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Given By
>ECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON GHARGES
'AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRE-
TARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR
JOE McCarthy, roy m. cohn, and
FRANCIS p. CARR
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Res. 189
PART 41
MAY 26, 1954
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICH
46620° WASHINGTON : 1954
X
f l^UteLIC I
Eoston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
COJIMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho JOHN F. KENNEDY. Massachusetts
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland THOMAS A. BURKE, Ohio
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan
Richard J. O'Melia, General Counsel
Walter L. Reynolds, ChieJ Clerk
Special Subcommittee on Investigations
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota, Chairman
EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Iinnois JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
Ray H. Jenkins, Chief Counsel
Thomas R. Prewitt, Assistant Counsel
Robert A. Collier, Assistant Counsel
SoLis HOEWiTZ, Assistant Counsel
Charles A. Maner, Secretary
CONTENTS
Paga
Index 1551a
Testimony of —
Cohn, Boy M., chief counsel, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations 1550
EXHIBITS
Intro-
duced Appears
on page on page
24. Records submitted by the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Co 1517 0)
25. Records submitted by the New York Telephone Co 1517 (')
* May be found In the files of the subcommittee.
UI
SrEClVL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES AND
COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE
HENSEL AND SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY, ROY M. COHN,
AND FRANCIS P. CARR
WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, 1954
United States Senate,
Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, D. C.
AFTER recess
(The hearing was resumed at 2: 15 p. m., pursuant to recess.)
Present : Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota (chair-
man) ; Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican, Illinois; Sen-
ator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michicran; Senator Henry C.
Dworshak, Republican, Idaho; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat,
Arkansas; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and
Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.
Also present: Ray II. Jenkins, chief counsel to the subcommittee;
Thomas R. Prewitt, assistant counsel; Ruth Watt, chief clerk.
Principal participants present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a
United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin; Roy M. Cohn,
chief counsel to the subcommittee; Francis P. Carr, executive director
of the subcommittee ; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel for tlie Army ;
James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army; and Frederick P.
Bryan, counsel to H. Struve Hensel, xissistant Secretary of Defense.
Senator Mundt. The committee will come to order, please.
The Chair will again begin by welcoming the folks who have come
here as guests of the committee to attend this hearing. You are
welcome. I call your attention to a standing rule of the committee
which forbids any manifestations of approval or disapproval of an
audible nature by any member of the audience at any time. The
officers that you see before you and the plainclothes men scattered
through the audience have a standing instruction from the committee
to remove from the room immediately, but politely, anybody who at
any time violates the terms under which you entered the room, which
was to refrain entirely from manifestations of approval or disap-
proval.
The Chair has two announcements to make. He is very certain of
the context of the first.
1513
i
1514 SPECIAL ESrVESTIGATION
After discussion around the table, it was decided by general agree-
ment that, inasmuch as IMonday of next week is a legal holiday, there
will be no meetings of the committee on the legal holiday. So when
we adjourn on Friday we will recess until Tuesday morning at 10
o'clock.
We also had a meeting on the question of the monitored telephone
calls. Mr. Welch produced a new form of a new statement which had
been signed by Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams. It was signed by all
of the members of the subcommittee, the seven members of the sub-
committee. The Chair understands that the monitored telephone calls
involving Senator McCarthy, Mr. Cohn, and Mr. Carr, have now been
turned over to the custody of Counsel Jenkins, and that with these
additional signatures, any calls involving members of the subcommit-
tee are also to be turned over to Counsel Jenkins.
Counsel Jenkins is going to spend a considerable portion of tonight,
whatever time is necessary, with his staff, determining which calls are
relevant and whether there are any items of security from the stand-
point of our national security interests involved in any of the calls.
In connection with their introduction as evidence, once the sub-
committee has decided, on the advice of counsel, which calls are rele-
vant and to be introduced, we will ask whoever happens to be on the
stand at the time, whether it be somebody representing the position of
Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams or somebody representing the position
of Senator McCarthy, Mr. Cohn, and Mr, Carr, to step down at that
time so that we can introduce those calls with the least possible amount
of delay.
That is as the Chair understands what occurred at our executive
session.
Senator McCaetiiy. Mr. Chairman, when I came in the door I un-
derstood you to say that Senator McCarthy had not signed the consent.
I think it should be made clear that all of my monitored calls, all of
Mr. Cohn's, all of Mr. Carr's, are already in the hands of Mr. Jenkins.
Senator Mundt. That is correct. The Chair said that. The Chair
said that those whose calls had not yet been delivered from the custody
of Mr. Welch to the custody of Mr. Jenkins have now signed an
agreement. We have all signed the same agreement. So Mr. Welch is
able to deliver to Mr. Jenkins those calls under the same restrictions
and on the same basis that your calls have been delivered to Mr.
Jenkins.
Senator McCarthy. Thank you.
Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, a point of inquiry.
Did I vmderstand the Chair to say that all the principals and all
members of the committee have signed the agreement ?
Senator Mundt. I think there is one exception to that. I do not
know whether Mr. Schine is considered under the heading of a princi-
pal or not. He was not at the meeting. He did not see the agreement.
So of course he signed nothing.
Mr. Cohn. He has already signed that form. He signed it 3 weeks
ago.
Senator Mundt. Very well.
On the basis of that information, I presume that the calls of Mr.
Schine either have been delivered to Mr. Jenkins or are now
deliverable.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1515
Mr. Counsel, you will call (lie next witness for the presentation of
the Stevens- Adams side of the case.
Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. IMr. Chairman, I have a wii-e here which I
-would like to put into the record, from Mrs. Dorothy Schilf, publisher
of the New York Post. The wire reads as follows :
As yon know, Senator McCarthy this morning repeatedly characterized the
Now York I'ost as a Communist slieot. He has previously made similar false
ami ridiculous charges against the New Yorlc Herald Tril)une, the New York
Times, the Washington I'ost, the Baltimore Sun, and the magazine published
by Henry Luce — •
whether it means published by, I don't know, but that is the way it
reads.
You have known me and my family for over 25 years. You have hoard the
testimony of our editor, Jimmy Wechsler, when he was called before the
McCarthy committee. I know that you know of my devotion to democracy and
my liatred of both communism and fascism at home and abroad. But for the
benefit of millions of people who may not know me or my newspaper, I would
appreciate it if you would read this statement into the record of the hearing
today.
Sincerely,
Dorothy Schiff,
Publisher, New York Post.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Prewitt ?
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman?
Senator IMundt. Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. I think in view of that wnre from — what is it,
the publisher? I think I should comment on it. I think maybe she
has one point in that wire. If I referred to it as a Communist sheet,
I should have referred to it as a Communist-line sheet. I M'ill be glad
to correct the record. I don't think that they get their directions, as
the Daily Worker does, direct from the headquarters of the Com-
munist Party. It is a complete Communist-line newspaper. I w^ant
to say that while I have discussed the infiltration of certain elements
of the press and the extent to which they have aided the Communist
cause, I feel that the New York Post is in a class almost by itself. It
is not — Avhile I refer to it as the Daily Worker, it is not technically
under the discipline, I assume, of the Communist Party. I don't
know. It would appear to be. But they do follow^ the Daily Worker's
editorials, completely paralleling them, rendering a great service to
the Communist Party. The editor of the paper admits that he was
one of the top functionaries of the Young Communist League ; claims
to have reformed. No indication of reform.
Certainly he has never done anything like what the certain indi-
viduals w'ho were members of the party, and who have reformed, have
testified have done. Pie continues to attack the FBI. He continues
to attack any committee, anyone exposing Communists.
May I just say this one word, Mr. Chairman? I do this because of
the wire. When I refer to the elements of the press which have been
infiltrated and doing a great service to the Communist Party, I hope
that I always make it clear that the vast majority of the press are per-
forming a great service in bringing the news to the American people.
Take, for example, the working press here. At least 90 percent of
them, I think, are some of the finest Americans I have ever met. So
we will make no mistake about any claim that all of the press are
Communist controlled.
1516 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Just one further word, Stu. We know that one of the aims, one of
the orders of the Communist Party has been to infiltrate the press
and control that media of information. I feel they have done that
thoroughly insofar as the New York Post is concerned. I feel that
is next to the Daily Worker, paralleling its line, doing a great service
to the Communist Party.
Apparently you disagree. We gain nothing, I assume, by discussing
that any further.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Senator Symington, the Chair will hear you
briefly and again make the plea that we get on with the case at hand,
because certainly among our problems is not an investigation of the
New York Post.
Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, there has been much discussion
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, commonly termed the "FBI."
In all the six positions that I held on the executive side of the Govern-
ment, I always had next to me either an FBI man or an FBI-trained
man. In the Air Force today is one of the greatest boys the FBI has
ever put out. He is now a major general in the Air Force, and he
handled those matters. The only reason that I bring this up is, with
all due respect to any member of this committee or any member of
this committee's staflf, I think I know Mr. J. Edgar Hoover as well
as any other member of the committee, and I know that I admire him
at least as much as any other member of the comittee.
Thank you.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Prewitt, you will call the next witness to pre-
sent the Stevens-Adams side of the case.
Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Sampson?
Senator Mundt. Is Mr. Sampson in the room ?
Will you raise your right hand, please. Do you solemnly swear,
Mr. Sampson, that the testimony you are about to give will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Sampson. I do.
Senator Mundt. You may be seated.
Mr. Prewitt?
Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Chairman, I should make this statement. Mr.
Sampson, as well as the witness that will follow him, Mr. Seavey, are
representatives of the Chesapeake Telephone Co. and the New York
Telephone Co., respectively. We propose now merely to introduce
into evidence
Senator McCarthy. May I say, to save time, I will be glad to con-
cede that the record of phone calls are from the telephone company,
and as far as we know it is an accurate list of the phone calls, if that
will save time.
Mr. Prewitt. If that is agreeable to all parties, I see no reason why
it can't be introduced in evidence by consent. All of the records of
the two telephone companies.
Senator Mundt. Is there any objection on the part of anyone to
accepting that as sworn testimony on the representation of Mr.
Sampson ?
The Chair hears none.
Mr. Prewitt. With this provision, Mr. Chairman, that photostatic
copies of the original phone tickets may be introduced by consent.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1517
Senator McCarthy. Mtiy I siin;<Test that before you introduce the
calls in evidence, that Mr. Jenkins decide which ones are pertinent.
I think any phone calls from the committee to Mr. Schine and any
calls from him to the committee, and perhaps other calls, may bo
pertinent. I question the wisdom of makinji; public the names of all
the peo])le that Mr. Schine might have called, and I will be glad to
rely upon Mr. Jenkins' judgment on that.
Senator Mundt. May the Chair say he has discussed that with the
counsel. An agreement has been reached on that. Mr. Welch has
no disposition to embarrass people who are not going to be called as
witnesses. He has taken it up with Mr. Jenkins, and the calls are
being introduced with that understanding.
Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Sampson, will you deliver to Mrs. Watt
Senator Mundt. Mrs. Duckett is replacing Mrs. Watt today, Mrs.
Watt's husband being ill. So you w^ill give them to Mrs. Duckett.
Mr. Prewitt. So they may be marked appropriately.
Senator Mundt. Will you mark them with the appropriate exhibit
numbers, Mrs. Duckett ?
(The documents referred to were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 24 and
25" and may be found in the files of the subcommittee. )
Senator Mundt. INIr. Jenkins, do you have another witness to call
in the presentation of the Stevens-Adams side of the case ?
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, I desire at this point to read a letter
addressed to me of May 13 :
Dear Mr. Jenkins: At the bearings on May 10, Mr. Culm and Senator Mc-
Carthy brought up the Peress case. On page 2246 of the transcript the following
appears :
"Mr. CoHN. Mr. Secretary, will you now tell us the name of tlie person or
persons who gave an honorable discharge to the Communist major, Maj. Irving
Peress?
"Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that that question and any
answer elicited thereby would be wholly irrelevant to the issues of this
controversy."
Mr. Cohn and Senator McCarthy pressed further, however, for the names of
the officers, as revealed by the inspector general's report, who had anything
to do with the various personnel actions concerning Peress. After further dis-
cussion, the following appears on page 22.^0:
"Mr. Jenkins. I certainly know of no reason to reverse the position I have
taken, Mr. Chairman. I think it is sound and still renew my objection."
And then on page 2266 you stated :
"* * * And then the names, as I understand it, the chairman ruled are to be
submitted to this committee or me, as its counsel, privately, and icithont exposing
their names."
At the top of page 2268, Chairman Mundt stated :
"* * * The other names reciuested by Mr. Cohn should he suhmitled confiden-
tially^ and to counsel for our committee because we don't want to expand the
circle of witnesses any more than necessary."
I have talked with the Chief of the Investigations Division, Inspector General's
Office, and the senior investigating officer in the Peress case. Accordingly, I
now submit to you, in the attached envelope, the names requested. I do so as a
personal and private communication and ask that tliese names be handled by
you in line with the quotations mentioned above.
Sincerely yours,
Robert T. Stevens,
Secretary of the Army.
Attachment.
* Italics supplied by the writer.
40020°— 54— pt. 41 2
1518 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. Pursuant to that letter, Mr. Chairman, another
envelope addressed to me as special counsel for this committee and
marked "confidential" was delivered. It is a sealed envelope. It has
not been opened by me and I have not, of course, examined the con-
tents of it. I presume that it contains the information set forth in
the Secretary's letter to me of May 13.
We have consulted the record, the transcript of the proceedings
in this case. The quotations set forth therein are correctly set forth.
Pursuant to that, Mr. Chairman, I see nothing to be gained by me
as counsel keeping this confidential report containing the information
requested by ]Mr. Cohn since it was to be delivered to me and to no one
else, and I now ask the chairman's permission to return it to counsel
for the Army, because it is given to me on condition that I not reveal
its contents. No purpose whatever could be gained by my retaining
it in my possession. I am not cleared for the confidential informa-
tion, I would feel greatly relieved, Mr. Chairman, if I am allowed to
be unburdened of this highly confidential and secret information.
Senator McCarthy. Before the Chair makes a ruling
Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy, the Chair will be glad to hear
you.
Senator McCarthy. Before the Chair makes any ruling, as chair-
man of the permanent subcommittee which has been attempting to
get this information for months, not as chairman of this committee,
1 will at this time order that Mr. Jenkins not turn it over to us — I
don't want to go into that now — but not put that beyond our control.
I am saying that not as counsel for Mr. Cohn or Mr. Carr in this
investigation of today. We have been trying to get the names of
those who promoted, who protected, who covered up this Communist
major. Our attempt to get that brought on these hearings, has held
up our exposure of Communists now for weeks. As chairman of the
Permanent Committee Investigating Communists I will now issue
what may be called a subpena. I will not ask that it be turned over
to us. It has been given to Mr. Jenkins in a confidential nature. I
will discuss that with him and discuss it with the Chair. But I don't
want it put beyond his control, regardless of what the Chair does in
this particular case — period.
Senator Mundt. The Chair recalls the colloquy which produced
the envelope in question. It developed out of a series of interroga-
tories emanating from the McCarthy-Cohn-Carr end of the table, to
the effect that these hearings perhaps were retarded to a date when
the Secretary of the Army could make available to his committee,
as contrasted with this special committee, the information on the
Peress case. It grew out of the introduction and the testimony of
the so-called memo of understanding in which the Secretary of the
Army, Mr. Stevens, agreed that after the inspector general's report
was made he would provide the information therein to the regular
investigating committee, and again as contrasted with this committee.
Finally, to the end that we could get on with the hearings and that
we could demonstrate, if possible, that it was delaying that determina-
tion on the part of Mr. Stevens, he was requested to provide in a con-
fidential manner to our counsel the information so that Senator
McCarthy and his associates could be assured of the fact that that
information had now been defined, had been isolated, and was available
to them under the terms of the memo of understanding at an appro-
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1519
priate time ^vhen he returned to the chairmanship of the committee.
I think it has fully accomplished its purpose.
I do not feel that we should continue to hold Mr. Jenkins responsible
for the information, because he doesn't, as he says, have any right to
open it under the terms of the agreement.
Senator McCaiithy. May I say, Mr. Chairman, I just want to make
this very clear for the record. As the Chair knows, it isn't necessary
to serve a written subpena upon a witness who has evidence. Under
all the rulings, if the witness is notified, that certain information
which he has is needed by a committee, that is sufficient. So Mr. Jen-
kins will consider that a subpena duces tecum is being served upon
]iim. I am not asking him to turn it over at once now. I am asking
him to keep it until such time as he can advise with Chairman Mundt.
If counsel turns it over now, I will hold him responsible, because I
don't want it to go beyond our control.
Senator JNIundt. Insofar as the Chair is concerned, he believes that
the communication has served its purpose. He is perfectly willing to
discuss with his colleagues in an executive session, sometime, any
motion that might indicate what disposition counsel should make of it.
He suggests for the time being he continues to keep it in his possession
and in a confidential status.
I^Ir. Jenkins. Very well, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
Senator Mundt. Mr. McClellan.
Senator McClellan. Was that submitted for the purpose of this
committee to open it and know what is in it, or what conditions are
attached to it?
Senator Mundt. It was suggested with the requirements that
counsel has read with the excerpts from the testimony. It was sub-
mitted to demonstrate so that we all know that the ascertainment has
been made that the Department of the Army now knows who was
responsible for the Peress situation, and in demonstration of that fact
has submitted that information to our counsel in conformity with the
colloquy in which we said it should be submitted on a confidential
basis and not for publication.
Senator McClellan. If I may inquire further, so far as I am per-
sonally concerned, and as a member of the committee, both in this
capacity we are now serving and of the regular subcommittee, so far
as I know at the moment, there is no reason why the committee should
not have the information. I don't understand why it is submitted
to this committee if we don't need it and have no responsibility for it or
it is not pertinent to the issues in this case. I am trying to determine
whether it is submitted, though, with the understanding that it is not
to be revealed to the regular subcommittee when it resumes. If so,
we should determine about that. I think possibly the committee is
entitled to it, whether they can sit or not, but I don't want us to take
a position here that violates a condition upon which thp documents
are submitted, until we know that it is either being made available or
that we issue the subpena to the proper source, because they have the
same information, and a subpena should be issued to the Army to
deliver it to the regular committee.
Senator Mundt. Could the Chair say that he is in complete agree-
ment with the position of the Senator from Arkansas, that certainly
the interest in the Peress case is nationwide. It is public business.
1520 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
The answer should be made public. But the avenue for making the
information public probably is more appropriately the subcommittee
when Chaired by Senator McCarthy in its ordinary status rather
than this. But he will ask the counsel to examine carefully the back-
ground by which we got this information, and as the Senator from
Arkansas suggests to inquire of the Secretary of the Army whether
he will permit us to make it a part of this particular record.
Senator McClellax. Mr, Chairman, just this one point. As of now,
so far as I know, I think this information should be required by the
regular subcommittee. I am not defending the Army, but I don't
want to get something through the back door. I want to go right
direct with a subpena to the Army and get it and bring it up here.
That is my advice.
Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
Senator McCarthy. I would like Senator McClellan to yield for
a minute. Senator, may I say to you, as ranking member on the
Democratic side of the Permanent Investigating Committee, that
while I have asked that the material be held in status quo, before I
order this used or turned over to the committee it will be taken up with
my full committee as soon as this investigation is over. No use of that
will be made. I will not ask that it be turned over to me until the
other six Senators on the regular investigating committee make their
decision.
Senator McClellan. I say to the Senator I see no objection to
holding it, but I like to do it direct. I would like to subpena the
Army and have them bring it up here, just like this committee got it.
Senator McCarthy. I don't want it put beyond our control in case
we decide we are entitled to it.
Senator Jackson. A parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman. A
reference is made to a memorandum of understanding.
Senator Mundt. Yes. I am sure you are not as innocent about the
contents of that as your face might indicate. It is a memorandum
of understanding in which you did not participate. It is what our
colleague from Arkansas refers to as a Eepublican luncheon which we
held with Secretary Stevens.
Senator Jackson. I am not bringing in partisanship. I didn't
bring in the memorandum of understanding. But I want to make
clear I know of no memo of understanding by which I am bound
or my colleagues on this side are bound.
Senator Mundt. That is correct. It was made with the Secretary
of the Army, an agreement made at that time.
Senator Jackson. I don't think it ought to be in these proceedings.
Senator Symington. Could I make an inquiry?
Senator Mundt. Surely.
Senator Symington. What was the memorandum of understanding?
Senator Mundt. I am sure I can't quote it verbatim, but one of its
provisions was that the Inspector General was going to go into the
Feress matter rather than have our committee continue to explore
it. When the Inspector General had made his report, the information
would be made available to our committee. That is not a verbatim
quotation, and don't quote me like you quote Lucas, because I don't
take it down in shorthand. You may proceed, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1521
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Welch apparently li:is a point of order.
Senator Mundt. Have you a point of order?
Mr. Welch. I am not clear that both sets of telephone records have
been submitted.
Senator Mundt. Yes, indeed. There is no question about that,
I am sure, any place around the table.
INIr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, I think I have an announcement that
will be received very happily. Before making that announcement,
I should like to make inquiry of Mr. Welch with respect to 1 or 2
matters.
Mr. Welch, as counsel for this subcommittee, I have endeavored to
the best of my ability to develop the Army's proof. As far as I know,
I have put on the witness stand each and every witness you have asked
me to put on. There were some 2 or 3 additional witnesses here
today we expected to use for the Army. You and I explored their
testimony tog:ether, and decided that it was either cumulative, or
that it was not particularly material at this time.
Are you now satisfied, Mr. Welch, for us to close the Army's case
with the understanding that you are not precluded from putting on
any material rebuttal proof?
i\Ir. Welch. Thank you for giving me this opportunity. You do
now liave what you might call the prima facie witnesses for the
Army. There are at least two other witnesses that I understand
will be called as committee witnesses, if not otherwise called.
One is Pvt. G. David Schine, and the other is Mr. Frank Carr.
I do not by anything I say now wish to indicate that I have no interest
in these two 'witnesses. I do. But, as to the prima facie case, as
to the original witnesses which I w^ished to have called, you have
treated me, Mr. Jenkins, with the utmost consideration. You have
been prepared to put on at least two witnesses that were cumulative
as to the Fort Monmouth incident, when Mr. Cohn was excluded from
the laboratory, who were cumulative. They were excused in part
because of the Senator saying yesterday that he would concede that
Mr. Colin was at least angry on that occasion. So I have been able
to contract the Army's prima facie case to that extent, and subject
only to what I say here, that you have called the witnesses as I have
asked you to call them.
]Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Welch, thank you very kindly for what you have
said. But I am about to close the Army's case unless there is a specific
objection on your part. The only way I can honorably do it, sir, is to
have your unconditional consent so to do, and I expect to call upon
Senator McCarthy to make the same public announcement when I
shall have finished the presentation of his case.
Mr. Welch. There is this difference, Mr. Jenkins, between this and
an ordinary lawsuit. This is a hearing in which it is, as I conceive it,
your duty, ]Mr. Jenkins, to call for all the facts. You, as I have con-
stantly said to the newspapermen when they would say to me who was
the Army's next witness, I have said, "Mr. Jenkins calls the witnesses,"
and you certainly do. You have now called all the witnesses that I have
asked 3'ou to call to make a prima facie case as I have indicated. I
have wanted, however, to make it very carefully a matter of record that
I do not wish to exclude from this the fact that I consider it part of
your duty to call the two men that I have mentioned if they are not
1522 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
otherwise called, meaning Scliine and Carr, and failing that, if you
failed to call them, in the last analysis I would wish to insist on my
own part that they be called.
Mr. Jenkins. At any time during the proceedings you, as counsel
for the Army, Senator McCarthy, and Mr. Cohn, are invited to
criticize any dereliction of duty on my part and to request me publicly
to put on any witness that I haven't put on. I welcome that.
]Mr. Welch. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
very happily announce that we have concluded with the Army's case,
and I now desire to call as the first witness for the Senator McCarthy
staff, Mr. Roy M. Cohn.
Senator Dworshak. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. Senator Dworshak?
Senator Dworshak. I now move that the charges involving Mr.
Struve Hensel be dismissed for lack of any testimony whatever in-
volving him or sustaining said charges, and that he no longer be con-
sidered a party in interest in this controversy, and be dismissed as a
witness; and also that at this time the charges preferred against Mr.
Frank Carr be dismissed because the proof and testimony concerning
Mr. Carr are wholly insufficient to sustain said charges. I further
move that he no longer be considered a party in interest in this con-
troversy, and that he also be dismissed as a witness.
Senator Mundt. Is there a second to the motion ?
Senator Dirksen. I second the motion.
Senator Mundt. Is it seconded ? Did I hear a second ?
Senator Dirksen. I second the motion.
Senator Mundt. Senator McClellan ?
Senator McClellan. Mr. Cliairman, I trust the Senator will make
his motions separately. The first motion, to dismiss these charges
against Mr. Hensel, is manifestly unfair to those who made the charges.
They have not had an opportunity to testify against Mr. Hensel.
Whether they want to withdraw the charges, I do not know, but the
charges against Mr. Hensel were made by Senator McCarthy and Mr.
Cohn, and Mr. Carr possibly, and they have not had a chance to prove
their case against him.
We have been hearing charges made by the Army against the other
side. I insist that that motion is premature, that it would be mani-
festly unfair to Senator McCarthy, who made the charges, and I
respectfully urge the Senator to withdraw it.
Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I wish merely to add to that by
saying that the charges with reference to Mr. Hensel are certainly not
a part of the Army's case under the document before us. I would not
be able to understand the theory on which a motion to dismiss with
reference to Mr. Hensel would lie when no one could conceivably be
called, up to this time, to testify on those charges. I do not under-
stand the theory on which we can proceed with reference to ISIr. Hensel,
and I heartily concur in the statement made by my colleague. Senator
McClellan.
Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen ?
Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman, this committee is sitting in judg-
ment upon people who are involved as principals in the case, notwith-
standing the fact that it was agreed at the outset that this is not an
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1523
adversary proceediiif];. I believe, however, there is a duty on this
committee, sitting as judjje and jury, even as there is upon a court
where litigation takes place, that insofar as possible the convenience
of the litigants be respected; that wherever they are immobilized, that
inconvenience be terminated as quickly as f)ossible; that if any par-
ticipant feels he is in jeopardy in any way that that jeopardy be
resolved as quickly as possible.
So here, as elsewhere, I think this motion is not only in order, but
I think it is the duty and the responsibility of this committee, sitting
in judgment, to take cognizance of it and to relieve any participants
unless there has been testimony and proof somewdiere along the line
that would indicate otherwise.
Thus far, Mr. Chairman, there has been no proof to sustain the
charges against Mr. Hensel, and I think this committee is almost in
duty bound, under the circumstances, and in the interest of expedition,
to support his motion to strike.
With respect to Mr. Carr, his name has been used very freely all
through these hearings. About the only thing in derogation of Mr.
Carr that I gleaned from the long testimony by Mr. Adams, the coun-
selor to the Army, was that by his silence he may have given consent.
That is entirely on the negative side, Mr. Chairman, and not on the
affirmative side, and in the circumstances I do not believe it fair that
we immobilize Mr. Carr any longer and keep him from his regular
duties if he wants to repair to them.
On the basis of the record thus far — and it is a pretty long record —
there has been no proof to sustain the charges, and I think the motion
to strike is eminently in order, and that it ought to be sustained, and
that in fairness to these participants we now say, instead of waiting
for the long interim period when a report will be filed, that insofar
as these two participants are concerned, that their identity with this
proceeding be concluded forthwith. I think the motion should be
sustained.
Senator Jackson. A parliamentary inquiry.
Senator Muxdt. Senator Jackson?
Senator Jackson. IVIay I inquire of the Chair whose case has been
presented from the time the hearing was started up until now ?
Senator Mundt. Up until now we have been presenting the side
of the case represented by the charges made by Secretary of the Army
Stevens and by Mr. Adams, as the case has been organized and pre-
sented to us under the direction of Mr. Welch and Mr. St. Clair.
Senator Jackson. A further parliamentary inquiry.
Does the record show, based on the complaint filed here and the
pleadings, so to speak, if I may use that term, is there anything in
the pleadings which indicate that the Army brought charges against
Mr. Hensel. A parliamentary inquiry.
Senator Mundt. Not to the best recollection of the Chair.
Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I ask a further parliamentary
inquiry. On what theory — not a legal theory but a theory of com-
mon sense — would a motion lie to dismiss charges against someone
who has not been called upon to offer proof?
Senator Mundt. The Chair is pursuaded by the arguments pre-
sented by Senator Dworshak and Senator Dirksen, in connection with
the general overall picture which we now confront, to wit : On two
different occasions motions were made which, as part of their con-
1521 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
tention, would have stricken from the record the charges made against
Mr. HenseL At that time the Chair went around the triangle to
determine whether in the opinion of either Mr. Hensel and his coun-
sel, or Senator McCarthy's associates and himself, there was any-
thing unreasonable or unfair or unjust about that portion of the
context of the proposal. At that time, on two different occasions,
both of those parties said that it \ ould be agreeable with them.
The Chair did not vote for those proposals, however, because when
he got around to the third part of the triangle and asked the same
kind of questions of Mr. Stevens and his counsel, they said as far
as their position was concerned and as far as the Stevens- Adams por-
tion of the case was concerned, they felt it was not proper and not
fair and not just.
Consequently, the Chair voted against the motion not because it
included Mr. Hensel or Mr. Carr, but because it included Mr. Adams
and Mr. Stevens and because they felt that it was not a proper pro-
cedure.
However, there is a different situation which now confronts us
because Mr. Adams and Mr. Stevens have had a complete opportunity
to present their case.
The Chair feels that
Senator Jackson. But Mr. Chairman, if I may inquire-
Senator Mundt. I was coming to your particular point, if you will
be patient.
Senator Jackson. Yes.
Senator Mundt. The Chair feels insofar as Mr. Carr is concerned,
all of the evidence which they have to present has been presented be-
cause their witnesses have all been arrayed before the committee.
Insofar as Mr. Hensel is concerned — what was the interruption ?
Senator Jackson. I just merely made the point that I did not di-
rect my parliamentary inquiry to Mr. Carr. I directed my parlia-
mentary inquiry to Mr. Hensel.
Senator Mundt. I understand your point has two parts. The Chair
feels as far as Mr. Hensel is concerned that the situation which con-
fronted us at the time the original charges were made has been altered
substantially by the course of the testimony, by the evidence which
has been adduced up to this time, by the fact that on two previous oc-
casions both Mr. Hensel's counsel and the McCarthy side of the posi-
tion have agreed to striking that part from the case, and furthermore,
and perhaps most importantly, by the issuance of the Executive order
which is going to make much more difficulty, certainly, in finding out
those pertinent portions about the testimony of Mr. Hensel than w^ould
otherwise have been the case.
So the Chair would say as far as his own particular vote is con-
cerned, that if Mr. Hensel and his counsel and Senator McCarthy
and his associates are of the same opinion now that they were on the
two previous occasions, he would of course vote to strike then from the
record something which neither side cared to inject into it and con-
sequently delay the conduct of these hearings enormously and un-
necessarily.
Senator Jackson. lYell, Mr. Chairman, I just want to conclude by
saying that I know of nothing in the Executive order that prevents
the offering of proof based on the charges filed against Mr. Hensel.
What part of the Executive order would prevent that ?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION" 1525
JSoiiator MuNDT. I refer to the part wliich precludes any possibility
of (liscussiiifi: any of the transactions occnrrin<^ at the nieetinf^ on Jan-
uary 21. The connnittee has previously decided unanimously that the
only portion of the Ilensel charge which we could appropriately con-
sider was the portion dealinf^ with motive, and the motive ])hase w^as
obscured by the fact that there are other meetings, other discussions
dealing with motive into which we are not permitted by tho Executive
order to inquire.
Senator Jackson. Mr. Stevens has testified that the meeting of
January 21 had nothing to do w'ith that. I am at a total loss all the
time
Senator Mundt. Mr. Stevens was not at that meeting.
Senator Jacksox. No, but he has testified as to who brought or
initiated the charges. I must confess that if this theory if followed
to its logical conclusion, and it is just common sense, then logically
the charges that Mr. Cohn, Senator McCarthy, have made against
the other parties, a motion to dismiss those charges would lie because
no ]:)roof has been offered up to this point.
Mr. Bryan. Mr. Chairman? Am I interrupting the discussions of
the learned Senators ? If I am, I apologize.
Senator Mundt. If you are, we will be happy to have you interrupt.
Go right ahead. |
Mr. Bryan. Senator Jackson has raised a question about what basis
there is for dismissal of the charges at this time against INIr. Hensel.
As a matter of fact, the motion that was made by Senator Dworshak,
in my judgment, is entirely proper, and to me and to my client if if:
were passed at this time and properly passed at this time would con-
stitute a wholly justified vindication of my client in these proceedings,
of Mr. Hensel. The fact is that in any judicial or quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding of this character, as the proof develops, if the proof as it
develops shows that any given set of charges against a party were
unfounded and without basis, then it becomes the duty of any body,
judicial or quasi-judicial, at that point in the proceedings to dismiss
those charges.
That point, in my judgment, has now plainly been reached. I will
not review the testimony in detail, except to say that witness after
witness on this stand has made it perfectly plain that the two charges
which were in any way releveant to these proceedings, namely, that
]\Ir. Hensel for some motive tried to stop the proceedings of this
subcommittee, have been affirmatively disproven right now. And
since those charges have been affirmatively disproven, it seems to me
that in all justice and fairness, neither Mr. Hensel nor his counsel
should be ke]:)t sitting around in these proceedings as a party, with
this sort of threat hanging over their heads. I may say in addition
to that, Mr. Chairman, in addition to that, I distinguish between a
judicial and a quasi-judical proceeding such as this. In a proceeding
of this character, where you have not the normal protection afforded
by a court of law, it is even more important to a citizen and a party
and a distinguished public official, that the charges against hnn be
disposed of as rapidly as possibly can be, and that if his vindication
comes it comes early and swift before the American public.
That point, as I say, has been reached not alone by failure of proof,
and we know there is no proof in support of these charges, but also
46620'— B4—pt. 41 3
1526 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
by affirmative proof to the contrary. That is why I would urge upon
this committee and upon its learned chairman, that this motion ought
to be granted in all justice and fairness to Mr. Hensel right now and
for his vindication.
May I say one other thing. Senator Dworshak's motion was
coupled with a statement that Mr. Hensel be excused as a witness.
Whether or not that be granted, in whole or in part by this subcom-
mittee at this time, I want to say in ]Mr. Hensel's behalf that he is
always ready and willing to appear at the behest of this subcom-
mittee at any time to give it any information which will throw any
light that might be thrown upon the controversy presently before it.
He sees no need to appear as a witness to dispose of unproven charges
or charges that were proven to be untrue. But he is still available
as a witness for this committee and will be at any time, and let tliere
be no doubt about that. I may say one final thing, sir, with regard
to my client and, after all, Mr. Chairman, I will remain silent, as
you will confess, for a very long time here, and maybe have just a
little opportunity to speak.
Mr. Hensel was given by this Nation the second highest decoration
in its power to give, the Distinguished Service Me<lal. He was given
that medal for very highly meritorious service to his country, during
the Second World War as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and in
other high capacities in that department.
He has come dowai to this Capital of the Nation again to serve his
comitry at great personal sacrifice and is at present engaged in mat-
ters of the highest importance to the Nation.
If public officials, against whom charges are le\'ied, are not vindi-
cated when they can be vindicated at the earliest opportunity, that
to my mind is a deterrent to men of ability and character who desire
to serve their country.
I call upon this committee and ask this committee to grant this
motion right here and now.
Senator Mundt. Does anybody else care to be heard ?
Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Senator McClellan.
Senator McClellan. I have w'itnessed some peculiar proceedings
in my lifetune, but never before have I witnessed charges brought
and then somebody moved to dismiss them before the man or the
person who made the charges was given an opportimity to testify.
This would be one of the grossest reflections upon those who made
the charges for this committee at this stage of the proceedings to dis-
miss the charges because it would be tantamount to saying to Senator
McCarthy and Mr. Cohn, that "your charges were baseless, they were
an imposition upon this committee and upon the country, and they are
irresponsible."
If you want to place that stigma upon Senator McCarthy and Mr.
Cohn, you may do so. But so far as I am concerned, we are going
to get the proof or the charges be withdrawn by those who made them,
and I shall vote against the motion.
Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen ?
Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman, it occurs to me that we have ven-
tilated this matter long enough. First of all, it should be said that
it has been bruited about and discussed in some of the executive ses-
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1527
sions tlmt we had — and I think INIr. Bryan will bear that out — I think
the testimony discloses that Mr. Ilensel had only an incidental rela-
tionship to the proceedings thus far. Insofar as that portion of the
charjje is concerned that goes back to 1941, I am frank to say that I
have conferred with counsel, and counsel would feel disposed to ob-
ject if anything relating to those charges that goes back 10 yeai-s
might be introduced in evidence.
Under the circumstances, there is nothing unusual or extraordinary
about this proceeding. This is regular in every respect, and 1 think it
does justice to two princi})a]s in the case, Mr. Carr and Mr. Hensel.
I suggest now, Mr. Chairman, that we vote on the matter, because
it is a responsibility individually for every member of this committee.
Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Muxdt. Senator Symington hasn't spoken yet. I will
come to you, Senator Jackson, later.
Senator Symington. First I would like to ask the counsel for Mr,
Hensel, or Senator JSIcCarthy, have the charges against Mr. Hensel
been withdrawn ?
Mr. Bryan. Are you asking that of me, Senator Symington?
Senator Sy^niington. I would ask that either of you or Senator Mc-
Carthy, or both.
Mr. Bryan. As far as I know, Mr. Symington, my arguments have
been directed to a motion pending before this committee.
Senator Symington. My question is a very simple question, Mr.
Bryan.
Senator McCarthy. Perhaps you would like me to answer it.
Senator Symington. I would like somebody to.
Senator McCarthy. I think perhaps I should answer that. May
I say that nothing has been witlidrawn. However, I have taken the
position since the Presidential directive ordering certain people who
were at the meetings at which the machinery was set in motion for
these smear charges which resulted in this show — since the President
decided that they couldn't talk, I just feel we never will get at the
facts in the matter and never can get the truth, and Mr. Hensel will
be too busy to testify under that directive.
Anything the committee can do to cut down the length of this so
we can get back to our work, anything they want to do to eliminate two
witnesses, eliminate clays of testimony, will not be objected to by me.
I have one objective now, now that we know we can never get all
the facts, and that is to get the show olf the road as soon as we can and
get back to our work of exposing Communists who at this moment
are in dangerous positions.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this ob-
servation about the question of Mr. Hensel. 1 have known him a long
time. He is in a position of great authority in the Department of
Defense of the United States. As I understand what Senator Mc-
Carthy has said, these grave charges are not being Avithdrawn except
for tlie fact that the President of the United States has issued a di-
rective which makes it impossible to get the truth. I don't see how
that could be known until and unless Mr. Hensel defended these
charges. In his position he probably has as much or more to say in
the Department of Defense with respect to the spending of billions and
billions of dollars, and it has been said, and I believe in complete justi-
fication, that a public office is a public trust. Pie v^as appointed by the
1528 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
President of the United States to this high office. I have no reason to
think that he is guilty in any way of the charges that have been made
against him, but I join with my colleagues that to dismiss these charges
at this time and leave this man as the No. 1 legal man in the Defense
Department of the United States, where everybody is looking for
corruption and problems, and leaving hanging over him these charges,
to me is just unbelievable.
I regret that apparently it is going to be decided on a straight
4-to-3 vote.
Mr. Bryan. Mr. Chairman.
I beg your pardon. I am so sorry.
Senator Symington. I would hope that the members of the major-
ity party of this committee consider the position in which they are
leaving Senator McCarthy, because he made the charges and wants
the truth, and Mr. Hensel, because from this day on, he will operate
on the basis of the charges that were made and were dismissed before
he was even given the opportunity to answer them.
Mr. Bryan. Mr. Chairman,
Senator MuNDT. Mr. Bryan?
Mr. Bryan. The learned Senator from Missouri has just advanced
what to me is one of the most extraordinary theories that I have ever
heard advanced in an American public hearing. That theory is,
apparently, that when charges are made against someone and those
charges are unsubstantiated, he has the burden of proving himself
innocent. That is a new one to me.
For over a thousand years of Anglo-Saxon law, we have proceeded
on the theory that a man was innocent until proof was brought for-
ward that he was guilty. I cannot believe that the Senator from
Missouri really meant to advance any such theory before the American
people.
The whole point of this motion is, first, that affirmative proof has
been brought forward that Mr. Hensel had nothing to do with this
situation and should never have been brought in ; and, second of all,
that apparently there is going to be no proof offered in substantiation
of the charges.
To keep a man in this situation in what might be called public
jeopardy under such circumstances, and to make statements which
might affect his probity, I think is unworthy in such a forum as this
or before the American people.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue the
colloquy just to this extent: I deeply regret having shocked this
eminent counsel and delightful gentleman from New York. I want
to say that in turn he has deeply shocked me, and I hope when I am
ever represented by a counsel and am innocent, that the counsel agrees
to give me a chance to prove my innocence before the people.
Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.
Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson.
Senator Jackson. May I say this to Mr. Bryan. While I may not
have the best knowledge of the law, I must say that I have never heard
of a doctrine advanced in all the years that I have lived that would
prevent an individual who has a case to make being heard. I will not
vote for a motion that will deny to any party to this controversy the
right to present his case;
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1529
1 do not know of any doctrine in Anijlo-Saxon law where an indi-
vidual comes into court and has an affirmative case, Mr. Bryan — I
am not talking about the negative allegations — but has an affirmative
case to prove, and then a motion is passed denying the individual or
individuals the right to be heard.
One last thing : Mention and reference has been made to the Execu-
tive order that it stops Mr. Hensel's side of this controversy. May
I just read the last paragraph of the President's order, the last para-
graph. 1 quote from the President's letter to the Secretary of Defense :
By this action I am not in any way restricting the testimony of such witnesses
as to what occurred ngtirdin;; any matters where tlie communication was directly
between any of the principals to tlie controversy within tlie executive hrancli
on the one tiand, and a member of the subcommittee or its staff on tlie other.
I think that last paragraph of the presidential directive certainly
makes it possible for full testimony to be heard. I want to say to
the chairman that I shall not vote for a motion in this hearing at any
time which denies the right to any principal to this controversy who
has made affirmative charges against another principal or principals.
It is in the grossest violation, Mr. Bryan, of all Anglo-Saxon law,
and if I might supplement it, with just plain commonsense.
Senator Mlxdt. May the Chair say first, before he recognizes any-
body else, because the only way he can get a chance to say anything
is to move in once in awhile — he has no place to appeal for the floor —
it seems to me that much of this discussion of Senator Jackson's has
gotten beside the point. The plaintiff in this case, or the person pre-
senting the charges in the original instance, was certainly not Mr.
Hensel. It was, instead. Senator McCarthy anci those associated with
him. Certainly, if they are content not to have the charges pressed,
it seems to me the committee would bs in a most unhappy position to
try to prod people to prolong the hearings, and expanding our wit-
ness list, and extending the evidence ad infinitum, ad nauseam. It
would seem to me that is perfectly clear. With regard to the Presi-
dent's order, it says, of course, not to interfere with any of the evidence
taking place between the principals and the members of the committee.
But there is nothing thus far in the testimony or in the presentation
of charges indicating that Mr. Hensel had any direct communications
of any kind witli the members of the subcommittee. His involvement,
if any, in the allegations of motive, were those which are involved
in the January 21 meeting, all of the other meetings, and the consul-
tations with the members of the executive department. Senator Jack-
son suggested to the Chair, "I heed what Secretary Stevens said in
his testimony." In his testimony, he was a bit confusing to the mind
of the chairman as to whether or not he testified that he did or did
not give an order to start off this thing, but he certainly was emphatic-
ally repetitious about the fact that he assumed the responsibility for
the launching of these charges w^hich obviously goes to the matter
of motive and is an additional reason why we need not keep Mr.
Hensel endlessly away from his duties and on the stand and in jeop-
ardy, when even the "Secretary of the Army has testified that as to
responsibility, it is his.
Mr. Bryan. I am sorry to prolong this, Mv. Chairman, but let me
say two things. No. 1, I want it clearly understood and plainly un-
derstood by the chairman and all the members of this committee
on both sides of the aisle that JMr. Hensel with regard to any testi-
1530 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
mony he mifrlit give in his own defense, if that ever becomes neces-
sary, and believe you me it never will, is not taking advantage of
any Presidential directive. I have not remotely suggested that Mr.
Hensel is going to take refuge in any Presidential directive and indeed
you need have no doubt that he will never do so, except insofar as he
might at sometime be bound by the orders of his superior.
Let that be quite plain.
The second thing is this: I still say to this committee that Mr.
Hensel will not want anything done here that does not completely
vindicate him. I say that he does not want to accept from this
committee or any of its members anything other than complete vindi-
cation. It seems to me the record is such that complete vindication
is in order and proper and should be given right now. And I ask
for it.
Senator Syiviington. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt, Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. A lot of people think that 4 to 3 voting will
be complete vindication. For a public servant, I do not agree. For
the first time, I am beginning to worry about whether or not this
committee was the right committee before which these charges should
have been presented. I remember that the chairman liimself con-
sistently stated that it was not, and that he preferred not to be a judge
in this case. I would like to respectfully remind him of that, as he
decides to cast his vote. But I Avant to say that based on the many
years that I spent in the Pentagon, it wouldn't be possible, in my
opinion, for Secretary Hensel to operate on the basis lie must operate
on in the best interest of tlie security of the United States unless these
charges are brought up. Therefore, I would like to say, with great re-
spect to my colleagues on this committee, that if there is to be a white-
washing of the charges and putting them under the rug before
the charges are even listened to, and before Mr. Hensel, who, I be-
lieve, is a great American, has the opportunity to answer the charges,
I shall take the matter to the floor of the Senate. I shall also
recommend to the Armed Services Committee, of which I happen to
be a member, that the entire matter be investigated in open sessions
before that committee.
Mr. Bryan. I beg your pardon, Senator McClellan.
Senator McCleli^\n. I want to make one more brief statement and
then I am through. I do not know^ whether there has been another
memorandum of agi'eement that the Democrats didn't have an oppor-
tunity to know about or not.
Mr. Bryan. May I say, Mr. Senator, that there is no memorandum
of agreement as far as I am concerned that I have heard anything
about ?
Senator McClellan. Well, all right. I have heard of them before
and I didn't hear of them until afterward. It seems the die is cast,
and we are going to vote this thing about 4 to 3. That is the way
it appears at the moment.
I simply want to say to my colleagues that in doing so you place
a stigma on those who made the charges. If they want to sit here
and take it, with no protest, that is all right with me, but I am not
going to vote to do it.
The second thing I want to say to you is that having made the
charges, just as sincerely, I assume, as they made the charges against
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1531
Adams and aoainst Secretary Stevens, if they now weaken and take
a position, "^Ve don't want to prosecute those charges," they are
equally as serious if not more so, because they say, "Hensel inspired
it," if they are going to withdraw that, and say it is being acquiesced,
and being dismissed without offering the proof, it is going to have a
little influence with me on some of the other cliarges, I will tell you
that now. I want to say one other thing now and then I will conclude.
I have said to this committee before, gentlemen, you have the
power to do it, you can vote it, and you can do it sigain. But I think
you will make a sad mistake.
Senator JNIcCarthy. Will you yield?
Senator Mundt. Will you yield to the Senator from Wisconsin?
Senator McClellan. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. I would like to make it very clear to the very
able Senator from Arkansas, that the only reason why I do not pro-
test this is because I have taken the ]:)osition since the President signed
the order saying we cannot get the facts about certain meetings, since
he signed an order saying that people in the executive cannot give
us the conversations, so we cannot get to the question of motives, that
the meeting of January 21 appears to have been the time when the
chain of events was set otf, which culminated in ]\Ir. Hensel signing
the report, I have just taken the position that it is hopeless to try
and get at all of the truth, and that, as I heard a small boy say once,
"There ain't no such animal as half the truth," and therefore anything
the connnittee can do to eliminate witnesses, to cut this down, so that
we can get back to the work which we should be doing, as far as I
am concerned, it is all right with me.
Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, I assume I yielded to the
Senator, but I might say this in reply. If you want to cut down and
eliminate witnesses, let's dismiss the whole proceedings. That is one
way to do it.
Senator Mundt. Any other Senators desire to be heard ?
Senator Dirksen.
Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman, I have never had any doubt that
this was the proper committee to investigate these charges. If I
entertained any doubt on that score, I would simply fortify my con-
viction by having resigned from the committee. That is the easy
way for anyone to test his conviction.
Mr. Bryan is absolutely correct. If and when a hearing indicates
a cloud over an individual, I think it is the responsibility of this
committee, sitting as judges and as jury, to remove that cloud as
quickly and as expeditiously as possible, conditioned entirely on what
has developed in the long hearing.
Finally, let me say, Mr. Chairman, I have been intrigued by the
solicitude that has been expressed by some about the Senator from
Wisconsin. I have known him a long time, and he has been abundant-
ly able to take care of himself under any circumstances.
I suggest we vote, ]\Ir. Chairman.
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. Are you ready to vote ?
Mr. Welch?
Mr. Welch. I assume that my small voice may be heard at some
point here. Senator Dworshak, I would count it, sir, a great courtesy
to me if you would split your motion into two parts, because you have
1532 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
in the same motion a dismissal as to Mr. Hensel and a dismissal as
to Mr. Carr. There is no lawyer in the courtroom, nor I think any
human being in the courtroom, who does not know that very dif-
ferent considerations apply to those two men. Indeed, all the argu-
ment now has been about whether or not you should dismiss as to
Mr. Hensel, and nothing has been said about Mr. Carr.
On that point. Senator Dworshak, I would like to be heard, and I
would like the two men to be dealt with separately, because anyone
must concede that quite different considerations apply to the two.
Would you. Senator Dworshak, do me the great courtesy of split-
ting your motion? I have no right to ask it, but I beg it as a favor.
Senator Dworshak. Mr. Welch, I certainly would like to comply
Avith your request, but it seems to me — and I am not an attorney —
it would seem to me for 20 days we have been hearing testimony by
the Army, and no material proof has been submitted which would
in any w^ay justify the involvement of Mr. Carr in these charges so
far as I can see. You are practical enough to know that you must
have some balance or compensating feature.
I want also to stress that we have been here for 20 days, and I am
willing to stay another 20 days and to have Senator McCarthy and
Roy Cohn and other witnesses on that side take the witness stand. I
have no desire, as has been suggested by other members of this sub-
committee, that we are attempting in any way to put over a white-
wash. That is not in my mind at this time, or at any time. I am
willing to stay here for 20 days and listen to the testimony of the other
side of this controversy.
But it seems to me that it is not within the jurisdiction of this sub-
committee to consider the charges of alleged fiscal operations which
originally were injected into this case involving Mr. Hensel. I think,
as the Senator from MisscTuri has indicated, if there is any justifiable
ground for carrying forward these charges to determine whether
they are false or true, that jurisdiction might well come before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services.
I can see no direct connection between those charges and the juris-
diction of this subcommittee in this specific controversy involving
the Senator from Wisconsin and his staff and the Secretary of the
Army and members of his staff.
So far that reason it seems to me that we would not be accomplish-
ing anything worthwhile if we were to consent or acquiesce in your
request at this time.
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. Have you something else to say, Mr. Welch ?
Mr. Welch. I am bitterly disappointed in that, because I think it
is very confusing to vote on these two matters in the same motion. I
am sure there is some sympathy for me on that side of the table when
I point out the different considerations that apply.
If the two points are to be voted on in the single motion, it then
becomes my duty to take what I would estimate to be about 10 min-
utes to point out to Senator Dworshak and to all of you the salient
features that seem to me to require a dismissal or a negative vote on
this motion insofar as it applies to Mr. Carr.
Mr. Chairman, may I have that 10 minutes ? I think I can do it.
Senator Mundt. Apparently we are proceeding here under the
10-minute rule, so I think you can.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1533
Senator Sytmtngton. IMr. Cliairman.
Will Mr. Welch yield to nie a minute?
Mr. Welch. Happily, sir.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I think this whole business
is getting silly. We have three witnesses. I know no reason why
Mr. Carr will not be declared innocent of any charges that have been
made against him. I have heard very little about it. The United
States Army is now on trial before the American people, and any way
you cut it, those are the facts.
I must admit that some of the testimony that has come from the
head of the Army, the Secretary, and from his legal adviser, have
been disturbing to me, but for many days — in fact, I believe, many
weeks — the counsel for the Army has sat- here patiently, and by his
actions more than his words attempted to expedite these hearings.
Now, a few moments after the Army's case is closed, despite the
strenuous, sincere objections of Army counsel, the majority members
of this committee, who are responsible for the current operation of
the United States Army, against, if I may say so, the almost bitter
objections of the head counsel of the Army, are deciding to vote, ap-
parently, in the affirmative to eliminate 1 of the 3 members who are
principals in the case that the Army has brought. In fact, if you
want to look at it from the standpoint of the Defense Department,
which I again remind these gentlemen it is their responsibility to oper-
ate ; we are now eliminating two members of the Defense Department.
Mr. Welch agrees to one. He does not agree to the other. The least
that I believe we can do as a committee is to carry on on the basis
that the Army counsel now wants us to.
I want to thank you, Mr. Welch, for letting me have this oppor-
tunity to support your position.
Senator Mundt. You may now state your position, JVIr. Welch.
You have 10 minutes.
Mr. Welch. I think, Mr. Chairman, that certain Senators on the
other side of the table have not been as appreciative of the seriousness
of the case that has been made against Mr. Carr as I am, on reading
the record. The- scene opens w^ith conferences either between Mr.
Cohn and Mr. Carr and ^Ir. Stevens, or it follows with the con-
ferences between Mr. Cohn and Mr. Carr with Mr. Adams, in which
Mr. Schine is repeatedly discussed and in which Mr. Cohn makes in-
ordinate demands in respect to Mr. Schine.
It is true that Mr. Carr appears to have the role of the strong, silent
man, but sometimes you can be very strong by silence.
Certainly it seems to me that when Mr. Carr rode to Fort Dix, as he
did, to interview General Ryan, to arrange for the time off for Mr.
Schine, that he must have been going there because he wanted to
achieve a result.
General Eyan's testimony, which was not denied, was that they both
requested the time off for Schine.
I wish to turn to one or two places in the record and read some short
statements to you gentlemen.
I read first from the record, volume 15, pages 2573, the testimony of
Mr. Adams :
On November 25 at the conclusion of the hearings in New Torlf, I returned
to Washington. I planned to go by air. I was going to be in the company of
46620"— 54— pt. 41 4
1534 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Carr. We missed our airplane at Newark Airfield and went to the Newarl£
Pennsylvania Railroad Station and came to Washington together on the train
on November 25. The train trip takes about 3 hours and 4.5 minutes. As I recall
now, and as I felt at the time, fully one-half of our entire conversation was
directed to Schine and was filled with Carr's observations to me to the effect
that for so long as Schine was not satisfactorily assigned, satisfactory insofar as
Mr. Cohn was concerned, that we were in trouble.
Now, that is Mr. Adams and Mr. Carr all by themselves on a railroad
train, and Mr. Carr saying, "As long as Schine was not satisfactorily
assigned, we," the Army, "are in for trouble."
On page 2593, of the record, Mr. Adams again is testifying, in
answer to Mr. Jenkins :
Yes, sir, Mr. Carr was in Washington. I think Mr. Cohn was in New York. 1
had a conversation with Mr. Carr with further reference to Mr. Cohn's attitude
on Schine, and I stated to him that if they would just leave me alone, I was going
to South Dakota for a 4-day visit with my mother and sister, and that if they
would just let me alone until I got back, I would find a way to speak to the
Secretary of the Army between Christmas and New Year's, and determine where
Schine was going to go. I did not guarantee that they would like what the
decision was, but I said, "I will get an answer so we will know where he is going
if you will just leave me alone for the next 6 days." On the 19th of December,
I went to Sioux Falls, S. Dak., by air. On the 20th of December, I received a
long-distance call from Mr. Carr, in which the subject — on the 20th of December
and on the 2.3d of December, while I was in Sioux Falls, S. Dak., I received
long-distance calls from Mr. Carr. On one, and I think on both of the occasions,
the principal subject of the call seemed to me to be Schine, and I restated that
I had told them that if they wouM just wait until between Christmas and New
Year's I would ti\v and find out what was going to happen to Schine.
Mr. Jenkins. You say that in 1 or 2 calls the subject seemed to be Schine.
Was there not Schine discussed by Mr. Carr long-distance while you were visiting
your mother in Sioux Falls, S. Dak.?
Mr. Adams. It was, and as I say, the principal purposes of one of the calls, as I
recall it, was Schine. My recollection is that both calls alluded to Schine.
And, on page 2G00 of the record, Mr. Adams is testifying again :
I telephoned my wife on the afternoon of the 9th of January to tell her that
the weather was bad.
This is in reference to Mr. Adams being in Amherst —
it was snowing, and it didn't look as though I would get back to Washington that
day, as I had planned. She told me that she had received a telephone call from
a woman who had stated that Senator McCarthy and Mr. Carr were anxious to
get in touch with me, and that she had indicated to them that she didn't know
where I was.
I wasn't particularly anxious to receive the call, because I felt that I knew
what it would be about. Nevertheless, I told her to tell Mr. Carr where I was.
And I received a telephone call from Mr. Carr at about 3 o'clock or 3 :15 in the
afternoon of January 9.
The subjects which we discussed were two : One, a clause which he wished
to get the Army to concur in for inclusion in the annual report of the committee,
and the problem concerned with Private Schine. He told me with reference to
Schine that Schine had gone to New York on leave for the weekend and had been
advised that he had to return on Saturday night to be available for K. P. on
Sunday, the next day. He indicated to me that Cohn was very anxious to get hold
of me about it, wanted to talk to me about it, wanted to know what I could do
about it.
Mr. Carr wanted to know if there was anything I could do about it. I protested
to Mr. Carr. I tried to put him off by saying that I was helpless in Amherst,
that I couldn't do anything when I wasn't in the Pentagon. I asked him if he
wouldn't defer telling Mr. Cohn where I was — Mr. Cohn was in New York, I
was in Amherst, and Mr. Carr was in Washington — if he wouldn't defer telling
Mr. Cohn where I was long enough to let me complete checking out of the hotel,
which I was then in the process of doing. I did not want to prohibit, to give him
a prohibition, tell him no, you may not telephone where I am, because I didn't
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1535
want to be in the position of refusing to receive a phone call from a committee
staff member. However, I did hope to avoid the call, because I was sure what it
would be about.
Mv. Carr's call with me was terminated shortly thereafter, and in a few
moments I received another telephone call. I picked up the phone and heard
Mr. Cohn's voice on the other end. I .saiil, "Hello," and I heard him say, "Hello,
John," something to that effect, and I very carefully put down the receiver.
And again from Mr. Adams' testimony :
Finally on the 4th of March I agreed I would come up and have lunch with
him on the following day, which was the .1th of Jlarch. He felt it would be better
if we did not have it here in this building. I think Mr. Colin was in town. So
we agreed that we would go to lunch at the IMethodist Building, across the street,
and we did have lunch together on that day. On that occasion Mr. Carr said to
me that he was making progress — he didn't say how or through what means —
in effecting a conciliation, in improving and reducing Senator McCarthy's ire
against the committee. That was about the substance of it. The great part of
the luncheon was given over to conversations with reference to Schine, in which
Mr. Carr stated to me, as he had on numerous other occasions, that he felt that I
should understand that as long as the assignment of Schine was not satisfactory
to Mr. Cohn that the Army was in for continued trouble.
I have other portions of the record marked. It takes too long to
read them. Those that I have read to yon are acts of Carr alone.
Mr. Carr placed calls for General Kyan and Lieutenant Blount at
Fort Dix in respect to time off for Schine. Most importantly, he wrote
6 of the 11 memoranda which ^yere released by Senator McCarthy to
the case, and which will be in evidence in this case. These memoranda
contain accusations against Stevens and Adams. They set up the
hostage charge for the first time. That was March 11. They set up
the blackmail charges for the first time. These accusations stand in
the record, or will stand when introduced, in cold type. No one sit-
ting in this chair can let them go unchallenged. They must be testi-
fied to by ]\Ir, Carr under oath, and I must have the chance to cross-
examine. It is in evidence that Mr. Carr requested Adams to work
with Sokolsky. You will remember Mr. Adams' testimony on that.
Most importantly, Mr. Carr was, as I understand it, Mr. Schine's
immediate superior. He is the one who can tell us what Schme was
doing on weekends and on the nights that he was off at Fort Dix.
He is the one that can tell us what committee work was so essential
that this man had to have these extraordinary excuses from Dix that
he had.
It is, as I have indicated to Mr. Jenkins, essential that we have
Mr. Carr as a witness in this case. I do not w^ant anyone in this room,
or anyone that hears my voice, to think I could bear a grudge against
a man that I have never yet actually met. I have heard Senator
McCarthy say that the Army wants his neck and wants his job.
Mr. Chairman, I would not know what disposition to make of either
the neck or the job if it were offered to me. I want to try tliis case
and bring the facts out fully.
Mr. Jenkins, my friend, I think I am looking at you more than
anyone else. I have not the power to keep Mr. Carr in the case as a
prmcipal if this vote goes as it seems somewhat indicated it will. As
long, Mr. Jenkins, however, as I have your promise that Mr. Carr will
be called so that I can examine him on these gi\ave charges that he
made in his memorandum and on all the other matters where he is so
important a witness, whether he helps me or hurts me, I want him as
a witness.
1533 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
And SO, ]Mr. Chairman, I say, first, you ought not to dismiss him.
If you were in the area of directed verdicts and we rested on this alone,
it seems to me, as a lawyer, there would have to be a verdict for the
Army on what I have read. But, whatever you do with him as a party,
I cling to him, Mr. Jenkins, as a witness.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. I address my remarks directly to Mr. Welch. Thus
far, ]\Ir. Welch, I have called to the witness stand each and every
witness suggested by you on behalf of the Army. I want you to under-
stand, as I am sure you do, that I work for the committee as its special
counsel. I am in no wise responsible for the policies adopted by the
committee. I have no vote on the committee. Should the committee
pass a motion or a resolution that precludes my calling any witness,
then you are bound to know, as I know you do know as an attorney,
that my hands are tied and that I cannot call that particular witness.
If no such restriction is placed on me, Mr. Welch, I shall continue
in my humble way, as I have in the past, to present the facts. But
please don't cast the burden or the onus upon me, because, as you know
and as everyone knows, I am taking orders from those who employ me.
JNIr. Welch. One word, Mr. Jenkins.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Welch.
Mr. Welch. I am confident, sir, that your prestige with this com-
mittee and with this country is such, sir, that if I say to you I w^ant
Mr. Carr called as a committee witness and add the word "please,"
he will be called.
Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman ?
Senator ]\Iundt. Senator Dirksen.
Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman, I have high respect and great
affection for our charming friend from Boston. He has read one
side of the story. So suppose, to be sure that we do not have an
ex parte presentation, that we read from the same record a little of
the other side.
I refer you, Mr. Welch, to page 2857 of the printed hearings. It
was in the course of that long onset of cross-examination conducted
by the chairman. Senator Mundt, and on that page he begins as
follows. He said:
You will develop specifically —
and this is addressed, of course, to the Army counselor, Mr.
Adams — ■
You will develop specifically the charges so that we can put our teeth into some-
thing specific. That is what we are trying to find, before January 20.
Of course, this relates to Mr. Carr. Here was Mr. Adams' reply.
He said:
As I have stated, he was a participant in the luncheon on November 6. I
remember no words. He did not seem to disagree with the request which was
made. I do not isolate the instances, but I know that he was at Fort Dix from
time to time.
He didn't participate. He said nothing. It must be remembered
that it wasn't Mr. Carr who charged himself; it was no member of
the committee who charged him. It was the Army who charged him.
Your principal prosecuting witness in this case, Mr. Welch, was your
counselor, Mr. Adams. But we go on :
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1537
Senator Mundt. Before we leave, I want to get these point by point so we
can save time. We have talien any charge out as far as the automobile is
concerned ?
Mr. Adams. That is right. He was as uncomfortable as I was.
Senator Mundt. At the luncheon, whether he was comfortable or uncomfor-
table, are you charging him with improper activity?
Mr. Adajis. No, sir. Pie was a coparticipant with Senator McCarthy in the
luncheon of December 10, the prime and sole purpose of which was to discuss
the New York assignment for Schine.
Senator Mundt. And what did Carr do on that occasion that was improper?
Mr. Adams. I state, sir, he was a coparticipant with Senator McCarthy,
Senator Mundt. I understand that. I want to understand what he was "co-ing"
while he was at the luncheon. You have been relatively specific about Cohn,
relatively specific about McCarthy. Now let's get specific about Carr. We
have to call Carr to defend himself against something, and we want to find
out what it is.
Mr. Adams. I am trying to recall, sir, my opinion of the Carr attitude prior
to and subsequent to January 20.
Senator Mundt. This is December 10. That is prior to January 20.
Mr. Adams. That is correct.
Senator Mundt. AVhat did he do on January 10
Mr. Adams. You mean January 20?
Senator Mundt. December 10, that you want to charge him with as being
improper?
Mr. Adams. He was a coparticipant in the luncheon.
Probably there enjoying succulent pork chops along with every-
body else.
The Senator was the one who was making the request with reference to
New York assignments of Schine.
Senator Mundt. I am talking about Carr. What did Carr do at the luncheon?
Mr. Adams. He did not disassociate himself with the Senator's position.
He didn't say anything. He maintained a silence. He was quiet.
The nature of Frank Carr, as a matter of fact.
He did not disassociate himself at the luncheon on November 6.
Senator Mundt. December 10 we are talking about.
Mr. Adams. I am speaking of both November 6 and December 10.
Senator Mundt. Let's make it December 10. What did he do on December
10 other than the fact that he did not say to his chairman, "Don't say that."
Mr. Adams. I would state that he was present; he did not disassociate
himself.
That is amazing, isn't it ? Where are the acts, Mr. Welch ? Where
is the affirmative testimony? We have been waiting for it.
Senator Mundt said :
All right. He was present. You charge him with improperly using means
to intimidate the Army because he was present at the luncheon and said noth-
ing. Is that a charge? Or do you say that as far as that luncheon is con-
cerned, there is no complaint on the part of the Army?
Mr. Adams. I think the fact that he was present, the fact that the position
of the chairman was being enunciated to us and that he was sitting there quietly
listening to it, made him a coparticipant.
So, silence and profundity are now the basis of the proof. There
has been no proof, and I think this committee must exercise its respon-
sibility to end participation in this case, and it becomes our duty,
I think, now to remove this cloud from Frank Carr on the basis of
what your prosecuting and what your asserting witness stated after
all the days on the stand. There is nothing affirmative. There are
no acts that would impeach Frank Carr in his conduct and indicate
that he has identity with the charge that he used improper influence
in behalf of Dave Schine. Surely he mentioned his name.
1538 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
You referred to the trip from New York. "Who hasn't engajred
in parlor-car conversation with a scotch in his hand w^hen it went
all around the circle full tilt, but was there an affirmative act? Was
there something overt there to bring Frank Carr within the orbit
of these charges ? Not a thing have you established.
So I say it is the duty of this committee, now that the Army has
presented its case — you said you had concluded with your witnesses —
it is a responsibility of the committee, now that your complaining
witnesses have been heard, that we relieve Frank Carr of this cloud.
The motion ought to be put and there ought to be a vote.
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman, will you bear one more word from me?
Senator Muxdt. Mr. Welch.
Senator Jackson. Might I ask one question, Mr. Welch?
Are the monitored telephone calls a part of your case?
Mr. Welch. We assume so, if received in evidence, of course. There
will be ones between Mr. Adams and Mr. Carr.
Senator Jackson. Is there anything in the monitored telephone
calls that bears on Mr. Carr?
]Mr. Welch. Oh, yes.
Senator Jackson. I merely make the point. Is the testimony
all in ?
Mr. Welch. It is not.
Senator Jackson. I will say this, INIr. Welch : I think the evidence
to date on Mr. Carr is pretty weak. I am being absolutely fair. But
I want to be fair to you, sir, in inquirimr whether you have your case
all in. I merely make the inquirj^, Mr. Chairman, wdiether the
motion is made before all the evidence is heard. I think it is pretty
important and I ask of ]VIr. Welch now, do you consider the monitored
phone calls a part of your case with reference now to Mr. Carr ?
Mr. Welch. Yes. One monitored phone call, at least — and I am
informed by Mr. St. Clair, who has dealt more closely with the mon-
itored phone calls than I have, possibly more directly involve Mr. Carr.
I wish to say a word to my friend, Senator Dirksen, whose voice
J always so much envy, you don't strike me, Senator, as being open
to conversion. I am afraid I may not wish your vote. But I do
wish to point out to you that it is possible to cooperate in a plan by
mere silence. If I were to meet you tonight in some dark alley and
relieve you of your wallet and had with me that strong, silent char-
acter St. Clair, St. Clair would be a participant in the holdup and
you know as well as I what the consequences would be. But it isn't
merely that.
I say that the train ride in which you introduced the scotch that
I don't find in the evidence, and in which Mr. Carr says, however
softly, "Mr. Adams, as long as Schine's assignment isn't satisfactory,
the Army is in for trouble," as a lawyer, sir, I say to you you cannot
direct a verdict in the face of that evidence.
I observe a nod from a lawyer whose opinion I respect, although
I differ with his politics.
Let me say this, Senator: If at the close of the case Mr. Carr is
found free of all fault by you, you will see me advancing toward him
smilingly. I have, sir, a genius for losing cases. I wish, however,
not to lose them until the evidence is in.
Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman? Bear with me one moment
while I make a comment. Well, Mr, Welch, I don't know about
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1539
meeting some robber in a dark alley, with that strong silent charac-
ter Mr. St. Clair, who would come to the rescue. But that, of course,
would refer to a criminal perpetration, which is certainly not before
us. Here are charges that embrace no incident, no misdemeanor, no
felony. Here you have charged a member of the committee staff
with undue and improper influence. I have been waiting for the
proof, and it has not come. And certainly it is within the province
of any judge, when the proof has not sustained the charge, to direct
a verdict, and that is precisely what is being done here. The court
doesn't have to wait for the end of the proceeding. It can remove
tlie cloud from the litigant or a participant or even from one charged
with criminality, when it appears to the court that that should be
done, and that is precisely what is before us today. You charged
p.flirmatively in your statement that there was improper influence on
the part of Mr. Carr. You come now and say that by his silence he
may have given consent. I simply do not agree. It was your respon-
sibility to make an affirmative case to this committee sitting as a
jury, and you have utterly failed to do so in my judgment.
For that reason, I gladly sustain the motion that is before us.
IMr. Welch. One more word. Let us not forget that Mr. Carr made
charges against INIr. Stevens and Adams. He charged them with black-
mail. He charged them with the hostage theory, and he in one of his
memoranda made that incredible charge that Stevens said he would
sell the Navy and Air Force down the river, and supply the witnesses
that would sink the other two services if they would only let go of
the Army. That abominable charge, if you will permit me to say
so, is a charge originated by Mr. Carr, and that will stand in this
record in the typewriting when those memoranda are in the case. I say
I wish to cross-examine him on that charge.
Senator JMcCarthy. Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy ?
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to, if I might,
correct a phrase that has bsen used so often here inadvertently, and it
has been used by myself a number of times. We referred to the Army.
I think it should be made very clear that this is not the Army that is
involved. It is a few little men from the Pentagon, woefully not in
uniform. Mr. Chairman, when I asked JNIr. Frank Carr to come with
this committee, he was then in charge of the subversive group of the
FBI over in New York. He was a supervisor of some of their most
highly trained investigators, approximately 200 in number, all investi-
gating communism, treason, subversion, and at that time I told Mr.
Carr that he would be thoroughly smeared, he would be accused of
everything on earth if he came with this committee. From past expe-
rience I know that to be true. I think it is very fortunate, and I tliink
Mr. Welch has performed a service to Mr. Carr and the American
people, by having this smear with a jury of 5 or 10 million people.
I think Mr. Welch underestimates the intelligence of this jury.
They know that while you issued charges, normal charges, in writ-
ing, not on the spur of the moment — signed by Mr. Welch — acquiesced
in by the other civilians in the Pentagon, you charge Mr. Carr with
making threats, and almost everything in the book. You knew that
if we believed those charges, it would mean the reputation, it would
mean the job of Mr. Frank Carr. There was no doubt in your mind
1540 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
about that, Mr. Welch, no doubt in the minds of your clients, Mr.
Adams and Mr. Stevens.
Now when your case is over, when your evidence is all in, when you
can find nothing against Frank Carr, you have no evidence against
him, except you say in answer to Senator Jackson's question maybe the
monitored phone calls might produce something — you know the only
monitored j^hone calls weie the calls monitored by Mr. Adams after
I refused to accede to the blackmail attempts. You know they were
self-serving, you know Mr. Adams testified to those in detail, so you
know there is nothing new.
This is a new ruse. May I say to the Chair and to the Senators, as a
judge I have seen many dishonest attempts by clever little lawyers
to smear and distort the facts. But in all my record as a judge, as
head of this committee, I have never in my life seen a man do what
Mr. Welch is doing now, namely, after he admits he has no evidence,
he still tries to tell 10 million people in the television audience that
IMr. Frank Carr here, with the tremendous record he has, the most out-
standing young man I have ever seen, with the most outstanding rec-
ord, he still says, "Well, let's keep him in here. Maybe somehow, some
place, sometime, we can get the reputation and the job of this man."
I may say that Mr. "Welch, Mr. Chairman, has I think perhaps
given a new name to hearings. They should be labeled from now on,
if he is directing the case, and I emphasize not the Army, directing
the case of these few little civilians in the Pentagon, they should be
labeled "smearings" instead of "hearings."
And again in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that all
of us, including myself, I have been guilty of it a number of times,
that we don't refer to this as the Army case, because this is not the
Army case, and I know from the calls I get that a great number of
combat men in tlie military get awfully sick away down deep inside
when they hear this effort to cover up Communists being labeled as
an Army case.
Senator Mundt. The Chair would like to say this, before voting,
because he at one time before listened to the persuasive powers of Mr.
^Velch and voted with him in a very important decision, at which
time the Chair departed from his Republican brethren and voted
with the Democratic members of this committee, because he felt the
Democratic members of this committee were right, and he felt that
Mr. Welch had reported a position of his client which the Chair sus-
tained in the interest of justice and fairness.
He has again listened to Mr, Welch. He finds him a bit less persua-
sive today than in his earlier endeavor to persuade the Chair. I think
the Chair should explain to Mr. Welch why is not quite as persuasive
with the Chair today as formerly.
In the first place, the Chair devoted the better part of 2 days to
interrogating Secretary Stevens about any specific charge he cared
to make against Mr. Carr. And at the conclusion, in substance, Sec-
retary Stevens said;
If I were the jury, on the basis of my testimony alone I would acquit Mr. Carr.
But he implied Mr. Adams. might have some very destructive and
pointed and specific testimony against Mr. Carr. So the Chair de-
voted the better part of 2 days to interrogating Mr. Adams about Mr.
Carr. He went specifically into the four points that you mentioned,
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1541
tlie train rule, the Sioux Falls calls, the Amherst call, and the meeting
in the Methodist Building. And at the conclusion of long col-
loquies, Avhich you did not read today, for lack of time — at the con-
clusion of those long colloquies — he asked Mr. Adams specifically in
each instance whether he considered anything that was done in con-
nection with any of those four contacts to be in the nature of im-
]n-o]->er means to influence the Army in the direction of granting
favors to Mr. Schine or in any other direction. And each time un-
der oath Mr. Adams said "No".
Then he said late, as you have said even more belatedly, that he
felt, however, that perhaps in the memoranda issued on March 11 there
was something to incriminate Mr. Carr. That was not very per-
suasive when Mr. Adams said it, Mr. Welch, nor when you said it,
because I knew, and he knew, and you know that at the time you pre-
pared your carefully drawn set of specifications to which you signed
your name, which it was testified you prepared after consultation with
the records of the principals, not one single mention was made of the
memoranda on which you now propose to indict Frank Carr. Nor can
I be as much persuaded as I might be about this new suggestion that
perhaps you now have found something which will indict Frank Carr.
Perliaps there is something in a monitored telephone call between
Mr. Adams, who testified he found nothing up until March 11, w^hich
would indict Mr. Carr, in the face of the testimony of Mr. Adams that
he found nothing before March 11 with which he could quarrel seri-
ously concerning the proper conduct record of Mr. Carr.
I am not too much persuaded by your expression of the hope that
these calls, when they are entered, will disclose such a fact.
But for your solace, Mr. Welch, may I say this : You are not before
a judicial tribunal. You are before a committee of the Senate. Any
action that the Senate takes is reversible. If we make an error in
voting now to dismiss Mr. Carr as a witness and Mr. Hensel as a
witness, if it develops that you can in fact elicit from the friends of
Frank Carr statements with which to indict him which you could not
produce by consultation with those who proposed to be against him,
then of course we can reverse our position on the basis of such
evidence.
On the basis of the full story as told up to now, and your complete
failure to specify a single direct charge against Mr. Carr of improper
behavior, the Chair feels that in common justice he should vote at
this time, at the conclusion of your case, certainly, to dismiss him as
a witness and to dismiss the charges — subject to reversal if in fact, as
I suggest, you succeed in getting from his friends who are about to be
the witnesses evidence against him which you could not produce by
putting your own people on the stand.
May I suggest finally that I think it is very important that when
we have a man of the importance of Mr. Hensel, who is needed in
the Defense Establishment, for whom there has been no charge sub-
stantiated, on whom the committee has already ruled that the basic
and most serious charges cannot be considered because they are beyond
the purview of this controversy, dealing with incidents some lO^years
ago — the Chair does not propose to be goaded into extending these
hearings and prolonging them and bringing in additional witnesses
when those presenting the charges against Mr. Hensel are perfectly
willing to see them adjudicated in this way.
1542 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Both of those statements are made to you, Mr. Welch, in the hope
that they may give you some comfort by virtue of the fact that sena-
torial bodies do sometimes reverse themselves, perhaps more fre-
quently than judicial tribunals.
Senator Potter. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. Senator Potter ?
Senator Potter. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that the Army's
case was very well presented by Secretary of the Army Stevens and
Counsel John Adams. I think the other collateral witnesses added
little to the testimony that the Army presented.
I concur and I think the concurrence has also been expressed by
at least one member on the other side of the aisle, Senator Jackson,
if I recall a newspaper account over the weekend — that at best the
case against Mr. Carr is exceedingly weak.
The Army has more or less presented its case against the three
principals — Senator McCarthy, Mr. Cohn, and Mr. Carr. It would
seem to me that Mr. Carr as a witness would add little unless Senator
McCarthy or Mr. Cohn brought into testimony the memoranda which
you mentioned. If they fail to bring into evidence and testify on
the memoranda from Mr. Carr, then I would say that the impor-
tance of Mr. Carr as a principal witness certainly is not great.
However, if Senator INIcCarthy or Mr. Cohn, in the course of their
testimony, bring in the memoranda from Mr. Carr, then I would
say that you would have a perfect right and the committee would be
bound to ofi'er Mr. Carr as a witness in that respect.
But until that is done, I would say that his position would be the
same as Mr. Hensel's. The charges against Mr. Hensel have not
been brought in. If they were brought in, I am certain that Mr.
Hensel would want to be a witness. But if they are not a part of
the testimony, it is the duty of the person who makes the charges to
offer evidence, and what he fails to offer in evidence, irrespective
of public statements that are made, is not to be considered as part
of this controversy.
So at this point I would say that since the charges made are not
substantiated by proof in this hearing, when the charges against Mr.
Carr at this time are not substantiated, both Mr. Hensel and Mr. Carr
should be excused as principals — with one proviso, however, that in
case, during the course of the testimony of Senator McCarthy and
Mr. Cohn, the memoranda of Mr. CaiT are used as part of their testi-
mony, Mr. Carr then should be submitted as a collateral witness.
Senator Muxdt. Does any other Senator desire to speak ?
Senator McClellan. I want to say one thing, Mr. Chairman: I
don't want Mr. Welch to get any false hopes that there will bs any
reversal. This is going to be final, and he is going to be eliminated.
I want to say I agree with you. You say you do not agree with my
politics. That is your privilege. But I want to say I agree with you
as to the merits of the case. I do not mean that I would vote to
sustain it after all the evidence is in, but as a lawyer I believe I know,
taking into account the memoranda that have been issued publicly,
certainly he is still a proper party to this proceeding until all the
testimony is in. I agree with you.
The first thing I said with respect to this motion was that the two
issues in the motion should be severed, should be offered separately,
and I made that request. But I don't think it Vvill make any differ-
SPECIAL mVESTIGATION 1543
ence. I think tlie vote is going to be just the same anyway. Maybe
it will shorten it. I want to say that I have never before seen a case
dismissed where the accusing party was in court and refusing to with-
draw the charges where the charges actually made a case if sustained
by evidence.
Gentlemen, you are not deceiving the American people, this great
jury that you have heard of, watching these proceedings. Hei-e are
the serious, damnable charges being made against Mr. Hensol, and
you have the accusers right here in the room, apparently tacitly con-
senting to the dismissal of those charges when, if they ought to be
dismissed, they ought to be dismissed by those who made the charges
stepping up here and publicly withdrawing them.
Senator Mundt. Senator Symington.
Senator Symington. I will be glad to yield to Mr. Welch. He was
kind enough to jneld to me.
Mr. Welch. Oh, no, Senator.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, then I will proceed.
I would like to ask would the Chairman consider a question of fur-
ther vote ? I would like to ask a question.
Senator Mundt. Go ahead.
Senator Symington. While I would very much like to ask a ques-
tion, I don't want to goad you about it.
Senator jMundt. I don't object to being goaded. Go ahead, whether
it is a goad or not.
Senator Sysiington. Maybe it is a sheep. I don't want to get your
"goad." In any case, I would like to ask this question : Do you intend
to vote to call Mr. Carr as a Avitness ?
Senator Mundt. Not unless some evidence is made against him. If
there is some evidence against him, then I can say I can reverse my
position.
Senator Symington. What you are really doing
Senator Mundt. Wait a moment. I am not going to vote to call
all the Americans into assembly before this committee, which is trying
to expedite these hearings, unless there is some evidence adduced
against them.
Senator Symington. Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to be sure I un-
derstand your position. Mr. Carr is, has, accused the Army of trying
to blackmail him. He states:
I am convinced that they will keep right on trying to blackmail us as long
as Schine is in the Army.
This is a memorandum of December 9, which was written to Senator
IMcCarthy from Mr. Carr. Don't you think that we should have the
right to question Mr. Carr about that?
Senator Mundt. We have a right to question him on anything that
is before this committee in the nature of sworn testimony. If it
comes in, you certainly have.
Senator Symington. These are charges. This isn't sworn testi-
mony. I would like to ask the Chairman again. Will he call Mr.
Carr as a witness. Will he agree to before this vote ?
Senator Mundt. The Chair is concerned, as he has said many, many
times, only with sworn testimony. He does not propose to follow all
the newspaper reports on these hearings down to the last minute.
But he is entirely convinced that any sworn testimony should be cross-
examined. He has taken that position from the very start.
1544 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION^
Senator Symington. Mr, Chairman, these hearings are being called
because of these charges. Mr. Carr has stated that the Army was
blackmailing the committee. On that basis, wouldn't he agree that
Mr. Carr should be called before this committee ?
Senator Mundt. May the Chair state that none of the charges, so-
called, prepared by either entity to the dispute, have been entered into
the record of the hearing. All we have is sworn testimony. We have
provided 20 days, or more than 20 days, for the Stevens- Adams side
presentation of the case.
Senator Jackson, May I call to your attention, do you remember
my true-false questions, when I asked Mr. Stevens on this very point,
and he denied under oath that such a blackmailing attempt had been
made ? I am sure I asked that. I will have to look up the record.
Are you going to not permit the other side to deny it under oath?
What is the point of asking these questions?
Senator Mundt. There has been no sworn testimony that I know
on the part of either Mr. Adams or Mr. Stevens or anybody else.
Senator Jackson. Secretary Stevens denied it under oath.
Senator Mundt. The Chair does not mind being asked questions,
but if he is not going to be permitted to answer them, it seems
Senator Jackson. If the charges are being put to a person, shouldn't
the person who made the charges against them be given an opportunity
to deny or admit them? I never heard of such a thing.
Senator Symington, Mr, Chairman, this is a very serious matter.
It looks to me as if a deliberate effort is being made by the majority
in the committee to prevent Frank Carr from taking the stand in
order to be examinee! by the Army. That is the reason for these
hearings. You didn't have any sworn testimony when you started
these hearings, and you put the others on the stand. Now, I would
like to ask a question before this vote so we will understand whether
this is a slick whitewash, in my opinion, or not. Do you intend to
call Mr. Carr before this committee if it is the request of Army counsel
that he be called in order to give the truth to the people ?
Senator Mundt. The Chair has said he stands ready to reverse any
position he takes providing the Army under oath brings some charges
against him.
Senator Symington, If you say reversed, does that mean at the
present time you would vote against calling Mr, Carr as a witness in
this case?
Senator Mundt. On the basis of the failure to produce any evidence
against him under oath now, the answer is "Yes,"
Senator Jackson, Weren't the hearings started, Mr. Chairman, on
the basis of these allegations ? I don't know what we are here for if it
wasn't for the basis of these allegations. I wouldn't have asked these
questions. I assumed that the charges made represented the views
of the individuals who signed them. And on the basis of that, I put
a lot of questions. I think that particularly in this particular situa-
tion we asked the Secretary of the Army specifically whether the
statements referred to by Senator Symington in the memorandum of
December 9 were true or false, and it would seem to me that the other
party ought to respond. I just don't understand this at all.
Senator Symington. Mr, Chairman, this is a very serious matter,
I repeat. If I may read from the letter of December 9, 1953. Mr.
Carr, to Senator McCarthy :
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1545
What I want to tell yon is that I am getting fed up witli tlie way the Army
Is trying to use Schine as a hostage to pressure us to stop our hearings on the
Army. Again today John Adajus came down here after the hearing and, using
clever phrases, tried to lind out "What is tiiere in it for us" if he aud Stevens
did something for Sehiue.
That is in the same memorandum, I repeat, that he said :
I am convinced that they will keep right on trying to blackmail us as long as
Schine is in the Army.
Now, for the 21 days we have heard tlie Army trying to defend
itself against these charges and, as I get your position, as chairman
of this committee, you are now taking a position that you do not feel
at this time that Mr. Carr shoukl be called before this committee in
order to get the truth, is that correct, sir ?
Senator Mundt. The answer to your question is emphatically it is
not correct.
Senator Symington. Would you say whether you will vote to call
Mr. Carr before this committee, before we vote to make him a prin-
cipal or not to make him a principal ?
Senator Mundt. The Chair will be happy to reiterate the reply he
made to the same question a minute ago. He gives the same answer.
Senator Symington. Can I hear that, sir?
Senator Mundt. Certainly. The Chair will vote to call Mr. Carr
if there is substantial evidence, if there is sworn testimony presented
against him. These presentations on behalf of Mr. Adams and Mr.
Stevens have been given under oath. The Chair has said he does not
propose to pursue newspaper comments about Mr. Hensel or news-
paper stories about Mr. Carr, or any other newspaper stories, except
those that desire to make under oath specific charges which have to
be entered.
Mr. Sytiiington. One more question, Mr. Chairman, on this sub-
ject: Do you believe that to date there has not been enough evidence
to justify calling Mr. Carr, despite the memorandum that was put
into evidence by Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn and Mr. Carr?
Senator Mundt. The Chair will say more concisely now, I hope,
what he said at great length sometime ago, that on the basis of the
sworn testimony of Mr. Stevens, and Mr. Adams, and on the basis
of the case presented by Mr. Welch, lie finds no specific charge of
any kind made against Mr. Carr indicating that he was improperly
endeavoring to influence the Army.
Senator Jackson. May I call this to the Chair's attention. The
Secretary of the Army and, I believe, Mr. Adams — I put the same
question to both — have testified under oath that the allegation by
Mr. Carr in the memorandum of December 9 is false.
Now, that means that someone is not telling the truth. The Chair
or this committee is going to be in the position that they are not going
to hear the other side of it. And may I add this, may I add this, Mr.
Chairman: It is significant. There are 2 sides in each 1 of these
situations. First, there is a denial by the principal, and then they
assert affirmative charges. Are you going to deny Mr. Carr the
right to offer proof that Mr. Schine was being held as a hostage?
That is his charge in the memorandum. Is it withdrawn?
JMr. CoiiN. Mr. Chairman.
I haven't said anything, sir, for a number of hours. I have been
waiting to be callecl as a witness. I think, sir, if I could be called
as a witness, I am ready, willing, and able, I hope, sir, to answer
1546 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
practically all of the questions which Mr. Symington and Mr. Jack-
son have raised about the issues in this case. I am ready to do that.
I think, sir, we might save an awful lot of time if I could be permitted
to do that.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. Are you ready to vote ?
Senator Symington. I am not ready to vote. If I may comment
about this matter ; I have respect for Mr. Cohn's ability as a lawyer,
and I am sure that some of these questions he could clarify, feut
the plain facts are that Senator Jackson asked the Secretary of the
Army whether the charges made by Mr. Carr, produced as evidence
in this courtroom, or in this hearing, under oath, were true or false.
And Secretary Stevens said they were false.
Therefore, he has accused Mr. Carr of making false untruthful
statements. It seems to me absolutely incredible that at this time,
if we are going to relieve Mr. Carr as a principal in this case, you,
as chairman of this committee, with the dignity and the integrity of
the United States Senate at stake, are not willing to say that regard-
less of whether he is or is not eliminated as a principal, you will
vote with the three Democratic members of this committee to see
that he is summoned as a witness. I ask you again, with deep respect
and sincerity, please, to say that regardless of whether he is or is not
voted out as a principal, that you wall vote with us to call him as a
witness, even if just as a plain ancillary witness?
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Welch?
]VIr. Welch. I had hoped I was through.
Senator Mundt. I am glad to recognize you again.
Mr. Welch. I am confident. Senator Symington, that this com-
mittee will not at this moment wish to take that second step. I think
I can count votes, and I think I observe Mr. Carr disappearing as a
principal in the case. Certainly there are enough lawyers in this
I'oom and in this country who hear my voice who will know this sim-
ple thing : that when he sat in a room in which Colin said something
and Stevens said something, we are entitled to have the version of the
strong, silent man who sat and listened. Maybe he will help me some.
Maybe he will hurt me some. But his recollection as he sat and listened
so perfectly as he did, is material in this courtroom.
