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Full text of "Special Senate investigation on charges and countercharges involving: Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G. Adams, H. Struve Hensel and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn, and Francis P. Carr. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 189 .."

SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES 
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRE- 
TARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN 
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR 

JOE McCarthy, roy m. cohn, and 

FRANCIS p. CARR 



HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Res. 189 



PART 64 



JUNE 14, 1954 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
46620° WASHINGTON : 1954 



Boston ?ubi.- ^. .:aiT 
>uperintcndent of Docuniants 

NOV 2 4 1954 



COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 

HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland THOMAS A. BURKE, Ohio 

CHARLES B. POTTER, Michigan SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina 

Richard J. O'Melia, General Counsel 
Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 



Special Subcommittee on Investigations 

KARL B. MUNDT, South Dakota, Chairman 
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 

HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 

Ray H. Jenkins, Chief Counsel 

Thomas R. Prewitt, Assistant Counsel 

Robert A. Collier, Assistant Counsel 

SoLis Horwitz, Assistant Counsel 

Charles A. Maner, Secretary 

U 



CONTEXTS 



Page 

Index I 

Testimony of — 

Carr, Francis P., executive director, Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations 2i\'2(t 

III 



SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES AND 
COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE 
ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE 
HENSEL AND SENATOR jpE McCARTHY. ROY M. COHN, 
AND FRANCIS P. CARR 



MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Special Subcommittee on Investigations 
OF THE Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington, D. G. 

The subcommittee met at 10 : 07 a. m., pursuant to recess, in the 
caucus room of the Senate Office Building, Senator Karl E. Mundt, 
chairman, presiding. 

Present : Senator Karl E. Mundt, Kepublican, South Dakota ; Sen- 
ator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Eepublican, Illinois: Senator 
Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan ; Senator Henry C. Dworshak, 
Republican, Idaho ; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas ; 
Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and Senator 
Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri. 

Also present : Ray M. Jenkins, chief counsel ; Thomas R. Prewitt, 
assistant counsel; Charles Maner, assistant counsel; and Ruth Y. 
Watt, chief clerk. 

Principal participants present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a 
United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin ; Roy M. Cohn, 
chief counsel to the subcommittee ; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel 
for the Army ; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army. 

Senator Mundt. The committee will please come to order. 

As we begin another week of hearings and one which the Chair 
hopes and believes may be the last week of the current hearings, I 
again want to welcome our guests who have come to the committee 
room to observe a branch of their Government in action, and to repeat 
the regulation which the committee adopted at the beginning of the 
hearing and has enforced throughout, to the effect that there are to be 
no audible manifestations of approval or disapproval of any kind 
at any time from our guests in the audience. The committee has in- 
structed the Chair and he has instructed the uniformed members of 
the Capital Police force and the plainclothes men scattered through 
the audience that this rule is to be enforced automatically, and that 
they should escort from the room immediately, politely but firmly, 
any of our guests who, for reasons best known to themselves, elect to 
violate the terms under which they entered the room, namely, to 
refrain entirely from audible manifestations of approval or dis- 
approval. 

2625 



2626 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

The Chair Avould like to anounce he received a call from Senator 
McCarthy's oflice this morning that Senator McCarthy had returned 
from the West sometime during the night by plane, and that he re- 
quested that we put on Mr. Carr, because Senator McCarthy is 
apparently catching up on the sleep that he missed during the night. 

Mr. Carr is one of our scheduled witnesses, and therefore, Mr. 
Jenkins, I suggest you call Mr. Carr and that he be sworn at this 
time, and that we begin the interrogation of Frank Carr. 

Will you stand and be sworn, please? Do you solemnly swear the 
testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Carr, I do. 

Senator Mundt. You may be seated. 

Mr. Jenkins. M:-. Chairman. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Jenkins ? 

Mr. Jenkins. I desire at this time to announce with pleasure and 
pride that my assistant, Mr. Thomas Prewitt, of Memphis, Tenn., 
will handle the examination of Mr. Carr. 

Senator Mundt. We will be glad to welcome Mr. Prewitt back to 
the committee table again. 

The witness has been sworn, Mr. Prewitt, and you may begin first 
the direct-examination, and then the cross-examination, of Mr. Carr, 
a member of the committee staff. 

TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS P. CAER 

Mr. Prewitt. State your name, please, for the record 

Mr. Carr. Francis P. Carr. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, you hold what position with this com- 
mittee? 

Mr. Carr. Executive director. 

Mr. Prewitt. You have since what date ? 

Mr. Carr. July 16, 1953. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, since you were one of the original princi- 
pals in this controversy, I think it appropriate that you give us some 
overall idea of your qualifications, with particular reference to your 
educational background. I will ask you if you are a college graduate ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I was graduated from Brown University in 
1939 with a bachelor of arts degree. 

Mr. Prewitt. What additional training or education have you had ? 

Mr, Carr. I was graduated in 1942 from the University of Pennsyl- 
vania Law School, 

Mr. Prewitt. Have you ever practiced law? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, I haven't. I went immediately into the FBI 
following my graduation from law school. 

Mr. Prewitt. You have never been admitted to the bar in any State 
or jurisdiction? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. When did you go to the FBI ? 

Mr, Carr, June 1, 1942, 

Mr. Prewitt, And were you a member of the FBI continuously 
from 1942 until you came with the committee? 

Mr. Carr, Yes, sir, I was. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2627 

Mr. Prewitt. Now, Mr. Carr, state in a general sort of a way the 
type of work that you were engaged in while you were with the FBI, 
with particular reference to your experience in connection with Com- 
munists and Communist-front investigations. 

Mr. Carr. All right, sir. Following my training as special agent 
here in Washington, D. C, and at Quantico, Va., I was transferred 
about the country to several field offices. When I was in Portland, 
Oreg., I began to work on investigation of Communists. That was 
in 1945. 

In 1946, 1 spent most of the year in San Francisco. I again worked 
on investigations of communism. In December 1946 I was transferred 
to the New York field division. New York City, where I was placed 
on the Communist squad. The investigations that I conducted and 
that were conducted under me, concerned the investigation of the 
Communist Party itself. Communist Party members, Communist-front 
organizations, and individuals alleged to be members of the Com- 
munist Party. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now, Mr. Carr, when did you first begin to devote 
a large part of your time to the work of investigating communism and 
Communist-front organizations ? 

Mr. Carr. I would say that I started the real intensive investigation 
when I arrived in the New York field division in 1946, December 1946. 

Mr. Prewitt. Would it be fair to say that from 1946 until you 
came with the committee, that your work was almost exclusively that 
of investigation and prosecution of Communists and Communist-front 
organizations? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, I think that would be a fair statement. 

Mr. Prewitt. When you came with this committee in July of 1953, 
did you hold any position, any executive position with the FBI in 
New York ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I was supervisor of the Security Matters Sec- 
tion which dealt with communism. 

Mr. Prewitt. And were there other FBI agents under your control 
and supervision ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. A large number. 

Mr. Prewitt. Approximately how many ? 

Mr. Carb. a large number, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, what part if any did you play in the investi- 
gation and prosecution of what we know as the first-string Communist 
Party leaders? 

Mr. Carr. Well, in 1948, 1 was placed on special assignment to work 
with the United States attorney for the eastern district of New York — 
southern district of New York, excuse me, John F. X. McGoughey, to 
prepare for the trial of the first-string Communist leaders. 

Such leaders as Eugene Dennis, Jack Stachel, Henry Winston, 
John Gates, the Daily Worker editor, and others. Through the entire 
9 months' trial before Judge Medina, I was assigned to Judge — now 
Judge — McGoughey, as a technical adviser, along with another man. 
The 11 who went to trial were all convicted. 

Mr. Prewitt. And you say that you were the chief investigator in 
connection with the prosecution of those 11 first-string Communist 
Party leaders? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, I don't think that anybody could say that I was 
the chief investigator or the investigator in connection with the prose- 



2628 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

cution of any Smith Act cases. I think perhaps the credit has to go 
to teamwork between the FBI and the United States attorneys, who 
prosecuted the case. Probably if any one person should have any 
credit it would be Mr. Hoover, because he first saw the danger of com- 
munism and had the FBI w^ork investigating it. 

Mr. Prewitt, Before you commenced the prosecution of these 11 
first-string Communist Party leaders, is it your testimony that you 
vs^ere almost exclusively engaged in the investigation of Communists 
and Communist-front organizations? That is, subsequent to 1946? 

IMr. Carr, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Preavitt. Now, Mr. Carr, I believe you stated that you joined 
the subcommittee staff on July 16, 1953 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I did. Before that time, I had not been in Wash- 
ington. I recall some discussion during General Reber's testimony. 
I arrived in Washington and was appointed on July 16. 

Mr. Prewitt. Will you state briefly your duties as executive direc- 
tor on the staff of the McCarthy committee ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, "executive director" is a pretty fancy title. 
Actually, I am the administrative head, more or less, of the investi- 
gative staff'. Some people have called it chief investigator. I don't 
know whether that is the correct name or not. 

Mr. Prewitt. When you came with the committee, tell us what was 
your first order of business? 

Mr. Carr. Well, the first thing I did when I came with the com- 
mittee was try to find out what my new job was all about. I spent a 
few weeks in the beginning trying to familiarize myself with subcom- 
mittee work. I tried to find out what investigations the subcommittee 
had had in the past, what pending work it had, and what future work 
it had projected. I spent a good deal of time interviewing and dis- 
cussing the background with each individual investigator on the staff, 
and I believe that I spent some time with each individual clerical per- 
son on the staff. I also met many people here in Washington, includ- 
ing members of the committee; I met with liaison people here in Wash- 
ington, and generally tried to familiarize myself with what was 
going on. 

Mr. Prewitt. At the time you came with the committee, had the 
committee started on its preliminary investigation of Communist in- 
filtration of the Army ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, it had. 

Mr. Prewitt. Tell us briefly just w^hat work had been done. 

Mr. Carr. I would say about a week or possibly 2 weeks after I first 
came with the committee, I had conferences with Mr. Cohn and with 
Senator McCarthy. I recall that Mr. Cohn told me that the subcom- 
mittee had done some preliminary work in connection with Communist 
infitration of the Army. He said that they had some evidence that 
there had been infiltration of G-2, the intelligence section of the 
Army. He said that they had some indication that there was Com- 
munist infiltration in two of the Army's agencies in the New York 
City area, the Signal Corps and the Quartermaster Corps. He also 
told me that he had received information from one Paul Crouch that 
Communist infiltration in the Army was not only likely but very 
probable. 

He told me that he — not he ; I should correct myself on that. He 
told me that the staff' had done some preliminary work in connection 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2629 

with the use of Communist line or Communist authors' work in the 
ijidoctrination material which was being used by the intelligence unit 
of the Army. He probably told me other things. That is all I recall. 

Mr. Prewitt. What written data had been assembled concerning 
the investigation of the Army ? 

Mr. Caur. Frankly, sir, there wasn't too much written data that had 
been assembled. The preliminary investigation of the Army, the Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, or of any other investigation, with the sub- 
committee — I assume with other subcommittees — is a rather informal 
thing. Every investigator on the staff is at all times — certainly I hope 
tliey are at all times — trying to think of, make contacts concerning, and 
develop information which will lead to future investigations and fu- 
ture hearings. 

They hacl at that time information which Senator McCarthy had 
received to the effect that at Fort Monmouth there were a large num- 
ber of Communists or alleged Communists employed. ^ They had in- 
formation — they had this Crouch memorandum which is really a gen- 
eral outline of his estimate of what the Communists would like to do 
in the Army. They had done some work concerning development of 
informants. 

Mr. Prewitt. I know it has been previously stated, but will you 
tell us when executive sessions on Communist infiltration of the Army 
commenced? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. The first executive session on infiltration of the 
Army was held on August 31, I believe, at least August 30 or 31, in 
New York City. At that time, information had been developed to the 
point where the chairman thought that executive sessions should be 
held concerning the infiltration of the Quartermaster Corps in New 
York City — Brooklyn, I believe, more properly — and the Signal Corps 
Photographic Laboratories in Queens. 

As a result of those hearings, 2 persons were suspended, 1 from the 
Signal Corps and 1 from the Quartermaster Corps. 

Mr. Prewitt. Those first sessions, as I understand it, were not with 
relation to Fort Monmouth ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, no, they were not with relation to Fort Monmouth 
proper. However, the Signal Corps was involved in connection with 
the security guard at the Signal Corps laboratories in Queens. 

Mr. Prewitt. After this first session — I believe you stated August 
31— did Senator McCarthy manifest publicly any determination that 
he would insist on calling members of the Army loyalty screening 
board ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, he did. I think on about the 2d or 3d of Septem- 
ber, Senator McCarthy publicly announced that he would have to look 
into the situation to determine who was responsible for allowing Com- 
munists to still be employed by the Government at this late date. I 
believe that there were announcements in the paper. Eight. This is a 
Washington Times-Herald article, by Willard Edwards, on Septem-. 
ber 3, in which he quotes Senator McCarthy as saying : 

"Until we find out who cleared these individuals for Army employment, despite 
their record of Communist activities, we will not get to the bottom of this tragic 
situation," McCarthy remarked. 

Following that, there were at least 10 pul'lic announcements con- 
cerning the need for getting at the bottom of the situation. 

46620"— 54— pt. 64 2 



2630 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Prewitt, By 10, do you mean 10 before the 

Mr. Carr. No. There were several, sir, concerning this early part 
of the investigation of the infiltration of the Army in the New York 
area. Then thronghout the investigation of Fort Monmouth, there 
were several other statements along the same lines by the chairman. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you participate in the executive sessions concern- 
ing investigation of the Government Printing Office ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. Prewitt. Were members of that loyalty board called before the 
committee? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; they were. They were called in and testified 
quite frankly. 

Mr. Prewitt. And no objection, as I understand, was interposed? 

Mr. Carr. No objection was raised at that time; no, sir. 

Mr. Preavitt. It is your testimony, as I understand it, that begin- 
ning around the first part of September, Senator McCarthy mani- 
fested publicly and repeated publicly on many occasions prior to 
January 20 or around that time 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. As long as I have been with the subcommittee 
Senator McCarthy has always impressed upon me that it is not so im- 
portant — it is not only important to get rid of the individual Com- 
munists by exposure and suspension, but it is also important to find 
out who is responsible for leaving him in there at this late date. 

Mr. Prewitt. When did you meet Mr. Stevens for the first time? 

Mr. Carr. I was introduced to Mr. Stevens on September 8. At 
that time it was no more than an introduction. I again met him on 
September 21, I believe, at which time I was one of several in a 
discussion. 

Mr. Prewitt. I will ask you when you first met Mr. John Adams. 

Mr. Carr. I first met Mr. John Adams on September 28, I believe. 
It was following a hearing here in this room. He introduced himself 
to me as the man who would be the new Department counselor, 
Mr. Stevens had previously advised me that Mr. Adams would be 
taking over that job. 

Mr. Prewitt. You were present, were you not, on the occasion of 
the meeting in Secretary Stevens' office on October 2 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; I was. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Cohn was also present ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Will you state briefly, very briefly, the substance of 
that meeting, the conversation between either you or Mr. Cohn and 
Secretary Stevens? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn and I went to the Secretary's office in the Pentagon for 
two reasons. Mr. Cohn was interested in the General Partridge situa- 
tion and also the fact that there had been a more or less a blackout 
order placed over the personnel at Fort Monmouth forbidding them to 
talk with subcommittee investigators. I was primarily interested in 
the latter. 

We went to Mr. Stevens. While we were there I explained to him 
that there had been this blackout order. INIr. Cohn also took part 
in tliat. Mr. Stevens picked up the phone and called General Lawton 
at Fort Monmouth. He told General Lawton that he wanted this 
order rescinded. During the course of this conversation, of which 
we could hear but one half, I recall Secretary Stevens saying to 
General Lawton, "No, no. I didn't say that, not that." 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2631 

And then he went on. As a result of the conversation, the order 
was rescinded. I was very pleased with that. And the investigation 
proceeded at Monmouth. 

Also during that conversation Mr. Cohn and the Secretary discussed 
General Partridge. Also during that conversation the subject of 
Dave Schine came up. It is my recollection, although I don't want 
to swear strictly to this, but it is my recollection that Secretary 
Stevens brought the subject up by stating that Mr. Schine was not 
going to receive a commission in the Army, but he had arranged that 
he would take care of Mr. Schine for the advantage of Mr. Stevens and 
the Army by placing him in a series, I would say, of intelligence 
schools to more or less observe them and report directly to the Secre- 
tary. He said that there was a great lack in the Army of personnel 
who knew anything about communism, and he thought he could use 
Schine to his advantage in that way. 

I thought in Mr. Cohn's attitude and action that it was perfectly 
all right with him. I took no part in this phase of the conversation. 

Mr. Prewitt. As I understand it, you made no statement one way 
or the other with reference to Schine ? 

Mr. Carr. I took no part in this phase of the conversation. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, I think at this point it would be well to 
state briefly the charges or specifications as contained in the document 
which Senator McCarthy filed on your behalf and on Mr. Cohn's 
behalf. 

Mr. Carr. Right, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. I am sure you are familiar with it. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. And correct me if I am wrong, when I state that in 
substance, Senator McCarthy, you, and Mr. Cohn have charged or 
specified that Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams sought to halt your investi- 
gation of the Army, that those two gentlemen sought to hold Private 
Schine as a "hostage" and that Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams sought 
to "blackmail" Senator McCarthy and members of his staff with 
threats that an unfavorable report would be issued if the loyalty board 
subpenas were not called off. Now, is that in substance the specifica- 
tions as contained in your document ? 

Mr. Carr. That is the substance of our statement ; yes, sir. 

Mr. PreW'Itt. Now, with reference to that, and I ask you for the 
sake of clarity to confine your testimony to those specifications or 
charges, I will ask you when was the first occasion on which either 
Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams sought to stop your investigation of the 
Army which is within your knowledge. 

Mr. Carr. The first occasion, to my knowledge, was a suggestion by 
Mr. xA.dams on or about October 9, in New York City, in room 1402 of 
the courthouse. Mr. Adams was present while we were interviewing 
witnesses concerning Fort Monmouth. He listened to much of the 
testimony, or the statements taken, and he said that the Army had 
most or all of this information, and that they would be able to handle 
the situation at Fort Monmouth themselves. He suggested that there 
was no need to continue beyond that week, and that there was no need 
for any hearings. 

Mr. Prewitt. What was your reaction to that ? 



2632 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. Well, frankly, sir, I thought it was a good try by Mr. 
Adams, and I didn't blame him for suggesting that. I saw nothing 
improper. I thought it was a good try. 

Mr. Prewitt. You don't attribute anything in the way of improper 
motive to that conversation ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, I don't. 

Mr. Prewitt. When was the next attempt, if any, on the part of 
either Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams to halt your investigation ? 

Mr, Carr. Well, the next, to my knowledge, was on either the 13th 
or the 14th of October. We were lunching with Mr. Stevens at the 
Merchants Club in New York City, about a block or two from the 
courthouse where we were holding hearings on Fort Monmouth. The 
Secretary and Mr. Adams both, at that time, were doing what I 
thought was exploring and feeling out the chairman to see if they 
coulcln't put across the idea that there should not be any continuance 
of the executive hearings and no future hearings. They made it very 
clear that they did not think that there was any necessity for future 
hearings, they made it clear that they had most, if not all, of the 
information ; that if the committee would give them what information 
they had, the committee had, with the information they, the Army, had, 
they would be able to clean up the situation. 

I recall that Senator McCarthy didn't buy this. Later he told me 
that the main reason he didn't buy it was because the Army had had 
this information, to his knowledge, for a long period of time, and 
that they had not done anything about it. 

Mr. Prewitt. Would you say, then, that these feelers or exploratory 
measures were unsuccessful on the part of Mr. Stevens and Mr. 
Adams ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. Obviously, sir. 

]\Ir. Prewitt. When was the next occasion on which either Mr. 
Stevens or Mr. Adams, within your personal knowledge, attempted 
to halt your investigation ? 

Mr. Carr. October 21, 1 believe, is the next one that I have personal 
knowledge of. 

Mr. Prewitt. State briefly the substance of what was said or done. 

Mr. Carr. On that date Mr. Adams, Mr. Cohn, and I flew to 
New York. We dined at Mr. Cohn's apartment, and we went to a 
prizefight that evening. On that date, Mr. Adams stated that he 
wanted the hearings on the Fort Monmouth situation ended. He 
thought that it would be helpful to him and to Mr. Stevens if we 
could drop these hearings. He suggested that there had been — again, 
he suggested, I might say, that there had been enough in the way of 
hearings, there had been enough in the way of publicity concerning 
the hearings, to force the Army to stop the hearings — excuse me, to 
force the Army to take action, and therefore we could turn it over 
to them. 

At this time, Mr. Adams also advised us that he would then, from 
then on, take over some of the control of the assignment of Mr. Schine 
who was to go into the Army. He said that prior to that time the 
Schine matter, as he termed it, was being handled by xirmy personnel. 
But he no^v, as a representative of the Secretary, would take over that 
matter. 

Mr. Prewitt. Do you mean he stated that he would personally take 
over and supervise the induction of Schine into the Army ? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2633 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; I don't. I can only tell you what lie said. He 
said that up until this time, personnel had handled the situation. 
But from now on he, as a representative of the Secretary of the Army, 
would have a say in it. I don't recall him saying that he would 
supervise it or anything like that. 

]Mr. Prewitt. What handling was necessary prior to October 21 
with reference to Schine ? 

Mr. Carr, He didn't tell me. I had no great interest in the matter. 
I assume, and it is an assumption on my part, I assume that this was 
a reference to the fact that on October 2, Secretary Stevens had said 
that he was going to let Schine go into the Army, do his training, 
and then use him, by sending him to intelligence schools, and things 
like that. 

I also understood that — not at that time, now, this is looking back 
at it — I also understand at this time that Mr. Schine and Mr. Stevens 
had had a conversation concerning what Mr. Stevens was going to 
do with Mr. Schine. 

Mr. Prewitt. With relation to your charges or specifications, did 
anything of significance occur between October 21 and November 6 
that is within your personal knowledge? 

Mr. Carr. Not that I can now recall. 

Mr. Prewitt. You were present on the occasion of the meeting 
in Secretary Stevens' office at the Pentagon on November 6 ; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; I was. 

Mr. Prewitt. On that occasion, what were the general subjects 
of conversation ? I know they have been gone into very thoroughly, 
but I will ask you to state them. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. It has been testified as to who was present. 
Wlien Mr. Cohn and I arrived with Senator McCarthy, I recall that 
the Secretary asked Mr. Cohn where Mr. Schine was. Mr. Cohn 
said that Mr. Schine felt that since he was now a private in the Army, 
it would be a little unusual for him to be having lunch with the 
Secretary. In that regard, I know that there was a sixth place set 
at the table. It was an office table about this size [indicating]. There 
was a sixth place set there, and I assume, after that conversation, 
it was for Mr. Schine, since there were only five of us who did dine. 

About the time we sat down at the table, the Secretary asked for 
a resume of the evidence that had been developed concerning — 
during the course of our Fort Monmouth investigation. Mr. Cohn 
took the floor, I would say for several moments, and gave a resume 
of all of the evidence that had been collected during the weeks of our 
investigation. Mr. Stevens was listening very intently. 

When IVIr. Cohn had finished his resume, j\Ir. Stevens asked how 
long the public hearings could be expected to run. I might note 
here that Senator McCarthy on, I think, the preceding day, Novem- 
ber 5, had made an announcement to the effect that the public hear- 
ings on Monmouth would begin on the following Thursday, I think 
the 12th of November. Senator IMcCarthy or Mr. Cohn told the 
Secretary that the hearings could be expected to run for approximately 
6 weeks. 

The Secretary was very upset about this. At least he appeared 
to be. He said that this was impossible; that if the hearings lasted 
anywhere near that length of time, that he would have to resign. 



2634 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

He said that he had been the Secretary of the Army for some 10 
months at that time, and that the people would not understand his not 
having taken action sooner. 

He asked if there was some way that the subcommittee could help 
take the pressure off of himself and the Army by holding hearings on 
other investigations. 

I recall that there was an answer made to that question, I don't 
recall whether it was Mr. Cohn or Senator McCarthy, but the answer 
was that we were not ready to hold hearings on any other investi- 
gation ; that we were ready to hold hearings on the Army. 

Senator McCarthy made it very clear that there would be no white- 
washing of this Army situation. He told the Secretary that he per- 
sonally should not be worried. He didn't agree with the Secretary 
that because he had been in there 10 months he would be held respon- 
sible in the public eye. He said that nothing had been done so far 
in the investigation which was aimed at or had hurt the Secretary 
personally. He said that the Secretary had been trying to assist 
the subcommittee ; that he himself had made public statements to that 
effect. He said, however, that he couldn't whitewash the situation 
by not having hearings. 

There then followed a suggestion by the Secretary that the Defense 
Department proper, the Air Force and the Navy, also had security 
situations which would bear looking into by the subcommittee. 

At that point Mr. Adams nodded and said that he would be able to 
furnish the subcommittee with information on that. 

The Secretary seemed to affirm this. He nodded his head and acted 
like — in fact, he said that that might be the answer to the problem. 

The next point that came up — I am not exactly sure of the order 
of this— but the next point that came up that I recall was a statement 
by Mr. Cohn that we were planning to investigate and eventually hold 
hearings on Communists in defense industries. 

The meeting was left with an understanding that we would not stop 
the Fort Monmouth hearings ; that we would have public hearings, 
but that in order to take some of the pressure off of the Army and 
Secretary Stevens personally, we would hold some public hearings 
on Communist infiltration of defense plants also. 

That is about what I recall. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was the subject of Schine brought up during that 
meeting ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; it was. During the course of the meeting, either 
Senator McCarthy or perhaps Mr. Cohn stated that Mr. Schine had 
been working on some of this work, and the Secretary then volunteered 
the suggestion that Mr. Schine might be made available to work 
weekends on committee business. He said that, if necessary, he could 
even work evenings on it, any time that he was not in training. This 
was said by the Secretary, and I assume at that point he was happy to 
do anything he could to keep us from having immediate hearings on 
the Army. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, did you make any statements with reference 
to Schine? 

:Mr. Carr. No, sir, I didn't at that point. 
Mr. Prewii-t. During that meeting? 
Mr. Carr. I don't recall any, no, sir. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2635 

ISIr. Preavitt. You have been styled in this proceeding as the silent, 
stronw man. Did you make any statement of any character at this 
luncheon meetinp: of November 6 ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, sir, I might say that that is one of the more appre- 
ciative appellations that have been passed over me in the past few 
months. I don't object to that. 

At the conference of November 6, I of course took part in the 
greetings. I took some minor part in the discussion when Mr. Cohn 
was describing the results or giving his resume of the investigation 
that had been conducted. 

If you will pardon me, I think I corrected him on one occasion. 
Generally speaking, it was pretty hard to get a word in. 

Mr. Prewitt. We can all understand that problem. 

Mr. Carr. It wasn't only Mr. Cohn at that point. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, subsequent to November 6 did you have 
any conversation with .Secretary Stevens with reference to the charges 
of Senator McCarthy and his staff? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. State when that was. 

Mr. Carr. On November 16, 1 saw the Secretary of the Army. On 
November 16, 1 was going to pick up Mr. Cohn and go to the airport. 
We were flying to New York. He asked me or I suggested that I 
would pick him up at the Pentagon on my way to the airport. I had 
no appointment with Secretary Stevens. 

Mr. Prewitt. For the purpose of clarity, this was the meeting that 
followed the November 13 press conference of Secretary Stevens, is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; it was. 

Mr. Prewitt. That was the purpose of the meeting? 

Mr. Carr. I understand it was, yes. 

Mr. Prewitt. You did not go with Mr. Cohn to the Pentagon ? 

Mr. Carr. No, I didn't. 

Mr. Prewitt. You had no appointment to see Mr. Stevens on that 
occasion ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; I had no appointment. And no intention of see- 
ing him. When I arrived — I merely went to pick up Mr. Cohn to pro- 
ceed to the airport. When I arrived, the Secretary's secretary, or at 
least the receptionist, announced that I had arrived. The Secretary 
was very gracious and ordered that I be ushered in. I went in. There 
were the usual greetings. The Secretary is very courteous. I sat 
down. They had apparently been discussing the November 13 press 
conference of Secretary Stevens. At the point when I arrived the 
Secretary was stating that he was very disturbed that the conference 
had been misinterpreted by some of the press present. 

He was very disturbed that the misinterpretation could cause any 
anxiety or any disturbance on the part of Senator McCarthy. He said 
that he had not intended to say that there was no espionage at Fort 
INlonmouth. He merely intended to say that he knew of no espionage 
at Fort Monmouth. He said he had not meant to affront Senator 
McCarthy and that he was most anxious to do whatever he could to 
straighten the matter out with Senator McCarthy. He said he would 
fiy up to New York that night and have dinner with the Senator. He 
said he would come up and have breakfast. He said he would have 
lunch the next day. He was very anxious to see the Senator. 



2636 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Cohn said that he would be seeing the Senator that afternoon, 
and I believe he said he would get in contact with him. As a result 
of the meeting, Mr. Stevens did come to New York the following day 
and met with Senator McCarthy. 

Mr. Prewitt. And on the following day, November 17, you were 
present at the Merchants Club in New York City ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I was. 

Mr. Prewitt. What, if anytliing, was stated by either Mr. Stevens 
or Mr. Adams at the Merchants Club meeting with reference to the 
possibility of your committee investigating the other services ? 

Mr. Carr, I have no personal knowledge of that conversation, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt, On November 24, I will ask you if Mr. Adams made 
any additional suggestion to you with reference to stopping your in- 
vestigation of the Army. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. On the I7th, however, I think I might have gone 
ahead of myself a bit. On the 17th 

Mr. Prewitt. Do you care to make a further statement about the 
17th? 

Mr. Carr. Wliile we are on the 17th, I might clear up one point if 
I could. 

Mr. Prewitt. Very well, sir. 

Mr. Carr. On the I7th, there was an arrangement made that the 
Senator and his staff would go to Fort Monmouth and then proceed 
to Boston in the Secretary's plane. I recall that when we arrived 
at Fort Monmouth — excuse me, Fort Dix I am talking about — I 
recall when we arrived — actually, it was McGuire Air Force Base 
adjacent to Fort Dix. When w^e arrived and were getting off the 

Elane, I heard the Secretary say something to the effect that now would 
e a good time to get that picture with Dave. There was a general 
round of handshakes and introductions. Mr. Schine was there. Gen- 
eral Ryan was there, two colonels — I believe — one was Colonel Brad- 
ley and one was Colonel Lavelle. There were some other officers, and 
there were some men there. There were some photographers there. 
After the introductions, I recall the Secretary motioned to Schine. 
I didn't hear him say anything, but they came and stood together 
against the plane. The photographers made ready to take pictures. 
I recall that I tried to get out of the picture. I saw it was coming, 
I tried to get out of the picture. I recall that General — excuse me, 
that Colonel Bradley was standing in the area. That is about all 
that happened there. I do recall that that evening when we were 
dining at one of the officer's quarters, Senator McCarthy told Mr. 
Schine in front of the two colonels. Colonel Bradley and Colonel 
Lavelle, that he wanted him to spend all of his free time when he was 
not in training working on the committee reports. That is about all 
of that conversation. 

Mr. Prewitt. You stated the substance of the events of November 
17th? 

Mr. Carr. As I recall them. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now, when was the next occasion on which either 
Mr. Adams or Secretary Stevens suggested that your hearings be 
concluded ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, the next that I know of, sir, was on the 24th of 
November. I had lunch with Mr. Adams and Mr. Cohn, and there 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2637 

had a])parently been some discussion that I was not in on. But at 
that point, durino: some point during the hmcheon, Mr. Adams 
brought up the subject of General Lawton and his possible removal 
from his command at Fort Monmouth. And he was very anxious to 
get what he determined some good word from Senator McCarthy 
concerning his attitude on a removal of General Lawton from Fort 
Monmouth. 

Mr. Adams said to Mr, Cohn that, "If you can give me some good 
word on the Lawton situation, maybe I can give you some good word 
on whether or not Schine will be available this weekend." I think, I 
am sure it was, the Thanksgiving weekend. I recall that Mr. Cohn 
was a little annoyed at this for what he termed the reason that he 
didn't like Mr. Adams tying up the Lawton situation w^ith Schine's 
availability over the weekend. He said that the Secretary had made 
an arrangement whereby Private Schine would be available on non- 
training hours and that he didn't like Mr. Adams interjecting himself 
into the situation. There was a little discussion about that, nothing 
•unpleasant, and we left. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, was that the first occasion on which Mr. 
Adams brought up this question of favors to Schine in consideration 
of your taking steps to stop the investigation ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, I think that is the first one that I know of. I think 
that on October 8 or 9, when we were talking about stopping the 
hearings, Mr. Adams may have said that the Secretary was going 
to do something for Schine, and that that should be some sort of an 
inducement to us. But the October 8 conversation on that matter is 
not exactly clear. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now, do you want to tell this committee that Mr. 
Adams, commencing around November 24, used Private Schine as 
bait to gain his desires ? Is that the substance of what you mean ? 

Mr. Carr. I think that Mr. Adams was aware of the fact that 
throughout the entire period of our association, beginning back in 
early October, that Mr. Schine was going to be in the Army, was in 
the Army, and that he had come from our subcommittee. I think 
he was aware of that fact. I think he was smart enough, clever 
enough, to keep that in the back of his mind at all times. I think he 
was using it wherever he could. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now, have you stated the substance of the events of 
November 24 insofar as they relate to your charges or specifications? 

Mr. Carr. As I now recall them. 

Mr. Prewitt. And when I say your charges, I am, of course, re- 
ferring to Senator McCarthy's charges. 

Mr. Carr. Right. 

Mr. PREwrrr. What occurred November 25, Mr. Carr, that relates 
to the matters which we are now discussing? 

Mr. Carr. Well, on November 25, Mr. Adams and I missed our 
plane connection from Newark to Washington, because of the holi- 
day traffic, I believe, and we took a train from the Newark depot to 
Washington. I would like to clear up at this point one part of Mr. 
Adams' testimony. He implied that perhaps the entire train trip 
was consumed, the time of the train trip was consumed, with a con- 
versation about Dave Schine. 

46620°— 54— pt. 64 3 



2638 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

I say tliat isn't so. I can recall several things we talked about on 
that train trip. We talked about General Lawton. We talked about 
the Fort Monmouth investigation. We talked about Mr. Adams' 
background. I recall him telling me about liis early youth out in the 
West. We talked about my background. We talked about the FBI. 
We talked about Mr. Adams' baby, who was giving him trouble at 
night. We talked about my three children. We talked about a press 
agent who was hired by the Pentagon. We talked about several 
things. We did talk about Schine, also. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was any suggestion made on that train trip with 
reference to termination of the Fort Monmouth hearings ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; there was. This, I believe — and I am subject 
to correction on this, but I believe I am right — this period of time, 
November 24 and November 25, these were the first open hearings 
on the Fort Monmouth situation. They were held in New York. Mr. 
Adams — and I don't say that there is anything wrong in his wanting 
to stop the hearings — Mr. Adams on the train ride suggested that 
since we had held numerous executive sessions on Fort Monmouth 
and'since we had now held 1 or 2 public hearings on Fort Monmouth, 
it would be a good time to drop the hearings. The Army was now 
ready to handle and the Army would handle the situation. 

That was the substance of the conversation concerning termination 
of the hearings. 

Mr. Prewitt. Tell us how the Schine subject came up during that 
train ride. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, but I think it would relate better, it follows in 
sequence the conversation w^e had concerning General Lawton. It is 
entirely up to you, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Very well. We will go on to another subject. There 
has been considerable testimony 

Mr. Carr. Sir, I don't mean to interrupt you. On this train ride I 
think it is important that I discuss some of the subjects of the train 
ride, since Mr. Adams has made it a point. 

Mr. Prewitt. Very well, you may do that. 

Mr. Carr. I would like to say that on this train ride, Mr. Adams 
asked me for my opinion of what Senator McCarthy's real reaction 
would be to the removal of General Lawton from his post at Fort Mon- 
mouth. Mr. Adams said that he thought that perliaps I would be able 
to give him a real insight into what the Senator would actuallv do. 

I recall telling him that the Senator would probably take the posi- 
tion that he couldn't do anything about the proposed removal if it were 
done. However, I knew that Senator McCarthy would not sit back 
and not make some statement concerning this — I think the word I used 
was "blast" — because of the removal of a man who had throughout the 
investigation shown tliat he was anxious to help the subcommittee, and 
a man who had a reputation for wanting to get rid of Communists at 
Fort Monmouth. 

Also on the train ride — I think I mentioned the fact we talked 
about a Pentagon press agent. 

Following this conversation about General Lawton, Mr. Adams 
turned to Private Schine, turned the conversation to Private Schine, 
and the substance of his conversation on that matter was that since the 
Senator and Mr. Cohn were feeling the way they did about General 
Lawton, and the Army would undoubtedly not take any stand at that 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2639 

moment on General Lawton because of Senator McCarthy's expected 
attitude, it might be a good thing if they could be a little nicer to him 
and he could be a little nicer to Private Schine. 

What he meant about being a little nicer, I can only guess. 

Mr. Prewiit. How did you construe it? 

Mr. Carr. I thought that he was doing a little bargaining. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was he offering up, shall we say 

Mr. Carr. A little tidbit. 

Mr. Prewitt. A little tidbit in the form of small favors ? 

Mr. Carr. I frankly thought that this was an instance of dangling 
favors concerning Schine. 

Mr. Prewitt. Have you stated the substance of your conversiition 
with Mr. Adams on November 25 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, with the exception of one thing that I overlooked, 
and that is concerning the convereation about General Lawton. Mr. 
Adams made it very clear to me that he thought and had thought for 
some time that General Lawton had made a big mistake. He said that 
General Lawton was fawning all over Senator McCarthy. He said he 
acted like Senator McCarthy is more important than the Army. He 
said that this was embarrassing to the Anny, that it was embarrassing 
to Mr. Stevens. He said that the general had been attending the execu- 
tive sessions on Fort Monmouth m New York, and that it didn't look 
right for the general to be traipsing in to the executive sessions behind 
the Senator and more or less rubberstamping everything the Senator 
did or said. 

He said this was embarrassing to the Army, and that Lawton seemed 
to forget who he was working for. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you report that conversation that you have just 
related ? 

Mr. Carr. Concerning General Lawton? 

Mr. Prewitt. To Senator McCarthy? 

Mr. Carr. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now have you stated the substance of the November 
25 train ride insofar as it relates to your charges ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I think I have. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did anything of any significance occur between No- 
vember 25 and December 9, concerning the matters we are talking 
about? 

Mr, Carr. Not tha± I now recall. 

Mr. Prewitt. Will you give me your version of the so-called map 
incident of December 9 as briefly as possible ? I will ask you firsts of 
course, if you were present on the occasion when it has been testified 
to here that Mr. Adams drew a rough map of the United States and 
divided it into nine sections. Were you present ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Following the hearing on that day Mr. Adams, Mr. Cohn and I 
walked down the corridor. Mr. Cohn and Mr. Adams were, I would 
say, close together. I was more to the side. I noticed that Mr. Adams 
had a piece of paper in his hand and that he appeared to be drawing 
on it. I came over to them. The paper seemed to be one of these pads, 
this size [indicating] and Mr. Adams — somebody had sketched a 
rough outline of the United States on the paper. Mr. Adams had a 
pencil and was separating it into rectangles. There has been testi- 



2640 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

mony — I believe the number was nine, but I am not sure. I know 
he had it broken into rectangular portions. 

I asked Mr. Cohn what was going on, and he smiled and said, "John 
is trying to trade us some homosexuals in the Air Force for informa- 
tion about our next investigation." 

As I recall it, I just laughed and walked on down the hall. I didn't 
stay with them at that point, although you might say that I was still 
with them. I walked a little bit ahead and to the side of them. They 
were engaged in other conversation. 

Mr. Prewitt. You merely heard Mr. Cohn make that statement? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. Prewitt. You heard no statement made by Mr. Adams? 

Mr. Carr. I heard no statement made by Mr. Adams. Mr. Adams 
neither affirmed nor denied it at that time. I didn't stay long enough 
to know whether he did or didn't. 

Mr. Prewitt. He remained silent in your presence when Mr. Cohn 
made the statement to you that you have just related? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; and it was a matter of a few seconds. When he 
told me that I moved on. I wasn't particularly interested. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you confer with Mr. Adams after this so-called 
map incident? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. When Mr. Cohn, Mr. Adams and I all arrived 
at the subcommittee offices down in room 101 in this building at the 
same time, for some reason, perhaps a telephone call, Mr. Cohn went 
ahead, and Mr. Adams and I were standing in the corridor outside of 
room 101. We were discussing the hearings. I think Aaron Coleman 
had been a Avitness that morning or the day before. Mr. Adams said 
that it would be impossible to hold public hearings with all the wit- 
nesses that we had in executive session on the secret laboratories at 
Fort Monmouth. He said that since we now had had in the public 
session the principal, shall we say, Communists at Fort Monmouth, 
the best subject, it would now be a good note to end the hearings on. 
This was the same general approach that he had used before. 

