THE
SPIRIT
O K
LAWS.
Tranflatcd from the FRENCH of
M. DE SECONDAT,
BARON DE MONTESQJJIEU,
By Mr. NUGENT,
VOL I.
Prolem fine matre creatam.
The THIRD EDITION corrected and
confiderably improved.
3LIOTHECA
;\*
LONDON,
Printed for J. NOURSE and P. VAILLANT in the Strand.
MDCCLVIII.
H
V
THE
TRANSLATOR
TO THE
READER.
f n ow i ng wor k may with the
{Iri6lefl jufbice be laid to have
done honour to human nature
as well as to the great abilities
of the author. The wifeft and moft learned
men, and thofe moil diftinguiihed by birth
and the elevation of their llations, have, in
every country in Europe, confidered it as a
moft excellent performance. And may we be
permitted to add, that a fovereign prince -j- as
juftly celebrated for his probity and good
fenfe, as for his political and military ikill,
f Tlje prefent King of Sardinia.
A 2
has
iv THE TRANSLATOR
has declared that from M. de Montefquieu he
has learnt the art of government. But had
the illuftrious author received no fuch diftin-
guimed honor, the numerous editions of
this work in French, and their fudden fpread-
ing through all Europe, are a fufficient tefti-
mony of the high eileem with which it has
been received by the public.
But notwithftanding the deferved applaufe
which has been fo liberally beftowed on the
author, there have been fome who have not
*
only endeavoured to blaft his laurels, 1
have treated him with all that fcurrility which
bigotry and fuperftition are apt, on every oc-
cafion, to throw out againft truth, reafon and
^ood fenfe. Thefe M. de Montefquieu has
himielf anfwered, in a feparate treatiie intitled,
A defence of the Spirit of Laws > from whence
we have thought proper to extract, for the
fake of fuch as have not feen that treatife,
the principal of thole objections, and the fub-
ftance of what has been given in reply : Only
iirft oblerving, that this defence is divided
into three parts, in the firft of which he
aniwers the general reproaches that have been
thrown out againfl him - 9 in the fecond he
replies
TO THE READER.
replies to particular reproaches ; and in the
third, he gives feme reflections on the man
ner in which his work has been criticized.
The author firft complains of his being
charged both with efpoufmg the doctrines of
Spinofa, and with being a Deift, two opi
nions directly contradictory to each other.
To the former of thefe he anfwers, by phci
in one view the feveral pallages in the Spirit
of Laws directly levelled againfl the doctrii
of Spinofa -, and then he replies to the objec
tions that have been made to thole pal Hit.;
upon which this injurious charge is founded.
The critic aflerts that our author fhimlA >
at his firft fctting out, and is offended at
his faying, that Laws in their mnft txtcx;
fignification^ arc t/ v relations a\
from the iwlio c cj things. To this he replies,
that the critic had heard it laid that Spinofa
had maintained that the world was governed
by a blind and necefTary principle ; and from
hence on feeing the word neceffhry, Ive con
cludes that this mull be Spinofifm j though
what is moil fuprizing, this article is di:
levelled at the dangerous principles maintained
by Spinofa : That he had Hobbes s fyflem in
A 3 his
vi THE TRANSLATOR
his eye, a fyftem, which, as it makes all the
virtues and vices depend on the eftablifhment
of human laws, and as it would prove that
men were born in a ftate of war, and that
the firft law of nature is a war of all againft:
all, overturns, like Spinofa, all religion, and
all morality. Hence he laid down this po-
fition, that there were laws of juftice and
equity before the eftablifhment of pofitive
laws : hence alfo he has proved that all
beings had laws; that even before their
creation they had porTible laws ; and that
God himfelf had laws, that is, the laws,
which he himfelf had made. He has fhewn *
that nothing can be more falfe than the afler-
tion that men were born in a ftate of war ;
and has made it appear that wars did not com
mence till after the eftablilhment of fociety.
His principles are here extremely clear ; from
whence it follows, that as he has attacked
Hobbes s errors, he has confequently attacked
thofe of Spinofa ; and he has been fo lit
tle underftood, that they have taken for the
opinions of Spinofa, thofe very objections
which were made againft Spinofifm.
* Book i. Chap. i.
Again,
TO THE READER. vii
Again, the author has (aid that the creation
which appears to be an arbitrary aft, f u ppfc$
laws as invariable as the fatality of the Alhcijh.
From thefe words the critic concludes that the
author admits the fatality of the Atheiils.
To this he anfwers, that he had juft before
deftroyed this fatality, by reprefenting it as
the greateft abfurdity to fuppofe that a blind
fatality was capable of producing intelligent
beings. Befkles, in the paflagc here ccn-
fured, he can only be made to lay what lie
really does fay : he does not fpeak of caufcs,
nor does he compare caufes ; but he fpeaks
of effects and compares effects. The wholo
article, what goes before and what follows,
make it evident, that there is nothing here
intended but the laws of motion, which,
according to the author, had been eftabliihed
by God : thefe laws are invariable ; this he
has afferted, and all natural philofophy has
afferted the fame thing ; they are invariable
becaufe God has been pleafed to make them
fo, and becaufe he has pleafed to prefer ve
the world. When the author therefore fays
that the creation which appears to be an ar
bitrary act, fuppofes laws as invariable as the
A 4 fatality
viii THE TRANSLATOR
fatality of the Atheifts, he cannot be under-
flood to fay that the creation was a neceflary
a6t like the fatality of the Atheifts.
Having vindicated himfelf from the charge
of Spinofifm, he proceeds to the other accufa-
tion, and from a multitude of paffages col
lected together proves that he has not only
acknowledged the truth of revealed religion ;
but that he is in love with Christianity, and
endeavours to make it appear amiable in the
eyes of others. He then enquires into what
his adverfaries have laid to prove the contrary,
obferving that the proofs ought to bear fome
proportion to the accuiation ; that this accu-
fation is not of a frivolous nature, and that
the proofs therefore ought not to be frivolous.
The firft objection is, that he has praifed
the Stoics, who admitted a blind fatality,
and that this is the foundation of natural re
ligion. To this he replies, " I wdll for a
14 moment fuppofe that this falfe manner of
" realbning has fome weight : has the au
thor praifed the pbilofophy and metaphy-
fics of the Stoics ? He has praifed their
morals, and has faid that the people reaped
great benefit from them : he has faid this,
" and
"
TO THE READER. ix
" and he has faid no more : I am miftakcn,
" he has faid more, he has at the beginning
cc of his book attacked this fatality, he does
" not then praife it, when he praifes the
" Stoics."
The fecond objection is, that he has
praifed Bayle, in calling him a great man.
To this he anfwers, <c It is true that the au-
" thor has called Bayle a great man, but lie
ct has cenfured his opinions: if he hasccniurcd
<c them, he has not efpoufed them : and fince
ff he has cenfured his opinions, he docs not
" call him a great man becaule of his opini-
" ons. Every body knows that Bayle had a
<c great genius which he abufed ; but this ge-
<c nius which he abufed, he had: the au-
< thor has attacked his fophifms, and pities
" him on account of his errors. I do not love
fc the men who fubvert the laws of their
country ; but I fliould find great difficulty
in believing that Cn-far and Cromwell hud
little minds : I am net in love with con
querors, but it would be very difficult to
perfuade me to believe that Alexander and
Jenghiz-Khan were men of only a common
genius. Befides, I have remarked, that
" the
cc
(C
<c
THE TRANSLATOR
" the declamations of angry men make but
" little imprefiion on any except thofe who
" are angry : the greateft part of the readers
cc are men of moderation, and feldom take
Cf up a book but when they arc in cool blood ;
" for rational and fenfible men love reafon.
<c Had the author loaded Bayle with a thou-
cc fand injurious reproaches, it would not
" have followed from thence, that Bayle had
" reafoned well or ill ; all that his readers
" would have been able to conclude from it
" would have been, that the author knew
cc how to be abufive."
The third objection is, that he has not
in his firft chapter fpoken of original fin.
To which he replies : " I afk every fenfible
" man if this chapter is a treatife of divinity ?
ic if the author had fpoken of original fin, they
" might have imputed it to him as a crime
" that he had not fpoken of redemption/*
The next objection takes notice, that "The
" author has faid that in England felf-murder
c< is the effect of a diftemper, and that it can-
" not be punifhed without punifliing the effects
c< of madnefs; the confequence the critic draws
<c from hence is, that a follower of natural
" religion
it
tc
TO THE READER. xi
" religion can never forget that England is the
" cradle of his feel, and that he rubs a fponge
" over all the crimes he found there/ He
replies, " The author does not know that
England is the cradle of natural religion ;
but he knows that England was not his
cradle. He is not of the fame religious
ct fenriments as an Englifhman, any more
ct than an Englifhman who fpcaks of the
<c phyfical effects he found in France, is not
" of the fame religion as the French. He is
<f not a follower of natural religion ; but he
" wifhes that his critic was a follower of
<c natural logic."
Thefe are the principal objections levelled
againft our author, on this head, from
which our reader will fufficiently fee on
what trifling, what puerile arguments this
charge of Dcifm is founded. He concludes
however this article, with a defence of the
religion of nature, and fuch a defence as
every rational Chriftran muft undoubtedly
approve.
" Before I conclude this firft part, I am
tempted to make one objection againft him
who has made fo many; but he has fo
2 " ilunned
cc
cc
cc
<c
xii THE TRANSLATOR
<c ftunned my ears with the words follower of
<c natural religion, that I fcarcely dare pro-
<c nounce them. I fliall endeavour however
cc to take courage. Do not the critic s two
" pieces (land in greater need of an explica-
<e tion, than that which I defend ? Does he
" do well, while fpeaking of natural religion
" and revelation, to fall perpetually upon one
<c fide of the fubjecl, and to lofe all traces of
" the other ? Does he do v/cil never to di-
ftinguifh thofe who acknowledge only the
religion of nature, from thofe who ac
knowledge both natural and revealed rcli-
<c gion ? Does he do well to turn frantic
" whenever the author confiders man in the
< (late of natural religion, and whenever he
<c explains any thing on the principles of na-
<c tural religion ? Does he do well to con-
4< found natural religion with Atheifm ? Have
" I not heard that we have all natural reli
gion ? Have I not heard that Chriftianity
is the perfection of natural religion ? Have
" I not heard that natural religion is em-
" ployed to prove the truth of revelation
" againft the Deifts ? and that the fame na-
" tnral religion is employed to prove the ex-
" iflence
(C
It
TO THE READER.
" iftence of a God againft the Atheifts ? He
" has faid that the Stoics were the followers
" of natural religion j and I fay, that they
were Atheifts, fmcc they believed that a
blind fatality governed the univerfe ; and
it is by the religion of nature that we
oughfc to attack that of the Stoics. He
fays that the fchcme of natural religion is
connected with that of Spinofa ; and I fay,
that they are contradictory to eacli other,
" and it is by natural religion that we
ought to dcftroy Spinoia s fchemc. I lay,
that to confound natural religion with
Atheifm, is to confound the proof with
" the thing to be proved, and the objec-
" tions againft error with error itlelf, and
" that this is to take away the moft povvcr-
" ful arms we have airainft this error."
o
The author now proceeds to the fecond
part of his defence, in which he has the fol
lowing remarks. " What has the critic done
to give an ample fcope to his declamations,
and to open the wideft door to invectives ?
<c he has confidered the author, as if he had
" intended to follow the example of M. Ab-
cc badye, and had been writing a treatife on
" the
(C
<c
cc
<(
(C
tc
cc
Cl
(C
CC
cc
cc
THE TRANSLATOR
" the Chriftian religion : he has attacked
" him, as if his two books on religion were
" two treatifes on divinity ; he has cavilled
<{ againft him, as if while he had been talk-
<c ing of any religion whatfoever which was
" not Chriftian, he fhould have examined it
< according to the principles, and^loctrines
<{ of Chriftianity ; he has judged him as if
" in his two books relating to religion he
" ought to have preached to Mahometans
" and Idolaters the doctrines of Chriftianity.
" Whenever he has fpoken of religion in
" general, whenever he has made ufe of
<e the word religion, the critic fays, that is
" the Chriftian religion ; whenever he has
" compared the religious rites of different
" nations and has faid that they are more
" conformable to the political government of
thefe countries than fome other rites, the
* c critic again fays, you approve them then
tc and abandon the Chriftian faith: when he
ic has fpoken of a people who have never em-
" braced Chriftianity, or who have lived
" before Chrift, again fays the critic, you
" do not then acknowledge the morals of
u Chriftianity - y when he has can varied any
11 cuftom
"
"
TO THE READER. xv
cuftom whatfoever, which he has found
" in a political writer, the critic aiks him,
<c Is this a doctrine of Christianity ? He
might as well add, You fay you are a ci
vilian, and I will make you a divine in
fpite of yourfelf : you have given us
<c el fe where feme very excellent things oa
" the Chriftian religion, but this was only
" to conceal your real lentiments, for I know
" your heart, and penetrate into your
" thoughts. It is true I do not underitand
" your book, nor is it material that I
" fhould difcover the good or bad defign
" with which it has been written ; but I
<l know the boUom of all your thoughts :
" I do not know a word of what you have
faid, but I undcrftand perfectly well, what
you have not faid."
But to proceed. The author has maintain
ed that polygamy is neceilarily and in its own
nature bad ; he has wrote a chapter exprdsly
againfl it, and afterwards has examined in a
philofophical manner, in what countries, in
what climates, or in what circumftances it is
leaf! pernicious ; he has compared climates
with climates, and countries with countries,
and
<c
((
*vi 1 Jti tt i K A N S L A 1 <J K
and has found, that there are countries, where
Its effects are lefs pernicious than in others ,
becaufe, according to the accounts that have
been given of them, the number of men and
women not being every where equal, it is
evident, that if there are places where there
are more women than men, polygamy, bad
as it is in itfelf, is there Ids pernicious than
in others. But as the title of this chapter *
contains thefe words, Ibat the law of polygamy
h an affair of calculation^ they have feized
this title as an excellent fubject for declama
tion. Having repeated the chapter itfelf,
againft which no objection is made, he pro
ceeds to juflify the title and adds : " Po-
" lygamy is an affair of calculation when we
" would know, if it is more or lefs pernicious
" in certain climates, in certain countries,
" in certain circumftances than in others -, it
" is not an affair of calculation when we
" would decide whether it be good or bad in
" itfelf . It is not an affair of calculation
when we reafon on its nature j it may be
" an affair of calculation when we combine
" its effects ; in fhort, it is never an affair
* Book xvi. Chap. 4.
2 cc of
TO THE READER. xvii
" of calculation when we enquire into the
" end of marriage, and it is (Till Ids fo,
" when we enquire into marriage as a law
" eftablifhecl and confirmed by Jefus Cfirift.
Again, the author having laid, that po
lygamy is more conformable to nature in fomc
countries than in others, the critic has feizc I
the words more conformable to nature^ to ma!
him fay, that he approves polygamy. To
which he anfwcrs, u If I fay, that I /hould
" like better to have a fever than the fairvy,
" docs this fignify that I fhould like to have
" a fever ? or only that the fcurvy is more
" difagreeable to me than a fever r"
Having finished his reply to what had been
objected on the fubject of polygamy, he
vindicates that excellent part of his work
which treats of the climates; \\hen ipeaking
of the influence thefe have upon religion, he
fays, " I am very fenfible that religion is in its
f own nature independent of all phylical
" caufes whatfoever, that the religion which is
44 good in one country is good in another,
* and that it cannot be pernicious in one
" country without being fo in all ; but yet,
* Book xvi. Chap. 4.
a I fay,
THE TRANSLATOR
" I fay, that it is praftifed by men, and
" has a relation to thofe who do not practife
" it, any religion whatfoever will find a
" greater facility in being practifed, either
<c in the whole or in part, in certain coun-
" tries than in others, and in certain cir-
< cumftances than in others, and that who-
" ever fays the contrary muft renounce all
< pretenfions to fenfe and underflanding."
But the critic has been greatly offended by
our author s faying, * that when a jlatc is at
liberty to re or to reject a new religion,
it ought to be rejected ; ivbcn it is received, it
ought to be tolerated. From hence he ob-
jecls, that the author has advifed idola
trous princes, not to admit the ChrifHan re
ligion into their dominions. To this he an-
fwcrs mil by referring to a pafiage in which
he. fays, -J- that the bejl civil and political lavs
are, next to Chrtftianity^ the grcatefl blcjfings
that men can give or receive ; and adds, " If
<c then Chriftianity is the firft and greateft
<c blefling, and the political and civil laws the
<f fecond, there are no political or civil laws
<{ in any ftate that can or ought to hinder
<c the entrance of the Chriftian religion."
* Book xxv. Ch, 10. Ibid, Ch, i His
to THE READER.
His fecond anfwer is, <c That the religion
tc of heaven is not eflablifhed by the fame
<c methods as the religions of the earth read
u the hiilory of the church, and you will
<c fee the wonders performed by the Chriflian
tc religion : was flie to enter a country, fhe
< knew how to open its gates ; every inllru-
<c ment was able to effect it ; at one time God
" makes ufe of a few fiiheimcii, at another
<c he fets an emperor on the throne, and
c makes him bow down his head under the
" yoak of the gofpcl. Docs Chrillianity
< hide hcrfelf in fubterranean caveni^ ? Hay
<c a moment, and you fee an advocate fpeak-
fc ing from the imperial ihronc on h.
* f behalf. She traverfcs, whenever ihe plead-
" feas, rivers, and mountains ; no obflacles
Cf here below can flop her progrefs: implant
tl averfion in the mind, flie will conquer this
<c averfion : eflablifh cultoms, form habits,
" publiih edicts, enact laws, fhe will triumph
" over the climate, over the laws which
" refult from it, and over the legiflators who
< have made them. God acting according
to decrees which are unknown to us,
extends or contracts the limits of his
religion. a 2 He
(C
tc
tc
C(
cc
THE TRANSLATOR
He next proceeds to vindicate what he has
laid on celibacy ; but as another writer who
has done juftice to this work, has fet the ill
confequences attending the celibacy of the
clergy in a ftronger light, than it would per
haps have been prudent for any gentleman in
France to have done, we fhall beg leave to
iniert a paragraph or two" from him.
" The doctrine of the perfection of celi
bacy, fnys he, has produced the fame
deftruftive effects, in Europe, as the heat
of the climate, the jcaloufy of command-
<c ers, and the flavery of the women have
" produced in Afia. According to the mod
11 exact obfervations, a (late that fuffers nei-
" thcr peftilence, nor war, nor famine, dou-
" bles the number of its inhabitants every
< fixty years. This being granted, every
tc kingdom which contains an hundred thou-
<( fand monks, lofes every fixty years, two
" hundred thoufand men, and a much greater
" number if an hundred thoufand rronks are
always kept on foot. Thus fuppofing that
they have had in France fmce the year
1640, two millions of fouls who have
ct taken the vow of celibacy, this kingdom
" has
<(
C(
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
TO THE READER.
" has loft thefe two millions who have
<c been unufcful during their life, four mil
lions which would have been produced by
them in the fpace of an hundred and
twenty years, two millions which would
have proceeded from the children of the
firft, from the year 1690 to the year 1750,
and two millions which would be produced
by the children of the two lad millions
" from the year 1750 to the year 1810. In
<c all ten millions, a lofs which though
" immenfe is real j bccautc the two millions
upon which I build this computation may
reafonably be fuppofed to be flickered ficm
" the mifcrics of war and famine, and to
" propagate in full fecurity : from hence it
" follows that France having only twenty
millions of fouls, though it ought without
the obftacle of celibacy to have thirty mil
lions by the year 1810, it lofes one third of
the force it might acquire. Can we then be
aftonifhed that ftates formerly extremely
populous fnould be now thinly inhabited ?
" Caft an eye on the infinite number of
perfons who in the two laft ages have taken
<c the vow of celibacy. Compute the defcend-
a 7 " r>J
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
if
cc
cc
<< ants they would have had in thi;
" To avoid all difpute add only to the ene-
t rative number, a number cqi^al to it, and
<e you will find that they would be equal to
" all Europe. What would they be, if you
? c were to attempt to calculate the progref-
" five courfe of generations. Your imagi-
" nation would create immenfe multitudes
(C which celibacy has annihilated. What
cf would they bo if you confidered this fub-
cc jecl: with the eye of faith, according to this
<e principle, that all the people upon earth,
" who are commonly computed an hundred
" millions, are all defcended from one man,
cc created about fix thoufand years ago j you
" will very readily find, that even a dozen
<c men who at the beginning of Chriftianity
t( embraced celibacy, might very well deprive
" the world of as many millions of inhabi-
c< tants as it at this day contains.
Thefe are fome of the principal objections
that have been made to the Spirit of Laws;
objections which however weak and trifling,
have been uttered with the zeal of a blind
bigot, who feeks to pervert what he does not
underftand, Truth and good fenfe always meet
with
TO THE READER. xxiii
with enemies, and though exprefled in the
ftrongeft and cleareft manner, will be mifin-
terpreted by the ignorant ; and attacked, cen-
fured and vilified by thofe, who, blinded by
zeal or prejudice, are refolved to fee every
thing through a falfe medium. The author
has however, done ample juftice to his own
work, and has fufficiently cleared his reputation
from all the afperfions that have been thrown
upon it ; we ihall therefore conclude this pre
face with the third part of his defence, which,
as it confifts of fomc excellent reflections on the
manner in which the Spirit of Laws has been
ciiticifed, and as it may be of ufc to direct th
judgment of future critics, we ihall give intire,
and without abbreviation.
" We have feen in the two firft parts, that
" all that refults from fo many bitter criti-
" cifms is this, that the author of the Spirit
<c of Laws has not performed his work
" according to the plan and the views of his
" critics; and that it his critics had wrote
" upon the fame fubject, they would have
" inferted in it a great number of things
" with which they were acquainted. It
<c appears alfo that they are divines, and the
a 4. " author
:X1V 1 Jri & I K A IN S L A 1 O R
ff author is a civilian ; that they think them-
" felves able to perform his bufmefs, and
ct that he does not think himfelf fit for theirs.
et In fhort, it follows, that inftead of attack-
< c ing him with fuch af -, they would
* have done better to have felt the value of
11 what he has faid in favour of religion :
o
ft which he has equally refpecled and de-
" fended: I ihall now make fome reflec-
<c tions,
<{ That manner of reafoning is not good,
" which being employed againft any good
" book whatfoever, will make it appear as
" bad as the worft book whatfoever ; and
** which being employed againft any bad
Cf book whatfoever, may make it appear as
" good as the beft book whatfoever.
" That manner of reafoning is not good,
" which to thofe things that are the fubjeel:
11 of difpute, calls in others that are foreign
to the pvrpofe, and which confounds the
feveral iciences and the principles of each
fcience.
< We ought net to difpute upon a work
built upon a fcience, from reafons that
may be brought againft the fcience itfelf.
<c
c<
CC
TO THE READER. xxv
cc When we criticife a work, and parti-
c cularly a large work, we ought to endea-
" vour to obtain a particular knowledge of
" the fciencc of which it treats, and care-
(< fully to read the approved authors who
have already wrote on that fcience, to the
end that we may be enabled to fee if the
<c author has deviated from the common and
" received manner of treating the fubjecr.
" When an author explains himfclf by his
" words, or by writings, which are the
<l image of words, it is contrary to reulon
" to quit the exterior figns of his thoughts,
11 in order to iearch into his thoughts thcin-
" felves - y becaufe there are none befides hini-
<c felf who know his thoughts : it is much
<c worfe when his thoughts are good, and
they attribute to him thofe that are bad.
" When we write acrainft an author, and
_j
become inccnled againil him, we ihould
prove the qualifications by the things, and
not the tilings by the qualifications.
" V/hen we find in an author a good
intention in general, we fhall be more
rarely deceived, if in certain places which
appear equivocal, we judge according to
<c
cc
<c
<f
"
"
the
AAV1
<C
cc
cc
iC
II
the general intention, than if we impute
" to him a particular bad intention.
" In books defigned for amufement, three
" or four pages may give an idea of the ftyle,
ce and the perfection of the work : in books
" of argumentation, we fee nothing if we
" do not fee the whole chain.
As it is extremely difficult to make a
good work, and extremely eafy to criticife
upon it, becaufe the author has had all
the pafTcs to guard, and the critic has but
<c one to force j it is necefTary that this laft
" fliould never be in the wrong : and if it
" happens that he is continually wrong, he
<c mud be inexcufable.
" Befides, as the criticifm may be confi-
cc dered as an oftentation of his fuperiority
" over others, and its ordinary defign is to
" gratify human pride, thofe who deliver
" themfelves up to this gratification, always
" deferve to be treated with equity, but fel-
" dom with indulgence.
<c And as of all the different kinds of
" writing, this is that in which it is moil
" difficult to (hew a good natural difpofition,
care fliould be taken not to encreafe by
i the
cc
cc
TO THE READER. xxvii
" the afperity of the exprcffions, the difa-
greeablenefs of matter.
When a perfon writes on great fubjects,
11 it is not fufficient that he confults his /:eal j
" he fhould alfo confult his abilities ; and it
cc heaven has not granted us great talents,
C| we may fupply them by a dillruft of our-
tc felves, by accuracy, labour, and reflection.
" That art of finding, in what has natu
rally a good meaning, all the bad mean
ings, which a mind accuftomed to ialic
rcafoning can give, is of no fcrvice to man
kind ; thofe who praclife it referable the
ravens who Hum living bodies, and fly on
tc all lides in fearch of carcaill
" This conduct, when obferved in criticifm,
produces two very great inconveniences :
the firft is, that it fpoils the minds of the
readers, by a mixture of true and fall
good and bad : they accuflom themfchx
to fearch for a bad fenfc in things that n
turally have a very good one , from whence
it becomes eafy to pafs to a difpofition to
" fearch for a good fenfe in things that have
" naturally a bad one ; it makes them lofe
" the ability of reafoning juftly, by throw-
cc
cc
cc
cc
(C
<c
(C
Cf
cc
cc
<c
(C
" in g
THE TRANSLATOR
" ing them into all the fubtilties of falfe lo-
c< gic. The fecond mifchief is, that render-
" ing by this manner of reafoning, the
<c good fufpecled, they have no other arms
" to enable them to attack the worn: and
" moft pernicious performances j by which
< means the public lofe the very rules by
" which they might diftinguifli them. If
" they treat as Spinofifts and as Deifts thofe
Cf that are not fo } what will they fay to thofe
< who are?
" Though we ought readily to think that the
" men who write againft us, upon fubjects
ct in which all mankind are concerned, are
" determined to this conduct by the force of
" Chriftian charity ; neverthelefs as the na-
" ture of this virtue will fcarcely permit it to
<c be concealed, as it (hews itfelf in us in
fpite of ourfelves, and fhines and fparkles
on all fides ; if it happened that in two
pieces both wrote againft the fame perfon,
" one upon the back of another, there could
<c be found no trace of this charity, that it
" did not appear in any phrafe, in any turn,
* any word, any expreffion j he who had
" wrote fuch works would have juft reafon
44
tc
"
cc
cc
c
1C
<c
cc
tc
TO THE READER. xxix
M to fear his not being influenced by Chriftian
" charity.
And as the virtues purely human, are in
us the effect of what is called good nature ;
if it was impofTible to difcover any veilige
of this good nature, the public might from
<c thence conclude that thefe writings were
" not the effect of human virtues.
tc In the eyes of men, actions arc ah\\r
c< more fmcere than motives ; and it is iv
eafy for them to believe that the ;K t of ut
tering the mofl cruel invectives is evil, than
to perfuade them that the motive which
<c made them utter them is good.
" When a man is placed in a fituation
which creates a rcfpect for religion, and in
which religion entitles him to refpect, and
attacks Before the men of the world, one
" of their own body ; it is abfolutely necei-
fary, that he fhould maintain, by his
manner of acting, the fupcriority of his
" character. The world is very corrupt;
cc but there are certain paffions which even
tc in the world are under a great reftraint ;
" there are favourites which forbid the others
<( appearing. Ccnfider the men of the w r orld
<( in
tc
cc
cc
cc
cc
THE TRANSLATOR
" in refpeft to each other, there is nothing
" fo timid ; this arifcs from a pride which
" durft not difcover its fecret motion c and
< which from the refpcct it has for o s,
" lets go its hold in order to recover it again.
- Chriftianity gives us the habit of fubduing
: udc; the world ives us the habit of
<( cone With the fe\v virtue
" have \\hat w.Aikl become of ; if the
" whole foul was ict at liberty, and if v
* v. ui- not attentive to the Icaft words, the
t lead iigns, and the lead gcdures ? Now
<l when perfons of a refpe<5lable character dif-
" cover paftions which the men of the world
<c ciurft not. fufFtr to appear, thefe begin to
<l believe themfelves better than they really
cc are. This is an evil of very great con-
" fequence.
ct We men of the world are fo frail that
" we deferve to be treated with the extremed
" circumfpe6lion and addrefs : for when they
" let us fee all the exterior marks of violent
* paffions, what would they have us think
<l of their minds ? Can they hope that we,
" with our ordinary rafii way of judging,
" lliall not be tempted to judge ?
" They
TO THE READER.
cc They might have remarked in difputcs
<f and converfations what happens amongfh
" that part of mankind whofe fpirits are
" rough and untraclable : as they do not
<c combat to affift, but to throw each other
" to the earth, they fly from truth, not in
" proportion to the greatnefs or littlenefs of
<c their fouls ; but to the greater or the k
degree of that caprice or inflexibility which
conftitutes their chara6lers. The contrary
happens to thofe to whom nature or educati
on have given a fwectnefs of temper : as their
difputes are mutual helps as they center in
the fame object, as they think differently only
that they may arrive at the fame fentiments,
they find truth according to their abilities.
" When a man writes on religious fubject
he ought not to depend fo far on the piety
cc of his readers, as to fay what is contrary to
" good fenfe ; becaufe, to gain credit with
C( thofe who have more piety than knowledge,
" he will gain difcredit from thofe who have
more knowledge than piety.
And as religion, when let alone, is capa
ble of. defending herfelf, fhe lofes more
" when ill defended, than when flie is not
" defended at all. " If
"
<(
"
"
11
"
"
"
<
(C
cc
cc
<c
<c
THE TRANSLATOR
" If it fhould happen that a man, after
having loft his readers, fhould attack any
" one who had gained fome reputation, and
" by that method fhould find the means of
< c being read j it might perhaps be fufpccled
ct that under the pretence of facrificing this
<c victim to religion, he iacrificcd him to his
" felf-lovc.
" That manner of criticifm of which we
<c arc fpcaking, is of all tilings in the world,
the moft capable of limiting the extent, and
of diminifhing, if I may prefume to make
ufe of this term, the mm total of rational
genius. Theology has its bounds and fet
forms ; becaufe the truths it teaches being
known, it is neceffary that men fhould ad-
here to them ; and they ought to be hin-
dered from wandering : it is here that ge-
nius ought not to take its flights ; it is cir-
<c cumfcribed, if I may be allowed the ex-
prefiion, within an enclofure. But it would
be making a jell of mankind to put the
fame enclofure about thofe who treat of
human fciences. The principles of geometry
are mofl true ; but if they v/ere applied to
things of tafte, they would make reafon
itielf
cc
<c
(C
c
tc
cc
CC
TO THE READER. xxx iii
<c itfelftalknonfenfe. Nothing ftifles a doclrine
<c fo effectually, as wrapping up every thing
< f in a doctor s gown : the men who would
<{ always teach, arc great obftacles to learn-
< c ing j there is no genius which they do not
< c contract, when they overwhelm it with a
million of frivolous fcrup! If you have
<c the bell intentions in the world, they will
< r f >rce you to fufpect them ; you can no longer
(f be employed in (peaking well, when you
tc are perpetually u ,ir of
< c fpeakingill; and wh ] ofpurfuing
<c your thoughts, you are only employed in
tc finding out fuch terms as may elcape the
cc fubtilty of the critics. They come to put a
" /. . on our heads, and to repeat at every
" word, Take care of falling. You would
tf fpeak like yourfelf, I will have you fpcak
<c like me. Do you attempt to foar aloft, they
<c flop you by pulling your flecvc : have you
<c life and vigour, they fcratch you cut of it :
" do you rife a little, there are men, who
<c taking a foot rule, and holding up tlv
" heads cry, Come down that we may mea-
" fure you : do you run your race, they
<c would have you obferve all the ftones which
" their trifling forms have placed in your
b " way.
xxxiv THE TRANSLATOR
" way. No fcience, no literature can efcape
" this pedantry : for our age has formed aca-
" demicians who would make us enter the
" fchools of the darkeft and moft ignorant
times. Dcfcartcs may properly give cou-
<c rage to thofe, who with a genius infinitely
" Ids than his, have as good intentions : this
" great man was perpetually accufed of
11 Atheiim 3 and yet there are not at this day
" ftrongcr arguments employed againft the
44 At hafts than he himfclf produced.
<c As to the reft, we ought not to regard
( criticifms as perfonal, except in the cafe
" where thofe who make them would render
<{ them fo. It is extremely proper that per-
" fons ihould be permitted to criticife the
" works that have been given to the public,
" becaufe it would be ridiculous, for thofe
" who have been willing to enlighten others,
<c not to be willing to be enlightened them-
" felves. Thofe who inform us are the com-
<l panions of our labours : if both the critic
<c and the author feek the truth, they are in
" the fame intereft ; for as truth is the pro-
" perty of all men ; they will be confederates
" and not enemies.
PREFACE.
PREFACE.
amidft the infinit v/v;- of fub-
s contained in this beck, there is
my
;;;, may p ,/, /
can at leajl ajjur. , ! it was not
inferted with an ill In- : : For I ,
naturally of a captious te Plato thanked
the Gods, that / ?s born in /. age
with Socrates : and for ; , / g: -ir thanks
to the Supreme, that I was born a fubjeft of
that government under which I 7/-;v and that
it is his pleafure I jhonld obey thofe, whom be.
has made me lo r ee.
I beg one favour of my readers, which I
fear will not lc granted me ; this is, that they
will not judge by a ftw bears . F :J,
the labour of twenty years ; will
approve or condemn the book entire, and not a
few particular pbrafcs. If they
b 2 into
xxxvi PREFACE.
into the de/tgn of ibe author, they can do it no
ether way jo corn / letch, as by fe arching into the
de/ign of the work.
I have Jirjl of all confidered mankind -, and
the rcfult of my thoughts has been, that amidjl
fuch an infinite diiierfity of laws and manners,
they were not foldy con dueled by the caprice oj
fancy.
I have laid down the frft principles, and
lave found that the particular cafes follow
naturally from them ; that the hijlories of all
nations are only confequcnces of them ; and
that every particular law is connected with
another law, or defends on fome other of a more
general extent.
When I have been obliged to look back into
antiquity, I have endeavoured to ajjiime the
fpirit of the ancients, left IJhould confider thofe
things as alike, which are really different ; and
left I Jhould m(fs the difference of thofe which
appear to be alike.
I have not drawn my principles from my pre
judices, but from the nature of things.
Here a great many truths will not appear,
till we have feen the chain which connects them
ith others, The more we enter into particu
lars.
PREFACE. xxx vii
j the more we flail perceive the certainty of
the principles on which they are founded. I have
not even given all thefe particulars, for who
could mention them all without a nicjl infup-
portable fatigue ?
*The reader will not here meet with any of
tbofe bold fight s y which fee m to characterize the
works of the prefent age. When things are ex
amined with ever fo fniall a degree c.f extent *
the failles of imagination muft vauifb ; theft
generally arife from the mind s collecting all
its powers to view only one fide cf the fub-
jett-> while it leaves tbe other uncbferved.
I write not to cenfure any thing e/tablifi\\i in
any country whatsoever. Every nation will here
fnd the reafons on which its maxims are found
ed -, and this will be tbe natural ;.v/ /,
that to propofe alterations, belongs only to tbofe
who are fo happy as to be born with a genius
capable of penetrating into the entire conjlitu-
tion of a ft ate.
It is not a matter of indifferent^ that
the minds of the people be enlightened. T. ;
preju dices of tbe ma gift rate have arife n from
national prejudice. In a time of ignorance
they have committed even the greateft evih
b 3 without
lii PREFACE.
without the leap fcrupk ; but in an enlightened
age le> i. conferring the
great eft blejjir.gs. T/!rv / nt
es; ll\ \ fee hew thev ;;:://: be re", .: ;
of the abufes cf i
li . /;. //( , //
<7 T. . cut wilb a
T/
cf them in
canfes to
h.
C f to cfford n,
fens to evi . his ccun!r\\
cf t
fl
i Is.
C I but ~cd fo as to pc
, to : -n
bo
(bey, fo f.nd a mw / ; from
ih-eh- c ; /
~. S.
*fbe mojl k cf mcrtch j : I tL:nk
j) could I ten; t to i
Jra /ices. By reJL-Llicts>
PREFACE. x>
be: cm an, ;. which renders meii ig:trcr.t
of feme particular tbings, but whatever ,
them ignorant rf fhemfefaes.
If is in endeavouring to inflrucl m, ./,
that ive arc bejl able to pra&ife tbat gc
v:rtm\ -uLich comprehends the love of alL
Man, tbat flexible being, conforming in focieiv
to tie thoughts and imprcjjiom of others^ is
- .ally capable of knowing Us ci.cn nature,
it is laid open to bis v.
lojing the very fenfe of /V, ivbcn this is
banified from his mind.
Often have I begun, and as often have I laid
afide this undertaking. I . a tboufand times
green the leaves I have written^ to the ^ is:
I every day felt my paternal hands fall -j-. /
have j: ! w: d>jccl without an\ fixed plan : I
have kuoii }2 neither rules nor exceptions ; / ha~.
found the truth, only to lofe it again. But
when I had once difcwered my fr/l principles^
every thing I fought for appeared - t and in t [
courfe of tn cnty years^ Ibavefeen my \iork be
gun ^ growing up, advancing to maturity, anc(
fu lifted.
* Ludibria with.
f Ter p.itria cecldsre manvs
b 4 if
R R E F A C E.
If t th fuccefs, I fiall OK?
It chief y to the grandeur and ;; fub-
jc5l. H r I do not think tlat I ha r :e Iccn
totally deficient in point cf genius. hen I hiree
f:cn K/J tit Jo many great men both In Fran,
England and German} 1 bii^e fetid bcfcre wc> I
ha-ce been loft in admiration ; but I t loft
?uy courage : I faid i-ith Correggto a And I
alfo am a * painter.
* Ed 10 ancbe fan pit tore.
J
CON-
CONTENTS.
Book I. Of Laws in general.
CHAP. I. Of the Relation of Laws to different
Beings, i
Chap. II. Of tbe Laws of Nature^ 5
Chap. III. Of -pofitive Law s y 7
Book II. Of Laws dirtfr.lv derived from the
Nature of Government.
Chap. I. Of tbe Nature of tbe three different Govern
ments, 1 1
Chap. II. Of the republican Government, find tie
Laws relative to Democni ibid.
Chap. III. Of the Laws relative to the Nature of
Ariftocracy, \ 8
Chap. IV. Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of
monarchical Government , 2 j
Chap. V. Of the Laws relative to the Nature of a
defpotic Government^ 25
Book III. Of the principles of the three Kinds
of Government.
Chap. I. Difference between the Nature and Principle
of Government^ 2 7
Chap. II. Of the Principle of different Govern-
rnnts, ibid.
Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. III. Of the Principle cf Democracy, 28
Chap. IV. Of the Principle of Ariftocracy, 31
Chap. V. That / "irtue is net the Principle of monar
chical Government^ 3 3
Chap. VI. /;; what manner Virtue is fupplied in a
monarchical Government, 35
Chap. VII. Of the Principle cf Monarcl ibid.
Chan. VIII. That Honor is not the Principle of defpo-
tic Government i 36
Chap. IX. Of the Principle cf defpotic Government ,
37
Chap. X. Difference of obedience in moderate and
defpotic Governments, 39
Chap. XL Reflections on the foregoing, 41
Book IV. That the Laws of Education ought to
be relative to the Principles of Government.
Chap. I. Of the Laws of Education,
Chap. II. Of Education in Monarchies, ibid.
Chap. III. Of Education in a defpotic Government,
47
Chap. IV. Difference between the Effects cf ancient
i me dim Education, 48
Chap. V. Of Education in a republican Government,
ibid.
Chap. VI. Of fane Lijlituticns among the Greeks, 49
Chap. VII. In -n- bat Cafe thefe Jingular Injlit utions
r.iay le cf Service, 52
Chap. VIII. Explication of a Paradox of tbe Anch
,>:crs, 5 3
Bock
CONTENTS.
Book V. That the Laws given by the Lcgifla-
tor ought to be relative to the Principle of
Government.