Nothing, Mr. Chairman, is more familiar to lawyers than this, that
if there is a witness in the control of one party who could give ma-
terial evidence and isn't called, the other party may say, "You may
draw the conclusion, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, that if he had been
called he would have hurt the man who didn't call him." Everybody
knows that.
I beg of you. I can take one stab in the heart a day. I can see Mr.
Carr go out as a principal if I have to.
Senator Potter, I couldn't believe, sir, you were going to announce
your vote as you have, but I think you have done so.
May I say sadly, gentlemen, that it seems strange to me that these
Republican lips of mine. Republican for 64 years, with the single
exception of Al Smith, whom I admired — that these lips can convince
only Democrats, my natural enemies, and that the Republicans, whom
I love and cherish, find my words are dust and ashes.
Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1547
Senator Dirksex. Mr. Chairman, it is quite evident now that the
new charge against Frank Carr is guilt by silence. Everybody must
assume his responsibility in public service by letting the country know
hoAV he votes. No one needs to be solicitous, Mr. Welch, or may I say
to my colleague on the left side of the chairman, about my political
skin. I have never ducked a vote and a responsibility. I think this
is a duty on the part of the committee.
]Mr. Chairman, it has been thoroughly ventilated. I suggest we vote.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. Are you ready to vote ?
Senator Symington. No. I want to ask one more question before
the vote, for the record.
I was a little mixed up about who had signed on the monitored tele-
phone conversations. I am beginning to think maybe they are dis-
appearing with Mr. Carr. Would you be good enough to tell the
committee who has agreed to put the monitored calls into the hearings
and who has not, as a result of the executive hearing this afternoon ?
Senator Mundt. The Chair stated to the best of his recollection
immediately after the meeting what had taken place. I believe that
I am correct in my statement that on the basis of the previous agree-
ment, the Telephone calls involving Mr. Cair and Mr. McCarthy and
Mr. Cohn have been delivered to the counsel ; that on the basis of 7
signatures made by the 7 members of this committee this noon, Mr.
Welch has agreed to deliver to the counsel immediately after this
meeting the telephone conversations involving the members of this
subcommittee, so that counsel tonight will have available all of the
transcripts and be able to report back on those that are relevant so
they can be introduced in evidence.
Senator Symington. That was not my question, Mr. Chairman.
My question w^as that the agreement which Mr. W^elch signed and
gave — I know the three Democratic members signed it. I believe I
saw you sign it. I would request that you ask all the principals if they
have signed the memorandum that was given us today. I do not
know whether the other Senators on the Republican side have.
Senator Mundt. The Chair has already announced that it was
signed by the seven members of this committee, by Mr. Adams, by
Mr. Stevens, and by nobody else.
Senator Symington. Was it signed by Senator McCarthy ?
Senator Mundt. It has been signed by nobody else.
Senator Symington. Or Mr. Schine?
Senator Mundt. It had been signed by nobody except Stevens,
Adams, and the seven members of the committee.
Senator Symington. Before we start moving around with the tele-
phone calls, may I ask that you ask the other principals, at least the
ones that are here, whether or not they signed the monitored tele-
phone calls? I think this goes in with the question of getting the
evidence based on the vote in respect of Mr. Carr.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, I am getting awfully weary
of this filibustering here. Mr. Symington knows, there is no doubt
in his mind, that my monitored calls were made available, Mr. Cohn's
were made available, Mr. Carr's were made available to Mr. Jenkins.
He knows also that in executive session today — he was there — that it
was agreed that all other monitored calls be given to Mr. Jenkins,
1548 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
and Mr. Jenkins and his staff go over those calls and decide which ones
should be in evidence.
I just wonder if we couldn't get rid of this filibuster and have a vote
and get JNIr. Cohn on the stand, and get some of these facts. I have
heard so many people saying they want to see Cohn and McCarthy
on tlie witness stand under oath, I just don't like to see them filibus-
tered off now.
Senator Symington. May I ask a question?
Senator Mundt. The discussion must be devoted to the motion.
Senator Symington. The question I would like to ask Senator Mc-
Carthy— and I honestly don't know it and 1 went to the executive
session — is whether he has signed the paper along with the rest of us
to put the monitored calls into the record.
Senator McCarthy. Senator Symington, you do know, if I may
correct you. You know, Stu, that I signed a paper 3 weeks ago al-
lowing Mr. Jenkins to get my monitored calls. You also know that we
discussed that in detail todayj and I wouldn't discuss an executive
session except that you are askmg me to. We discussed the matter in
detail today, and it was agreed that all phone calls should go to
Mr. Jenkins and that after he makes up his mind and wants to make
recommendations to the committee as to which ones are properly part
of the evidence, then we meet again and vote those in evidence that we
consider proper.
As I have said before, I want all the phone calls in. Even if we
are prevented from getting all of them in, I think that I will go on
getting even the abbreviated calls in.
I am waiting for Mr. Jenkins to get your calls, as he has had mine
for 3 weeks. Mr. Welch has had mine. I assume Mr. Welch having
had them, there isn't anything very secret about those phone calls any
more.
Senator Symington. Could I ask one more question, and that is,
Senator, Did you sign the paper that the rest of us signed today 'i
Senator McCarthy. No. I signed it long before you did, Senator.
Senator Symington. That is a different one. This is to make it
public record.
Senator McCarthy. Senator, let's not w^aste time. You know I did
not sign the paper. You saw it.
Senator Symington. I did not know it, because I was told by the
chairman that he thought you had.
Senator Mundt. Wait a minute. The Chair announced openly and
publicly, to keep the record straight, that it was signed by the 7 mem-
bers of the subcommittee. The Chair does not like to have the Senator
from Missouri misrepresent what he said. It is in the record. The
(^Aiair never made a statement of that kind, and the Senator should
know it.
Senator Symington. My belief is that the Chair gave me the im-
pression that everybody had signed today except Mr. Schine, who
was not here.
Senator Mundt. I suggest the Senator read the record of what the
Chair announced publicly. He did not talk privately with anybody.
Senator Symington. I stand corrected, if I am wrong about that.
Senator McCarthy. Could I answer your question, Senator
Symington ?
Senator Symington. Yes.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1549
Senator McCarthy. The answer is, I did not sign the document you
signed today. I sio;ned one 3 weeks before you did. Couldn't we pos-
sibly get a vote on this and go on with the hearing?
Senator Symington. I would be glad to, but I would like to say that
the reason I didn't sign it some days ago, and that the other Demo-
cratic members didn't sign it, was that it was for release to the counsel
only and not to the public as a matter of the record. The statement
that was drawn up by JSIr. Welch today was a statement that released
all the monitored calls for the record, to the public. I am sorry that
I did not understand at the executive hearing and that I did not under-
stand when I asked Chairman Mundt. I thought he said that every-
body had signed but Private Schine.
Senator Mundt. You will read in the record what I said. I said
it openly in the record. Are we ready to vote ?
Mr. Bryan. Mr. Chairman, before you vote, sir, may I be heard?
May I be heard for one brief interval ?
Senator Mundt. All right.
Mr. Bryan. I want to make this entirely clear to this committee and
the American public before this vote is taken. Mr. Hensel, regardless
of what vote is taken in this committee, stands ready and willing to
appear before this committee at any time. If at any time, there is any
material introduced in this record which should affect Mr. Hensel in
any invidious fashion or purport, Mr. Hensel will come to this com-
mittee and ask to be heard before this committee in no uncertain terms.
Now, let's get that clear.
Senator Mundt. As the Chair already stated, Mr. Bryan, perhaps
you didn't hear him, that if there is evidence produced under oath by
any of these parties, the committee certainly will call the witnesses.
These actions are reversible. You have stated that position now, and
made it very clear, and we accept it.
Mr. Bryan. I want to say one more thing, and that is this : I do
not want this committee vote and my client does not want this com-
mittee vote, to be given on any basis that he is seeking to escape from
the responsibility for answering any charges of any kind made against
him. 1 want this committee to understand when it votes that if this
committee decides that these charges against Mr. Hensel should be
dropped at this time, and Mr. Hensel vindicated Mr. Hensel necessarily
will accept that vindication. But I make no plea to this committee
other than the plea to vote justly and fairly, and to give Mr. Hensel
whatever they vote they think should be given to him and none other.
Senator Mundt. Are you ready for the vote ? The Chair suggests a
roll call. You have heard the motion made by Senator Dworshak and
seconded by Senator Dirksen. I do not need to restate it. Those in
favor will say "Aye." Those opposed, "No."
Senator McClellan?
Senator McClellan. No.
Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen?
Senator Dirksen. Aye.
Senator Mundt. Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. No.
Senator Mundt. Senator Potter?
Senator Potter. Aye.
Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson?
Senator Jackson. No.
1550 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Senator Mundt. Senator Dworshak?
Senator Dworshak. Aye.
Senator Mundt. The Chair votes "Aye." The motion is carried.
Mr. Cohn will come to the stand.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, I desire to call as the first witness for
Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn, Mr. Roy M. Cohn.
Se«ator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, I make a substitute motion,
or I oifer a motion, that Mr. Carr be called as the first witness instead
of Mr, Cohn. Let's settle it right now.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I second that motion.
Senator Mundt. Are you ready for the vote ?
Those in favor will say "Aye."
Senator McClellan. Call the roll.
Senator Mundt. Senator McClellan?
Senator McClellan. Aye.
Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen ?
Senator Dirksen. No.
Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson?
Senator Jackson. Aye.
Senator Mundt. Senator Potter?
Senator Potter. No.
Senator Mundt. Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. Aye.
Senator Mundt. Senator Dworshak?
Senator Dworshak. No.
Senator Mundt. The Chair votes no.
The motion is lost.
Mr. Cohn?
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, just 10 seconds.
Mr. Carr has asked me to tell you that he has refrained from
making any speeches here because he takes the position that he will
always follow the orders of the chairman of this committee, Senator
Mundt, and he will, if called by the chairman, appear; if not called
by the chairman, he will not appear.
Senator Mundt. Very well.
The Chair has already announced that if those representing the
Stevens-Adams side of the case make charges against him, he will be
called, if the charges are made under oath.
Mr. Cohn, you will stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the
testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing laut the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Cohn. I do, sir.
TESTIMONY OP ROY M. COHN
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman, before I vacate this chair that I have
occupied so long, I would like to say that it will, I think, be necessary
for Mr. Carr to remain in the room, because I am very confident that
there will be numerous occasions on which I shall now be forced to
ask the witness to confer with him and secure answers to questions.
Senator Mundt. That can be arranged.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Chairman, on that point, sir, I might say Frank
is right downstairs, as you know, and he can be here in 2 minutes'
notice at any time to give us any information Mr. Welch might want.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1551
ISenator Mundt. Tlie Chair would like to add that one reason he
voted as he did to expedite these hearings as much as he could by
throwing out tlie evidence which has not been testified to under oath,
was that both Mr. Hcnsel and Mr. Carr could get back to the very
important work in which they are respectively engaged, Mr. Hensel
in connection with the national defense, and Mr. Carr in connection
with protecting our defense establishment against infiltration by
Communists.
I am talking about the commercial establishments.
]\Ir. Jenkins ?
Mr. Jenkins. IMr. Chairman, Mr. Cohn has now been sworn as the
first witness for Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn, joint defendants.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman? May I just make one state-
ment before we start this interrogation?
Mv. Jenkins. As far as I am concerned, Senator, certainly.
Senator Symington. I said with respect to Mr. Hensel that I
thought it ought to go to the full committee and if necessary to the
floor of the Senate. I want to make it very clear that on the basis
of the decision taken by this vote, I think this procedure is a white-
wash, and I do not think we will get the truth. Therefore, I shall also
take the question of Mr. Carr appearing before this committee before
the floor of the United States Senate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, that will be another good way
of keeping this show on the road for a while.
Senator Mundt. ISIr, Jenkins ?
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, we have now officially begun the testi-
mony on the other side, Mr. Cohn having been sworn and having taken
the witness stand.
I observe that it is a quarter of 5 o'clock. That is within 15 minutes
of quitting time. Mr. Cohn's testimony will necessarily be lengthy.
It is my suggestion that we defer the beginning of the direct examina-
tion of the witness until tomorrow's session.
Senator Mundt. All right. It is unanimous.
We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 4 : 45 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to recon-
vene at 10 a. m., Thursday, May 27, 1954.)
INDEX
Pago
Adams, Jolin G ir)14-1517, 1523, 1524, 1531, 1533-1542, 1544
Air Force (United States) 1516,1539
Amherst ~_ 1534' 1541
Anglo-Saxon law 1528, 1529
Armed Services Committee (Senate) 1530,1532
Army (United States) 1519-1523,1532-1546
Assistant Secretary of tlie Navy 1526
Baltimore Sun IftH^
Blount, Lieutenant ir,35
Boston, Mass 1536
Bryan, Mr 1525, 1527-1529, 1531, 1549
Carr, Francis P 1514, 1518, 1521-1524, 1527, 1532-1547, 1550, 1551
Chesapeake Telephone Co 1516
Cliristmas 1534
Cohn, Koy M I5I4,
1517, 1518, 1521-1523, 1526, 1532-1535, 1537, 1542, 1545-1548, 1551
Testimony of 1550
Communist-line newspaper 1515
Communist major 1517
Communist Party 1515-1518, 1527, 1540, 1551
Communist sheet 1515
Counselor to the Army 1514-1517, 1523, 1524, 1531, 1533-1542, 1544
Daily Worker 1515, 15I6
Defense Establishment 1541
Department of the Army 1519-1523,1532-1546
Department of Defense 1527, 1528, 1533
Dirksen, Senator 1523
Distinguished Service Medal 1520
Duckett, Mrs I517
Dworshak, Senator 1523, 1526
Executive order 1524, 1529
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 1515,1516,1539
Fort Dix 1533, 1535
Henry Luce's magazine 1515
Hensel, H. Struve 1522-1532, 1541-1543, 1549, 1551
Hensel vote I549
Hoover, J. Edgar 1516
Inspector General 1517, 1520
Inspector General's Office (Investigations Division) 1517
Investigations Division (Inspector General's Office) 1517
Jackson, Senator 1529, 1540, 1546
K. P. (kitchen police) 1534
Letter to Jenkins (Secretary of the Army, May 13) 1518
Lucas 1520
Luce, Henry 1515
McCarthy, Senator Joe 1514-1522,
1524-1529, 1531, 1532, 1534-1536, 1539, 1542-1545, 1547-1550
McCarthy committee 1515, 1518, 1520
Methodist Building (Washington, D. C.) 1535
Monitored phone calls 1548
Navy (United States) 1539
New Year's 1534
New York City 1528, 1533, 1534, 1537-1539
New York Herald Tribune 1515
New York Post 1515, 1516
New York Telephone Co 1516
II INDEX
Page
New York Times _ 1515
Newark Airfield 1534
Newark Pennsylvania Railroad Station 1534
Pennsylvania Railroad Station (Newark) 1534
Pentagon 1530, 1534, 1539, 1540
Peress, Maj. Irving 1517-1520
President of the United States 1527-1531
Presidential directive 1527, 1529, 1530
President's letter to the Secretary of Defense 1529
President's order 1529
Republican luncheon 1520
Ryan, General 1533, 1535
St. Clair, Mr 1523, 1538, 1539
Sampson, Mr 1516, 1517
Schiff, Mrs. Dorothy 1515
Schine, G. David 1514,
1517, 1521, 1522, 1533-1535, 1537, 1538, 1541, 1544, 1545, 1547-1549
Seavey, Mr 1516
Second World War 1526
Secretary of the Army 1514^1518,
1520, 1523-1525, 1529, 1531-1535, 1539, 1540, 1542, 1544, 1545
Secretary of the Army (letter to Jenkin's, May 13) 1518
Secretary of Defense ."1 1529
Senate Armed Services Committee 1530, 1532
Senate of the United States 1530, 1.541, 1551
Sioux Falls, S. Dak 1534, 1541
Smith, Al 1546
Sokolsky 1535
Stevens, Robert T 1514-1518,
1520, 1523-1525, 1529, 1531-1535, 1539, 1540, 1542, 1544, 1545
United States Air Force 1516, 1539
United States Army 1519-1523, 1532-1546
United States Department of Defense 1527, 1528, 1.533
United States Navy 1539
United States President 1527-1531
United States Secretary of Defense 1529
United States Senate 1530, 1541, 1551
Washington, D. C 15.3.3, 1534
Washington Post 1515
Watt, Mrs 1517
Wechsler, Jimmy 1515
World War II 1526
Young Communist League 1515
o
SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRE-
TARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR
JOE McCarthy, roy m. cohn, and
FRANCIS p. CARR
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIED CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Res. 189
PART 42
MAY 27, 1954
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46620" WASHINGTON : 1954
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland THOMAS A. BURKE, Ohio
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan
Richard J. O'Melia, General Counsel
Walter L. REVxoLrs, Chief Clerk
Special Subcommittee on Investigations
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota, Chairman
EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michig.in HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
Ray H. Jenkins, Chief Counsel
THOMAS R. Pre WITT, Assistant Counsel
ROBERT A. Collier, Assistant Counsel
SOLis Horwitz, Assistant Counsel
Charles A. Maner, Seeretary
n
CONTENTS
Page
Appendix 1595
Index 1600a
Testimony of —
Cohn, Roy M., chief counsel, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations 1554
EXHIBITS
Intro-
duced Appears
on page on page
26. Document, March 1953, entitled "Communist Infiltration of
the American Armed Forces" 1570 1595
27. Excerpt from Washington Times-Herald, September 2, 1953. . 1581 1599
SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES AND
COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE
HENSEL, AND SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY, ROY M. COHN,
AND FRANCIS P. CARR
THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1954
United States Senate,
Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met at 10: 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in the
caucus room of the Senate Office Building, Senator Karl E. Mundt
(chairman) presiding.
Present : Senator Karl E. Mundt, Kepublican, South Dakota ; Sen-
ator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican, Illinois ; Senator Charles
E. Potter, Republican, Michigan ; Senator Henry C. Dworshak, Re-
publican, Idaho; Senator John L. INIcClellan, Democrat, Arkansas;
Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and Senator
Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.
Also present: Ray H. Jenkins, chief counsel to the subcommittee;
Thomas R. Prewitt, assistant counsel ; Charles Maner, assistant coun-
sel ; and Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk.
Principal participants present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a
United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin; Roy M. Cohn,
chief counsel to the subcommittee ; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel
for the Army ; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army.
Senator Mundt. The committee will please come to order.
Once again the Chair would like to welcome our guests to the com-
mittee room and to call their attention to the standing committee rule,
which is to the effect that there are to be no audible manifestations of
approval or disapproval of any kind at any time during the course of
these hearings, and to admonish our guests and to caution them that
the uniformed officers and the plainclothes men in the audience have
been instructed by the committee to remove from the room at once,
politely but firmly, any of our guests who violate the conditions under
which they entered the room. Those conditions were to refrain entirely
from manifestations of approval or disapproval.
The Chair would like to apologize for being 5 minutes late, because
his colleague and friend from Illinois suggested that I was tardy this
morning. I was. I might say I was detained in a conference, work-
ing on the farm problem, and the Chair still believes that probably
the maintenance of farm prosperity is even more basic than the issues
which we have here today. I will try not to be late again.
1553
1554 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Senator Symington has told the Chair that he wants to read a short
statement at the beginning, that it will not provoke any additional
colloquy, and the Chair would be happy to hear Senator Symington.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, we have been considering the position in which these
hearings have been left as a result of the action taken yesterday over
the protests of the minority, and also statements made by the chairman
and other members of the majority, with respect to Mr. Hensel and
Mr. Carr.
It is absolutely unthinkable that these hearings should conclude
without a thorough examination and cross-examination of Mr. Carr,
who participated in and has personal knowledge of many of the
critical facts.
We propose, Mr. Chairman, at the appropriate time, to again insist
that Mr. Carr be called as a witness.
There are other persons whose testimony is essential if the com-
mittee is sincere in trying to get to the bottom of this matter, and the
testimony of these people is essential to find the truth and also to
establish whether perjury has been committed or will be committed
by any witness in these hearings.
We are going to insist, Mr. Chairman, that all such other people
be called, as well.
At the present time, however, we shall merely reserve our rights to
demand at the proper time in the future that these people be called
so that the examination of the next witness may now go forward with-
out delay.
Senator Mundt. The Chair is a little surprised at the content of the
so-called noncontroversial statement, but believes we should expedite
the hearings, and at the appropriate time we will meet the issues when
they come appropriately.
Mr. Jenkins, you have a witness before you.
Ssnator Symington. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
say to me it was not controversial. It was a summary of yesterday and
I would like the people to know that I offered to let the chairman read
the statement, which he did not want to do.
Senator Mundt. You are correct. I didn't care to read the statement.
Mr, Jenkins, you may continue with the examination of the witness.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman.
TESTIMONY OF EOY M. COHN
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I believe you were sworn yesterday after-
noon.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. For the benefit of the record, will you please state
your full name.
Mr. Cohn. Roy M. Cohn.
JNIr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you are quite alone there, sitting there by
yourself. You understand of course that you are entitled to counsel.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir ; I understand that.
Mr. Jenkins. You are not availing yourself of that privilege?
Mr. Cohn. N"o, sir. I have served as counsel to the regular sub-
committee and I hope I can give the facts here without the advice ot
counsel.
II
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1555
Mr. Jenkins. You are representing yourself ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Would you mind telling your age, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoiiN. I am 27, sir.
Mr. Jenkins, What is your official position ?
Mr. CoiiN. Chief counsel of the United States Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations.
Mr. Jenkins. Is that the committee that we have been referring to
liere generally as the McCarthy committee for purpose of iden-
tification ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. When did you come with that committee, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Wlien Congress was reorganized, sir, in January of 1953.
Mr. Jenkins. Now approximately almost a year and a half ago.
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. In what line of endeavor were you engaged prior to
coming to the McCarthy committee ?
Mr. Cohn. I had been with the Department of Justice, Mr. Jenkins,
directly prior to coming. I was a special assistant to the Attorney
General of the United States.
Mr. Jenkins. Where were you stationed or located ?
]\Ir. Cohn. In Washington.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I am going to ask you at this time to relate
to the members of this committee your experiences, and particularly
your experiences that qualified or fitted you for the line of endeavor
in which you have been engaged since coming to the McCarthy com-
mittee ? Tell something of your background. You may use your own
judgment about what you want to cover, what area you want to cover,
but I am asking you now particularly about your experience, your back-
ground, your qualifications for the line of work in which you have
been engaged since being with the McCarthy committee.
Mr. Cohn. Do you mean, sir, the cases which I participated in in
the Department of Justice ?
Mr. Jenkins. First of all, of what college or colleges are you a
graduate ?
Mr. Cohn. Columbia University College and Law School, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And law school ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, then, in what line of work, particularly, were
you engaged before you were engaged with Senator McCarthy ?
Mr. Cohn. Before I came with the Senator ?
Mr. Jenkins. Eight.
Mr. Cohn. I was with the Department of Justice and I had been
working on cases involving the prosecution of Communists, spys, and
subversives for some time.
Mr. Jenkins. How long were you with the Department of Justice?
Mr. Cohn. I was with the Department of Justice for some 5 or 6
years.
Mr. Jenkins. For some 5 or 6 years ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say as an Assistant Attorney General ?
Mr. Cohn. Well, first, sir, I started off after I left law school as a
law clerk in the office of the United States district attorney in New
1553 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
York. Wlien I was admitted to the bar, I became an assistant United
States attorney. I then became confidential assistant to the United
States attorney and finally was appointed special assistant to the
Attorney General of the United States by Attorney General
McGranery.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, in what particular line of work were you
engaged as assistant United States attorney ?
Mr. CoHN. Well, at the beginning, sir, I prosecuted cases involving
counterfeiters and dope peddlers and the usual run of business in that
office. There came a time, about 1949, when I began to work pretty
much exclusively on the prosecution of cases involving communism,
subversion, and espionage.
Mr. Jenkins. And did or not you engage in that particular line
of work for some 4 or 5 years, or perhaps 6 years, before coming with
the McCarthy committee ?
Mr. CoHN. I would say about 3 or 4 years, sir,
Mr, Jenkins. Where was that, now ? In Washington or New York ?
Mr, Cohn. In both places, Mr. Jenkins, first New York and then
Washington.
Mr. Jenkins. Was not your experience along that line extensive
or otherwise ?
Mr, CoHN. Well, I don't know, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. We just want to know the facts. If you appear to be
immodest, that is quite all right. The committee wants to Know the
facts about your experience and your qualifications, particularly with
respect to Communists, subversives, poor security risks, et cetera.
Mr. Cohn. Very well, sir. Well, if I may, Mr. Jenkins, if I think
I know what you want, suppose I list the cases in which I participated
in some way, and let the committee
Mr. Jenkins. Not at any great length, but generally. Go right
ahead and list those cases in W'hich you participated.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, before the witness starts, I
wonder if the young men with their flash bulbs will move to one side
so they won't be between the witness and the questioner? I would
like to see what is going on.
Mr. Cohn. The list of the cases, Mr. Jenkins ? The first one was —
by the way, sir, before I list these cases, I would like to say this, in
working on the prosecution of these cases, I was part of a team. I
never prosecuted any one case alone. There were always a group of
fine people with me who worked long and hard on each of them. And
as far as we were all concerned, what we did was to present to grand
juries, to courts and to juries, evidence and facts accumulated over a
long period of time by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
We merely presented to the courts what the FBI had dug up over
years of intensive investigation of Communists and espionage activities
in this country.
The first of those cases, sir, which I had anything to do with, was
the prosecution of the first-string leaders of the Communist Party
before Judge Medina, up in New York. I did law work on that case.
Mr, Jenkins. What case was that, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. That was the prosecution, sir, of what have come to be
known as the first-string leaders of the Communist Party of the
United States. It was actually the members of the national committee
of the Communist Party of the United States, which is the governing
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1557
body of the Communist consi^iracy in this Nation. They were indicted
nnder the Smith Act for conspiracy to teach and advocate violent
overthrovs^ of onr Government, and were prosecuted before Judj^e
Medina in New York.
Mr. Jenkins. To identify that case, how many defendants were
there, do you recall?
Mr. CoHN. It started off with 12, sir, and the case was severed as
to William Z. Foster, the national chairman, on grounds of illness, and
11, I believe, were finally convicted.
Mr. Jenkins. Were there other cases of consequence, Mr. Cohn, in
which you actively participated as prosecutor or assistant prosecutor?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. After the trial of the first-string Communist
leaders, I began to work with Elizabeth Bentley, who had been courier
for a Communist spy ring and had gone to the FBI and furnished in-
formation as to the identity of various Communists who had infil-
trated the United States Government and conducted espionage ac-
tivities, and I worked with Harry Gold, who had just at that time told
the story of his participation in a Soviet spy ring in this country whicli
had obtained atom bomb and other secrets and transmitted them to the
Soviet Union.
As a result of working with Miss Bentley and Mr. Gold, there re-
sulted the prosecution of the next case, I believe it was the prosecution
of Abraham Brothman and Miriam Moskowitz, on charges of con-
spiracy to obstruct justice, in that they had covered up the Gold-
Rosenberg spy ring during the grand jury investigation in 1948 and
had delayed the uncovering of that spy ring for a number of years.
They were prosecuted for conspiracy to obstruct justice. I partici-
pated in that. They were convicted.
After that, sir, I went into the prosecution of William W. Reming-
ton on charges of perjury involving his denial, I believe before the
subcommittee of this very committee, involving the denial of member-
ship in the Communist Party. Mr. Remington had been a Commerce
Department official, and he had been one of Miss Bentley's Communist
espionage contacts while he. Remington, was in the United States
Government.
He testified first before a congressional committee and denied this,
and was later before a grand jury, and then prosecuted for perjury,
and I was in that case.
Mr. Jenkins. What was the result of that prosecution ?
Mr. Cohn, The result of the prosecution, sir, was that he w^as
convicted by the jury. The conviction w^as reversed on a question of
law by the United States Court of Appeals. We represented the evi-
dence to another grand jury ; he was reindicted, reconvicted, and his
conviction has but recently been affirmed by the United States Court
of Appeals, and he is serving a jail sentence.
Mr. Jenkins. Are there other notable cases, Mr. Cohn, in which you
participated as prosecutor?
Mr. CoiiN. Sir, after the Remington case, about 3 weeks thereafter,
I participated in the preparation for trial and in the prosecution of
the Rosenberg case.
Mr. Jenkins. Is that the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg case?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. That was the case in which Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg and Morton Sobell were defendants on a charge of con-
46620'— 54— pt. 42 2
1558 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
spiracy to commit espionage in that they, along with Harry Gold,
Alfred Slack
Mr. Jenkins. It is not necessary to mention the Alfred Slack case
here, Mr. Cohn. I would rather forget that, as far as I am concerned.
Anyway, did you help investigate and prosecute Julius and Ethel
Kosenberg ?
Mr. Cohn, Yes, sir. That case was prosecuted, and they were con-
victed of charges of conspiracy to commit espionage in giving atom
secrets and other secrets to a Communist spy ring.
After that, sir I believe the next thing was, I presented to the Fed-
eral grand jury in New York the evidence which resulted in the in-
dictment of the second-string leaders
Mr. Jenkins. Pardon the interruption, but one of the Senators
whispers to me and suggests that I ask you the outcome of the Julius
and Ethel Rosenberg case ; and, for the benefit of those, especially in
the TV audience, who don't know, will you please state what the final
result was?
Mr. Cohn. Very final, sir. Mr, and Mrs Rosenberg
Mr. Jenkins. You say it was very final ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Permanent?
Mr. Cohn. In the case of Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg, sir, they were
executed following affirmance of their conviction by the court of
appeals and denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court. They were
executed as atom spies.
Mr. Sobell is serving a 30-year sentence in Alcatraz for his participa-
tion.
Mr. Jenkins. You were telling about another case of consequence
in which you were actively engaged as prosecutor.
Mr. Cohn. I believe right after the Rosenberg case, sir, I presented
to the Federal grand jury in New York evidence which resulted in
the indictment of the second-string leaders of the Communist Party
in the United States.
In other words, after the first-string leaders were convicted, they
were replaced on the national committee of the Communist Party by
a new group of Communists who directed the conspiracy in this coun-
try. As soon as the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the first-
string group, we obtained the indictment of the second-string leaders
who had taken over the active direction of the Communist Party of
the United States. They were indicted, and I might say, sir, that that
indictment resulted in some further cases in that 4 of the second-string
leaders who were indicted failed to surrender on the charges of con-
spiracy to teach and advocate overthrow of our Government, and 4
of the first-string leaders who had been convicted before Judge Medina
jumped bail and became fugitives, which made it necessary for us
to prosecute for contempt of court the people who had put up the
bail for these fugitive Communists.
That prosecution for contempt of court, Mr. Jenkins, was the next
case. That was a prosecution of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Dashiell
Hammett, Abner Green, who were the trustees of the bail fund of the
Civil Rights Congress who had j)ut up the bail for these fugitive Com-
munists.
They were prosecuted for contempt of court. They were convicted
and given jail sentences. I remember that in the summer, sir, I argued
II
SPECIAL IN\KST1GATI0N 1559
tlie Field appeal before the United States court of appeals up in Con-
necticut. And that is the chain of events.
Mr. Jenkins. In addition, Mr. Cohn, to the cases you have men-
tioned, have or not you prosecuted other cases without mentioning
them specifically ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. I think that there were from that point on
very briefly there just 2 or 3 more.
Mr. Jenkins. Would you liive to mention those to the committee,
Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Whatever you say, sir.
Mv. Jenkins. In other words, you are not a defendant lawyer, I
take it. You are a prosecutor ; is that right ?
Mr. Cohn. I have been up until this proceeding, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Up until this proceeding.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Like myself, you are playing a sort of dual role ?
Mr. Cohn. Well, it seems pretty one-sided so far.
Mr. Jenkins. As a result of your experience, Mr. Cohn, in investi-
gating these various cases you have mentioned and others, and of
presenting those cases to the grand jury and appearing in court in
the role of prosecuting attorney, did you or not become what we might
call an expert on communism or a subversive, poor risk? Do you
think so, or not? Just give me your own opinion about it.
Mr. Cohn. Well, sir, I would say I was not an expert. I would
say in the course of these various trials I had to read an awful lot
of Marxist-Leninist literature and I had to learn the ins and outs
of the Communist conspiracy and the espionage movement in this
country.
Mr. Jenkins. Have you made a considerable study of communism,
Mr. Cohn?
]\Ir. Cohn. I have, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And particularly as it relates to the infiltration of
Communists in tlie United States and into the various governmental
branches and agencies?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Could you give us a short definition of what a Com-
munist is?
Mr. Cohn. A Communist, sir, is one who is under the discipline
of the movement which stands for the overthrow by force and violence
of the Government of the United States and of every other free
government throughout the world, and the movement which works
by criminal, illegal, means, by espionage and sabotage and every other
foul way known to man, to bring about the day when the world will
be under the control of the international Communist movement, and
when free governments will no longer exist.
Mr. Jenkins. I take it you are not on the friendliest of terms, then,
with the Communist Party ; is that right, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. I am not, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You have not been nominated as the editor of the
Daily Worker?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. I have been referred to in the Daily Worker
very considerably, but I have not been nominated by them for any
favorable offers.
Mr. Jenkins. Can you give us a short definition of espionage?
1560 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. I would say espionage, sir, is defined by law in title 18
of the United States Code and involves generally the possession of or
transmission of information vital to the national defense of the United
States to a foreign power with intent that it be used against the inter-
ests of the United States. That is a very rough definition. Of course,
the sections of law speak for themselves.
Mr. Jenkins. What is a subversive?
Mr. CoHN. A subversive, sir, I would say, is a person who is dedi-
cated to interests unfavorable to the continuation of the free govern-
ment under which we live in this country.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, what were the circumstances under which
you came to the McCarthy committee in January 1953 ?
Mr. CoiiN. Well, sir, I had never met — I did not know, I might have
met Senator McCarthy once at a dinner, casually. I did not know him.
Mr. Jenkins. I take it perhaps you had heard of him ?
Mr. CoHN. I had heard of him, sir, and I might say that we all felt
that our work in prosecuting Communists was considerably aided by
what Senator McCarthy was doing in alerting the Nation and the
world to the menace of Communist infiltration in this country. I had
very definitely heard of Senator McCarthy and I admired very much
what he was doing. I had never had the good fortune of talking with
him.
Mr. Jenkins. My question is. What were the circumstances under
which you came to the McCarthy committee in January 1953 ?
Mr. CoiiN. Well, sir. Senator McCarthy contacted me and asked
me to come to Washington
Mr. Jenkins. He had heard of you ?
Mr. CopiN. He had heard of me, sir ; yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. Cohn. He asked me to come to Washington and talk with him.
When I came clown, he asked me if I would come and serve as chief
counsel for this subcommittee if he recommended my name, and if my
name were approved by the members of the subcommittee. I, of
course, was deeply honored by that offer. It was more than I had
hoped for, and I told the Senator that as much as I wanted to, I
thought it might not be possible because I was a Democrat and he was
a Republican.
Mr. Jenkins. You are a Democrat, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I certainly won't hold that against you, Mr. Cohn.
Go right ahead with your testimony.
MrrCoHN. Well, I don't consider it a slur of any kind, sir. I am
proud of it, and I belong, I hope, to the wing of the party which is as
firmly — which is firmly dedicated to opposition to the Communist
movement in this country as I know is the Republican Party. I don't
think, sir, that it is a party issue anywhere. I know there are a lot of
Democrats who join with the able Republicans in fighting this.
Mr. Jenkins. In short, you believe in the two great party system
in this country ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And your political affiliations are certainly immate-
rial, I am sure, so far as every member of the committee is concerned ?
Mr. Cohn. Senator McCarthy told me it was completely immate-
rial. When I talked to him, he told me he did not care what my
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1561
politics were. He wanted to know if I thought I could serve this
committee and particularly whether I could contribute anything on
those Communist investigations.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you know how long Senator IMcCarthy had then
been chairman of the committee when you talked to him in January?
Mr. CoiiN. When I talked to him, I don't believe he was actually
chairman. I believe the Republicans had won the election and were
about to take over the JSenate. Under the rules of the Senate, he was
destined to become chairman and he was making plans to set up the
committee staff.
Mr. Jenkins. His staff had not been organized?
Mr. CoriN. No, sir.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Do you know whether or not you were the first
member added to his staff?
Mr. CoHN. I don't know that, sir. There were 2 or 3 who came in
pretty nnich at the beginning. I don't know if I was the first.
Mr. Jenkins. Be that as it may, you were engaged on the occasion
of your first conference with him ; is that
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir, the first conference, there the Senator asked
me if I was interested. I told him I certainly was. He told me he
would reconnnend my name to the committee. He did that. I was
approved by the committee and I began my duties, I suppose, a few —
a couple of days after the committee was organized in January.
Mr. Jenkins. And you have served as a chief counsel to the Mc-
Carthy committee since that time, and up to the present time?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, what are the duties of chief counsel to
the McCarthy committee ?
Mr. Cohn. Well, they are many and varied, sir. One duty is the
questioning of witnesses at executive sessions and public hearings.
The duties include working with the staff to develop material on the
infiltration of Communists into the United States Government, into
defense plants; material concerning corruption in office, and the as-
sembly of those facts, in preparation for public hearings, in prepara-
tion for executive sessions; examining witnesses, consulting with the
chairman and members of the committee, and generally working along
with the committee.
Mr. Jenkins. Can you give us, without divulging secrets that should
not be given to the public, the area in which you investigate for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not there are spies, Communists,
subversives, in the country, or in the Army or in any governmental
agency ?
Mr. CoiiN. Do you mean the sources from which
Mr. Jenkins. The sources.
Mr. Cohn. Generally speaking?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Surely, sir. First of all, we get a good deal of informa-
tion from people outside of Government, people who have been in
the Communist movement and who are in the best position to know
what the Communists are up to. We get information from certain
people in Government who point out instances were Communists are
being covered up and where no action is being taken against Com-
munist despite FBI warnings. We get information, sir, by ^oing
over old files, old records, documentations of people who have signed
1562 SPEaAL ESrVESTIGATIOlSr
Commimist petitions and who might later turn up in Government,
from communications received by us from many patriotic organiza-
tions, from Americans all around the country who gain this infor-
mation and who see fit to furnish it to this committee, to the investi-
gating committee of the United States Senate. Those are just a few
of the sources.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, when did the McCarthy committee begin
to investigate the existence or presence of spies or subversives in any
governmental agency ?
Mr. CoHN. I would say we began that right after the committee
was organized, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. As a result of information that you had, is that what
you are saying?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What was the first agency of the Government inves-
tigated by the McCarthy committee?
Mr. Cohn. The United — the first agency, I believe, sir — well, I
think there w^ere two, actually. We held hearings on the filing system
in the United States State Department, which showed that — well, I
guess there was general confusion in the manner of keeping files
wdiich had operated to the benefit of certain people in the State De-
partment with subversive records. It showed the operation of various
boards in the State Department, some of which had deleted unfavor-
able material on State Department people with subversive records of
Communist affiliation from the files, and things of that kind.
We conducted that investigation, and after that, the State Depart-
ment changed its filing system. We then held public hearings on
Communist infiltration and general inefficiency in the operation of
the information program which included among other branches, the
Voice of America.
Mr. Jenkins. Did or not you investigate the Government Printinfy
Office.
Mr. Cohn. That came a bit later, sir. I might say, while we were
holding public hearings on the Voice of America, and on the State
Department filing system, at the same time we were planning out what
was to come next, we were gathering information and laying the
groundwork for future investigations of the subcommittee. One of
those was, indeed, the Government Printing Office.
Mr. Jenkins. When was th^ investigation of the Government
printing Office conducted?
Mr. Cohn. Well, we began
Mr. Jenkins. Was it prior to the time that you started investigating
the Army, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. I would say the preliminary investigation was going on
at the same time as the preliminary investigation of the Army. The
public hearings were held just prior to the beginning of hearings,
formal hearings, on Communist infiltration in the Army.
Mr. Jenkins. As we understand it, before a public hearing is had,
or even an executive hearing is had, you have conducted some pre-
liminary investigation, groundwork or spadework, is that correct?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, there is an awful lot of staff work that goes into
these things. When we have an executive session or public hearing,
it means that before that, hours, days and weeks have been spent by
the staff in gathering information, interviewing witnesses, and de-
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1563
termining the facts for presentation to the committee at executive
session or public hearing.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you recall about how many witnesses the Mc-
Carthy committee has interviewed since its formation, or since the
inception of its work began?
Mr. CoHN. If you include staff interviews, sir, I would say safely
well over a thousand.
Mr. Jenkins. Well over a thousand?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. As a result of your investigation of the Government
Printing Office, I will ask you whether or not any suspensions or dis-
missals resulted.
Mr. C!oHN. Yes, sir. When we began our hearings in the Govern-
ment Printing Office, I might tell you about that for a minute, sir,
it was during the summer, the early summer I believe when we began
hearings. I remember very well that Senator Dirksen interrupted
a trip and came back, and Senator McCarthy was there. We started
the hearings and it developed very rapidly that there was working
in the Government Printing Office, in a room through which passed
the secrets, not only of the Army and Navy, but of just about every
sensitive Government agency in existence, that there was working in
this composition room at the Government Printing Office a man who
had been not only a Communist, but who had taken papers and secrets
from the Government Printing Office at night, taken them home with
him, without authority. Those facts were developed by Senator
Dirksen in executive session. Public hearings were held and this
man, Edward Rothchild, his name was, sir, claimed the fifth amend-
ment, before the subcommittee while currently working for the Gov-
ernment Printing Office.
He claimed the fifth amendment as to whether he was currently in
1953, engaged in espionage against the United States in the Govern-
ment Printing Office, on the ground that if he answered questions, his
answers might tend to incriminate him. There were suspensions
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, let's don't go into specific cases.
As a result of the investigation — before that — strike that question.
It was not part of the duty of the Army to investigate the Govern-
ment Printing Office, was it?
Mr. CoHN. None at all, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. That is an entirely distinct and separate agency.
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. The only part the Army would have in it is
this : The Government Printing Office did a considerable amount of
secret work or classified work for the Army. I know that a couple
of other agencies which sent their work over to the Government Print-
ing Office became very much concerned as our investigation got under
way and the fifth amendment claims were made. I don't recall that
we heard anything further.
Mr. Jenkins. Were there suspensions in the Government Printing
Office?
Mr. CoiiN. There were.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you recall the number ?
Mr. CoiiN. I think that I would want to check this. I think there
were 13 or 15, and there were a lot more than suspensions.
Mr. Jenkins. While on that subject, I want to ask you this question,
Mr. Cohn : During the period of your investigation of the Government
1561 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Printing Office, state whether or not Senator McCarthy or you caused
to be subpenaed and require to appear in executive session, members
of the Loyalty Board ?
Mr. CoHN. They appeared not only in executive session but they
appeared and testified fully in both executive and public sessions.
Mr. Jenkins. Was any question raised at that time about your
authority to have the members of the Loyalty Board subpenaed ?
Mr. CoiiN. None at all.
Mr. Jenkins. Was there any Presidential or other directive pro-
hibiting such a thing, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. No assertion of any Presidential directive or anything
else was made. They all came. They all testified, and the head of the
Government Printing Office gave us not only lipservice but full and
complete cooperation.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, in order to channel our course of investi-
gation, let s review here for a moment the charges, the charges being
now, as I apprehend them to be, first : That the Army or Mr. Stevens
and Mr. Adams sought to discredit the work or the importance of the
work of the McCarthy investigating committee. Right or not ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir-= —
Mr. Jenkins. No. 1.
Mr. CoHN. You start oil by saying "the Army," and I wonder
Mr. Jenkins. I said "and/or Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams." We are
not going to get into a hassle over that. .
Mr. Cohn. Let me say what I will not say again during these hear-
ings: This committee never investigated the United States Army as
such. I know that this committee, its chairman, its members, and
myself, have as deep a respect for the United States Army as they
have for the Government of which it is a part. We have no respect
for the Communists who have infiltrated, the small group of Com-
munists who have infiltrated that great Army or for the people in
that great Army who have covered up this Communist infiltration,.
That is what we investigated ; not the Army.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. That is the No. 1 charge in the speci-
fications of Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams; is that correct? The No. 1
charge of the McCarthy committee ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, on that, we did not make charges. We gave an
answer. We told what the facts were as we saw them. We did
not make charges. We initiated nothing. We were going about our
business.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, we are getting along wonderfully now.
If you will just give me direct answers, I think it would be the
greatest expediter that was ever brought about in this hearing.
Mr. CoHN. All right, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You have been doing it so far, and I comi)liment
you for doing it.
Mr. CoiiN. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. The No. 1 charge or No. 1 allegation or statement —
we are not going to differentiate between those words — in your docu-
ment prepared by request as counsel for this committee, is that Mr.
Stevens and Mr. Adams sought to discredit the work or the importance
of the work of the McCarthy committee. Is that right or not,
substantially ?
'I
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 15G5
Mr. CoiiN. Substantially, yes, sir, with qualifications.
Mi\ Jenkins. No. 2 — you might state what the qualifications are,
if there are qualifications.
Mr. CoiiN. What I am trying to do is this, Mr. Jenkins : I would
like to give specific facts, specific statements, and try to avoid charac-
terizing generally what people sounded like or what their emotions
were, and things of that kind.
Mr. Jenkins. No. 2 : It is alleged or stated in the document ])re-
pared by you and Senator McCarthy, that Mr. Stevens and INIr. Adams
sought to prevent or bring about a discontinuance of your investi-
gation of spies, subversives, and poor security risks in the Army.
Is that correct ?
Mr. CoiiN. They did.
Mv. Jenkins. And particularly at Fort IMonmouth. Is that right?
]\rr. CoHN. They did. That is true.
Mr. Jenkins. And, thirdly and lastly, that there was an attempt
on the part of Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams — perhaps you state in
your document a successful attempt — to prevent Senator McCarthy
and his staff from investigating members of the Loyalty Board; is
that right ?
IVIr. CoHN. That is true.
Mr. Jenkins. Do those three statements or charges — and I will
probably refer to them as charges — embrace, in the main, the allega-
tions of Senator McCarthy and Mr. Colin against Mr. Stevens and
Mr. Adams ?
Mv. CoHN. They are certainly an essential part of the picture.
JNIr. Jenkins. Very well.
JNIr. Colin, as I say, for the purpose of expediting these hearings
we want to channel our discussion within the area and bounds of those
three allegations.
When did the McCarthy committee begin investigating the infiltra-
tion of subversives, spies, or poor risks in the United States Army?
Mr. CoHN. Very shortly after the committee was organized, I
would say, sir, February of 1953.
Mr. Jenkins. What was the nature of that work, without giving
away any secrets ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir, not at all.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. CoHN. I want to give you all the information.
The thing came about in this way, Mr. Jenkins : We received infor-
mation— various members of the staff received information that the
Communist Party in this country, as in other countries, was trying to
and had succeeded to some extent in infiltrating the United States
Army and various of its installations. That was a historically known
fact that they were trying to do that, sir, and I don't think there can
be any doubt about it.
On that point, there is just one paragraph I wanted to read to you
which I think makes this picture quite clear.
Mr. Jenkins. You may do so.
Mr. CoiiN. That paragraph, ]Mr. Jenkins, comes from The 21 Con-
ditions of Admission into the Communist International, which is this
worldwide Communist conspiracy seeking the destruction of this Na-
tion and every other nation, and that paragraph concerns the Com-
40020°— 54— pt, 42 3
2566 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
munist plan to infiltrate armies in free countries of the world, and it
reads :
The obligation to spread Communist ideas includes the necessity of persistent,
systematic propaganda in the army. Wherever such propaganda is forbidden by
exceptional laws, it must be carried on illegally. The abandonment of such work
would be equivalent to the betrayal of revolutionary duty and is incompatible with
membership in the Third International.
That and the resolutions of the Sixth World Congress, one sentence
of which reads :
Revolutionary work in the army must be organized and openly advocated —
I think make it very clear, sir, that as a historical matter down
through the years up to and including the present date, one of the
principal aims of the Communist conspiracy has been the infiltration
of our military.
Mr. Jenkins. You say, Mr. Cohn, that you started the ground or
spadework in the early part of 1953 ?
Mr. CoHN. February of 1953 is the best I can place it.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you actively participate in that?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Other members of your staff ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. That is. Senator McCarthy's staff ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. When did you first start hearings on infiltration of
subversives in the Army ?
Mr. CoHN. Well, before we had hearings, sir, we conducted what is
known as a preliminary investigation and assembled the general areas
of information on Communist infil
Mr. Jenkins. Did that include the interview of witnesses ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir, we interviewed witnesses, we reviewed various
documents and information, and we came to, I would say, 3 or 4
conclusions.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did you know about a new and different
setup in the form of a Presidential directive of April 27, 1953, under
the new administration ?
. Mr. CoHN. I did.
i» Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you what effect that had with respect to
your investigation insofar as it related to a broadening of the area of
your investigation, or a relaxation of previous rules pertaining to your
investigation.
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I believe you refer to the directive of the present
administration issued by President Eisenhower, which provided for a
chance
'to^
Mr. Jenkins. I am not talking about the one of May 17.
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I am talking about the one of April 27.
Mr. Cohn. Of last year ; yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. The directive, sir, which provided for some relaxation
and for review of loyalty-board procedures and review of cases in-
volving possible security risks and Communists. That directive came
out.
Mr. Jenkins. And as a result of that, you say that you had, shall we
say, a freer hand with respect to conducting your investigation?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1 5G7
Mr. CoHN. To some extent; yes, \vc did.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, you were telling about the work you were doing
prior to your hearing^s when I interrupted you. You may proceed
along that line of direct testimony, if you will, Mr. Cohn.
INIr. CoHN. All right, sir. Well, to save time, I think what I would
like to do, if it is agreeable to you, Mr. Jenkins, is to summarize
the areas of information which reached the subconmiittee in the
course of its preliminary investigation.
]\Ir. Jenkins. You may now do so.
Mr. CoHN. Pretty soon after February, in fact, I think, around the
beginning of March, the staff obtained from people who had formerly
been in the Communist movement, specific details about what the
Connnunist conspiracy had done to infiltrate the United States Army,
and to place Communists in key places, sensitive places, in the Army
in the country. There was submitted to this committee a somewhat
detailed memorandum, ^vhich I have here, sir, and will not read from,
containing information about the number of Communists in the mili-
tary, containing information about various things the Communists
liad done to get their members in the military, in radar laboratories,
and explaining why it was essential for the Communists for purposes
of espionage, sabotage, for the purpose of recruiting other people in
the military into the party to bring about this infiltration,
INIr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, pardon the interruption. Would you care
to file the document to which you have just referred as an exhibit to
your testimony?
Mr. Cohn. I would be very glad to do that, if I could do that
Mr. Jenkins. If it will not betray any secrets.
j\Ir. Cohn. Sir, I would like to go over that with Senator McCarthy
during the noon hour. My opinion is that we will be glad to file it
with the subcommittee.
]Mr. Jenkins. Very well. You may continue with your direct
testimony.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. After receiving this memorandum on March —
it is entitled, "Communist Infiltration of the American Armed
Forces" — after that was submitted to us in March, the staff inter-
viewed a number of witnesses, went over a lot of documents, and
came — I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Pardon the interruption. Go right ahead, Mr. Cohn.
I didn't ^et your last statement, I am sorry.
Mr. Cohn. I don't know what it was, sir, I think that I said after
this memorandum was submitted to the committee, this memorandum
clarified and restated the fact
Mr. Jenkins. That is the memorandum to which you have just
referred ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, Communist infiltration of the Armed Forces.
Mr. Jenkins. Senator McClellan is interested in knowing a little
more about it. By whom was that memorandum prepared ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I would like to ask this, if I may
]Mr. Jenkins. I am not asking you to file it at this time. You say
you would like to consult with Senator McCarthy before you do so.
]Mr. Cohn. On the question of by whom it was prepared and on
the question of filing it, if I could talk to Senator IVIcCarthy during
the noon hour, I think I will be able to
1568 SPECIAL INVESTIGATIOlSr
Senator McClellan. Point of order, Mr. Chairman. I want to
know if it is a committee document.
Mr. CoHN. Pardon me?
Senator McClellan. Is it a committee document ?
Mr. CoHN. Well, Senator
Senator McClellan. I am asking you, not Senator McCarthy.
You ought to know.
Mr, CoHN. The document was submitted to the staff, sir, and I sub-
mitted it to the chairman of the committee.
Senator McClellan". If it is a committee document, I think the com-
mittee could be consulted a little too ; don't you ?
Mr. CoiiN. Well, sir, of course.
Senator McClellan. All right, then. Let us all be consulted.
Mr. CoHN. I am sorry, sir, I would be very happy if you want me,
Mr. Jenkins, to meet with the full committee or anybody else Sena-
tor McClellan suggests, and go over this question. I am sure we will
make the document available.
Senator Jackson. If it is a committee document, might we not look
at it ? We have never seen it before.
Mr. Jenkins. Senator Jackson, the first I have heard of it was
a few minutes ago. I have not seen it. I don't know the contents.
Senator McClellan. Find out if it has ever been made available
to the committee.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, could we have a 2-minute re-
cess? I would like to discuss the matter with Mr. Cohn.
Senator Mundt. Without objection we will have a 2-minute recess
to determine the origin of the document and identity of it.
Mr. CoHN. It has been available.
(Brief recess.)
Senator Mundt. The committee will come to order. The recess
is over.
Mr. Jenkins, you will continue.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, during the recess, did you and Senator
McCarthy and other members of the staii confer with respect to the
document to which you had referred ?
Mr. CoHN. We did, sir, and I want to apologize to you and the Chair
and Senator McClellan for delay. We were trying tp reach on the
telephone the gentleman who prepared this at the reques^f the com-
mittee back last March to get his permission. We have his per-
mission. We will be very happy to submit that document to the
committee, to tell you who wrote it, and to tell you what the circum-
stances were. I might say this, Mr. Jenkins, in conclusion on this
point : This, of course, is but one of a large number of informational
sources and documents which we obtained. As far as this particular
one is concerned, that is available.
Senator Mundt. Senator McClellan.
Senator McClellan. I do not know what the counsel intends to
ask, but I want to know now if that is a committee document.
Mr. CoHN. I am sure it is. Senator.
Senator McClellan. You are sure it is ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Senator McClellan. Have members of this committee ever seen it ?
Mr. CoiiN. It has been available to them, sir. I don't know whether
they have gone down to look at it.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1569
Senator McClellan. Where luis it been available?
Mr. CoHN. In the regular files of the subcommittee down in room
101 of the subcommittee olHces, sir. It has been there since March.
Senator McClellan. Since March ?
Mr. Coiix. Yes, sir.
Senator McClellan. Has any member of this committee ever been
apprised of it except Senator McCarthy ?
Mr. CoiiN. I don't think there was any specific apprisal of this par-
ticular memorandum, sir. I know that during the months during
which the investigation got under way
Senator McClellan^. If it is a committee document, why is not the
committee consulted instead of just Senator McCarthy?
Mr. CoiiN. For this reason, sir, if I may : We receive, and w^e have
literally, I believe, hundreds and possibly over a thousand files. We
have ail sorts of documents and memoranda. I don't think it has
ever been the practice to bring all of them up to each member of the
committee.
Senator McClellan. That is right. It has not been. And we
know nothing about it. And you know we know nothing about it;
do you not ?
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Senator IMcCarthy?
Senator McCarthy. Yes. IMr. Chairman, the Senator from' Ar-
kansas knows that he and his two colleagues absented themselves from
the committee. May I finish ?
Since they have returned, the work of the committee has been com-
pletely held up. Mr. McClellan knows, if he w^ants to go down to
the room in which the files are, that he can see any file he wants to
see. He knows that my staff cannot spend its time running up to
the offices of Senators and giving them information each day about
the vast amount of information that they have. We have, and I am
sure the Chair will agree to this, we have agreed to let the minority
have a counsel who can go through those files at will, and give any
information to the minority members.
Senator ISIundt. Mr. Jenkins ?
Senator McClellan. May I say this
Senator Mundt. Senator McClellan ?
Senator McClellan. You say you can't send them to members of
the committee. You have a staff down there that has nothing else
to do except make copies and provide them to members of the com-
mittee ; don't you ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Senator McClellan. You do have a staff down there ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes ; but they have a lot more to do than make copies
of memoranda, sir.
Senator McClellan. They have a lot more to do besides that ; don't
they ?
]VIr. CoHN. Yes, sir, they do. They investigate.
Senator McClellan. It is a committee document ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Senator INIcClellan. You didn't want to consult the members of
this committee about putting it in evidence, but only Senator Mc-
Carthy ; isn't that true ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, Senator McCarthy is the chairman of the committee.
1570 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Senator McClellan. I iinderstand, ; but there are some others who
have responsibility on this committee.
Mr. CoHN. I am sure of that, sir.
Senator McClellan. And you didn't want to consult us about it,
and you didn't.
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I would be perfectly happy to consult you about it.
Mr. Jexkixs. Mr. Cohn, before introducing that document in evi-
dence and filing it, tell us precisely what it is and what it embraces ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, all it is is one of a number of informational sources.
It embraces various facts about attempts on the part of the Communist
Party to infiltrate the United States Army. It contains an estimate
made by the author of this document, who was a Communist himself
for a long period of time, specifically concerned vfith Communist plans
to infiltrate the United States Army.
It contains estimates by him of the number of Communists still in
the United States Army at some of its installations and other informa-
tional and historical data about Communist plans to infiltrate the
United States Military Establishment. It is nothing of earth-shaking
significance at all.
Mr. Jenkins. Did I understand you to say that you had no objection
to revealing the name of the person who prepared that document?
Mr. Cohn. I have no objection. I talked to that person.
Mr. Jenkins. Who did prepare the document ?
Mr. Cohn. This document was prepared at the request of the staff
by Mr. Paul Crouch, who is currently a consultant for the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service of the United States Government,
who has worked for the Government both under the last administration
and is working for it under this administration, has been a witness
before grand juries and the trial.
I might say he was a witness at the Remington trial, in which I
played a part. He is currently an employee of the United States
Government.
JNIr. Jenkins. Was this document that you are about to file, to-
gether with other documents
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
IMr. Jenkins. Used as a basis upon which you conducted an inves-
tigation of subversives. Communists in the Army?
Mr. Cohn. This is one of many things, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. That is what I say. This, along with others, was
used as a basis for your investigation ?
]\Ir. Cohn. Yes, sir, this is one of the things.
I might say the particular purpose of it here, sir, is to establish the
date, a date on which we were looking into Communist infiltration.
Mr. Jenkins. What date does it establish, Mr. Cohn? .
Mr. Cohn. March of 1953.
Mr. Jenkins. March 1953?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. AVill you now file it as an exhibit to your testimony ?
Mr. Cohn. I would be very glad to.
Senator ISIundt. It will be marked with the appropriate exhibit
number.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 26" and will
found in the appendix on p. 1595.)
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIOiSr 1571
Senator McClellan. INIay we not be permitted to see it even now ?
I\lr. CoHK. Senator McClellan, of course I am filing it, and I assume
it is available to every member of the committee.
Senator jNIcClfxlan. We have no opportunity to know in advance
unless we have the opportunity to see it. It may be perfectly all
right. I am not trying to keep the document out, but I am trying to
get the proper consideration for those of us here on tlie minority side
of this committee who are not apprised of the proceedings and events
and what is going on. We have to sit here and meet with surprise
after surprise.
Senator Mundt. The Chair suggests that it be received, and that
if any of the minority members object to its being filed, it will not
be filed.
Mr. CoiiN. Sir, Senator McClellan, I will submit anything you want
me to.
Senator McClellan. I want you to submit that one. Let's see it
now.
Mr. CoHN. Very well, sir.
Senator McCarthy. Senator McClellan, may I have your attention ?
Senator McClellan. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. I would like to say if there is any laxity, any
criticism because we have not made copies of each piece of informa-
tion we have and given copies to all members of the committee, that
fault is mine. I have a very limited staff, as the Chair knows, and
they have been ordered to spend their time investigating communism,
corruption, graft, and what have you. The files are all open to every
member of the committee; and I may say. Senator McClellan, that
unless the committee changes the rule, I am not going to order my
staff to spend its time typing up copies of all of our memoranda and
sending it to all the Senators. The files are available. Any Senator
can go down and look through them at will. That has been the rule
since I have been Chairman.
Senator McClellan. May I ask the distinguished Chairman, have
we yet received the names — and I assume they are in the file — of the
claimed 133 Communists who are ready for investigation? I have
asked for it. Have I yet received it?
Senator ]\IcCarthy. You would know better than I, Senator. The
information is available to you if you request it.
Senator McClellan. I don't know how I can get it except to ask
for it. You keep talking about 133 Communists that you want to
investigate, and I haven't been able to get the name of one of them
yet.
Senator IMcCarthy. I say "exposed."
Senator McClellan. I am ready to help you investigate them. I
would like to have at least a little advance information.
Senator McCarthy. Senator McClellan, may I ask this : You know
I have been tied up here day and night with this investigation. I
frankly don't have the time now — that is one of the reasons why I
object to this show continuing on the road. As soon as we get through
with this, I am sure the Senator from Arkansas knows that I have
been always completely frank with him. He can have every piece of
1572 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
information that we have. It so happens, as you know, that I have a
lot of respect for the Senator from Arkansas.
Senator McClellan. I thank you.
Senator McCarthy. I hope that won't hurt your campaign.
Senator McClellaist. I hope you know I never want anything ex-
cept wliat is fair and tliat is all I am asking now.
Senator McCarthy. You will have every piece of information,
John.
Senator McClellan. I will be very glad to get what I have re-
quested at your convenience and I hope it will be soon.
Senator McCarthy. Good.
Senator Mundt. I hope we are not going to engage now in too much
additional colloquy among our colleagues, because one statement seems
to inherit another. I will recognize Senator Symington if he has a
point of order.
Senator Symixctoist. Mr. Chairman, there is some time when I
would like to say something in these hearings that the Chair doesn't
point out as delaying the hearings.
Senator Mundt. I would suggest that you wait until your 10-minute
period. The Chair has made no statement whatsoever.
Senator Symington. I will repeat again that the Chair himself
voted to recess the hearings for 10,000 minutes. Give me a chance,
please, to make my point which I think is pertinent to the subject.
Senator Mundt. You may make it. I couldn't stop you. I
wouldn't try.
Senator Symington. I trust you wouldn't, even if you could, Mr.
Chairman.
The point I was trying to make, sir, was that the minority counsel
tells me that he asked the committee for the names of these Commu-
nists in accordance with the wishes of the distinguished senior Sen-
ator from Arkansas, and was turned down.
Thank you.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy ?
Senator Symington. I beg your pardon. The counsel tells me he
was not turned clown, he has not received them yet. I would like to
ask them when he asked for them.
They were asked for approximately 10 days ago.
Senator McCarthy. May I say, Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons
•why I want to get this hearing ended is so that my staff can be in a
position to furnish Senator Symington, Senator McClellan, anyone
else the information that they are entitled to. But, Stu, you know
Senator Jackson. Well, Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. Let me finish. We have been tied up here.
You have had Frank Carr immobilized until yesterday and now he is
back on his job. If there is any information you want, you will get it,
period. Except, may I say, except in view of the statement by one of
my Democrat colleagues the other day that he would not hesitate to
make known the names of informants. In view of that, before I give
any information to anyone, even members of the committee, to disclose
confidential informants, I will have to take that up with the committee.
I feel that I have a rather sacred trust when a man comes in who is
working in Government and gives me information.
i\
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1573
Senator McCleixan. Let's be specific, Joe. Who was it that told
you he would give out your information. I didn't.
Senator McCarthy. Unless I misunderstood you, Senator, the other
day when I took the stand the question arose as to whether or not I
should jrive out the name of this younir nian who gave me the n'sinne
of the FBI files. Now, I read a story in the paper about 2 or o days
later, and again I certainly don't hold you responsible for news
reports
Senator McCleli^vn. Have I ever given out any information of
this committee?
Senator McCarthy. Let me finish. Your statement as it was quoted
was to the effect that you thought perhaps not only the man avIio gave
me this information about Communists, but also Senator McCarthy
might be guilty of a crime.
Senator McClellan. I repeat that statement, sir. I do not bslieve
you can receive information that is obtained by criminal means and
hold it in your possession without the probability of you, too, being
guilty of crime.
Senator McCarthy. If anyone wants to indict me, they can go right
ahead.
Senator McClellan. That is a matter of legal opinion. But this is
not restricted information, if you have the names, for the committee.
Senator McCarthy. Seiiator, let me say this. We now have you on
record as saying that you feel that the man who gave me information
about treason in Government — that is what it is, it is nothing less
than that — that he sliould be prosecuted.
Senator McClellan. I didn't say that. I asked your administra-
tion, the chief law-enforcement officer of the land, to look into it
and inquire, and determine what action should be taken. I am not
passing on the final merits of it.
Senator McCarthy. Let's get this straight.
Senator Mundt. We are getting a long way away from the issue.
Senator IMcCarthy. I know, but I think, Mr. Chairman, we should
straighten this out.
Senator Mundt. Senator Symington, I think my point is being
well taken here, when you say a little statement does inherit a lot of
colloquy.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, in view of Ssnator IMcClellan's
statement and his request, I would like to make it clear that I think
that the oath which every person in this Government takes, to protect
and defend this country against all enemies, foreign and domestic,
that oath towers far above any Presidential secrecy directive. And I
will continue to receive information such as I received the other
day. In view of Senator McClellan's statement that he feels that it is
a crime for someone to give me information about traitors in Govern-
ment, I am duty-bound not to give the Senator the names of those
informants.
Senator ^McClellan. I just want to get it straight.
Senator McCarthy. May I say that tliat will be my policy. There
is no power on earth that can change that.
Again, I want to compliment the individuals who have placed their
oaths to defend tli€ country against enemies — and certainly Commu-
nists are enemies — above and beyond any Presidential directive. And
46020°— 54— pt. 42 4
1574 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
none of them, none of them, will be brought before any grand jury
because of any information that I give. If any administration wants
to indict me for receiving and giving the American people informa-
tion about communism, they can just go right ahead and do the indict-
ing.
Senator McClellan. You may be right about it, but I don't know
of any oath that any man took for loyalty to his country that required
hJm to commit a crime.
Senator Mundt. The Chair suggests he would be happy to moderate
a meet-the-press program sometime on a debate between Senator Mc-
Cartliy and Senator JNIcClellan, but this is not remotely connected
I might say, with the hearings; nothing to do with the document in
question; and the 130 Communists, if there be such, working in de-
fense plants, is certainly work for this committee to take up in some
other forum and not here.
Senator Symington, I do hope you will not incite another revolu-
tion, but if you insist upon being heard, I will hear you.
Senator Symington. I am very grateful to you and I see you are
sticking to the pattern when I talk. For many years, I ran the Air
Force of the United States as its civilian head, and the civilian head
of a department, incidentally, does it under our form of Government.
From the standpoint of the security of the United States — and I
did my best to make this country as secure as possible against com-
munism— I Avould hate to think that all the people in the Air Force or
the Army or the Navy who may have some grudge against their
superior officer, or who may feel that their wisdom was superior to that
of their superior officer, including the Commander in Chief, were
being coaxed to give away secrets to those people they thought in
their mind — and they made the decision — they had the right to give
those secrets to, regardless of the law of the land.
One of my oldest friends in the newspaper business the other day
said that Edgar Hoover told him that if he released the document,
that he would be jailed. I read that with a great deal of interest.
I have never said that anybody committed anything wrong in receiv-
ing it. But I do say that regardless of his personal opinion, no man
who takes an oath of office not to divulge secrets, has the right to decide
to do it.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. I hesitate wasting the time; I w^ould like to
get back to Mr, Cohn's testimony. I think we have been waiting for
that story.
Senator Mundt. I would like to say that I thiiik this whole col-
loquy is irrelevant. We would like to get on with the hearings. But
the Chair does not have the authority of a judge in a courtroom. I am
talking about this colloquy. But the Chair can do nothing about it.
Senator McCarthy?
Senator McCarthy. I would agree that it is wholly irrelevant as
far as this hearing is concerned ; however, it is relevant as far as the
work of the investigating; committee is concerned.
I am at this point deeply concerned to find my two Democrat col-
leagues in effect notifying the 2 million people who work for this
Government that they think it is a crime for those employees to give
the chairman of an investigating committee evidence of Communist
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1575
infiltration, treason. I think that will serve to disconraiie them. As
far as I am concerned, I would like to notify those 2 million Federal
employees that I feel it is their duty to <2;ive us any information which
they have about graft, corruption, comnumism, treason, and that there
is no loyalty to a superior officer which can tower above and beyond
their loyalty to their country. I may say that I ho])e the day comes
wdien this administration notifies all Federal employees that any in-
formation which they have about wrongdoinc; should be oiyen to any
congressional committee which is empowered to take it, period.
Senator JNIcCi.kllan. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make this ob-
servation. I want to make this observation. If this theory is fol-
lowed, if this principle is adopted, that every Federal employee should
reveal everything he knows, that is, information against Communists,
then you can have no security system in America. It wall destroy it
totally and irrevocably if all who have information give it out
indiscriminately.
Senator Jackson. INIr. Chairman ?
Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson, may I implore you not to get into
this, please, which will invoke a lot more discussion. Our Kepub-
lican colleagues have remained silent. Your name has not been men-
tioned. The discussion has been going on between the three people
who precipitated it. We should get on with the hearings. This has
nothing to do with the hearing.
Senator Jackson. It grew out of a matter that came into these
hearings, and I merely want to say that the expressions that Senator
McCleilan and Senator Symington have made regarding the people
who give out such information from the departments is not just a
personal view, but it is my understanding that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
and Mr. Brownell, the Attorney General of the United States have
deplored it and have indicated it is a violation of law. That is not a
matter to be tossed around on a personal basis, but it comes from the
highest law-enforcement officer in the country.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Jenkins
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, just 10 seconds, if I may. If
a State Department employee had not rapped on the door of the
present chairman of this committee. Senator Mundt, and gave him in-
formation about treason, Alger Hiss would not be in jail today.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Jenkins ?
iVIr. Jenkins. Mr. Colin.
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Shall we resume ?
Mr. CoHN. I am willing.
Mr. Jenkins. I believe, Mr. Colin, you were telling the committee
about the work being done by the McCarthy committee with respect to
its investigation of Communists and subversives in the Army prior
to the beginning of your hearing.
Mr. CoHN. That is right, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I don't believe you had finished your statement with
respect to that area of investigation, and I now ask you to do so, Mr.
Cohn.
Mr. CoiiN. The area of investigation — in other words, sir, the in-
formation and the allegations which we had received presented the
following picture, which I might say was confirmed in almost every
instance: We found, sir, that pro-Connnunist literature had been in
1576 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
use by Army Intelligence and was still in use in some cases by Army
Intelligence.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you assert that as a fact, Mr. Colin?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I am giving you the benefit of the information and
evidence which we assembled, and in this case I would make a reference
to public hearings of the subcommittee conducted on September 28,
1953. I would like the record to speak for itself on that.
Then there were some other areas, Mr. Jenkins, which we have not
had a chance, due to this, to explore publicly yet, which concern
generally people following the Communist line teaching at various
Army institutions. We found that a directive had been issued in 1944
permitting and jjerhaps, in the interpretation of many, even en-
couraging the commissioning of Communists.
Mr. Jenkins. For the benefit of the record, under whose adminis-
tration was that directive issued?
Mr. CoHN. You mean who was President, sir?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.
Mr. CoHN. Franklin D. Roosevelt was President.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. CoHN. Anyway, a directive was issued in 1944, 1 believe by the
Department of the Army or the War Department as it was then
called, permitting the commissioning of people who were Connnunists
and members of the Communist Party. We were told, sir, and we
found that a number of persons, a number of Communists had been
commissioned in the United States Army, that some of them were
still in the Army, and that some had been commissioned in fairly
recent years.
Then, sir, we were given information and we found that as far
as the Army civilian personnel were concerned, there had been in-
filtration by Communists, people with Communist records, and people
who were certainly security risks.
W^e found, sir, that that infiltration had extended particularly to
the Army secret radar laboratories at Fort Monmouth, N. J. If I
might relate one very short incident which came to our attention about
that.
We were told, sir, that a man by the name of Aaron Coleman, whose
name has figured in these proceedings, was still working at Fort
Monmouth.
Mr. Jenkins. When did you ascertain that fact?
Mr. CoHN. That Avas in the spring of 1953. We were told that
Aaron Coleman was working at Fort Monmouth.
Mr. Jenkins. As a civilian employee?
Mr. CcHN. As a civilian employee. That name rang a bell. I
knew that that name had been mentioned in the course of the espionage
trial of the executed atom spies, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. I
went back and I checked the record of the Rosenberg trial, and I found
that in the course of the testimony of Julius Rosenberg, the con-
victed and executed atom spy, he had testified that Aaron Coleman,
this same Aaron Coleman, had been a friend and an associate of his at
Fort Monmouth.
Specifically, sir, I am referring to folio 1284 of the record as pre-
pared for the Supreme Court.
Mr. Jenkins. Had Rosenberg at one time worked at Fort Mon-
mouth ?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1577
Mr. CoiTN. Rosenberg had oone to school at Fort Monmouth, he
had been there on visits, and he was working technically, sir, for the
Army Signal Corps as an inspector.
]\Ir. Jenkins. To clear the record now — and let's keep it straight —
that certainly was long before Secretary Stevens assumed the duties of
his ofiice ?
Mr. CcHN. Yes, it was. Rosenl^erg was working for the Army
Signal Corps, I believe from around 1940 or 1941 to 1945.
]\Ir. Jenkins. But you found that Coleman had worked there simul-
taneously witJi Rosenberg?
i\Ir. ConN. There are one or two sentences, and I think it speaks for
itself, if I may.
Julius Rosenberg, the convicted atom spy, was asked at his trial as
follows :
Question. Can you give us now the names of some otlier classmates of yours
with whom you had either social or business relations after your graduation?
Answer by Julius Rosenberg :
Well, there were people who were in my squads in the electrical encrineering
courses. I\Ir. Aaron Coleman, who subsequent to graduation I met at Fort
Monmouth when I was assigned there.
Then he named a few additional names. He then went on to say —
was asked by the court, by Judge Irving Kauffman :
Did you see any of these people socially?
Julius Rosenberg answered :
The only way I got to see them socially was by going out to lunch with them.
Question by the Court :
In connection with your business?
Julius Rosenberg :
With my visiting them.
In other words, sir, in the spring of 1953, we were told that one of
the people still working at Fort Monmouth was a friend and associate
of atom spy Julius Rosenberg.
Mr. Jenkins. That was Aaron Coleman ?
Mr. CoHN. That was Aaron Coleman.
Mr. Jenkins. That rang a bell in your mind ?
Mr. CoHN. It did, sir. The name did. I then checked the record.
I ascertained what I just read here and other things, too.
INIr. Jenkins. That was before you ever started any hearings either
private or public ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenivins. Very well. You may go ahead, INIr. Cohn.
Mr. CoHN. We went on to the Coleman case, sir, and we checked
around on that. We were told — and what we were told has later
been confirmed under oath — that this same Aaron Coleman who was
still working at Fort ]\Ionmouth had participated in Communist
activity with the executed atom spy, Julius Rosenberg. Of course
we believed that to present a thoroughly alarming situation to think
that Coleman could still, in the year 1953, be at Monmouth.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Did or not your investigation prove that to be
correct ?
1578 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I believe the report speaks for itself on that. Cole-
man on the stand, under cross-examination before this committee I
believe on December 8, admitted that Julius Rosenberg had taken
him, Coleman, to a meeting of the Young Communist League. He
denied membership in the Young Communist League, but a man named
Nathan Sussman who admitted membership in the Young Com-
munist League, named Coleman under oath as a member of the Young
Communist League in the same cell with Julius Rosenberg and other
people, who have been found to be spies and Russian espionage agents.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I have permitted you to go into some detail
with respect to Aaron Coleman because his name figures quite
prominently in testimony heretofore.
Mr. Cohn. And will again.
]\Ir. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not in addition to Cole-
man, you discovered that there were other employees, civilian em-
ployees, at Fort Monmouth or in the Army whose records were such
as to elicit your interest as a member of the IMcCarthy investigating
committee.
Mr. CoiiN. Without mentioning any names, we were told that there
were a large number of people with Communist affiliations and with
connection with Communist spies who were still, in 1953, working
at the secret Army radar laboratories at Fort IMomnouth, in spite
of the fact that for a period of years the FBI had been warn-
ing people in the Army that these people were in the secret radar
laboratories, and giving the Army information on the basis of which
these people should have been suspended and removed.
Mr. Jenkins. How long did your investigation continue, Mr. Cohn,
looking to the assembling of facts preparatory to having hearings?
Mr. Cohn. I would say, sir, 2 or 3 or 4 months.
Mr. Jenkins. During that time did you meet the Secretary of the
Army ?
Mr. Cohn. We did not.
Mr. Jenkins. You did not consult or confer with him ?
Mr. Cohn. We did not.
INIr, Jenkins. When did your hearings begin with respect to the
intiltration of subversives in the Army generally ?
Mr, Cohn. They began in the summer, sir, directly following the
completion of open hearings on the Government Printing Office.
Mr. Jenkins. Can you give us the month?
Mr. Cohn. August.
Mr. Jenkins. In August 1953 ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Those initial hearings, we understand, were executive
hearings.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And held where ?
Mr. Cohn. At various places, sir. At the United States Court-
house, Foley Square, New York, where the committee has an office;
down in Washington, in this room, and in room 357, and maybe in
other rooms on the first floor ; and at Fort Monmouth itself.
Mr. Jenkins. Generally presided over by Senator McCarthy alone t
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. He is the chairman of the committee and he
presided at those sessions at which he was present and I believe he was
present at practically all the sessions.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1579
]Mr. Jenkins. For tlie benefit of those who do not know, Mr. Cohn,
it is my understanding certainly that one man constituted a quorum,
one member of the committee.
]\Ir. CoiiN. That is an important point, Mr. Jenkins. Under the
Christoli'el decision.
]Mr. Jenkins. Well, is that correct or not?
i\Ir. CoiiN. Yes, sir, it is. In order to make possible prosecution of
Communists and others for perjury, this conunittee, as I believe prac-
tically every other congressional committee, has adopted a one-man
quorum rule. Otherwise, when you bring a perjury or contempt case,
you have to prove that a majority of members of the committee wore
sitting right at the table during every second of the hearing or the de-
fendant gets acquitted. After the Supreme Court ruled on that, I
believe this committee, like most other committees, adopted this one-
man quorum rule.
]\[r. Jenkins. "Which rule prevails during these hearings, as we
understand it?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, ^Ir. Cohn, it has been testified to heretofore in
these hearings, that initially you were investigating three alleged sub-
versives or Communists in the Army generally, is that correct?
Mr. Cohn. Not exactly, Mr. Jenkins. There were three who were
called in first. There were a number under investigation. But you
are quite correct in saying that at the first hearings in August, we did
deal with three specific cases.
]Mr. Jenkins. They were not at Fort IMonmouth ?
Mr. Cohn. No, they weren't at Fort Monmouth, but one of them, sir,
was an Army Signal Corps employee and, of course, Fort Monmouth
is part and parcel of the Army Signal Corps. There is really no dis-
tinction between the Signal Corps and Fort Monmouth.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not the fact that you were
investigating these three subversives in the Army Avas publicized.
Mr. Cohn. It was.
Mr. Jenkins. And do you Imow about when ?
Mr. Cohn. I would say the end of August or the beginning of
September.
Mr. Jenkins. The end of August or the beginning of September?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you later learn and do you now know that that
was the information that was read by the Secretary of the Army when
he was in Montana?
Mr. Cohn. Yes. I believe what he read, Mr. Jenkins — he read
specifically about these cases
Mr. Jenkins. These three cases that we are discussing?
Mr. Cohn. Yes. Without going into detail on the three, and with-
out mentioning any names, this particular one in the Army Signal
Corps, who I think was in on August 31, Avas a security guard for the
Army Signal Corps, and the evidence Avhich we have, and Avhich I
have right here, is that he had signed a written pledge of support to
the Communist Party of the United States.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you have that before 3'ou ?
Mr. Cohn. I do, sir.
]Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, what became of those three subversives
or Communists or poor risks, that you initially investigated ?
1580 SPECIAL mVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I can tell you very clearly-
Mr. Jenkins. Were they or not suspended, discharged, or are they
still on the job?
Mr. CoHN. Two were. I think the third was, although I am not
sure. The one, the security guard at the Army Signal Corps who
had signed this Communist Party petition was suspended immedi-
ately after he was exposed by the committee. The second one, the
second Army employee, for the quartermaster corps, invoked the fifth
amendment as to certain Communist activities and was shortly there-
after suspended.
Mr. Jenkins. Was it thereafter that you directed your efforts par-
ticularly to Fort Monmouth, after the exposure of the three persons
about whom we have been talking ?
Mr. CoHN. I would say yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Is that correct ?
Mr. CoHN. With this qualification, Mr. Jenkins : We did hold hear-
ings in between on the use of Communists, pro-Communist litera-
ture, literature with Communist contents by Army Intelligence. We
had a public hearing. But with those exceptions, I would say the
concentration was on Aaron Coleman and Fort Monmouth.
Mr. Jenkins. And was the concentration on Fort Monmouth as a
result of the facts that you had assembled in the previous months of
investigation ?
Mr. Cohn. It was.
Mr. Jenkins. Had they directed or pointed your efforts toward
Fort Monmouth ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. When did you first meet the Secretary of the Army ?
Mr. Cohn. The beginning of September, sir.
Mh. Jenkins. Do you recall the date, the circumstances, the place?
Mr. Cohn. Yes. I recall generally the circumstances. I remember
that after these hearings were held in New York, various news stories
appeared, and one I wanted to read a paragraph from because I
think it is very important, jNlr. Jenkins. It shows that as early as
September 2, 1953, Senator McCarthy made it publicly clear, that
he intended to call before the subcommittee, members of the loyalty
board, people in tlie loyalty procedure, who were responsible for the
clearing of Army personnel with Communist and subversive records.
This news story, which is from the Washington Times-Herald, by
Willard Edwards, dated September 2, 1953, the one paragraph which
I care to read, if I may, sir, goes as follows :
It quotes Senator McCarthy as saying on Se2:)tember 3 :
Until we find out who cleared these individuals for Army employment, despite
their record of Communist activities, we will not get to the bottom of this
tragic situation, McCarthy remarked.
Mr. Jenkins. Would you care to file that?
Mr. Cohn. I would be happy to file it.
Mr. Jenkins. Let it be in the record subject to the approval of the
chairman.
Senator Mundt. We will give it the proper exhibit number and
file it.
May the Chair inquire now, and I think they have been advised
informally by the Democratic members, that they have no objection
to filing the earlier item.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1581
Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to it being
filed, I simply insist that I have a ri^^ht to see and know what is going
on before it happens.
Senator Mdndt. Very well. The preceding document was marked
"26," and 27 will be the newspaper story,
(The newspaper item was marked "Exhibit ISo. 27" and will be
found in the appendix on ]). 1599.)
Mr. Jenkins. Before interrogating you with respect to your re-
lationships, your contacts, your conversations with the Secretary of
the Army and his attorney, Mr. Adams, I want you to tell the members
of this committee your version, or your story, of your investigation of
subversives at Fort Monmouth and the result of that. I asked Yir.
Stevens for his version of Fort Monmouth, I asked Mr. Adams to
relate his version. I should now like to give Mr. Cohn an opportunity
to give the Cohn version of his investigation of Fort Monmouth and
the results you obtained without going into specific cases.
First of all, let me ask you a specific question : How long did you
investigate the alleged infiltration of poor risks or subversives at the
installation of the Army known as Fort Monmouth ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, the committee's attention and the attention of the
staff were first directed to that in the spring of last year. We are not
finished and I hope, when these hearings are over, that we will be
getting back to that.
Mr. Jenkins. How many subversives, Mr. Cohn, do you say were
suspended, discharged, or otherwise any disciplinary action taken
against them whatsoever, as a result of the McCarthy investigating
committee's efforts along that line?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, before we began our investigation, the number of
suspensions was zero. Following our investigation, the number was
o5. I believe that one of the 35, it has l)een said here by Mr. Stevens,
has been reinstated with full clearance, and I believe a number of
others have been put back on the job but have not had their security
clearance restored. So that we have before we started there was zero,
and now there are 34, most of them under complete suspension, some
of them there but with security clearance and access to security mate-
rial removed.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn. do I understand that it is your position
that there were 35 suspensions as a result of the work of the McCarthy
staff?
]Mr. Cohn. I believe that to be the fact, sir.
INIr. Jenkins, You have read the statement made by the Secretary
of the Army, his written statement. You have read the statement
made by Mr. Adams.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins, Is that correct ?
Mr. Cohn. I have heard those and remember them.
Mr. Jenkins. You have heard those read ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. Do you recall that it was stated by Mr. Adams in his
40-page statement that while the McCarthy committee speeded up the
suspension of these subversives, the Army nevertheless w^ould have
done it in due course of time. Is that your understanding of what
Mr. Adams said in substance?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
1582 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. Well, now, Mr. Colin, what significance or importance
do you attach to the time element insofar as a subversive is concerned
in an installation such as Fort Monmouth?
Mr. CoHN. Obviously, sir, time is of the essence in removing a se-
curity risk or a subversive from any secret installation, and particu-
larly, sir, from secret radar laboratories such as those at Fort Mon-
mouth, because at the one hand you have the offensive weapons like
the atomic and hydrogen bombs, and if the Russians have those just
about all we have left would be our defenses to aircraft and atomic
attack, and radar is an integral part of those defenses. Fort Mon-
mouth is one of the nerve centers of radar, secret radar research and
development in this country.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, it is alleged by you — and I am getting down
now to the specific allegations — that the Secretary of the Army and
his counsel used improper means and methods in their efforts to halt
the work of the McCarthy committee, particularly at Fort Monmouth.
I now ask you to tell the members of this committee when the first
overt act was committed in that respect, by whom and where?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. I don't believe, Mr. Jenkins, that we have
characterized any of the acts of Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams with the
use of the adjective "improper" or anything else. We have set forth
what the facts are. I will do that now, sir, at your directian.
Mr. Jenkins. I am asking now for you to take these up chrono-
logically.
Mr. CoHN. All right.
Mr. Jenkins. And in an orderly way tell when the first act, whether
it is overt or not, or the first word or the first deed, was said or done
which you construed or any member of your staff construed as an
effort on the part of the Secretary of the Army and his counsel to stop
your investigation of subversives at Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. The first contact we had with Mr. Stevens
about it, I suppose was during September, when w^e told him that the
investigation at Fort Monmouth was underway and how deeply con-
cerned we were about it. I suppose he had heard that rumored around,
anyway, before that. Mr. Adams came on the scene at the end of
September
Mr. Jenkins. Wait, Mr. Cohn. Don't go too rapidly. Your first
contact, as we understand it, was wdth the Secretary alone before
Mr. Adams came on the scene?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. I met the Secretary some 3 weeks before I ever
met Mr. Adams.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Where was this first conversation, this first contact
with the Secretary?
Mr. Cohn. The first contact with the Secretary w^as held after the
exposure of these two people with Communist records up in New York.
Mr. Jenkins. I am talking about the one in which you say jouap-
prised him of the fact that you were directing your investigations
into Fort ISIonmouth.
Mr. Cohn. Sir, we told him about that, the first time I recall talking
with Mr. Stevens about that is on September 16, 1953.
Mr. Jenkins. Where was that, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. New York.
Mr. Jenkins. Where, specifically, in New York ? •
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION" 1583
Mr. CoiiN. Tliat was in the apartment of Dave Schine's parents.
Mr. Jenkins. Who was present?
Mr. CoiiN. Chairman McCartliy, Mr, Stevens, I was there, Dave
Schine was there.
Mr. Jenkins. Precisely what did you tell the Secretary of the Army
with respect to the direction of your ofTorts at Fort Monmouth?
]\rr. CoHN. There was a o-eneral discussion about various arons of
Conununist inliltration in the Army which the committee had under
consideration. I recall two which were mentioned. One was the Fort
INIonmouth investifxation. Another was the investigation of use of
Communist-line literature by Army Intelligence.
Mr. Jenkins. What did the Secretary say on that occasion?
Mr. CoHN. He indicated he was very much concerned about the
situation.
]Mr. Jenkins. What, if anything, did he say, Mr. Cohn, which led
you to believe that he did not want you to conduct such an investi-
gation with respect to subversives in Fort Monmouth?
jNlr. CoHN. On that occasion?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, on that occasion.
Mr. CoHN. Nothing.
]Mr. Jenkins. Nothing whatever?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
JSIr. Jenkins. Was there anything on that occasion, to wit, Sep-
tember 16, said by the Secretary of the Army that was improper in
any way whatsoever ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. '\^nien was your next contact with the
Secretary ?
Mr. CoHN. The next contact wnth the Secretary, ]\Ir. Jenkins,
would be the day we held an executive session on the use of Com-
munist literature by Army Intelligence, down on the first floor of this
building, and I think that was a week or so later.
Mr. Jenkins. It would be, then, approximately September 23?
Mr. CoHN. I think the date was fixed by Mr. Stevens as the 21st of
September. I am sure that is right.
!&Ir. Jenkins. Was anj'thing improper said by the Secretary then,
]\lr. Cohn, with respect to stopping your work at Fort Monmouth ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Wlien was the first time that the Secretary of the
Army ever suggested to you that you discontinue that work and
turn it over to him or made any other suggestion leading you to be-
lieve that he wanted the McCarthy committee to step down and out
and let the Army do that work ?
]Mr. CoHN. The first conversation of which I have a recollection,
\^ith Mr. Stevens about that, I would fix on or about October 13.
I^'^r. Jenkins. Wliere was that?
]\Ir. CoHN. The Merchants Club, New York.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you, Mr. Colin, to please tell the com-
mittee in detail what the Secretarv said on that occasion, October 13,
at the Merchants Club in New York City ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, to be chronological about this, IMr. Adams had come
into the picture in the meantime. There had been some conversations
with him.
1584 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. Let me withdraw my question, then.
Mr. CoHN. All right,
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you, then, whether or not the first time
you were importuned, either you or Senator McCarthy, by anyone
coiniected with the Army to discontinue your investigation of sub-
versives at Fort Monmouth, was done by Mr. John Adams ?
Mr. CoHN. It was.
Mr. Jenkins. Where and when was that?
Mr. CoHN. That was up at the United States courthouse in New
York during the first week of October.
3.1r. Jenkins. The first week of October?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Was the Secretary of the Army with you, Mr. Colin,
on tliat occasion ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
INIr. Jenkins. Will you please tell the committee in detail what was
said on that occasion by Mr. Adams, and what occurred ?