I told him that I thought maybe he had better see Senator McCarthy 
about ending the hearings. 

Then the conversation drifted to some other subject. What it was, 
I don't know. 

Then Mr. Adams asked me quite casually how the hostage was mak- 
ing out at Fort Dix. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, had he ever used that term "hostage" 
previous to that? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; he had. Mr. Adams uses many terms, just as 
all of us do, which are perhaps facetious, but he used that term. I 
know he uses the term "Indians" to refer to staff members. He used 
the term "hostage" almost from the time that Schine went into the 
Army. I don't know — I couldn't tell, frankly, which times he was 
using it in a serious vein and which times he was just kidding about it. 
At this point, he used the word "hostage." He asked me how the 
hostage was making out at P'ort Dix. 

I told him that 1 guessed he was doing all right. And then he said 
to me, "Well, maybe he could do a little better with some help from 
us." I assume he meant himself or Secretary Stevens. I said that 
as far as I was concerned, he was doing all right. And he said, "Well, 
now, let's see. Maybe he could do a little better with a little help," 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2641 

and he said, "What's there in it for us if we do something for 
Schine?" He didn't say, "What's there in it for Stevens and me?" 
He said, "What's there in it for us if we do somethino; for Schine?" 
And I told him that I didn't think there would be anything in it for 
him if he did something for him. I recall that that afternoon I wrote 
a memorandum to Senator McCarthy in which I said, "Again, today, 
John Adams came down here after the hearings and using clever 
phrases tried to find out 'what's there in it for us,' if he and Stevens 
did something for Schine. He refers to Schine as our hostage or 
the hostage whenever his name comes up. I made it clear that, as far 
as I was concerned, I don't personally care what treatment they gave 
Schine, and that, as far as I was concerned, he was in the Army. I 
did say that I thought it wasn't fair" 

Senator Mundt. The committee members are asking for the date 
of that memo. 

Mr. Carr. This is the memorandum of December 9 : 

I did say that I thought it wasn't fair of them to take it out on Schine because 
we were investigating the Army, or to keep using — 

him 

to try to stop our investigations. I told him the only contact we were author- 
ized to have with him about Schine was on Investigations Committee business. 

There were other things in the memorandum. That is about the 
substance of that conversation. 

Mr. Prewitt. You now affirm the statements that you just read as 
contained in your memorandum of December 9? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I dictated that memorandum following our 
conversation. 

Mr. Prewitt. Have you stated the substance of jour conversation 
with Mr. Adams on December 9 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; as best I recall. 

Mr. Prewitt. Were you present on the occasion of the luncheon at 
the Carroll Arms on December 10? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; I was. 

Mr. Prewitt. State very briefly the conversation there. I believe 
Mr. Adams, Mr. Stevens, and Senator McCarthy were also present. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. That morning the Senator asked me if I wanted 
to have lunch with him at the Carroll Arms. He said that the Secre- 
tary would be there and Mr. Adams. We had lunch. The Secretary 
and Mr. Adams and the Senator Avere discussing the possibility of 
some end to the hearings at Fort Monmouth. The Secretary and Mr. 
Adams brought up the argument that the Army now had all of the 
information they needed, and that the subcommittee had helped the 
Army by having some of these hearings, and that the Army now 
could handle the situation. They thought that the hearings should 
be terminated. Senator McCarthy was noncommittal about the end- 
ing of the hearings. He pointed out that he wanted to have some 
hearings, at least, executive hearings, with members of the loyalty 
boards who had allowed some of these Communists at Fort Mon- 
mouth to remain in their jobs after investigations had been conducted 
of them. That is about the 

Mr. Prewitt. What was the attitude of Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams 
with reference to the Senator's statement about calling the loyalty 
board ? 



2642 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. Well, throuojhout the entire period of the Fort Mon- 
mouth investigations, it began, I believe, back in October, sometime, 
when a man referred to here as Mr. X had appeared, John Adams 
had taken the position that it would not be a good thing for the 
loyalty board members to be called in. The Secretary seemed to affirm 
that position at this luncheon. I don't specifically recall what the 
Secretary said at that luncheon. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was Schine discussed at this luncheon ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, very briefly. There was some conversation 
concerning him. Somebody, I don't know who it was, brought up the 
fact that he was at Dix. The Secretary said that he was doing well 
in his training, or words to that effect, and he mentioned that basic 
training was an important thing and that everybody had to do it. 
I remember that that touched off a rather long dissertation by Sena- 
tor McCarthy concerning his own basic training in the Marine Corps. 
That included a vivid description of crawling through mud, and I 
think it was good for 20 minutes. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was any bait offered up on that occasion with refer- 
ence to Mr. SchiVie ? 

Mr. Carr. Not that I recall. I wouldn't say, sir, 

Mr. Prewitt. Did Secretary Stevens ever refer to this young man 
Schine as a hostage? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, have you stated the substance of the con- 
versation with December 10 in connection with your charges? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, as best I recall. 

Mr. Prewitt. Let's go to December 17, the date of the celebrated 
luncheon and car ride. You were present ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. I take it you were present at the hearings on the 
morning of December 17 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. There were hearings that morning on the Fort 
Monmouth investigation, 

Mr, Prewitt. What was the subject of conversation during the 
luncheon and subsequent car ride on December 17 ? 

Mr. Carr. When Mr. Cohn and I arrived at Gasner's restaurant 
which is about a block away from the courthouse in New York, Mr. 
Adams and the Senator were already there. There was some general 
conversation, and then I recall the Senator saying that John has 
brought up the subject of Lawton again. This touched off a conver- 
sation at some length by — I wouldn't say a conversation, it was a 
monologue by Mr. Cohn. at this point, on the subject of General 
Lawton and reprisals made against persons who had helped the sub- 
committee in some way. 

He said that to remove General Lawton would be a disgraceful 
thing. He said that a man should not be punished for helping a liub- 
committee, and certainly Senator McCarthy should not sit by and allow 
a man of General Lawton's stature to be punished in any way for 
assisting in the investigation of the subcommittee. He brought up 
the fact that as a result of previous investigations of the subcommit- 
tee, several persons in the Voice of America had been conveniently 
dropped at the end of the investigation. He made quite a point of this. 
He said that the subcommittee, and no investigative agency, could last 
very long if it would sit back and allow persons who help it to be the 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2643 

subject of reprisals. I recall that — there was some conversation about 
the Senator being snbdned. The Senator was in agreement with Mr. 
Cohn, and because he was quiet, I don't think it means that he was 
subdued. He agreed with Mr. Cohn. He said that he felt that he 
could not order the Army about and tell the Army what it could do 
with its generals, but he fully agreed with Mr. Cohn's appraisal of 
the situation. 

Throughout the conversation Mr. Adams did not get many words 
in, but Mr. Adams kept trying to interject himself by making state- 
ments which I recall, in substance, as this : 

Let's talk about Schine. All right, let's talk about Schine. 

Now, Mr. Cohn replied rather heatedly, "I don't want to talk about 
Schine. Let's talk about Lawton. We are talking about Lawton." 
And we did talk about Lawton. 

When the luncheon had been served and eaten, we proceeded out- 
side the building. Mr. Cohn's car was parked nearby, and he offered 
us a ride uptown. Mr. Adams said that he was going to Penn Station, 
and he would grab a cab. I recall Mr. Cohn said he would give him 
p, lift. Adams was concerned about making a certain train. I don't 
know which one it was. 

We went uptown and as we got to Fourth Avenue, I am not sure 
whether at that point it is Fourth or Park Avenue, but it is all the same 
in New York at various points, we got to about 34th or 33d Street 
and Park Avenue, and Mr. Cohn tried to make a left turn. There 
was an officer there who was not much influenced by Mr. Cohn. 

We went through, we had to, a tunnel arrangement in the middle 
of the avenue, which made the next available exit something like 
Park Avenue and 46th or 48th Street. I am not sure of the number 
of the street. 

As I recall it, Mr. Adams was getting a bit disturbed about the train. 
He thought that he might not make it. 

Mr. Adams kept saying, "Let me out, let me out. I have got to make 
the train." 

Roy said, "I will take you over. Don't worry about it." 

When we got to this intersection at about 46th Street, Mr. Adams 
said, "I will take a cab," and at that point I think Mr. Cohn said — 
I don't know whether he said it, I just assume that he would say it^ 
at any rate, we were near the curb in the first lane of traffic, as I recall, 
and Mr. Adams got out. Mr. Cohn said, "O. K., take a cab," and 
Adams left. I think he testified that he did make his train. 

The Senator and I and Mr. Cohn continued uptown to the AValdorf 
where the Senator was staying. 

The Senator was not ejected from the car, I might say. 

As we got uptown, after Mr. Adams had left the car, the Senator 
said to Roy that the Lawton situation would work out all right. As I 
have since learned, both the Senator and Mr. Cohn contacted either 
the general or his aide that day or the next. 

Mr. pREWiTT. To recap the events of December 17, I will ask you 
if I am correct when I state that your testimony, in substance, is 
that the animated monolog which you spoke of, of Mr. Cohn, was 
precipitated by a discussion of General Lawton? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. Prewiit. And not by any discussion of Private Schine? 



2644 • SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. Mi\ Adams tried on several occasions to 
swing the subject to Schine, but it never got there. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was Mr. Adams the emanating factor as far as the 
subject of Schine was concerned? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. He tried, but it didn't get to Schine. 

Mr. Prewitt. The subject was ahnost exchisively around General 
Law ton ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, and the general subject matter of reprisals 
against persons who had helped the committee. 

Mr. Prewitt. In what manner was the subject of Schine injected 
into this heated conversation ? 

Mr. Carr. At the luncheon. 

Mr. Prewitt. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carr. It didn't get injected in beyond the point of saying, 
"Let's talk about Schine," and that is as much as it got in. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was that the extent of it ? 

Mr. Carr. That is. Mr. Cohn wouldn't talk about Schine. He 
wanted to talk about Lawton. 

Mr. Prewitt. He made no references to the treatment of Schine at 
Dix? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, not that I recall, at all. 

Mr. Prewitt. Have you stated the substance of the events of De- 
cember 17 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, as I recall them. 

Mr. Prewitt. Let's go to January 14, which I believe was the oc- 
casion of Mr. Adams' visiting your office, is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, January 14. 

Mr. Prewitt. What was his purpose, if you recall, in visiting your 
office on January 14 ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know his purpose. I can tell you what happened. 

Mr. Prewitt. Do so. 

Mr. Carr. Mr. Adams came to the office in room 101. Mr. Cohn 
and I were both present. He asked if the hearings on Fort Monmouth 
would resume. There had been a recess of a few weeks while the staff 
was getting out its reports. Mr. Cohn said he was sure that the 
chairman would resume the hearings when we had finished with the 
reports. He said that there was the question of the loyalty board yet 
to be considered, and that he was sure the Senator would be interested 
in those. 

Mr. Adams argued, again the same type of argument — he argued 
that the executive sessions had been held, we had now had sevei-al 
public sessions, and he didn't think there was any need to go into the 
loyalty board situation. ]\Ir. Cohn did not agree with him. In fact, 
I didn't agree with him, either. 

Mr. Adams was a little upset by this— not terrifically so, but some- 
what upset by this, and said that he thought that we, meaning Mr. 
Cohn and myself, could have cooperated with him a little more. He 
said that he'had been trying to work with us and that we could co- 
operate with him. He said that since we didn't want to cooperate 
witli him, maybe he could try a little bit of quote cooperation end 
quote, himself. 



SPECIAL mVESTIGATION 2645 

He asked INIr. Colin how Mr. Cohii would like it if Private Schine 
were shipped overseas. Mr. Colin said that he wouldn't like it. He 
said that Schine had not even finished his basic training, and that he 
didn't see any reason why Adams should link this up with the sub- 
ject of cooperation. He said that if, after his training, and as far as 
he was concerned as soon as the reports were out, they wanted to ship 
Schine overeeas, that was perfectly all right, but he said that be- 
cause he had been with the subcommittee, he should not be shipped 
overseas without completing his training. 

That is about the substance of that conversation. I frankly thought 
that Mr. Adams was baiting Mr. Cohn at this time. 

Mr. Prewitt. Is that the subject which you had in mind when you 
dictated a memorandum to Senator McCarthy dated January 15, 
1954? 

j\Ir. Carr. Yes, sir. 

That afternoon, I went upstars to see Senator McCarthy. As I 
recall, I either dictated or scribbled a note to him, saying that I 
thought he would do well to try to talk to John Adams and see if they 
couldn't sort of calm him down on this subject. I thought John 
Adams was baiting Koy a little more than necessary at this time. 
That was the purpose of my memo. 

Mr. Prewitt. The example which you have just stated — was that 
the worst baiting that you noted insofar as Mr. Adams was concerned? 

Mr. Carr. Yes ; I thinly it was about the worst attempt of baiting ; 
yes. 

Mr. Prewitt. It is your testimony that Mr. Adams' question about 
what would happen if Mr. Schine was sent overseas came about after 
a rather heatecl discussion concerning the production of members of 
the loyalty board? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; that and the termination of the hearings. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr., what occurred of any significance on 
January 19? 

Mr. Carr. On January 19, Mr. Adams appeared before Senator 
McCarthy at a hearing at which loyalty board members had been 
re(]uested to come. He appeared himself and said that he didn't 
think they should appear. 

The Senator said that he had information that he wanted to question 
members of the loyalty board concerning several matters, including 
such things as fraud and misconduct, and that he felt that the board 
members, just as any other Government employees or citizens, had to 
respond to subpenas, and then they might answer certain questions 
and not answer certain questions. 

Mr. Prew^i'it. When had the Senator requested the production of 
members of the loyalty board? 

Mr. Carr. I think that morning or the afternoon before. 

Mr. Prewitt. You are speaking of January 19 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Adams came along ? 

jNIr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PREw^T^r. That is correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. What was the Senator's reaction to the failure to 
produce members of the loyalty board ? 



2646 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. It would be difficult to say. I don't know what his 
reaction was. I know what happened. I know that as a result of 
Mr. Adams' appearance and the conversation that followed, Senator 
McCarthy and Mr. Adams agreed that by the followinor Friday Mr. 
Adams would either produce, send over the persons requested, or he 
would at a certain time of the day telephone me and subpenas would 
be issued. There was no argument. 

Mr. Prewitt. Were subpenas for production of members of the 
loyalty screening board ever actually prepared? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; subpenas were prepared. 

Mr. Prewitt. But they were never issued ? 

Mr. Carr. Never issued. 

Mr. Prewitt. Do you know when those subpenas were prepared? 

Mr. Carr. In the day or so following this 19th meeting I had them 
prepared. 

Mr. Prewitt. Around January 20, is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. On the 22d, Mr. Adams was to call me and I 
had the subpenas ready. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you have a conversation with Senator Dirk- 
sen on January 22 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, on the morning of January 22, Senator Dirksen 
called me and said— and asked me if I had issued subpenas, if 
subpenas had been issued, to certain members of the loyalty board. 
And I told him that they were ready but they were not to be issued 
until later that day. The Senator told me that he had had a con- 
versation with John Adams, and that if the subpenas were issued, 
Adams told him that there would be an embarrassing report issued 
concerning Mr. Cohn. He asked me not to issue the subpenas until 
he could speak with the chairman. Senator McCarthy. I, of course, 
agreed with him. 

Mr. Prewitt. On whose direction did you prepare the subpenas, 

Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. The subpenas were prepared at the direction of the chair- 
man. 

Mr. Prewitt. Prior to the preparation of these subpenas, on or 
about January 20, I believe you stated, had you ever prepared any 
subpenas for production of loyalty board members ? 

Mr. Carr. No, I don't think— I "don't think so. I think one time one 
appeared but Mr, Adams produced him. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was there any relation to the demand for production 
of the loyalty board members to the Schine matter, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. And is it your testimony that regardless of the treat- 
ment accorded Private Schine, your committee would have demanded 
production of the loyalty board members? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. Senator McCarthy had always stated that he 
wanted members of the loyalty board. 

Mr. Prewitt. And those two subjects had absolutely no relation one 
to the other? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. When was the next attempt or suggestion by either 
Mr. Adams or Mr. Stevens concerning your termination of the investi- 
gation of the Army or your foregoing issuing subi>enas for production 
of the loyalty board ? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2647 

Mr. Carr. Well, the following week, that is the week following 
January 19th and the 22d, quite by accident, I ran into Mr. Adams 
in the downstairs cafeteria, and we sat down and either had lunch 
or a cup of coffee. Mr. Adams asked me if Mr. Cohn were angry 
about the business of the threatened report concerning him. I told him 
that I was sure that he was. I told him what Mr. Cohn had told me, 
that he thought that John Adams had no business threatening to put 
out a report on him. He thought that it was a dishonest act on John's 
part, and that he was through with John, he would have nothing fur- 
ther to do with him. Mr. Adams told me that as far as he was con- 
cerned, he was very sorry about Mr. Cohn's attitude, because he said 
that he liked Mr. Cohn personally, and he didn't want to have any 
disagreements with him. He said that this putting out of the sub- 
penas — excuse me, this stopping of the subpenas, was something that 
he just had to do. He said he would stop at nothing to prevent the 
loyalty board members from coming in. 

There then folloAved some discussion about the subpenas being 
stopped, and he told me that this was nothing for Roy Cohn to be 
angry with John Adams about. He said that the whole affair con- 
cerning the loyalty board and the stopping of the subpenas, was 
not a John Adams' decision, he said it was not an Army decision. He 
said that this was a high administration decision. He told me that 
he had had a conference with Bill Rogers of the Department of 
Justice, and he also told me that there had been conferences with 
the Attorney General's office. That is about the substance of the 
conversation. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did Mr. Adams, prior to January 27th, ever register 
any complaint with you concerning alleged abuse by Mr. Cohn ? 

Mr. Carr. Abuse? 

Mr. Prewitt. Abuse or mistreatment with relation to Private 
Schine. 

Mr. Carr. No, he hadn't. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now, Mr. Carr, on March 5, 1954, did you have a 
luncheon engagement with Mr. Adams? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; I did. 

Mr. Prew^itt. What, if anything, was said by Mr. Adams on that 
occasion? I will ask you first to tell us where the luncheon was held 
and the approximate time. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. What, if anything, was said with reference to the 
issuance of a report on the Schine matter? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. The luncheon was held — Well, we met for 
lunch at the Methodist Building across the street. Incidentally, a lot 
of people go there and the food is fine. Mr. Adams and I sat at 
one of the tables, and I recall asking Mr. Adams was there going to 
be some sort of a report concerning Roy Cohn. I told him that I 
had read in the papers or had heard discussion, talk, that several 
Senators had requested of the Army or the Defense Department, an 
alleged report concerning Roy Cohn. 

Mr. Adams told me that — Mr. Adams said that, yes, that Senators 
had asked for a report, but he said he didn't think they were going 
to get it. He told me not to worry about it. He said there is noth- 
ing to it. 



2648 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

That was the end of that portion of the conversation. We then 
talked about Mr. Adams' own personal position. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was anything else stated on the occasion of tlie 
luncheon of INIarch 5 that relates to your specifications or charges? 
Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; I think so. 
Mr. Prewitt. Will you state it, please ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. Mr. Adams said that he wanted to reestablish 
himself on a friendly relationship with Senator McCarthy and Roy 
Cohn. He said that Mr. Cohn had not been friendly with him since 
sometime in January. He said that Senator McCarthy had let it 
be known that he wouldn't have anything further to do with John 
Adams. He said that the position of the Senator had reached the 
Pentagon and that it was damaging to him, the man assigned to 
contact with the committee, if both the chief counsel and the chair- 
man of the committee would have nothing to do with him. 

He asked me if I would help him in more or less patching up the 
differences as far as he was concerned. I told him that I would see 
what I could do. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now have you stated the substance of the conver- 
sation of March 5, insofar as it relates to your charges. 

Mr. Carr. Well, there was one other — I believe there is 1 other 
topic of conversation at that time, perhaps 2 others. 

Mr. Adams told me in connection with this getting back on friendly 
terms with the Senator and Mr. Cohn, that he knew that INIr. Cohn 
and Senator McCarthy would never believe that he had had nothing 
to do with the incidents that followed the General Zwicker testimony. 
He said that the matter had been taken out of his hands entirely and 
that it was a high policy matter. 

There was another portion of the conversation which concerned 
the fact that the subcommittee had, at that period of time, been call- 
ing before it individual uniformed members of the Communist Party 
in executive and public session. 

Mr. Adams had volunteered the appearance of the Secretary of 
the Army before the subcommittee to explain the Army's position 
on policy concerning Communists and the alleged Communists before 
the subcommittee. 

I remember there was some more or less kidding and joking back 
and forth between us on that point, since he had volunteered the 
Secretary's appearance. 

Mr. Adams said that there was some— well, he asked me how many 
more of the uniformed Communists we would call before the sub- 
committee. I told him that we know of several. He said that "There 
are probably 200 of them in the Army that you could call before the 
committee." 

He asked me if there was any possibilitv of discontinuing callnig 
any more of these uniformed niembei'S of the party or alleged mem- 
bers of the party, before the subcommittee, until after Mr. Stevens 
had testified. 

T told him that T would see what I could do about that matter. _ 
Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, before we conclude your direct examina- 
tion, I will ask you if there is any additional statement that you 
would like to make concerning the s])ecifications filed with the com- 
mittee by Senator McCarthy on your behalf and on INIr. Cohn's behalf, 
as well as his own? Do you care to make any other statement? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2649 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. I think Ave have covered it. If there is some- 
thing we have overlooked, I am sure you will bring it out. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, turning to an examination of you more in 
the nature of cross-examination, I should like to ask you, in your 
capacity as executive director of the committee — and I believe you 
state as chief investigator — do you have supervision and control over 
the other investigators on the staff? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I am the administrative person in charge of 
the investigators ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Do you give orders and suggestions to other inves- 
tigators ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes ; I do, and they also give suggestions to me. 

]\Ir. Prewitt. Are they under your supervision and control? 

Mr. Carr. Generally speaking; yes. 

Mr. PREW^TT. When did you first meet Mr. Schine ? 

Mr. Carr. I think I first met him down here in Washington after 
I had come with the committee, although I have a vague recollection 
of having been introduced to him somewhere in New York prior to 
that time. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you know after you came to the committee that 
Mr. Schine and Mr. Cohn were close personal friends ? 

Mr. Carr. I assumed they were friends ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. I will ask you to state, Mr. Carr, in a general sort 
of way, the qualifications of the other investigators on your committee. 
In general, are they men of experience with the FBI or the Justice 
Department, or lawyers ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. Most of them are. Some of them have gained 
knowledge through having worked their w^ay up more or less with 
the committee. They started out as clerks and have become inves- 
tigators. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Do you have any investigators on your staff, under 
your supervision and control or otherwise, who have not had prior 
experience in the FBI, Justice Department, or who are not lawyers? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; we do. 

Mr. Prewitt. State who that is, please ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. We have two men who are in the category 
that I have explained who started out with the committee as staff 
assistants, and who have been assisting in investigations and now 
conduct investigations themselves. 

Mr. Prewitt. You mean they have had long practical experience as 
members of the staff of the subcommittee ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes and no. They have had experience with the staff 
of the subcommittee. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, I would rather get an exact answer 

Mr. Carr. All right. 

Mr. Prewitt. On that question, if we can. 

Mr. Carr, Yes, sir. One has had what I would consider long 
experience, and the other has had what I would consider somewhat less 
exjDerience. 

Mr. Prewitt. What do you mean by "somewhat less experience"? 

Mr. Carr. I think experience of about a year prior to his doing 
investigative Avork. 



2650 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

]Mr. Prewitt. With reference to Mr. Schine and his qualifications 
and his investigative experience, I will ask you if you assigned any 
investigative tasks to Mr. Schine after you became executive director ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; I didn't. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did Mr. Schine undertake any investigative tasks 
after you became executive director? 

Mr. Carr. Well, sir, I had better explain it this way : When I came 
with the subcommittee, Mr, Schine was already a consultant with the 
committee. Mr. Schine was doing this part time. He was in New 
York. When he was in Washington, he had some office space over in 
the old building, the HOLC building, I believe it is, and I had space 
here. He was not often in Washington after I came with the com- 
mittee. 

Most of INIr. Schine's work, thoughts, suggestions were channeled to 
me and coordinated with me through Mr. Cohn. 

Mr. Prewitt. As I understand your testimony, then, ]\Ir. Schine 
was a part-time consultant ? 

]Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

]Mr. Prewitt. He spent only a small portion of his time in his ca- 
pacity as consultant with this committee ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. When I say parttime, I mean that he didn't 
devote his full time to that. He also was running a business. He did 
sj)end a good deal of time with the committee on committee work. 

]Mr. Prew^itt. After you came with the committee July 16 of last 
year, and until November 3, 1953, did Mr. Schine spend the greater 
portion of his time in New York running his business, or did he spend 
the greater ])ortion of his time in work on the committee ? I take it 
you "are familiar with what all of the employees of the committee do. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; I am familiar with the employees of the com- 
mittee and the work that they do. As I have explained, however, 
]\Ir. Schine was a consultant for the committee. He did committee 
work in New York City ; he did some down here. As I say, after I 
came with the committee, most of his time was spent in New York. 

Mr. Prewitt. Approximately how much time would you say Mr. 
Schine spent in Washington during that period, that is, July 16 until 
November 3? 

INIr. Carr. I would say he spent a fair portion of his time. It would 
be hard for me to say how many days. I did see him here. We had 
liearings in Washington in August and September. Later in the fall 
he was here on other occasions. 

He was not here every day, as most all the other investigators were. 

INIr. Prewltt. In a general sort of way, what service did Mr. Schine 
render to the committee during the period that you have just indi- 
cated? 

Mr. Carr. Since I came to the committee ? 

Mr. Prewitt. Yes, and prior to November 3. 

Mr. Carr. Right. Mr. Schine as a consultant was working on the 
development of information which would be of assistance to the com- 
mittee. He had done a good deal of work prior to the time I came 
with the committee on the Voice of America. He maintained his 
contacts with that investigation. He had more or less projected a 
plan for continued investigation of the Voice of America, some phases 
of the Voice of America. He contacted confidential informants to 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION ' 2651 

assist in the development of the Government Printin^r Office case. As 
a matter of fact, it was from knowledge that he learned through the 
Voice of America case that we first got onto the fact that there were 
Communists employed at the Government Printing Office. 

He had an informant who was of great assistance in connection 
with the Fort Monmouth investigation. He had another contact who 
furnished information concerning the General Electric Co. in upper- 
State New York, which is the area of his home. 

Mr. Pewitt. Mr. Carr, who supervised the work of Private Schine 
or Mr. Schine ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, sir, I don't know that it was supervised in any strict 
sense as you might say that of the other investigators was. The work 
of the subcommittee is an informal work until we get around to hav- 
ing hearings. It is preparation for hearings. As I say, Mr. Schine's 
activity and his work was reported and coordinated with me throuf^h 
Mr. Cohn. 
Mr. Prewitt. Through Mr. Cohn, did you say ? 
Mr. Carr. That is right. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was Mr. Schine responsible to you for the work 
which he did ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; I wouldn't say so. I always felt that Mr. Schine 
was responsible to the Senator. He was a consultant, Mr. Cohn was 
the chief counsel, and I was the staff director. I felt that we were all 
responsible to the Senator, and that we should as best we could coordi- 
nate our work. 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, there has been introduced in evidence a 
monitored call of November 7 between Senator McCarthy and Secre- 
tary Stevens, in which the Senator stated in substance, I believe, that 
on the subject of Schine Mr. Cohn was completely unreasonable. Mr. 
Carr, do you subscribe to that statement of the Senator's ? 

Mr. Carr. As far as I am concerned, no, he was never unreasonable 
with me. 
Mr. Prea\^tt. Unreasonable to any degree ? 
Mr. Carr. No, sir ; not as far as I am concerned. 
Mr. Prewitt. It is your testimony that Mr. Cohn was not unreason- 
able on the subject of Schine ? 
Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. You stated at length here the efforts or baiting tac- 
tics on the part of Mr. Adams, holding up small favors or tidbits in 
order to gain a termination of your investigation. You recall your 
testimony in that regard ? 
Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now, what effect would it have on Mr. Cohn, this 
baiting that Mr. Adams used? I will address myself particularly 
to the instance of January 14. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. Mr. Cohn— the effect it had on Mr. Cohn was 
that it annoyed him. Mr. Cohn felt very strongly that, since, he was 
responsible in some measure for bringing Mr. Schine with the sub- 
committee, that Mr. Schine should not be discriminated against by 
the Army ; he should not be used by the Army. An example of what 
Mr. Cohn apparently had in mind was the fact that Mr. Adams 
brought up this business of shipping him overseas before he had fin- 
ished his — actually finished his, training. Another example I might 



2652 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION" 

think of is this publicized statement by a general in the Army that 
he would give a hundred dollars to anyone who would poke Schine in 
the nose. That type of thing. JNIr. Cohn felt that Schine should not 
be discriminated against because he had worked with the committee. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was this a sensitive subject with Mr. Cohn ? 

Mr. Carr. "VVliat do you mean "sensitive" ? 

Mr. Prewitt. On the question of Schine, when Mr. Adams baited 
him, as you have stated. 

Mr. Carr. No, I wouldn't say it was a sensitive subject with Mr. 
Cohn. Mr. Adams baited him. Mr. Cohn, for a long time, took a 
good deal of baiting. Once in a while it would get under his skin, 
as it would anyone else. 

Mr. Prewitt. I want to refer you to Mr. Adams' testimony on page 
2606 of the record, that relates to the conversation of January 14. 
Do you have it ? 

I will read from Mr. Adams' testimony : 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir ; that is right. I asked him what would happen if Schine 
got overseas duty. He responded with vigor and force "Stevens is through as 
Secretary of the Army." I said, "Oh, Roy," something to this effect, "Oh, Roy, 
don't say that. Come on, really, what is going to happen if Schine gets overseas 
duty?" He responded with even more force, "We will wreck the Army." 

Is the statement which I have just read, attributable to Mr. Cohn, 
correct ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. I was there in the room. Mr. Adams had men- 
tioned this shipping of Schine overseas, Mr. Cohn did not make these 
statements. 

JSIr. Prewitt, There is no question but what that question was 
brought up? Mr. Adams asked Mr. Cohn what would happen if 
Schine were sent overseas? 

Mr. Carr. I don't recall his saying what would happen if Mr. 
Schine were sent overseas. I recall he said something about, "I will 
cooperate with you fellows a little bit now. How would you like it 
if I sent Adams overseas," something to that effect — "Sent Schine 
overseas." 

Mr. Prewitt. And it is your testimony that Mr. Cohn did not make 
any response, in substance, "We will wreck the Army" ? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. That is correct. 

Mr. Prewitt. Very well. I will read further from Mr. Adam's 
testimony on page 2607: 

Then he said, "The first thing we are going to do is get General Ryan for the 
way he has treated Dave at Fort Dix. Dave gets through at Fort Dix tomorrow 
or this week, and as soon as he is gone, we are going to get General Ryan 
for the obscene way in which he has permitted Schine to be treated up there." 

He said, "We are not going to do it ourselves. We have another committee 
of the Congress interested in it." 

Then he said, "I wouldn't put it past you to do this. We will start investiga- 
tions. We have enough stuff on the Army to keep investigations going indefi- 
nitely, and if anything like such-and-such double-cross occurs, that is what we 
will do." 

Did you follow me as I read, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, pretty much, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did Mr. Cohn make any such statement or the sub- 
stance of any such statement? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; he didn't. I am sure T would have recalled it 
if he had said anything concerning General Ryan. My contacts with 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2653 

General Eyan had been most pleasant and I thought he was a fine gen- 
tleman. I am sure I would have recalled it. 

Mr. Pre WITT. Were you within hearing distance of Mr. Cohn and 
Mr. Adams during the entire time of their conversation on this par- 
ticular day ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, I was, except for the very beginning of the conver- 
sation on the 14th; yes sir. 

]\[r. Prew^tt. But after the subject of Schine was interposed, you 
say by Mr. Adams • 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. You were within hearing distance of these two gen- 
tlemen as they conversed? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; I was in the room. 

Mr. Preavitt. And it is your testimony that no such statement as I 
have just read, which is attributable to Mr. Cohn by Mr. Adams, was 
made by Mr. Cohn ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; that is my testimony. 

Mr. Prewitt. And this statement concerning, "What we are going 
to do about General Eyan for the way he has treated Schine at Fort 
Dix," is just a figment of the imagination of Mr. Adams ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I don't know what it is. I know that it didn't 
happen. I know if it had happened, I would have gotten into the 
conversation at that point. 

Mr. Prewitt. Well, what was stated by Mr. Cohn in response to 
the inquiry of Mr. Adams concerning the possibility of Schine's ship- 
ment overseas ? 

INIr. Carr. At that point, Mr. Cohn said that he could see no rea- 
son for Schine being sent overseas, that he was disgusted with Mr. 
Adams for tying that in with this statement of cooperation and with 
the statement about a request for ending the hearings. 

I recall something about "He has not had enough training to go 
overseas." 

Mr. Prewitt. Did Mr. Cohn on that occasion or any other occasion, 
make the statement, "Stevens is through as Secretary of the Army"? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir; not that I ever heard. 

Mr. Prewitt. And if he made any such statement on January 14, 
you don't know anything about it ? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now, Mr. Carr, shifting back to an earlier date, I will 
ask you if you recall Mr. Adams' testimony that around the time that 
Dave Schine was inducted into the Army, November 3, Adams had 
a conversation with Mr. Cohn in which you were present, page 2533 
of the record, that that conversation occurred in room 101, Senate 
Office Building, at which time in substance Mr. Adams stated to Mr. 
Cohn that the national interest would preclude Mr. Adams doing any- 
thing in a preferential way for Mr. Schine. Do you recall the sub- 
stance of that testimony? 

Mr. Carr. No. I am just looking it over over here. 

Mr. Preavitt. I will read from the record, Mr. Carr, page 2533 : 

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir ; I pointed out to him that I was 15 years his senior, and 
although I did not at all presume to be as good a lawyer as he was, and I am sure 
that I am not, that I did feel that there was one field in which I could give him 
some friendly advice if he would take it. I pointed out to him that the national 
interest required that Schine be treated just like every other soldier. 



2654 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Jenkins. What was his reply to that, Mr. Adams, if you have finished 

Mr. Adams. It was the wrong clause to use, because he exploded at that and 
said if the national interest was the thing we were interested in, he would give 
us a little bit. He outlined how they would hold a series of hearings and point 
out to us — he would give us a little national interest if that was what we were 
interested in. This was the subject, Schine, which caused the degeneration 
of an otherwise friendly relationship over the months. 

Did you follow me, Mr. Carr ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Do you recall any such conversation between Mr. 
Adams and Mr. Colm ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, I don't. 

Mr. Prewitt. In which the induction of Schine was discussed? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, I don't. 

Mr. Prewitt. You were not present if any such conversation did 
in fact occur? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I don't recall any such conversation. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now let's go to December 17. I will ask you if on 
the morning of December 17 — that was preceding this automobile 
ride — Senator McCarthy reprimanded you or was critical of you with 
reference to the intervention of the committee on behalf of Schine 
atFortDix? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, he did not. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did he discuss that matter with you ? 

Mr. Carr. Not at that time ; no, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. I will ask you to refresh your memory, if you can, 
by turning to I\Ir. Adams' testimony, page 2586 of the record, and I 
will read it : 

Mr. Carr was in the room. 

And this is Thursday, December 17. 

When we walked into the room he began to speak to Mr. Carr about the sub- 
ject, and he began to criticize Mr. Carr about the matter that he had spoken to 
me about. 

To clarify it, I will read the preceding paragraph on page 2585 : 

Mr. Adams. Senator McCarthy stated to me that the purpose of his call the 
night before was that he had just learned, I deduced on tlie previous day, of 
the amount of interference with the oflBcials at Fort Dix which his staff had 
accomplished, and that he wished to tell me that as of then and now it was 
through, it had ceased ; that he was not going to permit it any more. I told 
him I was gratified to get that information, but it would be absolutely of no 
value to me unless he stated it to Cohn in front of me. 

Do you recall that testimony, Mr. Carr ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. It is your testimony now under oath that Senator 
McCarthy did not speak to you on the morning of December 17 with 
reference to any intervention on behalf of Schine by members of the 
committee ? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. You deny that any such reprimand as testified to by 
INIr. Adams took place? 

Mr. Carr. No. Senator McCarthy reprimanded me, but not on 
that subject, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. He did not reprimand you concerning Schine ? 

Mr. Carr. R"ght. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2655 

Mr. Prewitt. He did not reprimand you concerning Schine ? 

Mr. Carr. Right. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did he discuss with you on that morning the subject 
of Schine ? 

Mr. Carr. No, he didn't. 

Mr. Prewitt. Concerning his activities at Fort Dix ? 

Mr. Carr. Not on that morning, sir. 

jNIr. Prewitt. When did he discuss it with you, if he did ? 

Mr. Carr. Later in the day. In fact, it was on the telephone after I 
had left Senator McCarthy at the Waldorf Astoria. He told me that 
he had been hearing rumors, and he said that he thought that there 
was some talk that some of the press were going down to Fort Dix to 
stir up trouble. He asked me if I would be sure to check and make 
sure that the staff was not abusing any privilege that Secretary Stevens 
had given. 

Mr. Prewitt. So it is your testimony that Senator McCarthy did 
discuss the question of Schine's activities at Fort Dix and the relation- 
ship of the staff of the subcommittee to Schine later in the day? 

JNIr. Carr. That is right. 

Mr. Prewitt. I will ask you to turn to your memorandum dated 
December 21, 1953, to Senator McCarthy. Do you have that in front 
of you ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you dictate that memorandum ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. I will read from it : 

Following my conversation with you on last Thursday in New York, I think 
you should know that the staff of the subcommittee has not called upon Dave 
Schine's time or services except when necessary to the committee work. 

Was it Senator McCarthy's telephone call that prompted you to 
make this memorandum ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, it was. Actually, it was a telephone call from 
me to the Senator. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did the Senator ask you to look into the matter and 
give him a report ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. And you did look into it and this memorandum is your 
report to the Senator? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, in effect. I also talked to him. 

]Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Adams is not correct when he says that the 
Senator reprimanded you on the morning of Thursday, December 17, 
with reference to the subcommittee staff's intervention on behalf of 
Schine at Dix? 

Mr. Carr. That is right. 

Mr. Prewitt. He is in error there ? 

Mr. Carr. He is in error. 

Mr. Prewitt. On the question of your memoranda, Mr. Carr, I will 
ask you if the purpose of your dictating the various memoranda which 
are contained in the document which I am sm^e you are referring to 
now, was to convey information either to Senator McCarthy or to 
Mr. Cohn? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, convey information, and other reasons. 

Mr. Prewitt. What other reasons entered into that ? 

Mr. Carr, To make a record. 



2656 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION" 

Mr. Prewitt. So the memoranda had two purposes, is that correct? 

]Mr. Carr. My memoranda did ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. To convey information and for the purposes of keep- 
infj a record ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prew^itt. Did you attempt to dictate memoranda concerning 
all of your contacts with Mr. Adams? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was there any particular reason that you dictated 
the memoranda which in fact appear in this document which I have 
in my hand ? 

INfr. Carr. Yes, sir, there was a reason for each of them. 

]\Ir. Prewitt. All risjht. 

Now let's turn to your memorandum dated January 9, 1951, from 
yourself to Eov Cohn. Did you dictate that memorandum? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Where were you when vou dictated it? 

Mr. Carr. In Senator McCarthy's office. 

Mr. Prewitt. Here in Washin<rton ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

INIr. Prewitt. Where was Mr. Cohn ? 

Mr. Carr. In New York. 

Mr. Prewitt. That is the date, is it not, Saturday, January 9, when 
you talked to Mr. Adams who was in Amherst, Mass. ? 

]\f r, Carr. Yes, sir : that is correct. 

Mr. Prewitt. As I recall the testimonv, that call concerned two 
factors: One, the question of the insert for the annual report with 
relation to the rhanee in the Army's security program? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. And secondly, Private Schine? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Preavitt. Is that correct? 

Mv. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. I read from your memorandum : 

I called John Adams about the question of the insert for the annual report 
re the change of the Army security program. Also told him you had been trying 
to reach him about Dave "not being free Sunday to help with the report. He was 
up in Amherst, Mass., stated that he was snowbound and that he couldn't do a 
thing about it from Massachusetts. I am sure that he doesn't want to do any- 
thing but I told him vou would call. I think he will duck you. It is obvious that 
he doesn't want the "part about Army laxity in the report, so don't expect Dave 
to get off to help. 

Have I correctly read your memorandum, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. sir. . 

