-knell in it
arid — what was I to do ?
I knew the War Office would receive the obituary
notice with rage. But I was paid to send it in.
So I pulled myself together d la Samson, prepared
to perish if only I could bring to the ground that
temple patronised by wealth and fashion wherein
the Spirit of Cavalry sat enshrined. The effort
was made ; nothing stirred ; only one little tile
fell off the roof. " He has a tile loose " was
General Sir William Nicholson's comment.
Now (at a cost of how many million wasted
pounds of money, tons of forage, not to speak of
pleasantly mis-spent careers) the truth is known.1
Thinking Dragoons knew they were a wash-out in
Europe. To seize a fleeting opportunity Cavalry
had to be concentrated in the front area, and there
was no room for it in the front area where it blocked
the roads, villages and pumps. But when the
Cavalry were posted in rear with the Corps they
were never on the spot where the sanguine kept on
imagining they might have been able to do some-
thing. So there they stuck, inert, eating up all
the oats and hay in France and England ; for,
although they were dead, they could eat as much
weight of foodstuffs consumed by the 8,000 horses of
a Cavalry Division is 86 tons per diem or nearly thirty lorry
loads.
T
274 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
oats as would have given porridge ever more to all
the poor of London.
Towards the finale, once more the hopes of the
Cavalry began to soar. Here was the classic open-
ing. A routed, worn-out enemy before them—
before a Cavalry who had not suffered during the
war ; who embodied the only allied force which
still retained the bulk of its regular officers and
had its pre-war, highly trained, splendid N.C.O.
What a chance that seemed ! But alas, those
accursed Germans still would be up-to-date ; still
refused to be " sports." The same old song came
back from the supposed-to-be-pursuing Cavalry :
" Held up by machine guns we are unable to locate ;
please send infantry." In Palestine we were told
that the Cavalry had at last come into their own ;
but, in the first place, Asia is an undeveloped
theatre where old fashions have long runs ; in the
second place, under a fine Commander, who had
long been black-listed as a heretic because he had
faith in the rifle, our splendid Cavalry and Yeomanry
at last got a chance to forget their cavalry spirit,
and take on the spirit of the common or garden
infantryman who gets across country on horse-
back.
To anyone who looks through my spectacles,
it is clear that Cavalry will form no basis for our
Imperial Striking Force of the future. For a
time, mounted men will be necessary in Asia. Lord
Kitchener himself would hesitate before he started
pegging out Afghanistan into barbed wire allotments.
There is still space left upon that Continent for
Cavalry to use their mobility to find a flank and
cut communications. Cavalry can move three times
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 275
faster : also, at the end of a march the men, whether
for digesting their rations or fighting the enemy,
have more life in them than the exhausted Infantry.
In an undeveloped area these pulls may still coun-
terbalance the damning facts that Cavalry present
seven to eight times as big a target to the rifle or
machine guns as Infantry ; eat and drink seven to
eight times more; and cost twice as much to
keep.1
Take next the aeroplane, for weight and size a
miracle of reliability and toughness. But its wings
are still in the stage of those of a dragon-fly which
has just broken forth from its pupa and there,
poised, on the tall bullrush, lets sun and wind
play round the delicate pinions until they are
attuned to the new elements into which, after a
long apprenticeship in mud and water (just like
us), the perfected creature is at last about to enter.
Although we may believe implicitly in the wonderful
future of the aeroplane, our faith is hardly good
" cover " for an imperial gamble. We hardly
know enough yet about the air to stake our existence
upon an element more fickle even than the sea,
although already we do conjecture enough to feel
cool and comfortable when we hear of Armadas of
billion dollar dreadnoughts.
On the 15th April, 1915, when I was inspecting
the five Service aeroplanes, all that we had in
1 Taking the peace figures of 1914, a Regiment of line Cavalry
at home cost approximately £70,500. Its strength was 694
all ranks and 568 horses. The cost thus was just over £100 a
head, all ranks. A Battalion of Lane Infantry at homo cost
£53,300 and its strength was 802 all ranks, giving a cost of just
over £65 a head. Since the war horses, oats and hay have risen,
relatively.
276 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
hand wherewith to tackle the Turkish Empire,
Commander Samson remarked — not in an office
but out of doors with the enemy in front of him—
that if he had some two-seater planes for spotting
and reconnaissance as well as a bombing force
on the lines and in the proportion then allotted to
the Western Front, he could take the Peninsula
single-handed from the air.
Now if this famous flying man was right we
have found our cornerstone and our imperial Army
should be built up round an aeroplane. But was
he as right as that ? In this case we were assuming
(1) that our aeroplanes were at Tenedos : (2) that
they could deny to the enemy convoys the one or
two long, exposed roads by which he kept touch
with the rest of the Ottoman Empire : (3) that
they could sink any Turkish ships endeavouring
to communicate with the Dardanelles : (4) that the
Turkish Army would be starved out of the Narrows
so that our Fleet and Army could pass comfortably
on to Constantinople.
Now as to (1) unless the Fleet had brought the
aeroplanes to Tenedos, they must have flown from
Cannes — a feat above their strength in those days ;
and even supposing they had managed to get there
without help, they might have been scuppered the
first night after their arrival by infantry ferried
across from the mainland of Asia Minor. As to
(2) and (3), even as early as 1915 a strong force
of aeroplanes and seaplanes based upon Tenedos
or Imbros could, unaided, have played havoc with
the Turkish communications by land and sea.
As to (4), within a month the bulk of the enemy
forces would have cleared off the Peninsula and
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 277
the Turks on the Asiatic side of the Straits would
have found themselves in another kind of straits.
But the Narrows and their minefield batteries
would still have been held in some force, and those
garrisons could neither have been starved out nor
driven out by aeroplane alone. In short, the
aeroplanes would have paved a way for the action
of the other two arms : alone, they could not have
got to the spot ; or, if they got to the spot they
could not have stayed on the spot ; or, if they
got to the spot and stayed on the spot they could
not have forced a passage. To my thinking, then,
the aeroplane cannot yet look after itself, and f.
nothing that cannot look after itself can be chosen y
as the basic unit of an Army.
The big gun, the howitzer, the field gun, and the
machine gun — we know them well. For myself, I
have backed big guns for twenty-five years and
was the only witness who staked his reputation on
them before the Royal Commission on the South
African War.1 At the moment, they and the
Engineers who teach us how to escape from them,
seem to have the cannon ball at their feet. But
you cannot make a pivot or a starting point of a
gun if only because the article does not lend itself
1 Extract from body of the Report on the War in South
Africa : " 170. ... Sir Ian Hamilton expressed the view that
the field artillery in the War was unnecessarily mobile ; that
great mobility should be confined to the horse artillery. Ho
called attention to the great amount of space taken up by the
number of guns which accompany an Army, and expressed his
opinion that two heavy guns could silence six field guns. He
considered that the only artillery used in the field should be
(a) horse artillery to accompany mounted branches, and (6)
position artillery to accompany infantry, at a pace no greater
than that of infantry."
278 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
to being served out by the piece — or piecemeal.
Ordnance, great and small, works in groups. A
single gun feels as lonely and uncomfortable on the
battlefield as a vacuum in a gale of wind.
To students of German preparations it seemed
as though, during the six years immediately pre-
ceding the Great War, artillery was treading very
close upon the heels of the infantry. Although
guns alone could hardly march, fight and win
battles ; and although infantry might march, fight
and win battles without guns, still, the artillery
were gaining so fast that if the whole of the German
Ordnance had, in 1912, been deployed in a long
line with the whole of the infantry behind them,
it was by no means too fanciful to regard the foot
soldiers as forming a mere escort to those real,
ice-cutting instruments. The war rubbed in this
new aspect of the arms. When the first rush was
over, it became a case of sit tight. Movement
being suspended, the ponderous big guns were put
upon an admirable platform. Guns grew upon
the battlefield like mushrooms ; the great guns
attacked, the great guns counter-attacked ; the
guns lost, the guns won ; the infantry quitted or
the infantry walked in. So it went on until, at
Cambrai, right into this Bombardiers' Paradise,
there broke a herd of unheard-of monsters browsing
upon shrapnel, scampering through the laborious
entanglements as if they were webs of gossamer,
straddling the trenches, rooting out the machine-
gun nests, putting life and movement back into
the battle and proving themselves too nimble to
be flattened by our idols the siege guns.
In point of time the tank was the last to take
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 279
the field, but, in war, the last is very apt to be first,
thfltapk ; nonsifW it well ; for I
say unto you tnat Solomon in all his wisdom hit
upon no happier device. For years the idea was
in the air and seemed likely to remain there until,
suddenly, from Winston Churchill's brain out crawled
these lean kine of Pharaoh !
They crawled on to the battle-field out of Winston
Churchill's brain did these nightmares ; they have
gobbled up the fat horses of the Cavalry ; they
may yet gobble up the infantry with the big gun
as a bonne-bouche at the end : they are here : they
have come to stay : they will either ruin us or we
will rope them in and make them serve as the
corner-stone of our building. Fifty years B.C. the
British were famous for their chariots, replicas, we
are told of those driven by the heroes of Homer.
In the future let us be famous for our tanks, and
if we needs must seek the bubble reputation at
the cannon's mouth, let us do so seated in a whippet.