Chap. I. Idea of this Rock, 58
Chap. II. What is meant ly Virtue in a polii.
Stale, ibid.
Chap. III. What is meant ly a Love of the R,
in a Democracy, 50
Chap. IV. /// what manner the Love of / ..y and
Frugality is infpired, 61
Chap. V. In what manner tic Laves eftabUJb Equality
in a Democracy, 61
Chap. VI. In v:lat mc.nner the Laves ought to main
tain Frugality in a Dcmocrc 66
Chap. VII. Othei cds cf favouring the Principle
of Demo era 68
Chap. VIII. / thel.. >^ht fobs
relative to the Principle of Government in an Arijlo-
cracy, 72
Chap. IX. /;; v:hat manner the Laws are relative to
their Principle in Monarchies , 78
Chap. X. Of the expedition peculiar to the execu:
P cbies, 79
Chap. XI. Of the Excellence of c. Go-
vern/nent^ So
Chap. XII. The fame Subjeft continued^ S ^
Chap. XIII. An idea of dsfpotic Power^ ibid.
Chap. XIV. In ivhat manner tbe La-ivs are r\
to the Principles of dejpotic Government* ibid.
Chap. XV. The fame Subjett continued, 90
Chap. XVI. Of tbe Communication of Power, 93
Chap. XVII. Of Prefers, 94
Chap,
^ U 1\ JL li IM 1 5.
Chap. XVIII. O/ Rewards conferred by the Sove
reign, 96
Chap. XIX. New Conferences of the Principles of
the three Governments, 97
Book VI. Confequences of the Principles of dif
ferent Governments with refpecl to the Sim
plicity of civil and criminal Laws, the Form
of Judgments, and the infliftujg of Puniili-
> o o
ments.
Chap. I. Of the 5.v v of civil Lavs in different
Governments, 103
Chap. II. Of the Simplicity of criminal Laws in
different Governments^ 107
Chap. III. //. / Governments and in what Cafes
the Judges ought to determine according to the ex-
prcfs Letter of the Law, 109
Chap. IV. Of the Manner of forming Judg^r.
no
Chap. V. In \ilat Governments the Sovereign may be
Judge, 1 1 1
Chap. VI. That in Monarchies Alinijlers ought not
to be V, ] I ^
Chap. VII. Of a fingle Magiftrate, 1 1 6
Chap. VIII. Of Accufations m ~ent Governments ^
ibid.
Chap. IX. Of the Severity of Punijhments in different
Governments^ iiS
Chap. X. Of the ancient Frer.ch Laws, 120
Chap. XI. //<;/ i-jhcn a People are \ir!iiciis f.
/\Y/:// neccJJ&ryi ibid.
Chap. Xlf. Of tie Power of Puni foments, 121
Chap. XIII. Imfotency cf the Lc xs cf Japan, 12.$.
Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. XIV. Of the Spirit of tbc Roman Senate, 126
Chap. XV. Of the Roman Laws in refpeft to Punijh-
ments, 127
Chap. XVI. Of the jufl Proportion betwixt Punijh-
ments and Crimes, 130
Chap. XVII. Of the Rack, 132
Chap. XVIII. Of pecuniary and corporal Punifo-
ments, 133
Chap. XIX. Of the Law of Retaliation, ibid.
Chap. XX. Of the Puni/bmtnt of Fathers for the
Crimes of their Children, 134
Chap. XXI. Of the clemency of I he Prince, ibid.
Book VII. Confequenccs of the different Prin
ciples of the three Governments with refpeft
to fumptuary Laws, Luxury, and the Con
dition of Women.
Chap. I. Of Luxury, 137
Chap. II. Of fumpluary Laivs in a Democracy^
39
Chap. III. Of fumpiuary Laivs in an Ariflocracy^
140
Chap. IV. Of fumptuary Laws in a Monarchy, 141
Chap. V. / what Cafes fumptuary Laivs are ufefid
in Monarchies, 143
Chap. VI. Of the Luxury of China, 145
Chap. VII. Fatal Conference of Luxury in China,
146
Chap. VIII. Of public Coatinency, 147
Chap. IX. Of the Condition or State of Women in
different Governments^ 148
Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. X. Of the dcmcfiic tribunal among tie Romans,
149
Chap. XI. In what manner the In/lit aliens changed
at Rome together with the Goverwnei::, 151
Chap. XII. Of the Guardian/hip of V/omen among
the Romans, 152
Chap. XIII. Of the Punijbmcnts decreed by Empe
rors c.^ainjl the hie; :cy of II I ;/.v;/, 1^3
Chap. XIV. Sumptuary Ld-ivs among the Romans,
Chap. XV. Of Dowries and nuptial Advantages in
different Ccnjlitutions, 156
Chap. XVI. An excellent Ciijlcm of the Sammies*
J 57
Chap. XVII. Of Female Jdminiftratien, 158
Book VIII. Of the Corruption of the Principles
of the three Governments.
Chap. I. General Idea of this Bock^ J 59
Chap. II. Of the Corruption of the Principle of De-
mocn ibid.
Chap. III. Of the Spirit of extreme Equality, 162
Chap. IV. Particular Caufe of the Corruption of the
People, 163
Chap. V. Of the Corruption of the Principle of Ari-
Jtocracy* ibid.
Chap. VI. Of the Corruption of the Principle of Mo
narchy, 1 65
Chap. VII. ^bc feme Sub j eel continued, 1 66
Chap. VIII. Danger of the Corruption of the Prin
ciple of Monarchical Government, 167
Chap. IX. Hew reedy the Noliiity arc to defend the
Throne, 168
Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. X. Of the Corruption cf the Principle of defpo-
tic Government i 169
Chap. XI. Natural Effects of the Goodnefs and Cor
ruption of the Principles of Government, ibid.
Chap. XII. The fame Subjefl continued, 171
Chap. XIII. The Effect of an Oath among a virtuous
People, 173
Chap. XIV. How the fmallefl Change in the Con-
jlitution is attended with the Ruin of its Principles^
74
Chap. XV. Sure Methods cf preferring the three
Principles, 175
Chap. XVI. Dijlinftive Properties cf a Republic
ibid.
Chap. XVII. Dijlinftive Properties of a Monarch\,
176
Chap. XVIII. Particular Cafe of the Sfxnifh Monar
chy, 177
Chap. XIX. Diftinflive Properties of a dcfpciic Go
vernment, 178
Chap. XX. Conference of the preceding Chapters^
ibid.
Chap. XXI. Of the Empire, cf China, 1 79
Book IX. Of Laws in the Relation they bear
to a defenfive Force.
Chap. I. In what manner Republics provide fir their
Safety, 1 8 3
Chap. II. That a confederate Government ought to be
compofed of States of the fame Nature, efpecially cf
the republican Kind, 1 8 5
Chap. III. Other Requifites in a confederate Republic,
1 86
Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. IV. In what manner defpotic Governments pro
vide for their Security , 187
Chap. V. In what manner a monarchical Government
provides for it l sSecurity , 1 8 8
Chap. VI. Of the defenfive Force of States in general,
ibid.
Chap. VII. A Reflection, 190
Chap. VIII. A particular Cafe in which the defenfive
Force of a State is inferior to the offevfive, 1 9 1
Chap. IX. Of the relative Force of States, 192
Chap. X. Of the Weaknefi of neighbouring States,
ibid.
Book X. Of Laws in the relation they bear to
Offenfive Force.
Chap. I. Of cffenfive Force , 193
Chap. II. Of War, ibid.
Chap. III. Of the Right of Conqueft, 194
Chap. IV. Some Advantages of a conquered People ,
97
Chap. V. Gelon King of Syracufe, 199
Chap. VI. Of Conquejls made by a Republic, ibid.
Chap. VII. The fame Subjett continued, 201
Chap. VIII. The fame Subjefl continued, ibid.
Chap. IX. Of Conquefts made by a Monarchy, 202
Chap. X. Of one Monarchy that fubdues another^
203
Chap. XI. Of the Manners of a conquered People,
04
Chap. XII. Of a Law of Cyrus, ibid.
Chap. XIII. ALEXANDER, 205
Chap. XIV. CHARLES XII. 207
Chap.
*
THE
SPIRIT
O F
LAWS.
;, : .. : ..:.^. : ..:.. : .. : .. : .. : ..:..:;,;^^,::.:. : : . : - ;;-:-:-: :*:<
B O O K I.
Of Laws in General.
C H A P. I.
Of the relation of Laws to different Beings.
in their mod general fignifica- BOOK
^"^ ^""^
lion, are tiic neceflary relations refult-
^ n S fr m tne nature of things. In this *?
^ e n g s nave tnc ir laws, the Deity
has * his laws, the material world its
laws, the intelligences fuperior to man have their laws,
the beads their laws, man his laws.
Thofe who aflert that a Mind fatality produced the
various effetts we behold in this world, are guilty of a
very great abfurdity , for can any thing be more ab-
furd than to pretend that a blind fatality could be
productive of intelligent Beings ?
* La<w, fays Plutarch, is tbe queen of the Gcdt ar.dmtn. See his
treatife entitled, The neteflity of a Prince being a man of learning.
VOL. I. B There
2 THESPIRIT
i! o o K There is then a primitive reafon , and laws are
Chap i. ^ ie relations which fubfift between it and different
beings, and the relations of thefe beings among
themfelves.
God is related to the univerfe as creator and
prefervcT , the laws by which he created all things,
are thofe by which he preterves them. He acts ac
cording to thefe rules becaufc he knows them ; he
knows them beraufe he made them ; and lie made
them beraufe they are relative to his wifdom and
power.
As we lee that the world, though formed by the
motion of matter, and void of understanding,
fubfifts through fo long a lucceffion of ages, its
motions mull certainly be directed by invariable
l.rA 1 ; : and could we imagine another world, it
mui!: alio have conllant rules, or mail inevitably
peri fli.
Thus the creation, which feems an arbitrary act,
fuppoieth laws as invariable as thole of the fatality
of the Atheifts. It would be abfurd to fay, that the
Creator might govern the world without thofe rules,
fince without them it could not fubfift.
Thefe rules arc a fixt and invariable relation.
In bodies moved the motion is received, increafed,
diminifhed, loft, according to the relations of the
quantity of matter and velocity , each diverfity is
uniformity , each change is conftancy.
Particular intelligent beings may have laws of
their own making, but they have fome likewife
which they never made. Before there were intelli
gent beings, they were pofiible ; they had therefore
poffible relations, and consequently poffible laws.
Before laws were made, there were relations of pof
fible
O F L A W S. 3
fible juftice. To fay that there is nothing juft or B *
u nj u ft but what is commanded or forbidden by pofi-
live laws, is the fame as faying that before the de-
fcribing of a circle all the radii were not equal.
We muft therefore acknowledge relations of juf
tice antecedent to the pofitive law by which they arc
cftablifhed : as for inftance, that if human focietics
exifted, it would be right to conform to their laws ;
it there were intelligent beings that had received a
benefit of another being, they ought to be grateful ;
if one intelligent being had created another intelli
gent being, the latter ought to continue in its ,ri
ginal flate of dependance ; if one intelligent U-i
injures another, it delerves a retaliation of the injury,
and fo on.
But the intelligent world is far from being fo well
governed as the phyfical. For though the farmer
has alfo its laws which of their own nature are in
variable, yet it does not conform to them fo ex
as the phyfical world. This is becaufc on the o
hand particular intelligent beings are < mite i
ture, and coniequently liable to error , and on the
other, their nature requires them to be free agen r
Hence they do not fteadily conform to their primi
tive laws ; and even thofe of their owg inftituting
they frequently infringe.
Whether brutes be governed by the general laws
of motion, or by a particular movement, is what
we cannot determine. Be that as it may, they have
not a more intimate relation to God than the reft of
the material world ; and fenfation is of no other uis
to them, than in the relation they have either to
other particular beings, or to thfmfelves.
B 2
4 THESPIRIT
BOOK By the allurement of pleafure they preferve the
Chap i. being of the individual, and by the fame allurement
they preferve their fpecies. They have natural
laws, becaufe they are united by fenfations , pofi-
tive laws they have none, becaufe they are not con
nected by knowledge. And yet they do not con
form invariably to their natural laws ; thefe arc
better obferved by vegetables, that have neither in
tellectual nor fenfitive faculties.
Brutes are deprived of the high advantages which
we have , but they have ibmc which we have not.
They have not our hopes, but they are without our
irs , they are fubject like us to death, but without
knowing it , even moft of them are more attentive
than we to felf-prdervation, and do not make fo bad
a ufe of their paffions.
Man, as a phyfical being, is, like other bodies,
governed by invariable laws. As an intelligent
being, he incefTantly tranfgrefies the laws eftablifhed
by God, and changes thofe which he himfelf has
eftablifhtd. He is left -10 his own direction, though
he is a limited being, fubject like all finite intelli
gences, to ignorance and error ; even the imperfect
knowledge he has, he lofes as a fenfible creature,
and is hurried away by a thoufand impetuous paf-
fions. Such a being might every inftant forget his
Creator ; God has therefore reminded him of his
duty by the laws of religion. Such a being is liable
every moment to forget himfelf ; philofophy has
provided againft this by the laws of morality.
Formed to live in fociety, he might forget his fel
low creatures ; legiflators have therefore by political
and civil Jaws confined him to his duty.
CHAP.
U * L, A W 5. S
BOOK
CHAP. II. oi a.
Of the Laws of Nature.
ANtecedent to all thefe laws are thofe of na
ture, fo called becaufe they derive their
force entirely from our frame and being. In order
to have a perfect knowledge of thefe laws, we muft
confider man before the eftablifhment of fociety :
the laws received in fuch a ftate would be thofe of
nature.
The law which by imprinting on our minds the
idea of a Creator inclines us to him, is the firft in
importance, though not in order, of natural laws.
Man in a ftate of nature would have the faculty of
knowing, before he had any acquired knowledge.
Plain it is that his firft ideas would not be of a
fpeculative nature -, he would think of the preferva-
tion of his being, before he would inveftigate its
original. Such a man would feel nothing in himlelf
at firft but impotency and weaknefs ; his fears and
apprehenfions would be excefllve ; as appears from
inftances (were there any necefiky of proving it) of
favages found in forefts *, trembling at the motion
of a leaf, and flying from every fhadow.
In this ftate every man, inftead of being fenfible
of his equality, would fancy himfelf inferior. There
would therefore be no danger of their attacking one
another ; peace would be the firft law of nature.
The natural impulfe or defire which Hobbes at
tributes to mankind of fubduing one another, is far
1 Witntfs the favage found in tie forefts cf Hanover, who ivqj
carried over fo England under the reign ofQeorge I.
63 from
n J-j o i i iv. i
BOOK f rom being well founded. The idea of empire and
Chap. 2 dominion is fo complex, and depends on fo many
other notions, that it could never be the firft thai
would occur to human underftandings.
Hobbes enquires, For ivbat reafon do men go arm
ed, find have loch and keys to faften their doors, if
they be not naturally in a Jlate of war ? But is
it not obvious that he attributes to man before the
eflablifhment of fociety, what can happen but
in confequence of this eftablifhment, which fur-
niflics them with motives for hoitile attacks and
felt defence ?
Next to a fenfe.of his weaknefs man wo
foon find that of his wants. Hence another la\v
of nature would prompt him to feek for noun
nicnt.
IVar, I hax e obferved, would incline men to
(hun one another i but the marks of this fear be:
i iprocal, would foon induce them to affbciate. Be-
fidcs, this allocution would quickly follow from the
very pleafure one animal feels at the approach of
ar.c-thcr of the fame fpecies. Again, the attraction
aiiiin.^ irom the difference of fexes would enhance
this pleafure, and the natural inclination they have
for each other, would form a third law.
Bcfide the fenfe or inftinct which man has in
mmon with brutes, he has the advantage of at
taining to acquired knowledge ; and thereby has a
fecond tye wich brutes have not. Mankind have
therefore a new motive of uniting , ana a fourth
law of nature arifcs from the delire of living in
fociety.
C H A P.
<J i L, /i W d. 7
CHAP. III.
O/ pofitive Laws.
r
AS foon as mankind enter into a flare of fock-ty, \\ ,
they lofe the fenfe of their weaknefs , the equ.i-
Jity ceafes, and then commences the (Lire of war.
Each particular fociety begins to feel its ftrength,
whence arifes a ftate of war betwixt different nations.
The individuals likewife of each fociety become fen-
fible of their ftrength , hence the principal advan
tages of this fociety they endeavour to convert i<>
their own emolument, which conftitutes bcr
them a ftate of war.
Thefe two different kinds of military 11. i: ive
rife to human laws, C on/iderrd as inhabitants
fo great a planet which neceffarily implies a variety
of nations, they have laws relative to their mutual
intercourfe, which is what we call the Ui-u of nations.
Confidered as members of a fociety that mud be
properly fupported, tlu-y have laws relative to the
governors and the governed ; and this we CZ\] politic
law. They have alfo another fort of laws relating
to the mutual communication of citizens ; by which
is underftood the civil law.
The law of nations is naturally founded on this
principle, that different nations ought in time of
peace to do one another all the good they can, and
in time of war as little harm as pofTiblc, without pre
judicing their real interefts.
The object of war is victory , victory aims at con-
queft ; conquefl at prefervation. From this and the
preceding principle all thofe rules are derived which
conftitute the law of nations.
B 4 All
8 THESPIRIT
BOOK All countries have a law of nations, not except-
m, ino- the Iroquois themfelves, though they devour their
Chap. 3.
priloners : for they fend and receive ambaliadors,
and underiland the rights of war and peace. The
mifchief is that their law of nations is not founded
on true principles.
Befidcs the law of nations relating to all focieties,
there is a politic law for each particularly confidered.
No fociety can fubfift without a form of government.
The conjunction of the particular forces of individuals,
as Gravina well oblerves, conjlitutes what we call a
political jlatc.
The general force may be in the hands of a finglc
perfon, or of many. Some think that nature hav
ing eftablifhed paternal authority, the government
of a fingle perfon was moft conformable to nature.
But the example of paternal authority proves nothing.
For if the power of a father is relative to a fingle
government, that of brothers after the death of a
father, or that of cou/in germans after the deceafe
of brothers, are relative to a government of many.
The political power neceflirily comprehends the
union of ftveral families.
Better is it to fay that the government moil; con
formable to nature, is that whofe particular difpo-
jfition bell: agrees with the humour and difpofition of
the people in whole favour it is eftablifhed.
The particular force of individuals cannot be united
without a conjunction of all their wills. T be con-
jitnfticn of thofe iviUs, as Gravina again very juftly
obferves, is what ws call the civit STATE.
Law in general is human reafon, inafmuch as it
governs all the inhabitants of the earth , the political
and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the
particular
O F L A W S. 9
particular cafes in which this human reafon is ap- BOOK
plied. Chap. 3 .
They fliould be adapted in fuch a manner to the
people for whom they are made, as to render it
very unlikely for thofe of one nation to be proper
for another.
They fliould be relative to the nature and prin
ciple of the actual, or intended government , whe
ther they form it, as in the cafe of political laws,
or whether they fupport it, as may be faid of civil
inftitutions.
They fhould be relative ro the climate of radi
country, to the quality of the foil, to its fituation
and extent, to the manner of living of the natives,
whether hufbandmen, huntfmcn, or fhcphcrds: they
fhould have a relation to the degree of liberty which
the conftitution will bear-, to the religion of the in
habitants, to their inclinations, riches, number,
commerce, manners, and cuftoms. In fine, they
have relations amongft themfelves, as alfo to their
origin, to the intent of the legiflator, and to the or
der of things on which they are eftablifhed , in all
which different lights they ought to be confidered.
This is what I have undertaken to perform in the
following work. Thefe relations I fhall examine,
fmce all thefe together form what I call the Spirit
of laws.
I have not feparated the political from the civil
laws , for as I do not pretend to treat of laws, but
of their fpirit, and as this fpirit confifts in the va
rious relations which the laws may have to dif
ferent things, it is not fo much my bufmefs to fol
low the natural order of laws, as that of thefe re
lations and things.
I
JO la.j.a-v01AiXll
BOOK I fl^l] f ]r ft- examine the relation which laws have
; to the nature and principle of each government ;
and as this principle has a ftrong influence on laws,
I /hall make it my bufinefs to underftand it tho
roughly : and if I can but once eftablifh it, the
laws will foon appear to flow from thence as from
their fource. J mall proceed afterwards to other
more particular relations.
BOOK
U h" L, A W S. II
BOOK II.
Of Lmvs direElly derived from the Na
ture of Government*
CHAP. I.
Of the Nature of the three different Governments.
f~ "^ H E R E are three fpecies of government , BOOK
JL republican, monarchical, and defpotit. In or-
der to dilcover their nature, it is fufficient to recol- ^ t *
left the common notion, which fuppoles three defi
nitions, or rather three fads : that a republican go
vernment is that in which the body, or only a part of
the people, is pojj ejfed of the fuprcme power : Monar
chy, that in which a fingle perfon governs by fist and
ejlabliflied laws : a defpotic government, that in which
a fingle perfon directs every thing by his own will and
caprice.
This i$ what I call the nature of each govern
ment j we mud examine now which are thofe laws
that follow this nature directly, and confequently
are the nrft fundamental laws.
CHAP. II.
Of the republican Government, and the Laws relative
to Democracy.
WHEN the body of the people in a repub
lic are poffeiTed of the fupreme power, this
is called a democracy. When the fupreme power
is
12 1 n i^ o r i is. i 1
BOOK j s lodged in the hands of a part of the people, it is
Chap. 2. then an ariftocracy.
In a democracy the people are in fome refpecls
the fovereign, and in others the iubjed:.
There can be no exercife of fovereignty but by
their fuftrages, which are their own \vill ^ now the
fovcreign s will is the fovereign himfelf. The Jaws
therefore which eftablifh the right of fufFrage, are
fundamental to this government. In fact, it is as im-
| nrtant to regulate in a republic, in what manner, by
whom, to whom, and concerning what, furTrages are
to be given, as it is in a monarchy to know who is
the prince and after what manner he ought to govern.
DC- Lihanius ( ) fays, that at Athens a flrangcr
Jc^ intermeddled in tbc afemllics of tbc people, v:as
ed with deiitb. This is becaufe fuch a man ufurped
the rights of fovi \ty.
It is an cfTential point to fix the number of citi
zens who are to form the public: aiTemblies -, other-
wife it might be uncertain whether they had the votes
of the wl^ile, or of only a part of the people. At
Sparta the numbcr was fixt to ten thoufand. But at
Rome, a city dcfigned by providence to rife from
the weakeft beginnings to the higheft pitch ot gran
deur , at Rome, a city doomed to experience all the
vicilTitudcs of fortune; at Rome, who had fometimes
all her inhabitants without her walls, and fometimes
( b ) See all Italy and a considerable part of the world within
the conii- ^ m : at Rome, I fay, this number was never fixed
onThTcau- C)> ancl tnis was one ^ t ^ ie pr inci P al caufes of her ruin.
fes of the The people in whom the fupreme power refides,
grandeur Olia j u to j o o f thcmfelves whatever conveniently
and dc- . r . /
dine of they can -, and what they themlelves cannot rightly
the Ro- perform, they nvuft do by their minifters,
The
O F L A W S. 13
The minifters are not properly their s unlefs they B o K
have the nomination of them : it is therefore a fun- chap* 2.
damental maxim in this government, that the peo
ple mould chufe their minifters, that is, their ma
gi ftrates.
They have occafion as well as monarchs, and
even more fo, to be directed by a council or fenate.
But to have a proper confidence in thefe, they
fliould have the chufing of the members , and thii
whether the election be made by themfelves, as at
Athens ; or by fome magi (Irate deputed for that
purpofe, as on certain occafions was cuilomary at
Rome.
The people are extremely well qualified for chuf
ing thofe, whom they are to intrufb with part of
their authority. They have only to be determined
by things which they cannot be ftrangers to, and by
fads that are obvious to fenfe. They can tell when
a perlbn has been in feveral engagements, and has
had particular fuccefs ; they are therefore very ca
pable of electing a general. They can tell when a
judge is afllduous in his office, when he gives gene
ral fatisfaction, and has never been charged with bri
bery : this is fufficient for chufing a prretor. They
are ftruck with the magnificence or riches of a fel
low citizen j this is as much as is requifitc for elect
ing an edile. Thefe are all facts of which they can
have better information in a public forum, than a
monarch in his palace. But are they to n
nage an intricate affair, to find out and make a pro
per ufe of places, occafions, moments ? No, this
beyond their capacity.
Should we doubt of the people s natural ability
in refpect to the difcernment of merit, we need on-
lv
THESPIRIT
: oo K ]y ca ft an e y e on tne continual feries of furprizing
2< elections made by the Athenians and Romans ;
which no one furely will attribute to hazard.
We know that though the people of Rome aflumed
to themfelves the right of raifing plebeians to pub
lic offices, yet they could not refulve to chufe them;
and though at Athens the magiftrates w ere allowed by
the law of Ariftides, to be elected from all the dif-
ierent clafTes of inhabitants, yet there never was a
(<) Page ca | c f avs Xenophon ( c ), that the common people
(.91, and
(.02. t .dit. petitioned for employments that could endanger
Wechd. their fecurity or glory.
, .. As moil citizens have a capacity of chufing, though
they are not fufficiently qualilkd to be chofen , lo
the people, though n| calling others to an ac
count for their adminiftration, are incapable of the
adminiftration themil-hv
The public bufincfs muft be carried on, with a
certain motion neither too quick nor too flow.
But the motion ot the people is always either too
remifs or too violent. Sometimes with a hundred
thoufand arms they overturn all before them , and
fometimes with a hundred thoufand feet they creep
like infects.
In a popular ftate the inhabitants are divided in
to certain clafies. It is in the manner of making
this divjfion that great Initiators have fignalized
themfelves , and it is on this the duration and pro-
fperity of democracy have always depended.
Servius Tullius followed the fpirit of ariftocracy
in the diftribution of his clafies. We find in Livy
(* ^ i- ( d ) and in Dionyfius HalicarnafleuS ( e ), in what
1 Art rnanner he lodged the right of fuffrage in the
vV ieq. hands of the principal citizens. He had divided
i the
OF LAWS. 15
the people of Rome into a hundred and ninety-three BOOK
centuries, which formed fix clafTes ; and ranking ^ an 2>
the rich, who were in fmaller numbers, in the firft
centuries-, and thofe in middling circumftances, who
were more numerous, in the following centuries ;
he flung the indigent multitude into the laft , and
as each century had but one vote, it was property
rather than numbers that decided the elections.
Solon divided the people of Athens into four
clafles. In this he was directed by the fpirit <
democracy, his intention not being to fix tholl-
who were to chufe, but thofe who were capable of
being chofen , wherefore leaving to each citizen
the right of election, he made (* ) the judges eligi- ( f ).^
ble from each of thofe four clafTes ; but the magif- J
trates he ordered to be chofen only out of t l mt
three firft, which confifted of citizens of eafy for- Ifo
J wi.
tunes. 2. i-.diu
As the divifion of thofe who have a right of fuf- v * ;
frage, is a fundamental law in a republic-, io the s>t
manner alib of giving this fjffrage is another fun- Art. i
damental law.
The fuffrage by lot is natural to democracy -, as
that by do::e is to ariflocrav
The fuffrage by lot is a method of electing that
offends no one ; it lets each citizen entertain reafon-
able hopes of ferving his country.
But as this method is in itfelf defective, it has
been the glorious endeavour of the moft eminent
legislators to regulate and amend it.
* See in the Confiderations on the caufes of the grandeur and
decline of the Romans, chap. 9. how ihi: fpirir of Servius Tali
was preferveu republic.
Solon
16 T II E S P I R I T
B oo n Solon made a Jaw at Athens that military cm-
Chap. 2. ploymcnts mould be conferred by choice, but that
fenators and judges fhould be elected by lot. .
The fame legiflator ordained, that civil magiftra-
cies, attended with great expence, mould be given
by choice j and the others by lot.
But in order to amend the fuffrage by lot, he
made a rule that none but thofe who prefented
themfelves mould be elected , that the perfon elected
(f) See the mould be examined by judges ( E ), and that every
T)emof- C one mou ld h ave a right to accufe him if he were un-
& worthy of the office * : this participated at the fame
le- t j mc Q f t ^ e f u ff ra g e by lot, and of that by choice.
, and
, . . r i -/i
the orati- ^ nen time * tneir magiftracy was expired,
on againil they were obliged to lubmit to another judgment
upon the manner they had behaved. Perfons ut
terly unqualified, mud have been extremely back
ward in giving in their names to be drawn by
lot.
The law which determines the manner of giving
the fuffrages, is likewife fundamental in a democra
cy. It is a queftion of fome importance, whether the
fuffrages ought to be public or fecret. Cicero ob-
D lib. i, ferves ( h ), that the laws -}- which rendered them fe-
* 3- Ac cre t towards the clofe of the republic, were the caufe
of its decline. But as this is differently practifed in
different republics, I mail offer here my thoughts
concerning this fubjec~t.
* They ufed even to draw two tickets for each place, one
v, hich gave the place, arid the other which named the perfon
uho wru to fucceed, in cafe the firft was rejected.
f They v,ere called Lrga Talukres ; two tablets were prefent
ed to each citi7en. the firft marked with an A, for Antique, or
I ft.tlni if, and the other with an U and an/?, for Uti Rogat,
or Be It as von dr
The
OF LAWS. 17
The people s fuffrages ought douhtlefs to be B K
public f ; and this mould be confidered as a fun-
damental law of democrat The lower fort of
people ought to be directed by thofe of higher
rank, and reftrained within bounds by the gravity of
certain perfonages. Hence by rendering the fuf-
frages fecret in the Roman Republic all was loft;
it was no longer pofiible to direct a populace that
fought its own deftruction. But when the body of
the nobles are to vote in an ariftocracy ; or in a
democracy, the fenate || ; as the bu finds is then on-
Jy to prevent intrigues, the fuffrages cannot be too
fecret.
Intriguing in a fenate is dangerous ; dangerous
it is alfo in a body of nobles , but not fo in the
people whofe nature it is to act through pafTion. In
countries where they have no (hare in the govern*
ment, we often fee them as much inflamed on the
account of an actor, as ever they could be for any
concern of the ftate. The misfortun^ of a re, ub-
lic is, when there are no r intrigues , and this
happens when the people are corrupted by dint of
money : in which cafe they grow indifferent to pub
lic concerns, and paffionately defirous of lucre.
Carelefs of the government, and of every thing be
longing to it, they quietl : for their falary.
It is likewife a fundamental law in democracies,
that the people mould have the fole power to enact
laws. And yet there are a thoufand occafions or.
which it is necdTary the fenate mould have a power
f At Athens the people ufed to lift up their hands.
As at Venice.
|j The thirty tyrants at Athens ordered the fuffrages of the
Areopagites to be public, in order to manage them as they p.
L\fias or at. contra Agcrat, cap. 8.
VOL, I. C of
18 THESPIRIT
BOOK o f decreeing , nay it is frequently proper to make
Chap 3. f me tr i a l of a l aw before it is eftablifhed. The
confutations of Rome and Athens were excellent.
( h ) See The decrees of the fenate ( h ) had the force of laws
TV C
Team f r tne *P ace f a y ear an ^ did not become perpetual
lib.4,&.;. till they were ratified hy the confent of the people.
C H A P. III.
Of the LL> to tbc nature of Arijlccracy.
IN an ariftocracy the fupreme power is lodged in
the hands of a certain number of perfons. Thefe
arc iU-d both with the legiilative and executive
authority \ and the reft of the people are in refpedt
to them, the- lame as the iubjedts of a monarchy in
regard to the monarch.
They do not vote here by lot, for this would be
attended only with inconveniencies. In fact, in a
governnu-nt where the moil oppreftive diftinclions
are already eftablifhed, though they were to vote by
jot, ftill they would not ceafe to be odious ; it is the
.nobleman they envy and not the magiftrate,
\Yhen the nobility are numerous, there muft be
a fenate to regulate the affairs which the body of
nobles are incapable of deciding, and to prepare
thofe they decide. In this cafe it may be faid that
the ariftocracy is in fome meafure in the fenate, the
democracy in the body of the nobles, and the peo
ple are nothing at all.
It woi::.l be a very happy thing in an arifto
cracy, if by fome indirect method the people
could be emancipated from their ftate of anni
hilation. Thus at Genoa the bank of St, George
i being
O F L A W S. 19
being adminiftered by the people, gives them a cer
tain influence in the government, from whence their j ui .
whole profpenty ariies.
The fenators ought by no means to have a right
of naming their own members ; for this would be
the only way to perpetuate abufes. At Roi:
which in its early years was a kind of ariftocracy, the
fenate did not fill up the vacant places in their own
body, the new fenators were nominated by the
cenfors.
An exorbitant authority fuddenly conferred up
on a citizen in a republic, produces a monarch
or fomething more than a monarchy. In the latter
the laws have provided for, or in fome meafure
adapted themfelves to, the conftitution ; and the
principle of government checks the monarch : but in
a republic where a private citizen has obtained an ex
orbitant power l|, the abufe of this power is much
greater, becaufe the laws forefaw it not, and conie-
quently made no provision againft it.
There is an exception to this rule when the con
ftitution is fuch as to have immediate need of a ma-
giftrate inverted with an exorbitant power. Such
was Rome with her dictators, fuch is Venice with her
ftate inquifitors , thefe are formidable magistrates,
who reftore, as it were by violence, the ftate to
its liberty. But how comes it that thefe magiftra-
cies are fo very different in thefe two republics ?
It is becaufe Rome fupported the remains of 1,
ariftocracy againft the people -, whereas Venice em
ploys her ftate inquifitors to maintain her ariftocra-
They were named at firil by the tonfuls.
|| This is what ruined the republic of Rome : te Con/id era-
tions on the caufe s of" the g/andeur and decline of the Rc::;:m?.
C 2 cy
20 T H E S P I R I T
It o o K C y grrainft the nobles. The confequence was, that
Chap - at R me tne dictatorship could be only of a fhort
duration, becaufe the people aft through pafilon and
violence, and not with defign. It was necefiary
that a magiftracy of this kind fhould be exercifed
with luilre and pomp, becaufe the bufinefs was to
intimidate and not to punifh the people. It was
allo iKTeilury that the dictator fhould be created
only lor Ionic particular affair, and for this only
Ihould have an unlimited authority, becaufe he was
always created ipon fome fudden emergency. On the
contrary, at Vc-nice they have occafion for a perma
nent magifrracy ; for here it is that defigns may be
commenced, continued, fufpended, rcfumcd ; that
the ambition of a /Ingle perfon becomes that of a
family, and the ambition of one family that of ma
ny. They have occafion for a fecret magiftracy, be
caufe the crimes they punifh,, are hatched in fecrecy
and filence. This magiftracy mud have a general
inquifition, by rcafon their bufinefs is not to put a
flop to known evils, but to prevent the unknown.
In fine the latter magiftracy is appointed in order to
punifh fufpccted crimes j and the former ufed rather
menaces than punifhment even for crimes that were
openly avowed by their authors.
In all magistracies, the greatnefs of the power
mull be compcnfated by the brevity of the duration,
This moft legiflators have fixed to a year ; a longer
fpace would be dangerous, and a fhorter would be
contrary to the nature of the thing. For who is it
that in the management even of his domeftic affairs
would be thus confined ? At Ragufa * the chief ma-
gillrate of the republic is changed every month, the
Tournefort s voyages.
other
O F L A W S. 21
other officers every week, and the governor of the B
caftle every day. But this can take place only in a Q
fmall republic environed f by formidable powers,
who might eafily corrupt fuch petty and insignificant
magidrates.
The bed ariftocracy is that in which thofe who
have no mare in the legislature, are Ib few and in-
confiderable, that the governing party have no in-
tereft in opprefTmg them. Thus when Antipater ( b ) C 1 Diodo-
made a law at Athens, that wholbever was not r
v/orth two thoufand drachms, mould have no power
to vote, he formed by this nK-.ms the belt arido- "
cracy poflible ; becaule this \vas ib fmall a fum
excluded very few, and not one of any r.mk or con-
fideration in the city. Aridocranc.il families ought
therefore, as much as poffible, to 1-jvel themfclvcs
in appearance with the people. The more an arido-
cracy borders on democracy, the nearer it approaches
to perfection ; and the more it is imperfect, in pro
portion as it draws towards monarchy.
But the mod imperfect of all, is that in which
the part of the people that obeys, is in a date of ci
vil lervitude to thofe who command, as the arido-
cracy of Poland, where the pealants are (laves to the
nobility.
CHAP. IV.
Of the Relation of La-ivs to f/.e Nature rf men.
Government.
1
H E intermediate, fubordinate ;v I
dent powers, coniYitiite I
.: Lucca ih; magiltrutes are .
c
22 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK narchical government, I mean of that in which a
Chap. 4. f in gl e P er f n governs by fundamental laws. I faid,
the intermediate, fubordinate and dependent powers.
In fact, in monarchies the prince is the fource of
all power political and civil. Thefe fundamental
laws ncceflarily fuppofe the intermediate channels
through which tin- power flows : for if there be
only the momentary and capricious will of a fm-
gle per Ton to govern the Hate, nothing can be
fixed, and of courie there can be no fundamental
Jaw.
The moil natural, intermediate and fubordinate
.vcr is that of the nobility. This in fome mea-
iurc firms to be c-fTential to a monarchy, whofe fun-
da mental maxim is, no monarch, no nobility ; no no-
, no monarch -, but there may be a defpotic
prince.
There are men who have endeavoured in fome
countries in Europe to abolifh all the jurifdiction of
the nobility not perceiving that they were driving
at the very thing that was done by the parliament
of England. Abolifh the privileges of the lords,
of the clergy, and of the cities in a monarchy , and
you will foon have a popular ftate, or elfe a defpotic
government.
The courts of a ccnfiderable kingdom in Europe
have, for many ages, been flriking at the patrimonial
jurifdiclion of the lords and clergy. We do not
pretend to cenfure thefe fage magiftrates ; but we
leave it to the public to judge, how far this may
alter the conftitution.
Far am I from being prejudiced in favour of
the privileges of the clergy ; however, I fhould
be glad their jurifdiction were once fixed. The
queftiori
O F L A W S.
queftion is not whether their jurifdiclion was juftly B
eftablifhed , but whether it be really eftablilhed i Q " ^
whether it conftitutes a part of the laws of the coun
try, and is in every refpedl relative to thofe Jaws ;
whether between two powers acknowledged inde
pendent, the conditions ought not to be reciprocal ;
and whether it is not equally the duty of a good fub-
jec~b to defend the prerogative of the prince, as to
maintain the limits which from time immemorial he
has prefcribed to his authority.
Though the ecclefiaftic power is fo dangerous in a
republic, yet it is extremely proper in a monarchy,
efpecially of the ablblute kind. What would be
come of Spain and Portugal fince the fubvernon of
their laws, were it not for this only barrier againft
the incurfions of arbitrary power ? A barrier that is
always ufeful when there is no other : for as a defpo-
tic government is productive of the mod frightful
calamities to human nature, the very evil that re-
flrains it, is beneficial to the fubject.
As the ocean which feems to threaten to over
flow the whole earth, is flopped by weeds and by
little pebbles that lie fcattered along the fhore : fo
monarchs whofe power feems unbounded, are re-
ftrained by the fmalleft obftacles, and fuffer their
natural pride to be fubdued by fupplication and
prayer.
The Englifh to favour their liberty, have abo-
lifhed all the intermediate powers of which their
monarchy was compofed. They have a great deal
of reafon to be jealous of this liberty , were they
ever to be fo unhappy as to lofe it, they would be
one of the moft fervile nations upon earth.
C 4 Mr.
24 5 r 1 K 1
LOOK Mr. Law, through ignorance both of a repub-
, n - lican and monarchical conflitution, was one ot the
greateft promoters of abiolute power that ever was
known in Europe. Befides the violent and extraor
dinary changes owing to his direction : he wanted
to fupprcfs all the intermediate ranks, and to abolifh
the political communities. He was * the
monarchy by his chimerical reimburfemerus, and
kerned as if he wanted to redeem even the very con-
(litution.
It is not enough to have intern- : vvers
in a monarchy , there mull be pofitary
of the laws. This depofitary can be ,es
of tl-.p kipreme courts of juftice, who j :e the
new laws, and revive the obfolete. \ -.cural
lorance of the nobility, their indolence, con-
1 civil government, require there fj be
a body in vetted with a power of reviving anc. exe
cuting the laws which would be otherwiie bui -l in
oblivion. The prince s council are not a pu
They are naturally the depofuar
momentary will of the prince, and not of the K -
itnental lav Befides the prince s council is con
.ally changing-, it is neither permanent, nor nurr -
rou.s ; neither has it a fufficient fhare of the cc
tien. e of the people -, confequently it is incapable
let ;c in difficult conjunctures, or to reu
them to proper obedience.