Mr. Preavitt. You knew, I take it, that Mr. Schine was assigned to 
do K. P. duty, the following day, Sunday, January 16? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

At the time of the call ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. And the purpose of your call, among other things, 
was to get Private Schine relieved from that obligation? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. P: was not? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. The purpose of my call was to discuss a matter 
concerning the annual report with Mr. Adams. I had discussed it 
with his assistant, Mr. Haskins, on the day before. I wanted to 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2657 

get — Mr. Haskins was not in a position of authority to p;ive me an 
answer to what I was interested in, I called Mr. Adams. The Schine 
memorandum, the Schine matter, is incidental to my call. I merely 
told Mr. Adams, as incidental to my call, that Mr. Cohn had been 
trying to reach him. 

Mr. Prew^itt. Who brought up the subject of Schine on that 
occasion ? 

Mr. Carr. I brought up the subject of Schine in the telephone call. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you ask Mr. Adams to attempt to secure a release 
for Private Schine from duty on the following day ? 

Mr. Carr. No; I didn't. The conversation went something like 
this. I said that Mr. Cohn had been trying to reach Mr. Adams and 
that he wanted, that Mr. Schine had been assigned some duty over 
the weekend, and Mr. Cohn wanted him to work with him on the 
report. I told him that Mr. Cohn would try to contact him. 

Mr. Prewitt. And you dictated this memorandum to Mr. Cohn 
who was in New York on Saturday, January 9. Why did you insert 
in that memorandum — 

It is obvious that he doesn't want the part about Army laxity in the report 
so don't expect Dave to get off to help. 

Mr. Carr. I can't say why I inserted any particular part of this 
thing in here, any particular words. As a matter of fact 

Mr. Prewitt. Let me ask you this, Mr. Carr : Were you trying to 
convey the impression to Mr. Cohn that Private Schine would not be 
able to get off on the following day ? 

Mr. Carr. Xo, sir. I had already conveyed this information to 
Mr. Cohn by telephone, before I wrote this memorandum. 

"\^'lien I told Mr. Cohn by telephone, concerning the conversation 
I had had with Mr. Adams, Mr. Cohn said, "All right," he would 
call him. He called him. Mr. Cohn, later in the day, told me that he 
had called Mr. Adams at some inn at Amherst, Mass., and that the 
phone had rung, he heard it ring several times, he knew from the 
sound that somebody had picked up the receiver. He said something 
like "Hello, John" or "John?" and there was no answer. 

He felt that from the sound that somebody had hung up the re- 
ceiver. He told me that he was sure that Adams had been there and 
had received the call. It didn't make much difference to me at that 
point. Mr. Cohn said, "How about putting this in a memorandum. 
I want to know — I want to have this on the record." 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Cohn requested that in the memorandum? 

Mr. Carr. That is right. Yes. 

Mr. Prewitt. So it wasn't for the purpose of conveying the infor- 
mation to him on that particular day? 

Mr. Carr. No. He had the information. 

Mr. Prewitt. Now, Mr. Carr, I refer you to page 2573 of the record, 
which refers to your train ride with Mr. Adams on November 25, 
and I will read from Mr. Adams' testimony : 

. . . The train trip takes about 3 hours 45 minutes. As I recall now, and as 
I felt at the time, fully one-half of our entire conversation was directed to 
Schine and was filled with Mr. Carr's observations to me to the effect that for 
so long as Schine was not satisfactorily assigned, satisfactory insofar as Mr. 
Cohn was concerned, that we were in trouble. Mr. Carr pointed out to me 
that he thought — that he wasn't proposing this as an independent proposal, in 
my opinion, but I felt that he was passing on to me a feeling he had that as 
long as the assignment of Schine was not satisfactory, we could expect trouble. 



2658 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

You recall that testimony ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you state on that occasion, on that train ride, 
on November 25, in substance, that for so long as the assignment of 
Private Schine in the Army was unsatisfactory to Mr. Cohn, that the 
Army was in for trouble ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. You deny making any such statement ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Using the words of Mr. Adams or the substance 

of it? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. You have testified, though, have you not, Mr. Carr, 
that the subject of Schine was brought up on that train ride? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did it consume, as Mr. Adams has testified to, nearly 
one-half of your time? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. I have testified to that this morning. 

Mr. Prewitt. You already stated that there were numerous other 
subjects 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

]VIr. Prewitt. In the conversation. 

Now, in what manner was the subject of Schine injected into your 
conversation ? 

Mr. Carr. On the train trip ? 

Mr. Prewitt. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, it followed the conversation we had concerning 
General Lawton 

Mr. Prewitt. Do you deny, Mr. Carr, that you ever stated to Mr. 
Adams that as long as the assignment or the treatment of Schine was 
unsatisfactory to Mr. Cohn, that Cohn would make trouble for the 

Army ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; I never made that statement. 

]Mr. Prewitt. You never made any such statement as that? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Either on this occasion 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Or the occasion of your luncheon on March 5, or at 
any other time? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Mr. Prewitt. And it is your testimony that the subject of Schine 
was injected into these conversations by Mr. Adams in the form of 
using Schine as bait in an effort to halt the Army's investigations by 
this committee? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Is that how the subject of Schine was irjected into 
these conversations? 

Mr. Carr. Into this train-ride conversation and the conversations 
I have testified to. Oftentimes Schine's name would just come up 
in conversations. 

Mr. Prewitt. You heard Mr. Adams' testimony, did you not, that 
on December 20 and on December 23 you called Mr. Adams in South 
Dakota. Do you recall that? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I do. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2659 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you telephone, Mr. Carr, Mr. Adams at his home 
in South Dakota, on those two dates, December 20 and December 23? 

Mr. Carr. Sir, I recall talkino; to Mr. Adams in South Dakota on 
one date. He says two dates. Undoubtedly. I did. 

Mr. Prewitt. And what was the purpose of those calls ? 

Mr. Carr. Those calls had to do with General Lawton. 

Mr. Preavitt. Did the calls relate to Private Schine in any degree ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Was that subject brought up? 

Mr. Carr. Not by me, sir. 

]\Ir. Prewitt. Is it your testimony that the subject of Private Schine 
was interposed by Mr. Adams ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. I don't recall Private Schine's name being men- 
tioned in either of those phone calls, if there were two. 

Mr. Prewitt. Why do you state, then, that Mr. Adams brought up 
that subject? 

Mr. Carr. I didn't state Mr. Adams brought it up. I said I didn't 
bring up the subject. 

Mr. Prew^itt. And if it was brought up, it was not brought by you ? 

Mr. Carr. And if it was — that is correct. 

Mr. Prewitt. Let me read from Mr. Adams' testimony, page 2594 : 

On tbe 20th of December, I received a long-distance call from Mr. Carr, in 
which the subject — on the 20th of December and on the 23d of December, while 
I was in Sioux Falls, S. Dak., I received long-distance calls from Mr. Carr. On 
one, and I think on both of the occasions, the principal subject of the call seemed 
to me to be Schine, and I restated that I had told them that if they would just 
wait until beween Christmas and New Year's I would try and find out what 
was going to happen 

Mr. Jenkins. You say that in 1 or 2 calls the subject seemed to be Schine. 
Was there not Schine discussed by Mr. Carr long-distance while you were visit- 
ing your mother in Sioux Falls, S. Dak.? 

Mr. Adams. It was, and as I say, the principal purpose of one of the calls, as 
I recall it, was Schine. My recollection is that both calls alluded to Schine. 

New, Mr. Carr, do you now state that the principal purpose of 
either of these calls was Schine ? 

Mr. Carr. I do. 

Mr. Prewitt. And you deny the statement by Mr. Adams to the 
contrary ? 

Mr. Carr. I do. 

Mr. Prewitt, Mr. Carr, there is one other subject that I want to 
discuss with you, and I believe we can do it before adjournment. 

Mr. Carr. All right, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. That is the subject of work performed by Mr. Schine 
subsequent to November 3 while he was at Fort Dix. I will ask you 
if Mr. Schine interviewed any witnesses while he was stationed at 
Fort Dix, to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Do your records or memoranda kept in your office 
reflect that ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't think they do. 

Mr. Prewitt. There was no written data or memoranda kept to 
document any interviews which Mr. Schine made of witnesses while 
he was at Fort Dix ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know of any. 

Mr. Prewitt. Who assigned him to the task of interviewing wit- 
nesses while he was at Fort Dix ? 



2660 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. I don't know that he was assigned to the task of inter- 
viewing witnesses. He had been working on the Fort Monmouth 
case along with the rest of us. He had some informants. He had 
one witness that I can readily recall that he interviewed. I don't 
know that it was an assignment. I think it might have been just a 
followthrough. 

Mr. Prewitt. Why was Mr. Schine permitted to do that ty]ie of 
work while he was on duty at Fort Dix? As I understand it, you 
have a staff of trained investigators, men with experience in the FBI. 
Why was this young man, with no appreciable prior experience in in- 
terviewing witnesses, given that task or why w^as he permitted to 
doit? 

Mr. Carr. First, I might say that he was not permitted to do it 
while he was on duty at Fort Dix. All of these things happened 
during his nontraining hours. 

I might also state that as far as that period of time is concerned, 
he had had prior experience in interviewing witnesses and investiga- 
tion flowing from his work on the information program and the Voice 
of America investigation. 

Mr. Prewitt. Is it the practice of your office when an investigator 
interviews a witness to make no written memorandum of his inter- 
view ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, 1 don't want to say it is the practice of the office. 
It is the practice of the office to run itself as efficiently as possible. 
Sometimes memoranda are dictated, sometimes they aren't. 

During the course of preparation for hearings, many times notes 
are maintained; scribbled notes are used in interrogating witnesses. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you expect to use the information gathered by 
Private Schine in his interviews with these various witnesses? 

Mr. Carr. We did use information in at least one instance that I 
recall. 

Mr. Prewitt. How did you get that information from Private 
Schine? 

Mr. Carr. Usually it came through Mr. Cohn. 

Mr. Prewitt. Private Schine was able to retain in his head all the 
information gathered from these witnesses which he interviewed at 
Fort Dix without making any written memoranda of them? Is that 
your testimony, Mr. Carr? 
Mr. Carr. No, sir ; it isn't. 

Your question — could I have that question read, please? 
(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 
Mr. Carr. Part of it. The first part of the question, Private 
Schine didn't retain it in his head. He conveyed it to Mr. Cohn, 
who made use of it. The second part, I don't recall that he inter- 
viewed these people at Fort Dix. 

Mr. Prewitt, This practice of interviewing witnesses and making 
no memoranda of it, is that consistently followed by other investigators 
in your office? 

Mr. Carr. It is not consistently followed by anyone. However, 
Mr. Cohn very infrequently makes memoranda. _ During the haste 
of prei)aring for hearings very frequently interviews are conducted 
and information is received which appears in the printed interview 
at the hearing. There is no need in many cases for a memorandum 
prior to that time. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2661 

Mr. Prewitt. Mr. Carr, why weren't these interviews of witnesses 
by Mr. Schine conducted while lie was at Fort Dix conducted before 
he entered the Army? You knew he was going in the Army. 

Mr. Carr. Right, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Why weren't they ? 

Mr. Carr. If I understand your question, you want to know why 
weren't the interviews that he conducted after he was at Fort Dix 
conducted prior to that time. 

Mr. Prewitt. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carr. Right. Prior to Mr. Schine's going into the Army I 
discussed with Mr. Cohn and Senator McCarthy the fact that he 
would probably be in the Army. The main reason that I had for 
discussing it with them was the reports. The other information he 
had was valuable, but I was concerned with the reports. I felt that 
if the end of the year came around and the interim reports and the 
annual report were not out, it would be a reflection on the committee 
and a reflection on me. 

They advised me that they had given this work to Mr. Barslaag 
and that Mr. Barslaag was going to write the report. It later re- 
vealed that Mr. Barslaag was unable to write the reports, through 
no fault of his own. Information which Mr. Schine had in his pos- 
session was used in the staff interrogatories of witnesses in October. 
He cleaned up as much as he could at that point. 

Mr. Prewitt. You still haven't answered my question with ref- 
erence to Schine's interviewing witnesses while he was in the Army 
and stationed at Fort Dix. 

Mr. Carr. These, as far as I recall, were incidental matters. The 
prime reason — the prime M'ork, rather, that he had was in connection 
with the writing of the reports. 

Mr. Prewitt. Is it your testimony that he did or did not interview 
witnesses ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, he did. He interviewed some witnesses. When 
you say witness, I can think of one who was a witness offhand and 
others were confidential informants. 

Mr. Prewitt. Did you not have other investigators at your com- 
mand to do that sort of work ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Prewitt. Weren't they fitted to do it? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; but this was more or less a followtlirough on 
work that Mr. Schine had done before. For instance, one of the 
persons he talked to insisted that he only talk with Mr. Schine. These 
are things that happen in an investigation. 

Mr. Prewitt. Is it your testimony that young Mr. Schine was in- 
dispensable to the work of the committee, and that it was compel!- 
ing that he interview witnesses after he was inducted into the Army 1 

Mr. Carr. No, sir; it is not. 

Mr. Prewitt. Why was it done, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. As I have said, Mr. Schine did interview a few wit- 
nesses. I can recall one, oft'hand. He interviewed informants with 
whom he had had contact prior to his going into the Army. That was 
incidental to his main task which was preparing the reports. 

Mr. Prewitt. I have no further questions. 

Senator Mundt. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock, 

(Whereupon, the hearing recessed at 12 : 37 p. m., to reconvene at 
2 p. m., the same day.) 



INDEX 



Page 

Adams, John G 2630-2632, 2634, 2636-2648, 2652-2654, 2656-2659 

Air Force (United States) 2634, 2636, 2640 

Amherst, Mass 2656, 2657 

Army (United States)— 2628-2639, 2641, 2643, 2647, 2648, 2651, 2657, 2658, 2661 

Army agencies (New Yorli City) 2628 

Army Intelligence (G-2) 2628, 2(i29 

Army loyalty screening board 2629 

Army Quartermaster Corps 2628, 2629 

Army Signal Corps 2628, 2629 

Army's security program 2656 

Attorney General (United States) 2647 

Barslaag. Mr 2661 

Boston, Mass 2636 

Bradley, Colonel 2636 

Brooklyn, N. Y 2629 

Brown Uniyersity 2626 

Capitol Police 2625 

Carr, Francis P., testimony of 2626-2661 

Carroll Arms Hotel (Washington, D. C.) 2641 

Christmas 2659 

Cohn, Roy M.__ 2628, 2631-2640, 2642-2645, 2647, 2648, 2651-2653, 2656-2658, 2660 

Coleman, Aaron 2640 

Communist authors 2629 

Communist infiltration of the Army 2628, 2629 

Communist leaders (first-string) 2627 

Communist Party 2627-2631, 2634, 2638, 2640, 2648, 2651 

• Communist Party leaders 2627, 2628 

Communists 2627-2631, 2634, 2638, 2640, 2648, 2651 

Counselor to the Army 2630-2632, 2634, 2636-2648, 2652-2654, 2656-2659 

Crouch, Paul 2628 

Daily Worker editor 2627 

Defense Department 2634, 2647 

Dennis, Eugene 2627 

Department of the Army__ 2628-2639, 2641, 2643, 2647, 2648, 2651, 2657, 2658, 2661 

Department of Justice 2647, 2649 

Eastern district, New York (United States attorney) 2627 

Edwards, Willard 2629 

FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 2626-2628, 2638, 2649, 2660 

FBI (New York field diyision) 2627 

FBI (Security Matters Section) 2627 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 2626-2628, 2638, 2649, 2660 

First-string Communist leaders 2627 

Fort Dix 2636, 2640, 2642, 2652, 2654, 2655, 2659-2661 

Fort Monmouth 2629-2633, 2635-2638, 2640-2642, 2644, 2660 

G-2 (Army Intelligence) 2628, 2629 

Gasner's Restaurant, (New York City) 2642 

Gates, John 2627 

General Electric Co 2651 

Government Printing Office 2629, 2630, 2651 

Haskins, Mr 2656, 2657 

HOLC Building (Washington, D. O.) 2650 

Hoover, J. Edgar 2628 

Hotel Waldorf 2643 

Indians (staff members) 2640 

Justice Department 2647, 2649 



n INDEX 

Page 
Lavelle, Colonel 2G36 

Lawton, General 2630, 2637-2039, 2642-2644, 2(i59 

Loyalty board 2630, 2641, 2645, 2646 

Loyalty screening board (Army) 2629 

Marine Corps (United States) 2642 

McCarthy, Senator Joe 2626, 

2628-2636,2638-2642, 2645, 2646, 2648, 2654, 2655, 2661 

McCarthy's telephone call 2655 

McGonshey, John F. X 2627 

McGuire Air Force Base 2636 

Medina, Judge 2627 

Merchants Club (New York City) 2632, 2636 

Military Intelligence (G-2) 2628, 2629 

Navy (United States) 1— 2634 

New Year's 2659 

New York City 2627-2629, 

2631, 2632, 2635, 2636, 2638, 2639, 2642, 2643, 2649, 2650, 2655, 2646 

New York field division (FBI) 2627 

New York United States attorney (eastern district) 2627 

New York United States attorney (southern district) 2627 

Newark depot 2637 

Partridge, General 2630, 2631 

Pentagon — 2630, 2633, 2635, 2638 

Photographic Laboratories, Queens (Signal Corps) 2629 

Portland, Oreg 2630 

Quantico, Va -^ 2627 

Quartermaster Corps (Brooklyn) 2629 

Quartermaster Corps (U. S. Army) 2628,2629 

Reber, General 2628 

Rogers, Bill 2647 

Ryan, General 2636, 2652, 2653 

San Francisco, Calif 2627 

Schine, G. David 2631-2634, 2636-2639, 2644-2647, 2649-2661 

Secretary of the Army 2630-2637, 2639-2642, 2646, 2648, 2652, 2653 

Secretary's plane 2636 

Security Matters Section (FBI) 2627 

Signal Corps (United States Army) 2628, 2629 

Signal Corps Photographic Laboratories (Queens) 2629 

Sioux Falls, S. Dak 2659 

Smith Act 2628 

Southern district. New York (United States attorney) _ 2627 

Stachel, Jack ^ 2627 

Stevens, Robert T 2630-2637, 2639-2642, 2646, 2648, 2652, 2653 

United States Air Force 2634, 2636, 2640 

United States Army 2628-2639, 2641, 2643, 2647, 2648, 2651, 2657, 2658, 2661 

United States Army Quartermaster Corps 2628, 2629 

United States Army Signal Corps 2628, 2629 

United States attorney (eastern district, New York) 2627 

United States attorney (southern district, New York) 2627 

United States Attorney General 2647 

United States attorneys 2628 

United States Department of Defense 2634, 2647 

United States Department of Justice 2647, 2649 

United States Government 2625, 2629, 2645 

United States Marine Corps 2642 

United States Navy 2634 

University of Pennsylvania Law School 2626 

Voice of America 2642, 2650, 2660 

Waldorf Hotel 2643 

Washington, D. C 2627, 2628, 2637, 2649, 2650 

Washington Times-Herald 2629 

Winston, Henry 2627 

Zwicker, General 2648 

O 



^'^^\ 



SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES 
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRE- 
TARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN 

G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR 

JOE McCarthy, roy m. cohn, and 

FRANCIS p. CARR 



HEARING 



BEFORE THE 



SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGEESS 
SECOND SESSION 

PURSUANT TO 

S. Res. 189 



PART 65 



JUNE 14, 1954 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operatious 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
46620" WASHINGTOJJ' : 1054 



. Boston Pub -ry 

'uperintc-ndent of Documents 

NOV 2 4 1954 



.^, ;.■»!.•■.' 



COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 
JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 
KARL E MUNDT, South Dalcota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arl^ansas 

MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HENRY M. JACKSON, Wasliington 

HENRY C DWORSHAK, Idaho JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland THOMAS A. BURKE, Ohio 

CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina 

KiCHAUD J. O'Melia, General Counsel 
Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 



Special Subcommittee on Investigations 
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota, Chairman 
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
CHARLES E POTTER, Michigan HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 

HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 

Ray H. Jenkins, Chief Counsel 

Thomas R. Prewitt, Assistant Counsel 

ROBERT A. Collier, Assistant Counsel 

SoLis HOKWiTZ, Assistant Counsel 

Charles A. Maner, Hcvietary 

n 



CONTENTS 



rage 

Index I 

Testimony of — 

Carr, Francis P., executive director. Senate Permanent Subcommittee 

on Investigations 26G4 

III 



SPECIAL SENATE INYESTIGATION ON CHARGES AND 
COUNTEECHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE 
ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE 
HENSEL AND SENATOR JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN, 
AND FRANCIS P. CARR 



MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Special Subcommittee on Investigations 
OF the Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington^ D. C. 

after recess 

(The hearing was resumed at 2: 13 p. m., pursuant to recess.) 

Present: Senator Karl E. Mundt, Kepublican, South Dakota, 
chairman; Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican. Illinois; 
Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; Senator Henry C. 
Dworshak, Republican, Idaho ; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, 
Arkansas; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and 
Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri. 

Also present: Ray M. Jenkins, chief counsel; Thomas R. Prewitt, 
assistant counsel ; Charles Maner, assistant counsel. 

Principal participants present: Senak)r Joseph R. McCarthy, a 
United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin ; Roy ]\I. Cohn, 
chief counsel to the subcommittee; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel 
for the Army; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army. 

Senator Mundt. The committee will please come to order. 

The Chair w^ould like to welcome the guests of the committee who 
have come to the hearing this afternoon, and to tell you that you are 
very welcome to be here, and to repeat the standing rule of the com- 
mittee, if you have not heard it before, to the effect that there are to 
be no audible manifestations of approval or disapproval of any kind 
from the audience at any time. The uniformed members of the Ca])i- 
tol Police force whom you see before you, and the plainclothes peoj)le 
scattered through the audience, have standing instructions from tlie 
committee to remove from the committee room immediately, politely, 
but firmly, any who might elect to violate the terms under which he 
entered the room, namely, to comply with the committee regulation 
against audible manifestations of approval or of disapproval. I am 
sure that we will continue to enjoy the cooperation from our friends in 
the audience that we have enjoyed in the 63 or 64 sessions that we 
have had so far, and I again express my appreciation to the Capitol 
Police force and their associates in the plainclothes corps for helping 
to maintain the decorum that we have had in the committee room. 

2663 



2664 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS P. CAER— Resumed 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Prewitt, I understand that you had conduded 
your cross-examination with the morning session; is that correct? 

JVIr. Prewitt. That is correct. 

Senator Mundt. We will start, then, with the customary 10-minute 
go-arounds under the terms of the regulations of the committee, each 
member of the committee having 10 minutes in which to ask questions 
and counsel for each side having 10 minutes in wliich to ask questions. 

The Chair has the first 10 minutes and, Mr. Carr, I will ask you 
first of all whether you had ever met Mr. Schine before he came to 
work for our committee? 

Mr. Carr. I think I said this morning, and I am sure it is correct, 
that I was probably introduced to him one time. I have a vague recol- 
lection of having shaken hands with him at one time. It may have 
been at some function. I don't recall it definitely. 

Senator Mundt. At all events, you had no special background of 
friendship for him ? 

Mr. Carr. No. 

Senator Mundt. And you had no better or worse relationship with 
him as a friend, I presume, than 6 or 7 or 8 other members of our stall" ; 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. I would say even less. I only shook hands with him at 
an introduction, as I recall it. 

Senator Mundt. I think I understood the testimony this morning 
that most of your relations with him, since he was a consultant rather 
than an investigator, came either through Senator McCarthy or INIr. 
Cohn? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Senator Mundt. You had no personal interest, or did you have, in 
what his career in the Army might lead into ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; I didn't. 

Senator Mundt. A statement was made this morning which I am 
not sure I understood because it is subject to various kinds of interpre- 
tation. You were discussing one of your numerous luncheons with 
Mr. Adams, Mr. Cohn, and Mr. Carr. I think it was the one dealing 
with the first information that was given you that Schine might be 
heading toward overseas duty. You quoted Mr. Cohn as saying that 
you thought Schine should not be "used by the Army." That is sub- 
ject to quite a few interpretations. Let me ask you the first that pops 
into my mind. That might very well imply that Mr. Cohn thought 
that Schine should not be recruited into the Army or drafted into 
the Army. 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Mundt. What did you mean by "used by the army"? 

Mr. Carr. I am sure I meant, and I thought I made it clear later, that 
he should not be discriminated against by the Army because he had 
come from the committee. 

Senator Mundt. What you should have said to convey what yon had 
in mind, perhaps, was that he was not to be misused by the Army? 

Mr. Carr. "Misused" is probably the better word. 

Senator Mundt. I went back and looked at the record. You said 
"used." I heard you say "used," and it could be interpreted and, in 
view of some of the charges, might very well be interpreted that Mr. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2665 

Colin tliouglit lie should not be used as a member of the Army by draft 
or recruitment. You are sure that was not the intention of those words ? 
Mr. Carr. is o ; it was not. 

Senator Mundt. I want to ask you some questions now that I asked 
Senator McCarthy and I asked Mr. Cohn. 

As one interested in the past and also interested in the impact of 
the past on the future, it would seem to me that for a while in the 
investio-ation at Fort Monmouth, you as director of the staff. Senator 
McCarthy as chairman, and Mr. Cohn as chief counsel, had worked 
out a rather salutary relationship of cooperation, whereby the instru- 
mentality that you were investigating, sharing as it did your desire 
to eliminate the Communists from strategic positions, cooperated to- 
ward that goal. Do you feel that that is the optimum way in which 
we can conduct an investigation, if we can work out some kind of co- 
operative performance such as you did have for several weeks and per- 
haps months in the investigation of Fort Monmouth? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. In your opinion, what was it that caused that co- 
operative era to fall apart ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I think that it gradually deteriorated. I don't 
think that it ever had fallen apart during the Monmouth investiga- 
tion. There was still some limited cooperation between us right up'to 
the very end. I Avas talking to Mr. Adams. 

Senator Mundt. What caused the feeling of cooperation to end 
whether it occurred during the Fort Monmouth investigation or after- 
ward ? V/hat was the attribute that seemed to change the status of 
the cooperating forces? 

Mr. Carr. I think probably the important period was in connection 
with the calling in of the loyalty boards. That seemed to be the point 
that Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams didn't want us to go beyond. 

Senator Mundt. In your opinion, is there anything else growing out 
of the effort, the experience of the effort, in trying to work coopera- 
tively, which would lead you to believe that such a cooperative, joint 
effort could not again be resumed, provided it is possible to resolve the 
problem as to what to do about calling in people on a loyalty board, 
for example, issues of that kind ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. I think the problem can be resolved. 

Senator Mundt. Do you think it is worthwhile to try to make an 
effort to endeavor to establish that kind of cooperative approach to a 
security problem which should be of equal concern and undoubtedly 
is to all good Americans ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Carr, you said that on numerous occasions, 
John Adams referred to Dave Schine as a hostage, is that right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. In your presence and to you ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 
^ Senator Mundt. Did he do it in overtones which you would con- 
sider to be facetious or in overtones which you might consider to be 
ominous and threatening? 

Mr. Carr. I think that on most occasions he was being facetious. I 
don't think the use of the word "hostage" itself was considered— it was 
certainly not considered by me as a threat. I think facetious. 



2666 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator Mundt. You know John Adams rather well. I know him 
rather well. He is what you might call sort of a master of a flip 
phrase, is he not ? 

Mr. Carr, Yes. 

Senator Mundt. That is, sometimes the thing he says w^hen reduced 
to print, divested from its inflection, might convey an altogether 
different meaning than if you can hear the inflection and watch the 
pantomine of his face, is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. That is true of any of us. 

Senator Mundt. Yes; but do you agree that John G. Adams, 
perhaps, is more inclined to the flip phrase than maybe Frank Carr? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Senator Mundt. Yes, sir; perhaps more than the average. He 
picked that up as a young man. And, consequently, knowing the 
individual, I would be led to believe that even though he used the 
word hostage, he didn't do it in terms of a man about to make a threat, 
that "we are goin^ to chop off the head of Dave Schine" or "we are 
going to put him m a dungeon." It was done, perhaps, more or less 
I think between friends, and you were a friend of John Adams. Is 
that right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. With the feeling that what he said might be under- 
stood by you as a facetious remark. 

Mr. Carr. I don't think the use of the word hostage in itself is a 
threat ; no, sir. 

Senator Mundt. You have heard a lot of testimony, Mr, Carr, 
through this hearing, about the desire of the Army to call off the 
hearings, or to change the nature of the publicity growing out of the 
hearings — depending upon which witness happens to be on the stand — 
they put a different emphasis on what they would like to have had 
happen concerning the hearings, but it was agreed by all sides of tlie 
controversy that the people in the Army would have relished some 
kind of change, at least, in connection with the hearings. 

Now, did you ever have Mr. Stevens complain to you directly about 
the type of hearing that you were conducting as chief investigator or 
chief of staff man at Fort Monmouth ? Did he ever complain to you ? 

Mr. Carr. About the type of hearing ? 

Senator Mundt. Yes. 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Mundt. He never registered with you then, as the head 
man of the committee, next to the Senator, any specific complaints 
and said, "Carr, I would like to have you do it this Avay instead of 
that way," or "I would like to have you call them off." Nothing direct 
to you ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Did he ever register with you a specific complaint 
about the nature of the publicity which emanated from the hearings 
after each executive session was concluded ? 

]\Tr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Mundt. So that if such a desire was present on the part 
of the Army, it was not conveyed to you, you tell us now under oath, 
as chief investigator? 

Mv. Carr. Well, if I understand you, sir, such a desire, a desire to 
call off' the hearings; yes. Any talk to me personally by Mr. Stevens 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2667 

concerning the method or operation of the hearings, or newspaper 
results; no. 

Senator Mundt. In other words, your conversations with Mr. 
Stevens, you are telling us, were in the direction of suggesting that 
the hearings be dropped rather than in the direction that the hear- 
ings be changed? 

Mr. Carr. That is right. 

Senator Mundt. Or that the publicity be changed? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Senator Mundt. You tell us he did talk with you about the de- 
sirability of terminating them, but not the desirability of changing 
them or changing the publicity ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, yes, sir, I was present at the November 6 luncheon. 

Senator Mundt. At which time the publicity matter came up? 

Mr. Carr. I don't recall it. It may have. I don't recall it. 

Senator Mundt. What did you mean when you said you were pres- 
ent at the November 6 luncheon? That dealt with calling it off, you 
mean ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Senator Mundt. Other than that, did he ever call on you individ- 
ually or send word to you directly that he would like to have the 
hearings terminated or changed ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir; not individually. 

Senator Mundt. Just on that one occasion ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Senator McClellan, you have 10 minutes. 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Carr, when these hearings began you were 
regarded as one of the principals to the controversy; is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. As such, did you participate 

Senator McCarthy. Senator McClellan, I can't hear you. 

Senator Mundt. Will the control man be sure to turn up the mike 
a little louder, please ? 

Senator McClellan. Thank you. 

As one of the principals in this controversy, did you participate 
in the drafting of this document entitled, "Statement Submitted at 
Request of Temporary Committee" on April 20, 1953, to which I have 
frequently referred and which I identify as the countercharges in 
this case ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. You did participate in the drafting of it? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I was present in some of the drafting. 

Senator McClellan. At the time it was filed, did you then adopt 
it as your pleadings or your response to the committee's request? 

Mr. Carr. Insofar as it applied to me; yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Insofar as it applied to you, insofar as you 
were involved 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Either directly or indirectly in any of the 
charges or countercharges, you adopted this then as your resi^onse 
to the Army charges and as constituting your countercharges against 
the Army ; is that true ? 

46620*— 54— pt. 65 2 



2668 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I make no argument about the statement of 
charges. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellax. All right. Then I shall not have time or I 
shall not take the time to go through and identify each paragraph 
in which you are referred to and in which you make countercharges, 
but I want to ask you now if you state under oath that the counter- 
charges you have made in this document are true ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. At the time you made them, did you regard 
them as serious or frivolous ? 

Mr. Carr. Serious. 

Senator McClellan. Do you now regard them as serious ? 

Mr. Carr. Serious. 

Senator McClellan. You began regarding these things as serious, 
as a controversy, much earlier than the time this document was filed, 
didn't you ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator ]\IcClellan. You began regarding them as serious as of 
October 2, 1953; is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. That was the date you made your first memo- 
randum, was it not ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. You marked it "Confidential" and placed it 
in the file? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan, Now explain to us just what was serious about 
this controversy at that time. Why did you regard it as serious 
then? What had transpired before and what caused you to prepare 
this memorandum and file it ? 

Mr. Carr. I am not sure that I follow your last question, sir. I 
regarded this whole affair as serious. I so regard it now, I regarded 
the whole Fort Monmouth case as serious. I certainly regarded any 
contact I had with the Secretary of the Army as serious, I recorded 
this contact with the Secretary of the Army because Senator Mc- 
Carthy was out of town, and I tliought that this was something that 
he should know about. 

Senator McClellan. All right. There was something that de- 
veloped at that time that caused you to feel that it required some 
specific attention to the extent that you did prepare a memorandum 
at that time ? 

]Mr, Carr, Yes, sir. I thought this was something the Senator 
should know about. 

Senator McClellan. All right. What I w\ant to find out, was 
this the customary procedure after you had conferred with the Secre- 
tary of the Army or someone else in a similar position in Government? 

Mr, Carr, No, sir. 

Senator McClellan. This violated the custom, then? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; not necessarily. 

Senator INIcClellan. I didn't understand you, then. 

Mr. Carr. You asked if this were a customary procedure. The 
customary procedure is either to write a memorandum or to speak 
to the Senator, to the chairman. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2669 

Senator McClellan. I thought you had answered that it wasn't. 
Tliat is the reason I asked you the next question. 

I ask you again : Was this memorandum of October 2 in line with 
your customary procedures after you had had a conference with the 
Secretary of tlie Army, Secretary of the Navy, or someone else in a 
snnilar position of Government ? Was that customary, prior to that l 

Mr. Carr. The word "customary"— I did it in this instance. I 
think it would be a good thing to do in all instances. I am not 
sure 

Senator McClellan. I didn't ask what would be a good thing. I 
asked you what you had been doing before. Was it a conmion 
practice ? 

Mr. Carr. This was the first contact I ever had with the Secretary. 

Senator McClellan. It wasn't the first contact you had had with 
other high and important Government officials, was it? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Have you got any other memorandums in the 
file, of conferences or contracts similar to this with other Government 
officials prior to this date? 

Mr. Carr. I am sure I must have, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Can you recall any ? 

Mr. Carr. No,, not offhand ; no, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Let's see what was so serious about this that 
caused you to make a memorandum. We will read it briefly. 

Mr. Cohn and I met with Secretary Stevens at the Pentagon to discuss General 
Lawton of Fort Monmouth and his l)lacliOut order re Fort Monmouth personnel 
spealiing with our stait". 

Had General Lawton blacked out conversations between members 
of his staff and others at Monmouth, in other words, prohibited them 
from talking to the staff of this committee? Is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. There was such an order. 

Senator McClellan. There was such an order. Who had issued it? 

Mr. Carr. It was issued through General Lawton ; yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Issued through General Lawton. Do you 
know why he had issued it? 

Mr. Carr. No, I don't. 

Senator McClellan. All right, then you refer to : 

Jim Juliana had been advised by Colonel Allen that he couldn't talk vpith 
anyone because of an order by General Lawton forbidding talking to the 
McCarthy committee. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan (reading) : 

Mr. Stevens was very helpful — 

you say. 

He called Lawton and had the order immediately rescinded stating that 
it was his policy to cooperate with the Congressional committees. 

Did he state that? 
Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Did he call and have the order rescinded? 
Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. What was there in that action to indicate that 
tlie thing was serious? If he was cooperating, if he Avas getting tlie 



2670 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

order rescinded, what was there in an action which caused you to think 
you ought to make a memorandum of it? 

Mr. Carr. This memorandum was made because Senator McCarthy 
was out of town. Ordinarily I think that I would have just spoken 
to the Senator and told him what the Secretary had done. The Sena- 
tor was very interested in the Fort Monmouth situation. I left the 
memorandum for him. 

Senator McClellan. All right, your next sentence : 

Durins the course of the conversation Dave Schine's ponding induction into 
the Army came up. 

Mr. Carr. At the conference w^ith the Secretary, as I recall it the 
Secretary brought up the subject of Dave Schine by mentioning that 
he was not ffoing or didn't think he would receive a commission. 

Senator McClellan. Had he previously applied for a commission ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, I understand he had. 

Senator McClellan. Why did he bring that up in a conversation if 
you folks were not interested in it ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know why he brought it up. It was the first I 
heard the Secretary 

Senator McClellan. He brought it up because you were interested 
in it, didn't he? There wouldn't be any other reason to bring it up, 
would there? 

Mr. Carr. I suppose he did bring it up for that reason. 

Senator McClfxlan. He brought it up because you were interested 
and because you had had previous contact about it; is that not true? 

Mr. Carr. I had never had any previous contact about it; no. 

Senator McClellan. You had had none? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator McClellan, There was nobody there, as I interpret this 
memorandum, except you and Mr. Cohn? 

JVIr. Carr. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. And had he had previous contact with him 
about it? 

Mr. Carr. I don't really know. I think he had. I think he had ; 
yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Is that what prompted the Secretary to bring 
up the conversation about Dave Schine? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know what prompted him to bring it up. 

Senator McClellan. It was just uncalled for and unexplainable 
insofar as you know, then, that he would bring up such a conversation ? 

Mr. Carr. At the time; yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. At the time you didn't understand what he 
was bringing it up for ? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Senator McClell.\n. All right. [Reading :] 

Mr. Stevens stated that he thought Schine should tal^e his initial basic 
training and that after he had completed his basic, that he, Stevens, would 
be able to use Schine to his own advantage in the Army. 

Did the Secretary make that statement? 
Mr. Carr. Yes, he did. 

Senator McClellan. How did you interpret it at the time? What 
did he mean by it? AVhat was the import of it? 
Mr. Carr. Just what it says here, Senator. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2671 

Senator McClellan. I beg yonr pardon ? 

Mr. Carr. Just what it says "here, Senator. 

Senator McClellan. That he was going to use him to his 
advantage ? 

Mr. Carr. Correct. 

Senator McClellan. What did he mean by "to his advantage" ? 

Mr. Carr. As you read on further, he says something here about he 
would attend some security -type schools within the Army and report 
to Stevens his observations. 

Senator McClellan. After he had attended other schools ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Senator McClellan. Or had certain other training? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Senator McClfxlan. Did you get the impression— what I am try- 
ing to determine— this Schine matter has caused a terrible furor for 
quite a long time now. I am trying to find out whether the Army 
inspired this or whether there are other causes. Do you think now 
that the Secretary there just brought up the subject about Schine to 
discuss it with a view of trying to explain how he was going to handle 
him in the future, without anybody inquiring about it? Is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't really know why he brought him up, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Well, nobody has inquired about him, accord- 
ing to you. 

Mr. Carr, I didn't say that. 

Senator McClellan, Had they? 

Mr. Carr. I had never. 

Senator McClellan. You were there ? 

Mr. Carr. That is right. 

Senator McClellan, And JMr, Cohn was there? 

Mr, Carr, That is right. 

Senator McClellan. Had Mr. Cohn mentioned it before the Secre- 
tary said anything about it ? 

Mr._ Carr. The Secretary brought it up by this reference to the 
commission, as I recall it. 

Senator McClellan. Without anybody making any comment about 
it or asking or making any inquiry about it ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. He just brought it up out of a clear sky and 
started talking about it ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. There had been notliing prompting him to 
bring it up. You had been talking about Fort Monmouth, and he 
brought it up out of a clear sky and began talking about how he was 
going to handle Schine in the Army ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt, Senator Dirksen, you have 10 minutes. 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. Carr, how old are you ? 

Mr. Carr. Thirty-seven, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. You have a family ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; three children. 

S?nator Dirksen. Three children ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 



2672 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator Dirksen. What is your legal residence. Is it Washington, 
D. C? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I live in Falls Church. 

Senator Dirksen. You live where? 

Mr. Carr. Falls Church. 

Senator Dirksen. In Falls Church? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Before you came to this area, where was your 
legal residence? 

Mr. Carr. I am a native of Newport, R. I. I had been living for 
the last 6I/2— almost 7 years — in New York City. 

Senator" Dirksen. You got your bachelor's degi-ee from Brown 
University ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. What did you specialize in while there? 

Mr. Carr. Political science, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. And then you went to the University of Pennsyl- 
vania Law School and got your degree ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. But you did not secure admission to the bar, 
didn't make any effort, I take it, to become admitted to the bar? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. I went to law school primarily for the purpose 
of qualifying myself to enter the FBI. 

Senator Dirksen. Did you join the FBI on application initiated 
by yourself? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. By yourself? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. And you entered the FBI service when? 

Mr. Carr. June 1, 1942. 

Senator Dirksen. And you continued on until how long? 