Once upon a time, when I was out after tiger
in Assam, our camp was raided by a rogue elephant
in the night. We scattered into the jungle ; we
caught up our rifles and ran for it. The rifles
were no good : it was too dark to make out which
were our own elephants and where was the wild
fellow. So he courted our lady elephants to his
heart's desire ; flattened out our tents ; made hay
with the toothbrushes and towels and generally
enjoyed himself at our expense until dawn when,
not being encased in armour of proof, we were
able to get evens with him. Now I think an experi-
ence like that helps me to enter into the feelings
of a Brigadier, say, who has withdrawn his exhausted
280 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
men from the trenches into reserve billets in a
village behind the line. At midnight he hears
that half a dozen tanks have broken through the
front and are bearing down upon his Brigade !
Already tanks can gallop one better than Cavalry.
Before we know where they are, they will climb
and slip through rivers. A morass bothers them ;
a forest holds them up ; a village is an obstacle ;
tropical heat tires them ; but so do these things
inflict themselves on Cavalry. A tank with three
men and a boy in it chases a Cavalry Brigade and
begins to eat it up, at the tail. The horse guns
come into action and manage — the country being
favourable to artillery — to fend off the monster so
long as the day lasts. The light begins to fail ;
night comes on apace — so does the tank.
The more these vague outlines are considered
the more they will fill up with flying figures on
earth, sea and sky, whose motive is swiftness ;
i.e. the power to cope with the fighting man's old
enemies space and time. Take the diagram of
the battle of Jutland ; battle cruisers racing parallel
north-westwards and the ships of the line coming
up; take that diagram off the sea and plank it
down upon whatever continent you like best:
replace Jellicoe's ships by heavy armoured tanks
and Beatty's by light armoured racers : let whippets
stand for the destroyers : plaster the sky with
airships and aeroplanes : paint them there as thick
as stars ; do this and you will gain a truer impression
of the crash tactics and high velocity strategies of
the future than from poring over false battle pictures
by Verestchagin or Meissonier.
The tank is a warship on wheels. The tank
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 281
marks as great a revolution in land warfare as an
armoured steamship would have marked had it
appeared amongst the toilsome triremes at Actium.
One ironplated penny steamer off the Thames ;
only one ; and Mark Antony and Cleopatra might
have given Rome a sensual basis to her Empire
instead of those foundations of decency bequeathed
to her by Augustus. Think of it yet again, for
this latest terror will carry thought as well as men,
ammunition and petrol. Instead of one small
ironclad steamer barging into a battle between
triremes, take one tank barging into a unit of the
" Queen of Battles," a Battalion of heavy-armed
infantry. The infantry are naked to the bullet ;
are as naked as were the Incas when first they
encountered the Spaniards encased from head to
foot in finest Toledo steel. The men in the tank
are armoured more heavily and completely than
were those Spaniards and yet they are not, as were
the conquistador es, weighed down by the weight of
their coats of mail. On the contrary, though
wearing an impenetrable cuirass they move more
lightly and swiftly than Cavalry. They are not
tired or hungry or thirsty ; they carry heaps of
ammunition. Read over the story of Cortes and
the Incas. Read of the steel-clad Knights and the
French peasants in the Jacquerie.
We must " tame the tank and the aeroplane ;
they've got to be as familiar to us as taxis. Boys
must run away to air as Lord Reading, Masefield
and other famous men have run away to sea.
There's money in the air ; there's Empire in the
air ; news and vision in the air ; we don't quite
know what till we try : and the first step is to
282 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
bring aeroplanes and tanks into the regimental
framework.
Every Battalion of our heavy-armed infantry
owns a King's Colour and a Regimental Colour.
Consecrated emblems, regarded as sacred ; the
man in the street takes off his hat to them ; the
soldier salutes them. Emblems of unrecorded
heroisms, in war they would still form rallying
points round which Scottish or English would die
as the Saxons died round the Standard of Harold,
only, fire has reversed the old order ; warriors who
rally to a point are food for machine-guns ; we
don't want to rally men's bodies nowadays ; we
want to disperse the Battalion as a body and to
unite it only in its spirit.
So the Colours are left at home. Never since I
first joined has anyone ventured to display a large
crimson piece of silk, gold embroidered, in war.
At the Dardanelles, twelve miles from the firing-line,
I was begged not to break a little Union Jack no
bigger than a handkerchief, lest it should bring
down bombs.
Since Rorke's Drift, our Colours have gone into
the Cathedrals when our country called upon us
to fight. Poison gas would have been impossible
to people fighting under consecrated Colours. If
only we could get back our Colours we might put
back chivalry into war.
Seek for the atom round which the armies of
Napoleon, Marlborough and Julius Caesar crystal-
lised, you will find it in the Eagles, the Colours
and the Standards. Infantry has lost infinitely in
having had to part with these insignia just at a
moment when its own pre-eminence is being chal-
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 283
lenged by machines. Unless our artillery and
infantry can graft on to their body a gland which
will rejuvenate them, they have seen the best of
their days. So now I say : do not begin by raising
Battalions of tanks as separate corps ; do not take
any step which may tend to turn our infantry
into tank guards, tank supports or tank escorts ;
but rather, make a start by gazetting to every
Battalion of the Guards or Line, two brand-new
ironclad Ensigns to carry the King's Colours and
the Regimental Colour into action — two tanks.
So violent a juxtaposition of the old and new may
startle. The idea of chaining twenty mile-an-hour
monsters to three mile-an-hour masters may seem
absurd. Try it, and the Battalion Commanders
will rise to the occasion and will get plenty of work,
plenty of good value, out of their tanks. A tank
could help a Battalion in a hundred ways, not only
in battle, but in quarters and in the line of march.
When we sprinkle Lewis guns and maxims through
the Battalion and " reinforce " infantry with auto-
matic rifles which will loose off thousands of rounds
in a few minutes ; have the speakers ever weighed
those cartridges ? How are our hungry fire-arms
to be fed ? There is only one answer. They must
be fed by armoured caterpillar transport ; i.e. by
tanks.
We are to have five Companies instead of four.
The new unit will be made up of the administrative
people ; cooks, servants, batmen, orderly-room
clerks, orderlies, etc. This head-quarters Company
might possess as part of its outfit a section of light
guns made to serve against aircraft or tanks and
these, with two Maxims and eight Lewis guns,
284 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
would give it a higher resistant fire power than
that possessed by a whole pre-war Battalion. The
two tanks would be with it ; watchdogs ready at a
moment's notice to dart out, to rally the broken
ranks or to head them in the pursuit. Whenever
the Commander wished to mass the whole of his
tanks the mobility of the monsters would simplify
the move. In peace time the regimental tanks
would, naturally, do some weeks' training every
summer with the tanks of the Division.
A Battalion equipped with two to four fighting
tanks and lightly armoured caterpillar transport,
with light artillery and trench mortars, would cost
more money than an existing Battalion, although it
would be much weaker in man power, for a propor-
tion of the new men would belong to a more highly
paid category of labour than our present rank and
file ; also, be it said in passing, a more troublesome
category to manage. But engineers and skilled
mechanics can be managed by the right sort of
officer and they make rare good fighters : as to
cost, the Battalion would not, after all, cost hah*
as much as one of our existing infantry Brigades of
four Battalions and yet, in independence of move-
ment, hi fire, shock and holding power the new
model units should prove more than a match for
one of those infantry Brigades. Assume the two
types to be equal ; think what a saving in sea and
land transport, in rations and in casualties, by
endowing some 600 souls (for that is the strength I
would aim at) with the war value now possessed
by 4,000.
It is true that no less an authority than our
Field-Marshal, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 285
spoke the other day as if the notion of saving man
power by machinery was based upon fallacy. " We
might reduce the number of men," he is reported
to have said, ;' but the enemy might not. We
might produce a thousand tanks in the field and
say that they were equivalent to a thousand divi-
sions and, therefore, that was quite enough. But
the enemy might produce 2,000 tanks in the field,
provided he had the man power to do it." The
weak part of this powerful argument appears to
me to lie in its tail. The proviso contained in the
last nine words is surely incomplete ? The sentence
should have ended " provided he had the man
power, man intelligence, money power, manufactur-
ing power and petrol power to do it " ; and there
is a pretty big order ! We could run 2,000 tanks
in four months' time; Russia with all her man
power wouldn't get them finished until the pattern
was obsolete, and then she couldn't man them. An
enemy would need more than " man power " to
see England's hand in tanks. Put the problem
into terms of nations. If man power is to spell
victory, we are done. The entire white population
of our widely separated Empire is sixty-eight
millions, which is less than the concentrated popula-
tion of continental Germany ! If man power alone
is to be counted, then, as in pre-war days, the British
Empire on a voluntary basis could hardly cope
single-handed with Turkey. But, put war on to
a scientific basis, calling for an immense output of
skilled mechanics and engines, and there is only
one country in the world which would, at present,
meet us on equal terms ; namely, the U.S.A. So
far we have made no move towards this solution.