Mr CoHN. Yes, sir. What occurred was this, sir : We had had our
public hearing on Communist infiltration in the Army on September
28. September 29, Senator McCarthy was married, left on his honey-
moon, and the staff conducted its staff interviews on Fort Monmouth
personnel, people working in the secret radar laboratories at Fort
^lonmouth, up in New York at the beginning of October while
Senator McCarthy was away.
Before the Senator had left, Mr. Jenkins,, he gave us a way of reach-
ing him by shortwave radio. I don't think he encouraged us to reach
him, but he gave us a method of doing that in case we wanted him to
come back.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you interrupt his honeymoon ?
Mr. CoHN. I am afraid we did, sir. But before that, sir, we con-
ducted staff interviews of people currently working at the secret radar
laboratories in Fort Monmouth during September and during October.
To come directly to your question, during some of those staff inter-
views at the begining of October up in New York, Mr. John Adams
was present. He had been appointed but 2 or 3 days before as counsel
for Mr. Stevens.
Mr. Jenkins. October 1, to be exact.
Mr. CoiiN. Is that the date of the appointment? He had been
appointed October 1.
I met him before that. I believe that he had come over to our
hearing on September 28, and before the appointment Mr. Stevens
told us that Mr. Adams was going to be appointed and would be
working with our committee.
In any event, during the first few days of October while we were
having in these employees at Monmouth at the secret radar labora-
tories, concerning whom we had information of Communist affilia-
tion, association with Communist spies, removal of documents, and
things of that kind, Mr. Adams came up to New York and sat in on
those interrogations.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
What, if anything, did Mr. Adams say ?
Mr. CoHN. Mr. Adams — I might say that we became friendly —
Mr. Carr and I and the other staff members — became friendly with
Mr. Adams. He would go out to lunch with us and there was a very
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1585
cordial and pleasant relationsliip. We discussed the witnesses and
the hearin<xs and the whole situation, and we discussed Mr. Adams'
new job. On those occasions Mr. Adams made it clear to us that he
would be very appreciative if we could find some way of avoiding any
kind of hearino-s, executive or public or anything else, on the situation
of Communist infiltration at the Army secret radar laboratories at
Fort IMonmoutli
Mv. Jenkins. What were his objections, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Coiix. Well, sir, it w\asn't so much a question of objections.
He just wanted to know if w^e could avoid some way of doing it. He
felt if we could, such an arrantrenient would be a lot more agreeable
to ]Mr. Stevens and that it would solidify Mr. Adams, who had just
been appointed, in his new position. He felt that if some way could
be worked out of avoiding the subcommittee's going into this and
letting the Army go into it on the basis of subcommittee information,
it would be a more pleasant arrangement for Mr. Stevens and for
Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. Did Mr. Adams tell you specifically for what pur-
pose he had been em]3loyed or for what principal purpose he had
b?en employed by the Secretary of the Army ?
jVIr. Cohn. He had been employed as counsel, but he told us that
Mr. Stevens had given him as his first and most important assignment
observing the committee hearings and working on this Fort Mon-
mouth investigation.
Mr. Jenkins. Did or not he tell you at that time, Mr. Cohn, that
Mr. Stevens desired that you discontinue your investigation at Fort
IMonmouth and turn it back to the Army ?
Mr. Cohn. He did not make a direct request, Mr. Jenkins. He
made it clear to us that if some way could be found to have the com-
mittee not hold hearings, but let Mr. Adams and Mr. Stevens do the
job, that would be welcome news to Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. Did or not you accede to that — well, we will say in-
ference that you drew from what he said ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir, for two reasons : First of all, I had no authority
and neither did Mr. Carr or any other staff member to accede to that.
The chairman had made the decision and it was not in our power to
reverse that decision. The second point is we could see no basis in
fact for even making a recommendation to the chairman on that,
for this reason, Mr, Jenkins : Their situation had existed for a long
time, the infiltration by people with records of Communist affiliation
in the secret radar, Army radar laboratories at Fort Monmouth. The
FBI had been warning them about it for years, prior to Mr. Stevens''
administration and during Mr. Stevens' administration, and it looked
pretty much like one of those situations where action was being taken
l3ecause our committee was investigating, and where, if we stopped, the
action might very well stop.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, had or not the Army at that time, that is,
in the first week of October 1953, done anything whatever to your
knowledge by way of concentrating its efforts and pinpointing the
existence of subversives at Fort Monmouth ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. After our conversations with Mr. Stevens in
the middle of September, there were, I think Mr. Stevens has said,
5 or 6 suspensions from the secret radar laboratories at Fort Mon-
1586 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
mouth on the ground of security risk charges, and Communist affilia-
tion charges, and I have no reason to quarrel with that.
Mr. Jenkins. Had the Army done anything about it prior to your
meeting with Mr. Stevens on September 16?
Mr. CoHN. As far as I know it had not. I think Mr. Stevens' charge
showed that one person had been suspended in August for some
reason.
Mr. Jenkins. Chronologically, was your next contact after the one
the first week of October with Mr. Adams — was it with Mr. Adams
or was it with the Secretary of the Army or both ?
Mr. CoiiN, Sir, it was with Mr. Adams. He was there, I believe,
more than 1 day. I think he was there 2 or 3 days or maybe more
than that. He would be in on the sessions, and when he was not there,
his assistant would be there, and he would keep right on talking to
us, and a topic of discussion on his part was could we arrive at some
formula which he could tell Mr. Stevens about whereby this subcom-
mittee would bow out and let the Army conduct the investigation.
So those conversations with Mr. Adams continued on. There came a
time a few days later when
Mr. Jenkins. Before passing from that, do I understand you to
say that he said that the Secretary would be happier about it and that
it would solidify him with the Secretary if his desires were acceded to ?
Mr. CoHN. He made it clear that the Secretary would be happy
about it. I don't think he said solidify him with the Secretary, but
he said words to the effect that it would be a feather in his cap in his
new job, if he would accomplish this. It would solidify him in his
job.
Mr. Jenkins. You started to tell about another conversation with
Mr. Adams a short time thereafter.
Mr. CoiiN. This same line of conversation continued from that
period on for a matter of months. The next development was, as we
called in and talked to more and more of these people who were
working in the secret radar laboratories at Fort Monmouth, and as
we saw what tlie security situation was, what the records of some of
these people might be, and the fact that no action had been taken, I
communicated with Senator McCarthy by shortwave radio. I flew
down and I met him at West Palm Beach, he had been on an island,
and he came in. I met him at West Palm Beach, I think I brought
some of the transcripts of the testimony with me, and I told him that
there had been a few suspensions, but there were still a sizable
number of people working in the secret radar laboratories at Fort
Monmout with records of Communist affiliation to a greater or lesser
degree, and in view of the extreme sensitive defense and aircraft and
antiaircraft defense being done there, I felt that the situation was
serious enough for Senator McCarthy to come back and start holding
formal executive sessions right away.
ISIr. Jenkins. Do we understand that Senator McCarthy had been
on his honeymoon?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And did Senator McCarthy as a result of your going
to West Palm Beach and your having that conversation with him
return to Washington or New York ?
Mr. CoHN. He did. He flew to Wisconsin on Saturday or Sunday
and on Monday he vras in New York to hold hearings.
SPECIAL KSrVESTIGATION 1587
;Mr. Jenkins. Were hearings held ?
Mr. CoHN. They were.
Mr. Jenkins. VVas Mr. Adams present?
Mr. CoiiN. I don't recall whether Mr. Adams was there on Monday.
I think Monday was the 12th, and I am not sure of that. I know that
on the second day, both Mr. Adams and Mr. Stevens arrived on the
scene.
JNIr. Jenkins. That is October 13?
]\[r. CoiiN. I believe that to be October 13, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. I want you to tell the committee, Mr. Cohn, what oc-
curred on October 13, in New York City and particularly with respect
to anything tliat was said or done having relevancy to your charges
against Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams.
JNIr. Cohn. Well, having relevancy, sir, to the facts as they took
place, Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams, as I recall it, came up to New
York and came over to an executive session of the subcommittee on
the morning of the 13th, if that is the exact date. They sat in during
the testimony. I believe that a couple of current employees at the
secret radar laboratories at Fort Monmouth testified. A couple of
former employees invoked the fifth amendment about espionage, sabo-
tage, and things of that kind. It was a bad situation.
And Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams heard that testimony. While
they were there on that day, and during the lunch hour, when we went
over and had lunch with them, Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams raised
with Senator McCarthy the question of whether or not we had to have
hearings, whether we had to continue with them, when the investiga-
tion was going to stop, and wasn't there some w^ay that Mr. Stevens
and Mr. Adams could get us to stop and let Mr. Stevens and Mr.
Adams do this themselves.
Mr. Jenkins. At that time did the Secretary or his attorney, Mr.
Adams, complain about the type of newspaper publicity that was
flowing from these hearings, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Do you mean suggest that it was unfair in any way ?
IMr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. They did not.
Mr. Jenkins. Op that it was distorted ?
Mr. Cohn. No, hir. As a matter of fact, Mr. Adams and Mr.
Stevens, I believe, rr<^ then on and prior to that time, had been pres-
ent at some of the sessions, had been present at some of the news con-
ferences held after the sessions, had participated in some of those
news conferences, and I don't recall of any suggestion of inaccuracy
as to anything that Senator McCarthy said ever being made by Mr.
Stevens or by Mr. Adams.
I think sir
Mr. Jenkins. Well, did as a matter of fact either you or a member
of the staff or Senator McCarthy give to the press any distorted or
unfaithful account of the proceedings of those executive sessions?
JNIr. Cohn. I am sure we did not, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You did not?
Mr. Cohn. I am sure of that.
Mr. Jenkins. You say there was no complaint about it ?
Mr. Cohn. There was not.
Mr. Jenkins. Insofar as Secretary Stevens or Mr. Adams was
concerned ?
1588 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. There was no complaint to us or in my hearing. I might
say this, Mr. Jenkins, it was very clear that they did not like the fact
that there had been some Communist infiltration, and that Senator
McCarthy was suggesting that it should have been acted upon earlier.
They did not like the fact that that was being publicized. But they
made no statement that any of the publicity was unfair.
Mr. Jenkins. While we'are in New York on October 13, Mr. Cohn,
I want you to tell the committee whether or not some arrangement was
made by Mr. Stevens with the Merchants Club, of which he was a
member, with respect to the entertainment, and facilities, of that club
being tendered to Senator McCarthy and the members of his staff.
Mr. Cohn. Well, Mr. Stevens
Mr. Jenkins. What did take place ?
Mr. Cohn. I want to say was very, very kind, and he offered to put
the facilities of the Merchants Club, to which he belonged, a private
dining room there and luncheon, at the disposal of the subcommittee
and the staff every day during the time of our business up in New York
on this.
Mr. Jenkins. And was that to be free of cost insofar as the Senator
and members of his staff were concerned ?
Mr. Cohn. There was no discussion about that, sir. I assumed that
was included in the offer. And I might say, I see really nothing
wrong in the offer. Mr. Stevens was always very courteous and very
considerate.
Mr. Jenkins. You and Mr. Adams are in accord on that. He said
he saw nothing wrong about it.
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. I see nothing wrong about it.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you avail yourself of it ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir; we didn't. When Mr. Stevens was present on
the 13th, we had lunch with him there. I think the next day Mr.
Stevens had left before lunch but some of the generals were there and
Mr. Adams and we went over that day. There was November 17 when
we had luncheon with Mr. Stevens there. But on the great majority
of occasions, we ate over at Gasder's restaurant, rignt near Foley
Square. We ate over there and not at the Merchants Club.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, I want you to tell the committee to
what extent and to what degree Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams impor-
tuned you, requested you, pleaded with you to discontinue your hear-
ings with respect to Fort Monmouth and turn it over to the Army.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. Well, I don't think that I would call them
importunings, Mr. Jenkins, or anything like that. There was discus-
sion in which Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams made it very clear to Sena-
tor McCarthy that the sooner we stopped investigating the Army,
Communist infiltration in the Army, the better they would like it,
and that it would certainly be welcome to them personally if we would
stop it.
Mr. Jenkins. Did or not they concede that there had been Com-
munist infiltration in the Army, particularly at Fort Monmouth, or
was that fact denied by them ?
Mr. Cohn. Oh, no, there was no doubt about it in their minds or
in our minds or in anyone's mind.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you feel, then, Mr. Cohn, that they were exert-
ing too much pressure on you and the Senator 2
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1589
Mr, CoiiN. Sir, I attached no special significance to that. Most
people whose departments or agencies are under investigation are
not happy about that fact, and the sooner the investigation is over,
the better they like it.
Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams obviously were not personally pleased
at what might be classed as unfavorable results and unfavorable
publicity from their standpoint, and indications that Communists
and Communist infiltration had gone on in their Department. I as-
sume it was personally embarrassing to a certain degree, and they
wanted us to stop. I saw nothing unusual. That has been asked by
other people before.
Mr. Jenkins. Was your work at that time bearing fruit and were
you exposing and causing the suspension of subversives at Fort
Monmouth ?
Mr. CoHX. Well, sir. I think the record stands that before our com-
mittee started, the record was zero; after our committee investiga-
tion the record of suspensions of people from the secret radar labora-
tories stood at 35. So I don't think there can be much dispute about
results.
Mr. Jenkins. When, Mr. Cohn, was the next contact between the
McCarthy committee and — I will not say the Army — we will say the
Secretary or Mr. Adams, or one or the other of them or both of them ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I want to say at this point, obviously I am leaving
out here, as you and I have discussed, matters which you will want
to know, I know, and which Mr. Welch will interrogate me about on
cross-examination, about the Schine matter and about other conversa-
tions and discussions, and I am trying to channel myself to the areas
which you have outlined here.
Mr. Jenkins. You are entirely correct.
JMr. Cohn. On that, the next discussion was October 14, the very
next day.
Mr. Jenkins. What was that discussion?
Mr. Cohn. Well, sir, I had better go back to the 13th for one minute
and tell you what Senator McCarthy's reaction was to the request
or the discussion by Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams as to whether or not
we could not end our investigation of Communist infiltration and the
covering up of Communist infiltration.
Mr. Jenkins, What did the Senator say on the 13th, Mr, Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. I remember that the Senator went into some detail,
which I won't go into here, about our investigation of the Government
Printing Office, and used that to illustrate the fact that just how long
it would be necessary for the committee to continue its investigation
of Communist infiltration in the Army, how it came about, and who
was responsible for it, would depend to a large degree on the coopera-
tion received from Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams, on the house-cleaning
job which they themselves did, not only in getting out Communists
and security risks, but in getting out the people who had allovred
these Communists and security risks to stay in sensitive posts during
a period of time.
I remember the Senator was asked, "Will the investigation go on
forever?"
1590 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
The Senator said, "Of course it won't go on forever. The sooner
it is over — we have other things to do, too — the happier I will be."
"Words to the effect, "It is impossible now to set any kind of a time
limit on it. We have to see how things go, what results are obtained,
what kind of a housecleaning job you people do."
That was the substance of that conversation.
Mr. Jenkins. That is October 13?
Mr. CoHN. I believe that was October 13, the day Mr. Stevens had
come up to talk to the Senator.
Mr. Jenkins. Now we pass to the 14th of October.
Mr. CoiiN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you to tell the committee what was said and
done on that occasion, on that date, by the Secretary or by Mr. Adams.
]\Ir. ConN. Sir, there were two what I would call very significant
incidents on the 14th of October.
Mr. Jenkins. Will you please relate those now, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
First of all, as to physical presence, we had three sessions that day —
morning, afternoon, and night. Mr. Stevens was present during part
of the morning session. He then left and went someplace else. Mr.
Adams I believe was present during all three executive sessions of
the subcommittee, morning, afternoon, and night.
The two significant incidents, Mr. Jenkins, are these :
For the first one, I have to go back briefly to Aaron Coleman, be-
cause that is what it was about. As I told you, back in the spring
we found that Aaron Coleman was still working at Monmouth. We
found from the public record that this Aaron Coleman had been a
friend and associate of the convicted atom spy, Julius Rosenberg.
W^e had received reliable information that Aaron Coleman had par-
ticipated in Communist activity along wdth Rosenberg, and that this
man was still at Monmouth.
Now, with reference to October 14, we had found out something else,
too. We had been told reliably that this same Aaron Coleman, the
man who had been the friend and associate of Rosenberg, who had
gone to this Communist meeting with him, had taken papers, docu-
ments, secret documents, from the Army radar laboratories at Fort
Monmouth while occupying a very important, sensitive post there
dealing with the secret radar antiaircraft program. We had been
told specifically, Mr. Jenkins, that one afternoon a number of years
before, Coleman, while leaving the laboratory, I believe some paper
had slipped out from a pocket in his coat. That paper was retrieved
by a security guard. The guard looked at it and found it to be a
secret or classified radar document. The guard immediately reported
to his superiors the fact that Mr. Coleman had — a paper dropped out
of Mr. Coleman's pocket when he was leaving the laboratory, and that
that paper turned out to be a secret document bearing on important
radar work.
Mr. Jenkins. Did those facts develop to be true ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, and it is important with reference to an incident
which took place on October 14, and I am going to try to tie that
right in, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
SPECIAL ESTv^ESTIGATION" 1591
Mr. Coiix. Those facts did develop to be true.
The next step was this : After the report was made, after the security
g:uard picked up this document wliich dropped out of Coleman's
pocket, as I recall it^— I might be wronir on an occasional detail — Mr.
Coleman, with the security *iuard, went to his superiors in the security
and G-2 setup at Fort Monmouth. He told the chief security officer
at Fort Monmouth that this man, Aaron Coleman, while leavin«^ the
laboratory had apparently had on his person a secret document, the
document had fallen out of his pocket, and there it was.
The security officer then sent for Mr. Coleman and confronted him
and said to him words to the effect, "Mr. Coleman, isn't it a fact that
you have been removing from this laboratory secret radar documents,
and that at 3'our home at this very time you have put away, stashed
away, secret radar documents which you have taken from the lab-
oratory?"
The testimony under oath before this committee by the security
officer was that Mr. Coleman lied and denied that he had any secret
radar or classified radar documents at his home, denied that he had
taken them from the laboratory to his home and that they were then
in his home; that gradually he retreated from his denial until he
made enough of an admission to warrant the security officer in author-
izing a raid by Army intelligence officers on Coleman's home.
The raid took place, sir, and in the course of that raid some 43 secret
and otherwise classified radar documents were found in a bureau
drawer in Coleman's home — enough, by the way, I believe, according
to Coleman's own admission, to give a complete picture of the advances
by this country in radar defense up to a certain period. I believe
that was in 1946.
Now, sir, at that time in September these facts had come to our
attention. We did not know them to be facts, but we had reliable
information. Therefore, we went down physically to Fort Mon-
mouth, and we asked to see Aaron Coleman's personnel file, which is
available to us or to any congressional committee.
Mr. Jenkins. Can you give the date of that visit ?
Mr. CoHN. That was very early in October, sir. I would say that
was about October
Mr. Jenkins. It was prior to October 14?
Mr. Cohn. Well prior. I would say the 3d or the 4th of October.
It was a Saturday morning. We went down to Fort Monmouth
and we asked to see Coleman's personnel file. I might say we were
entitled to see it. It was displayed to us by somebody under General
Lawton's jurisdiction. We looked over that file. It was a lengthy
file. In that file we found documentary proof that what we had
heard about Coleman taking these documents from the secret lab-
oratories to his home was true. We found a report by Army intelli-
gence in the Coleman personnel file corroborating the facts which we
had learned and indicating that Coleman in fact had been caught with
these documents in a bureau drawer in his home during a raid by
Army intelligence. We found the further fact that in spite of this
and in spite of what we Imew to have been Coleman's close relation-
ship with atom spy Julius Rosenberg and participation in Com-
munist activities to some degree with Julius Rosenberg, in spite of
1592 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
those two facts, the association with Rosenberg-, the attendance at
the Commnnist meeting, and the taking of documents from the lab-
oratory, that Aaron Coleman had been allowed to continue his work
at Fort ]\Ionmouth and was in fact still at Fort Monmouth when our
investigation began.
We thought, Mr. Jenkins, that this was so important that we made
a verbatim copy — we took a pad of paper and copied word for word
the documents in the Coleman personnel file which proved these facts.
We then asked if we could take the file with us.
Mr. Jenkins. Were those facts available at that time and had they
been available to the Secretary of the Army ?
Mr. CoHN. They were in an Army file, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, of course they were available.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
]\Ir. CoHN. Now, we first, I believe, asked if we could take the file
with us. They told us no, we couldn't take the file with us because
that would leave them without any record of the file, that what would
happen was that they would have the file photostated and have a
photostatic copy of the file transmitted to us through the Pentagon.
That was perfectly agreeable. We didn't care whether we had the
original paper or a photostatic copy. So we copied out, we copied
out, unbeknown to them, I believe, although there was nothing wrong
in it, certainly, we copied out the particular portion of the file which
showed that Coleman's home had been raided and that the secret
documents had been found in a bureau drawer.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you come in contact with General Lawton on
that occasion, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. I did not, sir. I came in contact with two of the mem-
bers of General Lawton's staff, a Colonel Rubin, I believe, and another
gentleman who is in charge of the file room. He has the same name
as somebody else in this case.
Mr. Jenkins. Was it later that you came in contact with General
Lawton and worked with him in your investigation of Fort Mon-
mouth ?
Mr. CoiiN, Yes, sir. i naa never met the general. The way that
day ends is that we had made this copy of that part of the file which
to us was so very significant and they had promised to send us the
photostat of the complete file through the Pentagon.
Mv. Jenkins. That is early in October you are talking about?
Mr. CoiiN. Early in October. Now, sir, we kept pressing Mr.
Adams for that file. We kept asking, "Where is the photostat of his
Coleman personnel file? We need it. We need it badly."
We finally got it from Mr. Adams, I believe on the 13th of Oc-
tober, although it might have been prior to that. But anyway, sir,
on the morning of the 14th of October, Aaron Coleman himself was
a witness before the subcommittee.
Mr. Jenkins. At that time, had you procured from Mr. Adams
this file on Coleman?
Mr. CoiiN. Well, we thought we had the file. He gave us what pur-
ported to be the file.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1593
Mr. CoiiN. I had tliat file in front of me. I gave it over to Senator
McCarthy. He was interrogating Coleman, questioning Coleman,
under oath. Mr. Stevens was sitting there and Mr. Adams was sitting
there. I remember that Senator McCarthy turned to me. First we
covered the Rosenberg-Coleman connections and Rosenberg's positions
at Fort Monmouth. Senator McCarthy then turned to me and said
words to the effect, "Give me that file." I gave him the file and he
said, "Now sliow me where these documents are that show that Cole-
man was caught with secret radar documents in his home and in spite
of that fact they let him stay right on at Fort Monmouth for a period
of years."
Mr. Jenkins. Did you say forty-odd documents ?
Mr. CoHN. I believe the number was 43. Senator McCarthy said,
"Show me where it is in the file." He was about to ask Coleman
some questions about it. I said it is in such and such section and I
pointed to Avhere it was. He kept going through it and he said, "It
is not here." I kept saying, "It is there, it must be there."
Then he gave me the file. Then I remember there was a little bit
of excitement and 2 or 3 staff members started going through the file.
It was a voluminous file, with two sides to it, each one with a lot of
papers in it, and we kept going through it, and Senator McCarthy
kept saying, "Where are the papers; where are the papers?" And
we couldn't find them. It had become rather embarrassing at that
point and I went over to Mr. Adams and I said, "John, there is
something wrong here."
Mr. Jenkins. Who had given you the file ?
Mr. CoHN. As I recall it, Mr. Adams had given it to us or it had
come from Mr. Adams' office. I don't remember him personally
handing it to us. We got a lot of files from them. They came from
John or somebody in his office working under his control.
Anyway, I went over to Mr. Adams, I think it w^as, and some of the
people working with him, and I said, "There is something wrong here.
There is something missing from this file."
I was first told that there was nothing missing from the file. One
of the staff members, I think it was Jim
Mr. Jenkins. You are talking about Jim Juliana ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes. I think it was Jim Juliana. He had been down at
Monmouth and I think it was Jim who had made the copy of that
paper we had made from the file. He went upstairs and got his notes
and he came down with the verbatim copy of what had been in the
files when we last looked at them, and there it was. I then took that
over to some of the Army people and I said, "This paper was in the
file when we saw the file up at Fort Monmouth. Would you please
show me where it is now."
Mr. Jenkins. To whom were you talking, Mr. Colin ?
Mr. CoHN. I think it was Mr. Adams, sir, although I have no clear
recollection that it was.
Mr. Jenkins. You say both Mr. Adams and the Secretary was
there ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes. It was not the Secretary.
Mr. Jenkins. But he was there and present ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
1594 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. The Army people did some thumbing through the file
and they did not look through it too long and then they said, "Well,
it is not there."
Mr. Jenkins. Who said that?
Mr. CoHN. I don't recall. It was either Mr. Adams or one of his
people.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, why did they say it wasn't there ?
Mr. CoHN. At that time, sir, I don't know if they did tell us why it
wasn't there. They said that there must have been some mistake,
there must be something wrong, but it wasn't there. They asked me
if I were sure that the papers had originally been there, couldn't I be
mistaken. I told them that I could not be mistaken.
Senator Mundt. The hour of 12 : 30 having arrived, we will stand
in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee was recessed, to re-
convene at 2 p. m. the same day.)
APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
No. 28
March 1900.
Communist Infiltration of the American Armed Forces
There are more than a thousand Communists in the Armed Forces of the
Unitetl States today, prepared to carry on espionage, sabotage, and any kind
of disruptive activities during all-out war between the Soviet Union and this
country. Additional hundreds are in the National Guard and at least several
hundred hold commissions as Keserve oflicers.
I was the first national director of the Communist apparatus for infiltrating
the American Armed Forces, and throughout the next decade I remained con-
nected with this secret work as a consultant and the party's chief expert in that
field. Under the direct supervision of the Communist International and the Red
army general staff I set up the special department for these activities. During
the first year of operations, 192S-29, about two dozen carefully selected agents
were sent into tlie Army and Navy, and more than 200 into the National Guard.
In the fall of 1927, Nassonov, a leader in the Russian Communist Party and a
Comintern representative in this country, selected me to head the national
department for infiltrating all branches of the Armed Forces. Technically, I
headed a joint commission of the Communist Party and its subsidiary youth
organization, the Young Communist League. After I was selected for the job by
Nassonov, my official assignment by the Politburo and appropriation of funds
were only formalities.
I was in chai'ge of a commission and director of a field of work never before
undertaken by the Communist Party in this country, although iu France and
some other countries considerable progress ali-eady had been made.
How should we start our work? How many Communists should be assigned to
join the Army and Navy? Should they enlist for service in the Philippines,
Hawaii, Alaska, Panama, or the mainland? What efforts should be made in
the National Guard and ROTC? Once in the Armed Forces, what methods should
be employed to carry on activities and at the same time avoid detection by
military intelligence? Should military training be given in Communist schools?
If so, where should we obtain instructors and equipment? These were but a few
of many questions I asked Nassonov.
The Comintern representative could give no positive answers. It was a new
field, even for Moscow. The Communist International had decided that the
armed forces of all capitalist countries should be infiltrated and the soldiers
won over to the side of the Soviet Union and the world Conununist revolution.
The French Communists had taken the initiative and worked out their own
methods. There were no official Conununist books giving the line, no detailed
political blueprints. Nassonov said that I .should go to Moscow and meet with
the Red army general staff, the military department of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, and with the executive committee of the Communist Inter-
national. It was a timely moment for such a trip, for during the first 3 months
of 1928 there were to be held in succession enlarged meetings of the executive
committees of the Communist International and Young Communist International
and a world congress of the Red International of Trade Unions.
I arrived in the Soviet Union about Christmas 1927 and returned to the United
States about May 1, 1928. I was on the payroll of the Communist International
while in the Soviet Union, and the Comintern also paid my fare and other ex-
penses for return trip to the United States.
1595
1596 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
A few days after arrivinji: in Moscow I had my first ineeting with members of
the top command of the Red army. It was held in the Lux Hotel apartment of
Nassonov, the Comintern representative who had not yet returned to Moscow
from the United States. Mrs. Nassonov was present at my meeting with three
Red army general staff officers (one of them Marshal Tukhachevsky) and an
interpreter.
I was asked to give a general report on the American Army, especially its
composition, routine life in the barracks, possible grievances as basis for agitation
and propaganda. Also, my report included the strength of the Communist Party
and its youth organization, the Young Communist League, in the United States,
and our tentative plans for work in the Armed Forces. I concluded by placing
before the Red army officers the problems I had previously discussed with Nas-
sonov in New York. The general staff members then asked a number of detailed
questions.
Marshal Tukhachevsky was the first of the Red army officers to speak. He
said the very rough and tentative plan I had submitted did not provide for con-
centration, that it would scatter the energy of the movement. He said it was
fortunate (from the Communist point of view) that soldiers could select any
geographical area for service when they enlist. The main consideration in de-
termining concentration points is the vital importance of the area to national
defense during war. America's most vital spot, he said, is Panama and the canal
there. Therefore, Panama should be the first concentration point and several
carefully selected and capable Communists should join this army for service
there. The other Red commanders agreed with this. They also ixnnted out the
need of building a civilian Communist Party in the Republic of Panama and in
nearby countries (Costa Rica and Colombia). The second area for concentra-
tion should be Hawaii, military and naval key to the Pacific. The third point
for concentration should be Army posts around the port cities of New Yoi*k and
San Francisco. At first, only relatively small and carefully selected personnel
were to be sent into the Army and Navy, with greatest precautions to protect the
Communists from detection by military intelligence. The general staff, they
said, had made a careful study of means of communications and methods for
secret activities in Army and Navy units based on experiences of the French
Communists, pioneers in this fi4d. This data would be placed at my disposal
for careful study before my return to the United States.
Regarding the National Guard, the Red army commanders suggested a some-
what different approach. There should be mass enlistments by hundreds of
Communists. The objectives of the Communists in the National Guard should
be: (1) Obtain as much military knowledge and training at the expense of the
American Government as possible; (2) recruit other guardsmen and form Com-
munist units in as many places as possible ; (3) carry on agitation on any griev-
ances that could be found and seek to disrupt discipline. The ROTC also was
regarded as important, and Communist students should enlist in it with the
long-range perspective of becoming Army officers and reaching important
positions.
The Red army officers were unanimous in opposition to any extensive military
training in schools operated by the Communist Party and Young Communist
League in the United States — to anything beyond marching formation and
tactics in street riots and hand-to-hand fighting with police. We would not
have the rifles, machine guns, and other equipment, and few qualified in-
structors. It would attract the attention of authorities and cause them to
crack down on the party. "And why give second- or third-rate training when
you can get the best from the American Government, at their expense?" asked
one of the officers. "Send your members into the National Guard and the ROTC
and let the enemy pay for the training."
The Red army commanders told me that Amei'ican as well as other foreign
students at the Lenin School in Moscow already were receiving some military
instruction under Soviet military officials. (On subsequent visits to the Lenin
School I saw American and Soviet machine guns and military equipment from
many countries used for instruction purposes under supervision of Red army
officers.) They said that they would see that the amount of training was
increased. We discussed the possibility of thorough training at the Fi-unze
Military Academy of a few selected American Communist leaders who could
furnish capable military leadership during future revolutionary outbreaks in the
United States. Possible training for me at the academy was discussed. The
general staff members agreed in principle, with details to be worked out In the
future. Regarding my own work they said it was more important for me to
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1597
return to the United States soon and get actual operations under way. While
in Moscow I could study considerable material, translated into English or
French, dealing with methods of civil war, revolutionary outbreaks, and sabotage.
Also, they said I should lecture at the Frunze academy on the class composition
of the American Army, possible grievances, and my estimate of possibilities of
Ked intiltration in military establishments. (All of these were done while I
was in the Soviet Union.)
The most basic shortcoming in my report and draft plan, according to the
Red army commanders, was that I had completely neglected the Navy yards and
civilian workers in muntitlon and cliemical industries. How could we expect
to carry on effective sabotage during war if we did not have Communists working
there? It was agreed that this should be made an important part of the military
activities of the American Communists and that we would assign carefully
selected members to get jobs in those industries and establish joint units of
the party and Young Communist League in them. (The Brooklyn Navy Yard was
one of many places where such joint units were established under my direction
after return to the United States.)
The historic meeting in Nassonov's Lux Hotel apartment was the fir.st of
many important conferences, with weeks of intensive work over the 3 months
to follow. A few days later I began my participation in a "plenum" of the
executive committee of the Communist International. Other Americans present
were J. Louis Eugdahl and Sam Darcy. At that time Darcy was the head of the
international childrens' bureau of the Communist movement, directing the groups
known as Pioneers — where even grammar school students were recruited for
the Red cause. At the Communist International meetings I met such leaders
as Nikolai Bukharin, member of the Soviet Politburo and then head of the
Comintern ; Lenin's widow, Krupskaya ; Solomon Losovsky ; V. M. Molotov ;
Georgi Malenkov; Clara Zetkin ; Sen Katayama ; Jim Larkin of Ireland; Harry
PoUitt, William Gallacher. and William Rust, the three top leaders of the
Communist Party of Great Britain ; and other Communist officials from practic-
ally every country in the world — Doriat, Thorez, Gottwald, Lrzliatti, etc.
The Comintern plenum was followed immediately by a meeting of the execu-
tive committee of the Young Communist International, where Sam Darcy and
I represented the American Conmiunist Youth. I was elected by the executive
committee to represent the Young Communist International at the 10th anni-
versary celebrations of the Red army. The YCI had adopted the Budenny
Division, the Red army's crack cavalry outlit. I traveled to Tambov, near the
Volga, where this division was stationed. At the celebration I was made
an honorary regimental commander of the Red army. Dressed in Soviet military
uniform, I stood with the commanding general and high Government officials
as the soldiers marched in review, then addressed the division. I assured the
Russians that when the inevitable war comes between the United States, backed
by other capitalist countries, and the Soviet Union, American Communists
would do everything possible to turn the imperialist war into a civil war and
Insure the victory of the Soviet Union and the world revolution. (Pictures of
me in my Red army officer's uniform appeared in the Daily Worker of May 1,
1928, and on many other dates.)
One da'y while I was on the target range with the officers, the commanding
general of the division a.sked me a number of questions about the American
Springfield rifle and its value compared to the somewhat longer and heavier
Soviet rifles then in use. Then, he said : "We are not as much interested
in what kind of guns you have as on which side you are going to use them
when war comes between the Soviet Union and the United States."
In March I participated in another worldwide gathering of Communist
leaders — the congress of the Red International of Trade Unions. Several im-
portant events of far-reaching consequence took place there. Proposals by George
Mink from the United States to give far more intensive concentration on the
maritime industry and provide financial subsidies for American and other parties
for work in this field were adopted. This was the origin of Harry Bridges' power-
ful machine and of similar Communist organizations on the waterfront and
among sailors throughout the world. (Mink became an agent of the OGPU be-
fore his return to the United States and in later years became notorious as its
expert in assassinations and murders.) Another important event was the formu-
lation of plans for creating the Communist Party of the Philippines. Two Fili-
pinos, Evangelists and Manahan, attended the congress. George Mink, James S.
Allen, and I were assigned to work with them and prepare detailed plans for
creating a Communist Party in the islands. Subsequently, Allen went to the
1598 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Philippine Islands as Comintern representative, and later worked for the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations (one of many important Communists to be connected
with that organization).
In tlie meantime, I had practically completed my work on a very important
Comintern commission set up to work out the political line and organizational
plans for work in the armed forces of capitalist countries. The commission was
composed of five members, headed by Barbe, general secretary of the Young Com-
munist League of France. The other members of the commission were from
Poland, Greece, and Czechoslovakia. French was the one language spoken by all
of the five members so it became the ofiicial language of the commission.
The experiences of the French Communists proved of great value in drafting
political and organizational blueprints for the world. Barbe reported that the
French Reds had secret units on more than 100 vessels of the Navy and scores of
branches throughout the Army. Ha showed us many printed papers and other
agitational material the French Communists had prepared for distribution in the
Armed Forces.
Before coming to Moscow I had prepared draft demands for servicemen. With
few changes in formulation these had been given the O. K. of the Red army gen-
eral staff oflScers, and now they were adopted by our commission as part of the
material to go into the resolutions for formal ratification by the coming Sixth
World Congi-ess of the Communist International — held later in the year. The
demands I drafted are found on page 4.5 of The Struggle Against Imperialist War
and the Tasks of the Communists, adopted by the Sixth World Congress. This
very important and revealing document was based almost in its entirety on the
material drawn up by my associates and me on the commission during the winter
of 1928.
The key to Communist policy can be found in the following quotations, all
drafted by our commission :
"The proletariat in the imperialist countries must not only fight for the defeat
of their own governments in this war, but must actively strive to secure victory for
the Soviet Union * * * The Red army is not an 'enemy' army, but the army of the
international proletariat. In the event of a war against the Soviet Union, the
workers in capitalist countries must not allow themselves to be scared from sup-
porting the Red army and from expressing this support by fighting against their
own boui-geoi.sie, by the charges of treason that the bourgeoisie may hurl against
them (p. 31).
" * * * The proletariat in the Soviet Union harbors no illusions as to the
possibility of a durable peace with the imperialist * * * the primary duty of
the proletariat, as the fighter for socialism, is to make all the necessary political,
economic, and military preparations for these wars, to strengthen its Red army —
that mighty weapon of the proletariat — and to train the masses of the toilers in
the art of war * * * There is no * ♦ * contradiction * * * between the Soviet
Government's preparations for defense and for revolutionary war and a consist-
ent peace policy. Revolutionary war of the proletarian dictatorship is but a con-
tinuation of revolutionary peace policy 'by other means'."
The last sentence contains the key for understanding the current peace offen-
sives by the Communists throughout the world while the Red array prepares for
world conquest — aided by Red quislings in all countries including our own.
Only a relatively small part of the work of the commission was suitable for
publication in such open resolutions. Most of our time was devoted to practical
and conspiratorial matters such as communications between the party apparatus
and agents sent into armed forces, plans for disruptive agitation, sabotage in time
of war, and other means for bringing victory to the Soviet Union and defeat and
destruction to the Unite<l States and the capitalist world.
The commission was not left to itself during the course of our work. Bukharin,
head of the Comintern, made frequent inquiries regarding our progress and some-
times sent recommendations on specific points. But the most important direc-
tives came during my meeting with the head of the military department of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (Malenkov took part in this confei-ence.
Khitarov, later world head of the YCI, was translator. He had just returned
from China where he was Comintern representative.)
In 1928 the Communist International was housed in a realtively low and rather
antique building just outside the Kremlin walls. The interior was a maze of
corridors. By contrast, the Russian party headquarters were in a taller and
more modern office building. There were even more security precautions and a
greater number of armed guards than in the Comintern building — comparable to
the Kremlin itself, which I had visited on one occasion. I not only had plenty
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1599
of clociiments, but my pnitlo, escort, and translator was Khitarov, one of the
most important Communist leaders in tlie Soviet Union. Also present was Stalin's
secretary, Malenkov, then less important in the apparatus than Kiiitarov.
The importance of my work is well illustrated by the assisnnient of a hi^'h
functionary like Khitarov to act as translator. He had recently returned from
China, where he had been Comintern representative, and his reports had been
highlights of the plenums of the Communist International and the YCI. About
ft year later he became president of the Young Connnunist International after its
former head. Sliatzkin, failed to remain in Stalin's conlidence. Several Red army
general staff officers were present and took part in this conference in party head-
(piarters. I gave a detailed report on the work of the commission to that time.
On most points there was no disagreement. There were a few detailed changes,
and I was given instructions on additional matters to include. When I advised
the chairman, Barbe, and other members of the commission of the views of the
Kussian party, they were, of course, accepted without discussion or question.
In the Communist International the wish of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union is the final and supreme authority.
Some of my activities in the Soviet Union were of a propaganda nature, such
as a speech over the Comintern radio station, speaking tours of many parts of
the country, and articles in the Russian press. In the fall of 1927 I had been
invited to be a guest of the Society for Cultural Relations while in the Soviet
Union. As a former soldier of the American Army who had become a Communist,
I was then a Red hero, singled out for prominent mention in revolutionary litera-
ture. That pageantry and pomp was unimportant. The really important work
was my part in drafting plans for infiltration of American and other armies
as part of the Soviet plan for world conquest.
Near the 1st of May 192S I stepped from the Isle de France to the docks of
New York. I brought instructions from Moscow destined to have far-reaching
effects on the course of history.
No. 27
[From the Washington Times-Herald, September 3, 1953] '
Security Aid Bared as Red Is Suspended — Army Acts on Data McCarthy
Developed
(By Willard Edwards)
New York, September 2 (CTPS). — The Army Signal Corps Wednesday nigbt
suspended without pay a civilian employee assigned to guard secret military films,
on the basis of evidence gathered by Senator McCarthy, Republican, of Wisconsin,
that the worker was a supporter of Communist aims.
The action came as the accused man was reported to have Issued a death
threat to one of the witnesses against him.
Col. W. W. Lindsay, commanding officer of the New York section of the Army
Signal Corps, one of the most sensitive military agencies, announced the action,
which came on the third day of an inquiry by McCarthy's Senate investigating
subcommittee into Red penetration of the Defense Department.
SOME top secret
The security guard has been working on the night shift, reporting at 4 p. m.
daily. He passed on the admittance of all military and civilian personnel to
vaults containing thousands of rolls of motion-picture film, ranging in security
classification from restricted to top secret.
This ultra-secret branch of the Signal Corps, employing approximately 100
military aftd civilian workers, is located in Astoria, Queens, across the East River
from Manhattan.
Army officers, questioned by McCarthy during the past 2 days, had been
reluctant to admit the assignment of an individual with a pro-Communist record
to a post which could have been used for espionage or to aid in espionage. Sworn
testimony that the employee had predicted eventual Communist control of the
United States finally convinced them. The man was notified of his suspension
when he reported for work Wednesday afternoon.
1600 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
GETS KECORDS
Military authorities also said they were turning over to McCarthy the per-
sonnel records of two employees in the Quartermaster Corps here who have heen
identified at closed hearings as Communist Party members or followers. Both
had access to confidential military records, according to the testimony, but no
action has been taken in their cases thus far.
McCarthy was refused the loyalty files of the three Army employees on the
contention of the Army witnesses that they were still operating under orders
issued by President Truman in August 1948, at the height of the Alger Hiss
investigation, forbidding congressional committees access to all security files.
They said this order had never been revoked and they were still bound by it.
MAY CALL CHIEFS
McCarthy said he would summon Defense Secretary Wilson and Army Secre-
tary Stevens for an explanation of this refusal.
"Until we find out who cleared these individuals for Army employment,
despite their record of Communist activities, we will not get to the bottom of this
tragic situation," McCarthy remarked.
Witnesses at the closed session declared the Communist sympathies of the.
security guard at the secret film division of the Signal Corps had never been
concealed.
He had dfclared himself 100 percent in sympathy with Communist aims,
they testified, but had never actually joined the Communist Party because of
Lis Government employment.
A woman witness, who said she had heard the security guard say that he
looked forward to the day when Russia would subjugate the United States, was
extremely nervous, McCarthy said. Under questioning, she said the Army worker
had threatened to kill her if she testified against him. The subcommittee
ordered the woman placed under police protection.
Confronted with evidence that he had signed pledges of support for the Com-
munist Party candidacies for New York State offices of Robert Thompson, Israel
Amter, and Benjamin Davis, the Army employee admitted this action. He
denied Communist Party membership but when asked if he believed com-
munism was good for the United States, he said he was unable to decide.
ADMITS CONNECTION
Another witness, McCarthy said, whose endorsement helped the Signal Corps
employee get his Army post, admitted his own Communist-front connections.
He said he did not know whether the man he endorsed was a Communist or not.
INDEX
Page
Adams, John G 1564, 15G5, 15S2-1590, 1592-1594
Air Force (United States) 1574
Alaska 1595
Alien, James S 1597
American Communist Youth 1597
Amter, Israel 1000
Armed Forces (Communist infiltration) 1507,1595,1596
Army (United States) 1501-1507,
1574-1570, 157S-15S1, 1583-1586, 1588, 1589, 1591-1000
Army civilian personnel 1576
Army employment 1580
Army institutions 1576
Army Intelligence (G-2) 1576,1580,1583,1591
Army intelligence officers 1591
Army loyalty files 1600
Army officers 1590, 1599
Army personnel • 1580
Army radar laboratories (Fort Monmouth) 1578,1584-1587,1589-1593
Army Signal Corps 1577, 1579, 1580, 1599, 1600
Army witnesses 1600
Assistant Attorney General 1555
Assistant United States Attorney 1556
Astoria, Queens, N. T 1599
Atom bomb secrets 1557
Atom spy 1557, 1558, 1576, 1577
Attorney General (United States) 1555,1556,1575
Barbe 1598,1599
Bentley, Elizabeth 1557
Bridges, Harry 1597
British Communist Party 1597
Brooklyn Navy Yard 1597
Brothman, Abraham 1557
Brownell, Attorney General 1575
Budenny Division 1597
Bukharin, Nikolai 1597, 1598
Carr, Francis P 1554, 1572, 1584
China 1598,1599
Christmas (1927) 1595
Civil Rights Congress 1558
Cohn, Roy M., testimony of ^ 1554-1594
Coleman, Aaron 1570-1578, 1580, 1590-1593
Coleman personnel file 1592
Colombia 1593
Columbia University College 1555
Columbia University Law School 1555
Comintern 1595-1599
Comintern plenum ^ 1507
Comintern radio station 1599
Commander in Chief 1574
Commerce Department official 1557
Communists ___ 1555-1567, 1570-1577, 1578-1580, 1582-1586, 1588-1590, 1595-1000
Communists (U. S. Government) 1561,1562,1578
Communist conspiracy 1557, 1559, 1561, 1566, 1567
Communist infiltration (United States) 1560
Communist infiltration (U. S. Army) 1502,
1566, 1567, 1570, 1579, 1583-1585, 1588, 1589, 1595
I ■
n INDEX
Page
Communist International 1565, 1566, 1595, 1597-1599
Communist International (21 conditions of admission) 1565
Communist International (World Congress) 1598
Communist investigations 1561, 1578
Communist-line literature (Army) 1583
Communist Party 1555-1567,
1570-1577, 1578-1580, 1582-1586, 1588-1590, 1595-1600
Communist Party (first-string leaders) 1556,1557
Communist Party (France) 1598
Communist Party (Government Printing Office) 1562-1564
Communist Party (Great Britain) 1597
Communist Party (Philippines) 1597
Communist Party (Russia) 1578,1581,1595,1598,1599
Communist Party (second-string leaders) 1558
Communist Party (Sixth World Congress) 1566
Communist Party (Third International) 1566
Communist Party (United States) 1556,1558,1559-1562,1579,1596,1597
Communist petitions 1562
Communist records (New York) 1582
Communist revolution 1595
Communist schools 1595
Communist Sixth World Congress 1598
Communist spy ring 1557, 1558, 1584
Communist vs^aterfront organizations 1597
Congress of the United States 1555
Costa Rica 1596
Court of Appeals (Connecticut) 1559
Court of Appeals (United States) 1557
Crouch, Paul 1570
CTPS 1599
Czechoslovakia 1598
Daily Worker 1559, 1597
Darcy, Sam 1597
Davis, Benjamin 1600
Democratic Party 1560, 1572, 1573, 1580
Department of the Army 1561-1567,
1574-1576, 1578-1581, 1583-1586, 1588, 1589, 1591-1600
Department of Commerce official 1557
Department of Defense 1599
Department of Justice 1555
Doriat 1597
East River (New York City) 1599
Edwards, Willard 1580, 1599
Eisenhower, President 1566
Engdahl, J, Louis 1597
Evangelists 1597
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 1556,1557,1561,1573,1578,1585
Federal employees 1575
Federal grand jury (New York) 1558
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt 1558, 1559
Filing system (State Department) 1562
First-string leaders (Communist Party) 1556,1557
Foley Square (New York City) 1578,1588
Fort Monmouth, N. J 1565, 1576-1592
Fort Monmouth radar laboratories 1578, 1584-1587, 1589-1593
Foster, William Z 1557
French Communists 1 1595, 1596, 1598
Frunze Military Academy 1596, 1597
G-2 (Army Intelligence) 1576,1580,1583,1591
Gallacher, William 1597
Gasder's restaurant (New York City) 1588
General stafe (Red army) 1595,1596,1599
Gold, Harry 1557, 1558
Gold-Rosenberg spy ring 1557
Gottwald 1597
Government Printing Office 1562-1564, 1578, 1589
INDEX III
Page
Government Printing Office (Loyalty Board) 1504,1505
Grand jury investigation (1948) 1557
Greece 1508
Green, Abner 1558
Hamuiett, Dasluell 1558
Hawaii 15!)5, 1596
Hiss, Alger 1575
Hoover, J. Edgar 1574, 1575
Hotel Lux (Moscow) 1590,1597
Immigration and Naturalization Service 3570
Institute of Pacific Eolations 1598
International cliildren's bureau (Communist Party) 1597
Ireland 1597
Isle (le France (ship) 1599
Juliana, Jim 1593
Justice Department 1555
Kutayama, Sen 1597
Kauffman, Judge Irving 1577
Khitarov 1598, 1599
Kremlin 1598
Krupskaya 1597
Lariiin, Jim 1597
Lawton, General 1592
Lenin 1559, 1590, 1597
Lenin School (Moscow) 1596
Lenin's widow 1597
Linasay, Col. \V. W 1599
Losovsky, Solomon 1597
Loyalty Board 1580
Loyalty Board (Government Printing Office) 1504,1505
Loyalty files (Army) 1600
Lozliatti 1597
Lux Hotel (Moscow) 1590,1597
Malenkov, Georgi 1597-1599
Manahan 1597
Manhattan (New York City) 1599
Marx, Karl 1559
Marxist-Leninist literature 1559
McCarthy, Senator Joe 1555,
1556, 15G0-15G9, 1571-1575, 1578, 1580-1584, 1580-1588, 1590, 1593,
1599, 1600.
McGranery, Attorney General 1556
Medina, Judge 1550-1558
Merchants Club (New York City) 1583
Mink, George 1597
Molotov, V. M 1597
Moscow 1595-1599
Moskowitz, Miriam 1557
Nassonov 1595-1596
National Guard (United States) 1595,1596
Navy (United States) 1503,1574,1595,1596
New York City 1556-1558, 1578, 1580, 15S2-15S4, 1586-1588, 1596, 1599
New York Federal grand jury . 1558
New York State 1000
OGPU 1597
Pacific 1596
Panama 1595, 1590
Pentagon 1592
Philippine Communist Party . 1597
Philippines 1595,1598
Poland 1598
Politburo 1595, 1597
Pollitt, Harry 1597
President of the United States 1504,1500,1573,1576
Presidential directive 1504, 1566, 1573
Pro-Communist literature 1580
IV INDEX
Page
Quartermaster Corps 1000
Radar antiaircraft prosram 1590, 1591
Radar laboratories (Fort Monmouth) 1578,1584-1587,1589-1593
Red army — 1595-1599
Red army general staff 1595, 1596, 1599
Red army officers 1596, 1597
Rod International of Trade Unions 1595, 1597
Red quislings 159S
Remington, William W 1557, 1570
Remington trial 1570
Republican colleagues 1575
Roosevelt, Franklin D 1576
Rosenberg, Ethel 1557, 1558, 1576
Rosenberg, Julius 1557, 1558, 1576-1578, 1590, 1591, 1593
Rosenberg case 1557
ROTC 1595, 1596
Rothchild, Edward 1563
Rules of the Senate 1561
Russian Communist Party 1578, 1581, 1595, 1598, 1599
Russian espionage agents 1578
Russian press 1599
Russians 1581, 1597, 1600
Rust, William 1597
San Francisco 1596
Schine, G. David 1583, 1589
Second-string leaders (Communist Party) 1558
Secret film division (Signal Corps) 1600
Secret radar documents 1591, 1593
Secretary of the Army 1564, 1565, 1577, 1579-1590, 1593, 1600
Secretary of Defense 1600
Security Aid Bared as Red Is Suspended (newspaper article) 1599
Senate rules 1561
Senate of the United States 1561, 1562
Shatzkin 1599
Signal Corps (U. S. Army) 1577, 1579, 1580, 1599, 1600
Signal Corps secret film division 1600
Sixth World Congress (Communist Party) 1566,1598
Slack, Alfred 1558
Smith Act 1557
Sobell, Morton 1557
Society for Cultural Relations ^^ 1599
Soviet military uniform 1597
Soviet Union 1557, 1595, 1597-1599
Springfield rifle 1597
Stalin 1598
State Department 1562
State Department filing system 1562
Stevens, Robert T 1564, 1565, 1577, 1579-1590, 1593, 1600
Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communists 1598
Supreme Court of the United States 1558, 1576, 1579
Sussman, Nathan 1578
Symington, Senator 1575
Tambov 1597
Third International (Communist Party) 1566
Thompson, Robert 1600
Thorez 1597
Title 18 (United States Code) 1560
Treason in Government 1573
Tukhachevsky, Marshal 1596
TV audience 1558
Twenty-one Conditions of Admission (Communist International) 1565
United States Air Force , 1574
United States Army 1561-1567,
1574-1576, 1578-1581, 1583-1586, 1588, 1589, 1591-1600
United States Army Signal Corps 1577, 1579, 1580, 1599, 1600
United States Assistant Attorney General 1555
INDEX V
Page
United States attorney lOfiO
United States Attorney General 1555, 1556, 1575
United States Code (title 18) 15C0
United States Con.ure.ss 1555
United States Court of Appeals 1557
United States Court of Appeals (Connecticut) 1559
United States courthouse (New York City) 1578
ITnited States Department of Commerce official 1557
United States Department of Defense . 1599
Tiiiited States Department of Justice 1555
United States district attorney (New York) 1555
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 1556,
1557, 1501, 1573, 1578, 1585
United States Department of State 1562
United States Government Printinj? Office . 1502-1564,1578,1589
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service 1570
United States Military Establishment 1570
United States National Guard 1595, 1596
United States Navy 15(i3, 1574, 1595, 1596
United States President 1504, 1500, 1573, 1576
United States Quartermaster Corps 1600
United States Senate 1561, 1562
United States Supreme Court 1558
United States Why Department 1576
Voice of America (hearings) 1562
Volga (river) 1597
War Department (United States) 1576
Washington, D. C 1555, 1550, 1560, 1578, 1586
Washington Times-Herald 1580, 1599
AVest Palm Beach 1586
Wilson, Secretary of Defense 1600
World Congress (Communist International) 1598
Young Communist International (YCI) 1595, 1597, 1599
Young Communist League 1578, 1595, 1596, 1598
Young Communist League of France 1598
Zetkin, Clara 1597
O
SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRE-
TARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR
JOE McCarthy, roy m. cohn, and
FRANCIS p. CARR
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Res. 189
PART 43
MAY 27, 1954
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46620' WASHINGTON : 1954
V, 5
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
OCT 2 7 1354
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho
EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan
Richard J. O'Melia, General Counsel
Walter L. Reynolds, Cliief Clerk
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
THOMAS A. BURKE, Ohio
Special Subcommittee on Investigations
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota, Chairman
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
Ray H. Jenkins, Chief Counsel
Thomas R. Prewitt, Assistant Counsel
Robert A. Collier, Assistant Counsel
SoLis HoEwiTZ, Assistant Counsel
Charles A. Maxer, Secretary
n
CONTENTS
Page
Appendix 1651
Index 1653a
Testimony of —
Cohn, Roy M., chief counsel, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations 1602
EXHIBITS
Ivtrodiiced Appears
on page on page
28. Excerpt from New York Herald Tribune, November 6, 1953.. 1624 1651
28. Excerpt from Washington Times Herald, November 6, 1953.. 1624 1652
in
SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHAKGES AND
COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE
HENSEL AND SENATOR JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN,
AND FRANCIS P. CARR
THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1954
United States Senate,
Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Government Operations,
Washington., D. C.
AFTER RECESS
(The hearing was resumed at 2 : 15 p. m., pursuant to recess.)
Present : Senator Karl E. Mundt, Eepublican, South Dakota (chair-
man) ; Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Eepublican, Illinois;
Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan ; Senator Henry C.
Dworshak, Republican, Idaho ; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat,
Arkansas; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and
Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.
Also present: Ray H. Jenkins, chief counsel to the subcommittee;
Thomas R. Prewitt, assistant counsel ; Charles Maner, assistant coun-
sel ; and Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk.
Principal participants present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a
United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin ; Roy M. Cohn,
chief counsel to the subcommittee ; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel
for the Army ; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army.
Senator Mundt. The committee will come to order.
The temporary confusion at the table was the turning over of the
monitored transcripts to Mr. Sol Horowitz of the committee staff, who
has accepted them in behalf of Mr. Jenkins.
The committee will come to order. The Chair would like to begin,
as is his custom, by welcoming our guests to the committee room.
You seem to be here in unusually large numbers today, and conse-
quently this admonition perhaps should be voiced in even sterner tones,
to caution you that we have a standing rule of the committee that there
are to be no manifestations of approval or disapproval at any time
during the course of the hearing. The uniformed officers and the
plain-clothes men in the audience have instructions from the commit-
tee to remove immediately from the room, without any further notice
from the Chair, any of our guests who violate the terms by which you
entered the room, namely, to refrain from audible manifestations of
approval or disapproval. They will remove you politely but it will
1601
1602 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
be done immediately, and we hope it will not be necessary, and I hope
it will not.
As we concluded the morning session, Counsel Jenkins was engaged
in the direct examination of Roy Cohn, and Counsel Jenkins will con-
tinue now with his direct examination.
"When that is concluded, be it this afternoon or tomorrow morning,
he will then take oil' his hat and begin the cross-examination in his dual
role of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.
Mr. Jenkins?
TESTIMONY OF EOY M. COHN— Resumed
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, when we recessed for the noon hour, I was
examining you with respect to the events of October 14, at which time
you, together with certain members of your staff, were with the Sec-
retary of the Army and ]\Ir. Adams.
As I recall, you had recounted in some detail — and I am not sure
whether you had concluded or not — certain events leading up to the
meeting of October 14 which you said lent significance to the two
events of October 14. Had or not you concluded recounting those
events ?
Mr. CoiiN. Not quite, sir. I think I Avas about to conclude the file
stripping incident. If I might continue that.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you, JNIr. Cohn, now to conclude the state-
ments you were making at the time this committee recessed.
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. Anyway, it became very apparent that the
Coleman hie had been stripped, and stripped of the very information
which we wanted, between the time we had seen it out at Fort Mon-
mouth and the time Mr. Adams or a member of his staff — I think it
was Mr. Adams himself— had delivered it to our staff for use in the
course of the executive session.
We took the matter up with the xirmy right then and there after it
became clear that the material had been stripj^ed from the fde.
Mr. Jenkins. With whom specifically did you take it up, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. I am almost positive I went over and talked with Mr.
Adams, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
INIr. Cohn. And Mr. Adams — I don't know how much he said. I
told him the material was just missing from the file — period. We had
a copy of it. We knew it had been in there and it wasn't there now.
I Avent back and reported to Senator McCarthy. The Senator was
considerably disturbed about it. And he asked me to make a state-
ment for the record in the presence of Secretary Stevens and JNIr.
Adams indicating that the committee had been imposed upon to the
extent that vital information in the Coleman case which had been in
the file had been stripped by somebody in the Army before the photo-
static copy was delivered to us.
I made that statement at Senator McCarthy's direction, sir. It is
short and it follows. I am reading from page G42 of the minutes of
that date.
Mr. Cohn. —
By the way, Aaron Coleman was on the stand. I was addressing
mvself at the Senator's direction to Secretarv Stevens :
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1603
IMr. Secretary, we want to call your attention to the fact tliat at this time we
were down in Monmouth anil the Army made availahle, as it has and as have all
Government aj.'encies, the personnel tiles, not the loyalty and security liles, hut the
personnel files of various people under investigation. We examined the file of Mr.
Coleman and took copious notes from it, and as a matter of fact, some documents
were of very great interest and we made verhatim copies of them. Instead of tak-
ing the files'with us and bringing them hack here, they asked us over at Monmouth
If we would let them make photostats and they would have their records com-
plete. We agreed to that, and when the photostats arrived we found the files
had been stripped of some of the most relevant documents. It so happens that
some of the documents of wl'iich we had made verbatim copies were missing. We
wanted to call that to your attention. In the case of the Coleman file there
had been removed from it all papers indicating the search of his home by the
Security and Intelligence Division and the fact that he had been suspended
and the fact that these classified documents had been removed by him from the
Evans Signal Laboratory and found in his home.
I mijilit say with reference to the word "suspended," after Coleman
took these documents they suspended him for 10 days and then put
him rin;ht back where he was in the secret radar laboratories. So I
made that statement, Mr. Jenkins, to Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams on
October 14 at the direction of Senator McCarthy.
Mr. Jenkins. Before getting away from Coleman, you say that he
was suspended for 10 days and then reinstated. Was he later sus-
pended ?
Mr. CoiiN. He was suspended after our investigation had com-
menced.
I might say, Mr. Jenkins, there is an awful lot of detail on that case.
There had been an attempt, a recommendation, as I understand it,
by the security officer at Monmouth on more than one occasion to
have Coleman suspended which had been rejected until General Law-
ton came along and removed his security clearance, until he was
finally suspended.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did you release to the press the statement
you have just read from a memoranda or file ?
Mr. CoHN. We did not on that occasion, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. But you did release it to the Secretary of the Army 2
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. And Mr. Adams?
]\Ir. CoHN. Yes. Senator McCarthy wanted it to be right on the
record and wanted them to know that Ave were making a record of the
fact that this file which had been represented as a complete file, had
been stripped and stripped of just what we wanted.
Mv. Jenkins. In short, was it the Senator's position at the time that
he had been handed a phony document ?
Mr. CoHN. I guess that is about it, sir. What we wanted was out
of tlte file.
Mr. Jenkins. What explanation did Mr. Adams or Mr. Stevens or
anyone else connected with the Army give you with respect to the
alleged stripping of that file on Coleman?
Mr. CoiiN. As I recall, at that time Mr. Stevens said nothing. I
don't think he ever said anything about it. Mr. Adams talked to us
afterward, I think a day or so later, and said that the file had been
stripped in his office by some of, you may call them, subordinate
Indians, by some of his subordinate Indians.
Mr. Jenkins. I didn't get that answer.
]\Ir. CoTiN. Mr. Adams referred to the joeople who worked for him
as his Indians.
]C04 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins, Indians?
Mr. CoHN. Indians. And he said that the file had been stripped by
some of his Indians.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he tell yon by whom ?
Mr. CoHN. No ; we asked him to tell us by whom and he said that
be would rather not tell us by whom.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he indicate whether or not it was stripped with
his consent and at his direction ?
Mr. CoiiN. Xo, sir; he did not indicate that to us. In fact, he im-
plied it had not been done with his consent and at his direction.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he give any explanation as to why his Indians had
stripped that file?
Mr. CoHN. Yes. He told us the explanation that would be oiven
was because this Coleman information, the part we were interested
in, could be construed as either personnel information or as loyalty-
security information. And that if it were loyalty and security in-
formation, a case could be made out for the fact that it had been put
in the wrong file; it didn't belong in the personnel file but belonged
in another file. So it was stripped out of the personnel file before the
personnel file w\ns given to us, on the theory that it should not have
been in there in the first place.
I pointed out to Mr. Adams that the case had been treated back
at that time as a personnel matter, and not as a loyalty-security mat-
ter, that the information was properly in the file, that it had been
there for some years, and I made it pretty clear that it was quite ob-
vious to us the reason it had been stripped out was to stop us from
finding out that Coleman had been caught with these documents and
that no action had been taken to remove him from Fort Monmouth
in spite of it.
We got a letter from Mr. Adams a couple of days later, I think 2
or 3 days later, and that letter is in the record here, stating substan-
tially as I said here, that the information should not have been in
the files. It was admitted that it had been stripped from the files, but
saying that it was being construed as loyalty information, that is why
it was stripped from the files. But since we found out that it was
stripped from the files and we knew what was in it anyway, they
would give us what they had taken from the file, and they did give it
to us, which, of course, we had had copies of already.
Mr. Jenkins. Has that letter been heretofore introduced into the
record ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. We cross-examined ]Mr. Stevens or — I think it
w^as Mr. Stevens, about it — and that letter was produced and is in the
record.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, you stated prior to the noon recess
that there were two significant events of October 14. You have re-
lated only one of them ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Counsel, if you are turning to another subject,
the Chair would like to announce that Senator Symington and Sena-
tor McClellan were detained a few minutes in connection with the
Senator Hoey memorial services on the floor of the Senate.
We are all now present.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I will ask you to tell the members of this
committee what the second event of October 14 was.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1605
Mr. CoiiN. The second event, Mr. Jenkins, was the appearance of
Maj. Gen. Kirke B. Lawton, the connnandin<!: jieneral at Fort Mon-
mouth before the subconnnittee. That was in the ni<^ht session.
Mr. Jenkins. Did or not General Lawton testify at that time?
INIr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. He <2;ave probably the most important testi-
mony of the whole investifjjation.
Mr. Jenkins. As a result of the testimony given by General hawton
on that occasion, Mr. Cohn, was there any untoward event that
occurred ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What was that?
]\Ir. Cohn. The way it hapened was this, sir: General Lawton was
called in before the connnittee, as the commanding general of Fort
Monmouth would know more about this than anyone else. He testi-
fied and, Mr. Jenkins, he Avas asked about this whole situation of se-
curity risks and people with Communist affiliation up at Monmouth
by Senator McCarthy. Then Senator McCarthy
Mr. Jenkins. And Mr. Adams and the Secretary were present?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir. The Secretary had left during the morning
session. I don't know where he went.
Mr. Jenkins. Was Mr. Adams present ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, he was.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. Was that at an evening session?
Mr. CoiiN, That was at an evening session.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you moiin the third session you had held that day ?
Mr. Cohn. I believe it to be the third session we had held that day.
Mr. Jenkins. We understand.
Mr. CoHN. General Lawton was questioned by Senator McCarthy
about the fact that tlie security risks they had started suspending
very recently, people with Communist affiliations, people with connec-
tions with Rosenberg, people who had taken secret documents out of
the radar laboratories. Senator McCarthy wanted to know why it had
taken so long to get them, out of the secret radar laboratories, and I
think he said to General Lawton, "General, I concede it has only been
in the last few months you have been able to do anything about it."
General Lawton said :
No, sir ; it is not in the last few montlis. I have been trying for years, but
it is only in the last 2 or 3 weelis that I have been able to do souiethins about it.
And General Lawton went on to make it clear in response to ques-
tions that it was due to the action of the subcommittee in conducting
its investigation that these security risks were finally gotten out of
the secret radar laboratories, and that General Lawton had received
cooperation from his superiors only wdien Senator McCarthy and
the subcommittee entered the field and began looking into the matter
itself.
Mr. Jenkins. Did General Lawton testify to that?
Mr. CoHN. He did, sir, in Senator McCarthy's presence.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you have a record of that testimony ?
Mr. CoHN. I do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. You may proceed.
Mr. CoHN. The last thing in the Lawton testimony that was very
significant was. Senator McC^arthy pressed General Lawton as to why
it was that only in the last 2 or 3 Aveeks this effective action had been
40020°— 54— pt. 43 2
1606 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
taken, why it took action by the subcommittee, why it took an investi-
gation by the subcommittee to do something which should have been
done a long time before.
General Lawton, I might say, did not seem particularly anxious to
go into that. He finally let it stand just about this way: He said
something to the efi'ect, ''I know this very well, Senator, and I could
tell you, but please bear in mind I work for Mr. Stevens and I had
bstter not,"
I have that testimony right here.
Mr. Jenkins. Was he pressed further by Senator McCarthy?
Mr. CoHN. I don't believe he was. It was obvious that he did not
want to be in the position of being critical of Mr. Stevens and the
administration then in the Army, and I don't believe he was pressed
further on that point.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, do you know whether or not Mr. Adams
conveyed that information to the Secretary of the Army?
Mr. CoiiN. I am sure he did.
Mr. Jenkins. Are there any other significant events of October 14
shedding light on the charges made by you and Senator McCarthy
against Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams?
JNIr. Cohn. Yes, sir. I might say this, Mr. Jenkins: I have the
particular excerpt from General Lawton's testimony right here, and
1 suppose it speaks very well for itself. It is short.
Mr. elENKiNs. Is it short?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. In order that there may be no misunderstanding
whatever with respect to the testimony of General Lawton on that
occasion, I will ask you now to read it, Mr. Cohn.
Mr. Cohn. Thank you, sir. [Reading:]
The Chairman. —
meaning Senator McCarthy —
L<?t nie see if we can ask some questions that will not put you on the spot
as far as violating the regulations is concerned. Can we phrase the question
this way : Would you say that since you have taken over, and especially over
the past 6 months, you have been working to get rid of the accumulation of
security risks in the Signal Corps and that you have suspended a sizable number,
and you are working toward getting rid of all of those that you now consider
loyalty or security risks? Would that be a safe statement?
General Lawton. That is a question I will answer "yes," but don't go back
6 months. Let us go back — effective results have been in the offing in the last
2 weeks. I have been working for the last 21 mouths trying to accomplish
what is being accomplished in the last 2 weeks.
The Chairman. I think that covers that. So that you would say that in
the past several weeks you are getting some effective results?
General Lawton. Absolutely, that we have not gotten for the last 4 years.
The Chairman. And you have the complete cooperaton of the Secretary of
the Army in this, I understand?
General Lawton. Absolutely, and things are moving.
The Chairman. Could you tell us why it is only in the last 2 or 3 weeks that
you are getting these effective results?
General Lawton. Yes, but I had better not. I know this so well, but I am
working for Mr. Stevens.
After that testimony, Mr. Jenkins-
Mr. Jenkins. Let me ask you a question now, Mr. Cohn, before you
go f urtlier.
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1C07
Mr. Jexkins. Up to that time, had yon ever heard anythinp; with
reference to the proposed relievin<^ oi; General Lawton of his com-
mand by the Secretary of the Army ?
Mr. CoHN. Not a word.
Mr. Jenkins. Not a word ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you sometime later learn of such a proposed
project?
Mr. CoHN. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. We will get to that sometime later on.
I interrupted you. You started to make a statement.
Mr. CoHN. I was going to address myself to that very point, Mr.
Jenkins.
After this testimony was given, I think the next day Mr. Adams
indicated to us that he was not at all happy about it and that he was
not pleased with General Lawton.
Mr. Jenkins. That was on October 15 ?
Mr. CoHN. I believe tliat was around the 15th or 16th.
Mr. Jenkins. Can you recount as nearly as possible precisely what
Mr. Adams said ?
Mr. CoHN. He said then, as he said many times later — the sub-
stance of it, Mr. Jenkins, was that he thought that General Lav>'ton
had talked too much; that General Lawton had no right to put Mr.
Stevens on the spot and let Senator McCarthy know that effective
action in the investigation had come only after Senator McCarthy
and this committee had entered the picture. He was very much
annoyed at General Lawton from that point on.
Mr. Jenkins. Who heard Mr. Adams make those statements, Mr.
Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. I heard him make them. I know Senator McCarthy
did.
Mr. Jenkins. Was Senator McCarthy present ?
Mr. Cohn. Oh, yes. He knew that Mr. Adams was very unhappy.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Now, Mr. Cohn, is there anything else significant as of the 14th and
15th of October?
Mr. CoHN. Nothing wdthin my own personal knowledge, sir. There
is another significant item, but that will be testified to by someone
else.
Mr. Jenkins. Shall we pass now to the 19th of October ?
Mr. Cohn. Surely, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you to tell the committee, Mr. Cohn, what
occurred on October 19 that has a bearing upon the issues of this
controversy ?
Mr. Cohn. On the stopping of the investigation ?
Mr. Jenkins. Right.
Mr. Cohn. Some time prior to October 19, 1 think over the weekend
before, I told John Adams that I w^as going to go down to Fort
Monmouth; that I was going to accompany Senator McCarthy, and
some other staff members might be going with us. I believe I told
him that Mr. Rainville, the very able assistant to Senator Dirksen,
and Mr. Bob Jones, very able assistant to Senator Potter, were going
to go down, too, to represent Senator Dirksen and Senator Potter;
that we were going to go through the Evans Signal Laboratories to
1608 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
see just where Aaron Coleman had been workino;. We wanted to
look at the security setup, and we had plans to talk to a number of
witnesses down there.
In other words, Senator McCarthy decided it would be to every-
body's convenience to have some on-the-spot work done down at Fort
Monmouth.
Mr. Jenkins. Was that the Senator's party or was it the Secretary's
party?
Mr. CoHN. This was the Senator's. We were goino; down Avithout
any regard to Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams going down. Mr. Adams
either called me back or in a subsequent conversation told me that he
had talked with Mr. Stevens and that Mr. Stevens was likewise plan-
ning a trip down to Fort Monmouth and thought it would be a very
nice thing if we could all go down there together and would I pass
that along to Senator McCarthy and give Mr. Adams an answer.
I communicated with the Senator in some way or other, and he said
he had no objection at all to going down with Mr. Stevens and any-
one Mr. Stevens wanted to bring along. I reported that back to Mr.
Adams, and the now famous trip of October 20 to Fort Monmouth
was arranged.
Mr. Jenkins. Was anything said by Mr. Adams to you with respect
to having prepared a release to be given to the press on that occasion ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Prior to the time you made the trip.
Mr. CoHN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. CoHN. The trip was set for October 20. On October 19, as I
recall it, I was down here in Washington. I might say to set the
circumstances straight, Senator Mundt at that time was presiding as
the chairman of a subcommittee of the subcommittee, which was con-
ducting hearings on the part a Communist spy ring had played in
causing various officials of the United States Government back a
few years ago to actually deliver money plates of the United States
Treasury Department, the United States Mint, to the Soviet Gov-
ernment.
Senator Mundt was presiding at that investigation here in Wash-
ington and conducting open hearings, showing the pattern of Com-
munist infiltration in the Treasury and State Departments, I believe,
and how the Communists in those two Departments had used pressure
to get our Government to agree to ship for the first time in history
these money plates from the United States Mint over to the Soviet
Government.
They were money plates for occupation currency in Germany.
We were all working to a greater or lesser degree assisting Senator
Mundt in the preparation for executive sessions and public hearings
in that case.
It became obvious that not all of us could go up to Fort Monmouth ;
that part of the staff would stay and help assemble material for
Senator ISIundt, who had come back, I know, from South Dakota
to conduct these hearings.
We agreed that I would go up to Monmouth; that Mr. Rainville
and Mr. Jones representing Senator Dirksen and Senator Potter,
would come along. We advised Mr. Adams of just who would be in
our party.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1 COO
Mr. Carr, as I recall, did not fjo, but stayed and worked at the
hearings with Senator Miindt.
I was down here on Monday, the 10th. Mr. Adams telephoned,
and tliat is where the press release first came np.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, tell ns what was said by Mr. Adams with re-
spect to the press release, IMr. Cohn, if yon Avill, piease.
Mr. CoHN. As I recall it, Mr. Adams told me for the first time on
the morning of October 19, that he was preparing a press release
which he wanted Senator INIcCarthy to issue down at Fort Mon-
mouth the next day. He told me that — I don't recall his words — he
said, I think, that he had a rough draft or had made some notes, and
what he wanted Senator JNTcCarthy to say, and he would like to read
that to me over the telephone. I listened, and he read something
to me.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you have a copy of what he read to you, Mr.
Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. No; v:e have not had in the committee room a copy
of what he first read to me.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you remember the tenor of the document he read
to you^
Mr. CoiiN, I remember the tenor very well, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Will yon please state to the committee what it was ?
Mr. Cohn. The tenor of it was that Mr. Adams wanted Senator
McCarthy to say publicly the next day at Monmouth that this sub-
committee was going to bow out of the investigation at Fort Mon-
mouth and leave it to Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. Had you ever promised to do so up to that time ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you ever promise to do so ?
Mr. CoHN. Never.
Mr. Jenkins. Did Senator McCarthy to your knowledge ever prom-
ise to bow out of Fort Monmouth and turn it over to the Army ?
Mr. CoiiN. No.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you know why Mr. Adams prepared such a docu-
ment, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. I think the reason, sir, is — —
Mr. Jenkins. What, in your opinion was the reason ?
Mr. Cohn. He wanted Senator McCarthy to announce publicly, and
I assume be bound by that announcement, that he and the committee
were just going to step out and stop the Fort Monmouth investigation.
Mr. Jenkins. What reply did you make to him when he read that
document in which you were presumably to bow out of the Fort
Monmouth ?
]\f r. CoiiN. He read a couple of the sentences which we do have, such
as Mr. Adams wanting Senator McCarthy to say, "I have every con-
fidence that Secretary Stevens and the Army will move immecliately
and effectively to continue the investigation being undertaken by the
subcommittee." And tlien, again, Mr. Adams said, "I believe our re-
cent hearings have brouglit their names," meaning people with Com-
munist records, "out and that from here forward the Army should
be able to finish the job which we have started."
That is in substance what he wanted Senator McCarthy to say.
When I heard it
1610 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. My question was what was your reply to Mr. Adams
when you heard him read it ?
Mr. CoHN. My reply as best as I recall it was that I would telephone
Senator McCarthy and repeat to him as best I could what Mr. Adams
wanted him to say, that I would make a very fair presentation of what
Mr. Adams wanted him to say, but that I didn't think Mr. Adams
should have any confidence that Senator McCarthy would say it.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you telephone Senator McCarthy and apprise
him of the fact?
Mr. CoiiN. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you rocall the Senator's reaction ?
Mr. CoHN. I do.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, without using all of his words, Mr. Cohn, by
way of proper expurgation will you tell in substance what the Sena-
tor said ?
Mr. CoHN. The answer was no.
Mr. Jenkins. The answer was no.
Mr. CoiiN. I can say this much more, the Senator said he had no
intention of stopping the investigation, he didn't see why he should be
called upon to say that he was going to do it, and that he would not
say so. I called Mr. Adams back and I said that, as I had predicted
to him, the answer was no, and that the Senator was not at all receptive
to Mr. Adams suggestion.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, you have told about
Mr. CoHN. I might say this, Mr. Jenkins, I went on to tell him that
Senator McCarthy had said :
Since we are going to hold executive sessions, since we are going to hold public
hearings, there does not seem to be much sense in my coming out and saying we
are not going to do it.
I told that to Mr. Adams and that the Senator said this would be
inaccurate, how could he say he was going to stop the investigation,
when he was very clear that he was going to hold public hearings.
Mr. Jenkins. And, as a matter of fact, did you from time to time
thereafter hold both public and private sessions ?
Mr. CoHN. AVe did. After I had told Mr. Adams what Senator
McCarthy had said, that he wouldn't say we were going to stop,
and that affirmatively he had every intention of continuing, and that
he would hold executive sessions and public hearings, Mr. Adams
said something to the effect that, "I will put that in there, too, that
Senator McCarthy is going to hold executive sessions and public
hearings. Suppose I add that on to it? Maybe that will look better."
I don't recall what, if any, reply I made to that, sir, but I do recall
what happened later that afternoon.
Mr. Jenkins. What did happen later that afternoon ?
Mr. CoHN. As I recall it, I was up in room 357. I haven't bothered
to look up and see what was going on, but there was some kind of a
committee hearing going on or some kind of a meeting, and a mes-
senger from Mr. Adams' office came to the door with an envelope for
me. It contained a draft of a statement which Mr. Adams wanted
Senator McCarthy to make publicly the next day. As best I could
figure out, it was just what Mr. Adams had read to me originally, with
the exception of the fact he had added on a paragraph at the end
saying — after having said at the beginning Senator McCarthy will
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION IGll
stop liis investiiiation, Mr. Ad.ams added on a paraoraph at the end
saying bnt executive sessions and public hearin<!;s would be held. So
it seemed to have both what Mr. Adams thouf^ht should be said and
added on what I told Mr." Adams Senator McCarthy was "oing to do.
Mr. dENKixs. Do you mean one was a clarification of the other?
Mr. CoiiN. I don't know just what is was, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Was it in your opinion a contradiction?
INIr. CoHN. It Avas an obvious contradiction.
Mr. Jenkins. An obvious contradiction?
Mr. CoHN. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. CoiiN. And Mv. Adams produced, wlien we were cross-examin-
ing him about this, a draft of a statement, and I have no reason to
doubt that that is the statement he sent over that afternoon. It con-
tains language I have read, where Mr. Adams wanted Senator Mc-
Carthy to sa}', '"I believe that our recent hearings have brought the
names of these subversives out and that from here forward the Army
should be able to finish the job we have started.
He then goes on to say :
There are still some witnesses under snbpena by the subcommittee and they
will be heard later this week in New Yorlj in executive session. Following
these hearings it is our present plan to hold open hearings on the same subject,
probably in New York.
So you have in one paragraph, he wanted the Senator to say we are
stopping it, and in the next paragraph where he tried to embody the
Senator's thought, it made it clear we were not stopping, that we were
going to continue.
Mr. Jenkins. If I get the gist of what you have said, that original
statement stated that you were bowing out, so to speak, quitting your
investigation ?
Mr. CoHN. It said so in so many words.
Mr. Jenkins. And that was read to yon on the telephone and
you conveyed the Senator's message to him that he could expect it to
continue and then it was that the last two statements Avere added?
Mr. CoiiN. That is my recollection.
Mr. Jenkins. Taking that document without those last two state-
ments, Mr. Cohn, I will ask you wdiether or not you construed that
as an effort or an attempt on the part of the Army, or Mr. Stevens
or Mv. Adams, to persuade Senator McCarthy to give up his investi-
gation of Fort Monmouth.
Mr. Coiix. Sir, the document written by Mr. Adams says :
From here forward the Army should be able to finish the job we have started.
That statement was made to mean we were finished and that the
Army would be taking over.
Mr. Jenkins. Now you have testified about these events of October
19.
Mr. CoHN. Yes. sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you, as a matter of fact, in company with Sena-
tor McCarthy, the Secretary, Mr. Adams, and perhaps others, go to
Fort Monmouth on the 20th day of October ?
Mr. Cohn. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, what occurred there that day with re-
spect to this proposed press release, if anything?
1G12 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoiiN. With respect to the press release, sir ?
Mr. Jenkins. That is what I am askinji about.
Mr. CoiiN. All right. Well, going up in the plane, in Mr. Stevens'
plane — by the way, the chairman was there. I was with him, Mr.
Rainville was there, Bob Jones was there, Colonel BeLieu, General
P)ack, Mr. Adams, Mr. Stevens, and a couple of Mr. Stevens' orderlies.
Then I was sitting next to Mr. Stevens. He Avas sitting at a window
seat, I was next to him, and Senator McCarthy was across the aisle.
While the plane was taking off, Mr. Adams was sitting in the back
of the plane. After we were up in the air, Mr. Adams came forward
and knelt in the aisle in between Mr. Stevens and myself on the one
hand and Senator McCarthy on the other side of the aisle. JNIr.
Adams had with him, I think it must have been this [indicating], and
the draft of the press release
Mr. Jenkins. For the benefit of the committee, I will ask you to
identify what you mean by "this."
Mr. CoiiN. Exhibit No. 8. I believe that is what he had. And he
was kneeling in the aisle. He pulled it out and he started showing-
it to Senator McCarthy and asking Senator McCarthy whether or
not — wouldn't the Senator give him a break, wouldn't the Senator
issue this, wouldn't the Senator say these things.
The Senator read it and said he would not. Then Mr. Adams
said, "Well, what is wrong with it? What language would you like
out?"
The Senator said, as I recall it, the substance of what the Senator
said was, "Well, in this you have me saying that we are going to
stop the hearings. We are not. The last paragraph is accurate,
where you say we are going to continue them and have both executive
and public sessions, but the other business in there about us stopping
the investigation and turning it over to the Army isn't true and I
will not say it."
The Senator made a further point. He said, as I recall it, that he
was not in the practice of having other people, particularly people
wdiom he was investigating, prepare statements for him to make ; that
it was not characteristic of him; that the press knew it was not; and
that if he went in there and started reading off a statement like this,
everybody would know that it was not his, and the whole idea just did
not appeal to him.
He made the specific statement that he would not say anything
which could be construed as his saying that the investigation would
be called off.
Mr. Jenkins. Then you say the Senator definitely declined at that
time, while you were in midair and prior to landing at Fort Mon-
mouth, to issue such a press release?
Mr. CoHN. The Senator's specific declination was to say anything
that would indicate in any way that he was stopping the investigation
because, as he explained, he was not. He was going to hold hearings.
As far as specifically saying, "I will not say anything" or "I will
not make any release," I think he made it very clear — I don't recall
his saying it in so many words.
Mr. Jenkins. Later that day, did either Mr. Adams or the Secretary
make any further attempt to get this released to the press?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1613
Mr. Coiiisr. The next tKmcr I heard anything abont the release, as
far as I remember, Mr. Jenkins, was during hnich at the Administra-
tion Building.
Mr. Jenkins. What did you hear then ?
Mr. CoiiN. Senator McCarthy got up from his seat. He was sitting
up at the head of the table with Mr. Stevens.
Mr. Jenkins. We have heretofore identilied the place where he went.
Mr. CoHN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. It won't be necessary to designate it any further.
Mr. CoiiN. He left the room. As he Avas leaving the room, as I re-
call it, he walked doAvn the room. Between the chairs where we were
sitting at lunch and the wall, there was a table, and on the table, as I
remember it, there was a big pile of mimeographed statements. Sen-
ator McCarthy sto])ped when he reached the table, as I remember it,
and he picked one of them up.
Mr. Jenkins. What were they ?
Mr. CoiiN. They were another press release which Mr. Adams evi-
dently wanted Senator McCarthy to issue.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you have anything whatever or did Senator Mc-
Carthy have anything whatever to do with the preparation of those
mimeographed press releases ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, he didn't. The only thing he might have had to
do with it was, he had said there were certain things which he defi-
nitely would not say, and this third attempt by IMr. Adams was an
attempt, I think, looking at the release, to strike out those things
which Senator McCarthy made very clear he would not issue.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you have a copy of that mimeographed proposed
release ?
]SIr. CoHN. I don't have one right here. I know there are some
available, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you to
Mr. CoHN. I know what is in it. I read it over a couple of nights
ago. I have a very good recollection of what is in it.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, if we had one, it would not be necessary
for you to put your interpretation upon it. We want to get it
precisely.
State whether or not, in your opinion, it was a press release in which
the Senator in effect said that he was through with Fort Monmouth
or about to be through with Fort Monmouth, and would turn it over
to the Array ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, I don't think the third one was, Mr. Jenkins. I
think the third one said a lot of nothing.
Mr. Jenkins. Said a lot of nothing?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Anyway, Senator McCarthy had nothing to do with
the pre]')aration of it, and neither did you ?
Mr. CoHN. No.
Mr. Jenkins. When you get it, Mr. Cohn, I will ask you to file it
as an exhibit to your testimony.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. That was the third attempt that day, you say, to pro-
cure the Senator to make a press release; is that right?
40020°— 51— i.t. 43 3
1614 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. As I say, the way it happened was
[Document handed to Mr. Colin.]
Mr. CoHN. This is the one I mean, sir. It is marked "Committee
Exhibit No. 11." This one here jnst about eliminates what Mr. Adams
wanted said and what Senator McCarthy wanted said. It makes no
reference to whether the investigation by our subcommittee was or
was not going to continue.
Mr. Jenkins. Did the Senator release it to the press ?
Mr. CoiiN. No. What happened was this: The Senator picked it
up from this big pile of mnneographs, and he looked at it. As I
remember it, he then came over to me on his way out of the room and
motioned to me to walk along with him. I did, and he showed this to
me. I think that the Senator was not angry or disturbed. He was
just somewhat amused that they were still trying to get him to issue
this press release.
Mr. Adams followed us out of the room and asked the Senator if
he would not make this release, this third release.
Mr. Jenkins. The mimeographed one ?
Mr. CoHN. The mimeographed, the third one, yes, sir, which had
been piled up on this table in the lunchroom.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. CoHN. Mr. Adams wanted the Senator to issue that.
JSIr. Jenkins. "VVliat did the Senator say ?
Mr. CoiiN. The Senator said again — I think he made some com-
mente about its contents, the substance of which were that it didn't
say much of anything, and the point he made then was that he just
couldn't recall when, before, any agency which he was investigating
prepared a release and sought to put words in his mouth, and that he
was not going to go to the press and read or hand out something that
somebody else had written for us; that anything he had to say or any
questions they wanted to ask him, he could handle that very well him-
self, and he just was not going to give this out, but he woukl respond
to any questions the press might ask, but he was not going to make
such a release.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, at that time did you undertake to or exert
any influence over the Senator to prevent his making such a release ?
Mr. CoiiN. No. It was a completely unimportant matter to me.
]Mr. Jenkins. Did anything else occur on the 20th, Mr. Cohn, with
respect to the attempt of the Army to get you to quit Fort Monmouth
or to issue a press release relative thereto ?
Mr. Cohn. Not with the press release. There were a lot of very
peculiar things that happened on that day, sir. I don't know if you
want me to go into them now or on cross-examination. That was the
day when we were kept out of the laboratory, and I have heard at lot
of testimony that I was angry, which I was, and I could have saved
all those people from coming up here.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, frankly, those matters are relevant to the
countercharges.
Mr. Cohn. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. And it is anticipated that you will be examined or
cross-examined with respect thereto at a later time, and we hope not
too much later.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1615
So that is all that occurred, as we understand it, on the 20th of
October at Fort Monmouth with respect to your allegations against
Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams ?
Mr. CoHN. That is all that occurred with reference to the press
release.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not you saw either of those
gentlemen, Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams, on the following day, that is,
October 21 ?
Mr. CoHN. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. Who was there ?
Mr. CoHN. Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. Where?
Mr. CoHN. First on an airplane on the way to New York, and then
at my home, and then various other places.
Mr. Jenkins. What occurred on the 21st, Mr. Cohn, in New York ?
Mr. CoHN. Mr. Adams had suggested before that he would like to
go to see a boxing match that was to take place at Madison Square
Garden on the night of the 21st. He asked me if I could get tickets,
and there are some details that I might mention.
Mr. ,l*ENKiNS. It was a championship prizefight, was it not?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. The tickets cost $20, we understand.
Mr. CoHN. They did.
Mr. Jenkins. You tell what occurred with respect to that, you call
it boxing match.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. The prize fight — Mr. Adams wanted to go
and asked if I could get the tickets. I could and I did. I was down
in Washington. I had come down I think to see if I could help the
staff at all in connection with the hearings on the Communists being
responsible for the giving of these money plates to the Russians,
which were being presided over by Senator Mundt.
