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Full text of "Special Senate investigation on charges and countercharges involving: Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G. Adams, H. Struve Hensel and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn, and Francis P. Carr. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 189 .."

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special senate investigation on charges 
and countercharges involving: secre- 
tary of the army robert t. stevens, john 
g. adams, h. struve hensel and senator 
joe McCarthy, roy m. cohn, and 
francis p. carr 







S. Res. 189 

PART 34 

MAY 17, 1954 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 

46620° WASHINGTON : 1954 

Boston Public Li'rary 
Cuperintcndent of Documents 

SEP 2 8 1954 


JOSEril R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 




CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan ALTON A. LENNON, North Carolina 

Richard J. O'Melia, General Counsel 
Walter L. Reynolds, Chicj Clerk 

Special Subcommittee on Investigations 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota, Chairman 



Ray II. Jenkins, Chief Counsel 

Thomas R. Prewitt, Assistant Counsel 

Robert A. Collier, Assistant Counsel 

Sons HOSWITZ, Assistant Counsel 




Appendix 1268 

Index I 

Testimony of — 

Adams, John G., counselor, Department of the Army 1248 

EXHIBITS duced Appears 

on page on page 

19. (a) Letter from Senator Karl E. Mundt, United States Senate, 

to Hon. Herbert Brownell, Jr., May 10, 1954 1246 1268 

19. (b) Letter from Hon. Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney Gen- 

eral, to Senator Karl E. Mundt, May 13, 1954 1246 1246-47 

20. (a) Letter from Hon. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the 

United States, to the Secretary of Defense, May 17, 

1954 1248 1249 

20. (b) Memorandum for the President of the United States from 

the Attorney General, May 17, 1954 1248 1269 



MONDAY, MAY 17, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the 

Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 : 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in the 
caucus room of the Senate Office Building, Senator Karl E. Mundt, 
chairman, presiding. 

Present : Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota ; Sena- 
tor Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican, Illinois ; Senator Charles 
E . Potter, Republican, Michigan ; Senator Henry C. Dworshak, 
Republican, Idaho; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Ar- 
kansas; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and 
Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri. 

Also present: Ray H. Jenkins, chief counsel to the subcommittee; 
Thomas R. Prewitt, assistant counsel ; and Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk. 

Principal participants: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a United 
States Senator from the State of Wisconsin; Roy M. Colin, chief 
counsel to the subcommittee; Francis P. Carr, executive director of 
the subcommittee ; John G. Adams, counselor to the Army ; Joseph N. 
Welch, special counsel for the Army ; James D. St. Clair, special coun- 
sel for the Army ; and Charles A. Haskins, assistant counselor, Depart- 
ment of the Army. 

Senator Mundt. The committee will please come to order. 

The chairman would like to begin the week as he begins each session, 
by welcoming our guests to the committee room and advising our 
guests of a standing rule of this committee, which is that there are 
to be no manifestations of approval or disapproval of any audible 
kind at any time during the course of these hearings. These are 
important hearings. We want to conduct them in an atmosphere of 
seriousness and, while you are welcome here as our guests because 
this is public business, the officers and the plainclothes men in the audi- 
ence have a standing instruction from the committee to politely escort 
from the room immediately anybody who violates the conditions under 
which he entered the room, which was to agree to refrain from any 
manifestations interfering with the hearing. 



With that admonition, we are happy to have you here. 

We will begin this morning by announcing that the Chair has re- 
reeeived his reply from the Attorney General to a letter which was 
written some time ago in connection with the so-called Q^-page docu- 
ment, and in the interest of time I shall not read my letter of May 
10 in its entirety. It is a little long. But I will ask to include it in 
the record as an exhibit appropriately marked, and I shall read the 
significant passages. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 19 (a)" and will 
be found in the appendix on p. 1268.) 

Senator Mundt. For the purposes of recapitulation, you will recall 
that this dealt with the 2 1 / 4-page document— by the way, it has been 
returned, and I will ask that it be passed down to Senator McCarthy, 
since it is his property — in which, paraphrasing my letter, I asked 
the Attorney General whether his admonition against publishing or 
releasing the contents of that document in toto held for all portions 
and all paragraphs. The significant part of my letter, after review- 
ing our previous interrogatory of the Attorney General, was this : 

Would it be possible for you to authorize or clear for use as an exhibit before 
our subcommittee any of the paragraphs or portions of the enclosed 2 1 / 4-page 
document? It has occurred to some members of the subcommittee that the 
fact that the 2%-page document may contain the names of some of those still 
under investigation or being used as informants could be the basis on which 
you requested the contents be not divulged. If so, perhaps such names could 
be deleted and other portions of the document released. 

Will you please write me your reaction to this request, and if you feel it is 
against the best security interests of the United States to permit any portion 
at all of the 2Vi-page document to be used as an exhibit before our subcommittee, 
1 am sure it will be helpful to us if you will give your specific reasons for 
making such a determination. We, of course, do not want to make public 
anything which is deemed to be injurious to our national interest to disclose, 
but in our search for truth in the current hearings, on the other hand, we would 
like to have available for our consideration every fact and document which can 
be included in our record without doing violence to essential security con- 
siderations. . • 

We will appreciate a reply as soon as possible. 

I talked about the enclosures. 

I have here a reply from the Attorney General : 

May 13, 19G4. 
Honorable Karl E. Mundt, 

United States Senate, Washington, D. C: 

In reply to your letter of May 10, 1954, for the reasons set forth in my 
letter of May 6, it is my opinion that it would not be in the public interest to 
release the two and one-fourth page document which purports to be a copy of 
a letter or to release any part thereof. 

As I pointed out, the document is not authentic in that no such letter was 
written by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. The portions of this document which were 
taken verbatim from the fifteen page interdepartmental FBI memorandum dated 
January 26, 1951, by an unidentified person are classified "Confidential." By 
law this means they must not be disclosed "in the best interests of the national 

If the "Confidential" classification of FBI reports and memoranda is not re- 
spected, serious and irreparable harm will be done to the FBI. This principle 
applies with equal force to the release of portions of the FBI memorandum which 
are contained in the two and one-fourth page document as well as to the memo- 
randum as a whole. 

The Department has under consideration at the present time possible viola- 
tions of the criminal law as a result of the referral of the transcript of the hear- 
ings to the Department by your Subcommittee. The two and one-fourth page 


document is involved and its declassification at this time might affect adversely 
or even defeat the proper prosecution of offenses involved in its preparation and 
dissemination. This consideration confirms my original opinion that it would 
not be in the public interest to declassify the document or any part of it at the 
present time. 


Herbert Brownell, Jr., 

Attorney General. 

I ask that my letter in full, and the Attorney General's letter in 
full, be entered in the record, and properly identified. 

(The letter from the Attorney General was marked "Exhibit 

19 (b).") , , 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, before you hand over that let- 
ter, could I see it ? I would like the one from Brownell. 

( Document handed. ) 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman ? 

Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy ? 

Senator McCarthy. May I say that I don't think this committee 
is bound by any letter from the Attorney General. He says now that 
the letter or document, call it what you may, the 2^-page document, 
contains— it is taken verbatim from the 15-page memorandum. 

I think, Mr. Chairman, and I am not going to ask for a ruling upon 
this this morning, because I think we should get on with the testimony, 
I do think the committee should go into executive session and read this 
214-page document now, in view of the fact that it is established as 
having been taken verbatim from an FBI report. You will find, Mr. 
Chairman, that it states that an individual at the Signal Corps lab- 
oratory was in close touch with a Russian spy even up to the time of 
his trial, apparently, or right close to it. Without discussing this 
any further, I wish the Chair would call an executive session, read this 
letter to the committee, and determine what portions of it should be 
made public. I think portions of it should be made public. There is 
nothing further, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Mundt. The Chair, of course, has discussed in the execu- 
tive committee meetings, which we have periodically, the letter and 
what the committee desires to do with it. The Chair had agreed with 
Senator Symington, I believe, at the conclusion of our hearings on 
Friday, to permit him to proceed with a discussion with Mr. Adams in 
the general area of a point of order situation which has arisen because 
of some difficultv in finding out from Mr. Adams, and for Mr. Adams 
finding out for "himself, exactly his relationship to certain informa- 
tion which we began to discuss in earlier hearings. So the Chair will 
recognize, out of order at this time, for that purpose, Senator Symmg- 
ton. And the Chair would also like to announce that there has just 
been sent to him, which he has distributed to the members of the sub- 
committee a letter from the White House on that subject, which he 
assumes has been made available to the press. I have one more copy, 
Mr. Welch. I will send that over to you. Otherwise, I have just 
enough copies for the subcommittee members. It says "Immediate 
Release" and it has the name of James C. Hagerty, the Press Secre- 
tary to the President, at the top. I assume it has been made available 
lo the press. 




Senator Symington. Mr. Adams ? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. Have you the written instructions that you 
were going to deliver to the committee ? 

Mr. Adams. I do, sir. 

Senator Symington. Would you deliver them, please ? 

Mr. Adams. Could I deliver them, did you say I 

Senator Symington. Will you deliver them ? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. This is the document here, sir. 

Do you want it read, sir ? 

Senator Symington. What is the document ? 

Mr. Adams. It is a letter to the Secretary of Defense from the Presi- 
dent of the United States. 

Senator Symington. I see. 

Mr. Chairman, in the last minute I have seen this document for 
the first time. May I say respectfully to the committee that in thinking 
about this over the weekend there appeared to be only two reasons 
why Mr. Adams, a member of the executive branch, would bring this 
matter up voluntarily, these names up voluntarily in these hearings. 
The first would be carelessness which, because he has been legally 
trained and has eminent counsel, I would doubt. The second would 
be that for whatever reason it was, perhaps he wanted support. More 
probably, based on my experience in the executive department, he had 
worked it out that if the names came in, the information with respect 
to the meeting would be available. Inasmuch as all this committee 
is trying to do is find the truth, I was very glad to cooperate with what 
I thought were the desires of the administration in bringing this in- 
formation into the hearing voluntarily, to get the truth of that meet- 
ing, which apparently, based on Mr. Adams being there, was called in 
order to discuss those situations and those matters which are of such 
great interest to this committee in attempting to find the truth. 

Not having had an opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to read this direc- 
tive or this letter from the President of the United States prior to any 
further comments on this matter, on my part, I would appreciate the 
opportunity of reading the letter and perhaps discussing it further 
this afternoon. 

Senator Mundt. Very well. 

And may the Chair suggest by unanimous consent that the copy 
of the letter also be inserted in the hearings at this point and marked 
with an appropriate exhibit number. 

Mr. Adams. Mr. Chairman, I point out that there is about a 10- 
page memorandum from the Attorney General attached to the Presi- 
dent's letter and it also should be inserted. 

Senator Mundt. The Chair agrees. Is this the entire document, 
John 'I 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. That will be exhibit No. 20, then, the letter with 
attached pages of memorandum. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 20 (a) and 
20 (b)." Exhibit No. 20 (a) appears on page 1249. Exhibit No. 
20 (b) will be found in the appendix on p. 1269.) 


Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the letter. I 
am very curious to know what is in the letter. I wonder if it could 
not be read. 

Mr. Adams. Do you wish me to read the letter? 

Senator Mundt. We would not want to read the whole memo- 
randum. It is a pretty long memorandum. 

Senator McCarthy. I mean just the letter and not the memorandum. 