286 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
Whether or no the clever yet unimaginative remarks
of the Field-Marshal reflect a settled policy, assuredly
we are acting as if it did so. At this very time,
with all our vast industrial resources, with science
and her inventions at our beck and call, we had
on the 6th of June, 1921, 60,000 heavy-armed
infantry holding down the light-armed Arabs of
Mesopotamia. We cannot hold our Empire any
longer on these man-power lines. What is the
alternative ? We have got to make a new model
professional army capable of eating up " The Nation
in Arms " —and we can do it. There is only one
real title to Empire in peace or war ; superiority ;
but, not necessarily superiority in man power. If
the leading race goes to sleep and the subject race
comes on, there can be only one end to the race-
man power must win. The Arabs, Afridis, Waziris,
Fuzzy Wuzzies are busy, copying our infantry :
many deserters trained by us are in their tribes ;
they are coming on apace : they have good rifles
and cartridges and know how to use them ; we
must invent : we must go one better ; or we are
caught : we must lift war on to a more mechanical,
industrial, scientific plane. Let none of us be so
mad as to imagine we can oppose a law of the Medes
and Persians to natural laws, or insist that our
Army of the past is going to prove a passport to
an eternity of Empire. There is nothing eternal
about the British Army ; nothing fixed — thank
God, for that proves it is alive, although there are
some soldiers who seem to think it is as blasphemous
to alter one of its buttons as to question the doctrine
of the Trinity. When I first joined " A " Company
of the Gordons it was still spoken of affectionately,
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 287
though not officially, as the Grenadier Company.
So, if it is a sine, qua non in our Army to find a
precedent in the past, be it understood that when
my father joined the Gordon Highlanders he
served in Number 8 of the " Light Company " ;
that Number 1 was the " Grenadier Company."
There is nothing, therefore, now so very revolutionary
in proposing certain changes whereby trench mortars
would be handled by the old grenadiers and motor-
cycles be used to help the old Light Company to
recover its alertness.
These are my ideas. The Brigade would contain
four of these ideal Battalions ; the Division two
Brigades. The aim should be to keep the Division
down to the size of the Roman Legion in its prime ;
i.e. 6,200 fighting men. In any case the existing
Division must be cut down. On the road one of
our present Divisions with its transport extends
for sixteen miles ! With the new model Divisions
suggested :
(1) It would be possible to carry out reliefs by
Divisions whereby those vital formations would
remain constant, intact, together with their artillery,
tanks and aeroplanes.
(2) We should then have a number of Armies in
miniature ; Armies handy enough to slip neatly,
quickly, all complete, into airships or sea ships.
(3) By these means, i.e. by dividing our Army
into a larger number of smaller Divisions and by
making each Division an epitome of the grand
Army, we shall best combat our racial esprit de
clique to which the new machines are lending them-
selves.
For the last of the three reasons, as well as on
288 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
other grounds, aeroplanes should form part of the
Divisional Artillery. Aeroplanes are themselves
artillery of a sort, and, when they are not actually
working on reconnaissance or as long-range artillery,
their most essential duty is to spot for the Divisional
Artillery, a duty which will be carried out twice
as well when the observer and flyer know their
gunners and the gunners know them and their
manners and air customs.
As to the immediate and practical bearing of my
proposal, I doubt if there is a single soldier who
will question the numerous advantages of keeping
our Divisions intact, but it may be objected that
when we have got rid of our temporary " repara-
tions " garrisons there will be only one place abroad
where there could be a garrison of the size even
of my reduced divisions ; i.e. the Mediterranean.
When we get east of Suez, it may be argued, we use
mixed Brigades of British and Indian troops, and
once we do that the identity of our British Divisions
must be lost. I believe there are several ways of
meeting this objection and I will proceed to state
one of them :
Suppose the 6th Division has its headquarters on
Salisbury Plain and that its eight Battalions are all
1st Battalions. The 2/6th Division comprising the
second Battalions is posted, say, to Rawal Pindi.
On arrival, two Battalions in each of its Brigades,
four Battalions in all, would be replaced by native
Battalions. The Division would remain essentially
" the 2/6th " under its same Commander, brigadiers
and staff. Behind it would be formed, at once,
" the 3/6th " and " the 4/6th " Divisions on exactly
the same model except that the Brigades would
APPLICATION OF ORGANISATION TO TROOPS 289
consist of one British and three Indian Battalions
instead of, as in " the l/6th " or as in " the 2/6th,"
of two British and two Indian. The guns, aeroplanes
and tanks would be British. Whether, on the
Roman plan, " the 2/6 th " should remain per-
manently at Rawal Pindi or only for its tour of
ten to fifteen years of foreign service, changing
places then with " the l/6th," is a matter of senti-
ment. So long as, on the Cardwell analogy, the
Battalions abroad were the second Battalions of
the units serving at home the officers and men
would work eastwards and westwards freely, doing
part of their service at home and part hi India,
just as at present — but always as part of the same
division, the 6th.
Regimental " side " (the bad side of pride) will
spread like a prairie fire to our aeroplanes — unless
we watch it. Association is the antidote to exclusive-
ness. Paint the pants blue ; invent fanciful new
titles ; segregate into a separate corps, and you
lead your Air Marshals and their men direct to the
never, never land of " Look out for my wings ; I
don't know you, Mr. Mud-crusher, and I mean to
take jolly good care neither you nor your flat-footed
Generals shall ever know me ! " Wings instead of
spurs, only more so. In 1898 the artillery Comman-
der loaned out his guns to infantry Commanders as
if they were incomprehensible mysteries, and the
infantry Commander received them in the same
spirit. On that same Salisbury Plain, eight and
nine years later, I made infantry officers exchange
places for six weeks at a stretch with gunners.
Apart from all other advantages, administrative,
strategic and tactical, the best way to prevent
290 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
our new model Army from becoming a loose handful
of separate stuck-up sticks instead of a firmly
clamped, wire-bound military fascine, is to organise
the infantry of each Division to include land
machines, and to organise the Divisional Artillery
to include ah* machines. A Division so organised
will be complete in itself, ready to go anywhere
and tackle any enemy exactly like a Roman Legion,
and the mighty atom on which it will be built up
must be the tank.
CHAPTER XIII
APPLICATION OP DISCIPLINE, TRAINING,
PATRIOTISM
Simplicity of line ; harmony with surroundings ;
adaptability to habits of inmates are the charac-
teristics of good architecture and also of a sound
organisation. We have applied these standards to
our new model and the results have been duly set
forth. India, the Commonwealth and the Domin-
ions stand or fall with us. They are not watertight
compartments each of which is meant to close up
and look out for itself the moment a collision occurs.
Therefore, so soon as we get our own house in order
they will fall instinctively into line. But you can't
fall into line with a zigzag !
There remain discipline, training, patriotism, and
there is nothing much wrong with the methods of
their application by our officers, once they get to
work.
The Army does not get hold of the lads it enlists
until they are eighteen. During the years between
the South African War and the Great War it was
not easy to get the men to understand the great
moral and cultural ideas underlying the conception
of the British Empire. The Rank and File had
been so saturated with trade notions and the ethics
of commercialism that they could not conceive of
291
292 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
it as anything but a " business." Unless it could
be shown there was " money in it " they thought
the Empire must be a sort of Toff amongst nations,
and although they were always keen enough to
fight for fighting's sake, they did not wax enthusiastic
over turning John Bull into a Toff. The fault
here was that of the Education Department : the
British Empire, its aims and enemies had never
been explained.
Most recruits had fallen between two stools,
their parents and the schools. The parents thought
the schools were going to teach discipline and
patriotism and the schoolmasters said those subjects
were not in their curriculum. But it is in childhood,
when the infant is still within its home, that the
ball cartridge is in the breech of the rifle. The
mother aims carefully or carelessly as she is an
unselfish or a selfish woman and only pulls the
trigger when she sends the child to school. Storms
may drive the bullet from its course, obstacles may
break it in mid-career, but nothing in after life
can prevent that original impulsion from being the
prime factor of its flight.
Of all Japanese, the one who has most vividly
struck European imaginations is the late General
Count Nogi, the Commander of the besieging Army
at Port Arthur. Of all the many men of that race
I myself have had the privilege of knowing, he
was the most wonderful ; with a simplicity equalling
that of Kuroki, and an inward fire of patriotic
energy approaching that which burnt in the heart
of Kodama. Very respectfully, then, let us listen
to this flower of Japanese chivalry : " Bushido,"
he says, " is what our parents have taught us with
DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, PATRIOTISM 293
great earnestness, day and night, from our fourth
or fifth year, when we first began to have some
knowledge of the things around us."
So we get the capture of Port Arthur, and the
supreme victory of Mukden as a monument not to
women's votes but to their domestic virtues. The
tradition wins in the long run. As a mere stripling
young Yamagata swam out with his sword to
attack a foreign ironclad. The Americans were
much amused. Marshal Yamagata's spirit has over-
run a continent to-day and the Americans are no
longer amused. The mothers can keep the right
spirit alive. Under their tender hands the plastic,
formless spirit of the child " that cometh from
afar " can be moulded into reverence for tradition
and enthusiasm for what is noble and brave. Then,
no matter what our type of Army be, Regular,
Militia, Conscript, Volunteer, it would assuredly
be the best of its kind the wide world over.
In the opening years of the century, every single
recruit enrolled under the Banner of the Rising
Sun had been born and bred in that antique virtuous
atmosphere. Each one of them had absorbed the
great enthusiasm twenty years previously with
his mother's milk, and the schools had zealously
continued the education, marching their classes
through deepest snow to teach them that the idea
of storming Moscow was mere child's play for
patriots ; keeping ever before them the memory
of their national heroes and the thought that the
chief end of man was to die nobly ; to be, in his
own idiom, " determined to die " whenever his
Emperor might make the signal !