Defpotic governments, where there are no
fundamental laws, have no luch kind of depofi-
ti. nee it is that religion has generally to
ich 1. .ce in thofe countries, bccaule it forms
Per : king of Arr?gon made himfelf grand mafter of the
:d that alone changed die conftitution.
a kind
O F L A W S. 25
a kind of permanent depofitary , and if this cannot BOOK
be faid of religion, it may of the cuftoms that are c ,
rcfpecled inftead of laws.
CHAP. V.
Of the Lavs relative to the nature of a defpotic Go-
I ernment.
FROM the nature of defpotic power it fol
lows that the fingle pcribn inverted with
this power, commits the execution of it aJfo to a
fingle perfon. A man whom his fenfes conti
nually inform, that lie himfelf is every thing, and
his fubjects nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous,
and> ignorant. In coniequence of this, he neg
lects the management of public affairs. But were
he to commit the adminiftration to many, there
would be continual difputes among them ; each
would form intrigues to be his firft flave; and he
would be obliged to take the reins into his own
O
hands. It is therefore more natural for him to
refign it to a vizir *, and to inveft him with the
fame power as himfelf. The creation of a vizir is
a fundamental law of this government.
It is related of a pope, that he had raifed an
infinite number of difficulties againft his election,
from a thorough conviction of his incapacity. At
length he was prevailed on to accept of the ponti
ficate ; and refigned the adminiftration intirely to
his nephew. He was loon ftruck with furprize,
and faid, I fhould n /)j;v thought that thefe
things were fo eajy. The fame may be faid of
The Eaflern kings are never without vizirs, fays Sir John
Chardiji .
princes
26 THESPIRIT
BOOK princes of the Eafb, who, being bred in that pri-
thap c Ton where their eunuchs enervate both their hearts
and underftandings, and where they are frequently
kept ignorant even of their high rank, when drawn
forth i r i order to be placed on the throne, they are
firit am : but as foon as the re chofen
a vLir, ti. .indon themfelves in their feraglio to
the mod b tlons, purfuing in the midft of
a rt, the mult capricious extrava
gancies ; the.-. _T have dreamt to find
matters fo only.
The greater the extent of an empire, the greater
is the feraglio; and confequently fo much the more
be prince intoxicated with pleafure. Hence the
more nations fuch a prince has to govern, the lefs
he attends to the government , the greater his
affairs, the lefs he makes them the fubject of his
deliberations.
BOOK
O F L A W S. 27
BOOK III.
Of the Principles of the three kinds of
Government.
CHAP. I.
Difference between the Nature and Principle of Govern-
went.
AFTER having examined the laws relative BOOK
to the nature of each government, we mud in.
y~>i
inveftigate thofe that relate to its principle.
There is this difference between the nature
and principle of government , its nature is that by
which it is conftituted, and its principle that by
which it is made to act. One is its particular
ftructure, and the other the human paflions which
fet it in motion.
Now laws ought to be no lefs relative to the
principle than to the nature of each government.
We mufb therefore inquire into this principle, which
/hall be the fubject of this third book,
CHAP. II.
Of the Principle of different Governments.
IH A V E already obferved that it is the nature
of a republican government, that either the col
lective body of the people, or particular families
* This is a very important diftinftion, from whence I mall
draw a great many confequences ; for it is the key of an infinite
number of law:.
fliould
28 THESPJRIT
BOOK fhouU b e pofTeiTtd of the fovereign power: of a
Chap. 3 . monarchy, that the prince fhould have this fovereign
power, but in the execution of it fhould be di
rected by eftablimed laws : of a defpotic govern
ment, that a Tingle perfon fhould rule according to
his own will and caprice. No more do I want to
enable me to difcover their three principles ; thefe
are from thence moft naturally derived. I fhall
begin with a republican government, and in par
ticular with that of democracy.
C II A P. III.
Of the Principle of Democracy.
Tl I K RE 13 no great mare of probity necef-
fary to fupport a monarchical or defpotic
government. The force of laws in one, and the
prince s arm in the other, arc fufficicnt to direct and
maintain the whole. But in a popular flate, one
fpring more is necefiary, namely, r/V;
What I have here advanced, is confirmed by
the unanimous teftimony of hiflorians, and is ex
tremely agreeable to the nature of things. For it
is clc.ir that in a monarchy, where he who com
mands the execution of the laws generally thinks
himfelf above them, there is lefs need of virtue
than in a popular government, where the perfon
intruded with the execution of the huvs, is fenfible
his being fubject himfelf to their direction.
Clear it is alfo that a monarch, who through
bad advice or indolence ceafes to enforce the
exfnjtion of the Jaws, may eafily repair the evil :
he has only to follow other advice ; or to fhake
.oft t !olence. h ? in 2 popular govern
ment,
O F L A W S. 29
ment, there is a fufpenfion of the laws, as this can BOOK
proceed only from the corruption of the republic,
the flate is certainly undone,
A very droll fpectacle it was in the laft century
to behold the impotent efforts the Englifli made
for the eftablilhment of democracy. As thofe who
had a fhare in the direction of public affairs were
void of all virtue, as their ambition was inflamed
by the fuccefs of the mofl daring of their mem
bers *, as the fpirit of a faction was fupprefled
only by that of a fucceeding faction, the govern
ment was continually changing: the people amazed
at fo many revolutions, fought every where for a
democracy, without being able to find it. At
length after a feries of tumultuary motions and
violent mocks, they were obliged to have recoui
to the very government which they had fo odioufly
profcribed.
When Sylla wanted to reftore Rome to her liber
ty, this unhappy city was incapable of receiving it.
She had only fome feeble remains of virtue, and
as this was every day diminifhing, inftead of be
ing roufed out of her le:hargy, by Csfar, Tibe
rius, Caius, Claudius, Nero, Domitian, me ri
veted every day her chains j the blows flie ftruck
were levelled againfb the tyrants, but not at the
tyranny.
The politic Greeks who lived under a popu
lar government, knew no other fupport but virtue.
The modern inhabitants of that country are intirely
taken up with manufactures, commerce, finances,
riches and luxury.
* CromweJL
When
30 THESPIRIT
BOOK When virtue is bammed, ambition invades the
Chap hearts of thofe who are difpofed to receive it, and
avarice pofiefies the whole community. The defires
now change their objects ; what they were fond of
before, becomes indifferent ; they were free, while
under the reftraint of Jaws, they will now be free to
act againft law ; and as every citizen is like a flave
efcapcd from his mailer s houfe, what was a maxim
of equity, they call rigour ; what was a rule of ac
tion, they call conftraint ; and to precaution they
give the name of fear. Frugality, and not the thirft
of gain, now pafTes for avarice. Formerly the
wealth of individuals conftituted the public trcafure;
but now the public trcafure is become the patrimony
of private perfons. The members of the common
wealth riot on the public fpoils, and its flrength is
only the power of fome citizens, and the licentiouf-
nefs of the whole community.
Athens was pollcfied of the fame nuntfber offerees,
when me triumphed with fo much glory, and when
with fo much infamy Hie was inilaved. She had
f 1 ) PIu- twenty thoufand citizens ( 3 ), when fhe defended the
tarch in Greeks againft the Perfians, when me contended for
T> " 1 ^
Plato In cm pi re with Sparta, and invaded Sicily. She had
Cricia. twenty thoufand when Demetrius Phalereus num
bered them *, as flaves are told by the head in a
market. When Philip attempted to reign in Greece,
and appeared at the gates of Athens -f-, fhe had even
then loft nothing but time. We may fee in De-
mofthenes how difficult it was to awake her: fhe
* She had at that time twenty one thoufand citizens, ten
thoufand flrangers, and four hundred thoufand flaves. See Athe-
nacus, Book 6.
f She had then twenty thoufond citizens. See Demofthenes
in Ariftog.
dreaded
O F L A W S. , 31
dreaded Philip not as the enemy of her liberty, but BOOK
of her pleafures *. This famous city, which had l
withftood fo many defeats, and after having be
fo often deftroyed, had as often rifen out of her
afhes, was overthrown at Chaeronea, and at one
blow deprived of all hopes of refource. What d<
it avail her that Philip fends back her prifoners, it
he does not return her men ? It was ever after as caiy
to triumph over the Athenian forces, as it would
have been difficult to triumph over her virtue.
How was it pofTible for Carthage to maintain
her ground ? When Hannibal, upon his Ivi.
made praetor, endeavoured to hinder the magiftrates
from plundering the republic, did not i n-
plain of him to the Romans ? Wretches, \vho want
ed to be citizens without a city, and to be beholden
for their riches, to their very deftroyers ! Rome loon
infifted upon having three hundred of their principal
citizens as hoftages , me obliged them next to fur-
render their arms and mips ; niv.l thca fhe dedai
war againft them -f-. By the efforts made by this
defencelefs city, when reduced to defpair, one ir
judge of what fhe might have done in her full
ilrength, and affifted by virtue.
A
CHAP. IV.
Of the Principle of A v.
S virtue is neceflary in a popular govern
ment, fo it is necefTary alfo under an
They had paficd a law which rendered it a cr.pkal c
for any one to propofe applying the j
theatres to the military fervice.
f This war laited three years.
ariftocracv.
32 THESPIRIT
BOOK ariftocracy. True it is, that in the latter it is not
fo abfolutely requifite.
The people, who in refpeft to the nobility are
the fame as the fubjcdh with regard to the mon
arch, are reftrained by their laws. They have
therefore lefs occafion for virtue thrm the people
in a democracy. But how ar. the nobility to
be reft rained ? Thole who are to execute the
laws againft their < ,, will immediately per
ceive they are . . inft themfclves. Virtue
is therefore neceflfcry in this body by the very na
ture of the conftitution.
An arifrocratic.il government has within itfelf a
rtain ffrength which a democracy has not. The
nobles form a body, who by their prerogative and
through particular intercft, reftrain the people , it
is furricient here that there are laws in being to fee
them executed.
But as eafy as it is for the body of the nobles to
contain the people within bounds, fo difficult is it
to contain themfclves *. Such is the nature of this
conftitution, that it fecms to fubjecl: the very fame
perfons to the power of the laws, and at the fame
time to exempt them.
Now fuch a body as this can reftrain itfelf
only two ways , either by a very eminent virtue,
which puts the nobility in feme meafure on a level
with the people, and may be the means of forming
a great republic ; or by an inferior virtue, which
puts them at leaft upon a level with one another,
and on this their prefervation depends.
* Public crimes may be punifhed, becaufe it is here a common
concern ; but private crimes will go unpunished, becaufe it is a
common intereft not to punilh them.
Moderation
O F L A W 9. 33
Moderation is therefore the very foul of this
government-, a moderation I mean founded on vir- chap. 5.
tue, not that which proceeds from indolence and
pufillanimity.
CHAP. V.
fhat Virtue is not the Principle of a monarchical Co-
v eminent. ^
IN monarchies, policy makes people do grt
things with as little virtue as me can. Thus in
the fineft machines, art has contrived as few mo\
ments, fprings, and wheels as poftible.
The rtate fubfifts independently of the love of
our country, of the thirft of true glory, of felf-
denial, of the facrifice of our deareft interefts, and
of all thofe heroic virtues which we admire in the
ancients, and which to us are known only by
(lory.
The laws fupply here the place of thole virtues ;
they are by no means wanted, and the ftate dif-
penfes with them : an a6lion performed here in ie-
cret is in fome meafure of no confequence.
Though all crimes be in their own nature pub
lic, yet there is a diftinction between crimes that
are really public, and thole that are private, which
are fo called, becaufe they are more injurious to in
dividuals than to the whole fociety.
Now in republics private crimes arc more pub
lic, that is, they attack the conititution more than
they do individuals ; and in monarchies pub,
crimes are more private, that is, they are more
prejudicial to private people than to the con-
ftitution.
VOL. I. D I
34 THE SPIRIT
BOOK i beg that no one will take this amifs ; my ob-
TTT /
Chap *c Nervations are founded on the unanimous teuimony
of hiftorians. I am not ignorant that virtuous
princes are no fuch very rare fight j but I venture to
affirm that in a monarchy it is extremely difficult
for the people to be virtuous *.
Let us compare what the hiftorians of all ages
have faic^oncerning the courts of monarchs-, let us
recollect e converfations and fentiments of people
of all countries in refpect to the wretched character
of courtiers , and we mail find, that the fe are not
mere airy fpeculations, but things confirmed by a
fad and melancholy experience.
Ambition joined to idlenefs, and bafenefs to
pride , a dtfire of obtaining riches without labour,
and an averfion to truth , flattery, treafon, perfidy,
violation of engagements, contempt of civil duties,
fear of the prince s virtue, hope from his weaknefs,
but above all a perpetual ridicule caft upon virtue,
are, I think, the characteriftics by which molt
courtiers in all ages and countries have been con-
ftantly diftinguifhed. Now it is exceeding difficult
for the leading men of the nation to be knaves, and
for the inferior fort of people to be honed ; for the
former to be cheats, and for the latter to reft fatif-
fted to be only dupes.
But if there mould chance to be fome unlucky
honeft man -f- among the people, cardinal Richelieu
* I fpeak here of political virtue, which is alfo moral virtue
as it is directed to the public good ; very little of private moral
virtue; and not at all of that virtue which relate* to revealed
truths. This will appear better, Book V. chap 2.
t This is to be underilood in the fenie of the preceding
note.
1 in
O F L A W S.
in his political teftarrient * feems to hint that a B
1 1 1
prince (hould take care not to employ him -f-. So c ., } 6
true is it that virtue is not the fpring of this go- x ;.
vernment !
CHAP. VI.
In what manner Virtue is fupplied in a monarchical
Government.
BUT it is high time for me to have done
with this fubject, left I fhould be fufpccted
of writing a fatire againft monarchical government.
Far be it from me ; if monarchy wants one fpring,
it is provided with another. Honor, that is, the
prejudice of every perfon and rank, fupplieth the
place of virtue, and is every where her reprefenta-
tive : here it is capable of infpiring the mod glo
rious actions, and joined with the force of laws may
lead us to the end of government as well as virtue
itfelf.
Hence in well regulated monarchies, they are
almoft all good fubjefts, and very few good
men , for to be a good man, a good intention is
neceflary ( a ). ( a Scc ^ e
notep
CHAP. VII.
A
O/ the Principle of Monarcfy.
Monarchical government fuppofeth, as we
have already obferved, pre-eminences, and
* This book was written under the infpeflion, and from the
memoirs of cardinal Richelieu by Meflkurs de Bourfcis, and d ,
who were ftrongly his adherents.
t We muft not, fays he, employ people of man extraction i
they are too auftere and difficult.
D 2 ranks,
36 THESPIRIT
BOOK ranks, and likewife a noble defcent. Now as it is
Chap. - tne nature of honor to afpire to preferments and
diftinguifhing titles , it is therefore properly placed
in this government.
Ambition is pernicious in a republic. But in a
monarchy it has fome good effects , it gives life to
the government, and is attended with this advan
tage, that it is no way dangerous, becaufe it may
be continually checked.
It is with this kind of government as with the
fyftem of the un wrle, in which there is a power that
conllantly repels all bodies from the center, and a
power ot gravitation that attracts them to it. Honor
lets all the parts of the body politic in motion ;
by its very action it connects them ; and thus each
individual advances the public good, while he only
thinks of promoting his own particular intereft.
True it is, that, philofophically fpcaking, it is
a falfe honor which moves all the parts of the go
vernment , but even this falfe honor is as ufetul to
the public, as true honor could poflibly prove to
private people.
I- it not a very great point, to oblige men to
perform the moll difficult actions, fuch as require
a great degree of fortitude and fpirit, without any
other recompence, than the fame and reputation
arifing from the actions themfelves ?
CHAP. VIII.
flat Honor h not the Principle of defpotic Government.
O N O R is far from being the principle of
defpotic government : men being here all
i upon
O F L A W S. 37
upon a level, no one can prefer himfelf to another ; J -
men being here all flaves, they can give thcmfelves Ch
no preference at all.
Befides, as honor has its laws and rules, as
it knows not how to fubmit, as it depends in
a great meafure on a man s own caprice, and not
on that of another perfon , it can be found only in
countries in which the conftitution is fixed, and
where they are governed by fettled laws.
How can a defpotic prince bear with any fuch
thing as honor ? Honor glories in contempt of
life, and here the prince s whole ftrength confifts
in the power of taking it away. How can honor
ever bear with a defpotic prince? It has its ii\rd
rules, and conftant caprices , but a defpotic prince
is directed by no rule, and his own caprices dcllroy
all others.
Honor therefore, a thing unknown in defpotic
governments, where very often they have not fo
much as a fit word to exprefs it ( b ), is the prevail- ( b )SecPer-
ing principle in monarchies -, here it gives life to the r > lM47-
whole body politic, to the laws, and even to the
virtues themfelves.
CHAP. IX.
Of the Principle of defpotic Government.
AS virtue is neceflary in a republic, and in
a monarchy honor, fo fear is necelTary in a
defpotic government : with regard to virtue, there
is no occafion for it, and honor would be extremely
dangerous.
Here the immenfe power of the prince is devolved
i-ntirely upon thofe to whom he is pleafed to intruft
D 3 it,
38 T H u s P
BOOK ; t> Perfons capable of fetting a value upon them*
Chan o Delves would be likely to create revolutions. Fear
muft therefore deprefs their fpirits, and extinguish
even the lead fenfe of ambition.
A moderate government may, whenever it
pleafes, and without any danger relax its fprings.
It fupports itfelf by its Jaws, and by its own force.
But when a defpotic prince ceafes one fingle mo
ment to lift up his arm, when he cannot inftant-
ly demolifh thofe whom he has entrufted with the
firft pods and employments *, all is over : for as
fear, the fpring of this government, no longer fub-
fifts, the people are left without a protector.
It is probably in this fenfe the Cadis maintained
that the grand Seignor was not obliged to keep his
word or oath, when he limited thereby his au-
Ricaplt thority (*).
It is neceflary that the people mould be judged
fire. by laws, and the great men by the caprice of the
prince ; that the lives of the loweft fubjecls mould
be fafe, and the bafhaw s head always in danger.
We cannot mention thefe monftrous governments
without horror. The Sophi of Perfia dethroned in
our days by Mahomet the ion of Miriveis, faw the
conftitution fubvcrted before this revolution, be-
See the cau f e h e had been too fparing of blood ( h ).
revo- Hiftory informs us that the horrid cruelties of
krion by Domitian flruck fuch a terror into the governors,
crDu ~ that the people recovered themfelves a little under
caceau. r -
his reign -p Thus a torrent lays one fide or a
whole country wafte, and on the other leaves fields
* As it often happens in a military ariftocracy.
a military government, which is one of the fpeeies
of government.
untouched,
^ r ij i\ vv o. 39
untouched, where the eye is refrefhed with the fight BOOK
of fome diftant meadows. Chap, 10,
C H A P. X.
Difference of Obedience in moderate and defyotic Go
vernments.
IN defpotic ftates the nature of the government
requires the moft pafllve obedience -, and when
once the prince s will is made known, it ought
infallibly to produce its efFect.
Here they have no limitations or reflriiftions, no
mediums, terms, equivalents, parleys, or remon-
ftrances , nothing equal or better to propofe : man
is a creature that fubmits to the abfolute will of a
creature like himfelf.
In a country like this they are no more allowed
to reprefent their fears in refpecl to a future event,
than to excufe their bad fuccefs by the capriciouf-
nefs of fortune. Man s portion here, like that of
beads, is inftincl, compliance and punifhment.
Little does it then avail to plead the fentiments
of nature, refpect for a father, tendernefs for a wife
and children, the laws of honor, or an ill Hate of
health ; the orders are given, and that is fufficient.
In Perfia when the king has condemned a perlon,
it is no longer lawful to mention his name, or to in
tercede in his favor. Though he were drunk and
befide himfelf, yet the decree mult be executed ( g ) ; (*) See Sir
otherwife he would contradict himfelf, and the law fe~ n ,
f Cliardm.
admits or no contradiction. This has been the way
of thinking in this country in all ages , as the or
der which Ahafuerus gave to exterminate the Jews,
D 4 could
40 in & s r i K i i
r o K cculd not be revoked, they contrived to allow them
Chap. 10. tnc liberty f defending themfelves.
There is one thing however that may be op-
( h ) Ibid, pofed to the prince s will ( h ) ; namely, religion.
They will abandon a parent, nay, they will kill him,
if the prince fo commands ; but he cannot oblige
them to drink wine. The laws of religion are of
a fupcrior nature, becaufe they bind the prince as
well as the fubjeft. Bur, with refpect to the law of
urc it is otherwife , the prince is no longer fup-
pok-d to be u man.
In monarchical and moderate dates, the power
is limited by its very fpring, I mean by honor,
which like a monarch reigns over prince and peo-
pl They will not here alledge to their prince the
l.v. on ; a courtier would think this would
render him ridiculous. But the laws of honor will
be alledged on all occafions. Hence arife the re-
ftr56tions necefiary to obedience ; honor is naturally
lubje<5t to whims, by which the fubj eft s obedience
will be always directed.
Though the manner of obeying be different in
thefe two kinds of government, yet the power is
the fame. On which fide foever the monarch
turns, he inclines the fcale, and is obeyed.
The whole difference is, that in a monarchy the
prince has the afliftance of inftruction, and his
minifters have a far greater capacity and are better
verled in affairs than the minifters of a deipotic
government,
CHAP.
O F L A W S. 41
CHAP. XI.
Reflexions on fie foregoing.
SUCH are the principles of the three forts of B o o K
government : which does not imply that in a c ,
particular republic they actually are, but that they
ought to be, virtuous : nor does it prove, that in a
particular monarchy they are actuated by honor,
or in a particular defpotic government by fear ; but
that they ought to be directed by thefe principles,
Qtherwife the government is imperfect.
BOOK
A 2
BOOK IV.
"That the Laws of Education ought to be re
lative to the principles of Government.
CHAP. I.
Of tbc Laivs of Education.
BOOK /" "^ f { ]; ] aw s of education are the firft impre/Tions
i we n nd as they prepare us for civil
life, each particular family ought to be governed
purfuant to the plan of the great family which com
prehends them all.
If the people in general have a principle, their
contlitucnt parts, that is, the feveral families, will
have one allb. The laws of education will be there
fore different in each fpecies of government ; in mo
narchies they will have honor for their object , in re
publics, virtue j in defpotic governments, fear.
CHAP. II.
Of Education in Monarchies.
IN monarchies the principal branch of education
is not taught in colleges or academies. It in
Jbme meafure commences, when we fet out in the
world : for this is the fchool of what we call honor,
that univerfal preceptor which ought every where to
be our guide.
Here it is that we conftantly fee and hear three
things, tbat we Jhould have a certain noblenefs in
cur
O F L A W S. 43
our virtues^ a kind of franknefs in our morals^ and a BOOK
particular politenefs in our behaviour. Chap." 2.
The virtues we are here taught, are leis what we
owe to other, than to ourfelves ; they arc not fo much
what affimilates us to, as what diftinguifhes us from,
our fellow citizens.
Here the actions of men are not judged as good,
but as fhining ; not as juft, but as great ; not as
reafonable, but as extraordinary.
When honor here meets with any thing noble in
our actions, it is either a judge that approves them,
or a fophift by whom they are excufed.
It allows of gallantry when united with the idea
of fenfible affection, or with that of conqueft ; this
is the reafon why we never meet with fo ftrict:
a purity of morals in monarchies as in republican
governments.
It allows of cunning and craft, when joined with
the idea of greatnefs of foul or importance of affairs ;
as for inftance, in politics with whofe rlnefles it is far
from being offended.
It does not forbid adulation, but when feparate
from the idea of a large fortune, and connected only
with the fenfe of our mean condition.
With regard to morals, I have obferved that the
education of monarchies ought to admit of a certain
franknefs and open carriage. Truth therefore in
converfation is here a necefiary point. But is it for
the fake of truthJ by no means. Truth is requifite
only becaufe a perfon habituated to veracity has an
air of boldnefs and freedom. In fact, a man of
this flamp feems to lay a fire Is only on the things
themselves, and not on the manner in which they
are received.
Hence
44 T H E S P I R I T
H b o I If nee it is, that as much as this kind of franknefs
is commended, fo much that of the common people
is defpifed, which has nothing but truth and fimpli-
city for its object.
In fine, the education of monarchies requires a
certain politcnefs of behaviour. Men born for fo-
cicty, arc born to pleafe one another ; and a perfon
that would break through the rules of decorum, by
ili : hole he convcrfed with, would fo far lofe
the public elleem as to become incapable of doing any
good.
Jjut politcnefs, generally ipeaking, does not derive
its original from fo pure a fource. It rifes from a de-
fire ot diftinguifhing ourfelves. It is pride that ren
ders us polite : we feel a pleafing vanity in being re
marked for a behaviour that mews in fome mealure
we are not meanly born, and that we have not been
bred up with thofe who in all ages have been confi-
dered as the fcum of the people.
Politenefs, in monarchies, is naturalifed at court.
One man excefiively great renders every body elfe lit
tle. Hence that regard which is paid to our fellow
fubjecls ; hence that politenefs, which is as pleafing to
thole by whom, as to thofe towards whom, it is prac-
tifed ; becaufe it gives people to underftand, that a
perfon actually belongs, or at leaft deferves to belong,
to the court.
A court air confifts in quitting a real for a bor
rowed greatnefs. The latter pl^|fes the courtier
more than his own. It infpires him with a certain
difdainful modefty which mews itfelf externally, but
whofe pride diminifhes infenfibly in proportion to its
diftance from the fource of this greatnefs.
At
O F L A W S. 45
At court we find a delicacy of tafte in every thing, ]] K
a delicacy arifing from the conftant ufe of the fuper-
fluities of an affluent fortune, from the variety, and
cfpec^ally the iatiety of pleafures, from the multipli
city and even confufion of fancies, which if they arc
but agreeable are always well received.
Theie are the things which properly fall within
the province of education, in order to form what
we call a man of honor, a man pofiefTed of all the
qualities and virtues requifite in this kind of govern -
ment.
Here it is that honor interferes with every t
mixing even with people s manner of thinking, and
directing their very principles.
To this whimfical honor it is owing that the vir
tues are only juft what it pleafes, and as it pleales ;
it adds rules of its own invention to every thing
prefcribed to us , it extends or limits our dutu
cording to its own fancy, whether they proceed irom
religion, politics, or morality.
There i$ nothing fo ftrongly inculcated in mo
narchies, by the laws, by religion, and honor, as
fubmifiion to the prince s will ; but this very honor
tells us that the prince ought never to command a
difhonorable action, becaule this would render us
incapable to ferve him.
Gruillon refufed to alTaflinate the duke of Guife,
but he offered Henry III. to fight him. After the
maflacre of St. Bartholomew, Charles IX. having
fent orders to all the governors in the feveral pro
vinces for the Hugonots to be murdered, vifcount
Dorte, who commanded at Bayonne, wrote thus to
the king, ( g ) Sire, among the inhabitants of this t \
town, and your majcftfs troops^ 1 could not ^WA
fa hil1
46 THESP1RIT
TV K f muc ^ as one execuf * oner i they are honcjl citi-
Chap.* 2. zens an d brave foldiers. We jointly therefore be-
feecb your tnajefty to command our arms find lives
m things that are practicable. This great and
generous foul looked upon a bafe action as a thing
impoiTible.
There is nothing that honor more ftrongly re
commends to the nobility, than to fervc their prince
in a military capacity. In fact tty$ is their favourite
profeflion, becaufe its dangers, its^fuccefs, and even
its mifcarriages are the road to grandeur. And yet
this very law of its own making, honor chufes to ex
plain ; and if it happens to be affronted, requires
or permits us to retirr.
It infifts alfo that we fhould be at liberty either
to feek or to reject employments ; a liberty which
it prefers even to an ample fortune.
Honor therefore has its fupreme laws, to which
education is obliged to conform. The chief of thefe
are, that we are allowed to fet a value upon our for
tune, but it is abfolutely forbidden to fet any value
upon our lives.
The fecond is, that when we are raifed to a pod
or rank, we mould never do or permit any thing
\vhich may feem to imply that we look upon our-
felves as inferior to the rank we hold.
The third is, that thofe things which honor for
bids are more rigoroufly forbidden, when the laws
do not concur in the prohibition ; and thofe it com
mands are more flrongly infifted upon, when they
happen not to be commanded by law.
CHAP.
O F L A W S. 47
CHAP. III.
Of Education in a defpotic Government.
AS education in monarchies tends only to raife BOOK
and ennoble the mind, fo in defpotic govern- *
ments its only aim is to debafe it. Here it muft ne-
cefiarily be fervile ; even in power fuch an education
will be an advantage*, becaufe every tyrant is at the
fame time a flave.
ExcefTive obedience fuppofes ignorance in the pi r-
fon that obeys : the fame it fuppofes in him that
commands ; for he has no occafion to deliberate, to
doubt, to reafon j he has only to will.
In defpotic ftates each houfe is a feparate govern
ment. As education therefore confifts chiefly in fo-
cial converfe, it muft be here very much limited ;
all it does is to ftrike the heart with fear, and to
imprint on the underftanding a very fimple notion
of a few principles of religion. Learning here proves
dangerous, emulation fatal , and as to virtue, Ari-
(lotle cannot think there is any one virtue belonging
to flaves ( c ) ; if fo, education in defpotic countries is ( e ) Polit.
confined within a very narrow compafs. u
Here therefore education is in fome meafure necd-
lefs : to give fomething one muft take away every
thing i and begin with making a bad fubjec~t in order
to make a good flave.
For why mould education take pains in forming a
good citizen, only to make him mare in the public
mifery ? If he loves his country, he will ftrive to re
lax the fprings of government : if he mifcarries, he
will be undone ; if he fucceeds, he muft expofe him-
felf, the prince, and his country to ruin.
C H A P,
4 8 T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. IV.
Difference between the effefts cf ancient and modern
Education.
govern-
Chap.*4. A. merits that had virtue for their principle ;
5. and when this was in full vipor, they performed
things unfcen in our times, and fuch as are capable
of aftonifhing our little fouls.
Another advantage their education had over ours ;
it never was effaced by contrary impreffions. Epami-
nondas, the laft year of his life, faid, heard, faw, and
performed the very fame things as at the age in which
he received the firft principles of his education.
In our days we receive three different or contrary
educations, namely, of our parents, of our mafbers,
and of the world. What we learn in the latter effaces
all the ideas of the former. This in fome meafure
arifes from the contraft we experience between our
religious and worldly engagements ; a thing unknown
to the ancients.
CHAP. V.
Of Education in a Republican Government.
IT is in a republican government that the whole
power of education is required. The fear of
defpodc governments rifcs naturally of itielf amidft
threats and punifhments ; the honor of monarchies
is favoured by the paffions, and favours them in its
turn : but virtue is a felf- renunciation which is al
ways arduous and painful.
This virtue may be defined, the love of the laws
and of our country. As this love requires a con-
ftant
O F L A W S. 49
ftant preference of public to private intcreft, it is * o o K
the fource of all the particular virtues , for they arc
- ~ Chap. 5.
nothing more than this very preference it lelf.
This love is peculiar to democracies. In thefe
alone the government is intruded to private citizens.
Now government is like every thing elfe : to pre-
ferve it, we mud love it.
Has it ever been heard that kings were not fond
-of monarchy, or that defpotic princes hated arbi
trary power ?
Every thing therefore depends on eftablifliing this
Jove in a republic, and to infpire it, it ought to be the
principal bufinefs of education : but the furc-ll way
of inililling it into children, is for parents to let them
an example.
People have it generally in their power to com
municate their ideas to their children ; but they are
(till better able to transfufe their pafilons.
If it happens otherwife, it is becaufe the imprel-
fions made at home arc effaced by thofe they have
received abroad.
It is not the young people that degenerate : they
are not fpoilt till thole of maturer age are already
funk into corruption.
CHAP. VI.
Of fome Inftitutions among the Greeks.
THE ancient Greeks, convinced of the ne-
ceflity that people who live under a popular
government mould be trained up to virtue, made
very fingular inftitutions in order to infpire it. Upon
feeing in the life of Lycurgus the laws that legislator
gave to the Lacedasmonians, I imagine I am reading
VOL. I. E the
50 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK t h e hiftory of the Sevarambes. The laws of Crete
Ch-n 6 were tne m del of thofe of Sparta ; and thofe of
Plato reformed them.
Let us reflect here a little on the extenfive genius
with which thofe legiflators muft have been endowed,
to perceive that by {triking at received cuftoms, and
by confounding all manner ot virtues, they flio.uld
difplay their wifdom to the univerfe. Lycurgus by
blending theft with the fpirit of juftice, the hardeft
fervitudc with excels of liberty, the moft rigid fen-
timents with the greateft moderation, gave (lability
to his city. He fecmed to deprive her of all refour-
ccs fuch as arts, commerce, money, walls : ambi
tion prevailed among the citizens without hopes
of improving their fortune , they had natural fe.iti-
mcnts without the tie of a fon, hufband, or father ;
and challity was ftript even of modefty and fhame.
This was the road that led Sparta to grandeur and
glory ; and fo infallible were her inftitutions, that it
fignified nothing to gain a victory over her, without
Subverting her polity *.
By theie laws Crete and Laconia were governed.
Sparta was the laft that fell a prey to the Macedoni
ans, and Crete to the Romans -j-. The Samnites had
the fame inftitutions, which furnifhed thofe very Ro-
(*) Florus, mans with the fubjedl of four and twenty triumphs ( a ).
A character fo extraordinary in the inftitutions of
Greece, has fhewn itfelf lately in the dregs and cor-
* Philopu-men obliged the Lacedaemonians to change their man
ner ot educating their children, being convinced that if he did not
take this meafurc they would ahvavs ha\ e a great foul and a noble
heart. Plutarcl\ Life of Pbilop<emen. See Livy book 38.
( She defended licr laws and liberty for the (pace of three years.
See the 98, 99, and 100 book of Livy in Fiona s epitome ; fhe
made a braver rcnilance than the gn.-atelt kii,
2 ruption
O F L A W S. 51
ruption of our modern times *. A very honeft legif- BOOK
lator has formed a people, to whom probity leems as C j ;j .,
natural as bravery to the Spartans. Mr. Pen is a
real Lycurgus ; and though the former made peace
his principal aim, as the latter did war, yet they
refemble one another in the fingular way of living
to which they reduced their people, in the afcendant
they had over free men, in the prejudices they over
came, and in the paffions they fubdued.
Another example we have from Paraguay. This
has been the fubject of an invidious charge againft a
fociety, that confiders the pleafure of commanding
as the only happincfs in life : but it will be always a
glorious undertaking to render government fubler-
vient to human happincfs -f.
It is glorious indeed for this fociety to have been
the firft in pointing out to thofe countries the idea
of religion jc^jned with that of humanity. By repair
ing the devaftations of the Spaniards, Hie has begun
to heal one of the mofl dangerous wounds that the
human fpecies ever received.
An exquifite fenfibility to whatever me diftin-
guifhes by the name of honour, her zeal for a religion
which is far more humbling in refpect to thofe that
hear than to thofe that preach it, have fet her upon
vaft undertakings, which (he has accomplished with
fuccefs. She has drawn wild people from their
woods, fecured them a maintenance, and clothed
their nakednefs ; and had (he only by this means
improved the induftry of mankind, it would have
been fufficient to eternize her fame.
* InfeceRemuIi, Cicero.
f The Indians of Paraguay do not depend on any particular
lord, they pay only a fifth of the taxes, and are allowed the ufe
of fire-arms to defend themfelves.
E 2 Thofe
5 2
B O O K.
IV.
. 6.
, i lu-
i in
-uff-
con-
:>:%
chairs.
THE S P I Px I T
Thofe who mail attempt hereafter to introduce
fuch institutions as thefe, muft eftablifh. the com
munity of goods as prefcribed in Plato s republic j
that high refpedl he required for the gods -, that
feparation from ftrangers for the prefervation of
people s morals , and an extenfive commerce car
ried on by the community and not by private citU
MS : they mult give our arts without our luxury,
and our wants without our defires.
They muft profcribe money, the effecT; of which
is to fwfll people s fortunes beyond the bounds
prefcribed by nature -, to learn to prelerve for no
purpoll* what has been idly hoar.ded up , to multiply
without end our ddires , and to fupply the fterility
of nature, of whom we have received very fcanty
means, ot inllaminL; our paflions and of corrupting
each other.
" The Epidamnians ( c ) perceivingttheir morals
" depraved by converting with barbarians, chofe
" a magiftratc for making all contracts and fales
41 in the name and behalf of the city." Commerce
then does not corrupt the contlitution, and the con-
ftitution does not deprive the fociety of the advan-
tages of commerce.
VII.
CHAP.
/;; what Cafe theft Jmgidar Inftitutions may be of
Service.
INSTITUTIONS of this kind may be pro
per in republics, becaufe they have virtue for
their principle ; but to excite men to honour in mo
narchies, or to imprint fear in defpotic governments,
Jefs pains is neceffary.
Befides
,
O F L A W S. 5
Befides they cannot take place but in a fmall >
ftate *, in which there is a polTibility of a general
education, and of training up the body o[ the peo
ple like a fingle family.
The laws of Minos, of Lycurgus, and of Plato,
fuppofe a particular attention and care, which the
citizens ought to have over one another s condii
But an attention of this kind cannot be expected in
the confufion, and multitude of affairs in which a
large nation is intangled.
In inftitutions of this kind, money, as we have
above obferved, muft be banimed. But in creat
* O
focieties, the multiplicky, variety, emb^rraflhicnt,
and importance of affairs, as well as the {utility
of purchafing, and the flowncis of exchange, re
quire a common meafure. In order to extend or
fupport our power, we muft be pofTdlcd of the
means to which, by the unanimous conlent of man
kind, this power is annexed.
C II A P. VIII.
Explication of a Paradox of tbc Ancients, in rrfpefi. to
Manners.
HAT judicious writer Polybius informs
J[ us, that mufic was neceflary to foften the
manners of the Arcadians, who lived in a cold
gloomy country ; that the inhabitants of Cy-
nete who flighted mufic were the cruel left of
all the Greeks, and that no other town was fo
immerfed in luxury and debauch. Plato is not
afraid to affirm that there is no poftibility cf
* Such as were formerly the cities of Greece.
E 3 making
54 THESPIRIT
BOOK making a change in mufic, without changing like-
Chan/8. w ik tne fr ame f government. Ariftotle, who
feems to have wrote his politics only in order to
contradict Plato, agrees with him notwithftanding,
in regard to the power and influence of mufic
over the manners cf the people. This was alfo
pi) Life of the opinion of Theophraftus, of Plutarch ( d ), and
I d "j>Ki.i -. O f a i| tj ie ancients , an opinion grounded on ma
ture reflection ; being one of the principles of
their politics *. Thus it was they enacted laws,
and thus they required that cities mould be go
verned.
This I fancy may be explained in the follow
ing manner. It is obfervable that in the cities of
Greece, efpecially thofe whofe principal object was
ir, all lucrative arts and profeffions were confi-
dcrecl as unworthy of a freeman. Mcft arts, fays
Hook Xenophon ( c ), corrupt and enervate the bodies of
^thofmc- tkofc that fxcrcife tlcm \ they oblige tl-cm to fit un
der a _/ cr near the fire. Tkey can find no
Icifttre, dtker for friends^ cr for the republic.
It was on-ly by the corruption of fome democracies
that artifans became freemen. This we learn from
( f ) Polit. Ariftotle f , who maintains, that a well regulated
Bool; 3. republic will never give thorn the right and freedom
Chap. 4 . } ,
or the city
* Pb*n In his fourth book of laws, fays, that the prrfeflures of
rnufic and gymnic exercifes are the moll important employments in
the :ity ; and in his Republic, Uook t,. Damon will tell you, fays
he, what founds are capable of infpiring a meannefs of foul, info-
Icnct 1 , ar>1 the contrary vin;.
f Diorhr.ntcs, fays Arillotlr, Polit. ch. 7. made a law for-
zrcrly at Athens that artifans fhoulci be P.aves to the republic.
Agriculture
O F L A W S. 55
Agriculture was likewife a fervile profeffion, and B ^ *
generally pradtifed by the inhabitants of conquered ch 8
countries. Such as the Helotes among the Lacedae
monians, the Periecians among the Cretans, the
Penejles among the Theflalians, and other con
quered * people in other republics.