Senator Mundt. I think there is no objection. Do you have a copy 
of the letter, Mr. Adams? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. And right after that we will put in the memo- 

Mr. Adams. This is a letter signed Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed 
to the Honorable, the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C : 

Dear Mr. Secretary : It has long been recognized that to assist the Congress 
in achieving its legislative purposes every Executive Department or Agency 
must, upon the request of a Congressional Committee, expeditiously furnish 
information relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Committee, with 
certain historical exceptions — some of which are pointed out in the attached 
memorandum from the Attorney General. This Administration has been and 
w'll continue to be diligent in following the principle. However, it is essential 
to the successful working of our system that the persons entrusted with power 
in any one of the three great branches of Government shall not encrouch upon 
th > authority confided to the others. The ultimate responsibility for the conduct 
of the Executive Branch rests with the President. 

Within this Constitutional framework each branch should cooperate fully with 
each other for the common good. However, throughout our history the President 
has withheld information whenever he found that what was sought was con- 
fidential or its disclosure would be incompatible with the public interest or 
jeopardize the safety of the Nation. 

Because it is essential to elticient and effective administration that employees 
of the Executive Branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising 
with each other on official matters, and because it is not in the public interest 
that any of their conversations or communications, or any documents or repro- 
ductions, concerning such advice be disclosed, you will instruct employees of 
your Department that in all of their appearances before the Subcommittee of 
the Senate Committee on Government Operations regarding the inquiry now 
before it they are not to testify to any such conversations or communications or 
to produce any such documents or reproductions. This principle must be 
maintained regardless of who would benefit by such disclosures. 

I direct this action so as to maintain the proper separation of powers between 
the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government in accordance with 
my responsibilities and duties under the Constitution. This separation is vital 
to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power by any branch of the Government. 

By this action I am not in any way restricting the testimony of such witnesses 
as to what occurred regarding any matters where the communication was 
directly between any of the principals in the controversy within the Executive 
Branch on the one hand and a member of the Subcommittee or its staff on the 


/s/ Dwfght D. Eisenhowlb. 

To the letter, sir, is attached a 10-page memorandum from the 
Attorney General to the President. 

Senator Mundt. Thank you. 

Of course, none of us have had an opportunity to read the memo- 
randum. It is rather lengthy. From a quick look at it, the Chair 
notes it begins with a line" of precedents starting March 1792, under 
the administration of President Washington, and includes a great 
many references down through history, including several under the 

46G20'— 54— pt. 34 2 


administration of President Roosevelt and 10 cases under the admin- 
istration of President Truman. 

The Chair believes, along with Senator Symington, we would want 
to have a little time to look over this memorandum and the attached 
exhibits before trying to make any quick, snap judgment. 

Mr. Adams. I might state, Mr. Chairman, that the letter is dated 
May 17, 1954, which is today. 

Senator McCarthy. May I see the letter, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Mundt. You may have my document to survey it, if you 
want to. The Chair will then proceed with the ordinary 10-minute 
rule and we will start with Mr. Jenkins if he has further questions of 
Mr. Adams. 

Mr. Jenkins. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Mundt. The Chair has one or two that he will ask at this 
time. He may have some a little later. You will recall, Mr. Adams, 
since you were in the room during this entire hearing, that a number 
of questions were asked Secretary Stevens about a telephone call 
that he had with you and you had with him involving, if the Chair 
recalls correctly, two calls the same date, at which time you were at the 
New York or New Jersey end of the line and Secretary Stevens was 
here, and involving the status of General Lawton's command? 

Mr. Adams. I do, sir. 

Senator Mundt. The Secretary at that time suggested 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Mundt. The Chair is endeavoring to ask a question. 

Senator McCarthy. I have a question of the Chair. 

Senator Mundt. The Chair is asking a question. Please do not in- 
terrupt him unless it has to do with the question. 

Senator McCarthy. I don't think the Chair has disposed of the 
previous business yet. 

Senator Mundt. The Chair has disposed of it temporarily and would 
like to continue with his question. During your 10-minute period 
you may get back to that business or Senator Symington may, but he 
is endeavoring to ask a question now. 

Senator McCarthy. I would like to ask the Chair a question here. 

Senator Mundt. The Chair really wishes you would not interrupt 
him in the middle of a question when he is asking the question. 

Senator McCarthy. When the Chair finishes that question 

Senator Mundt. He would like to continue without interruption 
unless you object to the question. 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, I don't object to your question. 

Senator Mundt. All right, let's wait until we get an answer and at 
an appropriate time I will recognize you. How would that be ? 

Senator McCarthy. When the Chair finishes. 

Senator Mundt. I will recognize you at the appropriate time. 

Will you read the question as far as I had gotten before the inter- 
ruption, please? 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested) 

Senator Mundt (continuing). That he was unable to recall fully the 
conversations and that we ask you about them. Could you recapitu- 
late as briefly as possible, the nature, first of all, of the original call, 
which, I think, came from the Secretary to you % 

Mr. Adams. My recollection, sir, is that on the afternoon of Novem- 
ber 24, 1 am not sure whether it was the 24th, but the calls were on two 


different days, I was in my hotel room in the Commodore Hotel at the 
end of the day, and I had telephoned the Secretary for the purpose 
of reporting to him the occurrences of the day. And during the course 
of the conversation, he stated to me that a matter had come to his at- 
tention which disturbed him, and that if it were true, it might be 
grounds for him to have to relieve General Lawton of his command. 
He did not detail it, but he pointed out to me that it was not concerned 
with the fact, it was not related to the fact, that General Lawton had 
been cooperating with Senator McCarthy and this subcommittee. 

He asked me to see if I could find the time to see Senator McCarthy 
and point this out to him, and see if I could make Senator McCarthy 
understand that if the move proved to be necessary, that is, if the alle- 
gations proved to be true, if he found it necessary to take this action, 
that Senator McCarthy would understand that his action was based on 
the fact that — on facts different from the fact that General Lawton 
had been cooperating with the committee. That was about the sub- 
stance of the first conversation. 

Senator Mundt. Would it be a fair summary to say that what the 
Secretary asked you to do was to discuss with the Senator the possi- 
bility that General Lawton might be removed 

Mr. Adams. That is right, sir. 

Senator Mundt. And to determine the Senator's reaction ? 

Mr. Adams. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Mundt. That was the nature of the first call ? 

Mr. Adams. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Now, would you go to the second call which I think 
originated with you to the Secretary? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. I might describe to you the intervening 
events, if I may. Senator McCarthy made a radio broadcast or tele- 
vision broadcast that night, and I saw him after the broadcast and I 
saw Mr. Cohn also. I don't recall that I mentioned it at that time, 
but I very well may have. I saw them the following morning. I saw 
Mr. Cohn before I saw Senator McCarthy. At least I mentioned the 
matter with Mr. Cohn before I mentioned it with Senator McCarthy. 

Senator Mundt. Did you discuss with Mr. Cohn the fact that the 
Secretary was thinking of relieving General Lawton? 

Mr. Adams. I did. I mentioned the fact that the Secretary had 
called me and he was disturbed about matters which had been brought 
to his attention and he asked me to talk to Senator McCarthy. Mr. 
Cohn suggested that I let him talk with Senator McCarthy about it 
first, which I did not do. Sometime within the next half day, I talked 
or within the next few hours, I brought the matter up to Senator 
McCarthy. I told him that Mr. Stevens had had these allegations and 
that he might find it necessary to relieve the officer, and that he had 
asked me to tell him about it, and to assure him that if this relief 
became necessary, that it would not be because of the fact that the 
officer had cooperated with the committee. My recollection of our 
conversation is that Senator McCarthy was a little bit — wasn't non- 
committal, but had indicated that if the Secretary found it necessary 
to do that, he would understand. Later on in the day, we talked about 
the matter together at lunch, I think, Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn, 
and at that time Senator McCarthy indicated some reluctance, indi- 
cated to me that he hoped that if Mr. Stevens found it necessary to 


take this step, that he would not do it that day or that week, because of 
the fact that there would be conclusions drawn by newspapers un- 
friendly to Senator McCarthy that perhaps it had been an action 
merely because of the fact that General Lawton had been friendly 
with the committee. 

Later in the day, in the middle of the afternoon, I was back in Mr. 
Cohn's office, and in the presence of Mr. Cohn and Senator McCarthy I 
called Mr. Stevens back and I reported this conversation to him. I 
told him that there was some reluctance and that Senator McCarthy 
felt that although he wouldn't want to say anything, he might be 
forced into a position where he would have to make comment about it, 
and that he had asked or hoped that if it were necessary for the Secre- 
tary to do this, he could defer it until about the first of the year, by 
which time probably the investigation of Fort Monmouth would have 
been over for 5 or 6 weeks, or so, and that there would not be this 
speculation in the press. 

My recollection is that Mr. Stevens stated something to the effect 
that he couldn't promise ; it might be that these things would be proved 
and that they would be of a serious nature and that he would have to 

I, of course, did not relate that statement to Senator McCarthy, but 
the conversation was more or less — or Mr. Stevens' attitude was more 
or less left up in the air, and I think Senator McCarthy was left with 
the impression that I had advised Mr. Stevens of his reluctance to the 
move. That is the conversation as I remember it. 

Senator Mundt. You say Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn both 
heard your end of the conversation ? 

Mr. Adams. They were in the room, sir. The room was not large. 
There were other things going on in the room, but there was no reason 
why they shouldn't have overheard what I said. I made no effort to 
conceal it. 

Senator Mundt. They knew you were calling Secretary Stevens at 
that time on that? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. And, as a matter of fact, General Lawton was not 
removed, was he? 

Mr. Adams. No, sir ; he was not. 

Senator Mundt. And I believe is still in command at Fort Mon- 
mouth ? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, he is. 

Senator Mundt. Passing to another topic, do you know of your own 
personal knowledge, Mr. Adams, whether, in fact, Private Schine 
received preferential treatment at any time to which he was not en- 
titled as a soldier in the United States Army ? 

Mr. Adams. From my own personal knowledge, sir, I do not. 

Senator Mundt. I ask you this question as counsel for the Army : 
In the event it develops, through checking the investigation, checking 
the Inspector General's report, through a study of the facts, in the 
event that it develops that Pvt. G. David Schine did in fact receive 
preferential treatment as a member of the United States Army to 
which he was not entitled, who would be responsible for that fact, the 
Army officers who gave him the preferential treatment or the members 
of the committee staff that asked for it 2 


Mr. Adams. Sir, you are asking me a question that is very difficult 
to answer. 

Senator Mundt. That is right down your alley, because you are the 
counsel to the Army. You would have to advise somebody on that. 
This is the one question which, it seems to me, to which you could say, 
''Now }"ou are talking my language." 

Mr. Adams. May 1 have the question read again, please? 

Senator Mundt. Surely. Will you read the question? 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

Mr. Adams. Mr. Chairman, I think the fair answer is that the Army 
is responsible for administering the Army. The ultimate responsi- 
bility is in the Secretary. Subordinate commands have responsibili- 
ties delegated to them. It would be necessary to determine who in 
each instance was responsible. It may be decided that there had 
been fault on my part in passing on information to the various eche- 
lons of command and indicating that there was a desire for prefer- 
ential treatment. If that is so, I would be at fault. 

If it were to be determined that the Secretary had directed prefer- 
ential treatment he would be at fault. 