The British recruit, officer or man, is not of the
294 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
temper to absorb ideas which died in Europe with
Don Quixote. He would consider them heathenish,
and indeed they do not fit in readily with our codes.
But we soldiers might fairly demand from govern-
ment, from the Church and from board schools,
that our recruits should come to us with an inkling
at least of the gist of a citizen's duties. A short
time before the war, some leaflets fluttered across
the educational horizon — leaflets wherein the meaning
of the words " policemen," " municipality," " Lord
Mayor " were expounded ; containing also a few
straight tips as to how an artful dodger might
make a bit by working the State oracle. This is
not the stamp of training in citizenship here advo-
cated. Milton tells us that a ' * complete and generous
education " should fit a man " to perform justly,
skilfully and magnanimously all the offices, both
private and public, of peace and war." But the
young men we used to enlist at our depots — the
youths for whose elementary education we used to
pay fifteen millions a year, then twenty and then,
for 1913-14, nearly twenty-six milhons a year,
owed strangely little of their equipment for State
service in peace or war to their State education.
The book learning they possessed had been given
them to get the better of their comrades ; not to
help their comrades. Their theory of duty to the
State in peace was limited to doing nothing actively
noxious to the common weal ; to keeping on the
right side of tne law. As to their duty in war, I
have made it my business to ask young soldiers
this question, and not one of them has been able
to remember any advice during the course of his
board school education as to how a true Briton
DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, PATRIOTISM 295
could best help his country in war-time. The
scholastic idea seems to have been that we were
so admirable that we had no enemies. For that
reason, perhaps, the lads were brought up to be
their own. For certainly the egoist has no enemy
like himself and Milton recognised that fact long
ago when he laid his stress upon a " generous "
education. The State schools prepare our boys
for peace and prosperous times : this is unfair : the
people ought to be prepared for war and hard times.
As it is, recruits have to learn the meaning of words
like " fair play," " renown," " honour," loyalty,"
" glory," after they have joined the Colours.
Here is where the British Officer comes in and, to
the surprise even of those who know him best and
admire him most, turns himself into a pedagogue
and throws himself heart and soul into saving the
heart and soul of his little brother, the soldier.
How does he do it ? How can he do it ? He is
shy ; inarticulate ; loathes ink-splashing ; turns
pale at the idea of a lecture. But, he has been at
a public school !
Compare for a moment the ideals set before the
public schoolboy and the State school scholar ;
see the paragon of the public school ; a gallant
figure. One who helps — who rules — who leads—
who orders ; Captain of the Eleven ; the mainstay
of the football team ; already a man in temper and
resource, he wields more power more beneficially
than many a Premier. The finished public school-
boy has been well trained in the art of Life, though,
naturally enough, when this monastically-bred
creature comes in contact with women he is out of
his depth in an instant.
296 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
The paragon of the board school is not the Captain
of a team, but the individual prize winner. Behold
the pasty-faced creature step forth — a knock-kneed
marvel who has made the mistresses' career. He is
no more use for battling with the wide world than
one of the many sick headaches his erudition has
cost him. There he stands, his memory stuffed as
full of half-digested information as a Strasburg
goose with truffles. His only chance in life is to
get a post whence he will be able again to disgorge
the unassimilated contents of his brain into other
young minds as an owl vomits its midnight banquets
into the gaping throats of the owlets; or else—
that grand Eldorado — a seat on a Government
office stool. Once, in an evil hour, a great merchant
was bitten with the whim of taking the top boys
of board schools, on their intellectual merits, as
the future managers of his immense concerns
abroad. Had he lived only a year or two longer
he would have witnessed the ruin of his business.
Any average public schoolboy was their master
when it came to managing native labour or negotiat-
ing with others in the give and take see-saw of the
battle of life.
Our State spends more and more money on
education and, speaking purely as a soldier, I
gratefully admit that a recruit's brains have been
so far improved that he will pass muster as a trained
soldier in one-third of the time he took in 1870.
Pass muster ? Yes, as to his knowledge ; but
have his heart, character, physique also shown
value for the money ? How about discipline,
training and patriotism ? Remember, we have
behind us the report of a Royal Commission on
DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, PATRIOTISM 297
education to say that the trifle of £20,000,000 a
year we were then spending was " having no effect
on poverty " ; was not " developing self-reliance
or forethought in the characters of the children."
Indeed, we needed no Royal Commission to tell us
so ; have we not eyes and ears ? Have we not
memories ? We have never got our money's worth :
nor will that same system, intensified and pro-
longed, give us value for our £97,206,348 ! How
should it ? How on earth should anything in a board
school curriculum develop self-reliance ? If the senior
class were told to run the school now and then . . . ?
The baby of a labourer, being a British labourer's
baby, has very likely better hereditary claims on
Society than the baby of a profiteering war Peer.
The ups and downs have been so tremendous in
these islands that we have ploughmen's children
with Royal Descents running back to the Emperors
of the East or the Emperors of the West whose
Member of Parliament would get a fright if he saw
his own family tree. But here, in these same
islands, the children of Labour are handicapped—
not because they don't get money enough voted
for their education, but because the money goes on
book learning. They are taught, very feebly, to
obey ; they are not taught to command and, if
they are not taught to command, how ever are
they going to govern ? Public schoolboys may
learn devilish little, but at least they do get a chance
of learning how to rule their boy comrades : board
schoolboys may learn no end of stale news about
figures, words and places, but they hardly ever
get a real chance of learning how to handle the
other boys.
298 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
" Education for all " might, but does not, mean
" Equal opportunities for all." By including bodily
training and character discipline in the term " educa-
tion " and by enlisting the big boys to help them,
the masters of public schools have made it easier
for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle
than for a poor man to enter the Cabinet. What
we call in our common talk " the governing classes "
are " public school classes " : they with but few
exceptions have run the British Empire. Where
the exception has come in, although that outsider
might be no end more brilliant than the rest, he
has rarely carried through without letting us down.
Heredity has nothing to say to this ; not in these
islands where the breeding of the lower classes
is not low. Here the pot has always been on
the boil and particles of the brew have always
been darting up into the scum and falling back
into the sediment. There is no earthly reason
why the son of a British charwoman by a
British sea cook shouldn't rule all England except
that he has never been disciplined or trained —
except that he has never been taught to rule
others — let alone himself — at his expensive State
school.
The boy scouts have managed, by efforts compared
with which the defence of Mafeking was a picnic,
to break through the cocoon of routine set up by
soulless Boards and Administrators. But, large
as their figures loom, they are only a tiny percentage
of the whole boy population. Moral character and
patriotism ; team work ; initiative ; self-reliance ;
inter-reliance ; self-control, control of comrades
are taught to hardly more than ten per cent, of the
DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, PATRIOTISM 299
800,000 boys aged 12 and under 14 existing in the
United Kingdom and Ireland.
Ask a board schoolboy of about 11 years old
why he has to attend, he will answer, " Because I
will be clever when / am a man " ; or else, " Because
of the copper " ; or else, more often, " Because /
will be able to make more money." Ask any 11-
year-old boy at a preparatory school why he is
going on to a public school and he may say,
:< Because father was there, of course ! " or " Because
it's the only school " ; or, " Because every decent
fellow goes there," the idea from the very start
being that the public school is a very splendid
place and that he — the small boy — is going there
not to beat other fellows in exams., but to acquire
merit through being associated with them in so
ancient and famous a guild. Working on from
that foundation, discipline, training and patriotism
come quite naturally.
My plan is that State schools, primary and second-
ary, should take a leaf out of the book of the great
public schools. Boys are not " learning " to be
quiet and good when they are forced " by order "
of grown-ups to gaze silently at the blackboard and
behave like little gentlemen. They are learning
to hate blackboards and little gentlemen. The
attempt to run boys rigidly on grown-up lines is
universal ; French, Germans, Greeks, Italians,
Chinese try it, and fail — all parents try it and fail.
So no wonder our world is a failure. The British
public school is an exception because it is not run
by grown-ups but by the big boys ; the B.P. Scouts
are an exception, for there the schoolmaster periodic-
ally changes himself into a scoutmaster ; becomes
300 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
a bigger boy and joins with the other big boys in
leading the school into another world ; into realms
coloured with a touch of romance ; flavoured with
a suspicion of risk ; enlivened with the idea of live
enemies and a feeling of Red Indians. Until our
State schoolmasters take these idiosyncrasies into
account, they must resign themselves to complete
loss of control over the most alive side of boy nature,
and boys will continue to leave State schools per-
fect caricatures of what the State school meant
them to be.
Baden Powell has shown us how the discipline,
training and spirit of the public school can be
grafted on to the State school system. Let the
school resolve into a company of scouts who always
go out for a fortnight's camp in the summer, for
that will be the best part of their year's education.
If the masters can rise to the new situation they
will find that the boys accept the scoutmaster as
they never accepted the schoolmaster, for if that
scoutmaster bids them march through flood or fire,
through fire or floo4 they will march.