Mr. Carr. For 11 years, 1 month and, I think, 15 days. 

Senator Dirksen. Does a person take an oath when he Joins the  
FBI? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. ' 

Senator Dirksen. In substance, what is that oath? 

Mr. Carr. It is an oath of allegiance to the country, and to the 
Constitution. ^ ^ I 

Senator Dirksen. I would assume, of course, that it requires some  
special qualifications to get into the FBI? j 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 1 

Senator Dirksen. Rather strict qualifications, are they? | 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. . . , j 

Senator Dirksen. What is the physical qualifications for joining 
the FBI? 

Mr. Carr. Well, you have to take a physical examination and be 
qualified. There are many things that you have to be able to do, I 
but the prime thing is that you must be able to do arduous physical 1 
work. 

Senator Dirksen. You must have some vigor, then, I take it? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. You have been referred to as the strong man in 
this drama, Mr. Carr. There are no weak men in the FBI, are there ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2673 

Senator Dirksen., So that streno^tli is, after all, an inheritance of 
the days when you were in the FBI ? 

Mr. Carr. If there is strength there, that is where it came from 
sir ; yes, sir. ' 

Senator Dirksen. What are the requirements for thorou<yhness in 
the work of the FBI? ui^niiebh 

Mr. Carr. I think that the FBI is the most thorough investigative 
organization in the world, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. And what are the requirements for accuracy in 
pursuing your work? 

Mr. Carr. I also think that the success of the FBI is an example of 
their accuracy. 

Senator Dirksen. Do you get some charge from a very distin- 
guished public servant, John Edgar Hoover, about veracity wlien 
you pursue your duties in the FBI ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. He speaks to all of the new agents as thev 
enter. ^ 

Senator Dirksen. In other words, there is a high requirement for 
accuracy and thoroughness and veracity in the pursuit of that work« 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 
_ Senator Dirksen. Are there any loose-lipped people who ever <rQt 
into the FBI, and if they do, do they stay there very long? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know of any that stayed ; no, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. About how many agents and other personnel are 
there, Mr. Carr, so far as you know ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know as of this moment, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. You know you have been referred to not only as 
the strong character m this drama, but as the silent character in tliis 
drama. You have seen that in the press, haven't you ? 

Mr, Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Silence is almost a requirement in pursuintr the 
secretive work of the FBI, isn't it ? "^ 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, you might say that. 

Senator Dirksen. To be the best kind of a man in that field, you 
have to be not only strong, but, I take it, you have to be somewhat on 
the silent side, don't you ? 

Mr. Carr. It helps : yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. I would think so. They certainly articulate the 
> 1/ '^/^^ silence is golden, if tliey are going to get any work done. 

Mr. Carr, of all the FBI agents who have ever called on me for 
information, every one of them always had a notebook. Does every 
h BI man carry a notebook ? 

My. Carr. Yes, sir. Every investigator carries some sort of a note- 
book ; yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. He doesn't lean or trust to the slender road of 
memory, does he ? 

Taking notes, then, becomes a habit, doesn't it ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. So I presume in your work with the committee 
you have always been rather meticulous about making notes? 

Mr. Carr. I have made notes ; yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. All along the line as you go, to refresh vour 
memorv? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; whenever I could,; 



2674 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator Dirksen, Now INIr. Carr, I raise all this for a very definite 
reason. We are movino; on toward the end of this high political 
adventure, if you want to call it that, and when we get to the end 
of the cause, it appears to me that what will confront this committee 
will be a conflict in veracity and a conflict in capacity to recollect 
where there is a variance in the testimony between witnesses. Have 
you refreshed yourself from time to time on notes that you have made 
as you have gone along ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. You feel then, Mr. Carr, rather reasonably sure 
of your recollection of many things that have been raised in the 
course of this investigation ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. Senator Dirksen, I wonder if you would yield 
just for a few seconds ? 

Senator Dirksen. I yield. 

Senator McCarthy. I think you should have this in mind when you 
are examining any of the witnesses, and I think other members of 
the committee should have it in mind also, and that is this, that I have 
an unwritten rule, a rather strong one, that when any member of the 
committee interrogates any one who doesn't want his name known, 
doesn't want it bandied about, in other words the informants, if you 
can call them that, I have requested that no memorandum be placed 
in the file, knowing that too many people have access to those files. 

So I wish you would keep that in mind when you discuss the differ- 
ence in the procedure. In the FBI, I think everything is broken 
down, everything is put in the file. In my committee, I have the 
strong duty to any Government employee who wants to give us infor- 
mation. As I say, I have given instructions that their names not go 
into the file, that no memorandum be prepared, that I be informed 
of what the information is, if it is of value. 

Senator Dirksen. When recollection comes into issue, Mr. Carr, 
you are willing to stand upon your recollection, based upon the re- 
freshment you receive from notes taken as you had gone along? 

Mr, Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. And you are willing to stand on the record of your 
veracity in making answer to the questions that have been addressed 
to you? 

Mr. Carr, Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, I think for the moment, Mr, Carr, I have 
only one other question and that is this : 

Is it possible for a person to express an interest in another, in your 
judgment, without being charged with undue influence ? And by that 
I mean this : It Avould be natural, of course, in your associations in the 
committee room, with all members of the staff, and that would include 
Mr. Schine, that you might express an interest without carrying it to 
such an aggressive point that it can be construed as undue influence on 
your part. Have you an opinion as to wdiere the dividing line might 
be? 

Mr, Carr. Well, I think it is possible and commendable that one 
person has an interest in another. 

Senator Dirksen. So you believe that you could express an interest 
in the military future of G. David Schine and still not transgress the 
proprieties 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2675 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. And invite the charge that there had been 
undue influence on your part? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. That is all, Mr. Chairman, for the moment. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson, you have 10 minutes. 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Carr, do I understand from the answer 
you gave in response to Senator Dirksen's questions that you took 
notes in connection with all of these various meetings and get- 
togethers ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Jackson. In other words, the only notes that you have are 
the notes that have been transformed into the form of memoranda 
which are included in this document? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct, the only notes I have at this time. 

Senator Jackson. So it is not accurate, then, to say that your recol- 
lection would be better than parties on the other side of this con- 
troversy because you had taken notes at the time of these various inci- 
dents ? 

Mr. Carr. I agree with you, sir. I didn't say that. 

Senator Jackson. I got the impression, you see, that you had notes 
on all of these other incidents that took place that are not included in 
the memoranda. 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. I will stand on my recollection. 

Senator Jackson. Pardon me? 

Mr. Carr. I stand on my recollection. 

Senator Jackson. You stand on your recollection. So you are not 
relying on notes, then, in connection with the other conversations not 
included in the memoranda ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. I have some notes of some things, yes, sir, through- 
out the course of the 

Senator Jackson. But insofar as this dispute is concerned that we 
have been listening to for 8 weeks, the notes taken, memoranda, and 
everything, are contained in the document, for all practical purposes ? 

Mr. Carr, Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Carr, in your memorandum of December 
9, 1953, in the first paragraph, you state the Army is trying to use 
Schine as L hostage. In substance that is it, in the first paragraph. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. You go on to say that John Adams refers to 
Schine as "our hostage" or "the hostage" whenever this name comes 
up. I wonder just how you are using the term "hostage" in your 
memorandum. The dictionary definition in part is that "the state 
of a person given or kept as a pledge pending the fulfillment of a 
future demand, as a threat." That is Webster's definition. Webster 
also defines "hostage" as "the state of a guest, hence the state of a 
hostage treated as a guest." 

As you use it, is it the former or the latter? 

Mr. Carr. You say the last was the state of a guest? 

Senator Jackson. There are two alternative definitions. They are 
not quite reconcilable. Let me give you the latter. 

I am asking how he used the word "hostage" in his memorandum. 

46620°— 54— pt. 65 3 



2676 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator McCarthy. I would like to have you go over it again, if 
you would. 

Senator Jackson. Webster's dictionary— that is a pretty good 
source — states that "It is the state of a person given or kept as a pledge 
pending the fulfillment of a future demand, as a threat." That is 
the first definition. 

Then the second one is that "It is the state of a guest, hence the state 
of a hostage treated as a guest." 

How did you use the word "hostage"? 

Mr. Carr. I think that I first used the word hostage from associa- 
tion with Mr. Adams. He first used the word "hostage." I had in 
mind, to make a long sentence, I had in mind that he had in mind 
that this was a person whom they could — that this was an object or 
person that they could hold over our head in order to put pressure 
on us. 

Senator Jackson. In other words, you were using it in the sense 

of a threat? 

Mr. Carr. I would say loosely in the sense of a threat ; yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. What did the Army threaten to do to Schine 
if the hearings were not called olT? 

Mr. Carr. What did they threaten to do with Schine ? 

Senator Jackson. Yes; what did the Army threaten to do with 
Schine if the hearings were not called oif ? 

Mr. Carr. One thing that they threatened to do was to ship him 
overseas before he had finished 'his training. I shouldn't say "the 
Army." Mr. Adams made that statement. 

Senator Jackson. Are you sure that— I wasn't quite certain from 
previous testimony— that Mr. Adams had definitely threatened to 
send him before he had finished basic training? 

Mr. Carr. That was the interpretation I placed on it. I don't 
know what day he intended him to go. 

Senator Jackson. When was that first date when he threatened 
to send him overseas before finishing basic training? 

Mr. Carr. It was on the 14th of January. 

Senator Jackson. How could you have in mind that threat when • 

Mr. Carr. I didn't say I had in mind that threat, sir. 

Senator Jackson. But this memorandum was written on December 
9. You used the word "hostage" in the first paragraph. 

Mr. Carr. That is right, and you gave the term "threat" to it from 
the dictionary, and I h ve adopted the dictionary. I said that I had 
in mind 

Senator Jackson. What threat did you have in mind on December 9 
when you used the word "hostage"? 

Mr. Carr. I didn't say I had in mind a threat on that date. I used 
the word "hostage" as a word that Mr. Adams had used and as a word 
that I meant to mean holding somebody over our head to use pressure 
on us. 

Senator Jackson. As I read the second sentence in your December 9 
memorandum : 
What I want to tell you — 
this is to Senator McCarthy — 

is that I am setting fed up with the way the Army is trying to use Schine as a 
hostage to pressure us to stop our hearings on the Army. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2677 

What could they have done to Schine at that time ? 

Mr. Carr. What could they have done to Schine? 

Senator Jackson. Yes. This was December 9. He was getting his 
passes right along, wasn't he ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. The use of the word "hostage" goes back to 
Adams' use of the word "hostage." I don't claim that I am using the 
word "hostage" in this sense or in any sense in the strict dictionary 
sense. I am using it as Mr. Adams used it, as I thought he used it, I 
should say, as a means of dangling a little bit of pressure over us or 
indicating that he could do favors for him if we would do favors for 
the Army. 

Senator Jackson. Then with reference to the December 9 memo- 
randum of 37ours, Mr. Carr, when you used the word "hostage" you 
didn't have in mind then that the Army could do anything to hurt 
Schine ? 

Mr. Carr. I wouldn't say that I had in mind they could do anything 
to hurt Schine. 

Senator Jackson. They had been pretty fair with him up to that 
time, hadn't they? He had been getting extra passes, more than the 
normal draftee was getting, isn't that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, the Army had been fair with him at that time. 

Senator Jackson. As far as you knew at that time, you didn't 
know of anything that they were doing or contemplated doing that 
would come within the category of a threat? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Jackson. You also state in the memorandum down in the 
next paragraph that : 

I did say that I thought it wasn't fair of them to take it out on Schine because 
we were investigating the Army, or to keep using it to try to stop our investiga- 
tions. 

Actually at that time were they taking anything out on Schine? I 
I am just reading the 

Mr. Carr. No, that is a statement that I think— at this point is a 
little difficult for me to say exactly what I had in mind when this 
thing was dictated. I think that the statement you just read, which is 
in the second paragraph, is the 

Senator Jackson. Yes. It is the next to the last sentence in the 
second paragraph. 

Mr. Carr. Right. 

Senator Jackson. You see you talk in terms as if it were going on 
now. In other words "I did say I thought it wasn't fair of them to 
take it out on Schine." 

You didn't have in mind that they were taking it out on Schine at 
that time. 

Mr. Carr. No. If you will recall my testimony 

Senator McCarthy. May I have a copy of that memorandum ? Do 
you have one there, Jim ? 

Senator Jackson. In the next paragraph 

Senator McCarthy. Will you hold it. Senator, until I get the memo- 
randum ? All right, sir. 

Senator Jackson. In the next paragraph you say : 

I am convinced that they will keep right on trying to blackmail us as long 
as Scliine is in the Army. 



2678 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator McCarthy. What page are you on, Senator? 
Senator Jackson. The memorandum of December 9. That is what 
I have been referring to all the time. It is on page 5 of the printed 

one. 

Senator McCarthy. Thank you very much. 
Senator Jackson (reading) : 

I am convinced that they will keep right on trying to blackmail us as long as 
Schine is in the Army. 

Do I understand that they were blackmailing you during this time? 

Mr. Carr. This is a reference to the part of my testimony this morn- 
ing where Adams said to me, "What's there in it for us if we do some- 
thing for Schine?" 

The use of the word "blackmail" here by me is as sort of an extor- 
tion, use for extortion. 

Senator Jackson. A pretty serious charge. Blackmail is a felony, 
isn't it? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I 

Senator McCarthy. Could I suggest, Senator Jackson 

Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson's time has expired. 

Senator Potter, you have 10 minutes. 

Senator McCarthy. Point of order, then. 

Senator Potter. Senator Dirksen explored with you adjectives that 
have been used to describe you in connection with this hearing, one 
being strong and the other silent. And I believe that under your 
oath to the committee there is some reason to call you both strong and 
silent. I believe another adjective also has been applied to you 
also during the course of the hearing, not only strong and silent but a 
hungry man. 

Mr. Carr. There is some evidence of that, too, I dare say. 

Senator Potter. Do you care to let your physical being stand in 
mute evidence that you are at times a hungry man ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. I might say that hungry means for food. 

Senator Potter. Yes. I think that evidence could speak for itself. 
Mr. Carr, what is the status — what is your status within the commit- 
tee staff organization? Do you receive orders from the chief counsel 
or does he receive orders from you, or are both of you on a par and 
receive orders from the chairman ? 

Mr. Carr. I would say we are more or less on a par, if you wanted 
to make an organizational chart of the thing. We both receive orders 
from the chairman and members of the committee, and we attempt 
to coordinate them between us and correlate our duties between us. 

Senator Potter. If there is a certain investigation to be held, for 
example, would the chief counsel tell you, "We are going to this field 
and there are certain areas, certain things we should look for," and 
then you would take over from there, is that essentially correct? or 
would you say — go ahead. 

Mr. Carr. Not exactly, sir. The chief counsel works along with us 
in connection with our investigation. I feel that, as the investiga- 
tive arm, as you might say, that it is more or less my function and the 
function of the investigators to do everything we can to see that coun- 
sel who is going to present the case, as it were, in the hearings, has 
what he needs. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2679 

Senator Potter. As the chief administrative officer of the commit- 
tee staif, do you supervise the entire personnel or just the investiga- 
tors? 

Mr. Carr. Well, all of the personnel on the staff, aside from the 
clerical, are really investigators. Some five of them are lawyers. 
But the amount of legal work, as such, is not too great. It is mostly 
investigative work. I do supervise them. A question involving some 
more serious, or a need for a serious knowledge and more complete 
knowledge of legal aspects of a particular matter, it is always turned 
over to Mr. Cohn to be sure to check. 

Senator Potier. What about the women members of the staff, the 
clerical personnel. Do you supervise them? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Potter. Now, Mr. Carr, you have testified to the fact that 
during your FBI work, it was customary procedure to make many 
memoranda, and I believe Senator McCarthy mentioned that you 
had been instructed for your committee work here when informers 
were brought into it, no memorandum was made. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. That is the Senator's instructions, yes. 

Senator Potter. But I notice the memorandum that you have 
submitted here — is this typical of the subject matter of the memo- 
randa that you would make as staff director of the committee? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I don't know about typical. These are memoranda 
that I did make. 

Senator Potter. These are memoranda where no informer is men- 
tioned. It is on a problem with wliich the committee is confronted. 
The reason I am asking the question, Mr. Carr, is because I assume 
that there are probably other memoranda dealing with other general 
subjects, is that correct, in your files? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Potter. So the memoranda that are submitted here are 
not all the memoranda that you have prepared ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Potter. Mr. Carr, you heard Mr. Adams testify concern- 
ing what took place on that famous automobile ride in New York 
from the courthouse to the hotel, when Mr. Adams missed his train, 
he claims, three times. I believe you testified this morning that during 
that automobile ride, Mr. Cohn, I believe,,, was the driver, there was 
quite an animated conversation. Do you agree that it was quite 
animated ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Potter. But it is your testimony that the discussion during 
that automobile trip concerned General Lawton, is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. It did, sir. 

Senator Potter. Was David Schine mentioned during the course 
of that conversation ? 

Mr. Carr. As I said this morning, his name was mentioned at the 
luncheon when Mr. Adams said, "Let's talk about Schine." It is my 
recollection that his name was not mentioned at any point during the 
automobile ride. 

Senator Potter. When Mr. Adams testified, he intimated that there 
was a certain amount of friction between Mr. Cohn and Senator Mc- 
Carthy at the same time, and he stated that after he had returned and 



2680 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

talked with you about this automobile ride, when Mr. Adams stated 
that he was left olF in the middle of the street and had to catch a cab 
to get to the depot in a hurry to catch his train, that you stated that 
"You should have seen what happened to Senator McCarthy." 

I would like to quote to you from the testimony of Mr. Adams on 
that, so I will be quoting correctly. This is Mr. Adams stating — this 
is on page 2592: 

Mr. Carr told me d few days later that lie didn't think that I should feel badly 
about the way I was put out of the ear because he said I should have been there 
to see the way Senator McCarthy left the car a few blocks later. 

Did you say that, Mr, Carr? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Potter. Did you say anything in substance that would 
give Mr. Adams any reason to make that statement under oath ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; I didn't. I can see no reason why I would have 
said it, since Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn appeared to be in 
agreement about this subject of possible reprisals against persons who 
had helped the committee. 

Senator Potter. And you heard Mr. Adams state that the main 
source of — that the main subject of conversation was Mr. Schine, and 
you state that w\as not so ; it was General Lawton ? 

Mr. Carjr. He is mistaken; yes, sir. 

Senator Potter. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Mundt. Thank you. 

Senator Symington, you have 10 minutes. 

Senator Symington. Mr. Carr, you are the executive director of 
the staff, is that right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. Would you tell me briefly what your functions 
are in that capacity? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. Briefly I am the administrator of the office 
staff. I supervise and follow the work of the investigators and the 
clerical force. I also, however, investigate myself, as I understand 
and I know Mr. Cohn does. 

Senator Symington. I think you want to change the way that 
sounded a little bit. 

Mr. Carr. Well, I also investigate, myself, and Mr. Cohn investi- 
gates. 

Senator McCarthy. I think Senator Symington has a good point. 

Senator Symington. You act as an investigator yourself? 

Mr. Carr. Right. 

Senator Symington. And you came out of the FBI where you had 
a great desire for efficiency and office routine and clerical routine? 

Mr. Carr. The FBI does have great efficiency in office and clerical 
routine; yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. Do you assign all investigators to their par- 
ticular jobs? Are they all under you ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, I think you could say all the investigators are undei 
me. 

Senator Symington. So you know what each investigator is doing 
at any particular time in a general way? He is assigned a mission 
and he carries out that mission under your supervision; is that right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. In a general way, yes, sir. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2681 

Senator Symington. Do the members of your staff, as director, do 
they report back to you the results and accomplishments of their in- 
vestigations periodically ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. When they report, do they make written re- 
ports or oral reports, or both ? 

Mr. Carr. Both. 

Senator Symington. If they made an oral report, do you write a 
memorandum or do they write a memorandum for the files on the 
contents of that report? 

Mr. Carr. Not in all cases ; no, sir. 

Senator Symington. Tell me a little about it, how they decide or 
you decide that it is to be done or not to be done ? 

Mr. Carr. For instance, an investigator might tell me of a certain 
bit of information he had received which was a decisive bit of progress 
in i^ome investigation he was carrying on. He might tell me what had 
]ia])pened up to that point. He might go back and write a memo- 
randum to that point. He might go back and not write a memoran- 
dum. He might do additional work and subsequently write a 
memorandum. 

Senator Symington, But generally he would have a memorandum 
when the job was closed, wouldn't he? 

Mr. Carr. In most cases, he would, yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. Don't you think it is important to have writ- 
ten records of the results of any investigations in the files? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; I think it is important. 

Senator Symington. Wouldn't it be important to have a record 
in the files? For example, a staff member might get sick or go to 
work on another job or go to another town. It would be important, 
therefore, for him to leave a record if possible, wouldn't it? 

Mr. Carr. It might. 

Senator Symington. Are you familiar with this mimeographed 
document I have here, called Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Filing and Administration? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. Let me read to you a paragraph from page 7. 

Senator McCarthy. May I have a copy of that first. Senator? 

Senator Symington. Let me read to you a paragraph on page 7, 
quote : 

The results of all interviews and investigations should be made a matter of 
record for the appropriate investigative tile by preparing memorandums or 
reports for that file. In most cases the preparation of a memorandum by the 
sralf member will be sufficient to keep a case file record of the investigation 
being conducted. 

On that basis, it would seem to be routine, wouldn't it, except in 
extraordinary cases, to have a file of any particular investigation ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington, As I understand this morning, Private Schine 
does not report to you, is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. No. sir. 

Senator Symington. To whom does he report? 

Mr. Carr. Usually 

Senator Symington. Or did he report? 



2682 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. Usually he reports to the Senator, and as I said this 
morning, his work was coordinating with me through Mr. Cohn. 

Senator Symington. I see. As administrative head of the staff, are 
you also in control of the files of the investigating subcommittee, the 
files themselves ? 

Mr. Carr. Technically, I assume you are right, sir. 

Senator Symington. "Do you want to 

Mr. Carr. I am not in physical control of them. 

Senator Symington. But technically they are under your super- 
vision, is that right ? 

Mr. Carr. That is right. 

Senator Symington. Are all documents which relate to committee 
investigations placed in these files? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Symington. If they are not in the files, where are they 
placed? 

Mr. Carr. For instance, an investigator might receive information 
from a confidential informant, which information would be of value 
in connection with an executive or a public hearing which might be 
conducted. He may have notes on that. The fact that the witness 
testified before the subcommittee and was asked questions which the 
investigator had in his notes or had turned over on a slip of paper 
to the counsel or the chairman might not be recorded in the files. That 
is one example. His notes or penciled memorandums might be de- 
stroyed and undoubtedly would be. 

Senator Symington. Ultimately, do all summarized reports get 
into the file, or do all final reports get into the files, or do you have in 
effect two sets of files, one that are too secret to be in the general files, 
and one that are not too secret? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. There is only one set of files. 

Senator Symington. Only one set of files. Is there any committee 
classification put on material going into the files? In other words, 
are some documents marked "Secret" and some not? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Symington. Do Senators on the committee also have access 
to these files? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. Do the investigators on the staff have free 
access to the committee files ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Senator Symington. Do the secretaries and clerical assistants also 
have free access to the files? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. That is another matter. There is a girl who 
handles the files, the filing clerk. She has access to the files. She files 
the material as it comes in. She takes care of the file room. She has 
access to them, of course, physical access. The personnel, the clerical 
i^ersonnel aside from her would have physical access, yes, but they are 
not supposed to and do not go down and look through the files. 

Senator Symington. Suppose your secretary wanted to get a file, 
Mr. Carr, could she go down and lift the file out of the files, or would 
she have to ask the file clerk? 

]\Ir. Carr. Physically she could do it. The proper way to do it 
and the way I think she would do it would be to go down and ask 
the file clerk. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2683 

Senator Symington. She would be violating the regulation if she 
(lid it herself? 

Mr. Cark. I don't think she would be violating a regulation; no 
sir. 

Senator Symington. In other words, if any file clerk or any secre- 
tarial help really wanted to see the files, they could, is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. No. My secretary 

Senator Symington. I am only trying to find out. 

Mr. Carr. My secretary would not be violating any regulation if 
she went down to get the file for me. If she went down on an after- 
noon just to browse through the files 

Senator Symington. I understand. She has access to the files for 
you. 

Mr. Carr. Right. 

Senator Syiviington. Do all the investigators have access, too? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Senator Symington. Do members of the staff of other committees 
have access to the files of this committee ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Symington. Do members of the staff of Senators who arc 
on the committee have access to the files? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Symington. Of this committee? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. I have never known one to go to the files. 

Senator Symington. Does the minority counsel have access to the 
files? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. Could I ask you to prepare a list for me, Mr, 
Carr, showing persons of all categories who have free access to com- 
mittee files and the approximate time involved in each category? 

Mr. Carr. I could do that for you right now if you want to take the 
time. 

Senator Symington. All right; fine. 

Mr. Carr. The committee members have free access to the files. I, 
iis staff director, have free access to the files. 

Senator Symington. Who is that ? 

Mr. Carr. I do, myself. 

Senator Symington. Yes. 

Mr. Carr. Mr. Cohn does. Mr. Kennedy does. The rest of the 
legal counsel and the investigators do. Those are the only persons 
that I would say have free access to the files. I might qualify that 
by saying this, that 

Senator Symington. Let me interrupt you a minute to be sure. 
The file clerk has access to the files? 

Mr. Carr. The file clerk. 

Senator Symington. And any clerical supporter, or rather aid, your 
secretary, Mr. Cohn's secretary. Senator McCarthy's secretary — they 
have access to the files if they go down to get the files for you, isn't 
that right? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. Your statement is just a little too broad there. 
My secretary or Mr. Cohn's secretary would have access to the files 
if she went down there for me. The access would be through the 
file clerk. However, I don't preclude the possibility that if the file 

46620"— 54— pt. 65 4 



2684 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION | 

( 

I 

clerk wasn't there, they could physically find the file. The secretary, 
your secretary, the secretary of Senator McCarthy or any other mem- 
ber of the committee, would not, if the question came to me, have ac- ' 
cess to the files. If you wanted somethinor, if your secretary wanted 
somethinj^ for you, it would come by request and then the clerk would 
get the file for you. 

Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn, you have 10 j 
minutes. I 

Mr. CoHX. No questions. 

Senator Mundt. I beg your pardon, it is not your time. 

Senator Dworshak, I am sorry. Senator Dworshak, you have 10 
minutes. 

Senator Dworshak. Mr. Carr, you have not been present through- 
out all of these hearings, because you were released a few weeks ago, 
but I am sure you have observed that there has been created the im- i 
pression that the Department of the Army has been somewhat lax in ' 
dealing with subversives and security risks within the Department. 
You have had extensive experience with the FBI. I realize you joined 
this committee only about 11 months ago, but based on your experience | 
in dealing with the various agencies and bureaus of the executive de- 
partment, I would like to have your observation as to whether you \ 
believe the Department of the Army under Secretary Stevens is doing ! 
an efticient job in rooting out these subversives. i 

Mr. Carr. Well, sir, I think that I will have to qualify any opinion i 
that I might make to my own knowledge. The only knowledge I | 
have of the operation of the Army in regard to security risks, or per- i 
haps anything else, is in connection with the investigations that I have i 
been connected with. They had a situation at Fort INIonmouth. I 
That is the biggest problem that I know they had. They did have i 
some — at least two — persons who were Communists or extremely pro- \ 
Communist whom they suspended in the New York area. ' 

Senator Dworshak. Do you think comparable conditions exist in i 
other Army installations? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know. I have read pieces in the paper, but I 
don't know of my own knowledge that they do exist in other places. I 

Senator Dworshak. In your experience as an official of the FBI, 
did you have an opportunity to contact and work with the De]mrt- , 
ment of the Army? Haven't you been aware of the activities of the 
Department in regard to this subversive program ? ! 

Mr. Carr. Well, in my own personal experience with the FBI, I had 
very little contact with the Army intelligence agencies, personal con- 
tact with the Army intelligence agencies. 

Senator Dworshak. AVe realize that as a result of the prodding of 
the investigations subcommittee at Fort Monmouth, the Army prob- 
ably has been accelerating its work there. Do you think that if the 
subcommittee were to withdraw entirely from its investigation there 
and in other Army installations, that there would be a tendency to 
coddle subversives and security risks within the Army ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't think at this time the Army is going to coddle 
any security risks; no, sir. I think enough attention has been drawn 
to it. I think the Army will do a fast job of trying to get rid of 
Communists. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2685 

Senator Dworshak. You can conceive of no reason why they should 
do otherwise, can you '{ 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Davorshak. Therefore, you will concede that the Ameri- 
can people have no reason to be apprehensive about the possibilities 
of having espionage actively working within the Army? 

Mr. Carr. I think that the American people might well be appre- 
hensive about questions of espionage at all times, within the Army 
and without it. The Communists are always vigilant and I think 
the American people should be vigilant also. 

Senator Dworshak. You also will concede that Secretary Stevens, 
as a patriotic American, ought to be interested in rooting out and 
exposing these subversive forces wherever they may be found witlun 
the Army? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. And I may say in that regard, with the sub- 
committee there was never any question of Secretary Stevens not 
being anxious to rid the Army of Communists. The only trouble 
came when the subcommittee wanted to find out who was responsible 
for allowing tlie Communists to be there. 

Senator Dworshak. Do you think, then, at lower levels there was 
a tendency to cover up and protect those who had been too lenient 
and too coddling in dealing witli this particular problem? 

Mr. Carr. I think there had been. I don't know whether it still 
exists. 

Senator Dworshak. You don't know what? 

Mr. Carr. I don't laiow whether it still exists now. I think there 
has been. 

Senator Dworshak. You think in the future there will be a greater 
inclination to do an effective job? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I think that is true of not only the Army but 
the Navy and all executive branches, or legislative branches when- 
ever you have an expose of some laxity in another agency that doesn't 
take advantage of finding out somebody else's faults, it itself is very 
much at fault. 

Senator Dworshak. It is essential if we are building up a national 
preparedness and defense establishment, we must be absolutely cer- 
tain that we do not liave these subversive forces within our armed 
services. That is very apparent ; is it not ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; and I think as a result of this Investigations 
Subcommittee, the Department of Defense in April revised many of 
its regulations concerning the Communist threat. 

Senator Dworshak. And we can look for a decided improvement in 
the future in the handling of this program? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; I think so. 

Senator Dworshak. From the standpoint of the top echelon and 
also from the security boards? 

Mr. Carr. I look for it, sir; yes, sir. 

Senator Dworshak. One more question. What do you think the 
Army could have done for David Schine if the relations between 
the Army and this subcommittee at Fort Monmouth had been more 
agreeable ? 

Mr. Carr. Could I iiave that question again, please? 

Senator Mundt. Will the reporter read the question, please? 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 



2686 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator Dworshak. In other words, it has been pointed out that 
David Schine was more or less a hostage, and that there may have 
been discrimination because of the lack of adequate response or full 
cooperation on the part of the staff of this committee Now, what 
do you think— what treatment might he have expected it this rela- 
tionship had been more agreeable? ^ o I-- 

Mr. Cark. Well, I think that— I can't complain about bchine's 
treatment. 

Senator Dworshak. You don't? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. ^ • ^ o i • 

Senator Dworshak. You think, then, that David Schine was not 
discriminated against, and that while he may not have received any 
preferential treatment, because he is still a private, that you think he 
got about what he was entitled to, the same as any other enlistee or 
draftee entering the Army? 

Mr. Carr. Well, General Ryan has testihed that he got no specia 
privilege. I don't have any knowledge that he got less than special 

privilege ; no, sir. i 1 1 i 

Senator Dworshak. You don't think, then, that he should have 

received a commission 

Mr Carr. No ; excuse me. He received less than the ordinary 

Senator Dworshak. He should have followed the regular routine 
and qualified, and if he were competent in every way, then he should 
have received a commission; otherwise none? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I think that the ordinary procedure, yes. 

Senator Dworshak. But if you did have any interest or made any 
contacts with the Department of the Army to urge some preferential 
treatment, I will say alleged preferential treatment, for David Schme, 
you feel that he was not discriminated against, and that it is not justi- 
fiable to sav that he was held as a hostage? -, t ., • i 

Mr. Carr. Well, the word "hostage" is Mr. Adams' word. 1 think 
that they were trying to use Dave Schine as they were trying to use 
other things, to stop the hearings ; yes, sir. . 

Senator Dworshak. In other words, David Schine has received 
about the same treatment that other young men entering the Army 
receive, is that right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; I think so. 

Senator Dworshak. That is all. 

Senator Mundt. Now, Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn, you have 10 

ininiitGS. 

Senator McCarthy. I will yield my time that I have to Mr. Cohn. 

Do you have any questions, Mr. Cohn? 

Mr. Cohn. No, sir; I don't. 

Senator McCarthy. I have no questions. ^ . ^ 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Welch or Mr. St. Clair, you have 10 minutes. 

Mr. St. Clair. Mr. Carr, it has been said that some time previous 
to the start of these hearings, there was a loyalty oath circulated m 
vour office. Is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. It has been said, yes, sir. i , i , 

Mr. St. Clair. Is that correct? Was there such an oath circulated ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. I don't think so. 

Mr. St. Clatr. Did you sign anything that anyone could call a 

loyalty oath? 
Mr. Carr. No, sir. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2687 

Mr. St. Clair. Did you sign any form of paper that indicated your 
support of Mr. Cohn ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St, Clair. To your knowledge, did anyone under your super- 
vision sign such a paper ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. It is your testimony, then, sir, that no such paper 
exists? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

JNIr. St. Clair. And never did exist ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. My testimony — it is not my testimony that no 
such paper exists. It is my testimony that to my knowledge no such 
paper exists. 

Mr. St Clair. Have you heard others talk about it ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I have seen it in the newspaper. 

Mr. St. Clair. Have you heard Mr. Juliana talk about it? 

Mr. Carr. No; I don't think I have, although I won't say that I 
haven't. I have heard a lot of talk about it ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Would such a paper be in the files of the committee, 
subcommittee? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Insofar as you personally know, no such paper exists ; 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. I have never seen any such paper ; no, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. And you have not signed it ? 

Mr. Carr. I have never been asked to sign it; no, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Now, Mr. Carr, when you first came to this com- 
mittee, it was in the middle of July? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. I take it that you must have met Mr. Schine about 
that time; is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. I can't be sure of this, sir, but I don't believe that I saw 
Mr. Schine until sometime in August, I think around the time we 
were holding the hearings on the Government Printing Office. 

Mr. St. Clair. About when would that be, Mr. Carr ? 

Mr. Carr. The second week in August, the second or third, maybe 
the last week in August. 

Mr. St. Clair. So you were on the job for a month before you met 
him; is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. With the exception of 

Mr. St. Clair. Of the handshake? 

Mr. Carr (continuing). Of the handshake, I think that is about 
correct. I can't swear to that. I may have seen him before, but my 
best recollection is sometime in August. 

Mr. St. Clair. So it was about the 1st or 2d week in August before 
you met him in connection with your duties as staff director. That 
is what I am getting at. 

Mr. Carr. About the 2d or 3d. 

Mr. St. Clair. About the 2d or 3d week? 

]Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Do you know what he was doing during the period 
from July 16, when you first came to this committee, and the 2d or 3d 
week of August, Mr. Carr ? 

Mr. Cark. Yes, sir. 



2688 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. St. Clair. Was he working for the subcommittee, sir? 

Mr. Carr. That is my understanding; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. I take it he was not working under your direction ? 

Mr. Carr, No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. I also understood you to say this morning, Mr. Carr, 
that Mr. Schine was a part-time consultant. Is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. At the same time he was acting as a part-time con- 
sultant for this subcommittee, he was also running a business, didn't 
you say? 

Mr. Carr. That is my understanding; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. That was a fairly substantial business, was it not? 

Mr. Carr. I understand it is. 

Mr. St. Clair. Involving the affairs of several hotels, theaters IJ 

Mr. Carr. That is my understanding. 

Mr. St. Clair. Therefore, it follows, does it not, that not too much 
of his time was available for this subcommittee; is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. I wouldn't say that. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, would you say that he spent half of his time 
running this large business and half of his time working for this sub- 
committee ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, I couldn't say that. 

Mr. St. Clair. Could you make any estimate as to what portions of 
his time were used in running the affairs of the business and what por- 
tion was used in working for this subcommittee? 

Mr. Carr. I don't think I could make any good estimate ; no, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Is it fair to say, Mr. Carr, that you saw Mr. Schine 
infrequently ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Mr. St. Clair. I think you have told us that whatever work Mr. 
Schine did came to you through Mr. Cohn. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. ]^ that correct? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. I take it, then, that if Mr. Schine wrote any reports 
or memoranda, they would have been handed to Mr. Cohn and Mr. 
Cohn handed them to you, is that correct? 

Mr. Carr, Not necessarily. Mr. Cohn might tell me about them. 

Mr. St. Clair. He might tell you about them. Just so we can get 
at it a little quicker, did you ever see any memorandum that Mr. 
Colin said had been written by Mr. Schine? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Mr, St. Clair. Wheji did you see the first such memorandum or 
re])ort? 

Mr. Carr. I don't recall seeing any report in the sense that I think 
you are using it. 

Mr. St. Clair. Some writing that would evidence some work for 
the subcommittee in the form of either a report or a memorandum? 

]\Ir. Carr. Right. I believe I saw a memoranda from Mr. Schine 
during the period of late July, August, around there. 

Mr. St. Clair. That was something IVIr. Cohn handed you for the 
files? 

Mr. Carr. No, I don't recall he handed it to me. 

Mr. St. Clair. He simply told you about it? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2689 

Mr. Carr. As I recall, he said, "Here is a memoranda of Sohine's," 
and I never saw it other than his saying that. He said, "Here is a 
memoranda of Schine's," and he told me something about it. I recall 
one of those occasions. 

Mr. St. Clair. Did you ever have occasion to refer to it again? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. So you can tell us nothing about it? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. When you first came to this subcommittee, did you 
at some time learn that Mr. Schine was being considered for a com- 
mission in the Army ? 

Mr. Carb. Not when I first came with the subcommittee. 

Mr. St. Clair. When did you first learn that fact? 

Mr. Carr. I think it was some time after I had been with the com- 
mittee, a few weeks. 

Mr. St. Clair. A few weeks ? 

Mr. Carr. Maybe. I am not sure. 

Mr. St. Clair. You talked with Mr. Cohn almost daily, I take it, 
when you first came with the subcommittee ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. During that time, he never told you about Mr. 
Schine's possible commission in the Army ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I have said he had. He did. I heard about it. 

Mr. St. Clair. Yes, but you said it would be several weeks after 
you came. I am trying to find out when you first learned about it. 

Mr. Carr. I can't say. I don't know when I first learned it. 

Mr. St. Clair. You came with the subcommittee in the middle of 
July? 

Mr. Carr. That is right. 

Mr. St. Clair. Would you say you had heard of it before the end 
of July ? 

Mr. Carr. I really couldn't say. I may have. I knew that he 
was applying for a Reserve commission. 

Air. St. Clair. Did you not learn that General Reber is supposed 
to have promised him such a commission ? 

Mr. Carr. I learned that not during that period. 

Mr. St. Clair. When did you learn that first ? 

Mr. Carr. Some time later. 

Mr. St. Clair. That doesn't help me very much, Mr. Carr. Give 
me at least a month, if you can. 

Mr. Carr. I am not sure that I can. I did learn it some time 
later. 

Mr. St. Clair. It would have been important to you as the staff 
director to learn, would it not, that your principal consultant was 
about ready to get a commission in the Army, wouldn't it ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. You were counting on his services in running the 
affairs of this subcommittee, weren't you? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; but I would like to state, if I may, from what 
information I had he was applying for a Reserve commission. At that 
point I didn't know whether he was going in the Army or not. 

Mr. St. Clair. It was important for you to know that, wasn't it? 

Mr. Carr. It might become important for me to know that. 



2690 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. St. Clair, You considered that his function was an important 
function for the subcommittee, didn't you ? 
Mr. Carr. Yes, I did. 

Mr. St. Clair. And therefore you would like to know what avail- 
ability this man would have to the committee in the immediate future, 
wouldn't you? 

Mr, Carr. Yes, sir; I think I would, 

Mr. St. Clair. So you now say you didn't even inquire as to whether 
or not he was <>;oing to get a commission soon ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir; I didn't inquire about the commission. 

Mr. St. Clair. You paid no attention to the matter, is that right? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; I think it was 

Mr. St. Clair. You paid some attention to the matter? 
Mr. Carr. I think we must be sure we are talking about the same 
thing. 

Mr. St. Clair. Let's be sure, I am talking about the matter of a 
commission for one G. David Schine. 
Mr. Carr. Right. 

Mr. St, Clair, What are you talking about? 

Mr, Carr, I am talking about the matter of a Reserve commission 
for one G. David Schine. 

Mr. St. Clair. All right. I will amend mine by putting in a Re- 
serve commission. 