In fine, every kind of low commerce -J- was in
famous among the Greeks ; as it obliged a citizen
to ferve and wait on a flave, on a lodger, or a
ftranger. This was a notion that clamed with the
fpirit of Greek liberty : hence Plato ( s ) in his laws ( R ) Book 2.
orders a citizen to be punifhed it he attempted to
concern himfelf with trade.
Thus in the Greek republics the magiftrates were
extremely embarrafied. They would not have the
citizens apply themfelves to trade, to agriculture,
or to the arts ; and yet they would not have them
idle ( h ). They found therefore employment for them ( h ) A ii.1.
3 , ... ; ,,- Polit. lib.
in gymmc and military exerciies -, and none elie |0
were allowed by their inftitution . Hence the
Greeks mud be confidcred as a fociety of wreft-
Jers and boxers. Now thefe exercifes having a na
tural tendency to render people hardy and fierce,
there was a neceflity for tempering them with
* Plato likewife and Ariftotle require flaves to till the land,
Laws Bcok ;. Polit. Book 7. c. 10. True it is that agriculture
was not every where exercifed by flaves : on the contrary, Ari
ftotle obferves, the belt republics were thofe in which the citizens
themfelves tilled the land : but this was brought about by the cor
ruption of the ancient governments, which were become dcmocra-
tical : for in earlier times the cities of Greece were fubjeft to an ari-
itocratic government.
f Cauponatio.
Ars corporum exercendorum gymnaftica, variis certaminibuj
terendorum pcedotribica. Ariltot. Polit. 1. 8. c. 3.
E 4 others
^o i I* iv* a F l K * i
BOOK others that might foften their manners *. For this
T \r
G , o purpofe, mufic, which influences the mind by means
of the corporeal organs, was extremely proper. It
is a kind of a medium between the bodily exercifes
that render men fierce and hardy, and fpeculative
fciences that render them unfociable and four. It
cannot be faid that mufic infpired virtue, for this
would be inconceivable : but it prevented the ef
fects of a favage inftitution, and enabled the foul
to have fuch a fhare in the education, as it could
never have had without the affiftance of har- .
mony.
Let us fuppofe among ourfelves a fociety of men
fo paffionatdy fond of hunting, as to make it their
employment : thefe people would doubtlefs con-
thereby a kind of rufticity and fiercenefs. But
if they happened to receive a tafte for mufic, we
fhoulcl quickly perceive a fenfible difference in their
froms and manners. In fhort, the exercifes ufed
by the Greeks excited only one kind of paffions,
vi/.. fiercenefs, anger, and cruelty. But mufic ex
cites all thofe ; and is likewife able to infpire the
Toul with a fenfe of pity, Jenity, tendernef?, and love.
Our moral writers, who declaim fo vehemently a-
gainft the Hage, fufficiently demonftrate the power
of mufic over the foul.
If the fociety abovementioned were to have no
other mufic than that of drums and the found of
the trumpet ; would it not be more difficult to ac-
complifh this end, than by the more melting tones
* Ariflotle obferves, that the children of the Lacedaemonians,
\vho began thefe exercifes at a very tender age, contracled fron}
therice too great a ferocity and rudenefs of behaviour.
of
OF LAWS.
57
of fofter harmony ? The ancients were therefore B *
in the right, when under particular circumftances chap/8.
they preferred one mode to another in regard to
manners.
But fome will afk, why fhould mufic be pitched
upon preferable to any other entertainment ? It is
becaufe of all fenfible pleafures, there is none that
lefs corrupts the foul. We blufh to read in Plu
tarch ( J ) that the Thebans, in order to foften the ^ Life of
manners of their youth, authorifed by law a pafiion, Pelopida*.
that ought to be profcribed by all nations.
BOOK
58 TH E SPIRIT
MGHnBWRNftHnORIHM^^
BOOK V.
*fhat the Laws given by the Legiftator
ought to be relative to the Principle of
Government.
CHAP. I.
Idea of this Book.
BOOK f ^ HAT the laws of education ought to be
v * relative to the principle of each government,
% j. has been fhewn in the preceding book. Now the
fame may be laid of thofe which the legiflator
gives to the whole fociety. This relation of laws
to this principle, ftrengthens the feveral fprings of
government, and this principle receives from
thence, in its turn, a new degree of ftrength.
And thus it is in mechanics, that action is always
followed by reaction.
Our defign is to examine this relation in each
government, beginning with the republican flate
whofc principle is virtue.
CHAP. II.
What is meant by Virtue in a Political State.
VIRTUE in a republic is a mod fimple
thing; it is a love for the republic; it is a
feniation, and not a confequence of acquired know
ledge : a fenfation that may be felt by the meanefl
as well as by the higheft perfon in the flate. When
the
O F L A W S.
the common people adopt good maxims, they B
adhere to them fteadier than thofe we call gentle-
men. It is very rare that corruption commences
with the former ; nay, they frequently derive from
their imperfect light a ftronger attachment to the
eftablifhed laws and cuftoms.
The love of our country is conducive to a
purity of morals, and the latter is again conducive
to the love of our country. The lefs we are able
to fatisfy our particular pafiions, the more we
abandon ourfelves to thofe of a general nature.
How comes it that monks are fo fond of their
order ? It is owing to the very caufe that renders
the order infupportable. Their rule debars them
of all thofe things by which the ordinary paflions
are fed ; there remains therefore only this pafllon
for the very rule that torments them. The more
auftere it is, that is, the more it curbs their inclina
tions, the more force it gives to the only pafiion it
leaves them.
CHAP. III.
What is meant by a Love of the Republic in a Demi-
cracy.
A Love of the republic in a democracy is a
Jove of the democracy ; a love of the de
mocracy is that of equality.
A love of the democracy is likewife that of fru
gality. As every individual ought to have here
the fame happinefs and the fame advantages, they
ought confequently to tafte the fame pleafures and
to form the fame hopes; which cannot be expected
but from a general frugality.
The
THESPIRIT
The love of equality in a democracy, limits
ambition to the fole dcfire, the fole happinefs of
doing greater fervices to our country than the
reft of our fellow citizens. They cannot all render
her equal fervices, but they ought all to ferve her
with equal alacrity. At our coming into the world,
we contract an immenfe debt to our country, which
*
we can never difcharge.
Hence diftincYions arife here from the principle
of equality, even when it feems to be removed by
fignal fervices, or fuperior abilities.
The love of frugality limits the defire of having
to the attention requifitc for procuring neceflaries to
our family, and fuperfiuities to our country. Riches
give a power which a citizen cannot ufe for him-
klf, for then he would be no longer equal. They
likewife procure pleafures which he ought not to en
joy, becaufe thele would allb fubvert the equality.
Thus well regulated democracies, by eftablifhing
domeflic frugality, made way at the fame time tor
public expences, as was the cafe at Rome and Athens,
when munificence and profufion arofe from the very
fund of frugality. And as religion requires us to
have pure and unfpotted hands when we make our
offerings to the Gods, the laws require a frugality of
life to enable us to be liberal to our country.
The good fenfe and happinefs of individuals de
pend greatly on the mediocrity of their talents and
fortunes. Therefore as a republic, where the laws
have placed many in a middling llation, is compofed
of wile men, it will be wifely governed ; as it is
compofed of happy men, it will be extremely happy.
CHAP.
OF LAWS. 6r
CHAP. IV.
In what manner the Love of Equality and Frugality is
infpired.
TH E love of equality and of a frugal ceco- BOOK
nomy is greatly excited by equality and fru- c ,
gality themfelves, in focieties, where both thefe
virtues are eftublilhed by law.
In monarchies and defpotic governments, no
body aims at equality ; this does not Ib much as
enter their thoughts i they all afpire to fuperiority.
People of the very loweft condition defire to emerge
from their obfcurity only to lord it over their fellow
fubjects.
It is the fame with refpect to frugality. To
love it we muft praftife and enjoy it. It is not
thofe who are enervated with pleafure, that are
fond of a frugal life , were this natural and com
mon, Alcibiades would never have been the admi
ration of the univerie. Neither is it thofe who envy
or admire the luxury of the great ; people that
have prefent to their view none but rich men or
men miferable like themfelves, deteft their miferable
condition, without loving or knowing the real term
or point of mifery.
A true maxim it is therefore, that in order to
love equality and frugality in a republic, thele vir
tues muft have been previoufly eilablimed bv law.
CHAP.
THE SPIRIT
CHAP. V.
In what manner the Laws eftablijb Equality in a De
mocracy.
S
O M E ancient legiflators, as Lycurgus and
Romulus, made an equal divifion of lands.
A fettlement of this kind can never take place
but upon the foundation of a new republic ; or
when the old one is fo corrupt, and the minds
of the people fo difpofed, that the poor think them-
felves obliged to demand, and the rich obliged to
confent to, a remedy of this nature.
If the legillator, in making a divifion of this
kind, does not enact laws at the fame time to fup-
port it, he forms only a temporary conftitution ;
inequality will break in where the laws have not
precluded it, and the republic will be utterly un
done.
Hence for the prefervation of this equality it is
abfolutcly neceflary there mould be fome regulation
in refpect to women s dowries, donations, fuc-
ceflions, teftamentary fettlements, and all other
forms of contracting. For were it once allowed
to difpofe of our property to whom and how we
pleafed, the will of each individual would difturb
the order of the fundamental law.
Solon, by permitting the Athenians upon failure
) Plu- of iflue ( b ) to leave their eftates to whom they
rch, life pi ea f ec ] acted contrary to the ancient laws by
Solon. ,, , , .
which the eltates were ordered to continue in
) Ibid, the family of the teftator ( c ) ; and even contrary to
his own laws, for by abolifhing debts he had aimed
at equality.
The
O F L A W S. 63
The law which prohibited people s having two BOOK
inheritances * was extremely well adapted for a de- chap* c
mocracy. It derived its origin from the equal
diftribution of lands and portions made to each
citizen. The law would not permit a fingle man
to pofTefs more than a. fingle portion.
From the fame fource arofe thofe Jaws by which
the next relation was ordered to marry the heirefs.
This law was given to the Jews after the like diftri
bution. Plato ( d ), who grounds his laws on this ( d ) Repub-
divifion, made the fame regulation, which had been
received as a law by the Athenians.
At Athens there was a law whofe fpirit, in my
opinion, has not been hitherto rightly understood.
It was lawful to marry a fifter only by the fa
ther s fide, but it was not permitted to marry a
fifter by the fame venter -f. This cuftom was ori
ginally owing to republics, whofe fpirit it was not
to let two portions of land, and conlequently two
inheritance*, devolve on the fame perfon. A man
that married his fifter only by his father s fide,
could inherit but one eftate, namely, that of his
father , but by marrying his fifter by the fame
venter, it might happen that his filler s father
having no male iflue, might leave her his eftate,
and confequently the brother that married her,
might be poflefled of two.
Little will it avail to object what Philo
1 PLilolaits of Corinth made a law at Athens that the number
of the portions of land and that of inheritances fhould be always
the fame. Arift. Polit. lib. 2. cap 12.
f Cornelius Nepos in pr<rfat. This cuftom began in the earlirft
times. Thus Abraham fays of Sarah, fie is try fijitr, my father s
daughter, but not my mother s. The fame reafons occasioned the
eftablifhing the lame law among different nations.
64. THESPIRIT
BOOK f a y S * 9 tnat: though the Athenians were allowed to
Chap c marr y a fift er by tne Cher s fide and not by the
mother s, yet the contrary practice prevailed among
the Lacedaemonians, who were permitted to marry
a filler by the mother s fide, and not by the father s.
()Lib.io. For I find in Strabo ( c ) that at Sparta, whenever
a woman married her brother (he had half his por
tion for her dowry. Plain it is that this fecond Jaw
was made in order to prevent the bad confequences
of the firft. That the eftate belonging to the fifter*s
family might not devolve on the brother s, they
gave half the brother s eftate to the filter for her
dowry.
neca -)-, fpeaking of Silanus, who had married
his filler, fays, that the permiffion was limited
at Athens, but general at Alexandria. In a mo
narchical government there was very little concern
about any iuch thing as a divifion of eftates.
Excellent was that law, which, in order to
maintain this divifion of lands in a democracy, or
dained that a father who had feveral children, mould
(*) Plato pitch upon one of them to inherit his portion ( f ), and
ofth * ^ eave ^ ie otners to be adopted, to the end that the
kind, lib. number of citizens might always be kept upon an
3- teg- equality with that of the divifions.
\riflot. Phalcas of Chalcedon ( s ) contrived a very extra-
lib. 2. ordinary method of rendering all fortunes equal, in
a republic where there was the greateit inequality.
This was, that the rich mould give fortunes
with their daughters to the poor, but mould re
ceive none themfelves , and that the poor mould
* Defpecialibus legibus qua pertinent ad pnecepta Decalogi.
f Atbcnis diriiidium licet t sllexandrwt toiutr.. Seneca de morfe
CLmdii.
receive
O F L A W S. 65
receive money for their daughters, inftead of giving BOOK
them fortunes. But I do not remember that a re- ch .
gulation of this kind ever took place in any repub
lic. It lays the citizens under fuch hard and odi
ous conditions, as would make them deteft the very
equality which they defigned to cftablim. It is
proper fometimes that the laws mould not feem to
tend fo directly to the end they propofe.
Though real equality be the very foul of a de
mocracy, yet it is fo difficult to eftablifh, that an
extreme exactnefs in this refpecl: would not be al
ways convenient. Sufficient it is to eftablifh a cen-
fus *, which mould reduce or fix the differences to
a certain point : it is afterwards the bufinefs of par
ticular laws to level as it were the inequalities, by
the duties laid upon the rich, and by the eafe they
afford to the poor. It is moderate riches alone that
can give or fuffer this fort of compenfations ; for as
to men of over-grown eftates, every thing which
does not contribute to advance their power and ho
nor, is confidered by them as an injury.
All inequality in a democracy ought to be de
rived from the nature of the democracy, and even
from the principle of equality. For example, it
may be apprehended that people who are obliged to
live by their labour, would be too much impoverim-
ed by a public office, or neglect the duties attend
ing it -, that artifans would grow infolent , and that
too great a number of freedmen would overpower
the ancient citizens. In this cafe the equality of
* Solon made four clafles, the firft, of thofe who had nn in
come of ;co minas either in corn or liquid fruits ; the fecor
thofe who had 300, and were able to keep a horfe ; the third, of
thofe who had only 200 ; the fourth, of all thofe who i;vc d by
their manual labour, plut. LifeofSolcn.
VOL, I. F the
66 THESPIRIT
BOOK tne citizens * in a democracy may be fupprefled,
Chap 6 wnenever lt w ^ conduce to the utility of the ftate.
But then it is only an apparent equality they re
move : for a man ruined by a public office would
be in a worfe condition than the reft of his fellow
citizens, and this fame man being obliged to neglect
his duty would reduce the other citizens to a worfe
condition than himfelf, and fo on.
CHAP. VI.
In what manner the Laws ought to maintain Frugality
in a Democracy.
IT is not fufficient in a well regulated democracy
that the divifions of land be equal ; they ought
alfo to be fmall, as was cuftomary among the Ro
mans. " God forbid^ faid Curius to his foldiers -f%
thai a citizen fljould look upon that as a fmall piece of
land, which is fufficient to fupport a man."
As the equality of fortunes fupports frugality,
frugality fupports the equality of fortunes. Thefe
things, though in themfelves different, are of fuch a
nature as to be unable to fubfift feparately ; each
is the caufe and the effect , if one withdraws itfelf
from a democracy, it is furely followed by the
other.
True it is that when a democracy is founded on
commerce, private people may acquire vaft riches
without a corruption of morals. This is becaufe
the fpirit of commerce is naturally attended with
* Solon excludes from public employments all thofe of the
fourth clafs.
f They infifted upon a larger dirifien of the conquered lands.
PlutarcV* moral works, Lives of the anuem Kings and Comman
ders.
that
O F L A W S. 67
that of frugality, ceconomy, moderation, labour, B *
prudence, tranquillity, order, and rule. As long chap. 6.
as this fpirit fubfifts, the riches it produces have no
bad effect. The mifchief is when exceflive wealth
deftroys this fpirit of commerce ; then it is that ths
inconveniences of inequality begin to be felt.
In order to fupport the fpirit of commerce, it
fhould be carried on by the principal citizens , this
fpirit alone ought to prevail without being crofied
by another , all the laws mould encourage it ; and
thefe very laws, by dividing the eftates of indivi
duals in proportion to the increafe of commerce,
Ihould fet every poor citizen fo far at his eafc as
to be able to work like the reft, and every rich
citizen in fuch a mediocrity as to be obliged to la
bour either to preferve or to acquire his wealth.
It is an excellent law in a trading republic, to
make an equal divifion of the father s eftate among
the children. The confequence of this is, that how
great foever a fortune the father has made, his
children being not fo rich as he, are induced to
avoid luxury, and to follow the parent s induftri-
ous example. I fpeak here only of trading repub
lics, for as to thofc that have no commerce, the le-
giflator mud purfue quite different meafures *.
In Greece there were two forts of republics : the
one military, like Sparta; the other commercir>]-
as Athens. In one the citizens were obliged to he-
idle ; in the other endeavours were ufed to infpire
them with the love of induftry and labour. Solon
made idlenefs a crime, and infifted that each citizen
ihould give an account of his manner of getting a
In thefe the portions or fortunes of women ought to be very
much limited.
F 2 lively-
68 THESPIRIT
BOOK livelyhood. In fadl, in a well regulated democra-
Chap 7 cv wnere people s expcnces ought to extend only
to what is necefTary, every one ought to have as
much as his neceflities require ; for how could his
wants be otherwife fupplied ?
CHAP. VII.
Other methods of favouring the principle of
Democracy,
AN equal divifion of lands cannot be eftabliflv.
ed in all democracies. There are fome cir-
cumftances in which a regulation of this nature
would be impracticable, dangerous, and even fub-
verfive of the conftitution. We are not always
obliged to proceed to extremes. If it appears that
this divifion of lands, which was defigned to pre-
ferve the people s morals, does not fuit with the de
mocracy, recourfe mud be had to other methods.
If a fixed body be eftablifhed to ferve as a rule
and pattern of manners, a fenate, to which age, vir
tue, gravity, and public fervices gain admittance ;
the fenators, by being expofed to public view like
the flatues of the Gods, muft naturally infpire fen-
timents that will transfufe themfelves into the bofom
of every family.
Above all, this fenate muft fteadily adhere to the
ancient inflitutions, and mind that the people and
the magiftrates never fwerve from them.
The prefervation of the ancient cuftoms is a very
confiderable point in refpe<5t to manners. Since a
corrupt people feldom perform any memorable
actions, feldom eftablifh focieties, build cities, or
enact laws ^ on the contrary, fmce moft mftitutions
arc
O F L A W S. 69
are derived from people of fimple or fevere morals ; 3 K
to recall men to the ancient maxims is generally re- QUO. -*.
calling thorn to virtue.
Befides, if there happens to be any revolution,
by which the flate has affumed a new form, this
feldom can be effected without infinite pains and
labour, and hardly ever with idlenefs and a deprava
tion of manners. Even thofe who have been the
inftruments of the revolution, are defirous it fhould
be reliftied, which is difficult to compafs without
good laws. Therefore ancient inftitutions are ge
nerally reformations, and modern ones abufes. In
the courfe of a long adminiftration the defcent to
vice is infenfible ; but there is no re-afcending to
virtue without making the mod generous efforts.
It has been queftioned whether the members of
the fenate we are here fpeaking of, ought to be for
life, or chofen only for a time. Doubtlefs they
ought to be for life, as was the cuftom at Rome *,
at Sparta -f-, and even at Athens. For we muft nor
confound what was called the fenate at Athens,
which was a body that changed every three months,
with the Areopagus, whofe members, as perpetual
models, were eftablifhed for life.
Let this be therefore a general maxim : that in a
fena:e defigned to be a rule, and the depofitary, as
it were, of manners, the members ought to be chofen
for life : in a fenate defigned for the adminiftration
of affairs, the members may be changed.
* The magiftrates there were annual, and the fenators for life.
f Lycurgus, fays Xenophon de Re pub. Lacederm. ordained, that
the fenators fhould be chofen from amongft the old mer, to the
end that they fhould not be negleded in the decline of life ; thus
by making them judges of the courage of young people he ren
dered the old age of the former more honourable than the ftrength
and vigour of the latter.
F 3 The
yo THESPIRIT
BOOK f ne fpirit, fays Ariftotle, waxes old as well as the
Chap . 7. body. This reflexion holds good only in regard to
a fingle magiftrate, but cannot be applied to a fena-
torian aflembly.
At Athens, befide the Areopagus, there were
guardians of the people s morals, and guardians of
the laws *. At Sparta all the old men were cenfors.
At Rome the cenforfhip was committed to two par
ticular magiltratcs. As the fenate watched over
the people, the cenfors were to have an eye over the
people and the fenate. Their office was to reform
the corruptions of the republic, to ftigmatize indo
lence, to cenfure irregularities, and to correct faults ;
and as for notorious crimes, thefe were left to the
punifhment of the laws.
That Roman law, which required the accufations
of adultery to be public, was admirably well calcu
lated for preferving the purity of morals ; it inti
midated married women, as well as thofe who were
to watch over their conduct.
Nothing contributes more to the prefervation of
morals, than an extreme fubordination of the young
to the old. Thus they are both reftrained, the for
mer by the refpect they have for thofe of advanced
age, and the latter by the refpect they have for
themfelves.
Nothing gives a greater force to the laws than a
perfect fubordination between the citizens and the
magiftrate. The great difference which Lycurgus ejla-
tlifljed between Sparta and the other cities, fays Xeno-
()Repub- phon ( a ), confifts chiefly in the obedience the citizens
I acd fo ew * c the laivs ; they run y when the magiftrate calls
* Evert the Areopagus itfelf was fubjcdl to their cenfure.
them.
O F L A W S. 71
them. But at Athens a rich man would le highly dif- B K
fkafcd) to be thought dependent on the magiftrate. chap. 7,
Paternal authority is likewife of great ufe to
wards the prefervation of morals. We have already
obferved,that in a republic there is not fo coercive a
force as in other governments. The laws mud
therefore endeavour to fupply this deficiency by
fome means or other j and this is done by paternal
authority.
Fathers at Rome had the power of life and death
over their children *. At Sparta every father had
a right to correct another man s child.
j
Paternal authority ended at Rome together with
the republic. In monarchies where fuch a purity
of morals is not required, they are controlled by
no other authority than that of the magiftrates.
The Roman laws which accuftomed young peo
ple to dependance, eftablifhed a long minority.
Perhaps we are miftaken in conforming to this cuf-
tom ; there is ne necefllty for fo much conflraim in
monarchies.
This very fubordination in a republic might make
it neceflary for the father to continue in the pollei-
iion of his children s fortune during life, as was the
cuftom at Rome. But this is not agreeable to the
fpirit of monarchy.
We may fee in the Roman hiftory, how ufeful this power u .is
to the republic. I mall give an inltance even in die time of its
greateft corruption. Aulus Fulvius was let out on his journey
in order to join Catiline ; his father called him back, and put
him to Jearh. SalJull Je bdlo Catil.
CHAP.
72 THESPIRIT
CHAP. VIII.
In what manner the Laws ought to It relative to the
principle of Government in an Ariftocracy.
y K TF the people are virtuous in an ariftocracy, they
Chap. 8. JL en jy ver y near the fame happinefs as in a popu
lar government, and the ftate grows powerful. But
as a great mare of virtue is a very rare thing where
men s fortunes are fo unequal, the laws muft tend
as much as poflible to infufe a fpirit of moderation,
and endeavour to re-eftablim that equality which
was ncccfiarily removed by the conftitution.
The fpirit of moderation is what we call virtue in
an ariftocracy ; it fupplies the place of the fpirit of
equality in a popular ftate.
As the pomp and fplendor with which kings are
furrounded, form a part of their power, fo mo-
defty and fimplicity of manners conftitute the
ftrength of an ariftocrattc nobility *. When they
affect no diftinction, when they mix with the peo
ple, drefs like them, and with them fhare all their
pleafures, the people are apt .to forget their fubjec-
tion and weaknefs.
Every government has its nature and principle.
An ariftocracy muft not therefore afiume the na
ture and principle of monarchy ; which would be
the cafe, were the nobles to be inverted with per-
fonal and particular privileges diftinct from thofc
In our days the Venetians, who in many refpe&s may be
faid to have a very wife government, decided a difpute between
a noble Venetian and a gentleman of Terra firma in refpeft to
precedency in a church, by declaring that out of Venice a noble
Venetian, had no pre-eminence over any other citizen.
Of
O F L A W S. r 73
of their body ; privileges ought to be for the fe- BOOK
nate, and fimple refpeft for the fenators.
In ariftocratical governments there are two prin
cipal fources of diforder : excefllve inequality be
tween the governors and the governed ; and the
fame inequality between the different members of
the body lhat governs. From thefe two inequa
lities, hatreds and jealoufies arife, which the laws
ought always to prevent or reprefs.
The firft inequality is chiefly, when the privileges
of the nobility are honorable only as they are igno
minious to the people. Such was the law at Rome
by which the Patricians were forbidden to marry
Plebeians * , a law that had no other effecT: than to
render the Patricians on the one fide more haughty,
and on the other more odious -J-.
This inequality occurs likewife when the condi
tion of the citizens differs with regard to taxes :
which may happen four different ways , when the
nobles aflume the privilege of paying none ; when
they commit frauds to exempt themfelves J , when
they engrofs the taxes to themfelves under pretence
of rewards or appointments for their refpective em
ployments i in fine, when they render the com
mon people tributary, and divide among their
own body the profits arifmg from the feveral fub
fidies. This laft cafe is very rare ; an ariftocracy
fo inftituted would be the mofl intolerable of all
governments.
* It was inferted by the Decemvirs in the two laft tables. See
Dionyf. Halicarn. 1. 10.
f ft is eafy to fee the advantages the tribunes drew from
thence in their fpeeches.
{ As in Come arillocracies in Italy ; nothung is more prejudicial
to the government.
While
74 THESPIRIT
BOOK While Rome inclined towards ariftocracy, flic
Chap s. av ided all thefe inconveniences. The magiftrates
never received any emoluments from their office.
The chief men of the republic were taxed like the
reft, nay heavier, and fometimes the taxes fell
upon them alone. In fine, far from fharing a-
mong themfelves the revenues of the ftaie, all they
could draw from the public trcafure, and all the
wealth that fortune flung in their way, they be-
ftowed freely on the people, to be excufed from
accepting the honors which the latter wanted to
confer *.
It is a fundamental maxim, that as pernicious as
the effects of largefies are to the people in a demo
cracy, lo falutary are they in an ahftocratical go
vernment. The former make them forget they arc
citizens, the latter bring them to a fenfe of it.
If the revenues of the ftate are not diftributed
among the people, they muft be convinced at lead
of their being well adminiftered : to feaft their eyes
with the public treafure is with them the fame thing
almoft as enjoying it. The golden chain difplayed
at Venice, the riches exhibited at Rome in public
triumphs, the treafures preferved in the temple of
Saturn, were in reality the riches of the people.
It is a very eflential point in an ariftocracy, that
the nobles themfelves mould not levy the taxes.
The firft order of the ftate in Rome never con
cerned themfelves with it ; the levying of taxes was
committed to the fecond, and even this in procefs
of time was attended with great inconveniences.
In an ariftocracy of this kind, where the nobles
* See in Strabo, 1. 14. in what manner tbe-Rfcccians beha-,
-n thi? rcfpecl.
levied
OF LAWS. 75
levied the taxes, the private people would be all at BOOK
the difcretion of thofe who were in public employ-
merits , and there would be no fuch thing as a fu-
perior tribunal to check their power. The mem
bers appointed to remove the abufes, would rather
enjoy them. The nobles would be like the princes
of defpotic governments, who confifcate whatever
eftates they pleafe.
Soon would the profits hence arifing be confi-
dered as a patrimony, which avarice would en-
Jarge at pleafure. The farms would be lowered,
and the public revenues reduced to nothing. This
is the reafon that fome governments, without having
ever received any remarkable mock, have dwindled
away to fuch a degree, as not only their neighbours,
but even their own fubjeds have been furprized
at it.
The laws mould likewife forbid the nobles all
kind of commerce : merchants ot fuch unbounded
credit would monopolize all to themfelves. Com
merce is a profefiion of people who are upon an
equality ; hence among defpotic dates the moft mi-
ferable are thofe in which the prince applies himfelf
to trade.
The laws of Venice * debar the nobles from
commerce, by which they might even innocently
acquire exorbitant wealth.
The laws ought to employ the moft effectual
means for making the nobles do juftice to the peo
ple. If they have not eftablifhed a tribune, they
ought to be a tribune themfelves.
* Amelet de laNeuffaye t of the government of Venice, part 3.
The Claudifin law forbad the fenators to have any fhip at k
tn.at held above forty bufhels. Liv. 1. 21.
Every
76 THE SPIRIT
BOOK Every fort of afylum in oppofitlon to the execu-
Chap 8 ^ on * *ke ^ aws deftroys ariftocracy, and is foon
fucceeded by tyranny.
They ought always to mortify the pride of do
mineering. There fhould be either a temporary or
perpetual magiftrate to keep the nobles in awe, as
the Ephori at Sparta, and the ftate Inquificors at
Venice, magiftrates that are fubject to no forma
lities. This fort of government Hands in need of
the ftrongeft fprings : thus a mouth of ftone * is
open to every informer at Venice, a mouth to
which one would be apt to give the appellation of
that of tyranny.
Thefe tyrannical magiftrates in an ariftocracy
bear fome analogy to the cenforfhip of democracies,
which of its own nature is equally independent. In
fact, the cenfors ought to be fubject to no inquiry
in relation to their conduct during their office ;
they mould meet with a thorough confidence, and
never be difcouraged. In this refpect the practice
of the Romans deferved admiration ; magiftrates
of all denominations were accountable for their
adminiftration f, except the cenfors J.
There are two very pernicious things in an ari-
tocracy ; either excefs of poverty, or excefs of
wealth, in the nobility. To prevent their poverty,
it is necefiary, above all things, to oblige them
to pay their debts in time. To moderate the excefs
* The informers throw their fcrolls into it
+ See Livy, 1. 49. A ccnfor could not be troubled even by a
cenfor, each made his remark without taking the opinion of his
collegue ; and when it otherwife happened, the cenfor/hip was in
a manner abolilhed.
I At Athens the Logift*, who made all the magiftrates account
able for their conduct, gave no account themfelve*.
of
O F L A W S. 77
of wealth, prudent and infenfible regulations fhould B K
be made; but no confifcations, no agrarian laws, Ch 3
no expunging of debts, thefe are things that are
productive of infinite mifchief.
The laws ought to abolilh the right of primo
geniture among the nobles *, to the end that by a
continual divifion of the inheritances their fortunes
may be always upon a level.
There mould be no fubftitutions, no powers of
demption, no rights of Majorafgo, or adoption.
The contrivances for perpetuating the grandeur of
families in monarchical governments, ought never
to be employed in -f- ariftocracies.
After the laws have compafied the equality of
families, the next thing they have to do, is to pre-
ferve a proper harmony and union amongft them.
The quarrels of the nobility ought to be quickly
decided , otherwife the contefts of individuals be
come thofe of families. Arbiters may terminate,
or even prevent the rife of difputes.
In fine, the laws muft not favour the diftinctions
raifed by vanity among families, under pretence
that they are more noble or ancient ; pretences of
this nature ought to be ranked among the weak-
nefTes of private perfons.
We have only to caft our eyes on Sparta ;
there we may fee how the Ephori contrived to
check the foibles of the kings, as well as thofe of
the nobility and of the common people.
* It is fo pra&ifed at Venice, Amclot de la HouJJaye t p. 30, &
31-
f The main defign of fome ariftocracies Teems to be lefs the
fupport of the ftate than of what they call their nobility.
CHAP.
78 THESPIRIT
CHAP. IX.
In what manner the Laws are relative to their
Principle in Monarchies.
* V K /V ^ honor is the principle of a monarchical
Chap. 9. ./ jL government, the laws ought to be relative
to this principle.
They mould endeavour to fupport the nobility,
in refpec~l to whom honor may be, in fome meafure,
deemed both child and parent.
They fhould render the nobility hereditary, not
as a boundary between the power of the prince and
the weaknefs of the people, but as the bond and
conjunction of both.
In this government, fubflitutions which prefervc
the eftates of families undivided, are extremely ufe-
ful, though in others not fo proper.
Here the power of redemption is of fervice, as it
reftores to noble families the lands that had been
alienated by the prodigality of a parent.
The lands of the nobility ought to have privi
leges as well as their perfons. The monarch s dig
nity is infeparable from that of his kingdom , and
the dignity of the nobleman from that of his fief.
All thefe privileges mud be particular to the
nobility, and incommunicable to the people, un-
Jefs we intend to aft contrary to the principle of
government, and to diminifh the pcwer of the
nobles together with that of the people.
Subftitutions are a reftraint to commerce -, the
power of redemption produces an infinite number
of procefles ; every eftate in land that is fold
throughout the kingdom, is, in fome meafure, with
out
O F L A W S. 79
out an owner for the fpace of a year. Privileges 3 p *
annexed to fiefs give a power that is very burthen- chap." 9.
fome to thofe governments which tolerate them.
Thefe are the inconveniences of nobility, incon
veniences however that vanifh when confronted
with the general utility which refults from it : but
when thefe privileges are communicated to the peo
ple, every principle of government is broke through
to no manner of purpofe.
In monarchies a perfon may leave the bulk of his
eftate to one of his children ; a permifiion improper
in any other government.
The laws *ught to favour all kind of commerce*
confident with the conftitution of this government,
to the end that the fubjecls may, without ruining
themfelves, be able to fatisfy the continual cravings
of the prince and his court.
They mould eftablifh fome fixed regulation, that
the manner of collecting the taxes may not be more
burthenfome than the taxes themfelves.
The weight of duties produces labor, labor wea-
rinefs, and wearinefs the fpirit of indolence.
CHAP. X.
Of the Expedition peculiar to the executive Power in
Monarchies.
GREAT is the advantage which a monar
chical government has over a republic : as
the ftate is conducted by a fmgle psrfon, the exe-
* It is tolerated only in the common people. See the third
law. Cod. dt Comm. & Mmaforib.ts, \vhich is full of good
fcnfe.
cutive
So T H E S P I R 1 T
B cutive power is thereby enabled to act with greater
Chap! 10* expedition. But as this expedition may degene
rate into rapidity, the laws fhould ufe fome con
trivance to flacken it. They ought not only to
favour the nature of each conftitution, but likewife
to remedy the abufes that might refult from this
very nature.
( a )Tef- Cardinal Richelieu (*) advifes monarchs to per-
K * mit no fuch thing as fccieties or communities that
raife difficulties upon every trifle. If this man s
heart had not been bewitched with the love of de-
fpotic power, ftill thefe arbitrary notions would
have filled his head.
The bodies intruded with the depofitum of the
laws, are never more obedient than when they pro
ceed flowly, and ufe that reflection in the prince s
affairs which can fcarcely be expected from the ig
norance of the laws which prevails in a court, or
from the precipitation of its councils *.
What would have become of the fined monarchy
in the world, if the magiftrates, by their delays, by
their complaints, by their prayers, had not flopped
the rapidity even of their princes virtues, when
thefe monarchs confulting only the generous im-
pulfe of great minds, wanted to give a boundlefs
reward to lervices performed with a boundlefs cou
rage and fidelity ?
C II A P. XI.
Of the Excel* f a monarchical Government.
O N A R C H Y has" a great advantage
over a defpotic government. As it na-
* Bar bar. -His, jlatirn exe$ui regiurr. r. Ta
cit. Annal. 1. 5.
turally
cc
cc
It
O F L A W S. 81
rurally requires there fliould be feveral orders be- B K
longing to the conftitution under the prince, thechap. n.
ftate is more fixed, the conftitution more fteady,
and the perfon of him that governs more fecure.
Cicero ( a ) is of opinion, that the eftablifhing of (a) Lib. 3.
the tribunes was the prefervation of the republic. de Le S-
In fa ft) fays he, the violence of a headlefs people
is more terrible. A chief or head is fenfible that
the affair depends upon himfelf^ and therefore be
<c thinks -, but the people in their impetuofity are ig-
<c nor ant of the danger into which they hurry them-
<c fehes" This reflection may be applied to a de-
fpotic government, which is a people without tri
bunes ; and to a monarchy, where the people have
fome fort of tribunes.
In fact, it is obfervable, that in the commotions
of a defpotic government, the people hurried a-
way by their paffions, pulh things always as far
as they can go. The diforders they commit are
all extreme ; whereas in monarchies things are fel -
dom carried to excefs. The chiefs are afraid on
their own account, they are afraid of being aban
doned ; and the intermediate dependent powers *
do not chufe that the people mould have too much
the upper hand. It rarely happens that the flates
of the kingdom are intirely corrupted. The prince
adheres to thefe, and the feditious who have neither
will nor hopes to fubvert the government, have
neither power nor will to dethrone the prince.
In thefe circumftances men of prudence and au
thority interfere ; moderate meafures are firft pro-
pofed, then complied with, and things at length
* See the firft note of book 2. ch. 4,
VOL. L G are
82 THESPIRIT
BOOK are redreffed -, the laws relume their vigour, and
Chap. 11. command fubmiflion.
Thus all our hiilories are full of civil wars with
out revolutions, while the hiilories of defpotic go
vernments abound with revolutions without civil
wars.
The writers of the hiflory of the civil wars of
fome countries, even they who fomented them,
fufficiently demonstrate how little reafon princes
have to fufpecl: the authority with which they inveft
particular bodies of men tor their fervice ; fmce
even under the unhappy circumftance of their er
rors, they Ikhed only after the laws and their du
ty , and reltr.iincd, r.iorc than they were capable of
(*) Me- inflaming, th< etuofityoi the revolted (**).
7; Cardinal Richelieu, reflecting perhaps that he had
<k Ret/! to mi; - c ^c fti tes ot the kingdom, has
and other recourfe to the virtues of the prince and of his mi-
j ^ nifters for the fupj .rt (* ot the government : but
i. I olit. he requires fu main chings, that indeed there is none
but an angel capable of iuch attention, of fuch light,
of fuch refolution, and knowledge , and fcarce can
we flatter ourielves ever to fee fuch a prince and
minilters, no not while monarchy fubfifts.
As people who live under a good government,
are happier than thole who without rule or leaders
\vanc!ci about the forefts , fo monarchs who live
under the fundamental laws of their country, are
far happier than defpotic princes, who have nothing
to regulate either their own or their fubje&s hearts.
H A P.
O F L A W S. 83
BOOK
CHAP. XII. Cteplu.
The fame fubjetl continued. 1 3> * ! 4-
LE T us not look for magnanimity in defpotic
governments , the prince cannot impart a
grandeur which he has not himfeif : with him there
is no fuch thing as glory.
It is in monarchies we fee the fubjecls around the
prince, receiving the influence of his beams ; there
it is that each perfon filling, as it were, a larger
fpace, is capable of exercifmg thofe virtues which
adorn the foul, not with independence, but with
grandeur.
CHAP. XIII.
An idea cf defpotic
WHEN the favages of Louifiana are de-
firous of fruit, they cut the tree to the
root, and gather the fruit ( d ). This is an emblem ( 4 ) EditV-
of defpotic government. in
315.
CHAP. XIV.
In what manner the Laivs are relative to the Prin
ciples of defpotic Government.
TH E principle of defpotic government is
fear , but a timid, ignorant, and faint-
fpirited people have no occafion for a great num
ber of laws.
Every thing ought to depend here on two or
three ideas , therefore there is no neceffity that any
new notions mould be added. When we want to
break a horfe, we take care not to let him change
G 2 his
84 THESPIRIT
BOOK h; s matter, his leflbn, or his pace. Thus an im-
Chap. 14. prefTion is made on his brain by two or three mo
tions, and no more.
If a prince is fhut up in a feraglio, he cannot
leave this voluptuous abode without alarming thofe
who keep him confined. They cannot bear that
his perfon and power mould pafs into other hands.
He feldom therefore wages war in perfon, and
hardly ventures to intruil the command to his
generals.
A prince of this (lamp, unaccuftomed to refift-
ance in his palace, is enraged to fee his will oppofed
by armed force , hence he is generally governed by
wrath or vengeance.
Befides, he can have no notion of true glory.
War therefore is carried on under fuch a govern
ment in its full natural fury, and a lefs extent is
given to the law of nations than in other ftates.
Such a prince has fo many imperfections, that
they are afraid to expofe his natural ftupidity to
public view. He is concealed in his palace, and the
people are ignorant of his fituation. It is lucky for
him, that the inhabitants of thofe countries need
only the name of a prince to govern them.