Senator Mundt. The purpose of the Chair, may I say, is not to 
single out any particular individual in the Army to hold responsible 
for preferential treatment which may not have taken place, but to 
establish, if he can, for the record, that if such preferential treatment 
were actually accorded David Schine, it would be a responsibility of 
somebody, let us say, in the Army. Just leaving it that way, would 
that be correct ? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir; I think it is correct that it is fundamental in 
the Government that where an individual has the authority, he also 
has the responsibility. 

Senator Mundt. Thank you. That is a very good answer, a 
straight answer. 

My time has expired. 

Senator McClellan ? 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Adams, under the letter you read this 
morning from the White House to the Secretary of Defense, accord- 
ing to my hurried interpretation of it — and I have only glanced at it 
once — do you consider that you are now under direct orders through 
channels from the White House not to divulge any conversation that 
took place in the conference which I believe you say was held on 
January 21 ? 

When I say conference, I refer to that meeting held in Mr. Brown- 
ell's office, attended by the Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Kogers, 
Presidential Assistant Mr. Sherman Adams, and others. Do you 
consider now that you cannot give any information to this committee 
in view of that directive with respect to what occurred there at that 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. And the conversations that took place? 

Mr. Adam :. Yes, sir ; I do, sir. Senator McClellan, I saw this 
memorandum about 20 minutes before you did. I place the inter- 
pretation on it at this time that I am now prohibited from speaking 
about the conferences which I have had, that I have been so 


Senator McCleixan. That you are prohibited from saying what 
occurred, any conversations that took place. You are not prohibited 
from saying that a conference was held, are you? 

Mr. Adams. I am not — I don't think I am prohibited, sir, from 
saying that a conference has been held. I have already stated that. 

Senator McCleixan. You have already stated that. And it was 
a conference regarding this controversy that has been held. That 
was the subject matter of it, was it not? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCleixan. I am led to ask you this question, in view 
of that statement, Mr. Adams. Was the action taken thereafter, after 
that conference, taken on the basis of the independent decision and 
judgment of the Secretary of the Army, or was it taken as the result 
of decisions made at that conference ? 

Mr. Adams. May I have that question read, please? 

(Whereupon, the question was read by the reporter as above 

Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman ? 

Senator Mundt. Counsel Jenkins. 

Mr. Jenkins. Of course, it is a very difficult thing to interpose an 
objection to a question asked by a member of this subcommittee. How- 
ever, the question asked by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas 
would elicit from this witness indirectly information that he is not 
permitted to give directly, and I fear would impinge upon the Presi- 
dential directive. 

I desire to call that to the attention of the committee, and of Mr. 
Adams, in all fairness to all parties concerned. I fear any answer 
Mr. Adams gave to that question might involve Mr. Adams in a 
violation of the directive that was issued by the President this 

Senator McClellan. I am waiting for an answer. 

Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Welch. 

Mr. Welch. I happen to share the view of Mr. Jenkins, and had 
he not spoken would have said the same thing, in less graceful and 
less cogent language. 

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Jenkins is correct, and that 
I have the somewhat distasteful duty of construing the document that 
is before us and instructing the witness that, in my opinion, he ought 
not to ansAver. 

Senator McClellan. The witness, then, follows the instruction of 
his counsel, does he, and declines to answer on the ground that it 
might be violating the directive under which he is now operating in 

Mr. Adams. That is my opinion, sir. 

Senator McClellan. That is your opinion, also ? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCleixan. Then if your opinion prevails and the advice 
of your counsel prevails and his interpretation and the interpretation 
of the counsel of this committee is correct, then it is impossible for 
this committee, for lack of testimony, because testimony is being 
withheld, to determine where the final responsibility lies for the action 
that was taken on January 21. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Welch. Could that be read, please, sir ? 


Senator Mundt. The reporter will read the question. ( Whereupon, 
the question was read by the reporter as above recorded.) 

Senator McClellan. On January 21 and following January 21. 

Mr. Adams. I just don't think I can answer your question, sir. 

Senator McClellan. You cannot answer that. What I am trying 
to determine is — and I think we are entitled to know it without going 
into any detail — is when did the responsbility shift from the Secre- 
tary of the Army, from the date of that conference, to the higher level 
authorities? In other words, who must take the responsibility for 
the actions which have been taken by the Secretary of the Army with 
respect to this controversy since the 21st day of January when you 
held this high-level conference? I don't want to blame the Secretary 
for it if he is not to blame, if he is under orders, any more than I 
want to blame you for not answering the questions, because you are 
under orders. 

Mr. Adams. Once again, Senator McClellan, very respectfully, I 
feel that the letter from the President consists of instructions which 
I may not violate, and of course I cannot take from the record remarks 
I have already made, and they are on the record for the committee to 
read, but nothing can be added to it insofar as I can see. 

Senator McClellan. Well, I understand it. I haven't had time 
to really study this directive, but as I understand it, it precludes from 
telling what occurred down there at the conference. I am not asking 
you now what occurred down there, what was said, who gave orders 
or didn't give orders. I am simply trying to determine whether the 
Secretary of the Army and you, under his orders and directions, 
whether you two are now responsible for what may have occurred in 
connection with this controversy since January 21, when that high 
level conference was held. If you are carrying out orders and the 
Secretary carrying out orders from higher authority, you must be 
absolved from any blame. I am trying to determine where the re- 
sponsibility lies. Now, you tell me that you can't tell that under this 

Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, as this committee well knows, I have 
interposed but very few objections to any question asked by a mem- 
ber of this committee. Mr. Adams is in a dilemma this morning. He 
has an order which has come to him through proper channels from 
the President of the United States, directing him to divulge nothing 
that occurred in the conference of January 21. My distinguished 
friend from Arkansas is now asking him for a result of that confer- 
ence of January 21, the question being whether or not, since the con- 
ference of January 21, he and the Secretary were responsible or some 
other authority in the executive branch of the Government was 

Mr. Chairman, I call the committee's attention to the fact that 
that would elicit from this witness a fact, and a fact that would 
naturally flow from that conference of January 21, and to that ex- 
tent would be violative of the Presidential direction of this morning. 
That Senator McClellan, is the last objection I shall interpose with 
respect to that question, but I do want to make my position clear with 
respect to that matter. I do not think under the circumstances that it 
is a proper question. I do not think that Mr. Adams can properly 
answer that question unless he violates the instructions he has re- 
ceived from the highest executive officer of the land this morning. 


Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Mundt. Senator McClellan ? 

Senator McClellan. I am going to ask the questions. They may 
be objected to and I may not get the answers. The witness may be 
quite proper, for him not to answer the questions, but I am going to 
try, as I started out to do in the beginning of these hearings, to place 
the responsibility where it belongs insofar as it is possible for this 
committee to get the proof. And I say to you now, Mr. Chairman, 
if we are going — if the committee is going to be left in a dilemma 
of not knowing whether the Secretary is responsible for the action 
taken after that date, or whether the responsibility is at a higher level, 
then Ave will never be able to completely discharge our responsibility 
in this proceeding. I ask you again, Mr. Adams, the simple question : 
From that date on, were you operating, you and the Secretary operat- 
ing, under the directions of higher authority or were you making the 
decisions upon your own responsibility in your respective positions? 
You can refuse to answer, if you like, but the record will simply 
show that this committee is unable — I am not asking what occurred 
down there that day. I am not asking you anything that was said, 
any advice that was given, I am simply asking from that day on 
were you acting on your own or were you acting under orders from 
higher sources. I think the committee is entitled to know that. It is 
just a simple yes or no. 

Mr. Adams. May I confer a moment, sir, with counsel ? 

Senator Mundt. The Chair thinks he should pass upon the objec- 
tion raised first by our counsel. May the Chair say he shares com- 
pletely the point of view of counsel. He recognizes also the right of 
Senator McClellan to propound the questions. The Chair thinks he 
should advise the witness of his position, although he has able counsel 
to do that. He has the directive. The Chair is not going to insist 
that he violate the directive. The Chair believes answering the ques- 
tion would violate the directive. But if the witness elects to violate 
it, it is his responsibility not that of the Chair or the committee. 

Mr. Adams. Mr. Chairman, I believe that I must respectfully de- 
cline to answer and to state that I feel I am bound by the directive 
of the President of the United States and to state further that I be- 
lieve that the conclusions I would have to draw for Senator McClellan 
and in answering his questions would be violative of the spirit of 
this directive. 

Senator McClellan. Let me ask you another question, then, and 
see if this violates it. Did you act on your own responsibility, you 
and Secretary Stevens, prior to January the 21st in the decisions and 
actions you took? You can answer that. 

Mr. Adams. Our negotiations prior to January 20th, sir, were 
strictly within the responsibility of the Army. 

Senator McClellan. The responsibility of the Secretary, you mean ? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Thereafter you decline to say because of this 
directive, is that correct ? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. I would respectfully decline to answer, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, that is all. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen ? 

Senator Dirksen advised the Chair he had to go upstairs to help 
make a quorum of the Judiciary Committee. He will return. We 


will hoar him for questioning at the end of the cycle, if he is back 
by that time. 
* Senator Jackson ? 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, first I want to apologize for being 
a little late this morning. I delivered a talk at the Industrial College 
of the Armed Services, at the War College, at Fort McNair, at 8 : 30 
this morning. So, for that reason, I was delayed in arriving. 

Senator Mundt. Very good. 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I want to say at the outset, that, 
as a preface to a possible question to Mr. Adams, I respect the right 
of the President under this constitutional authority to refrain from 
giving information that may be requested by the Congress from time 
to time that would interfere with the efficient and proper operation 
of the executive branch of the Government. 

I do believe, however, that in this situation we have before us the 
fact that the Secretary of the Army in his testimony, if my memory 
serves me correctly, did make reference from time to time to conver- 
sations and discussions that he had with other people in the executive 
branch who were not necessarily principals to this controversy. 

I think, very clearly, that if it were in our power as a court, we 
would say that the President and the executive branch has waived its 
right to object insofar as it relates to this specific subject matter. 
1 am fully aware, however, that it is entirely within the discretion 
of the President of the United States under the Constitution, to with- 
hold this information if he so desires. 

I conscientiously believe, Mr. Chairman, that he may not be using 
his discretion wisely in this situation. I believe it fair to say that 
the principals to this controversy should have been directed not to 
give this information prior to their taking the witness stand. It 
seems rather unique that we get this letter — what is the date — May 17, 
today, when we are well along in the hearings. 

I think that any such directive should have been issued at the 
outset. It seems manifestly unfair to me, and I believe it may be 
manifestly unfair to all the principals to this controversy, including 
Mr. Adams and the Secretary of the Army, not to be able to tell the 
whole story when part of the story is in the record. 

The committee is in a dilemma of passing on testimony that is 
incomplete. I think, if I may humbly submit that the executive 
branch is doing a great injustice to this committee and to all of the 
principals to this controversy by exercising the power which the 
President has, very late in the proceedings. 

I think it is a bit difficult to explain to the American people why 
it is necessary to invoke constitutional rights at a stage of the pro- 
ceedings where, according to the directive, the constitutional rights 
of the President have already been invaded without any objection 
until a certain incident got a lot of publicity. 