Mr. Jenkins. That was the hearing in which the Senator from
South Dakota was engaged ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir ; the Senator from South Dakota was the chair-
man of the subcommittee at that time and was holding hearings day
in and day out on that matter.
I came down frankly to see if I was needed. As I recall it, I was
not particularly needed. Senator Mundt was in very satisfactory
shape, and he told me — Senator Mundt I believe told me that I need
not stay down here and work on those particular hearings.
Mr. Carr was coming up to New York to carry on the work in
the Monmouth investigation. I might say that because of the incident
which I will relate on cross-examination about being kept out of the
laboratory, and other things, we had to go back to Fort Monmouth
on another date to do what we went to do on the first day. Mr. Carr
came back to New York with us and was going to go on and did go
on that second trip.
We flew up to New York with Mr. Adams on the same plane. Oui."
office made the reservations. We met on the plane. From that plane,
from the airport in New York, we went over to my home where Mr.
Adams had dinner.
Mr. Jenkins. That is on October 21 ?
1616 SPECIAL IN\'ESTIGATION
Mr, CoHN. Yes. Tliat is tlie clay after the Fort Monmouth incident.
Mr. Jenkins. I understand.
Mr. CoHN. Mr. Adams had dinner with my family and with me at
my house on that night.
After dinner we went down to the prizefight and after the prizefight
we went out.
Mr. Jenkins. Had you procured the tickets for the prizefights?
Mr. CoHN. I had.
Mr. Jenkins. Do we understand they cost $20 apiece?
Mr. CoHN. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. While on that subject, Mr. Colin, when did Mr.
Adams reimburse you for the price of his ticket ?
Mr. CoHN. On February 18.
Mr. Jenkins. How much later?
Mr. CoiiN. I guess about 4 months later.
Mr. Jenkins. Four months later. In the interim had you seen him
and been with him a number of times ?
Mr. CoHN. I had.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you at some time near the time we are talking
about likewise buy some theater tickets for Mr. Adams?
JNIr. CoHN. The theater tickets — and I want to emphasize this, Mr.
Jenkins, if I may, I in nowise want to criticize Mr. Adams for asking
me to get fight tickets or theater tickets or anything else. It was a
social courtesy which I Avas very happy to extend to him and would
extend to anybody else under similar circumstances. I thought there
Avas nothing wrong in his asking me to do it and I was glad to do it.
Mr. Jenkins. How many theater tickets did you get for him ?
Mr. CoHN. I think the theater tickets were three.
Mr. Jenkins. Three?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you recall the price of those theater tickets?
Mr. CoiiN. The total for the 3 was $25.80. ^
Mr. Jenkins. I am not intimating there is anything wrong about
the purchase of a fight ticket or the theater tickets. The committee
might think so, or the committee might think — I believe it is our
friend from the great State of Washington who requested me to find
out the date of the theater tickets.
Mr. CoHN. December 16. There was some discussion prior to that
date, but that night that the theater party finally came off was the
night of December 16, Senator.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Do you recall how much those theater tickets were in
dollars and cents?
Mr. CoiiN. Sir, there were the theater tickets plus about a 90 cents
or $1 brokerage charge.
Mr. Jenkins. What did they cost, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. The total was $25.80.
Mr. Jenkins. That made a total of $45.80?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I don't count the $20. Mr. Adams I was glad to
have as my guest on that occasion and there was no necessity for him
to pay me back.
Mr. Jenkins. I know, but Mr. Adams insisted 4 months later in
reimbursing you for the theater tickets and prizefight tickets; is that
correct ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1617
Mr. Jenkins. It was not 4 months after for the theater tickets?
Mr. CoiiN. It was 2 months after that.
He need not ever reimburse me for the fight ticket.
Mr. Jenkins. The reason I am bringing it out is not to embarrass
you or ]\Ir. Adams. The committee might think there is some sig-
nificance to it in view of the events that occurred prior to the ])ayment
and subsequent to the payment.
Mr. ConN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. The fact is that he did pay you some if'lS for the prize-
fight and the theater tickets?
Mr. CoiiN. He did.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, you say that you had seen him a
number of times between October 21 and February 24.
Mr. CoHN. February 18, it was.
Mr. Jenkins. February 18?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir,
Mr. Jenkins. During those, would you say, numerous times you
iiad been with Mr. Adams — is that right?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir, there were numerous times.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not at any time during
those numerous meetings with you and Mr. Adams, he ever made any
offer to reimburse you for either the prizefight or the theater tickets ?
Mr. CoHN. The prizefight tickets, no, sir, according to the best of
my recollection. The theater tickets, I believe he did say, sir, that he
would reimburse me for them, and I told him that when the bill came
to my office, I would send it on to him to be paid.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you recall an event of October 29?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, before you — before you leave October 21, there were
some things said on that night which you might regard to be of
significance.
Mr. Jenkins. I ask you to now tell the committee what those things
were.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir, I will be very brief on them. We spent a lot
of time together that night, at dinner, at the fight and afterward.
And Mr. Adams was very much disappointed that Senator McCarthy
had declined to make the announcement that he vras stopping the in-
vestigation the day before. Mr. Adams wanted to know what could
be done to work out some arrangement whereby we would stop the
investigation. He was very anxious to have us do that.
He asked us about that and there was quite a bit of discussion about
it. We told them we did not see that anything particular could be
done. He mentioned on that occasion, as he had to another staff
member once before, and as he did to us on subsequent occasions, made
the suggestion that if we could sort of spread around the investiga-
tion to include other parts of the military, such as the Navy and the
Air Force, it would not look so bad for the people in the Army.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, perhaps that will be regarded as
the most serious charge made by you and Senator McCarthy against
the Army or Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams, and I ask you whether or
not that is the first time that any such suggestion was ever made
to you ?
Mr. CoHN. To me, personally, yes. To members of our staff, no,
Mr. Jenkins. And where were you when such a suggestion was
made ?
1618 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. It was sometime during that evening, sir, I don't re-
member the exact location.
Mr. Jenkins. Where did you have dinner that evening?
Mr. CojiN. At my home.
Mr. Jenkins. Where did you go after the prizefight?
Mr. ConN. I think we went to a couple of phices.
Mr. Jenkins. A couple of places?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes. They were restaurants, or things.
Mr. Jenkins. No unfavorable inference would be drawn as far as
I am concerned, ]\Ir. Colin. I understand you are a single man.
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And Mr. Adams is a good talker and he probably
will be able to talk himself out of any domestic difficulties.
Mr. CoiiN. Based on that night, there is nothing he has to talk
himself out of.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Now, Mr. Cohn, do you say that sometime that evening, that is the
evening of October 21, a suggestion was made to you by Mr. Adams
that the McCarthy investigating committee go after the Navy or the
Air Force?
Mr. CoiiN. Mr. Jenkins, it wasn't quite that forceful, if I might
use the word.
Mr. Jenkins. I want you to tell, because the committee, I feel, will
regard it as extremely important, as nearly as you can, and as pre-
cisely as you can, the circumstances under which anything was said,
and as nearly as you can, verbatim, if possible, just what Mr. Adams
said that night.
Mr. Cohn. I can't possibly, sir, give you verbatim what Mr. Adams
said that night. The best I can do is give you the substance of Avhat
he said, and I want to emphasize, as far as this Navy-Air Force sug-
gestion, there was no great dramatic thing about saying, "Stop the
investigation about us and go ahead and blow up the Navy and the
Air Force."
The idea which ]\Ir. Adams was trying to project was that if we
were to investigate Communist infihration in the Navy and the Air
Force at the same time, at that time, that would sort of take some
of the onus off the Army, and if we could leave the Army alone and
give some attention to the Communist infiltration in the Navy and
the Air Force, it would not put the Army in a bad light or it would
not put the Army — leave the Army all alone in a bad light. I want
to emphasize this.
Mr. Jenkins. Who was present?
Mr. CoiiN. I was there and Frank Carr was there.
Mr. Jenkins. And Mr. Adams; the three of you?
Mr. Cohn. And Mr. Adams. I want to emphasize this : Mr. Adams
and Mr. Stevens, neither one ever suggested that we pursue any false
information or anything of that kind about the Navy and the Air
Force. Their idea was that there was undoubtedly a problem of
Communist infiltration in the Navy and the Air Force, similar to that
in the Army, and they were just hoping that we could give that some
attention for a while.
]Mi'. Jenkins. Let's stick to the occurrence of the 21st day of Oc-
tubpr.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1G19
Mr. Jenkins. Have you now, you think, imparted to tlie committee
all of the knowledge you possess with respect to what was said on that
occasion ?
Mr. CoHN, No, there was one other comment which might or might
]iot be important later.
Mr. Jenkins. I ask you to state what it is.
Mr. CoHN. That Avas that Mr. Adams told us that night that he Avas
goi)ig to take over handling the arrangements for Dave Shine's tour
of duty in the Army. He said })revious to tliat these arrangements
have been handled by ])ersonnel in the Army, but that was going to
become his per.sonal business from tlien on. That, 1 think, about
sums up Avhat I recall pertinent to this case. Tliere vvas considerable
other discussion, sir, about Mr. Adams was trying to find out w'here
we Avere getting some of our information from, and there was a lot
of joking going on back and forth.
Mr. Jenkins. INIr. Cohn, the remarks tJiat you have attributed to
Mr. Adams Avitli respect to the evening of the 2Lst of October, and
especially those in which a suggestion was made that there Avas
material in other branches of the service to investigate as far as
subversives are concerned, Avere those remarks by Mr. Adams jocu-
larly, facetiously, or did you get the impression that he Avas dead
serious about them ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, it is very difficult for me to try to read Mr. Adams'
mind or chart his emotional position at that particular moment.
Mr. Jenkins. You say he was expressing Mr, Stevens' great dis-
appointment at your continued investigation of Fort Monmouth?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, he was ])articularly talking about the fact that
Senator McCarthy had not made the press release, had not said the
day before that he Avould stop the investigation.
Mr. Jenkins. At that time had either you or the Senator from
Wisconsin considered diverting your efforts from Monmouth and
going into the area of the Air Force or the Navy ?
Mr. CoHN. No.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you have any information that Avould have jus-
tified your so doing?
Mr. CoiiN. Sir, there is an aAvfr.l lot of information in our files.
We have a lot. I don't know what people have Avritten in and Avhat
we have. I kncAv of no specific information AA-hich would have Avar-
ranted certainly the holding of hearings on the Navy or Air Force
at that time.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. Cohn. There is one small situation in the Navy Avhich occurs
to me, but we had planned no investigat'on.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, do you feel that Ave have thoroughly ex-
plored the events of October 21 ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. What occurred on October 29, especially with refer-
ence to a trip to see one David Greenglass ?
Mr. Cohn. Oh, yes, sir. October 29 we went up to the Lewisburg
Penitentiary to see David Greenglass. David Greenglass was the
brother-in-laAv of Julius Rosenberg and had participated Avith Julius
Rosenberg in the Soviet spy ring. Greenglass, unlike Rosenberg,
entered a plea of guilty and admitted to the FBI and to the country
1620 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
just what his part in stealing atom secrets had been. He testified as
a witness at the Rosenberg prosecution. As a matter of fact, 1 ex-
amined Mr. Greenglass on the witness stand, and I therefore knew
him.
In going over the Rosenberg testimony with reference to the Cole-
man case, I came across some statements by Mr. Greenglass which in-
dicated that he might have knowledge that there had been actual
espionage in the Army Signal Corps.
Mr. Jenkins. At Fort Monmouth?
Mr. CoiiN. At Fort Monmouth specifically, and at other places, sir,
within the jurisdiction of the Army Signal Corps, including com-
panies which were doing subcontracting work for Fort Monmouth and
the Army Signal Corps. We therefore decided sometime in October,
in preparation for public hearings, that we would go up to talk with
David Greenglass and see just what information he could give to us,
whether or not there had been espionage in the Signal Cor])S, whether
there might be some people who hadn't been caught yet, and whether
there were any leads he could give us which would assist in the in-
vestigation of Communist infiltration in the secret radar laboratory
at Monmouth.
We had been talking about this trip for some 2 or 3 weeks
Mr. Jenkins. When you say "we," whom do you mean ?
Mr. CoiiN. I mean the staff of the committee, and it was known also
to Mr. Adams and to General Lawton.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. Did you go to see Greenglass on October
29?
Mr. CoiiN. We did.
Mr. Jenkins. Did Mr. Adams go with you?
Mr. CoiiN. No.
Mr. Jenkins. Did General Lawton go with you?
IVIr. CoiiN. I believe he wanted to, sir, but he was not permitted to.
Mr. Jenkins. Why was General Lawton not permitted to go with —
who did go with you, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. I know Dave Schine went, Frank Carr, I believe went;
and ]Mr. O. John Rogge, who was counsel to Mr. Greenglass, who rep-
resented Mr. Greenglass at the Rosenberg trial, who I knew from that,
went along as counsel for Mr. Greenglass.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Who prevented General Lawton — who, as we under-
stand it, was the commanding general at Fort Monmouth — from going
with you on this trip of October 29 to see David Greenglass?
Mr, ConN. What I know about it is this, sir: AVhen the trip — w^e
had this October 14 incident which I have described when General
Lawton said it wasn't until this committee came along that any effec-
tive action had been obtained at Monmouth, and he wouldn't go into
details because he worked for Mr. Stevens. As I say, from that time
on, Mr. Adams was distinctly unhappy with General Lawton. Mr.
Adams told me, and I know he told the Senator, that he was not happy
about the idea that General Lawton was sitting in on hearings of our
committee. General Lawton would come in day after day and sit
there and listen to witnesses, take notes of what the witnesses said, and
I have reason to believe that some of the facts which he gleaned aided
him in arriving at the decision to suspend various people working in
the secret radar laboratory.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1621
General Law ton also said that lie avouIcI like to come or at least send
a representative up to this Greeno:lass interview, because he felt if
Greenglass knew anything; about espiona<ie, past, present or possible,
in the Army Siii'nal Corps and afl'cctino; Fort IMonmoutli, General
Lawton would like to know about it and know about it fast.
General Lawton said he would come or send his aide along with us
£0 his aide could report to him.
I don't remember tlie details of the conversation, Mr, Jenkins, but
I do remember that Mr. Adams told me that he was going to have
General Lawton told not to go and to start keeping his nose out of
things and out of the investigation.
General Lawton, who we had welcomed on the trip, we would have
been very happy to have him with us, although he originally planned
to go or to have a representative there, the fact is he communicated
to us a couple of days before the trip and said that he could not go
and he could not send a re])resentative.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he tell you why, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. I don't recall whether he did or not.
Mr. Jenkins. But Mr. Adams did tell you
ISIr. Cohn. Mr. Adams made it very clear.
Mr. Jenkins. He wanted General Lawton to keep his nose out of
it?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you a little more about General Lawton
later on your direct examination, but while on the subject of General
Lawton, I now^ ask you whether or not at all times General Lawton
was most cooperative with the McCarthy Committee in the investiga-
tion of the infiltration of subversives at Fort Monmouth ?
Mr. Cohn. He was, sir. The only incident of any kind we ever
had with General Lawton, as far as I recall, was that there was a
question in the general's mind at one point as to whether he would
get in trouble if he allowed us to continue interviewing, conducting
staff interviews with people who worked at Fort Monmouth. I took
that matter up with Mr. Stevens personally, and Mr. Stevens called
General Lawton and said that those interviews could be conducted,
and they were.
I know of no instance in which General Lawton withheld any proper
cooperation from the subcommittee.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not the interview^ to which
you refer was the interview of November 6?
Mr. Cohn. That was October 2.
Mr. Jenkins. Back in October?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
I might say this, sir: that we knew when we were in this investiga-
tion, although we had not met General Lawton personally, we knew
by reputation that General Lawton had no use for Communists, and
we knew that General Lawton was very unhappy about the fact that
he had in these secret laboratories at Fort Monmouth security risks.
We had been told that by people who worked under General Lawton,
who had worked with him and who knew him. We had no doubts
about General Lawton.
4G020°— 51 — pt. 43 4
1622 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. Do you know thnt General Lawton, when he was
finally given free rein, of his own volition and after his own investi-
gation made certain suspensions at Fort Monmouth?
Mr. CoHx. He did, sir.
JNIr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Colm, have you related all of the incidents
with respect to October 29 and your trip to Greenglass, or do you care
to elaborate upon that ?
Mr. CoHN. Very briefly, sir, as to what knowledge we gained from
Greenglass which becomes im])ortant later, again with a brief refer-
ence if I may to the public record. Based on the information which
we received from David Greenglass on that day, we have drawn up a
question-and-answer deposition Avhich he swore to and which has
become a part of the records of the subcommittee, in which he de-
scribed the fact that there had been espionage in the Army Signal
Corps and that such activities might possibly still be continuing.
In other words, that all the members of the ring had not been
ap])rehended, but he said — I am not going to read it. If I may I will
just read a sentence or two from it.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. CoiiN. It speaks for itself.
Mr. Greenglass was asked the question: "Did you learn" — sir, as I
said, he himself had been a Communist spy and had admitted it and
was helping the FBI and the Government.
Mr. Jenkins. And we understand now undergoing a life sentence.
Mr. CoHN. I think it is a 15-year sentence.
Mr. Greenglass was asked this que3<:ion:
Question. Did you learn if there was espionage in the Army Signal Corps?
Answer. Yes. I learned that there was espionage in the Army Signal Corps.
I learned that the Rosenberg ring took and obtained secrets from the Army
Signal Corps and transmitted them to Russia.
Question. Will you give us some of the details concerning your knowledge
of espionage in the Signal Corps?
Answer. Yes. Rosenberg told me that tlui Russians have a very small and very
poor electronics industry (this is of course another name for the radar indivstry)
and that it was of the utmost importance that information of an electronics
nature be obtained and gotten to him. Things like electronics valves (vacuum
tubes), capacitors, transformers, and various other electronic and radio com-
ponents were some of the things that he was interested in.
Rosenberg also told me that he gave all of the tube manuals he could get
his hands on to Russia, some of which were classified "top secret."
Continuing, he said :
About 1947, at a time when it was a top United States scientific secret, Julius
Rosenberg told me about information he had obtained from a frit^nd relating
to a thinking machine which would send out interceptor guided missiles to
knock out an enemy's guided missiles which had been detected by our radar and
its course predicted by our thinking machines. Rosenberg was discussing this
information with me, as I said before, when it was a top American scientific
secret.
Of course, it must be remembered that Rosenberg was employed by the Signal
Corps during World W^ar II and worked at Fort Monmouth and at other places
which were working on prime or subcontracts for the Signal Corps such as the
Emerson Radio Corp. At one time, too, Rosenberg was .an inspector for the
Signal Corps.
After the war, when Rosenberg and I were in business together in New
York, Rosenberg used his Signal Corps contacts in attempts to obtain con-
tracts for Pitt Machine Products and the G. & R. Engineering Co.
I am winding this up.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1G23
As a matter of fact. Julius Rosenlierg made a munber of trii)S to Signal Corps
officials in Pbiladeliihia for this imriiose.
Once, when I questioned Julius about the necessity of the frequent Phila-
delphia trips, he answered that not only were the trips necessary for company
business, but also because he had to see his espionage contacts.
Question. Did Rosenberg tell you anything about working on the proximity
fuse while he was at the Signal Corps installation at Emerson?
Answer. Yes. Rosenberg told me that while he was at the Signal Corps at.
Emerson he stole the proximity fuse and gave it to the Russians.
Greenglass then goes on to describe liow Kosenberg accomplished
this step. I won't do that now.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, from what have you been reading?
Mr. Cohn. I have been reading from a sworn deposition by David
Greenglass, which is in evidence before the McCarthy committee,
and — I won't go on with that description. Greenglass goes on.
Mr. Jenkins. Was that a deposition taken by the McCarthy
committee ?
Mr. Cohn. It was.
Mr. Jenkins. It is not the testimony given by Greenglass in court
against his brother?
Mr. Cohn. No. We wanted Greenglass to actually come and testify
before the committee. The Justice Department would not permit it,
but they did permit us to take a deposition. The last question, Mr.
Jenkins, and I think it is significant, is this :
Question. AVhen did the operation of the Rosenberg ring which had as its
purpose the obtaining of radar secrets for Russia stop?
Answer. As far as I know, these operations never stopped, and could very
possibly be continuing to this very day.
And there are further details in the Greenglass testimony.
Mr. Jenkins. What action, if any, did Senator McCarthy take on or
about the 5th day of November, with reference to making a state-
ment about continuing his investigation or holding hearings, either
executive or public hearings, on Fort Monmouth ?
Mr. CoHN. Well, on the 5th of November, which was the day before
this luncheon in Mr. Stevens' office, Senator McCarthy stated publicly
that it was his firm intention to hold public hearings on Communist
infiltration at the Fort Monmouth Army radar laboratories.
Mr. Jenkins. Were those statements or was that statement carried
in the press ?
Mr. Cohn. It was, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Given wide circulation ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, if I without reading might insert in the record two
articles, 1 from the New York Herald Tribune, and 1 from the Wash-
ington Times Herald, saying in starting :
A full exposure of Communist espionage activities at the Signal Corps labora-
tories and radar center at Fort Monmouth, N. J., was promised yesterday by
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, when he begins hearings at the United States
Courthouse.
and so on. May I file those for the record ?
Senator Mundt. Will you identify them by date ?
Mr. Cohn. Surely. The two stories are dated Friday, November G,
1953. They refer to statements made by Senator McCarthy on Thurs-
day, November 5, 1953.
Senator Mundt. Without objection they will be filed as exhibits.
I think they are 28 and 29.
1624 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
(The above-referred docnments were marked for identification as
"Exhibits 28 and 29" and will be found in the appendix on pp. 1651
and 1652.)
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, in view of previous testimony, I don't
think it would be denied by anyone that there was a luncheon in the
Pentagon in the Secretary's office on November 6 ?
Mr. CoHN. It certainly will not be denied by me, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I wa^it the Roy M. Cohn version of that luncheon.
We have heard from IMr. Stevens, we have heard from Mr. Adams,
and now we want to hear from Mr. Cohn with respect to that par-
ticular meeting.
Mr. Cohn. I will tell you what went on as best I recall it, sir. The
luncheon was arranged by INIr. Adams. He said at the request of Mr.
Stevens. Mr. Adams had been talking to us on October 21 and on
subsequent occasions about what could be done to stop hearings and
the investigation of our committee at Monmouth.
He indicated that he and Mr. Stevens would be very much pleased
if we could work out some way of stopping it, that it was not helping
either one of them.
]\fr. Jenkins. Had the Senator's declaration of November 5 been
carried in the press prior to the invitation of Mr. Adams ?
Mr. CoiiN. No; I think actually the invitation was before that, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. Cohn. I would say 2 or 3 days, I don't remember just when,
prior to November 6, Mr. Adams callect me, I believe it was, although
I have no clear recollection of the call, just when it was, Mr. Adams
called me, and he^said couldn't he and Mr. Stevens get one more crack
at the Senator before these hearings got underway, and Mr. Stevens
would be deeply appreciative if a little luncheon could be held at his
office so that the matter could be discussed. I called the chairman.
Senator McCarthy, and asked him about it. He said, sure, if Mr.
Stevens thinks there is something he wants to talk to him about, he
would be glad to have lunch with him. The meeting was set up. Sen-
ator McCarthy was expected, the Senator was expected, Dave Schine
was expected, Frank Carr was expected, I was expected.
Mr. Jenkins. Why do you say Dave Schine was expected ?
Mr. Cohn. Because he was.
Mr. Jenkins. Who named the guests, the invitees ?
Mr. Cohn. As I recall, it was Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. So you and the Senator and Dave Schine and Frank
Carr, being four in number, were invited to attend this luncheon at the
Pentagon on November 6 ?
Mr. Cohn. We were.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say the prime purpose was to get one more
crack at the Senator in an effort to get him to call off the investigation
of Fort Monmouth?
IMr. Cohn. That is the substance.
Mr. Jenkins. Wlio attended the luncheon ?
Mr. Cohn. From our side, there was the Chairman, Frank and
myself.
Mr. Jenkins. Why did not Dave Schine attend the luncheon ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't remember, sir. I remember there were two or
three reasons. I remember we passed the invitation on to him. He
had had an illness in ]\is family. No. 1, and No. 2, he had been inducted
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1C25
into the Army and he had some reservations about going down to the
Secretary's office and having lunch Avith him.
Mr. Jenkins. What happened at the hincheon on November 6?
Mr. CoHN. Do you want that in detail ?
Mr. Jenkins. I think it would be well ; certainly the substance and
important facts salient to the issue.
Mr. CoHN. It is the only time I had lunch at Mr. Stevens' office
and I do remember rather well what happened there. I know that
Frank Carr and I arrived before Senator McCarthy and then the
Senator came. Luncheon places were set for us and for Dave Schine.
He did not — Dave, as I explained, did not come. Mr. Stevens asked
where he was.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, do you remember distinctly that there were
G plates or chairs or places for 6 people at that table that day?
Mv. CoiiN. I don't remember the number six, Mr. Jenkins. What
I do remember is that there was a vacant place at the table. One
more had been expected tlian arrived. I remember Mr. Stevens asking
if Dave were not coming. I think Mr. Adams said something to the
effect that no, I had tokl Mr. Adams that Dave probably wouldn't be
down. I also remember, since we have been talking about pictures,
that Mr. Stevens said that a couple of photographers at the Pentagon
had wanted a picture of him, the Secretary, with Dave, who had just
been inducted as a private, and he had told them that he expected
Dave for lunch and thought the picture could be taken then.
Mr. Jenkins. By Dave, you mean Dave Schine ?
Mr. CoHN. Dave Schine.
Mr. Jenkins. You remember that distinctly ?
Mr. Cohn. I do.
Mr. Jenkins. And you remember distinctly, Mr. Cohn, positively,
definitely, that Schine was invited to be there on that occasion ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. I remember I called him and told him that
he was invited and expected and he said he did not think he could
come. I don't remember how definite he was. I remember telling
Mr. Adams that I would be there, that the Chairman would be there,
that I would be there, that Frank would be there. I thought I made
it pretty clear that Dave would not be there, but apparently Mr.
Adams had not relayed that to Mr. Stevens.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say it was the Secretary in person that said
he had hoped or expected to have his photograph taken with Dave
Schine?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, it was not that much of a Federal case, if I can use
that term. It was simply a matter, as I understood it, of a couple
of photographers at the Pentagon who thought if they got a picture
of the Secretary of the Army and of Dave Schine, who had been
inducted as a private, that w'ould be a good picture to have. They
had made inquiries of Mr. Stevens' office and Mr. Stevens had ap-
parently said that he expected Dave for lunch that day, and that the
picture could be taken on that occasion. But when Dave didn't show
up, he asked where Dave was and mentioned he had told the pho-
tographers they probably could get that picture. I do remember
that. There was no
Mr. Jenkins. Now, what occurred there that day in addition to the
things you have detailed?
Mr. Cohn. It was a long session.
1626 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. As we understand, about a 3-hour session.
Mr. CoHN. Yes. It was long, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. We don't want you to consume 3 hours in telling us
what transpired there on that occasion.
Mr. CoHN. There is no danger of that, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Condense that, Mr. Cohn, and tell us the important
things of that day.
Mr. CoHN. By summary, sir, the important things were this : Mr.
Stevens and Mr. Adams wanted to know if there was not some way
to stop these public hearings which Senator McCarthy said would
be held, wasn't there some way we could get them called off. Senator
McCarthy said no, there was no way, that the hearings would be held
and that they should be held.
Mr. Stevens next asked if he could know what — get a rundown of
the public hearings and see what they were going to show, so he could
be prepared for what was to come. He addressed that to Senator
McCarthy. Senator McCarthy then — I think Senator McCarthy
started giving an outline and then he turned to me and said, or told
me in substance to tell Mr. Stevens everything that was going to be
brought out at the first public hearing, just sit there and tell him the
whole thing. I spent
Mr. Jenkins. Up to that time, as we understand it, you had never
had a public hearing with respect to Monmouth ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, we had not.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. CoHN. I went into a detailed review of witnesses we expected
<o call, testimony that would in all probability be adduced, and things
along those lines, showing — I remember I talked about this Green-
glass deposition. I remember, Mr. Jenkins, I told Mr. Stevens that
our investigation showed that not only had Julius Rosenberg been
down at Monmouth, but that probably a majority of members of the
Rosenberg spy ring had at one time or another worked at the Army
Signal Corps and specifically down at Fort Monmouth, which was a
pretty good indication as to how important the Russians thought
those laboratories were. I told Mr. Stevens that evidence we had
showed that friends and associates of Julius Rosenberg and other
members of his ring, had still been at INIonmouth in the year 1953,
that a group of them had moved out of Monmouth, but that that didn't
mean much, because they had moved into the Federal Telecommuni-
cations Laboratory, which was a company doing subcontracting work
for the Army Signal Corps at Fort JMonmouth, so that they were doing
]ust about the same thing at another place,
I remember that we told Mr. Stevens that one drastic example of
this is the case, and it is a public record, of a man named Joseph Levit-
sky, for whom Julius Rosenberg was the contact, who was employed
with the Federal Telecommunications Laboratory, and that Joseph
Levitsky had been working at the Federal Telecommunications Labo-
ratory right down to 1953, even though his employment application
showed for all to see that Julius Rosenberg was 1 of the 3 people who
got him the job.
And there are a lot of other examples. It showed a very, very
disagreeable situation of Communist infiltration over a period of
time, and of the presence of security risks.
I gave that outline to Mr. Stevens.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1 C27
Mr. Jenkins. Did the Secretary express any surprise at the fact
that such conditions existed, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't know that he was surprised, sir. He was dis-
turbed.
Mr. Jenkins. Was it made known to him that you intended to
continue your work at Fort JMonmouth and to have these open
sessions ?
INIr. Cohn. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Senator McCarthy went
further. He said that even more important to him than the ex])osure
of individual Communists or security risks was the exposure of people
within the Department of the Army who had covered up the security
risks and Communists and had made it possible for them to continue
on the job until the committee came along.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, what was said by either the Secretary or
Mr. Adams on that occasion, designed to persuade or influence you
to not hold these open hearings on Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I don't know anything about a design, but after
this recital was completed, I recall that Mr. Stevens got up and turned
to Senator McCarthy and said, in effect — I don't remember his exact
words — "Senator"
Mr. Jenkins. Just one minute, Mr. Cohn. I don't hear you. What
was it the Secretary said ?
^ INIr. Cohn. He said in substance
Mr. Jenkins. Can you compete against that ? Try the third time
now.
Mr, Cohn. Mr. Jehkins, the Secretary stood up and addressed him-
self to Senator McCarthy and said words to the effect: "Senator, if
you go through with these hearings, they will be public hearings,
and if you go into this loyalty setup and everything else, I will have
to resign as Secretary of the Army. I have been here for 10 months.
A lot of the people involved have been serving under me, and it is my
responsibility, and I am just going to have to resign."
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, are you definite and positive that the Sec-
retary made such a statement as that ?
Mr. Cohn. I am, sir, and I think he has admitted that he has on
this witness stand, although there might be some difference.
Mr. Jenkins. In the version ?
Mr. Cohn. In the terminology.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Welch has reminded the Chair that we are at
the seventh inning, so we will take a 5-minute recess at this time.
(Brief recess.)
Senator Mundt. The committee will come back to order. I am
sure that the Chair need not admonish the audience about the rule
with which you are familiar, against any audible manifestations of
approval or disapproval, because I feel that most of you who were
here before the recess are the same folks who are here now.
Mr. Jenkins, you were interrogating — I do not see the witness.
The witness will please take his seat now, and we will continue with
the interrogatory.
Mr. Jenkins was in the process of direct examination of Mr. Cohn
in connection with the luncheon in the Pentagon taking place on
November 6. He will pick up the evidence at the place where he
left off.
1628 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Counsel Jenkins, you may proceed.
Mr. Jenkins. Kow, Mr. Colin, we were at the Pent-agon on Novem-
ber 6 at the luncheon?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And that was when we took a recess. You had re-
counted the events up to the point where you said the Secretary of
the Army stated that if these investigations continued, he would have
to resign as Secretary of the Army.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. He said that, to Senator McCarthy and Sen-
ator McCarthy replied.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you recall what Senator McCarthy's reply was?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir, I do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What was it?
Mr. CoHN. Well, the tenor of what Senator McCarthy said was that
he thought Mr. Stevens was entirely too sensitive on the question of
the personal effect it would have on Mr. Stevens. The Senator did
not agree that it would l)e that much of a personal reflection on Mr.
Stevens. He thought if Mr. Stevens did a housecleaning job, that
he had no reason to be personally concerned.
Mr. Jenkins. Did at that time Senator McCarthy indicate that
he would desist from further investigation, or desist from holding
public hearings with respect to Fort Monmouth, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. No.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, an allegation is made and one that
the committee may consider a very serious allegation, the allegation
being by you and Senator McCarthy that on that occasion, November
6, Mr. Stevens made some remark or made some statement about
your desisting from further investigation of Fort Monmouth and
going after the Navy and the Air Force. I want you to tell as nearly
as you can this subcommittee precisely what the Secretary of the
Army said on that occasion with respect to that subject.
Mr. Cohn. Of course, I can't give you the exact words, Mr. Jen-
kins. The substance was that Mr. Stevens felt if we would look at
Communist infiltration in the Navy and the Air Force for the while
and give the Army a rest, that that would be welcome.
Mr. Jenkins. What reply was made to that suggestion?
Mr. Cohn. The reply by the chairman was a number of points. I
remember 1 or 2 of them were that first of all we could not start an
investigation, we had no facts warranting such an investigation at
that time. It is required before you start investigating someplace
you have to have a preliminary investigation, lay the groundwork,
and that takes weeks and sometimes months. That second of all we
did not even have the information on which to predicate that pre-
liminary investigation, and the Senator did not think that was feasi-
ble. He went on to explain that our next investigation was all set
anyway, and that that was not of the Navy or Air Force, but involved
Communist infiltration in defense plants, the presence of current Com-
munist Party members in defense plants.
Mr. Jenkins. Was that the second time that such a thing had been
mentioned in your presence, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. It is the second time that I recall, sir. There might
have been others, but I do not recall them. I specifically recall, at
this time I specif, jally recall November 6.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1629
Mr. Jknkins. Do you recall any other time subsequent to that?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes.
]Mr. Jenkins, Now
Mr. CoiiN. I might say that, on the question of following that up,
Mr. Jenkins, on the question of information which we were lacking,
that Mr. Adams did make a comment that there was no problem
about that, that he could get us the information.
Mr. Jenkins. Yes. That, as we understand it, is the occasion of
the niap incident ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir; that is not. That was at the same November 6
luncheon.
Mr. Jenkins. "\Yliat did Mr. Adams say on that occasion ?
Mr. CoHN. The substance of what he said was that he could help
us get information on the Navy and Air Force. I might say that the
conversation changed when the Senator mentioned that our next in-
vestigation was of Communist infiltration in defense plants, because
Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams immediately said that if we were to inves-
tigate Communists in the defense plants, that that might involve the
Defense Department itself, Defense Department personnel, and that
that would be very helpful to Mr. Stevens because it would remove the
Army as the sole object of the committee's investigation on Commu-
nist infiltration in the military.
Senator jNIcCarthy, I remember, said "Well, we had that investiga-
tion planned, we were all ready on it, we were going to go ahead on it,
and if doing that simultaneously was going to ease Mr. Stevens' per-
sonal situation or make Mr. Stevens feel better about it, Mr. Stevens
would be the beneficiary of us going ahead with the Communist infil-
tration of defense plants."
Mr. Jenkins. Had or not you then projected such an investigation
looking to defense plants ?
Mr. CoHN. We had, for some time prior to that.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say the Secretary and/or Mr. Adams ex-
])ressed delight or satisfaction or pleasure over such an
Mr. CoHN. Yes. They thought that that would spread around the
blame a little bit and they felt that would be very, very helpful to them.
And Senator McCarthy took the view that we were already on that
other investigation, we were going ahead with it, and if running that
along at the same time was going to ease Mr. Stevens' situation per-
sonally and ease his state of mind, that he was very glad that that
would be the result.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, was anything else said of significance or
of interest that day, November 6, that would shed any light whatever
on your charges against the Army?
Mr. CoiiN. There were a lot of other things said, sir. Some gen-
erals came in. General Eidgway, General Trudeau and General
jMudget. and I had to tell the story all over again about our investiga-
tion at Fort Monmouth. There was more discussion. There was dis-
cussion about Dave Schine, and completing his work for the commit-
tee while he was doing Army training, just about as Mr. Stevens and
INfr. Adams have reported it. It is a long meeting, but I think I have
covered the substance of it.
4GG20 0— 54— pt. 43 5
1630 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. Going from November 6 to November 24 and 25, and
with particular respect to the proposed removal of General Lawton
from Fort Monmouth, I want you to tell the members of this subcom-
mittee what you know about that subject, Mr. Cohn.
Mr. Cohn. On November 24, Mr. Adams talked for the first time
about definite, concrete plans to remove General Lawton.
Mr. Jenkins. Just what did Mr. Adams say ?
Mr. Cohn. As I recall it — and bear in mind, Mr. Jenkins, there had
been a lot of in-between discussion between the night of November 14
when General Lawton made the statement that I read. There then
came the order or instruction that he couldn't go along to Monmouth,
and it was apparent that he was in the doghouse. Then on November
24, Mr. Adams came up to New York. We had public hearings on
Communist infiltration in the Army radar laboratory
Mr. Jenkins. I am very sorry to have to interrupt you, Mr. Cohn.
We have skipped from November 6 to November 24, have we not ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. That is quite a period, a period of approximately 2 or
3 weeks.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Were there other occurrences between those two dates
that would be of interest to the committee insofar as they might shed
light upon the issues involved in this controversy ?
Mr. Cohn. I think there were, Mr. Jenkins. For instance, there
was that press conference of Mr. Stevens on November 13, and things
like that, but I am sure that that will be covered on cross-examination,
and in keeping with your admonition to me that we just keep this
down
Mr. Jenkins. We are talking now particularly about your charges
against Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams.
Mr. Cohn. Well, sir, you say "charges." I want to give you the
facts.
Mr. Jenkins. All right, then, we will call it statements or allega-
tions. That will be satisfactory.
Then we go to November 24 ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I want to ask you this one question about
November 17. That is the date of the photograph which has been in-
troduced here.
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Were you present when that photograph was taken ?
Mr. Cohn. I was.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not on that occasion at the
McGuire Airfield — is it ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Which is adjacent to Fort Dix?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not on that occasion the Sec-
retary of the Army requested that his photograph be taken with Dave
Schine ?
Mr. Cohn. What happened, sir, was, we got off the plane and Pri-
vate Schine was standing over with General Ryan and some officers,
I believe. The ])hotographer was there. Mr. Stevens called Private
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIOW 1631
Scliine over to his side. 1 don't su])pose he would have come over if
he hadn't been called over. And Private Schine stood next to him.
They were taking pictures, and Mr. Stevens made a comment about
bcini^ glad to get a picture of himself and Private Schine. That did
occur.
Mr. Jenkins. That did occur?
]Mr. CoiiN, Yes, sir. I heard no remark that INIr. Stevens addressed
]xirticu1arly to the photograjiher or anything else, but he called, I
remember very clearly that he called Dave from where Dave was
standing, over to his side to appear in the picture.
J\Ir. Jenkins. Dave, of course, was then in the Army and was then
assigned and physically at Fort Dix ^
Mr. CoiiN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Being assigned to that post?
Mr. CoHN. Yes.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Passing from that now to November 2-i and 25, and
with particular reference to the proposed Lawton dismissal, I want
you to tell the members of the committee what you know about that,
what Mr. Adams said about it, what INIr. Stevens said about relieving
General Lawton.
Mr. CoiiN. I didn't see Mr. Stevens on November 24. Mr. Adams
came to New York for the open hearings on Fort Monmouth. Ap-
parently he received some communication from Mr. Stevens about
General Lawton. I don't remember what time of the day it was, first,
sir, but Mr. Adams spoke to me and said to me :
I have some news which I am going to have to break gently to Senator McCarthy.
I asked him what it was. He said to me :
We are now at a point where we are going to get down to business about getting
rid of Lawton.
He said he had had word from Mr, Stevens, and that they planned
to relieve General Lawton of his command by the next day.
Mr. Adams asked me what I thought Senator McCarthy's reaction
would be.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he tell you why they were removing General
Lawton?
Mr. CoHN. At that point he did not go into any detail, sir. I
assume he knew that I knew why they were removing him.
Mr. Jenkins. Had or not he from time to time cliscussed the re-
moval of General Lawton with you, from October 14 or 15 up to
this date?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, he had not discussed the actual removal of General
Lawton. He had made a good many very derogatory remarks about
General Lawton and indicated that General Lawton was in the dog-
house with Mr. Stevens.
Mr. Jenkins. Had incurred the displeasure of Mr. Stevens ?
Mr. CoiiN. That is a much better way to put it — had incurred the
dis]:)leasure of Mr. Stevens.
Mr. Jenkins. Now we want to go into the statement Mr. Adams
made on November 24.
Mr. CoiiN. The first thing he said on November 24 — he might have
given detail, I don't know — was that Mr. Stevens had made concrete
plans to remove General Lawton; that Mr. Stevens had it very much
on his mind and was very anxious to get rid of General Lawton and
1632 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
intended to do so, hoped to be able to do so the next day, but that he
first wanted Mr. Adams to broach the subject with Senator McCarthy
and wanted to know whether or not Senator McCarthy would make
a public issue out of General Lawton's dismissal.
Mr. Adams asked me my opinion in the matter. I gave it to him.
Mr. Jenkins. What was your opinion?
Mr. CoHN. My opinion was that Senator McCarthy would know
that it Avas a reprisal against General Lawton for his cooperation
with the committee and for the prompt action which he had taken,
and that Senator McCarthy woulcl not like it.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. Was anything else said on that subject,
Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. Yes. Mr. Adams said that the pressure was really on,
and he just had to get an answer for Mr. Stevens and had to bring —
the substance of it was he had to bring Senator McCarthy around
and get Senator McCarthy to agree not to make a public fuss about
it if they relieved General Lawton.
Then there Avas something more that day.
Mr. Jenkins. What was that ?
Mr. CoHN. That night, if I recall correctly, Senator McCarthy was
delivering a coast-to-coast television speech at 11 p. m. on the Harry
Dexter White case. Mr. Adams asked during the afternoon sometime
where the speech was being held. He said he wanted to come up and
talk to Senator McCarthy. We told him where it was being held.
As a matter of fact, I think I gave him the wrong address, uninten-
tionally. But eventually he did get to the right place, and he heard the
Senator's speech.
After the speech he walked over with us to some other place and on
the way he started asking Senator McCarthy whether or not Sena-
tor McCarthy wouldn't promise not to make a public fuss about it if
they kicked out General Lawton.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did you get the impression that the sole
and exclusive mission of Mr. Adams on that occasion, to New York,
was to discuss the General Lawton situation ?
Mr. Cohn. No. The impression I got, Mr. Jenkins, was that Mr.
Adams in all probability would have been in New York anyway.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. Cohn. P^or the public hearings on Fort Monmouth. That,
being in New York, Secretary Stevens had told him or had called him
or something, and told him to use that opportunity to work on Sena-
tor McCarthy.
Mr. Jenkins. I want you to tell about the conversation between
Mr. Adams and Senator McCarthy.
Mr. CoHN. It is hard for me to differentiate between the conversa-
tion that night and the next day, because it continued right on through.
So I could lump those two periods together, Mr. Jenkins, the night
of the 24th and the morning and noon of the 25th, I could tell you
what happened.
Mr. Jenkins. You may do so.
Mr. Cohn. Senator McCarthy questioned Mr. Adams in detail
about why they were trying to get rid of General Lawton. Mr. Adams
said, well, there were all kinds of stories about him and all kinds of
allegations, and he made a speech in which he said that some universi-
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION ] C33
ties aren't careful about what they teach in certain subjects, some
things along those lines.
Senator McCarthy was not particularly persuaded by this. He said
to Mr. Adams, in substance, "Don't kid me about it. I know why
you are getting rid of him. I know what you have been saying about
him and I know why you are getting rid of him, and I think it is all
wrong."
So John wanted to know, conceding all that, wdiat Senator Mc-
Carthy would do aboiit it.
Mr. Jenkins. When you say John, you mean John Adams?
Mr. CoHN. John Adams. He wanted to know, conceding all tliose
things, wliat Senator McCarthy would do about it, just how mucli of
a public fuss Senator McCarthy would make about it if they got
General Lawton out.
Senator McCarthy, I don't think gave a decisive answer about that.
He said words to the effect, "I don't know just what I can do about it,
I can't promote or demote a general, or I can't give them a rank or
anything else. All I can do is complain, and I don't know whether I
can complain before my own committee or whether I have to complain
to the Armed Services Committee, or wdiatever it might be. But I
think it would be a very unfortunate thing for 'INIr. Stevens to do
because it would be a signal to other people in the Army throughout
the country that a great general w^as being punished for cooperating
with a committee investigation designed to oust Communists from
secret places, and I don't tliink it should be done. That is my advice."
That afternoon, November 25, there was an awful lot of discussion
back and forth about it. Mr. Adams
Mr. Jenkins. Eanging over a period of how long ?
Mr. CoHN. Ranging during the 24th and up to the early afternoon
of November 25.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you heard the Secretary state there on
the witness stand that Lawton was a great general; did you not?
Mr. CoHN. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say that he was at all times most cooperative
with the committee in its work in ferreting out Communists and
subversives ?
Mr. CoHN. He was.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you know of any reason why either the Secretary
or John Adams would have wanted to relieve General Lawton of his
command at that sensitive plant except as a retaliatory measure for
his cooperation with your committee ?
Mr. CoHx. The reason was because he was displeased with him
because of his cooperation with our committee and because of the fact
that he had taken a strong stand on the mishandling of the security
and Communist problem by people in the Army.
Mr. Jenkins. I didn't mean to cut you off, Mr. Cohn, in your recita-
tion of all of the conversations that occurred between Mr. Adams,
you and the Senator, on November 24 and 25. You say it extended
through a part of the night?
Mr. CoiiN. Through the night of the 24th and on the 25th up until
the afternoon, the early afternoon, before the hearing of the 25th.
It ended just before the hearing when Mr. Adams telephoned Mr.
Steve*is in my presence.
1C34 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that General
Lawton was not relieved of his command ?
Mr. CoHN. I know that he has not been formally relieved of his
command, sir. I think that, as a technical matter, they have seen
to it he is not around much now.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you know, Mr. Cohn, that he was not promoted
in that he was not given a permanent assignment of the rank he
now holds?
Mr, CoiiN. Mr. Jenkins, when we were riding back from Fort Mon-
mouth, I think it was the night of October 22, although I could be off
on the date, the chairman and I were riding with General Lawton in
his car. We had been holdings hearings at Monmoutli during the
day, and we were going to hold hearings in New York that night.
General Lawton came back to sit in at the hearings. There was a
discussion between the general and Senator McCarthy about the gen-
eral's status. The Senator complimented the general on the wonderful
cooperation he had given us, and told the general he thought the
general was a great American because of the tirm stand he had taken
on these Communists and security risks. General Lawton told the
Senator words to the effect, "Yes, but that stand will cost me my pro-
motion and I will be lucky if I survive much longer out here at Fort
Monmouth." Those words turn out to be somewhat prophetic,
Mr. Jenkins. He is not at Fort Monmouth ?
Mr, CoHN, I don't know just what his status is now, sir, I have
heard that they told him he was sick when he felt well, and that he
was assigned to a hospital,
Mr. Jenkins. As a matter of fact, he is out here at Walter Reed
Hospital, is he not ?
Mr. CoHN. I heard they first sent him to a hospital and after he got
to the hospital and was feeling fine, they told him to take sick leave
from the hosjiital. Apparently, the last I heard, he is now on sick
leave from the hospital.
]Mr. Jenkins. And he was not permanently assigned to his present
rank?
Mr. CoHN. He was denied promotion.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, what is the significance for the benefit of
those who do not know, and I am sure there are many who do not
know, in not assigning a general — let us say a major general, to the
rank of a permanent major general.
Mr. CoHN. Sir, General Lawton was on a list for promotion to the
permanent rank of major general. That promotion was denied to
him. If it had been granted, it Avould have made it pospible for liim
to stay in the Army for an additional period of time. But denying
the promotion, it means he will have to retire that much sooner. That
is the way I understand it.
Mr, Jenkins. Do you know how much additional time it would have
meant to General Lawton to stay in the Army ?
Mr, CoHN. I do not know the exact number of years,
Mr. Jenkins. I don't know ; I am asking you.
Mr. CoHN. I don't know the exact amount.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, what do you know about a telephone con-
versation in the early part of November in which Mr. Adams called
General Lawton on the telephone and made certain requests of him
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1625
witli respect to Avitlidi-uwiiifr tlie jxenoral's recommendation for the
suspension of certain subversives at Fort Alonmoiith? You heard Mr.
Adams' testimony on that?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, Idi-d.
]\Ir. Jenkins. You heard liim admit that ?
Mr. CoiiN. He did.
Mr. Jenkins. What do you know about that? When did you find
out about it ?
Mr. CoiiN. I don't think T found out about tliat particular phone
call until these hearings. What I did know, Mr. Jenkins, is that not
only ^Ir, Adams but various other emissaries from tlio Secretary's
Office and from the Army had been ^^.oino; to (General Lawton and
tryino- to tell him to keep quiet, to keep his nose out of thin<;s, and
had been makino; su^jgestions that certain security risks should not
be suspended, and various other things along those lines. I was aware
of that general situation. I didn't know about that particuhir phone
call until this hearing.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you this question: Did you hear me ask
Mr. Adams whether or not h^ called (Jeneral Lawton in the early
part of November 1953, and asked, in substance, whether or not Gen-
eral Lawton could see his way clear to withdraw certain cases which
he. General Lawton, had recommended for removal as bad security
risks, at which point (General Lawton refused to do so, stated that he
would not, and that the Secretary of the Army would have to take
the responsibility for such withdrawals. Did you hear that testi-
mony?
Mr. CoHN. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you know of any reason why Mr. Adams, counsel
for the Army, would make that request of a general of the Army
in a sensitive plant such as Fort Monmouth ?
Mr. CoiiN. I would rather not comment on that, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, have you told all you know about
the Lawton incident?
Mr. CoHN. The Lawton incident ? No.
On November 25, at about two in the afternoon, or so, T don't know
the exact time, Mr. Adams, after a final attempt to get Senator Mc-
Carthy to say he would not make an issue out of this, called up Mr.
Stevens on the telephone. He called Mr. Stevens from the anteroom
of the hearing room at the United States courthouse, courtroom 110,
and I heard IVIr. Adams tell Mr, Stevens that Senator McCarthy was,
in effect. Senator McCarthy thought it would be very unwise to
relieve General Lawton, and that the Senator was not running the
thing, running the Army, but he certainly felt if his advice was being
sought it was a bad mistake and things along those lines.
It was a friendly conversation with Mr. Adams. It was friendly
but the Senator was firm. That is the substance of what happened
on November 25. For the time being, but not for long, the Lawton
situation was dropped.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, was the Lawton situation ever brought up
again, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. When and under what circumstances? What oc-
curred ?
1636 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. The LaAvton situation was mentioiiefl a number of times
between then and the 16th of December, and the I7th of December.
Mr. Jenkins. By whom ^
Mr. CoHN. By Mr. Adams. I had no conversations with Mr.
Mr. Stevens about it.
Mr. Jenkins. In what connection was it brought up ?
Mr. CoHN. The connection w^as they were working on — Mr. Adams I
was working on Senator McCarthy to get the Senator's promise of i
silence, if General Lawton were relieved of his command. |
Mr. Jenkins. Still trying to get him relieved ? >l
Mr. CoHN. Very much so. }
Mr. Jenkins. Up to and including, you say, December 17? I
Mr. CoiiN. I think it went even past that. I have personal knowl-
edge of events on December 17.
Mr. Jenkins. I want you to tell this committee all of the personal
knowledge you have on the particular area of inquiry we are now
exploring about the removal of this general. I
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Starting on the 25th of November and coming right
on down.
Mr. CojiN. I can give you no specific dates or conversations between
November 25 and December 17. There were conversations, Mr.
Adams kept pressing for assurance that tlie Senator would say
nothing, wouldn't make an issue out of it, if General Lawton were
removed.
The thing came up again very actively on the IGth and 17th of De-
cember. On the 16th I know that Mr. Adams talked to Senator
McCarthy directly about it and told Senator McCarthy, I believe,
that there was a new target date set by Mr. Stevens for removing
General Lawton, and that that target date was January 1.
Mr. Jenkins. Where was that conversation?
Mr. CoiiN. I was not there, sir. I believe it took place in the United
States courthouse in or about courtroom 110 where an executive ses-
sion on Fort Monmouth or Communists in defense plants was
underway.
Mr. Jenkins. Did the Senator impart that knowledge to you?
Mr. CoHN. That knowledge was imparted to me by the Senator ; yes.
Mr. Jenkins. By the Senator. That was as late as December 17?
Mr. CoHN. That was the 16th. On the 17th I have personal
knowledge.
Mr. Jenkins. All right. What occurred on the 17th. We are
still talkino; about this general.
Mr. CoiiN. The 17th, Mr. Jenkins, which is the day of that famous
luncheon and car ride uptown which Mr. Adams described so vividly,
as you might recall, on that day
Mr. Jenkins. I want you to describe as vividly as you can, Mr.
Cohn
Mr. CoHN. I am not as "jood at it, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. There might be a division of opinion on that asser-
tion, too.
Mr. CoHN. Sir, what happened
Mr. Jenkins. You are not entirely inarticulate, and I don't think
counsel for the Army would be accused of such.
Mr. CoiiN. All right, sir.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1 C37
^Ir. Jenkins, Now I want you to tell what statements were made
by Mr. John Adams on the 17th day of December about removing
this <ijreat general from Fort Momuouth.
j\Ir. CoHN. I will tell you, sir, what he said and what we did about it.
On the morning of the 17th sometime, JSenator McCarthy told me
that Mr. Adams was at it again and was pressing the Senator lor a
promise of silence if General Lawton were removed. The Senator
was becoming ])retty much disturbed about it at that point, and
frankly, sir, so was I.
Mr. Jenkins. Let's get it straight, Mr. Cohn. This had been going
on since the 14th day of October?
]Mr. CoHN. That is right.
JNIr. Jenkins. Am I right?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. November, December — for more than a period of 2
months' time.
Mr. CoiiN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
I\Ir. CoiiN. On the 17th, after the Senator told me that Mr. Adams
had advised him of a new target date for removing (xeneral Lawton,
we all went out to lunch and we went over to Gasner's Restaurant
to have lunch. I was present. The chairman was present. Frank
Carr was there. At the beginning of the luncheon two friends, two
personal friends of Senator McCarthy were there. They left shortly
after the luncheon commenced. I don't know if they heard part or
all of the conversation. They might well have.
Senator INIcCarthy had told me about Mr. Adams' plan for General
Lawton. The others had preceded me to the restaurant. When 1 got
there, I brought the subject up as I think Mr. Adams conceded on
the stand I did. 1 said, "Mr. Adams," remarked to the effect, "I
understand you are after General Lawton again."
Mr. Adams confirmed that and said that January 1 was the new
date which had been set for General Lawton's removal. He said that
a successor to General Lawton had already been picked and that he
and Mr. Stevens were determined to get General Lawton out.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he tell you who the successor was ?
Mr. CoHN. I believe he did, sir. I don't recall the name. I haven't
taken the time. If I could go over a list of available generals, I
might be able to do that. He did mention a name.
Mr. Adams made it very clear that they meant business about it this
time. We had following that a very animated discussion and argu-
ment about this whole situation. I told Mr, Adams that 1 thought the
way they M'ere going after General Lawton was a perfectly disgrace-
ful thing; that his only sin, as far as I knew, had been that of fighting
communism and fighting it hard, and of cooperating with this com-
mittee, and of telling the truth when he testified before the committee
on where the blame belonged for not doing anything about the se-
curity risks in the radar laboratory.
Mr. Jenkins. What other, if any, accusations did Mr. Adams make
against the general at this time?
Mr. CoHN. He started out by saying there were other things, too.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he particularize and tell you what they were?
Mr. CoHN. Yes. He mentioned this university thing again, I be-
lieve. He said General Lawton's judgment had not been good; that
1G38 SPECIAL INVESTIGATIGlSr \
some of the people General Lawton had eelected for his staff had made
a poor impression upon Mr. Adams. He started off giving tiiose
reasons.
Senator McCarthy stoj)ped Mr. Adams while he was giving the
reasons.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Adams stated that General Lawton had made a
poor impression upon him, Adams, is that what you say?
Mr. CoiiN. Mr. Adams said that some of the ])eo])le General Law-
ton had picked for his staff' had made a poor impression on Mr. Adams.
Mr. Adams had made it clear that General Lawton personally had
made a poor impression on Mr. Adams. I think he said that he had
sent for General Lawton on a couple of occasions and General Lawton
had been in his office and had not impressed Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, while we are pursuing that subject do you
know of any jurisdiction whatever that either you or the Senator from
Wisconsin had with respect to the promotion or the demotion or the
removal of an officer in the Army ?
Mr. CoiiN. The only jurisdiction in this case, sir, was putting the
case to the people of the United States. As a matter of fact, there
was a discussion about that right tlion and there. Mr. Adams started
giving these reasons, and Senator McCarthy cut him off' with words
to the effect, "Well. John, there are always a lot of reasons you can
give when you want to do something, but you have made no secret out
of the fact before that you and Mr. Stevens don't like General Law-
ton, and he has cooked his goose and now you have heard him testify
before us that until we came along no effective action had been taken."
Mr. Jenkins. Did you ever hear of a Secretary of the Army going
to a United States Senator to get his advice about the promotion or
demotion or removal of one of his generals in the Army
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Until this matter came up?
Mr. CoHN. I recall none, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Now, Mr. Cohn, we are talking about now the l7th day of Decem-
ber in New York City.
Mr. CoiiN. At that luncheon Senator McCarthy interrupted Mr.
Adams and said something to the effect, that "Let's save a lot of time
here, John. There are always a lot of reasons you can give when you
want to do something, but you have been frank with us before and
General Lawton cooked his goose when he told the committee that
until we came along he w^as stuck Avith these security risks and it is
only after we came along that some people in your place woke up."
The Senator went on and questioned Mr. Adams on that.
Mr. Adams was pretty frank about it. He said to us :
How would you people like it if soHaebody working for you told us that you
weren't doing a good joli? You wouldn't want him around, would you?
Things to that effect.
Mr. Adams then brought up the point of what the Senator would
do about it. On that the Senator said that he did not know what
he could do about it, that he couldn't order the Secretary or in any
way change the action of the Secretary in removing General Lawton,
that it would seem to him — Well, at the beginning he said, "I don't
know Avhat he could do about tliis." I pointed out to Senator
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1G39
McCarthy then that he could do about that what he had done about
the case of a State Department employee in another investigation
we had. This employee testified before our committee, and when he
oot back to his job he found that it had been chanf»;ed and he no
lonoer had a pood job, but he was out poundinp; the pavement again.
Senator McCarthy called the Under Secretary of State, General
Smith, before the subcommittee, and asked him whether he thouirht it
was right to take rejirisal on someone who had cooperated with the
connnittee. General Smith did not think it was right. The man was
reinstated.
I pointed that out to Senator McCarthy, and I told the Senator that
unless we could protect in some way the people who had cooi)erated
with us in this type work and the exposure of Conununists and security
rislcs, that our committee, the investigating committee, would not long
be in business, nor would the FBI or any agency like that.
I think tlie Senator was in agreement with those views.
We left the restaurant and we got into the car and Mr. Adams was
going to this train.
I am sure I oti'ered to drive him up to the station. Do you want
me to go into that car ride, INIr. Jenkins ?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, Mr. Cohn, we are not ready for the car ride
except as it relates to any conversations on the ])art of Mr. Adams with
respect to relieving this general.
Mr. CoHN. Well, it was continued in the car. Mr. Adams said he
had to give Mr. Stevens an answer, and he wanted to give him the
right answer, and that General Lawton had to go January 1, that he
and Mr. Stevens did not want General Lawton around any longer.
Mr. Jenkins. Who was present in that car ride?
IMr. CoHN. The Senator was there, I was there, Frank Carr was
there.
Mr. Jenkins. The four of you?
Mr. Cohn. The four of us.
Now, Mr. Adams — after Mr. Adams left the car, and I might say he
left under a lot happier circumstances than he has described here —
the Senator and Frank and I continued the discussion. Senator
McCarthy was pretty much exorcised about that at the time and he
told Frank and myself that he had taken just about enough on this
Lawton situation and that he was going to communicate directly with
General Lawton and tell the general that he would stand bel»nd him
and, if necessary, I believe, would call General Lawton before this
in public session, and bring out that the General was, although a great
general and one who had done an outstanding job here, was being
made the object of a reprisal because of what he had done. 1"he
Senator was leaving to make a speech, he was going to catch a plane,
and he told me to make sure that the message got through, not to rely
just on him calling General T>awton, but that I myself should contact
General I^awton or General Lawton's aide and let the general know
what Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams were trying to do to General Lawton.
Mr Jenkins. The aide being Lieutenant Corr?
Mr. CoiiN. Then Lieutenant Corr and now Captain Corr.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you do so?
Mr. Cohn. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. When?
Mr. Cohn. That very night.
1640 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. What was said ?
Mr. CoHN. I placed a telephone call to General Lawton. I don't
believe I reached him. I did reach Lieutenant Corr. I have the
phone slip of the telephone call to General Lawton dated December 17,
1953, at, I think, six something in the evening, made from my home
phone in New York to Fort Monmouth.
Mr. Jenkins. Li substance, what message did you give then Lieu-
tenant Corr, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. I told Lieutenant Corr that we had had a lunch and
discussion with Mr. Adams and apparently Mr. Adams and Mr.
Stevens were very determined to take it out on General Lawton, and
that Senator McCarthy wanted General Lawton to know that the
Senator believed in General Lawton and what he had done, and the
Senator would recommend that the committee and the public know
the story if General Lawton were removed. And I told Lieutenant
Corr that I had been instructed by the Senator to furnish full details
of what was afoot to General Lawton.
The Lieutenant said, "I would like to talk to the general about this.
May I do this and may I call you back?"
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, is that the first time to your knowledge
that either you or the Senator or anyone on your staff had appraised
this general of the fact that they were after him ?
Mr. Cohn. Except for the discussion in the car riding back that
night and for occasional conversation in which it was clear that Gen-
eral Lawton was gradually being removed from the scene by being
ordered to stay away from hearings and not to go on this Greenglass
trip, I believe that this was the most specific conversation that night
and the next clay, December 18, that I had with General Lawton's staff.
Mr. Jenkins. I want you to tell the committee about the conversa-
tion of the 18th.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. Lieutenant Corr told me that he had talked
w^ith the general and received permission to listen to what I had to
say. I invited Lieutenant Corr to come in to New York to see me
the next day, December 18.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. Now, I want you to tell about the con-
versation and the events of December 18.
Mr. Cohn. Lieutenant Corr, I believe it was December 18, came to
see me. It was around lunchtime, he met me and we went out to lunch,
and we had a long talk. In the course of that talk, I told Lieutenant
Corr about the luncheon with Mr. Adams the previous day, I believe,
about the argument we had had about General Lawton, about what
Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams were trying to do to General Lawton, and
I discussed some of these otlier charges wliich Mr. Adams had made
against General Lawton and asked Lieutenant Corr what he knew
about them. And Lieutenant Corr said that he, of his first-hand
knowledge, knew them to be untrue, that General Lawton had always
done an outstanding job, had been a great American, and a great
general and a great commanding officer. I discussed this at some
length with Lieutenant Corr, and at the conclusion of the conversation
T asked Lieutenant Corr if, by any chance. Senator McCarthy did not
get through to General Lawton on the phone. I asked Lieutenant
Corr to convey to General Lawton the respects of the Senator, and the
fact that the Senator believed General Lawton had done an outstand-
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1C41
ino; job for this country in tryino; to protect the secret radar laborato-
ries at Fort Monmouth and tliat if he were to be punished for that job,
he ■would not be without defenders. That was the substance of my
conversation with Lieutenant Corr on December 18.
Mr. Jenkins. JMr. Cohn, does that complete the General Lawton
story 'i
Mr. CoiiN. To this extent, sir : There were other conversations there-
after. Tlie January 1 target date was set. Senator INIcCarthy asked
me about it. It turned out, by the way, sir, that he had reached Gen-
eral Lawton on the telephone and had spoken with him himself, too, so
General Lawton had worked in both ways. There was more discussion
with Mr. Adams. The upshot of it was Senator INIcCarthy was going
to make a light if action were taken against General Lawton.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, I want you to tell the committee about
a map of December 9, which was drawn on approximately that date.
Mr. CoiiN. Yes. It was, as best I can fix it, the 8th or the 9th. It
was those couple days when we had the Aaron Coleman public sessions
of tlie committee down here.
Mr. Jenkins. Where did that incident take place?
Mr. Coiix. The incident started in the corridor outside of room 101
after the hearing and continued inside the room.
INIr. Jenkins. Without my asking you specific questions now, Mr.
Cohn, just start in the beginning and chronologically relate to the
committee the incidents of that day in which this map figures.
Mr. Cohn. Well, there were a number of incidents that, day sir. As
far as the map is concerned
Mr. Jenkins. Let's start with the first incident that day, whether it
is related to the map or whether it isn't.
Mr. CoTiN. Very well. There was discussion about Schine on that
day. ]Mr. Adams talked to Mr. Carr and talked to me and said that
he was close to making a decision on where Schine would go after
basic training, and he, Mr. Adams, was very much disappointed that
the committee had not stopped its hearings on Fort Monmouth, that
they were going on and felt that we had not been giving him, Mr.
Adams, any kind of a break.
By the way, he would refer to Private Schine as the hostage, he
would and he did, and he did that frequently.
Mr. Jenkins. Since you have now injected the name of Private
Schine in your testimony, Mr. Cohn, I want to ask you whether or
not, from time to time, over the course of these weeks and months
that we have been talking about, Mr. Adams and Mr. Stevens did
mention the name of Schine.
]\Ir. Cohn. ATe mentioned the name to them and they mentioned
the name to us, yes.
]\Ir. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not, without being specific
at this time, from time to time ISIr. Adams referred to Schine as
hostage.
Mr. CoTiN. He called him by that name, as the hostage, more fre-
quently that he called him by the name of Schine.
Mr. Jenkins. State whether or not from time to time, while the
Secretary and his counsel were attempting to get you to discontinue
your investigation of Fort Monmouth, they made certain statements
with respect to certain things they expected to or would do for David
Schine.
1642 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. As far as Mr. Adams is concerned, the answer is he
did.
Mr. Jenkins. That he did ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. As far as Mr. Stevens is concerned, any dis-
cussions I ever had with him were on a completely friendly basis,
and I found him always to be a gentleman and more than courteous
to me.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not in these conversations,
particularly the ones had with you by Mr. Adams with respect to
General Lawton, relieving him of his command, and with respect to
you discontinuing the investigation of subversives at Fort Monmouth,
whether or not Mr. Adams from time to time brought in the name of
David Schine.
Mr. CoHN. He did. There were discussions about Schine. They
were initiated by Mr. Adams on a number of occasions. They were
initiated by me on other occasions.
Mr. Jenkins. There was a mixture of the 2 subjects, an intertwining
of the 2 subjects?
Mr. CoHN. The two subjects.
, Mr. Jenkins. Sometimes brought in by you, you say very frankly ?
Mr. CoHN. I do.
Mr. Jenkins. And sometimes brought in by Mr. Adams?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, we will ask you more about that later, but
I want you to tell the committee now the incidents of December 9.
Mr. CoHN. After the Schine conversation, Mr. Adams had fixed in
his mind, sir, the idea that there was one particular Army project
which we were about to investigate next. There was always some-
thing coming up. There was always going to be one which would be
next. Frankly, I didn't know what Mr. Adams was talking about at
that point. But Mr. Adams thought he knew about something we
were about to investigate. He asked me to let him in on it, to tell him
what the project was. I told him I could not tell him because I
couldn't, I didn't know of any particular one to which he was refer-
ring, and when the time came I would certainly tell him about it.
Mr. Adams still thought that I was holding something back, and
he said, "I will tell you what I will do." We were still in the hall,
by the way. We were on the way down from the hearing room to the
office. He took out a pad of paper, a sheet of paper, and drew a map
of the United States and divided it into, I believe, 9 or 10 — the figure
9 sticks in my mind — 9 sections or 9 areas. He said to me —
You mark on this map the location of the Army place which you are going to
investigate next, and I am going to mark down the location of an Air Force
base where there are a large number of sex deviates which will make some good
hearings for your committee.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you know why he resorted to such a circuitous
route as that, shall we say, to elicit the information from you ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir, that didn't bother me. Mr. Adams was con-
stantly asking us about what we were going to investigate next.
Mr. Jenkins. Did it occur to you at the time that it was somewhat
childish to resort to such a method of procedure of trying to elicit
information instead of going directly to the point?
SPECIAL mVESTIGATION 1643
Mr. CoHN. The fact is, there was n ^ood deal of jokinor and prac-
ical jokes and other kinds going back and forth between Mr. Adams
nd myself.
Mr. Jenkins. Where was tliat map drawn?
Mr. CoiTN. That was drawn in the corridor outside of room 101,
nd tlien Mr. Adams walked on into the room with us and the discus-
ion was continued.
I remember that he started drawing the map outside, up against the
)(>.-t outside of tlie room.
Mv. Jenkins. How many Army areas are there in the United States ?
Mr. ConN. I don't know.
Mr. Jenkins. You don't know whetlier there are nine or not?
Mr. CoHN. I do not, sir. I am sure we could find that out.
Mr. Jenkins. Yes.
Anyway, your recollection is — was it a fairly accurate representa-
ion of the United States?
Mv. Cohn. He drew a map which certainly was intended to
)e the United States, and the drawing was not that bad. It was the
Jnited States.
Mr. Jenkins. And designated, you think, 8 or 9
Mr. CoHN. The number nine sticks in my mind.
Mr. Jenkins. As I understand it, he told you that if you would
iivulge to him where you next area of operation was, that he in turn
<\'ould divulge to you an area in Avhich there were homosexuals in
:he Army?
Mr. CoHN. In the Air Force.
Mr. Jenkins. In the Air Force?
^Ir. Cohn. That is right.
Mr. Jenkins. What did he say, Mr. Cohn, about your going after
the Air Force or after these homosexuals ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't remember any extended discussion about that.
He was just going to trade us this piece of information for something
that he wanted.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you then have any information about homosex-
uals in the Air Force?
Mr. Cohn. No.
IMr. Jenkins. Did you trade with him?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You didn't strike a bargain?
Mr. Cohn. It would not have been necessary for us to make a trade.
If there was anything he should have known about, w^hen the time
comes, as we always did, we would have been glad to tell him about it.
I did not know what he was referring to.
Mr. Jenkins. Was Mr. Carr with you on that occasion ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, as I recall your testimony, that is the third
time that this man Adams suggested to you to go after the Air Force
or the Navy ?
Mr. Cohn. That is right.
]Mr. Jenkins. Is that right?
Mr. Cohn. That is the third time I recall. There were a number
of occasions. It was a constant topic. When I sa}^ "constant" maybe
that is a poorly chosen word. It was discussed on occasions.
1644 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
il
Mr. Jenkins. You heard Mr. Adams' version of the map incident'
Mr. CoHN. Yes, I heard his version.
Mr. Jenkins. You say yours is the correct version, is that correct!
Mr. CoHN. I do ; yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did anytliing else occur on December 9 which is oi
any significance and would shed light on the issues in this controversy?
Mr. CoHN. Nothing that I recall offhand.
Mr. Jenkins. When was your next meeting with Mr. Adams or the
Secretary ?
Mr. CoHN. I don't think I ever saw Secretary Stevens after the 17th
of November. I don't think I ever saw him or talked to him again
Mr. Jenkins. You saw Mr. Adams after the ITtli of
Mr. CoHN. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. When, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. After the 17th of November ?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes. I
Mr. CoHN. I would imagine — I don't think I saw him between the
I7th of November and some time in January.
Mr. Jenkins. Would that be January 14 ? Does that date
Mr. CoHN. It might very well have been, sir. I do not know
whether I saw him between Deceml)er 17 and January 14. I do
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not on or about January 14,
to refresh your recollection, Mr. Adams came to your office and made
some inquiry with respect to what would happen if David Schine were
sent overseas.
Mr. Cohn. It didn't happen quite that way, sir, but he did come to
our office and there was a conversation.
Mr. Jenkins. W^ell, Mr. Cohn, at that time did or not Adams state
anything about the possibility or probability of Dave Schine being
sent overseas?
Mr. Cohn. He did.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he ask in substance what your reaction would be
if such a thing happened ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. He was telling us what his reaction was going
to be if other things didn't happen.
Mr. Jenkins. What did he — just tell the conversation in full of
January 1 1, ^Ir- Cohn.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. I have to co back for one brief moment, Mr.
Jenkins, on the Loyalty Board. You remember, sir, that I told you
that from the 3d of September on at fairly frequent intervals Senator
McCarthy had made it clear privately and publicly that until he
could get in before the committee the peo])le responsible for the
clearing of Communists and people with Communist records, he
could not conclude the investigation and could not get down to the
bottom of the trouble.
On December 16 we had before the committee in public session a
witness named Samuel Snyder. ]\Ir. Snyder had been cleared by
this Pentagon loyalty board about a year before. When he appeared
before our committee a year later he invoked the fifth amendment on
the ground of self-incrimination about his association with a well-
known member of the Communist conspiracy. The record was quite
impressive.
Senator McCarthy at that point expressed the belief that he had
seen just about enough and it was certainly inconceivable to him how a
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1645
man with such a record, a man whose suspension had been ordered
by a lower loyalty board could be reinstated and <?iven a clearance,
a security clearance, by this top screening board in the Department
of tlie Army.
Senator McCarthy, I believe in public session insisted upon the
names of the people on the loyalty board who had cleared this man
Snvtler. He got some of them and the promise, not from the Army
but from Mr. Snyder himself — he got some of the names and a promise
from Mr. Snyder's counsel that he would get all of the names. On that
occasion Senator McCarthy told Mr. Adams, that the committee
was going into its report writing ]ieriod, whicli would take about a
month before the appropriation of the committee was up, and we
tiled our annual report. But just about the first order of business
after those reports were out of the way and hearings were resumed
would be the summoning of people connected with this loyalty board
clearance. Mr. Adams was very much disturbed by that. He had
Deen told by me over the phone and I assume by other staff members
at the beginning of Januaiy that the date for production of some of
these loyalty board members would be around between the middle
and the end of January some time, when the report writing was
finished on January 14.
jMr. Jenkins. Yes, go right ahead.
Mr. CoiiN. Do you want me to tell you about the
Mr. Jenkins. You are telling now about the members of the loyalty
board. <
Mr. CoirN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And the Senator's investigation of them?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, that is beginning to get into the January 14 con-
versation. Do you want me to tell you what was said, sir, on Jan-
uary 14? '
Mr. Jenkins. Yes. The committee would be very much interested,
I am sure.
Mr, CoHN. On January 14, as I recall — and I cannot swear to the
date, it was the 13th or 14'th, around that time Mr. Adams has said the
14th and I have no reason to doubt that date — Mr. Adams paid a call
on me and on Mr. Carr. He discussed the stopping of hearJn.<vs at
Fort JMonmouth. He didn't want the members of the loyalty Board
who had cleared the Monmouth people called. He wanted the inves-
tigation stopped, the usual ground was covered.
Mr. J enkins. "Why did he not want the members of the loyalty board
called, Mr. Cohn, or did he say ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, there were several reasons, sir. He said, and he had
said on other occasions, that there were elements of personal embarass-
ment connected with it to himself and Mr. Stevens.
Mr. Jenkins. Did I understand you to say a moment ago that one of
the members of the loyalty board had taken the fifth amendment?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir, no member had ever taken the fifth amendment
so far as I know. One had been questioned by us on October 30 in New
Yorlc, about a record of Communist — afliliation with the Communist
activities.
Mr. Jenkins. Anyway, on January 14
Mr. CoHN. Wliat I said, jSIr, Jenkins, was that this loyalty board
had cleared people who, after llieir cleaivaice, had taken the fifth
u
1646 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
amendment, which was pretty good evidence of the fact that they ki
shouldn't have been cleared.
Mr. Jenkins. On January 14, Mr. Adams objected to the investiga-
tion of Monmouth continuing?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir,
Mr. Jenkins. And to your calling members of the loyalty board
before your committee for examination ?
Mr. (John. That is right. He objected to the Fort Monmouth inves-
tigation continuing and particularly to that part of it which would
entail the calling of members of the loyalty board.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. I want you to tell all that occurred on jcs
that dav.
Mr. OoHN. Yes, sir. Well, he came over to the office, we talked, we
had lunch, we went back to the office, we talked some more, and an
awful lot was said.
He told us that he was very, very unhappy about the way the Fort
Monmouth situation had been handled by us in the continuing of hear-
ings. He said that he had hoped from the beginning that we could get
the hearings stopped, could avoid them, now it seemed like they were
going on, that Mr. Stevens was upset, that he was upset, couldn't we
stop them in some way, and that particularly since we were turning
to these loyalty boards and the clearance procedure he was unhappy
and he felt that the staff of the committee — I assume Mr. Carr and
I — had not cooperated with Mr. Adams in trying to bring about a
termination of this investigation.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. Anything else as of that date?
]\Ir. CoHN. Yes. The way the Schine overseas thing came in was
this: Mr. Adams said we had not been cooperating with him, and
that he was going to show some examples of noncooperation, too, and
how would we like it if Schine were ordered overseas.
Well, we knew at that time that Schine was still in basic training,
that only he had done less than half of his basic training. We knew
that under the normal practice in the Army he would not be sent over-
seas for some time to come.
Mr. Jenkins. Was Dave Schine still at Fort Dix ?
Mr. CoiiN. He w^as still at Fort Dix, then. And we knew that
supposedly he was going on to Camp Gordon, Ga., from there. Mr.
Adams had previously said that. And we knew there could be no
basis in fact for Mr. Adams' statement that Schine was going over-
seas, unless Mr. Adams intended to see that that came about. We
made it clear that we didn't care whether he did go overseas or didn't
go overseas, but that we didn't quite understand the way Mr. Adams
was ringing that in w^ith the suggestion that we weren't cooperating
with him in getting his investigation stopped. I would like to make
what I think is a very important point on that here.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. You may do so.
Mr. CoHN. Mr. Adams, in his testimony before this committee, and
I watched this rather closely, sir, and I hope Mr. Welch will correct
me if I am wrong, described the events of January 14 and said that
the topic was Schine, and that he just came out with a statement
about Schine going overseas. I say that Mr. Adams came over and
coupled the Fort Monmouth investigation and the stopping of it with
this comment about Private Schine. And I have looked back at the
Army charges, the Stevens- Adams charges, filed on March 11, and
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1647
his part of it, event 37, must liave been prepared by Mr. Adams, l)e-
;ause he ^Yas the only one from that side who Avas present, and in
hat
Mr. Jenkins. Just read that in full, Mr. Colin, if you will, at this
ime.
JNIr. CoiiN. What I vranted to read vras the first sentence.
A day or so after the conversation,
Mr. Jenkins. I didn't get the beginning of it.
Ms. CoHN (reading) :
A day or so after the conversation with Mr. Cohn, Mr. Adams went to the
Capitol and called on Mr. Cohn and Mr. Carr, in Mr. Cohn's office in the Senate
nvestigations Subcommittee. General discussion was had concerning the Private
k'hine situation and the progress of the McCarthy investigation at Fort Mon-
Qouth.
Vnd I would like to point out, sir, that it is my testimony that those
wo subjects were brought up by Mr. Adams, that they were linked, and
hat Mr. Adams was not being on the level with the committee when he
ailed to mention that the Fort Monmouth investigation was discussed
hat day, and that Mr. Adams has admitted here in his original charges
hat those two matters were discussed by him when he came over to
^isit us on that occasion.
Mr. Jenkins. What you are saying, as we understand it, Mr. Cohn,
s that on January 14, Mr. Adams came to your office, and there, at
hat time and on that occasion, talked about the discontinuance of
/our investigation of Fort Monmouth
JNIr. Cohn. He did.
Mr. Jenkins. And talked about his objections to your subpenaing
he members of the loyalty board for examination ?
Mr. Cohn. He did.
jNlr. Jenkins. And threaded in with that conversation, a threat, as
L get it from you, to send Dave Schine overseas if you persisted in
investigating Fort Monmouth and in subpenaing the members of the
loyalty board, is that correct ?
Mr. Cohn. I would say, sir, that is a sensible interpretation of what
happened on that day, and following that, Mr. Jenkins, of course,
there were the events, the subsequent events, in which Mr. Adams
tried to — went to members of this committee and tried to get the
loyalty board subpenas killed and the investigation called off, accom-
panying that insistence on his part that the investigation and subpenas
be killed with the hint that if it were not killed, there would be a
report about me.
Mr. Jenkins. And you are, I take it, in part referring to the testi-
mony of certain witnesses who testified ?
Mr. Cohn. I am referring, sir to the statements by Senator Dirksen,
Senator INIundt, and Senator Potter before this committee.
Mr. Jenkins. And do you say, Mr. Cohn, that the straw that broke
the camel's back, and the incident that precipitated the preparation
and the filing of these charges, was the fact that you persisted, you
and the Senator from Wisconsin, in demanding the subpenaing and
the examination of the members of the loyalty board and continuing
your investigation of Fort Monmouth, and that it was for that reason
that these charges were prepared and released to the public with
respect to the allegations against you and Senator McCarthy?
Mr. Cohn. The only way I could answer that is this: Mv. Jenkins,
this was certainly the immediate reason, I am sure, from Mr. Adam's
1648 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION I
standpoint. From what has come out at these hearings, and fronii
other things that we know, I think it is quite clear that a number ofl*
people hacf a lot of different reasons for doing what they did in trying
to discredit us and stop the o]oerations of this committee.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did you have a conversation with Senator^
McCarthy on the evening of January 22 ?
Mr. CoiiN. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. I want you to tell these gentlemen on the subcom^
mittee about that conversation, the substance of it.
Mr. CoHN. I had called Senator McCarthy about an investigation
we were conducting, not dealing with communist infiltration in the
Army. He told me he could not talk to me and would I please call
him back at 11 or 11 : 30, something like that. I called him back,
and he told me that Mr. Adams had been to see him, Mr. John Adams
had been to see him, in his apartment, and Mr. Adams was trying to
pull — I think he used the words of a neat little trick of blackmail, and
say that unless we killed the investigation, there would be spread
around a report about me, which would be embarrassing to me.
Senator McCarthy told me that, and on that night. I obtained
further details later on, when I spoke with the Senator in person.
After I obtained those details, I heard enough for me to conclude in
my own mind that I cared to have nothing more to do with Mr. John
Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did the Senator tell you that night that
he refused to yield to the demands of John Adams ?
Mr. CoHN.'Hedid.
Mr. Jenkins. And have you heard from the lips of Mr. Adams
that it was the next day that he started preparing the materials,
assembling the materials, in the raw — I believe that expression has
been used, from which evolved this 34-page document known as events ?
Mr. CoHN. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you recall a conversation, Mr. Cohn in which Mr.
Adams called you — and I believe maybe you w^ere in New York City —
in which he stated that you had been ducking him ?
Mr. CoHN. I do.
Mr. Jenkins. I want you to tell us about that.
Mr, CoHN. That conversation, as best I can place it, Mr. Jenkins,
was February 12. Bear in mind, sir, that on January 22, Senator •
Mr. Jenkins. Pardon me one minute, Mr. Cohn.
(Discussion among committee out of the hearing of the reporter.)
Senator Mfndt. Just a little huddle about whether we are going
to stop approximately at 5 o'clock or not, and we are.
Mr. Jenkins. I think perhaps, Mr. Chairman, the witness should
be allowed to answer the last question.
Do you recall the question ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, on the February 12 phone conference. Do you
want me to complete that or wait until tomorrow ?
Mr. Jenkins. I suggest you go ahead and complete your answer.
Mr. CoHN. Surely, sir.
After Senator McCarthy told me what Mr. Adams was trying to do,
the Senator told me he had told Mr. Adams he would not give in to
that or any other blackmail threat. I was very clear in my mind
that I would not. I decided to have nothing to do with Mr. Adams.
I heard from other staff members that Mr. Adams had been asking
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1C49
t ihout me and callinf^ up and Avaiitin^ to know where I was in AVash-
no;ton. I did not pay any attention to those calls.
On Lincoln's Birthday, February 12, Mr. Adams telephoned me
it my home in New York. He asked me if he was correct in assuminsji;
I liat I had been duckinoj him. I told him he was very correct. Hs
isked me why I had been dnckino; him, why I didn't call him, Avhy I
lidn't see him, why we hadn't had lunch, why we hadn't gotten lo-
..j, 4 ether and had a talk, why we were out of touch.
I told INIr. Adams that very frankly the reason was because I believed
that he had been thorouiihly dishonest. Pie asked me what I meant.
I believe I told him what 1 meant. I told him that he had directly
or indirectly made a blackmail threat to members of the subconunit-
tee, sayino- that if we not stop the investigation and kill those sub-
penas, JMr. Adams was goino; to cause an untrue re])ort to be spread
or circulated — I didn't know the details about it — concerning: me.
Mr, Adams at first denied that he had spoken with anyone about it.
In fact, he never admitted it, but I told him that I knew he had cer-
tainly talked to Senator jMcCarthy about it, and I knew what tlie
Senator had told me, and that was enouch for me.
Mr. Adams said that I had to understand his position, that he had
a job to do, that he had told me all along that these loyalty board
subj)enas were going to present very, very great problems to him, and
that he would have to stop at nothing to see that the investigation
was killed at that point, and that I should try to understand what he
was trying to do.
I told him I could not understand what he was trying to do, and
that ju^t about terminated the conversation.
Senator JNIundt. The Chair would like to make a brief announce-
ment about tomorrow's meeting. Inasmuch as we have a distinguished
guest, Haile Selassie, here in "Washington, who is addressing a joint
session of Congress at noon, it is possible we may recess a little before
12 : 30 or perhaps have to reconvene a little after 2. Otherwise, there
will be no change or interruption in our schedule.
Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman.
Senator ISIundt. Senator McClellan.
We have not recessed. Will you be quiet for a moment?
The Chair recognizes Senator McClellan.
Senator McClellan. I regret that I shall not be able to attend the
meeting tomorrow, but I assume that this witness will be available for
cross-examination on Tuesday. I understand the committee is to
recess after tomorrow until next Tuesday, and there will be no session
held on Monday. Am I correct?
Senator Mundt. That is correct.
I might add further that counsel has advised the Chair that he
believes he will require probably all day tomorrow, at least, in
cross-examination. iNIay the Chair say also just a word of heartfelt
ap])reciation to his colleagues on both the Republican and Democratic
side of the aisle for the fact that there has been exem])lary restraint
on the part of everyone today, including counsel — not a single in-
terruption and not a single point of order all afternoon. May that
continue.
We stand in recess until 10 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 5 : 05 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m.,
Friday, May 28, 1954.)
APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
No. 28
[From tlie New York Herald Tiibiine, Friday, November 6, 1053]
McCarthy Vo^YS Radar Spy Expose
(By Walter Arm)
A full exposure of Communist espionajjje activities at the Signal Corps Labora-
)ries and Radar Center at Fort Monmoutli, N. J., was promised yesterday by
enator Joseph R. McCarthy when lie begins public hearings at the United States
onrthjouse in Foley S<]nare Thui-sday.
The Wisconsin Republican, winding up 5 weeks of closed hearings during which
e questioned almost 100 witnesses, said, "There will be considerable evidence
f the operations of an espionage ring at Fort Monmouth for a considerable
leriod after the war."
Senator McCarthy said that hearings would take "a considerable time" and
show a very clear-cut picture'' of espionage. He added: "There's no question
roni the evidence that there has been espionage. I won't at this time try to
ring it down to any particular date; we'll let the evidence speak for itself."
He was asked whether the ring had been organized and directed by Jul'us
losenberg, executed atomic spy, and replied : "That's one of the things I'd like
0 know. The others are, whether some one higher up directed it and whether
t is still in existence."
To underline his private belief that the ring continued operating long after
he arrest of Rosenberg in 1950 and almost up to the present, Senator McCarthy
;lisclosed he had questioned a former radar engineer "who is a member of the
Communist underground today."
He hinted that the ring was still in existence by saying: "Keep in mind that
[he commanding officer of Fort Monmouth has been suspending employees for
Communist or espionage activities up until a few days ago." He put the known
total of suspensions at 29.
The Senator declared he had questioned "members of the spy ring who are
still running around loose." He added that this was no reflection on tlie Federal
Bureau of Investigation or any other Government agency and said : "There just
hasn't been enough evidence to convict them."
A woman witness questioned yesterday, he asserted, "was a member of the
Rosenberg ring, but when we asked her about it she refused to answer on the
grounds of self-incrimination."
The Senator said the woman also refused to say whether she bad ever taken
false passports to underground agents or carried money to William Perl, a former
physics instructor convicted of perjury.
UNDERGROUND MEMBER
The present "member of the Communist undergroiuid" admitted he had been
a Communist 20 years ago, but said he was no longer with the party. Senator Mc-
Carthy said. He added that the man had worked on the Norden bomb sight
during the war and admitted being a friend of David Greenglass, brother-in-law
of Rosenberg, who is now serving 15 years for espionage.
Earlier in the day. Senator INIcCartby called on Harvard University to discharge
Wendell H. Furry, a professor of physics at the university, who had refused to
answer questions before the Senate Permanent Investigations Committee on
Wednesday.
1651
1652 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
In a telegram to Dr. Nathan M. Pusey, president of Harvard, Senator 5j
Cartliy called on the Harvard Corp. to show its attitude toward Communist pji
fessors. He charged that Professor Furry had refused to say "if he had indocj.;
nated students in the Communist philosophy."
"It's a smelly mess," he added, "and I can't conceive anyone sending th-
children anywhere where they might be open to indoctrination by Commun;
profes.sors." He said that such professors were not "free agents," but "unc
the discipline of Russia."
"This committee is not investigating colleges as such," he said, "but it is
terested in any campus partially supported by Federal funds through tax (
emptions or grants."
At Cambridge, ]\Iass., there was no comment from Dr. Pusey.
Prison Examinations
Washington, November 5 (AP).— Attorney General Herbert Brownell, J
announced today a set of rules— the first of their kind— under which congrt
sional committees may examine inmates of Federal prisons. All examinatio
must be conducted at the prison where the inmate in held.