When Charles XII. was at Bender, he met with
fome oppofition from the fenate of Sweden , upon
which he wrote word home that he would fend one
of his boots to command them. This boot would
have governed like a defpotic prince.
If the prince is a prifoner, he is fuppofed to be
dead, and another mounts the throne. The treaties
made by the prifoner are void, his fucceflbr will
not ratify them : in effect, as he is the law, the Hate,
and the prince ; when he is no longer a prince, he
is
O F L A W S. 85
is nothing : were he not therefore deemed to be B K
dead, the flate would be fubverted. Chap.*i 4 .
One thing which chiefly determined the Turks
to conclude a feparate peace with Peter I. was the
Mufcovites telling the Vizir, that in Sweden ano
ther prince had been fct upon the throne ( e ). () Conti-
The prefervation of the ftate is only the prefer- u ^ lon of
r i r i ruffen-
vation oi the prmce, or rather of the palace where dorPs in-
he is confined. Whatever does not directly menace woduftion
this palace or the capital, makes no imprefiion on [* e Q f l
ignorant, proud, and prejudiced minds ; and as for Europe in
the concatenation of events, they are unable to tl l e art
trace, to forefee, or even to conceive it. Politics, den, ch.
with its feveral fprings and laws, muft here be very I0
much limited; the political government is as fimple
as the civil *.
The whole is reduced to reconciling t ie political
and civil adminiftration with the domeitic govern
ment, the officers of ftate with thofe of the feraglio.
Such a ftate is happieft, when it can look upon it-
felf as the only one in the world, when it is environed
with deferts, and feparated from thofe people whom
they call Barbarians. Since it cannot depend on
the militia, it is proper it mould deftroy a part of
itfelf.
As fear is the principle of defpotic government,
its end is tranquillity : but this tranquillity cannot
be called a peace ; no, it is only the filence of thofe
towns which the enemy is ready to invade.
Since the ftrength does not lie in the ftate, but in
the army that founded it , in order to defend the
(late, the army muft be preferved, how formidable
* According to Sir John Chardin there is no council of ftate in
Perfia.
G 3 foever
S6 THESPIRIT
* foever to the prince. How then can we reconcile
^aap. 14. tne fecurity of the government, with that of the
prince s perfon ?
Obferve how induftrioufly the Ruffian govern
ment endeavours to temper its arbitrary power,
which it finds more burthenfome than the people
themfelves. They have broke their great bodies
of troops, mitigated criminal punifhments, erected
tribunals, entered into a knowledge of the laws, and
mftructcd the people. But there are particular
caufes that will probably oblige them to return to
the very milery which they now endeavour to avoid.
In chofc flates religion has more influence than
any where elfr -, it is a fear added to fear. In Ma
hometan countries it is partly from their religion
that the people derive the furprizing veneration they
have for their prince.
It is religion that amends, in fome meafure, the
Turkifh conilitution. The fubjects who have no
attachment of honor to the glory and grandeur of
the ftate, are attached to it by the force and prin
ciple of religion.
Of all dcfpotic governments, there is none that
labours more under its own weight, than that
wherein the prince declares himfelf proprietor of
all the lands, and heir to all his fubjects. Hence
the neglect of agriculture ariies , and if the prince
intermeddles likewile in trade, all manner of indui-
try is ruined.
Under this fort of government nothing is repaired
" or improved ( f ). Houies are built only for the ne-
, bute ^ J
of the Ot- cefilty ot habitation , there is no luch thing as dig-
ing of ditches, or planting of trees ; every thing
p. i^6/ * s drawn from, but nothing reflored to the earth j
3 d*
O F L A W S. 87
the land lies unfilled, and the whole country be- B K
comes a deferr. Chap. 14.
Is it to be imagined that the laws which abolifh
the property of land, and the fucceffion of eftates,
will diminifh the avarice and cupidity of the great ?
By no means. They will rather flimulate this cu
pidity and avarice. The great men will be prompt
ed to ufe a thoufand opprefTive methods, imagining
they have no other property than the gold and fil-
ver which they are able to feize upon by violence or
to conceal.
To prevent therefore the utter ruin of the ftate,
the avidity of the prince ought to be moderated by
fome eflablifhed cuftom. Thus in Turky the prince
is fatisfied with the right of three per cent, on the
value of inheritances ( E ). But as he gives the great- ( c )Seecon-
eft part of the lands to his foldiery, and difpoles of ^"inSri-
them as he pleafes, as he feizes on all the eftates of tances of
the officers of the empire at rheir deceafe, as he has theTurks,
the property of the eftates of thofe who die without an dmoder*
ifiue, and the daughters have only the ufufruft, it Sparta.
thence follows that the areateft part of the eftates alfo
C u rr?-r J Ricaut n
or the country are pollened -m a precarious man- the Otto-
man Em-
By the laws of Bantam * the king feizes on the
whole inheritance, even wife, children, and habita
tion. In order to elude the cruelleft part of this
law, they are obliged to marry their children at
eight, nine, or ten years of age, and ibmetimes
younger, to the end that they may not be a wretched
part of the father s fucceffion.
* Collection of voyages that contributed to the eftablifhment
of the Eaft- India company, torn, i. The law of Pegu is left
<*uel ; if there happens to be children, the king fucceeds only to
two thirds. Jbid. torn. 3. p. i.
G 4 In
THE SPIRIT
B o^o K j n countries where there are no fundamental laws,
Chan 14 tne fuccefiion to the empire cannot be fixed. The
crown is then elective, and the right of electing is in
the prince, who names a fucceflbr either of his own
or of fonae other family. In vain would it be to
eftablifh here the fucceflion of the eldeft fon ; the
prince might always chufe another. The fucceflbr is
declared by the prince himfelf, or by a civil war.
Hence a defpotic {late is, upon another account, more
liable than a monarchical government to diflblution.
As every prince of the royal family is held equally
capable of being chofen, hence it follows that the
prince who afcends the throne, flrangles immediate
ly his brothers, as inTurky ; or puts out their eyes,
as in Perfia; or bereaves them of their underftand-
ing, as in the Mogul s country > or if thefe precau
tions are not ufed, as in Morocco, the vacancy of the
throne is always attended with a horrid civil war.
( h )Seethe By the conititutions of Ruflla ( h ) the Czar may
chufe who he has a mind for his fucceiTor, whether
ons, efpe- ^ ^ s own or of a ftrange family. Such a fettlement
cialiv that produces a thoufand revolutions, and renders the
/ " 2 throne as tottering as the fucceflion is arbitrary.
The right of fucceflion being one of thofe things
which are of moft importance to the people to know ;
the beft is that which moft fenfibly ftrikes them, fuch
as a certain order of birth.
A fettlement of this kind puts a ftop to intrigues,
and flifles ambition ; the mind of a weak prince is
no longer inflaved, nor is he made to (peak his will
as he is juft expiring.
When the fucceflion is eflablifhed by a funda
mental law, only one prince is the fucceflbr, and his
brothers have neither a real nor apparent right to
difpute
O F L A W S. 89
difpute the crown with him. They can neither pre- BOOK
tend to, nor take any advantage of the will of a fa- rhao" u
ther. There is then no more occafion to confine or
kill the king s brother than any other fubject.
But in defpotic governments, where the prince s
brothers are equally his flaves and his rivals, pru
dence requires that their peribns be fecured ; efpe-
cially in Mahometan countries where religion confi-
ders victory or iuccefs as a divine decifion in their
favour; fo that they have no fuch thing as a monarch
de jure, but only de fafto.
There is far a greater incentive to ambition in
countries where the princes of the blood are fenfible
that if they do not afccnd the throne they mull be
either imprifoned or put to death, than amongtl us,
where they are placed in fuch a ilation, as may fa-
tisfy, if not their ambition, at leaft their moderate
defires.
The princes of defpotic governments have always
perverted the ufe of marriage. They generally take
a great many wives, efpecially in that part of the
world where abfolute power is in fome meafure na
turalized, namely Afia. Hence they come to have
fuch a multitude of children, that they can hardly
have any great affection for them, nor the children
for one another.
The reigning family refembles the (late \ it is too
weak itfelf, and its head too powerful , it feems very
numerous and extenfive, and yet is fuddenly extinct.
Artaxerxes ( b ) put all his children to death for con- (t) See
fpiring againft him, It is not at all probable that
fifty children fliould confpire againft their father,
and much lefs that this confpiracy mould be owing
to his having refufed to refign his concubine to his
elded
9 o THESPIRIT
BOOK elded Ton. It is more natural to believe that the
Cha 14. whole was an intrigue of thole oriental feraglios,
& 15. where artifice, treachery, and deceit reign in filence,
involved in thick obicurity ; where an old prince,
grown every day more infirm, is the firft prifoner of
the palace.
Alter what has been faid, one would imagine
that human nature mould perpetually oppofe a de-
fpotic government. But notwithftanding the love of
liberty, fo natural to mankind, notwithilanding their
innate deteftation of force and violence, moft nati
ons are fubjecl to this very government. This is
ifilv accounted for. In order to form a moderate
*
government, it is necefTary to combine the feveral
} owers, to rule, temper, and fet them in motion,
to give, as it were, ballaft to one in order to en
able it to refill another. This is a mafter-piece of
I ^illation, rarely produced by hazard, and feldom
attained by prudence. On the contrary, a defpotic
government offers itfelf, as it were, at firft fightj it
is uniform throughout , and as pafiions only are
requifite to eftablifh it, this is what every capacity
may reach.
" . CHAP. XV.
The fame fubjett continued.
IN warm climates, where defpotic power generally
prevails, there is an earlier fenfibility, as well as
Sec the an earlier extinction of the paffions ( e ) j the under-
book of" (landing is fooner ripened , they are in lefs danger of
" fquandering away their fortunes ; there is lefs facility
the nature in diftinguifhing themfelves in the world ^ lefs com-
cf the ch- munu:a t lon between young people, who are eonfcned
piate.
at
O F L A W S. 91
at home , they marry much earlier, and confequently BOOK
they may be fooner of age than in our European chap.* i c.
climates. In Turky they are of age at fifteen ( E ). ( g )
Here there is no fuch thing as a cefllon of goods;
in a government where there is no fixed property, modem
people depend rather on the perfon than on his
eftate.
The cefTion of goods is naturally admitted in mo
derate governments *, but efpecially in republics,
becaufe of the greater confidence which arifes from
the probity of the citizens, and becaufe of the lenity
and moderation that a form of government, which
every one feems to have framed for himfelf, ought
to infpire.
Had the legiflators of the Roman republic efta-
blifhed the cefTion of goods f, they never would
have been expofed to fo many feditions and civil
difcords, nor would they have experienced the dan
ger of the evils, or the inconveniency of the re
medies.
Poverty, and the precarioufnefs of property in a
defpotic ftate, render ufury natural, each perfon raif-
ing the value of his money in proportion to the dan
ger he fees in lending it. Milery therefore pours
in from all parts into thofe unhappy countries \
they are bereft of every thing, even of the refourcc
of borrowing.
Hence it is that a merchant under this govern
ment is unable to carry on a great trade , he lives
* The fame may be faid of competitions in regard to fair bank
rupts.
f There \vas no fuch eftabliihment made till the Julian law,
J)e cejjlone bonerum ; which preferred them from prifon, and from
an ignominious divifion of their goods.
-r from
92 THESPIRIT
B oo K f rom fond to mouth ; were he to encumber him-
Chap. i 5 . felf with a large quantity of merchandifes, he would
lofe more by the exorbitant intereft he mufl give
for money, than he could pofllbly get by the goods.
Wherefore there are no laws here relating to com
merce , they are all reduced to what is called the
civil polity.
A government cannot be unjuft without having
hands to exercife its injuftice. Now it is impoflible
but thefe hands will be grafping for themfelves.
The embezzling of the public money is therefore
natural in defpotic Hates.
As this is a common crime under this govern
ment, confifcations are very ufeful. By thefe the
people are eafed ; the money drawn by this means
being a confiderable tribute which could hardly be
raifed on theexhaufted fubjects : neither is there in
thofe countries any one family which the prince
would be glad to preferve.
In moderate governments it is quite a different
thing. Confifcations would render property un
certain, would ftrip innocent children, would de-
ftroy a whole family inftead of punifhing a fingle
criminal. In republics they would be attended with
the mifchief of fubverting equality, which is the
very foul of this government, by depriving a citi
zen of his neceflary fubfiftence.
( h ) Au- There is a Roman law ( h ) againfl * confifcations
thentica except in the cafe of Crimea majtftatis^ or high trea-
fla^runT f n f the m ft heinOUS nature * Jt W0uld be a
Cod. <te prudent thing to follow the fpirit of this law, and
tea. damn. to \^ m \ t conr ]fcations to particular crimes. In coun-
* They feem to have been too fond, of confifcations in the re*
public of Athens.
tries
OF LAWS. 93
tries where a local cuftom has rendered real eftates BOOK
alienable, Bodin very juftly obferves that confifca- chap.*i6.
tions fhould extend only to fuch as are purchafed or
acquired ( 5 ). ^ Book 5*
CHAP. XVI. ch 3 *
Of the Communication of Power.
IN a defpotic government the power is commu
nicated intire to the perfon entrufted with it.
The vizir himfelf is the defpotic prince , and each
particular officer is the vizir. In monarchies the
power is lefs immediately applied ; being tempered
by the monarch as he gives it*. He makes fuch
a diftribution of his authority, as never to commu
nicate a part of it, without referving a greater fhare
to himfelf.
Hence in monarchies the particular governors of
towns are not fo dependent on the governor of the
province, as not to be dill more fo on the prince \
and the private officers of military bodies are not fo
far fubject to their general, as not to owe ftill a
greater fubjection to their fovereign.
In moil monarchies it has been wifely regulated,
that thofe who have an extenfive command, mould
not belong to any military body , fo that as they
have no authority but through the prince s parti
cular pleafure, and as they may be employed or
not, they are in fome meafure in the fervice, and
in fome meafure out of it.
This is incompatible with a defpotic government.
For if thofe who are not actually employed, were
neverthelefs invefted with privileges and titles, the
* Ut efle Phcebi dulcius lumen folet
Jamjam cadentis <
con-
94 THESPIRIT
BOOK confequence muft be that there would be a kind of
Chap 16 men * n c ^ e ft ate > w ^ m ig nt be faid to be great of
themfelves , a thing dire&ly oppofite to the nature
of this government.
Were the governor of a town independent of the
bafhaw, expedients would be daily necefTary to
make them agree ; which is highly abfurd in a de-
fpotic ftate. Befides, if a particular governor
might refufe to obey, how could the other anfwer
for his province with his head ?
In this kind of government authority muft ever
be wavering ; nor is that of the loweft magiflrate
lefs fteady than that of the defpotic prince. Un
der moderate governments, the law is prudent in
all its parts, is perfectly well known, and even the
pettieft magiftrates are capable of following it. But
in a defpotic Mate, where the prince s will is the
law, though the prince were wife, yet how could
the magiflrate follow a will he does not know ? He
muft certainly follow his own.
Again, as the law is only the prince s will, and
as the prince can only will what he knows, it fol
lows that there are an infinite number of people who
muft make their wills keep pace with his.
In fine, as the law is the momentary will of the
prince, it is neceffary that thofe who will for him,
mould follow his fubitaneous manner of willing.
C II A P. \V!I.
Of Prefents.
IT is a received cuftom in defpotic countries,
never to addrefs any fuperior whomfoever, not
excepting their kings, without making them a pre-
fent.
O F L A W S. 95
fent. The Mogul ( k ) never receives the petitions B K
of his fubjects, if they come with empty hands, chap. 17.
Thefe princes fpoil even their own favours. ( k )Colleo
But thus it mud ever be in a government where y n a es
no man is a citizen ; in a government where they that con-
have all a notion that a fuperior is under no obli- Abated to
. c . the clta-
gation to an inferior ; in a government where men bliihment
imagine themfelves bound by no other tie than the of the
\-j J LT il T J *
chaftiiements inflicted by one party over another ;
j f j company.
in a government, in fine, where there is very little Tom. i.
to do, and where the people have feldom an occa- P- 8o -
fion of prefenting themfelves before the great, of
offering their petitions, and much lefs their com-
plaints.
In a republic prefents are odious, becaufe virtue
{lands in no need of them. In monarchies honor is
a much ftronger incentive than prefents. But in
a defpotic government, where there is neither ho
nor nor virtue, people cannot be determined to
act but through hope of the conveniencies of life.
It is in conformity to republican ideas, that Plato
ordered thofe who received prefents for doing ( )
their duty, to be punimed with death. They muft
not take prefents, fays he, neither for good nor for
evil aftions.
A very bad law that was among the Romans^), ( m ) Leg. 5.
which gave the magift rates leave to accept of fmall ^ . a r e |
prefents *, provided they did not exceed one hun
dred crowns the whole year. They who receive
nothing expect nothing , they who receive a lit
tle, foon defire a little more, till at length their
defires fwell to an exorbitant height. Befides, it
is much eafier to convict a man, who knows him-
* Munufcula.
felf
96 THESPIRIT
BOOK f e ]f obliged to accept of no prefent at all, and yet
\ I ^"^
Chap. 18. w ^ Accept of fomething, than a perfon who takes
more when he ought to take lefs, and who always
finds pretexts, excufes, and plaufible reafons in juf-
tification of his conduct.
CHAP. XVIII.
Of Rewards conferred by the Sovereign.
IN defpotic governments, where, as we have
already obferved, the principal motive of action
is the hope of the conveniencies of life, the prince
who confers rewards, has nothing to beftow but
money. In monarchies where honor alone predo
minates, the prince s rewards would confift only of
marks of diftinction, if the diftinctions eftablifhed
by honor were not attended with luxury which
neceflarily brings on its wants: the prince there
fore is obliged to confer fuch honors as lead to
wealth. But in a republic where virtue reigns, a
motive felf-fufficient and which excludes all others,
the recompences of the ftate confift only of public
atteftations of this virtue.
It is a general rule, that great rewards in mo
narchies and republics, are a fign of their decline ;
becaufe they are a proof of their principles being
corrupted, and that the idea of honor has no long
er the fame force in monarchy, nor the title of ci
tizen the fame force in a republic.
The very worft Roman emperors, were thofe
who were moft profufe in their largefies ; for exam
ple, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Otho, Viiellius, Com-
modus* Hdiogabalus, and Caracalla. The beft, as
Augujlus
O F L A W S. 97
S) Vefpafian, Antoninus Pius y Marcus Aure- B r K
Hits and Pertinax, were ceconomifts. Under good Ch |(
emperors the ftate refumed its principles ; all other
treafures were fupplied by that of honor,
CHAP. XIX.
New Confidences of the Principles cf the three
Governments.
I CANNOT conclude this book without mak
ing fome applications of my three principles.
It is a queftion, whether the laws ought to oblige Ift.
a fubjed: to accept of a public employment. My l
opinion is, that they ought in a republic, but not
in a monarchical government. In the former, pub
lic employments are atteftations of virtue, depofi-
tums with which a citizen is intrufted by his coun
try, for whom alone he ought to live, act, and
think , confequently he cannot refufe them *. In
the latter, public offices are testimonies of honor ;
now fuch is the capricioufnefs of honor, that it
chufes to accept of none of thefe teftimonies but
when and in what manner it pleafes.
The late king of Sardinia inflicted punifhments -f-
on his fubjects that refufed the dignities and public
offices of the ftate. In this he unknowingly fol
lowed republican ideas : but his manner of govern
ing in other refpects fufficiently proves that this was
not his intention.
* Plato in his Republic Book 8. ranks thefe refufals among the
marks of the corruption of a republic. In his Laws, Book 6.
he orders them to be punifhed by a fine r at Venice they are
punifhed with banifhment.
f Viclor Amadeus*
VOL. I. H Secondly.
9 8 THESPIRIT
BOOK Secondly, it is queftioned whether a fubjedt
cha " fhould be obliged to accept of a poft in the army
II. Quef- inferior to that which he held before : Among the
tion. Romans it was ulual to fee a captain lerve the next
year under his lieutenant *. This is becaufe virtue
in republics requires a continual facrifice of our per-
fons and of our repugnances for the good of the
flate. But in monarchies, honor true or falfe will
never bear with what it calls degrading itfelf.
In defpotic governments where honor, pods
and ranks are equally abufed, they indifcriminately
make of a prince a fcnllion, and of a fcullion a
prince.
III. Qucf- Thirdly it may be inquired, whether civil and
tion. military employments mould be conferred on the
fame perfon ? In republic?, I think, they mould
be joined, but in monarchies fcparated. In repub
lics it would be extremely dangerous to make the
profeffion of arms a particular flate, diftincl from
that of civil functions -, and in monarchies no lefs
dangerous would it be to confer thefe two employ
ments on the fame perfon.
In republics a perfon takes up arms only with
a view to defend his country and its laws ; it is
becaufe he is a citizen he makes himfelf for a while
a foldier. Were thefe two diftinct ftates, the per
fon who under arms thinks himfelf a citizen, would
foon be made fenfible he is only a foldier.
In monarchies they whole condition engages them
in the profeflion of arms, have nothing but glory, or
Some centurions having appealed to the people for the
employments which thev had before enjoyed, it is jvft, my cw">~
-r-ades, faid a centurion, that you foould look upon fccry pcft as honor-
able hi r . ;v an cpp:riunity cf r 5 the republic.
. Jcc. 5. lib. 42.
at
O F L A W S. 99
at lead honor or fortune, in view. To men there- B K
fore like thefe the prince mould never give any chap , i a.
civil employments ; on the contrary they ought to
be checked by the civil magiftrate, that the fame
perfons may not have at the fame time the confi
dence of the people and the power to abufe it *.
We have only to caft an eye on a nation that
may be juftly called a republic difguifed under
the form of monarchy, and we mall fee how jea
lous they are of making a feparatc order of the pro-
feifion of arms, and how the military itate is con-
ftantly allied with that of the citizen, and even
fometimes of the magiftrate, to the end that thefe
qualities may be a pledge for their country, which
ihould never be forgotten.
The divifion of civil and military employments,
made by the Romans after the extinction of the
republic, was not an arbitrary thing. It was a
confequence of the change which happened in the
conftitution of Rome ; it was natural to a mo
narchical government ; and what was only com
menced under Auguftus -f , fucceeding emperors (|
were obliged to finifh, in order to temper the mili
tary government.
Procopius therefore, the competitor of Valens
the emperor, was very much to blame, when con
ferring the proconfular dignity upon Hormif-
das, a prince of the blood royal of Perfia, he re-
* Ne imperium ad optimos nobilium transferretur, Senatum
militia vetuit Gallienus, etiam adire exercitum. Aurelius Vittor
de viris illuftribus.
f Auguftus deprived the fenators, proconfuls, and governors
of the privilege of wearing arms. Dio. 1. 33.
I) Conftantine. See Zozimus lib. 2.
Ammianus Marcellinus lib. 26. More vetcrum & btlla. retfuro.
H 2 ftored
ico T H E S P I R I T
BOOK ftored to this magiftracy the military command
Chap* IQ. f which it had been formerly pofTefled , unlefs
indeed he had very particular reafons for fo doing.
A perfon that afpires to the fovereignty, concerns
himfelf lets about what is ferviceable to the (late,
than about what is likely to promote his own in-
tereft.
IV. Quef- Fourthly it is a queftion, whether public em
ployments fhould be venal ? They ought not, I
think, in defpotic governments, where the fubjects
muft be inftantaneouily placed or dilplaced by the
prince.
But in monarchies this venality is not at all im
proper, by reatbn it is an inducement to undertake
that as a family employment, which would never be
undertaken through a motive of virtue-, it fixes like-
wife every one to his duty, and renders the feveral
(*) Frag- orders of the kingdom more permanent. Suidas ( k )
" very juftly oblerves that Anaftafius had changed
the em- the empire into a kind of ariftocracy, by felling all
bailies of public employments.
tine For" Plato ( ! ) cannot bear with this venality. " T .
phyroge- " is txaftly\ fays he, as if a perfon teas fo be
n | U R S h " ma ^ e a nwiwr cr T^ ot f a fop f or b* s m "
lib. 8. ct ne y- & i* pojjible that this rule Jhould be lad
* in every other : ment of life, and bold good
" OK.]- ..iijlrp. f a republic ?" But
Plato fpeaks of a republic founded on virtue, and
we of a monarchy. Now in monarchies (where
though there were no fuch thing as a regular fale
of public offices, ftill the indigence and avidity of
the courtier would equally prompt him to expofe
them to faie) chance will furnilh better fubjecls
than the prince i choice. In fine, the method of
attaining
O F L A W S. ioi
attaining to honors through riches, infjnres and ? ^
cherifhes induftry *, a thing extremely wanting in c hap , 9<
this kind of government.
The fifth queftion is, in what kind of govern- V. Quef-
ment Ceniors are necefTary ? My anfwer is, that tlon>
they are necefiary in a republic, where the principle
of government is virtue. Vv e rruift not imagine
that criminal actions only are dcftru&ive of vir
tue i it is deftroyed alfo by carelelTnefs, by faults,
by a certain coolncfs in the love of our country,
by dangerous examples, by feeds of corruption, by
whatever does not openly violate but elude the
laws, by what does not fubvert but weaken them ;
all this ought to fall under the inquiry and correc
tion of the Cenfors.
We are furprized at the punifhment ot the Are-
opagite, for killing a fparrow, which, to efcape the
purfuit of a hawk, had taken fhelter in his bofom.
Surprized we are alfo that an Areopagite fhould
put his fon to death for pulling out the eyes of a
little bird. But let us reflect that the queftion here
does not relate to a criminal condemnation, but to
a judgment on manners in a republic founded jon
manners.
In monarchies there mould be no Cenfors ;
monarchies are founded on honor, and the na
ture of honor is to have the whole univerfe for its
Cenfor. Every man that fails in this refpect, is
fubjeft to the reproaches even of thofe who are
void of honor.
Here the Cenfors would be fpoilt by the very
* We fee the lazinefs of Spain, where all public employments
are given away.
H 3 people
102 1 n t, b V 1 R 1 T
BOOK people whom they ought to correct : they could
Chap 10 nct P reva ^ againft the corruption of : a monarchy ;
the corruption rather would be too ftrong againft
them.
Hence it is obvious that there oug-ht to be no
^j
Cenfors in defpotic governments. The example of
China feems to derogate from this rule ; but we
fhall fee in the courfe of this work, the particular
reafons of that inftitiition.
Jjk.
BOOK
OF LAWS. 103
BOOK VI.
Confequences of the Principles of different
Governments with reffeEt to the Sim
plicity of civil and criminal Lcrjcs, //
Form ofJudgmentSi and the InfliEtlng
of Punijhments.
C H A P. I.
Of the Sir,. cf civil T.a":s in i i Co:
MON A R C H I E S do not permit of fo great BOOK
a /implicit/ of laws as defpotic governments, r , VI *
For in monarchies there mutt be courts of judica
ture ; thefe mult give their decifions -, the decifions
muft be preferved and learnt, th.it we may judge in
the fame manner to day as ycfterday, and that the
lives and property of the citizens may be as certain
and fixt as the very conltitution of the (tate.
In monarchies, the adminiitration of juitice which
decides not only in whatever belongs to lire and pro
perty, but likewife to honor, demands very fcrupu-
lous inquiries. The delicacy of the judge increafes
in proportion to the increafe of his trull, and of the
importance of the interefts on which he determines.
We muft not therefore be furprized to find fo
many rules, reftrictions, and extenfions in the laws
of thofe countries -, rules that multiply the particu
lar cafes, and feem to make of reafon itfelf an art.
H 4 The
104- T H E S P I R I T
BOOK Xhe difference of rank, birth and condition,
VI r
Chap* i eftablifhed in monarchical governments, is fre
quently attended with diftinctions in the nature of
property , and the laws relative to the condition
of this government, may augment the number of
thefe diftindtions. Hence among us, goods are
divided into real eftates, purchafes, dowries, para
phernalia, paternal and maternal eftates , moveables
of different kinds j eftates held in fee fimple, or in
tail , acquired by defcent or conveyance , allodial,
or held by foccage *, ground rents, or annuities.
Fach fort of goods is fubject to particular rules,
which muft be complied with in the difpofal of
them. Thefe things muft needs diminifh the fim-
plicity of the laws.
In our governments, the fiefs are become here
ditary. It was necefihry that the nobility fhould
have a fixt property, that is, the fief mould have
a certain confiftency, to the end that the proprietor
of the fief might be always in a capacity of ferv-
ing the prince. This muft have been productive
of great varieties; for inftance, there are coun
tries where fiefs could not be divided among the
brothers ; in others the younger brothers may be
allowed a more generous fubfiftence.
The monarch who knows each of his provinces,
may eftablifh different laws, or tolerate different
cuftoms. But the defpotic prince knows nothing,
and can attend to nothing , he muft take general
meafures ; he governs by a rigid and inflexible
will, which throughout his whole dominions pro-
- luces the fame effects ; every thing bends under
his feet.
In
O F L A W S. 105
In proportion as the decifmns of the courts of B o o K
judicature are multiplied in monarchies, the law is (^ ,
loaded with decrees that ibmenmes contradict one
another, either becaule fucceeding judges are of a
different \vay of thinking , or becaule the fame
caufes are fometimes well, and at other times ill
defended ; or in fine, by reafon of an infinite num
ber of abufes that flip into whatever paiTes through
the hands of man. This is a neccffary evil, which
the legiflator redreffes from time to time, as con
trary even to the fpirit of moderate governments.
For when people are obliged to ha\v rccourfe to
courts of judicature, this (hould come from the
nature of the conftitution, and not from the con
tradictions or uncertainty of the laws.
In governments where there are neceflary di-
flinflions of perfons, there mud likewifc be privi
leges. This alfo diminifhes the fimplicity, and
creates a thoufand exceptions.
One of the privileges leaft burthenfome to focie-
ty, and efpecially to him who confers it, is that
of pleading in one court preierably to another.
Here new difficulties arife, when it becomes a
queftion, before which court we mould plead.
Far different is the cafe of people under defpo-
tic governments. In thole countries I can fee no
thing that the legiflator is able to decree, or
the magiftrate to judge. As the lands belong
to the prince, it follows, that there are fcarce
any civil laws concerning the property of lands.
From the right the fovereign has to fuccecd to
eftates, it follows likewife that there are none re
lating to inheritances. The monopolies eftablifhed
by the prince for himfelf in fome countries, render
io6 THE SPIRIT
BOOK a u forts of commercial laws quite ufelefs. The
Chap. i. marriages which they ufually contract with fhe-
flaves, are the caufe that there are fcarce any civil
Jaws relating to dowries or to the particular advan
tage ot married women. From the prodigious mul
titude ot (laves it follows likewife that there are very
few who have any fuch thing as a will of their own,
and of couric are anfwerable for their conduct before
a judge. Moft moral actions that are only in con-
k quence of a father s, a hulband s, or a mailer s will,
are regulated by them and not by the magiitrates.
I forgot to obferve, that as what we call honor,
is a thing hardly known in thofe countries, the fe-
veral points relating to this honor, which are of
fuch importance with us, are with them quite out
of the queflion. Defpotic power is of itfelf fuffici-
ent ; round it there is an abfolute vacuum. Hence
it is, that when travellers favour us with the de-
fcription of countries where arbitrary fway prevails,
they feJdom make mention of civil laws *.
All occafions therefore of wrangling and of law-
fuits are here removed. And to this in part is
owing that religious people in thofe countries are
fo roughly handled : as the injuftice ot their de
mand is neither fcreened, palliated, nor protected
by an infinite number of laws, of courfe it is im
mediately difcovered.
* In Mazulipatan it could never be found out that there was
fuch a thing- a^ written law. See the collection of voyages that con
tributed to the eft abli foment of the India company , Tom. IV. Part I.
p, ;9 1 . The Indians are regulated in their judgments by certain
cuiloms. The Vedan and fuch like books do not contain civil
laws, but religious precepts. See Lettres, Ed, 14. colleft.
HAP.
OF LAWS. 107
CHAP. II.
Of tbt Sir.iphcity of criminal Laws in different Go
vernments.
WE hear it generally faid that juftice ought BOOK
to be adminiftered with us as in Turky. ^ VI -
Is it poflible then that the mod ignorant of all na
tions fhould be the moil clear fighted in a point
that it mod behoves mankind to know ?
If we examine the fet forms of juftice in refpect
to the trouble the fubject undergoes in recovering
his property, or in obtaining fatis. faction for an in
jury or affront, we mail find them doubtlefs too
many : but if we confider them in the relation
they have to the liberty and iecurity of the fub-
ject, we mail often find them too tew ; and we
mall be convinced that the trouble, expence, de
lays, and even the very dangers of our judiciary
proceedings, are the price that every fubject pays
for his liberty.
In Turky, where little regard is mewn to the
honor, lives, or eftates of the fubject, all caufes
are one way or other quickly decided. The me
thod of determining them is a matter of indiffe
rence, provided they be determined. The bafhaw,
after a quick hearing, orders which party he pleafes
to be baftinadoed, and then fends them about their
bufinefs.
Here it would be dangerous to have the pafTion
of litigioufnefs-, this fuppofes a violent defire of ob
taining juftice, a ftrong averfion, a hurry of mind,
and an obftinacy in purfuing revenge. All this
fhould
io8 T H fc b V 1 R I T
BOOK fhould be avoided in a government, where Fear
VI
Cha 2 ought to be the only prevailing ientiment, and in
which the leaft popular disturbances arc frequently
attended with fudden and unforefeen revolutions.
Here every man ought to know that the magiftrate
muft not hear his name mentioned, and that his
fecurity depends intirely on his being reduced to a
kind of annihilation.
But in moderate governments, where the life of
the meaneft fubject is deemed precious, no man is
flript of his honor or property but after a long in
quiry -, and no man is bereft of life, till his very
country has attacked him, an attack that is never
made without leaving him all poflible means of
making his defence.
Hence it is that when a perfon renders himfelf
abfolute *, he immediately thinks of fimplifying the
laws. In a government thus conftituted they are
more affected with particular inconveniencies, than
with the liberty of the fubjecl, which is very little
minded.
In republics it is plain that as many formalities
at leaft are neceffary as in monarchies. In both
governments they increafe in proportion to the va
lue which is fet on the honor, fortune, liberty and
life of the fubject.
Jn republican governments men are all equal ;
equal they arc alfo in defpotic governments : in the
farmer becaufe they are every thing, in the latter
becaufe they are nothing.
* Cifsr, Cromwellj and many others.
CHAP-
OF LAWS. 109
CHAP. III.
In what Governments and in what cafes tbe judges
ought to determine according to the exprefs letter of
tbe Law.
TH E nearer a government approaches to a BOOK
republic, the more the manner of judging VI -
becomes fettled and fixt ; wherefore it was a fault
in the republic of Sparta for the Kphori to pafs fuch
arbitrary judgments, without having any Jaws to
direct them. The firft confuls at Rome pronounced
fentence in the fame manner as the Ephori ; but the
inconveniency of this proceeding was foon felt, and
they were obliged to have recourfe to exprefs and
fixed laws.
In defpotic governments there are no laws ; the
judge himfelf is his own rule. There are laws in
monarchies , and where thefe are explicit, the judge
conforms to them ; where they are otherwife, he
endeavours to inveftigate their fpirit. In republics
the very nature of the conftitution requires the judges
to follow the letter of the law. Here there is no
pofiibility of interpreting a law againft a fubjecl,
in cafes where either his honor, property, or life
is concerned.
At Rome the judges had no more to do than to
declare, that the perfon accufed was guilty of a par
ticular crime, and then the punifhment was found in
the laws, as may be feen in divers laws ftill extant.
In England the jury determine whether the fadl
brought under their cognizance be proved or not
if it be proved, the judge pronounces the punimment
inflidled by the law for fuch a particular fact, and for
this he need only open his eyes. CHAP
no T H E S P I R I T
C II A P. VI.
Of the manner of forming Judgments.
BOOK JENCE arife the different manners of form-
VI - JL ing judgments. In monarchies the judges
chufe the method of arbitration -, they deliberate
together, they communicate their thoughts in order
to come to an agreement, they moderate their opi
nion to render it conformable to that of others ; and
the Ientiments of the feweit become efpoufed by the
two largell numbers. But this is not agreeable to
the nature of a republic. At Rome and in the cities
of Greece, the judges never entered into a confulta-
tion-, each gave his opinion one of thefe three ways,
/ abfolvfi 1 condemn i it does not appear clear to me* :
this was becaufe the people judged, or were fup-
pofed to judge. But the people are far from
being civilians ; all thefe reflections and methods of
arbitration are above their reach ; they muft have
only one object, and one fmgle fact fet before
them ; and then they have only to fee whether they
ought to condemn, to acquit, or to fufpend their
judgment.
The Romans introduced fet forms for actions -f-
after the example of the Greeks, and eftablimed
a rule that ear h raufe mould be directed by its pro
per action. This was neceflary in their manner of
judging j it was neccifary to fix the ftate of the
queftion, that the people might have it always
before their eyes. Otherwife in a long procefs,
* Non
f i^uas aSicnes tie pofufus frcut we/let injlitueret, certas folem-
que ejjia -ijoluirunt. L. 2. $ 6. Digeft. de Orig. Jur.
this
O F L A W S. in
this ftate of the queftion would continually change B *
and be longer diftinguifhed. cta "
Hence it followed that the Roman judges grant- & 5.
cd only the fimple demand, without making any
addition, deduction, or limitation. But the praetors
devifed other forms for actions, which were called
ex bona fide, where the method of pronouncing fen-
tence was left to the difpofition of the judge. This
was more agreeable to the fpirit of monarchy. Hence
it is a faying among the French lawyers, that, in
France * all atlions are EX BONA FIDE.
CHAP. V.
//; what Governments the Sovc, may be Judge.
MACHIAVEL (8) attributes the lofs of the %) Dif-
liberty of Florence, to the people s not courft: *
judging in a body in cafes of high trealbn againft Decad of
themfeives, as was cuftomary at Rome. For this pur- Livy.
pofe they had eight judges : but the few, fays Ma- c
chiavel, are corrupted by a few. I fhould willingly
adopt the maxim of this great man. But as in thofe
cafes the political intereft prevails in fome meafure
over the civil (for it is always an inconveniency that
the people mould be judge in their own cauie) in
order to remedy this evil, the laws muft provide as
much as pofTible for the fecurity of individuals.
With this view the Roman legiQators did two
things; they gave the perfons acculed, permiflion to
banifh themfeives -j- before fentence was pronoun-
* In France a perfon though fued for more than he owes,
lofes notwithftanding his cofts, if he has not offered to pay as
much as he owes.
f This is well explained in Cicero s oration pro C<ftina, to
wards the end.
ced ;
112 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK cec j * . and they ordained that the goods of thofe
Chap c wno were condemned fhould be facred, to prevent
their being confifcated to the people. We mall fee
in the Xlth book the other limitations that werefet
to the power the people had of judging.
Solon knew how to prevent the abufe which the
people might make of their power in criminal judg
ments. He ordained that the court of Areopagus
fhould re-examine the affair ; that if they believed
( ) Demof- the party accufed was unjuftly acquitted ( ), they
corona P T mou ^ accule him again before the people; that if
494, edit, they believed him unjuftly condemned ( k ) 9 they
Frankf. fhould put a flop to the execution, and make them
(k) see re j u dge ^e proceeding. An admirable law that
philoitra- fubjected the people to the cenlure of the magiftracy
t1 f 5 he s"- wmc ^ tne y m rt revered, and even to their own!
phifts, In affairs of this kind it is always proper to throw
book i. j n fome delays, efpecially when the party accufed is
. under confinement; to the end that the people may
grow calm and give their judgment cooly.
In defpotic governments the prince himfelf may
be judge. But in monarchies this cannot be; the
conftitution by fuch means would be fubverted, and
the dependent intermediate powers annihilated ; all
let forms of judgment would ceafe , fear would take
pofTeflion of the people s minds, and palenefs fpread
itfclf over every countenance : the more confidence,
honor, affection, and fecurity is in the fubjeft, the
more widely extended is the power of the monarch.
We fhall give here a few more reflections on this
point. In monarchies the prince is the party that pro-
lecutes the perfons accufed, andcaufes them to be pu-
* This was a law at Athens, as appears by Demofthenes. So
crates refined to make ufe of it.
nifhed
OF LAWS. 1
niflied or acquitted ; now were he himfelf to fit as K "
judge, he would be both judge and party.
In this government the prince has frequently the
benefit of confifcations i fo that here again by being
judge himfelf of crimes, he would be both judge
and party.