I assume, Mr. Chairman, that it would be impossible for me to put 
any questions to Mr. Adams that he could answer. I think there 
should be someone from the executive branch, maybe the Secretary 
of Defense, to explain why this letter was issued on May 17 and not 
prior to the hearing. I hope that will not be construed as an invasion 
of the President's right to withhold information he deems appropriate 
to the running of his branch of the Government. I deeply respect 

46G20 — 54— pt. 34 3 


the right of the President under the doctrine of separation of powers 
to do that which has been outlined in the long series of precedents 
which date, I believe, from Washington through Truman. But I 
do sincerely believe that there has been a bad abuse of that discretion 
in this situation. I think it may result in more injustice than it will 
in aiding any constitutional doctrine that the President finds necessary 
to invoke at this time. 

Senator Mundt. I take it that was not a question directed to the 

Senator Jackson. No. I can ask questions, but I am not going 
to take up any more time. I do believe, Mr. Chairman, the record 
should be made clear on this point. I am fearful of the injustices 
that will inevitably flow from this situation. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Potter? 

Senator Potter. Mr. Chairman, this controversy has run head-on 
into that twilight zone defined or implied under the doctrine of separa- 
tion of powers between the legislative branch of the Government and 
the executive branch. The location of this zone has been a contro- 
versial matter throughout our history, whether the issue was an inva- 
sion of the executive branch by the legislative branch of our Govern- 
ment or a question of the executive branch hindering the due functions 
of the legislative branch of the Government. 

I feel that as a congressional committee we would have no right, 
for example, to subpena a member of the President's Cabinet and have 
him reveal to us what took place in a Cabinet meeting, what various 
members of the Cabinet had to say. I don't know, Mr. Chairman, 
whether the high-level meeting that took place in the office of the 
Attorney General falls in that category or not. That is something that 
will have to be decided, I assume, in one of our executive sessions. 

I do feel that the committee has a right to know whether the decision 
to make public the document now known as the Chronological Order 
of Events was taken on behalf of the Secretary of the Army, Mr. 
Stevens, and Mr. Adams, the two principals on that side of the con- 
troversy, or whether it was a directive from a higher level. 

I would regret to have the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Stevens, and 
Mr. Adams, the Counsel for the Army, used as whipping boys when 
they were ordered to carry out a procedure which was the responsi- 
bility of a higher office. 

I think it is a very serious decision that we of the committee have 
to make, and I would hope that we can continue the hearing this 
morning without prying into that twilight zone or forcing the witness 
to make decisions which it would be most difficult for him to make 
when he has an order signed by the President on the one hand, and 
he is under oath to tell the truth before this committee on the other, 
which makes his position most untenable. 

I think in order for the committee to treat the witnesses in all fair- 
ness, Ave should make our own decision as to what questions are proper, 
what questions he can answer without violation of the order of the 
Chief Executive. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Mundt. I take it that was not a question. 

The Chair sincerely hopes that at least after this first 10-minute ; 
round, my colleagues will once again refrain from these long comments 


and engage only in questioning the witness, because otherwise we are 
going to continue these hearings interminably. 

The Chair recognizes he cannot control the situation. He can sim- 
ply endeavor to persuade his colleagues to desist. 

Senator Symington ? 

Senator Potter. We will revise and extend. 

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, in the letter, which I have now 
read briefly, from the President, it says : 

Throughout our history the President has withheld information whenever 
he found that what was sought was confidential or that its disclosure would be 
incompatible with the public interest or jeopardize the safety of the Nation. 

Mr. Chairman, this is a grave world and those are fundamental 
words. I would like to say here that I have great respect for the 
problems of the President of the United States, and also for him 

Mr. Adams, I would like to ask you two questions which I trust 
are in order; and if they are not, then objection can be made and 

The first question is: Why did you bring up these names volun- 
tarily in your testimony? 

Mr. Adams. Sir, I had no instructions that I could not bring 
them up. 

Senator Symington. The second question is, Did anybody in the 
conference on January 21 know that you were going to bring these 
names up ? 

Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Mundt. Counsel Jenkins. 

Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, with all due deference to the dis- 
tinguished Senator from Missouri, Mr. Adams is now being asked 
a question which would elicit certainly some information, some fact 
with reference to the meeting with the executive officers on January 
21. He is being asked now whether or not they knew or any member 
present knew that he would gratuitously mention their names in giving 
his testimony before this committee. That would elicit from Mr. 
Adams a fact that occurred at that conference and I respectfully sug- 
gest, Mr. Chairman, that it is an improper question in that it would 
require Mr. Adams to impinge upon the Presidential direction of 
this date. 

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, one of the rewards of these 
distressing hearings has been an opportunity to get to know this dis- 
tinguished son of Tennessee, and if that is the way he feels about it, 
I will withdraw the question. 

I would like to say, however, that I deeply respect the chairman's 
position. I trust he will practice what he preaches about making 
talks. I would like to point out to him that if these names had not 
been voluntarily brought up by the witness, this subject would never 
have been dwelled on at all. 

Now, Mr. Adams, I have some questions here that I would like to 
ask with respect to the Loyalty Review Board. As I understand your 
testimony, the Army had' no objections to the subcommittee investi- 
gating acts of graft or any personal dishonesty on the part of mem- 
bers of the Loyalty Review Board of the Army ; is that right ? 

Mr. Adams. No, we could not, sir, object to interrogating indi- 
viduals about matters of that sort. 


Senator Symington. What did you object to ? 

Mr. Adams. On the occasion when this developed the indications 
to me were that this was just the first increment of the entire Loyalty 
Board. As I have testified before, sir, the matter had been rather a 
subsurface problem which I had reason to believe might sooner or 
later become the principal issue, and when these individuals were 
called and I was told that they were to be interrogated on January 19, 
I think the date was, or some time thereabouts, I instructed the mem- 
bers of the Board that if they received subpenas — I did not instruct 
them not to go. I instructed all the members of the Board — I don't 
isolate this meeting exactly — if they received subpenas they were to 
make contact with me because I as yet didn't know whether or not 
they would have to respond. My plan was to accompany any of them 
to any interrogations so that I could instruct them as to what matters 
under existing regulations and orders they might not answer. But 
w T hen the call came to me on the morning of the 19th asking for these 
names, I did not transmit the request to the 5 or 6 individuals who 
were involved, but I came myself, and it was during the afternoon 
when they were supposed to appear that Senator McCarthy first made 
me aware of the fact that he wished to interrogate these people about 
graft and corruption in their personal discharge of their official duties. 

That did not change my opinion of the fact that this still remained 
the first increment of the 25 or 26 who probably would be called within 
the next few weeks. It was for that reason that I undertook to estab- 
lish the position. 

Senator Symington. Mr. Adams, you suppose that anyone has de- 
rogatory information relating to the honesty of a member of the 
Loyalty Eeview Board. What does the Army think he should do 
with that information ? 

Mr. Adams. Do you mean supposing one civil servant has deroga- 
tory information about another civil servant? 

Senator Symington. May I repeat the question and would you an- 
swer it instead of asking me ? 

Mr. Adams. I don't know who you mean by "someone." That is 
the reason I asked you the question. 

Senator Mundt. Would you like the question reread? 

Senator Symington. No. I will change it and say "anyone." I 
don't believe I did change it. Suppose anyone has derogatory infor- 
mation relating to the honesty of a member of the Loyalty Review 
Board. What does the Army think that he, anyone, should do with 
that information ? 

Mr. Adams. Bring it to the attention of the Army. 

Senator Symington. How? 

Mr. Adams. Well, if he is a member of the Army, by memorandum 
to his superior. If he is outside of the Army by a communication to 
the Secretary of the Army or to a responsible official of the Army. 

Senator Symington. My next question is, if you received any such 
derogatory information about a member of the Loyalty Board or if 
it were received in your office, what would you do? 

Mr. Adams. I would bring it immediately to the attention of the 
Security Division of G-2 of the Army, which I have had occasion 
to do on one or two occasions in the last 6 months. 

Senator Symington. Is it then the Army's opinion that the respon- 
sibility to see that all members of the loyalty review board are honora- 


ble and honest men, and so conduct themselves, lies with the xVrmy 
and the Department of Defense ? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. To whom are the members of the loyalty re- 
view board accountable? 

Mr. Adams. For their performance as members of the loyalty secu- 
rity board, sir, they are accountable to the Secretary of the Army. 

Senator Symington. Would you agree that the only way in which 
these loyalty review boards can retain their independence and do 
justice to the persons concerned is to have them specifically responsible 
to someone? 

Mr. Adams. Very definitely, sir. 

Senator Symington. Has anyone communicated to the Army any 
derogatory information relating to graft or dishonest acts, on the part 
of any members of the loyalty review boards in question, and, if so, 
who and when ? 

Mr. Adams. With reference to the individual to whom we have 
referred earlier in this hearing as Mr. X, subsequent to the time that 
he was interrogated, the transcript of the executive sessions concerning 
his questions and answers was given to the Army by the subcommittee. 

Senator Symington. Was there any graft or dishonesty or any dis- 
honesty including graft, that resulted from that ? 

Mr. Adams. To my recollection, sir, no. 

Senator Symington. If there is an^vthing in error with respect to 
your last answer, would you check that and let us know ? 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. I think I have recently read the testimony 
with reference to that individual, and his interrogations was directed 
toward his associations, not graft and corruption, but whether or not 
he had associations with people of a Communist leaning. 

Senator Symington. If there is any such derogatory information 
on him or on anyone else on a loyalty review board, what would the 
Army have done ? 

Mr. Adams. Well, I can't speak for the Army prior to October 1, sir. 
But when I was there, or since I have been there, which is about 1 
months, although there is no announced policy, it is very strongly — 
it is a very strongly held opinion by the officials whose responsibilities 
include selecting panels and selecting people for participation in the 
loyalty board, that immediately on receipt of derogatory information, 
either of a loyalty security nature or having to do with graft or cor- 
ruption, the individual should be immediately taken from the loyalty 
board and if the charges are of a serious nature, he also, additionally, 
should have whatever security clearance he has lifted, suspended. 

Senator Symington. You are going far afield, I think, in answer to 
my question. 

Mr. Adams. I beg your pardon. 

Senator Symington. I asked you if the Army had received any such 
derogatory information with respect to graft or any dishonesty, what 
would the Army do with respect to that member of the loyalty board. 
Can you give me a short answer to that ? 

Mr. Adams. I think, sir, they would relieve him from the loyalty 
board. If the charges were serious, they would susoend him and at 
the same time an immediate investigation of the charges would be 
undertaken by proper authorities. 


Senator Symington. I thank yon. Now, Mr. Adams, did the Army 
attempt to persuade members of this committee not to subpena the 
membership of the loyalty review board in question ? 

Mr. Adams. Read the question, again, sir. 

Senator Symington. Did the Army attempt to persuade the mem- 
bers of this committee not to subpena the membership of the loyalty 
review board in question? 

Mr. Chairman, I understand my time is up. May I have an answer 
to this question ? 

Senator Mundt. You may. 

Mr. Jenkins. Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, that calls for a yes or 
no answer, apparently. Is that what you want, Senator ? 

Senator Symington. I would like as short an answer as possible, 
Mr. Counsel, that gives the facts. 

Mr. Adams. I think, sir, that my previous testimony has been that 
I did call on certain members of this committee and that I did ask that 
these individuals not be subpenaed. 

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of other ques- 
tions. I will await my turn. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Dworshak? 

Senator Dworshak. No questions. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Welch ? 

Mr. Welch. No questions. 

Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn. 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, we have this morning a most 
unexpected and most unusual development. I don't know whether 
any further questioning of Mr. Adams will be of any benefit. We 
find now that Mr. Adams was in a conference with the Ambassador to 
the United Nations, with the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney 
General, that they were the ones, according to Mr. Adams' indications, 
who instigated the charges against Mr. Carr and Mr. Cohn. We find 
now the charges against Mr. Carr were a complete fraud upon the 
committee, that the Army's case is in and there is no evidence against 
Mr. Carr. 

I frankly thought all along Mr. Adams and Mr. Hensel were the 
people who had instigated this. Mow there is no way of knowing 
who did. There is no way of checking motives. We have the at- 
torney general who was present at that conference ruling upon what 
documents can be admitted in evidence, a most unusual ruling this 
morning, in which he says that a document is not authentic but ver- 
batim. I don't quite follow that. 

We asked what portions of this could be made available. Obviously 
there are portions having nothing to do with security but would be 
extremely embarrassing to those charged with security. 

I would like, Mr. Chairman, to have a 5- or 10-minute recess to 
decide, or to conferr with Mr. Carr and Mr. Cohn to see what we 
should do under this unusual situation in which we can only hear 
the evidence about that conference which might be damaging to Mr. 
Cohn, Mr. Carr and myself, and suddenly, halfway through the testi- 
mony we cannot get the complete story. 

I would like, Mr. Chairman, to have about a 5-minute recess to deter- 
mine what action I should take in view of this unprecedented, com- 
pletely unusual, almost unbelievable situation we are confronted with 
this morning. 


May I have a 5-minute recess to consult with Mr. Colin and Mr. 

Senator Mundt. I think that is a fair request. It was an unexpected 
and an unanticipated development. We will declare a 5-minute recess 
and return. 

(Brief recess.) 

Senator Mcndt. The committee will please come to order. 

We will resume the business of the hearing. At the time of the 
recess, Senator McCarthy had the floor under the 10-minute rule. The 
Chair will recognize Senator McCarthy or Mr. Colin. 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, I must admit that I am some- 
what at a loss as to know what to do at the moment. One of the sub- 
jects of this inquiry is to find out who was responsible for succeeding 
in calling off the hearing of Communist infiltration in Government. 
That the hearings have been called off, no one can question. I fear 
that maybe in my mind I was doing an injustice, possibly, to Mr. 
Adams and Mr. Hensel. 

I strongly felt all along that they were the men responsible for it. 
At this point, I find out there is no way of ever getting at the truth, 
because we do find that the charges were conceived, instigated, at a 
meeting which was testified to by Mr. Adams. 

Now for some fantastically strange reason, the iron curtain is pulled 
down so we can't tell what happened at that meeting. I don't think 
the President is responsible for this. I don't think his judgment is 
that bad, Mr. Chairman. 

There is no reason why any one should be afraid of the facts, of the 
truth, that came out of that meeting. It is a very important meeting. 
It doesn't have to do with security matters. It doesn't have to do with 
national security. It merely has to do with why these charges were 

We find now that admittedly the charges against Mr. Carr were a 
complete fraud upon the committee. The case of Mr. Adams and Mr. 
Stevens is in. They admit they have no evidence against Mr. Carr. 

Last week I couldn't understand why Mr. Welch and Mr. Adams 
would not agree to withdraw their charges against Mr. Carr, very 
serious charges. I find now that maybe they were not free agents. 
I don't know. 

At that meeting, there was one individual who was not a member 
of the White House staff. He was confirmed by the Senate to a posi- 
tion with the U. N., Ambassador to the U. N. If he were there as the 
emissary of the President, if he will testify under oath or give an 
affidavit that he was there representing the President — I frankly 
would hesitate in insisting upon calling him, but I don't believe that 
that can be established. That is not his function. The question is 
how far can — I am not talking about the present occupant in the 
White House. But we have a tremendously important question here, 
Mr. Chairman. That is, How far can the President go? Who all 
can he order not to testify ? If he can order the Ambassador to the 
U. N. not to testify about something having nothing to do with the 
U. N., but a deliberate smear against my staff, then any President — 
and we don't know who will be President in 1956, 1960, 1964 — but any 
President [laughter] — I won't repeat that. Any President can, by 
an Executive order, keep the facts from the American people. 


As I say, I don't believe that this is the result of President Eisen- 
hower's own personal thinking. I am sure if he knew what this was all 
about, that he would not sign an order saying that you can't tell the 
Senate committee what went on when they cooked up those charges 
against Mr. Colin, Mr. Carr, and myself. 

Mr. Chairman, there is also another very important aspect of this. 
We find that the Deputy Attorney General, who I know wrote the 
letter the other day — I don't know about the one today — was one of the 
individuals who advised Mr. Adams to write out these charges. The 
Attorney General and his Deputy must every day pass upon ques- 
tions, questions of evidence. They must ultimately decide who is lying. 
The testimony will be completely contradictory here. There is no 
question about that. Somebody will be lying. I think it is unheard of 
that you have an Attorney General and a Deputy Attorney General 
calling on a smear like this, if they did. If they did not, they should 
be down here telling us they did not. The evidence now is that they 
did. And then have them passing upon all of the important questions. 

Mr. Chairman, may I say that it will be completely impossible for 
me to question the witness now until the committee meets and de- 
termines what the ruling will be, whether, for example, individuals 
not connected with the White House, like Mr. Lodge, and others, are 
exempt from coming down here and telling us the truth merely be- 
cause the President says they should not come. 

If the President can order Mr. Lodge, for example, who has nothing 
to do with the White House as far as we know, to seal his lips, then 
the President can order any witness we have. 

We have heard the case of Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams. We find, 
if you will pardon me for some slight repetition here, Mr. Chairman, 
we find they have no case at all against Mr. Carr except that he gave 
Mr. Adams friendly advice. We find that Mr. Adams said Saturady — 
after all the testimony was in, I said, "What did Mr. Colin do that was 
wrong ?" The only thing that he did except talk, according to Adams, 
was to fail to persuade me to call off the subpenas of the loyalty board. 

Now we are getting clown to the meat of the case, Mr. Chairman, and 
that is, who was responsible for the issuance of the smear that has held 
this committee up for weeks and weeks and weeks, and has allowed 
Communists to continue in our defense plants, Mr. Chairman, handling 
top-secret material, as I said before, with a razor poised oyer the jugu- 
lar vein of this Nation? Who is responsible for keeping all these 
Army officers down here and all the Senators tied up while the world 
is going up in flames ? 

I do think, Mr. Chairman, that we should go into executive session. 
1 must have a ruling as to what will be behind an iron curtain and what 
facts we can bring out before I can intelligently question the witnesses. 
I do think that someone, for his own benefit, should contact the Presi- 
dent immediately and point out to him, perhaps, that he and I and 
many of us campaigned and promised the American people that if they 
would remove our Democrat friends from the control of this Govern- 
ment, then we would no longer engage in Government by secrecy, 
whitewash and coverup. 

I think that these facts should be brought to the President, because 
the American people will not stand for such as this, Mr. Chairman. 
They will not stand for a coverup half-way through a hearing. 


I have asked, Mr. Chairman, that we dispose of this without these 
lengthy hearings. That was turned down, turned down by the repre- 
sentative of the Executive. Once it is turned down, I say let's go 
through it and lay all the facts upon the table. We can't lay the facts 
upon the table if we are going to draw an iron curtain when we are 
half-way through the hearings. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for an executive session, a meeting 
of the committee, so I will know just to what extent the committee is 
going to honor this order or any other order like it. 

Ssnator Potter. Mr. Chairman, I move that we recess until tomor- 
row morning at 10 o'clock, and in the meantime that we have an 
executive session to take up the controversy which is now in dispute. 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, 1 would like to be heard on the 

Sanator Mundt. Senator McClellan? 

Senator McClellan. I think in view of the fact that I asked some 
questions trying to place the responsibility, I should make my position 
clear at this time before this motion is passed on. 

For the present at least, I am not disagreeing with the Executive 
directive with respect to conversations that may have taken place at 
this meeting. The President may be within his rights to say that you 
cannot inquire into how a decision was arrived at in the executive 
branch of the Government at the President's level. But I do not 
agree — I wholly disagree, and I shall insist upon making this record 
clear with respect to what was the result of the decision made at that 
rime, whether responsibility shifted from the Secretary of the Army 
to higher authorities. That we are entitled to know, because unless we 
can get that information, we will not have the evidence here upon 
which to make a decision that will place the responsibility. 

If the Secretary is acting under orders from higher authority, the 
Secretary cannot be censured for carrying out those orders. Without 
regard to how the decision was arrived at, if a decision was made at 
that time, this committee is entitled to know it and entitled to know 
where the responsibility lies for what occurred thereafter in carrying 
out that decision. 

I shall ask at the executive hearing, when it is held, Mr. Chairman, 
that this committee determine whether we are going to insist on 
answers to those questions as to the result of the conference, and not 
how the decision was arrived at. 

S?nator Mundt. Is there a second to the motion made by the Senator 
from Michigan ? 

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I will oppose that motion be- 
cause in my opinion it is the duty of this committee to get the truth. 
If it cannot get all the truth, then it is still the duty of the committee 
to get as much of the truth as possible. I do not believe that the hearing 
should be recessed or postponed. I believe that the hearing should 
proceed at the same time that these problems are discussed and ad- 
judicated upon. 

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I move — it is 10 minutes of 12 — as a 
substitute motion, that we adjourn and reconvene at 2 o'clock, or recess 
and reconvene at 2 o'clock. 

Senator Mundt. The attention of the Chair was temporarily di- 
verted. Are you suggesting that we simply recess now, Senator 
Symington, and not have an executive session, and meet at 2 ? 


Senator Symington. I didn't say that, Mr. Chairman. I said instead 
of recessing until tomorrow, that now we recess and reconvene at 2 
o'clock this afternoon in the normal procedure, so that we proceed 
with these hearings — correction. My distinguished colleague, the 
senior Senator from Arkansas, suggests that we make it 2 :30, in order 
that we have full time for an executive hearing. I would modify my 
substitute motion to that extent, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator McClellan. I second the substitute motion. 

Senator McCarthy. Could I make a suggestion, Senator Syming- 

Senator Mundt. Let the Chair report for the record that the sub- 
stitute motion as made by Senator Symington has been seconded by 
Senator McClellan. 

Senator McCarthy. Will Senator Symington yield for a minute? 

Senator Symington. I will be glad to. 

Senator McCarthy. Instead of making that 2 :30, I wonder if you 
won't make your substitute motion 3 o'clock, because it will take us 
some time to thresh out these problems. I think we should give our- 
selves sufficient time. 

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, in an effort to extend every 
consideration possible to the junior Senator from Wisconsin, I will 
now further revise my substitute motion and recommend that we 
continue, that we recess until 3 o'clock this afternoon. 

Senator Mundt. Is the amendment satisfactory to the seconder? 

Senator McClellan. I accept the amendment. 

Senator Potter. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a major question 
which has to be discussed. I feel that it would be foolhardy for us 
to walk into this accidentally. I think — I know, as one member of 
the committee, it is a serious question. Rather than to set a time limit 
that we meet at 2 :80 or 3 o'clock, there is no need of our coming back 
here and meeting until this question has been resolved. So I say, 
I don't care whether it is 3 o'clock or tomorrow morning, but I think 
the main question is to resolve this controversy. So I would like to 
suggest that we recess now, have an executive session, and come back 
at the call of the Chair after the decision has been made by the 

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I speak to that? I do not 
agree with Senator Potter. I believe that these hearings shall go on 
and should go on regardless of whether this matter is adjudicated to 
the satisfaction of the committee or anybody else. Therefore, the 
motion which has been moved and seconded I believe is now before 
the committee. 