Mr. Carr. Right. Since it was a Reserve commission, and at that 
time I had no great interest in it, I didn't know whether he was going 
in the Army or not. 

Mr, St. Clair. Well, when did you learn that that commission 
would not be forthcoming? 

Mr, Carr, I think the first time I learned that it would not be forth- 
coming was when Secretary Stevens talked about it on October 2. 

Mr, St. Clair. At that late date. That is when you first learned 
that it would not be forthcoming. 

Mr, Carr, I think so. It may have been earlier. 
Mr, St. Clair, Then the matter was still open and active insofar 
as you as staff director were concerned at that time, 
Mr. Carr. Would you read the question, please, Mr. Reporter? 
(The reporter reacffrom his notes as requested.) 
Mr. Carr. Could you explain the question, please, sir? 
Mr. St. Clair. Perhaps it is not a very clear question. I thought 
you testified that the first you learned that Mr. Schine was not going 
to get a commission was as late as October 2 ? 

Mr. Carr. That is it. It may have been earlier 

Mr. St. Clair. So prior to October 2 you must have thought he 
might still be going to get that commission ? 
Mr. Carr. I might have ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Are you not very sure about it, Mr, Carr ? 
Mr. Carr, No ; I am not. 
Mr. St. Clair. You could be mistaken? 
Mr. Carr. I could be mistaken. 

Mr. St. Clair. Could you be 

Senator Mundt. Your time has expired, Mr. St. Clair. 
The clock on the wall seems to indicate it is 3: 30, so we will take 
our customary .5-minute seventh-inning stretch at this time. 
(Brief recess.) 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2691 

Senator Mundt. The committee will please come to order. The 
Chair feels confident that about the same audience is here now as 
was here before the recess, so it is unnecessary to remind you of the 
committee rule against audible manifestations of approval or dis- 
approval. I will assume a risk by saying, like Calvin Coolidge's rela- 
tionship to sin, "We are agin it." I'm sure you will comply with 
that admonition. 

We had concluded one go-around with our questioning, and I will 
ask counsel Prewitt whetlier he has any other questions at this time. 

Mr. Prewitt. I will pass. 

Senator Mundt. JMr. Prewitt passes. 

The Chair has just a few questions. 

Mr. Carr, I was interested in your replies to the questions pro- 
pounded by Senator Dirksen, that you had, after graduating from 
Brown University, gone to the law school specifically to become a 
member of the FBI. I might say one of the good things about these 
hearings is we are getting better acquainted with our staff members 
than we ever had the opportunity to do before. I didn't know that. 
Let me ask you a question or two about your work in the FBI, with 
which you say you were connected for 11 years. What were you 
doing in the FBI immediately before you came to the committee, inso- 
far as you do not violate FBI regulations in discussing your duties 
and functions ? 

Mr. Carr. I was supervisor of the security matters section in the 
New York field division of the FBI, engaged in the investigation 
of communism, sir. 

Senator Mundt. As supervisor, did you have men under you, over 
whom you were in control ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. About how large a staff did you have there if 
that is permissible to tell ? 

Mr. Carr. A very large number, sir. 

Senator Mundt. By that you would say as large as your staff here, 
or considerably larger? 

Mr. Carr. Many times larger, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Many times larger. In the course of your experi- 
ence with the FBI, did you take some of the in-training courses that 
the FBI has for its agents and operatives ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I did ; several of them. 

Senator Mundt. Is that what they call the FBI Academy ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, at Quantico, Va. 

Senator Mundt. Once or twice during my 16 years down here, it 
has been my high pleasure and happy honor to be invited to give 
the commencement address at the FBI Academy, and I want to say 
that I think it is as good a demonstration of a governmental in-training 
program as I have seen anywhere. Is part of your instruction there 
teaching you to become accurate and meticulous and precise and exact 
in your work and in your procedures? 

islr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. And you took that course on more than one oc- 
casion ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. The original training course and then ap- 
proximately every year or 18 months a retraining course here in 
Washington and at Quantico, Va. 



2692 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator Mundt. The Chair is correct, I believe, in his recollection, 
is he not, that you came to our committee direct from the FBI? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. You had no intermediary period of either employ- 
ment or unemployment? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Another question I want to ask relates to this 
train ride that we have heard so much about. I am not sure that 
we can throw any additional light on that. But, at any time in that 
31/^-hour train ride, did you endeavor to put pressure on Mr. Adams 
in any way to induce him to do something favorable to Mr. Schine? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; not at that time nor any other. 

Senator Mundt. Nor at any other time ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Your testimony is that at no time did you ever, 
directly or indirectly, contact Secretary Stevens or Mr. Adams, pres- 
suring them to do something toward Schine which they would not 
have done had there been no such man in this world as Frank Carr, 
is that right? 

Mr. Carr. That is right, sir. 

Senator Mundt. I think Mr. Adams testified that you had talked 
to him about certain difficulties which had arisen between your shop 
and his shop in the course of these investigations. I suggested to 
him that perhaps, as he had testified to us, it was part of his, Adams, 
to quote him, "business" to keep this cooperative program going, to 
keep the train on the track, to keep a workable arrangement between 
the members of his staff and the members of your staff. Do you 
recall that testimony ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I think I do. 

Senator Mundt. I wondered if it would be a fair statement to say 
that on occasion, in conversing with Adams, you considered it part of 
your "business" to use his phrase, likewise to try to keep the members 
of his shop and the members of your shop working together on this 
cooperative formula? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator Mundt. You were interested in getting the investigation 
concluded, to bring out the best possible results, and to do that, your 
major concern, as I take it, was to get these minor irritations behind 
you and out of the way and to develop and maintain working rela- 
tionships between the Army side of this investigation and the com- 
mittee side? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; and I maintained my relationships with Mr. 
Adams right up until the time of the original chronology of events 
was made public. 

Senator Mundt. Until that paper with the 34 events was pub- 
lished ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Until that time, you and he continued, each from 
his own corner, to do what you could to keep this cooperative program 
continuing ? 

Mr. Carr. I did from my corner, sir; yes. 

Senator Mundt. Was it your feeling that he did from liis corner, 
and when he would talk to you, sometimes, what he was ultimately 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2693 

trying to do was to see to it that this thing didn't break down and fall 
apart and become an open controversy ? 

Mr, Carr. I think that he was trying to prevent an open controversy ; 
yes. 

Senator Mundt. I think that concludes my questions. 

Senator INIcClellan, you have 10 minutes. 

Senator INIcClellan. Mr. Carr, we were on your memorandum of 
October 2, when my time expired before. 

JNIr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. I want to read the concluding paragraph of 

it, and I quote: 

I think you should know that Mr. Stevens was very helpful and certainly indi- 
cated that he had no intention of allowing General Lawton to place his blackout 
of Army personnel re their possible contact with this committee. 

Is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, that is what it says, sir ; yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. That indicates to me that up to that time Mr. 
Stevens was cooperating beautifully, is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I had no trouble with Mr. Stevens. 

Senator McClellan. Well, I am talking about cooperating at Fort 
Monmouth. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; he cooperated. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. And your complaint there, then, was against 
General Lawton and not against Mr. Stevens; isn't that correct? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir; not specifically. I might say had I known these 
memoranda were going to become historic documents I might have 
written them a little more carefully. This was intended to mean that 
Mr. Stevens had been helpful in removing the, what I termed "black- 
out order" preventing the staff from talking to personnel at Fort 
Monmouth. 

Senator McClellan. That is exactly. But whose blackout order 
was it ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I don't know whose blackout order it was, sir. I 
know that it was issued through General Lawton. 

Senator McClellan. Well, you refer to it as his blackout order, 
meaning General Lawton, don't you, in this memorandum? 

Mr. Carr. Right, sir, at that time I considered it was his blackout 
order. 

Senator McClellan. Well, whose do you consider it was, now ? 

Mr. Carr. At this point I don't know, sir. I don't know who may 
have issued an order to General Lawton. 

Senator McClellan. Well, do you have the information 

Mr. Carr. I have none, sir. 

Senator McClellan, That one was issued to him? 

Mr. Carr. I have none, sir. 

Senator McClellan. At that time, insofar as you know now, it was 
General Lawton's order, wasn't it? 

Mr. Carr, The order was General Lawton's. 

Senator McClellan, And you went to the Secretary and got it 
corrected ? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 



2694 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator McClfxlan. Now let's go to the next one on page 5, I be- 
lieve, of December 9. I don't think— well, I might ask you about this 
one of November 6, I quote from it : 

Stevens said that if we brought out everything, he would have to resign. 

You are referring there as to bringing out everything at Fort 
Monmouth, is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, this isn't my memorandum. I take that to mean, 
however 

Senator McClellan. You were present? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. At the conference. 

Mr. Carr. However, I didn't dictate the language. I take this to 
mean, I take this to mean that if we brought out everything that Mr. 
Cohn had related to him in his resume concerning Fort Monmouth. 

Senator McClellan. Were you present? 

Mr. Cark. At the November 6 luncheon, yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Did you hear the resume that Mr. Cohn gave? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, I did. 

Senator McClellan. Then it referred to what Mr. Cohn has said 
as to the information they had and could develop, is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. What was in it made him think he would lose 
his job? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know Avhat made him think he would lose his 
job. As we pointed out to him— I say "We" — that is, as Senator 
McC^arthy pointed out to him, there Avas nothing there that would 
make him lose his job or that he should cojisider would make him lose 
his job. 

Senator McClellan. Let me ask you now if you have developed 
all that information and evidence at your hearings? 

Mr. Carr. I am sorry, sir, I didn't hear you. 

Senator McClellan. Was there developed at the subsequent hear- 
ings on Fort Monmouth all of the information in the outline as given 
to Secretary Stevens by Mr. Cohn? Has it all been made public yet? 
Have you developed it in sworn testimony, whatever he related to him 
that day? 

Mr. Carr. All that Mr. Cohn outlined to him that day, I think, has 
been — this is a long time now — I think it has been developed in sworn 
testimony. 

Senator McClellan. What I am trying to determine is, is there 
anything else that should be developed that hasn't been that might 
cause him to lose his job? In other words, has there been any with- 
holding or failure to develop whatever was outlined that day? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. If I follow your question, I don't believe that 
the Secretary, as the Secretary of the Army, needed to have this 
worry about his job. 

Senator McClellan. Maybe he didn't. What I am trying to deter- 
mine is whether he had any basis for it or not. I am trying to deter- 
mine what followed thereafter. Have you developed in the investiga- 
tion of Fort Monmouth all that was outlined to the Secretary that 
day, or is there some more to be developed that might still have some 
impact upon his retaining his job? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2695 

Mr. Carr. Whether it would have an impact on his retaining his 
job, I don't know, but there is at least one phase of it that has not 
been fully developed which was called to his attention that day. 

Senator McClellan. That is more serious than the other that has 
been developed ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, I wouldn't say it was more serious, although I 
consider it serious. 

Senator McClellan. There is still some work to be done, then, on 
the Fort Monmouth hearings ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I would say that there are two phases to an 
investigation of this type. The first phase, and a very important one, 
is to get rid of the Communists or the subversives or security risks 
found there, to get rid of them. 

The second phase is to find out who w^as responsible for leaving 
them there. In many cases, who was responsible for allowing them 
to be reinstated. 

Senator McClellan. Was he referring to the fact that if you found 
out who was responsible for leaving them there, if you developed that, 
it might get his job ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't think so. I think what he was referring to, I 
think he thought if we had public hearings concerning just the 
amount of information that we did have public hearings on, that 
worried him. 

Senator McClellan. What you think he thought at that time has 
been developed up to now, hasn't it? 

Mr. Carr. That is pretty hard for me to say what I think he thought, 
and things like that. 

Senator McClellan. You just said what you think you thought 
he thought. 

Mr. Carr. I am using your words. I am trying to go along with 
this line of questioning. I think that the Secretary was disturbed that 
if public hearings developed or showed as much as Mr. Cohn outlined 
to him that day, he was most concerned. 

Senator McClellan. I will ask you this question, then : Have they 
lip to date shown as much as Mr. Cohn outlined to him that day ? 

Mr. Carr, I think generally speaking, with the exception of the 
loyalty phase, loyalty board phase. 

Senator McClellan. Don't you regard that pretty serious? If 
somebody is responsible for keeping Communists and subversives in 
there and protecting them, don't you regard it as very serious? 

Mr. Carr. I regard it as serious, yes. 

Senator McClellan. Do you think that is being done now? 

Mr. Carr. I don't think it is being done now ; no, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Has it been done up until now or until just 
recently ? 

Mr. Carr. I think it was being done. I don't know because, you 
see, we didn't get the loyalty board people here. 

Senator McClellan. You have your preliminary investigation, 
haven't you ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. You know what it shows. You know what 
you think you can prove ; don't you ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know too much about what we can prove from the 
loyalty board thing, because the preliminary investigation has not 



2696 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

developed to the point where I could say something conclusive about 
it. We would have to have some of these people in to ask them some 
questions. 

Senator McClellan. I am talking just about Fort Monmouth, not 
the loyalty board. 

Mr. Carr. Oh. Then we are not talking about the same thing. I 
am talking about the loyalty board, sir. 

Senator McClellan. You haven't investigated the loyalty board 
yet, have you, as far as public hearings ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Now let's go to the one of Decem.ber 9. Ap- 
parently, judging from the one that I have just referred to, the first 
one, on October 2, everything was getting along pretty well at that 
time, but a month and 7 days later it seemed they had already begun 
to deteriorate; is that correct, judging from this memorandum? 

Mr. Carr. Two months later, I thought they had ; yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Two months later? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Two months later. You are correct. 

In this you refer to a statement that you testify under oath that 
Mr. Adams made when he asked you, "What's there in it for us?" if 
he and Stevens did something for Schine. Just what do you mean 
by that? What did you understand him to mean at the time? 

Mr. Carr. I understood him to mean when he made that state- 
ment^ — I understood it to be an attempt to bargain with us, to trade 
oti' shortening or ending the hearings by his making some arrange- 
ment to do something for Schine. 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Carr, as an investigator and a former 
FBI man, do you not regard such charges as that against anyone as 
very serious? 

Mr. Carr. I certainly do. 

Senator McClellan. You think, then, these charges are not frivo- 
lous ; that they ought to be looked into ? 

Mr. Carr. I told you they were serious when you first asked me. 

Senator McClellan. If they are true, they should be dealt with ; 
shouldn't they ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. That is my thought about it. There has been 
some reference to this whole matter as frivolous, a waste of time. 

Mr. Carr. Not by me, sn-. 

Senator McClellan. Not by you. But do you agree with me that 
if these charges are true, they indicate that immediate and prompt 
action should be taken to correct the situation? 

Mr. Carr. It is not for me to say that, but I believe with you ; yes, 
sir. 

Senator McClellan. Thank you. 
Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen. 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. Carr, when Senator IVIundt was carrying on 
a very extensive cross-examination of ]Mr. Adams, it runs in my mind 
that it was all summed up by Mr. Adams saying that while there was 
no affirmative act on your part to indicate influence, that you failed 
to speak up, that you failed to protest, that you failed to remonstrate, 
that you sat silent. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2697 

Do you feel that you had a duty under those circumstances to speak 
up and interject yourself in any kind of controversy that may have 
existed at that time? 

Mr. Carr. In the first place, sir, I wouldn't have any duty to speak 
up unless I thought there was something improper. In the second 
place, there was nothing improper that I observed. In the third 
place, I might say that it is not my duty to break into the conversa- 
tion of the chairman of this committee and the Secretary of the Army 
and tell either side what they should do. I want to emphasize that 
I didn't see anything improper on the side of Mr. Cohn and Senator 
McCarthy and myself in anything that we had done. 

Senator Dirksen. Referring now a moment to that celebrated train 
ride, when did that train leave Newark Station ? 

Mr. Carr. It is my recollection that it was sometime in the late 
afternoon. I would say probably 4 : 30 or 5 o'clock. We arrived 
down here around 8 o'clock the day before Thanksgiving. 

Senator Dirksen. So it is roughly about 4 hours or 3% hours of 
travel time? 

]\Ir. Carr. Approximately ; yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Did you sit in the same seat together ? 

Mr. Carr. We traveled in luxurious style, sir. We were in a club 
car. He had the chair next to mine, and we luxuriated ; yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Did you remain in the club car all the while 
that you were coming down to Washington ? 

]Mr. Carr. 'No, sir. We went in to dinner, and following dinner 
we stopped in what I think is probably the real club car, a smoking 
car. We smoked. I smoked a cigar. I don't know whether Mr. 
Adams smoked or not. It was during that period that we talked 
about the Pentagon press agent. 

Senator Dirksen. Did you encumber the dinner hour with conver- 
sation about committee business and incidental matters ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. I don't say positively no. 

Senator Dirksen. Did you get on to more pleasant subjects at any 
time ? 

Mr. Carr. During the dinner hour I very vividly recall that we 
discussed our own background. I recall Mr. Adams explained his 
and I explained mine. We discussed our families. I recall his 
telling me about his baby that made noises in the night ; yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. You sort of presented yourself to each other in 
the best possible light, I take it? 

Mr. Carr. It wasn't exactly that. sir. We had known each other 
for some time now, seeing each other practically every day, at least 
talking to each other on the phone. But this was an opportunity to 
sit down and relax and in an unofficial way talk. 

Senator Dirksen. That is a good train on which to take a snooze ; 
isn't it? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Did you take a snooze in the course of the trip ? 

Mr. Carr. No, I didn't. I did read the paper, though. 

Senator Dirksen. I have been wondering how much of that 4-hour 
period was devoted to these various affairs, including one G. David 
Schine. But enough of the train ride, Mr. Carr. 

Mr. Carr, if a member of the regular subcommittee came to procure 
something from the files, you would know about it ; wouldn't you ? 



2698 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr, Carr. Yes, sir; I would. 

Senator Dirksen. And if a member of the re<iular subcommittee 
sent a staff member from his office to procure something from the files, 
you would know about it, wouldn't you ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I would. 

Senator Dirksen. You have been with the committee roughly about 
11 months, haven't you ? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct, yes. 

Senator Dirksen. And taking out the time of this investigation, 
we might say it was Avhat, 914 months? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, then, in that 9i/2-months' period, how many 
members of the subcommittee actually came to the committee room 
to talk to you or someone else in authority and procure something 
from the committee files ? 

Mr. Carr. I can't recall any member of the subcommittee coming 
to my office or the subcommittee offices to procure anything from the 
file. I believe that on 1, maybe 2, occasions for some reason or an- 
other, an executive meeting of the committee was held in my office 
and some members of the subcommittee came to the office for that 
purpose. 

Senator Dirksen. Would you interpret that — and I speak very im- 
personally because it includes me, you see, and I have to take my full 
share of the responsibility — as either being too busy or being a little 
indifferent, or having complete confidence in what the committee staff 
was doing? 

Mr. Carr. I would say that it would be a combination of baing too 
busy to personally come down there. I know that on many occa- 
sions — I can't say many occasions, I know on some occasions, members 
of the subcommittee have called me or other staff members on the 
phone, and requested things. They have been sent to them. I know 
during the course of Senator Potter's investigation concerning the 
war atrocities, that he was in contact with myself and Don O'Donnell 
on many occasions. 

Senator Dirksen. May I say in behalf of Senator Potter, he did a 
magnificent job on that Korean atrocities picture. Would you agree? 

IMr. Carr. I think so, too, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Yes, sir. Now, then, Avhat is your understanding 
of the reserve commission as distinguished from an Army commission ? 

Mr. Carr. My understanding is that a Reserve is a Reserve. He 
doesn't go into the Army until they call him. He is held in reserve. 

Senator Dirksen. So you believe that you were right in assuming 
that Mr. Schine, if he got a Reserve commission, might or might not 
be called at some reasonably early date ? 

Mr. Carr. I believe that to be a correct assumption; yes, sir, al- 
though I didn't give it much thought at the time. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, he was an uncompensated consultant of 
the committee, is that correct? 

IMr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. He was, therefore, no charge upon the committee 
funds that have been approved by a vote of the Senate ? 

Mr. Carr. I didn't^ — was what, sir ? 

Senator Dirksen. I say his services were, therefore, no charge upon 
the committee funds that had been approved by the Senate? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2699 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. Perhaps incidental phone calls or something 
like that, but there was no charge to the committee. 

Senator Dirksen. So if, for any reason, including induction into 
the United States Army, his services must be dispensed with, it would 
be possible, of course, to secure some other investigator to take his 
f)lace ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; if an investigator was necessary it could be 
done, yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. That is all. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson ? 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Carr, in the last hour we were on the memo- 
randum on page 5, December 9. I was referring to the language 
that you used in the next to the last paragraph with reference to 
blackmail. Do I understand that you did not intend to use the word 
"blackmail" in the usual sense of that word? 

Mr. Carr. I intended to use the word "blackmail" yes, sir. I don't 
qualify it very much. I just tell you that sometimes I use words 
loosely and to me I was thinking at this point blackmail in one sense 
of its meaning. I think that the dictionary will show that one mean- 
ing of blackmail is to extort, and that is what I was thinking of. 

Senator Jackson. And to extort is a crime ? 

Mr. Carr. I consider to extort a crime ; yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. So it was blackmail in a lawyer's sense of the 
term ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I wasn't using it in a lawyer's sense. I was using 
it in a free sense, in the sense in which this memorandum was written. 

Senator Jackson. Well, were you using it in an FBI sense? I 
mean, that is your training. 

Mr. Carr. I don't know that I was. However, I will tell you that I 
thought this was an extremely serious business, yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. So on December 9, the situation was serious ? 

Mr. Carr. It was to me, yes. 

Senator Jackson. This was your memorandum ? 

Mr. Carr, Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. And you were stating or giving your own state 
of mind on that date ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. You recall the testimony in the hearings that 
there was a feeling that the thing, this controversy with the Army, 
didn't get serious until January 21. 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. I recall it. 

Senator Jackson. You don't agree with that, according to this 
memorandum, then, do you? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, I agree with that in the sense in which it was used 
here. I agree with that. I believe it got really serious on the 21st 
or 22d of January. I believe, however, that it was serious at this time, 
and that is why I wrote the memorandum. 

Senator Jackson. This was all released to the press in March, after 
the chronological list of charges had been released bv the Army, rio-ht? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. J'' ^ • 

Senator Jackson. So that the public was advised that there was 
blackmail going on as of December 9, at least, and that is still your 
opinion ? 

Mr. Carr. That there was — — 



2700 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator Jackson. That there was bhxckmail attempted as of De- 
cember 9 ? 

Mr. Carr. In the sense of extortion — yes, I believe that. 

Senator Jackson. So as far as you are concerned, the situation was 
serious prior to January 21 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. In the relations with the Army, I am referring to. 

Mr. Carr. The situation, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Yes, but I say that is with reference to the Army, 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Senator Jackson. Now if you will refer to page 4, that is memo- 
randum 7, down along about the third paragraph 

Mr. Carr. Excuse me, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Maybe it is not the same— it is the same. You 
have the same memoranda. 

Mr. Carr. The third paragraph? 

Senator Jackson. The third paragraph : 

As you kuow, I have on many occasions been pretty curt with Dave ahout the 
prompt submission of memoranda. However, in this current situation in view 
of the change of plans I cannot criticize him. 

Well, now, what memos did he submit to you? Or what memo- 
randa did he submit to you ? , -^^ 1 

Mr. Carr. As I said, I don't recall any specific one that he submitted 
to me. That is one of the things I was questioning him about, sir. 

Senator Jackson. So far as you know, he has never submitted any 
memoranda to you? . 

Mr. Carr. So far as I know, he has never submitted any memo- 
randa to me. , 

Senator Jackson. You see, as I read your sentence, and 1 am Joolv- 
ing at it literally, I don't know what you had in mmd, but I am 
quoting you now : 

As you know, I have on many occasions been curt with Dave about the prompt 
submission of memoranda. 

That statement would imply that he would get it in, but he wasn't 

very prompt. 
Mr. Carr. No, it might imply that, if you— 
Senator Jackson. Isn't that a reasonable implication ^^ 
Mr Carr That is a reasonable implication, but I believe that i 
wrote this having in mind that I wished he would submit more memo- 
randa, more memoranda, and I wished he would submit them 

promptly. , , ^ «- v ^ 

Senator Jackson. But all the time that you were stafi director, 
starting in July, throuoh this period at Fort Dix, you never received 
any memoranda from him? Or a memorandum of any kind relating 
to his work, to your knowledge? 

Mr. Carr. I don't recall any, although I may have. 

Senator Jackson. Now, Mr. Carr, as I recall, and I am sure you 
heard the testimony, Mr. Adams testified that you had suggested to 
him that he should get in touch with Mr. Sokolsky; is that true^ 

Mr. Carr. I heard the testimony. ^ The statement is not true. 

Senator Jackson. Well, I say his is that • 

:Mr. Cari;. His statement that I suggested to him that he get m 
touch with (Jeorge Sokolsky is in eri-br; yes, sir. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2701 

Seiicator Jackson. You never stated that? 

Mr. Carr. I don't recall ever stating that. I can — I would tell you 
more if you want me to. 

Senator Jackson. I am trying to figure out why you would be sug- 
gesting to Mr. Adams that he should get in touch with Mr. Sokolsky. 

Mr. Carr. I didn't suggest it to him. 

Senator Jackson. You never did? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Is it partly correct, or how does Mr. Sokolsky 
come into this controversy with the Army ? 

Mr. Carr. The statement is not correct in any way. There is a 
situation which I have in mind that I believe he had in mind at the 
time. The situation was — this was around the first part of February. 
I recall that Mr. Adams recalled for me in the conversation with him 
how helpful he and the Secretary believed Mr. Sokolsky had been at 
the occasion of a luncheon meeting on November 17 when Mr. Sokol- 
sky had discussed with them the preparation of a press release which 
I understand they didn't use. They held a joint press conference. 
This is in relation to November 17 at the Merchants Club when Secre- 
tary Stevens and Senator McCarthy gave a joint press conference. 

Senator Jackson. I just couldn't understand why someone outside 
the Government would be in this. Was he in as a sort of friend of the 
court and trying to arbitrate? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. It didn't happen that way. As I stated, Mr. 
Adams recalled to me that Mr. Sokolsky had been helpful to the 
Secretary and friendly to the Secretary and to Mr. Adams at that 
time. This was around the first part of February, as I recall. I 
think he told me — I think I told him at that time, rather, "Go ahead, 
call him." He suggested that maybe Mr. Sokolsky could be helpful 
to him in connection with, if I recall correctly, this letter that Secre- 
tary Stevens subsequently sent to Senator McCarthy. 

Senator Jackson. So it is your impression that Mr. Sokolsky was 
quite friendly to the Secretary and was trying to help the Secretary ? 
Is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. No. ^ I want to make this clear. Mr. Adams was of the 
opinion — and I think correctly so — was of the opinion that at the time 
of November 17, Mr, Sokolsky had been friendly to the Secretary. I 
don't know whether that was his first meeting or not, but he thought 
that Mr. Sokolsky had been friendly to the Secretary. Therefore, he 
thought Mr. Sokolsky might possibly be of assistance to him. 

Senator Jackson. In ironing out the difl'erences between the Army 
and Senator McCarthy and the staff over the press release ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Over the Fort Monmouth hearings, basically ? 

Mr. Carr. Over this November 13 press conference which Mr. 
Stevens had held, yes. 

Senator Jackson. Yes. But it grew out of the Fort Monmouth 
executive hearings ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes ; it grew out of the Fort Monmouth hearings. 

Senator Jackson. Now let me ask you whether the Secretary, Mr. 
Stevens, or Mr. Adams wanted the investigation at Fort Monmouth 
stopped or the executive sessions, the hearings, stopped ? 

Mr. Carr. I think they wanted both stopped. 



2702 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator Jackson. What did they seem to be discussing the most? 
Were they talking about the executive sessions and tlie press releases 
after the executive sessions, or were they insisting on a stopping of the 
entire investigation, as such? 

Senatar Mundt. The Senator's time has expired. The witness may 
answer the question. 

Senator Jackson. There is a substantial difference, you will recall. 

Mr. Carr. I recall no time when either Mr. Adams or Mr. Stevens 
spoke to me about the press releases after the liearings, I recall Mr. 
Adams attended many of the press conferences following the hearings. 
I know that Secretary Stevens attended at least a few. At no time 
did they say to me, and I don't believe to Senator McCarthy or Mr. 
Colin, anything about the press releases. I think that they wanted 
the executive sessions of the subcommittee on Fort Monmouth discon- 
tinued. I think they wanted the investigation discontinued. They 
said so. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Potter, you have iO minutes. 

Senator Potter. Mr. Chairman, reference has been made to the 
Korean war-crime atrocity hearings of which it was my privilege to 
serve as chairman. I would like to state that the work of the staff in 
preparation for the hearings was excellent, and Mr. Carr and Mr. 
O'Donnell rendered great service in preparing for those hearings. 

Mr. Carr. I think Mr. O'Donnell should have most of the credit on 
that, sir. 

Senator Potter. He did an excellent job, and your counsel was 
greatly appreciated. 

I might also add that the Army and the Navy, the Air Force, and 
the Department of State, who were called on for information, were 
also most cooperative. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Potter. Mr. Carr, in referring to your testimony this morn- 
ing, I believe you mentioned the plane trip — I believe it was Novem- 
ber 17 — when you and Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn and Mr. 
Stevens and others went to Fort Dix. You were met at the airport 
by some of the personnel at the camp there and Private Schine. I 
believe you stated in your testimony this morning that Mr. Stevens 
said, in essence, "This is a good time to have my picture taken with 
Dave." Is that correct? If not, I wish you would tell me your rec- 
ollection of what Mr. Stevens did say. 

Mr. Carr. That is it, in essence; yes, sir. 

Senator Potter. Who did he say that to ? 

Mr. Carr. It is my impression he said it to Mr. Cohn as we were 
getting off the plane. 

Senator Potter. You have heard the testimony of Secretary Ste- 
vens, and I think Mr. Adams and others, who say — testimony which 
is in contradiction to yours — who say that no mention was made about 
having the picture taken with Mr. Schine. Is that correct? You 
have heard the testimony? 

Mr. Carr. I have heard the testimony; yes. 

Senator Potter. You are positive in your statement under oath 
that Mr. Stevens did make a statement stating that, this is a good time 
to have his picture taken with Dave ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, and I think the proof is that the picture was 
taken. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2703 

Senator Potter. I have no further questions. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Jackson? 

Pardon me. Senator Symington? 

Senator Symington. Mr. Carr, where are the committee files kept? 

Mr. Carr. Most of the committee files are kept in room 160, sir. 

Senator Symington. "Where are tlie others kept? 

Mr. Carr. Tlie file room is room 160. On the occasion tlie files will 
be in my office if we are working on them. 

Senator Symington. That will be the only other place besides the 
committee room. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. Would that be temporary or permanent? 

]Mr. Carr. In my office ? 

Senator Symington. Yes. 

Mr. Carr. That would be temporary ; yes. 

Senator Symington. In efi'ect you previously testified that under 
certain circumstances all committee staff and clerical help would be 
able to get at the files, wouldn't they ? 

Mr. Carr. I testified that physically the committee staff would be 
able to get at the files. I think I have made it clear that clerical em- 
ployees are not supposed to go down and spend their time 

Senator Symington. But you made it very clear that if, say your 
secretary or somebody else's secretary went down and the file clerk 
wasn't there or was ill that day, didn't happen to be there, she could 
go ahead and get the files ? 

Mr. Carr. She could do that ; yes. 

Senator Symington. So in effect the files are available to every 
member of the committee under certain circumstances? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Senator Symington. Mr. Carr, do you know what clearance each of 
your staff members have, that is, each investigator, each clerical, 
stenogi'apher, file clerk, and so forth? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. What are those clearances? Let me put it 
to you this way : Have they all o^ot clearances from the Department of 
Defense and if so, on what basis ? 

Mr. Carr. They have clearances, varying degi'ees of clearances. 
One of them has top secret clearance on a "need to know" basis which 
has never been retracted. Generally they all have clearance up to 
and including secret. 

Senator Symington. Let's see. You say one staff member has top 
secret clearance ? 

Mr. Carr. I recall that one staff member was given top secret clear- 
ance. I don't know tliat it was ever rescinded. 

Senator Symington. All the others from the Department of Defense 
have secret clearance, clearance through secret, is that right? 

ISIr. Carr. The other clearances are through secret, yes. 

Senator Symington. And it really would not make any difference 
whether one had top secret and all the rest had secret or one had 
secret and all the rest had top secret if they all had access to the files, 
isn't that right ? 

Mr. Carr. I would say that it wouldn't make a great deal of differ- 
ence whether it was secret or top secret ; no, sir. 



2704 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator Symington. Have you any clearance from the Atomic 
Energy Commission and, if so, on what basis? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know of my own — I don't know of any clearance 
from the Atomic Energy Commission. 

Senator Symington. Will you check into that and make it a matter 
of record ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. As you know, our budget, most of our budget, 
depends upon our estimate of enemy strength and that, of course, has 
a lot to do with the Central Intelligence Agency estimates. Have 
we any clearance of staff members in this committee, of this committee, 
from the Central Intelligence Agency? Has it ever been asked for? 
And, if so, on Avhat basis? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know of my own knowledge whether any clear- 
ance has ever been asked of Central Intelligence Agency. I think it 
would probably be useless to ask an agency for clearance to investi- 
gate it. 

Senator Symington. I didn't say anytliing about investigating. 

Mr. Carr. Well, or to use the documents. I don't 

Senator Symington. In other words, as long as you brought the 
word up, it would be unfortunate if we had a subversive on our staff 
and he hadn't had clearance, and then he examined an agency and in 
that agency he got information which made it possible for him to 
betray the country ? 

Mr. Carr. It would be unfortunate and most unusual. 

Senator Symington. Klaus Fuchs was unusual, wasn't he, and so 
was Mr. May ? 

Mr. Carr. He certainly was. 

Senator Symington. Let me ask you another question. Have the 
staff members got clearance from the FBI, and other clerical help, 
and, if so, on what basis ? 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy, have you a point of order ? 

Senator McCarthy. No; I think it is a point of personal privilege 
for my staff. Senator McClellan was talking about the possibility of 
subversives on our staff. The implication is that he knows of some 
subversive on the staff. He does not. If he knows of any subversive 
then he should take the stand and tell about him. Otherwise, he ov;es 
a duty to apologize to the young men who have been Avorking day 
and night to get rid of Communists, wdiile Mr. McClellan and his 
friends — Mr. Symington. 

Senator McClellan. Get your names straight. 

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed with my inter- 
rogation of the witness? 

Senator McCarthy. A point of personal privilege. 

Senator Mundt. You may state it, but I think you misstated it in 
talking about Senator McClellan. 

Senator McCarthy. If Senator Symington knows of no subversive 
on the staff, then he should say so. If he has any evidence of any 
subversive on any staff, then he should be willing to take the oath here 
and tell us about it. I don't like these innuendos against these young 
men who have been working so hard at very low salaries to dig out 
Communists without the help, may I say, of men like Senator Syming- 
ton. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2705 

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Mundt. On the point of personal privilege, the Chair will 
rule that he did not hear Senator Symington mention any member of 
the stail being a subversive. 

You may proceed. 

Senator Symington. I thank the Chair. 

Now, let's see where we were, Mr. Carr. I trust that does not come 
out of my time. 

Senator Mundt. It does not. 

Senator Symington. Thank you. 

Getting back to the question of clearance from the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, you know a lot about those clearances? 

Mr. Carr. No ; I don't, sir. 

Senator Symington. Don't you ? 

Mr. Carr. No. 

Senator Symington. When you were in the FBI, you didn't know 
about clearances? 

Mr. Carr. Yes ; I knew about clearances. But you said I knew a 
lot about them. I really don't. 

Senator Symington. You don't know much about them ? 

Mv. Carr. I want to make it clear that I was not in any section of 
the FBI which handled liaison matters. I don't know that 

Senator Symington. Mr. Carr, these people are on this staff or 
under your administrative control — is that correct — is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, they were. I haven't finished what I was saying. 

Senator Symington. Let me proceed, if I may, and I will strike the 
previous question, because I don't want my time to run out. 

Mr. CoHN. Mr. Chairman, I don't think Mr. Carr finished an 
answer to a previous question. 

Senator Syminrton. We will go back and pick it up. 

Senator Mundt. You may finish the answer. 

Mr. Carr. What I was leading up to was that I don't know about 
the FBI giving any clearance on any individual. As I think Senator 
McCarthy has testified, they have advised us from time to time that 
they had no derogatory information concerning members of the 
staff. 

Senator Symington, They have advised you from time to time that 
they have no derogatory information concerning any members of the 
staff, is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Concerning members. 

Senator Symington. Thank you. Let me ask you this question: 
Wlien I was in the executive branch of the Government, the FBI 
would investigate people provided that you had not hired them. 
That is, before they came with you. Is that now stopped also, do 
you happen to know ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know that, sir. 

Senator Symington. Does this include the clerical members too? 
Have the clerical members, the stenographer and the clerks, got 
secret clearance in the Department of Defense, for example? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I believe that is correct. 

Senator Symington. Now, I would like 

Senator Mundt. May the Chair inquire of the members of the 
conmiittee. We have a rollcall vote, and it is 25 minutes to 5. 



2706 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator Symington, May I ask one more question and I will be 
tlirough. 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, before we go to the rollcall 
vote, there is a point of personal privilege. 

Senator Mundt. The Chair has recognized Senator Symington for 
a question. I will then recognize you. 

Senator McCarthy. Could I raise the point of personal privilege ? 

Senator Mundt. The Chair recognized Senator Symington for one 
more question and then I will recognize you. 

Senator Symington. May I emphasize, Mr. Chairman, I have no 
information. I am simply asking for information. 

Mr. Carr, under the present rules for access to files of this committee, 
if a former Communist who had not really reformed, or a subversive, 
or any security risk on this committee staff that might get on it, decided 
to betray his country by revealing the contents of a secret FBI docu- 
ment which he had found in these files to a possible enemy, it would 
be a relatively simple matter, would it not, for him to do that, based 
on the way these files are handled ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, sir. I don't agree with you. I don't know of any 
I'BI secret documents that are contained in our files. 

Senator Symington. There are no purported secret documents of 
the FBI, confidential documents in the files ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir; I don't know of any FBI documents in our 
files. 

Senator Symington. What would you say the 2l^-page document 
was? 

Mr. Carr. That was from the Senator's office. 

Senator Symington. That was not in the files ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Symington. But if it were in the files, then it would be 
possible for someone to get it under these rules, would it not ? Will 
you answer the question? 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman? I raise a point of personal 
privilege. You gave Mr. Symington the right to ask one question. I 
do want to raise that point before we leave this afternoon. 

Senator Mundt. Kaise it briefly, then, because we have to adjourn 
for the vote. 

Senator McCarthy. I will raise it as briefly as I can. May I say, 
Senator Symington has been here by innuendo trying to smear the 
staff of young men who have been working to dig out Communists. 
He is talking about what might happen if there were a subversive on 
the staff. I would like to ask him now, even though he is not under 
oath, whether he has any information at all of any kind to justify this 
attempted smear against these 14 young men who have done such an 
excellent job uncovering Communists. 

If he has no information, then he should be honest enough to tell us. 
If he has information, he should take the stand and take the oath as 
these young men have been taking it. 

Now may I ask you. Senator, Do you have any information to in- 
dicate that there is anyone on my staff who is subversive, as you have 
indicated in your questioning? 

Senator Mundt. Senator Symington, you may answer the ques- 
tion and then we will have to recess for the vote. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2707 

Senator Symington. I will answer that question this way, Senator 
McCarthy : In all the years that I have been in this Government, based 
on the testimony that has been given before this committee under oath, 
I think the files of what you call, my staff, my director, my chief of 
staff, have been the sloppiest and most dangerously handled files that 
I have ever heard of since I have been in the Government. 

Senator Mundt. We will recess for the vote. 

Senator McCarthy. You can run away if you like, Stu. You can 
run away if you like. You have been here trying to smear the staff 
of this committee, the young men who have been working to uncover 
Communists. You jump up and run away without answering the 
question. I have asked you a simple question. Do you have any evi- 
dence of au}^ kind to indicate that there is any subversive amongst these 
young men? If not, if not you are leaving here this afternoon, leav- 
ing a smear upon the name of each and every one of them. You 
shouldn't do that, ]\Ir. Symington. That is just dishonest. That is 
the same thing that the Communist Party has been doing too long. 

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, apparently an}' time anybody 
says anything against anybody working for Senator McCarthy, he is 
smearing them and accusing them of being Communists. 

Senator McCarthy. Answer the question. 

Senator Symington. That is the best answer I can give you and that 
is the only answer you are going to get. 

Senator McCarthy. You won't answer if j^ou know of any sub- 
versive ? 

IMr. Chairman, even though the Chair is leaving, I want to make 
this record, and, Mr. Keporter, will you take this down; Mr. Reporter, 
will you take this down ? 