The State has neglected this wonderful lever, the
Boy Scout movement, because it has become con-
fused in the official mind with the Cadet movement,
which no one has dared discuss as a State measure
since Haldane suddenly dropped it like a hot potato
upon the floor of an astonished House. But the
official mind is mistaken. There is no military bias
whatsoever in General Baden Powell's system and
soldiers are glad that it is so.
Cadet Corps do have a military bias and are
chiefly valuable as a process for giving cohesion in
a fresh form to public schoolboys who have already
DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, PATRIOTISM 301
trained themselves in sports, observation and char-
acter ; they are not much use, except as aids to
smartness and cleanliness, to boys brought up in
State schools who have no chance of any character
training beyond what they have picked up in the
streets. Per contra scout training would not be
much use to public schoolboys, but is a heaven-sent
method of putting snap into those primary and
secondary mortuaries.
So much for the " application " of discipline,
training and patriotism to the raw material of an
Army. Should it be decreed by fate that my
words awaken some echoes in the hearts of " Labour "
and " Democracy," they will insist on their children
being given the same chance as the upper classes
who have had the luck to form their characters
upon an open-air regimen of fair-play, self-discipline,
initiative, and responsibility.
The Dominions, as well as the Commonwealth,
are miles ahead of us. In Australia, New Zealand
and Natal the reform has gone far enough to be
pronounced to be the greatest reform. But it is
not too late to take a step which will put off the
day when Macaulay's New Zealander makes copy
out of our ruins. Overseas they are working on
cadet lines where behaviour is imposed from outside :
we can go one better by frankly adopting the scout
method whereby the behaviour is only the outward
sign of the inward and spiritual grace. Without one
iota of militarism in their education, they will yet,
each of them, become twenty-five per cent, more
valuable to an Army.
Our new model Army will need new model men.
Let us organise, discipline and train them, whether
302 THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN ARMY
it be to form an Army of industry or an Army in
the field. Let us send our State schools yearly
into camp. There, by the sea or on the grassy
downs or purple heather, starved soul and stunted
physique would be able to shake off for a short
time the drag of the stuffy class-room in the mean
street. There, they might gain respite from the
suffocating atmosphere of the utilitarian-intelligent
— that specific for narrowing down human nature
into one hard, small point. There, working as a
team, victory would be organised and a spirit too
which would make better uses of victory than their
parents were able to achieve.
Turn them into little soldiers ? Not a bit of it !
The boys are soldiers in their hearts already — and
where is the harm ? Soldiers are not pugnacious.
Paul bade Timothy be a good soldier. Christ
commended the centurion. Milton urged teachers
to fit their pupils for all the offices of war. The
very thought of danger and self-sacrifice are inspira-
tions.
When a lover swims to his love across the stormy
Hellespont : when an Admiral sinks with his ship
after ordering all hands to the boats : when a
man prays God that his life may be accepted in
exchange for that of his wife or his child, the gallery
of fellow mortals take courage, and even as they
view the victory of the incorruptible over the
corruptible feel immortality stir within their souls.
The spirit of the true Army should be cast in a
like mould — winged with a like inspiration. There
are religious beliefs too sacred to be freely discussed
between brothers, so in the heart of an Army that
is to be invincible lies buried like the mainspring
DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, PATRIOTISM 303
of a watch the password, Dulce et decorum est pro
patria mori.
Dare we then refuse to draw the close curtains
from the darkened boyhood of our State scholars ;
shall we continue to deny them even one or two
glimpses into the vast realms of united, brotherly
struggle, stirring adventure, and progress, in com-
pany, towards some dimly discerned but surely
glorious goal ?
The measure of beauty the boys absorb in their
youth becomes the multiple of their patriotism.
Let the State look after the recruits, the Army
will look after itself. What an Army we should
then possess ! Not a dead thing, but a thing of
life, animated by a thought of glory. Let the State
give her slum children a sight of the rolling seas,
of the stars of night. Force her, you voters, to
teach her poorest children love of their own woods
and rivers and hills. Force her to show them at the
same time their national patrimony and how to
defend it. Do this — and do it in the name of God-
quickly !
Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner, Promt and London
Telegrams : "Scholarly, London." 41 and 43 Maddox Street,
Telephone : 1883 Mayfair. Bond Street, London, W. ,.
September, 1921.
Messrs. Edward Arnold & Co.'s
AUTUMN
ANNOUNCEMENTS, 1 92 1.
THE SOUL AND BODY OF AN
ARMY.
By GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON, G.C.B.
AUTHOR OF "A STAFF-OFFICER'S SCRAP-BOOK," "THE MILLENNIUM?"
" GALLIPOLI DIARY," ETC.
One Volume. Demy 8vo. i8s. net.
General Sir Ian Hamilton was impelled to write this book by
the conviction that war in the future will be in all respects a
radically different thing from all the wars of the past, the Great
War itself included. Never, he insists, were all the elements of
the art of war so much in the melting-pot as at the present time ;
never, therefore, was intelligent anticipation of all possible future
developments in warfare so essential if we as a nation are to
survive.
The present volume is an endeavour to bring this point of view
home to the ordinary citizen, and to help him to take a living
interest in the many problems which urgently call for a wise
solution. The subject is marshalled under six headings, namely,
Organization, Discipline, and Training, which comprehend all
matters that are subject to direct modification or control, and are
therefore treated of very fully; and Numbers, Genius, and Patriot-
ism, which are disposed of more briefly, as they lie largely or
wholly outside the sphere of military statesmanship. The three
2 Edward Arnold 6- Co.'s Autmnn Announcements.
principal topics are dealt with in all their aspects, and with a
profuse wealth of illustration, drawn both from history and from
the author's own varied and extensive experience of military
administration, and of modern armies in war and in peace time.
From this discussion there emerges a body of principles, which
in the concluding chapters he applies to the solution of the prob-
lems indicated in the preceding pages.
One of the most striking conclusions arrived at is that the rifle
has had a levelling effect in war, and has reduced the value of
efficiency (training) as against that of numbers. In the late war
this tendency was further accentuated by the conditions of trench-
warfare ; but this will not hold good in the future, when the tac-
tical possibilities of tanks, aeroplanes, etc., have been more com-
pletely developed, and success will fall, not to the big battalions,
but to the army whose organization and training are best suited
to the new conditions.
ADRIENNE TONER.
By ANNE DOUGLAS SEDGWICK (MRS. BASIL DE
SELINCOURT),
ACTHOK OF " FRANKLIN KANE," " TANTE," " THE ENCOUNTER," BTC.
One Volume Crown 8vo. 75. 6d. net.
Adrienne Toner is a young American, orphaned and unattached.
Not a typical young American girl, very far from it, though only
America could have produced her. Incidentally, she possesses
wealth, but her paramount possession is a creed, a philosophy of
life which possesses her, and which she lives up to heroically,
according to her lights. Thus equipped, she finds her way into
a pleasant English family, with a nice set of not very unusual
friends. An alien, exotic element, fascinating some, disconcerting
or exasperating others, she works strange havoc in the little
English circle. It is not her creed that does it so much as her
temperament and character. For she is desperately alive and
real, far too much so to be explained or bounded by her own
simple formulas. Things happen, amongst them the Great War,
but her personality is the book. Mrs. de Selincourt has made no
more ambitious effort than this, and never, not even in " Tante,"
has she achieved so complete a creation.
Edward Arnold & Co.'s Autumn Announcements. 3
MEMORIES AND NOTES OF
PERSONS AND PLACES
By SIR SIDNEY COLVIN, M.A., D.Litt.,
FORMERLY SLADE PROFESSOR OF FINE ART IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
AND KEEPER OF THE PRINTS AND DRAWINGS AT THE BRITISH MUSEUM.
With Portrait. Demy 8vo. i8s. net.
Few British readers will need to be reminded of the debt which
art and art criticism owe to Sir Sidney Colvin, whose forty years'
experience at Cambridge and at the British Museum have com-
bined with the rare freshness and breadth of vision of a cultured
and unprejudiced mind to ensure for his opinions that respect
which is their undoubted due. At the same time he has always
nursed the hope of one day becoming free to work no longer upon
the productions, however treasurable and fascinating, of man's
hands, but upon objects which have always interested him more
deeply still, namely, poetry and the scenes of nature and the
characters of men and women.
Part of this hope found fulfilment in his " Life of Keats," pub-
lished a few years ago ; and the present volume is the result of a
purpose he has long entertained of giving us, to use his own words,
" a record of the most lively impressions I could definitely recall
as having been made upon me since boyhood, not only by persons,
but by scenes and places, and not only by these, but by events
and movements, especially those in literature and art."
It was originally intended that the work should occupy several
volumes, but the effects of the war, and the claims of advancing
years have unfortunately prevented the author from carrying out
his plan on so ambitious a scale. It is, however, some consolation
to reflect that this one volume may perhaps be regarded as con-
taining the concentrated essence of the whole scheme. Its
exceptional interest may be gauged from mention of the headings
of some of the chapters. These include among others: Mr.
Gladstone; Ruskin; Burne-Jones; Rossetti; Robert Browning ;
East Suffolk as the home of Edward Fitzgerald ; George Meredith
and Box Hill; The British Museum and Sir Charles Newton;
Victor Hugo; and Gambetta. Among places having chapters
to themselves are Athens, and the Land's End of France. But
the widest appeal will probably be made by the long section of
the book dealing with Robert Louis Stevenson, whose intimate
friendship with the author may well make the picture here drawn
of him come nearer to the life than that which anyone else has
given us.