The regulations were formulated and made public in connection with the pi
posal by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's (Republican, Wisconsin) Senate Inves
gations' Subcommittee to interview atom spy David Greenglass, who is held at t
Lewisburg, Pa., Penitentiary.
Senator McCarthy once proposed to take Greenglass to New York for questio
ing but later agreed the examination would be at Lewisburg. The committee
seeking Greenglass' testimony in connection with an investigation into allea
tions that an espionage ring has operated at the radar laboratory at Fort Mc
mouth, N. J.
Mr. Brownell's rules made it clear the Justice Department does not intend
let prisoners be taken out of the Federal penal institutions for examination.
I
.
No. 20
[From the Washington (D. C.) Times-Herald, Friday, November 6, 1953]
McCakthy Ends Secret Quiz at Fout Monmouth— Public Sessions Slat
TO Stakt Thursday
(By Willard Edwards)
New York, November 5 (CTPS).— Senator McCarthy, Republican of Wi
cousin, wound up a month of closed hearings on security leaks in the secret rads
laboratories of the Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth, N. J., Thursday, ar
announced :
"Our investigation has revealed considerable evidence of the operations of a
espionage ring in the Signal Corps during World War II and for a considerab.
period thereafter. We are ready to present the evidence in public sessions."
The open sessions are tentatively scheduled to open next Thursday. The
may last for weeks. The staff of the Senate Investigations Subcommittee, heade
by Chief Counsel Roy M. Cohn and Director Frank P. Carr, was given the tas
of coordinating a vast accumulation of testimony and data obtained from mor
than 250 witnesses, of whom about 120 have been questioned under oath.
29 ON staff suspended
McCarthy refused to express an opinion on whether a spy ring was functionin
at Fort Monmouth until a recent date. He noted, however, that the Army ha
suspended, at least 29 civilian scientists and technicians at the Army post in th
last month, all of them being charged with Communist or subversive connection
which made them potential sources of information for an enemy power.
The testmiony has disclosed, it was learned, that Julius Rosenberg, atomii
spy who died in the electric chair last June, was recruiting agents to purloii
radar secrets as late as 1949. He was arrested in the summer of 1050. He hac
worked at Fort Monmouth from 1940 to 1945.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1C53
■MeCarthy rotnrnod to Washington whcro ho will confer Friday with Army
;(•( rotary yievons who has cooporatod fully with tho invostif^ation, sitting in on
iiany hoarings. Stevens has pledged the dismissal of all security risks in the
Jiunnl Corps.
The final closed sessions In tlie United States courthouse were typical of numer-
M!s luvirinus that have boon hold since the explosive situation at Fort Rlon-
111 'uth was made public last October (i.
Six witnesses wore questioned under oath. The names of none were mado
uhlic. All six either had worked in the Sij^nal Cijrps or on secret projects liidied
\ilh radar work.
Two witness, one a woman, pleaded possible self-incrimination in refusing
n answer when asked if they had engaged in espionage. Another voiced the
aiiie plea when asked if he was a Communist. A fourth said he was a former
.'oinmunist but had loft the party. The fifth denied Conununist Party moml)er-
-liip until confronted with his party card. The sixth denied communism but
yvas shown to have been active in two Communist-dominated organizations.
During the day, McCarthy calletl on Harvard university to fire Prof. Wendell
N. Furry, currently on probation with the university for refusing to answer
questions about communism before another Senate committee.
McCarthy said Wednesday a Harvard physics professor refused to tell the
subcommittee whether he ever engaged in radar espionage during the war or
ever indoctrinated his students with Conununist philosophy.
Thursday, McCarthy identified the professor as Furry.
Attorney General BrownoU meanwhile announced the rules under which con-
gressional committees will be permitted to examine inmates of Federal prisons
One of the regulations provides that all such interrogations shall take place
inside the prisons.
GREENGLASS TO BE QUESTIONED
The announcement apparently cleared the way for the subcommittee headed by
McCarthy to question David Greenglass, atom spy and brother of Mrs. Ethel
Rosenberg, who was executed for spying for Russia. Greenglass is serving a term
in Lewisburg, Pa., prison.
McCartliy reportedly had been undecided whether to question Greenglass in
prison or in New York,
The Canadian Government has turned down a request to permit Igor Gouzenko,
former Russian Embassy cipher clerk who turned up a Soviet spy ring in Canada
in 194.J, to meet with American congressional committees digging into Communist
activities in the United States.
The State Department announced the Canadian Government's refusal and
informed sources said the Canadian Government had established that Gouz?nko
has no information tliat is not already available to congressional investigators.
INDEX
idains, John G 1G02-1G21, 1G24-1G27, 1G29-1G4!)
Uluiinistration Building (Fort Monmouth) 1G13
Ur Force (United States) 1G17-1G19, 1628, 1629, 1G42, 1G4.S
U-ni, Walter Ki,")!
Vrraed Services Committee (Senrte) lG;'>;i
Viniv (.United States) 1G02,
1G()3, 1605, 1G09, IGll, 1612, 1G14, 1G17-1623, lG2r., 1G27, 1G29, 1G31,
1633, 1634, 1G3S, 1642, 1G43, 1G45, 1646, 1648, 1G52, 1G53.
Vnnv Security and Intelligence Division 1603
irmy Signal Corps IGOG, 1G20-1G23, lG.-)l-lGr)3
Army Signal Corps Laboratories (Fort Monmouth) 1G06, 1620-1623, IG.")!
A-Ssociated Press (AP) lGr)2
Attorney General (United States) 1G.j2
Back, General 1G12
BeLieu, Colonel 1G12
Brownell, Herbert 1652, ]Gr)3
Cambridge, Mass 16.')2
Camp Gordon, Ga 1G46
Canadian Government 1653
Canadian Soviet spy ring 1G53
Capitol Building (V.'ashington, D. C.) 1647
Carr, Francis P 1615,
1618, 1620, 1624, 1625, 1637, 1639, 1641, 1618, 1645-1647, 1G52
Cohn. Roy M 1652
Testimony of 16!)2-164'J
Coleman, Aaron 1602-1604, IGDS, 1620, 1641
Communist conspiracy 1644
Communist infiltration in the Air Force 1618, 1628
Communist infiltration in the Army 1648
Communist infiltration in defense plants 1(529
Comnninist infiltration in the Navy 1618, 1628
Communist infiltration in the secret radar laboratory at Monmouth 1G20, 1630
Communist infiltration in the State Department 1608
Communist infiltration hi the Treasury 1608
Communist Party 1605,
1608, 1618, 1620-1622, 1626-1629, 1633, 1634, 1636, 1639, 1644, 1645,
1651-1653.
Communist professors 1652
Communist spy ring 1608, 1619, 1622, 1651
Communist underground 1651
Communists 16(15,
1608, 1618, 1620-1622, 1626-1629, 1633, 1634, 1636, 1639, 1644, 1645,
1648, 1651, 1653.
Corr, Lieutenant 16.39-1641
Counselor to the Army 1602-1621, 1624-1627, 1629-1649
CTPS 1652
Department of the Army 1602, 1603,
1605, 1609, Kill. 1612, 1614, 1617-1623, 1625, 1627, 1629, 1631, 1633,
1634. 1638, 1642, 1643, 1645, 1646, 1648, 1652, 1653.
Deiiartment of Defense 1629
Department of Justice 1623,1652
Department of State 1608,1639,1653
Dirksen, Senator 1607, 1608, 1647
Edwards, Willard 1652
Electronics industry (Russia) 1622
INDEX
4
fi'T
Pi
Emerson Radio Corp 16:
Evans Signal Laboratory 1603, 16C
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 1619, 1622, 1639, 16."
Federal funds 162
Federal prisons 1652, 16j
Federal Telecommunications Laboratory 162
Foley Square (New York City) 165
Fort Dix 1630, 164
Fort Monmouth 1603-1601 ^
1607-1609, 1611, 1613-1616, 1619-1624, 1626-1632, 1634-1637, 1640
1642, 1645-1647, 1651, 1652.
Fort Monmouth radar laboratories 1603, 160
Furry, Wendell H 1051-165
G & R Engineering Co 162
Gasner's Restaurant (New Yorli City) 168
German occupation currency 160
Gouzenko, Igor 165
Greenglass, David 1619-1623, 1626, 1640, 1651-165
Harvard Corp 165
Harvard University 1651-165
Hoey, Senator 160
Intelligence and Security Division (Army) 160
Jones, Bob 1607,1608, 161
Justice Department 162
Lawton, Gen. Kirke B 1603, 1605-1607, 1620-1622, 1630-164
Levitsky, Joseph 162
Lewisburg, Pa ^ 1619, 1652, 165
Lewisburg Penitentiary 1619, 1652, 165
Lincoln's Birthday 164
Lower loyalty board 164
Loyalty Board 1644, 164
Madison Square Garden 161
McCarthy, Senator Joe 1602, 160::
1605-1614, 1617, 1618, 1621, 1623-1629, 1631-1641, 1644, 1645, 1647
1649, 1651-1653.
McCarthy Ends Secret Quiz at Fort Monmouth (newspaper article) 165
McCarthy Vows Radar Spy Expose (newspaper article) 165
McClellan, Senator 160
McGuire Airfield 163
Mint (United States) 160
Mudget, General 102
Mundt, Senator 1608, 1609, 1615, 164'
New York City 1611
1615, 1622, 1630, 1632, 1634, 1638, 1640, 1645, 1648, 1649, 1652, 165:
Navy (United States) 1617-1619,1628,162-
New York Herald Tribune 1623, 165
Norden bomb sight 165:
Pentagon 1624, 1625, 1628, 164-
Pentagon Loyalty Board . 164
Perl, William 105:
Philadelphia, Pa 162;
Pitt Machine Products 162"
Potter, Senator 1607, 1608, 164'
Prison examinations 165:
Proximity fuse 1625
Pusey, Dr. Nathan M 165i
Radar industry (Russia) 1622, 1625'
Radar laboratories (Fort Monmouth) 1603
1605, 1620, 1621, 1623, 1630, 1637, 1041, 1651, 1651;
Radar spy 1051
Rainvilfe, Mr 1607, 1608, 1612
Ridgway, General 1029
Rogge, O. John 1620
Rosenberg, Ethel 1620, 1622, 1653
Rosenberg, Julius 1605, 1619, 1620, 1622, 1623, 1626, 1651, 1652
Rosenberg ring 1622, 1023, 1626, 1651
INDEX III
Page
nssia 1C22, 1G23, 1052, l(ir>3
ussian electronics industry l(i22
• iissian Embassy oiplior cleric l(ir):{
ussian radar industry llj22, 1()2;{
ussians 1G2:J
van, General 1<5;{0
chine, G. I)avid___ 1010, 1020, 1024, 102."., 1029, 1031, 1G41, 1042, 1044, 1040, 10r,7
econd World War 1()22
ecret radar laboratories (Fort INronniouth) lOO:!,
1605, 1020, 1621, 102;?, lOMO, 10:!7, 1041, 1(;51, 1052
ecretary of the Army l(i()2-1009,
1011-1013. 1015, 1017-1021, 1023-10:]3, 103.5-1042, 1044-1040, 10,53
ecurity and Intelli.ii:ence Division (Army) 1003
Security ollicer (Fort Monmouth) l<i03
elassie, Ilaile 1()4!)
enate Arnu'd Services Committee 1033
liiinal Corps (U. S. Army) 1008,1620-1023,1051-1053
^iJ;ual Corps Laboratories (Fort Monmouth) 1000,1020-1023,10.51
imith, General 1()39
•.enate of the United States 1004
■Snyder, Samuel 1044
>oviet Government 100-5
?oviet spy rin.ij 101!)
>oviet spy ring (Canada) 1().53
^tate Department (United States) 1008,16.30,16.53
3teven.s, Robert T 1002-1009,
1011-1613, 1615, 1617-1021, 1023-1033, 1635-1642, 1644r-1646, 16.53
^yminston. Senator 1604
Treasury Department (United States) 1008
I'rudeau, General 1029
Under Secretary of State_„ 1039
United States Air Force 1017-1019, 1628, 1629, 1642, 1643
United States Army 1602,
1603, 1605, 1009, 1011, 1012, 1614, 1017-1623, 1625, 1627, 1629, 1631,
16.33, 1634, 1638. 1642, 1643, 1045, 1046, 1048. 1652. 1053.
United States Army Signal Corps 1606, 1020-1623, 1651-16.53
United States Attorney General 16.52
United States Congress 1649
United States courthouse (New York City) 1623,1635,16.51
United States Department of Defense 1629
United States Department of .Justice 1623
United States Department of State 1608,1630,10.53
United States Mint 1608
United States Navy 1617-1019, 1028, 1029
United States Senate 1004
United States Treasury Department 1608
University, Harvard 1651-16.53
Walter Reed Hospital (Washington, D. C.) 1634
Washington, D. C 1608, 1615, 1648, 16.52, 16.53
Washington Time.s-Herald 1623, 16.52
White. Harry Dexter 16.32
World War II 1622
o
'IJ7>- ! - ' ^^^_.f
SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRE-
TARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR
JOE McCarthy, roy m. cohn, and
FRANCIS p. CARR
HEARING
BEFOKE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMIHEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIED CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Res. 189
PART 44
MAY 28, 1954
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
^
'i0
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46620° WASHINGTON : l'J54
. S°«on Public Liftrarv
-Permtondent of Documents
OCT 2 7 m4
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNME-NT OPERATIONS
JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAxX, Arkansas
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HENRY M. JACKSON, Wasliington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idalio JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
EVERETT MrKINLEY DIKKSEN, Hlinols STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland THOMAS A. BURKE, Ohio
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan
Richard J. O'Melia, General Counsel
Walteu L. Reynolds, ChieJ Clerk
Special Subcommittee on Investigations
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota, Chairman
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIKKSEN, Illinois JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
CHARLES E. POTTER, Mieliigau HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, I.laho STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
Ray H. Jenkins, Chief Counsel
Thomas R. Puewiit, Assistant Counsel
Robert A. Collier, Assistant Counsel
SoLis HoEwiTZ, Assistant Counsel
Charles A. Maner, Secretary
U
CONTENTS
Page
Index 16y3a
Testimony of —
Cohn, Roy C, chief counsel, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 1656
Investigations
EXHIBITS
In'rodu.ed Appears
on page on page
No. 30. Letter from Senator Joe McCarthy to Senator Karl E.
Mundt, chairman, Special Subcommittee on Investigations,
May 28, 1954 __ _ _.. 1656 1656-57
ni
SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON ClIARCES AND
COUNTERCHAIUJES INVOLVING: SECKETARY OF THE
ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN (I. ADAMS, H. STRUVE
HENSEL AND SENATOR JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN,
AND FRANCIS P. CARR
FRIDAY, MAY 28, 1954
United States Senate,
Special SuBCOM]\riTTEE on Investigations of the
Committee on Government Operations,
Washington^ I). C.
The subcommittee met at 10 :15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in the
caucus room of the Senate Office Buikling, Senator Karl E, Mundt,
chairman, presidinfj.
Present: Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Sen-
ator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Ro])ublican, Illinois; Senator Charles
E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; Senator Henry C. Dworshak, Re-
publican, Idaho; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washing-
ton ; and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.
Also present: Ray H. Jenkins, chief counsel to the subcommittee;
Thomas R. Prewitt, assistant counsel ; Charles Maner, assistant coun-
sel ; and Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk.
Principal participants present : Senator Joseph R. IMcCarthy, a
United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin; Roy M. Colin,
chief counsel to the subcommittee; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel
for the Army; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army.
Senator Mundt. The committee will come to order.
For the information of the newspapermen, we will close at 12 :15
this noon instead of 12: 30, which will give us time to get over to tlie
joint session of Congress to hear Emperor Haile Selassie and we will
resume at 2 o'clock promptly, as usual. So the recess will be from
12 : 15 to 2 instead of 12 : 30 until 2.
To our guests in the committee room, the Chair would like to ex-
tend the customary morning greeting and a word of welcome and to
point out to you, if you are here for the first time, that we have a
standing committee rule against any audible manifestations of ap-
proval or disapproval at any time in any manner.
_ The officers in the room and the plainclothes men have instruc-
tions from the committee to escort immediately from the room, politely
but forthwith, anyone who violates the terms by which he enters the
committee room, which is to refrain entirely from manifestations of
approval or disapproval.
I must say from the standpoint of audience nonparticipation, these
have been the most orderly hearings the Chair has ever noticed on
1656 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Capitol Hill, and I want to salute once again the Capitol Police
and their associates, and our friends in the audience for conforming
completely with the committee rule.
To the contrary notwithstanding, Ave want the guards to remove
from the room immediately anybody if in a brief holiday spirit this
morning you should violate that standing admonition of the Chair.
We left oil' as of yesterday with Counsel Jenkins engaging in direct
examination of Mr. Cohn, a witness on the so-called McCarthy-Cohn
side of the controversy. He will continue at this time with his direct
examination which he tells me he will conclude in a very short time or
interval, at which time he will wipe off his smile and put on his frown
and proceed with the cross-examination.
Counsel Jenkins.
FURTHER TESTIMONY OF ROY M. COHN
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I think I have only two questions to ask
you. One is with respect to the repayment to you of certain money
by Mr. Adams for the theater and prizefight tickets. As I understand
it, you have another statement you desire to make with reference to
that subject of inquiry.
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I clon't believe we brought out the fact that re-
payment actually was made on February 18 and what the circum-
stances of it were.
Mr. Jenkins. Is that all you care to say about that, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, if you think it is relevant I would relate the pay-
ment of that money and what Mr. Adams said in connection with pay-
ment to me at that time.
Mr. Jenkins. The committee may consider it relevant, and I ask
you to do so.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. I told you yesterday about the February 12
telephone call when Mr. Adams called me to find out why I was
ducking him and why he didn't see me. I did see him at a subcom-
mittee hearing, which I of necessity attended, and which he attended
on February 18. He took a roll of bills and stuck them in my pocket.
As I recall it, he was sitting in the jury box in the courtroom where
the hearing was being held and I was walking by in the morning and
he said hello and I said hello, and he reached over and just stuck this
roll of bills in my pocket. I don't remember w^hich pocket it was.
Senator Mundt. If you will pardon me, the Chair has just been
handed a letter which he thinks he should read at this time, because
it contains some good news for Mr. Welch, and I would like to have
the attention of Mr. Welch so that he can carry this good news with
him over the weekend.
This is addressed to me by Senator McCarthy ; addressed to Hon.
Karl E. Mundt, United States Senate Office Building, Washington 25,
D. C. I have read only the first two paragraphs, but I can tell it is
good news for Mr. Welch and I want to send him to Boston happy.
Mat 28, 1954.
My Deae Senator Mundt: As you know, I have felt very strongly about the
vicious and completely unfounded attack by Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams upon
Mr. Frank Carr, the chief of the Investigations Subcommittee staff.
As a number of Senators so ably pointed out on Wednesday, May 26, Adams and
Stevens presented absolutely no evidence of any wrong doing on the part of
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1657
Mr. Carr. When the Senators very propi-rly dismissed the charj^es against Frank
Carr, on the ground that they had been proven false, they coupled that move with
what at that time appeared to he the higical course of also releasing him as a
witness so he could get back to the job of directing the important pending investi-
i;ations of the subcommittee.
Mr. Carr feels that while he has been cleared by the subcommittee of all the
Adams-Stevens charges, nevertheless, he should be called as a witness if, after all
lh(> evidence on both sides is in, any member of the subcommittee, or any principal,
wishes to (juestion him. He feels as I do that while this investigation was delib-
erately and cleverly planned by those who had a personal interest in sidetracking
our exposure of Communists, e\ery member of the staff of this subcommittee
should be available to testify.
While I strongly argued that the phony, trumped-up, false charges against
Mr. Carr should be dismissed, I have made it very clear that I would advise all
members of the staff to appear before this committee if called. As you know,
Mr. Carr took no part in the discussions concerning his dismissal as a principal,
and as a witness. His position always has been that as an employee of the
subcommittee, he would follow the instructions of this committee, and would not
volunteer advice unless asked for it. However, lie was deeply disturbed to learn
that this connnittee's action was interpreted by some to mean that he would not be
available to testify.
As the Chairman knows, while I felt that technically it was improper to dismiss
the Hensel matter before I had an oi)portunity to give testimony thereon, I made
no objection because I felt that the President's secrecy order, which precluded
Mr. Hensel's testifying to any conversations, planning, etc., between other mem-
bers of the executive branch and himself, made it impossible ever to get the whole
truth and that, therefore, these hearings should be ended as soon as possible so
that we could get back to our work. I want to make it clear at this time, however,
that if any Senator or any interested party desires to question me with regard to
the Hensel matter, I shall be ready and willing to answer such questions.
Yours very truly,
Joe McCarthy,
TJnited States Senate.
The letter will be made a part of the record.
(The letter above was marked as "exhibit No. 30.")
Senator Mundt. I think that should clarify the atmosphere, Mr.
Welch, and everybody sliould be happy, and confirms a statement that
1 made the other day when I said senatorial bodies are reversible bodies
and they do have the facility to meet problems as they arise.
I think in fairness to Mr. Carr, I should say one personal word.
I met him in the hall last night afterward, and said something in a
jocular manner about how it felt to be an ex-witness, or something
of that kiud, or an ex-principal, and he told me at that time that
he had never quite understood his position at the committee table,
because he was here allegedly as a principal but had never been called
upon in tho round robin of 10-minute questioning. He had no counsel.
He did want me to know, however, that he felt he should have an
opportunity to testify if anybody felt that he should.
So I think that should be said in fairness to Frank Carr; so that
the strong, silent man, Mr. AYelch, is avaihable to you at any time
that you want to have him testify.
Mr. Jenkins, you may proceed.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you may proceed with your answer to the
question.
Mr. CoTiN. Yes, sir. Mr. Adams stuck the money in my pocket.
Afterward I saw Mr. Adams out in the corridor, and I asked him
what it was all about. He told me that he wanted me to take the
money. It was for the theater tickets and for the prizefight tickets.
I told him that as far as the theater tickets were concerned, I would
send the bill on to him or let him know how much it was and he didn't
1658 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
have to be concerned about that. As far as the prizefight ticket was
concerned, he was my guest and there was a number of months before
and it was certainly no need for him to, at this date, give me any money
for the ticket.
He told me that on the prizefight ticket he knew that Dave Schine
had paid for the ticket. I told him he was quite wrong, that Mr.
Schine had not paid for the ticket; that I had paid for the ticket.
Mr. Adams, I might say, had jocularly suggested that Mr. Schine
s' ould pay for the tickets. I told him I had paid for the tickets, Mr.
Schine had not. Anyway, he said, "I want to have all accounts be-
tween us closed ; it is very important to you and very important to
me."
I asked him what he meant by that, I didn't quite understand it.
He said words to the effect, "I hope you will never know what I do
mean by that, but some people are trying to get me to do something
and I hope you don't know what it is; I hope you never find out, but
we have to get the record straight now or it will be embarrassing to us
both later on."
Under those circumstances, I did not give him back the money.
I kept it. That was that.
Mr. Jenkins. What was the date of that conversation, Mr. Cohn?
IMr. CoiiN. The date of that conversation, sir, was February 18,
1954. It was the hearing at which Maj. Irving Peress appeared in
public session before the subcommittee, I believe. It was the date
of the Peress hearing. I believe that to be February 18.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you question him about who was trying to get
him to do certain things that he said he hoped he would never have
to do?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir; he was very mysterious about the whole thing.
I did not understand any detail about what it was about, and he
pressed this money on me on that occasion, and made it very clear
that he was determined I should take it and that there were very
important reasons why I should, and I took it and that was that,
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did you ever have a conversation with Mr.
Adams with respect to the Major Peress case ?
Mr. CoHN. I did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. When was that ?
Mr. CoHN. The first time I told Mr. Adams about Major Peress
was in December of 1953. I believe some time in the early part of
December 1953.
Mr. Jenkins. Will you relate what was said on that occasion ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. I was in discussion with Mr. Adams about this,
as I recall it, about this order permitting the commissioning of Com-
munists, and I suggested to Mr. Adams that there were a number of
Communists who currently held commissions in the Army.
Mr. Adams said that that was completely untrue; that there was
not a single Communist who held a commission in the Army. I told
him he was quite wrong. He asked me if I would give him the name
of one. I gave him the name of one. I gave him the name of Maj.
Irving Peress. He said he knew nothing about the situation, but he
was positive that I was wrong. He said — he checked on it and I
talked to him about it a few days later, I don't remember exactly when,
sir, and he said that he was taking action on the Peress case.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1659
I paid. "Well, that means I am ri^ht, doesn't it ; he is a Communist ?"
jNIr. Adams said, "Well, we are takiii<y action on the case and the
tiling will be taken care of."
I told the chairman abont that. I told him — he kneAV abont the
Peress case— I told him about this, and I told him what 1 told Mr.
Adams. The chairman told me that we should p;ive JMr. Adairs a
certain period of time to take care of the case himself, within the
Army and get rid of Peress.
I think the chairman mentioned a month or 6 weeks; somethin*?
alonir those lines. 1 mentioned the case to Mr. Adams on a number
of subsequent occasions, including some early in January. There
finally came a time in mid-January and after that, when Senator
^McCarthy kept questioning me as to whether they had gotten rid of
Peress. I told him that as far as 1 knew they had not.
The Senator said he had waited long enough and that he wanted
a sub]")ena served on Peress, and he wanted him prosecuted before the
subcommittee. Peress was produced before the subcommittee on Sat-
urday morning. January 30—1 believe we checked the date on that,
sir — in New York, at executive session.
JNIr. Carr or the Senator, I don't know whom, invited Mr. Adams
or some representative of the Army to be present to see whether or
not this major was a Communist and just what his testimony should
be. No representative of the Army came. INIajor Peress came and
invoked the fifth amendment, as to just about everything — Commimist
Party membership, organizational activities, whether he was using
his post in the Army to recruit soldiers into the Communist Party,
whether he was holding Communist Party meeting at his home while
he was stationed down at Camp Kilmer, whether he had been a Com-
munist when he was promoted from captain to major, and things
along those lines.
The testimony elicited the fact that in August of — that Major
Peress, when he was commissioned, sir, as a captain, had an open
record as a Communist. He was not a secret Communist, he had an
open record. The files of the New York City Police Department,
which were available to the Army and to G-2, contained statements
by informants showing that Peress had attended Communist leader-
ship school. Peress had been referred to in the Daily Worker a couple
of years or a year or so before, as a contributor to Communist defense
funds. In spite of that, he was commissioned a captain.
In August it developed, when the Army questioned him about his
Communist activities. Peress claimed the fifth amendment, to the
Armj', and in spite of the fact that he claimed the fifth amendment, to
the Army, they promoted him to the rank of major a couple of months
thereafter.
Senator JNIcCarthy, to put it mildly, was deeply distressed about
the situation. This was a Saturday.
I believe on Monday, Monday morning, Senator McCarthy sent
an open letter to Mr. Stevens, who was then in the Far East and was
expected back in a day or so, addressed it to Mr. Stevens' office, and
stated all the facts in Peress case and demanded that there be a court-
martial of Major Peress, and that action be taken against all of those
responsible for commissioning and promoting this fifth-amendment
Communist.
46G20°— 54— pt. 44 2
1660 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. What was the date of that letter, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. 1 believe it was February 1, 195-4.
Mr. Jenkins. Did the Senator ever receive a reply to that letter?
]\Ir. Cohn. He did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you know the tenor of the reply ?
Mr. Cohn. The tenor of the reply, sir, was that it was a very long
letter, and if I might say, it said nothing. The Senator had requested
the names of those who were responsible for the promotion of Peress,
who were responsible for the cancellation of his orders, who were
responsible for commissioning him. Mr. Stevens' letter was a long
letter, but it did not give any of the names and, of course, to this day
we don't have any of those names.
Mr. Jenkins. Peress had then been honorably discharged?
Mr. Cohn. That is the important point, sir. Senator McCarthy
wrote this letter on February 1 demanding that Peress not be hon-
orably discharged, but saying that he should be court-martialed for his
conduct as an officer in the Army, and for defying the Army by claim-
ing the fifth amendment to the Army, and then claiming the fifth
amendment before this committee for other Communist activities.
Mr. Stevens was out of the country, and the letter was handled by
Mr. Adams in Mr. Stevens' behalf. I know that in talking with
Senator McCarthy, Mr. Carr was in touch with Mr. Adams about this
matter, and Mr. Carr earnestly asked Mr. Adams not to allow an
honorable discharge to be issued to this fifth-amendment Communist
major. He called him on numerous occasions, on February 1 and
February 2. There were a few phone calls, a number of phone calls.
Finally we heard from other sources, Mr. Jenkins, that in spite
of all this and in spite of the Senator's letter and before Mr. Stevens
had a chance to return, that Major Peress was to be given an honorable
discharge on the afternoon of February 2.
I understand that Mr. Carr telephoned Mr. Adams and begged him
for the last time to hold up the honorable discharge until Mr. Stevens
got back, saying it would be a very had mistake to give an honorable
discharge to this fifth amendment Communist.
Mr. Adams declined to do this, and I believe that on February 2,
an honorable discharge was given to Major Peress.
I then know from Senator McCarthy, sir, that I believe on the
night of February 2 or February 3, I think probably the 2d, Senator
McCarthy telephoned Mr. Adams at Mr. Aclams' home and told Mr.
Adams in no uncertain terms what he thought of the manner in
which Mr. Adams had handled the Peress case. Mr. Adams was di-
rectly responsible for failure to delay the honorable discharge despite
open and public warnings by Senator McCarthy that this honorable
discharge would be a very serious mistake and that any action on it
should be held up until Mr. Stevens returned.
I know that that conversation took place.
On the 18th, Mr. Adams was in New York when Major Peress
appeared in public session.
Mr. Jenkins. The 18th of what month ?
Mr. Cohn. February. That is the date Mr. Adams gave me back
that money, paid me that money.
Then General Zwicker appeared that afternoon, and I won't go into
that, other than to say that General Zwicker had been cooj)erative with
a representative of the staff of the subcommittee who had privately
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1661
interviewed General Zwicker on, 1 believe, the Saturday before Gen-
eral Zwicker testified. General Zwicker had tokl this investigator
a lot of facts and a lot of important facts about how this fifth amend-
ment Communist had been promoted, and other things concerning this
fifth amendment Connnunist's treatment in the Army.
When General Zwicker ai)peared before the committee he was
asked the very same questions, and he just didn't give any answers.
He was just quiet about the whole thing.
Mr. Adams Avas next to him advising him, and it became very ap-
parent from the questioning of the witnesses that INlr. Adams had
been working on them the previous afternoon. 1 believe it was the
previous afternoon. The day before, Mr. Adams had gone up to see
them.
Senator McCarthy concluded that Mr. Adams had told thom to
keep quiet and not to give the committee the information. That did
not help relations between Senator McCarthy and Mr. Adams at that
point. The Senator was quite annoyed about it.
This hassle on General Zwicker developed, and on the next night,
sir, February 19, Mr. Carr from New York spoke to Mr. Adams, and
then called me and asked me if I would call Mr. Adams and talk to
him to see if we could not avoid the further questioning of people
like General Zwicker and get in instead the person who had given
General Zwicker and others the orders to keep quiet.
I called Mr. Adams and I told Mr. Adams that I thought in justice
to General Zwicker and the officers involved, the proper person to
produce was the man wdio had given the orders silencing General
Zwicker and these other officers and let that man tell why he had
ordered them to defy the subcommittee.
Mr. Adams did not agree and I remember we got into — it was sup-
posed to be a short conversation, but we got into an extended discus-
sion of the Peress case, in the course of which I told Mr. Adams that
I had warned him about that case for a period of months and that
he had done nothing about it. He admitted that. He said, I think, he
had written 1 letter or made 1 phone call and had forgotten to follow
it up or had not followed it up.
Then I took up the question of the honorable discharge and Mr.
Adams said, well, he just wasn't going to delay it and he didn't delay
it, and that was that. He said, "Anyway, you seem to think the proof
on Peress was awfully strong. I don't." I told him that I couldn't
think of much stronger proof on anyone, on a major or captain in
the Army than the fact that he claimed the fifth amendment before
the Army itself on a typical Army loyalty-to-the-United States form.
The fact that the police files contained the statement by New York
City policemen who had been undercover agents in Communist cells
with Peress, that the Daily Worker mentioned him by name as a
contributor to Communist defense funds, and that he invoked the fifth
amendment before the committee.
I added the statement that I was sure that the FBI had full infor-
mation on Peress which had been available to Mr. Adams and to the
people in the Army.
At that point ^Mr. Adams made some derogatory comments con-
cerning: the FBI and said :
Well, who pays attention to their reports anyway? They are just a lot of
hearsay and I am not aoins to listen to an FBI recort about somethiiiir like this.
1662 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
That expression does not happen to be alon<^ my way of thinking,
and there was not much more to the conversation.
"V^Hiile I was talking with Mr. Adams, it was from a hotel room in
Albany where we were conducting hearings. We had Felix Insler-
nian, who had been the photographer in the Alger Hiss case. Senator
McCarthy was present and two or three other men were in the room
while I had this conversation with Mr. Adams.
With the exception, Mr. Jenkins, of a casual meeting with Mr.
Adams at the beginning of March at a hearing in the hearing room
of the committee at which he again invited me out to lunch, which I
declined, I have had I believe no further contacts with Mr. Adams.
I have not seen Mr. Stevens since the I7th of November, and I believe,
sir, this is about the substance of wlif.t you want me to tell you on this
part of the examination.
Mr. Jexkins. Mr. Cohn, approximately how many times did you
talk to Mr. Adams with respect to Major Peress and with respect to
the documents to which you have just referred, which were in existence
and which, as you claim or say, shed light upon his communistic
leanings?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I don't recall having discussed the police depart-
ment documents with Mr. Adams until this February 18-February 19
incident. I did very definitely discuss with Mr. Adams the fact that
I had information that Peress as an Army officer had defied the Army
back in August, had refused to answer questions when the Army
asked him questions and that there was written documentation as
to that.
Mr. Jenkins. Was that documentation in the possession of the
Army ?
Mr. CoHN. Of course it was. They have never given it to us but
I am sure it is there, sir. I am sure it is there and I am sure it is
available to Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you advise Mr. Adams that Peress had taken
the fifth amendment before your committee ?
Mr. CoHN. I did not. But after Major Peress did take the fifth
amendment before the committee, there were newspaper stories about
it, and I believe Mr. Adams was directly and personally advised by
Mr. Carr as to exactly what had transpired, exactly what had tran-
spired, and Mr. Adams had been invited by Mr. Carr, I believe, to be
present at the session when Major Peress testified. In fact, I think
Mr. Carr urged him to be there.
Mr. Jenkins. And, of course, he testified prior to his discharge?
Mr. CoiiN. He did. He testified and invoked the fifth amendment
before our committee prior to the time the Army gave him an honor-
able discharge.
Mr, Jenkins. Do you know whether or not Senator McCarthy ever
talked to Mr. Adams about the Peress case and about the evidence
you had given him?
Mr. Cohn. I know he talked to him on a number of occasions, sir,
and I know specifically that Senator McCarthy telephoned Mr.
Adams, I believe at Mr. Adams' home, on the night of February 2,
and told Mr. Adams just what he thought of the way in which Mr.
Adams had handled the Peress case.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say that you know Mr. Frank Carr likewise
talked to Mr. Adams about it ?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1 G63
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir, and I know Mr. Adams tokl Mr. Carr about
some of the things Senator McCarthy liad tokl Mr. Adams about the
way Mr. Adams had handled the Peress case.
Mr. Jenkins. Have yon ever ascertained who was responsible for
the promotion of Teress, Mr. Colin?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, it has been a long number of months now, and we
have never, despite frequent, repeated, oral, Avritten, telephonic, per-
sonal and every other kind of request, plea and demand, been given
rhat information, and 1 doubt that we ever will be, the way things
look now.
Mr. Jenkins. Have you ever been given information as to who was
responsible for his honorable discharge?
Mr. Cohn. The only one that we know of who dealt with his hon-
orable discharge during that February 22 period, other than the
Zwicker testimony, is Mr. Adams, and we don't know what major
role Mr. Adams played in that, whether he was acting under orders
from someone else or not. We have not been told. I am sure no
one can say we haven't asked.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, IMr. Cohn, as a final question on direct examina-
tion
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
ISIr. Jenkins. And with respect to yours and Senator McCarthy's
charges against Mr. Stevens and IMr. Adams, is there any other fact
now or are there any other facts which, in your opinion, shed light
upon the truth or falsity of those charges that you now care to state
to this committee?
Mr. Cohn. As far as our answers and our account of what happens,
sir, I believe I have given you the substance. I am sure that there are
other incidents and other events which might shed light on this
which I have overlooked or omitted because I knew they would be
covered by others or on cross-examination. But I am sure that under
your cross-examination and that of Mr. Welch and the Senators, all
of the facts will come out.
Mr. Jenkins. Now let me make this statement, and I don't make it
for your benefit, because you are perfectly aware of the role, the dual
role, in which I serve. But for the benefit of those who tuned in late,
shall we say, Mr. Cohn, it is not a pleasant thing to cross-examine a
witness, especially after one has conducted the direct examination.
It has, I think I should say in all truth, been a painful thing to cross-
examine the Secretary of the Army and Mr. Adams and others, and
it is not a personal thing. It is purely official and in conformity with
what I deem to be my duty. I do hope that you and those who are
interested and those who are hearing and seeing these proceedings will
understand that.
Mr. CoiiN. It is your duty, sir, and I will do my best to answer your
questions.
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman ?
Before you begin, Mr. Jenkins, one single word. It seems to me
that in"'fairness to those in the room and those who listen, that the
counsel for the committee should state a second time — it has been said
before — that the names of those who were connected with the Peress
discharge have been handed to the counsel for the committee days
ago.
1664 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. Handed to the counsel, sir, and handed right back to
the Army and we have never seen them.
Mr. Welch. You are quite wrong in that, Mr. Cohn. It was shuf-
fled back and forth but it ended up in the possession of my good and
trusted friend Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. CoHN. If Mr. Jenkins will show it to us, we will be very happy.
Mr. Jenkins. I believe it is still in my possession despite the fact
that I tried to escape the responsibility. It is marked "Confidential."
It has not been opened by me. I see no purpose whatsoever in it
remaining in my possession and I have no intention of opening that
envelope. I now tender it back, Mr. Welch, and I do hope you will
take it.
Mr. Welch. It was the Senator who wished it to remain in your
possession.
Senator Mundt. I think the Chair settled that previous altercation
by saying it should remain in your hands until we have a chance to
have an executive meeting to see what can be done, if anything, to get
rid of its confidential status, so that the country and the people may
know who is responsible for Major Peress. We do not expect you to
violate the confidential order.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, in order to channel the area of our
inquiry, let us again re-state the issue about which I desire to cross-
examine you. That is that you and Senator McCarthy, and Mr. Carr,
are charged by Mr. Stevens and by Mr. Adams with using improper
means with them for the purpose of securing preferential treatment
for G. David Schine. You understand that, do you not ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, how long have you known Mr. Schine?
Mr. CoHN. I have known him well, sir, I would say for about 2
years.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, how long have you known him ?
Mr. CoHN. I might have met him prior to that 2-year period casu-
ally or around town. I have no definite recollection of it, but it might
have happened.
Mr. Jenkins. I believe 3'ou are a native of New York City?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And so is Mr. Schine ?
Mr. Corn. Well, he is a native of up-State New York but he does
spend a good deal of time in and around New York City.
Mr. Jenkins. What was the occasion of your meeting him and
coming in contact with him, Mr. Cohn? Was it official or was it
social or otherwise?
Mr. CoHN. It was a luncheon arranged by a mutual friend.
Mr. Jenkins. Approximately 2 years ago?
Mr. CoTiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, since that time you and David Schine
have been what we might call warm personal friends, have you not?
Mr. CoHN. He is one of my many good friends, sir, yes.
Mr. Jenkins. One of your many good friends. And in all fairness,
Mr. Cohn, isn't it a fact that he is one of your best friends ? We all
have our best friends. There is no criticism of you on that account.
Mr. CoHN. No, of course not, sir.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1665
JNIr, Jenkins. We have friends whom we love, I do. And the rela-
tionship between you and Dave Schine has been very close for the
past 2 years, hasn't it ?
JNIr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. He is one of a number of good friends I am
proud to have.
Mr. Jenkins. You have known him socially ?
Mv. CoiiN. I have.
Mv. Jenkins. Visited in his home?
]\lr. CoTiN. Yes, sir.
]\Ir. Jenkins. He has visited in your home ?
]Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And you have perhaps double dated together? There
is no reflection on anything about that. You are both single young
men as we understand it.
Mr. CoHN. We have been on double dates, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And that Avas in New York City?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And when you came to the McCarthy committee, T
believe you say in January 1953
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn came when ?
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Schine ?
Mr. Jenkins. ISIr. Schine.
Mr. Cohn. He came 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, I believe.
Mr. Jenkins, 2 or 3 weeks thereafter.
Now, Mr. Cohn, Mr. Schine resigned his position in New York City
in order to come with the McCarthy committee, did he not?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What was his position in New York City?
Mr. Cohn. His main business position, I believe, was president and
general manager of the Schine Hotel Corp.
Mr. Jenkins. President and general manager?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Does he still hold those positions ?
Mr. Cohn. As far as I know, he does, sir. I am sure he is not
spending too much time in it.
Mr. Jenkins. But he came here, as we understand it, as an unpaid
consultant?
Mr. Cohn. He worked for us as an unpaid consultant ; yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And has worked ever since until his induction into
the Army as an unpaid consultant?
Mr. Cohn. He has, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And came within approximately 2 or 3 weeks of the
time you came?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. Upon whose recommendation was he retained by
Senator McCarthy?
Mr. Cohn. That is a long story, sir, but for these purposes I would
be glad to say that I was one of the people avIio did recommend him.
Mr. Jenkins. And upon your recommendation, and perhaps that
of others, he was retained and worked with you, actively, on this com-
1666 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
mittee, up until the time he was inducted into the Army; is that
correct ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, you knew that Dave Schine was a
prospective draftee in the Army, did you not?
Mr. CoHN. At what point, sir?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, suppose I ask you at what point. "Wlien did you
learn ?
Mr. CoiiN. Well, when he came with the committee sir, he was
physically — he had been in the Army Transport Service and he was
currently physically disqualified for service in the Army. He was
in I V-F, so far as I know.
Mr. Jenkins. When did you learn that there was a likelihood or
even a possibility of Dave Schine being inducted into the Army?
Mr. CoHN. I knew, sir, that steps were being taken to cause him
to be reexamined physically. I believe in the early summer of 1954.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you mean 1953?
Mr. Cohn. 1953, you are right. I am sorry.
Mr. Jenkins. The early summer. Do you mean June?
Mr. CoHN. Around that time, yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, Mr. Cohn, you knew in July, of course, you
knew ever since June, that Dave Schine was likely to be drafted into
the Army, did you not ?
Mr, CoHN. Sir, the first step was the physical, the reexamination.
If he were kept in the status in which he had been, of physical dis-
qualification, he could not have been. It was after he passed the
physical examination and it was found that the physical defect he had
was remedied, from that point on I would say he certainly was
eligible for call back into the Army.
Mr. Jenkins. When did he pass his physical ?
Mr. CoHN. It was July, I believe.
Mr. Jenkins. July?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. The early part of July ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. When in July, specifically ?
Mr. CoHN. The early part.
Mr. Jenkins. Sometime before the 8th day of July ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Then from a period prior to the 8th day of July until
he was actually inducted on November 3, you knew, Mr. Cohn, that
Dave Schine would in all likelihood be inducted into the Army, did
you not ?
]\[r. CoHN. Yes, sir.
]Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, Senator McCarthy knew that, also ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
]\Ir. Jenkins. The members of the staff knew it? It was common
knowledge among the members of the staif ; is that right ?
Mr. CoHN. It was certainly no secret.
Mr. Jenkins. That is what we understand.
Mr. CoHN. That is right.
Mr. Jenkins. Why, Mr. Cohn, did you not then, when you knew
or realized, as did the Senator, that you were about to lose a member
SPECIAL mVESTIGATlON 1G67
of your staff — why did you not then take steps to rephice this young
man ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, it wasn't a question of rephicing him. It was a
question of the work which he was doing and had previously been
doing.
Mr. Jenkins. I know, but you knew certainly before the 8th of
July that here was a young man who was going to leave you. Do you
mean to say that after July 8 you gave committee work to this young
man to do ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. We used him as long as we could.
Mr. Jenkins. Notwithstanding the fact that you knew— did you
know about when he would be inducted?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you know about what time ordinarily elapsed
between the passing of a physical examination and the actual
induction ?
Mr. CoiiN. I think the time varies, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. The time varies ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And this time it was July, August, September, Oc-
tober— 4: months, wasn't it ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. In spite of that fact, you continued to feed work to
him from time to time ; is that right, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Knowing that ultimately you would lose him?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Can you ex])lain to this committee why this McCarthy
committee, carrying on this tremendously important work, as you say,
of digging out Communists and subversives and all that sort of thing,
had on its staff a young man w^hom you knew you would lose but to
whom you say you continued to assign additional work ? Mr. Cohn,
why did you do that, if you have any explanation of it?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. The reason is that the work assigned to him
was additional work dealing with matters on which he had already
begun to work and matters on w^hich he had special knowledge.
Mr. Jenkins. What character of work had he been doing and had
he done from, we will say, in January — that is about when he came;
isn't it?
Mr. CoHN. I think it was February.
Mr. Jenkins. All right. January or February. What charac-
ter of work had Dave Schine been doing from the inception of his
employm.ent by Senator McCarthy up to July 8?
Mr. Cohn. I would say just about everything, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, Mr. Cohn, could you be a little more particu-
lar
Mr. Cohn. I could, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. And tell us just what character of work he was doing?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. We are going to get along better, you know, if we
get answers. You are reputed to be, and I don't deny it, one of the
smartest lawyers in these parts.
Mr. Cohn. I deny it, sir.
4CG20°— 54— pt. 44 3
1668 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. Well, all right. My question was: What character
of work was Dave Schine doing from, we will say, early in February —
assuming that is when he came to Senator McCarthy — up to July 8 ?
Mr. CoHN. Very well, sir.
Dave Schine came with the committee as an unpaid consultant
originally to work on an investigation of the information, the United
States information program and the Voice of America, matters to
which Dave had given a number of years' study and writing before he
did come with our committee. The type of work he did, to answer
your question, was this : He interviewed personally and on many oc-
casions, in fact most occasions, alone, I would say hundreds of wit-
nesses working at the Voice of America and in various parts of the
information program and having knowledge of the Voice of America
and the information program. He checked out the facts obtained from
these witnesses, obtained documentation, participated in the setting
up of what were a large number of executive sessions and public
hearings held by this committee in connection with that investigation.
Mr. Jenkins. May I interrupt you there ?
Mr. CoHN. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. He interviewed hundreds of witnesses ?
Mr. CoHN. He did.
Mr. Jenkins. With respect to the Voice of America, we will say?
Mr. CoHN. He did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. All right, Mr. Cohn, of course he documented the
names of those witnesses, I assume ?
Mr. CoHN. He documented the names of many of those witnesses,
sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Not all of them, you mean?
Mr. CoHN. I can't say that he documented the names of all of
them, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You have files in your office here in this building;
do you not ?
Mr. CoHN. We do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You have stenographers and secretaries at your
disposal ?
Mr. CoHN. We do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You keep a file on each individual investigation?
Mr. Cohn. We do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Of course, you had a file on Dave Schine's work with
respect to the Voice of America ; didn't you ?
Mr. CoHN. To a limited extent, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Were your files on other cases to a limited extent?
Mr. CoHN, Very probably, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, do you mean to tell us that Dave Schine
in carrying on this work with respect to the Voice of America did not,
after his conference or interview with each witness, make a memo-
randum for the file?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. You say there were hundreds of such witnesses?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. There were memorandums made, trial briefs
we called them, of interviews of a great number of witnesses. There
were a number of witnesses as to whom no such trial briefs or memo-
randums were made, and I would be glad to tell you why.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1669
Mr. Jenkins. Did you work witli Inm in tlie intprviewing of those
hundreds of witnesses with respect to the Voice of America?
Mr. Cohn. On some occasions I did, sir. On some I did not.
Mr. Jenkins. On those occasions when you worked with him, did
you make a file?
Mr. CoHN. On some I did, and some I did not. Those in Wash-
in<;ton I did. Very frequently those interviewed in New York I did
not.
Mr. Jenkins. Why did you not make a file on those in New York
and a memorandum or at least a synopsis of their testimony, their
names, and their addresses?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, because when we were in Washington we had a sec-
retarial staff available down here and we would dictate, after talking
with the witness, a trial brief or memorandum.
When we worked up in New York, we engaged an outside stenog-
rapher to come in and do that same type work up in New York for us.
That went on for a short period of time and when the bill was sub-
mitted by the outside stenographer that bill was disallowed by the
Senate Disbursing Office, which said we had no right to hire steno-
graphic help in New York.
From that point onward, I believe, we did not hire stenographic
help in New York. We made some penciled notes, some penned notes,
but we did not maintain this trial brief system as we did in the case
of Washington witnesses.
Mr. Jenkins. You shuttled back and forth between New York and
Washington, didn't you?
Mr. CoHN. We did.
Mr. Jenkins. And you didn't have a stenographer at your disposal
at all times in New York City ?
Mr. CoHN. We did not, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. But when you didn't have you made pencil notes,
3'Ou say?
Mr. CoHN. On some occasions.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, if you examined a Avitness with respect to
subversion or subversive propaganda or the Voice of America or
whatever you want to call it, do you mean to tell us, Mr. Cohn, that
you didn't then and there write down the name of that witness, his
address, his telephone number ? Is that what you are telling us?
Mr. Cohn. On all occasions we did not, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. On all occasions. Well, can you explain why you
would go to a witness — I am talking about material witnesses?
IMr. Cohn. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. AVitnesses by whom you would expect to establish
facts. I think if you interviewed a witness who knew nothing you
didn't care anything about him. Dave Schine's knowledge of that
witness wouldn't be important to you, would it?
Mr. Cohn. Not if he knew nothing on a particular point.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. Cohn. Just one qualification, sir. It might develop that a
witness would say something which we were not interested in on that
point. Something might later arise and we would think back that
there were witnesses we had talked to who did have something to say
on something we weren't then interested in but which came up later.
That happened.
1670 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. What you are tellin<ij us is that you and Mr. Schiiie
would ^o and interview these witnesses, ascertain the area of their
knowledo;e, the extent of their knowledge, and would not at all times
even make a notation, a memorandum of their names and their ad-
dresses. Is that right, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, it is.
Mr. Jenkins. Can you give the committee any explanation of why
you conducted your investigations in that manner?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. The best explanation I can give to the com-
mittee on that, as I think members of the committee know, is that we
have a very limited staff. They worked hard. They know no hours.
They work nights. There were times they would not allow a stenogra-
pher to work. They talk on occasions to dozens of witnesses in dif-
ferent places on a day and on a night. This small group of people
down on that staff do a job, a wonderful job which is not done by
people many times their number I think in a lot of other places. I
think that if there are some lapses in efficiency of our files or the setup
is not what it might be in a large corporation or something like that,
I think the members of the committee can understand the limitations
under which we work, and if there is any blame to be attached for
certain lack of efficiency on some things, I am sure that blame is mine.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, was that one reason why you wanted Dave
Schine at your disposal after he was inducted in the Army, that is,
to give you reports on his investigations with these witnesses?
Mr. Cohn. Generally, yes, sir. You are right. The one important
category was the fact that there had been witnesses to whom he had
talked, concerning whom we needed information or more complete
information than we had, and in going through files or in going into
other matters, it became necessary, and Senator McCarthy found it
necessary on a number of occasions, for us to communicate with Mr.
Schine and get information from him or get clarification and advice
from him on certain situations.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, when you would get that information from
Mr. Schine
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Would that be documented information that he had
or just had he had lodged here in his brain, in his mind?
Mr. Cohn. A good deal of it, sir, was information which he had
in his mind. We would sometimes go down with lists of witnesses,
I came across one the other day, and he would give us his recollection
as to what those witnesses could or could not help us on, as best he
remembered it. There were other occasions when there was not docu-
mentation.
Mr. Jenkins. When you realized prior to July 8 that this young
man was going to leave you, why didn't you then have him sit down
with a stenographer, here in Washington, and document all of this
information that was peculiarly within his own knowledge and about
which nobody else knew?
Mr. Cohn. We did take certain steps along those lines, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I know, Mr. Cohn. But why didn't you do what I
asked you there ? Why didn't you have Dave Schine sit down with a
stenographer and say in effect, "Now, Dave, you are leaving us. You
know facts that we want to know. Sit down here and dictate it, be-
cause you are going."
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1671
Why didn't you do that, Mr. Cohii ?
M-'. CoiiN. We did not do that to a conijilete extent, sir, because it
was impossible for us at that time to anticipate every single thing
that might arise on a later occasion. We tried to anticipate some of
the imi^ortant tilings. We tried to cover them. We Avere successful
in some cases. In others we were not successful. Our comnumications
with Dave after he was in were about things which arose on the spot
then and which needed clarification, where we needed some informa-
tion from him.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say that subsequent to July 8, when you
knew you were going to lose him, you continued to give additional
assignments of work to him?
Mr. CoiiN. He continued to work for us, sir — I don't believe he
vStarted any new matters, but he continued to work for us on matters
or which he had been working up until the very time he went in, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, in the main he had been working on matters
pe-"tainino; to tlie Voice of America, as we understand it?
Mr. CouN. That was certainly one of the very important things he
was doing.
Mr. Jenkins. What ether important thing was he doing, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. He was working on preliminary investigations of the
Army, of another of a certain Government intelligence agency, not
the FBI. he was working on a preliminary investigation concerning
possible delay in the development of the hydrogen bomb, possible
Communist connections on the part of persons concerned with the
development of the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb, he was
working on Communist infiltration in the United Nations and
UNESCO; he worked on the Government Printing Office investiga-
tion. There are undoubtedly others, but those are ones which
specifically occur to me right now, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. How many men were on your staff?
Mr. Cohn. Very few, unfortunately. I believe, sir, we had about
9 or 10 working there. That is subject to correction. I might be 1
or 2 off. I might say this, Mr. Jenkins, the setup at the beginning,
the first 6 months or so, was such that practically the only people
working on certain things were Dave Schine and myself, with some
occasional help from 1 or 2 other investigators. The rest of the sub-
committee staff was working on investigations with which I had
nothing to do, under the direction of Senator McCarthy.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, from July 8 to November 3 is a
period of approximately 4 months, isn't it?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And during that 4 months period, you and (lie Sena-
tor from Wisconsin knew that this boy was leaving you ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And in spite of that fact, you are telling this com-
mittee that you did not have him get his work current, get his reports
in, complete his memoranda, so that you would have the benefit of all
the knowledge that he had when the day came that he put on the uni-
form of the United States Army?
Mr. Cohn. My answer, Mr. Jenkins, sir, is that we took as many
steps as we possil3ly could, consistent with our setup, to transfer work
and see that things with which he was involved would be carried out
without him.
1672 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. But you did not do what I just asked you, did you?
Mr. CoHN. We did not and could not have done a complete job.
We tried. If we did not succeed, I am sorry.
Mr. Jenkins. And on the other hand, you continued to assign addi-
tional work to this young man ?
Mr. CoHN. When you say additional Mork, Mr. Jenkins, I don't
think we assigned any work on any new investigations to Mr. Schine,
from that point on.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Colin, since July 8, and before November 3, do
you have files made up as a result of reports given by Dave Schine?
Mr. CoHN. There are undoubtedly reports given by him, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Are they dated ?
Mr. CoHN. I don't know, sir. I haven't looked. I will be glad to
and supply to you whatever we have.
Mr. Jenkins. Where would they be ?
Mr. CoHN. In the subcommittee office, I believe, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I believe I heard you testify yesterday on direct ex-
amination, or perhaps it was Senator McCarthy's statement, that you
in all probability had thousands of files there, is that right?
Mr. Cohn. I am again going to say that I probably am guilty of
inefficiency, sir, but I don't believe I have ever personally gone through
any of the filing cabinets. I think — I would say that there must be
a thousand files, or something like that.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, have you gone through the file on the Voice of
America?
Mr. Cohn. I have not for some time, sir. There is no file on the
Voice of America as such, as far as I know, Mr. Jenkins. There are
probably upward of a hundred files dealing with the information pro-
gram and the Voice of America investigation. Mr. Carr keeps the
files as best he can, I think, according to an FBI technique, which I
think is good. It is somewhat difficult to understand. But there are
a great number of files on the Voice of America, and the informa-
tion program investigation.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, can you produce to lis any reports, docu-
mented, made by Dave Schine between July 8 and November 3?
Mr. Cohn. I imagine so, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. How is that?
Mr. Cohn. I am sure if we went through the files we could.
Mr. Jenkins. You are sure that you can ?
Mr. Cohn, will you do so ?
Mr. Cohn. I will be glad to, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Can you, Mr. Cohn, produce to this committee any
documents prepared bv Dave Schine during his 8 weeks training at
FortDix?
Mr. CoiiN. 1 can.
Mr. Jenkins. You can?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What were those reports on ?
Mr. Cohn. The principal thing, sir, was the 3 interim reports of
this subcommittee on the 3 — on the investigation beinor conducted on
the information agency and the Voice of America. Specifically, the
3 interim reports, are. No, 1, on I believe the engineering facilities
of the Voice of America, subtitled "Baker East and Baker West";
No. 2, the United States Information Centers ; and No. 3, the Infor-<
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1673
mation Agency proper, with the Voice of America as a subdivision,
plus sections relating to tliose interim reports which appear in the
annual report of the snlx'omniittee.
Substantial part of (hose reports were pre))ared by Dave Schine
while he was in tlie Army.
And to further answer your question, sir, I imagine some of his
notes are around and some otlioi- thiiius along those lines.
]\Ir. Jenkins. So the principal reason that you wanted conferences
with Mr. Schine after he was drafted in the Army was to assist
you in preparing the reports that you spoke of?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, 1 don't know if it was the most important infor-
mation we got.
JSfr. Jenkins. What was the most important, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoiiN. There might be a difference of opinion on the staff
about that. Some of the boys feel that the most important matters
discussed with him were interviews which he had conducted concern-
ing Fort Momnouth and the radar installations and information which
he had about that.
Mr. Jenkins. Were those interviews documented?
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me, sir?
Mr. Jenkins. Were those interviews reduced to writing?
Mr. Cohn. I don't know whether they were or not. I know that
information was obtained from him, and I know that certain action
was taken on the basis of that information.
Mr. .Jenkins. W^ho interviewed him?
Mr. Cohn. On that?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. I talked to him about that. Senator McCarthy talked
to him. Jim Juliana talked to him. I believe Frank Carr probably
talked to him.
Mr. Jenkins. Sometimes you talked to him on the post at Fort Dix ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Sometimes you talked to him elsewhere?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. While he was at Fort Dix, Mr, Cohn, did he do any
investigative work for the committee ?
Mr. Cohn. Investigative?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. The only investigative work he would have done, sir,
is I think that after training, certain weekend periods after training,
I think it is probable that he did interview a number of witnesses.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you know with respect to what subject?
ISIr. Cohn. I can at this moment, sir, recall one dealing with com-
munism in defense plants. I think that he talked with some witnesses
he had been handling on the Voice of America and information pro-
gram investigation.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he make written memoranda of those interviews?
Mr. Cohn. I am inclined to think that he did, sir. In fact, on the
Voice of America, I know he caused a witness to whom he talked to
draw up a written report, with certain statements and recommenda-
tions. I believe he had that written report sent to me with a copy
to him. I noticed that the other day.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, we will get back to the work done by Mr.
Schine while he was at Fort Dix a little later.
1674 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Yon, heinor a lawyer, of course understand the importance of the
independence of tlie three great branches of the Government, do you
not?
Mr. CoHN. I do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You understand the reason why there is a check and
balance, and that one should be and must be entirely independent of
the other ?
Mr. CoHN. I think I can a<^ree with you to a certain extent, sir.
I am sure you don't want my views on the separation of powers doc-
trine. I believe that there of necessity has to be a certain amount of
overlapping and working together. I don't believe that complete
independence of the 3 branches should mean defiance of 1 branch
by another branch.
Mr. Jenkins. You of course are with the legislative branch.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Secretary Stevens is with the executive branch.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You knew this boy was about to become a member
of the Army.
Mr. CoHN. Yes. sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You knew it prior to July 8.
Mr. CoHN. Yes,, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you, Mr. Cohn, whether or not you knew
that Senator McCarthy first talked to General Reber on July 8?
Mr. CoiiN. I don't know the exact date, but General Reber said it
was July 8, and I am sure that is it.
Mr. Jenkins. You heard General Reber testify that Senator
McCarthy on that date asked him for a direct commission.
Mr. CoHN. I don't know if the testimony was that the Senator
asked him for it. I think it was, sir, if I am correct, that he wanted
to know if Dave was qualified for a commission in the Army, and what
he should do or could do to get it, yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will read you what General Reber said. We are
talking about the 8th day of July now, and General Reber was a
general in the Army, as you know, and the man contacted by Senator
McCarthy. He was assigned as a sort of liaison officer between the
Army and the Senate. You knew that?
Mr. Cohn. I knew, sir, that it developed that General Reber's job
was the processing of applications just such as this, yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will read you what General Reber said on page 24 :
At that time Senator McCarthy informed me that he was very much interested
in obtaining a direct Reserve commission for his consultant, Mr. G. David Schine.
Mr. Cohn, you heard General Reber testify to that, didn't you?
Mr. Cohn. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. You knew that Senator McCarthy did that, didn't
you ?
Mr. Cohn. The conversation I heard, sir, was Senator McCarthy
asking General Reber whether Dave Schine would qualify for a com-
mission, and if he would, how Dave would go about applying for it.
Mr. Jenkins. I point out further to you the testimony of General
Reber :
The Senator pointed out, as I recall it, that he felt that Mr. Schine, because
of his background of investigative experience with the committee, was fully
qualified for a commission.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1675
Mr. Cohn, 3^011 were there on that occasion, weren't you?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. Further:
At about that time, as I recall it, a few minutes after I initiated my conversa-
tion with the Senator, Mr. Cohn came Into the room.
That is correct, isn't it?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And it says further:
Mr. Cohn also emphasized —
That is true, isn't it, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Emphasized what, sir?
Mr. Jenkins, He says :
That is, that this boy was qualified by reason of his investigative experience
for a commission in the Army.
Mr. Cohn. I am sure I could have said that.
Mr. Jenkins. You emphasized that ?
Mr. CoiiN. There is nothing wrong with that, as far as I know.
Mr. Jenkins. I understand that. If that is just an isolated event
and nothing else
Mr. Cohn. I didn't mean there was nothing wrong with the act. I
mean I have no disagreement with that testimony.
Mr. Jenkins. At that time a United States Senator and you, as his
chief counsel, were talking to General Eeber about a commission for
your friend, close companion, and a member of the McCarthy inves-
tigating staff. That is correct, isn't it ?
Mr. Cohn. It is correct to this extent, sir : We were talking to the
man on Capitol Hill charged with the duty of processing applications
such as this for people working on Capitol Hill, about an application
that might be filed by someone who was working on Capitol Hill.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I see. You wanted this friend of yours and you
wanted this member of the IMcCarthy staff to receive a direct com-
mission instead of entering the Army as a raw private, didn't you?
Mr. Cohn. I thought he was entitled to a commission, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I know, but answer my question.
]\Ir. Cohn. Oh, yes, I thought he w^as entitled to a commission. I
still do.
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn, I will ask you if it isn't a fact that from that time, that
is, July 8, until the last day of July, a period of about 22 or 23 days,
if you didn't call General Reber practically every day with respect to
this commission for G. David Schine ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. How many times did you call him ?
]\Ir. Cohn. I have no idea how many times, sir, I can give you a
general idea.
Mr. Jenkins, All right, will you please do so ?
Mr. Cohn. As General Eeber testified, I believe, when he was leav-
ing Senator McCarthy's office, the Senator told me in General Reber's
presence to follow the matter up with General Eeber, I did that. I
don't know how many times I spoke to General Eeber. I would say
1C76 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
it inio^lit have been 8 times, 4 times, something like that. I do know,
sir, that I would ])la{'e a call to General Reber and it avouM usually
be 2 or 3 days before 1 would <xet to talk to him. He apparently spent
most of his time up on Capitol Hill going in and out of the offices of
the various Senators and the various conmiittees, and he was a busy
man and it was no easy job to get him on the telephone. I don't think
1 talked with him every day. I think that is a gross exaggeration.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I will ask you if you didn't emphasize with
General Reber the necessity for S])eed in getting this boy a commission,
knowing that once he was drafted it would then be too late to get a
commission ?
Mr. Cohn. I think that is a fair statement.
Mr. Jenkins. You think that is a fair statement?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. How many times would you say, Mr. Cohn, that you
called this general in the Army about this one boy from July 8 to
July 31 ?
Mr. Cohn. I would think the follow-up calls after the conversa-
tion when General Reber was going to look into it might have been
3 or 4 or 5, something like that, sir, over the period of a month.
Mr. Jenkins. Over a ])eriod of some 3 weeks?
Mr. Cohn. Whatever it is, sir; 3 weeks.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you deny that you called him practically every
day, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. P>ery day, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. I certainly deny that I s]5oke with him every day.
About calling him every day, I might have told Frances or whoever
vs-as in the office to place a call to General Reber. If the call were
placed to General Reber, and General Reber were not there, as a
r.ormal practice our secretary would place the call again that after-
noon, probably place it again the next morning. I suppose that would
go on until I got General Reber on the phone and talked with him.
As far as my having talked on the phone with General Reber every
day, I don't think I did, sir. I am sure I didn't.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you know who General Reber is? You
know his character, you know his reputation ; don't you ? He is
one of the outstanding generals in the Army ?
Mr. Cohn. I know who he is. I have no reason to doubt that.
Mr. Jenkins. I want to read you from his testimony on page 38
of the record. First my question :
How many telephone calls would you estimate you received, General?
General Rebek. I could only make an estimate, Mr. .Tenkins, because, of course,
I did not keep a record of those telephone calls, hut I would say that at times I
received 2 and 3 telephone calls a day, and there were other days, of course, on
which I received either 1 or no telephone calls. But I received consistently
throughout that period possibly an average of two telephone calls.
Mr. Cohn, is that true or is it not ?
Mr. Cohn. It is a little difficult for me to understand, sir, exactly.
Mr. Jenkins. He says that on occasions you called him 2 or 3
times a day about a commission for Dave Schine. Did you?
Mr. Cohn. Two or three times a day ?
Mr. Jenkins. That is just as I read, as I recall it. He said, "But
I would say at times I received 2 and 3 telephone calls a day."
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1677
Now, did you or not, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't believe I spoke with General Reber 2 or 3 times
on any day, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, are you in a position to definitely deny it or
aiiirni it ?
Mr. CoiiN. I am in a position to ^ive you the general picture, and
tliere is no argument with me about that at all.
Mr. Jenkins. Would you say you called him 2 or 3 times a day on
some days?
Mr. Cohn. I would say I don't think I did.
Mr. Jenkins. You say you don't think you did ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Would you be positive about it ?
Mr. Cohn. I can be almost positive about it, sir. I don't think the
total number of times I talked to General Reber wa;:: more than 4 or 5.
Mr. Jenkins. It could have been more ?
Mr. Cohn. It could have been more.
Mr. Jenkins. You talked to him on July 8 ?
Mr. Cohn. That was in person, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I understand. And if you talked to him 4 or 5 or
more times, then that would be 5 or 6 times that you talked to this
general about Dave Schine during the month of July, wasn't it?
Mr. Cohn. I think that is about the best estimate I could make, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you, Mr. Cohn, whether or not after you
had exhausted every effort within your power to get a commission
through General Reber, you then went to Gen. Walter Bedell Smith?
Mr. Cohn. It wasn't a question of exhausting every effort within
our power to get it from General Reber, sir. The general on the
first occasion when Senator McCarthy asked him if one with Dave
Schine's experience would be qualified for a commission, General Reber
unhesitatingly said he was sure that he would be. His Army trans-
Eort service, with the work he had done Math the committee, his
usiness experience and other things, he was sure that he would be.
The Senator asked me to follow it up. I did, and I called the general
and he seemed gradually to retreat from what he had originally said,
until it got to a point around the end of July when he made it clear
that there had been a change and that Schine would not get a commis-
sion. It was after that, I believe, sir, that I talked with General
Smith.
Mr. Jenkins. You went to the State Department ?
Mr. Cohn. I did.
Mr. Jenkins. And talked to Gen. Walter Bedell Smith about a
commission for Dave Schine, did't you?
Mr. Cohn. I did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. How many times did you talk to General Smith about
it. Mr. (^ohn?
Mr. Cohn. Once. I believe, and I will be glad to tell you why I
talked to Mr. Smith.
Mr. .Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not you told General Smith
this : "He," talking about I^fr. Roy Cohn, "said that the Army authori-
ties had not been cooperating, that General Reber had promised to
arrange for a commission for Mr. Schine and had not done so."
Did you tell General Smith that, Mr. Cohn ?
1678 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoH^r. What I recall telling General Smith is this, sir, and I
think you might find it to be just about the same thing. I told General
Smith that (ieneral Reber had originally, based on the merits and
the qualifications of Schine, said that there could be no doubt but that
he \yas entitled to a commission, that afterward he retreated from that
original statement, that Senator McCarthy had heard from somebody
in the Pentagon, although ({eneral Reber himself was a fine man, that
there might be some hard feelings by the general against Mr. Schine
resulting from an unpleasant ex])erience which Mr. Schine and I
had had with a nuin who we did not then know, but who turned out
to be General Reber's brother. That brother worked for the State
De})artment. At that point, I spoke to General Smith and asked him
if he could find out whether or not, in view oi" General Reber's origi-
nal statement, that Schine was clearly qualified, and in view of the
change, and in view of the fact it turned out we had had this un-
pleasant incident with a man, Avith General Reber's brother, whether
the application had been given a fair shake. That was the substance
of my conversation with General Smith on that point.
ISIr. Jenkins. I want to read you now an excerpt from General
Smith's testimony, and ask you whether it is true or whether it isn't
true.
Mr. CoHN. Sure.
Mr. Jenkins. Quoting on i)age 147 of the record :
I asked Mr. Cohn why he came to nie, as I was no longer in active military
service. He replied that the Army authorities had not been cooperating, that
General Reber had promised to arrange for a commission for Mr. Schine and
liad not done so, tliat I Icnew all the senior officers in the Pentagon and would
know who to talk to.
Is that true or not, ISIr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. I would differ with that to this extent, sir. The circum-
stances, as I recall it, and this is a difference in detail and a matter of
memory, I have a high respect for General Smith. The way it hap-
I^ened was this : First of all, I knew General Smith and I knew that
General Smith knew Dave Schine and his family, and knew about him
and about his qualifications. I was talking to General Smith. General
Smith called the office, I believe, about something or other. I men-
tioned this situation to him. He said, "Drop over tomorrow morning,"
or whatever it was. I went over and I told him about the situation.
The reasons for my talking to General Smith, which of course I don't
expect him to have read my mind, were that he knew me, and he knew
Schine, and he certainly knew the people over in the Army and would
be in a good position to find out whether the application had been
treated on its merits.
Mr. Jenkins. But didn't you tell him when he said, "Well, why do
you come to me, I am not in the Army ?" didn't you say, "Why, General
Smith, you know everybody in the Pentagon, know all the senior
officers there, and you would know who to talk to." ?
Mr. Cohn. I certainly might have, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You don't deny saying that, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. No, I don't deny it.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, did you tell General Reber when
you talked to him on the 8th day of July that you were just talking to
him as Roy M. Cohn, an individual, or did you disassociate yourself
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1679
in any way from your official position as the representative of a United
States Senator?
You didn't, did you ?
Mr. CoHN. To tell him that I was disassociating myself? No.
]\Ir. Jenkins. You didn't tell him that you were just there as an
individual? You were there as a representative of a United States
Senator, weren't you, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir. He came to Senator McCarthy's office. Gen-
eral Reber, sir — I think perhaps this may be an important point here.
General Keber's job is the prooessin2: of applications just like this for
people on Capitol Hill. 1 don't think any of us knew General Reber
or had ever heard of him. We asked who the man was who did
handle these applications. That turned out to be General Reber. He
stopped over to Senator McCarthy's otlice, as I suppose every day in
the week he or his successor stops in the offices of the other Senators
in the building, and was talking to Senator McCarthy about this. I
think I came in at the tail end of the conversation. I did not say, "I
am hereby disassociating myself from"
Mr. Jenkins. In other words, General Reber was talking to a
United States Senator ?
Mr. CoHN. Oh, yes.
Mr. Jenkins. As such.
Mr. CoHN. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. The chairman of the McCarthy investigating com-
mittee.
Mr. Cohn. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. And was talking to his chief counsel as such.
Mr. CoHN. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. That is the capacity, Mr. Cohn, in which you went to
see Walter Bedell Smith, too ; isn't it ?
Mr. CoHN. That is a little more difficult to say, sir. I knew Gen-
eral Smith personally. I did not know General Reber personally.
Mr. Jenkins. When you went to him, you didn't say, "Now, General
Reber, forget the fact that I am chief counsel for the McCarthy inves-
tigating committee," did you ?
Mr. CoHN. I didn't tell him to forget it or to remember it, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he think, "Here is the duly accredited representa-
tive of a United States Senator asking me, a member of the State
Department, to use my influence with the Pentagon to get a commis-
sion for Dave Schine" ?
INIr. CoiiN. I am sorry. I thought you were talking about General
Reber.
Mr. Jenkins. I am talking about Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.
Mr. CoHN. I am sorry, sir.
I had a very long talk with General Smith, not only about this
but about a lot of other personal and other things, and a very
pleasant talk. I have a very high respect for him. I talked to him
as I always do, I hope, as though I am talking to a man for whom
I have a good deal of respect.
INIr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you went back to see General Smith on the
following day ; did you not ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir. I saw General Smith only once. I talked with
him only once to ask him to see wliether this application had been
treated on the merits.
1680 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION |
Mr. Jenkins. Did you not talk to him on the telephone at a later
date ?
Mr. CoHN. No. As I recall it, I talked to him one day, and I started
telling him the story over the telejjlione, and he said, "Come around
tomorrow morning," or something like that, and I dropped around to
his office the next morning and I talked to him. I believe I talked
to him on the phone once, at which the a])pointment in his office was
arrnnged. I saw him once in his office. I believe that that was that.
Mr. Jenkins. That is the first, last, and only time you ever talked
to General B.^dell Smith about a commission or any dispensations for
Dave Schine? Is that Avhat you are saying?
Mr. CoHN. I believe it is, sir. That is his recollection, according
to his statement here, and that is mine. I don't recall any other
conversation.
Mr. Jenkins. ]\Ir. Colin, I believe that there was a breakfast held
on September 16 in the Schine apartment in New York City, was
there ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Who attended that breakfast?
Mr. CoHN. Senator McCarthy, Secretary Stevens, myself, Dave
Schine. Secretary Stevens asked to meet Dave Schine's mother.
He did not know her. And she came in to meet Secretary Stevens
and staj^ed a few minutes and talked with him.
Mr. Jenkins. Where was that meeting held?
Mr. CoHN. He had seen her picture in the living room, or some-
thing, and asked to meet her.
Mr. Jenkins. Where was that meeting held, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHX. That meeting was held — it was a breakfast at the apart-
ment of Mr. and Mrs. Schine.
Mr. Jenkins. That is Dave's father and mother?
Mr. CoHX. Dave's father and mother.
Mr. Jenkins. Is that at the Waldorf Towers in New York City?
JMr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. elENKiNS. Had you spent the night there?
Mr. Cohn. Had I spent the night there?
JMr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You were there for breakfast.
]\Ir. Cohn. I spent the night at my own home.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you and this boy, Dave Schine, as a matter
of fact, now, were almost constant companions, as good, warm per-
sonal friends are, weren't you? That is the truth about it?
Mr. Cohn. I am pleased to say, sir, the truth is that we were and are
good friends. He is one of my many good friends. I hope you will
not ask me to scale which one is a better friend. I have a lot of good
friends, and I like them and I respect them all.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not, Mr. Cohn, on that
occasion, September 16, in the Schine apartment. Senator McCarthy
asked the Secretary of the Army for the second time — no, for the
first time to the Secretary — being the Senator's second request, and
the first to the Secretary, for a commission for G. David Schine?
Mr. Cohn. He did not.
Mr. Jenkins. He did not?
Mr. Cohn. He did not.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1681
Mr. Jenktxs. Mr. Colin, I want to read you what the Secretary says
about it, page 201):
Secretary Stevens. Yes, my recollection is that Senator McCarthy on this^
Perhaps I had better read back one question.
My recollection is that Senator McCarthy on this occasion asked me for a
(■(iiiunissioii for Uav!«.l Scliuio. Since I was familiar with the fact that the
:iItl)lic'ation for a coimuission for David Schine had been turned down some weeivs
luevionsly, I moved away from that subject as rapidly as I could.
Question :
Did you know at that time that a previous application on the part of Schine
for a commission liad been denied by the Army?
Secretary Stevens. Yes, I did.
Question :
Did you know on information that overtures had been made to various peciple,
including General Reber, General Smith, and perhaps others, by members of the
McCarthy Committee for a commission for G. David Schine?
Answer :
I knew about the cases referring to General Reber and General Smith,
yes, sir.
We are talking about this breakfast on September 16 in New York
City, and you lieard what the Secretary said about that, Mr. Colm?
Mr. CoHN. I heard everything he said about that, sir.
Mr. Jenklns. You heard him testify and you have read his tes-
timony?
Mr. CoHN. I heard him.
Mr. Jenkixs. Do you say that on that occasion Senator McCarthy
did not request of the Secretary a commission for Schine ?
Mr. CoHN. I do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What was said on that occasion ?
Mr. CoHN. And I might say, sir, if I might explain that answer
or amplify it, Mr. Stevens' further testimony said, I believe, and I
hope Mr. Welch will correct me if I am wrong, that he was very hazy
about the whole thing, w\as not sure whether anything was said about
a commission on that occasion, and left the thing very much up in the
air, I think I can help, because I do have a clear recollection, and I
know that on that occasion and on no other occasion in my presence
did Senator McCarthy ask Mr. Stevens for a direct commission for
David Schine.
Mr. Jenkins. Was David Schine there that morning ?
Mr. CoHX. He was.
Mr. Jexkins. Mr. Cohn, was there any discussion whatever on that
occasion
Mr. CoHN. There was.
Mr. Jexkixs. By either you or Senator McCartiiy with respect to
any special dispensation or assignment for David Schine?
Mr. CoHN. There was not any discussion concerning any special
favor or dispensation for David Schine.
Mr. Jexkixs. You heard the Secretary say that at least on one
occasion the Senator from Wisconsin asked him for a commission for
Dave Schine. You heard that, didn't you, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHx. I did.
Mr. Jex'kins. I am inclined to agree with you that he said he was
not definitely sure that it was on September 16 in New York City.
1682 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHK. He said he was hazy about the September 16-
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did you at any time ever hear-
Mr. Cohn. Excuse me. The answer to that is no, sir. I have the
record, page 212, on this incident. [Reading:]
Mr. Jenkins. Is your mind clear on that, or is it hazy?
Secretary Stevens. It is not clear.
Mr. Jenkins. You say your mind is clear on it ?
Mr. CoiiN. My mind is not hazy on that occasion^ sir; no.
Mr. Jenkins. If the Secretary gives it as his best recollection that
such a thing did occur on September 16, you say the Secretary is in
error ?
Mr. Cohn. I say he has made an error, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you talk, Mr. Cohn, to Secretary Stevens on
October 2 ?
Mr. CoiiN. I did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. In New York City?
Mr. Cohn. I did, sir. I am sorry. Did you say New York City ?
]\fr. Jenkins. Did you talk to the Secretary anywhere then?
Mr. Cohn. Yes. It was in Washington in Mr. Stevens' office. I
am sorry, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not Mr. Frank Carr was
present on that occasion.
Mr. Cohn. He was present throughout.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you, Mr. Cohn, whether or not on October
2 you, in the presence of Mr. Carr, asked the Secretary of the Army
for a special assignment for G. David Schine.
Mr. Cohn. I did not.
Mr. Jenkins. You did not?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Noav I Avant to read you what the Secretary of the
Army swore about that, Mr. Cohn. We are talking about the second
day of October 1953. [Reading :]
Mr. Cohn told nie about the forthcoming investigation at Monmouth. He said
that General I-awton, the commanding general at the Fort Monmouth installa-
tion, had taken some action which made it difficult for the staflf of Senator
McCarthy's committee to get the information they wanted by talking with people
they wanted to talk to at Fort Monmouth, and he said it was impairing their
ability to do the job. I said well. I wanted to cooperate with the committee to
the very limit of my ability and in their presence then and there I called Gen-
eral Lawton on the telephone.
Mr. Jenkins. What did you say to General Lawton then and there
m the presence of Mr. Cohn and Mr. Carr?
Mr. Jenkins. What did you say to General Lawton then and there in the
presence of Mr. Cohn and Mr. Carr?
Answer :
I told General Lawton I wanted full cooperation by him and the members of
his staff, that he was to make available those people at his installation that the
properly accredited representatives of Senator McCarthy's committee wanted
to interview.
You heard the Secretary testify to that?
Mr. Cohn. I heard that testimony, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did that occur?
Mr. Cohn. That occurred, sir, with this qualification : As I testi-
fied yesterday on direct examination, Mr. Jenkins, we took up with
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1683
Mr. Stevens, the fact that General Lawton did not know whether
lie could make personnel at his post available for interview by the
subcommittee stall' and asked that we obtain clearance for him to make
that possible from the I'entagon.
Mr. Carr and I brou<2,ht that up with Mr. Stevens, who said he
would call General Lawton ;ind say that from his standpoint, from
^Ir. Stevens' standpoint, he would encourage General Lawton to give
us complete coo{)eration.
Mr. Stevens placed the telephone call in our presence. Bear in
mind, sir, I could hear only what Mr. Stevens said and not what
General Lawton replied. Mr. Stevens told General Lawton to give
us complete cooperation, to make available to us any personnel out
at Fort Monmouth we wanted to interview. We had explained to
]N[r. Stevens that this was a universal policy of all Government agen-
cies and that certainly the Army would want to follow it.
He told that to General Lawton, complete cooperation, "Let them
interview anyone they want at your post."
Then there was a long silence on Mr, Stevens' end of the phone while
General Lawton was apparently saying something, which 1 assumed
to be his interpretation of Mr. Stevens' direction. When General
Lawton was finished talking, Mr. Stevens said, "Xo, no, I didn't mean
that. Don't give them that," something like that. Mr. Carr and I
looked at each other, much as to say that is where it was taken away.
That is what I recall of that conversation. I don't know what
General Lawton asked Secretary Stevens if he could show us and
what Secretary Stevens referred to when he said "No, not that, I
didn't mean that, don't show them that." Wliatever those words
were.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I want to read you further from the Secre-
tary's testimony with respect to this October 2 meeting:
Secretary Stevens. Mr. Cohn brought up the matter of G. David Schine and
wanted to know if he couldn't be assisned to New York City.
That is the occasion when the Secretary called General Lawton,
isn't it ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And told him to cooperate?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And the Secretary says here positively and under
oath that on that occasion, and in the presence of Mr. Frank Carr,
you brought up, and on October 2, approximately 1 month before
this boy was inducted into the Army, you brought up the subject of
David Schine and wanted to know if he couldn't be assierned to New
York City. Did you, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I can't answer that until you go back and let me
tell you about the first, or prior conversations which I had with Mr.
Stevens on the subject of Dave Schine.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you mean back on the same date, October 22?
Mr. Cohn, No, sir. Conversations which were held on September 16,
and two specific ones, September 16 and September 2L
Mr, Jenkins, The September 16 meeting being in the Schine
apartment ?
Mr. CoiiN. That is right, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. Do I understand that you talked to the Secretary
about David Schine on that occasion ?
1684 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. That is true, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, just answer the question which I have
asked you now and then you are certainly entitled to go back and
explain it. My question now is, Did you on October 2, in the presence
of Frank Carr, say to the Secretary of the Army in substance that
you wanted Dave Schine assigned to New York City, or wanted to
know if it was possible to get him assigned to New York?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir, that was not the discussion that was held on that
day.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, I am reading you his testimony again:
Mr. Cohn In-ouaht up the matter of G. David Schine and wanted to know if
he couldn't be assigned to New York City.
Mr. CoHN. Schine was discussed. That is not what was said in
the course of the discussion.
Mr. Jenkins. But he was discussed. And I read further:
IVIr. Jenkins. Why did he say he wanted him assigned to New York City?
Secretary Stevens. Well, he said there was a lot of committee work that had
to be attended to, and he was sure there wei-e various assignments around
New York City that the Army could assign David Schine to.
Did you say that, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir; that was not the substance of that conversation.
Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt, ]\Ir. Jenkins? Might I
suggest that you have Mr. Cohn tell just exactly what conversation
there was with regard to the assignment to the New York area ?
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you are entitled to explain. You say that
was not the substance of the conversation?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir. Mr. Jenkins, anything you want, I will give
you the answers.
Mr. Jenkins. What was the substance of the conversation?
Mr. Corn. The substance of the conversation on that day, as I recall
it, was this: Mr. Stevens stated that Schine was going to take basic
training, like everybody else, that right after basic training Mr. Stevens
had planned out an assignment for Schine whereby Schine was going
to be in attendance as an observer at various intelligence schools of the
Army for the purpose of reviewing text books and other matters and
report directly to Mr. Stevens on that subject. This discussion followed
a talk with Mr. Stevens on that occasion in which Mr. Stevens told us
that he had been greatly disturbed by the General Partridge testimony
over the use of Communist, pro-Communist literature and Communist
indoctrination literature by Army intelligence, and in the schools.
Mr. Stevens also told us that a day or two before October 2, he had,
he, Mr. Stevens, had had a long talk with a major, whose name he
had gotten from us, I believe, teaching at an Army intelligence school.
1 believe out at Holabird, Md. That from the outline the major gave
him as to the type of literature they were using, from the Partridge
situation and other reports which he had gotten, he, the Secretary,
was very much disturbed about the whole situation and that he was
looking forvrard to using Schine to his great advantage in going over
these text materials, and going to the schools, and reporting to Mr.
Stevens.
I believe, sir, and I have no clear recollection but it is perfectly
possible or probable, that I asked Mr. Stevens at the point ii, during
the basic training, wherever that was, some arrangement could be made
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1685
for staff members to contact Mr. Schiiie in case of an emergency or in
case there was something wliich we might need from him. That, to
the best of my recollection, is the substance of what occurred on that
occasion. And there were some prior discussions with Mr. Stevens
about the Schine assignment which we have not covered. If you want
to, I will. If you don't
Mr. Jenkins. On October 2, you did suggest to him that there miglit
be occasions when you would want to consult with Mr. Schine about
committee work?
Mr. CoHN. That is perfectly possible, sir, and I do not deny it.
Mr. Jenkins. So, Mr. Colin, that makes some 8 or 10 times, up to
that time, October 2, that you had talked to somebody in the Pentagon
about David Schine being made available to you, doesn't it? Or about
a commission for him?
Mr. CoHN. About a commission or about being made available
Mv. Jenkins. Five or six times with General Reber?
Mr. CoHN. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. At least once with General Smith.
Mr. CoHN. Sure. More than that, sir, I think there were discussions
with Mr. Stevens on September 16.
Mr. Jenkins. About Schine?
]Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. And on September 21.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you want to explain the September 16 discussion?
Mr. CoHN. Whatever you say, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. But up to October 2, now, you had had
some 8 or 10 discussions with either the Secretary on Mr. Adams about
Schine ; had you not ?
Mr. CoHN. I don't believe I had ever talked with Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. Up to that time ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir. I believe I met Mr. Adams very briefly on Sep-
tember 28. I did not discuss Schine with him and he did not discuss
Schine with me.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Jenkins, I very much dislike interrupting
you, you do such an excellent job of cross-examination, but I do think
in view of the fact that so much has been made of the Schine situation
that the witness should be asked to tell about the other two meetings
in which Schine was discussed. I notice he was not asked to give the
information on those two meetings.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, the Senator will have ample oppor-
tunity to examine and cross-examine this witness. I am trying to get
along. I know the committee wants to get along.
Mr. Cohn, you heard the Secretary or Mr. Adams or both say that
the McCarthy committee, Senator McCarthy, and you or both, indi-
cated to them, as early as October 13, that you w^ere ready to discon-
tinue your Fort IMonmouth investigation and turn it back to the Army.
Do you recall that testimony ?
Mr. Cohn. I do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not it isn't a fact that at
that time, that is, on October 13, something was said to the Secretary
about our readiness to turn it over to him, together with your informa-
tion that was available, and let the army proceed with it? Did that
occur 2
1686 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION"
Mr, CoiiN. No, sir. What occurred was this: The Secretary or
somebody — I remember the term "Is the investigation going to go on
forever ?" And Senator McCarthy said :
No, it will not go on forever. There will be a time when we will step out and
turn it over and you will have it all to yourselves. When that time comes will
depend in a .great measure on the job of housecleaning which you people do.
I remember the Senator went into quite a detailed discussion about
the Government Printing Office investigation, and told how that
started out, could have taken much longer than it did, but was short-
ened by the complete, 100 percent, not lip-service, but actual coopera-
tion which we received from ]\fr. Blattenberger, the head of the Gov-
ernment Printing Office.
Mr. Jenkins. So you say that when the Secretary of the Army
testified here under oath that an indication or a statement was given
to him on October 13 that you were going to turn it back over to him,
that he is incorrect about that ?
Mr. CoHN. I would sa}', sir, he is incorrect in the time element.
There was certainly no doubt that it was made clear to him that the
investigation was not going to go on forever. I do say, sir, that he
mistaken in entertaining the hope, on that occasion, that the bowing
out of this subcommittee from Communist infiltration at Monmouth
or in the Army was an imminent matter, and I think, sir, that the
newspaper clij:)pings which I put into evidence yesterday, plus the
Senator's refusal to issue that press release saying he was going to
turn it back, on October 19, could have left no doubt in Mr. Stevens'
mind that the Senator was not going to turn it back at that point.
Mr. Jenkins. Mv. Cohn, wasn't it as a result of statements made
by you and/or Senator JMcCarthy to the Secretary and Mr. Adams
on October 13 and 14 that Mr. Adams prepared this proposed press
release on the 19th day of October?