Senator Mundt. Is there any further discussion ? 

As the Chair understands the motion — and he will repeat it as 
best he can and call for a vote if there is no further discussion — it 
is that we recess now and reconvene at 3 o'clock, and that the Chair 
call an executive session during the interim for the purpose of dis- 
cussing the situation which has arisen with regard to the executive 
order and the testimony of Mr. Adams. 

Is there any further discussion ? Are you ready for the vote ? 

May the Chair say before the vote that if it prevails, he will call 
the executive session in room 357. 


Those in favor of the motion made by Senator Symington and sec- 
onded by Senator McClelJan, will signify by— Do you want a rollcall 

Very well, we will have a rollcall vote. 

Senator McClellan ? 

Senator McClellan. Aye. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen? 

Senator Dirksen. Aye. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson? 

Senator Jackson. Aye. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Potter ? 

Senator Potter. No. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Symington? 

Senator Symington. Aye. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Dworshak ? 

Senator Dworshak. Aye. 

Senator Mundt. The Chair votes "aye." 

The motion prevails. We will meet at 1:30 in room 357. We 
willl reconvene at 3 o'clock here. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m. the committee was recessed, to reconvene 
at 3 p. m. the same day. ) 



No. 19 (a) 

United States Senate, 
Washington, D. C, May 10, 195$. 
Hon. Herbert Brownele, Jr., 

United States Attorney General, 

Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C. 

Dear Herb: This letter is with further regard to our recent exchange of 
correspondence whereby in a communication dated May 6, you responded to a 
letter I wrote you under date of May 5, soliciting your opinion in connection 
with a 15-page interdepartmental memorandum dated January 26, 1951, from 
John Edgar Hoover to Gen. A. R. Boiling, and also a 2 1 / 4-page letter dated 
January 26, 1951, addressed to Major General Boiling and closing with the 
typewritten reproduction of the name "J. Edgar Hoover." 

In your letter of May 6, you gave it as your opinion that it would not be in 
the public interest to enter as an exhibit in our current hearings either of these 
2 documents. You are aware, I am sure, of the position taken by Senator Mc- 
Carthy before our committee in which he held that it would not violate the 
public interest to include as an exhibit the 2 1 / 4-page document, and at which 
time he suggested the possibility of calling you before our subcommittee in 
executive session for the purpose of ascertaining precisely why you felt the 
disclosure of the contents in the 2% -page letter would not be in the public in- 
terest. Since you are receiving daily transcriptions of our hearings, you un- 
doubtedly have also had your attention called to the suggestion of Senator Mc- 
Clellan that if you were to be called to testify on this point, it should be in 
public session rather than in private session. Senator McClellan has also asked 
me privately to state in this letter that if you are to be called, he would like to 
request that you bring J. Edgar Hoover with you at the time of such a meeting. 

At a meeting of the subcommittee Friday afternoon, however, it was decided 
before any action of any kind was taken on Senator McCarthy's suggestion 
that I should write you this letter again conveying to you the 2 x /4-page docu- 
ment in question together with the following request : 

Would it be possible for you to authorize or clear for use as an exhibit before 
our subcommittee any of the paragraphs or portions of the enclosed 2^4-page 
document? It has occurred to some members of the subcommittee that the 
fact the 2 1 /4-page document may contain the names of some of those still under 
investigation or being used as informants, could be the basis on which you re- 
quested the contents be not divulged. If so, perhaps such names could be 
deleted and other portions of the document released. 

Will you please write me your reaction to this request and if you feel it is 
against the best security interest of the United States to permit any portions 
at all of the 2 1 /4-page document to be used as an exhibit before our subcommit- 
tee, I am sure it will be helpful to us if you will give your specific reasons for 
making such a determination. We, of course, do not want to make public 
anything which it is deemed would be injurious to our national interest to dis- 
close, but in our search for truth in the current hearings, on the other hand, we 
would like to have available for our consideration every fact and document 
which can be included in our record without doing violence to essential security 

We would appreciate a reply as soon as possible. 

With best wishes and kindest personal regards, I am 
Cordially yours, 

Karl E. Mundt, United States Senator. 



No. 20 (b) 


For : The President. 

From : The Attorney General. 

One of the chief merits of the American system of written constitutional law 
is that all the powers entrusted to the Government are divided into three great 
departments, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. It is essential 
to the successful working of this system that the persons entrusted with power 
in any one of these branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the 
powers confided to the others, but that each shall be limited to the exercise 
of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other. The doctrine 
of separation of powers was adopted to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power and to save the people from autocracy. 

This fundamental principle was fully recognized by our first President, George 
Washington, as early as 1796 when he said: "* * * it is essential to the due 
administration of the Government that the boundaries fixed by the Constitution 
between the different departments should be preserved * * * ". In his Farewell 
Address, President Washington again cautioned strongly against the danger 
of encroachment by one department into the domain of another as leading to 
despotism. This principle has received steadfast adherence throughout the 
many years of our history and growth. More than ever, it is our duty today 
to heed these words if our country is to retain its place as a leader among the 
free nations of the world. 

For over 150 years — almost from the time that the American form of govern- 
ment was created by the adoption of the Constitution — our Presidents have 
established, by precedent, that they and members of their Cabinet and other 
heads of executive departments have an undoubted privilege and discretion 
to keep confidential, in the public interest, papers and information which re- 
quire secrecy. American history abounds in countless illustrations of the refusal, 
on occasion, by the President and heads of departments to furnish papers to 
Congress, or its committees, for reasons of public policy. The messages of our 
past Presidents reveal that almost every one of them found it necessary to 
inform Congress of his constitutional duty to execute the office of President, 
and, in furtherance of that duty, to withhold information and papers for the 
public good. 

Nor are the instances lacking where the aid of a court was sought in vain 
to obtain information or papers from a President and the heads of depart- 
ments. Courts have uniformly held that the President and the heads of depart- 
ments have an uncontrolled discretion to withhold the information and papers 
in the public interest ; they will not interfere with the exercise of that discre- 
tion, and that Congress has not the power, as one of the three great bram-hes 
of the Government, to subject the executive branch to its will any more than 
the executive branch may impose its unrestrained will upon the Congress. 


In March 1792, the House of Representatives passed the following resolution: 
"Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the causes of the 
failure of the late expedition under Major General St. Clair; and that the said 
committee be empowered to call for such persons, papers, and records, as may 
be necessary to assist their inquiries'' (3 Annals of Congress, p. 493). 
. This was the first time that a committee of Congress was appointed to look into 
a matter which involved the executive branch of the Government. The expedi- 
tion of General St. Clair was under the direction of the Secretary of War. The 
expenditures connected therewith came under the Secretary of the Treasury. 
The House based its right to investigate on its control of the expenditures of 
public moneys. It appears that the Secretaries of War and the Treasury 
appeared before the committee. However, when the committee was bold enough 
to ask the President for the papers pertaining to the General St. Clair campaign, 
President Washington called a meeting of his Cabinet (Binkley, President and 
Congress pp. 40-41). 

Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, reports what took place at that 
meeting. Besides Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Henry Knox, Secretary of 
War, and Edmond Randolph, the Attorney General, were present. The com- 
mittee had first written to Knox for the original letters, instructions, etc., to 


General St. Clair. President Washington stated that he had called his Cabinet 
members together, because it was the first example of a demand on the Executive 
for papers, and he wished that so far as it should become a precedent, it should 
be rightly conducted. The President readily admitted that he did not doubt the 
propriety of what the House was doing, but he could conceive that there might 
be papers of so secret a nature that they ought not to be given up. Washington 
ind his Cabinet came to the unanimous conclusion : 

"First, that the House was an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries. 
Second, that it might call for papers generally. Third, that the Executive ought 
to communicate such papers as the public good would permit, and ought to refuse 
those, the disclosure of which would injure the public ; conseqently were to 
exercise a discretion. Fourth, that neither the committee nor House had a 
right to call on the head of a department, who and whose papers were under 
the President alone; but that the committee should instruct their chairman to 
move the House to address the President." 

The precedent thus set by our First President and his Cabinet was followed in 
1796, when President Washington was presented with a resolution of the House 
of Representatives which requested him to lay before the House a copy of the 
instructions to the Minister of the United States who negotiated the treaty with 
the King of Great Britain, together with the correspondence and documents 
relative to that treaty. Apparently it was necessary to implement the treaty 
with an appropriation which the Houre was called upon to vote. The House 
insisted on its right to the papers requested, as a condition to appropriating the 
required funds (President and Congress, Wilfred E. Binkley (1947), p. 44). 

President Washington's classic reply was, in part, as follows : 

"I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to with- 
hold any information which the Constitution has enjoined upon the President 
as a duty to give, or which could be required of him by either House of Congress 
as a right ; and with truth I affirm that it has been, as it will continue to be while 
I have the honor to preside in the Government, my constant endeavor to har- 
monize with the other branches thereof so far as the trust delegated to me by 
the people of the United States and my sense of the obligation it imposes to 
'preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution' will permit" (Richardson's 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 1, p. 194) . 

Washington then went on to discuss the secrecy required in negotiations with 
foreign governments, and cited that as a reason for vesting the power of making 
treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. He felt that 
to admit the House of Representatives into the treatymaking power, by reason 
of its constitutional duty to appropriate moneys to carry out a treaty, would be 
to establish a dangerous precedent. He closed his message to the House as 
follows : 

"As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my understanding that the assent of the 
House of Representatives is not necessary to the validity of a treaty ; * * * and 
as it is essential to the due administration of the Government that the boundaries 
fixed by the Constitution between the different depai'tments should be preserved, 
a just regard to the Constitution and to the duty of my office, under all the 
circumstances of this case, forbids a compliance with your request" (Richard- 
son's Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 1, p. 196). 

rRESiBENT jefferson's administration 

In January 1S07, Representative Randolph introduced a resolution, as follows: 
"Resolved, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, 
requested to lay before this House any information in possession of the Execu- 
tive, except such as he may deem the public welfare to require not to be dis- 
closed, touching any illegal combination of private individuals against the peace 
and safety of the Union, or any military expedition planned by such individuals 
against the territories of any Power in amity with the United States; together 
with the measures which the Executive has pursued and proposes to take for 
suppressing or defeating the same" (16 Annals of Congress (1806-07), p. 3o6.) 
The resolution was overwhelmingly passed. The Burr conspiracy was then 
stirring the country. Jefferson had made it the object of a special message to 
Congress wherein he referred to a military expedition headed by Burr. Jef- 
ferson's reply to the resolution was a message to the Senate and House of 
Representatives. Jefferson brought the Congress up to date on the news which 
he had been receiving concerning the illegal combination of private individuals 
against the peace and safety of the Union. He pointed out that he had recently 


received a mass of data, most of which had been obtained without the sanction 
of an oath so as to constitute formal and legal evidence. "It is chiefly in the 
form of letters, often containing such a mixture of rumors, conjectures, and 
suspicions as renders it difficult to sift out the real facts and unadvisable to 
hazard more than general outlines, strengthened by concurrent information or 
the particular credibility of the relator. In this state of the evidence, delivered 
sometimes, too, under the restriction of private confidence, neither safety nor 
justice will permit the exposing names, except that of the principal actor, whose 
guilt is placed beyond question" (Richardson's Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents, vol. 1, p. 412, dated January 22, 1S07). 