Farther, by this means he would deprive Himfelf
of the moft glorious attribute of fovereignty, namely,
that of granting pardon -f , for it would be quite
ridiculous of him to make and unmake his dccifions :
furely he would not chufe to contradict himfelf. B j-
fides, this would be confounding all ideas ; it won!
be impofiible to tell whether a man was acquitted,
or received his pardon.
Lewis XIII. being defirous to fit as judge at the
trial of the duke de la Valette *, afTembled in 1m
cabinet fome members of the parliament together
with fome counfellors of ftate to confult about it :
upon their being compelled by the king to give their
opinion or judgment concerning the decree for his
arreft, the prefident deBdievre laid, " That he found
it very ftrange a prince mould pafs fentence upon
one of his fubjeCts -, that kings had referved to
" themfelves the power of pardoning, and left that
" of condemning to their officers -, that his majefly
" wanted to fee before him at the bar, a perfon who
" by his decifion was to be hurried away in an hour s
" time into the other world ! That this is what a
prince s countenance, from whence favours flow,
* fhould never bear ; that his prefence alone re-
f Plato does not think it right that kings, who, as he fr.
are piiefts, fhould preiide at judgments where people are con
demned to death, to exile, or imprifonment.
: See the relation of the trial of the duke de La Yalette. It
is printed in the memoirs of Mont refer. Tom.-, p. 62.
VOL. I. I IC moved
(C
(C
1C
ii 4 T H E S P I R I T
B no K moved ecclefiaftic cenfures , and that fubjccts
p " ought not to go away diiTatisfied from their
" prince." \Vhen fentence was palTed, the fame
prefident faid, " This is an unprecedented judg-
" merit, to fee, contrary to the example of pad
" ages, a king of France in the quality of a judge,
" condemning a gentleman to death
n, leniences paficd by the prince would be
ilic an inexhauftible fource of injuftice and abufe , the
" a " courtiers by their importunity would always be able
to extort his decifions. Some Roman emperors
were fo mad as to fit as judges themfelves-, the con-
feqiu , that no reigns ever fo furprized the
univcrfc with opprefllon and injuftice.
(0 At " Claudius, fa\s Te.citus ( c )> c.Ppr&p ,
r \ I * k^ * * *
lib. 11. cc to ii m r c ]j the judgment of law-fiiits and the funfii-
ons cf magijl . on to all nhinmr of
But Nero upon his coming to the
empire after C , ideavoured to conciliate
the minds of the people, by declaring, " That he
" would take care not to be judge himfelf in pri-
" vate cauics, that the parties might not be ex-
" pofed within the walls of a palace to the iniqui-
{ Ibid. " tous power of a few freedmen ( d )."
" , fays Zozimus ( e ),
" a n of calumniators fpread the : sail round,
" i efted the court. Upon e. per font deacfe it
<c . tely fuppofed he bad left no children * ;
" and in confe of this, his / green
away by a pt. For as the prince ivas fur-
prizingly Jlupid^ and t enter-
prizing, f. ; a flave to the infatiable avarice
of L -, infomucb that to
* The fame diibrder happened und?r Theod: ;er.
" an
tc
It
Cl
(C
(I
<.
(C
cc
O F L A W S. 115
an honefl man nothing could be more deferable than BOOK
death" ,^i
Chap. 5,
Formerly, fays Procopius ( ), there ufcd to be & 6.
" very few people at court \ but in Jufti man s reign, U,f ecre
" <?j the judges had no longer I .rty of admi,
" ing juftice, their tribunals were c, -le the
prince s palace refounded with the clamours of the
feveral litigating parties" Every bc<iy knows
what a proftitution there was at that court ot public
judgments and even of the very Jaws themfelves.
The laws are the eye of the prince , by them he
fees what he could not otherwife difcern. Should
he attempt the function of a judge, he would not
then labour for himfelf, but for impoftors that wane
to deceive him.
CHAP. VI.
That in Monarchies the Minifters ought not to be
Judges.
IT is likewife a very great inconveniency in mo
narchies for the minifters of the prince to be
judges. We have ftil] inftances of ftates wrure
there are a great number of judges to determine
fifcal controverfies, and where the minifters not-
withftanding (a thing almoft incredible !) want like
wife to determine them. Many are the reflections
that here arife ; but this fingle one will fuffice for
my purpofe.
There is in the very nature of things a kind of
contraft between a prince s council and his courts of
judicature. The king s council ought to be com
pofed of a few perfons,- and the courts of judicature
of a great many. The reafon is, in the former,
I 2 things
n6 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK things fhould be undertaken, and purfued with a
a kind of warmth and paflion, which can hardly be
8. expected but from four or five men who make it
their fole bufmefs. On the contrary in courts of
judicature a certain coolnefs is requifite, and an in
difference in forne meafure to all manner of affairs.
A
CHAP. VII.
Of afmgk Magistrate.
Magiftracy of this kind cannot take place
but in a deipotic government. We have
an inftance in the Roman hiftory how far a fingle
magiftrate may abufe his power. Might it not be
very v.vll t : pectcel that /ipfius on his tribunal
mould contemn the laws, after having violated the
( ) Sec the very law of his own ( b ) enacting? Livy has given
" us the iniquitous diiYmclion of the Decemvir. He
O/.v had fuborned a man to reclaim Virginia in his pre-
fence as his (lave ; Virginia s relations infifted that
by virtue of his own law Hie fhould be configned
to them tiil the definitive judgment was patted.
Upon which he declared that his law had been made
only in favour of the father; and that as Virginius
was abfenc, no application could be made of it to
H Quod the prefcnt cafe ( c j.
rptiel-
!.(. abc.
CHAP. VIII.
ratus. Li- Qf Accitfutions in different Governments.
\uis Dec.
" N Rome * it was lawful for one citizen to
JL ace Life another ; this was according to the
* And in a great many other cities.
fpirit
O F L A W S. 117
fpirit of a republic, where each citizen ought to *
have an unlimited zeal for the public good, and chap. S.
where each citizen is fuppofcd to hold the whole
rights of his country in his hands. Under the em
perors the republican maxims were ftill purfued ;
and inflantly a pernicious fet of men darted up,
a whole fwarm of informers. Whofoever had nu
merous vices and abilities, a mean foul and an am
bitious fpirit, bufied himfelf in the fearch of fome
criminal whofe condemnation might be agreeable to
the prince : this was the road to honor and for
tune * ; but luckily we are ftrangers to it in our
country.
We have at prefent an admirable law, namely
that which requires that the prince who is efta-
blifhed for the execution of the laws, mould appoint
an officer in each court of judicature to profecute
all forts of crimes in his name : by this means the
profefiion of informers is a thing unknown to us ;
for if this public avenger were fufpected to abulc
his office, he would foon be obliged to name his
author.
By Plato s laws n ), thofe who neglect to inform ( ) Lib. 9.
or to affift the magistrates, are liable to be punifli-
ed. This would not be fo proper in our days.
The public profecutor watches for the lafety of the
citizens ; he proceeds in his office, while they enjoy
the fweets of tranquillity.
* See in Tacitus the rewards given to thefe informc.
CHAP.
u8 THESPIRIT
CHAP. IX,
Of tie Severity of Pttni/hments in different Govern
ments.
BOOK " ~^HE feverity of punifhments is fitter for
^ ! defpotic governments whofe principle is
terror, than for a monarchy or a republic whofe
fpring is honor and virtue.
In moderate governments the love of one s coun
try, fhame and the fear of blame, are reftraining
motives, capable of preventing a great multitude
oi Here the grcateft punifhment of a bad
a. viction. The civil laws have therefore
a ioftcr way of correcting, and do not require fo
much force ami k-veritv.
4
In thofe dates a legiflator is lefs bent upon
puni filing than preventing crimes , he is more at
tentive to infpire good morals than to inflict punifh
It is a perpetual remark of the Chinefe authors *,
that the more the punifhments of criminals were
increafed in their empire, the nearer they were to
a revolution. This is becaule punifliments were
augmented in proportion as the public morals were
corrupted.
It would be an eafy matter to prove that in all
or a! moil all the governments of Europe, punifli
ments have increased or diminifhed in proportion as
thofe governments favoured or difcouraged liberty,
* I fhall fliew hereafter that China is in this re/pec! in the
fame cafe as a republic or a monarchy.
In
OF LAWS. 119
In defpotic governments people are fo unhappy, c K
as to have a greater dread of death than regret tor chap. 9.
the lofs of life; confequently their punifhments ought
to be more fevere. In moderate flat* ;, they are
more afraid of lofmg their lives than apprehenfive
of the pain of dying ; thofe punifhments therefore
that deprive them fimply of life are fufficient.
Men in excefs of happinefs or mifery are equal
ly inclinable to feverity ; witnefs conquerors and
monks. It is mediocrity alone and a mixture of
profperous and adverfe fortune that inipire us with
lenity and pity.
What we obferve among particular men, is
equally obfervable in different nations. In countries
inhabited by favages who lead a very hard life, and
in defpotic governments, where there is only one
perfon on whom fortune lavifhes her favours, while
the miferable fubjecls lye expofed to her infults
people are equally cruel. Lenity reigns in mode
rate governments.
When we read in hiftory the horrid feverity
of the Sultans in the adminiftration of juftice, we
feel a kind of pain upon confidering the miferies of
human nature.
In moderate governments, a good legiflator may
make ufe of every thing by way of punifhment.
Is it not a very extraordinary thing that one of the
principal puniQiments at Sparta was to deprive a
perfon of the power of lending out his wife, or of
receiving the wife of another man, and to oblige
him to have no company at home but virgins ? In
fliort whatever the hw calls a punifhment is fuch
effectively.
I C H.A P.
120 i 11 t b ^ 1 K 1 T
CHAP. X.
Of tbe ancient French Laws.
VI * T^ C ^ e anc ^ ent F renc h l aws we find the true fpirit
Chap. 10. A of monarchy. In cafes relating to pecuniary
*- " punifhments the common people are lefs feverely
punifhed than the nobility *. But in criminal -j-
cafes it is quite the reverfe , the nobleman lofes
his honor and his voice in court, while the pea-
fant, who has no honor to lofe, undergoes a cor-
ral punilhment,
CHAP. XT.
?/;?/ i-:bcn a People are virtuous, feiv Puniflments
are neceffary.
TH E people of Rome had fome fhare of
probity. Such was the force of this pro-
bi y, that the legiflator had frequently no farther
occ afion than to point out the right road, to induce
them to follow it; one would imagine that inftead
of precepts it was fufficient to give them counfels.
The punifnments of the regal laws and thofe of the
twelve tables were almoft all abolimed in the time of
the republic, in confequence either of the
or
* Suppofe for inftance, to prevent the execution of a decree,
*hc common people paid a fine of forty fous, and the nobility
of iixty Livres : S^mme Rule. Book 2. p. 19;-. edit. Got. oi
the year iua.
-See the council of Peter Defcntaines, c. 13. efpecially the
I. art.
|j It V.T.S made by Valerius Pullicola foon after the c--rulf;on
- ie "kings, and was twice renewed, both times by ma-
OF LAWS. 121
or of the P or dan law *. It was never obferved BOOK
that this ftep did any manner of prejudice to the chX, u
civil adminiftration.
This Valerian law which inhibited the magiftrates
from ufing any violent methods againft a citizen
that had appealed to the people, inflicted no other
punimment on the perfon who infringed it, than
that of being reputed a difhoneft man( h ). ( h ) A7/V/
ultra quam
itnprobe
CHAP. XII. faaumal-
:. Liv.
Of tic Pcn-er cf Punijbments.
EXPERIENCE (hews that in countries
remarkable for the lenity of penal laws,
the fpirit of the inhabitants is as much affected
by them, as in other countries by feverer punifh-
ments.
If an inconveniency or abufe arifes in the ftate,
a violent government endeavours fuddenly to re-
drefs it ; and inftead of putting the old laws in
execution, it eftablimes fome cruel punimment
which inftantly puts a (lop to the evil. But the
fpring of government hereby lofes its elafticity ;
the imagination grows accuftomed to the fevere
as well as to the milder punimment , and as the
fear of the latter diminimes, they are foon obliged
in every cafe to have recourfe to the other. Rob
beries on the high-way were grown common in
fome countries -, in order to remedy this evil, they
giftrates of the fame family, as Livy obferves, 1. 10, the queftion
was not to give it a greater force, but to render its injunctions
more perfeft. Dili^- :/m, fays Livy, ibid.
* Lev Poi-cia pro tergo tii It was made in the 454th
year of the i of Rome.
invented
122 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK invented the punifhment of breaking upon the
Chap 12 wnee l tnc terror of which put a flop for a while
to this mifchievous practice. But foon after rob
beries on the high-ways were become as common
as ever.
Delertion in our days was grown to a very great
height; in confequence of this it was judged pro
per to punifli dcfcrters with death ; and yet their
number did not diminifh. The reafon is very na
tural ; n i accuftomed daily to venture his life,
defpifes or afreets to uefpiie the danger of lofing it.
lie is daily habituated to the fear of fhame ; it
would have been therefore much better to have con
tinued a punifhment which branded him with infa
my for life: the punifhmcnt was pretended to be
increafed, while it was really diminifhed.
Men muft not be led by excefs of violence ; we
ought to make a prudent ufe of the means which
nature has given us to conduct them. If we inquire
into the caufe of all human corruptions, we mail
find that they proceed from the impunity of crimes,
and not from the moderation of punimments.
Let us follow nature, who has given fhame to
man for his fcourge , and let the heavieft part of
the punifhment be the infamy attending it.
But if there be fome countries where fhame is not
2 confequence of punifhment, this muft be owing to
tyranny, which has inflicted the fame punimments
on villains and honeft men.
And if there are others where men are deterred
only by cruel punimments, we may be fure that
this muft in a great meafure arife from the violence
of the government, which has ufed fuch punim
ments for flight tranfgreMions.
It
OF LAWS. 123
It often happens that a legiflator defirous of re- BOOK:
forming an evil, thinks of nothing but of this refor- CJia 12
mation ; his eyes are open only to this object, and
fhut to its inconveniencies. When the evil is re-
drefifed, there is nothing more feen but the feverity
of the legiflator , yet there (till remains an evil in
the date that has fprung from this feverity ; the
minds of the people are corrupted, and become ha
bituated to defpotic power.
Lyfander ( ; ) having obtained a victory over the ( b ) Xe-
Athenians, the prifoners were ordered to be tried in J 1 .??* 1
confequence of an accufation brought againlt the
Athenians of having thrown all the captives of two
gallies down a precipice, and of having refolvcd
in full afTembly to cut off the hands of thofe whom
they mould chance to make prifoners. The Athe
nians were therefore all mafiacred, except Adyn:
who had oppofed this decree. Lvfjvder reproached
Philocles, before he was put to death, with having
depraved the people s minds and given leiTons of
cruelty to all Greece.
" The Argives, fays Plutarch ( c ), having put ff- ( c )Mc-
ce teen hundred of their citizens to death, the At he- f !
,, . i i r -r r T who art
mans ordered Jacnfces of expiation, that it might mtrufled
" pleafe tbs Gods to turn the hearts of the Athenians >7 -" v/
L<. r r j ,; 7 A > direftion
jrom Jo cruel a thought. O f ftate
There are two forts of corruption ; one when affairs.
the people do not obferve the laws ; the other when
they are corrupted by the laws ; an incurable evil,
becaufe it is in the very remedy itfelf.
CHAP,
THE SPIRIT
CHAP. XIII.
Impotency of the Laws of Japan.
XCESSIVE punifhments may even cor
rupt a defpotic government -, of this we have
an inftance in Japan.
g ee Here almoft all crimes are puniflied with death ( d ),
wtftr. becaufe difobedience to fo great an emperor, as that
of Japan, is reckoned an enormous crime. The
queftion is not fo much to correct the delinquent,
as to vindicate the authority of the prince. Thefe
notions are derived from fervitude, and are owing
efpecially to this, that as the emperor is univerfal
proprietor, almoft all crimes are directly againlt his
interefts.
They punifh with death lies fpoken before the
Collec- magiftrate ( c ) ; a proceeding contrary to natural
n f defence.
Even things which have not the appearance of a
1 to crime are feverely punimed ; for inftance, a man
that ventures his money at play is put to death.
the True it is that the furprizing character of this
ft India obftinate, capricious, refolute, whimfical people,
^ a who defy all dangers and calamities, feems to ab-
428. folve their legiflators from the imputation of cruelty,
notwithftanding the fcverity of their laws. But are
men, who have a natural contempt of death, and
who rip open their bellies for the lead fancy, are
fuch men, I fay, mended or deterred, or rather
are they not hardened, by the continual fight of
punifhments ?
The relations of travellers inform us, with re-
fpecl to the education of the Japanefe, that chil
dren muft be treated there. with mildnefs, becaufe
they
OF LAWS. 125
they become hardened to punifhment , that their B ; K
flaves mud not be too roughly ufed, becaufe they Ch
immediately put themfelves in a pofture of defence.
Would not one imagine that they might eafily have
judged of the fpirit which ought to reign in their
political and civil government, from that which
fhould prevail in their domeftic concerns ?
A wife legiflator would have endeavoured to
reclaim people s minds by a juft temperature ot"
punifhments and rewards , by maxims of philofo-
phy, morality, and religion, adapted to thefe cha-
raclers ; by a juft application of the rules of ho
nor, and by the enjoyment of a conflant hippin<
and foft tranquillity of life. But thcfe are fprings
to which defpotic power is a ftranger , it m.
abufe itfelf, and that is all it can do : in Japan it
has made its utmoil effort, and has furpafled even
itfelf in cruelty.
As the minds of the people by this means grew
wild and intradlable, they were obliged to have re-
courfe to the moil horrid fever. This is the ori
gin, this the fpirit of the laws of Japan. They had
more fury however than force. They fucceeded in
the extirpation of Chriftianity , but fuch unaccount
able efforts are a proof of their impotence. They
wanted to eftablifh a good polity, and they have
fhewn greater marks of their weaknefs. ^ Collec-
We have only to read the relation of the inter- tion of
view between the emperor and the Deyro at Me- ]
aco ( ). The number of thofe who were fuffocated t.-ibutedto
or murdered in that city by ruffians, is incredible ; \
young maids and boys were carried off by fore
and found afterwards expofed in pubMc places, -
at imfeafcnable hours, quite naked and ibwn in ^
linen p. z.
126 T H E S P I R I T
B oo K ij nen bags, to prevent their knowing which way
Chap 14. tne y na ^ pa^d > robberies were committed in all
parts, the bellies of horfes were ripped open to
bring their riders to the ground, and coaches were
overturned in order to drip the ladies. The Dutch,
who were told they could not pals the night on the
fcaffolds without expofing themfelves to the danger
of being aiTaflinated, came down, &f.
I dial I here give one inftance more from the fame
nation. The emperor having abandoned himfelf to
infamous pleafures, lived unmarried, and was con-
fequcntly in danger of dying without iflue. The
Deyro lent him two beautiful young virgins-, one he
married out of refpect, but would not meddle with
IKT. 1 1 is nurfe caufed the fined women of the em
pire to be lent for, but all to no purpofe. At length
( ) Ibid, an armorer s daughter having pleafed his fancy ( e )
he determined to marry her, and had a fon. The
ladies belonging to court, enraged to fee a perfon
of fuch mean extraction preferred to themfelves,
ftifled the child. The crime was concealed from
the emperor ; for he would have fpilt a torrent of
blood. The excefllve feverity of the laws hinders
therefore their execution : when the punifhment fur-
pafles all meafure, they are frequently obliged to
prefer impunity to it.
CHAP. XIV.
Of the Spirit of the Reman Senate.
UJSF D E R the confulate of Acilius Glabrio
and Pifo, the A law * was made to
* Thofe that were re condemned to a fine ; they
could not be admitted into the rank of fenators, nor nominated
to any public office. Dio Eo,
prevent
O F L A W S. 127
prevent the intriguing for places. Dio fays {") that ]
the fen ate engaged the confuls to propoi (
ion that C. Cornelius the tribune had rei ook
caufe moft fevere punifhments to be eftablifhed i
againft this crime , to which t
greatly inclined. The fenate rig!. :dged th
immoderate punifhments would llnke indeed a
terror into people s minds, but mint have alfo this
effect, that there would be no body afterwards to
accufe or condemn ; whereas by propofing mode
rate punifhments there would be always judges and
accufers.
CHAP. XV.
Of the Roman Laws in refpcft to T
1A M flrongly confirmed in my fentiments upon
finding the Romans on my fide, and I think
that punifhments are connected with ; iture
the government, when I behc le
changing in this refpect their civil ,r-
tion as they altered their form of government.
The regal Jaws made for a n de compcfed
of fugitives, (laves, and vagabond
vere. The fpirit of a republic ^ * re
quired that the Decemvirs mould not ha d
thofe laws in their t tables \ but men who
aimed at tyranny were far from conforming to a
republican fpirit.
Li-iy ( b ) fays in relr fc o the punifhrnent of ( b ) Lib. i.
Metius Suffetius, dictator of Alba, who was con
demned by Tullus H o be pulled to r.
by two chariots us the firft and lad
p j lent in which the rer of hum
128 T H S P I R I T
B oo K nity feemed to have been loft. He is miftaken ;
Chap ic. tne l aw f r ^ e twe l ve tables is full of very cruel
punifhments *.
The defign of the decemvirs appears moft con-
fpicuous in the capital punifliment pronounced
againft libellers and poets. This is not agreeable
to the genius of a republic, where the people like
to fee the great men humbled. But perfons that
aimed at the fubverfion of liberty, were afraid of
writings that might revive its fpirifj-.
Aim t! . >ulfion of the decemvirs, almoft all
the i uvs v. nolifhed. It is true they were
not ( ,iy repeal u , but as the Porciiin law had
ordained that no citi/en of Rome mould be put to
death, they were of no further u
This is exactly the time to which we may refer
( c ) Book i. what Lky fays (") cf the Romans, that no people
\\viv ever fonder of moderation in punimments.
But if to the lenity of punimments we add the
right which the party accufed had of withdrawing
before judgment was pronounced, we mall find that
the Romans followed the fpirit which 1 have ob-
fervcd to be natural to a republic.
Sylla who ccnfounded tyranny, anarchy, and li
berty, made the Cornelian laivs. He feemed to
have contrived regulations merely with a view to
create new crimes. Thus diftmguifhing an infinite
number of actions by the name of murder, he found
murderers in all parts ; and by a practice but too
much followed, he laid fnares, fowed thorns, and
* We find there the pur.ifhment of fire, and almoft always
capital puniflmients, theft, punif. h death, tj
-f Sylla animated with tht fame ipirit as the decemvirs, fol
lowed their example in ^ -J:^ r^ial laws againit fatyri-
cal writers.
J opened
O F L A W S. 129
opened precipices, wherefoever the citizens fet their
^et. Chap. 15-
Almoft all Sylla s laws contained only the inter
diction of fire and water. To this Caeiar added the
confifcation of goods *, becaule the rich, by preferv-
ing their eftates in exile, became bolder in the per
petration of crimes.
The emperors having eftablifhed a military go
vernment, foon found that it was as terrible to the ( ) See the
prince as to the fubjcct , they endeavoured therefore 3 d
to temper it, and with this view had recoil rfe to j e? <^ or _
dignities and to the refpecl with which thole digni- <>>
ii Us. and
ties were attended. , t -;
The government thus drew nearer a little to number of
monarchy, and punifhments were divided into three , :llc
i rr ,U i r i J i the Divert
claries ( ) , thole which related to the principal per- anc j j n " t ho
fons in the ftate ( m ), which were very mild , thofe Codex.
which were inflicted on perfons of an inferior rank( n ), "
and were more fevere ; and in fine fuch as concerned ( n )Medios.
only perfons of the lowed condition (), which were pinkos
i n. le g- 3-
the molt rigorous. legi s a j
MaximiMis. that fierce, that ftupid prince, increafed leg- Cor-
1 J "
the rigour of the military government which he ought j^. 1 e
to have foftened. The lenate were informed, fays
Capitolinus( p ), that fome had been crucified, others ( p ) Jul.
expofed to wild beafts, or fewed up in the fkins of LapJ ? A "
nil i r :m
beafts lately killed, without any manner of regard
to their dignity. It feemed as if he wanted to ex-
ercife the military difcipline, on the model of which
he pretended to regulate the civil adminiftration.
In the confederations on the rife and declenfion of
the Roman grandeur* we find, in what manner
* Poenas facinorum auxit. cumlocupletes eo facilius fcelere fe ob-
ligarent, quod integris jpatrimoniis exularent. Suet in Jul. Cafare.
VOL, I. K Confbantine
i 3 o T H E S P I R I T
BOOK Conftantine changed the military government into
Cl 16. a military and civil one, and drew nearer to
Monarchy. There we may trace the different
revolutions of this ftate, and fee how they fell
from rigor to indolence, and from indolence to
impunity.
C H A P. XVI.
Of tbc jiifl Proportion betwixt Punijhmcnts and Crimes.
I
T is an cllential point that there fhould be a
certain proportion in punifhments, becaufe it
is eilential that a creat crime mould be avoided ra-
^ <
ther than a ldVcr, and that which is more pernicious
to focicty rather than that which is lefs.
(i Hift.of tc An impoftor ( 4 ), who called himlelf Conftan-
Nicepho- " tine Ducas, railed a great infurreftion at Con-
arch of " fontinople. He was taken and condemned to be
ifonti- " whipt ; but upon informing againfl feveral per-
nople. j- ons of diftinftion, he was condemned to be burnt
" as a calumniator." It is very extraordinary that
they fhould thus proportion the punifhments betwixt
the crime of high treafon and that of calumny.
This puts me in mind of a faying of Charles II.
king of Great Britain. He faw a man one day ftand-
ing in the pillory ; upon which he afked what crime
the man had committed. He was anfwered, Pleaje
your wcjefty be has wrote a libel againft your minifters.
The fool ! laid the king, why did be not write againft
me ? they would have done nothing to him.
" Seventy perfons having confpired againft the
( r > In Ni- " emperor Bafil ( r ) i he ordered them to be whipt,
cephorus s < an ^ ^ na j r o f ^^ v neac j an( j t> earc } s to be burnt.
hlitaT : ,. A flag
<c
It
O F L A W S. 131
A flag one day having taken hold of him by the B *
girdle with his horn, one of his retinue drew his c hap. 16.
fword, cut the girdle, and laved him , upon
which he ordered that perfon s head to be cut off,
for having, faid be, drawn his fword againft his
" fbvereien. Who could imagine that the lame
o a
prince could ever have pafled two fuch different
judgments ?
It is a great abufe amongft us to condemn to the
fame punifhment a perfon that only robs on the
high- way, and another that robs and murders.
Surely for the public fecurity fome difference mould
be made in the punifhment.
In China thole who add murder to robbery, are
cut in pieces ( B ) j but not fo the others : to this dif
ference it is owing that though they rob in that,, p. 6.
country, yet they never murder.
In Ruflla where the punifhment of robbery and
murder is the fame, they always murder ( h ). The ( h ) Prcfcnt
dead, fay they, tell no tales.
* J Ruma by
When there is no difference in the punifhment, /VH-.
there mould be fome in the expectation of pardon.
In England they never murder on the high-way,
becaufe robbers have fome hopes of tranfportation,
which is never the cafe in refpect to thofe that com
mit murder.
Letters of grace are of excellent ufe in moderate
governments. This power which the prince has of
pardoning, exercifed with prudence, is capable of
producing admirable effects. The principle of de-
fpotic government, which neither grants nor re
ceives any pardon, deprives it of thefe advantages.
K 2 CHAP.
132 T H E S P I R"I T
CHAP. XVII.
Of the Rack.
BOOK " * H E wickednefs of mankind makes it ne-
VI. ceffary for_the laws to fuppofe them better
than they are. Hence the deposition of two wit-
nefles is diffident in the punifhment of all crimes.
The law believes them as if they fpoke by the
mouth of truth. Thus we judge that every child
conceived in wedlock is legitimate-, the law having
a confidence in the mother as if fhe were chaftity it-
if. lut the ufe of the rack againft criminals can
not be defended on a like plea of neceflity.
We have before us the example of a nation blefied
with an excellent civil government *, where with
out any inconvenicncy the practice of racking cri
minals is rejected. It is not therefore in its own
nature neceiliry -f.
So many men of learning and genius have wrote
againft the cuftom of torturing criminals, that af
ter them I durft not prefume to meddle with the
fubject. I was going to fay that it might fuit
defpotic ftates, where whatever infpires fear is
the propereft fpring of government , I was going
to fay that the Haves, among the Greeks and Ro-
* TheEnglifli.
f Thr- citizens of Athens could not be put to the rack (lyfai
rat. in . 1 gorat.) unlefs it was lor high treafon. The torture
is ufed within thirty days after condemnation (Cunus Fortuiut-
-ff ->-. S hol. Ub. 2.) There was no preparatory torture: In
\ to the Romans, the ^d and 4th law ad leg. "Jidiam Ma-
ews that birth, dignity, and the military profeflion ex-
people from the rack, except in cafes of high treafon.
udent reftri&ions of this practice made by the laws of
hs.
mans
OF LAWS. 133
mans But I heard the voice of nature cry out B K
loudly againfl me. Cha p . i.
&i 9 .
CHAP. XVIII.
Of pecuniary and corporal PunifomentS.
OUR anceftors the Germans admitted of none
but pecuniary punifhments. Thcfe free and
warlike people were of opinion that their blood
ought not to be fpilt but with fword in hand. Oa
the contrary, thefe punifliments are rejected by
the Japanefe ( e ), under pretence that the rich might () Ser
elude them. But are not the rich afraid of being Keinj>fer.
dripped of their property ? And might not pecu
niary punifhments be proportioned to people s for
tunes? and in fine, might not infamy be added to
thefe punifhments ?
A good legiflator takes a juft medium ; he or
dains neither always pecuniary, nor always corporal
punifhments.
CHAP. XIX.
Of the Law of Retaliation.
THE ufe of the law of retaliation * is very
frequent in defpotic countries, where they
are fond of fimple laws. Moderate governments
admit of it fometimes , but with this difference,
that the former exercife it in full rigour, and among
the latter it always receives fome kind of limitation.
The law of the twelve tables admitted two; firfb
it never condemned to retaliation but when the plain-
* It is eftabliftied in the Koran; See the chapter oftbi Cow.
K 3 tiff
I
134 T H E S P I R I T
B o^o K t jflf could not be fatisfted in any other manner *,
ru- fecondly, after condemnations they might pay da-
X. i I . I *-, ^ J * J * J
& 21. mages and intereft ( d ), and then the corporal was
(d\ TK* 1
) c. j changed into a pecuniary punimment ( e ).
fo the 1
oftheVi- CHAP. XX.
ihs,
Book 6. O/ ffo Pumjhment of Fathers for the Crimes of their
lit 4- 3- a/Mr/?."
5-
N China fathers are punifhed for the crimes of
their children. This was likewile the cuftom
( f ; Src at Peru ( ) , a cuftorn derived from the notion of
fii defpotic power.
hiftory oi 1 . A . . r . . r
the ci vil Little does it ligniry to lay that in China the ra
ther is puni flied for not having exerted that pater
nal authority which nature has eftablifhed and the
laws thcmfelves have improved. This ftill fup-
pofes that there is no honor among the Chinefe.
Amongft us, parents whole children are condemned
to punimment, and children -f whofe parents have
undergone the like fate, are as feverely punifhed by
lhame, as they would be in China by the lofs of
their lives.
C II A P. XXI.
Of the Clemency of the Pyincc.
(CLEMENCY is the peculiar characlcriftic of
^f monarchs. In republics whole principle is vir
tue, it is not fo necefiary. In defpotic govern-
Si membrum rupit, ni cum eo pacit, talio efto. Aului Gel-
l:us, lib. 20. cap. i.
f Inftead of punifhing them, fays Plato, they ought to be
commended for not having followed their father s example. Book
9. cf iai .-s.
ments
O F L A W S. 135
ments where fear predominates, it is lefs cuftomary, B K
becaufe the great men are to be reftrained by exam-
pies of feverity. It is more necefTary in monar
chies, where they are governed by honor, which
frequently requires what the very law forbids.
Difgrace is here equivalent to chaftilement ; and
even the formalities of juftice are puniihments.
This is becaufe particular kinds of punifhment are
formed by fhame which on every fide invades the
delinquent.
The great mrn in monarchies are fo heavily
punifhed by difgrace, by the lols (though often
imaginary) of their fortune, credit, acquaintances,
and pleafures, that rigour in ivfpcd: to them is mrd-
lefs. It can tend only to dived the fubjedl of the
affection he lias for the pcrfon ot his prince, ami
ot the refpect he ought to have for public pofts
and employments.
As the inftability of the great is natural to a
defpotic government, fo their fecurity is interwoven
with the nature of monarchy.
So many are the advantages which monarchs
gain by clemency ; fuch love, fuch glory attends
it ; that it is generally a point of happinefs to have
an opportunity of exerciflng it , which in thefe
parts is feldom wanting.
Some branch perhaps of their authority, but ne
ver hardly the whole will be difputed : and if they
fometimes fight for their crown , they do not fight
for their life.
But fome may afk, when is it proper to punifh,
and when to pardon ? This is a point that is eafier
felt than prefcribed. When there is danger in the
K 4 exercifc
136
D o o K
\T
Chap. 21
()
( ) 1
of Si
-. For-
THE SPIRIT
exercife of clemency, the danger is vifible , it is an
eafy matter to diftinguifh it from that imbecillity
which expofes princes to contempt and to the very
incapacity of punifhing.
The emperor Maurice ( k ) made a refolution ne
ver to fpill the blood of his fubjects. Anaftafiu^
punifhed no crimes at all. Ifaac Angelus took an
oath that no one mould be put to death, during his
reign. Thofe Greek emperors had forgot that it
s not for nothing they were intruded with the
rd.
BOOK
O F L A W S.
137
BOOK VII.
of the different Principles
of the three Governments with refpeEi
tofumptuary La\vs y Luxury, and the
Condition of Women.
CHAP. I.
Of Luxury.
LUXURY is always in proportion to the BOOK
inequality of fortunes. If the riches of a , ^^
CJnQD I
Hate are equally divided, there wil be no luxury ;
for it is founded merely on the conveniences ac
quired by the labour of others.
In order to have this equal diftribution of riches,
the law ought to give to each man only juft what is
necefiary for nature. If they exceed thofe bounds,
fome will fpend and others wfll acquire, and by
this means an inequality will be eftablifhed.
Suppofing what is necellary for the fupport of
nature to be equal to a given fum, the luxury
of thofe who have only what is barely necelTary,
will be equal to a cypher - 9 it a perfon happens to have
double that fum, his luxury will be equal to one , he
that has double the latter s fubftance, will have a
luxury equal to three j if this be ftiJl doubled,
there will be a luxury equal to feven , fo that
the property of the fubfequent individual being al
ways fuppofed double to that of the preceding, the
luxury will increafe double, and an unit be always
added,
138 THESF IRIT
BOOK added, in this progreflion, o, i, 3, 7, 15, 31,
Chap. i. 6 3> I2 7
In Plato s republic *, luxury might have been ex
actly calculated. There were four forts of Cenfus s,
or rates of eftates. The firft was exactly the term
beyond poverty, the fecond was double, the third
triple, the fourth quadruple to the firft. In the firft
Cenfus luxury was equal to a cypher \ in the fecond
to one, in the third to two, in the fourth to three ;
and thus it followed in an arithmetical proportion.
Confidering the luxury of different nations with
refpeel to one another, it is in each ftate in a com
pound proportion to the inequality of the fubjects
i- i tunes, and to the inequality of the wealth of
the different flat- In Poland, for example, there
is an extreme inequality of fortunes ; but the pover
ty of the whole hinders them from having fomuch
luxury as in a more opulent ftate.
Luxury is alfo in proportion to the populoufnefs
of the towns, and efpecially of the capital ; fo that
it is in a compound proportion to the riches of the
itate, to the inequJmty of private fortunes, and to
the number of people fettled in particular places.
In proportion to the populoufnefs of towns, the
inhabitants arc filled with vain notions, and actuated
by an ambition of diftinguiming themfelves by
trifles -f-. If they are very numerous, and moft of
them itrangers to one another, the paffion of dif-
* The firit Cenfus was the hereditary (hare in land, and Plato
would not allow them to have in other effedls above a triple of
the hereditary lhare. See bis La~j. s, book ^.
f In a great city, Jays the author of the Fable of the Bees, torn. I.
p. 133. they drefs above their condition, in order to be eileemed
more than what they really are by the multitude. This to a weak
perfon is almoft as great a pleafurc as the accomplifhment of his
de/ires.
tinguifhin^
OF LAWS. 135
tinguifhing themfelves redoubles, becaufe there are BOOK
greater hopes of fuccels. As luxury infpires thefe ^ j
hopes, each man afiumes the marks of a fuperior & 2.
condition. But by endeavouring thus at diitinc-
tion, every one becomes equal and diftinclion
ceafes ; as all ot them are defirous of relpecl, no
body is taken notice of.
Hence antes a general inconveniency. Yhofe
who excel in a profe/Tion fet what value they pleafe
on their labour ; this example is followed by people
of inferior abilities , and then there is an end of all
proportion between our wants and the means of fa-
tisfying them. When I arn forced to go to law, I
muft be able to fee council ; when I am lick I mud
be able to fee a phyfician.
It is the opinion of feveral, that the afirmbling fo
great a multitude of people in capital cities, is an
obltructiGn to commerce, becaufe by this means the
inhabitants are no longer within a proper diftance
from each other. But I cannot think fo ; for men
have more defires, more wants, more fancies, when
they live together.
CHAP. II.
Of Sumptuary Laivs in a Dewc
WE have obferved that in a republic where
riches are equally divided, there can be no
fuch thing as luxury -, and as this equal distribution
conilitutes the excellency of a republican govern
ment, hence it follows that the lefs luxury there is
in a republic, the more it is perfect. There was
none among the old Romans, none among the La
cedaemonians , and in republics where this equality is
not quite loll, the fpirk of commerce, jnduftry, and
virtue.
T H E S P I R I T
BOOK virtue, renders every man able and willing to live
z, on n s own property, and confequently prevents the
growth of luxury.
The laws concerning the new divifion of lands
infilled upon fo eagerly in fome republics, were of
rhr. moil falutary nature. They were dangerous
only as they were fudden. By reducing inftantane-
r HI fly the wealth and riches of fome, and increafing
that of others, they form a revolution in each fa-
miJy, and mutt produce a general one in the ftate.
In proportion as luxury gains ground in a republic,
the minds of the people are turned towards their par
ticular interefts. Thofe who are allowed only what
is neceflary, have nothing to wifh tor but their own
and their country s glory. But a foul depraved by
luxury has many other defires \ and foon becomes
an enemy to the laws that confine it. The luxury
in which the garrifon of Rhegio began to live, was
the caufe of their malTacring the inhabitants.
No fooner were the Romans corrupted, than their
defires became boundlefs and immenfe. Of this we
(^ Fra<r- ma y J U( % e by the price they fet on things. A pitcher
memoY of Falcrnian wine ( 2 ) was fold for a hundred .an
the 36th denarii ; a barrel of fait meat from the !-. --m of
Diodorus, Pontus co ft four hundred a. good cook tour ulents;
quoted by and for boys no price was reckoned too great.
Por*h TO When the whole world, impelled by the force of a
gen. in his general corruption, isimmerfed involuptuoufnefs( b ),
aa f what muft then become of virtue ?/
I irtues and
l :cS P W A P TIT
( b ) Cum V> 1U>
maximus Qf Sumptuary Laws in an Arijlocracy.
omnium _
impetus f~ "^ H E R is this inconveniency in an ill con-
HameiTct J- ftituted ariflocracy, that the wealth centers
ia
OF LAWS. 141
in the nobility, and yet they are not allowed to BOOK.
fpend ; for as luxury is contrary to the fpirit of mo-
deration, it muft be banifhed from thence. This & 4.
government comprehends therefore only people that
are extremely poor, and cannot acquire , and people
that are vaftly rich, and cannot fpend.
In Venice they are compelled by the laws to
moderation. They are fo habituated to parfimony,
that none but courtezans can make them part with
their money. Such is the method made ufe of for
the fupport of induftry ; the mod contemptible of
women fpend freely their money without danger,
whilft thofe who fupport them confume their days
in the greateft obfcurity.
Admirable in this refpedl were the inftitutions of
the principal republics of Greece. The rich em
ployed their money in feftivals, mufical chorus s,
chariots, horfe-races, and chargeable offices. Wealth
was therefore as burthenfome there as poverty.
CHAP. IV.
Of Sumptuary Laws in a Monarchy.