4 Edward Arnold & Co.'s Autumn Announcements.
THE DIARY OF A HUNTSMAN.
By THOMAS SMITH,
AUTHOR OF " THE LIFE OF A Fox."
With an Introduction by LORD WILLOUGHBY DE BROKE.
With 8 coloured Plates from magnificent Pictures by Herring, A Iken,
Wolstenholme, and Pollard, and tlie original black and white Illustrations.
Crown 4*0. Price a is. net.
This book was first published in the second year of the reign
of Queen Victoria, and has become a Sporting Classic wherever
Fox-hunting is carried on. It describes the experiences of a Master
of Foxhounds, mainly derived from hunting his own hounds in the
Craven country, probably as difficult a country to kill a fox in as
any in England. But Mr. Smith so closely studied the science,
and so skilfully applied the art of Fox-hunting that he contrived
to bring a fox to hand on most days when he took his hounds out.
It would be interesting to know how many huntsmen achieve
this feat to-day. If any of them fall short of it they cannot do
better than read Mr. Smith's book, and try to find out how be
did it.
If one were forced to select only one textbook to place in the
hands of a young huntsman, no mistake would be made in choosing
Mr. Smith's work. There are more actual stage directions in it
than in any other work of the kind — not omitting the immortal
" Beckford " — and every phase and aspect of the chase is
judiciously dealt with.
In this edition no expense has been spared in the attempt to
provide illustrations worthy of the text, and the publisher is much
indebted to Mr. Basil Dighton for allowing him to reproduce some
rare coloured prints and valuable paintings.
UNIFORM WITH THE ABOVE.
THE LIFE OF A FOX.
By THOMAS SMITH.
With an Introduction by LORD WILLOUGHBY DE BROKE.
With magnificent coloured Illustrations. Crown ^to. Price 2 is. net.
Edward Arnold & Co.'s Autumn Announcements.
THE RAINBOW BRIDGE.
By REGINALD FARRER,
AUTHOR OF " MY ROCK GARDEN," "ALPINES AND BOG PLANTS," ETC
With 1 6 pages of Illustrations and a Map. One Volume. Demy Svo.
2 is. net.
la "The Eaves of the World" Mr. Farrer described his adven-
turous journey in the mountainous region on the south-west
border of Kansu during the summer and autumn of 1914, and
closed his narrative with his arrival at Lanchow. In the present
work he resumes the story with a detailed account of his winter
sojourn in that city, which presents to us a series of vivid pictures
of social life in one of the provincial capitals of China. Early in
1915 he started on his travels again, this time in a N.-N.-W. direc-
tion. His first objective was the remote frontier town of Si-ning
fu, where the lateness of the season enforced a somewhat prolonged
stay, but as soon as the weather permitted, he left civilization
behind him, and installed himself in a rude but adequate dwelling
situated in a lofty valley of the Da Tung Alps.
At this point in the narrative botany again takes its proper
place as the predominant feature, but not exclusively so, for the
botanical work was diversified by more than one visit to the
Buddhist monasteries of Tien Tang and Chebson, the latter a
small town in itself. Mr. Farrer paints with enthusiasm the
charms of both these places, and in both his remarkable gift for
portrayal — at once humorous and sympathetic — of Chinese life
and character finds ample scope. His companion, Mr. William
Purdom, extended his travels as far as the neighbourhood of the
great Koko Nor Lake, fifty or sixty miles beyond Si-ning fu ; but
the most valuable botanical work was accomplished in the lime-
stone valleys of the Da Tung Alps, where several species wva were
obtained.
Summer ends early in these lofty regions, and in September the
party returned to Lanchow. The closing chapters of the book
are occupied with the long journey southward — partly by road
and partly by river — from Lanchow through the heart of China
to the Yang-tse River, where the author takes leave of his readers.
It may be of interest to add that Mr. Farrer, fascinated by his
experiences among Chinese people and Chinese flora, started last
year on another adventurous journey into Southern China, but
unhappily succumbed to illness in Upper Burmah in December,
1920.
6 Edward Arnold & Co.'s Autumn Announcements.
THE MECHANISM OF LIFE
IN RELATION TO MODERN PHYSICAL THEORY.
By JAMES JOHNSTONE, D.Sc.,
PROFESSOR or OCEANOGRAPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL.
Demy 8vo. With numerous Illustrations. 153. net.
In his Preface the author tells us that by " the Mechanism of
Life " he means " the results of a scientific analysis of the
activities of living animals," the results, in other words, of
modern physiological research, and a large part of this book is
occupied with an account of these results. But the book is a
great deal more than a physiological treatise ; the promise im-
plied in the reference to Modern Physical Theory is fully carried
out, and the object aimed at is " to give the reader an attitude in
his attempt to understand" the phenomena of Life in the most
extended sense, matters which carry us far beyond the boundaries
of physiology, and about which "no one can think without
becoming metaphysical, even if he does not know it." This
object is kept in view throughout, and imparts a certain liveliness
to the driest scientific details. It also determines the method
and order of exposition.
We begin with the Nature of Animal Life, and are introduced
to the conceptions of Structure and Function and to the animal
as a machine in the narrower sense. This brings up the question,
" Whence does the machine get its driving power ? " and so leads
to a discussion of the principles of energy and of the operation of
Plant and Animal Metabolism in the transformations of the
" working substance of life." Having thus got our machine and
the needful energy to keep it going we proceed to the co-ordination
of its various activities by the brain and the special nervous
mechanisms, and are thus prepared for an Analysis of Behaviour,
and an examination of the working of the nervous system as a
whole.
Here the author, having completed his physiological survey,
passes in review the various Conceptions of Life which have
prevailed since Descartes, and the effects on these of the progress
of the sciences of physics and chemistry. The point has now
been reached where the metaphysical implications referred to in
the Preface force themselves on the attention. Some of these are
dealt with in two concluding chapters on " The Meaning of Per-
ception," and " The Nature of Life."
It is interesting to note that the titles of the first and last chapters
are almost identical, while nothing could exceed the diversity of
Edward Arnold & Co.'s Autumn Announcements. 7
their contents. Those of the latter include some of the most bold
and startling speculations of modern physics, but they seem to arise
quite simply and naturally from what has gone before, so firm
and comprehensive is the author's grasp of his subject. Finally,
some of the purely philosophical discussions are carried a little
farther in a Metaphysical Appendix.
HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM.
AN HISTORICAL SKETCH.
By SIR CHARLES ELIOT, K.C.M.G., D.C.L., LL.D.,
H.B.M. Ambassador at Tokio.
Three Volumes. Demy Svo. £5 55. net.
An exhaustive work on a subject of vast magnitude and trans-
cendent interest. The author traces the growth of Brahminism
in India from the earliest times, describes in full detail the extra-
ordinary career of the Buddha, and follows out the later history
of both Brahminism and Buddhism in India and the other
countries of Eastern Asia, down to the present day. In the East
religion, moral philosophy, and metaphysics are all inextricably
intertwined. Consequently there emerges a complete spiritual
history (in the widest sense of the word) of India, or in modern
phraseology, a complete record of Indian mentality; while the
later career of Buddhism in China and elsewhere, and its inter-
action with other modes of religious and philosophical thought is
a subject of scarcely inferior interest.
In the preparation of his great work, which has extended over
many years, the author has not confined himself to books and
libraries, but has travelled extensively in India and other regions
of Eastern Asia. He has visited many places which lie beyond
the ken of ordinary travellers, and has conversed on the spot with
many representative theologians and philosophers belonging to
divers races and nationalities. For, besides other eminent quali-
fications, Sir Charles Eliot brings to his task a knowledge of
Oriental languages, living and dead, which is probably unique.
Thus his book is not a mere academical treatise, but stands in
vital relation to the present spiritual and moral life of Asia.
8 Edward Arnold & Co.'s Autumn Announcements.
WAR AND NATIONAL FINANCE.
By the HON. R. H. BRAND, C.M.G.,
FELLOW or ALL SOULS COLLEGE, OXFOBO.
One volume. Demy 8vo. 153. net.
This important work consists of a series of articles contributed
by the author to The Round Table at intervals during the years
1912-1920. They all deal in one way or another with the effects
of war on the financial and economic structure of this country
and of the British Empire. The reader will judge how far they
predicted and correctly portrayed the actual course of events
before, during, and after the war. The volume does not afford a
continuous commentary on the financial history of the war,
because, owing to the author's absence for a year in the United
States with the British Mission to Washington and the Imperial
Munitions Board of Canada, he was unable to write anything
between the end of 1916 and the Armistice. The last two years
of the war, however, so far as internal finance went, represented
the continued application, on a constantly growing scale, of the
principles and methods elaborated in the first two years ; so far
as concerned external finance — by far the greatest and most
serious problem — our task was by March, 1917, comparatively
simple owing to the entry of the United States on our side.
The articles written since the Armistice were intended to help
towards a practical discussion of actual problems which are still
facing us, and require immediate treatment.
It will be remembered that the author acted for three months
at the Peace Conference as Financial Adviser to Lord Robert
Cecil, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, and that he
was Vice- President of the International Financial Conference at
Brussels in 1920.