On February 10, 1835, President Jackson sent a message to the Senate wherein 
he declined to comply with the Senate's resolution requesting hiin to communi- 
cate copies of charges which had been made to the President against the official 
conduct of Gideon Fitz, late Surveyor General, which caused his removal from 
office. The resolution stated that the information requested was necessary both 
in the action which it proposed to take on the nomination of a successor to Fitz, 
and in connection with the investigation which was then in progress by the 
Senate respecting the frauds in the sales of public lands. 

The President declined to furnish the information. He stated that in his 
judgment the information related to subjects exclusively belonging to the execu- 
tive department. The request therefore encroached on the constitutional powers 
of the Executive. 

The President's message referred to many previous similar requests, which he 
deemed unconstitutional demands by the Senate : 

"Their continued repetition imposes on me, as the representative and trustee 
of the American people, the painful but imperious duty of resisting to the utmost 
any further encroachment on the rights of the Executive" (ibid., p. 133). 

The President next took up the fact that the Senate resolution had been 
passed in executive session, from which he was bound to presume that if the in- 
formation requested by the resolution were communicated, it would be applied 
in secret session to the investigation of frauds in the sales of public lands. The 
President said that, if he were to furnish the information, the citizen whose 
conduct the Senate sought to impeach would lose one of his basic rights; namely, 
that of a public investigation in the presence of his accusers and of the wit- 
nesses against him. In addition, compliance with the resolution would subject 
the motives of the President, in the case of Mr. Fitz, to the review of the Senate 
when not sitting as judges on an impeachment; and even if such a consequence 
did not follow in the present case, the President feared that compliance by the 
Executive might thereafter be quoted as a precedent for similar and repeated 

"Such a result, if acquiesced in .would ultimately subject the independent con- 
stitutional action of the Executive in a matter of great national concernment to 
the domination and control of the Senate ; * * * 

"I therefore decline a compliance with so much of the resolution of the Senate 
as requests 'copies of the charges, if any,' in relation to Mr. Fitz, and in doing 
so much be distinctly understood as neither affirming nor denying that any such 
charges were made; * * * (ibid., p. 134). 

One of the best reasoned precedents of a President's refusal to permit the 
head of a department to disclose confidential information to the House of Repre- 
sentatives is President Tyler's refusal to communicate to the House of Repre- 
sentatives the reports relative to the affairs of the Cherokee Indians and to 
the frauds which were alleged to have been practiced upon them. A resolution 
of the House of Representatives had called upon the Secretary of War to com- 
municate to the House the reports made to the Department of War by Lieutenant 
Colonel Hitchcock relative to the affairs of the Cherokee Indians together with 
all information communicated by him concerning the frauds he was charged to 
investigate ; also all facts in the possession of the Executive relatiug to the 
subject. The Secretary of War consulted with the President and under the 
latter's direction informed the House that negotiations were then pending with 
the Indians for settlement of their claims ; in the opinion of the President and 
the Department, therefore, publication of the report at that time would be in- 
consistent with the public interest. The Secretary of War further stated in his 
answer to the resolution that the report sought by the House, dealing with 
alleged frauds which Lieutenant Colonel Hitchcock was charged to investigate, 
contained information which was obtained by Colonel Hitchcock by ex parte in- 


quiries of persons whose statements were without the sanction of an oath, and 
which the persons implicated had had no opportunity to contradict or explain. 
The Secretary of War expressed the opinion that to promulgate those state- 
ments at that time would he grossly unjust to those persons, and would defeat the 
object of the inquiry. He also remarked that the Department had not been 
given at that time sufficient opportunity to pursue the investigation, to call the 
parties affected for explanations, or to determine on the measures proper to be 

The answer of the Secretary of War was not satisfactory to the Committee on 
Indian Affairs of the House, which claimed the right to demand from the Execu- 
tive and heads of departments such information as may be in their possession 
relating to subjects of the deliberations of the House. 

President Tyler in a message dated January 31, 1843, vigorously asserted that 
the House of Representatives could not exercise a right to call upon the Executive 
for information, even though it related to a subject of the deliberations of the 
House, if, by so doing, it attempted to interfere with the discretion of the 

The same course of action was taken by President James Buchanan in I860 
in resisting a resolution of the House to investigate whether the President or any 
other officer of the Government had, by money, patronage, or other improper 
means, sought to influence the action of Congress for or against the passage of any 
law relating to the rights of any State or Territory. (See Richardson, Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 5, pp. 618-619. ) 

In the administration of President Ulysses S. Grant the House requested the 
President to inform it whether any executive offices, acts, or duties, and if any, 
what have been performed at a distance from the seat of government established 
by law. It appears that the purpose of this inquiry was to embarrass the Presi- 
dent by reason of his having spent some of the hot months at Long Branch. 
President Grant replied that he failed to find in the Constitution the authority 
given to the House of Representatives, and that the inquiry had nothing to do 
with legislation (Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. VII, 
pp. 362-363). 

president Cleveland's administration 

In 1S86, during President Cleveland's administration, there was an extended 
discusson in the Senate with reference to its relations to the Executive caused 
by the refusal of the Attorney General to transmit to the Senate certain docu- 
ments concerning the administration of the office of the district attorney for the 
southern district of south Alabama, and suspension of George W. Dnrkin, the 
late incumbent. The majority of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary con- 
cluded it was entitled to know all that officially exists or takes place in any of 
the departments of government and that neither the President nor the head of 
a department could withhold official facts and information as distinguished from 
private and unofficial papers. 

In his reply President Cleveland disclaimed any intention to withhold official 
papers, but he denied that papers and documents inherently private or confidential, 
addressed to the President or a head of a department, having reference to an act 
entirely executive such as the suspension of an official, were changed in their 
nature and become official when placed for convenience in the custody of a puhlic 
department (Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 8, pp. 
378-379, 381 ) . 

Challenging the attitude that because the executive departments were created 
by Congress the latter had any supervisory power over them, President Cleveland 
declared (Eberling, Congressional Investigation, p. 258) . 

"I do not suppose that the public offices of the United States are regulated or 
controlled in their relations to either House of Congress by the fact that they 
were created by laws enacted by themselves. It must be that thess instrumen- 
talities were created for the benefit of the people and to answer the general 
purposes of government under the Constitution and the laws, and that they are 
unencumbered by any lien in favor of either branch of Congress growing out of 
their construction, and unembarrassed by any obligation to the Senate as the 
price of their creation." 


In 1909, during the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, the ques- 
tl©n of the right of the President to exercise complete direction and control over 
heads of executive departments was raised again. At that time the Senate 


passed a resolution directing the Attorney General to inform tne Senate whether 
certain legal proceedings had been instituted against the United States Steel 
Corp., and, if not, the reasons for its nonaction. Request was ilso made for any 
opinion of the Attorney General, if one was written. President Theodore 
Roosevelt replied refusing to honor this request upon the ground that "Heads of 
the executive departments are subject to the Constitution, and to the laws passed 
by the Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, and to the directions of the 
President of the United States, but to no other direction whatever" (Congres- 
sional Record, vol. 43, pt. 1, 60th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 527-528). 

When the Senate was unable to get the documents from the Attorney General, 
it summoned Herbert K. Smith, the head of the Bureau of Corporations, and 
requested the papers and documents on penalty of impiisonment for contempt. 
Mr. Smith reported the request to the President, who directed him to turn over 
to the President all the papers in the case "so that I could assist the Senate in the 
prosecution of its Investigation." President Roosevelt then informed Senator 
Clark of the Judiciary Committee what had been done, that he had the papers 
and the only way the Senate could get them was through his impeachment. 
President Roosevelt also explained that some of the facts were given to the 
Government under the seal of secrecy and cannot be divulged, "and I will see to 
it that the word of this Government to the individual is kept sacred (Corwin, 
The President — Office and Powers, pp. 281, 428; Abbott, The Letters of Archie 
Butt, Personal Aide to President Roosevelt, pp. 305-300). 


In 1924, during the administration of President Coolidge, the latter objected 
to the action of a special investigating committee appointed by the Senate to 
investigate the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Request was made by the committee 
for a list of the companies in which the Secretary of the Treasury was alleged to 
be interested for the purpose of investigating their tax returns. Calling this 
exercise of power an unwarranted intrusion, President Coolidge said : 

"Whatever may be necessary for the information of the Senate or any of its 
committees in order to better enable them to perform their legislative or other 
constitutional functions ought always to be furnished willingly and expeditiously 
by any department. But it is recognized both by law and custom that there is 
certain confidential information which it would be detrimental to the public 
service to reveal" (68th Cong., 1st sess., Record, April 11, 1924, p. 6087). 


A similar question arose in 1930 during the administration of President Hoover. 
Secretary of State Stimson refused to disclose to the chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee certain confidential telegrams and letters lead- 
ing up to the London Conference and the London Treaty. The committee 
asserted its right to have full and free access to all records touching the nego- 
tiations of the treaty, basing its right on the constitutional prerogatives of the 
Senate in the treaty-making process. In his message to the Senate, President 
Hoover pointed out that there were a great many informal statements and 
reports which were given to the Government in confidence. The Executive was 
under a duty, in order to maintain amicable relations with other nations, not to 
publicize all the negotiations and statements which went into the making of 
the treaty. He further declared that the Executive must not be guilty of a 
breach of trust, nor violate the invariable practice of nations. "In view of this, 
I believe that to further comply with the above resolution would be incompati- 
ble with the public interest" (S. Doc. 216, 71st Cong., special sess., p. 2). 


The position was followed during the administration of President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. There were many instances in which the President and his execu- 
tive heads refused to make available certain information to Congress the dis- 
closure of which was deemed to be confidential or contrary to the public interest. 
Merely a few need be cited ; 

1. Federal Bureau of Investigation records and reports were refused to con- 
gressional committees, in the public interest (40 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 8, April 30, 

2. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation refused to give tes- 
timony or to exhibit a copy of the President's directive requiring him, in the 


Interest of national security, to refrain from testifying or from disclosing the 
contents of the Bureau's reports and activities (hearings, vol. 2, House, 78th 
Cong., Select Committee To Investigate the Federal Communications Commis- 
sion (1944), p. 2337). 

3. Communications between the President and the heads of departments were 
held to be confidential and privileged and not subject to inquiry by a com- 
mittee of one of the Houses of Congress (letter dated January 22, 1944, signed 
"Francis Riddle, Attorney General, to Select Committee," etc.). 

4. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget refused to testify and to pro- 
duce the Bureau's files, pursuant to subpena which had been served upon him, 
because the President had instructed him not to make public the records of the 
Bureau due to their confidential nature. Public interest was again invoked to 
prevent disclosure. (Reliance placed on Attorney General's Opinion in 40 Op. 
Attorney General No. 8, April 30, 1941.) 