Mr. ConN. I don't know why he prepared it. sir. I do know that
nothing was said to him on the 13tli of October, particularly, sir,
when you take into account the two events on the 14th of October,
namely the stripping of the files and the Senator's displeasure which
Avas conveyed to ISIr. Adams on that, and General Lawton's testimony,
that it was only when we came in that they started doing something,
which made it pretty clear that if we went out they would stop doing
anything, the Senator discussed those matters with ISIr. Adams, and
I am sure, sir, that on October 19, Mr. Adams, while he was welcome
to try, could have had no sound reason for believing that the Senator
was about to bow out of these investigations,
Mr. Jenkins. Now, you made a trip to Monmouth on the 20th day
of October, Mr. Cohn, did you not?
Mv. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. That has been rather fully described here and you
have heard that testimony, haven't you ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir,
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, when you were denied admission to a sen-
sitive laboratory, you became highly incensed. Now, that is the truth
about it, isn't it ?
Mr. Cohn. That is the truth, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And on that occasion, you said, "This is a declaration
of war," didn't you ?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1687
INIr. Coiix. I don't recall the exact words I used, sir. I don't re-
call saying that. I can give you the substance of what happened and
the substance of what I said, if you care to have nie do it.
Mr. Jenkins. Let's just pinpoint is, Mr. Cohn, because the Secre-
tary of the Army was there
Mr. CoiiN. Yes ; he was there.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say he was wanting you to discontinue your
investigation of Fort Monmouth and of the Army.
]\Ir. CoHN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. That is right?
Mr. CoHN. Sure.
Mr. Jenkins. And Mr. Adams was there?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Colonel BeLieu was there, the Secretary's aide?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Lieutenant Corr was there?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Many others were there, some 20 or 25 people, in-
cluding a United States Senator and a Congressman?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir ; there was a whole train of cars.
Mr. Jenkins. And Senator Dirksen had his representative there?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Senator Potter had his representative there ?
Mr. CoHN. Both Senator Dirksen and Senator Potter were ably
represented there.
Mr. Jenkins. Many high-ranking officials, both of the Army and
of civilian life. That is right, isn't it, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. It is right, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You were there, you might say, almost in the robes of
a United States Senator, being chief counsel.
Mr. CoHN. Nothing would entitle me to that high designation, sir,
and I don't think, if I may say so, it is an accurate description.
Mr. Jenkins. I am reading to you from page 3554 the testimony of
this young man BeLieu, quoting Roy M. Cohn :
This is it. This is war with the Army.
Did you say that, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I have no recollection of the words I used, and spe-
cifically to answer you, I do not remember using those words.
Further, Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Jenkins. You don't deny it ?
Mr. Cohn. Well, I come pretty close to denying it, sir, because I
talked to Mr. Rainville and Mr. Jones, who were with me throughout
that day, and they tell me they were angry as I was, and a lot of things
were said. They don't recall those particular words being said.
I will make no argument with you that I was angry, and if you want,
I can give you the substance of what happened and what I do recall
saying.
Mr. Jenkins. You were highly incensed, weren't you ?
Mr. Cohn. I was, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And threats are usually made by people when they
are angry, aren't they ? That is the time when threats are made.j
Mr. CoHNi Certainly one of the times.
i
1G88 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. Certainly one of the times, and that is usually when
a threat of violence is made.
Mr. CoHN. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. That is right, isn't it ?
Mr. CoHN. Sure.
Mr. Jenkins. For all you know, in that fit of anger, you say here
now under oath that as far as you know you neither admit nor deny
that you said, ''This is war with the x\rmy" ?
Mr. CoiiN. Sir, I go a little further than that. I remember the
substance of some of the things I said. I do not remember using those
words and saying that. I have heard or heard read into the record
here versions of what I did say, by three Army witnesses, each one of
whom had a different version of what I said. I have talked with Mr.
Kainville and Mr. Jones, and they say I did not say those words. All
I can do is tell you I was angry, give you the substance of some of the
things which I did say, and tell j-ou what happened on that occasion.
I cannot tell you, sir, the exact words which I used, and I don't believe
anybody else can tell you the exact words which I used.
iklr. Jenkins. You heard Colonel BeLieu testify ?
Mr. CoHN. I did ; yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I read further from his testimony, Mr. Cohn, the
same page of the transcript, quoting you, quoting Mr. Cohn :
I don't understand why you let Communists work in here and you won't let
me in.
Did you say that?
Mv. CoiiN. That sounds a lot more like Roy Cohn than the previous
one.
Mr. Jenkins. That declaration of war, you mean, doesn't sound like
Roy Cohn when he is mad?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. What I say when I am mad is to say they let
Communists in here and don't let us in.
Mr, Jenkins. Quoting further, let's see if this sounds like you :
I have been cleared for classified information.
Mv. Cohn. That sounds like me, and that was the fact.
Mr. Jenkins. Had you been cleared for classified information, Mr.
Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. Not only that, sir, but I had a specific secret clearance
from the Defense Department.
Mr. Jenkins. "I have access to FBI files when I want them." Did
you say that?
Mr. Cohn. Colonel BeLieu is a little bit mistaken in the terminol-
ogy, sir, and I would like
I\Ir. Jenkins. What, then, was the terminology about the FBI files?
Mr. Cohn. I don't recall the exact statement. I can tell you this,
Mr. Jenkins: I did not say that I currently had access to FBI files or
that I could see them whenever I wanted to.
Mr. Jenkins. Neither did Colonel BeLieu say that, Mr. Cohn. Here
are his words
Mr. Cohn. What did he say?
Mr. Jenkins. "I have access to FBI files when I want them." Did
you say that?
^Ir. CoiiN. I did not say "I have access to FBI files when I want
them."
h
?!1J
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1CS9
Mr. Jenkins. Then I ask you what you did say about the FBI
files.
Mr. CoHN. All ri^ht. This is important to me, and I hope 1 may
be ])ermitted on this 1 minute to explain.
Mr. Jenkins. Any time I cut you off, I don't mean to do it.
Mr. CoiiN. You do not cut me oil'.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. You call me down. What did you say
about the FBI files?
Mr. CoHN. I have no richt or reason to call you down, sir. I want
to answer every question. On this particular point it is important.
I did not say and I could not have said that "I have access to FBI
files," because, sir, since I have come with this committee, I have not
had access to FBI files, and I have never seen an FBI file. I would
like to make that very clear under oath, to end any statement by any-
body that I, while with this committee, have seen FBI files or have
had them. That is not true.
Before I came with the subcommittee, sir, I was with the Depart-
ment of Justice for a number of years, dealing with prosecutions of
Communists and subversives and spies. I did have access to FBI files.
I did use FBI files extensively.
Were it not for FBI files, we could not have obtained a single con-
viction.
If I referred to FBI files on that occasion, I would have said, "I
had access to FBI files," or "I have had access to FBI files," and
Colonel BeLieu by being wrong about two letters in one word 7 months
later might create an unfortunate impression.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did you on that occasion then say, do we
understand your version to be this, that you put it in the past tense
and said, "I have had access to FBI files"?
Mr. CoHN. I say, sir, it is possible that I said, "I had access to FBI
files." I say it is impossible that I said, "I have access to FBI files,"
because that would not have been a true statement.
Mr. Jenkins. I read you further, quoting you :
You are doing this just to embarrass me. We will investigate the heck out
of you.
Did you say that, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. I don't recall those words, sir,
Mr. Jenkins, You don't deny it ; do you ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, again I can come pretty close to denying that that is
the type thing I said, because I talked to Bob Jones and Harold Kain-
ville, who were with me throughout, and they say I did not say those
things.
Mr. Jenkins. Did they claim to have heard all you said, Mr. Cohn?
Mr, Cohn, They say, sir — and it is my recollection, too — that they
were with me throughout. I was not the only one excluded. They
were excluded along with me.
Mr, Jenkins. They were angry, too ?
Mr. Cohn. They were angry, too ; yes, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. Now the question is, you heard this young man Be-
Lieu testify ?
Mr. Cohn, I did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You know nothing against his character?
Mr. Cohn. I not only know nothing — I am sure there is nothing and
I am sure he was doing, sir
1690 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. He was in the war and had a lot of battle stars on
him.
Mr. CoiiN. I admire him highly and I am sure he was doing his very
best to give his recollection of the exact words that were uttered 7
months ago. I believe some of them are probably right. I believe
some of them are probably a little bit wrong. I have no quarrel with
him about the substance of what happened or the fact that I was angry
or the fact that in spite of the poiiit that they got us up there and
wasted a day for us, they wouldn't let us in the place which we were
supposed to see, ancl I undoubtedly said that they let Communists in
and kept us out, and I can tell you why I know I said that, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, in short and in truth, there on that occasion
in the presence of high-ranking otficers of the Army, including the
highest rankiiig one, the Chief, the Secretary, and in the presence of
high-ranking civilians you declared war on the Army; didn't you?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You did not?
Mr. Cohn. No ; I did not.
Mr. Jenkins. Didn't you say, "This is war; this is it"?
Mr. Cohn. I don't remember saying that.
Mr. Jenkins. You don't remember saying that?
Mr. Cohn. No.
Mr. Jenkins. If these high type men whom you have described,
including the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Adams as civilians, and
this colonel and this captain or others, lieutenants, there say that
Roy M. Cohn said, "This is it, this is war, we will investigate the
heck out of the Army," or "investigate the Army from now on out,"
you don't deny it, do you ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. You see, the Secretary, as I heard his testi-
mony, did not say that I said any of those things. Various other
witnesses say that I said diflerent things, used different words, dif-
ferent terminology, different phrases, different thoughts, different
ideas. I talked to Mr. Rainville and Mr. Jones to see if they could
remember exactly what was said. They can't remember exactly what
was said, but what it appears we can all agree on is that I was angry,
as they were, because we had been invited up there to do some work
that might be useful to us, we had the door slammed in our face
for what seemed to be no good reason and we had wasted a day. I
undoubtedly, when the door was slammed in our face, said I was
angry and made statements to the effect that they let Communists
in and they keep us out, and I do know I did make that particular
statement because I remember repeating it in a very humorous vein
at the luncheon whicii followed later on.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, isn't it the truth that further on that oc-
casion in this fit of anger you demanded that somebody get an auto-
mobile and take you away from there and take you to New York?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. I made no demands for an automobile.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you make a request or a suggestion ?
Mr. CoiiN. No. What I said was this, sir: I said, "What is the
point of us hanging around here? AYe are just wasting our time.
They invite us up here and then shut the door and we are standing
out on the grass. I might as well be back in Washington or New
York doing some work."
SPKCIAL INVESTIGATION 1691
If that is interpreted as a request for an antoniobilc to make possible
the thoii<;ht which 1 had ex])ressed
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did you ever, whatever you said on tliat
occasion to the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Adams, anybody else — did
you ever at any time that day or at a later date apoloj^ize to tlie
Secretary of the Army for Avhat you said i
Mr. CoiiN. I never said anythin<]^ in a fit of ano:er to Secretary
Stevens on tliat or any other occasion, sir. I am sure if an apolo<!;y
were called for I would have ten.dered one. I never said anythin<ij
derogatory concerning any of these otlier people mentioned on that
day. It was a very simple incident which was one of a few incidents
I would be glad to tell you about which occurred on that day which
added up to the fact that the whole trip was a little bit ridiculous
and we were wasting a lot of time and we were angry and would
like to get back some place and do some work.
Mr. Jenkins. But whatever was said, and I don't know what the
committee is going to find out what was said on that occasion, you
say you were angry ?
]\lr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And do I understand you to say you don't remember
all you said ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't have the remotest idea of all I said.
Mr. Jenkins. You don't have the remotest idea of what you said?
My. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Xow, for whatever it might have been, Mr. Cohn,
did you at that time or any subsequent time, ever offer ai:)ology to
this high-ranking man, the highest ranking man in the United States
Army, Secretary Stevens, did you ever do it or not ?
Mr. Cohn. No. And if I might explain that answer
Mr. Jenkins. You may. The answer is "No," and now you can
give any explanation you desire.
Mr. Cohn. Thank you, sir. I don't think there was any occasion
for it. I had said nothing. I had not displayed my anger, so to
speak, in front of Mr. Stevens in any way. I had said nothing to
him on that occasion or any other occasion which would cause me
to apologize to him, sir. I regarded Mr. Stevens as a fine, gentle-
manly, courteous person.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you still so regard him, Mr. Cohn, as a fine, gen-
tlemanly, courteous person ? Do you still so regard him ?
Mr. Cohn. If we go back to the day prior to these hearings, sir
Senator McCarthy. Do you want to take the fifth amendment on
that?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. I would say this, I regard J\Ir. Stevens as a
gentlemanly i:)erson, and as a courteous person, yes, sir. I never in
my contacts or discussions with him — he always treated me very po-
litely, very fine, and I can say nothing more than that. There were
no heated discussions or any other kind of untoward incidents on
any occasion when I was together with Mr. Stevens, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you ever tell the Secretary that you didn't mean
what you said, that you were in a fit of anger when you said it?
Mr. Cohn. Well, I don't know how you interpret it.
Mr. Jenkins. You may answer that yes or no, Mr. Cohn. Did you
or not ?
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1692 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. Let me tell you what happened.
Mr. Jenkins. I know. I want you to answer it. Did you ever tell
hiiTi, "Mr. Secretary, I was mad, I was anj^ry, I was incensed"?
]Mr. CoiiN. I led all of those present to believe a little while later
that the incident was completely forj^otten about, by tryinjy to make
what might have been a poor joke about it, and if I might tell you
that, sir
Mr. Jenkins. Yon are entitled to explain.
IVfr. C'oiiN. The first thing, I might say this, IMr. Jenkins, to eX'
plain it fully, the first thing that happened when we got out there
on this trip, where we hoped to get a little work done, was we get
up to one building and this was not tlie seco]id building, this was
the first one, and there was a great deal made about a big secrecy [[^
thing, and we were seeing something tliat nobody ever looked at
before in the history of mankind and all of that. One of the offi-
cers, I don't remember who it was, came up to me and whispered to
me, "This is really a big deal, they are really showing you something.
They had a party of the Russian military mission which came through
and they showed them exactly the same thing."
I passed that along to Senator McCarthy and Senator McCarthy
asked out loud in front of everybody and said, "This is very interest-
ing, but how secret is it? Isn't it a fact that a Russian military mis-
sion was shown this same stuff ?"
There was a little discussion back and forth between some of the
Army people there, and I believe it finally developed that a cou])le
of years before, or sometime prior to that, a Russian, a Soviet, military
mission had been cleared by the Slate Department and sent up to
Fort IVIonmouth for a visit, and had been taken through that area and
shown these things. We next went on to the second building where
]\Ir. Rainville, Mr. Jones, and I were told we could not come in be-
cause— I was told I couldn't come in because I didn't have cleaiance.
1 said I did have clearance and they said, "Well, you can't come in
anyway because we don't know that you have clearance."
I couldn't do much more than tell them that I had clearance, Mr.
Jenkins. They kept us out and the three of us were — we thought it
w^as a pretty ridiculous thing, to get us all the way up there if they
weren't going to let us in, they could have made up their minds on
that before they called us up there. We then went to lunch, ]\Ir.
Jenkins, and during the lunch, I was sitting at one end of the table
and Mr. Stevens was at the head of the table with Senator McCarthy.
A discussion came up about Aaron Coleman. Mr. Stevens, Senator
McCarthy, and Senator Smith of New Jersey, and a couple of others
were discussing the Coleman case, and all of a sudden, a colonel, a
full colonel, I believe, I don't remember whether it was a full colonel,
a "chicken" colonel, all of a sudden jumped up and held up his hand
and ordered Mr. Stevens to be quiet. That surprised everybody.
Everybody looked at the colonel who just told the Secretary to keep
quiet. And Mr. Stevens looked at the colonel. The colonel said, "Mr.
Stevens, you are discussing a case which is confidential and you have
no authority to discuss that case."
Mr. Adams then whipped out a little black book which he had in
his pocket and took the name of the colonel and made some comment
that the colonel would not be in that vicinity for a very long period of
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1693
ime. I understand lie has not been. The whole thin^^, sir, that whole
!;i V, Avas tilled with a bunch of ridiculous incidents. At the end of it,
\v. Stevens got up and delivered a little talk, a very line talk, in which
e covered a number of events about the investigation and the situa-
ion at IVIonmouth and morale, and said that he certainly hoped that
\oy Colin and Harold Eainville and Bob Jones and whoever else
light have been the object of this exclusion, would understand tiuit
he decision was made as best he could make it, and so on and so forth,
t was a very fine, very gracious speech. Then we went around the
able and everybody at the table got up and said something. When
t came around to me, I got up and as I recall, I expressed my pleasure
0 everyone present for their courtesy, and everything else, and tried
o make some generally pleasant remarks, and said as far as the inci-
lent to which Mr. Stevens referred, that was all forgotten about on
air part, and that the only hope Mr. Eainville, Mr. Jones, and I had
ras that by the time the investigation was over, people who worked
or the United States Senate would be able to get in the laboratory,
nd that the Communists would not be able to get into the laboratory.
That concluded that. I came across a little newspaper account which
eported that incident in a somewhat humorous vein 2 or 3 days later.
Chat is the way I recall the thing, ]Mr. Jenkins.
Senator Muxdt. Before adjourning, the Chair would like to an-
lounce that the senior ranking Democratic member. Senator McClel-
an, is necessarily absent this morning, and this afternoon.
We will now recess for the purpose of the special session and will
neet promptly at 2 o'clock this afternoon.
(Whereupon, the committee recessed at 12: 13 p. m. to reconvene at
J p. m. the same day.)
INDEX
Page
Adams, John G 10.-6 1664, 1685-1 6S7, 1G00-16<J2
Aibaiiy, N. Y 1062
Army (Uuited States) 1659-1604, IGOG, 1070, 1071, 1073-1071), IGSl, 1683-1691
Army Intelligence (G-2) 1659,1684
Army Intelli.ueuee School 1084
Army loyalty-to-the-United States form 1001
Army officer 1662
Arn)y Transport Service 1606
Atomic bomb 1071
"Baker East" (interim report) 1072
"Baker West" (interim report) 1072
BeLieu, Colonel 1687-1689
Blattenberger, Mr 1686
Boston, Mass 1056
Camp Kilmer 1059
Capitol Hill 1656, 1675, 1676, 1679
Capitol Police 1056
Carr, Francis P 1050, 1057, 1660-1004, 1072, 1073, 1682, 1084
Cobn, Boy M., testimony of 1656-1693
Coleman, Aaron 1692
Communist defense funds 1661
Communist infiltration at Monmouth 1686
Communist infiltration in the United Nations 1671
Communist leadership sdiool 1659
Communist literature 1684
Communist Party 1657, 1659-1661, 1667, 1071, 1084, 1080, 1088, 1689
Communists 1657, 1659-1661, 1667, 1671, 1084, 1086, 1688, 1689
Curr, Lieutenant 1687
Counselor to the Army 1656-1664, 1685-1687, 1690-1692
Daily Worker 1659
Department of the Army__ 1659-1664, 1666, 1670, 1671, 1673-1679, 1681, 1683-1691
Department of Defense 1688
Department of Justice 1689
Department of State 1677, 1679, 1692
Dirksen, Senator 1687
Far East 1659
FBI files 1688, 1689
FBI report 1661
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 16i!1, 1671, 1672, 1688, 1689
Fifth-amendment Communist 1659-1661
Fort Dix 1672, 1673
Fort Monmouth 1673, 1082, 10S3, 1685-1687, 1692, 1693
Fort Monmouth laboratory 1693
Four-F (Army classification) 1666
G-2 (Army Intelligence) 1659,1684
Government intelligence agency 1671
Government Printing Ofiice 1671, 1686
Hensel, H. Struve 1657
Hiss, Alger 1662
Holabird, Md 1684
Hydrogen bomb 1671
Information agency (interim report) 1672,1673
Inslerman, Felix 1662
Jones, Bob 1087-1090, 1092, 1693
Juliana, Jim . 1673
II INDEX
Page
Justice Department 1089
Lawton, General 1GS2, 10S3, lOSG
McCarthy, Senator Joe 1650, Kl.-)?,
1059-1068, 1670-1075, 1077, 1679-1082, 1085, 1086, 1691, ]0i)2
McClellan, Senator Ki'.tS
Mimdt, Senator 1056
New York City 1659-1661, 1664, 1065, 1009, 1680, 1681,1683, 1084, 10!)0
New York City Police Department 1059, 1001
Partridge, General 1084
Pentagon 1078, 1079, 10S3, 1685
Peress, Maj. Irving 1058-1004
Police Department (New York City) 1059,1001
Potter, Senator 1087
President of the United States 1057
Pro-Communist literature 1084
Radar installations (Fort Monmouth) 1673,1093
Rainville, Harold 1087-1690, 10t)2, 1093
Reber, General 1074-1679, 1681, 1685
Reserve commission 1074
Russian military mission 1092
Schine, G. David 1658, 1664-1685
Schine Hotel Corp 1065
Secretary of the Army 1659, 1600, 1603, 1004, 1674, 1680-1687, 1690-1093
Senate Disbursing Office 1009
Senate of the United States 1057, 1693
Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell 1077-1681
Smith, Senator (New Jersey) 1692
State Department 1677, 1679, 1692
Stevens, Robert T 1659, 1663, 1664, 1069, 1674, 1680-1687, 1690-1693
UNESCO 1071
United Nations 1071
United Nations (Communist infiltration) 1071
United Nations (UNESCO) 1071
United States Army 1059-1604,1066,1670,1671,1673-1679,1681,1683-1691
United States Department of Defense 1088
United States Department of Justice 1089
United States Department of State 1677,1079,1092
United States Information Centers (interim report) 1072
United States President 1057
United States Senate 1057,1693
United States Senator 1679, 1687
Voice of America 1608, 1009, 1071-1073
Waldorf Towers (New York City) 1080
Washington, D. O 1056, 1609, 1082, 1090
Zwicker, General 1000, 1601, 1063
o
SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRE-
TARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR
JOE McCarthy, roy m. cohn, and
FRANCIS p. CARR
HEARING
BEFOUE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PUKSUANT TO
S. Res. 189
PART 45
MAY 28, 1954
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46630° WASHINGTON t 1954
Boston Public Library-
Superintendent of Documents
OCT 2 7 i354
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOSEPH R. McCarthy, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, Soutli Daljota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland THOMAS A. BURKE, Ohio
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan
Richard J. O'Melia, Oencral Counsel
Walter L. Reynolds, ChicJ Clerk
Special Subcommittee on Investigations
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota, Chairman
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
Ray H. Jenkins, Chief Counsel
Thomas R. Pkewitt, Assistant Counsel
Robert A. Collier, Assistant Counsel \
SoLis HoRwiTZ, Assistant Counsel
Charles A. Maner, Secretary
n
CONTENTS
Page
Index I
Testimony of —
Cohn, Roy M., chief counsel, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations 1G96
III
SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES AND
COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE
HENSEL AND SENATOR JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN,
AND FRANCIS P. CARR
FRIDAY, MAY 28, 1954
United States Senate,
Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Government Operations,
Washinffion, D. C.
after recess
(Tlie hearing was resumed at 2 : 20 p. ni., pursuant to recess.)
Present: Senator Karl E. Munclt, Republican, South Dakota, chair-
man; Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Eepublican, Illinois; Sen-
ator Charles E. Potter, Eepublican, Michigan; Senator Henry C.
Dworshak, Eepublican, Idaho; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat,
Washington ; and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.
Also present: Eay H. Jenkins, chief counsel to the subcommittee;
Thomas E. Prewitt, assistant counsel; Charles Maner, assistant coun-
sel.
Principal participants present: Senator Joseph E. McCarthy, a
United States Senator from the State ol Wisconsin; Eoy M. Cohn,
chief counsel to the subcommittee; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel
for the Army ; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army.
Senator Mundt. The committee "will come to order.
The Chair would like to start in by welcoming the guests who have
come here to the committee room this afternoon, and to call your
attention to a standing rule of the committee to the effect that there are
to be no manifestations of approval or disapproval audibly from the
audience at any time in any manner. May I say that the uniformed
officers that you see before you and the plainclothes men in the audi-
ence have standing instructions from the connnittee to escort from
the room politely by immediately, and without argument, any of our
guests who decide to violate the terms upon which he entered the room
through disrupting the hearings by audibly making manifestations
of approval or disapproval.
The Chair does not anticipate that we will have any difficulty with
this overflow audience this afternoon, because all previous audiences
have been magnificent, but he thinks that he should tell our guests
now of that firm rule of the. committee.
The Chair received one pleasant piece of information during the
lunch hour which he would like to read to make his colleagues and all
1G95
1G96 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION"
participants feel a little better. IMr. Fulton Lewis, Jr., called me
on the phone and said that the INIutual Broadcasting Co. had been
conducting a poll as to whether these hearings were in fact worth-
while or not. He said they had received 149,895 pieces of mail,
"Do you believe that the hearings have been a good thing for tlie
country?" "Yes," 115,930. "No," 33,965.
"Do you believe that the hearings should continue until all the facts
are on tlie record ?'_' "Yes," 104,474. "No," 42,000.
I thought on this weary Friday afternoon, my colleagues and all
participants might like to know that there are people who believe that
perhaps useful and valuable information is flowing out to the country
as a result of these hearings.
Counsel Jenkins, you were interrogating Air. Colin.
TESTIMONY OF ROY M. COHN— Resumed
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, by the way of a brief recapitulation, you
say that Mr. Schine came to the committee in early February 1953;
approximately at that time.
Mr. CoiiN. I think so, sir. The record will show the exact date,
and we can get that for you.
Mr. Jenkins. It was known by the staff that he would be an inductee
or draftee in early July?
Mr. CoiiN. He was eligible from July on, sir.
JMr. Jenkins. And at that time he had passed his physical ?
]\f r. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, from the time he came to the staff',
we will say early in the year, approximately the first of February, up
until the time he was inducted in the Army on November 3, he worked
on certain specific files, as we understand from your testimony this
morning.
Mr. Cf)HN. No, sir. There was no such thing as his working on files,
Mr. Jenkins. The way it would go was this : He would work on inves-
tigations, and we have hundreds and I suppose over a thousand files
dealing with various investigations of the subcommittee. He did not
as far as I know no specific work on the files as such.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. He worked on investigations with respect
to certain areas of inquiry. We will put it that way. For instance,
the Voice of America.
Mr. Cohn. There is no doubt about it.
Air. Jenkins. No doubt about that.
Air. Cohn. No, sir.
Air. Jenkins. Now specifically what other areas of investigation
were worked upon by Air. Schine?
Air. Cohn. I couldn't give you a completely accurate answer, Mr.
Jenkins. I can tell you he did a tremendous amount of work on the
Voice of America, the information agency •
Air. Jenkins. Let's pinpoint it as we go.
Air. Cohn. Sure.
Air. Jenktns. The Voice of America is No, 1.
Air. Cohn. Sure.
Air. Jenkins. No. 2 you would list as what ?
Air. Cohn. When I say Voice of America I had better clarify it
this way : I mean the United States Information Agency and its activi-
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1G97
ties. Tlie Voice of America is l)iit 1 of 5 subdivisions of the Infor-
mation Ageiicy. We investigated not only the Voice of America but
the other 4 subdivisions as well, and I am sure there are a large
number of files bearing upon the other 4 besides the Voice of America,
so \ve might call it the information program.
Mr. Jr.NKTNS. The information program?
Mr. CoHN. Right, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And that embraces five different areas of investi-
gation?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir, the Voice of America, the broadcasting part, the
International Pre?s Service, International Motion Picture Service,
the exchange program, and the Information Center program, I believe
are the five.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you have a file, Mr. Cohn, on each of the five
divisions?
Mr. Cohn. I am sure we don't, and, a.o:ain, 1 am just really guessing
about this. I am sure we don't have 5 files, 1 on each of these things.
We probably
Mr. Jenkins. Do vou have one file on it ?
Mr. Cohn. No. We in-obably have on that 50, 75, 100, 150 files
relating to the investigation of the information program and its 5
subdivisions. I think that there might be files on witnesses, files on
projects, things along those lines. There are undoubtedly a great
number of files on these matters.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, now, the general topic is the information pro-
gram, isn't it?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And that embraces at least five different areas of
investigation?
Mr. Cohn. It does, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And, Mr. Cohn, would you not have one general file
covering the information program ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't believe so, sir. I don't see hoAv that would be
possible.
Mr. Jenkins. Who does your filing down there in the office ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't know, sir. I assume that the girls do it under
the supervision of Frank Carr.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, when you want some information pertaining
to the information investigation, you ask someone to bring to you a
file on that subject, do you not ?
Mr. Cohn. Well, when I want information, sir, I will usually ask
Mr. Carr, Jim Juliana, one of the investigators, and they, I assume,
will go to the file or wherever else it might be, and give it to me.
Mr. Jenkins. They are members of the staff ?
Mv. Cohn. Yes, members of the staff.
Mr. Jenkins. And if you want a certain, definite, specific piece
of information, with respect to that particular subject, you usually
ask ]Mr. Carr or Mr. Juliana, or other members of your faculty?
Mr. Cohn. I think that is true. I might ask Frances Mims, or one
of the girls in the office. It depends on who is around and what
I want.
Mr. Jenkins. Then either Mrs. Frances Mims, or Mr. Juliana, or
Mr. Carr, would know in which files the particular data is that you
ask for, that is correct, isn't it ?
1G9S SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. Well, I assume somebody would be able to find it, sir.
Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt, Mr. Counsel?
It is not on the questioning and not on a point of order, but, Mr.
Chairman, I understand we are adjourninf^ this afternoon over the
weekend, and I think it would be unfair to pull any surprises on any-
body Tuesday morning. Therefore, I have a subpena here w^hich I
would like to have served today so that those involved can give the
matter some thought over tlie weekend. It is a subpena which I am
submitting to the Chair with a request that he sign it. It is directed
to the Department of the Army and Robert T. Stevens, the Secretary
of the Army, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.
If signed, it will order him to produce all files containing material
related to tlie Army charges of March 11, Fort INIonmouth, and to the
Irving Peress case, and to the proposed removal of J. B. Lawton from
command at Fort Monmout, N. J., and otherwise pertaining to un-
favorable action to General Lawton. I want to hand this to the
chairman and request that this be signed so that we may have this
material when we come back here Tuesday morning.
Mr. Jenkins. Shall I proceed, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Yes.
(Document handed to Chair)
Mr. Jenkins. Then, Mr. Cohn, if we should now ask for certain
data pertaining to this one general subject of investigation, you could
pull that out of the file, either yourself or through Mrs. Mims, Mr.
Juliana or Mr. Carr?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, if there are any documents you want, and direct
me to produce them, I
Mr. Jenkins. They will produce them ?
Mr. ConN. I will go downstairs, we will go to the files and wherever
else any of the papers or anything else you might want might be,
and we will be glad to give you what ever we have, sir. We will obey
the directions of the committee.
JNIr. Jenkins. Now, I want you now, Mr. Cohn, to tell the members
of the committee what other areas of investigation Mr. Schine directed
his activities to from the time he went with the committee until the
time of his induction into the Army.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. He worked on, I suppose, one way or another,
a good number of the committee's investigations, Mr. Jenkins. He
worked on various preliminary investigations of the committee, and
in particular he Avould
Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. Surely, sir.
Senator McCarthy. One of the newsmen has just called my atten-
tion to the fact that the subpena is directed to material concerning
J. P. Lawton. I know he has been referred to as Kirke. Can you
tell me whether it is J. B. ?
Mr. Cohn. It is Maj. Gen. K. B. Lawton.
Senator McCarthy. It is K. B. instead of J. B. ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Senator McCartjiy. K. B. Lawton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, Mr. Cohn, I am asking you to name all of the
general subjects upon which Mr. Schine worked in the time of his
induction — from the time he went with the staff until the date of his
induction.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1699
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. I would say that he worked on a good nuinl)er
of tlie committee's preliminary investigations, and, Mr. Jenkins, he
Avonld handle a number of informants for the committee.
In other words, he would be the contact man between the committee
and a number of witnesses or informants who were furnisliing infor-
mation to the committee on various matters which miglit or might
not result in investigations into preliminary investigations.
To give you a better picture, Mr. Jenkins, we get down in the com-
mittee, and Senator ^IcCarthy particularly gets up in his ollice, a
tremendous amount of mail, a tremendous amount of material fur-
nishing information, furnishing leads, suggesting that certain wit-
nesses be contacted. Peojilc are coming in every day in the week with
information. That is referred to various staff members, and some-
times it will result in something more, sometimes it will result in
nothing.
It is a very busy office. There is just a tremendous volume of
subjeets.
For instance, I am sure at the present time thei-e must be a hundred
or so — and I am guessing at the exact figure — preliminary investiga-
tions underway which various people are working on or have fur-
nished information about, a very broad area. It is very difficult for
me just to go down the list. I can name some for you if you care to
have me do that.
Mr. Jenkins. Among other things that Mr. Schine did was to dis-
cuss facts or interview or interrogate a number of witnesses, which I
believe you said this morning numbered into the hundreds?
Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt the very able counsel again ?
Senator Munut. Senator McCarthy ?
Senator McCarthy. A subpena was served upon me this noon. I
have been asked by half a dozen newsmen if we couldn't clarify just
wliat was in that subpena, whether it will be honored by rne, and what
will happen with regard to the material that is subpenaed.
In view of the fact that we are trying this before a rather large
jury, a jury of 20 or 30 million, I think maybe we should clarify that,
Mr. Jenkins, if we could.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. I haven't asked you about the production
of any files yet, Mr. Cohn. I am trying to find out the character
of the work Mr. Schine did, and we now understand, and we under-
stand from your testimony this morning, that, among other things
he did, was interviewing and interrogating witnesses.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir,
^Ir. Jenkins. Numbering into the hundreds, I believe you said.
Mr. Cohn. I believe that statement is an accurate one, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Is accurate?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And that in some instances he dictated memoranda
with respect to his interview «f those witnesses?
Mr. CoiiN. Well, I would say there were a couple of stages in that,
Mr. Jenkins. Undoubtedly, there were some memoranda. There
were other things which I call — you might have a different name for
it — trial briefs. It would start, "John Jones — "
In other words, you would interview a witness and then afterward,
sometime later, before you called the witness in an executive session or
4CC20*— 54— pt. 45 2
1700 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
public session, 3^011 would get up a list, a sheet of paper, Avhich would
say, "John Jones will testify as follows :
"I am an engineer at the Voice of America. I went with the Voice
of America such and such year, and such and such date it came to
my attention that they were building a transmitting station in an
area where it wouldn't work, and I complained about it and they
wouldn't do anything about it, and So-and-So is a Communist.''
Things along those lines. Trial briefs were drawn up. I believe
on a number of occasions such trial briefs were furnished to members,
handed out to members of the subcommittee prior to the appearance
of the witness before the committee. In other words, before the wit-
ness would come before the committee, Mr. Schine or somebody else
would pass out to the members of the subcommittee this trial brief,
or synopsis in ether cases, of the general area that the witness might
cover, and I am sure that our files or drawers down in the office would
contain a number of those trial briefs and memoranda and other
notes, and things of that kind.
Mr. Jenkins. In short, when he would interview" a witness, you
believe his memoranda or trial brief or synopsis, whatever you want
to call it, would contain the name and address of the witness, wouldn't
it?
Mr. CoiiN. On occasion, definitely, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And a synopsis of the information imparted to him
by that witness?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. That is right?
Mr. Cohn. There were a lot of occasions when that was done.
Mr. Jenkins. Those are memoranda usually prepared by Mr. Schine
while he was with the staff or prepared by others on the staff as a
result of their conference with Mr. Schine; that is right, isn't it, Mr.
Cohn?
Mr. CoiiN. As a general proposition, Mr. Jenkins. It is awfully
hard for me in a couple of answers tc try to give a picture of the way
the whole office runs and the volume of work that is done there and
the way in which things are done. For your particular purposes here,
I agree with that statement.
Mr. Jenkins. I think that is perfectly clear. I believe 3'ou stated
this morning that in some instances there was no dictation or no
memorandum prepared by Mr. Schine.
Mr. Cohn. That is true, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. He carried that information in his head ?
Mr. Cohn. That is true.
Mr. Jenkins. Including the name of the witness ?
Mr. Cohn. That is true.
Mr. Jenkins. His informer ?
Mr. Cohn. There are some instances in which he carried it in his
head. There are others in which a file might contain a lisrof 12
witnesses without any reference to what those witnesses know or would
be able to say. There was just no set pattern, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, those memoranda prepared by Mr.
Schine — and I am talking about the ones that he dictated or prepared
or supervised from the time he went to the committee until his induc-
tion into the Army — are in the files with this committee, in this room,
are they not ?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1701
Mr. CoHN. Not in tliis room, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I mean in this building.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. CoHN. As far as I know, a great deal of them are right down
there.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, after he was inducted into the Army, he
had certain week nijihts oiVi
jNIr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And certain weekends off?
IMr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
IMr. Jenkins. That was for the purpose of enabling him to do com-
mittee work, was it not^
Mr. Cohn. It was, and he did.
Mv. Jenkins. He did do that?
J\lv. Cohn. Pie did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, during that period of time you say you
were getting information from him that he had acquired prior to his
induction in the Army?
Mv. CoHN. Tliat is riglit, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I take it that memoranda of such information was
pre])ared ?
Mr. Cohn. Let me answer to you this way, Mr. Jenkins : This is the
way it would go. There are again a number of categories. I know
tliat I on occasion — let me give you one example, if I may, which just
occurs to me which might be helpful. There was a man who had been
one of Mr. Schine's contacts in New York who had information on
radar and on the giving of radar secrets to the Russians and to the
Communists, and very important information. That man had been
referred to Mr. Schine by an assistant secretary in one of the Presi-
dent's executive departments. Mr. Schine talked with that man, I
don't know how many times he talked with him, but he got a certain
amount of information. At the time he obtained the information we
decided not to use it. It didn't fit in at that particular time. Then
Mr. Schine went in the Army. There came a time when we wanted
to use that information. I tried to contact that man. He would not
talk to me at that point. Certain things were developing. I remem-
ber that I reported back to Senator McCarthy, and he told me to go
down and talk with Mr. Schine and get wdiat Mr. Schine knew about
this man's testimony. I did go down and I did have a discussion wdth
Mr. Schine. I think a stall:' member was with me. We got a number
of facts from him as to what this man had said.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you make a memorandum of that ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't think I did make a memorandum. I know I
talked wnth Senator McCarthy and some other staff members about
that. The reason I don't think I made a memorandum is this: that
man subsequently committed suicide. After that event happened I
was contacted by an authoritative Government intelligence agency
which knew that Mr. Schine had been in touch with this man. I ex-
plained what I knew about the situation, antl by this time Mr. Schine
was down at Camp Gordon. I remember telephoning down there and
talking with Mr. Schine. It developed that there had not been a
memorandum. He had never made a memorandum. I had not made
a memorandum, after talking to Mr. Schine about it.
1702 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
So what I did then was verbally supply to this intelligence agency —
it was the FBI — the information which we had, and I believe I con-
tacted Mr. Schine and confirmed that information. I don't know
whether they actually interviewed him at that point.
That is one specific thing which occurs to me right now.
Another thing, sir, which covers a great area of what you are inter-
ested in right here involves the preparation of the interim reports
on this information program investigation we were just discussing.
When we learned that Mr. Schine would be inducted it had been
expected, by the way, that he would write or prepare a draft or pro-
posed report. He knew more about those investigations than anyone
else did.
It was expected that he would prepare drafts of those reports. He
was working on a lot of other things, day-to-day matters, and it
would have been difficult for him to do that in the fall months. We
therefore asked the research director of the committee if he could
take over that part of Mr. Schine's work and finish it so IVIr. Schine
could work on these other matters. He agreed to do so, and on some of
the reports he did a highly competent job. With respeci to three, the
Voice of America, the information program report, the Voice of
America engineering project report, known as Baker East, Baker
West, the subtitle, and the report on the United States Information
Service, the research director stated that he had not been with the com-
mittee while the investigation was conducted and that it was not
possible for him to do the right kind of a job.
Nevertheless, he drafted up some copies of the reports. We are
now well into — I think this was about October cr November, late
October, or the beginning of November, and he sent a draft up to
Senator McCarthy, of the first one. Senator McCarthy read it over
and made some notes on it and then drew a big "X" through the top
page and the last pane and indicated that the whole report must be
redone from top to bottom and that he wanted Dave Schine to do
it. Dave Schine rewrote that report, the Information Center report,
the Baker West report, and the Voice of America proper, or informa-
tion program proper report, and as well as those three re])orts, he
helped prepare the three sections dealing with those reports which
appear in the annual report of this subcommittee. That was a long
and arduous job. He did the rewriting job. After he did it, it was
checked over. I typed a good deal of it myself at home, I might say,
his notes. Other matter he submitted directly down here to the
committee.
Senator McCartiit. I don't like to interrupt this testimony which
I think is extremely important, but for the first time for a week, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to raise a point of order, and that is, with the
wind blowing this way, Mr. Chairman, I don't know what you are
smoking but it is awfully hard on me. I wonder if you would revert
to the pipe instead of the cigar.
Mr. Symington". Mr. Chairman, if Senator McCarthy thinks it is
bad for him, look where I am sitting.
Senator Mundt. Very well. The Chair thinks he can attend to that
point of order to the satisfaction of all concerned.
Senator Jackson. I think it should be noted that there are at least
three nonsmokers on the left side of the Chairman.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1703
Senator McCarthy. May I say to the Chair if he will throw that
away, I will, on Tuesday morning, bring some cigars made of
tobacco.
Senator Mundt. The photographers will kindly resume their
positions.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, INIr. Cohn, had yon finished your answer?
Mr. CoiiN. Not quite, sir, but almost.
Mr. Jenkins. You go ahead.
Mr. Cohn. INIr. Schine prepared substantial sections of these re-
ports, lie did a lot of rewriting. As a matter of fact he reorganized
the whole way of doing it. He thonght that instead of one com])re-
hensive report, which is what we had iirst thought of, that it should be
broken down into 3 parts, and that there should be 3 separate interim
re])orts to be filed before the annual report. He went ahead and he
did, I would say, the greater part of that job.
Mr. Jenkins. Are you talking about work he did, now, after he
was inducted into the Army ?
Mr. Cohn. I am, sir. This is work he did after he was inducted
into the Army.
Mr. Jenkins. And during the 8 weeks' stay at Fort Dix ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, let me ask you this question: Were you
with Mr. Schine on all or practically all occasions of his leave of
absences from Fort Dix ?
Mr. Cohn. I cannot say that, sir. I was with him, I worked with
him, on a good many of those occasions. And other staff members
worked with him on other occasions.
Mr. Jenkins. Were you with him on his leave of absences on week
nights? Certainly on some occasions?
Mr. Cohn. On a few occasions I was, sir, and on a few occasions,
1 don't think there were too many, I don't think there were too many
week nights at all, but on a few occasions I was with him and on a few
occasions other members of the staff were with him, sir.
Mr. Jenkins, What other members of the staff were with him, Mr.
Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. 1 can recall Frank Carr, I can recall Jim Juliana, sir.
There were probably others. I would say there were. I would say
as things would arise, and some one had to talk with him about some-
thing. Senator IMcCarthy would send someone to talk with him.
Mr. Jenkins. Were you with him on weekends ?
Mr. Cohn. I was a number of times, sir, and when I wasn't I would
talk witli him on the phone or he would deliver to my house the
written product so far as these reports were concerned.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, state whether or not on any weekend that
Mr. Schine was off from Fort Dix he went to Miami, Fla., or the State
of Florida ?
Mr. Cohn. Whether he went to Miami, Fla., or the State of Florida ?
Mr. Jenkins. The State of Florida.
Mr. Cohn. While assigned to Fort Dix?
JVIr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. The answer to that, I am sure, is "No."
INIr. Jenkins. He was not in the State of Florida during the Christ-
mas holiday 2
1704 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. During the Christmas holiday ?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. CoHN. He was not. He was working during the Christmas
holiday.
Mr. Jenkins. Was he in the State of Florida during the New Year's
holiday?
Mr. CoHN. He was not, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You say he worked during the Christmas holiday ?
Mr. CoHN. I do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. On committee work?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Were you ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Where?
INIr. CoHN. If we want to talk about day by day, I think I can help
you on that.
Mr. Jenkins. All right, Mr. Cohn, let's start back, then, with the
first day, the first night that he was away from Fort Dix. Were you
with him on that night?
Mr. CoHN. The first night he was away from Fort Dix ?
Mr. Jenkins. On a leave of absence on committee work.
Mr. CoHN. He went down there on
]Mr. Jenkins. The 10th day of November.
Mr. Cohn. On the 10th of November. On that night, I suppose he
was down there. I didn't see him. On November 11, Frank Carr
and I — it was Armistice Day and there was no training, by the way,
and I know Frank Carr and I went down to see him. Frank Carr
took with him a large bundle of papers. I think those were con-
cerning— Frank will be able to tell you about those — I think those
concerned the Fort Monmouth investigations and the interviews which
Schine had conducted on those.
We sat, the three of us sat at a picnic table out near the reception
center at Fort Dix, outside, for 2 or 3 hours and went through those
papers. When we w^ere through with them, and talking about the
Monmouth investigation, we left.
That, I believe, sir, is the first time we saw Schine after he went
down to Dix.
Mr. Jenkins. Was any memorandum ever made of that meeting or
conference with David Schine?
Mr. CoHN. A memorandum of the meeting?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. CoHN No, sir ; I don't believe there was.
Mr. Jenkins. Or of the information that he imported to you at that
time ?
Mr. CoHN. That I can't be sure of. It is very possible, in fact prob-
able, that Mr. Carr might have noted on some of those files or papers
that he had down with him, certain facts which Mr. Schine had given
to him. I don't know.
Mr. Jenkins. But if a memorandum was made, it could easily be
found in the files, as we understand it ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. I don't think Mr. Carr went back and dictated
a memorandum that, "I saw Dave Schine today," such and such and
such and such. He went down to see Dave Schine and to talk to him
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1705
about certain matters that he had worked on. I assume he got the
iiilormation and acted upon it.
Mr. Jenkins. Did Mr. Schine leave the post on November 11?
Mr. CoiiN. I don't believe so, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You don't think he did ?
^Ir. CoriN. No.
Mr, Jenkins. And that was Armistice Day?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, November 11.
Mr. Jenkins. When was the next time after November 11 that Mr.
Schine was given a leave of absence to work with the committee?
Mr. CoiiN. xVfter November 11, sir — I just can't give you that date,
sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, anyway
Mr. CoiiN. I remember this. It was probably after training on that
weekend or on the next weekend. I recall this, Mr. Jenkins. I recall
one of the early things he worked on was the preparation of the David
Greenglass deposition, which we introduced in evidence at our first
public hearing at Fort Monmouth. Mr. Schine had been down on the
interview of David Greenglass and had gotten information from Mr.
Greenglass. I think Mr. Schine had taken some notes on that day.
In fact, I think he took a lot of notes on that day, as to what Green-
glass had said.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Where are those notes, Mr. Cohn ?
JVIr. CoHN. They are someplace, I suppose, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. They can certainly be found, can they not?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, if they are in existence. I know we now have the
notes reduced to the Greenglass deposition, and that is in the record
of this committee.
Mr. Jenkins. They were prepared, those notes were taken, made by
Dave Schine after he was inducted into the Army?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir. The notes he took were taken up at Lewisburg
Penitentiary when we were interviewing David Greenglass. The
matter then dropped, Mr. Jenkins. What I was telling you, sir, was
that there came a time after Mr, Schine was down at Fort Dix that —
well, I have to go back one step further.
After the Greenglass interview, we anticipated calling Mr. Green-
glass as a witness before the subcommittee. We had every reason to
believe that would be done. That did not work out. The Department
of Justice, Mr. Kogers, vetoed that idea, and we were not allowed to
have David Greenglass appear before the subcommittee. Therefore,
we had to get what Mr. Greenglass had to say before the subcommittee
in written form, and somewhat at the last minute.
I recall that Mr. Schine drew up in question and answer form what
he thought was an accurate estimate of what David Greenglass had
said when he had been interviewed by us in October.
I recall I was away. I was out of town. And Mr. Schine sent
another committee investigator over that weekend up to Lewisburg
to talk to Greenglass. As I recall it, the committee investigator went
over what Schine had written up with Mr. Greenglass. Mr. Green-
glass made a number of changes, and I think on a Sunday Mr. Schine
talked with Mr. Greenglass or with the investigator who was stand-
ing at the side of Mr. Greenglass, and worked out the fi.nal copy of
this deposition; and a few days later it was in evidence before the
1706 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION"
committee. That is the deposition which I read from in the record
here yesterday.
That is another incident which comes to my mind right now.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, without ftoing into each specific instance
of a leave of absence, I want to ask you this
Mr. Cohn. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Schine was at Fort Dix for a period of 8 weeks;
that is correct, isn't it?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. During that period of time, he had various and
sundry consultations with the members of your staff ?
Mr. Cohn. He did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You say that during those consultations you had
him impart to you knowledge that he had acquired prior to his
entrance into the Army?
Mr. Cohn. That is in this one category sir, and perhaps a small
category. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Certain memoranda were made of those interviews
and of the facts that you gleaned as a result of your conferences with
Dave Schine ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I can't say that certain memoranda were made.
After each visit we would not come back and make a memorandum.
We would go down to find out about something. I remember the
night of November 17, when Senator McCarthy was along, there was
a specific investigation which he wanted to discuss with Mr. Schine.
It was something on which Mr. Schine had been working. It was
a matter of getting Mr. Schine's evaluation of certain facts and the
testimony of certain witnesses with whom Mr. Schine had been work-
ing. I remember that. That was after that plane ride with Mr.
Stevens. We went over to the Air Force Base at McGuire Air Field.
Colonel Lavelle and Colonel Bradley were there, and when Senator
McCarthy started talking with Mr. Schine about this investigation,
the two colonels excused themselves and the discussion continued
for some period of time. I did not make a memorandum about that.
I assume Senator McCarthy did not.
I know that after talking with Mr. Schine and then with other
members of the staff thereafter, we decided to do something, or rather,
not to do something.
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt a moment?
I would count it a great courtesy, Mr. Jenkins, if you would ask
the witness over the long weekend to get together 75 or 100 typical
Schine memoranda so they could be examined by me or my staff.
Mr. Jenkins. I haven't come to that yet, Mr. Welch.
Mr. Cohn, let me ask you this question: Did Schine prepare any
memoranda whatever after November 3 on any subject ?
Mr. Cohn. I think the answer to that — I can only give you a guess —
is probably yes, sir. I would have to check the files and talk with him
before giving you a definite answer on that. I assume now you are
referring to, did he himself dictate or prepare specific memoranda,
distinguishing that from talking to members of the subcommittee staff.
Mr. Jenkins. That is the question I have asked you. Did he or
not?
Mr. Cohn. I would say in all probability there are some. I don't
know.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1707
Mr. Jenkins. Did or not you prepare any memoranda after No-
vember 3 as a result of your conferences with Schine ?
Mr. CoiiN. Specific memoranda ?
JNIr. Jenkins. Yes, on any subject.
Mr. CoiiN. I don't recall that I prepared specific memoranda, no,
sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did any member of your staff?
Mr. CoiiN. I don't know that, sir. I would have to talk with each
one who talked with Mr. Schine and find out whether, after talking
with him, they went back and prepared some kincl of memorandum, or
whether they merely found out what they Avanted to know and acted
on the basis of it. There might be some. I don't knoAv.
Mr. Jenkins. Then, as far as you know, there is not now in your
files a single memorandum prepared either by Schine or by anyone
who talked to Schine, after November 3 ? Is that right, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir, I can't quite say that, because I know there are
certain written things in the files, and if you want, I will be glad to tell
you about those.
Mr. Jenkins. That were either prepared by Mr. Schine or prepared
by members of the staff as a result of their conversations w^ith Mr.
Schine?
;Mr. CoHN. Under that category, yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, how long would it take you to go to your
files with other members of your staff and take from these files those
memoranda that you have just told us about?
Mr. CoHN. Oh, I don't know how long it would take, sir. It
wouldn't take too long, I am sure.
Mr. Jenkins. Would it be possible, if we had an adjournment, for
you to go down there now with members of my staff' and look through
your files and find out just what had been dictated by Dave Schine
subsequent to November 3 or what had been dictated by any
member
Mr. Cohn. No, sir, I would say it would not be possible in a matter
of a few minutes to give you a complete answer to what you want. I
can give you right now a certain amount of inform atiofi.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Jenkins, would you do me a favor ?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, indeed.
Senator McCarthy. I have what appears to be an urgent call. I
would like not to have the subpena matter brought up while I am
gone. Would you hold that up for 5 minutes, the procluction of the
files? Would you do that?
Mr. CoHN. Continuing, Mr. Jenkins, I think I can give you a good
deal of the information that you want right now. The main — -
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, if we are going t© hold it
"1^
Mr. CoHN. I thought the Senator meant a technical discussion of
the subpena. I don't think he objects to your interrogating me.
Mr. Jenkins. What I want to know, Mr. Cohn, is whether or not
you can produce those documents, papers, writings, that were either
prepared by David Schine or any of you as a result of your confer-
ences with David Schine subsequent to November 3.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. I would say the outstanding example are the
three interim reports of the subcommittee, namely, engineering proj-
46620»— 64— pt. 45 3
1708 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
ects, the information centers, and Voice of America proper, plus those
sections of the annual report. They have been printed. They are
available. I have them. I can produce them for the committee, along
with my sworn statement that substantial portions of them Avere writ-
ten by Mr. Schine.
Mr. Jenkins. As we understand it, Mr. Cohn, they were prepared
by another person after Schine was taken in the Army.
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And revised by Schine. Am I wrong about that ?
Mr. (JoiiN. You are, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he prepare the originals of those reports ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir. Here is what happened. Before he went in
the Army, in anticipation of his going into the Army, Senator Mc-
Carthy asked the research director of the subcommittee to write the
report. The research director of the subcommittee prepared those
reports.
Mr. Jenkins. Who is the research director ?
Mr. CoHN. Mr. Karl Kaarslag.
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jenkins, I don't mean to startle you so. These three interim
reports I assume are in print and could be furnished to counsel, could
they not ?
Mr. CoHN. Of course. I will do that right away.
Mr. Wf^LGH. I would be glad to have them.
Mr. Jenkins. We will ask for those forthwith.
Mr. Welch. Mr. Juliana is looking over his shoulder and appar-
ently going to get them.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you have those here, or can they be made avail-
able to us forthwith ?
Mr. CoHN. If not, we can get them.
Mr. Jenkins. Will you ask Mr. Juliana to get them ?
Mr. CoHN. He didn't need the request. He has them in the room
already.
Mr. Jenkins. You were interrupted. Go right ahead with your
statement.
Mr. Cohn. The research director of the subcommittee was asked
by Senator McCarthy to prepare a draft of all these re]:>orts.
The Senator thought that would remove that much of what Dave
had left to do. He got out a draft of one report wliich I believe
was all right. That was on the State Department tiling system, if
I recall it correctly. When it came to the report on the information
program investigation which had been, sir, you must bear in mind,
the principal investigation — when I say principal I mean in length
of time and number of hearings held — of the subcommittee during the
last year. It occupied a matter of months. Public hearings were
held day in and day out, executive sessions and staff interviews, in
the time of the committee's information. They are not even over now.
On those reports the research director submitted something to Sen-
ator McCarthy which Senator McCarthy believed was not satisfac-
tory. We talked to the research director and asked if he couldn't
re-do them. He said since he had not been with the subcommittee
while those thiiigs were going on he could not do the job. He said
in connection with the State Department filing system, I believe, that
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1709
he had worked with the boys on the staff who had handled that in-
vestir^ation and that he thought these reports on the information pro-
gram should be prepared by Dave Schine who had done the work on
that investigation.
Senator McCarthy read the draft the research director had pre])arcd
and agreed that they had to be just scrapped and redone completely.
From that point en, David Schine took over that job and he did it
in substantial part. I worked on it with him. It came down here
to Washington, Frank Carr worked on it, it Avent back to the research
director, it was submitted to the various members of the subcommittee
for comment, they made changes in it and the final comment evolved.
15ut that was, I might say, the bulk of the work done by Dave Schiue
during that period of time.
Mr. Jenkixs. And those reports will be filed with this committee
this afternoon ? You have now sent for them as I understand it.
Mr. CoHN. I am sure of that, sir. We can do that this afternoon.
And, IMr. Jenkins, there are also the sections of the annual re]iort
which pertain to these three reports. In other vrords, in the annual
report, we had sort of a summary of each interim report, sort of a
summary of each investigation which the subcommittee had conducted
during the year, and those particular sections with which Mr. Schine
was familiar, with which he had handled on the investigation, were
prepared in part by him, and we would have those for you, too.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say you would not be able to submit to the
committee this afternoon any documents or memoranda prepared by
Mr. Schine subsequent to his induction into the Army, with the excep-
tion of these three reports ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir, I don't say that. I say that in order to do the
job you want me to, and give you what we can, I would like to work
on it over the weekend, or whatever else you want, and talk to the
staff members and go through the files and see that we give you what
there is there. I don't think I can do that for you in 5 or 10 minutes
and do any kind of an accurate job.
Mr. Jenkins. Could you assign one of the members of your staff
to it now, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. I don't have to. I worked on that myself.
Senator IMcCarthy. May I interrupt ? I missed the last 3 minutes.
I had to, for a phone call, which I thought of some importance. If
you are talking now about the subpenas, may I say that when the
subpena
Senator Mundt. There is no talk about sub])enas. You are wrong.
Senator McCarthy. You are talking about the production of rec-
ords from our files ?
Senator ]\Iundt. Yes, about the records.
Senator McCAirruY. Couldn't we get down to this question of the
subpena? I have to leave fairly soon and I would like to dispose of
that.
Mr. Jenkins. I would be glad to dispose of that now.
Senator McCarthy. May I say the reason I ask this is because
I have to leave fairly soon, and I want to dispose of this question.
Mr. Jenkins. Glad to. Mr. Cohn, during the noon hour, there was
a subpena issued upon you ; is that correct?
1710 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoiiN. It was addressed to the committee or myself. I was
eating lunch with Senator McCarthy and your process servers arrived
on the scene and I respectfully referred them to the chairman of the
committee and he accepted service of the subpena, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. And it was a subpena for these files on the Voice of
America, and other files upon which Dave Schine had worked, and
particularly for all documents, data, memoranda, notes, made by Dave
Schine, both before his induction into the Army on November 3 and
thereafter? In substance, is that correct?
Mr, CoHN. I would say it is much broader than that, Mr. Jenkins,
I would say it would call for us to turn over probably three-quarters
of all our files, and take them out of our ofKce and turn them over
to the committee. It says:
AU files pertaining to the investigation of the Voice of Aniericn, Overseas In-
formation Service, tlie Government Trintins Office, the investigation of Com-
munists and suhversives in the Army and at Fort Monmouth, and all other
files on which G. David Schine did any work.
That embraces a very larf^e part, T sui)pose, of our files. I h-ave read
the wordinji^ of the subpena and I sup})ose it speaks for itself, sir.
Mr, Jenkins, Now, Mr, Cohn, can you, in association with members
of your staff, examine those various files mentioned in that subpena?
Mr. Cohn, Surely.
Mr, Jenkins, And take therefrom everything that constitutes the
work of Dave Schine that is documented?
Mr, CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr, Jenkins, Will you do that?
Mr, CoHN. I would be very ha])])y to do that,
Mr, Jenkins, When may the committee expect that information
to be forthcoming?
Mr. Cohn. The committee may expect th-at information to be forth-
coming, unless something unforeseen happens, and I am sure it won't,
at the beginning of its next session, which means I will have to stay
down here over the weekend. I will be glad to do it, though.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, just so there are no precedents
established, I want to make it cleai- that Mr, Cohn is not in charge of
the files. The chairman is. That is why I insisted the subpena be
served upon the chairman.
Mr. Cohn. I will be glad to work on the job over the weekend for
you, Mr. Jenkins, and try to have this for you the first thing on Mon-
day morning, Tuesday morning, I am told we don't sit on Monday.
Mr. Jenkins. You say it could not be done prior to that time?
Mr. Cohn. Well, if you would like us to try, sir, we cculd stay
down tonight, I suppose, and work as fast as we can if it is a matter
of that urgency.
Mr. Jenkins, There is no disposition on my part to work any undue
hardship on anybody.
Mr. Cohn. It won't be an undue hardship. We will do whatever
you want.
Mr. Jenkins. We are trying to find out the character, kind, and
extent of the work done by ]Mr. Schine, particularly after he went
into the Army on November 3.
Will those files, or certain parts of them, reflect the work done by
Dave Schine after November 3?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1711
Mr. CoHN. I ^rould say the bulk of the matter would be in these
reports which we tan give you this afternoon. I would say anythin*^
else in the files, sir, there might be some memoranda, I know myself
of 1 or 2, one thing just comes to my mind now concerning a re])ort
which he had drawn up on the Voice of America situation as of the
last few months, yon wnll get the bulk of that in the form of these
three reports and the sections of the annual re])ort.
That is the main job he did in the limited amount of time he spent
for us while down at Fort Dix,
Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry ?
Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson ?
Senator Jackson. I make it for the purpose of speeding a decision
on this matter. It is my understanding that it is not expected that
all these files as such be turned over, but only that part of the files
in which G. David Schine has done some work as evidenced by memo-
randa of various kind.
Mr. Jenkins. Senator, that is all I asked for.
Senator Mundt. Senator, that is correct. I might say to the
Senator that the snbpena was very hastily drawn. I think it Avas
very broad and I said so at the time. I said if it was signed with the
understanding that it involved just wliat the counsel talked to me
about, and that is the parts of the files which have been prepared
by G. David Schine, and that the committee rule against disclosing
informants was maintained, it would be perfectly all right. I think
the wording was broader than the intent. The intent was very clear
to all parties.
Mr. CoHN. May I consider the subpena is amended ?
Senator Mdndt. Mr. Prewitt tells me he is preparing a modified
subpena which spells out precisely what all hands want. That should
simplify the matter considerably.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. In view of the fact that we are dealing with
matters here which go far beyonc this investigation insofar as estab-
lishing precedents are concerned, I do believe that the members of
the committee should know that position the chairman of the Perma-
nent Investigating Committee will take insofar as subpenas are con-
cerned. Before I do that — Roy, do you have that subpena there ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir; I do.
Senator McCarthy. Would you give it to me?
Mr. CoHN. I also have the report Mr. Welch wants.
Senator McCarthy. I may say this subpena
Senator JNIundt. Would you give Mr. Welch the reports which are
now available ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Senator McCarthy. I may say the supena
Senator Mundt. Go aheacl, Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. May I ask the chairman in view of the fact
that I have the
Senator Mundt. You have the floor. Go ahead.
Senator McCarthy. That I have yielded to his request that I not
take the time of the committee, not interrupt him, and I have done
tliat for about 3 or 4 days. Now^ will you give me about 10 minutes.
1712 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Senator Mundt. I wish you could do it in less, but proceed.
Senator McCarthy. O. k., make it nine and a half.
Senator Symington. Will the Senator yield to me for just a
minute?
Senator McCarthy. I will, Stu, but let me go over this for just a
minute and then I will be glad to do it then.
This noon there was served upon me a subpena which ordered the
production of all files on which Schine did any work. I was confused
by that. I knew this was actually drawn over the noon hour. I
knew that the Chair of this committee signed subpenas as I do, upon
the request of his counsel. This is no reflection upon the chairman
of this committee. But this subpena would indicate that we were
supposed to bring up to this room all of the files we have in the com-
mittee room. I was confused by that because the Chair has access
to those at any time he wants to have access.
However, Mr. Chairman, we do have a new element introduced
into this as of yesterday. Yesterday, as the Chair will recall, Senator
McClellan, who is the ranking Democratic member of this committee,
made the unqualified statement that he thought it was a crime for
individuals to give me information about Conmiunist infiltration of
this Government if that had the stamp of secret, confidential or re-
stricted. It was very clear, I believe, that my two good Democrat
friends who are here at the table today agreed with him on that.
That can mean only one thing, namely, that my Democrat friends
feel that we should send to jail those people who give us information
about graft, corruption, and communism, rather than those who are
guilty of those crimes. In fact, I believe it was suggested by one of
my Democratic colleagues that I was guilty of a crime for bringing
to the attention of the people this information about Communist in-
filtration at Fort Monmouth.
Mr. Chairman, that poses a very serious question as Tar as I am
concerned. I have a duty to the people who furnish me information,
not to have their names known. I know many of them would lose
their jobs if their names were made public. Our files contain some
of those names.
In view of Senator McClellan's statement — and he is high in the
hierarchy of the Democratic Party, and I assume it is a high policy
decision
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a point
of order, if I may.
Senator McCarthy. Could I finish ?
Senator Symington. My point of order is that 1 don't think we
ought to discuss what Senator McCleilan does think or doesn't think
the one day that, because of yjersonal business, it was necessary for
him to leave this committee. If the Senator from Wisconsin wants
to ask an individual Democrat what he thinks about it, who is pres-
ent, speaking for myself, and I am sure my distinguished colleague
from the State of Washington agrees, we would be very glad to tell
him.
It is a complicated subject. The President spoke on it again this
morning. I would appreciate that it not be taken as a general Demo-
cratic policy matter at this time, in the absence of our senior colleague,
the Senator from Arkansas. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin
for letting me make that observation.
]
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1713
Senator Jackson. Might I say this Mr. Chairman: I see no point,
in order to get some simple information wliich is very relevant to
the inquiry and the charges made, that we need to go into these other
matters. I -want to say this in Senator McClellan's absence. I do
not recall that Senator McClellan ever said that the giving of informa-
tion, as such, that would aid in rooting out communism, corruption or
treason, or what have you, is wrong. The whole issue is, can we
permit individuals who work for the Government, who have an oath
and obligation to carry out their orders, to turn over documents to
anyone not authorized to receive the same. It is that simple.
Mr. Hoover told an individual who had a copy of one of these docu-
ments, according to the press account, that if it were given out he
would be arrested. The Attorney General has spoken out, !• think
the issue is very clear, and I don't see that "we need to go into this
whole question.
Senator McClellan is not here today, and I think that we ought to
try to confine ourselves, Mr. Chairman, to the specific request for
relevant material that relates to this inquiry.
Senator Mundt. In response to the two points of order, may the
Chair again say this: that a subpena was hastily drawn as a result
of a telepnone conversation which he had with counsel. It was
brought to my room at a time when there were several people in the
office, just preceding lunch, and I signed it. I said, "It seems to me
that this subpena is broader than the understanding I had with the
counsel over the telephone." I said, "If you will interpret it on that
basis and make it clear that what we want is what the counsel had
asked for from the witness, and what I undertood from counsel
had been requested by some of the members of the committee, the
memoranda and the documents and the data and the reports which
were worked on by David Schine, and if it is done with the under-
^^tanding" — and I want you to get this point. Senator McCarthy,
because it clears up what you are talking about — "with the under-
standing that we are not going to make the names of any informants
XJublic, we are not going to go beyond the matter of our committee
counsel as far as the names of informants are concerned, I will sign
the subpena and it will be delivered."
Senator Symington. A parliamentary inqury.
I beg your pardon, Mr. Chairman. I thought you had finished.
Senator McCarthy. How long must this ijiterruption go on? I
started to make a statement.
Senator Mundt. A point of order was raised, and the Chair is talk-
ing on the point of order.
Senator McCarthy. If I may
Senator Mundt. A point of order, as you know, can interrupt any-
body's speech, and you were interrupted by the point of order made
by Senator Symington. I am talking now.
So we are now in the process
Senator McC'arthy. Are you talking on the point of order?
Senator Mundt. We are now in the process of modifying the sub-
pena so it states in printed form exactly the understanding that was
reached by all the members of the connnittee and by counsel, which
we recognize is not now stated in the form of subpewa. So if we keep
that in mind, we may shorten the colloquy.
I recognize the Senator from Wisconsin.
1714 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Senator Symington. Could I ask a parliamentary inquiry, Mr.
Chairman ?
Senator Mundt. You may.
Senator Symington. Why was the subpena issued by counsel, what
is the subpena supposed to say if it is w^rong, and what will it take to
make it right if it is wrong ? One, two, and three.
Senator McCarthy. Could I finish this, please, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. I can't answer the .parliamentary inquiry.
Go ahead. I have the new subpena here which I can read if you
would like to have me read it first, Senator McCarthy, to bring the
colloquy up to date.
Senator McCarthy. Senator Symington's No. 1 raises a question
which should be answered. The reason the subpena was issued was
because I received a call in my office saying that the Democrat mem-
bers wanted their counsel to examine our liles. I called Mr. Jenkins
at that time — if I am wrong in this, l^ay, tell me — and I told him I
would not allow that in view of Senator McClellan's statement that
the names of ii'formants would be made public, and apparently my
Democrat friends thought they should be prosecuted for giving the
information if some clerk somewhere in Government stamps the stuff
secret, confidential, or restricted.
I told Mr. Jenkins they would not have access to the files, but if
they would issue a subpena setting forth what was needed they could
have that, that as far as the chairman was concerned he certainly had
access to the files, and Mr. Jenkins did.
I had the subpena served on me when I was having lunch this
noon. I told the young man who served it — I believe he tried to serve
it on Mr. Cohn first, and I said I would take the subpena — told him
I would not honor this subpena if it was to include the names of
informants, if it were to go beyond the scope of this investigation.
I then went to the office of Senator Mundt and talked there to the
Senator about this, and he and I both agreed, I believe, that when the
subpena calls for all the files actually all that is properly admissible
are the parts of the files produced by Dave Schine. I told the chair-
man we would produce those.
However, Mr. Chairman, I think that today we do have a very
important question, and I think the record should be clear so that we
do not establish a precedent wdiich will be cited later if and when
someone tries to subpena the confidential files of an investigating
committee, because if you could subpena all of their files at wall you
would destroy every investigating committee.
In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I note the statement issued today
by the Attorney General. May I say I want no argument with Herb
Brownell. The last time I met him I had a very pleasant meeting.
I have quite a bit of respect for him. I am confused, however, by
some of the statements being issued. For example, if I may quote
from one of the press stories — I am having considerable trouble with
this IIP story — to the effect that the executive branch of the Govern-
ment has the sole and fundamental responsibility for enforcement of
laws and the President's orders are drafted to protect the security of
our Nation.
May I say, Mr. Chairman, that I agree with that, that the executive
branch has the responsibility to enforce tlie laws. However, under the
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1715
lieor<2;anization Act. if the ('hair will bear with me for a minute, iiiuier
the lleorii'anizatioii Act, Ave tried to clear up this contest as to what
information the American joeople couhl ^a-t. Under that there is set
up the (lovernment Opeiaiions Connnitlee. The job of that com-
mittee was spelle<l out in detail. It was to investio;ate jjraft, cor-
ruption, dishonesty, inelKciency, in (lOvernment. That is, in the
executive branch.
I am disturbed to find that my friends in the executive branch feel
that this duty we have to exi)ose what (hey are doin<^, that this duty is
interpreted by them to mean that we are trying to tell them what to do.
That is strictly not true. I will take, if I may, another minute or two.
In the Aloer Hiss case, in which the chairman was to a great extent
resj)onsible for seeing that a traitor was sent to jail, if people in the
executive had folloAved the admonition that was laid out this morning,
if a man from the State Department or some part of the executive had
not ra])ped on the door of the chairman at around 2 : 30 in the morn-
ing and given him information, Mr. Hiss might well now be an
Assistant Secretary of State. I want to make it clear, Mr. Chairman,
insofar as subpenas are concerned, my staff is ordered not to produce
any material from the files under any circumstances until I have been
consulted, that any sub])enas served upon them be served upon me.
I may say, Mr. Chairman, that any information in the files having to
do Avith this controversy will be available to the chairman, will be
available to all the members of tlie committee.
However, Mr. Chairman, I do have a very serious problem, and I
would like to take it up at the earliest possible moment next week with
our investigating committee, a very serious problem, as to just what I
can do now in view of the position my Democrat friends have taken,
that is that they think api)arently the criminals are those that give
us information about crime rather than the guilty party.
Up until this point, I have taken the position that all of my files
were wide open to all members of the committee. However, I have
a heavy duty to the people who give ns information. If w^e didn't get
information from loyal Government employees who respect their — if
1 may read one sentence from it, the oath of our Federal employees,
that they will defend the United States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic, and that they take this obligation freely without any
mental reservations — I may say, ]\Ir. (Chairman, that I have instructed
a vast number of those employees that they were dutybound to give
me information even though some little bureaucrat had stamped it
secret to protect himself.
If I am wrong, I Avould like to get the committee's advice on that.
I still advise all of those employees that anything they have given
me in confidence will be treated in confidence. The question is just
what I can do not — as I say, I am very much confused by this — by way
of giving my Democrat colleagues all the information they should get,
and at the same time not giving my Democrat friends any informa-
tion Avhich will allow them to do what Senator McClellan suggested
be done the other day, namely, send to jail those who give us
information.
As one final word— and I know you are getting uneasy, Senator
Jackson, I will yield to you in 1 minute here — as 1 final word, Mr.
Chairman
46620°— 54— pt. 45 4
1716 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Senator Mundt. May the Chair say he agreed with the Senator
from Wisconsin to adjourn a little early this afternoon, which he can-
not do if we cannot examine the witness.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, this is far more important than
examining the witness. Mr. Cohn said he would be available any day
of the week here, at all times. On this question of what we can do
with the files, I know there will be attempts, as there were this noon,
unknown to the Chair, to get files which will give the names of
informants.
I merely want to serve notice now, Mr. Chairman, that while I will
give my Democratic colleagues every piece of information which I pos-
sibly can, that their positions, taken yesterday that they want to send
to jail a chairman of a committee, and I am not worried about that,
a chairman of a committee who dares to fulfill his oath, and the good
loyal people in Government who give me informa^^ion, puts me in a
position of having to refuse my Democrat friends liere any informa-
tion which will disclose the names of informants, period.
Senator Mundt. May the Chair say first of all, in response to the
parliamentary inquiry raised by Senator Symington, and in response
to the statement made by Senator McCarthy, that there was no collu-
sion, I am sure, on the part of any members of this committee. Demo-
crat or otherwise, in connection with this subpena, from the stand-
point of the information and the informants being given out publicly.
The Chair has stated that he was advised on the telephone by counsel
as to what was wanted. He read the subpena, which, I say, was
broader than it was intended to be. He said it should be issued with
that understanding.
Unfortunately, the man who issued the service, didn't have that in-
formation in mind. We now have a subpena which does exactly what
was desired by the members of the committee. I think it does every-
thing that any member of the committee wants, and the Chair proposes
to read it. I think this will be a solution to this particular situation.
It is to the Senate Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations, and to Mr. Roy M. Cohn :
Pursuant to lawful authority, you are hereby commanded to appear before the
Senate Permanent Sulxi-ommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations of the Senate of the United States, and forthwith, to bring to
249 Senate Office Building, the following material, that you produce all memo-
randa, data, or documents, dictated or prepared by G. David Schine, and all
memoranda or data prepared by other persons from information furnished by
said Schine, that are contained in files of the subcommittee except memoranda
disclosing names of informants.
We now have brought the affidavit directly into harmony with the
instructions that the Chair received and the understanding that he
believes the committee members had in mind when they asked for the
subpena.
Senator Jackson?
Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I merely want to make this brief
point. He wants the subpena.
I don't know that I am authorized to serve it on you.
Senator McCarthy. I will accept service. [Laughter.]
Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I regret that all of this time is
being taken up on a matter that does not relate to the matter immedi-
ately before us. However, when certain statements are made, of
necessity one cannot stand idly by lest it be construed as acquiescence.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1717
First of all, I have not said that the Chairman has violated the law.
I don't know. That is not my job. That is the responsibility of the
people of the executive branch. But I want to say this, that the
Attorney General of tlie United States, and the liead of the Federal
Bm-oau of Jnvestiffation, Mr. J. Ed<^ar Hoover, has said that it is a
violation of the law for an employee of the Govermnent. entrusted
with the classified secret information, to ^\ve it to one not entitled to the
same.
That is a clearcut statement by the Attorney General, and the head
of the Federal Bureau of Invest ijiation, and 1 am not ji;oin<ij to be a
party to any proposition which would encourage eni))loyees in the
Federal Government to turn over classified documents to i)eople not
entitled to receive the same under the law of the land.
I do not believe that you can have any kind of security system in
the United States if we are <2;oino- to place a subjective test on whether
an individual can determine whether a certain document can be turned
over to one not entitled to the same.
I think tliat is as clear as anythin<]j can be, and T assume that is the
position taken by the President. It is an entirely diil'erent matter
for an employee of the Government, or for any citizen, to ^'ive infor-
mation which is not illegal to give, which will help ferret out any of
these things that we have been talking about. They are two entirely
different matters.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can get back on to the subject matter.
Senator Mundt. I hope we can, but the Chair has agreed to recog-
nize Senator Symington briefly, and then I hope we can get back on
the subject.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to associate
myself with my distinguished, brilliant, young colleague from the
State of Washingt(m. It is hard for me to follow some of the things
that were said by the Senator from Wisconsin, but I, to the best of
my ability, will try to answer some of the statements he made with
respect to our feelings and very briefly give my opinion.
First, I do not agree that I said anything about jailing the Chair-
man, and in general I would say, with sincerity and respect, that the
fact that the Senator from Wisconsin states that my position is such,
and my position is such, does not necessarily make it a fact.
Secondly, I would hope that from now on we never again say,
based on the issues that we are discussing at this time, that all we are
talking about is the shining of Private Schine's shoes.
Third, I would like to say that it seems to me that the opinion of
the leading lawyer in the Government, even though I am of a dif-
ferent party, is something which all Americans must give considera-
tion to. To the best of my recollection, he was appointed by President
Eisenhower and was unanimously confirmed by the Senate. I may
be wrong in the latter, but I don't remember any major difference.
Last, based on, even as late as today, a press conference with the
President, it is now clear that he and the junior Senator from Wis-
consin are not in agreement.
The next point that I would like to make. Mr. Chairman, is that one
of the reasons we left this committee, we Democrats, was because it
was a committee which we felt had one-man rule. We came back on
the committee with the understanding that a majority of the members
1718 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
of the committee could make the decisions. Therefore, 1 was both sur-
prised and disappointed to hear the Chairman say that on his own,
without any committee vote, he had decided — and I mi<^ht add, there-
fore, without any authority — he had decided to withhold the relatively
simple request that was made by our distinguished counsel with respect
to these files.
I would suggest to the Chairman of this committee, Senator Mundt,
that we vote. We have one Republican missing and we have one
Democrat missing. It seems to me the issue is a very clear one. Do
we follow the concept of the President of the United States and the
Attorney General of the United States as to what should or should not
be done in this matter, or do we follow the opinion of the junior Sen-
ator from Wisconsin ?
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I recommend — and I would like the at-
tention of the Chair, I would appreciate the attention of the Chair.
Senator Mundt. I am torn between the demands of the 2 Democratic
members at the moment, 1 w^hispering in my ear and 1 talking in the
microphone.
Senator Symington. I can't imagine a more fortunate situation.
Senator Mundt. I can think of many, many happier situations to
be in.
Senator Symington. May I get back to my motion, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to propose now that this committee vote as to wdiether
or not the counsel of this committee, Mr. Jenkins subpena, approved
by the chairman, be honored or not be honored. We can decide then
how our Republican colleagues feel and how our Democratic col-
leagues feel, and in that way we can decide whether we are going to
get the files with respect to Mr. Schine or wdiether we are not.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Poti'er. Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Symington. Is this a substitute motion ?
Senator Mundt. Senator Potter?
Senator McC^arthy. Could I have one minute, Charlie?
Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy ?
Senator McCarthy. No. 1, I wonder if all the lights don't confuse
my good friend from Missouri, Senator Symington. We have agreed
while he w\as sitting here that the subpena which is now issued should
be honored. This only calls for material produced by Dave Schine.
The original sub]:)ena called for all the files. This subpena very
wisely — and I want to compliment the chairman for his good judg-
ment— provides that there will not be produced anything which would
disclose the names of any informant. The Chair and I talked about
that during the noon hour. We agreed that this would be available.
When the Senator from Missouri makes his motion, I am sure he is not
making it with the idea that he can accuse anyone; I am sure he was
busy talking to someone, or something, when we made it very clear
that there is no question about the production of this material. What
we are talking about now is the production of other material.
May I say in answer to Senator Jackson— he says that J. Edgar
Hoover — it is odd how J. Edgar Hoover is used as a shield for some
of our friends— that J. Edgar Hoover said it would be a violation of
law to give information to unauthorized people.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1719
Of course that is true. But Senator Jackson knows that the chair-
man of a committee, a committee set u]) under the Keori^anization Act
to oet all the information from the executive, is not an unanthoi'ized
person.
het me fin ish, i f I may.
I don't think we should bandy it about this way. Senator McOlel-
lan talked about the indiscriminate handino- out of information. AVe
are not talkinc; about that. We are talkini>; about Federal employees
pjivinc; the chairman of a committee, which has been set up to investi-
jfjate the executive — that was made very clear in the Reoroanization
Act — tliat chairman o;ettini>; information.
I certainly hope, Senator Jackson, that at some time, perhaps not
under television lights, but sometime my Democrat friends will
aoree with me that we do have the job of ex]:)osing araft, corruption,
and communism, I hope my Democrat friends will finally, at long
last, agree with me that we should not try to punish the loyal Fed-
eral employees who say, "I will not protect any crookedness, any dis-
honesty in govermuent, merely because my boss or someone else takes
a 'Secret' stamp and stamps it on a document." If we can do that,
I think we can perform a great service.
May I say, Mr. Chairman, the reason I have taken so much time
on this is because I do want to make it very, very clear to all of the
Federal employees, as I have said before, that there is no power on
earth which will force me to disclose the names of individuals who
are respecting their oath, their oath to defend this United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and giving the head of a
committee information.
ISIay I strongly urge my Democrat friends — and let me make it
clear 1 know they don't love Communists any more than you do — may
I strongly urge that they think this matter over over the weekend and
see if we cannot sort of join forces here and have a committee that can
get the information it needs and maybe we can also ])ersuade the
Attorney General — I hope so, because I think he is an honest man —
persuade him that where he does have the duty to enforce the law,
that we have the duty to expose any failure to enforce the law.
I would like in closing to call his attention to the situation back
in 1924 — I am sure the Senators will remember — when we had the
Attorney General involved in a dishonest situation. He advised
the President at that time — may I have the Chair's attention? — he
advised the President at that time, the Attoiney General who was
involved in this crooked deal advised the President to issue a secrecy
rule which was almost identical to the one that was issued last, I
believe it was the 17th of May.
We had a man then who, instead of following the advice of his
Attorney General, said, "Mr. Attorney General, you are out. We
won't take your advice."
It ended up with all Cabinet members freely testifying, peoj^le
went to jail. If we had the same rule in 1924 that we have now, you
would have had a complete coverup.
May I again make it clear I am not suggesting that Attorney Gen-
eral Brownell resign or anything like that. I am inclined to think
that at that meeting on the 21st at which there was set in motion the
machinery to try to smear this young man over here who has done
1720 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
I think more than any man I know to combat the Communist con-
spiracy— when there was set in motion the smear against him I have
good reason to believe that Brownell was not a part of that conspiracy.
I just hope that maybe at some time we can get the evidence and find
out who in that meeting opposed what was done and who set in motion
the planned smear.
Senator Mundt. The Chair has agreed to recognize JSenator Potter
next, because he has not spoken yet. But before doing that, may I say
to Senator Potter and all the rest of my colleagues, that this has been
going on now for something over 30 minutes and really we have no
issue before us. Let's get the focus of the picture first.
Senator Jackson. We didn't open this up.
Senator Symington. We didn't open it up, now.
Senator Mundt. The Chair has the floor. There is at the moment
a subpena which has been served and accepted, to produce the material
that we all desire. The Chair has made it clear that in the issuance of
the earlier subpena, which he has since recalled, the same intent was
there. The language was faulty but he conveyed the intent over the
phone, apparently not to the satisfaction of the Senator from Wis-
consin. The intent of the two of them are identical. We are going to
get the material. Now, Senator Potter.
Senator Potter. Mr. Chairman, Senator Dworshak and myself have
felt a little lonely clown at the end of the table. I would like to com-
ment. We have seen a lot of queer and unusual things take place in
this hearing during the past twenty-some days. I think this will prob-
ably go down in history as the first time that j committee of Congress
has ever subjpenaed itself against its own records.
Senator Jackson. It is being done because of a refusal. How else
can you get them ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, if I might say this. Senator Mundt, there was no
refusal. Without any service of a subpena, I promised the committee
this morning the material requested would be produced, and it will be
produced, sir.
Senator Mundt. Now, Senator Jackson, if you want to be recog-
nized again, I think we will have to recognize you. But one at a time.
If we are going to debate this thing, we better debate it in order.
Senator Jackson has the floor. May the Chair again urge that we
finish this as soon as possible?
Senator Jackson. Two brief points. I didn't raise or open this
point that Senator McCarthy brought into the discussion today, but
I merely want to say, again, that I am not going to be a party to a
proposition, where a clerk, whether it be in the FBI, can give classified
information to anyone contrary to the instructions of the head of the
agency. If Mr. Hoover says no one is to give this out, do you mean to
say that a clerk, a stenegrapher or employee, in that agency can give
out classified information ?
Obviously, if we are going to have that kind of security system, the
FBI would be in shambles, the whole Federal Government would be
in shambles, the Atomic Energy Commission wouldn't be able to
operate.
Mr. Chairman, I don't think there is any need for a subpena in this
case. Under the rules of this committee, every member is entitled to
all information in the files.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1721
The chairman, I mean the chairman of the full committee, Senator
McCarthy, has stated time and time a<2;ain in these hearin<!;s, since we
started, that Ave all have access to these liles. Now, Senator McCarthy
cannot chanoe the rules of the connnittee, 1 don't think, not, at least,
with my acquiescence, by a pronouncement here that they are not
iioluiX to allow the Demorratic members of this committee to have this
information. AVhat kind of a Government do we have?
Senator JNIcCautiiv. Would the Senator yield for one second?
Senator Jackson. No. Let me finish this brief statement.
Now, without conceding- anythino-, with reference to his rij^ht to
withhold this information, to which 1 believe we are entitled as mem-
bers of the committee under existing rules, and there has been no
change to my knowledfje of the rules, to date, other than some unilat-
eral statements, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that the last part of the
subpena, "except memoranda disclosing; mimes of informants," that
such memoranda should be turned over to you, and I am sure that
would be an amicable arranoement with (^hairman Mundt and Senator
McCarthy, but I am not jioino; to concede that we are not entitled to it.
But for the sake of expeditino- action on this, I think any memoranda
that Mr. Schine has prepared reo;arding informants ou«>ht to be turned
over to the chairman so we know that he has actually written out such
memoranda without the committee members goinc; over the names of
such individuals. We are not interested in names. All we are in-
terested in here is whether he has written such memoranda.
Now, I think that should settle that part of it. I don't think there
should be any dispute on that point, if you have a record of it.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman ?
Senator McCarthy. Will you yield for a minute. Scoop ?
Senator Jackson. And I think before yielding, I just want to do
this : I think with reference to the requirement for a subpena, that the
counsel to the committee, Mr. Ray Jenkins, can satisfactorily explain
that. I would like to yield on that point.
Senator McCarthy. Would the Senator yield to me for a minute?
Senator Symington. I think I have the floor now, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. The Chair has not recognized anybody. The Chair
will recognize somebody as soon as he determines whether or not Sena-
tor Jackson is going to yield to the counsel or to Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. W^ill you yield to me for a minute so I can an-
swer what you brought up ?
Senator Jackson. On the basis of allocation of time, may I yield to
Senator Symington?
Senator Mundt. Senator Symington.
Senator Symington. I thank the Chair.
The reason the subpena was issued. Senator Potter, was because
the counsel for the connnittee stated that Senator McCarthy stated he
would not give the records to the committee unless a subpena was
issued. That is point 1. Point 2 is regardless of what the opinion of
any member of this committee is, in my opinion a majority of this
committee has a right to see anything that the committee has.
On the third jioint, we had pretty good success when we said that
we would take the matter of Mr. Carr to the Senate floor, if he did
not testify, and therefore, I want to state right now that if the
members of this committee cannot see the records of this committee, we
1722 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
will take that to the Senate floor, too, and see what the Senate thinks
about this.
Finally, it is a straight difference of opinion here, between Presi-
dent Eisenhower and the Attorney General, and the junior Senator
from Wisconsin. I want to say very frankly, and without being argu-
mentative about it, that in my opinion if the Senator from Wisconsin
is right, we haven't got a good government, we haven't got a poor
government, we just won't have any government at all.
Finally, I am getting a little astonished at the amount of defense
that this administration gets from the Democratic members of the
committee and the abysmal silence on my right.
Senator Dworshak. Mr. Chairman ?
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, a point of personal privilege.
Senator Mundt. May the Chair say that that was a rollcall. It
will have to be brief on personal privilege. Senator McCarthy ?
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, may I say that Senator Syming-
ton, and I am sure it is not because he is trying to deceive the people,
apparently he is confused — don't interrupt me, please. Senator — he has
again misstated the facts. There is no attempt on the part of the
Senator from Wisconsin to deny this committee any information which
the Chair wants. The Chair knows that I told him that our tiles are
wide open to him. The Chair does know, however, that I have stated
and I will continue to state, that my Democrat colleagues will not
get the names of the loyal Government employees who give us the
evidence of treason that has been growing over the past 20 or 21
years, because he will not, I will not give those names to them when
they say that "Our function in coming back on the connnittee is not to
expose and prosecute Communists" — Senator, would you like to hear
this, it is about you — that they in effect say, "Our function is not to ex-
pose Communists"
Senator Symington. I have always listened to what Senator
McCarthy has to say. You asked me and I will answer you. You don't
have to have everybody looking at you all the time you are talking.
Senator McCarthy. The point is well taken.
Senator Mundt. The Chair suggests that the Senator conclude now
in about 30 seconds. We have to go to a rollcall vote and when we
return, I do hope we can get on with the business of the day.
Senator McCarthy. We will make it 15 seconds. I thought when
my Democrat colleagues were coming back on the committee, they
were coming back for the purpose of helping me dig out Communists
and corruption. Why they ar3 afraid to help me do that I don't
know. Until they reverse their stands and agree with me on indi-
viduals who gave us information that we need as a committee, until
they do that, they will not get the names of any informants. I under-
stand we are voting now, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I want to rise to a point of
personal privilege. Senator McCarthy can say anything in the world
about me that he wants. But, again, I ask him not to talk about
my beloved colleague, the senior Senator from Arkansas in this
fashion on the only day that the Senator has missed these hearings.
I am not going to say another word.