BANKERS AND BORROWERS.
By JOHN BRUNTON,
ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER, BARCLAY'S BANK, LTD., BIRMINGHAM.
With an Introduction by ERNEST SYKES, Secretary of the
Institute of Bankers.
One Volume. Demy Svo. 75. 6d. net.
The object of this book is to supply a want from which the
author (no doubt in common with many other managers and
officials of banks) has often suffered in the course of a long
Edward Arnold 6- Co.'s Autumn Announcements. 9
experience of banking — namely, the lack of readily accessible
information regarding the exact borrowing powers of statutory
and other bodies of various kinds. This information, which is
largely contained in Acts of Parliament and legal records, can
normally be obtained only by a considerable amount of research
for each particular case which arises. The author has therefore
provided here a convenient and inexpensive book of reference,
which will result in the saving of much valuable time to busy men.
All forms of statutory bodies, including Registered Companies,
Incorporated and Public Utility Companies, Local Authorities,
Building, Friendly, Co-operative, and other Societies, are fully
dealt with ; and in order to make the work as complete as possible
reference is also made to ordinary and limited Partnerships and to
individuals in certain special capacities, for example, Executors,
Trustees, Liquidators, Receivers and Managers, Minors, Agents,
Stockbrokers, Moneylenders, Churchwardens, and many others.
There is a full consideration of the Liquidation of Companies,
whether voluntary or otherwise, which is cognate to the subject
as showing a lender how to recover his money ; this is followed
by two useful tables showing the Subsidiary Acts administered
by Local Authorities, and a comparison of the Capital Accounts of
Municipal Corporations and Public Companies; and at the end of
the book are printed the relevant extracts from Acts of Parliament,
and a full index.
FORENSIC CHEMISTRY.
By A. LUCAS, O.B.E., F.I.C.
One Volume. Demy Svo. 155. net.
Forensic Chemistry may be defined as chemistry applied to the
solution of problems which arise in connection with the adminis-
tration of the law. The author is the Director of the Govern-
ment Analytical Laboratory at Cairo, and the book is largely the
outcome of many years of practical experience in work of this
nature. It is the first English book dealing with the means of
obtaining the facts on which chemical evidence is based.
Ordinary methods of analysis which can be found in ordinary
textbooks and which are known to every analyst are omitted,
but all special methods which are of value to the expert are given
in full. The book will make an undoubted appeal to all those
who are interested in the way in which Chemistry may be applied
to the unravelling of legal problems.
io Edward Arnold & Co.'s Autumn Announcements.
THE SALMON RIVERS AND LOCHS
OF SCOTLAND.
By W. L. CALDERWOOD, F.R.S.E.,
AUTHOR OF "THE LIFE OF THE SALMON," ETC.
New and Revised Edition. With Maps and Illustrations. Demy 8vo.
255. net.
The first edition of this important and comprehensive work has
been out of print for a couple of years, and, as the demand for it
appears to be fully sustained, the author has been engaged in the
interval in preparing a thoroughly revised edition. Since Mr.
Calderwood's book was first published a considerable amount of
fresh material has become available. The fishing records have
been brought up to date wherever it has been possible, and
modifications in the general conditions on various rivers are
described. In some cases, of which the mouth of the Gala is an
instance, these are due to improved systems of purification, and
in others to the activities of bodies whose interests lie in other
directions than salmon-fishing.
Mr. Calderwood, who is Inspector of Salmon Fisheries for
Scotland, treats the different rivers according to circumstances ;
in the case of large rivers such as the Tay, Dee, and Tweed, the
different fisheries are described. Records of the catches of salmon
over a period of years are given in many cases. Valuable infor-
mation is afforded as to the extent of estuaries, the amount of
netting, obstructions that hinder the passage of fish, and the
sources of pollution. The names of the proprietors and lessees of
the principal fisheries are indicated, and also the hotels that provide
salmon-fishing. The Lochs at the head waters of the rivers are
included, so far as they are accessible to salmon. The maps,
which are a feature of the work, have, of course, been retained in
the new edition.
Although the book forms a genuine work of reference on the
subject, it is eminently readable by all who take an interest in the
salmon in the way of sport, natural history, or vocation. Many a
good yarn is scattered through its pages, and much information on
the life and habits of the fish.
PRESS OPINIONS OF THE FIRST EDITION.
"Simply indispensable to the salmon fisher." — The late Mr. ANDREW LANG
in the Morning Post.
" From the pure angling point of view there are no end of things mentioned
of interest, including many accounts of sport. But the chief value of
Mr. Calderwood's book, to my mind, is its faithful presentation of the salmon
rivers of Scotland as they have been, as they are, and as they might become.
Edward Arnold 6- Co.'s Autumn Announcements. n
No man has had such opportunities of studying the question — not as it affects
one river, but all— and then it is so clear from all he writes that it is not only
the work of a state official, but of one who is interested in the subject heart
and soul, in every branch of it" — Fishing Gazette.
"A book that is almost to be termed monumental. We have to marvel at
the extent and completeness of the writer's information. It is a book \yhich
all Scottish anglers, or those of other nationalities who have angled on the
Scottish rivers, will read with great pleasure and interest."— Country Life. '
"This work is, we imagine, likely to become the standard book on the
subject. ' ' — Westminster Gazette.
"The volume is crammed from title to colophon with practical informa-
tion. "—Pall Mall Gazette.
THE PROMENADE TICKET:
A LAY RECORD OF CONCERTS.
By A. H. SIDGWICK,
AUTHOR OF "WALKING ESSAYS," "JONES' WEDDING AKD OTHER POEMS."
New Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. net.
In response to numerous requests the publishers have decided
to issue a new edition of this delightful book, which, first pub-
lished early in the war, achieved instant popularity. It is an
imaginary record of the experiences of a group of ordinary people,
not being experts or critics, at the Promenade Concerts. It is in
the form of a diary, each day's record being written by one of the
five characters. These five treat each other's views — and much
of the staple concert music — with complete frankness and
occasional irreverence, and write without any formality either of
style or content. The book can be appreciated without any
technical knowledge of music, and is emphatically adfdressed to
the amateur rather than the professional. It deals particularly
with the familiar and standard works, and contains full-length
sketches of some of the most familiar. It can be safely recom-
mended to any amateur who likes comparing his experiences with
others', and to any professional who likes to feel his superiority
over amateurs.
SOME PRESS OPINIONS OF THE FIRST EDITION,.
" A witty and delightful book, full of general criticism of music, music-
lovers, and would-be music-lovers." — Spectator.
" What the Upton Letters— owing, perhaps, to a certain grandiosity— just
failed to do for literature and the amenities, this book, in a more unbuttoned
way, easily compasses for music." — The Times.
" It is a criticism which will be read with relish by every music-lover, and
•ot least by the professional musician. ' The Promenade Ticket ' is emphati-
cally a book to be enjoyed."— Musical News.
12 Edward Arnold & Co.'s Autumn Announcements.
CHEMICAL DISINFECTION AND
STERILIZATION.
By S. RIDEAL, D.Sc., F.I.C., and E. K. RIDEAL, M.A.,
D.Sc., F.I.C.
One Volume. Demy 8vo. a is. net.
Owing to the cessation of German imports during the Great
War many new Disinfectants were placed on the market which,
while being similar to the German articles previously used,
appeared under different proprietary names. During this same
period, in consequence of military requirements, much research
on the use of new substances as disinfectants was carried out,
and consequently many new disinfectants came into use. The
present time is, therefore, singularly appropriate for the publica-
tion of a book on this subject, and the authors have collected a
mass of material which is scattered through numerous scientific
journals, and have given a connected and comprehensive account
of this important branch of scientific knowledge.
The subject-matter may be divided roughly into three parts :
firstly there are chapters dealing with disinfection and steriliza-
tion for specific purposes, such as disinfection of public vehicles,
preservation of food and sterilization of water; secondly, the
disinfectants are described according to their chemical structure
and the class of compounds to which they belong ; and, finally, the
methods of testing disinfectants are given. As the authors are
well-known authorities on disinfection, the Rideal- Walker Test
being one of the standard tests adopted in this branch of scientific
work, it cannot be doubted that the book will become the
standard work on the subject and will have a large circulation
amongst those who are concerned in the maintenance of public
health.
MEDICAL EXAMINATION FOR
LIFE INSURANCE.
By THOMAS D. LISTER, C.B.E., M.D., F.R.C.S., M.R.C.P.
One Volume. Demy 8vo. los. 6d. net.
Dr. Lister's book will prove useful to the many medical men
who undertake examinations on behalf of Life Insurance
Companies, a part of the work of the general practitioner which
involves some variations from ordinary method corresponding
with the special object with which such examinations are made.
Edward Arnold & Co.'s Autumn Announcements. 13
Much of the book is naturally devoted to a detailed discussion
of the Examination Form, dealing first with the particulars
required of the personal and family history of the proposer, and
then with the methods of conducting the various stages of the
actual examination. This part of the book particularly abounds
in valuable suggestions drawn from personal experience as to
ways of treating nervous and special cases, drawing inferences,
and obtaining true impressions.
But a scarcely less valuable feature, and one which will make
the book useful also to those who are thinking of taking out a
Life Insurance Policy, is the lucid explanation of the functions of
the Medical Staff of an Insurance Company, and of the relation
between the medical report and the many other factors which
affect the decision of the Company to accept or reject a proposer.