Mr. Symington, other members of the Democrat Party here have 
been intimating that they know of some subversive on the staff' in- 
vestigating Communists. I have asked INIr. Symington pointblank to 
tell us whether he knew of any such subversive. He runs away. He 
won't answer the question. 

May I say that that is the most dishonest, the most unfounded 
smear upon some of the most outstanding young men that I have 
ever seen work to uncover Communists. And before this is over, 
the American people will have a better picture of it. 

I guess we must go vote now. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 40 p. m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at -O' a. m. the following day, Tuesday, June 15, 1954.) 



INDEX 



Page 

Adams, John G 2664- 

2G6G, 2675-2077, 2679, 2680, 26S6, 2692, 2696, 2697, 2700-2702 

Air Force (United States) 2702 

Allen, Colonel 2669 

Armv (United States) 2664- 

26G7, 2670, 2671, 2675-2678, 2684-2G88, 2689, 2692-2604, 2698-2702 

Army commission 2G98 

Army Reserve 2G98 

Atomic Energy Commission 2704 

Brown University 2691 

Capitol Police 2663 

Carr, Francis P., testimony of 2664-2707 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2704 

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 2704 

Cohn, Roy M 2864, 2665, 2669- 

2671, 2679, 26S0, 26S2, 2684, 2686, 2G88, 26C9, 2694, 2G97, 2702, 2705 

Coolidge, Calvin 2691 

Communist Party 2665, 2684, 2685, 2695, 2704, 2706, 2707 

Communists 26j5, 2684, 2685, 2695, 2704, 2706, 2707 

Congressional committees 2G69 

Counselor to the Army 2664-2666, 

2675-2677, 2679, 2680, 2686, 2392, 2696, 2697, 2700-2702 

Department of the Army 2G64-2667, 

2670, 2671, 2G75-2678, 2684-2686, 26S9, 2G92-2G94, 2698-2702 

Department of Defense 26S5, 2703, 2705 

Department of State 2702 

Dirksen, Senator 2678 

Falls Church 2672 

FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 2672-2674, 

2G79, 2680, 2684, 2691, 2G92, 2696, 2699, 2704r-270G 

FBI Academy (Quantico, Va.) 2691 

FBI document 2706 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 2672-2674, 

2679, 2G80, 2684, 2691, 2692, 2696, 2699, 2704-2706 

Fort Dix 2700, 2702 

Fort Monmouth 20G5, 2GG6, 266S-2671, 2G84, 2693-2696, 2701, 2702 

Fuchs, Klaus 2704 

Government employee 2674 

Government officials 2669 

Government Printing Office 26S7 

Hoover, J. Edgar 2G73 

Juliana, Jim_: 2669, 2687 

Kennedy, Mr 2683 

Korean war-crime atrocity hearings 2702 

Law School of the University of Pennsylvania 2672 

Lawton, General 2669, 2G79, 2GS0, 2693 

Loyalty board 2665 

McCarthy, Senator Joe 2664, 

26G5, 2667-2670, 2077-2680, 2683, 2684, 2686, 2697, 2701, 2702, 

2704, 2705. 2707. 

Merchants Club (New York City) 2T01 

Navy (United States) 2702 

New York Citv 2672, 2679, 2684 

Newark Station 2097 

I 



n INDEX 

Page 

Newport, R. I 2072 

O'Donnell, Mr 2702 

Peiita-on 2669 

Potter, Senator 2698 

Quantico, Va 2691 

lieber, General 2689 

Reserve commission 2689, 2690 

Rvan, General 2686 

Schine, G. David 2664r- 

2666, 2670, 2671, 2674-2681, 2685-2090, 2692, 2696-2698, 2702 
Secretary of the Army— 2667, 2669-2671, 2684, 2685, 2692-2694, 2696, 2697, 2702 

Sobolsky, George 2700, 2701 

State Department 2702 

Statement submitted at request of temporary committee (April 20, 1953 )_ 2667 

Stevens, Robert T 2667, 2669-2671, 2684, 2685, 2692-2694, 2696, 2097, 2702 

Thanks.i:ivins 2()97 

United States Air Force 2702 

United States Army 2664- 

2667, 2670, 2671, 2675-2678, 2684-2686, 2689, 2692-2694, 2698- 

2702. 

United States Department of Defense 2685, 2703, 2705 

United States Department of State 2702 

United States Navy 2702 

University of Pennsylvania Law School 2672 

Washington, D. C 2691, 2697 

Webster's definition 2675 

Webster's dictionary 2676 

o 



SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES 
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRE- 
TARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN 
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR 

JOE McCarthy, roy m. cohn, and 

FRANCIS p. CARR 



HEARING 



BEFORE THE 



SPECIAL SUBCOMMIHEE ON 
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIED CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Res. 189 



PART 66 



JUNE 15, 1954 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
46620" WASHINGTON : 1954 



ablic Library 
.,,^,,;ntcndent of Documents 

NOV 2 4 1954 



COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

KAUL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HENRY M. JACKSON, Wasliington 

HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

EVERETT McKINEEY DIRKSEX, HIinois STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 
JOHN' MARSHALL lUrj'LER, Mar.vland THOMAS A. BURKE, Ohio 

CHARLES E. rOTTEI{, Michigan SAM J. ERVJN, Jh., North Carolina 

KicHARD J. O'^rELiA, General Counsel 
Waltek L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 



Special Subcommittee on Investigations 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota, Chairman 
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan HENRY M. JACKSON, WashiMglon 

HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 

Ray H. Jenkins, Chief Counsel 

Tno.MAS R. Pkewwt, Assistant Counsel 

Robert A. Collier, Assistant Counsel 

SoLis HoKwiTZ, Assistant Counsel 

Chakles a. Maner, Secretary 

n 



CONTENTS 



P.ifce 

Index I 

Tesliinony of — 

Carr, Francis P., executive director, Senate Permanent Subcommittee 

on Investigations 2710 

III 



SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES AND 
COUNTERCHAEGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE 
ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE 
HENSEL AND SENATOR JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN, 
AND FRANCIS P. CARR 



TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Special Subcommittee on Investigations 
OF THE Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 : 13 a. m., pursuant to recess, in the 
caucus room of the Senate Office Building, Senator Karl E. Mundt, 
chairman, presiding. 

Present: Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Sen- 
ator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican, Illinois; Senator Charles 
E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; Senator Henry C. Dworshak, Re- 
publican, Idaho; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; 
Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and Senator 
Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri. 

Also present : Ray M. Jenkins, chief counsel ; Thomas R. Prewitt, 
assistant counsel; Charles Maner, assistant counsel; and Ruth Y. 
Watt, chief clerk. 

Principal participants present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a 
United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin; Roy M. Cohn, 
chief counsel to the subcommittee; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel 
for the Army ; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army. 

Senator Mundt. The committee will please come to order. 

The Chair would like to begin by welcoming our guests who have 
come to the committee room and to tell them that the committee is 
happy to have you watching one of your congressional committees in 
operation. 

The Cliair would like to have the audience listen very carefully to 
w^hat he is going to say next, because he observed before the meeting 
began that there was some applause as various principals and 
committee members entered the room. Perhaps you have not been 
following the hearings and do not realize that that is strictly forbidden. 

The Chair, rather than to try to have anybody removed from the 
room for violating that committee rule, has instructed the officers again 
today to be particularly alert and to remove from the room immediately 
without any further notice, politely but firmly, with the authority that 
they have vested in them by the Congress of the United States, anyone 
applauding or anyone engaging in any other audible manifestations 

2709 



2710 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

of approval or disapproval. That is a fair rule. That is a continuing 
rule. That is a rule the committee expects our officers to enforce com- 
pletely without any further instruction from the Chair. 

Those instructions are from the committee and provide that they 
shall be carried out both by the uniformed members of the Capitol 
Police force whom you see before you, and the plainclothes men scat- 
tered through the audience. 

You have all been warned, as you have been welcomed. If you 
decide to violate the terms under which you entered the room and are 
removed, you have removed yourself, because you have failed to com- 
ply with the regulations of this committee and of these hearings. 

I feel that with that explanation we will not have any further in- 
terruption by i)eople who seek to disrupt a hearing which they have 
come to observe. 

As we concluded the hearings yesterday. Senator Symington had a 
few minutes left of his 10 minutes, but tells me that he had concluded 
his questions, so we will switch next to Senator Dworshak, who has 
not yet come into the committee room. 

He not being here, the Chair recognizes Mr. Cohn or Senator 
McCarthy for 10 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS P. CARR— Resumed 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Cohn ? 

Mr. CoiiN. I have no questions. 

Senator McCarthy. No questions. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Welch or Mr. St. Clair for 10 minutes. 

Senator McCarthy. One or two questions, Mr. Carr. 

Senator Mundt. You are recognized. Your microphone is not 
turned on or else your voice has gotten hoarse, and we cannot hear you. 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Carr, I think yesterday you mentioned 
that we received FBI reports occasionally. From the answer I gather 
that there might have been the feeling that you had received the FBI 
reports. Any FBI reports come directly to me, is that right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. And any clearance, secret, top secret, confiden- 
tial, would come to you and you would only learn about that by hear- 
ing about it from me; is that right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; that is right. 

Senator McCarthy. Nothing further, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Mundt. Thank you very much. 

Mv. AVelch or Mr. St. Clair, 10 minutes. 

Mr. St. Clair. Mr. Carr, yesterday you may recall we were dis- 
cussing the meeting that you and Mr. Cohn had with the Secretary on 
October 2. Do you recall, sir? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. And I believe you testified in substance that the 
Secretary in the course of that meeting brought up the question of 
Schine by stating in substance that Schine was not going to get a 
commission. Do you recall that? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. And I guess I fairly outlined your testimony, have 
I not ? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2711 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I didn't say that he — I didn't specifically say 
he brought it up. As I recall, I think I said that it was my recollec- 
tion that the Secretary had brought this matter up, or started the 
conversation. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, do you now wish to suggest that perhaps you 
could be wrong, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. No ; I don't think I am wrong. 

Mr. St. Clair. That is your best recollection ? 

Mr. Carr. Right. 

Mr. St. Clair. The Secretary brought it up in the manner that you 
and I have discussed ? 

Mr. Carr. Right. 

Mr. St. Clair. We were discussing that fact in connection with what 
work you had outlined for Private Schine. Do you recall ? 

Mr. Carr. Xot specifically; no, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, in any event, that news was the first you had 
heard of it, was it not, Mr. Carr ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, that, as I said yesterday I said I thought that was 
the first time I had learned that Mr. Schine would not receive a com- 
mission, a Reserve commission. 

Mr. St. Clair. That is right. Did you know that Mr. Schine had 
received formal notification that he was not going to get a commission 
on July 31 of 1953? 

Mr. "Carr. No, I did not. 

Mr. St. Clair. Did you know that General Reber testified that he 
had told Mr. Cohn about that time that Schine was not qualified? 

Mr. Carr. I think I heard General Reber's testimony. 

Mr. St. Clair. All right. But insofar as you were concerned, the 
first you heard of it was on October 2 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, that is the best of my recollection. 

Mr. St. Clair. So that up to that time, apparently we agreed yes- 
terday, but if not say so, you thought that Schine was likely to get a 
commission ; isn't that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. I didn't know whether he was or he wasn't. I thought 
that he would. I thought 

Mr. St Clair. You heard that General Reber was supposed to have 
said he would. 

Mr. Carr. I am not sure whether I heard that at that time or 
whether I — I heard General Reber say these things, I heard the testi- 
mony, but I am not sure that at that time I knew about it. 

Mr. St. Clair. I am not suggesting that General Reber testified 
that he promised a commission. I am just suggesting that your as- 
sociates have so testified, and apparently must have told you that 
fact, too. 

Mr. Carr. Well, I don't recall that they ever told me that at that 
time. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, in any event, you must have been counting on 
Mr. Schine as a member of your committee up until the date of Octo- 
ber 2, hadn't you ? On your staff, pardon me. 

Mr. Carr. Until that time, I hadn't given it too much consideration. 
1 thought he was getting a Reserve commission. 

Mr. St. Clair. You thought he was going to get a commission? 

Mr. Cark, That is right. 



2712 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Uv. St. Clair. Well, then, you must have been counting on his not 
being avaihible to you, then, in the reasonably near future? 

Mr. Carr. After that time I was pretty certam of it; yes, sir. 

My. St. Clair Well, up to that time you felt that he was going to 
get a commission and get it soon, didn't you ? 

JNIr. Cakr. Quite frankly, I didn't give it much thought as far as 
the commission was concerned. I knew he had applied for a Keserve 
commission. That is about the size of it. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, in any event, when you learned the fact that 
he was not going to get it, it meant that there had to be some change 
in your plans and it\vas an important event for you, was it not? 

Sir. Carr. It wasn't an important event, but I did give it considera- 
tion. 

Mr. St. Clair. This man was important to the staff of this com- 
mittee, Avas he not? 

Mr. Carr. Yes ; he was. 

Mr, St. Clair. And a change in his military status to you as a di- 
rector must have been an important event, is that right? 

Mr. Carr. It was w^orth considering, and I did consider it. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, I don't want to push you too far, but it was 
worth a considerable amount of consideration, was it not? 

JNIr. Carr. I gave it a considerable amount of consideration. 

Mr. St. Claiu. You did? 

;Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. That is right. Don't you consider it a rather singu- 
lar event, Mv. Carr, that you did not mention that fact in your 
memorandum of October 2? 

Mr. Carr. What fact is that, sir? 

Mr. St. Clair. That Schine was not going to get a commission. 

]\Ir. Carr. No. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, it was an important thing, you said. 

Mr. Carr. 1 don't think it was that important. 

Mr. St. Clair. You mentioned a lot of things in that memorandum, 
but you did not mention this fact, did you ? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. I might have left it out or I might have 
put it in. 

Mr. St. Clair. As a matter of fact, your memorandum of October 
2 is slightly inconsistent with that fact, is it not, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. I don't think so. 

i\Ir. St. Clair. I call your attention, sir, to the second paragraph 
of it and the fourth line. Let me read you that sentence, which be- 
gins in tlie third line of the second paragraph : 

During the course of the conversation, Dave Schine's pending induction — 

and I emphasize the words "pending induction"' — 

into the Army came up. 

Have I read that sentence correctly? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. If his induction was pending on October 2, that is 
inconsistent with the fact that you have testified to, that you thought 
he was going to get a commission until the Secretary told you other- 
wise? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, but I didn't write this memorandum until after I 
had talked to the Secretary. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2713 

Mr. St. Ckair. Yes, but you are referring to a conversation con- 
cerning a pending induction. Now you testify the conversation was 
not concerning a pending induction, but was concerning the fact that 
he was not going to get a commission. 

Mr. Carr. No; I haven't testified— you say as if I had testified only 
to that fact. I testified also to the fact that the Secretary said, as I 
say in my memorandum, that he intended to use Mr. Schine to the ad- 
vantage of the Army by sending him to intelligence schools. 

Mr. St. Clair. That is certainly true, but let's get back to the fact 
that you testified, sir, that the Secretary told you on October 2 that 
Schine was not going to get a commission. 

Mr. Carr. That is my recollection. 

Mr. St. Clair. In the first place, you make no mention of that fact 
in this memorandum, do youf 

Mr. Carr. No. 

Mr. St. Clair. Even though you consider it of some importance ? 

^Ir. Carr. I consider it of some importance. I don't consider it of 
so much importance that I had to put it in the memorandum. Other 
things were left out of the memorandum, too. 

Mr. St. Claik. Also, in view of the fact that you state in the 
memorandum the conversation concerned a pending induction. Have 
I refreshed your recollection to some extent, Mr. Carr, that perhaps 
you are mistaken about the conversation with the Secretary and the 
commission ? 

Mr. Care. No; I am not mistaken. 

Mr. St. Clair. You are not mistaken ? 

Mr. Carr, No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. So you state now tliat the Secretary brought it up 
by informing you that Schine was not going to get a commission. 

Mr. Carr. No ; he didn't bring it up by informing me. He brought 
up the subject of Schine, and he was the first one that, in my recollec- 
tion, during this conversation said that Schine wasn't going to get 
a commission. 

Mr. St. Clair. Now you say he did not bring it up by stating that 
Schine was not going to get a commission? 

Mr. Carr, No, sir; no, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Let me ask you this: There was some discussion 
beyond that point, right? 

Mr, Carr. Beyond the point of the commission? 

Mr. St. Clair. Yes. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. You said in substance, I believe, that Mr. Cohn in- 
dicated his assent to what you claim the Secretary had outlined for 
this private. 

Mr. Carr. This intelligence school arrangement, and that sort of 
thing, yes, I think Mr. Cohn said "That is fine," or something like 
that. 

Mr. St. Clair. Did Mr. Cohn put it any stronger than just agree- 
ment, or did he try to urge it on the Secretary ? 

Mr. Carr. No. As I recall, it was the Secretary's statement. The 
Secretary is the one who mentioned the schools, riot Mr. Cohn, 

Mr. St. Clair. But Mr. Cohn indicated his assent, is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. He indicated that was fine; yes. 

40020°— 54— pt. 60 2 



2714 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. St. Clair. Was it fine with you, Mr. Carr ? 
]\Ir. Cakr. It didn't make any difference to me. 
Mr. St. Clair. It made no difference to you? 
Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. But it made some difference to Mr. Cohn? 
Uv. Carr. I don't think a great deal of difference, but he said "That 
is fine." 

Mr. St. Clair. All right. 

I think you testified yesterday that as early as October 8 or October 
9 John Adams indicated to you that he thought maybe the committee 
ought to call off their hearings on the Fort Monmouth investigation, 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. At that point Mr. Adams indicated he thought there 
should be no hearings on the Fort Monmouth situation. There had 

been none 

Mv. St. Clair. He made it a little stronger than I made it, then. 
He indicated to you there ought not to be any ? 
Mr. Carr. We had not started having hearings at Fort Monmouth. 
Mv. St. Clair. When was your first hearing? 

Mr. Carr. I think the first executive hearing was on the 12th of 
October. 

Mv. St. Clair. If I suggested the 8th of October, would that refresh 
your recollection? 

Mr. Ca«r. No. The 8th of October, as I testified, Mr. Adams was— 

and I think I am correct on this— Mr. Adams was in attendance at 

interviews of persons who worked at Fort Monmouth, staff interviews. 

The executive sessions did not start until Senator McCarthy arrived 

in New York so that witnesses could be sworn. 

Mr. St. Clair. So it is your testimony that John Adams wanted 
to call the executive sessions off even before they started; is that 
right ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't say he wanted to call the executive sessions off. 
I say that John Adams on the 8th or about the 8th, during the period 
of these staff interviews, suggested that there was no need for having 
any hearings at all. 

Mr. St. Clair. That was before they had even started, was it not? 
INIr. Carr. That is correct. 

]Mr. St. Clair. So the sum and substance of it is that you testified 
John Adams wanted to call them off before they had even started? 
Mr. Carr. If you want to put it that way, that will be all right. 
Mr. St. Clair. I don't want to be unfair with you but that is the 
fact. 
Mr. Carr. That won't hurt me. That is all right. 
Senator Mundt. Your time has expired, Mr. St. Clair. 
Mv. Prewitt, any questions? 
Mv. Prewtit. No questions. 
Senator Mundt. The Chair will pass. 
Senator McClellan, any questions? 

Senator ISIcClellan. Mr. Carr, I have 2 or 3 more questions, I 
believe. When I concluded yesterday I believe you had agreed with 
me that the charges against the Secretary of the Army and Mr. Adams 
were quite serious. 
^Ir. Carr. Yes, sir. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2715 

Senator McClellan. Then from your testimony, as you have al- 
ready stated and from the charges to which we have referred gen- 
erally— I didn't call each one specifically to your attention, but you 
are familiar with them— would you agree with me that the conduct 
of the Secretary of the Army and Mr. Adams if these charges are 
true, were quite improper? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I think they were improper; yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Don't you think they are quite grave if you 

take into account the security of our country'? If they were actually 

trying to protect, as charged, those who were protecting Communists 

-n our Government and in the Army, wouldn't you say they are quite 



grave 



Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. _ I don't think it is my position to pass on such 
matters, but I agree with you they are serious and grave. 

Senator McClellan. And they should have been exposed if that 
was true ? 

Mr. Carr. I would be happy to have them exposed ; yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Would they have been exposed, in your judjr- 
ment, had not this chronological report of the Army been published? 

Mr. Carr. I think they would. 

Senator McClellan. How long do you think it would be before 
we had gotten to them ? 

Mr. Carr. I really don't know, but I think it would have come 
about. 

Senator McClellan. At any rate, the issuing of the chronological 
statement of events did bring about the exposure of this promptly, 
didn't it? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. So it accomplished some good if these charges 
are true. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. That is a way of putting it; yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. All right. That is the way 'it is, in its proper 
perspective, if your charges are true. The issuance of that report 
immediately caused the response that called to the attention of the 
country a condition that the Defense Department or in the Department 
of the Army that certainly could not be tolerated if it is true. Don't 
you agree with me ? 

Mr. Carr. It called it to the attention of the country. I agree 
with you. 

Senator McClellan. And it is a condition, if true, that cannot be 
tolerated ? 

Mr. Carr. I wouldn't have tolerated it ; no, sir. 

Senator McClellan. All right. That is att. One other question, 
if I have more time. I did want to ask you this : As staff director, 
now, you helped check the files to determine the documents that you 
may have in them relative to Mr. Schine's work, did you ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, actually, I had very little part in it, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Well, I don't know whether you can identify 
them or not, but are you prepared to say that the documents that 
have been turned over to the counsel are all that are in the files? 
Are you prepared to say that, as staff director? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I am not the one who went through the files 
physically. I have been advised by those who did that— and by Mr. 



27 IG SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Schiiie— that the work which appears here is— how do you say— the 
end result, 1 think is the term that has been used here. 

Senator McClellan. All I have been trying to do is to get all of 
them before us, and I am trying to find out who can tell us that they 
are all before the committee now. Can you ? 

Mr. Cakr. 1 think Mr. Cohn can probably tell you that better than 

I can. 

Senator McClellan. All right. That is all. 

Senator Muxdt. Senator Diiksen, any questions? 

Senator Dirksen. No questions. 

Senator Muxdt. Senator Jackson, any questions? 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Carr, I assume you formulated a file on Fort 
Monmouth? 

]\Ir. Cark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. What is the date of the first document in that 

file? 

iAIr. Carr. I am not sure. I think it is some time in August or 

September, maybe. 

Senator Jackson. The first document in the file is m August or 
September ? 

Mr. Carr. I think that is right. 

Senator Jackson. What was the first document in that file? 

JNIr. Carr. I don't recall, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Well, I think you indicated yesterday that there 
were memos and certain information that you had dictated or had 
come to vour attention that was put in the file. 

Mr. Carr. Well, I don't recall that part of the testimony. If you 
would 

Senator Jackson. As far as you know, there was nothing in thi^ 
file prior to July or Auffust, then* on Fort Monmouth? 

Mr. Carr. Well, let me say this. Senator. The preliminary investi- 
gation of this case and all other cases, I can't say all other cases but 
other cases, is a very informal thing. Information is gathered, some- 
times material is received, this is on an informal basis. Now, in con- 
nection with the Fort Monmouth investigation, it is my recollecton, 
and it is only a recollection after these months, that when the investi- 
gation was well underway, much of this material which has been in 
the oflico. in the possession of the individuals working on the case, was 
assembled into a file. 

Senator Jackson. Yes, but I take it you just testified that the first 
memos or memoranda that went into the file was July or August; is 
that right? 

Mr. Carr. I am only testifying that, as I recall, the first memoran- 
dum is dated some time during that period ; yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. And prior to that time, you don't know of any 
work that was done on the Fort Monmouth investigation? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; I know of work. As I said, I don't know — I 
believe that is the first date of the memorandum. 

Senator Jackson. Well, actually, Mr. Carr, the work didn't get 
underway full speed, shall we say, until August, did it? 

Mr. Carr. I would say, "Yes"; August. 

Senator Jackson. That was about the time when you found out 
that Mr. Schine was going to go into the Army ? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2717 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. That was about the time when I got busy on 
this case. 

Senator Jackson. Well, you took over the Fort Monmouth investi- 
gation. Had there really been any work done as far as actual in- 
vestigation at Fort Monmouth ? 

Mr. Carr. There had been preliminary work done, sir. 

Senator Jackson. What kind ? 

Mr. Carr. There had been informants developed and there had been 
information obtained concerning the situation at Fort Monmouth; 
yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Well but actually there hadn't been any specific 
legw^ork done on Fort Monmouth ? 

Mr. Carr. The large amount of legwork began during that period, 
I would say, August-September ; yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. But prior to that you had the Crouch document ? 

Mr. Carr. We had the Crouch document; yes, sir. I don't put too 
much stress on the Crouch document as such. 

Senator Jackson. As a matter of fact, that is a pretty general 
statement. 

Mr. Carr. It is a general statement. I think it is a very good 
statement concerning Communist infiltration. 

Senator Jackson. But as an FBI agent, you were pretty well 
trained in the fact that it was well known that the Communists would 
try to infiltrate, have tried for years to infiltrate the Military Estab- 
lishment, whether it is the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I was aware of that. I don't wish to overrate 
or underrate the Crouch memorandum. The facts in there, the state- 
ments in there, are undoubtedly accurate. To me, sir — to me, the 
8 Crouch memorandum is more of a signal than important in itself. 

Senator Jackson. He said there were a thousand Communists in 
the Army. He didn't back up that statement with any specific bill of 
particulars, did he ? 

Mr. Carr. No. I didn't place that sort of stress on the Crouch 
memorandum. 

Senator Jackson. As a matter of fact, the Selective Service Act 
makes no prohibition against the drafting of Communists into the 
armed services,. isn't that correct? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Senator Jackson. So it is obvious that there is bound to be a cer- 
tain number of Communists in uniform, particularly in the enlisted 
ranks ? 

It follows logically that you are bound to get some, isn't that right? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Senator Jackson. So you come to the inevitable conclusion that 
there must be some in uniform. 

Mr. Carr. I agree with you. But at some point, if you are going 
to give an investigation some serious consideration, at some point 
something has to be brought to your attention. I think the Crouch 
memorandum in this case served as a means of bringing it to our 
attention. I don't say that I agreed with him in the memorandum 
that there were a thousand or anything like that. 

Senator Jackson. But, Mr. Carr, you wouldn't want to leave the 
impression that with your long experience in the FBI that you need 



2718 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

to have someone like Crouch explain to you that there might be Com- 
munist infiltration in the Army. You knew that as an FBI agent? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. I didn't need the memorandum. I 
should say, the memorandum 

Senator Jackson. The Crouch document didn't refresh your recol- 
lection or give you any new information that you didn't already have? 

]\lr. Carr. I don't know. I couldn't agree fully with your state- 
ment. I am agreeing with what you are talking about. There is 
some of your language that mixes us up. 

Senator Jackson. Can you point out anything in the Crouch docu- 
ment that you didn't know about before? 

Ml'. Carr. Well, no, I don't want to do that. 

Senator Jackson. All right. We won't go into any further detail 
about that. When did you first see the 2V4-page FBI document? 

Mr. Carr. I believe — I believe that I first saw the two and a — 
what is it, 214-page document? — in this courtroom, or just before 
that, just the day that Mr. McCarthy handed it up here, or attempted 
to have the Chair read it. 

Senator Jackson. You had never seen it before? 

]VIr. Carr. I had never seen it. I knew about it, however. 

Senator Jackson. So it was never in the files? 

Mr. Carr. It was never in the files downstairs; no, sir. 

Senator Jackson. How could you conduct this investigation? You 
are the staff director and if you hadn't seen it until the day you came 
in, how could you have conducted this investigation without having 
seen that document ? 

Mr. Carr. I didn't have to see the document, sir, I knew what was 
in it. 

Senator Jackson. You were told everything that was in it, but 
they wouldn't let you see it? 

Mr. Carr. No. 

Senator Jackson. It was a pretty hot document, then? 

Mr. Carr. No, I don't subscribe to that. There was no need for 
me to keep the document or to see the document. I was told what 
was in it. I was given the list of the persons who were in it. I had 
all the information contained in the document. I had no need for 
keeping the document. 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Carr, isn't it quite unusual that you, as staff 
director of the committee, would not have access to this document and 
see it; yet it would be offered here in evidence to the public? 

Mr. Carr. Well 

Senator Jackson. How do you figure that out ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't think it is unusual. I think it would be C[uite 
unusual if I wer.? given information by the chairman of the committee, 
and I insisted that I had to have the document to back up what he 
was telling me. 

Senator Jackson. But wasn't it the heart of the whole investigation 
of Fort Monmouth? 

Mr. Carr. It was an important part of the investigation, sir. 

Senator Jackson. It pinpointed one of the key individuals, Aaron 
Coleman, did it not? 

Mr. Carr. It did that, yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Did you have any reason why you didn't want to 
look at the document ? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2719 

Mr. Carr. No, I didn't have any. I would look at it. I looked at 
it here. 

Senator Jackson. You what? 

Mr. Carr. I looked at it here in the courtroom. 

Senator Jackson. Yes, but you hadn't looked at it up until that 
time, although you were in charge of the entire investigation at Fort 
Monmouth, directing the staff work ? 

Mr. Carr. No. The day that it came down here I think is the first 
time that I actually looked at it. 

Senator Jackson. I say that is the firet time you looked at it, even 
though you had directed the staff investigation in the Fort Mon- 
mouth hearings and investigation. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, I think that is correct. 

Senator Jackson. That is all. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Potter ? 

Senator Potter. Mr. Chairman, I have concluded my examination 
of Mr. Carr. However, I would like to announce that I am chairman 
of the Communications Subcommittee of the Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Committee, and we have hearings which I have postponed 
three times, most important hearings. They are hearings on the 
future of television. I have scheduled them for this afternoon. 
So I am going to ask to be excused for the afternoon session so that 
we can go ahead with these hearings. It will seem a little different 
to have hearings about television rather than hearings where you 
are on television. 

Senator Mundt. Very good. 

Any questions, Senator Symington? 

Senator Symington. I pass. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Dworshak? 

Senator Dworsiiak. No questions. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Cohn or Senator McCarthy ? 

Senator McCarthy. Just 1 or 2 questions. 

Mr. Carr, Mr. Jackson was discussing the Crouch document. The 
Crouch document, as I recall, gives a fairly good resume of the attempt 
of the Communist Party to infiltrate our Army, is that right ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; I think it is a good document; yes, sir; a good 
document. 

Senator McCarthy. Having worked with the FBI on the matter 
of communism for a number of years, having been head of the sub- 
versive desk, whatever you call it 

Mr. Carr. I call it security matters, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. O. K. — you wouldn't need any resum^ by Mr. 
Crouch. You had all the information which you gathered over a num- 
ber of years, I assume ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, sir, it is some time since I actually read the Crouch 
document over, but I think I can generally agree with you, yes, sir. 

Senator McCartpiy. I want to hand you a document, if you can call 
it that, a mimeographed two sheets of paper. Glancing through that, 
Mr. Carr, do you find that the Communist International, various Com- 
munist meetings. Communist writers, the Daily Worker, have over the 
past 20, 25, or 30 years reaffirmed that one of their principal targets 
was the army of every free nation ? 

Mr. Carr, Yes, sir. 



2720 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator IMcCarthy. So Avhen j-ou came with the committee, you 
didn't need any one individual to tell you that the military would be a 
target for the Communist Party 1 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. Mr, Carr, is it correct that as of now we are all 
ready to go ahead with hearings, hearings of the committee of which 
Mr. Potter is chairman, having to do with the holding of prisoners of 
war, by the Reds, some of them even since World War I ? 

Mr. "Carr. Yes. I think we will be ready when Senator Potter is 
ready. 

Senator IMcCarthy. We have been discussing whether or not tliis 
investigation was holding up the investigation of communism. Is it 
true that we have a tremendous backlog of work now, a great number 
of Communists in defense plants ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. We have knowledge of such. 

Senator INTcCarthy. Instead of investigating Communists now, as a 
result of this investigation we are spending the time and the very 
limited funds which we have to investigate, in elfect, you and Mr. 
Cohn and myself? 

Mv. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. Do you feel, Mr. Carr, that this calling off of 
the investigation of Communists in key industries, in the military, is a 
great victory for the Communist Party ? 

JNlr. Carr. Yes, sir ; I think it is. 

Senator ISIcCartiiy. Just one other question. When you came with 
my committee, Mr. Carr, did I have a long talk with you and warn you 
that you would be smeared completely if you had any success, that you 
would be accused of almost every type of improper conduct hi the 
book, and I told you that was one of the penalties of working with my 
committee? 

JNIr. Carr. Yes, sir; you did. 

Senator McCarthy. Despite that, you said you were willing to quit a 
very good job which you had with the FJU, a job as head of the security 
desk, I believe you call it, in New York, and come down and work with 
my connnittee ; is that right ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; I did. 

Senator INIcCarthy. In conclusion, Mr. Carr, may I say that I feel 
very strongly, as I think I may have indicated last night, that I must 
protect the young men who have come with the committee to do a job 
of exposing Communists. I feel very strongly about the smear leveled 
against them, sometimes not by the Communist Party, but sometimes 
by the Communist Party using megaphones, unknowing megaphones if 
1 may say, men who don't realize what tliey are doing. 

I just want to again assure you and assure Mr. Cohn and the rest 
of my committee that whenever any of these smears are attempted, 
you can be sure I will do everything t can to try and give the American 
people the truth. I think something has been accomplished by these 
hearings in that regard. 

No further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Welch or Mr. St. Clair, you have 10 minutes. 

Mr. Welch. Mr. Chairman, Mr. St. Clair. 

Senator Munut. We can't hear you, Mr. AVelch. Will you turn on 
Mr. Welch's microphone, please. Try again, Mr. Welcli. 

Mr. Welch, you have 10 minutes. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2721. 

Mr. Wklcii. Mr. Chairman, I was about to say to you that Mr. St. 
Clair will continue to conduct a portion of this witness' cross-exami- 
nation, but with an interruption from me on a small point at this 
time. 

Senator MuNDT. You may divide the 10 minutes between you in any 
way you like. 

Mr. Welch. That is right. 

Mr. Carr, first as to your joining this committee when you came 
from the New York desk. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. I take it that you looked on it as advancement, did 
you not, sir? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; I looked on it as somewhat an advancement, 
although looking back on it I am not sure. 

Mr. Welch. In any event — and I have no slight criticism of you, 
sir — you looked on it as a step forward in your career? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I looked on it as an interesting challenge. 
I was interested in it, yes. 

Mr. Welch. One other item. We have often heard about the 
limited appropriation that you have. Would you know the amount 
of it, sir, for this year ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. It varies from year to year. This year I 
think it is approximately $214,000. 

Mr. Welch. Pretty close to a quarter of a million dollars. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. It was what the Senator asked for, was it not, from 
Congress ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I think during the period there was some 
debate back and forth, but I think it is generally what was asked for; 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. What I really wanted to ask you about, Mr. Carr, was 
this 21/4-page document. I was somewhat surprised to learn that 
you first saw it in this courtroom. You told us that ? 

Mr. Carr. I said that I believe it was in this courtroom. I have 
a recollection that it was on the day that it was shown in this court- 
room. I may have brought it down from the Senator's office. I 
am not sure. I know I saw it here, yes, sir, for the first time. 

Mr. Welch. You also told us, of course, that you knew about it. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. And that you were told what was in it ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. And that you had all the information that was in it? 

Mr. Carr. I think that is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. How did you get that information, Mr. Carr ? 

Mr. Carr. How was it relayed to me ? 

Mr. Welch. Yes. 
_ Mr. Carr. It first I believe was relayed to me in a general conversa- 
tion with Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn. Later I think in a con- 
versation — or conference you might properly call it — with Senator 
McCarthy. He told me in detail what was in it and, as I recall, I 
made a list of the names in pencil. 

46620°— §4— pt. 66 3 



2722 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Welch. When they were talking to you about it, did you 
realize that it purported to be a confidential document of the FBI? 

Mr. Cahr. No, sir. 

Mv. Welch. Was that concealed from you? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. . . 

To answer your (luestion, when we first talked about it, it was told 
to me that this was a document which substantiated the statements 
made bv an informant within the Army. 

^fr. Welch. I didn't quite ask you that. Did you learn that it 
had at the top of it "confidential"? 

Mr. Carr. I am not sure that I did. I may have. 

:Mr. Wr.LCH. Was that— I would like to know whether you were told 
that or were not told that. 

Mr. Carr. At this point I can't say whether I was or I wasn t. 

Mr. Welch. It would have impressed you had you heard it, would 
it not ? 

Mr. Carr. No; not particularly; no, sir. 

Mr. Welch. Not as an old FBI man if you saw a letter purporting j 
to be signed by J. Edgar Hoover and marked at the top "confidential" 
you say you wouldn't have been impressed by it? 

]\Ir. Carr. I have seen maiiy such letters, sir. 

Mr. Welch. In your files? 

]Mr. Carr. No, sir. In my files? 

Mr. Welch. When you were in the FBI? 

]\Ir. Carr, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. But, Mr. Carr, you are out of the FBI now, you know. 

Mr. (^arr. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Welch. Have you seen many of them since you got out? 

]\[r. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Welch. You never even saw this one until this courtroom, did 
you? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. Welch. Now, once again, remember that you are not now on 
the FBI. or a member of the FBI, had you known that that document, 
the two-and-a-quarter-page document, was purportedly carrying J. 
Edgar Hoover's signature and was marked at the top "Confidential" 
would that have impressed you? 

Mr. Carr. I don't think it would have impressed me, particularly; 
no. sir. 

Mr. Welch. You just wouldn't have been impressed, is that right? i 

Mr. Carr. Well, I am not sure what you mean by impressed. I say j 
that it wouldn't have particularly impressed me ; no, sir. 

Mr. Welch. Suppose I were to produce a document like that now, 
purporting to carry J. Edgar Hoover's signature and marked at the 
to]) "Confidential," would you be amazed to find it in my possession? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir; I wouldn't at all. 

Afr. Welch. Then you think so-called confidential documents pur- 
porting to carry Hoover's signature are bouncing around Washington 
by the dozen ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Welch. This is the only one you heard of bouncing around; 
is it not ? 

Mr. Carr. No. sir. If you produced one, sir, I would say it was one 
that was directed to the Army. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2723 

Mr. Welch. Were you in the courtroom when we heard from the 
messenger to J. Edgar Hoover, when we heard it should not be made 
public or transmitted to anyone ? 

Mr. Carr. I was in the courtroom. I don't recall that he saicl that. 

Senator McCarthy. Just a minute. Keep the record straight. Mr. 
Hoover did not say that. It was Mr. Brownell. 

Mr. Welch. Were you in the courtroom when Mr. Brownell said it 
should not be disclosed to anyone ? 

Mr. Carr. I think I was; yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. What happened, as I understand it — strike that out. 
When Mr. Carr— strike that out. When the Senator and Mr. Cohn 
talked to you about it, did they have some document in front of them? 

Mr. Carr. As I recall, when they first talked to me about it, they 
didn't. I think when I talked with Senator McCarthy about it, I 
think he may have. I know he told me in detail what the document 
contained. I can't at this point say that he did or he didn't. He may 
have. 

Mr. Welch. Did they tell you, sir, that they didn't want to give you 
a copy of it? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. No, sir. 

Mr. Welch. Did you get the impression they were being very care- 
ful about it ? 

Mr. Carr. Oh, no, sir. I could have had a copy of it, I suppose, if 
I wanted it. 

Mr. Welch. Then, I think we understand each other. If you on the 
first time you heard about it had said, "May I have a copy of it," you 
could have had it? 

Mr. Carr. I have no reason to believe that the Senator wouldn't 
trust me with a copy ; no, sir. 

Mr. Welch. Then you could have put that in the files of your 
committee ? 

Mr. Carr. I probably could have. I didn't. 

Mr. Welch. Yes. Now, what did you do — strike that out. Did 
either INIr. Cohn or the Senator give you a typewritten list of the names 
that were in the document ? 

Mr. Carr. No 

Mr. Welch. Did they read them to you and you wrote them down ? 

Mr. Carr. As I recall, the Senator — I don't know whether you would 
say he read them or perhaps he knew them all by heart. I don't know, 
but I copied down a list of names ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. In longhand? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. And did that list of names become the basis of the Fort 
Monmouth investigation as you suggested to the Senator ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. Welch. You used them ; did you not?? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, we looked into this list of names ; yes, s>r. 

Mr. Welch. And examined a portion, at least, of the men who were 
named in it ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. How many of the men who were named in it did you 
examine either in executive — strike that out. How many of (he 
men whose names were listed in it did you examine in any form 
whatever ? 



2724 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. I couldirt say exactly, but I would say a good portion 
of them. 

Mr. Welch. A good portion of them ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Mr. Welch. Then isn't it a fact, sir, that the Fort Monmouth 
investigation was substantially based on the names that you got out 
of the 214 -page document? 