Senator Mundt. We will stand in recess. When we resume, I hope
the interrogatories and not the colloquies will continue. We will
have a 10-minute recess.
(Brief recess.)
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1723
Senator Mundt. The committee will please coiiie to oixler.
The rollcall vote iu the Senate haviii<»; bo(Mi com|)leted, the com-
mittee will reconvene. The audience knows of the a(hnonition ol' the
Chair.
Mr. Jenkins, our counsel, will start interroj^atinft- the witness. INIr.
Cohn is on the stand.
Mr. Jenkins?
Senator PoTTEn. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mdndt. Senator Potter.
Senator Potter. INIr. (/hairmun, before we left to vote, Sena-
tor Symington made a statement that the Ixepublican members of the
committee had been strangely silent. 1 would like to say this to my
good friend from Missouri: that the Kepnblican members on this
committee are here to ascertain the facts and not make ])olitical
speeches. We have an able counsel who has been directing his ques-
tions to the witness. The television camera, I assume, has been on you
about two-thirds of the time.
I would like to say this: I have a great respect for tlie man who
sits in the Wliite House, President Eisenhower. 1 think the other
members of the committee resjject him likew^ise. He is a great ad-
ministrator and a great American. It ill behooves a man who has
been campaigning for the things that tlie President has stood for
to tell us what we should do and how we should run our ])arty.
I w^ould like to say further that the Senator from Missouri stated
that we would have no Govermnent if this continued. Thank God
we live in a country where the people's re])resentatives can watch the
executive branch of the Government. Our Government is a triparty
government. We are the people's representatives. I am the first to
admit that the investigating committees of Congress sometimes step
out of line. When we do, we get our toes stomped on, as we should.
But by the same token, I think many times the executive branch
of the Government oversteps its responsibilities and authority.
When it does, the Congress has seen fit to pass laws to create a com-
mittee such as this.
1 respectfully submit that this committee is operating as a legiti-
mate arm of the Congress, and I resent, not only as a Republican but
as a Member of the Senate, any slure that w^e, as Republicans, are
letting down the President. The President is a great man, and I
for one hope that he is in po\Yer for at least 8 years.
Senator Mundt. The Chair does hope now we can get on with the
business.
Senator Symington". Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. I know the temptation is great to talk on and on,
but I wish we could get on.
Senator Symington. I listened to my friend and colleague, the dis-
tinguished junior Senator from Michigan, with a great deal of respect.
I think he knows that there is nobody in the Senate for Avhom I have
more affection and respect.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Jenkins, will you proceed with the interroga-
tories, please ?
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, before doing so, I would like to con-
tribute to this time-consuming discussion for the purpose of
clarification.
1724 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
I publicly take full responsibility for the issuance of the subpena
which was served on the Senator from Wisconsin at noon. It was
served for this reason : Prior to the noon recess, I was cross-examining
Mr. Cohn with resj^ect to the character of work that had been done by
Mr. Schine, both before and after his induction into the Army, and
particularly with reference to the character of the work he had done
Avhile on leaves of absence. I wanted a record which Avould reflect,
if possible, the extent of the work that was done by Mr. Schine
officially.
I called Mr, Cohn during the lunch hour. I told him that I was
with the members of my staif ; that in addition thereto, I had with me
the attorney for the three Democratic members of this committee;
that the four of us wanted to come to his office and examine those
records. Mr. Cohn replied that he desired to discuss that matter Avith
the Senator from Wisconsin. He no doubt did so, whereupon the
Senator from Wisconsin called me and stated that the records would
not be made available except by subpena: that if they were subpenaed
they would be made available.
Pursuant to that, a subpena was requested and was issued by the
chairman.
I confess that it was too broad in its scope. We now have a new
and different one which has been issued and which has been accepted
by the Senator from Wisconsin, which clearly defines precisely what
w^e want. And I trust, Mr. Chairman, that once and for all and finally
that settles the question of the subpena.
Now, Mr. Cohn
Senator MuNDT. I hope so. Proceed.
Senator Jackson. Just one point. I want to make it clear
Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson.
Senator Jackson. That based on the rules of the committee, all
members of the committee are entitled to this information and 1 don't
think for one moment that it should be construed from the subpena
that we are not entitled to that as members of the committee.
I do say that the latter part of the subpena, Mr. Chairman, which
excludes memoranda relating to informants or information that Mr.
Schine may have worked on, is not acceptable on our side for the
reason that we are entitled to that information, and while I am not
asking for the names of informants, I do think that you as chairman
and the counsel should have the information as to whether or not in
fact such memoranda exists as a result of the efforts of Mr. Schine.
Senator Mundt. May the Chair say chat the Senator from Wiscon-
sin told him at noon that that information would be made available to
counsel and to the Chair without a subpena, all the names of the in-
formants, and the Chair said he would be glad to receive it and report
on the number of memoranda, but he did not expect to be a vehicle for
conveying the names of informants.
Senator Jackson. Why don't we cancel the subpena and agree that
this information be made available ?
Senator Mundt. That is perfectly all right with the Chair.
Proceed with the interrogatories.
Mr. Cohn. Senator Mundt, I might say, sir, that with respect to
this entire discussion, I understood that this morning I was directed
to produce these very things. No subpena at all was necessary, of
any kind. I am prepared to obey that direction and I will do that.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1725
Senator Munht. We "vvill nssiinie tliat on the subpona there was a
sliiiht misunderstanding, but it at Jeast provoked a very inviting
del)ate.
Senator Jackson-. Mr. Chairman, that information can be sub-
penaed without the subi)ena 'i
Senator Mundt. The information will be obtained and the confi-
dential informants' names will be delivered to the ('hair whose lips
will remain sealed. lie will not reveal the informants.
INIr. Welch. JNIr. Chairman, this is not a political speech, I have
no political ambitions. I do wish Mr. Jenkins to ask a question. Be-
fore adjournment, INTr. Jenkins would you be good enough to ascer-
tain from this witness, if he can be good enough to give the names
of the stenographers and secretaries who took the Schine dictation?
Mr. Jenkins. Will you do that?
]\Ir. CoHN. As Mr. Welch knows, I have not testified that Mr. Schine-
dictated anything to the stenograj)hers in Washington. We have no
stenographers in New York; they are all in Washington. JVIr. Schine
was not in Washington once, that I know of, during the entire time
he was at Fort Dix, No such thing as Mr. Welch asks for exists. 1
am sure he knew that. If he would like the names of the stenographers
in our office, I imagine those are a matter of record and w^e would
like to do that. I might say, sir, if I am ever given the chance, we
will supply to the committee all documents, memoranda, reports, and
any other information worked on by Dave Schine since he came to
the committee which might be of interest to the committee and Mr.
Welch.
Mr. Jenkins. Both before and after November 3 ?
Mr.Cohn?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir ; we will give you everything.
Mr. Jenkins. As we miderstand it, that will be made available if
physically possible to this committee not later than next Tuesday
morning?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And if there are any secretaries or stenographers that
Mr. Schine gave any dictation whatsoever, their names will likewise
be available?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Senator JVIundt. Mr. Welch that seemed to answer your question.
Mr. Welch. I am not interested in documents that Mr. Schine may
have worked on, in the sense of looked at, read, or thought of. I want
his work product, the dictation that he produced, and I want Mr. Cohn
to understand that is what I am after.
Mr. Jenkins. I think Mr. Welch, that has been made perfectly clear
to Mr. Cohn.
Ithas, hasit not?
]\Ir. Cohn. Sir, the only thing— I am going to go through the files
and give you everything that we have that Dave Schine worked on
or had anything to do with, with the exceptions of the names of the
confidential informants.
Mr. Jenkins. The chairman has made a statement about that. Let's
proceed, if we may.
Mr. CoiiN. I have already testified to much length about the work
that he did, and the fact that he ])articipated in the writing of these
reports. I have furnished to Mr. Welch the reports which he par-
1726 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
ticipated in writing, and if Mr. Welch is interested in this point, I
would be very glad to state under my oath here, that when Mr. Schine,
after his training, was out to work on committee business, that, to my
knowledge, he Avas working on committee business, did work on these
reports, did confer with the stati members of this committee on com-
mittee business, was not in Florida, or anything else. That is the fact,
that Mr. Welch has my sworn testimony, and, of course, at the right
time, I will be opened to cross-examination from him about that.
Mr. Jenkins. And on Tuesday morning next you will furnish to
this committee all documentary evidence, wliatever it may be, wliich
embraces the work of David Sciiine ?
Mr. CoHN. I will, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, we have now settled, and I think and I
hope, once and for all the question of the issuance of the subpena and
the question of whether or not the junior Senator from Wisconsin will
or will not go to jail, and at the noon hour you and I had completed
our cross-examination with respect to the occurrences of October
20, at Fort Monmouth, is that correct?
Mr. CoHN. I have forgotten even just what we ended on, sir, but
I believe that was it.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you recall the testimony, Mr. Cohn, of Mr. Adams
to the effect that between October 20 and November 1, you and he
had several telephone conversations with respect to special assign-
ments for David Schine ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't recall the words "special assignments," sir. If
you say that, I
Mr. Jenkins. Well, with respect to G. David Schine. Do you re-
call Mr. Adams' testimony ?
Mr. Cohn. No doubt, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. That covers a 10-day period.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I would like to read to you, Mr. Cohn, what he says
about that.
Mr. Cohn. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins (reading) :
I have checked my notes.
This is the testimony of Mr. Adams on page 2522 of the record.
Thei'e were regular telephone calls, 2 or 3 a day. I can't say every day there
were 2 or 3, but I was in telephone contact quite regularly with Mr. Cohn who
spent most of his time in New York, and with Mr. Carr who spent most of his
time in Washington.
Do you mean subsequent to October 20?
That is correct, sir.
Then, continuing:
What I am trying to tell you, Mr. Jenkins, is that between October 20 and
November 1, I had numerous conversations. I cannot precisely state in which
of these conversations the subject of Mr. Schine and his treatment was dis-
cussed, but it was discussed during that period.
Is that correct, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. That there was discussion about Schine ?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, and the treatment of Mr. Schine.
Mr. Cohn. As best I recall, Mr. Jenkins, I actually don't recall
any specific conversation with Mr. Adams. I know that during that
period of time there was discussion about Schine being on temporary
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1727
fluty for 2 weeks or a longer time, in order to complete his committee
work and do some work on tliese reports. 1 certainly might have
discussed that with Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. The time was then drawing near when Dave Schine
was going into the Army, wasn't it?
JNIr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. He was to enter in November.
ISIr. Jenkins. It was then known by you and to the Senator, no
doubt, and to the members of his staff, that he would be inducted on
November 3; is that correct?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I will ask you if it isn't a fact that you
requested that he be given a 2 week leave of absence?
Air. CoTiN. Sir, what I did was this : I talked, I believe, my recollec-
tion is, with Mr. Stevens rather than Mr. Adams. We had been dis-
cussing this matter on a number of previous occasions, and I believe,
sir, that I did discuss with Mr. Stevens the question of what arrange-
ment could be made for Schine to finish up his work and to turn over
certain information and work on these reports. An arrangement was
worked out whereby he would go in the Army and then get 2 weeks'
temporary duty in order to do some of these things.
Mr. Jenkins. That is, he would be sworn in
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. But not physically go in?
Mr. CoHN. That is correct.
Mr. Jenkins. And spend the first 2 weeks of his tenure in the office,
out of the Army?
Mr. CoriN. That is about right.
Mr. Jenkins. That is what you wanted?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, INfr. Cohn. wasn't that a rather unusual request,
that this boy here, out of the millions of privates in the Army who have
come and gone and who are now in the Army, that this one young
man would be taken somewhere and put through the formality of an
oath, and then instead of putting on the uniform and being given the
training which is ordinarily given the millions of other privates
during that first 2 weeks, this boy, of all boys, be allowed a 2 week
furlough which you say you requested for the purposes you say you
requested it — didn't you consider that, Mr. Cohn, especially in the
light of all these previous requests that you had made in his behalf,
and which, as I understand, you have admitted here, as being rather
unusual?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I saAv nothing unusual or improper, and if there
were, I am sure ]\Ir. Stevens would not have done it, and he did do it.
Mr. Jenkins. Don't you know, as a matter of fact, Senator Mc-
Carthy, your superior, for whom you were working, went to the Secre-
tary or to Mr. Adams, or both, and said "Don't do it. This boy will
be seen on the streets of New York, and it is known by the public and
the ])ress that he is an inductee, and don't give him this 2 weeks'
leave of absence"?
INIr. CoiiN. It didn't happen quite that way.
Mr. Jenkins. How did it happen, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoiiN. It haj)pened in this way, sir: I talked with Mr, Stevens
about the problem over the telephone. Mr. Stevens told me that the
way to work it out was by this 2 weeks' temporary duty. I think he
1728 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
went into some detail about that. I told him that I would have to
check wtih Chairman McCarthy and see if that arrangement was
agreeable with him.
I talked to Senator McCarthy, and he said that it sounded all right.
I think I then called back Mr. Stevens and said that the Senator said
he thinks it is all right.
The arrangement was put into effect by Mr. Stevens. Senator
McCarthy had been away. When he came back he said, as you put it,
Mr. Jenkins, that there probably would be criticism, I think he said,
from the hostile press if, after Schine was inducted, he was not in
uniform and down at the post and was still working with the com-
mittee for this 2-week period.
Senator McCarthy sent for Schine — I think he spoke to him after a
hearing — and asked him whether or not he would be willing to do this
work after hours and over weekends after training, and go right in,
and put in the extra work after hours insteael of recreation and other
things, and thereby eliminate the need for this 2 weeks, and it probably
would have turned into more than 2 weeks' temporary duty.
Schine said that he was perfectly willing to do that ; that he would
do the training and the work at the same time.
Senator McCarthy then communicated with Mr. Adams or I com-
municated with Mr. Adams — I don't recall — and said that Mr. Schine
was willing to do this work after hours, and there would be no need
for this 2 weeks or more of temporary duty.
Mr. Jenkins. But you had requested it initially, had you not?
Mr. CoHN. Sir
Mr. Jenkins. You can answer that yes or no. Mr. Cohn.
Mr. CoHN. I can answer it in this way, Mr. Jenkins : There was this
problem, there was a question of how it could be worked out, how he
could be given the time to finish it. This idea evolved. I don't know
whether originally it was my idea or whether I explained the situation
and Mr. Stevens came back to me and said this is the way it can be
done according to regulations. I don't recall that. I don't quarrel
about it one way or the other. I will be glad to say
Mr. Jenkins. The truth of the matter is you wanted him to spend
his first 2 weeks in the Army out of the Army, did you not?
Mr. CoHN. No. sir. The truth of the matter is that there was this
problem of finishing the subcommittee work and Mr. Stevens stated
that one way of arranging for that would be by giving him temporary
duty after his induction. I am sure, sir, there could have been nothing
wrong with it or Mr. Stevens wouldn't have done it, and he did do it.
Mr. Jenkins. And at your request?
Mr. CoHN. Pardon me, sir?
Mr. Jenkins. At your request?
Mr. CoHN. Yes. I explained the situation.
Mr. Jenkins. To put it another way, you did not want Dave Schine
at Fort Dix the first 2 weeks of his Army tour, did you ?
Mr. CoHN. I didn't care where he was. It was a question of get-
ting this work done.
Mr. Jenkins. You wanted a furlough for him?
Mr. Cohn. No; it was a question of getting this work done.
Mr. Jenkins. I know it was a question of getting his work done.
I am not asking you why you wanted furlough now but you wanted a
furlough for him the first 2 weeks of his Army tour, didn't you?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1729
]Mr. CoiiN. Tlmt was one aiTanj^enient that was discussetl. I cer-
tainly Avill not quarrel with you about that.
Mr. Jenkins. All right. I will ask you if you didn't ask the Secre-
tary for another arraniienient in the alternative at that time.
JNIr. CoiiN. At that time, sir?
]\rr. Jknktns. Yes. This CIA assignment.
Mr. CoHN. No. The (TA thing was discussed loi.g before that, sir.
Mr. Jf.nkins. Very well. I want to read to you from the testimony
of Mr. Adams at page 2521):
I mil quite sure it was not a teU'i)lione call, but Senator McCarthy said to
1110 ho did not fool this Iciiiiiorary duty for Scliino was a j;ood thiiifi, that ho folt
that iioopio, nioniliois of tho press, who nii,i;ht be critical, hostile with liini, or
critical of Schine or Mr. Colin or this coniniiltee, might consider that it was a
form of proferonfial Ireatniont and he would prefer, and he asked if I would
arrange to have the temporary duty cancelled.
Did you know that Senator McC'arthy did that?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. After he talked with Schine, as I have
described it, and Schine agreed to do the work after hours, Senator
McCarthy told Mr. Adams that that would be
Mr. Jenkins. After you requested a 2- week furlough, then Senator
McCarthy went over your head, so to speak, and requested tliat it be
cancelled? That is the truth about it, isn't it?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir; it is not.
Mv. Jenkins. Not true ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir. It did not happen that way. After talking
with Mr. Stevens, I told Mr. Stevens that I would have to check with
Senator McCarthy from wliom I took orders. I called Senator Mc-
Carthy. He told me that he thought this temporary duty arrange-
ment would be all right. I called Mr. Stevens back and said that
Senator McCarthy said he thought this temporary duty f rrangement
would be all right. It Avas put into effect by Mr. Stevens.
Senator McCarthy returned from a trip, reexamined the situation,
and decided that he Avould be — he said first of all the 2 weeks would
turn into more than 2 weeks because these reports certainly could
not be finished, and that he would be much happier about it if Schine
would agree to do this committee work after hours and do his training
at the same time.
He first talked to Scliine to see if he was agreeable to this. Schine
was agreeable and said he would do it, and after that the Senator
communicated with Mr. Adams just about as you have stated it there,
sir. There was not any question of disagreement. I took my orders
from Senator McCarthy on that.
IMr, Jenkins. Very well. Mr. Cohn, isn't it a fact that after Sena-
tor McCarthy told the Secretary and/or Mr. Adams wdiat we have just
related, that is, about not allowing this boy to be seen on the streets
Mr. ConN. I don't remember anything about the streets.
Mr. Jenkins. To a hostile press and that sort of thing, didn't you,
after that, request that he be given at least the balance of the weekend?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir, I think the way that happened was this. There
was a discussion right at the time as of when the cancellation of tem-
porary duty should be effective. Mr. Adams said that, "I think some
order could go out either canceling it effective immediately, but,"
he said, "since the weekend is coming up, they probably — I don't know
if they take people down on Saturday or Sunday, whatever it was —
1730 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
we will make it Monday. Is that agreeable ?" Or we said Monday, is
that agreeable? My recollection is that Senator McCarthy was there.
Mr. Jenkins. May I read to you the testimony of Mr. Adams on that
subject? It is very short, and let's see if it is correct:
Subsequcrit to that time and out of Senator McCarthy's presence, Mr. Cohn,
who was aware of this request —
speaking of the request of Senator McCarthy —
stated to me that "as lonj< as it is the middle of the week now," which would have
been the 4th of November, "there is no use canceling it and having him report
in on Friday morning. There is nothing for him to do, so why don't you just
cancel it for him to report it on next Monday morning?"
Mr. Cohn, you remember making such a recjuest of Mr. Adams, don't
you ?
Mr, Cohn. No, sir ; I remember there was a discussion between, as
I recall it, Mr. Adams, Senator McCarthy, and myself about this, and
that is my recollection. I can certainly be wrong about it, and that
the date was set at that time. I also remember, sir, that it was said
that Private Schine would report on a Monday morning. I think
when Mr. Adams drew up the orders, it turned out that he made it
a Tuesday morning instead of a Monday morning, and there was a
further mixup on that.
Mr, Jenkins. Do you remember a meeting with Mr. Adams at your
office at 101, this building, on November 1, Mr. Cohn?
Mr, Cohn. On November 1 ? No, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. On November 1, Senate Office Building, 101.
Mr. Cohn. I don't remember. I don't even remember if I was in
Washington that date, sir. I would have to check the records on that.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you remember that Mr, Adams stated to you on
that occasion that it was in the national — may I read his testimony to
you with reference to that matter ?
Mr, Cohn. Surely, sir.
Mr. Jenkins (reading) :
I pointed out to him —
that is, to Mr. Cohn —
that I was 15 years his senior and that although I did not at all presume to be
as good a lawyer as he was — I am sure that I am not — that I did feel that there
was one field in which I could give him some friendly advice if he would take it.
Do you remember that ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir, I don't remember tliat because it didn't happen.
Mr. Jenkins. "I pointed out to him," you remember him telling you
you were a better lawyer than he was, don't you ?
Mr. Cohn. I think there was constantly an argument between the
two of us as to which one was the better lawyer, with my suggestion
that he was better representing the interests of Secretary Stevens and
with his suggesting that I was better representing the interests of
this committee, I don't think cither one of us arrived at a conclusion.
I am sure Mr. Adams is better.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr, Adams testified to this, "I pointed out to him that
the national interests required that Schine be treated just like eveiy
other soldier." Do you remember him pointing that out to you, Mr.
Cohn?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1731
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir, and I miglit say that in my relationship Avith
Mr. Adams there were not any speeches such as that made by him
to me.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, whether there was or whether there wasn't,
that statement is a oood statement, isn't it?
IMr. CoiiN. It is a very good one, sir.
Mv. Jenkins. That the national interests required that Schine,
as well as everv other one of the millions of bovs that have served
before, that are serving now, and that will serve hereafter, be treated
precisely alike ? You agree with that, don't you ?
Mr. Cohn. I do, sir.
j\Ir. Jenkins. But you deny that Adams said that to you ?
]Mr. Cohn. I say that I don't recall on any occasion Mr. Adams
making that type of speech to me. Our relationship was not such,
and I just don't recall that ever having been said to me.
Mr. Jenkins. x\nd here is Mr. Adams further now, sitting right
where you are, a few days ago, page 25-^3 :
sir. Adams. It was tbe wrong clause to use, because he exploded at that and
said if the national interest was the thing we were interested in, he would give
us a little bit. He outlined how they would hold a series of hearings and point
out to us — he would give us a little national interest if that was what we were
interested in.
Mr. Cohn. When is this supposed to have happened, sir ?
Mr. Jenkins. It is supposed to have happened, Mr. Cohn, on the
1st day of November, in your ofKce, room 101. That is the testimony
of John G. Adams. You recall it here on the witness stand?
Mr. Cohn. I recall his testimony, sir. I recall no such incident.
INIr. Jenkins. IMr. Cohn, you say you recall no such incident?
Mr. Cohn. I do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. He says you were talking about Dave Schine on
J^ovember 1st.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. He says you had called him a number of times be-
tween October 20 and November 1st and Dave Schine's name had
been discussed.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. You say I called him. I think Mr. Adams
called me as much or more often than I called him.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. We will put it that way. You called
him and he called you.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins, And that there were a number of calls, he says some-
times 2 or 3 a day.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir ; and very few relating to Schine.
INIr. Jenkins. But some?
Mr, CopiN. Yes, sir ; that he was discussed.
]Mr. Jenkins. Well, Mr. Cohn, in what respect were you discussing
Schine betw^een October 20 and November 1 or any other time, if
you were not discussing him in relation to some dispensation that you
or your staff wanted for him ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, we did not consider it a dispensation. There was a
matter of committee work that had to be done independently. There
was a matter of training that Schine was to do, has done, and will
continue to do in the Army. There was a matter of working both of
1732 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
those things out so that they both could be done without interfering
with each other.
We did not regard that, sir, as a preference, and we certainly never
asked for anything which we thought was a preference.
Mr. Jenkins. But you had known then for more than 3 months that
you were going to lose Dave Schine from your staff, you say ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir ; that it was probable.
Mr. Jenkins. And that he had those 3 months' time within which
to impart to your mind the things which he had in his mind and which
he had not documented ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir; it is not quite as simple as that, as I explained
before. Without going over all the ground, we had for one thing and
probably the most important thing, the question of these reports.
In July we tried, we tried very hard to make arrangements to have
these reports which are, after all, just about some of the most impor-
tant products of this committee's work during the year, we tried to
have that work turned over from Dave Schine to somebody else. We
had reason to believe that that would succeed. It did not succeed.
I did not know in July that it would not succeed. I did not know that
in August. I did not know that in September. There is nothing I
could have done about it during that period of time. There are other
things which came up. There are things which are still coming up,
from time to time. There are matters concerning the Voice of Amer-
ica, new matters, matters relating back to things which he had done
which I could not possibly anticipate. It has been necessary for us
to call him from time to time.
But he has been doing his Army training, and he has been giving
lis his information, and we certainly did not use any improper means,
such as Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams suggest, on any of these things,
and Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams never told us that we were. And if
vre were, I am sure they would not have done any of the things we
discussed.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, would or not an inordinately large num-
ber of telephone calls and personal contacts with respect to this one
private, whether or not those conversations were in the friendliest
manner or whether they were characterized by heated discussions, if
there were say 65 telephone calls
Mr. CoHN. I am sure there were more, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. There were more ?
Mr. CoHN. I am sure of that.
Mr. Jenkins. In which David Schine's name was mentioned ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Then the Secretary of the Army has understated the
case in that respect ?
Mr. CoiiN. No. sir. I think he is inaccurately stating the case.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you say inaccurately ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. But j-ou say now that there were more than 65 tele-
phone conversations ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I know that there were times during the week when
Senator McCarthy would call me or Frank Carr or other staff mem-
bers and ask about something which Schine knew about, that we would
call down to Dix, have Schine call us, tell us about it, call back Senator
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1733
]\IcCartliy, or have him call Senator McCarthy directly, and I think
if you add up the number of those calls, they would be hioher.
Mr. Jenkins. No, I am talkin<»; about the calls from the members of
your stall' and the Secretary of the Army and Mr. Adams. The Sec-
retary of the Army says there are 65 of those.
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I didn't understand him to say that. I understood
him to say, and I mi^ht be wrong about this, that there were 65 calls
about Scliine, and I thought he was includino; in that calls that might
have been made down to Fort Dix, to the commanding general or some
one on his staff, asking that Schine call up someone on the staff or
Senator McCarthy to give them some information or answer some
question.
There were times, I remember, when we did not even require that
Schine would call up. We would simply call down there and say,
"Can you get an answer to this question, can you get us this
information."
Lieutenant Blount or somebody else would pass along something
and then call back and say, "The answer is this," or "Look for it here,"
or whatever the particular matter happened to be. ^
Mr. Jenkins. Did you ever try to get a commission for any other
private or any other inductee other than Dave Schine ?
INIr. CoiiN. Not that I recall, sir, although I might have been given
as a reference, as I was by Mr. Schine, by other persons.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you ever try to get any other private or inductee
especially assigned to any given area in the Army ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, we never had anybody on our committee staff who
had done this work, inducted before. There was no comparable
situation.
Mr. Jenkins. That is hardly an answer to my question.
Mr. CoHN. My answer to your question is no, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Is "No" ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins, Do you deny that you and/or other members of the
McCarthy staff talked to Secretary 'Stevens and Mr. Adams, or both
of them, a total of 65 times on the telephone with respect to G. David
Schine?
Mr. CoHN. I am in no position to confirm or deny that, sir. I
will say this: If your question is, to Mr. Stevens or Mr, Adams on
Schine, I am sure that there were not 65 specific phone calls between
us and Stevens and Adams on Schine.
INIr, tfENKiNS. That is
Senator ]\IcCarthy. ]\Lay I interrupt, Mr. Counsel ?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, indeed.
Senator McCarthy. I may be wrong, but I am inclined to think
the figure 65 was used in connection with calls made to Fort Mon-
mouth, not in connection
Mr. CoiiN, Fort Dix, sir.
Senator McCarthy. I mean Fort Dix, and not calls made to Mr.
Stevens,
Idr. CoHN. I thought that was a composite figure of calls with the
Army about Schine. I may be very wrong, Mr, Jenkins, I guess we
can check Mr. Stevens' statement. 1 thought it was a composite figure
of calls with the Army, calls and meetings with the Army about
Schine. I thought that embraced everything.
1734 BPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Senator McCarthy. Let's not use the word "composite".
Mr. Jenkins. If the Secretary — we will have his statement to pre-
sent to you here momentarily, I hope, Mr. Colin — suppose we defer
that question until we do have it.
Mr. CoHN. If he says that the calls were between Stevens and Adams
and us on Schine, you are right, sir, and I am wrong, and I will
apologize. I thought it was
Mr. Jenkins. You certainly owe me no apology, Mr. Cohn. I
am trying to elicit the facts here. But if he says there were 65 tele-
phone calls between his office and your office and its various members
with respect to G. David Schine, would you deny that ?
Mr. CoHN. I would say, sir, before I answer that I would have to
know ii he means, if he includes in that, calls down to Fort Dix, and
there were some, I believe, to Camp Gordon to get information from
Schine. If he includes those, T would say the figure is low. If he
does not include those, I would say the figure is very high.
Mr. Jenkins. Very high ?
Senator McCarthy. I hate to interrupt you, Mr. Jenkins, but may
I say 1 was listening to the testimony of Mr. Stevens, and if there
were only 65 calls made to Dave Schine at Camp Dix, then my office
staff was not following my instructions, because I know I asked them
much oftener than 65 times to call Dave Schine and get information
from him.
Mr. Jenkins. Senator, that was not my question.
Senator Mundt. That was not a point of order.
Mr. Jenkins. That was not my question. May I read to you — I
am now reading from the statement of Secretary Stevens, being the
statement that he filed and which Avas sworn to here :
From mid-July of last year until March 1 of this year, David Schine was
discussed between one branch or other of the Department of the Army and
Senator McCarthy or members of his staff in more than 65 telephone calls.
Senator McCarthy. What is that? What is the page?
Mr. Jenkins. Page 142. This is the statement filed —
]\Ir. Cohn. I believe that does conform with what we thought, Mr.
Jenkins, that the reference was not to calls between Mr. Stevens and
Mr. Adams and us, but included, if I might quote :
^alls between one branch or the other of the Department of the Army and
Senator McCarthy or members of his staff,
and that, of course, would include calls to Fort Dix and to Camp
Gordon. And on that basis I would say, sir, that the figure is probably
low.
Mr. Jenkins. But that does not include your calls to Dave Schine,
does it ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I don't believe we would call him directly. What
we would have to do is call down to Fort Dix to the headquarters
there and ask that he call us back. I assume that they were counting
a call which we might have made down there asking to have him call
us, as a call between us and someone in the Army in which Schine
was discussed. I don't quarrel with them in doing that.
Mr. Jenkins. Let's read it again, Mr. Cohn.
From mid-July of last year until March 1 of this year, David Schine was
discussed * * *.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1735
If you called Fort Dix and talked to General Ryan or Captain Corr
and wanted to talk to Dave Schine, that would simi)ly have been a
request that Dave Schine call you. It would not have been a discus-
sion of Dave Schine, would it ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, my interpretation is that those calls would be in-
cluded in this. If I might respectfully sugf^est, Mr. Jenkins, if the
Army could oive us a breakdown on this we would know. They have
not.
]\Ir. Jenkins. Very well. If the Secretary means what you say,
then you say it is true ?
Mr. CoiiN. I say the figure is low, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Is low ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. If the Secretary means otherwise, and that is, that
it involves a discussion between you or the McCarthy committee and
the executive branch of the Government in which Dave Schine was
discussed with reference to dispensations or treatment for him, you
say it is high ?
Mr. CoHN. I do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What about this statement of the Secretary, that
during the same period the matter was discussed at approximately
19 meetings between Army personnel and Senator McCarthy or mem-
bers of his staff ? That excludes Dave Schine, doesn't it, any discus-
sion with Dave Schine, and it excludes any discussion except a
discussion between Army personnel — that would include General
Kyan — and Senator McCarthy and his staff? What do you say about
that, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. I would say that is susceptible to just about the same
interpretation, because if I went down to see Schine and I went in
first and talked to Lieutenant Blount, or something like that, I sup-
])ose that would count as a discussion. I just don't know what they
mean, sir. It is very hard when they give you a general conclusion
here without giving you the facts to support it, to know just what
we are talking about. If we could get a breakdown, I would be very
happy to testify as to a specific fact. I can't very well do that on the
basis of these conclusory statements.
Mr. Jenkins. Here he has said that there were 84 discussions,
either telephonic or personal, with respect to this one private in the
Army. Now, Mr. Cohn, on your own interpretation of what it is,
don't you think that that is an unusually large number of conversa-
tions, and the consum])tion of a lot of time with respect to this one
private in the Army, regardless of the knowledge that he had in his
investigations on the McCarthy committee? Don't you think that?
Mr. Cohn. Under the circumstances in which the contacts were had
and the information was being gotten and the general picture on the
committee, and the fact that it did not interfere with his training,
as has been testified to here, and that he did not receive preferential
treatment, as has been testified to here, my answer to your question
would be, "I do not, sir."
Mr. Jenkins. You do not think so ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
]Mr. Jenkins. Would you sa}' that any effort on your part to get
these leaves of absence, to get a commission, to get him assigned to
the New York area, was influenced even to the slightest degree by
1736 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
your friendship for him, your fondess for him, your closeness to him?
Was it or not ? What do you think about that ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, my answer to you would be this : As far as finishing
the committee work was concerned or anything like tliat, no. What I
did and what I was instructed to do was done only with relation
to committee work and without any regard to the fact that Dave Schine
or anyone else on the stalf might be a personal friend of mine. Inso-
far as the commission is concerned, sir, he gave me as a reference on
that application for a commission, and I would say that the response
I gave, I would have given on interrogation about that, would have
been influenced by my acquaintance with him and the fact that I had
known him before he had come with the committee. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you know that on November 7 the Senator from
Wisconsin, the chairman of the committee, called Mr. Adams and said
that Roy Cohn thought Schine should be a general in the Army and
run it from a penthouse on the Waldorf-Astoria ? Have I misquoted
you, Senator ? I don't mean to.
Senator McCarthy. You certainly have.
Mr. Jenkins. All right. I beg your pardon. I want to get pre-
cisely what it is. [Reading.]
Now in that conversation Senator McCarthy said that one of the few things
that he had trouble with Mr. Cohn about was David Schine.
You heard that testimony, didn't you?
Mr. Cohn. I read that testimony, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And this further :
Roy thinlis that Dave ought to be a general and operate from a penthouse
on the Waldorf-Astoria, or words to that effect.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Jenkins, I hesitate-
Mr. Jenkins. I don't say you say this. I am reading from the
testimony.
Senator McCarthy. May I say I hesitate interrupting you. I
think you are equally vigorous in your cross-examination of both sides.
Mr. Jenkins. I believe you said the other day I was equally unfair
to both sides.
Senator McCarthy. May I say, Mr. Jenkins, that I did call the re-
porter and tell him to be sure to strike that because I meant "equally
vigorous." I do think if you have a question about this conversation
between McCarthy and Adams or Stevens, Mr. Cohn is in no position
to answer the questions. I think you had better question me.
Mr. Jenkins. I assume he has heard about it.
Senator McCarthy. I am sure your cross-examination of me will be
sufficiently vigorous to bring out those facts.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did Senator McCarthy tell you about mak-
ing such a statement ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir ; he did not.
Mr. Jenkins. Did Mr. Adams tell you that?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, did Senator McCarthy have trouble with you
about Dave Schine?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, Senator McCarthy has at one time or another had
trouble wnth me about myself and just about every other member of
the staff. Did he have any serious trouble with me about Dave Schine
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1737
or aiiv other member of the staff? The answer to that is "No," sir.
Our ollice is just like every other oHTice of its kind, except, perhaps, it
is a good deal busier, tempers are short, and we try to get out a lot of
Avoik, and the boys down there do the very best job they can. There
are dill'erences ofopinion. If Senator McCarthy t^uggests on occasion
that we do things in the wrong way, we probably do, and he is prob-
ably completely justified. I would "hope that we could be judged, that
they could be judged, on the overall result, which is the ])ro(luct of a
good deal of luird Avork and I hope not entitrely unsatisfactory, the
overall result in the action of the committee during the last year in
exposing Communists in vital places and in performing what I hope
has been some kind of a service.
]Mr. Jknkixs. Well, it isn't true that you lose your head, now, when
Dave Schine's name is mentioned and he is not kept off of K. P. duty
or thinks like that?
]\fr. CoHN. That is completely untrue, sir.
]Mr. Jenkins. Completely untrue?
]\Ir. (^oiiN. Yes, sir.
ISIr. Jenkins. You never tried to get him excused from K. P.?
Mr. CoHN. The only incident
Mv. Jenkins. Did you hear the question?
Mr. CoHN. Yes.
j\ir. Jenkins. Did you ever try to get him excused from K. P. duty ?
]Mr. CoiiN. I am trying to answer your question, sir. The only
incident where I heard any discussion about Dave Schine and K. P.
was the incident taking place the beginning of January when he was
to get some kind of duty, it turns out to be K. P. during a day, a non-
training day, when he was to w^ork on one of these reports which was
due to go to tlie printer within a few days. At that time I believe I told
Lieutenant Blount and everyone else who had anything to do with it,
that for my money, they could put Dave Schine on K. P. all night long,
every niglit of the week, but that I would appreciate it if within the
arrangements stated by Mr. Stevens on November G he could be avail-
able to do the work he had to do during nontraining hours. Sir, out-
side of that, I never expressed any interest and I had none on the
number of times Dave Schine was on K. P. or anything else, and
1 have none now\
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, it is now 5 o'clock, and I think it is a
good time to quit while we are on K. P. duty.
Senator Mundt. May the Chair say that just about a thousand years
ago one time, he started out to become a schoolteacher and sometimes
had difficulty with disorderly pupils that he had to keep after school.
So tonight he had to keep you until 5. He was going to quit at 4: 30.
So we will now recess until 10 o'clock Tuesday morning.
Happy holiday to everybody.
(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 10
a. m., Tuesday, June 1, 1954.) /
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INDEX
Page
Aflanis, John G 1720-1734, 17:50
Air Force base (McGuire Airfield) 1700
Ariuistice Day 1704, 1705
Ariuv (United States) 1090,
1098, 1700, 1701, 1703, 1705, 1708-1710, 1724. 1727, 1728, 1731-1735
Assistant Secretary of State 1715
Atomic Energy Commission 1720
Attorney General (United States) 1713,1714,1717-1719,1722
Baarslas, Karl 1708
Baker East 1702
Baker West 1702
Blount, Lieutenant 1733, 1735, 1737
Bradley, Colonel 1700
Brownell, Herbert 1714, 1720
Camp Gordon, Ga 1701, 1734
Carr, Francis P 10y7, 1098, 1703. 1704, 1709, 1721, 1720, 1732
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 1729
Christmas holiday 1703, 1704
Cohn, Roy M., testimony of 1090-1737
Communist conspiracy , 1720
Communist infiltration at Fort IMonmouth 1712
Communist infiltration of tiie Government 1712
Communist Party 1700, 1701, 1712. 1719. 1720. 1722, 1737
Communists 1700, 1701, 1712. 1719, 1720, 1722, 1737
Congress of the United States 1720.1723
Corr, Captain 1735
Counselor to the Army 1720-1734, 1736
Department of the Army 109G,
1G9S, 1700, 1701, 1703, 1705. 1708-1710, 1724, 1727, 1728, 1731-1735
Department of Justice 1705
Department of State 1708,1715
Dworshak, Senator 1720
Eisenhower, President 1717, 1722
Engineering project report (Voice of America) 1702
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 1702,1717,1720
Fort Dix 1703, 1704, 1705, 1700, 1711. 1725. 1732. 1733. 1735
Fort Monmouth 1098, 1704, 1705, 1710, 1726
Government intelligence agency 1701
Government Printing OfRce 1710
Greenglass, David 1705
Hiss, Alger 1715
Hoover, J. Edgar 1713, 1717, 1718, 1720
Hotel Waldorf-Astoria 17.".0
Information Center program 1097
Information Center report 1702
International Motion Picture Service 1097
International Press Service 1096
Jackson, Senator 1715, 1719
Juliana, Jim 1097, 1098, 1703
Justice Department 1705
K. P. (kitchen police) 1737
Kirke 1698
Lavelle, Colonel 1706
Lawton, Maj. Gen. K. B 1698
Lewis, Fulton, Jr 101)0
II INDEX
Pagi
Lewisburg Penitentiary 170;
McCarthy, Senator Joe 1G98, 1C!)9,
1701-1703, 170G, 1708-1716, 1718, 1721, 1722, 1727-1730, 1732-173
McClellan, Senator 1712-1714, 171L
McGuire Airfield 1706
Miami, Fla 170;
Mims, Mrs. Frances 1G<J7, 10!);
Mutual Broadcasting Co IfiiJi
New Year's holiday 1704
New York City 1701, 172G, 1727
Overseas Information Service 1710
Peress, Maj. Irving l(i!)S
President of the United States 1712, 1717-1719, 1722, 1723
Prewitt, Mr 1711
Radar secrets to Russians 1701
Reorganization Act 1715, 1719
Rogers, Mr 1703
Ryan, General 1'
Schine, G. David IGOG, 1G98-1711, 1713, 1714, 171G-1718, 1724-173'^
Secretary of the Army 1G98, 1727, 1728, 1730, 1732-1735, 1737
Senate of the United States 171G, 1721-1723
State Department 1708, 1715
Stevens, Robert T 1G98, 1727, 1728, 1730, 1732-1735, 1737
Symington, Senator 1716
United States Army 1G9G, 1G98, 1700,
1701, 1703, 1705, 1708, 1710, 1724, 1727, 1728, 1731-1735
United States Assistant Secretary of State 1715
United States Atomic Energy Commission 1720
United States Attorney General 1713, 1714, 1717-1719, 1722
United States Department of Justice 1705
United States Department of State 1708, 1715
United States Information Agency 1G96
United States President 1712, 1717-1719, 1722, 1723
UP story 1714
Voice of America 1696, 1697, 1700, 1702, 1708, 1710, 1711, 1732
Voice of America engineering project report 1702
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel 1736
Washington, D. C 1G98, 1709, 1725, 173C
White House 1Z23
o
I
/ .^J-^(^
SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRE-
TARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR
JOE McCarthy, roy m. cohn, and
FRANCIS p. CARR
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S- Res. 189
PART 46
JUNE 1, 1954
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46620° WASHINGTON : lliyl
Boston Public Library
superintendent of Documents
OCT 2 7 1954
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOSEPH R. McCAKTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Daliota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Aikans-as
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HEKRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho JOHN F. KENNEDY, M:is*acliu«tts
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland THOMAS A. BURKE, Ohio
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan
Richard J. O'Melia, General Counsel
Walter L. RErxoLos, Chie} Clerk
Special Subcommittee on Investigations
KARL B. MUNDT, South Dakota, Chairman
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho STUART SYMINGTON, Misrsouri
Ray H. Jenkins, Chief Counsel
Thomas R. Puewitt, Assistant Counsel
Robert A. Collier, Assistant Counsel
SoLis HoRwiTZ, Assistant Counsel
Charles A. Ma.ver, Secretary
II
fe
I
CONTENTS
^ , Page
Index I
Testimony of —
Cohn, Roy M., chief counsel. Senate Permanent Snl)committee on In-
vestigations 1740
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SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES AND
COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN C. ADAMS. H. STRUVE
HENSEL AND SENATOR JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN,
AND FRANCIS P. CARR
TUESDAY, JUNE 1, 1954
United States Senate,
Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Government Operations,
Washington^ D. C.
The subcommittee met at 10:10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in the
caucus room of the Senate OfHce Building, Senator Karl E. Mundt,
chairman, presiding.
Present: Senator Karl E, Mundt, Eepublican, South Dakota;
Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Kepublican, Illinois; Sen-
ator Charles E. Potter, Eepublican, Michigan; Senator Henry C.
Dworshak, Republican, Idaho; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat,
Arkansas; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and
Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.
Also present: Ray H. Jenkins, chief counsel to the subcommittee;
Thomas R. Prewitt, assistant counsel; Charles Maner, assistant coun-
sel ; and Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk.
Principal participants present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy,
United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin; Roy M. Cohn,
chief counsel to the subcommittee; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel
for the Army ; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army.
Senator Mundt. The committee will please come to order.
We will resume our hearings. The Chair will start once again by
welcoming our guests who have come to the committee room and telling
J ou we are happy to have you here to attend these public hearings and
to tell you about our committee ruling, which is not new to those of you
"who have been here before, but that we have a committee rule forbid-
ding any audible manifestations of approval or disapproval on the
part of the audience in any form or at any time.
The committee has given the uniformed officers that you see before
you and the plainclothes men scattered in the audience a standing
order to remove from the room politely but firmly and immediately
any of our guests who for reasons best known to themselves violate
tlie terms by which they entered the room. Those terms included
completely refraining from any manifestations of approval or dis-
approval. We have had wonderful cooperation from our friends in
the audience and we expect that cooperation to continue.
1739
1740 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
As we conchuled last Friday, Counsel Jenkins was in the process
of cross-examining Mr. Roy Cohn, and that cross-examination will
continue at this time with Mr. Jenkins, our counsel, continuing the
cross-examination.
Mr. Jenkins.
FUETHEE TESTIMONY OF EOY M. COHN
Mr. Jen^kins. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cohn, I again remind you that it is still my painful duty to
continue the cross-examination of you as a witness.
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you recall a meeting with Secretary Stevens, Mr.
Cohn, on November IG?
Mr. Cohn. I do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Will you tell the members of the committee what
occurred on that occasion?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. That meeting came about as a result of a call
to me from Mr. John Adams on the afternoon of the 15th. It relates
back to the press conference which Mr. Stevens had held on November
lo, and I don't know just how much detail you want me to give, Mr.
Jenkins, on all those incidents.
Mr. Jenkins. What I particularly want to ask you, Mr. Cohn, is
this : As a preface to that question
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. State whether or not Senator McCarthy was quite
upset over the press release given out by Mr. Stevens.
Mr. Cohn. I don't know whether I would say upset, sir. He felt
Mr. Stevens had made untrue statements in the course of the press
conference, and that disturbed him.
Mr. Jenkins. The statement being to the effect that there was no
current espionage in the Army, is that right ?
Mr. Cohn. It was more than that, sir. There were other state-
ments with which Senator McCarthy quarreled.
Mr. Jenkins. That was the part of it to which the Senator particu-
larly objected?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, if I recall, there were three parts. One was just
as you mentioned, a report that Mr. Stevens had said that there had
been no espionage at Fort Monmouth. I believe that is the way the
newspaper story which caused the most comment read, the one in the
Herald Tribune by Homer Bigart.
No. 2, as I recall it now, Mr. Stevens was reported to have said that
none of the suspensions at Fort Monmouth related in any way to the
theft or removal or disappearance of documents, which we knew to
he untrue.
No. 3, 1 recall, Mr. Stevens had in his press conference given to the
press a breakdown as to the number of suspensions which had taken
place, which breakdown he had previously refused to give to this com-
mittee on the ground that it was security information covered by
the Presidential directive, and the chairman of the committee couldn't
quite understand why Mr. Stevens would hold a press conference and
give out information which he had told the committee he couldn't give
to the committee because it was security information. There might
have been other things but I remember those three very particularly.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1741
Mr, Jenkins. I Avill ask you whetlier or not on that occasion you
stated to the Secretary of the Army that he had doublecrossed Senator
McCarthy.
Mr. CoiiN. No. sir; I don't recall nsinfj those words at all.
Mr. Jenkins. I want you now to refresli your recollection, Mr.
(John, and to serve your memory and to state as nearly as you can to
this connnittee just what you said to the Secretary of the Army, if
anything, with reference to a doublecross.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. As 1 recall it, Mr. Adams called me the day
before and asked me to come down to see Mr. Stevens. He told me
that the matter was of such importance to Mr, Stevens, Mr. Jenkins,
that if I could not come down to Washington the next morning, Mr.
Stevens would fly up to New York to see me that night, which was a
Sunday night.
I had to be back in New York IMonday afternoon but I certainly
was not going to put the Secretary of the Army to the trouble of
flying up to New York just to see me, so I went down on Monday
morning at his request.
Mr. Stevens was very much upset at the way the press had reported
his press conference. He said they had distorted what he had said,
that they had badgered him at the conference, that 1 or 2 reporters
got hold of him and were throwing unfair questions at him. ISIr.
Adams kept saying he knew the whole thing was a mistake and for
that reason he had purposely left the room before the press conference
took place.
Mr. Stevens said he could fully understand that Senator McCarthy
would take issue with the press stories and their accuracy and that
he would like to repudiate everything he had said at the press
conference.
For my part, I told Mr. Stevens I had talked with Senator Mc-
Carthy, who was speaking up in New England — I told Mr. Stevens
that Senator McCarthy felt and that I felt and Frank — we all felt
who knew the facts about the thing that it had been unfortunate
because the facts had been misrepresented in the newspapers and
that certainly he had given an inaccurate portrayal of the situation
as it had existed.
Mr. Jenkins. My specific question is whether or not you told the
Secretary that he had doublecrossed Senator McCarthy.
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I do not recall using that word, and I am quite sure
1 didn't use that word. This conversation
Mr. Jenkins. Do we understand by that that you specifically deny
<hat,Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. Mr. Jenkins, my best memory is I did not use that worci
Mr. Jenkins. I want to read you what the Secretary says, page
372 of the transcript of the record.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins (reading) :
Mr, Cohn said that Senator McCarthy was mad.
Did you say that ?
Mr, CoHN. I said he was mad. I certainly conveyed the impres-
sion that Senator McCarthy felt the story was inaccurate and Mr.
1742 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Stevens, if he said what he was supposed to have said, shouldn't have
said it because it wasn't true.
Mr. Jenkins (reading) :
And Miat I had doublecrossed him.
Mr. CoHN. No, sir, I don't recall that.
Mr. Jenkins. I know you say you don't recall. Do you deny or
admit it or say that j^our memory fails you on that subject?
Mr. CoHN. You are asking me to give you word for word what was
said on that clay, November 16. I can't do that. I can give you the
substance of the conversation, because I remember it. I cannot swear
to you what exact words I did use and what exact w^ords I did not
use. I can give you tlie substance of it and I would be very happy
to do that.
Mr. Jenkins. As I understand it, you neither affirm nor deny that
statement?
Mr. CoHN. I can say that the best I can give you on that, would be
a guess, and my guess would be that I did not use it. I cannot recall
using the word "doublecrossed" to Mr. Stevens and I cannot see the
appropriateness of it in connection with this discussion about the press
conference. It was a very pleasant discussion.
Mr. Jenkins. You say it was a pleasant discussion ?
Mr. CoHN. Extremely so, on both sides.
Mr. Jenkins. The Secretary changed his statement, did he not ?
Mr. Co UN. He did the next day ; yes, sir.
]\f r. Jenkins. On November 17, at the Merchants Club in New York
City?
Mr. CoiiN. Y^es, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You say you don't recall using the word "double-
crossed" to the Secretary ?
Mr. CoHN. I do, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And I believe you say you don't recall ever having
used that word to the Secretary, "doublecrossed" ?
Mr. CoHN. I don't recall.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you ever remember having used the word "double-
crossed" to Mr. Adams, the Secretary's counselor ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You do not ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Anyway, the press release was altered on the I7th
day of November, was it not ?
Mr. CoHN. I would say it was corrected to bring it in conformance
with the true facts.
Mr. Jenkins. There was a newspaper strike in New York City in
November, was there not, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. There very well might have been, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, now, Mr. Cohn, don't you remember well that
on November 28 there was a newspaper strike in New York City?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir, I don't remember that well. I do remember,
after hearing Mr. Adams' testimony, that there was a — yes, I do
remember that there was a newspaper strike.
Mr. Jenkins. And these hearings that were being conducted in New
York City were, as a result of that strike, transferred to Washington;
were they not ?
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1743
Mr. CoHX. They were not, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. They were not ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. AVell, Mr. Cohn, they were transferred to Washin<^-
ton : weren't they ?
]\Ir. Cohn. No, sir; they were not transferred to Washington. We
had previously lield hearings in Washington. We held some in New
York. Whenever i)ossible, we would hold them in Washington.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. Now, perha]:)S, my choice of the word
"transfer-' was an unhappy one, and conveyed an erroneous meaning
to your mind. What I mean to ask you is this : Upon the occasion of
the newspaper strike in New York City, the hearings were held in
Washington during the ])endency of that strike; weren't they?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I can't agree with you on that. I don't believe that
to be the fact, and I would very much appreciate this, if I could get
the dates of the newspaper strike and see whether it was on the days
that we held hearings in Washington, which I believe were December
8 and 9. I could give you a better answer if I had that.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, there was a strike during the period the latter
part of November 1953, Mr. Cohn, was there not? Do you not re-
member that?
Mr. Cohn. I know definitely that there was a strike. If I could get
the exact dates on it, sir, I would be in a much better position to help
you on this.
Mr. Jenkins. Why were there no hearings held in New York City
during that newspaper strike, if there were none held ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't know that there were none. It probably would
turn out that there were. I just don't know, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, do you know if there were any held in
New York during that time ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir, I can't tell you a thing until I know the dates of
the newspapers strike, and then by a check of the records I can tell
you very quickly whether there were any in New York and whether
the ones held in Washington were held in Washington during the time
of the newspaper strike in New York.
Mr. Jenkins. I want to ask you, Mr. Cohn, if it isn't a fact that
there was a neW'Spaper strike in New York City in the latter part of
November, and that these hearings were then held in the city of
Washington because they could not and were not publicized in New
York City?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You heard Mr. Adams testify on that subject; did
you not ?
Mr. Cohn. I did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you hear Mr. Adams testify under his oath that
Mr. Carr, the director of your staff, told him that the reason the
hearings were transferred to Washington was because of the strike
in New York City and as a consequence the hearings could not be
properly publicized, whereas they could be in the city of Washington?
You heard Mr. Adams testify to that; did you not?
Mr. CoiiN, Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did Mr. Carr make such a statement, to your knowl-
edge ?
46020°— 54— pt. 40 2
1744 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. I am sure he never made such a statement seriously, sir,
ami I am sure Mv. Adams knew that he never did.
Mr. Jenkins. He wouldn't have made it jocularly, would he?
Mr. CoHN. He might have, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Would you say if Mr. Carr did make such a state-
ment— did you ever talk to Mr. Carr about that?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir, I have no recollection of ever having talked to
Mr. Carr about the newspaper strike.
Mr. Jenkins. Can you assign any reason whatever why these hear-
ings were held in Washington during the pendency of the newspaper
strike in New York City?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, first of all, I can't say they were held in Washington
during the pendency of the strike, because I don't have the date the
strike was under way. I know hearings were held on December 8 and 9,
and if you tell me the strike was on December 8 and 9
Senator McCarthy. ]\Iay I interrupt, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Senator JNIcCarthy?
Senator McCaktiiy. If you feel there was anything improper about
holding hearings in Washington about Communist infiltration, I am
appalled. I was the man who ordered the hearings held in New York,
held in Boston, held in Washington, and held in other places. I don't
understand Avhat this has to do with the issues. However, if Mr.
Jenkins thinks it has, I will be glad to answer in full why we held
hearings in various parts of the country.
Mr. Jenkins. Senator, I want to ask about it. The committee may
think that it is important, and that is why I am asking.
Senator Mundt. The Chair believes counsel has a perfect right to
interrogate the witness.
Senator McCarthy. I don't object.
Senator Mundt. And the Senator from Wisconsin may object if he
wants to. May the Chair suggest that there be no interruption this
week unless there are points of order or points of personal privilege,
and of course the Senator from Wisconsin
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. Have you a point of order?
Senator McCarthy. You may call it that, I don't know.
Senator Mundt. I want to know whether you call it that and
whether you will state it. We will have to proceed now.
Senator McCarthy. I want to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that
if there was anything improper about holding hearings in Washing-
ton, hearings were held here, I ordered them held here, I ^yi]l answer
any questions, when I get on the stand, on them. |res«ii
Senator Mundt. The Chair heard you the previous time.
Mr. Jenkins undoubtedly will ask you questions about it. The
Chair reiterates the statement that there be no interruptions, please,
this week, unless they are points of order or points of personal privi-
lege. We believe we are on the home stretch of these hearings, and if
we are going to get home we have to proceed in order.
Mr. Jenkins ?
Senator McCarthy. I have a point of order here now, Mr,
Chairman.
Senator Mundt. You may state your point of order.
Senator McCarthy. As a point of order, I would like to ask the
1st
)Ir,
izatioi
COD(]d(
was
Jlr„
k
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1745
enter in tlie record a wire from an individual w\\o was mentioned
last week a; an informant. 1 will not ask that this be put in the record
at this time. I am askino; that the Chair read it. I hope he gives
all members of the committee copies of the wire. It shows the extent
to which the Justice Department is going to prevent the testimony of
certain witnesses being received here.
May I say, Mr. Chairman, that I find on the back of this wire cer-
tain notes. For that reason, I wish the Chair would use this wire
himself.
Senator Mundt. The Chair Avill endeavor to read it during the
lunch hour. Proceed, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkixs. Mr. Cohn, during the period from November 18 to
December 8 do you know how many times you called Mr. John Adams?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You heard Mr. Adams testify with respect to numer-
ous telephone calls from you during that period of time, did you not?
Mr. CoHN. I thought he said that we had numerous conversations,
sir. I believe he made just as many calls to me as I did to him.
Mr. Jenkins. I think you are entirely correct. But you and he
called each other from time to time, a number of times during that
period, as a matter of fact.
Mr. CoHN. Surely.
Mr, Jenkins. In those telephone calls the subject of Dave Schine
was discussed from time to time, was it not?
Mr. CoHN. I would say infrequently, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Infrequently ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. I w\ant to read you what Mr. Adams said about that,
^Ir. Cohn, on page 2564, and ask you whether or not he is correct in
liis testimony. [Reading.]
There were calls to me fairly regularly. I can't say that the calls to me were
?very day. There were some long-distance calls from New York. There were
xcasions during this period where the press of committee business or the requests
)n the Army required me to place telephone calls to Mr. Cohn, and during many
Df these calls which I placed to Mr. Cohn I was subjected often during the course
Df the telephone calls to the same sort of treatment, extreme pressures, with
•eference to a commitment for a New York assignment for Schine immediately
it the conclusion of his 8 weeks of basic training.
Is that true or false, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr, Cohn. Sir, it is very difficult for me to put a legal character-
zation on it. I would say Mr. Adams is quite mistaken. If he were
pressured or abused he certainly never indicated that to me and I be-
ieve you will find the circumstances of my calls were many and his
conduct of them to be such that no reasonable person can believe that
le was abused or felt that he had been,
Mr. Jenkins. You did want Mr. Schine assigned to the New York
if irea, did you not ?
Mr. Cohn. There was never a question of any permanent assign-
nent of Mr. Schine to the New York area.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, INIr. Cohn, that is not an answer to my question.
Vly question is specifically, you did want Schine assigned to the New
fork area, did you not?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. The question was the finishing up of this com-
nittee business which had to be done in the New York or "Washington
1746 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
area. Mr. Adams knew the problem, and that is what the discussions
were about, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I am afraid you still haven't answered the question
directly. It is specifically: You did want Schine assigned to the
New York area, is that right or is it wrong?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir; I can't give you a categorical "Yes" or "No"
answer to that question.
Mr. Jenkins. Why can you not?
Mr. CoiiN. Because the thing just doesn't admit of it. It was a
question of having to finish up the subcommittee business. Mr. Adams
knew all about that situation. He knew that it would be a convenience
if Schine could be in the New York or Washington area until he got
through with that. But if you ask me did we ask for a commitment
on what sounds like a permanent assignment to the New York area,
I can't fairly give you a yes or no answer to that.
Mr. Jenkins. But, Mr. Cohn, I didn't sav anything about a perma-
nent assignment. The question was simple. Did you want Schine
assigned to the New York City area? Now, I think you can answer
that "Yes" or "No" and then make such explanation as you see fit.
]\Ir. Cohn. Surely, sir. I would say "No," we did not request an
assignment for Schine
Mr. Jenkins. I didn't ask you about a request. I am asking you
about a mental state, now, what was in your mind. Did you want him
assigned to the New York area ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir, I would say, if I had to go in to our mental
state, what we wanted was to get the subcommittee work done and the
reports out, and we wanted Scliine's help as much as we could get that
without interference with his regular Army training. I would say
that was our mental state at that period of time.
]Mr. Jenkins. And wanting that, you wanted him assigned to a
convenient post, and the New York area would have been the most
convenient area to which he could have been assigned, that is correct,
isn't it?
Mr. Cohn. Not quite, sir, it never quite got down to that, because he
was at Fort Dix, and they were making him available during the
weekends, and we could send staff members out to talk to him, or talk
to him on the phone when problems arose, and there was no great
difficulty.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, did you ever ask the Secretary of the Army
or his counselor, John Adams, to assign this young man Schine to the
New York area ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir, I don't believe anything that blunt came up.
It was a question of the problem of finishing the subcommittee work,
and working out some way of his doing that without interfering with
his Army training.
]Mr. Jenkins. You heard all this testimony by the Secretary of the
Army, by Mr. Adams, about these numerous calls, requests, on your
part, on the part of the Senator, to get this boy assigned to the New
York area so that he could assist in the committee work, and you say
that didn't happen, is that right, now ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. I am trying to give you the picture as it did
happen. There was just never a request, "Assign him to the New
York area," period. This problem had been discussed by us with them
I
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1747
over a period of time. They knew wliat tlie problem was, and it wijs
always a question of letting him linish up his subcommittee work with-
out interfering with his Army training. That was a problem on both
sides, and we both did our best to work the thing out and it was worked
out, sir, in a perfectly satisfactory manner.
j\Ir. Jexkins Mr. Cohn, do you remember meeting with Mr. Adams
on December 8 ?
Mr. CoiiN. I remember the
Mr. Jknkixs. Do you remember a hearing on December 8 ?
Mr. CoiiN. I do, sir. I think that was the day Aaron Coleman tes-
tified in public session down in Washington.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you talk to Mr. Adams on that occasion about
Dave Schine during the course of the hearing ?
Mr. CoHN. I can't say that I did, sir. I certainly don't deny that
I talked with Mr. Adams on that occasion,
]\Ir. Jenkins. That hearing w\as held right here in this room, wasn't
it?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
]Mr. Jenkins. And Mr. John Adams was sitting approximately
where Mr. Maner is sitting to my rear ?
Mr, Cohn. Excuse me, Mr. Jenkins. I have gotten a note here, I
don't know how authentic it is, that the newspaper strike was not on
the days that our hearings were held in Washington, namely on De-
cember 8 or December 9. I assume the information is authentic.
Mr. Jenkins, Very well. I am asking you noAv, Mr. Cohn — you
had a perfect right to put that into the record. I don't know when
the newspaper strike was on.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir,
Mr, Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you recall this hearing here on December
8, do you not ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins, You say you do not remember talking to John Adams
about Schine wdiile the hearing was in progress ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you deny talking to Adams about Schine while
those hearings were in progress ?
Mr, Cohn. No, sir. I say it is unlikely, though, sir, for this reason,
if I might explain my "no" answer,
I looked at Mr. Adams' original charges filed on March 11, and in
those I believe, sir, he said that he talked to me about Schine before
the hearings started. Then in his testimony here at this hearing, he
changed that and said that I talked to him during the hearings. And
if Mr. Adams isn't straight on it, sir, I don't think I can be expected
to be. It is very possible that there was conversation between him and
me about Schine on the subject of staff members seeing him at night
while he was doing his training. Whether that took place before the
hearing or during the hearing or on the next day or whether it didn't
take place at that time, I am in no position to affirm or deny it.
Mr. Jenkins. AVas Schine being given additional work to do along
about that time or after he was inducted in the Army, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Additional, sir ?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, new^ assignments.
JVir. Cohn. No, sir.
174S SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. New work to do ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jexkins. New witnesses to interrogate?
Mr. CoHN. Pie was not, sir.
• ]\ir. Jenkins. Was not?
Mr, CoiiN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. It was a question of finishing up his work?
Mr. ConN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You heard General Ryan testify that Schine told
him that his work was increasing, did you not, Mr. Colin?
Mr. CoiiN. I think that was a true statement, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. A true statement?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. In other words, he was retrogressing instead of
progressing in the getting up of these rejjorts? Wouldn't that be the
effect of it?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir; it wasn't quite that. 1 think that is about the
period of time that he got hit with the full impact of finishing these
reports with a time limit on it. Doing these reports turned out to be
quite a formidable job. There was a lot of hard work that he did on
those, and a lot of hard work that I think just about every other
member of the staff did on tliose reports. It got to the point, Mr.
Jenkins, where I think we stopped holding all hearings for a period of
aboivt a month just to get those reports out. It was quite a job.
JMr. Jenkins. Very well. We will get back to thnt. I am asking
you now about December 8, about these public hearings, and I want
to ask you about what Mr. Adams swore under oath, and I want to ask
you whether or not it is true or false. I am reading now from page
2574 of the record, from the testimony of Mr. Adams:
0.1 a number of occasions during the course of interrogation of tlie witness,
wlien others were interrogating them, Colin got up and came over and spol^e to
me about Schine, saying things to the effect "What ai)out Dave's thing, wliat
about Dave's thing, what about Dave's thing?" It continued intermittently
th;ont;hout the morning.
What do you say about that, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoiiN. I would say this, Mr. Jenkins, first of all I am just
looking here at Mr. Adams' original charges of March 11 in which
he set forth a detailed account of these events. If you are talking
about December 8, there is not one word about my having said any-
thing to him about Dave Schine on December 8, and I assume Mr.
Adams' memory was better when he drew this document on March 11
than it was 2 months later when he testified before this committee.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, that document of March 11 was a general
statement, and I am talking to you now about specific testimony in
support of those statements. And he says that on December 8, during
a public hearing in this room, you continuously asked him "What
about Dave's thing?" Do you deny it or is it the truth or do you
have no recollection about it?
Mr. Cohn. I have no recollection of talking with him, sir, and I
would say since he makes no reference to it in his own original charges
here, in all probability it did not happen.
Mr. Jenkins. You won't say definitely that it did not happen?
You don't definitely deny it?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1749
Mr. Jenkins. Well, if it is true, tlien, what did you mean by Dave's
thing?
Mr. CoHN. I tliink what we were discussing then was this change
of situation occasioned by tlie order that stall' members could not talk
to Schine after training on week nights down at Fort Dix. There
was some discussion about Mr. Adams — between Mr. Adams and my-
self— on the change in the weekend and week-night arrangement.
That discussion continued until we worked out a formula that helped
us in our work and did not interfere with Schine's army training.
There certainly might have been discussion about that during this
period of time, sir. Whether it was on December 8 or not, I just don't
know.
Mr. Jenkins. On or about the 9th of December, you learned that
a weekend pass for Schine had been canceled, did you not, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't think so, sir. I think that was some period of
time before that.
]Mr. Jenkins. Well, did you learn of the cancellation of a week
night pass on or about December 9th ?
Mr. Cohn, I don't know, sir. Once again I thought that that was
before. I might be wrong.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you if this happened, that you learned some
time, about December 9th, that a pass, whether weekend or week-
night, a pass for Schine had been canceled, and that you went to
Adams, talked to Adams and told him that it was just another Army
or Stevens' doublecross ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir ; I don't recall using those words.
Mr. Jenkins. You don't recall using that word "doublecross"?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I believe you testified a while ago that you never re-
called at any time using the word "doublecross"?
Mr. Cohn. I do not recall ever having used that word, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What did you say to Mr. Adams about the cancella-
tion of that pass for Dave Schine ?
Mr. Cohn. The discussion I had with Mr. Adams was about work-
ing out some arrangement whereby Dave Schine could be available to
staff members after his training hours and get this work done. We
worked out an arrangement on November 6, and before that, that
arrangement was just fine with us and worked out well. When the
arrangement was tried and reexamined, it was a question of working
out some kind of a new arrangement that would not interfere with his
training but would give us an opportunity to get the information and
get the work done.
I did talk to Mr. Adams, I would say, infrequently about that, sir.
That might have been on December 8 or 9 or around that period of
time. I certainly don't dispute that.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I again read you from Adams' testimony,
page 2577 of the record :
Mr. Adams. December 9, yes, sir. Cohn was aware of this decision on week-
days, and he was again getting up regularly from the committee table, coming
over to speak to me about Schine's availability, and he was very put out, petulant,
about the decision on weeknights. He talked to me about Mr. Stevens and con-
sidered this a doublecross, an Army doublecross of a commitment already made.
It was a Stevens doublecross.
What do you say about that, Mr. Cohn ?
1750 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. I say about that, sir, I don't recall it, and I am inclined
to doubt that it happened that way, because again, sir, I am looking
at the specific statement Mr. Adams made 2 months ago in his charges
filed March 11, where he gives a completely different version of that
conversa-tion.
Mr. Jenkins. You say you are not definite and sure about it. Will
you deny it ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir. I will afRrm
Mr. Jenkins. You don't deny it ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir. I will affirm to you, sir, that I did discuss with
Mr. Adams — rather, he discussed with me first this change in ar-
rangement, namely, that the weekends were going to be shortened
and that week-night passes for consultation with staff members and
work would not be allowed. There was a question of a readjust-
ment which would make it possible for us to get our w^ork done and
make it possible for Schine to continue his training like every other
soldier. There were discussions w^ith Mr. Adams about that.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you recall Mr. Adams testifying that you
were so persistent and pressured him to such an extent that he de-
cided to go and talk directly with Senator McCarthy about it. You
recall that, do you not ?
Mr. CoHN. I recall that testimon}', sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You recall the fact that he did go to Senator Mc-
Carthy?
Mr. CoHN. I recall the fact that he went to Senator McCarthy, not
about that, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you, Mr. Cohn, if it isn't a fact that when
you learned that Mr. John Adams had gone to talk to Senator Mc-
Carthy, you told John Adams that you would tench him not to go
over your head and talk to the Senator ?
Mr. CoHN. It didn't happen that way at all, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did it happen approximately tliat way ?
Mr. CoHN. I don't even think you can say it happened approxi-
mately that way, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. "Wliat did happen ?
Mr. CoHN. Wliat hai^pened, sir, as I recaH it, is this : Mr. Adams
had had a discussion with us after these hearings in Washington on
the 8th and 9th. On both days I believe Mr. Adams had had the cus-
tomary discussion with us about when the hearings could be ended,
and Mr. Carr and I told him that nothing could be done about that.
Mr. Adams on the 9th, sir, w^ent up to see Senator McCarthy and
asked Senator McCarthy directly whether or not he would not bring
about an end of these Fort IVIonmouth hearings. After I heard about
that, I remember talking to Mr. Adams. I don't know whether it was
that day or not.
Mr. Jenkins. May I interrupt you, Mr. Cohn ?
IMr. CoHN. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you if Senator McCarthy didn't tell you
that Mr. Adams likewise talked to him about your intercessions for
Dave Schine ?
Mr. Cohn. He did not, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. He did not ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well, you may go ahead.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1751
Mr. CoiiN. After John went up to see the Senator about fjettinijj
these hecarings stopped and talked to him about tliat, the Senator told
somebody, who told us about the conversation. I remember that
Frank Carr and I talked with John Adams about it, sir, and there was
nothing along the lines that you suggest. As I recall it, 1 talked to
John first, and I told him — I asked him about his conversation with
Senator McCarthy, and whether he had had any luck in getting the
hearings stopped. He said that he had not and, as I recall it, he said
lie hoped I did not mind his having spoken with Senator McCarthy
about the matter directly, because John Adams and I were on one
lower level and Senator McCarthy and Mr. Stevens were on a higher
level.
I think, sir, after Mr. Adams was in the picture, if I had Avanted to
talk to j\Ir. Stevens about some cooperation that we were or weren't
getting from the Army, I would have gone to Mr. Adams, who was on
my level, and asked him to set up the date, and then gone along with
him to see Mr. Stevens.
Mr. Adams didn't do that with us, but he went right up to see
Senator McCarthy. As I recall it, Mr. Adams wanted to know if I
was annoyed at that.
Mr. Jenkins. Were you?
Mr. CoHN. I told him, sir, as I recall it, that if the tables were
turned and I had wanted to see Mr. Stevens about something like
that, I probably would have called Mr. Adams first and asked him to
make the date, and gone along w^th Mr. Adams, who was on my level,
Decause if I didn't do that, sir, it probably would have looked like
something of a reflection on Mr. Adams.
Then Mr. Adams told me, as I recall it — he said, as I recall it, "I
;hink you are right, but Frank Carr suggested to me that I go up and
;alk to Senator McCarthy. Frank Carr told me, 'Why don't you go up
md talk to the chairman about it ? We can't stop the hearings. He
;an.' "
The matter was dropped right then and there, because if he had
alked tc Mr. Carr about it, and Mr. Carr told him to go up and talk
;o the Senator, that was certainly fine.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, as a matter of fact, you were put out
because Mr. Adams had gone over your head and talked directly to
he Senator ; that is the truth, isn't it ?
Mr. CoHN. There just was not that much of a question about it.
Mr. Jenkins. You weren't angry about it?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir ; I was not angry.
Mr. Jenkins. You didn't upbraid him about it?
Mr. CoHN. No; I didn't upbraid him.
Mr. Jenkins. When he swore under his oath here, "I said to him — "
itrike that. [Reading:]
He said he would leach me what it meant to go over his head. I said to him,
■Roy, is that a threat?" and he said, "No, that is a promise."
You say that didn't happen, Mr. Cohn, that that is purely a figment
»f the imagination of Mr. Adams and is false ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir. I would say it is probably quite an exaggerated
iccount of something that was not much of an incident at all.
Mr. Jenkins. Is there any basis whatever for that ?
46G20°— 54— pt. 40 3
1752 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir; I would say the basis for it is the fact that
Mr. Adams did go to see Senator McCarthy on or about December iJ
about these hearings. I was not along, and I did discuss with Mr.
Adams some time after that the fact that he had gone to see Senator
McCarthy and had told him that if the tables were turned I prob-
ably would have called him to make the date with Mr, Stevens and
he hadn't done that. He told me, as I recall it, that he had spoken to
P'rank Carr before he went up to Senator McCarthy and that Frank
Carr suggested that he should go up. That was that, far as I was
concerned.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you have an argument with Mr. John Adams
fibout when the weekend starts, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. I did have a discussion.
Mr. Jenkins. You had a discussion ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What was it?
Mr. Cohn. As I recall it, sir, I think that took place on the 4th of
December. I can fix that date pretty well because a friend of mine
was in my office, it turns out, when I was talking to Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you mind revealing the name of that friend at this
time?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I would rather check with him first and then tell
you about it afterward. I am sure he would have no objection.
That conversation I think was Friday afternoon, December 4, and
I did have a discussion with Mr. Adams about when a weekend starts.
It es, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, do you mean by that that there was a disagree-
ment between you and Mr. Adams about when a weekend started ?
Mr. Cohn. There was a discussion.
Mr. Jenkins. What was the discussion, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. There was a lot of talk that afternoon.
Mr. Jenkins. Let us condense it now, if you will, please.
Mr. Cohn. Very well, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And just tell us what that discussion was.
Mr. Cohn. The discussion was about changing the time Schine
would have available to work on the committee reports. He ordinar-
ily had been available after training on Friday and was able to put
in a full day Saturday and a full day Sunday. That arrangement
was changed around the beginning of December so that he was not
available until some time during the day Saturday, which cost us
a day. I discussed that with Mr. Adams, sir, and suggested that
this was not in accordance with the original arrangement we had made.
Mr. Adams said, "Well, you are right, we did say weekends," and we
had previously interpreted weekend to mean from the end of the day
Friday until the end of the day Sunday or until Monday morning.
Mr. Jenkins. Whose interpretation was that?
Mr. Cohn. That was everybody's at the beginning, sir, Mr. Adams'
and ours.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you and Mr. Adams when you agreed on week-
end passes place an interpretation on what a weekend meant ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. Actually we didn't. I thought and I guess
he thought that we assumed that weekend meant from the end of Fri-
day until Monday rxiorning.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1753
Mr. Jenkins. Well, now, is that -what you say a weekend is, from
tlie end of Friday, or Friday afternoon, or the beginning of Friday
evening, until Monday morning; is that your interpretation?
Mr. CoiiN. Until Sunday night or Monday morning. Yes, sir. In
other words, if I might put it a different way, Saturday and Sunday
would be the 2 weekend days.
Mr. Jenkins. And you did have a discussion with Mr. Adams about
it ? You say it didn't amount to an argument?
Mr. CoiiN. I did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. He put a different interpretation on it, didn't he ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. He said it started Saturday noon?
Mr. CoHN. It wasn't a question of putting a different interpreta-
tion on it, sir. There was a lot of talk back and forth and we both
agreed that up until that time both he and I had interpreted it to
mean Friday afternoon until Sunday night, and then there was a
change. The whole thing got back to "Well, what was meant by a
weekend." I said, "I thought it was meant the end of the day Friday
until Monday morning or Sunday night." And Mr. Adams said a
weekend meant anything anyone wanted a weekend to mean. There
was a discussion about that.
Mr. Jenkins. I take it you were wanting Mr. Schine, now, for this
committee work?
Mr. CoHN. Sure.
Mr. Jenkins. For no other purpose?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir ; for no other purpose.
Mr, Jenkins. Mr, Cohn, do you know how many long-distance
elephone calls you put from yourself to — pardon me. Do you know
low many long-distance telephone calls you put in to John Adams
m this 1 day? Now, you say this discussion happened on Decem-
)er4?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir ; that is the best I can fix it, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well, we will accept that as the date. How
nany times did you call John Adams on December 4, long distance,
,bout anything ?
Mr. CoHN. About anything ?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr, CoHN. Mr. Adams says 2 or 3 times, that is about right. 1
mow there were 2 or 3 topics of conversation, sir, and I know that at
east 2 of those 3 topics of conversation required additional phone
alls to be made from me to Mr. Adams. I would say on 2 or 3 is
)robably right.
Mr. Jenkins. I want to show you a telephone record.
Mr. CoHN. You don't have to, Mr. Jenkins, if you will tell me
phat it is.
Mr, Jenkins. I will tell you what it is, and I will show you the
ecord, Mr. Cohn, and it is here for all to see, the record being that
in the 4th day of December there were four long-distance telephone
alls from Mr. Cohn in New York City to Mr. John Adams.
Mr, CoHN. It could be, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Just examine it and tell me.
Mr. Cohn. I don't even have to do that, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Is that correct ?
Mr. CoiiN. No doubt, if the record shows that ; sure.
1754 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. And I will ask you, Mr. Colin, if they weren't with
reference to what a weekend meant?
Mr. CoHN. They were not, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. They were not?
JNIr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Why did you call him four times on that day?
Mr. CoHN. Let me tell you what happened that afternoon, sir, and
1 will tell you why there were four phone calls. I didn't know I
placed them all. My recollection is that on 1 or 2 occasions he had
called me back and I called him again
Mr. Jenkins. The record shows they were all from you, Mr. Cohn,
from New York City to John Adams.
Mr. CoHN. Very well. I recall one thing that necessitated a fur-
ther phone call was this : Mr. Adams on that afternoon — and I start
<his by saying that I allege nothing whatsoever improper on this —
had taken up with me the question of getting theater tickets for his
aunt, whose name I recall but don't want to mention here unless you
want me to. She lived in Brooklyn.
Mr. Jenkins. That is not necessary.
IVIr. CoHN. In fact, there were two aunts. They lived in Brooklyn
and Mr. iVdams was going to be in New York the next week or w^eek
after. He gave me a list of 2 or 3 shows, and he asked me if I could
line up some tickets for one of those shows. No. 1, and if. No 2, 1 could
call his aunts at some number he gave me in Brooklyn and agree on
an evening with them when they would be available to go, and agree
on the name of the show, and get the tickets and let him know, and
he would plan to be in New York on that particular evening.
As I recall it, sir, and I am sure of it, I placed a call to his aunts
in Brooklyn and I placed a call, I know, to the theater ticket broker
to see if I could get a particular show. I think he wanted Tea House
of the August Moon, and I don't think we could get tickets to that.
I called Mr. Adams back and I brought him up to date on that par-
ticular situation. We discussed in some length those arrangements on
that day. As I say, that little theater party finally came off on
December 16.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, did you discuss Schine ?
Mr. ConN. Yes, sir. I told you about that.
^Ir. Jenkins. On each of those four calls ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir, I doubt if he was discussed on each of those
four calls at all.
Mr. Jenkins. You say you doubt it ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
]Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you remember Mr. Adams' testimony on
that subject, don't you ?
Mr. Cohn. I do, and I am not finished telling you what we tallced
about.
Mr. Jenkins. I beg your pardon. I didn't mean to cut you off.
Mr. Cohn. There was one other topic of conversation and that topic
of conversation was General Lawton. Mr. Adams talked to me on
that occasion about some new allegations against General Lawton,
in which Mr. Adams thought he mi<jht be relieved of his command
and in which Mr. Adams thought might have a particularly appeal
to me in getting me to help Mr. Adams have Senator McCarthy agree
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SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1755
not to make a public issue if (leueral Lawton were relieved of his
command. As a result of certain statements Mr. Adams made to me,
1 afjreed to check those statem.ents with certain people I knew in Now
York who might have knowledge of it and s^ot to the source. I tele-
phoned on that afternoon, sir, to two ])eo|)le I knew in New York
who would have knowled^je of those statements about General Lawton,
and I recall reportinc; back to JMr. Adams on what those people had
to say about General Lawton, and I also recall makin^j a tentative
arrangement to have Mr. Adams see one of those people during the
next week. I do recall, sir, that I spent a substantial period of time
talking to Mr, Adams on that particular afternoon about these various
subjects. I think I s])ent probably an hour and a half or 2 hours
on the phone with Mr. Adams about these subjects.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, Mr. Adams' testimony, and if I am in
error you may correct me and you may refer to page 2582 of the
record, that on those occasions, on the 4th day of December, you used
obscene language, language that he couldn't repeat here in the presence
of the spectators or the radio or television, unprintable language,
vituperative language. What about it?
Mr. CoHN. Well, sir, I am not going to deny that there might be
certain things that I say and I believe all of us say that we would not
say on television. As far as using vituperative or obscene language
is concerned, I have talked to practically all of my friends about that,
and the consensus of opinion is that if anything I use a good deal less
of cuss words than most people do.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you talk to yourself about it, now?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I am asking you now about Roy Cohn's version of it,
not what your friends say about the type of language you used. John
Adams swore that you used bad words.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. I don't know what he calls a bad word and
what he meant, sir. I will very freely tell you that on occasion I might
use a word which I would not use here on television.
Mr. Jenkins. Is that when you are angry ?
Mr. CoHN. It might be when I am angry.
Mr. Jenkins. Like October 20 at Fort Monmouth ?
Mr. Cohn. It wouldn't necessarily be when I am angry. It might
be when I am talking to another man and we are talking about some-
thing we don't like, or something like that. It could be on a lot of oc-
casions, sir. I do want to say this, while I very freely admit that I
have used words that I would not be prone to repeat
Mr. Jenkins. You have the usual repertoire of bad words, I take it,
Mr. Cohn ?
]\Ir. CoHN. I would say I have about the usual. I don't think I have
any unique ones in my vocabulary. i
Mr. Jenkins. You have never plowed a mule in new ground, then,
Mr. Cohn.
Mr. Cohn. No, I don't think so, sir. And there are words that I
certainly would not repeat on television.
Was there anything vituperative or obscene or anything that is out
of the ordinary or out of normal ? I would say definitely not, sir, and
Mr. Adams cevtniidy never indicated to me or to anybod^y else that he
objected to anything which I said to him. That is all new.
1756 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. And so when he swears that you discussed Schine
with him on four occasions on the 4th day of December, and argued
with him over what constituted a weekend, and used obscene and
vituperative language, do you say that John Adams swore truthfully
or falsely?
Mr. CoHN. I would say this, sir, again I am loathe to characterize
V. hat somebody else says as false. That involves a lot of elements
]\fr. Jenkins. Did you or not? We will put it that way, Mr. Cohn.
Yes or no.
Mr. CoHN. Let's do it this way
Mr. Jenkins. I would rather you do it that way and then you are
entitled to make an explanation. You can answer that, I think, yes
or no.
Mr. Cohn. We did discuss what constitutes a weekend, sir. I don't
believe — certainly in my opinion I did not then or on any other oc-
casion use to Mr. Adams what I think — well, I don't want to pull
anybody else in here — what I think a normal person would regard as
vituperative or obscene or unusual language between two guys talking
about something. I do say, sir, that Mr. Adams has omitted to state
a good number of important other things which were discussed on
that afternoon and on other occasions, and has tried to create the im-
pression that just about every time we talked it was all about Schine
and Schine finishing committee work and getting preferential treat-
ment when that just isn't true. So I would say, sir, Mr. Adams has
given an inaccurate picture of what happened on that afternoon, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you talk about the investigation of subversives
in the Army ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir. We might very well have. I remember that
was a frequent topic of conversation. What I remember is what you
say, what he says. I remember the General Lawton discussions, be-
cause I had to talk to other people about that and called Mr. Adams
back. I have checked with those other people, and I know that I did
talk on that afternoon. And, sir, I do know that there was discussion
about his aunts, and the theater tickets on that afternoon. So the best
I can tell you, sir, is that there is a little bit of truth thrown in with an
awful lot of omission.
Mr. Jenkins. The discussions, Mr. Cohn, centered around the in
vestigations of the McCarthy committee, the theater tickets, sometimes
Schine — that is the truth, isn't it?
Mr. CoHN. I remember the weekend, sir. I remember the General
Lawton thing. I remember the theater tickets for the two ladies in
Brooklyn.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you remember this automobile ride in New York
City on December 17, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you remember what John Adams swore about
that?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you remember that he testified that you were sc
angry that he feared for Senator McCarthy's life and limb ; in other
words, that you would commit mayhem on him if he left him alone?
You remember that?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir, I do.
Decen
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SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1757
Mr. Jenkins. Were ymi aiiirry on that occasion?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, we had an aninuited discussion about General
Lawton.
Mr. Jenkins. An animated discussion?
Mr. CoHN. I don't think Senator McCarthy on that occasion or on
any other occasion was in need of bodily protection from Mr. Adams
a<;ainst me or against anybody else.
Mr. Jenkins. The discussion was quite animated, you say ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir, it was.
]\Ir. Jenkins. I suppose, JNIr. Cohn, by that you mean that your
temper rose and fell and, as Mr. Adams said, like the tides of the sea ;
is that right?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I have never made up an emotional chart, and I
just can't give as vivid a characterization as Mr. Adams can. I can
tell you, sir, though, for your purposes here, that there was lengthy
discussion about General Lawton; that I was very much disturbed,
sir, about what they were trying to do to General Lawton ; that I was
sufficiently disturbed so that that night I communicated personally
with General Lawton's headquarters to tell him what they were trying
to do to him, and that the next day I took my time to have lunch with
General Lawton's aide. Lieutenant Corr, to tell him just what Mr.
Adams was up to. So I certainly was upset about it, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you talked to him about Dave Schine on
that occasion, didn't you?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you deny that now positively and emphatically ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir; I can certainly deny to you, sir, that that
animated discussion was about Dave Schine.
Mr. JENKINS. Was Schine's name mentioned?
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Adams said at the hearings here that he said— he
kept trying to say, "Let's talk about Schine."
Mr. Jenkins. Did he or not ?
Mr. Cohn. I think he might very well have said "Let's talk about
Schine."
Mr. Jenkins. Did you talk about Dave Schine ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir, I don't recall that we did. Neither does the
Senator, and neither does Mr. Carr. I was intent on talking about
General J^!;wton and vrhat they were trying to do to him. That is
what we did talk about, sir, and I think about the best proof of that
is that that night — and you have the phone slip, Mr. Jenkins — I
phoned General Lawton's headquarters to send word to the general
just what had happened at lunch that day; and the next day, sir,
December 18, I had lunch wdth Lieutenant Corr, General Lawton's
p-ide, and I told him what Mr. Adams was trying to do to General
Lawton.
The discussion that day, sir, was about General Lawton.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, Mr. Adams testified that you cursed him
on that date. Do you remember that ?
Mr. Cohn. I heard his testimony, sir. I think he said that I used
abusive and
Mr. Jenkins. I will read you precisely what he said, page 2587 of
the record :
ilr. Cohn liecame extremely agitated, became extremely abusive. He cursed
me aud tbeu Senator McCartby.
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1758 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
He said you cursed both him and the Senator.
Mr. CoHN. I think he is a little bit wrong about that, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. A little bit?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. How much?
Mr. CoHN. I will try to tell you how much.
Mr. Jenkins. Or how little?
Mr. CoHN. I will try to tell you that, sir.
"We had an animated discussion about the General Lawton situa-
tion. I don't thing he can say that I was disturbed at Senator Mc-
Carthy. I think it is more accurate to say, sir, that Senator McCarthy
agreed with me, and that it was Mr. Adams against Senator McCarthy,
Mr. Carr, and myself, and not the other way around.
As far as using intemperate language or anything like that, I can't,
once again
Mr. Jenkins. He doesn't say intemperate language. He says pro-
fane language.
Mr. CoiiN. Sir, I don't know what Mr. Adams calls profane
language.
Mr. Jenkins. He says you cursed him.
Mr. CoiiN. I don't know what he means by that, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Colin, you know what cursing is.
Mr. CotiN. Well, sir, once again, I suppose we have to go word by
word here. I have told you, sir, that I certainly have on occasion,
as I assume everyuody else here has, used some words which you
would not want to repeat on television. When you are talking to
another man, when you are discussing a situation or when you are
discussing someone, you might say something which you don't want to
say on television.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say you did it in a period of animation ?
Mr. CoHN. I very well might have, sir ; sure.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you are perfectly capable of becoming
quite animated at times, too, are you not ?
Mr. CoHN. I am sure that I am.
Mr. Jenkins. Nobody can accuse you of being a phlegmatic type of
person ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. During that period of animation, you say that you
might have used some words that you wouldn't want repeated over
television
Mr. CoHN. Certainly.
Mr. Jenkins. And radio ?
Mr. CoiiN. No doubt about that.
Mr. Jenkins. No doubt about it?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you on that occasion, as John Adams swore-
Mr. Cohn. I might very well, sir. It certainly would have been
an appropriate occasion to use some of those words.
Mr. Jenkins. An appropriate occasion ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. So I take it by that, Mr. Cohn, that now you admit
that on that occasion, in a period of animation, you used some pro-
fanity to the counselor for the Secretary of the Army; is that right?
I
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION J 759
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I don't want to argue with you al)out what ])ro-
fanity
Mr. Jexkins. I don't want to argue with you. I am merely asking
you a question.
Mr. CoiiN. I will certainly say that that would have been a very
appropriate occasion, and I might very well have used words which
1 would not repeat here and would not w\ant to hear anyone else repeat
here on television, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You say it was all centered around General Lawton ?