5. The Secretaries of War and Navy were directed not to deliver documents 
which the committee had requested, on grounds of public interest. The Secre- 
taries, in their own judgment, refused permission to Army and Navy officers to 
appear and testify because they felt that it would be contrary to the public 
interests (hearings, Select Committee To Investigate the Federal Communica- 
tions Commission, vol. 1, pp. 46, 48-68). 

president teuman's administration 

During the Truman administration also the President adhered to the tra- 
diitonal Executive view that the President's discretion must govern the surrender 
of Executive files. Some of the major incidents during the administration of 
President Truman in which information, records, and files were denied to the 
congressional committtees were as follows : 

Date Type of document refused 

Mar. 4, 1948 FBI letter-report on Dr. Condon, Director of National Bu- 
reau of Standards, refused by Secretary of Commerce. 

Mar. 15, 1948 President issued directive forbidding all executive depart- 
ments and agencies to furnish information or reports con- 
cerning loyalty of their employees to any court or com- 
mittee of Congress, unless President approves. 

Mar. 1918 Dr. John R. Steelman, confidential adviser to the President, 

refused to appear before Committee on Education and 
Labor of the House, following the service of 2 subpenas 
upon him. President directed him not to appear. 

Aug. •">, li 'IS Attorney General wrote Senator Ferguson, chairman of 

Senate Investigations Subcommittee, that he would not 
furnish letters, memorandums, and other notices which 
the Justice Department had furnished to other Govern- 
ment agencies concerning W. W. Remington. 

Feb. 22, 1950 S. Res. 231 directing Senate subcommittee to procure State 

Department loyalty files was met with President Truman's 
refusal, following vigorous opposition of J. Edgar Hoover. 

Mar. 27, 1950 Attorney General and Director of FBI appeared before 

Senate subcommittee. Mr. Hoover's historic statement of 
reasons for refusing to furnish raw files approved by At- 
torney General. 

May 16, 1951 General Bradley refused to divulge conversations between 

President and his advisers to combined Senate Foreign 
Relations and Armed Services Committees. 

Jan. 31, 1952 President Truman directed Secretary of State to refuse to 

Senate Internal Security Subcommittee the reports and 
views of Foreign Service officers. 

Apr. 22, 1952 Acting Attorney General Perlman laid down procedure for 

complying with requests for inspection of Department of 
Justice files by Committee on Judiciary : 

Requests on open cases would not be honored. Status 

report will be furnished. 
As to closed cases, files would be made available. All 
FBI reports and confidential information would not 
be made available. 
As to personnel files, they are never disclosed . 


Date Type of document refused „ 

Apr. 3, 1952 President Truman instructed Secretary of State to withhold 

from Senate Appropriations Subcommittee files on loy- 
alty and security investigations of employees — policy to 
apply to all executive agencies. The names of individ- 
uals determined to be security risks would not be di- 
vulged. The voting record of members of an agency 
loyalty board would not be divulged. 

THUS, you can see that the Presidents of the United States have withheld 
information of executive departments or agencies whenever it was found that the 
information sought was confidential or that its disclosure would be incompatible 
with the public interest or jeopardize the safety of the Nation. The courts, too, 
have held that the question whether the production of the papers was contrary 
to the public interest, was a matter for the Executive to determine. 

By keeping the lines which separate and divide the three great branches of our 
Government clearly defined, no one branch has been able to encroach upon the 
powers of the other. 

Upon this firm principle our country's strength, liberty, and democratic form of 
Government will continue to endure. 


Abbott (letters of Arebie Butt) 1273 

Acting Attorney General 1274 

Adams, Jobn G 1247 

Testimony of 1248-1267 

Adam, Sherman 1253 

Annals of Congress 1269, 1270 

Appropriations Committee (Senate) 1275 

Armed services (United States) 1257 

Armed Services Committee (Senate) 1274 

Army (United States) 1252,1253,1256,1259-1262,1264,1274 

Army officers 1252, 1264, 1274 

Attorney General (United States) 1246-1249, 

1258, 1262, 1284, 1268, 1269, 1272-1274 

Attorney General's opinions 1273, 1274 

Biddle, Francis 1274 

Biddle letter (January 22, 1944) 1274 

Binkley, Wilfred E 1269, 1270 

Boiling, Gen. A. R 1268 

Bradley, General 1274 

Brownell, Herbert, Jr 1247, 1253, 1268 

Buchanan, President James 1271, 12721 

Bureau of the Budget 1274 

Bureau of Corporations 1273 

Bureau of Internal Revenue 1273 

Burr conspiracy 1270 

Butt, Archie (personal aide to President Theodore Roosevelt) 1273 

Carr, Francis P 1262-1264 

Cherokee Indians 1271 

Chief Executive 1258 

Chronological Order of Events (document) 1258 

Clark, Senator 1273 

Cleveland, President 1272 

Cohn, Roy M 1251, 1252, 1262-1264 

Commodore Hotel 1251 

Communists 1261 

Condon, Dr 1274 

Confidential FBI reports 1246 

Congress, Annals of 1269, 1270 

Congress of the United States 1249, 1257, 1269, 1270, 1272-1274 

Congressional committee 1249 

Congressional Record 1273 

Constitution of the United States 1257, 1269, 1270, 1272, 1273 

Collidge, President 1273 

Corwin (The President — Office and Powers) 1273 

Counselor to the Army 1247-1267 

Democrat 1264 

Department of the Army 1252, 1253, 1256, 1259-1262 

Department of Defense 1261 

Department of Justice 1246, 1268, 1274 

Department of War 1271, 1272 

Deputy Attorney General 1253, 1262, 1264 

Director of the Bureau of the Budget 1274 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 1273 

Durkin, George W 1272 

Eberling congressional investigation 1272 



Education and Labor Committee (House) 1274 

Eisenhower, Dwight D 1249, 1204 

Executive department heads 1273 

Executive departments 1249. 1265 

Executive directive 1265 

Executive order 1263 

Expedition of Major St. Clair 1269 

Farewell Address (President Washington) 1269 

FBI Director 1273, 1274 

FBI memorandum (January 26, 1951) 1246 

FBI reports 1246, 1247, 1274 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 1246, 1273, 1274 

Federal Communications Commission Investigation (1944) 1274 

Ferguson, Senator 1274 

First President of the United States 1270 

Fitz, Gideon (Senate resolution on) 1271 

Foreign Relations Committee (Senate) 1273, 1274 

Fort McNair (War College) 1257 

Fort Monmouth 1252 

G-2 (Army Intelligence) 1260 

Government agencies 1249, 1258, 1274 

Grant, President Ulysses S 1271, 1272 

Hagerty, James C 1247 

Hamilton, Alexander 1269 

Hensel, H. Struve 1262, 1263 

Hitchcock, Lieutenant Colonel 1271 

Hoover, J. Edgar 1246, 1268, 1274 

Hoover, President 1273 

Hoover letter (January 26, 1951) 1268 

Hotel Commodore 1251 

House Committee on Education and Labor 1274 

House of Representatives 1269, 1270, 1271, 1272 

House Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications 

Commission 1274 

"Immediate Release" (White House letter) 1247 

Industrial College, Armed Services (War College) 1257 

Inspector General's report 1252 

Jackson, President 1271 

Jefferson, Thomas 1269, 1270 

Judiciary Committee (Senate) 1256, 1272-1274 

Justice Department 1246, 1268, 1274 

King of Great Britain 1270 

Knox, Henry 1269 

Lawton, General 1250-1252 

Legislative branches of the Government 1249 

Lodge, Mr 1264 

London conference 1273 

London treaty 1273 

Long Branch 1272 

Loyalty Review Board of the Army 1259, 1260-1262 

McCarthy, Senator Joe 1246, 1247, 1249-1252, 1260, 1262, 1263, 1266, 1268 

McClellan, Senator 1268 

Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Richardson) 1270-1272 

Minister of the United States to Great Britain 1270 

Mundt, Senator Karl E 1246, 126S 

National Bureau of Standards 1274 

Navy (United States) 1274 

Navy officers 1274 

Opinions of the Attorney General 1273, 1274 

Perlman, Acting Attorney General 1274 

Personal aid to President Theodore Roosevelt 1273 

President Cleveland's administration 1272 

President Coolidge's administration 1273 

President Hoover's administration 1273 

President Jackson's message (en Gideon Fitz) 1271 



President Jefferson's administration 1270 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration 1273 

President Theodore Roosevent's administration 1272 

President Truman's administration 1274 

President Washington's administration 1269 

President — Office and Powers (Corwin) 1273 

President of the United States 1247-1200, 1234-1259, 1263-1265, 1260-1275 

Presidential assistant 1253 

Presidential directive 1278, 1280-1282 

President's Cabinet 1258, 1260 

President's letter 1247, 1248, 1255 

President's message (Jackson) 1271 

Press secretary to the President 1247 

Randolph, Edmond 1260, 1270 

Remington, W. W 1274 

Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1270-1272 

Rogers, Deputy Attorney General 125a 

Roosevelt, President Franklin 1250, 1273 

Roosevelt, President Theodore 1272, 1273 

Russian spy 1247 

St. Clair, Major General 1260, 1270 

Sehine, G. David 1252, 1253 

Secretary of the Army 1250-125S, 1261, 1264, 1265 

Secretary of Commerce 1274 

Secretary of Defense 1248, 1240, 1253, 1257 

Secretary of State 1269, 1273, 1275 

Secretary of the Treasury 1269, 1273 

Secretary of War 1269, 1271, 1272 

Security Division (G-2, Army) 1260 

Select Committee To Investigate the Federal Communications Commission 

( House) 1274 

Senate Armed Services Committee 1274 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 1275 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1273 

Senate Judiciary Committee 1256, 1272-1274 

Senate resolution (on Gideon Fitz) 1271 

Senate of the United States 1246, 1268, 1270-1273 

Signal Corps Laboratory 1247 

Smith, Herbert K 1273 

State Department loyalty tiles 1274 

Steelman, John R 1274 

Stevens, Robert T 1250-1258, 1261, 1284, 1265 

Stimson, Secretary of State 1273 

Surveyor General 1271 

Svmington, Senator 1247, 1250, 1267 

Truman, President 1250, 1258, 1274, 1275 

Tyler, President 1271, 1272 

United Nations 1262, 1263 

United States Acting Attorney General 1274 

United States armed services 1257 

United States Army 1252, 1253, 1256, 1259-1262 

United States Attorney General 1246-1219, 125S, 1262, 1264, 1268, 1269, 1272-1274 

United States Bureau of Internal Revenue 1273 

United States Congress 1249, 1257, 1269, 1270, 1272-1274 

United States Constitution 1257, 12G0, 1270, 1272, 1273 

United States Department of Justice 1246, 1268, 1274 

United States House of Representatives 1269 

United States Navy 1274 

United States President 1247-1250, 1254-1250, 1263-1265, 1269-1275 

United States Secretary of Commerce 1274 

United States Secretary of Defense 1248, 1249, 1253, 1257 

United States Secretary of State 1269, 1273, 1275 

United States Secretary of the Treasury 1269, 1273 

United States Secretary of War 1269, 1271, 1272 

United States Senate 1246, 1268, 1270-1273 



United States Steel Corp 1273 

United States Surveyor General 1271 

United States War Department 1271, 1272 

War College (Fort McNair) 1257 

War College (Industrial College, Armed Services) 1257 

War Department 1271, 1272 

Washington, D. C 1246, 1268 

Washington, President 1249, 1258, 1269, 1270 

Washington's administration 1269 

Washington's Cabinet 12C9, 1270 

Washington's Farewell Address 1269 

White House 1247, 1253, 1263, 1264 

White House letter 1247 

White House staff 1263 




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