^[r. Carr. That was one of the main sources for the beginning of 
the investigation ; yes, sir. There were other — — 

Mr. Welch. I understand. 

Mr. Carr. Other things, also. 

Mr. Welch. But that was really the base for it? 

Mr. Carr. That was not really the base for it; that was one of 
several things. 

Mr. Welcil Well, but the point is you took those names and 
started with those? 

Mr. Carr. Well, we had those names and we had some other names, 
sir. 

Mr. Welch. I understand, but as you questioned the people whose 
names you had, they, in turn, turned up other names for you? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; but what I am trying to say is that at the 
time we had these names, we had information concerning other situa- 
tions at Fort Monmouth. 

Mr. Welch. Well, did you have the names of other witnesses? 

Mr. Carr. We had the names of, as I recall, a few other witnesses. 
AVe had also other informants concerning Fort Monmouth. 

Mr. Welch. By the way, do you have your own personal list of 
informants? 

Mr. Carr. No. sir; J have no list. 

Mr. Welch. You have no list of informants that come to you with 
material 

Mr. Carr. No, sir; I have no list. 

Mr. Welch. Whose names you protect. Does Mr. Cohn, to your 
knowledge, have a list of informants? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know what Mr. Cohn has in that regard. 

Mr. Welch. The answer is you don't know ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know. 

Mr. Welch. The Senator, of course, you do know has such a list? 

Mr. Carr. No, I don't know that he has a list. 

Mr. Welch. You understand, do you not, that he has informants 
whose names he will protect? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; and I have them, too. 

Mr. Welch. That is what I am asking about. Do you have your 
own list, sir? 

Mr. Carr. I have no list, sir. 

Mr. Welch. I don't mean a written list. Is there a collection of 
informants who report to you rather than anyone else? 

Mr. Carr. No, there is no collection. There are no set group of 
informants that come steadily to me. I have people who tell me 
things. The Senator, I am sure, has people who tell him things. 
Mr. Cohn does. And I am sure you do. I don't intend to ever reveal 
the unnu's of persons who tell me things in confidence; I am sure you 
wouldn't ; I am sure the Senator wouldn't. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2725 

Senator Mundt. Your time has expired, Mr. Welch. 

Any questions, Mr. Prewitt ? 

Mr. Prewitt. I will pass. 

Senator Mundt. The Chair will pass. 

Senator McClellan? 

Senator McClellan. Just two more questions. 

Mr. Carr, you agree with me that these hearings have also investi- 
gated the Army as well as you and Mr. Cohn and Senator McCarthy, 
don't you'^ 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; to some extent I think they have. 

Senator McClellan. Do you mean slightly? 

Mr. Carr. I am in agreement with you, Senator. 

Senator McClellan. Haven't I asked just as hard questions against 
the Army as I have anybody else ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; I think you have been fair to me. 

Senator McClellan. Let me ask you one other thing, and let's still 
be fair. Don't you think it is just as important to get out of the head 
of the Army those who are coddling and protecting Communists as it 
is to get the individual Communist out of the defense plants? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; that is one of the bases for perhaps the trouble 
here. We wanted to go after the persons who were 

Senator McClellan. Maybe it is the whole trouble. But what I 
am trying to get at and have been trying to get at is the truth of the 
charges on each side. And do you agree with me that if your charges 
are true, that this committee could hardly be engaged in more im- 
portant work than trying to establish the fact and take remedial 
action accordingly ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I think that I am in pretty general agreement with 
you ; yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. I think you are, too. Let me ask you one other 
thing and then I am tlirough. 

Speaking of smears, is it not also true from your observation and 
experience that Senators who do their duty in- connection with investi- 
gations like this also get smeared ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. sir. I think any one who comes to Washington is 
taking a good chance. 

Senator McClellan. You and I are in agreement with respect to the 
seriousness of the charges and also that you get exposed to smears if 
you do your duty. Are we ? 

Mr. Carr. It can happen ; yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. It does happen, doesn't it? 

Mr. Carr. It does happen. 

Senator McClellan. Not only can, but does. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCleli.an. Thank you, that is all. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen ? 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman, I have 1 or perhaps 2 questions. 

Mr. Carr, I have heard that expression "coddling Communists" on 
a number of occasions in the hearing. Drawing on recollection, do 
you recall that that expression appears in the answer and charges 
made by Senator McCarthy for himself and Mr. Cohn and you? 
Frankly, I couldn't 

Mr. Carr. I don't know about the phrase being used ; no sir. 



2726 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Senator Dirksen. I could not find it in the answer and in the coun- 
terchar<res. I wondered whether I had overlooked it or whether you 
knew whether it was there or not. 

Mr. Carr. I don't recall that plirase beinoj used in the paper. 

Senator i3irksen. One other observation, rather than a question. It 
occurs to nie that the lan<>ua(;e used was that there has been gross mis- 
handling; of the Communist issue; is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. Yos. sir. 

Senator Dirksen. That, of course, would be somethino; different, I 
think, from the expression quote "coddlintj; Communists" end quote. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirivsen. That is all. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Muxdt. Senator Jackson? 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Carr, maybe you wish you had stayed up in 
New York? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Jackson. You are takino; no amendments on that. Do you 
feel anybody on this committee has smeared you? 

Mr. Carr. On this conmiittee here? 

Senator Jackson. Yes. 

JNIr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Some of us on this side in these hearings have 
been given some smear publicity, as a matter of fact, so it isn't all 
just a one-way affair, is it ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know about that, sir. I have never given any 
publicity, made any statement 

S(Miator Jackson. T am not saying you. 

Mr. Carr. Right, sir. 

Senator Jackson. I am not referring to you. 

Air. Carr. I might say you have never done anything to me, sir. 

Senator Jackson. That is all. 

Senator Munot. Senator Potter? 

Senator Potter. I have no questions. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Symington? 

Senator Symington. I pass. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Dworshak? Mr. Cohn or Senator Mc- 
Carthy? 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Cohn? 

Mr. CoMN. I pass. 

Senator McCarttiy. I pass. 

Senaior Mundt. Mr. Welch, you have 10 minutes. 

Mr. Welch. Mr. Carr, when I was last questioning you, I was ques- 
rioiiiug you about your list 

Senator McCarthy. There is one question, Mr. Welch, I would like 
to ask, if T may. Just one. May I interrupt? 

Mr. Welch. Surely. 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Carr, I may not have cleared this up this 
moi-ning, I am not sure. On page GGOl, I notice you say: 

As I think Senator McCarthy has testified— 
referring to the FBI — 

they have aflvised us from time to time that they had no derogatory information 
concerning nicnihcrs of tlie stuff. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2727 

Am I correct that you were testifying as to what I told you and 
that the FBI had given no direct report to any member of the staff, 
including yourself? 

Mr. Carr. No ; the reports come through the chairman. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. Any reports that come directly to me marked 
"Confidential" are for my use only? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; that is my understanding. 

Senator McCarthy. I think we should also make it clear that these 
reports do not have to do with investigations. These reports have to 
do with the members of the staff ; is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. That is my understanding; yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. As far as you know, neither I nor any mem- 
ber of the staff has ever gotten any report of any kind directly from 
the FBI; is that right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. You are using the word "report," sir. I am 
thinking of a letter which they say they had, a name check letter, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. When you say there is a report on all em- 
ployees, you are relying upon what I told you? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Senator McCarthy. No further questions. 

Senator Mundt. All right, Mr. Welch, you have 10 minutes. 

Mr. Welch. Mr. Carr, I was asking you at the close of my 10- 
mmute period about your litle grou]) of informers, if you have one, 
and I think perhaps we were misunderstanding each other, because just 
as my period ended, I think you were saying that you have some peo- 
ple who give you information in respect to the activities of Govern- 
ment employees. Is that right, sir? 

Mr. Carr. From time to time; yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. Sir? 

Mr. Carr. From time to time; yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. And those men you protect as to their names? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. I take it Mr. Cohn has his list of informers ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know about Mr. Cohn, sir. 

Mr. Welch. You have no information as to whether or not he has ? 

Mr. Carr. I think he has, but I can't speak for him. 

Mr. Welch. Did you understand that Mr. Schine also had a list, 
perhaps a smaller one? 

Mr. Carr. It is my understanding he has ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. He has one? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. Of course, we know the Senator has one. 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Mr. Welch. Now, Mr. Carr, to turn to another subject for a mo- 
ment, speaking of Communists, the one group of people or the one arm 
of this Government that has literally fought communism with blood 
and with steel is the Army in Korea, isn't it ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. There is no doubt about all of us being proud of that 
act on the part of our Army ? 

Mr. Carr. Not in the least, sir. 

Mr. Welch. Of course, nobody could think that was coddling Com- 
munists, could they ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 



2728 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Welch. Isn't it just incredible to you, Mr. Carr, just simply in- 
credible to you that anybody in the Army should actually coddle 
Communists? 

Mr. Cakr. It would be incredible to me; yes, sir. 

:Mr. Welch. Just incredible. At least we can agree on that one. 

You don't want to sit in that chair and have anybody in this coun- 
try think for a moment that you believe the United States Army cod- 
dles Communists, do you ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't think the United States Army coddles Com- 
munists. 

Mr. Welch. Thank you, sir. I knew you w^ould agree with me. 

Mr. Carr. I would like to complete it, sir. 

Mr. Welch. Would you like to qualify it now ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't want to qualify it. 

Mr. Welch. Wouldn't you rather just have it simply that way ? 

Mr. Carr. No ; I would rather say it my way, if you don't mind. 

Mr. Welch. I will let you say it your way, provided you say it 
nicely, sir, to the effect that the United States Army does not coddle 
(yommunists. Is that what you would like to tell us in your own 
words ? 

Mr. Carr. No, not exactly that. I am in agreement with you, Mr. 
Welch 

Mr. Welch. If you are, can't we move along ? 

Senator McCarthy. Let him finish. 

Mr. Welch. I think he wants to put a kind of qualification on it 
that I don't think he really ought to want to put on. 

INIr. Carr, do you want to add something to what seemed to me to 
be so clear and so fresh and so nice ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, I would just like to say that I don't think that 
at this time the Army is coddling Communists. I think that the 
Army has gone to a great extent — I should not say the Army — I think 
JNIr. Stevens and Mr. Adams went to great limits to prevent the 
exposure of persons who had cleared Communists. I don't say that 
thnt is necessarily coddling Communists. 

Mr. Welch. What you are talking about there is the loyalty board 
deal, isn't it? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. Welch. You know perfectly well — by the way, you have told 
us you went to law school. 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

jNIr. Welch. You know perfectly well there is a very grave legal 
issue involved right at that point, don't you ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't — I am not sure that I follow you on that. 

Mr. Welch. Well, you have heard Mr. Cohn and me discuss the 
proposition as to whether or not your committee may legally call 
jnembers of the loyalty board and put them on the stand and say, 
"How come you decided this way in this case ?" You have heard that 
discussion, haven't you? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; I have. 

Mr. Welch. Don't you know, as an investigator and a lawyer, that 
that presents grave legal problems? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir ; there are two arguments there. 

Mr. Welch. Yes, sir. Thank you for that. Honest men and patri- 
otic men can have Mr. Cohn's view, that you ought to be able to sum- 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2729 

mons them and question the dickens out of tliem. That is rif^ht, isn't 
it? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. And honest and patriotic men can have, let's say, the 
Welch view, that it is pretty awkward to call up the judge and say 
''How come you decided the case the way you did ?" 

Mr. Carr. You can have that view, sir ; yes, sir. 

INIr. Welch, Yes. That is a proper and a patriotic view, isn't it? 

Mr. Carr. I can't say patriotic or proper. I know nothing unpatri- 
otic about your view or persons who hold that view. It is not the 
view that I would hold. I think that any Government employee is 
res])onsibie for what he does just as I am responsible sitting here. 

Mr. Welch. Understand me, Mr. Carr. I am not saying I am 
right, you understand. I am just saying it is perfectly possible to 
have that legal view. 

:Mr. Carr. All right. 

Mr. Welch. You must see yourself that it is a little awkward for 
these people who sit on the Loyalty Board if they are going to decide 
questions fairly, it is a little awkward for them to have to bear in 
mind all the time that after they have decided a case maybe they will 
be hauled up, put under oath and questioned as to how they reached 
their decision. 

Mr. Carr. It may be a little awkward, but I can't see that if they 
are doing their job and if they do it right, why they should worry 
about it at all, 

i\Ir. Welch. In any event, I want you to make it clear that the only 
point at which your committee and the Army came into collision, real 
collision, was on the point of whether the members of the Loyalty 
Board were going to be produced and examined. 

Mr. Carr. There was one other thing that came 

Mr. \\'elch. Wasn't that their 

Mr. Carr. The other thing was the Peress case. 

Mr. Welch. That is another matter. The real collision came about 
the loyalty boards, didn't it? 

Mr. Carr. That was wdien — yes, the collision came there, and it 
came on the Peress case. 

]\Ir. Welch. And there was a scrap about the Zwicker matter? 

Mr. Carr. There was a combination of things; yes, sir. 

Mr. Welch. But the real thing where Adams stood pat and said 
"You are not goin^ to do it," was at the point where you wanted the 
loyalty board members and he said no? 

Mr. Carr. That is what he said ; yes. 

Mr. St, Clatr. Now, Mr. Carr, do you want to take a mnuite to get 
your mind reoriented ? It is perfectly all right. We were discussing 
the attempts that you say Mr. Adams and 3»Ir. Stevens made to get you 
to call off these Fort Monmouth hearings, and you suggested, I think, 
that the first intimation came from Mr. Adams as early as about 
October 9. Is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. To my knowledge. 

Mr. St. Clair. Yes, to your knowledge, and that is what I am 
asking you about. 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

4G620°— 54— pt. C6 4 



2730 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. St. Clair. Xow, on October 21 was another occasion that I 
think you have told us about. That was the night you went to the 
prize fi^ht. Do you remember ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Incidentally, did you pay for your ticket, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. No. I was a guest of Mr. Cohn. 

Mr. St. Clair. Did he ever ask you to pay for it? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir : and I never offered to pay for it. 

Mr. St. Clair. Twenty dollars is a rather expensive fight, isn't it ? 

Mr. Carr. It was a championship fight. 

Mr. St. Clair. It is rather harcl to get tickets in the first place, I 
assume. 

]\Ir. Carr. Probably. 

Mr. St. Clad{. Now, on that occasion there was a party of four, 
was there not, at some time ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Who was the fourth member, Mr. Carr ? 

Mr. Carr. A friend of mine. 

Mr. St. Clair. If, for some reason, you don't want to say his name, 
it is perfectly all right. I will let you exercise that option. 

Mr. Carr. I don't think that it adds to these hearings. 

Mr. St. Clair. It may or may not. Was he Avith you part of the 
evening? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. He was with us during the fight and I think 
afterwards we went to a restaurant and had something to eat, and I 
think maybe a drink. 

Mr. St. Clair. And he was with you then ? 

Mr. Carr. For a portion of the time. As I recall, he left early, a 
few minutes. 

Afr. St. Clatr. Did these efforts by Mr. Adams to get you to call 
off the hearings take place in his presence ? 

Mr. (vARR. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. That would have been a rather impolitic thing for 
Mr. Adams to do, would it not have? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. He was a stranger to Mr. Adams, was he not? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

]\fr, St. Clair. Now, Mr. Adams — incidentally, Mr. Adams is a 
reasonably intelligent person, don't you think, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; very much so. 

Mr. St. Clair. He was a friend of yours, wasn't he ? 

Mr. Carr. I thought he was ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St Clair. Now, I think the next thing you testified to that I 
can remember, and I may slip over some of them, but I think you 
testified that again on December 9 yon had a talk with Mr. Adams 
and he again suggested to you that it might not be a bad idea to call 
this whole thing off; is that right ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. On this occasion, however, he started to use some 
rather frightening language, according to you ? 

Mr. Carr. I didn't quite hear you. I am sorry. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, he started to use, in accordance with your 

vmail and 
? 



^.»^x. Kjx. v^L,^ii«. >vcii, lie hiarieu lo use, in accordance wi 
testimony, sir, some rather frightening language, like blackn 
hostage and "what is there in it for us,^' and things like that? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2731 

Mr. Carr. He used the last two. 

Mr. St. CLiUR. The hist two. And I think your testimony is that 
the substance of his conversation consisted of what you deem as a 
blackmail, is that right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes ; I thought it was 

Mr. St. Clair. Or an extortion, or something equally as serious, is 
that right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. I am sorry, Mr. St. Clair, your time is up. In 
fact, you had 11 minutes. I was tapped on the shoulder and didn't 
know about it. 

]\Ir. Prewitt, any questions? 

Mr. Prewitt. Pass. 

Senator ]\Iundt. The Chair has just 1 or 2 questions, and I want 
to ask them in line with what JSIr. Welch is bringing out, because I 
am afraid that possibly Mr. Welch brought out an implication which 
I am sure he would be the last man in the world to want to bring out, 
and that is that simply because we all agree that we have the best 
Army in the world, we all agree that we have a magnificent officer 
corps, we all agree that they went over and did a terrific job of fighting 
against communism in Korea. Those things we are in agreement 
about, but the implication might be that those things being true, that 
there could be no Communists in the Army. I want to ask you now, 
as an old FBI agent, I want to ask you in your present capacity as 
staff director, whether, in your opinion, a young Communist boy 
drafted in the Army ceases to be a Communist operative simply be- 
cause he gets into the Army under the draft. 

Mr. Carr. Xo, sir; he doesn't. 

Senator Mundt. He is not only then in the uniform of the United 
States, but we find a man in the uniform of the United States who is 
there primarily for the purpose of disrupting the Army, of breaking 
down our security, of delivering secrets to the enemy, of sabotaging 
our defense, would that be right? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; and I think largely as a result of the Peress case, 
the Defense Department has taken steps to be in a position to better 
handle the induction and the subsequent Army career, the Defense 
Department career of such persons. 

Senator Mundt. And I want to join you in congratulating the De- 
fense Department in doing what it did last April. Mr. Welch, we are 
confronted with a very serious problem. You and I, I am sure, will 
agree that a Communist should not have a draft-exempt status. He 
cannot be a conscientious objector. So the Army has to bring him in. 
What you do when you get him there raises some real problems. 
For a time they treated Communist draftees like everybody else, gave 
them commissions, promoted them as they did in the case of Peress. 
That thing having been highlighted before the public, that thing 
having been demonstrated as it was, made everybody feel that that 
isn't the way to treat a Communist. So they have tried a new method. 
I hope it is satisfactory. It is not an easy problem. 

We should not be quick to condemn the Army or anybody else for 
dealing with the problem. But the idea must not get abroad in the 
United States that simply because a Communist has a uniform on, 
that we now have a good American instead of an actual or potential 

spy. 



2732 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. , .1 ^ t ^ j ^ 

Senator Mdndt. I am sure ISIr. Welch agrees to that. I wanted to 
make that clear because our listeners might get a false mipression. 

Senator McClellan, you have 10 minutes. 

We will have order, please, in the committee room. 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Carr, I thought I had concluded a mo- • 
ment ago, but I find I should ask you 1 or 2 other questions now. If 
vou have it there, you may follow me. I think I will read it correctly. 
I want to read your charge No. 46, or read from that charge. 

:Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. . ,, ^ 

Senator McClellan. Follow me as I read the last sentence in that 

charge : 

But as soon as the probe turned to the infinitely more important question of 
who was responsible for protecting Comujunist infiltration, and protecting Com- 
munists who had infiltrated, every conceivable obstacle was placed in the path 
of the committee's search for the truth. 

I have used the term or word "coddling" with respect to that 

charge. 

Now, I may have been challenged for the use of that term. Will you 
tell me, in view of that charge, and your having testified that that 
<'harge is true, if the use or the application of the term "coddling" is 
too strong a term to apply to it? 

Mr. Carr. Well, Senator, I don't wish to get into a dispute on defi- 
nitions of words here, but I think perhaps "coddling" might imply 
that the persons alleged to do the coddling were in favor of the Com- 
munists that were being coddled. I think, if I could continue, sir; 
1 think this statement here more clearly expresses the position that it 
might not be that they like the Communists any better than the rest 
of us, and I am sure that you, yourself, from your experience, as I 
recall, in connection with the privates that we were bringing in here, 

1 am sure you had no love for them ; I am sure 

Senator McClellax. I have pretty well demonstrated that to your 
satisfaction, haven't I? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; you have. But I think that this language here 
implies that there might have been not a desire to protect the Com- 
munists, but a desire to protect other people, maybe themselves, and 
maybe a system. 

Senator McClellan. This language says, "And protecting Com- 
munists." It is direct. It doesivt say other people ; "and protecting 
Communists who had infiltrated." 
Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. That is a direct charge that they were pro- 
tecting Communists who had infiltrated. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I don't withdraw any of this language. I 
•just am giving you the thought that I think, in the protecting of the 
Communists, it might have been for some other reason. 

Senator ^IcClellan. But actually, isn't "coddling" a much softer 
word, a weaker work, than "protecting" ? If I have used the wrong 
term, I want to know it. 

Mr. Carr. No; I don't quarrel with you. Senator, about your terms, 
and don't quarrel with me about this, sir. 

Senator McClellan. If you do, wherever I have used the term or 
the word "coddling," I will substitute the word "protecting," if you 
think it would make any dilTerence. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2733 

Mr. Caer. I don't quarrel ^vitli you over the use of the word. 

Senator McClellax. Thank you very much. 

That is all. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen, you have 10 minutes. 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address this to 
Mr. Welch. 

Mr. Welch, this is really only a footnote to the rather pleasant dis- 
cussion we have had about the extent to which the legislative power 
goes in investigations of tlie executive branch. AVliat I propose to 
cite is not exactly a matter in point, because I recognize the distinction 
that is involved, but back in the MacArthur hearings, which were held 
in this ver}^ room, incidentally, by the Armed Services Committee of 
the Senate, there was an inquiry into the dismissal of General Mac- 
Arthur in April of 1951, and the Armed Services Committee held 
closed hearings in this room in the following month. Transcripts 
were made available to the press as soon as they were cleared with 
respect to security information. 

General Bradley, who was then Chief of Staff, and certainly bore 
a confidential relationship to the President of the United States, 
came to us voluntarily to testify ; and as I recall, he testified that the 
decision for the dismissal of MacArthur had been made at a White 
House conference Avhich was attended by President Truman, Gen- 
eral Marshall, Averill Harriman, Secretary of State Acheson, and 
there may have been others. 

Having made that statement, Senator Wiley then sought to ascer- 
tain whether or not somebody was in attendance at this conference 
who expressed an opposite view, and General Bradley at that point 
said that because of the clear separation of powers between the legis- 
lative and the executive, he refused to testify any further. 

The committee went into that question at considerable length, and 
as I recall, there were seven Members of the Senate who felt that Gen- 
eral Bradley ought to be compelled to testif}^ with respect to every- 
thing that had been said at the conference. However, the issue was 
not pressed and got lost in the welter of things, as I recall. 

So, frankly, I think we are back to that question again. In some 
way or another it is going to have to be more clearly resolved than 
it has been at any other time. 

Of course, that raises the question of whether or not the committee 
can actually subpena members of the top loyalty screening board in 
the Army and not only compel them to appear, which I think is a right 
under the Marl)ury v. Madison decision by John Marshall long 
ago, but the more important question is whether they can be compelled 
to testify as to the reasons why they reversed the lower loyalty boards 
in the Army structure. That question, of course, has not yet been 
resolved. We sort of bounced around the edges in the course of this 
very long hearing. 

I wanted to allude to it only for purposes of the record, because it 
is something which in time must be explored. 

That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Welch. Mv. Chairman, could I have just a moment to comment 
on that ? 

Senator Muxdt. I think you should have it. 

JSIr. Welch. This will be a friendly approach. Senator Dirksen, as 
you would expect from one in my position to you. 



2734 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

\s a lawyer, the way tliis tliino; points up in my mind is as follows, 
and it is quite simple. As a lawyer, you and I know that when a 
case is tried in a courtroom and it is decided, nobody ever has the 
power to call on the jury and say, "How come you did what you did i 
and nobody ever has the power to call on the judge and say, How 
come you did what you did f 

These loyalty review boards are quite a lot like a ]udge and 3ury, 
as any lawyer will admit. They are not precisely like them, but they 
are quite a lot lii^e them. You are in that area where you either 
do or you don't call them up and say, "How come you did what you 

did?"' 

On that point, sir, as I need not tell you, lawyers ditter, and on 
that point the Army and this committee differed. As I have said 
before, it will not be resolved in this courtroom— in this room— but 
somewhere one of these days it must be resolved for the good of this 
country. . 

Senator Dirksen. I would raise only two questions with respect to 
that, Mr. AVelch. The first one is this: Whether they perform a 
quasi-judicial or an administrative function, as such; and perhaps 
the more important query : If you assume, for instance, that somebody 
on one of those boards had some rather oblique ideas, let us say, about 
communism— and I make no allegation, of course^and the committee 
were stymied in its efforts to get that information, the question is then. 
How could a committee of Congress evoke all of the truth in a matter 
of such importance to the security of the country ? 

I know, of course, that you and I shall not resolve it here, but I did 
want the record at least to show that in one way or another, only 
within the last few years this same constitutional question has been 
bouncing around in the Congress. 

Mr. Welch. What I like about it is that in a country like this, 
honorable and patriotic men can differ about it, and I think you will 
agree they may. 
Senator Dikksen. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Muxdt. Senator Jackson, do you have any questions? 
Senator Jackson. I will pass, Mr. Chairman. 
Senator MuNDT. Senator Potter? 

Senator Potter. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment on the 
stotement which you made during your period of questioning about 
the Communists being drafted into the Army and the Department of 
Defense meeting that situation. For the information of the commit- 
tee, I might mention I am working on legislation which, I hope, may 
cure that prol)lem. 

In my opinion, a member of the Communist Party is not fit to wear 
the uniform of a United States soldier. We don't allow criminals 
to wear tlie uniform. We sliould not allow a Communist, who is 
dedicated to the overthrow of our Government b}^ force and violence, 
to wear the uniform. 

I think our Selective Service Act should be amended to provide a 
special designation for a person wlio uses the fifth amendment to 
refuse to state whether he is a member of the Communist Party. 
That designation should be plainly stamped upon all of his records so 
that ixv)i)le will know that this man was refused military service; he 
was unfit to wear the uniform because that man was nof: loyal to his 
country. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2735 

Senator Mundt. I am glad to have that information, Senator 
Potter. 

Senator Sj^mington ? 

Senator Symington. I pass. 

Senator Mundt, Senator Dworshak. 

Senator Dworshak. No questions. 

Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn. 

Mr. Cohn. No questions. 

Senator McCarthy. I have a few questions. 

Mr. Carr, there has been raised here the question of what can be 
done with a Communist who has been drafted and is in the military. 
Is it correct that we called four cases, each one of them handled differ- 
ently? One was a doctor who was kept in as a private. 

The next, a fifth-amendment Communist dentist given an honorable 
discharge. 

Another one, still a doctor in the military. 

And a fourth, Avho had been a member of the Communist Party 
for a short period of time, gave the FBI all the information he could 
about the Communist conspiracy. He got less than an honorable 
discharge, not exactly a dishonorable discharge. It was the second- 
grade discharge. 

They were called for the purpose of demonstrating very clearly to 
Mr. Stevens and those in charge that there was no policy up until the 
time at least that we called these people. All four were handled in a 
completely different fashion. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

Senator McCarthy. The only one who got less than an honorable 
discharge — I won't use his name here — was the young man who had 
been a member for a while, frankly admitted he was a member, gave 
the FBI — gave Army Intelligence apparently all the information he 
had about the people who were with him in the Communist movement. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. As I recall, he testified that he had been coop- 
erative with the Army and he was most cooperative with the com- 
mittee. 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Carr, there was raised a question about 
what a wonderful job our men did in Korea. I agree they did a 
tremendous job over there, the fighting men. I think it is especially 
appropriate that I ask you some questions about that today in A'iew of 
the fact that we have here behind this table Sgt. Gilbert Cumbow, of 
the Army Chemical Center of Maryland, who was in Korea for about 
14 months, selected as the outstanding soldier of the Second Army. I 
think it may be quite appropriate that we did this Korean matter in 
view of the fact that we have one of the young men over there who 
was fortunate enough to come back alive, who might well have died 
because of the result of a few things I would like to question you 
about now. 

For example, I find in the Congressional Record of January 17 an 
insert by Senator Styles Bridges. We find here that General Lowe 
was sent by President Truman to Korea. Apparently President Tru- 
man wanted to have some eyes and ears over there so he would get a 
firsthand report. Why he sent him I don't know, but apparently he 
was not too satisfied with the reports he was getting, and Lowe was 
apparently a very good selection by President Truman. 



2736 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Wo (iiul tlie Story that Lowe's rei)ort never did ^et tliroiigh to Tresi- 
fUM.t Truiuiin. If it had, we don't know how many more young men 
wouhl l)e living today who are dead now.  ^ -n a f 

We find the story on page A-22 of the Congressional Record ot 
Jaiuiarv 17. Mav I quote.^ It is a story by Bill Cunningham, as a 
i-L'suit o"f an interview with a general whose lips were sealed lor some- 
time after he came back, but finally became unsealed. He said: 

Goneral MacArthur was rijrht in Korea, and if he had been left alone, he long 
since would have won in Korea. 

Dropping down, he says : 

What we face now is a disfrraceful stalcinate, the writing off of tens of thou- 
sands of needless American casualties, the loss of face throuiih the entire oriental 
world and a pointless, undefined position for ourselves. MacArthur was ham- 
struu:!' and finally brought down by the interference of the State Department. 

Then, he goes on to describe this. Here is a man picked by Presi- 
dent Truman. AVe don't know whether he is a Democrat or Repub- 
lican. I assume he was just a great American soldier. All the records 
indicate he was. He says that we could have long since won the war. 
Because MacArthur was hamstrung and finally brought down, we 
have had to write off tens of thousands of casualties. 

Now, in connection with Mr. Welch's question about whether or not 
the American people have the right to know the facts, don't you agree 
with me wholeheartedly, Mr. Carr, that where you have a situation 
such as this, where a top general says that, in effect, thousands of 
men died because a general was not allowed to win the war, that the 
American people are entitled to know the facts, all of the facts, and 
they should not be kept from the people? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I would. 

Senator McCarthy. No. 2 : Mr. Carr, there seems to be being built 
up, I gather, some idea that there seems to be something sacred about 
what a member of the loyalty board does. If a man steals $10,000, 
there is no question about our right to expose him, is that right? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. Wouldn't you think that it is 10 times more 
serious to find a man ordering a Communist returned to secret radar 
laboratories knowing he was a Communist? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. I would like to call your attention, Mr. Carr, 
to a statement by Maj. Gen. C. H. Gerhardt* who incidentally has not 
been before this committee, but this statement was made publicly, so 
there a])parently is no violation of any confidence by repeating it. 
He said this: 

The 24 civilian employees of the Second Army at Fort Meade, P.Id., were on 
a suliversive list, but were protected by someone within the Department of the 
Army. 

He is quoted as having stated on May 15, 1954, that — 

in the cases of some of these civilians, we would carry the removal proceedings 
successfully through every stage upward, only to have these cases in every in- 
stance reversed by the President's Loyalty Security Review Board. 

Is that roughly the same situation we found in regard to Fort Mon- 
mouth ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir; it was. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2737 

Senator McCarthy. Do you think, Mr. Carr, that there is any- 
thing sacred, any reason, why the American people should not know 
who is clearing these Communists, who is sending them as I have so 
often said back to a position wliere they are in effect poised with a 
razor blade OA'er the jugular vein of this Nation? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir, I don't. 

Senator McCarthy. President Eisenhower, in his state of the 
Union message made a statement, and I am again reverting back to 
Mr. Welch's discussion of the Korean war — I got the impression he 
felt that because our soldiers did a great job there that perhaps we 
should not protect them from traitors who might be able to infiltrate 
the Army, and maybe I am doing j\Ir. Welch an injustice, but that is 
the impression I got from his statement. Let me read what the 
President of the United States said, if I may, and see if this does 
not indicate either subversion or criminal incompetence, which re- 
sulted in the death of American young men, a situation which should 
have been exposed long before this time. 

Here is the President of the United States, he says this : 

In June 1950. following the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea, the 
United States Seventh Fleet was instructed both to prevent attack upon For- 
mosa, and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of opera- 
tions against the Chinese Communist mainland. 

And I call your attention especially to this : 

This has meant, in effect, that the United States Navy was required to serve 
as a defensive ai'm of Communist China. 

Here is the President of the United States. May I repeat that? 
He says : 

This has meant in effect that the United States Navy was required to serve as 
a defensive arm of Communist China. 

Then, dropping down further, he says: 

This permitted those Communists with greater impunity to kill our soldiers and 
those of our United Nations allies in Korea. 

I may say that I heartily agree with President Eisenhower when 
he says that the order which was in existence until he took over the 
Presidency in effect made our Seventh Fleet a defensive arm of the 
Communist Party, allowed them to kill American young men. If 
the statement is true, and I am sure it is, it means that young Ameri- 
can men are dead today who would be living if it were not for this 
traitorous order. Do you agree — could I finish the question — do you 
agree with me, Mr. Carr, that, in a situation such as this, there is no 
reason on earth why the American people should not hear the individ- 
uals who were responsible for such a traitorous order, find out whether 
they were Communists or whether they were merely stupid beyond 
words ? 

Mr. Carr. I agree with you. 

Senator JNIundt. Mr. Welch, or Mr. St. Clair, you have ten minutes. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, Mr. Carr, we were talking, I think, about the 
prize fight. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. A fight on a little smaller scale than we have just been 
talking about. 



2738 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

I tliink I am wrong, 1 tliiiik we passed from that into around Decem- 
ber sometime when your memorandum indicates that Mr. Adams was 
using some strong language. I suppose, Mr. Carr, that you would 
not look upon those alleged activities of Mr. Adams as being very 
much in the order of cooperation with you and your staff and the 
committee, would you? 

Mr. Carr. In the order of cooperation, sir? 

Mr. St. Clair. Yes. 

Mr. Carr. How do you mean that? 

Mr. St. Claib. Well, if I were to blackmail you or attempt to black- 
mail you, I wouldn't be cooperating with you in the same breath, 
would I ? 

Mr. Carr. Perhaps I didn't hear you, sir. Go ahead, sir. Will 
you repeat it ? 

Mr. St. Clair. Perhaps it should be read. 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

Mr. Carr. I am sorry, I wasn't paying attention 

Mr. St Clair. That is all right. It is not a difficult question. You 
would look upon it 

Mr. Carr. I would like to hear it. 

Mr. St. Clair. Certainly you may. 

Senator Mundt. The reporter will read the question, please. 

Mr. St. Clair. Why don't I restate it quickly ? 

Senator Mundt. Very well. 

Mr. St. Clair. If I were to attempt to blackmail you, you wouldn't 
think that would be highly cooperative of me, would you ? 

Mr. Carr. No, I wouldn't think so; no. 

Mr. St. Clair. If I threatened to hold a^ friend of yours as a hos- 
tage, you wouldn't think that I was highly cooperative with you, 
would you ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. You say these things happened on December 9, don't 
you, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. I am not sure in my mind whether, at least insofar 
as the "hostage" language is concerned, your testimony is that it was 
facetious or not. Perhaps you can tell me. Did you consider it 
facetious? 

Mr. Carr. The use of the term "hostage" by Mr. Adams was on 
many occasions facetious. It might have been at this time. 

Mr. St. Clair. It might have been at this time? 

Mr. Carr. It might have been. 

Mr, St. Clair. Would you have written a memorandum about it, 
sir, if it was facetious? 

ISIr. Carr. I wrote a memorandum about the other statement. 

Mr. St. Clair. It also includes something about "hostage," 
doesn't it? 

Mr. Carr. It includes the fact that we had been, I think, to a hear- 
ing. It includes many things. But the reason I wrote it was this 
other statement. 

Mr. St. Clair. Sure. You don't mean to suggest that you wrote 
a memorandum about a facetious remark made by Mr, Adams, do 
you? 

Mr. Carr. No; of- course not. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2739 

Mr. St. Clair. It was serious, wasn't it ? 

Mr. Carr. The reason I wrote this memorandum was the other 
remark by Mr, Adams. 

Mr. St. Clair. All right, but insofar as the question of "hostage" 
is concerned, he was serious, wasn't he, as far as you know ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. He was serious. He had been serious several 
times. Other times he had been facetious. It is hard to tell which 
is which sometimes. 

Mr. St. Clair. He certainly wasn't very cooperative with you or 
the staff on December 9, was he? 

]Mr. Carr. No; I don't think he was being cooperative; no, sir. 

]\Ir. St. Clair. No. It was so bad you wrote a memorandum to 
Senator ]\IcCarthy about it, didn't you? 

Mr. Carr. That is right. 

Mr. St. Clair. When did you write it? 

Mr. Carr. The same day. 

Mr. St. Clair. The same day? 

Mr. Carr. I might say that he was perhaps trying to be coopera- 
tive, if we wanted to cooperate with him ; yes. 

Mr. St. Clair. Would you read me that answer? I didn't quite 
understand it. 

(Whereupon, the answer was read by the reporter as above re- 
corded. ) 

Mr. St. Clair. Do you mean to suggest, Mr. Carr, that while he 
as you said, tried to blackmail you, he was also being cooperative? 

Mr. Carr. No. I say you might put the interpretation on it that 
he was trying to be cooperative with us if we wanted to play ball 
with him ; yes. He was making an offer. He said, "What's there in 
it for us?" 

Mr. St. Clair. Yon didn't accept the offer, did you? 

Mr. Carr. That is right. 

Mr. St. Clair. So he was not cooperative, was he ? 

Mr. Carr. No ; but it was a try. 

Mr. St. Clair. But it didn't result in cooperation, did it? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; not in that respect. 

Mr. St. Clair. It did not in any respect on that day, did it? 

Mr. Carr. That is substantially correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. You know, sir, that about a week later the Senator 
stated for the public record that Mr. Stevens and those who are now 
in charge, which would include Mr. Adams, had fully cooperated 
witli the committee. You know that, don't you ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. St. Clair. Do you consider that the information you gave to 
the Senator on December 9 is consistent with his statement in the 
public record on December 15? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know that it is consistent with it; no. I know 
that 

Mr. St. Clair. You consider it highly inconsistent, don't you? 

Mr. Carr. It is inconsistent with it; yes. Inconsistent with my 
memorandum ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Sure, and the information you imparted to him ? 

JNIr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. And the information you had been imparting to him 
since October 9? 



2740 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. AVere you present when the chairman, Senator 
McCarthy, made that statement for the public record? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know 

Mr. CoHN. I was going to ask, Mr. St. Clair, can you give me the 
documentation on that? 

Mr. St. Clair. Yes. It is now in the record at page 5841. 

Mr. Carr. I don't know Avhether I was present. I might very well 
have been. I might say — and I think maybe I could save a little 
time by saying it now — that Senator McCarthy, when I gave him this 
memorandum, after he had seen this memorandum and I had spoken 
to him, he thought that I was overly disturbed by this situation. He 
thought that I was perhaps too disturbed about this; that Adams 
miglit not have meant what I thought he meant. 

Mr. St. Clair. Mr. Adams was sent by you, as you testified, to see 
Senator McCarthy that same day, namely, December 9 ? 

Mr. Carr. I wouldn't say "sent." 

Mr. St. Clair. You suggested that he might go see the Senator? 

Mr. Carr. Eight; that is right. 

Mr. St. Clair. You know that he did go see the Senator? 

Mr. Carr. Yes ; I know that. 

Mr. St. Clair. Sure. Are you suggesting that the Senator didn't 
quite believe your memorandum? 

Mr. Carr. No. I am suggesting only that the Senator was not as 
disturbed about the situation as I was. 

Mr. St. Clair. I see. You have no doubt in any event, though, 
Mr. Carr, but that Senator McCarthy, when he stated for the public 
record on December 15 that he had had full cooperation, he meant 
what he said ? 

Mr. Carr. I have no doubt. I don't know what he meant. 

Mr. St. Clair. You don't suggest that he didn't mean it, do you, 
Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. Well, he said it. The record speaks for itself, I guess. 

Mr. St. Clair. You don't want all these people to understand the 
Senator speaks for the public record and not mean it, do you? 

Mr. Carr. No, I don't. I want you to ask the Senator what he 
means when he says it, not me. 

Mr. St. Clair. Perhaps we will, Mr. Carr, but insofar as you are 
concerned, I just want to get it established that the chairman as of 
December 15 stated there had been full cooperation. 

Mr. Carr. All right. He probably 

Mr. St. Clair. And that you consider that inconsistent with your 
memorandum which you say you wrote on December 9. 

Mr. Carr. I consider it inconsistent with my memorandum ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. I would like to go back for just a moment, to change 
the pace a little bit. You remember the flight to McGuire Air Base in 
New Jersey on December 17 ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Mr. St. Clair. There has been an awful lot of talk about a photo- 
graph that was taken on that day, or a series of photographs. 