TACITUS .fays, ( h ) " That the SIMMS, a ( M Demo-
" German nation, have a particular refpeSf rib - Ger -
" for riches ; for which reafon they live under the r
** government of one perfon" This mews that
luxury is extremely proper for monarchies, and that
under this government there muft be no fumptuary
laws.
As riches, by the very conftitution of monar
chies, are unequally divided, there is an abiblutc
neccflity for luxury. Were the rich not to fpend
their money freely, the poor would ftarve. It is
even
I 4 2 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK cven necetfary here that the expences of the rich
Q ha mould be in proportion to the inequality of for
tunes ; and that luxury, as \ve have already obferved,
fhould increaie in this proportion. The augmenta
tion of private wealth is ouing to its having deprived
One part of the citizens of their neceflary fupport ;
this muft therefore be reftored to them.
For the prefervation therefore of a monarchical
Hate, luxury ought continually to increafe and to
grow more extenfive, as it rili-s from the labourer
to the artificers, to the merchants, to the magif-
tratcs, to the nobility, to the great officers of ftate,
up to the very prince ; othenvifc the nation will be
undone.
In the reign of Auguflus, a propofal was made
in the Roman fcnate, which was compofed of grave
magiftrates learned civilians, and of men whofe
heads were filled with the notion of the primitive
times, to reform the manners and luxury of women.
( ) Dio. It is curious to fee in Dio, ( c ) with what art this
lib" 1 4. P rmce eluded the importunate follicitations of thofe
ienator-. This was becaufe he was founding a
monarchy, and diflblving a republic.
Under Tiberius thc^diles propofed in the fenate
the re-efbblifhment of the ancient fumptuary laws
Tacit. ( r ). fhih prince, who did not want fenfe, oppofed
in the prefect fit nation of things. How could.
^ bow could the provinces, tree ? We were
hile we vzere inhabitants of a Jingle city ;
now we coyifume the riches of the univerfe, and
<c employ both majiers andflaves in ourfervice." He
plainly law that fumptuary laws would not fuit the
prefent form of government.
When
OF LAWS. 143
When a propofal was made under the lame em
peror to the fenate, to prohibit the governors from L}I ^
carrying their wives with them into the provinces, &.- 5.
becaufe of the diflblutencfs and irregularities which
C*
followed thofe ladies, the propofal was rejected. It
was faid, that the examples of ancient aufterity had
been changed into a more agreeable method of living
( h ). They found there was a neceflity for different ( h > fa
duritiei
manners. fm
Luxury is therefore abfolutely neceffary in monar
chies ; and neceffary allb in defpotic ftates. In the
former it is the life people make of what fliare of
liberty they poflcls , in the other it is the abufe they lib. 3-
make of the advantages of their (Livery. A Have
Tingled out by his mailer to tyranni/e over the other
(laves, uncertain of enjoying to morrow thebleffings
of to day, has no other felicity than that of gluttim:
the pride, the paflions, and voluptuoufnefs of the
prefent moment.
Hence arifes a very natural reflection. Republics
end with luxury - y monarchies with poverty ( : ). Op -
ia pa-
ritoramox
CHAP. V. - lbucm -
rus
In -n-bat cafes Sumptuary Lws c.rc ufefnl in a
Monarchy.
WHETHER it was from a republican
fpirit or from fome other particular cir-
cumftances, in the middle of the thirteenth century,
fumptuary laws were made in Arragon. James
the firft ordained that neither the king nor any of
his fubjefts mould have above two forts of difhes
at a meal, and that each dim mould be drefled
only
344 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK only one way, except it were game of their own
VII. i . n . /k\
Chap. 5. kl]]ln S ( )
( k ) Con- In our days fumptuary laws have been alfo en-
itution ac ted i n Sweden ; but with a different view from
of James r
I. in the thofeof Arragon.
year 1234 A government may make fumptuary laws with
larca a VICW to a bfolute frugality ; this is the fpirit of
Hifpanica fumptuary laws in republics -, and the very nature
p. 4429. o f tne tn i n g mews that fuch was the defign of thofe
of Arragon.
Sumptuary laws may likewife be made with a
defign to promote a relative frugality : when a go
vernment perceiving that foreign merchandizes being
at too high a price, will require iuch an exportation
of the home manufactures, as to deprive them of
more advantages by the lofs of the latter, than they
can receive from the pofieflion of the former, they
will forbid their being introduced. And this is the
fpirit of the laws that in our days have been pailed in
Sweden *. Such are the fumptuary laws proper for
monarchies.
In general the poorer a ftate is, the more it is
ruined by its relative luxury , and confequently the
more occafion it has for relative fumptuary laws.
The richer a ftate is, the more it thrives by its
relative luxury ; for which reafon it muft take
particular care not to make any relative fumptuary
laws. This we mail better explain in the book on
ft gee commerce ( ! ) ; here we treat only of abfolute
book 20. luxury.
chap. 20.
* They have prohibited rich wines and oilier coftly merchan
dizes.
CHAP.
S
OF LAWS. 145
CHAP. VI.
Of the Luxury cf China.
UMPTUARY laws may, in fome govern- BOOK
ments, be necefTary for particular reaions. The
people, by the influence of the climate, may grow
fo numerous, and the means of fubfifting may be lo
uncertain, as to render an univerfal application to
agriculture extremely neceflary. As luxury in thofe
countries is dangerous, their fumptuary laws fhould
be very fevere. In order therefore to be able to
judge whether luxury ought to be encouraged or
profcribed, we fhould examine fir ft what relation
there is between the number of people and the fa
cility they have of procuring fubfiftence. In England
the foil produces more grain than is neceflary for
the maintenance of thofe who cultivate the land,
and of thofe who are employed in the woollen manu
factures. This country may be therefore allowed to
have fome trifling arts, and confequently luxury.
In France likewife there is corn enough for the fup-
port of the hufbandman, and of the manufacturer.
Befides, * foreign trade may bring in fo many necef-
faries in return for toys, that there is no danger to
be apprehended from luxury.
On the contrary, in China the women are fo
prolific, and the human fpecies multiplies fo faft,
that the lands, though ever fo much cultivated, are
fcarce fufficient to fupport the inhabitants. Here
therefore luxury is pernicious, and the fpirit of
induftry and ceconomy is as requifite, as in any
republic *. They are obliged to purfue the ne-
* Luxury has been here always prohibited.
VOL. I. L ceflary
THE SPIRIT
BOOK cefiary arts, and to fhun thofe of luxury and plea-
VII. c
Chap. 6. fure
& 7 . This is the fpirit of the excellent decrees of the
Chinefe emperors. " Our anceftors, fays an emperor
(p) In an " of the family of the Tangs ^), held it as a max-
ordmance " im, that if there was a man who did not work, or
Father Du " a woman that was idle, fomebody muft fuffer cold
Halde, or hunger in the empire." And on this principle
he ordered an infinite number of monafteries of
Bonzes to be deftroyed.
The third emperor of the one and twentieth Dy-
(<)Hiflory nafty ( q ), to whom fome precious (tones were
of china, broujiht that had been found in a mine, ordered it
* i it n\-
n.ifU m to ke ^ nut II P not chufing to fatigue his people
Father Da with working for a thing that could neither feed
HaI ; K nor cloath them.
work
torn. i. So great is our luxury, fays Kiayventi ( r ), that
( ) In a people adorn with embroidery the fhoes of boys and
difcourfe , , A , , ,. , / /; T i
cited by ;r J > woom they are obliged to Jell. Is employing
Father Du fo many people in making cloaths for one per-
Halde, { Qn t { ie wa > r to p reven t a p;reat many from wanting
torn. 2, p. \ r c
4 ,8. cloaths r There are ten men who eat the fruits or
the earth to one employed in agriculture ; and is
this the means to prefer ve numbers from wanting
nourifhment ?
CHAP. VII.
Fatal Confluence of Luxury in China.
IN* the hiftory of China we find it has had twenty-
two fucct-fiive Dynafties, that is, it has experi
enced twenty-two general, without mentioning an
infinite number of particular, revolutions. The three
firft Dynafties laded a long time, becaufe they were
3
OF LAWS. 147
fagely adminiftered, and the empire had not fo great Boo*
an extent as it afterwards obtained. But we may ch ,
obferve in general that all thole Dynaflies began & 8.
very well. Virtue, attention, and vigilance, are
neceflary in China ; thefe prevailed in the com
mencement of the Dynafties, and failed in the end.
It was natural, that emperors trained up in mi
litary toils, who had compafTed the dethroning of
a family immerfed in pleafures, mould be fteady to
virtue, which they had found fo advantageous, and
afraid of voluptuoufnefs, which they knew had proved
fo fatal to the family dethroned. But after the three
or four firft princes, corruption, luxury, indolence,
and pleafures, poftefs their fuccefibrs ; they muc
themfelves up in a palace ; their underflanding is im
paired , their life is fhortened , the family declines;
the grandees rife up , the eunuchs gain credit ;
none but children are fet on the throne ; the palace
is at variance with the empire; a lazy fet of fel
lows that dwell there, ruin the induftrious part of
the nation ; the emperor is killed or deftroyed by
an ufurper, who founds a family, the third or fourth
fucceflbr of which goes and (huts himlclf up in the
very fame palace.
CHAP. VIII.
Of public Continency.
SO many are the imperfections that attend the
lofs of virtue in women, and fo greatly are their
minds depraved, when this principal guard is re
moved, that in a popular (late public incontinency
may be confidered as the lad of miferies, and as a
L 2 certain
I 4 8 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK certain Fore-runner of a change in the confti-
VII
Chap 8. tutlon
& g . Hence it is that the fage legiflators of repub
lican ftates have always required of women a parti
cular gravity of manners. They have profcribed
not only vice, but the very appearance of it. They
have banifhcd even all commerce of gallantry,
a commerce that produces idlenefs, that renders
the women corrupters even before they are cor
rupted, that gives a value to trifles, and debafes
things of importance-, a commerce, in fine, that
makes people adl intirely by the maxims of ridicule,
in which the women are fo perfectly fkilled.
CHAP. IX.
Of tbc condition or ft ate of // emeu in different Go-
iv; uwents.
IN monarchies women are fubject to very little
reftraint, becaufe as the diftinftion of ranks calls
them to court, thither they repair in order to ai-
fume that fpirit of liberty, which is the only one
there tolerated. The afpiring courtier avails him-
felf of their charms and paflions, in order to ad
vance his fortune: and as their weakneis admits not
of pride, but of vanity ; luxury conftantly attends
them.
In defpotic governments women do not intro
duce, but are themfelves an object of luxury. They
mil ft be in a ftate of the moft rigorous fervitude.
Every one follows the fpirit of the government, and
adopts in his own family the cuftoms he fees elfe-
where eftablifhed. As the laws are very fevere and
executed on the fpot, they are afraid left the liberty
of
OF LAWS. 149
of women mould expofe them to dangers. Their L \ K
quarrels, indilcretions, repugnances, jealoufies, Q iap 9 .
piques, and that art, in fine, which little fouls have & 10.
of interelling great ones, would be attended there
with fatal confequences.
Befides, as princes in thofe countries make a fport
of human nature, they allow themfelves a multitude
of women ; and a thoufand confiderations oblige
them to keep them in clofe confinement.
In republics women are free by the laws, and
conftrained by manners , luxury is banifhed from
thence, and with it corruption and vk
In the cities of Greece, where they were not un
der the reftraint of a religion which declares that
even amongft men a purity of morals is a part of
virtue ; where a blind paffion triumphed with a
boundlefs infolence, and love appeared only in a fhape
which we dare not mention, while marriage was
confidered as nothing more than fimple friendfhip*;
fuch was the virtue, fimpliciry, and chaftity of
women in thofe cities, that in this relpect hardly
any people were ever known to have had a better
and wifer polity -f.
CHAP. X.
Of tbe domeftic Tribunal among the Romans.
Romans had no particular magiftrates,
like the Greeks, to infpecl the conduct of
* In refpecl to true love, Jays Plutarch, the women have no
thing to fay to it ; in bis treat ife on lo<vt, p. 600. He fpoke in
the ftile of his time. See Xenophon in the dialogue intitled
Hiero.
f At Athens there was a particular magiftrate who infpe&ed
the conduct of women,
L 3 women,
j 5 o - THE SPIRIT
BOOK W omen. The cenfors had not an eye over them but
VII
Chap 10 as over l ^ e re ^ f tae republic. The inftitution of
the domeftic tribunal * fupplied the magiftracy
eftablifhed among the Greeks -)-.
The hufband fummoned the wife s relations, and
tried her in their prefence J. This tribunal pre-
ferved the morals of the republic , and at the fame
time thefe very morals maintained this tribunal. For
it decided not only in refpecl: to the violation of the
laws, but alto of morals , now in order to judge of
the violation of morals, morals are requifite.
The penalties inflicted by this tribunal, ought to
be, and actually were, arbitrary : for all that relates
to manners, and to the rules of modefty, can hardly
becompri/.ed under one code of laws. It iseafy indeed
to regulate by laws what we owe to others ; but it is
very difficult to comprize all we owe to ourfelves.
The domeftic tribunal infpecled the general con
duct of women : but there was one crime, which
befide the animadvert! on of this tribunal, was like-
wiie fubjecl to a public accufation. This was adul
tery -, whether that in a republic io great a violation
of morals inrerelled the government ; or whether
the wife s immorality might render the hufband s
Romnlu- ini ; .tu:oil thi- trib irwl, as appears from Dionyfms
}f,i!ira;i;air. bonk 2 . p,
f See in I. P. y, hook 39, flu ufl- :li;ir ade of this tribu
nal at the time of the confpin< v of the Bacch.m : the> gave
lite name of confpiracy againil the republic to afTrmhlies in which
the morals of \vomen and young people uere debauched.
| It appears from D:t,>nj\ ILduam lib. z. that Romuk
inftitution was, that in ordinary cafes the huitmid ihould fit as
judge in prefence of the wife s relations, but that in grievous
crimes he mould determine in conjunction with five of them.
Hence Ulfian, lit. 6. 9, 12, & 13, diftinguifhes in rcfpecT. to
the different judgments of manners, between thofe which he calls
important, and thofe which are left fo, graviores, k-viores.
fufpecled ;
U 1^ j^ A vv o. 151
fufpefbed; or whether, in fine, they were afraid left BOOK
even honeft people might chufe that this crime chap. n.
fliould rather be concealed, than punKhed.
CHAP. XI.
In what manner the Inflitutions changed at Rome,
together with the Government.
AS morals were fuppoft-d by the domeftic tri
bunal, they were alib fuppofcd by the public
accufation ; and hence ic is that thde two things fell
together with the public morals, and ended with
the republic*.
The eftablifhing of perpetual queftions, that is,
the divifion of jurifdiclion among the pnrtors, and
the cuftom gradually introduced of the pnetors
judging all affairs themfelves-f, weakened the uie of
the domeftic tribunal. This appears by the furprize
of hiftorians, who look upon the decifions which
Tiberius caufed to be given by this tribunal, as
fmgular facts and as a renewal of the ancient courfe
of pleading.
The eftablifliment of monarchy and the change of
manners put likewife an end to public accufations.
It might be apprehended left a dilhoneft man, af
fronted at the contempt Ihewn him by a woman,
vexed at her refufals, and irritated even by her vir
tues, Ihould form a defign to deltroy her. The
Julian law ordained that a woman mould not be ac-
cufed of adultery till after her hufband had been
* Judicio de moribus (quod antea quidem in antiquii tegibus
tum eraf y non autem freque nta&atur) penitus abolito, leg. 1 1 . Cod.
de repud.
\ Judicia extraordiaaria*
L 4 charged
BOOK charged with favouring her irregularities-, which li-
Ch-tp D mited greatly and annihilated, as it were, this fort
& \z. of accufation *.
Sixtus Quintus feemed to have been defirous of
reviving the public accufation-)-. But there needs
very little reflection to fee, that this law would be
more improper in luch a monarchy as his, than in
any other.
CHAP. XII. ,
Of the Guardianfhip of Women among the Rowans.
"1 1 IL Roman laws fubjected women to a per
petual gunrdiiinfhip, except they were under
t < :ul tlu authority of a hunSand J. This guar
dian Ihip was given to the neareft of the male relati
ons i and by a vulgar expreffion || it appears they
were very much confined. This was proper for a
republic, but not at all necelTary in a monarchy .
That the women among the ancient Germans
were likewife under a perpetual tutelage, appears
from the different codes of the laws of the Barbari
ans **. This cuftom was communicated to the
monarchies founded by thofe people ; but was not
of a long duration.
* It was entirely aboli:! " It i- a flume,
f aid he, that fettled marriage:, iliould be diilurbed by the pre-
"
f SixtUi Qmiicus ordained, that if a hulband did not come and
make his complaints to him of his wife s infidelity, he mould be
put to death. See L-ti.
\ -A//, convenificnt in manam I iri.
|| Ntjit mi hi pal runs oro.
^ TJie Papian law ordained under Auguflus that women who
had bore three children ihould be exempt from this tutelage.
** This tutelage was by the Germans called Mvndeburjium.
CHAP.
OF LAWS. 153
CHAP. XIII.
Of the punifiments decreed by Emperors again/I the
Incontinency of ll omen.
TH E Julian law ordained a punifliment againft BOOK
adultery. But fo far was this law, any more , ^ JI>
than thofe afterwards made on the lame account,
from being a mark of purity of morals, that on the
contrary they were a proof of their depravation.
The whole political fyftem in refpect to women
received a change in the monarchical ilate. The
queflion was no longer to oblige them to a purity
of morals, but to punilh their crimes. Tlut new
laws were made to punifli their crimes, was owing
to their leaving thole tranfgrefllons unpunilhed,
which were not of fo criminal a nature.
The frightful diiTolution of manners obliged in
deed the emperors to enact laws in order to put
fome (top to lewdnefs ; but it was not their inten
tion to eftablim a general reformation. Of this
the pofitive facts related by hiftorians are a much
flronger proof, than all thefe laws can be of the
contrary. We may fee in Dio the conduct of Au-
guftus on this occafion, and in what manner he
eluded, both in his prsetor s and in his cenlbr s
office, the repeated inftances that were made him*,
for that purpofe.
We
* Upon their bringing before him a young man who had
married a woman with w-hom he had before carried on an illi
cit commerce, he hefitated a long while, not daring to approve
nor to punilh thefe things. At length recollecting himfelf, fedi-
tionsy fays he, have been the cauje of very great evils, let us forget
them. Dio, book 5^.. The fenate having defired him to give
them fome regulations in refpeft to women s morals, he evaded
their
j 5 4 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK "\Ve find indeed in hiftorians very rigid fentences.
VII
Cha i - P a fi~ e ^ * n tne rei g ns f Auguftus and Tiberius againft
the lewdnefs of Tome Roman ladies : but by (hewing
us the fpirit of thefe reigns, they at the fame time
(hew us the fpirit of thofe decifions.
The principal defign of Auguftus and Tiberius
was to punifh the diflbJutenefs of their relations. It
was not their immorality they punifhed, but a par
ticular crime of impiety or high treafon * of their
own invention, which ferved to promote a refpedl
for majefty, and anfwered their private revenge.
The penalty of the Julian law was fmall +. The
emperors infifted that in pafllng fentence the judges
mould increafe the penalty of the law. This was
the fubject of the invectives of hiftorians. They
did not examine whether the women were deferving
of punifhment, but whether they had violated the
law, in order to punifh them.
ne of the moft tyrannical proceedings of Tiberi
us , was the abufe he made of the ancient laws.
When he wanted to extend the punifhment of a Ro
man lady beyond that inflicted by the Julian law, he
revived the domeftic tribunal J.
Thefc
their petition, by telling them that they fhould chaftife their wives,
in the fr.me manner as he did his; upon which they defired him
to tell them how he behaved to his wife. (I think a very indii-
creet queltion).
p:>m inter viros & fceminas vulgatam gravi nomine lar-
farum religionum appellando, elementiam majorum fuafque ipfe
leges egrediebatur, Tucit. Annal. lib. 3.
f This law is given in the Digeft ; but without mentioning
the penalty. It is fuppofed it was only rtlegatio t becaufe that
of inceft was only Jepcrtatio. Leg.Jiquis viduam, ff. de qusft.
Proprium id Tiberio fuit fcelera nuper reperta prifcis verbis
obtegere, Tacit.
I Adulterii graviorem poenam deprecatus, ut exemplo majo-
rum propinquis fuis ultra duceBtefimum lapidem rcmoveretur,
fuafiu
OF LAWS. 155
Thcfe regulations in refpedt to women concerned Bo *
only fenatorian families, but not the common peo- chap. n,
pie. Pretences were wanted to accufe the great, & 14.
which were conftantly furnifhed by the diflblute be
haviour of the ladies.
In fine, what I have above obferved, namely that
purity of morals is not the principle of monarchy,
was never better verified than under thofe firft em
perors-, and whoever doubts of it need only read
Tacitus, Suetonius, Juvenal, or Martial.
CHAP. XIV.
Sumptuary Laws among the Ronu*-
WE have fpokcn of public incontinency, bc-
caufe it always accompanies, always fol
lows, and is followed always by luxury. If we
leave the motions of the heart at liberty, how fhall
we be able to reflrain the weaknefles ot the mind ?
At Rome, befides the general inftitutions, the
cenfors prevailed on the magiftrates to enact feveral
particular laws to preferve the frugality of women.
This was the defign of the Fannian, Licinian, and
Oppian laws. We may fee in L/ i v ( k ) the great k ) Decad.
^^ TAT" 1*1*
ferment the feiiate was in, when the women infilled [
upon the revocation of the Oppian law. The abro
gation of this law is fixed upon by Valerius Maxi-
mus as the period from whence we may date the
luxury of the Romans.
fuaftt. Adultero Manlio Italia atque Africa interdiftum eft.
Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.
CHAP.
156 T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. XV.
Of Dowries find Nuptial ..ntagcs in different
Conjiituticr.s.
BOOK T-^V O W R I E S ought to be confidcrablc in
VII
Chap - JL J monarchies in order to enable hufbands
to fupport their rank and the eilabiifhed luxury.
In republics, where luxury fhould never reign -J-,
they ought to be moderate , but there fhould hardly
be any at all in defpotic governments, where women
are in Tome meafure (laves.
The community introduced by the French laws
between man and wife, is extremely well adapted to
monarchical government-, becaufe the women are
thereby interested in domeftic affairs, and compelled,
as it were, to take care of their family. It is lefs fo
in a republic, where women have more virtue. But
it would be quite abiurd in defpotic governments,
where the women themfelves generally conftitute a
part of the matter s property.
As women are in a ftate that furnimes Sufficient
inducements to marriage, the advantages which the
law gives them over the husband s property, are ot
no fervice to fociety. But in a republic they would
be extremely prejudicial, becaufe riches are pro
ductive of luxury. In defpotic governments the
profit accruing from marriage ought to be mere fub-
fiftence, and i.o more.
f Marfeiiles was the wife ft of all the republics in its time;
.: ordained that dowries fhould not exceed one hundred
crowns in money, and five in cloaths, as Strabo obferves, lib. 4.
CHAP.
O F L A W S. *57
CHAP. XVL
An excellent Cuftom of the Sammies.
TH E Samnites had a cuftom which in fo fmall BOOK
a republic, and efpecially in their fituation, c 6
mud have produced admirable effects. The young
people were all convened in one place, and their
conduct was examined. He that was declared the
beft of the whole afTc mbly, had leave given him to
take which girl he pleafed for his wife i the perfon
that had been declared fecond heft chofe after him ;
and fo on ( k j. Admirable inilitution ! The only re- ( v ) F:
commendation that young men could have on this B^V* 1
occafion, was owing to virtue and to the ii-r vices Damafce-
done their country. He who had the greateft fliare nus > takcn
of thefe endowments, chofe which girl he liked out b eus in th * e
of the whole nation. Love, beauty, chaftity, vir- collection
tue, birth, and even wealth itfelf, were all, in fome ^
llantinc
meafure, the dowry of virtue. A nobler, and Porphyro-
grander recompence, lefs chargeable to a petty ftate,
and more capable of influencing both fexes, could
fcarce be imagined.
The Samnites were defcended from the Lacede
monians : and Plato, whofe inftitutes are only an
improvement of thofe of Lycurgus, enacted very
near the fame law *.
* He even permits them to have a more frequent interview
with one another.
CHAP.
158 T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. XVII.
Of Female Alminiftration.
BOOK T T is contrary to reafon and nature that women
Ch * J[ Ihould reign in families, as was cultomary
among the Egyptians , but not that they fhould
govern an empire. In the firft cafe the ftate of their
natural weaknefs does not permit them to have the
pre-eminence-, in the fecond their very weaknefs ge
nerally gives them more lenity and moderation, qua
lifications fitter for a good adminiftration, than
roughnefs and feverity.
In the Indies they are very eafy under a female
government , and it is fettled that if the male ifTuc
be not of a mother of the fame blood, the fe
males born of a mother of the blood-royal muft fuc-
( k ) Edify- cecd ( k ). And then they have a certain number of
ing Let- perfons that afiift them to bear the weight of the
coUcd ion. government. If to this we add the example of
England and Ruflia, we mall find that they fucceed
alike both in moderate and defpotic governments.
BOOK
OF LAWS. 159
ffiHMHIHHgEXHIBI$^^
BOOK VIII.
Of the Corruption of the Principles of the
three Governments.
CHAP. I.
General Idea of this Book.
TH E corruption of each government gene- H n *
rally begins with that of the principles. Ch " f
CHAP. II.
Of the Corruption of the Principle of Democracy.
TH E principle of democracy is corrupted,
not only when the ipirit of equality is ex
tinct, but likewife when they fall into a ipirit of ex
treme equality, and when every citizen wants to
be upon a level with thofe he has chofen to com
mand him. Then the people, incapable of bearing
the very power they have intruded, want to do
every thing of themielves, to debate for the fenate,
to execute for the magiftrate, and to (trip the
judges.
When this is the cafe, virtue can no longer fub-
fift in the republic. The people want to exercife the
functions of the magiftrates \ who ceafe to be revered.
The deliberations of the fenate are flighted , all re-
fpect is then laid afide for the fenators, and confe-
cjuently for old age. If there is no more refpeft for
old
160 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK o ]d a g e<> there will be none foon for parents ; defer-
K_ \ ence to hufbands will be likewife thrown off, and
fubmifiion to mailers. This licentioufnefs will foon
taint the mind , and the reftraint of command
be as fatiguing as that of obedience. Wives, chil
dren, flaves, will fluke off all fubje&ion. No
longer will there be any fuch thing as manners, or
der, or virtue.
We find in Xenc-plo>fs banquet a very lively de-
fcription of a republic in which the people abufed
their equality. 1 .:.ch gueft gives in his turn the
reafon why he is fatisfied. " Content I am with
** V, fays Chamides, becaitfc of my po\
" ll hen I was rub, I was obliged to pay my court
" to informers, kneeing I was more liable to be
* hurt by them y than capable of doing them harm.
" The republic conjlantly demanded fome new fum of
" me i and I could not decline paying. Since I am
" grown poor, I acquired authority -, no body
" threatens me, I rather threaten others. I can go
orjic re I pleafe. The rich already rife from
their feats and give me the way. I am a king, I
" CCY-J btfore a fir.-ir : I paid taxes to the republic 9
" new it maintains me : 1 am no longer afraid of
" Icfing ; I hope to acquire"
The people fall into this misfortune, when
thofe in whom they confide, dcfirous of concealing
their own corruption, endeavour to corrupt. To
prevent them from feeing their own ambition,
they fpeak to them only of their grandeur , to
conceal their own avarice, they inceiTantly flatter
theirs.
The corruption will increaie among the corrupt-
ers, and likewife among thofe who are already cor
rupted.
<c
<c
O F L A W S. 161
rupted. The people will didribute the public BOOK
money among themfelves, and having added the cj iap> j.
adminidration of affairs to their indolence, they will
be for adding to their poverty the amufements
of luxury. But with their indolence and luxury,
nothing but the public treafure will be able to
fatisfy their demands.
We muft not be furprifed to fee their fuffrages
given for money. It is impofTible to give a great
deal to the people without fqueezing much more
out of them : and to compais this, the Mate muft
be fubverted. The greater the advantages they
feem to derive from their liberty, the nearer they
draw to the critical moment of lofing it. Petty
tyrants arife, who have all the vices of a (ingle
tyrant. The fmall remains of liberty foon become
nnfupportable ; a fmgle tyrant darts up, and the
people lofe all, even the advantages of their cor
ruption.
Democracy hath therefore two excefies to avoid,
the fpirit of inequality which leads to ariftocracy
or monarchy , and the fpirit of extreme equality,
which leads to defpotic power, as the latter is com-
pleated by conqueft.
True it is that thofe who corrupted the Greek
republics, did not become tyrants. This was be-
caufe they had a greater pafTion for eloquence than
for the military urt. Befides there reigned an impla
cable hatred in the hearts of the Greeks againft thofe
who fubverted a republican government ; and for
this reafon anarchy degenerated into annihilation,
inftead of being changed into tyranny.
But Syracufe, which was fituated in the midft of
a great number of petty dates whofe government
VOL. I. M had
162 THfe SPIRIT
t> een changed from oligarchy to tyranny ( c )
Chap a Syracufe which had a fenate * fcarce ever mentioned
( c )SecPlu- in hiftory, was expofed to fuch miferies as are the
tarch m CO nfcquenccs of a more than ordinary corruption.
of Timo- This city continually in a ftate of licentioufnefs f or
Icon and opprefilon, equally labouring under its liberty and
fcrvitude, receiving always the one and the other
Jike a tempcft, and notwithftanding its external
ftrength conftantly determined to a revolution by
the Icaft foreign power : This city, I fay, had in its
bofom an immenfe multitude of people, whofe fate
it was to have always this cruel alternative, of either
giving themfelvcs a tyrant, or of being the tyrant
thcmfelves.
C II A P. III.
Of the Spirit of extreme Equality.
A^ ditlant as heaven is from earth, fo is the
true fpirit of equality from that of extreme
equality. The former does not confift in managing
Ib that every body mould command, or that no
one fhould be commanded ; but in obeying and
commanding our equals. It endeavours not to be
without a matter, but that its m afters mould be
none but its equals.
In the ftate of nature indeed, all men are born
equal i but they cannot continue in this equality.
It was that of the fix hundred, of whom mention is made
by Diodorns.
f Upon the expv.Kmn of the tyr.ints they made citizens of
Grangers and mercer; nr, , which produced civil wars, Ariftct.
P lit. lil>. jj. tap. .pie having been the caufe of the victory
over the Athenians, the republic was changed, ibid. cap. 4. The
paflion of two y -UIIQ magiftratcs, one of whom carried off the
other s boy, and in jevcnae the other debauched his wife, was at-
nded \vithachange in the form of this republic, ibij. lib. 7. cap. 4.
Society
OF LAWS. 163
Society makes them lofe ir, and they recover it ^ K
only by means of the laws. Ch.j..&-.
Such is the difference between a well regulated
democracy, and one that is not fo, that in the
former men are equal only as citizens, but in. the
latter they are equal alfo as magiftrates, as fenators,
as judges, as fathers, as hufbands, or as matters.
The natural place of virtue is near to liberty ;
but it is not nearer to extreme liberty than to
fervitude.
CHAP. IV.
Particular Caufe of the Corruption of the People.
GREAT fuccefs, efpecially when chiefly owing
I to the people, fwells them fo hi ^h with
pride, that it is impoffible to manage them. Jea
lous of their magiftrates they foon become icalous
like wife of the magiftracy , enemies to thofe that
govern, they foon prove enemies alfo to the confti-
tution. Thus it was the victory over the Perfians
obtained in the ftreights of Salamis thac corrupted
the republic of Athens ( d ) -, and thus the deieat of ( Ariftot.
the Athenians ruined the republic of Syracufe ( e ).
Marfeilles never experienced thofe great tranfi- \*) ibid.
tions from lownefs to grandeur : this was owing to
the prudent conduct of this republic, which always
preferved her principles.
CHAP. V.
Of the Corruption of the Principle of Ariftocracy.
A
RISTOCRACY is corrupted if the
power of the nobles becomes arbitrary :
M 2 when
164 T H E S P I R I T
DOCK w hen this is the cafe there can no longer be any
Chap c v i rtue either in the governours, or the governed.
If the reigning families obferve the laws, it is a
monarchy with feveral monarchs, and in its own
nature one of the mod excellent-, for almoft all thefe
inonarchs are tied down by the laws. But when
they do not obferve them, it is a defpotic flate
governed by a great many defpotic princes.
In this laft cafe the republic confifts only in the
nobles. The body governing is the republic , and
the body governed is the defpotic flate; which forms
two of the rnoft heterogeneous and divided bodies
in the world.
The extremity of corruption is when the power
of the no ; Becomes hereditary*-, for then they
can hardly have any moderation. If they are few in
number, their power is greater, but their fecurity
lefs , if they are a larger number, their power is
lets, and their fecurity greater : infomuch that
power goes on increafing, and fecurity diminifhing,
up to the very defpotic prince whofe head is encir
cled with excels of power and danger.
The great number therefore of nobles in an here
ditary ariftocracy renders the government lefs vio
lent : but as there is lefs virtue, they fall into a
fpirit of fupinenefs and negligence, by which means
the flate lofes all its ftrength and activity
An ariftccracy may maintain the full vigor of
its conftitution, if the laws be fuch as are apt to
render the nobles more fenfible of the perils and
fatigues, than of the pleafure of command j and if
* The ariftocracy i= changed into an oligarchy.
f Venice is one of thofe republics that has belt corrected by
its laws the inconveniencies of hereditary ariltecracy.
the
O F L A W S. 165
the government is in fuch a fituation as to have fome- B " K
thing to dread, while fecurity fhelcers under its pro- chap. 6.
tedtion, and uncertainty threatens from abroad.
As a certain kind of confidence forms the glory
and {lability of monarchies, republics on the con
trary muft have fomething to apprehend *. A fear
of the Perfians fupported the laws of Greece. Car
thage and Rome were alarmed, and ftrengthened
by each other. Strange, that the greater fecurity
thofe dates enjoyed, the more, like ftagnated wa
ters, they were fubject to corruption !
CHAP. VI.
Of the Corruption of the Principle of Monxrc,
AS democracies are deftroyed when the people
defpoil the fenate, the magiftrates, and judges
of their functions ; fo monarchies are corrupted
when the prince infenfibly deprives locieties or cities
of their privileges. In the firft cafe the multitude
ufurp a defpotic power ; in the fecond it is ufurped
by a fingle perfon.
" The deduction of the Dynafties cf T/in and
" Solii" SAYS A CHINESE AUTHOR, " ^as
" owing to this : the -princes injlead of confining
themfehes like their anceftors to a general infpec-
tion, the only one worthy of a fovereign, wanted to
govern every thing immediately by themfehes ( f )." (^ Corn -
The Chinefe author gives us here the caufe of the ^J-\vorks
corruption of almoft all monarchies. made un
der the
* Juftin attributes the extindlion of Athenian virtue to the Tl/,/,0^ re-
death of" Epaminondas. Having no further emulation, they (ated by
fpent their revenues in feafts, frequentitu caenam, q-uam caftra father
uifentes. Then it was that the Macedonians emerged out of )uHa!
obfcurity, 1. 6.
M 3 Monarchy
it
tc
(C
i66 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK Monarchy is deftroyed, when a prince thinks he
Chap 6 ^ ews a greater exertion of power in changing, than
& 7. in confoiming to, the order of things-, when he
deprives fome of his fubjects of their hereditary
employments to beftow them arbitrarily upon o-
thers -, and when he is fonder of being guided by
fanry than judgment.
Monarchy is deftroyed, when the prince, direct
ing every thing entirely to himfelf, calls the ftate to
his capital, the capital to his court, and the court
to his own perfon.
Monarchy is deftroyed, in fine, when the prince
miftakes his authority, his fituation, and the love
of his people ; and when he is not fully perfuaded
that a monarch ought to think himfelf fecure, as a
defpotic prince ought to think himielf in danger.
CHAP. VII.
The fame Subjefi continued.
THE principle of monarchy is corrupted,
when the firft dignities are marks of the
firft fervitude, when the great men are ftripped of
popular rd] >cl, and rendered the low tools of ar
bitrary power.
It is ftiJI more corrupted, when honor is fet up
in contradiction to honors, and when men are capa
ble of being loaded at the very fame time with
infamy * and with dignities.
it
* Under the reign of Tiberius ftatues were creeled to, and
triumphal ornaments conferred on. informers ; which debafed
ihefe honors to fuch a degree, that thofe who had really merited
them difdained to accept of them. Fragm cfDio, took 58. taken
from the extrafi af virtues and vices, by Conltantine Porphyrog.
See
O F L A W S. 267
It is corrupted when the prince changes his juftice B K
into feverity , when he puts like the Roman empe- ha ,^
rors a Medufa s head on his bread * ; and when he & 8.
affumes that menacing and terrible air which Com-
o
modus ordered to be given to his llatues ( c ). ( e ) Hero-
Again it is corrupted, when mean and abject
fouls grow vain of the pomp attending their fervi-
tude , and imagine that the motive which induces
them to be entirely devoted to their prince, exempts
them from all duty to their country.
But if it be true, (and indeed the experience of
all ages has fhewn it) that in proportion as the power
of the monarch becomes boundleis and immenfe,
his fecurity diminifhes; is the corrupting this power,
and the altering its very nature, a lefs crime than
that of high treafon againft the prince ?
CHAP. VIII.
Danger of the Corruption of tbe Principle of monar
chical Government.
TH E danger is not when the (late pafles
from one moderate to another moderate
government, as from a republic to a monarchy, or
from a monarchy to a republic ; but when it preci
pitates from a moderate to a defpotic government.
Moft of the European nations are ftill governed
by principles of morality. But if by a long abufe
See in Tacitus in what manner Nero on the difcovery and punifh-
ment of a pretended confpiracy, bellowed triumphal ornaments
on Petronius Turpilianus, Nerva, and TigelJinus Annal book
14. See like wife how the generals refufed to ferve, becaufe they
contemned the military honors, pervnlgatis triumphi infignibus t
Tacit. Annal. book i :.
* In this ilate the prince knew extremely well the principle
f his government.
M 4 of
i68 i tt s J Hr>I T
BOOK o f p Owe r 5 or t he fury of conquefl, defpotic fway
Chap. 9. fl luu ld prevail to a certain degree ; neither morals
nor climate would be able to withftand its baleful
influence : and then human nature would be r xpofed,
for ibme time at lead, even in this beautiful part
of the world, to the intuits with which Ihe has been
b.ifed in the other three.
C H A P. IX.
IL fie Nobility are to defend the Throne.
1 1 T Tnglifh nobility buried themfelves with
Charles the firft, under the ruins of the
thr and before that nine, when Philip the
;nd endeavoured to tempt the French with the
allurement ot liberty, the crov/n was ccnftamly fup-
red by a nobility who think it an honor to obey
a king, but confider it as the loweil iniamy to fhare
the power with the people.
The houfe of Auftria has ufed her conilant en
deavours to opprefs the Hungarian nobility ; little
thinking how ferviceable that very nobility would
be one day to her. She wanted money from their
country which it had not , but took no notice of the
men with which it abounded. When a multitude
princes fell to a difmembering of her dominions,
the feveral pieces of her monarchy fell motioniefs,
as it were, one upon the other. No life was then
to be feen but in that very nobility, who refenting
injuries done to their fovereign, and forgetting
thoie done to themfelves, took up arms to avenge
her cauie, and confidcred it as the higheft glory
bravely to die and to forgive.
CHAP.
OF LAWS. 169
CHAP. X.
Of tbe Corruption cf the Principle of defpotic Govern-
nt.
T
H E principle of defpotic government is Tub- B K
ject to a continual corruption, becaufe it is Q^ I0j
ts nature corrupt. Other governments are & u.
deftroyed by particular accidents which do violence
to the principles of each conftitution ; this is ruined
by its own intrinfic imperfection, when no acciden
tal caules impede or corrupt the principles on which
it is i It maintains itfelf therefore only
when f; ; re urn (lances drawn from the climate, reli
gion, f^Uation, or genius ot the people, oblige it
to fuliovv fome order, and to admit of fome rule.
By thefe things its nature is torced without being
changed : its ferocity remains ; and it is made tame
and tractable only for a time.
CHAP, XL
Natural Effefts of the Goodnefs and Corruption of the
Principles of Government.
WHEN once the principles of government
are corrupted, the very beft laws become
bad and turn againft the flate : but when the prin
ciples are found, even bad laws have the fame effect
as good , the force of the principle draws every
thing to it.