There are chapters on extra risks; some special kinds of life
insurance (e.g., for loans and annuities) ; occupations, habits and
residence abroad as affecting the " life " ; and also on foreign lives,
in connection with which it is interesting to hear that members
of every race in the world are insured by British offices.
The author is President of the Assurance Medical Society, and
Medical Officer of the Royal Exchange, Friends' Provident, and
North British and Mercantile Offices. It will readily be seen,
therefore, that he is in a position to speak with authority on this
subject.
RECENTLY PUBLISHED.
GEOLOGY OF THE BRITISH
EMPIRE.
By F. R. C. REED, M.A., Sc.D., F.G.S.
With numerous Maps. One Volume. Demy 8vo. 405. net.
SOME PRESS OPINIONS.
"The compilation of such a work needs enormous industry and knowledge
of Geology much wider than the actual subject-matter. Dr. Reed is known
to have both these requirements. We have checked his accounts of some
districts with which we are acquainted, and find them both clear and up to
date. The index contains over 2,000 names of places and geological
formations." — The Times.
"Dr. Reed performs his work with great thoroughness, and the book,
which is admirably produced by the well-known firm of Edward Arnold, will
doubtless take its place as the standard work on the subject. Dr. Reed has
amplified the notes of a series of lectures he has delivered for many years at
Cambridge into a useful, well-written, and well-arranged volume, written in
a lucid style of unquestionable scientific quality and fully worthy of the
importance and magnitude of the subject. From cover to cover the book is
furnished with excellent maps, and to each section is added a full biblio-
graphy which the student will find invaluable."— Mining Journal.
14 Recently Published.
A HUNDRED YEARS IN THE
HIGHLANDS.
By OSGOOD MACKENZIE.
With Illustrations. Demy 8vo. Third Impression. i6s. net.
The title of this interesting work is justified, in that the Author's
own recollections cover a period of nearly eighty years, while the
diaries of his uncle, Dr. John Mackenzie, have provided him with
a wealth of materials reaching much further back. It is indeed
fortunate that these vivid diaries have been preserved, for their
possession enables the Author to supplement and amplify his
own reminiscences with many valuable quotations, describing
Highland life in bygone times.
The book appeals to all lovers of the Highlands of Scotland,
both in Great Britain and in all parts of the world where men of
Scottish blood or descent have settled. Very characteristic of
the Author is his intense devotion to his northern home. He
loves the hills and the sea, the heather and the loch. He loves
the people, their language and traditions ; he has a soft place in
his heart for their superstitions. All forms of Highland sport
have been familiar to him from childhood, and he is a shrewd
observer of animal and bird life as all true sportsmen should be.
His successful transformation of a Ross-shire wilderness into
beautiful gardens, full of rare trees and plants never previously
grown in those parts, is famous throughout Scotland. Last, but
not least, is his keen and kindly sense of humour, which gives
rise to many a well-told anecdote and permeates the whole book.
" One of the charms of Mr. Mackenzie's book is that it all rings true — even
the fishing stories. The chapters on agriculture, Church and State, smuggling
and sheep-stealing, local superstitions, the pipers of Gairloch, and on peat and
vanishing birds are full of good matter. To all those who reverence ancient
customs and lore of the West Coast Highlands this book will be a real delight. ' '
— The Times.
"It is safe to say that generations yet unborn will find Mr. Osgood
Mackenzie's book a mine of interest and delight. Mr. Mackenzie, aided in
some measure by his uncle's note-book, has provided a book so entertaining
that something quotable can be found on every page of it. We have only
indicated its entertaining qualities roughly. Every sportsman will find it
better than any description of it." — Country Life.
" We congratulate all who love the Highlands upon the preservation of so
many memories and their presentation in so delightful a form." — Glasgow
Herald.
" \ very delightful book. There is not a dull moment in it from beginning
to end." — Scotsman.
"Those who love Nature, sport, old times, good companions and fine
scenery should read Osgood Mackenzie's ' A Hundred Years in the Highlands.
Besides other good things, it is full of delightful stories of wild life." — Daily
Chronicle.
" One does not require to have the gift of prophecy when stating that the
present work is destined to become standard." — Scottish Field.
Recently Published. 15
CALICO PAINTING AND PRINT-
ING IN THE EAST INDIES IN THE
XVIlTH AND XVIIlTH CENTURIES.
By G. P. BAKER.
Double Demy Folio (22^ in. x 17^ in.) With 37 Coloured Plates
(in a separate Portfolio] and numerous Black and White Illustrations
and a Mab. £30 net.
The purpose of this magnificent work is to place in the hands
of Students of Design and those engaged in the application of the
Arts to Industry, the best facsimiles of early Oriental painted and
printed cotton fabrics that modern methods of reproduction can
achieve.
Few such examples survive, and from the perishable "nature of
the fabrics, they must gradually be lost to the world. The ex-
amples are chosen from various collections, and as specimens of
decorative art are incomparable in design and may be classed with
the finest of Oriental carpets. As masterpieces of manufacture
they bewilder the expert Calico-printer, and teach the handi-
craftsman the immense value of patience in reproduction.
The author, Mr. G. P. Baker, is well-known for his life-long
interest in the subject, and no expense has been spared in making
the coloured plates as perfect as possible. The work of producing
them has been entrusted to Messrs. Griggs and the London
Stereoscopic Company.
"Mr. G. P. Baker has given to the world in a very beautiful form the
result of a lifetime's study of this branch of the arts. What a difference it
would make to the work produced in this country if every manufacturer
possessed the culture and enthusiasm for his craft which characterizes the
author ! A vast amount of erudition has gone to the making of this book ;
the history of the subject is set down at length ; there is subtle appreciation
of various influences on design — Chinese. Persian, Indian, and European ;
expert knowledge of weaving and chemistry is brought to bear on the subject,
and finally, the way in which these beautifuf painted and printed textiles
affected furnishing, decoration, and dress in Europe in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries is described in detail.
" All who love beautiful things will feel grateful to Mr. Baker for making
it possible for them to examine the most characteristic examples of a most
captivating art, very little known and long since passed away. Few examples
of it survive, and these from the perishable nature of the fabrics will be lost
gradually to the world.
"This book will be preserved in all the important libraries of the world,
and those who most fully understand the subject will best recognize what a
great service to the arts Mr. G. P. Baker has rendered by publishing the
results of his research." — The Cabintt Maker,
16 Edward Arnold & Cos Autumn Announcements.
SOME RECENT PUBLICATIONS.
A SURVEY OF
ENGLISH LITERATURE (1780-1880).
By OLIVER ELTON,
HON. D.I.ITT. DURHAM AND MANCHESTER,
PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL.
From 1780-1830. Two Vols. 325. net.
From 1830-1880. Two Vols. 333. net.
"We shall not disguise our opinion that in its union of freshness and maturity, of versatile
sensibility and incisive clearness, applied to an immense mass of exact and first-hand knowledge,
it bids fair to take its place as the most authentic judgment of our generation upon the Victorian
age."— PROFESSOR HKRFORD in the Manchester Guardian.
JOHN MARTINEAU
THE PUPIL OF KINGSLEY.
By his Daughter, VIOLET MARTINEAU.
With Portrait. Demy Svo. ias. 6d. net.
" We do not remember ever reading a book of this kind which possessed such ineffable charm
•r so arresting an interest in every one of its pages." — Nottingham Guardian.
A MANUAL OF COOKERY.
By the late FLORENCE A. GEORGE,
AUTHOR OF " KING EDWARD'S COOKHKY BOOK," " VEGETARIAN COOKERY," ETC.
Crown Svo. 8s. 6d. net.
"Of inestimable value for its wide range of useful information, and indispensable to the
economic housewife." — Western Mail.
PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY.
By WILLIAM BROWN, M.A..M.D., D.Sc..
READER IN PSYCHOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON (KING'S COLLEGE),
CLINICAL ASSISTANT IN NEUROLOGY, KING'S COLLEGE HOSPITAL.
With a foreword by WILLIAM ALDREN TURNER, C.B., M.D.
Crown Svo. 8s. 6d. net.
" The volume is one of the best simple expositions of psycho-analvsis which have yet appeared,
and it is all the better in avoiding a dogmatism which at this time of day must be hasty."
— Athenaiim.
\^ MEN OF MIGHT
STUDIES OF GREAT CHARACTERS
By A. C. BENSON, C.V.O., LL.D.,
MASTER OF MAGDALEN COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE ; AUTHOR OF " THE UPTON LETTERS,"
" FROM A COLLEGE WINDOW," ETC.,
AND
H. F. W. TATHAM.
New Illustrated Edition. Crown Svo. 6s. net.
" Models of what such compositions should be ; full of incident and anecdote, with the right
note of enthusiasm, where it justly comes in, with little if anything of direct sermonizing, though
the moral for an intelligent lad is never far to seek. It is a long time since we have seen a better
book for youngsters." — Guardian.
Jf
J,
University of California
SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
405 Hilgard Avenue, Lot Angeles, CA 90024-1388
Return this material to the library
from which it was borrowed.
ft
•
J
I nM
UN
Boo
College
Library
u
102
H175s
A 001 109 535 3