Mr. Cai{R. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clatr. It now turns out that you are the mysterious fourth 
man in the picture, aren't you? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 



SPECIAL IN\^ESTIGATION 2741 

Mr. St. Clair. Did you see Private Schine as you got off tlie plane? 

Mr. Carr, Yes, sir ; I did. 

Mr. St. Clair. Did you go up and shake hands with him and say 
"hello," or something? 

Mr. Carr. As I recall, there was more or less a round of handshak- 
ings. I don't know whether I went up to see him or he went up to see 
me. There were some other people there. 

]\Ir. St. Clair. You shook hands all around, and you shook hands 
all around? 

]\Ir. Carr. I am sure I must have shaken hands with him. I know 
I shook hands with General Ryan. 

Mr. St. Clair. And other people shook hands with Private Schine 
and General Ryan and other persons? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. Did you see that Private Schine had two coats with 
him ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't recall that he had two coats. I don't recall that 
he didn't have two coats. 

Mr. St. Clair. '\^^ien the picture was taken he had a coat on, didn't 
he? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. You didn't see him hand another coat to any colonel, 
did you? 

Mr. Carr. No ; I can't say that I saw him hand a coat to a colonel. 

Mr. St. Clair. Either you did or you didn't. Which is it ? 

Mr. Carr. As I say, I can't say that I saw him hand a coat to an- 
other colonel. The reason I wanted to go on, the reason I can't say is 
because I recall that on the flight to Boston that night Senator Mc- 
Carthy and Mr. Cohn and I were joking about the fact that some- 
body had held Schine's coat so he could have his picture. I can't at 
this point state whether somebody held Schine's second coat or his 
first coat or whether somebody helped him on with his coat. I don't 
know. I know we joked about it. We thought it was General Ryan. 
At least I thought it was General Ryan who had held his coat. It 
may have been one of the colonels. 

Senator Mundt. Your time has expired. 

Mr. Prewitt? 

The Chair will pass. 

Senator McClellan? 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Carr, I have been using the words 
"coddling Conmiunists'' and apparently there was some objection to 
it. Let's take up another term now that has been used to describe 
situations, and that is "holding a razor blade at the jugular vein of 
this Nation." I believe you agreed with Senator IMcCarthy in his 
application of that term to those to whom he referred in his questions 
a while ago. Did you? 

Mr. Carr. He had some pretty long questions. 

Senator McClei,lan. I know he did. 

Mr. Carr. But I will agree that the Communists, especially those 
strategically placed in defense industries and in Government and in 
other places, do hold in effect a razor blade at the throat of the Nation ; 
yes. 

Senator jMcClellan. All right, we will agee on that. 



2742 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Now let's go a little further and see if you agree on this. I think 
we have agreed that Communists, individual Communists working in 
defense plants or who have infiltrated, hold a razor blade over the 
jugular vein of this Nation. If yonr charges are true with respect to 
Secretary Stevens and Mr. Adams that they have been protectmg those 
who have infiltrated, those Communists, would you also agree with 
me that they are holding a razor blade over the jugular vein of this 
Nation '( 

Mr. Carr. Well, let me put it this way, sir. I would not say— 1 
think the Communists are the ones who would be holding a razor 
blade at the jugular vein of the Nation. 

Senator McCi.ellan. They are protecting the razor. _ 

Mr. Carr. I would say, our charges, our statement being what it is, 
thev are not rushing to pull the razor away. 

Senator McCleij.an. Tliey are not rushing to pull it away. They 
are protecting the razor then. 

Mr. Carr. That is the best I can say. 

Senator McClkllan. All right, thank you. That is all. 

Senator Mundt. Senator Dirksen? 

Senator Jackson ? 

Senator Jackson. Just a couple of questions, Mr. Carr. What was 
the reason that you made the trip on November 17 to see Private 
Schine at Fort Dix? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I didn't make the trip to see Private Schine at 
Fort Dix. I, in effect, went along for the ride. I was going to Bos- 
ton. I was going to Boston by commercial airplane and the Secre- 
tary offered his plane — in fact, he insisted that the Senator and his 
party use his plane, and I went along. 

Senator Jackson. Do you know what the reason was for the trip 
to Fort Dix ? You were riding as a passenger? 

Mr. Carr. Eight. The only answer I can give you to that is 

Senator Jackson. That was really the trip to McGuire Air Force 
Base, which is adjacent to Fort Dix? 

Mr. Carr. That is right. The best answer I can give you to that is 
to tell you what happened. I had no knowledge as to the purpose of 
the trip when I was invited to go along. The only thing I know is 
that when we were there. Senator McCarthy, in front of two colonels, 
and, again, later, told Private Schine that he wanted him to work 
every moment he had off of his training on getting out — getting the 
reports prepared. 

Senator Jackson. Was there any work discussed at this meeting 
on November 17? 

Mr. Oakr. Yes, there was. 

Senator Jackson. What did you discuss? I mean, what project? 

Mr. Carr. Well, I personally didn't discuss too much with him. Mr. 
Cohn did. The Senator talked with him about the reports. 

Senator Jackson. When you say "report," are you referring to the 
report on the Voice? 

Mr. Carr. Sir? 

Senator Jackson. When you say the report, what report are 
you 

Mr. Carr. Generally speaking, I was speaking about the informa- 
tion centers report and the Voice of America report. I recall that 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2743 

the Senator spoke to him about other things. I recall that he men- 
tioned tlie Oppenheimer situation. 

Senator Jackson. To Private Schine? 

INIr. Cahr. Yes. There was something of a discussion about that. 
What it was, I, at this point, don't recall, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Do you mean that there was some discussion 
about an investigation on Mr. Oppenheimer? 

Mr. Cark. I couldn't say that. 1 got the impression that it rehited 
to something, perhaps, th:it St'hine had done or knew about. I didirt 
pay much attention at this point. That is about all I can say about it. 

Senator Jackson. You don't recall any information or anything 
that you needed to get from Schine on that occasion ? 

jNI;-. Carr. I didn't personally. I think maybe Mr. Cohn did. And 
1 don't know whether the Senator needed it or just wanted to discuss 
something with him. 

Senator Jackson. But you didn't have any information that you 
wanted or 

Mr. Carr. Not at that particular time. I just went along to go to 
Boston. 

Senator Jackson. But your recollection was that it was something 
with reference to the Oppenheimer matter? 

Mr. Carr. No; that is not my recollection as to what it was. I 
don't know all about it. I do recall that there was some discussion 
of that, that siibject. 

Senator Jackson. Were you with Private Schine and Mr. Cohn all 
the time? 

Mr. Carr. Most of the time; yes. sir. There were two colonels with 
us most of the time. I spent some time discussing many topics with 
them. 

Senator Jackson. You worked on the hearings in connection with 
the latter — the hearings at Boston? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Do you recall that Mr. Cohn has testified — it is 

on page 64G : 

the circumstances of our meeting Private Schine were that prior to commencing 
certain hcT.rings in Boston, we desired to obtain from Private Schine informa- 
tion which he had, sir, pertaining to the investigation which we were nbout 
to open in P.oston. For that reason, we went down to see him and we tallied 
to him about that and that alone. 

Mr. Carr. That is probably right, that is probably correct, sir. As 
I say, I went along for the ride. 

Senator Jackson. When did the investigation of defense plants 
start? 

Mr. Carr. The investigation of defense plants? 

Senator Jackson. Yes. 

Mr. Carr. That had been started, as I recall, some time during the 
fall of the year. 

Senator Jackson. Do you know about when? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. It was during the course of the Fort Monmouth 
hearings. It developed that this radar work was more or less farmed 
out to different electrical companies and establishments. 

Senator Jackson. Well, did Schine start in on this new work then 
in connection with these defense plants when he was already in the 
Army? 



2744 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr C\m No, sir. This was in October, and it wasn't a question, 
as far as I know, it wasn't so much a question of his starting m on new 
work as a question of his receiving information from an informant 
of his who had some knowledge concerning it. That is my under- 
standing of it, sir. , . ^ ^ . 

Senator Jackson. Some information that was important m con- 
nection with these hearings? . 

Mr. Carr. Information that was important in connection with 
Communist infiltration into defense industries. 

Senator Jackson. That is all. 

Senator Mundt. Any questions to my right? 

Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn, any questions? 

Mr. CoiiN, Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. Yes; I have a few. 

Senator Mundt. Senator McCarthy? 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Carr, I have discussed a number of times 
publicly Avhat I call "treason." I have been criticized for that because 
they claimed that I use words too strong. I would like to now discuss 
the statements by five rather outstanding Americans, I think all of 
them telling the truth, I believe it adds up to what we can call 
treason, and I would like to discuss with you the question of whether 
or not the American people are entitled to the information or not. 

As I have said to you often, I think you have heartily agreed, this 
is no game we are in, although you would think so from what wo 
see go on here some days. The blue chips are really down now. 

There, of course, are two theories. One is that it is a favor to the 
American people to give them the information of what their servants 
are doing. The other is that they are entitled to the information as 
a matter of right. As you know, I subscribe to the latter theory. 

Now, I would like to read to you, if I may, from the statements of 
three individuals and ask you if you don't agree that regardless of how 
the information is classified, the American people should know the 
background of this. 

(jeneral Van Fleet was on the witness stand, one of our really great 
generals, next to Douglas MacArthur, and on page 31 he had this to 
say. Senator Byrd was asking a question. He said : 

You are quoted, I think, General, In the newspapers, as I recall, as saying on 
two occasions that you could have gotten the military victory in Korea. Is that 
correct? 

General Van Fleet. I think that was a little overstated in the paper. We 
misht define what you mean by military victory. I would not say a complete 
victory, but in June of 1951, we had the Communist armies on the run, they were 
hurting badly, out of supplies, completely out of hand, out of control. They were 
in a panic, and were doing their best to fall back, doing their best to fall as 
far back as possible, and we stopped by order. We did not pursue to finish the 
enemy. 

Senator Byhd. Did you recommend that the attack be continued? 

General Van Fleet. Oh, yes; I was praying for them to turn me loose. 

Dropping down : 

Senator Byrd. If you had authority to go ahead and pursue the enemy as far 
as you could, what would have been the result? 

General Van Fleet. I believe we would have gotten all of his heavy enuinment 
and perhaps two or three hundred thousand prisoners. 

Tlien General Ridgway was testifying, and I don't have his testi- 
mony here but 1 can recap it, I think, pretty much from memory. 
He was talking about the order to cut down the production of ammuni- 
tion, an order which was signed in 1950 and never countermanded. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2745 

As Ridgway says, and, as I say, I am not quotins; him verbatim, but 
in effect h' said, "When the ammunition piles ran low, the corpses in 
the graves registration section piled high." 

I am just quoting you from five individuals. One other now, all 
dissected episodes but all part of the same picture. 

General Bullitt was testifying. He was testifying about the order 
which President Eisenhower canceled when he took office, the order 
which the President referred to as using our Navy as a protective arm 
Ox the Communist — using our Seventh Fleet as the protective arm of 
the Communist army — here is what General Bullitt said. He said : 

The anti-Communist Chinese Navy is forbidden to act in any way by order of 
our Government, which has given orders to our fleet to prevent it from stopping 
the Comnuinist supply ships going up to Korea. Those Communist supply ships 
sail right by Formosa, equipped with Soviet munitions, put in the Communist 
ship in Gdynia. They come all the way around and go right by Formosa and 
sail past there, taking those weapons up to be used to kill American soldiers in 
Korea, and by order of our Government, the Chinese Navy is flatly forbidden to 
stop them on tlieir way up there. 

Senator Watkins asked the question : 

"Would the Chinese Navy — 

and the anti-Communist Navy of China — 

would the Chinese Navy have the power except for that order to intercept them, 
and capture them? 

Ambassador Bullitt. Certainly, without question, sir, without question. 

So, Mr. Carr, when we are talking about investigating, we have here 
a sequence of statements made not 20 years ago, not 10 years ago, but 
in the very recent past, a statement made by General Lowe to the 
effect that because General MacArthur was hamstrung and brought 
down we had to write off tens of thousands of casualties; the state- 
ment by President Eisenhower that until he took office our Seventh 
Fleet w^as being used ?s the protective arm of the Communist Party; 
the statement by General Van Fleet that we could have captured all of 
the heavy equipment, and two or three hundred thousand of the enemy 
if politicians in Washington had not stopped him ; the testimony of 
General Ridgway to the effect that the ammunition shortage, when 
the piles of ammunition ran low the number of corpses piled high; 
the testimony of Ambassador Bullitt to the eftect that by order of our 
Government the bullets were being shipped by Formosa and being 
used to kill American boys. 

Now, I have referred to that, Mr. Carr, as treason. I am not going 
to ask you to say how you would define it, but I hear Mr. Welch 
and individuals here talking about the importance of secrecy, whether 
or not the American people can know what is going on. You and 
1 know, Mr. Carr, that if individuals were in the Government, re- 
sponsible for the 5 different incidents which I have just related to 
you, and if all the information is stamped secret, we have no way 
on earth of knowing whether they are still there, whether they are 
still holding important jobs, and the only way, the only way we can 
determine whether or not the individuals responsible for these, what 
I call 5 incidents of treason, the only way we can find out whether 
they are still holding positions of power, is that we have access freely 
to information except, of course, anything which would give out the 
names of informants, which would endanger the security of this 
Nation. 



2746 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Do you agree with me, Mr. Carr, that we get down to this: It is 
important beyond words that when we get through with this hearing 
that somehow, someway, we work out with this administration a for- 
mula whereby we can get the names so the American people can see 
the faces of the individuals responsible for, as Lowe says, the deaths, 
or tens of thousands of casualties, of Americans ? 

Mr. Carr. I think that we, and the people, have the right to know, 
and I think it important that some policy is worked out on that line ; 
yes, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Carr, can you think of any reason why 
the old Truman blackout order of 1948 should be maintained in 
effect as of 1954? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. Just one further question. If our committee 
is to perform its function, it is imperative, is it not, that every black- 
out order, regardless of whether it is Truman's or anyone else's, be 
canceled instantly ? 

Mr. Carr. I think that is correct, sir. 

Senator McCarthy. No further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Welch or Mr. St. Clair, you have 10 minutes. 

Mr. St. Clair. Mr. Carr, I take it the summation of your testimony 
yesterday as to Private Schine was that you had no interest in his 
military career, is that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. That is substantially correct, yes. 

Mr. St. Clair. I mean, if the Army felt that he should be a private, 
that was all right with you? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. If he was to be promoted to a sergeant, that would 
be all right with you ? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. You had no interest one way or the other, right? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct, no personal interest. 

Mr. St. Clair. Do you think Mr. Colin had any personal interest 
in Private Schine's Army career ? 

Mr. Carr. No, I don't think he had any what you would call per- 
sonal interest in his career. I think he had an interest in his career 
more so than I would have, since he knew Mr. Schine better than I 
did, to see that the Army did not misuse Private Schine because he 
had come from the committee. 

Mr. St. Clair. Did you have any information, sir, that the Army 
was misusing Private Schine in any way ? 

Mr. Carr. No. Let me think for a second here. I don't recall any 
information that the Army was misusing Private Schine, no, sir, but 
that wouldn't prevent alertness to such possibility, no, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Do you think there was such an alertness on your 
part ? 

Mr. Carr, No, I didn't have any great alertness ; no, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Do you think that Mr, Colm had a great alertness 
toward the possibility of misuse of Private Schine? 

Mr. Carr. I think that he didn't have any great alertness. I think 
that he had perhaps more than I did an awareness of the possibilities of 
such action being taken by the Army. 

Mr. St. Clair. Do you think he was extremely tender on that sub- 
ject? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2747 

Mr. Carr. No, I don't think he was extremely tender on that subject. 

Mr. St. Clair. You don't think he was quick to find any misuse ? 

Mr. Carr. No. 

Mr. St. Clair. Or alleged misuse, pardon me. 

Mr. Carr. No, I don't. 

Mr. St. Clair. Then I take it that if Mr. Adams were to offer you a 
quote, tidbit, unquote, it would fall on deaf ears, is that correct ? You 
had no interest in this man as an Army private? 

]\Ir. Carr. Yes, sir, it would fall on deaf ears. 

Mr. St. Clair. Would it have fallen on deaf ears on Mr. Cohn's 
part, do you think? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I think it would. 

Mr. St. Clair. So these were simply silly acts on the part of John 
Adams to offer you quote, tidbits, unquote ? 

Mr. Carr. I think maybe. 

Mr. St. Clair. Just plain ridiculous, isn't that right? 

Mr. Carr. I think they were ridiculous, yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. I take it your testimony yesterday was that John 
Adams, a reasonably intelligent person, is said to have offered you tid- 
bits in exchange for breaking a general, isn't that right ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't recall — I don't know that that is my testimony, 
but I recall the train ride, I think, if that is what you are referring to. 

Mr. St. Clair. I am referring to several things, but that is one. 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

No, I don't think I said yesterday that he offered tidbits in return 
for the breaking of a general; no. I don't think that would be the 
exact wav of saving it. 

Mr. St. Clair. Didn't you say in substance that on one occasion 
Mr. Adams said, "If you will give me a good word on General Lawton, 
I will give you a good word on Private Schine's Thanksgiving week- 
end''? 

Mr, Carr. Yes, I said that ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Do you really think that happened, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. Eeally think what hap))ened, sir? 

Mr. St. Clair. That he offered a weekend pass to a private in order 
to get this committee's approval for breaking a general ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, you say that he offered a weekend pass. You give 
a different connotation to it than I would, and than I did. He 
said 

Mr. St. Clair. Let me read it to you so we won't have any misunder- 
standing. Page 6515 : 

Mr. Adams said to Mr. Cohn, "If you can give me some good word on tlie 
Lawton situation, maybe I can give you some good word on whether or not 
Schine will be available this weekend." 

Mr. Carr. Yes. That is November 24, isn't it? 

Mr. St. Clair. That is right. 

Mr. Carr. Yes. Go ahead. 

Mr. St. Clair. Is that the suggestion of a rational person, that a 
weekend pass for a private is counterbalance for approval of the 
breaking of a general ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. I think you 

Mr. St. Clair. That is your testimony. I read it, sir. 

Mr. Carr. All right. l)o you want me to explain it to you now ? 



2748 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. St. Clair. No. I just want to know if that is what you intended 
to j^ive as your testimony. 

Senator McCartpiy. Mr. St. Clair, could the witness answer? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I will stand on any testimony I have given 
here. If you can show me something that is wrong, if I have made a 
mistake 

Mr. St. Clair. Am I wrong in suggesting to you that your testi- 
mony is that John Adams offered a weekend pass for Senator McCar- 
thy's approval of breaking a general? 

'Mr. Carr. No. My testimony here, if I am reading from the same 
page you are, sir, 6515 

Mr. St. Clair. That is correct. I haven't misread it, have I? 

Mr. Carr. The second full paragraph. It says here : 

Mr. Adams said to Mr. Cohn that "If you can give me some good word on the 
Lawton situation, maybe I can give you some good word on whether or not 
Schine will be available this weekend." 

Mr. St. Clair. Did I misread it? 

Mr. Carr. I am not sure that you read it, but you are talking about, 
did Adams trade off a weekend for a private as against a demotion 
for a general. Adam.s is saying here, as I interpreted it when he said 
it, he is saying here that if Cohn would — actually, he is referring to 
Senator McCarthy. That is who he is interested in. If Senator Mc- 
Carthy would give some good word, that means would Senator McCar- 
thy go along and not make any public statement concerning the 
removal or demotion of a general, he then might be able to be a little 
more agreeable as to whether or not Mr. Schine would be available 
that weekend to work on committee business. 

The Secretary of the Army had previously said 

Mr. St. Clair. Are you still answering a question or making a 
speech ? 

Mr. Carr. I am still answering a question. I am not addicted to 
making speeches, but I w^ould like to get the question in here. The 
Secretary of the Army had said that Schine would be available 
these weekends. Mr. Adams is trying to usurp the power, I assume, 
of the Secretary, He is changing things around. 

Mr. St. Clair. It still adds up that there is on one side of the 
balance the question of a weekend pass for a private and on the other 
side of the balance the ratification or at least silence on the part of 
Senator McCarthy as to the breaking of a general. Is that your 
testimony? 

Mr. Carr. If you w\ant to add it that way, it is all right with me. 

Mr. St. Claik. Don't you think that is the fair way to add it? 

Mr. Carr, I don't think it is necessarily a fair way to add it. 

Mr. St. Clair. All right. You don't have to. 

Mr. Carr. I don't wish to continue disagreeing with you. 

Mr. St. Clair. You are entitled to disagree with me at any time you 
wish, sir. 

Mr. Carr. All right, sir. Then I will continue. 

Mr. St. Clair. What was there about Private Schine that would 
lead a rational person to think, sir, that a little tidbit could move 
around such powerful forces as generals? 

Mr. Carr. I think that you are talking in circles here, Mr. St. Clair. 

Mr. St. Clair. Maybe you are talking in circles. It is your testi- 
mony I am referring to. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2749 

Mr. Carr. Maybe I am, sir, but what I am trying to say here is that 
General — the General Lawton situation was something aside from 
Schine. Mr. Adams was trying to tie the General Lawton situation 
in with the Schine thing. 

Mr. St. Clair. That is what you say. 

Mr. Carr. That is what I say ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. That is right. I am suggesting to you it is a rather 
ludicrous suggestion, isn't it? 

Mr. Carr. It probably is. It didn't work. 

Mr. St. Clair. It is even moi-e ludicrous to offer a tidbit to a pri- 
vate in exchange for calling off the work of this subcommittee, isn't 
it, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. It didn't work. I guess maybe it is ludicrous. 

Mr. St. Clair. That is right. 

Mr. Carr. I didn't make the suggestion. 

Mr. St. Clair. No; but you are testifying to it, aren't you? 

Mr. Carr. I am testifying to what happened, what I heard and 
what I know, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Here is, you are testifying, a reasonably intelligent 
man making two absolutely ludicrous suggestions. 

Mr. Carr. I think that John Adams is a reasonably intelligent man. 
I think on occasions he has made ludicrous suggestions ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Isn't it true, sir, that there is something about Pri- 
vate Schine that didn't make these suggestions, as you put them, so 
ludicrous ? 

Mr. Carr. What would that be, sir? 

Mr. St. Clair. A little bait in front of Private Schine— I am using 
your words and I don't mean to suggest that I agree with them — in 
fact had enough power to cause these things to happen, did it not? 

Mr. Carr. It didn't happen. Maybe Mr. Adams thought that it 
would. I don't know. 

Mr. St. Clair. What would there be about Private Schine that 
would lead this reasonably intelligent man to think that a little tidbit 
dangled in front of him would caupe the work of the subcommittee to 
cease, and cause a general to be broken ? 

Mr. Carr. I can't say what was in ]\Ir. Adams' mind. I think Mr. 
Adams was trying. He tried many times in many ways. He was 
trying. 

Mr. St. Clair. These were rather feeble efforts, though, weren't 
they, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. They were feeble. He didn't succeed. 

Senator Mundt. The time has expired. You may finish your 
answer. 

Mr. Carr. They didn't succeed. 

Senator Muxdt. Mr. Prewitt? 

The Chair will pass. 

Any questions to my right? 

Any questions to my left ? 

Mr. Cohn or Senator McCarthy? 

Mr. CoHN. No questions. 

Senator McCarthy. Just one question : Regardless of what Mr. 
Adams or Mr. Stevens or anyone else did, the course of the hearings 
wasn't affected one iota by anything they did until they succeeded in 
calling them off by this hearing here, is that correct? 



2750 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Senator McCarthy. No further questions. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. St. Clair or Mr. Welch, you have another 10 
minutes. 

Mr. St. Clair. And by the same token, Private Schine received no 
special treatment froni the Army, did he? 

Mr. Carr. I think that General Ryan has testified that he hadn't; 
yes, that is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. So that if Mr. Adams is correct, that this com- 
mittee, through its chief counsel and others sought to get preferential 
treatment, this committee didn't get it? 

Mr. Carr. So, then, Mr. — would you have that read, please? 

Mr. St, Clair. Would you read it, please? 
(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

Mr. St. Clair. That is true, there was no preferential treatment 
you know of? 

Mr. Carr. For Schine ? 

Mr. St. Clair. Yes. 

Mr. Carr. No ; there was no preferential treatment that I know of. 

Mr. St. Clair. Now, let's go to December 17. You recall that 
occasion, do you not? 

Mr. Carr. December 17 ? Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. There were hearings that morning in New York, 
were there not, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. You attended them ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Did you have a discussion with Senator McCarthy 
either before, during, or immediately after those hearings about Pri- 
vate Schine ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Did his name come up at all, either before, during, 
or immediately after the hearing? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Now, you testified that you and Mr. Colin met with 
the Senator and Mr. Adams at Gasner's Restaurant after the hearings 
at noon. 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. You testified, as I remember, that Mr. Adams and 
the Senator were already there? 

Mr. Carr. That is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. Can you tell me about what time of the day it Avas? 

Mr. Carr. It would be rough, but the hearings were in the morning, 
they start at 10:30. Probably somewhere between 12 and 1, maybe 
1 : 30. Lunchtime. 

Mr. St. Clair. Now, when you sat down, you said, I think, that 
there was some general conversation, and then the Senator said, in 
effect, that Mr. Adams had brought up the subject of General Lawton. 
Do you recall that ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. I don't mean to misstate it. Have I fairly stated 
your testimony? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, 1 think that is 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2751 

Mr. St. Clair. Was this general conversation, sir, of long duration 
or just how would you type it? 

Mr. Carr. I don't recall specifically. I know that there was general 
conversation before this came up. 

Mr. St. Clair. Yes. Well, did this come up rather quickly in the 
conversation ? 

Mr. Carr. I don't think it came up too quickly. It may have. I 
recall — I know 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, as you 

Mr. Carr (continuing). We ordered lunch. There was talk about 
what we were o;oin<r to eat. There was general conversation. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, the first serious subject, then, discussed, was 
that of General Lawton, is that correct? 

Mr. Carr. I think that is correct. 

Mr. St. Clair. And would you sav that the Senator made his ob- 
servation almost after he had ordered his lunch? 

Mr. Carr. No. I can't tell you exactly. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, as a matter of fact, there were some other 
people present, weren't there ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, there were other people present for a period of 
time. 

Mr. St. Clair. And did this conversation take place at any time 
while they were there? 

Mv. Cakr. Which conversation ? The general conversation ? 

Mr. St. Clair. I thought, sir, that was the only conversation. I will 
take it all back. I will take it all back. It is my fault. I have 
too many generals. Now, when these people were there, is that the 
period of time in which, as we say, the general conversation took 
place ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, that is my recollection. 

Mr. St. Clair. Was it after they left that the subject of General 
Lawton came up ? 

Mr. Carr. I think it was. I think it was. 

Mr. St. Clair. You think that was the case? 

Mr. Carr. I think it was. Now, it may have started before. I don't 
know. 

Mr. St. Clair. Your testimony was that that suggestion from the 
Senator touched off a monologue from Mr. Colin? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. Now, I don't know whether immediately Mr. Cohn 
got the floor, but a monologue followed ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, I think I am quoting you directly when I say 
you testified yesterday it touched it off. 

Mr. Carr. All right. I will 

Mr. St. Clair. And that indicates, does it not, to you and to me, 
that that was an immediate reaction on the part of Mr. Cohn? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. Yes, I will go along with that, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. And that was after these other persons had left, is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Carr. It is my recollection it was after they had left. 

]Mr. St. Ci^vir. You are not too sure of it ? 

Mr. Carr. I wouldn't state that positively ; no, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. You wouldn't? 

Mr. Carr. No, 



2752 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. St. Clair. You are not too sure of it ? 

Mr. Carr. I just wouldivt state positively. I am pretty sure of it. 

Mr. St. Clair. All right. Now, how long were you in the restau- 
rant? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know. The usual time it takes to eat lunch, not 
too much 

Mr. St. Clair. It is true Mr. Adams missed a couple of trains, is it 
not? 

Mr. Carr. He says he did. I am not sure. 

Mr. St. Clair. You are not in a position to deny it, are you? 

Mr. Carr. I wouldn't deny it. Of course not. 

Mr. St. Clair. How long do you think you were there ? 

Mr. Carr. Oh, I would say — I don't really know. Probably an hour, 
45 minutes, maybe longer, maybe less. 

Mr. St. Clair. Would it have been as much as 2 hours ? 

Mr. Carr. It might have been. I don't think so, but it could have 
been. I am not sure. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, an hour, or 45 minutes, is what you believe it 
was? 

Mr. Carr. I am really not sure on that. 

Mr. St. Clatr. Did this monologue continue throughout the dura- 
tion of the lunch ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, it is my recollection that it continued. Perhaps 
somebody got a word in once in awhile. But pretty much, yes, pretty 
much. 

Mr. St. Clair. And did it continue from the ride uptown until Mr. 
Adams got out of the car ? 

Mr. Carr. Well, no. There I am not sure that it was only Mr. Cohn 
who was talking. I think the Senator may have said something. I 
think I may have said something. 

Mr. St. Clair. This was the first time you had observed Mr. Cohn 
take the floor on the question of General Lawton, isn't it ? 

Mr. Carr. I am not sure this is the first time I observed him take the 
floor. I know I have hoard him take the floor on the subject of possible 
reprisals against persons who had helped the committee. We have 
had — he had had instances of that before in other investigations con- 
ducted. 

Mr. St. Clair. This whole matter had been gone over before at the 
end of November, had it not ? 

Mr. Carr. What whole matter is that, sir ? 

Mr. St. Clair. The question of General Lawton. 

Mr. Carr. The question of General Law^ton came up, to my first 
knowledge, concerning any action or possible action, came up in 
November around Thanksgiving. 

Mr. St. Clair. Yes. And didn't you learn that he had been re- 
quired to submit a written report to the Secretary ? 

Mr. Carr. I didn't learn that, no, not at that time. 

Mr. St. Clair. You didn't learn that ? 

Mr. Carr. No. 

Mr. St. Clair. You didn't learn that that report was dated Novem- 
ber 25 ? 

JMr. Carr. No, I don't think I learned that. 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2753 

Mr. St. Clair. And you didn't learn that the Secretary accepted that 
report ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir ; I don't think I learned that. 

Mr. St. Cl.\ir. All right. You testified there was a monologue, 
and I guess a rather animated one, for a period through lunch, and 
perhaps part of the ride. 

Mr. Carr. Well, I — no, I think I testified that there were un- 
doubtedly some interruptions. 

Mr. St. Clair. All on the same subject? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, on the same subject. 

Mr. St. Clair. All on the same subject? 

Mr, Carr. As best I recall ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. And that the only question about Schine was an 
attempted interruption by Mr. Adams? 

Mr. Carr. That is my recollection ; yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, do you want to state positively, sir, that that 
is what happened? 

Mr. Carr. That the only talk about Schine was this attempt by Mr. 
Adams to bring it into the conversation? 

Mr. St. Clair. Yes. 

Mr. Carr. I think that I could say that that is the only mention of 
Schine that was made that day. When you say positively, I am not 
sure that I would want to say that. Somebody might have mentioned 
him, might have said something. But I am pretty sure that is the 
only time. 

Mr. St. Clair. You are pretty sure of it? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. You have no reservations about that ? 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. What time was it when you let the Senator out at 
the Waldorf Astoria? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know. It was following the lunch. It takes 
probably 20 minutes to drive uptown, maybe 25. I don't know 

Mr. St. Clair. Well, about what time was it? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know. The middle of the afternoon sometime. 

]\Ir. St. Clair. And you got out, and I guess the Senator got out, 
and Mr. Cohn got out ? 

Mr. Carr. No, as I recall, the Senator got out, I continued uptown 
with INIr. Cohn. 

Mr. St. Clair. Where did you go ? 

Mr. Carr. He dropped me farther uptown. 

Mr. St. Clair. Where did you go ? 

Mr. Carr. Mr. Cohn was making a speech, as I recall — is that 
right? — another speech that afternoon at some high school up in the 
Bronx. I drove up with him, I think. I think following the speech 
I went somewhere and I met him later. I know I met him again that 
night. 

Mr. St. Clair. You went with Mr. Cohn to this high school up in 
the Bronx, is that right ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. St. Claik. That speech was delivered, and then you went 
someplace with him for supper ? 



2754 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

Mr. Carr. No. I think I left him. If I recall, I think I went 
Christmas shopping. 

Mr. St. Clair. Christmas shopping? 

Mr. Carr. I think so. 

Mr. St. Clair. Did you know that the Senator was going on a trip 
that afternoon ? 

Mr. Carr. Yes, I did. 

Mr. St. Clair. And he took a plane out and went for several days? 

Mr. Carr. Yes. 

Mr. St. Clair, Do you know 

Mr. Carr. I am not sure how long, but he went to Chicago, I 
think. 

Mr. St. Clair. Do you know what time he was supposed to leave? 

Mr. Carr. No ; I really don't. 

Mr. St. Clair. Do you know what time he checked out of the hotel ? 

Mr. Carr. No, I don't. 

Mr. St. Clair. You testified yesterday that the Senator called you 
on the telephone to talk with you about Schine, do you recall that? 

Mr. Carr. I think I testified yesterday that I called the Senator 
on the phone and I now recall that I called the Senator from up in 
the Bronx on the telephone about other matters, one matter being for 
my information how long he was going to be out of town, and things 
like that. 

Mr. St. Clair. What made you call him there? Why didn't you 
anlc liim M'hile you were riding uptown, Mr. Carr? 

Mr. Carr. I just can't answer that. I don't know. 

Mr. St. Clair. You just don't know? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know. 

Mr. St. Clair. It just suddenly struck you, Mr. Carr, that you 
had better find out about Mr. Schine, is that right? 

Mr. Carr. I don't know. I just can't tell you. 

Mr. St. Clair. You just can't tell me. 

Senator Mundt. Do 3^011 mean Mr. Schine or Senator McCarthy? 

Mr. St. Clair. I mean Mr. Schine. . 

Mr. Carr. You had better ask that again. I thought you meant 
what made me call Senator McCarthy at that time. 

Mr. St. Clair. That is right, and suggested 

JNIr. Carr. Would you repeat the question ? 

Mr. St. Clair. Would you read the question to him ? 

(Whereupon, the question was read by the reporter as above 
recorded.) 

Mr. Carr. No, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. What was it that made you call the Senator shortly 
after j^ou left him off at the hotel ? You had been with him all noon- 
time, hadn't you ? 

Mr. Carr. Right at this point, I really can't say. 

Mr. St. Clair. I am sorry. 

Mr. Carr. The best I could say was that I probably forgot about 
something that I should have talked to him about. 

Mr. St. Clair. And that was Private Schine? 

Mr. Carr. No, it wasn't, sir. 

Mr. St. Clair. That is what you talked with him about on the tele- 
phone when you called him from the Bronx? 



SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 2755 

Mr. Carr. That is one of the things which we talked about and, as 

1 testified yesterday, I believe it was the Senator who mentioned 
Schine's name to me. 

Mr. St, Clair. What were the other subjects you talked about? 

Senator Mundt. You may answer the question. The time has 
expired. 

Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. One subject that I recall was the length of 
time that Senator McCarthy would be out of town and I believe there 
was something about the reports. That is about all. I am sure there 
was something else. 

Senator Mundt. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, the committee recessed at 12 : 33 p. m., to reconvene at 

2 p. m., the same day. 



INDEX 



Page 

Acheson, Secretary of State 2733 

Adams, John G 2714, 2715, 2728-2730, 2738-2740, 2742, 2747-2750 

Air Force (United States) 2717 

Anti-Communist Chinese Navy 2745 

Army Chemical Center of Maryland 2735 

Armed Services Committee (Senate) 2733 

Army (United States) 2711-2713, 

2715 2718, 2722, 2727, 2731, 2733-2736, 2746, 2748 

Army career 2731 

Army in Korea 2727 

Army Intelligence (G-2) 2735 

Army intelligence schools 2713 

Army Reserve commission 2711, 2712 

Boston, Mass 2741-2743 

Bradley, General 2733 

Bridges, Stvles 2735 

Brownell, Mr 2723 

Bullitt, General 2745 

Capitol Police 2710 

Carr, Francis P., testimony of 2710 2755 

Chief of Staff (United States) 2733 

Chinese Communist mainland 2737 

"Coddling Communists" (expression) 2725,2726 

Cohn, Roy M 2711,2713,2714,2719- 

2721, 2723-2720, 2730, 2735, 2741, 2743, 2744, 2746-274S, 2751, 2753 

Committee on Armed Services (Senate) 2733 

Coraunications Subcommittee (Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com- 
mittee) 2T19 

Communist armies 2744 

Communist China 2737 

Communist conspiracy 2735 

Communist International 2719 

Communist Party 2715, 

2117-2720, 2725-2723, 27:J], 2732, 2734-2<37, 2741, 2742, 2744, 2745 

Communist ship 2745 

Communist writers 2719 

Communists 2715, 

2717-2720, 2725-2728, 2731, 2732, 2734-2737, 2741, 2742, 2744, 2745 

Communists in the Army 2717-2719, 2731, 2732 

Congressional Record 2735, 2736 

Crouch document 2717-2719 

Counselor to the Army 2714, 

2715, 2728-2739, 2738-2740, 2742, 2747-2750, 2752 

Cumbow, Sgt. Gilbert 2735 

Daily Worker 2719 

Defense Department 2715, 2731, 2734 

Department of the Army 2711-2713, 

2715-2718, 2722, 2727, 2731, 2733-2736, 2746, 2748 

Dworshak, Senator 2710 

Eisenhower, President 2737, 2745 

FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 2710, 

2717 -2720, 2722, 2720, 2727, 2731, 2735 

FBI agent 2717, 2718, 2731 

FBI document 2718 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FB1)__ 2710, 2717-2720, 2722, 2720, 2731, 2735 



II INDEX 

Page 

Fifth-amendment Communist 2735 

First World War . 2720 

Formosa 2745 

Fort Dix 2742 

Fort Meade, Md 2736 

Fort Monmouth 2714, 2716, 2717, 2724, 2729, 2736 

Gasner's Restaurant (New York City) 2750 

Government employee 2729 

Gdynia 2745 

Harriman, Averell 2733 

Hoover, J. Edgar 2722,2723 

Infiltration of the Air Force 2717 

Infiltration of the Navy 2717 

Intelligence schools (Army) 2713 

Interstate and Foreitcn CV)mnierce Committee (Communications Subcom- 
mittee) 2719 

Korea 2727, 2731, 2735-2737, 2744, 2745 

Lawton, General 2749-2752 

Lowe, General 2'>35, 2736, 2746 

Lowe's report 2736 

Loyalty board 2729 

MacArthur, General 2733, 2736, 2744, 2745 

MacArthur hea^rings 2733 

Marljury v. Madison (decision) 2733 

Marshall, General 2733 

Marshall, John 2733 

McCarthy, Senator Joe 2710, 

2714, 271S-2721, 2723-2728, 2735-2737, 2740-2742, 2744, 2740, 2748- 

2750, 2754, 2755. 

McGuire Air Base 2740,2742 

Military Establishment 2717 

Navy (United States) 2717,2737 

New York City 2714, 2720, 2750 

New York desk 2721 

Oppenheimer, Mr 2743 

Peress case 2729 

President of the United States 2733, 2.735-2737, 2745, 2746 

President's Loyalty Security Review r>oard 2736 

Reber, General 2711 

Republic of Korea 2737 

Reserve commission (Army) 2711,2712 

Ridgway, General 2744, 2745 

Ryan, General 2741, 2750 

Schine, G. David 2710-2713, 2715-2710, 2727, 2741-2743, 2746-2750, 2753 

Second Armv 2735, 2736 

Secretary of the Army 2710-2715, 2728, 2729, 2735, 2739, 2742, 2749, 2752, 2753 

Secretary of State 2733 

Selective Service Act 2717, 2734 

Senate Armed Services Committee 2733 

Senate of the United States 2733 

Seventh Fleet (United States) 2737,2745 

State Department 2736 

Stevens. Robert T 2710-2715, 2728, 2729, 2735, 2739, 2742, 2749, 2752, 2753 

Thanksgiving weekend 2747 

Truman, President 2733, 2735, 2736, 2746 

Truman blackout order (1948) 2746 

United Nations allies in Korea 2737 

United States Air Force 2717 

United States Army_ 2711-2713,2715-2718,2722,2727,2731,2733-2736,2740,2748 

United States Capitol Police 2710 

United States Chief of Staff 2733 

United States Congress 2709,2734 

United States Department of Defense 2715, 2731, 2734 

United States Department of State 2736 

United States Military Establishment 2717 

United States Navy 2717,2737 



INDEX in 

Page 

United States President 2733 

United States Secretary of State 2733 

United States Senate 2733 

United States Seventh Fleet 2737,2745 

Van Fleet, General 2744, 2745 

Voice of America report 2742 

Washington, D. C 2722,2725 

White House conference 2733 

World War I 2720 

Zwicker 2729 

O