Mr. CoHN. I do. sir.
Mr. Jenkins. That the Schine subject had nothing whatever to do
with it?
Mr. CoHN. It did not, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And that John Adams testified erroneously, we will
put it?
Mr. CoiiN. I would say he was mistaken, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will read you further from John Adams, 2588 :
The subject was Schine. The subject was the fact— the thing that Cohn was
angry about, the thing that he was so violent about was the fact that, one, the
Army was not agreeing to an assignment for Schine; and, two, that Senator
McCarthy was not supporting his staff in its efforts to get Schine assigned to
New Yorli. So his abuse was directed partly to me and partly to Senator
McCarthy.
Is that true or false, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I would say Mr. Adams is mistaken about that.
The only
Mr. Jenkins. Then I take it you say that is absolutely false.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Jenkins, when you say something is false, you are
going into a man's state of mind and into an element of willfullness.
I would rather say there, sir, that Mr. Adams' account is not accurate
and leave it to the committee to judge whether it was willfully inac-
curate or whether he was mistaken.
Mr. Jenkins. You say it isn't accurate ?
Mr. Cohn. It is not.
Mr. Jenkins. And let the committee draw its own conclusions. Is
that what you are swearing to, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. Cohn, do you remember when Mr. Adams went to Sioux Falls,
S. Dak., to visit his mother?
Mr. Cohn. I don't doubt that he did. I don't remember it. And I
didn't talk to him when he was there, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you inspire anyone to talk to him while he was
there?
Mr. Cohn. I did not.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you discuss with Mr. Frank Carr the advisability
of Mr. Carr's calling him or did you talk to Carr about calling him ?
Mr. CoiiN. Not that I recall, sir; no.
Mr. Jenkins. Not that you recall ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Are you in a position to deny it, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. I am in position to tell you, sir, I have no recollection
of ever suggesting to Mr. Carr that he call Mr. Adams in South
Dakota.
40020°— 54— pt. 46 4
1760 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. Did INIr. Curr ever tell you that he called Mr. John
Adams?
Mr. CoJiN. I don't recall that, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you know or did you ev-er learn that while John
Adams was in Sioux Falls, S. Dak,, just prior to the Christmas holi-
days, Mr. Frank Carr called him on two different occasions about an
assignment for Dave Schine?
Mr. CoHN. I don't believe that Mr. Carr did call him on these occa-
sions about an assignment for Dave Schine. I believe, sir, Mr. Carr
will tell you wliy he did call him. I don't have personal knowledge of
the subject. Since these hearings have come up I have talked with
Mr. Carr about it and 1 do know why he called him.
JNIr. Jenkins. Did you call Mr. John Adams at Amherst?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. When was that?
Mr. CoHN. 1 believe that date has been fixed as January 9.
]Mr. Jenkins. January 9?
Mr, CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I believe Mr, Carr called him. You and Mr, Carr
were together, were you, on that occasion?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir.
Mr, Jenkins, You were in New Y^'ork?
]\Ir. CoiiN, Yes, sir,
Mr. Jenkins, Mr, Carr was in Washington?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you know that Frank Carr was calling Mr.
Adams while he was at Amherst for the purpose of making an
address.
Mr. Cohn. I knew that Mr, Carr had been trying to find Mr.
Adams; yes, sir. I didn't know Mr. Adams was in Amherst,
Mr, Jenkins. You were likewise trying to get him located?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr, Jenkins, What was the purpose of your call to Mr, Adams on
that occasion, Mr, Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. As I think I testified the last time, Mr. Jenkins, that
was an occasion when, as I recall it, Schine had come into New York.
This was about a week before the final date on the filing of these re-
ports, and we were hard pressed. Schine had come into New York to
do his work on them, and he had been ordered back to Fort Dix to do
some kind of duty. The purpose of my interest in it then, sir, was to
see if that duty could be done during the week nights when he was
not available to work on these reports, and to that end, sir, I tried to
talk with Mr. Adams. I believe I first talked with Lieutenant
Blount, and then I tried to reach Mr. Adams,
Mr, Jenkins, You say you first talked with Lieutenant Blount?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins, On that same day ?
Mr, Cohn, Yes, sir; I think so.
Mr, Jenkins, Mr. Cohn, you had no intention whatever of mention-
ing the name of Dave Schine to Mr. Adams when you called him at
Amherst?
Mr. Cohn. I had every intention of it. It was the only reason
I was calling him, sir.
I
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1761
Mr. Jenkins. For what purpose, did you say?
Mr. CoHN. I say the purpose of that, sir, was to see that Schine
under the arrangement we had previously made was avaihible to do
the work on the reports over the weekend, and tliat the (hity he had,
lie could stay up extra hours or whatever it was during the weekiiights.
That was the purpose of my call to Mr. Adams on that occasion.
Mr. Jenkins. And you called immediately after you had talked to
Lieutenant Blount?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir; I don't think so.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, you called subsequent to your conversation
with Blount?
Mr. CoiiN. That is right, sir, I first talked to Lieutenant lilount
and he told me that they had instructions that Mr. Adams must per-
sonally approve any of those things, and I then tried to get in touch
with Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. Is that conversation with Lieutenant Blount that you
had on that day a conversation in which you told him that you had a
long memory, and would not forget the names of Colonel Ringler and
Lieutenant Miller?
Mr. CoHN. That is that conversation, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you make such a statement as that, Mr. Cohn,
to Lieutenant Blount in that conversation ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir; it was not made that way, and I would be glad
to explain what did happen.
Mr. Jenkins. You heard Lieutenant Blount's testimony?
Mr. Cohn. I did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What Avas said on that occasion ?
Mr. Cohn. I called Lieutenant Blount, I believe, on that occasion
about the same problem, whether or not Schine could do this work
during the week, and whether they would live up to the arrangements
which Mr. Stevens had made, making Schine available to finish his
subcommittee work over weekends. I think 1 explained to Lieutenant
Blount that we had just about a week or so left before the deadline on
filing committee reports, that we were very hard pressed, that arrange-
ments had been made for Schine to wcrk on them, and I wondered
whether he couldn't have Schine do his work over on week nights,
stay up extra, and as Lieutenant Blount testified here, very correctly
so, I told him I didn't care how many times they put him on K. P.
duty or anything else, during week nights, as long as we had him
during the })eriod Mr. Stevens had outlined to work on these reports.
That is what I talked to Lieutenant Blount about. It was quite a long
talk. I had talked to Lieutenant Blount on several other occasions
and we had become somewhat friendly. I liked him. He told me
then that the company connnander, a colonel was — seemed to have a
low opinion of Dave Schine and that there seemed to be a great deal
of friction about it. I then told Lieutenant Blount, sir, as I recall,
an incident which had been related to me about a statement which
this colonel had made about Schine, not about Schine, actually, but
about the type of w^ork which this committee was doing, which would
lead one to the conclusion that this gentleman was very much out
of sympathy with what we were doing, regarded it as a "witch hunt,"
which is the term that he used, I believe, and I told Lieutenant Blount
about that, and it is very possible, sir, that I did say I had a long
1762 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
memory find that I would remember that colonel's name. I know
that I did ask — pash the name alon^ to a member of the statf and asked
that a check be made of this particular colonel, because he was talking
in a pretty peculiar way about the Communist investigation.
Mr. Jexkins. That is, Ringler was?
Mr. (?0HN. Sir, I am sorry that his name has been injected into this,
because it is very possible that there was a misunderstanding about
it, and he is entitled to his opinion. But that is who it was, and that
in what his name was.
Mr. Jenkins. Are you saying tliat Colonel Ringler was talking
peculiarly about the investigation of Communists, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. I am saying, sir, that Colonel Kingler had made a state-
ment concerning the work of this committee wdiich had been told to
Private Schine by somebody who
Mr. Jenktns. Well, what was the statement, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. The statement was, sir, that we were engaged in a witch
bunt and that investigations like this were red herrings, things along
tliose lines.
Mr. Jenkins. And that statement was conveyed to you by Mr. Dave
Schine?
Mr. CoHN. It was, sir.
Mr. Jenktns. And do you say it was for that reason that you said
that the name of Colonel Ringler would long linger in your memory?
Mr. CoHN. I might have said I was going to remember the name,
yes. sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, now, Mr. Cohn, you heard this young man, the
lieutenant, testify?
Mr. C OHN. I did, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And you say that you and he had been on friendly
terms?
Mr. CoHN, Yes, sir, we had been.
Mr. Jenkins. And still are?
Mr. Cohn. Well, I haven't had any disagreement with him
Mr. Jenkins. As far as you know, he ie a high-type man of
integrity?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I will read you what he says, page 3508, and this is
Lieutenant Blount :
Pursuant to that, he said that some people at Fort Dix had been very coop-
erative, but that Colonel Ringler and LientenaLt IMiller had made things
especially diflicult for Private Schine. and that he, Mr. Colm, had a very long
memory and was never going to forget their na.nes.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What do you say about that, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Well, 1 say, sir, what I just told you a few minutes ago,
that when I spoke to Lieutenant Blount, he indicated to me that it:
was this colonel who was making the objections and that apparently
there was some reason for animus between him and betw^een Schine.
1 then did relate this particular incident to Lieutenant Blount as I
recall it, and I know I mentioned it to a staff member and asked for
a rundown on this colonel's name, and I might certainly have said
that I will remember the name or something like that; yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, let's get it straight, Mr. Cohn. This young
man testified that you said that Coknel Ringler and Lieutenant
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1763
Miller had made things especially difficult for Private Schine? Did
you or did you not say that ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir ; as I recall it
Mr. Jenkins. Your answer is no, sir ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir; and then I am going to tell you that as I recall
the conversation that Lieutenant Blount said that as far as he was
concerned, the thing was a lot of nonsense; that the arrangements
were made, it was working out fine, Schine was doing all of his train-
ing and if he wanted to spend his spare time that way, that was just
fine with Lieutenant Blount, he thought that was fine, but that some
other people did object to it, Colonel Ringler in particular, and he
said nothing disparaging at all about Colonel Ringler, seemecl to have
different views about the thing.
I then told Lieutenant Blount, as I recall, this incident about
Colonel Ringler and in connection with that, might very well have
made the statement about a long memory. If Lieutenant Blount says
I did, I am sure I did. I am sure he would not misrepresent.
Mr. Jenkins. You are sure that this young man would not mis-
rej^resent ?
Mr. CoHN. I am sure he would not want to misrepresent, sir. I
think he is trying to recall a conversation that took place some time
ago as best he can. It did take place. In substance, I agree with
him on what was said.
Mr. Jenkins, I read you further from Lieutenant Blount's testi-
mony. As I understand it, you now say that Lieutenant Blount, if
he said it, you are in no position to deny what I have read to you.
Thatisright, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir. I say there is an argument about certain termi-
nology and things that were said. I say in substance I did call him,
the discussion was just as he said, the topic was the same. There are
a few refinements on which we might disagree, which is only logical,
after the lapse of this period of time.
Mr. Jenkins. You know of no feeling or animosity that Lieutenant
Blount might have against you '^
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And no motive to distort the facts?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir; and I have nothing against him. He was very
cordial at all times.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, if you say on that occasion, that these two
officers, a colonel and a lieutenant, had not been cooperative with Dave
Schine or not treated him as you thought he should have been treated,
and that you had a long memory and their names would linger in your
mind indefinitely, wasn't that a form of a threat against the Army?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir. It was certainly not meant as such. It was
not said as such. It was said in the context that I have said here, and
I am sure that Lieutenant Blount would not interpret it to be such.
As I said, our relationship M^ith him was extremely cordial, I said
and I think he is a very nice guy.
Mr. Jenkins. I want to read you further from his testimony. Did
you ever discuss with Lieutenant Blount whether or not this boy ought
to be relieved from KP duty ? I mean Dave Schine.
Mr. Cohn. That is what the whole question was. The question was
whether he was going to do it during the time Mr. Stevens said he
would be available to the committee, those 2 days a week, or whether
1764 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
he could do it by staying up some niglits during the week, when he
was out there for training. I told Lieutenant Blount, as he testified
here, that as far as I was concerned, they could put him on KP every
night of the week, all week long. Our only problem was to let him
work on these reports, when he was supposed to do it, under the
arrangements made by Mr. Stevens.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you whether or not this statement is cor-
rect, it being an excerpt from the testimony of Lieutenant Blount :
No, sir; Mr. Cohn on that particular day never mentioned committee work.
He did say tliat what we wanted to do with Private Schine from Monday to
Fi'iday would be 0. K. as far as he was concerned.
Mr. CoHN. That is right.
Mr. Jenkins (reading) :
But he didn't see why Private Schine had to pull KP on Sunday.
Did you say that, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir. What happened, as far as saying what I
didn't care what they did with him Monday through Friday, they
could put him on as much KP or keep him up all night, that is true,
sir. As far as not mentioning committee work, I believe the lieutenant
is mistaken about that. Every time I talked to him about the Schine
thing, it was about committee work. I never talked to him about
anything else, and I don't think he suggested that I did. I don't
think I gave him a detailed description of just what work he was
supposed to do or anything like that. But he knew what it was
about, sir, and I knew what it was about.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you ask Lieutenant Blount or make a statement
to Lieutenant Blount to the effect that you didn't see why Schine
had to pull KP duty on Sunday, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. No sir. What I said to him, I believe, was
Mr. Jenkins. His testimony is not correct ?
Mr. CoHN. It is very hard to say it is not correct.
Mr. Jenkins. All right, you say you didn't say it, and we can draw
cur own conclusions ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, there is so much here a matter of terminology. I
agree completely with the substance of what Lieutenant Blount says.
I agree that I called him. I agree with him on just what the discus-
sion was about. The discussion was about sticking to the arrange-
ment that had been made, which was working out fine, which would
allow Schine during his non-training period on Sundays to work
on these reports and do this committee work. I did tell Lieutenant
Blount that we would like that arrangement to be lived up to ; that
if they wanted to stick him on KP or anything else all night long
Monday through Friday, that was perfectly O. K. with us. That
undoubtedly was said, and that is true.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you remember a conversation with Mr. Adams
on January 11, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. On January 11 ?
Mr. Jenkins. January 11.
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Do you recall Mr. Adams' testimony with respect to a
conversation you had with him on that day ?
Mr. Cohn. I don't recall that, sir. If you would refresh my
recollection
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1765
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. I am reading from page 2G05 of the
record :
Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. He said the Army had promised Schine a commission
and had not lived up to it.
I am talking about a conversation in which Mr. Adams testified that
you enumerated a number of Army or Stevens doublecrosses willi re-
spect to Dave Schine. Did you ever have such a conversation with
Mr. Adams ?
Mr. CoHN. On the statement you have just asked me about, Mr.
Jenkins — —
Mr. Jenkins. January 11.
Mr. CoHN. No, I don't have any recollection of that. On the ques-
tion of the commission, Mr, Adams did tell me and other people on
the staff — Mr. Carr and Senator McCarthy— that if Schine were not
who he is and was and did not come from this committee, he would
have been given a commission.
Mr. Jenkins. Does that mean that you were talking to Adams about
a commission for Schine ?
Mr. CoHN. No, sir. I think it was just a discussion about some-
thing in the far distant past, and wdiat would have happened and
what could have happened if Schine were not a guy from the McCarthy
committee.
Mr. Jenkins. You were just together talking?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. You said nothing, the Senator said nothing, Frank
Carr said nothing about a commission for this boy, and Adams just
out of the clear blue said he would have been given a commission if he
had geen given his just due?
Mr. CoHN. It probably wasn't out of the clear blue, Mr. Jenkins.
To give you the whole picture, we saw Mr. Adams and talked with
him day in and day out over a period of months. He was with us pro-
fessionally, socially, and every other way. We talked to him on the
phone all of the time, just about everybody and everything we knew,
all of our mutual friends, people we knew — things were talked about
by us at one time or another.
Mr. Jenkins, Including Dave Schine?
Mr. CoHN. Sure; absolutely.
Mr. Jenkins. I want to read you what Mr. Adams testified here at
page 2605 in which he enumerated your alleged allegations of numer-
ous Army doublecrosses.
Mr. CoHN. Is that 2605, Mr, Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. 2605. [Heading :]
He said the Army had promised Schine a commission and had not lived up to it.
Did you say that, Mr. Colin ?
Mr. CoiiN. On that occasion, sir ?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir, or on any occasion.
Mr, CoHN. Yes, I think Mr. Adams and I did discuss the fact that
when General Eeber came in he said on the merits, on the basis of
Schine's qualifications, his service in the Army Transport Service, the
work he had done with this committee, his business experience, his uni-
versity degree, and everything else, there was no doubt in the world
but that he was entitled to a commission.
1766 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Adams did tell us that the reason he did not ^et the commis-
sion was because they didn't want to be criticized by the hostile press,
and if Schine were not Schine — one of the penalties of being who
he was was not getting the commission. That is true, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Then your answer is in the affirmative, you did say
the Army had promised Schine a commission and had not lived up
to it ? Your answer is in the affirmative ? Is that right, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. We talked to Mr. Adams. There was this discussion,
not once but I remember 2 or 3 times at least, about why Schine did
not get a commission. It was away back in the past. Mr. Adams
very frankly told us why he did not get a commission.
Mr. Jenkins. I know. I didn't ask you that now. Adams said
that you said, "The Army had promised Schine a commission and had
not lived up to it." As I understand you, you say that is correct, Mr.
Cohn, is that right or not ?
Mr. CoHN. In order to move along
Mr. Jenkins. No, we are not trying to move along. Mr. Cohn, I
want your testimony in here.
Mr. CoHN. My testimony about that, sir
Mr. Jenkins. And don't say "Yes" unless it is true, and don't say
"No" unless it is true,
Mr. CoHN. All right, sir. Thank you.
My testimony on that, sir, is that there were 2 or 3 occasions when
the reasons that Schine did not get a commission were discussed
with Mr, Adams. In those discussions, Mr. Adams made it very
clear to us that the reason Schine had been turned down was because
of who he was and the fact that he came from this committee.
Those discussions did take place. I can't say, sir, in the context in
which you give it, that I or anybody else made a special issue out of
saying to Mr. xVdams that back in July they should have given Schine
a commission and didn't give him a commission. Certainly it was
mentioned on 2 or 3 occasions in the form of talk about that which
had long since passed.
I agree with that, sir, yes. I do not recall this January 11 con-
versation.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, my question to ISfr. Adams was this: "Can
you enumerate these various doublecrosses that he then claimed the
Army had given Schine?" And Adams in response to that said that
you said the Army had promised Schine a commission and had not
lived up to it, and that it was a doublecross.
JNIr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. Is that correct ?
Mr. CoiiN. You ask me do I recall that specific conversation ?
Mr, Jenkins, Yes. I am asking you, did it happen or not, on
either January 11 or any other time ?
Mr, CoHN. The best I could give you is what I have given you;
that there was this discussion between Mr, Adams and us on 2 or 3
occasions about what had happened about the commission. We never
asked him to get Schine a commission. We never asked help in any
way. The thing was a closed book as far as we were concerned.
Mr. Jenkins. You say the x^rmy had "promised Schine a com-
mission" ?
Mr. CoHN. I don't know about the word "promise." I say, sir.
General Eeber said the first time he came in, when he heard Schine's
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1767
qualifications, he didn't liesitate 2 seconds before lie said, "Yes, there
is no doubt about it, he is entitled to a connnission.-'
Mr. Jenkins. Did you consider the fact that Schine was not given
a commission an injustice to Schine, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. CoHN. I would say so, sir; yes.
Mr. Jenkins. You would say it was an injustice ?
Mr. CoHN. I would say it was ; yes.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you consider it a doublecross, a breach of
promise ?
Mr. CoiiN. That is hard to say, sir. I would rather give you what
the facts were. General Reber, a man comes in and says, "On the
merits, he is entitled to it. Yes, tliere is no doubt about it." Then
he doesn't get it. Whether you want to call that a doublecross, a
change, an injustice, or whatever you want to call it, sir, I don't know\
That is the way it happened.
Mr. Jenkins. Adams further said that you stated that they had
promised a New York assignment for Schine, and had not lived up
to it, on January 11. What do you say about that, sir ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir. I say if you go on and read about this business
about canceling the week-night availability, changing what a week-
end constituted, and all that, those things undoubtedly were discussed
between Mr. Adams and between us, yes, sir. I w^ould agree with
that.
Mr. Jenkins. Will you agree that you made the statement that you
had been promised a New York assignment for Schine, and that the
Army had not lived up to it? Will you agree to that or not?
Mr. Cohn. No. I recall no conversation along those lines.
Mr. Jen kins. Do you deny it, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, if you go on and read
Mr. Jenkins. That is another subject now. You have enumerated
this commission.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
]V[r. Jenkins. You have testified about that. Then he said, No. 2
is that you claimed that Schine had been promised a NeAv York as-
signment and they had not lived up to that. That is a different
subject.
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. What about that now ?
Mr. Cohn. I would say that that is inaccurate.
Mr. Jenkins. Inaccurate?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Yon deny that, then ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. I would say that is inaccurate.
Mr. Jenkins. No. 3, that they had canceled Schine's week-night
availability. What do you say about that — accurate or inaccurate?
JSIr. Cohn. That is accurate, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. That is accurate?
Mr. Cohn. Sure. They had. Although I have to say this, Mr.
Jenkins: After having clone that. General Eyan made an arrange-
ment, Mr. Adams took it up with General Ryan, and General Ryan
made an arrangement whereby staff members could go down and see
him on the post, and all that, put a conference room at their disposal.
That was satisfactory. That took care of the problem.
46020°— 54— pt. 4G 5
1768 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. The next number : Tliat we were requiring Schine to
meet Saturday morning duty schedules, which was a doublecross.
Mr. CoHN. That is that weekend discussion ; yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Is that accurate ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. We discussed that. We discussed changes in
the terms of this weel^end with Mr. Adams.
Mr. Jenkins. The next number : That the Secretary's statement of
November 13 — he says you threw that up to him then, on January 11.
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I am not saying anything
Mr. Jenkins. I am asking you now, Mr. Cohn.
Mr. CoHN. I am sorry.
Mr. Jenkins. He is enumerating what he chaims you told him con-
stituted a number of doublecrosses. And that the Secretary's state-
ment of November 13 with reference to current espionage at Fort
Monmouth was a doublecross.
Did you say that ?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, maybe I don't understand. Are you asking me did
I in a specific conversation on January 11 say all these things?
Mr. Jenkins. Or any other time.
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir; I certainly might have — I certainly discussed
with Mr. Adams the Secretary's statement of November 13. I told
Mr. Adams that I thought the statement was unfortunate because it
was untrue. I told him that the statement on espionage at Fort Mon-
mouth was untrue. I told him that Mr. Stevens' statement about why
these thirty-odd people had been suspended was untrue. And I cer-
tainly did consider that, sir, to be a wholly untrue and inaccurate
statement and one with which I disagreed.
I did discuss that with both Mr. Adams and Mr. Stevens, and if
Mr. Adams said I discussed that and that I felt they had been wrong
in that and had made untrue statements, Mr. Adams is telling the
truth about that ; yes.
Mr. Jenkins. And sixth, he enumerates six of the alleged double-
crosses or what you termed "doublecrosses," and now he says you stated
on January 11, this long period at Camp Gordon was a sixth double-
cross ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. That is definitely and positively untrue, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, the best I can tell you is this about the discussion
about Camp Gordon : Mr. Adams gave a different version on the length
of time Schine would be down there on a number of occasions. I
don't believe, sir, that I ever said the changed version constituted a
doublecross or anything like that. On this subject, Mr. Jenkins, I
would go further. If Mr. Adams is listing here things I had dis-
cussed with him where I felt in my opinion he was — maybe it was a
wrong opinion — he was quite wrong and had done things which had
come under the heading of things which were unfair and unjust, I
certainly would have recounted what they were trying to do to General
Lawton. I would have recounted a large number of other things
W'hich I thought and still think had been handled by Mr. Adams
in a way that was not fair and not accurate. So I would say that this
list is probably incomplete.
Mr. Jenkins. And, Mr. Adams further testified, do you recall, Mr.
Cohn, that during that conversation in v.'hich he said that you enumer-
I
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 17G9
ated six doublecrosses, that you were quite animated, to use your
expression ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And used vituperative and obscene language; is that
true or not ?
Mr. CoHN. I don't even remember tlie conversation, sir.
]\[r. Jenkins. You don't even remember the conversation?
Mr. CoiiN. I do remember discussing these things tliat we have gone
down the list about with Mr. Adams. I think he was conservative.
I tliink Ave liad animated discussions about what they were trying to
do with General Lawton. AVe had discussions about the (ile-s(rii)ping
situation. We had discussions about a number of other things, in
which there were animated discussions and disagreements between
us, sir. There were a lot of things, and discussed over a long period
of time. As far at the vituperative and obscene language, 1 can say
nothing more than what I have said here.
]\Ir. Jenkins. What happened when Mr. Adams told you the boy
was to go overseas?
Mv. CoHN. I believe I have related that sir. If you want me to
relate it again, I will.
Mr. Jenkins. I will ask you this one question, that I may have
asked you before, and I believe I have. Mr. Adams told you the
chances were 9 to 1 that he would go overseas ; did he not?
Mr. CoHN. It didn't happen that way.
Mr. Jenkins. It didn't happen that way ?
Mr. CoiiN. No, sir.
INIr. Jenkins. Hoav did it happen ?
Mr. CoHN. Mr, Adams said that he came over to see Mr. Carr and
me. I believe he fixed the date as October 14, and I have no disagree-
ment with that. A lot of things were talked about, the personal
things, the law partnership, a lot of other things, stopping the investi-
gation at Fort IVIonmouth, not calling the members of the loyalty
boards, we went to lunch, we came back, we had more talk. It was
during that visit that Mr. Adams said to us — that he threw out this
business about sending Schine overseas. And I think, sir, if I might
respectfully suggest, if you and the committee will examine the con-
text in which that was said, you will regard it as a most unusual
statement, for Mr. Adams to come out and make on that occasion, one
not supported by the facts, and one which I think clearly indicates
the purpose for which he was making the statement at that time. We
knew that Schine was going to go to Camp Gordon, was going to get
training as a CID agent, go to some of these intelligence schools. And
that his overseas tour would probably come some time later.
Mr. Adams threw that in right then at this point, I tliink, sir, as
an example of how he could get nasty. I thinlv the record bears that
out. Once again, Mr, Jenkins, because I think this is an important
point, I show you the inconsistency between Mr. Adams' testimony
before this committee, when he said that this overseas business just
came out of a thin air, just brought up by him out of a thin air, and
his original charges in which he admits coupling on that visit which
he initiated and which he admits coupling, the statements about Schine
going overseas with a discussion about the Fort ISIonmoulh investiga-
tion. I think his original statement is the true one.
1770 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Jenkins. You will recall, Mr. Cohn, that he testified that you
said that if Schine went overseas, Stevens was through as Secretary
of the Army ?
Mr. Cohn. I heard him say that, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you or not?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you say anything like that, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir, and my recollection is that I did not. I have
talked to Mr. Carr who was sitting there the whole time, and he says
I did not.
Mr. Jenkins. Then you say that such a statement on the part of Mr.
Adams is purely a figment of his imagination or has no foundation
whatever in fact?
Mr. CoiiN. I would say, sir, that he is mistaken.
Mr. Jenkins. He is mistaken?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And when he swears, as is reflected on page 2606
as follows :
Yes, sir, that is risht. I asked him what would happen if Schine got overseas
duty. He responded with vigor and force, "Stevens is through as Secretary of
the Army."
You say that didn't happen, Mr. Cohn?
Mr. CoiiN. I say I have no recollection of having said that. I
checked with Mr. Carr who was sitting right there, and he says I
did not say it, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I am not asking you what somebody else
said that you did or did not say. As I understood you a moment ago,
you said that did not happen.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And as I understood your last response to my ques-
tion, you said you have no recollection of that happe.iing.
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I don't recall that having happened, I don't remem-
ber saying that, and I checked with the only other person in this world
that was there, and he said likewise he does not remember it being
said and does not remember it having happened.
Mr. Jenkins. As we get it, then, Mr. Cohn, you are not here deny-
ing it of your own knowledge?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I could come pretty close to that.
Mr. Jenkins. I know, but "pretty close" is a relative term. Some-
times an inch means a whole lot and sometimes several feet means
nothing.
Mr. Cohn. Surely.
Mr. Jenkins. As I get your testimony, you neither admit or deny
saying that Stevens is through as Secretary of the Army if this boy
Schine has overseas duty ; is that right, now, Mr. Cohn ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. I think I would go much further than that.
I have given it to you, sir, as my best recollection and my recollection
is a fairly good one, that I did not make those statements. I told you
I checked with the only other person on this earth that was there,
and he says I did no make those statements, sir. And I can tell you
under oath here, that I never, I never threatened to wreck the Army,
that I am sure that Mr. Adams never believed for two seconds that I
threatened to wreck the Army, that I am sure he knows I could not
"wreck the Army, and that whole thing is just a little bit ridiculous.
li
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1771
Mr. Jenkins. Do we get that you deny it, you affirm it, or you say
you have no recollection of it?
Mr. CoHN. I am telling you, sir, that No. 1, I have a pretty good
recollection, No. 2, I remember that day. No. 3, I do not remember
saying any of those things the way Mr. Adams lias them, and No. 4,
I checked with the only other person that was there on that occasion,
and he says my recollection is correct, that I did not make those
statements.
Mr. Jenkins, You are telling us what Mr. Frank Carr said?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And I want to know, and the committee wants to
know for the benelit of this record, what Mr. Roy M. Cohn said.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. As I get it now, you are saying that you have no
recollection of it?
jSIr. CoiiN, No, sir, I say I do not recall having said that.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, that is what I get your answer to be, that you
don't recall having said it.
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. But you don't deny it?
Mr. Cohn. Sir, I say I am sure I did not say it.
Mr. Jenkins. All right, now you are saying you did not say it, Mr.
Cohn?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir. I am saying I am sure I did not make that
statement, and I am sure that Mr. Adams and anybody else with any
sense, and jNIr. Adams has a lot of sense, could ever believe that I was
threatening to wreck the Army or that I could wreck the Army. I
say, sir, that the statement is ridiculous.
Mr. Jenkins. I am talking about Stevens being through as Secre-
tary of the Army.
Mr. Cohn. That is equally ridiculous, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And untrue?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir, equally ridiculous and untrue, I could not
cause the President of the United States to remove Stevens as Secre-
tary of the Army.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, I pass to you — strike that.
You have testified, I believe, Mr. Cohn, last Friday ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. At that time you were questioned about committee
work that was done by Mr. Schine after he was inducted into the
Army on November 3d?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And about committee work that he did prior to
November 3d ?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And I believe you testified that subsequent to Novem-
ber 3d, after his induction into the Army, and while he was on these
various passes and leaves of absence, he dictated certain memo-
randa
Mr. Cohn. That is not quite right, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Is that not correct?
Mr. Co TIN. No.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, what is correct, Mr. Cohn ?
1772 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr, CoiiN. What is correct, sir, is this: I might say that neither
I nor Dave Schine nor anyone on our staff as a matter of practice
goes around dictating a lot of memoranda. I told you, sir, that what
Schine did, when staff members talked to him and when he was off,
it fell into a number of categories. One of the things he did was to
clarify and turn over information which he might have in his head
which he might be able to get by reference to papers which we showed
him, concerning witnesses and situations on which he had worked
when he was with the committee. I also told you, sir, that he did a
good deal of work on the three interim reports which I mentioned, of
the subcommittee, and on certain sections of the annual report of the
subcommittee.
That is the substance of what he did during the very limited period
of time that he had off, during his Army training, sir. That is what
I told you that he did, sir, and that is what he did do.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, during the times that he was off on these
passes
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did he dictate any memoranda whatever, except work
on these three interim reports to which you have referred ?
Mr. CoHN. I don't think he himself dictated anything, sir, in the
way of memoranda ; no, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you or any member of the staff dictate any mem-
oranda as a result of your conversations with Dave Schine during
these leaves of absence or passes ?
Mr. CoHN. That might have happened, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. That might have happened?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir. And I might say, we will have available staff
members who talked with him, and I assume they are checking their
files and will be able to show you whether or not there are any mem-
oranda which they prepared on information which Dave Schine gave
them.
Mr. Jenkins, on that point, typical points would be that we would
ask him about certain situations, one of which occurs to me very
clearly, one concerning this major, I won't mention his name, the major
that Dave Schine had handled before he went into the Army, who had
given us pretty important information which had never been reduced
to writing. I talked to Dave Schine about that information when it
came into issue some time in December. Senator McCarthy talked
to him about it. I did not make any memoranda about what Dave
Schine told me. I know the Senator did not. I knew the same thing
came up in January when the major committed suicide. The FBI
asked me about it. They knew that Schine had been in touch with
this man. And I communicated with Schine again and rechecked my
recollection of what Schine had told us. But I don't think on that
occasion I made any memoranda, sir, and I don't think the Senator
did. On the other hand, you do have these reports, and I can't tell
you that there are no notes by Schine and things like that, because I
know there are. I know he worked on these reports, I know we have
the end product of what he produced and we might have parts of
the drafts and things along those lines.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, you produced a part of the end product
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1773
Mr. Jexkins. Of what Dave Schine accomplished alter lie went in
the Army on November 3 ?
Air. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. In your testimony last Friday, did you not?
]Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
]\Ir. Jenkins. That consisted of these three interim reports'^
ISlr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. And nothing else?
]Mr. CoiiN. That is a lot, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well. I am not in a position to judge. The
judges sit both to my right and to my left.
Mr. ConN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Colin, is there any other evidence, documenta-
tion, reflecting the work of Dave Schine except those three documents
that you produced here last Friday?
jNIr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr, Jenkins. What are they?
Mr. CoiiN. Unfortunately, sir, we did not keep all the drafts that
led up to these documents. We do have drafts or fragments of
drafts of some of these reports. Some w^ere dictated by Dave Schine
before he went in, and after he went in. We have some notes which
Mere made by him on drafts of those reports I think while he was
down at Fort Dix, beginning in January, a few things along those
lines, sir. You have my sworn testimony as to what he did, and you
will have the sworn testimony under oath here, and subject to cross-
examination, of other staff members who talked to him, on the ques-
tion of what he did in that very limited time that we are talking
about when he was doing his Army training at the same period.
Mr. Jenkins. Was it not our understanding last Friday that be-
tween Friday and Tuesday morning, this morning, you and other
staff members and your employees, secretaries, and stenographers,
were to search the files and produce as evidence this morning any
documentation of any additional work done by Schine?
Mr. CoHN. Sir, I believe what you asked us to do was to produce
for the committee, w^ork done by Schine or things worked on by Schine
m any stage from the time he went with the committee to July, and
from the time he went in the Army up to the present time. You did
make that direction and ask that we produce those things.
Mr. Jenkins. Are you prepared to do it now ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Jenkins. To produce additional documents, data, compiled by
Schine ?
Mr. CoHN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Or other members of the staff' as a result of their
conversations with Schine?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I ask you to do so now, Mr. Gohn.
Mr. CoHN. It is on the way down, sir. It will be here in 2 or 3
minutes.
Mr, Jenkins, Mr. Chairman, would you mind recessing for 2 or
3 minutes while I am on that subject, and let me pursue that to its
logical conclusion ?
You say they will be here in 2 or 3 minutes, Mr. Cohn?
1774 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr, CoHN. Maybe less than that, sir. The minute you started ask-
in(T about it, somebody went after it.
Senator Mundt. There will be a 2- or 3-minute recess,
(iirief recess.)
Senator Mundt. The committee will come to order, please. The
recess has been concluded. Counsel was interrogating Mr. Cohn about
the production of the data and documents and worksheets which have
been requested by the committee as emanating from ]!ilr. Schine.
I see that a box of something has arrived. I presume it is the ma-
terial. So, Counsel Jenkins, you may continue with the interrogation
of Mr. Cohn.
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Cohn, are you now prepared to answer my last
question and to produce the documents to which I referred and to
which the Chairman has just referred ?
Mr. CoiiN. Pretty much so, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. Will you now do so ?
Mr. CoiiN. Consider it done, Mr. Jenkins.
I would like to make a brief statement in connection with this
production, if I may.
Mr. Jenkins. Does the box in front of you contain those documents,
the work sheets ?
Mr. CoiiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. The end product of the work of Mr. Schine, is that
correct ?
Mr. Cohn. It does, sir; and I would like to make an explanation,
if I may.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. Cohn. What we did was this : First of all, this was over the
Memorial Day weekend, but so we could keep our word with the
committee and have as much of the material as we could here this
morning, we made some members of the staff work during parts of
the weekend. We have tried to get together here a good deal of
what Dave Schine wrote, dictated, Avorked on, while he was with the .
committee and after he left the committee.
I don't say this is a complete production. As I told you, there are
probably a thousand files. We haven't gone through them all. There
are probably a lot more, somewhat more.
Another thing I have to tell you, sir, is that the names of confi-
dential informants do appear in various of these documents. In
various of these documents there are no names of confidential in-
formants. In some there are names of people who are confidential
informants.
Mr. Jenkins. Have you segregated the documents ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir, I have not done that, sir. I have not been able
to do it in the time limit.
I want to make one more statement, if I may, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Very well.
Mr. Cohn. There is also some information here on which Schine
worked and got from other agencies which is security information,
and is so denominated by other agencies. In other words, I noticed
some stuff which the CIA sent over to him. They stamped that
"confidential security information." So that material does have a
security classification.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1775
There is some other material, I think some State Department ma-
leriiil, sent to Schine, acUh'essed to him, which does have a security
classification. There are the names of informants. Informants
Avoukl be disclosed, and I imagine some sources of information which
this committee has would be lost if these names were publislved.
There is a good deal of the material which does not come under
that prohibition, which would not reveal the names of informants
or concern informants who have already been exposed and have al-
ready testified.
But I would Sxay, sir, this is the best job we could do for you in the
limited period of time which we had.
Senator Muxdt. Mr. Counsel, may the Chair say this: We receive
this material with the understanding that the names of the informants
will n.ot be made pnblic.
Mr. CoHx. Yes, sir.
Senator Muxdt. I suggest we will have to have some kind of screen-
ing process to delete those names in the event that Mr. Welch or
anybody on the committee desires to put all of this material into the
public record. The Chair would also like to suggest that in that
screening process we delete the names of people who are accused of
different maledictions of various kinds such as we have in an investi-
gation part way through, because there is no need to bring in the names
of a lot of people who might ultimately turn out to be innocent.
At least this material is available to the members of the committee,
it is available to Mr. Welch, and I think he understands the terms
under which it was received and that there will be no disposition on
Mr. Welch's part to put the names of informants in any public record.
Am I right, Mr. Welch ?
Senator McCarthy. May I ask Mr. Cohn a few questions about
this?
Senator Mundt. Let me find out from ]SIr. Welch first whether my
understanding is correct. What hje wants to find out is what work
was done by Mr. Schine rather than to try to put a lot of names of
people in the public record.
Mr. Welch. I cannot see that I would have any need to put names
in the public record, but I do not wish at this time, speaking in com-
plete ignorance of what is in the box, to say that I would exclude
any of it.
Senator Mundt. My point is, Mr. Welch, in your looking at these
names, looking at the records which are to be made part of the com-
mittee material, that you do so with the understanding that befoi-e
any names are placed in the public record, that would take committee
action.
Mr. Welch. That is fair enough.
Mr. Mundt. May I have that understanding with you, sir. Am I
right, Mr. Welch?
Mr. Wei-ch. Yes; but could I say one thing more. What I am
particularly interested in is the work product of David Schine after
he was inducted in the Army. That is what I wish to see. That,
1 take it, is segregated, or can be segregated.
Mr. ('OHN. Senator Mundt, if I may, there are two things I have
to say hei-e. There is some material in here concerning the names of
informants and other things which, speaking for myself, 1 don't think
1776 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Mr. Welch ouo;ht to see. I have no objection to the Chair's seeing it.
It belongs to the committee. It is committee information and every
niember of the committee certainly ought to see it, and Mr. Jenkins.
1 think there might be some things which Mr. Welch does not want
to see. There might be some things which concern matters concerning
an investigation of some of Mr. Welch's clients and things along those
lines. I am sure the committee would not want him to go into those.
The second point is, Senator Mundt, that so far as Mr. Welch just
asked for, in the very limited period of time that Dave Schine had
to do some of this work when he was doing his training all day long at
the same time down at Fort Dix, the bulk of the work he did was on
those reports, and there is some information bearing on that which
I know will be available to Mr. Welch in here along with these
documents.
As I explained to Mr. Welch on Friday, sir, Dave Schine did not
come down to Washington at all. He did not dictate to our stenog-
raphers down here, sir. As far as I know, he did not dictate mem-
oranda. That is not the way it went. It was a very, very limited
thing. He did a lot of work on finishing up these reports. I have
given Mr. Welch those reports in printed form and he is free to in-
terrogate me about them. We do have some notes and a few drafts
which I think will be of help to Mr. Welch. But I do want to make
it clear, sir, that in the very limited period of time that Schine had
while he was dow^n at Fort Dix doing his training at the same time,
I covered the categories of what he was w'orking on. There just is
not that much more.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Mundt. As the Chair understands the terms under w^hich
we are receiving the material, it will be a committee decision as to what
goes in the public record and what is made available beyond the per-
sonnel of the committee and its staff.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. 1 will recognize Mr. Welch first, if he has some-
thing else to say.
Mr. Welch?
Senator McCarthy. Sure, go ahead, Mr. Welch.
Mr. Welch. Am I recognized?
Senator Mundt. You are recognized.
Mr. Welch. I was a little puzzled at Mr. Cohn's reference to my
clients. I have only a modest collection of them. Presumably they
might all be listening on the television and they wouldn't crowd the
audience too much. But I am not aware of any clients who were in-
% estigated by this committee or had any transactions with it. I would
wnsh you would say something that would make my few little clients
feel better than they must at this moment, when they hear you talk-
ing about them.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Welch, I thought, sir — maybe it is my fault, and I
will apologize if it were — I thought I very clearly indicated to the
committee what I referred to was information dealing with Communist
infiltration into the Army. In view of the fact, sir, that you repre-
sent the Secretary of the Army, and the Counselor of the Department,
I did not, sir, refer to any of your clients in private practice. I know
but one of them who happens to be a good friend of mine, sir, and I
have no intention of trying to get his business.
I
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1777
Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman, I feel better on both points.
Senator Mundt. Very well.
Senator McCarthy ?
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that the
subpena was served upon me and the material has been produced here
by the chairman of the
Senator Mundt. May the Chair say the material was produced with-
out the benetit of the subpena. At the sug<i"estion of Senator Jackson,
we withdrew the subpena and got a unanimous consent.
Senator McCarthy. I w^ould like to ask Mr. Cohn a few questions
about this material, if I may.
Mr. Cohn, as we know, this was ordered produced before the Memo-
rial Day holidays.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
Senator McCarthy. You have had very little time to go through
this material, I assume ?
Mr. Cohn. Well, sir — well, we put in some time on it sir; yes.
Senator McCarthy. And I may say for the record, I was taking a
vacation over the holidays myself. I think I talked to you a coui)le
of times by phone and talked to you for a few minutes last night also.
I would like to know a little more about this material. Does this
contain the names of any informants who came to me to give me
information ?
Mr. Cohn. Are you saying, sir, to you personally as opposed to Dave
Schine or myself or someone on the staff ?
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. I don't know, sir.
Senator McCarthy. You don't know ?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir. I can think of some who I know spoke both to
you and to Dave Schine.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, I am going to order the coun-
sel not to turn that material over. It will not be available to Mr.
Welch until I have had a chance to go through it.
Mr. Cohn. May I submit it to Mr. Jenkins, though, sir ?
Senator McCarthy. If it is understood that it will be available only
to Mr. Jenkins and the chairman; yes. But I will order you not to
make it available to Mr. Welch at this time until I have had a chance
to go through it. I was asked to produce certain material. I am
ready to produce the material I was asked to produce. I may say
that it took Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams about 6 months to get a few
names for us. I think maybe we should have more than just the
holiday weekend to go through this. I would like to ask the Chair's
indulgence to have at least another half day so that I can with ]\Ir.
Carr go through this material here and make sure that it complies
with the request of the Chair.
Senator Mundt. The Chair has previously announced that the ma-
terial is being accepted by the counsel and by the committee. It will
not be released to peo])le beyond the committee staff and the committee
members without action of the committee members.
Senator McCarthy. As chairman of the committee, I have no per-
mission to turn this material over to the chairman without permission
of the Permanent Investigations Committee. I will call a meeting of
this coiinnittee after we get through today. May I say that anything
1778 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
tliat Dave Scliine has done, any work he has performed, any notes
lie had made, certainly sliould be available to Mr. Welch, to everyone
on this committee. However, I am afraid that I will have to refuse to
turn files over on just hit or miss basis, not knowing what is in them,
until I get permission of the full investigating subcommittee. I will
call a meeting of the subcommittee for that purpose.
Senator Mundt. In the meantime, they will be in the custody of
Committee Counsel Jenkins, in response to our request which was
issued in lieu of a subpena, but with the same understanding.
Mr. CoHif. May the record indicate, Senator Mundt, that we are
herewith producing to yourself, sir, and to Counsel Jenkins, the mate-
rial, as much of the material as we could assemble, called for by Mr.
Jenkins Friday afternoon?
Senator Muxdt. Very well.
Senator McCarthy. Just a minute so we don't have any mis-
understanding.
Senator McClf.llan. Mr. Chairman, can I be recognized?
Senator JNIundt. Are you through. Senator McCarthy ?
Senator McClellan. What I want to determine now is are these
files now in the custody of this committee or are they not? I want
to know. I can't tell from all of this
Senator IMundt. The Chair would assume
Senator McClellan. I don't want an assumption. I want to know
are these files in the custody of this committee or are they not?
Senator McCarthy. May I answer that?
Senator McClellan. No. I am asking the chairman.
Senator Mundt. The Chan* would assume on the basis of the record
that you have heard as well as 1, that these files have been turned over
to the custody of our committee counsel, Mr. Jenkins, and have been
delivered to him by Mr. Cohn.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy ?
Senator McCarthy. I have said repeatedly that I would not make
available the names of any informants, any of my informants. If
this is a matter between Mr. Schine and Mr. Cohn, if these are in-
formants that he feels should be turned over to the counsel of the
committee, I assume that he has talked to Mr. Schine about this, that
is well and good. However, it is now 12 : 10. I would like to have
the noon hour to discuss this matter with Mr. Cohn. In the mean-
time, I will, with the Chair's permission, consider these files in the
custody of the Permanent Investigating Subcommittee.
Mr. Cohn. Sir?
Senator Mundt. Mr. Cohn.
Mr. Cohn. Senator Mundt, might I explain this : I have talked to
Private Schine about this over the weekend, sir. The files do contain
the names of certain informants, certain people who have been giving
this committee information, sir. And I would like to say that both
Schine and I, and I believe all of the staff members know that the
success or failure of this committee, sir, depends upon our ability
to get information concerning the mishandling or laxity or inefficiency
in the executive branch of the Government. That is why this com-
mittee is set up, sir. We must get that information from people in
the executive. If we don't get it, we are out of business. We have a
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION . 1779
specific mandate, under the Le<^islative Keorizanization Act, to look
into laxity and mishandling; of situations in the executive. Most of
the time, sir, you can get that information only from people who work
in the executive. We have ohtained statements from a large numl)er
of people who do work in the executive. I am no more anxious, sir,
to embarrass those people or to betray their confidence, than is the
very distinguished chairman for whom I have the very highest respect.
I notice, sir, in the memorandum of law, which Mr. 15rownell sub-
mitted, in support of the Eisenhower directive, he has a quote from
Theodore Roosevelt in refusing to turn information over to a sena-
torial committee on the ground that that information would give
away the name of a man wdio furnished that information to the Gov-
ernment, and asked that his name be kept secret. President Theodore
Eoosevelt said that that was a sacred trust. I regard the information
given to this committee by people who want to see Communists ex-
posed and uncovered as a sacred trust. I am the last one who wants
to reveal their names, sir. As I understand it now, I am producing
this material to you, sir, to Mr. Jenkins and to the committee, not for
the purpose of destroying these sources of information, and revealing
the names of these people, but on the understanding that these names
of confidential information vrill not be revealed, but that the material
will be made otherwise available to you, sir.
Senator Mundt. That is the basis on which the material was
solicited, and it ij on that basis that the material is received.
Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
Senator Mundt. Senator McClellan.
Senator INIcClellan. Do I understand that this material, whatever
it is — I don't know what is in it — is made available for the inspection
of the committee as it now is presented in that box, or is it not? That
is what I want to know.
Senator Mundt. My understanding very definitely is that it is made
available for inspection by the committee.
Senator INIcClellan. Are there any conditions or qualifications on
it? Let's keep the record straight.
Senator McCarthy. May I correct the Chair ?
Senator Mundt, There are none that I know of.
Senator McClellan. Let's see.
Senator McCarthy, May I correct the Chair ?
Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy ?
Senator McCarthy, The Chair asked me if I would be willing to
produce all of the material produced by Mr. Schine, minus the names
of any confidential informants. I told him I would do that. I will
do that. I will not turn this material over to the committee now, in
view of the fact that it appears that the names of confidenial in-
formants are in it. If the committee of which I am chairman votes that
I must turn over the names of confidential informants, then we will
take that matter up, but I have no right as chairman of the Permanent
Investigating Committee to turn material which the Chair has never
asked for over to the Chair. I want to make it very clear that my staff
has only had the holidays to go through this. You will see that there
is a vast amount of material.
I want to know whether — for example, if Mr, Schine has an in-
formant and if that informant is willing to have his luime known, well
1780 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
and good. B3fore I would have this material turned over, I would
want to know what material is in it.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, let me say that as chairman of the com-
mittee which has jurisdiction of this material, I would like to have
at least a few hours to have the staff go through this so I can give you
a report of what we have got here.
The Army took 6 months to give us a few names. I think I should
have a couple of hours.
Senator Mundt. The Chair has no idea whatsoever what is in that
box, but he does recall that on Friday Mr. Cohn was ordered specifical-
ly to produce the material. He was asked whether he could do it, and
he said he could. He has had Friday night and Saturday and Sun-
day and Monday, until Tuesday morning. The Chair is certainly dis-
appointed if Mr. Cohn is unable at this time to comply with the re-
quest which was made in lieu of a subpena.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cohn has complied. You
can see he has volumes of material there.
Senator Mundt. There is no compliance unless it has been delivered.
Senator McCarthy. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cohn is
my chief counsel. He is not chairman of the Investigating Commit-
tee. As chairman of the Investigating Committee, I have the control
of the files. The members of my committee can vote what to do with
it. I will have to be bound by majority vote. I will not turn the
files over to the committee now without knowing what is in them.
I merely ask that we have a bit of time. It is 12 : 15. I don't
think it is unreasonable to have 15 minutes, until 12: 80, so I can go
over this material during the noon hour. If the Chair will consider
that this material is my jurisdiction now
Senator Mundt. May the Chair inquire whether during the noon
hour you will call together a meeting of the committee to determine
the legal process by which, in your opinion, this transfer can be made?
Senator McCarthy. I want first to go over the material with Mr.
Cohn and find out what is here. I haven't had a chance to do that yet.
It may be unnecessary to call a meeting of the committee. The Chair
knows that I have worked with him very, very closely, and have ac-
ceded to many requests which I didn't fully agree with, in order to
expedite this matter; and this matter, I am sure, will be taken care of
to the satisfaction of all the members of the committee. But, as I
said
Senator Mundt. The Chair wishes to know what the Senator is sug-
gesting now, because if we are going to recess until 2, w^e don't want
to recess until 2 o'clock and have to recess again. If you can decide
with Mr. Cohn in a private conference that you think you have the
authority to deliver this material, well and good. If not, the Chair
suggests that you arrange to call a committee meeting, say, at a quarter
to 2, at which we can determine that.
Senator McCarthy. May I suggest we continue with the cross-ex-
amination of Mr. Cohn
Senator Mundt. Counsel advises me that this is the next step in his
interrogation ; that this is the thing he w^ants to talk about before turn-
ing it over to committee members.
Senator McCarthy. Then instead of adjourning at 12 : 30 — I can't
see the clock from here — it is 12: 15 or 12. 17 — that we adjourn now
so I can discuss this matter with my chief counsel and the staff and find
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1781
out just exactly what we have liere. There cerlaiuly is no iuclination
and no desire to keep any nuiterial ])ertinent to this invest it^'al ion from
this committee.
Senator Mundt. May the Chair inquire whether, if we do that,
you will be ready at 2 o'clock either by action of the committee or by
your own action to produce the material which we have tried to get.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman.
Senator McCarthy. May I answer that, Mr. Chairman ?
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. We have, as the Chair can see, a huge box full
of material. I am reasonably certain that by 2 o'clock we will be able
to handle this matter satisfactorily. I do want to talk to Mr. Carr
and to Mr. Cohn, and find out what we have here. I told the Chair
I would give him all the material minus the names of the informants
and it is impossible for me to look at that box of material and know
whether or not there are the names of informants in it. I have told
my informants time and time again over the air that their names
would not go to anyone who would try to punish them and try to get
their jobs. That is still my position. The Chair has not asked for the
names of informants. I hope that we can go through that, and ])er-
haps with Mr. Jenkins and his staff decide what is material, and what
is not. I hope we can answer that by 2 o'clock.
IVIr. CoHN. I would be very happy if Mr. Jenkins would work with
us on it.
Senator Mundt. Senator McClellan.
Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, I am not concerned about the
Senator's having time to go through the files so that he will know what
is being presented or what is being filed or made available to this com-
mittee. If he doesn't know and wants time, that is certainly all right.
But I do want this understood : Anything filed before this committee,
anything presented in response to this request, subpena, or whatever
it is. this Senator is going to look at it if he wants to.
I don't Avant any misunderstanding about that. I say that to you.
1 mean what I am saying. I want you to understand it. I want to
know when it is filed ancl when it is not. "When it is filed it is going
before this committee as a part of the record of this committee, and
this Senator is going to see it. If it is not filed that is a different
matter, but whenever it goes into the custody of this committee this
Senator is going to look at it if he wants to and I am not going to ask
Senator McCarthy whether I can or not. I w^ant you to know that.
Senator Mundt. May the Chair say
Senator McCarthy. I think I have a right to answer that.
Senator Mundt, The Chair has the floor. ]\Iay the Chair say that
any material received in evidence before this committee is received by
the committee and is available to the committee members and to the
staff of the committee. I don't know anything about what is in that
box. I know what we asked for. Whatever we get is available to
Senator McClellan, to all the Republicans and all the Democrats, and
all the members of our committee staff, of whom there are five.
Senator McCarthy. May I say to the chairman, the chairman is
speaking now as chairman of the special committee, and he certainly
has a right to. May I say speaking as chairman of the Special In-
1782 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
vestiojatin^ Committee, that the Senator from Arkansas will not get
tlie names of any confidential informants that I have. This is es-
pecially true in view of the fact that since the Senator came back on
the committee, he came back since days after Mr. Adams and Mr.
Stevens contacted him, he hasn't taken the stand to tell us why he
came back, what that conversation was, that is his business and we
can't subpena him to do it. He has made it very clear, however, the
Senator from Arkansas has, that he feels that those individuals that
give me information about Communists, about traitors, that they
should be prosecuted. He has made speeches demanding that they
be prosecuted. I want to tell the Senator from Arkansas, in all
honesty now, that he will not get the names of any individuals who
give me information about graft, corruption, or communism, unless
and until he assures me that those names will not be used. Let me
make this clear. As far as I am concerned, I don't make memoranda,
I don't put those names in the files. I am very careful not to do that.
I have been worried about the sort of thing, Senator McClellan, that
I have seen here the past few days. I was frankly worried when my
three Democrat friends came back on the committee about whether
they were coming back to help us dig out graft, corruption and com-
munism, or whether they were coming back upon the request of Mr.
Adams and Mr. Stevens. I still don't know. I still don't know, but I
want to say very clearly, the Senator from Arkansas will never get
the name of anyone who confidentially and in secrecy gives me
information about dishonesty, graft, corruption, treason, in this
Government.
Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman? May I say to the Senator
from Wisconsin I have never asked him for such names. His implica-
tion is false. Secondly, it is false when you imply by any language
that you may have used here now, and when I was absent from this
committee, that I wanted the name of informants to make public. I
never made such a statement. I never thought they should be made
public. The Senator knows that. And he knows he was unfair when
he made such statements and such implications in my absence.
I do take this position, that I am talking about classified informa-
tion. If the Senator has a right, as chairman of this committee or as
a United States Senator, to have the secret files of this Government,
the classified files, dealing with the security of this country, to have
them pilfered, and the documents given to him, then I say it will
destroy the security system that protects this country at this hour.
That is the position I have taken. I take it now. I simply ask your
administration to take the facts as revealed by you and let the Ameri-
can people know whether that is the process that this Government and
this administration is going to follow. If it is, the people are entitled
to know it. And there are a few other Senators that can perform
the same conduct if they care to. But I want to point out to you,
that I am talking about the basic issue of national security. And if
the Senator — if there is information in the files, secret information
that the Senator refers to here, marked by some little bureaucrat
"classified," in your statement last Friday, that little bureaucrat can be
no one else except J. Edgar Hoover. He is the one who marked it
classified, and if you want to refer to him to the American people as
a little bureaucrat, that is your privilege. But the American people
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1783
are entitled to know if it is a little bureaucrat that is controlling^ this
secret information. I would like to know it, too.
But I do say that 1 take the position that this lias become a national
issue, as to whether we are entitled to <>et the classified liles and make
them ])ublic here in hearings of this character. If we are, legally so,
then we know how to proceed. We can suppeiia every document
that the FBI has, and you can carry on. \ou will get more work
from that than all of the Congress divided into committees could
possibly attend to. If we are not entitled to it legally, if we are not
entitled to get by subpena, then I raise the question are we entitled to
get it by theft ? I do not believe we are.
Xow, that is the clear-cut issue. As to your informants, I don't
want to know their names. I don't care anything about them. I
am not concerned about that, people who give you information, and
certainly Government employees can give information within their
personal knowledge, quite properly, about any Communist in Govern-
ment. But when he gets that information from a classified document
that is marked "secret" and deals with the security of this country,
then I wonder, Mr. Chairman.
All I want to know is what this administration interprets the law
to be. If they interpret it to be no crime for him to go in there and
take that document and make it available, when the committee cannot
get it by subpena, if that is no crime, we are entitled to know it. That
it all r want to know. I will be very interested, and I hope it will
be expedited one way or the other, in the Attorney General making
that decision. I think he has already made it, but 1 think the Ameri-
can people are entitled to know what the position of this administra-
tion is with respect to these secret documents that go to the vital
security of our counrty.
We are entitled to know it on a legal basis and not upon the indi-
vidual basis of what one citizen may think, one Senator may think,
or someone else may think. I hope we will keep this a government of
law and order.
Senator SymincxTON. Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Mundt. The Chair will recognize the Senator in just a
minute, but he wants to call attention to the fact that we are talking
about two different committee setups, there was no argument before
US about their special investigating committee, and the fact that
material received in testimony by subpena or otherwise is made
available to all committee members.
The discussion taking place between Senator McCarthy and Sena-
tor McClellan, which Senator Symington now wishes to join--
that discussion deals entirely with the regular investigating commit-
tee of the Senate, of which Senator McCarthy is chairman.
Senator Symington. May I proceed, please?
I am trying to get a recognition, please, and I would like to proceed,
if I may.
Senator McCarthy. A point of personal privilege.
Senator Mundt. You may state your personal privilege.
Senator McCaijtiiy. I think I should be given the right to answer
Senator McClellan, without the interruption of Senator Symington.
If he has something to say when I am through, good. But it is long-
established policy that when a Senator makes a statement, as Senator
McClellan made, the Senators may answer. May I have a right?
1784 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Senator Symington. Mr, Chairman, I would like to rise to a point
of privilege myself, and I will stay whatever length you like, but I
have said nothing this morning of any kind on this critically im-
portant point to the Nation's security.
Senator McCarthy. May I answer Senator McClellan ?
Senator Symington. I would appreciate your letting me know,
after Senator McCarthy gets through with his answer, that I would
be allow^ed to proceed before the recess.
Senator Mundt. The Chair will call on Senator Symington when
he has listened to Senator McCarthy. I think Senator McCarthy has
a point of personal privilege involved because the personalities in-
volved in this particular conversation at the moment appear to be
Senator McCarthy and Senator McClellan. If Senator Symington
wants to get into it, I think it will prolong it. But I will^ call on you
after Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. Mr, Chairman, as the Chair knows, the Attor-
ney General issued a statement the other day to the effect that the
executive has the sole duty and right to enforce the law. That is
correct. From that he apparently jumped the huge gap and said that
therefore the Congress could not investigate whether or not they are
badly enforcing that law. It is because they have the right to enforce
the law, and the duty, that the Congress could not examine how they
are enforcing it.
I pointed out, Mr. Chairman, previously, that as chairman of the
investigating committee I have no choice, under the Reorganization
Act I have the duty, but to examine and expose any wrongdoing in
the executive branch.
I pointed out that you cannot hide wrongdoing behind a stamp of
secrecy. Let's not bring J. Edgar Hoover into this. J. Edgar Hoover
made no decision as to whether or not these documents could be made
public. That was made by the Attorney General.
Let me finish, please, I didn't interrupt you. Senator McClellan.
I want to make it very clear that while I am chairman of the com-
mittee, I will receive evidence of wrongdoing, graft, corruption,
treason, from any Government employee who will give that to me. I
feel those Government employees have a high duty to do that. They
all take an oath, as I recall, to defend this Nation against all enemies,
foreign and domestic.
I believe that oath towers far above any loyalty to a superior officer
who might be jailed if they give us the facts.
As I said before, back in 192-1 Ave had a situation in w^iich we were
not dealing with treason, Mr. Chairman, we were dealing then with
the theft of money. The Nation can recover from the theft of money
but not from treason. At that time the Attorney General advised
President Coolidge not to allow the Congress to know what was going
on. He said, "Cover it up ; hide it." When the President discovered
the Attorney General was involved, he fired that Attorney General.
He told committees of Congress they could have all the information,
w^th Cabinet officers to testify. They did, and as I recall, some of
those Cabinet officers went to jail.
Mr. Chairman, I do have a very, very serious problem here. I
realize that the members of the committee, of the investigating com-
mittee, should have access to every piece of information in the files.
SPECIAL ESr^'ESTIGATION 1785
I think tliat should be the rule. I have told the memhors that they
couhl have complete, free access to all the liles; that their minority
counsel could have access to all the files. However, when Senator
McClellan, as the ranking member — I assume he speaks for the other
members when he ooes out and says there should be an investiuntion
to determine whether or not I have been liuilty of a crime in <iettin<^' in-
formation about Communist infiltration, information, Mr. Chairman,
which shows that the security department of tlie militai-y has been
warned time and time a<2:ain by a very competent VIM that 1 am
o-uiUy of a crime because I let the peo])le knov; thore facts, then 1 am
confi-onted with the very serious problem of how J can do the two
im])ossible tasks — No. 1, make all fdes, including- the names of inform-
ants, available to the members of the connnittee — and 1 say in that
connection I never ])ut the names of the informants in tlie hies; and,
No. 2, protec t the informants.
I want to discuss that with my chief counsel today to find out whether
or not the individuals named in here «ive their consent, and also at
the earliest possible time I would like to have a meeting; with, not tliis
committee, but my investio;atinii: ccwnmittee, which is ])ractically the
same in membership, and determii^.e how we can iron out this problem.
In the meantime, may T say, John, that you will not set the nr.mes
of any informants.
Senator McClellan. May I tell you, T don't want the names of your
informants. You <2;et away from the issue. You won't face it. tiere
is the issue : You said you didn't want the FBI or Hoover brouiiht into
it. Here is the record. Mr. Collier, who testified hei-e on the stand,
was instructed by this committee to contact Mr. Hoover rgardino; the
document, and here is what he reported back to this committee under
oath :
Upon your iiisti'uctions I coninmnicated with the FBI and expressed iiiy desire
to talli to Mr. Hoover. Within a few minutes thereafter. 'Sir. Hoover called me
on the telephone. He stated tl;at the letter to General Boiling; of January 20,
I!'."!, was elassified l)y the word "•Confidential." and he does not feel that he lias
any right to declassify it or to discuss its contents.
That is from Mr. Hoover himself regardino; the document that came
m controversy here.
I hold in my hand a copy of a letter from Attorney Gen.eral Browu.ell
dated May 13, 1054, addressed to the chairman of this subcommittee,
and in it he says :
If the confidential classification of FBI reports and memoranda is not respected,
serious and irreparable harm will be done to the FBI.
Senator ]\IcCarthy. What letter are you reading from now?
Senator McClellan. I am reading from a carbon cop}^, and I will
as!: the chairman to verify it, of a letter
Senator McCarthy. From Brownell ?
Senator IMcClellan. May 13, 1954, from Herbert Brow^nell, Jr.,
who is Mr. Hoover's boss, as I understand it. He says :
If the confidential classification of FBI reports and memoranda is not re-
spected, serious and irreparable harm will be done to the FBI.
I have heard you many times praise Mr. Hoover. I don't know
whether you meant to suggest that the President, because Mr. Brown-
ell has taken this position and Mr. Hoover takes this position — I
don't know whetlier you mean to imply that they should be tired or
1786 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
something clone with tliem, as was done with one back in 1924. But
may I say to you, Senator, I am trying to settle a basic issue of law,
I don't want any of your confidential information. All I want is, let
the country get this legal question settled so we can all operate within
the law, if that is possible. You say what you wnll do and what you
will not do. I tell you, Senator, that I will not set myself up above
and apart from the law, I am going to conform to it. You do as you
please.
Senator McCarthy, Will the Senator yield for a minute ?
Senator Mundt. I think the Chair agreed to recognize Senator
Symington next, but before doing so, exercising his prerogative as
the Chairman, he again wants to point out that none of the discussion
which has occupied us for the last 10 or 15 minutes has anything to
do with the issue before this committee. The Chair has already
ruled, and nobody has challenged his ruling, that any of the material
produced in evidence before these hearings becomes available to all
of the members of this committee and to the staff. The discussion
w^e are having deals with a different status altogether, a different com-
mittee, a committee headed permanently by Senator Mc(Jarthy, the
Permanent Senate Investigations Subcommittee. The Chair has
agreed to hear Senator Symington, Before doing so, he dismisses
Mr, Cohn from the stand so he may go through that box and find
out what material should be back at 2 o'clock ,
Senator McCarthy, Senator Symington, as a personal courtesy,
will you allow me first to answer the statement by Senator McClellan ?
Senator Symington. I yield to the junior Senator from Wisconsin,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mundt, Mr, Cohn, you and your aide may go through the
contents so that by 2 o'clock you may deliver the material in answer
to our substitute for a subpena.
Senator Symington, May I first say it might be well if Mr. Cohn
would stay until we get through the points I would like to bring up
with respect to the files that are pertinent to the matter that we are
now discussing,
Mr. Cohn. I will be very happy to.
Senator McCarthy, May I say to the Senator from Arkansas, it
disturbs me greatly to get into an argument here with the ranking
Democrat member of my investigating committee. We have gotten
along very well for quite a few years now, while the Senator was
chairman and while I was ranking Republican member, except for a
short period of time this summer. The Senator has quoted from a
letter from Brownell in which he says that you can't declassify or
make public any FBI letters, or something to that effect, I don't
recall the language, I would like to call the Senator's attention to
the fact that when Mr, Brownell made his speech out in Chicago
naming a dead spy, and then when he was criticized and accused of
not telling the truth, accused of lying, he made the files public. He
declassified the secret files,
I don't criticize him for doing that. I think those files should have
been made public long before that. He didn't give the names of any
informants.
My position is that if an Attorney General can declassify a document
to expose a dead spy, then he should declassify a document to expose
living spies.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION" 1787
INIay I say to the Senator, I knew it was goino; to brinoj up a j>r()l)lem
here if we — you talk about viohitinj^ the hiw and setting yourself above
the law. There is no law that prevents our getting this information.
Senator McClellan. That is what I want to lind out, Joe.
Senator McCarthy. Let me say this: If a Presidential directive,
one 1 think mistakeidy made, unwisely made — I don't think this Con-
gress is bound by any Presidential directive of secrecy. When Truman
wrote his blackout order in 1948 which protected the Alger Hisses in
the Govermnent, I thought he was making a grievous error. When
President Eisenhow^er, whom I respect greatly, passed his secrecy
order which went far beyond the Truman order, I tliought he was
making a grievous error and I felt he was not entitled to do it.
]May I say, Senator, just for your benefit, I am not setting myself
above any law. I feel that 1 have an oath as a Senator, an oath as the
chairman of an investigating committee. That oath binds me to get
information of wrong-doing in Government. I feel that there is no
valid directive of any kind which can say that, as chairman of the
connnittee, I must not do that.
If the Congress passes a law and the President signs it, saying the
chairmen of these investigation committees must not get information of
w^'ong-doing, that the American people must not know what is going
on, ihat the American people must not hear of treason, that they must
]iot hear of graft and corruption, if we pass that law and it is made a
law% then there is nothing I can do except abide by it. But, Senator,
I just will not abide by any secrecy directive of anyone. I think you
and I have seen and will see Presidents come and go.
In closing, we have a duty to do our job even though we may ditfer
with a perfectly honest version of what the President thinks his job is.
Senator McClellan. We may differ about that, and that is what I
think the American people are entitled to have settled, whether you
are right or the President is right. That is what I am trying to find
out. When yon say I am trying to put you in jail, I am asking no such
thing. I don't care if you are staying out. No one is afraid of you
out any more than they would be with you in, so far as I know. But
the point I am making, Joe, is, and you know it, you have reached the
crossroads in this thing, and w^e are entitled in the course of these hear-
ings now, to have this thing settled, if there is any way to settle it.
Seiiator McCarthy. Let me have 10 seconds.
Senator McClellan. One other thing. The testimony is here from
Mr. Collier, that the document that raised this controversy, is from
the highest classification, he is quoting Mr. Hoover, that can be put
on a document by the FBI, and he further says that the contents of
the 214 page and so on, he went on.
You brought up Mr. Brownell disposing of a dead Communist. I
was kind of like you. I asked that $64 question at the hearings, as a
member of that committee: Just what public interest did he have in
mind to serve by so doing? I have never gotten an answer yet. Do
you understand? I may agree with you about that. But we are at
the crossroads now in committee investigations and in the adminis-
tration's position, and I am simply doing nothing, I don't care if you
keep all of your information in your liead or somewhere else, as far
as I am concerned, I want you to understand that — so far as I am
concerned, I want to settle a basic issue here that is vital, I think, to
the security of this Nation, and settling it right.
1788 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Senator ]\IcCarthy. Senator, would you yield for 10 seconds ?
Senator McClellan. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. Would the Senator agree with me, that if tliis
order, the latest order, applies to all investigations, an order which
says that if there are two people in Government who get together and
contrive, whether it is for graft, corruption, or whatever, they can't
be called upon to testify, wouldn't that in ettect just end the work of
all investigating committees ?
Senator McClellan. I will meet j^ou somewhere and discuss it with
you, sometime, and see if we can agree. But meantime, it is before
the highest law enforcement body of this Government and the Presi-
dent of the United States and I think it should be settled. Whether
anybody goes to jail or not, I am not concerned. But I am concerned
because I do believe that if a policy is followed that you advocate, and
every Senator has that right and every chairman of a committee has
that right, I don't believe we can maintain the security system that
now has been invoked and used, to try to protect this country.
Senator McCarthy. A security of crooks ?
Senator McClellan. I don't believe Mr. Hoover is a crook. I be-
lieve they are doing what they believe to be right.
Senator McCarthy. I didn't say Hoover was a crook.
Senator Mundt. May the Chair say that it is a quarter to 1. He
promised Senator Symington some time ago that if he insisted on get-
ting into this colloquy, he will recognize him. He now wants the Chair
to recognize him. He presumes he will say something critical of
Senator McCarthy. If he does, he will give Senator McCarthy 2
minutes to answer him.
The timekeeper will be ready to notify the Chair when to give the
2 minutes to Senator McCarthy.
Senator Symington, Mr, Chairman, may I now have the floor ?
Senator Mundt. You now have the floor. The rest of us have a
date for lunch.
Senator Symington. The Chair has a very general way of prolong-
ing the hearings, and I must say my admiration for his operation is
only exceeded by something else. I would like to say Mr. Cohn is com-
ing back on the stand, and if the Chair agrees, perhaps I could shorten
up. I would have nothing that would interest Mr. Cohn except in an
indirect way. If he would like to have Mr. Cohn leave, that is all
right with me. Would you like Mr. Cohn to leave, Mr. Chairman?
Semitor Mundt. Yes. I would like to have Mr. Cohn leave so he
can go through the box and be ready at 2 o'clock.
Mr. Cohn. I have no going through it to do sir. I know what is
in this box. I know what the material is. I have only to talk with
the chairman of the committee about it, sir.
Senator Mundt. The Chair would be happy to dismiss Senator Mc-
Carthy, but he is afraid he won't go.
Senator Symington ?
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, first I would make the point
that I never would have wanted to serve on this committee in the
beginning, I would never have accepted membership on it, if I had
not felt that everything that was available to the chairman and the
majority of the committee was going to be made available to me.
Now, there has been quite a lot of talk recently about talking over the
airwaves to people about giving information when they think the
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1789
Government is not opoi-atino- pi-()[)erly. As I said last week, and sa}'
again, in my opinion, this is very danoerous. We have gone back to
dead spies, we have gone back to 19*24. I would be willing to go back
to Benedict xVrnold, and say that I ho])e everybody remembers that
there can be traitors in the Military Establishment in this country.
I would like to urge everybody who is listening to this television, to
follow the rules, and the rules are relatively simple.
If a man in the Air Force believes that there is graft or corru])lion
by his superior ofticer, he can inunediately go to the officer superior to
him. For example, a captain, if he believes his major is wrong,
can go to the colonel, or he can go to the Office of Special Investiga-
tions, run by a great young general, and he can complain directly
there.
As a matter of fact, the Office of Special Investigations is spread
around the country, so tliat there would not be any effort on his part at
the various bases. The same thing is true in the Army. If a captain
or a sergeant or a private feels that their superior officer or anybody
else is acting improperly, they can go around their normal supervision
and go to another officer, or in the case of the Army, they can go to
G-2, which is also around the Army, and in the case of the Navy, they
ran go to the Office of Naval Tnvestigations, either directly at head-
quarters or through one of the many branches that are established
for just that purpose. In the case of graft or corruption, or unfair
treatment, it is important that they do it.
In the case of subversion or disloyalty it would be even more im-
portant. That is the ])attern. It has worked for the last 150 years
in our Government. It did pretty well in many wars, including World
War I and II. I would urge that they do it that way and no other
way.
Finally, if they feel that the entire establishment. Military Estab-
lishment", under their Secretary and their Chief of Staff, and the Secre-
tary of Defense, and the Commander in Chief, is just no good, and
that they should correct that, then they can go to either the Depart-
ment of Justice or to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and they
can make their charges there.
So they have at least the four definite steps set up where their
charges can be made without going out of the executive branch, and
then of course the executive branch decides whether or not that
should be given to the legislative bodies, or the legislative body can
ask for it.
I am not protesting about anybody giving any information any-
where, but I do think that it ought to be done on the basis of the
laws of the land.
Now with respect to these files. Thursday afternoon we were
told that the Democratic members of the committee — that it was
their responsibility after the Crouch letter was introduced, to know
what was in the files. And our counsel asked that he see the files on
Thursd-^.y. He was told that the files in question were not in the nor-
mal files", and that therefore they could not be seen at that time.
On Friday there was a great deal of testimony, and now we are
back on the question of these charges. On Friday there was a great
deal of testimony as to whether or not the improper pressures which
the Army said were utilized with respect to Private Schine were justi-
fied. The witness made his statements that they were justified, based
1790 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
01) committee business. It was then requested tliat tlie files be turned
over to committee counsel. That was refused by Senator McCarthy
without subpena. Thereupon a subpena was issued in the lunch pe-
riod on Friday to get the files.
At the time it was issued and it was served, Senator McCarthy told
the person who served it that he would not honor it. We then went
ahead to the best of our ability on Friday afternoon to find out what
was in the files to verify the statements made by the witness as to
what Private Schine was doing when he was off of the base on the
various times that he was allowed to leave with the premise that he
was going to do committee business. We did not get anywhere on
Friday with respect to that, so Saturday morning, the minority
counsel went to the committee and asked, to the committee chambers,
and asked that he be allowed to see the files in question. He was
told at that time that neither he nor any members of the committee,
and it is my understanding not Mr. Jenkins, the counsel for the com-
mittee, could see the files.
So since then we have had 1, 2, 3 — 3 days pass since the last request.
1 must say, Mr. Chairman, that I think there is an extraordinary in-
terest in not showing these files, considering the importance of the
files with respect to the information and the whole basis on which these
hearings are being held.
Senator Mundt. The Chair will recognize Senator McCarthy for
2 minutes, and at the end of 2 minutes the timekeeper will notify the
Chair, and the Chair will notify the audience that we are in recess for
2 minutes.
Senator McCarthy. Do you mean that after this long diatribe, the
Chair arbitrarily gives me only 2 minutes to answer ?
Senator Mundt. We are supposed to have a lunch hour here pretty
soon. The Chair recognizes from experiences of the past that
colloquy can go on endlessly between you and the Democratic mem-
bers of the committee.
Senator McCarthy. I think I can cover it in 2 minutes, Mr. Chair-
man, but I don't want any new 2-minute rule applied only to the
Senator from Wisconsin.
Senator Mundt. It applies to this request. I will recognize you
for 2 minutes.
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, this plea of Senator Syming-
ton's to keep information about wrongdoing, graft, and corruption se-
cret from the Congress, to keep it within the Department, is so fantas-
tic, so dangerous, that I am going to ask the young man, who has done
a great job of prosecuting criminals, to try to answer it. I think
the 2-minute rule is unreasonable, but I will yield tne 2 minutes to
Mr. Cohn.
Mr. CoHN. I can't possibly answer in 2 minutes. I need a little bit
more. I think it is important. I think it would be unfair to us to
let Mr. Symington's statement stand over the lunch hour when some
of them, sir, are not so.
Senator Mundt. You may proceed and see what you can do in 2
minutes.
Senator Symington. Just a minute, Mr. Cohn. You say some of
the statements I have made are not so. Let's start right there. What
is it that I said that isn't so? I tried very hard to state the facts
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1791
a? I was oiven them, and if they are incorrect, let's f^et the true facts
on the table.
Mr. CoHN. TJifijht, sir.
As Senator 8ymino;ton knows, I have always had a ^reat deal of
respect for him, and that is why I was very sorry to hear him say
what he just did. I believe Senator Syminoton said — and I thoui^ht
he M'as addrepsino^ it to me — that we are trying to keep those iiles
back, that there is a reluctance on our part, and that that is to be
interpreted in some way as bearin<^ on the issue of what Dave Schine
was doing wlien he was supposed to be working on Senate business.
Senator Syjiington. I did not address my remarks to you. In fact,
I suggested
Senator Muxdt. Mr, Cohn has the floor. ITe was limited to 2
minutes, and the Chair will grant 2 additional minutes because of the
interruption. After all, Mr. Colin has the floor and is entitled to
answer.
Senator Symington. The witness said I made a mistake, and he
said I was addressing my remarks to him. If I made a mistake, I
stand corrected, but I do believe if he said I was addressing my
remarks to him, inasmuch as I said he could leave if you thought that
was all right, then I ought to be allowed to say I wasn't addressing
my remarks to him, especially because of your great sudden hunger
yon want us to leave as soon as he finishes.
Mr. CoHN. I have no objection.
Senator Mundt. The Chair believes, in the first place, as he has
said before — and he wants to reiterate now so there is no mistake
about it — none of this colloquy has anything to do with any issue
before the committee. It is all entirely irrelevant to the issue.
Senator Symington. I specifically disagree with that. I think
the question of the files and when we obtained the files and why we
waited 4 days for the files after the testimony, is as close to anything
that has ever come up in this hearing with respect to the charges at
hand. Mr. Chairman, I know that I am not going to win this with
you, because you have the gavel and you have the chair, and there-
fore I am ready to go to lunch.
Senator Mundt. The Chair w^ould simply like to say very clearly
again that there is no argument about these files. AVhatever is sub-
mitted to the committee is submitted to all members of the committee.
They all have access to it.
Mr. Cohn, because Senator Symington interrupted you when you
were trying to answer him, he believes now you should be entitled
to make your reply without interruption, however long it be, at which
time we shall recess.
]\Ir. Cohn. It won't be long, and I hope I wdll never say anything
on this subject again.
I want to say, I don't mind being interrupted by Senator S3'ming-
ton at any time if he feels I am not making an accurate statement.
On the issue here, sir, I think Senator Symington has known me
long enough, I hope, to know that I w^ill always tell him the truth.
I have sworn under oath, and other witnesses will do likewise, that
when Dave Schine was out working on committee business, that is
Avliat he was doing. He was not in Florida, he was not in the Stork
Club ; he was working on subconnnittee business.
1792 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
Tlie Army has produced not one word to show he wasn't, because
they can't.
Now, sir, I have my testimony, and I am open to cross-examination
on tliat in full detail. I want to make it very clear that in any re-
quest I ever made, I have never abused my oath of office and my ob-
ligation to this committee.
As far as these files are concerned, there is no reluctance on my part
in producing them. I am anxious to produce them to show the com-
mittee the amount of work, and I think a number of members know
about it, that Dave Schine did well, and did for nothing, for this com-
mittee, and work which he did in the very limited period he had when
he was in the Army, getting up early, doing his basic training, and
at the same time, after hours, instead of recreation and other things,
giving his time to the subcommittee.
Now, sir, the final thing I wish to say is this: I heard a name here
used a great deal this morning which means a good deal to me. That
is the name of John Edgar Hoover. In the work I have done in com-
munism, the work I have done with boys, some of whom are in this
room, who have prosecuted these cases against spies, the Rosenberg
case, the Remington case, the U. N. case, and the others, along with
me, there is one man above all others whom we worship, and that is
J. Edgar Hoover, because over a period of years and years, long be-
fore it was a popular thing to do, that is the man who has been the
leader and the spearhead of the fight against Communist infiltration
in our Government and in this country.
It is when the reports prepared under the direction of J. Edgar
Hoover have been ignored by Government agencies and by the heads
of those Government agencies — it is when that situation "arises that,
without the work of congressional committees such as this, Alger Hiss
and William W. Remington, to my personal knowledge, would not be
in jail today.
i worked on the Remington case, sir, as a member of the executive
branch, as a member of the Department of Justice, and I know, sir,
that that case was broken by this very committee because Remington's
superiors ignored FBI re]-)ort:s, and had it not been for this committee,
this Communist spy would never have been exposed.
I know, too, sir, that Alger Hiss would not be in jail today vrere it
not for the work of a congressional committee,
I know, too, sir, that Edward Rothschild, who has invoked the fifth
amendment as to whether or not he is a Communist espionage agent,
would still be handling the secrets of this committee — woulcl still be
handling the secrets of the Government Printing Office, would still be
handling classified work from the Army, the Navy, CIA, and other
places, unless Senator McCarthy and Senator Dirksen had come back
to Washington during the summer and received information from
people working in the Govermnent Printing Office who knew that
these FBI reports, which undoubtedly bore stamps of secrecy, had
been violated and ignored over a period of years.
Unless Senator McCarthy and Senator Dirksen had gotten that in-
formation and done that job, this man who was a fifth amendment
Communist and a fifth amendment spy, would to this very minute be
working and handling the secrets of this country in the Government
Printing Office.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1793
I never before, sir, fi'oin the st:ilT level, saw any conflict between
onr duty and the duty of the executive. I understood the duty of tliis
committee to be that of ste[)i)ino- in where — I am sure the instances are
few — the executive might fail to act on FBI reports and things of
that kind.
In a very limited way, sir, our staff has tried to carry out that duty.
The staff are a handful, sir, of hardworking boys wdio work day and
night up against probably hundreds and thousands of people who
work over in the Army and in other i)Iaces.
This handful of people down there, who work day and night and
weekends, have brought about the removal from defense plants of
Connnunists. They have brouglit about the removal from (iovern-
ment agencies and from the Army of Communists and S])ies. Sir,
it is hard to hear them criticized for having done that job. They
have done it as best they know how and in keeping with the law of
the land and in keeping with the mandate of this committee to inves-
tigate inerticiency and failure to act on the part of the executive.
I am sure, sir, that John Edgar Hoover and the FBI and what they
have stood for would be the last people to criticize this or any other
congressional committee for pointing out to the American public the
fact that (jovernment agencies have ignored FBI warnings and failed
to act on the basis of information which Mr. Hoover had given to them.
I want to thank you, Senator Mundt, for giving me the opportunity
to clarify this.
Senator Mundt. We stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
Senator Symington. Before we recess, I w^ould like to say that I
am entirely in favor of any Government employee coming here with
unclassified material as a last resort, but as a court of first resort I don't
think this is the right place for it, in the Congress.
(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the committee w^as recessed, to reconvene at
2 p. m. the same day. )
INDEX
Page
Adams, John G 1710-1701,1764-1771,1770,1777,17X2
Air Force (United States) 178'J
Auilierst 1700
Army (Office of Special Investigations) ]7S!)
Armv (United -States) 1740, 1740, 1747, 1745), 1751, 1703,
1704, 1700, 1707, 1770-1773, 1775, 1776, 1780, 1789, 1790, 1792, 1793
Army Intelligence (G-2) 1789
Army press conference (November 13) 1740
Army Transport Service 1705
Arnold, Benedict 1789
Attorney General 1779, 1783-1780
Angust jMoou (show) 1754
Bigart, Homer 1T40
Blonnt, Lientenant 1709, 1701, 1703, 1764
Boiling, General 1785
Boston, ]\Iass 1744
Brooklyn, N. Y 1754
Brovvnell, Mr 1779, 1785-1787
Cabinet officers 1784
Camp Gordon 1768, 1769
Carr, Francis P 1743,1744,1750-1752,1757-1700,1765,1769,1771,1777
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 1774,1792
Chicago, 111 1786
Christmas holidays 1760
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 1774,1792
CID 1709
Cohn, Roy M., testimony of 1740-1793
Coleman, Aaron 1747
Commander in Chief 1789
Commnniists in Government 1783
Commnnist infiltration 1744, 1785, 1792
Communist investigation 1702
Communist Party 1744, 1762, 1779, 1782, 1783, 1785, 1787, 1792, 1793
Communist spy 1792
CommuQists 1744, 1762, 1779, 1782, 1783, 1785, 1787, 1792, 1793
Congress of the United States 1783, 1784, 1787, 1790, 1793
Coolidge, President 1784
Corr, Lieutenant 1757
Counselor to the Army 1740
Crouch letter 1789
Department of the Army 1740, 1740,
1747, 1749, 1751, 1703, 1764, 1700, 1767, 1770-1773, 1775, 1776, 1780,
1789, 1790, 1792, 1793.
Department of Justice 1745, 1789, 1792
Department of State 1775
Dirksen, Senator 1792
Eisenhower, President 1779, 1787
FBI letters 1786
FBI reports 1785, 1792, 1793
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)___ 1772, 1783, 1785-1787, 1789, 1792, 1793
F^fth amendment spy 1792
First World War 1789
Fort Dix 1746, 1749, 1760, 1762, 1773, 1776
Fort Monmouth 1740, 1750, 1755, 1708, 1769
II INDEX
Page
G-2 (Army Intelligence) 17Sn
Government Printing Office 17i»2
Herald Tribune 1740
Hiss, Alger 1787, 17'J2
Hoover, J. Edgar 1782, 1784, 1785, 1787, 1788, 1702, 17!)3
Jackson, Senator 1777
Justice Department 1745, 1789, 17!»2
K. P. (kitchen police) 17G3, 17U4
Lawton, General 1754-1750, 17G'J
Legislative Reorganization Act 177!)
McCarthy, Senator Joe 1740,1741,
1744, 1750-1752, 1754, 175G-1759, 17G5, 1772, 1775-1788, 1700, 1702
Memorial Day 1774, 1777
Merchants Club (New York City) 1742
Military Establishment 1780
Miller, Lieutenant 17G1, 17G2
Navy (United States) 1789,1792
Now England 1741
New York City 1741-174G, 175o-175G, 1750, 17G0, 17G7
Newspaper strike (New York City) 1742,1743
Office of Naval Investigations 1780
Office of Special Investigations (Army) 1789
President of the United States 1740,1771,1770,1784,1785,1787,1788
Presidential directive 1740, 1787
Press conference (Army, November 13) 1740
Press release (Stevens) 1740,1742
Iteber, General 17G5, 17G7
Remington, William W 1702
Remington case 1792
Ringler, Colonel 1701, 1763
Roosevelt, President Theodore 1779
Rosenberg, Ethel 1792
Rosenberg, Julius 1792
Rosenberg case 1792
Rothschild, Edward 1792
Ryan, General 1748, 17G7
Schine, G. David 1745-1750, 1754 1756, 1757, 1759-1779, 1789-1792
Second World War 1789
Secretary of the Army 1740-1742,
174G, 1749, 1751, 1752, 1758, 17G1, 1763, 1765, 1768, 1770, 1771, 1776,
1777, 1782, 1789.
Secretary of Defense 1789
Sioux Falls, S. Dak 1750
State Department 1775
Stevens, Robert T 1740-1742,
1746, 1740, 1751, 1752, 1758, 1761, 1763, 1705, 1768, 1770, 1771, 1776,
1777, 1782, 1780.
Stevens' doublecross 1740, 1765
Stevens' press release 1740, 1742
Stork Club (New York City) 1791
Tea House (show) 1754
Truman, President 1787
Truman blackout order (1948) 1787
United Nations case 1792
United States Air Force 1789
United States Army 1740,
1746, 1747, 1749, 1751, 1763, 1764, 1766, 1767, 1770-1773, 1775, 1776,
1780, 1789, 1700, 1792, 1793.
United States Attorney General 1779, 1783-1786
United States Commander in Ch^ef 1789
United States Congress 1783,1784,1787,1790,1793
United States Department of Justice 1745, 1789, 1702
United States Department of State 1775
United States Military Establishment 1789
United States Navy 1789, 1792
United States Office of Naval Investigations 1780
INDEX III
PiiKe
TTiiitod States Oflioo of Special Investi.ualioiis (Ant'v) 17S!»
Uiiitetl States Tresident 174U, 177 J, 1779, 1784, 1785, 17S7, IT.ss
United States Secretary of Defense lis',)
Wnsliiiintoii, D. C 1741-1747, 1760,177(1, 1 •.•22
World War I 17S'»
World War II 17S!)
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