The inhabitants of Crete ufed a very fingular me
thod, to keep the principal magistrates dependent on
the laws i which was that of Infurreffion. Part of the ( j ) Ariilot.
citizens rofe up in arms f 1 ), put the magiftrates to f 01 ?
r book 2.
chap. 10.
170 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK flight, and obliged them to return to a private life.
Chap ii. This was fuppofed to be done in confequence of the
Jaw. One would have imagined that an inftitution
of this nature, which eftablifhed fedition in order
to hinder the abufe of power, would have fub-
verted any republic whatfoever-, and yet ic did not
fubvert that of Crete. The reafon is this *.
When the ancients wanted to expreis a people
that had the ftrongeft love for their country, they
always mentioned the inhabitants of Crete : Our
( f )Repub. country, faid Plato ( f ), a name fo dear to the Cretans.
lib. 9. They called it by a name which fignifies the Jove of
(t)Plu- a mother for her children ( e ). Now the love of
V.
. s our country fets every thing right.
treatifc Hie laws of Poland have likewife their Infur-
reflion : But the inconveniencies thence arifing
Painty mew tnat tne people of Crete alone were
years ought capable of employing fuch a remedy with fucccfs.
to meddle The p-ymnic exercifes eftablifhed amoneft the
i<jith pub- OJ
lie affairs. Greeks, had the fame dependance on the goodnefs
of the principle of government. " // was tbe Lace-
HRepub. " dsmonians and Cretans, faid Plato ( h ), tbat opened
" tbofe celebrated academies which gave them fo emi-
* nent a rank in tbe world. Modefty at firji was
4< alarmed j but it yielded to tbe public utility"
In Plato s time thefe inftitutions were admira
ble -j- ; as they had a relation to a very important
objecl,
* They always united immediately againfl foreign enemiee,
which was called S \ncrctifnt. Hut. Mor. p.
f The Gymnic art was divided into two parts, dancing and
v.-njiling. In Crete they- had the armed dances of the Curetes ;
at Sparta they had thofe of Caftor and Pollux ; at Athens the
armed dances of Pallas, which were extremely proper for thole
that were not yet of age for military lervice. Wrellling is the
image of war, faid Plato, of laws book 7. He commends an
tiquity
m
O F L A W S. 171
object, which was the military art. But when vir- B " K
tue fled from Greece, the military art was deftroyed ^h np \ l
by thefe inftitutions ; people appeared then on the & iz.
arena, not for improvement, but for debauch.
Plutarch informs us ( a ) that the Romans in his ( Ply-
time were of opinion that thofe games had been mora i Sj -
the principal caufe of the flavery into which the thctrea-
Greeks were fallen. On the contrary, it was the
flavery of the Greeks that had corrupted thefe f ,- cnj
exercifes. In Plutarch s time ( h ), their righting f f" g the
naked in the parks, and their \vreftling, infected
the young people with the fpirit of cowardice, in- ( b ) Ibid.
clined them to infamous paffions, and made them
mere dancers. But in Epaminondas s time the
exercife of wreftling made the Thebans win the
famous battle of I .eucha ( c ). ( c ) Plu-
There are very fVw laws which are not good, mora ^
while the ftate retains its principles : here I may Table pre-
apply wli.u Epicurus faid of riches -, // is not the /;- PW 1 *
quor, but the vejfel, that is corrupted.
CHAP. XII.
Tbefamt Subjeft continued.
IN Rome the judges were chofen at firft from
the order of fenators. This privilege the Gracchi
transferred to the knights : Drufus gave it to the fe
nators and knights ; Sylla to the fenators only ;
Cotta to the fenators, knights, and public treafurersj
Csefar excluded the latter ; Antony mack decuries
of fenators, knights, and centurions.
tiquity {or having eftablifhed only two dances, the pacific and
the Pyrrhic. See how the latter dance was applied to the mili
tary art, Plato ibid.
When
72 T H E S P I R I T
3 o o K When once a republic is corrupted, there is no
hap. \ 2 . portability of remedying any of the rifing evils, but
by removing the corruption and reftoring its loft
principles : every other correction is either ufelefs or
a new evil. While Rome preferved its principles
intire, the power of judging might without any
abufe be lodged in the hands of fenators : but as
C->
foon as this city was corrupted, let the judicial au
thority be transferred to whatfoever body, whether
to the fenate, to the knights, to the treafur.
to two of thefe bodies, to all three together, or to
any other , matters Hill went always wrong, [ he
knights had no more virtue than the fenate, the trea-
furers no more than tne knights, and thefe as little
as the centurions.
When the people of Rome had obtained the pri
vilege of fharingtl. -iftnicy wi:h the Patricians,
it was natural to think that t .cii flatterers would im
mediately become arbiters of the government. But
no fuch thing ever happenrd. It was obfeivable
that the very people who had rendered the plebeians
capable of public offices, conftantly fixe i their choice
upon the Patricians. Becaufe they were virtuous,
they were magnanimous ; and becaufe they were
free, they had a contempt of power. But when
their morals were corrupted, the more power they
were poficfied of, the lefs prudent was their conduct ,
till at length U] n becoming their own tyrants and
Haves, they loft the ftrength of liberty to fall into
the weaknefs and impotency of licentioufnefs.
C H A P
OF LAWS.
CHAP. XIII.
"The Effett of an Oath among a virtuous People.
THERE is no nation, fays Livy ( p ), that BOOK
has been longer uncorrupted than the Ro- .
Chap. 13.
mans-, no nation where moderation and poverty (p)Booki.
have been longer refpec~led.
Such was the influence of an Oatb among thefe
people, that nothing bound them ftronger to the
laws. They often did more for the obfervance of
an oath, than they would ever have done for the
third of glory or for the love of their country.
When Quintius Cincinnatus the Conful wanted
to raife an army in the city againft the JEqui and
the Volfciy the tribunes oppofed him. " IVell^ faid
he, let all thofe who have taken an oath to tbe
Conful of the -preceding year^ march under my Ian-
ners ( q )." In vain did the tribunes cry out that (<j Livy
this oath was no longer binding ; and that when they Book 3-
made it, Quintius was but a private perfon. The
people were more religious than thofe who pretended
to direct them; they would not Men to the diftinc-
tions or equivocations of the tribunes.
When the fame people thought of retiring to
the Sacred Mount , they felt an inward check from
the oath they had taken to the Confuls, that they
would follow them into the field ( r ). They entered ( r ) I
i> (
then into a defign of killing the Confuls ; but
dropped it, when they were given to underftand
that their oath would ftill be binding. Now it is
eafy to judge of the notion they entertained of the
violation of an oath, by the crime they intended
to commit.
After
tc
it
I 7 4. T H E S P I R I T
BOOK After the battle of Canns, the people were fVized
V 1 1 T
"
Chap u l a P a c ^ iat they wanted to retire to Si
cily. But Scipio having prevailed upon them to
fwear they would not ftir from Rome ; the fear of
violating this oath furpafied all other apprehenfions.
Rome was a fhip held by two anchors, religion and
morality, in the midilof a furious tempeft.
CHAP. XIV.
JIciv the fmallejl Charge in the Conftitution is attended
with tbe Ruin of its Principles.
A
RISTOTLE mentions the city of Car
thage as a well regulated republic. Polybius
us *, that there was this inconveniency at Car
thage in the fecond Punic war, that the fenate had
loft almoft all their authority. We are informed by
Livy that when Hannibal returned to Carthage, he
found that the magiftrates and the principal citizens
had abufed their power, and converted the public
revenues to their own emolument. The virtue
therefore of the magiftrates, and the authority of
the fenate both fell at the fame time j and all was
owing to the fame caufe.
l-.very one knows the wonderful effects of the
cenforfhip among the Romans. There was a time
when it grew burthenfome , but ftill it was fupport-
ed, becaufe there was more luxury than corruption.
( s ) See Claudius ( ) weakened its authority, and by this
Ch zth rneans c ie corruption became greater than the luxury,
and the cenforfhip dwindled away of itfelf -f.
* About a hur.drcd years after.
| The trib-jurs hindered them from making the cenfus, and
% d their e Ve Cicero to Atticus, Book 4th, Let-
d ; .-
CHAP.
OF LAWS. 175
CHAP. XV.
Sure Method of preferring the three Principles.
I Shall not be able to make myfelf rightly under- BOOK
flood, till the reader has perufed the four fol- ,
Chap. 15,
lowing chapters. & 16.
CHAP. XVI.
Dtftinflive Properties of a Republic.
IT is natural to a republic to have only a fmall
territory , otherwile it cannot long fubfift. In
a large republic there are men of large fortunes,
and confequently of lefs moderation ; there are
trufLs tco great to be placed in any Tingle fubjecl: ;
he has interefts of his own ; he foon begins to think
that he may be happv \t, and glorious, byop-
preiTing his fellow cieizens , and that he may raife
himfelf to grandeur on the ruins of his country.
In a large republic the public good is facrificed
to a thoufand views , it is fubordinate to exceptions ;
and depends on accidents. In a fmall one, the in-
tereft of the public is eafier perceived, better un-
derftood, and more within the reach of every citi
zen ; abufes have a lefs extent, and of courfe are
lefs protected.
The long duration of the republic of Sparta was
owing to its having always continued in the fame
extent of territory after all its wars. The fole aim
of Sparta was liberty , and the fole advantage of its
liberty, glory.
2 It
THE SPIRIT
BOOK j t was the fpirit of the Greek republics to be
Chap 16 as contented with their territories, as with their
& 17. laws. Athens was firft fired with ambition and
gave it to Lacedremon , but it was an ambition ra
ther of commanding a free people, than of govern
ing flaves -, rather of directing than of breaking the
union. All was loft upon the ftarting up of mon
archy, a government whole fpirit is more turned to
increaie and advancement.
Excepting particular circumfhnce *, it is diffi
cult for any other than a republican government to
fubfifb long in a fingle town. A prince of fo petty
a ftate would naturally endeavour to opprefs his
fubjecls, bccauie his power would be great, while
the means of enjoying it or of caufing it to be
refpected, would lv very inconfiderable. The con-
fequenee is, he would trample upon his people. On
the other hand, inch a prince might be eafily crufhed
by a foreign or even by a domdlic force ; the peo
ple might every inltant unite and rife up againfl
him. Now as foon as a prince of a fmgle town is
expelled, the quarrel is overj but if he has many
towns, it only begins.
C H A P. XVII.
Dtfltnffrus Properties of a Monarchy.
A MONARCHICAL ftate ought to be
of a moderate extent. Were it fmall, it
\vould form itfelf into a republic : were it very
large, the nobility, poflefTed of great eftates, far from
* As when a petty fovcrcign fupports himfelf betwixt two
great powers by means of their mutual jealoufy ; but then he has
only a precarious exigence.
the
OF LAWS. 177
the infpection of the prince, with a private court !5 T K
of their own, and fecure moreover from fudden chap. \
executions by the laws and manners of the country,
fuch a nobility, I fay, might throw off their allegi
ance, having nothing to fear from too How and too
diftant a punifhment.
Thus Charlemain had fcarce founded his empire
when he was obliged to divide it ; whether the
D
governors of the provinces refilled to obey , or
whether in order to keep them more under fubjec-
tion there was a necefTity of parcelling the empire
into feveral kingdoms.
After the deceafe of Alexander his empire was
divided. How was it poffiblc for thofe Greek and
Macedonian chiefs, who were each of them free
and independent, or commanders at lead of the vic
torious bands difperfed throughout that vail extent
of conquered land, how was it poffible, I lay, for
them to obey ?
Attila s empire was difTolved foon after his death;
fuch a number of kings, who were no longer under
reftraint, could not refume their fetters.
The fudden eftablifhment of unlimited power is
a remedy, which in thofe cafes may prevent a diflb-
lution: but how dreadful the remedy, that after the
inlargement of dominion, opens a new fcene of
mifery !
The rivers haften to mingle their waters with the fea -,
and monarchies lofe themfelves indefpotic power.
CHAP. XVIII.
Particular cafe of the Spanijh Monarchy.
LE T not the example of Spain be produced
againft me , it rather proves what I affirm.
VOL. I. N To
j 7 8 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK To preferve America (he did what even defpotic
A/TIT
Cha io. P ower fefelf does not attempt, (lie deftroyed the
& 20. inhabitants. To preferve her colony, fhe was oblig
ed to keep it dependent even for its fubfiftence.
In the Netherlands fhe efiayed to render herfelf
arbitrary -, and as foon as fhe abandoned the attempt,
her perplexity increafed. On the one hand the
Walloons would not be governed by Spaniards, and
on the other the Spanifh foldiers refufed to fubmit
(<) Seethe to Walloon officers ( c ).
hiftorypf j n j ta ]y ft^ maintained her ground, merely by
the Unit- , n , r ir it i i
ed Pro- cxhauiting herielr and by enriching that country,
vinccs, by For thofe who would have been glad to have got
H T C T
rid of the king of Spain, were not in a humour to
CIerc * c f i
reiule his gold.
C H A P. XIX.
Biftinflwc Properties of a defpotic Government.
A Large empire fiippofes a defpotic authority
in the perfon that governs. It is necefiary
that the quicknefs of the prince s refolutions fhould
fupply the diftance of the places they are fent to i
that fear fhould prevent the carelefihefs of the re
mote governor or magiftrate , that the law mould
be derived from a fingle perfon, and fhould change
continually according to the accidents which incef-
fantly multiply in a ftate in proportion to its extent.
C II A P, XX.
Confequexce of the preceding Chapters.
IF it be therefore the natural property of fmall
dates to be governed as a republic, of middling
ones to be fubjecl: to a monarch, and of large em
pires to be fwayed by a defpotic prince ; the con-
fequence
OF LAWS. 179
fequence is, that in order to preferve the principles B K
of the eftablifhed government, the ftate muft be ^ ap 21
fupported in the extent it has acquired, and that
the fpirit of this (late will change in proportion as
it contracts or extends its limits.
CHAP. XXI.
Of the Empire of China.
BEFORE I finifh this book, I (hall anfwer
an objection that may be made to what has
been here advanced.
Our mifllonaries tell us that the vaft empire of
China has an admirable government, in which there
is a proper mixture of fear, honor, and virtue. Con-
fequently I muft have given an idle diftinction, in
eftablifhing the principles of the three governments.
But I cannot conceive what this honor can be
among people that will not do the lead thing with
out blows *.
Again, our mercantile people are far from giving us
any idea of that virtue fo much talked of by the mif-
fionaries , we need only confult them in relation to
the robberies and extortions of the Mandarines ( e ). ( e ) Among
Befides, Father Parenwit* letters concerning the other s D*
emperor s proceedings againft fome new converted i a *jjfn. s
princes of the blood ( f ) who had incurred his dif- ( f ) Of the
pleafure, plainly mew us a continued plan of tyran- g
ny, and inhuman injuries committed by rule, that ma,Edify-
is in cool blood. in g Lct ~
We have likewife Monfieur de Mairan s, and the collection,
fame Father Parennin s letters on the Government of
D
China. I find therefore that after fome pertinent
queftions and anfwers, the whole wonder vanimes.
* It is the cudgel that governs China, fays Father du Halde.
N 2 Might
i8o T H E S P I R I T
BOOK Mieht not our mifllonaries have been deceived
VIII
Chap. 21. ^7 an Appearance of order ? Might not they have
been ftruck with that continual exercife of a fmgle
perfon s will, an exercife by which they themfelves
are governed, and which they are fo pleafed to find
in the courts of the Indian princes becaufe as they
go thither only in order to introduce great changes,
it is much eafier to convince thofe princes that there
are no bounds to their power, than to perfuade the
people that there are none to their fubmifiion* ?
In fine, there is tY^vemly Ibme kind of truth
even in errors themfeh It may be owing to par
ticular, and p rluips very fingular circumilances,
that the Chinde government is not fo corrupt as one
might natui\il I y expect. The climate and Ibme other
phyfical c aufes may, in that country, have had fo
flrong an influence on the morals, as in fume mea-
fure to produce wonders.
The climate of China is furprizingly favourable
to the propagation of the human fpecies. The wo
men are the mod prolific in the whole world. The
mod barbarous tyranny can put no ftop to the pro-
grefs of propagation. The prince cannot lay there
like Pharaoh, Let us deal i. left tbey
nmlil" He would be rather reduced to Nero s
wifh, that mankind had all but one head. In fpite
of tyranny, China by the force of its climate will be
always pop , and will triumph over the tyran
nical oppreflbr.
China like all other countries, that live chiefly
upon rice, is fubject to frequent ianiir.. When
* See in Father Availed them
felves of the authority o; ndarines, who
cor arcd, t the laws of the country, no foreign
worCjip could be eliablifhcd in the empire.
the
O F L A W S. 181
the people are ready to ftarve with hunger, they B K
difpede in order ro feck for nourifhment; in con- chap. 21.
fequence of which, fmall gangs of robbers are formed
on all fides. Molt of them are extirpated in their
very infancy; others fwell, and are likewife fup-
prefled. And yet in fo great a number of fuch
diftant provinces, fome gang or other may happen
to meet with fuccels. In that cafe thfy maintain
their ground, ftrengthen their party, form them-
felves into a military body, march flraic up to the
capital, and their leader alcends the throne.
From the very nature of things, a bad admini-
ftration is here immediately punimed. The want
of fubfiftence in fo populous a country, produces
fudden dilbrders. 1 he reafun why the redrefs of
abufes is in other countries attended with fuch dif
ficulty, is becaufe their effects are not immediately
felt ; the prince is not informed in fo fudden and
fenfible a manner as in China.
The emperor of China is not taught like our
princes, that if he governs ill, he will be lefs happy
in the other life, lefs potent and lefs rich in this.
He knows that if his government is not good, he
will be ftript both of empire and lire.
As China grows every day more populous not-
withftanding the expofing of children, the inhabi
tants are inceiTantly employed in tilling the lands
for their fubfirtence. This requires a very ex
traordinary attention, in the government. It is
their perpetual concern that every body mould be
able to work without any apprehenfion of being
deprived of the fruits of his labour. Confequently
this is not fo much a civil as a domeftic government.
N 3 Such
oz inr^orirvii
3ooK Such has been the origin of thofe regulations
hap. 21. wmc h nave been fo greatly extolled. They wanted
to make the laws reign in conjunction with defpotic
power , but whatever is joined with the latter lofes
all its force. In vain did this arbitrary fway,
labouring under its own misfortunes, defire to be
fettered ; it armed itfelf with its chains, and is be
come ftill more terrible.
China is therefore a defpotic ftate, whofe princi
ple is fear. IVrhaps in the earlieft dynafties, when
the empire had not fo large an extent, the govern
ment might have deviated a little from this fpirit :
but the cafe at prefent is otherwife.
BOOK
O F L A W S. 183
BOOK IX.
Of Laws in the relation they bear to a
clef en five Force.
CHAP. I.
In what manner Republics provide for their Safety.
IF a republic is fmall, it is deftroyed by a foreign BOOK
force ; if it be large, it is ruined by an internal c , IX
imperfection *.
To this twofold inconvenience both Democracies
and Ariftocracies are equally liable, and that whe
ther they be good or bad. The evil is in the very
thing itfelf ; and no form can redrefs it.
It is therefore very probable that mankind would
have been at length obliged to live conftantly under
the government of a fingle perfon, had they not
contrived a kind of conftitution that has all the
internal advantages of a republican, together with
the external force of a monarchical, government.
I mean a confederate republic.
This form of government is a convention by
which feveral fmall dates agree to become members
of a larger one which they intend to form. It is
a kind of afiemblage of focieties, that conftitute a
new one, capable of increafing by means of new
afibciations, till they arrive to fuch a degree of power,
* Fato potentite, non fud <ui nix<e. Tacit.
N 4 as
BOOK as to be able to provide for the iecurity of the
Chap. i. united body.
It was thefe aflbciations that contributed fo long
to the profperity of Greece. By thefe the Romans
attacked the univci ic, and by thefe alone the univerfe
withflood them : for when Rome was arrived to
her higheft pitch of grandeur, it was the aflbcia
tions behind the Danube and the Rhine, aflbciations
formed by the terror of her arms, that enabled the
! . 11 b.i ruins to refill her.
1 lorn hence it proceeds that Holland, * Germany,
and the S\vils Cantons, are confidered in Europe as
perpetual republics.
The aflbciations of cities were formerly more
neceflary than in our times. A weak defencelefs
town was cxj-.ofed to greater dangers. By con-
queft it was deprived not only of the executive
and legiflative power, as at prefent, but moreover
of all human property -f~.
A republic of this kind able to withftand an ex
ternal force, may fupport itfelf without any inter
nal corruption ; the form of this fociety prevents
all manner of inconveniencies.
If a fin gle member fhould attempt to ufurp the
fupreme authority, he could not be fuppofed to have
an equal authority and credit in all the confederate
dates. Were he to have too great an influence over
^2
one, this would alarm the reft , were he to fubdue
a part, that which would ftill remain free, might
oppofe him with forces independent of thofe which he
* It is competed of about fifty different republics. State of
the United Provinces by M. Janiflbn.
f Civil liberty, goods, wives, children, temples, and even
burying places.
had
O F L A W S. 185
had ufurped, and overpower him before he could BOOK
be fettled in his ufurpation. CJia *
Should a popular infurrection happen in one of & z.
the confederate ftates, the others are able to quell
ic. Should abufes creep into one part, they are re
formed by thofe that remain found. The itate may
be deftroyed on one fide, and not on the other ;
the confederacy may be difiblved, and the confe
derates preferve their fovereignty.
As this government is compofed of petty repub
lics, it enjoys the internal happinefs of each , and
with refpect to its external fituation, it is pofieiTed
by means of the aflbciation, of all the advantages
of large monarchies.
CHAP. II.
That a confederate Government ought to be compcfcd of
ftates of the fame nature, efpecially of the republican
Kind.
T
H E Canaanitcs were deftroyed, by reafon
they were petty monarchies that had no uni
on nor confederacy for their common defence : And
indeed a confederacy is not agreeable to the nature
of petty monarchies.
As the confederate republic of Germany confifls
of free cities, and of petty ftates fubject to different
princes, experience mews us that it is much more
imperfect than that of Holland and Swiiferland.
The fpirit of monarchy is war and enlargement
of dominion : peace and moderation is the fpirit of
a republic. Thefe two kinds of government cannot
naturally fubfift in a confederate republic.
Thus
186 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK Thus we obferve in the Roman hiftory, that
Cha \ w ^ en tne Veientes had chofen a king, they were im
mediately abandoned by all the other petty repub
lics of Tufcany. Greece was undone as foon as the
kings of Macedon obtained a feat among the Am-
phiftyons.
The confederate republic of Germany, compofed
of princes and free towns, fubfifts by means of a
chief, who is in fome reipe<5ts the magiftrate of the
union, in others the monarch.
i
CHAP. III.
Other rcqiiifites in a confederate Republic.
N the republic of Holland one province cannot
conclude an alliance without the confent of the
others. This law, which is an excellent one and
even neceflary in a confederate republic, is wanting
in the Germanic conftitution, where it would pre
vent the misfortunes that may happen to the whole
confederacy, through the imprudence, ambition, or
avarice of a fmgle member. A republic united by
a political confederacy, has given itfelf intirely up,
and has nothing more to refign.
It is difficult for the united ftates, to be all of an
bo equal extent and power. The Lycian ( a ) republic
H- was an afibciation of twenty three towns ; the large
ones had three votes in the common council, the
middling ones two, and the fmall towns one. The
Dutch republic confifts of feven provinces, of differ
ent extent of territory, which have each one voice.
r v ) Srrabo The cities of Lycia ( b ) contributed to the expences
4- of the ftate, according to the proportion of fuf-
frages. The provinces of the united Netherlands
cannot
OF LAWS. 187
cannot follow this proportion , they fnuft be directed * c
by that of their power. Chap. "
In Lycla ( c ) the juJges and town magiftrates ( } Ibi
were elected by the common council, and according
to the propcrtion already mentioned. In the re
public of Holland they are not chofen by the com
mon council, but each town names its magiftrates.
Were I to give a model of an excellent confederate
republic, I mould pitch upon thatofLycia.
CHAP. IV.
In what manner defpotic Governments provide for their
ficurity.
AS republics provide for their iecurity by
uniting, defpotic governments do ic by fe-
parating, and by keeping themfelves, as it were,
fingle. They facrifice a part of the country, and
by ravaging and defolating the frontiers, they render
the heart of the empire inaccefilble.
It is a received axiom in geometry, that the
greater the extent of bodies, the more their circum
ference is relatively fmall. This practice therefore
of laying the frontiers wafte, is more tolerable in
large than in middling dates.
A defpotic government does all the mifchief to
itfelf that could be done by a cruel enemy, whofe
progrefs it could not refill.
It preferves itfelf likewife by another kind of
feparation, which is by putting the moft diftant pro
vinces into the hands of a feudatary prince. The
Mogul, the king of Perfia, and the emperors of
China have their feudataries , and the Turks have
found their account in putting the Tartars, the
Moldavians,
j88 T H L SPIRIT
BOOK Moldavians, the Walachians, and formerly the
Chap, c, Tranfilvanians between themfelves and their enemies.
&6.
CHAP. V.
In what manner a Monarchical Government provides
for its Security.
A Monarchy never deftroys itfelf like a defpo-
tic government. But a kingdom of a mo
derate extent is liable to fudden invafions : It mud
therefore have flrong holds to defend its frontiers ;
and troops to garrifon thofe holds. The leaft fpot
of ground is difputed with art, with courage, and
obllinacy. fXlpotic Rates make incurfions againft
one another ; it is monarchies only that wage war.
FortrelTes an- proper for monarchies ; defpotic
governments are afraid of them. They dare not in-
truft them to any body, for there is no one that has
a love for the prince or his government.
CHAP. VI.
Of the defenftve Force of States in general.
TO preferve a (late in its due force, it mull
have fuch an extent, as to admit of a pro
portion between the quicknefs with which it may be
invaded, and that with which it may render the in-
vafion abortive. As an invader may inftantly ap
pear on all fides, it is requifite that the flate mould
be able to make on all fides its defence -, confequently
it mould be of a moderate extent, proportioned to
the degree of velocity that nature has given to man
to enable him to move from one place to another.
3 France
O F L A W S. 189
France and Spain are exactly of a proper extent. Book
They have fo eafy a communication for their forces, Cha
as to be able to convey them immediately to what
part they have a mind , the armies unite and pafs
with rapidity from one frontier to another, without
any apprehenfion of fuch difficulties as require time
to remove.
It is extremely happy for France, that the capital
(lands nearer to the different frontiers in proportion
to their weaknefs , and the prince has a better view
of each part of his country in proportion as it is
more expofed.
But when a vaft empire, like Perfia, is attacked,
it is feveral months before the troops are able to af-
femble , and then they cannot make fuch forced
marches for that length of time, as they can for fif
teen days. If the army on the frontiers is beaten, it
is certainly difperfed, becaufe there is no neigh
bouring place of retreat. The vidtor, meeting
with no refiflance, advances with all expedition, fits
down before the capital and lays fiege to it, when
there is fcarce time enough to give notice to the
governors of the provinces to come to its relief.
Thofe who forefee an imminent revolution, haften
it by their difobedience. For men whole fide
lity is intirely owing to the proximity of punim-
ment, are eafily corrupted as foon as it becomes
diftant j their aim is their own private intereft.
The empire is fubverted, the capital taken, and the
conqueror difputes the feveral provinces with the
governors.
The real power of a prince does not confift fo
much in the facility he meets with in making con-
quefts, as in the difficulty an enemy finds in attack
ing
THE SPIRIT
BOOK i n g n i m? anc ^ if I may fo fpeak, in the immutabi-
Chap. 7. lity f h s condition. But the increafe of territory
obliges a government to expofe new fides by which
it may be ateacked.
As monarchs therefore ought to be endued with
wifdom in order to increafe, they ought likewife to
have an equal fhare of prudence to limit, their
power. Upon removing the inconveniencies of too
fmall a territory, they ought to have their eye con-
ftantly on the inconveniencies that attend its immo
derate enlargement.
CHAP. VII.
A Refeftion.
TH E enemies of a great prince, whole reign
was protracted to an unufual length, have
very often accufedhim, rather, I believe, from their
own fears, than upon any folid foundation, of hav
ing formed and carried on a project of univerfal
monarchy. Had he fucceeded, nothing would
have been more fatal to Europe, to his ancient fub
jects, tohimfelf, and to his famity. Heaven that
knows our true interefts, ferved him more by
defeats, than it could have done by victories. In-
ftead of making him the only fovereign in Europe,
it favoured him more by rendering him the moft
powerful.
The fubjects of this prince, who in foreign
countries are never affected but with what they have
j
forfaken ; who on leaving their own homes look up
on glory as a fovereign good, and in diftant coua-
tries as an obftacle to their return ; who difpleafe
you even by their good qualities, becaufe they feem
to
O F L A W S. 191
to be joined with an air of contempt ; who are capa- BOOK
ble of fupporting wounds, perils, and fatigues, but ch s.
not the lofs of their pleafures ; who love nothing fo
much as gaiety, and confole themfelves for the lofs
of a battle by finging a ballad on the general ;
thofe fubjects, I fay, would never have been able to
compafs an enterprize, fo as to render it impoffible
to be defeated in one country, without mifcarrying
in all the others , nor to mifcarry for a moment
without mifcarrying for ever.
CHAP. VIII.
A -particular Cafe in which the defen/ive Force of a
State is inferior to the offenfive.
IT was a faying of the lord of Coucy to king
Charles V. that the Englijh are never weaker^
nor eajier overcome than in their own country. The
fame was obferved of the Romans ; the fame of the
Carthaginians ; and the fame always will happen to
every power that fends armies to diftant countries,
in order to reunite by dint of difcipline and military
power, thofc who are divided among themfelves by
political or civil interefts. The ftate finds itfelf
weakened by the diforder that dill continues, and
more fo by the remedy.
The lord of Coucy s maxim is an exception to the
general rule, which difapproves of wars againft di
ftant countries. And this exception confirms like-
wife the rule, becaufe it takes place only in refpecl
to thofe by whom fuch wars are undertaken.
CHAP,
192 T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. IX.
Of the relative Force of States.
BOOK A L L grandeur, force, and power are relative.
/~\ Care therefore muft be taken that in endea-
Lnap. 9, ^ -^
& 10. vouring to increafe the real grandeur, the relative be
not diminifhed
Under the reign of Lewis XIV. France was at
its higheft pitch of relative grandeur. Germany
had not yet fuch great monarchs as it has fince pro
duced. Italy was in the fame cafe, England and
Scotland were not yet formed into one united king
dom. Arragon was not joined to CaftiJe i the di-
ftant parts of the Spanifh monarchy were weakened
by it, and weakened it in their turn , and Mufcovy
was as little known in Europe, as Crim Tartary.
CHAP. X.
Of the IVcaknefs of neighbouring States.
WHENSOEVER a (late lies contiguous
to another that happens to be in its decline,
the former ought to take particular care not to pre
cipitate the latter s ruin, becaufe this is the happieft
fituation imaginable ; nothing being fo convenient
for one prince as to be near another who receives
for him all the rebuffs and infults of fortune. And
it feldom happens that by fubduing fuch a flate, the
real power of the conqueror is as much increafed, as
the relative is diminifhed.
BOOK
OF LAWS. 193
$$$&&$&&$*$&$&&$<
BOOK X.
Of Laws in the Relation they hear to
offenfive Force.
JLJ +/
C II A P. I.
Of offenfive Force.
OFFENSIVE force is regulated by the COOK
law of nations, which is the political Jaw
of each country confidered in its relation to ever
other.
CHAP. II.
Of War.
THE life of governments is like that of man.
The latter has a right to kill in cafe of na
tural defence ; the former have a right to wage \
for their own prefervation.
In the cafe of natural defence I have a ris;nt to
o
kill, becaufe my life is in refpect to me, what the
life of my antagonift is to him : in the fame man
ner a ftate wages war, becaufe its prefervation is
like that of any other being.
Among citizens the right cf natural defence
not imply a neceffity of attacking. Inftead of at
tacking they need only have recourfe to proper tribu
nals. They cannot therefore exercife tl ht of
defence, but in fudden cafes, when immediate death
would be the confequence of waiting for the afTift-
VOL. I. O ance
194 I M
BOOK ance o f th e laws. But among focieties the right of
Y- O *
Cha 2 natura l Defence carries along with it fometimes the
& 3. neceflity of attacking-, as for inftance, when one na
tion fees that a longer peace will enable another to
deftroy her, and that to attack that nation inftantly
is the only way to prevent her own deft ruction.
From thence it follows, that fmall focieties have
oftener a right to declare war than great ones, be-
caufe they are oftener in the cafe of being afraid of
deftruction.
fPhe ii;;lit therefore of war is derived from ne
ceflity and lirict juftice. If thofe who direct the
confcience or councils of princes do not hold by this,
all is undone : when they proceed on arbitrary prin
ciples of glory, convcniency, and utility , torrents
of blood will overfpread the earth.
But above all, let them not avail themfelves of
any fuch idle plea as the glory of the prince : his
glory is nothing but pride j it is a pafTion and not
a legitimate right.
It is true the fame of his power might increafe
the ftrength of his government , but it might be
equally increafed by the reputation of his juftice.
CHAP. III.
i
Of the Rigbt of Conquejl.
FROM the right of war comes that of con-
queftj which is the confequence of that right,
and ought therefore to follow its fpirit.
The right the conqueror has over a conquered
people is directed by four forts of laws, the law of
nature which makes every thing tend to the prefer-
vation of the fpecies ; the law of natural reafon,
which
O F L A W S.
which teaches us to do to others what
have done to ourfelves ; the law that f
cal focieties, v/hofe duration e has not 1"
ed ; and in fine the law derived from th of
the thing itfelf. Conqueft is an acquifition , acqui-
fition carries with it the fpirit of prefervation and
ufe, and not of deftruclion.
A conquered nation is treated by the conqueror
one of the four following ways. Either he con
tinues to rule them according to their o\vn laws,
and aflumes to himfelf only the excrcife of the po
litical and civil government , or he gives them
new political and civil government , or he deftroys
and i die fociety, or in fine, he exterminates
the inhabitants.
The fir ft way is conform :o the law of nr:i-
ons now followed ; the fourth is more agreeable to
the law of nations followed by the Romans : in
fpect to which I leave the reader to judge how far
we have improved upon the ancients. We muft
due praife to our modern times, to our prefent r.
, to our religion, philofophy, and manners.
The authors of our public law, guided by an
cient hiftories, without confining; themfelves to c.
o
of drift necefiity, have fallen inco reat errc
They have adopted tyrannical and arbitrary prir.
, by >fmg the conquerors to be in-
i I know not what ri^-ht to kill-, from thence
o
they have drawn confequences
ry principle, and eftablifhed maxims \ con
querors themfelves, when pofieiTed of rhe le
of ienle, never prefumed to follow. It is a plain c
that when the conqueft is completed, the conq
has no longer a right to kill, becaufe he has no
O 2 longer
196 THE SPIRIT
B on K l on g er the plea of natural defence and felf-prefer-
3 . vation
\VhaL has led them into this miftake, is that
they imagined a conqueror had a right to deftroy
the focicty ; iiom whence they inferred, that he had
a right to dellruy the men that compofe it-, a wrong
coniec]ueme from a falle principle. For from the
dellruclion of the fociety it does not at all follow,
that the people who compofe it ought to be alfo
deilroyed. Society is the union of men, and not
the men themlelves , the citizen may perifh, and
the man remain.
From the right of killing in cafe of conquell, po-
liti. drawn that of reducing to (lavery ; a
nliv|ii< is ill grounded as the principle.
There is no UK h thing as a richt of reducing;
O <^J O
people to ilavery, hut when it becomes neceflary
for the prefer\ of the conquell. Prefervation,
hut IH rude, i: the end of conqueft; though
iri vitude may hajvpen lometimes to be a neceflary
means of j
J \en in that cafe it is contrary to the nature of
things that the llavcry mould be perpetual. The
people cnflaved ought to be rendered capable of
becoming fubjecls. Slavery in conquefts is an ac
cidental thing. \Vhen after the expiration of a
certain fpace of time alf the parts of the conquer
ing itate are connected with the conquered nation,
by cuitom, marriages, laws, alTociations, and by
a certain conformity of fpirit ; there ought to be an
end of the Oavery. For the rights of the conqueror
founded intirely on the want of thofe very
things, and on the eftrangement between the two
nations which prevents their confiding in each other.
A
O F L A W S. 197
A conqueror therefore who reduces the conquered B o o <
people to flavery, ought always to referve to him- chap! 3,
ielf the means (for means there are without num- & 4.
her) of reftoring them to their liberty.
Thefe are far from being; vas;ue and uncer-
o o
tain notions. Thus our anceftors acted, thole an
ceftors who conquered the Roman empi: The
laws they made in the heat of fire, action, impe-
tuofity, and the pride of victory, were afterwards
ibftened , thole laws were fevere, but they rendered
them impartial. The Burgundians, Goths, and
Lombards would always have the Romans continue
a conquered people , but the laws ot i
debald^ and Rotbaris, made the Romans and Bar
barians fellow-citizens ( q ). (<0 See the
Code of
CHAP. IV.
Some Advantages of a conquered Peof
INSTEAD of inferring fuch fatal confequcnces
from the right of conqueft, much better would
it have been for politicians to mention the advan
tages which this very right may fomettmes give to
a conquered people ; advantages which would be
more fenfibly, more univerfally felt, were our law
of nations exactly followed, and eftablillied over all
the earth.
Conquered countries are, generally fpeaking, de
generated from their original inftitution. Corrup
tion has crept in, the execution of the laws has
been neglected, and the government is grown op-
preffive. Who can queftion but fuch a (late would
be a gainer, and derive fome advantages from the
very conqueft itfelf, if it did not prove deftructive ?
O 3 When
ir/, T H E S P I R I T
r, o o x When a government is arrived to that degree of
corruption as to be incapable of reforming itfelf, it
would not lofe much by being new moulded. A
Miqueror that enters triumphant into a country,
wh i- the monicd men have by a thoufand wiles
and . cs inll-nfibly pracYifed innumerable wa.
h e the miserable people, who grie-\
to into laws, live under opprefTion,
and think they have no right to complain ; a con-
i)> , .i tuial change, and then
-inny will be the firil thing expofed
to Lib iury.
ii, for inftancc, countries opprefTed
b ; mers or tiu iv\ enues, and eaied afterwards
I-. i-. -, who 1 . ither the engagements
n< f the leguimak- prince. Even the
s hav, without any inter-
fition oi the conqueror.
onetimes the frugality of a conquering nation
h. .1 them to allow the conquered thofe ne-
.>, of which they had been deprived under a
Lwiul prir,
A conqueit may deftroy pernicious prejudices,
, if I may prefume to make ufe of the ex-
preflion, the nation under a better genius.
;iat good might not the Spaniards have done to
the Mexicans ? They had a mild religion to impart
u them? but they gave them a mad fuperitition.
They might have let ilaves at liberty ; they made
iree men ilaves. They might have undeceived them
with regard to the abufe of human facrifices , in-
ilead of that they deftroyed tliem. Never fhould
I have done, were I to recount all the good they
did not, and all the mifchief they did.
It
OF LAWS. 199
It is a conqueror s bufmefs to repair a part of BOOK
the mifchief he has committed. The right therefore chap." c,
of conqueft I define thus : a ncceiTary, lawful, and & 6.
unhappy right, which leaves always an immenfe
debt to difcharge in order to clear the obligations of
human nature.
CHAP. V.
Gekn King of Syracttfe.
TH E nobleft treaty of peace ever mentioned
in hiftory is, in my opinion, that which
Gelon made with the Carthaginians. 1 1<: infilled
upon their abolifhing the cuftom of facrificing their
children ( r ). Glorious indeed ! After having de- ( r ) See M.
feated three hundred thoufand Carthaginians, he re- Bar , h
TtlC S COi-
quired a condition that was advantageous only to
themfelves, or rather he ftipulated in favour of hu-
man nature.
CHAP. VI,
Of Conquejls made by a Republic.
IT is contrary to the nature of things, that in
a confederate government one ftate mould
make any conqueft over another, as in our days
we have feen in Swiflerland *. In mixt con
federate republics, where the aiTociation is between
fmall republics and fmall monarchies, this is not
fo abfurd.
Contrary it is alfo to the nature of things, that
a democratical republic mould conquer towns, which
cannot enter into the fphere of its democracy. It is
* With regard to Tockenburg.
O 4 necefTary
200 T H E S P I R I T
B oo K necefiary that the conquered people fhould be capa-
Chan/6. b\e of enjoying the privileges of fovereignty, as was
fettled in the very beginning among the Romans.
The conqueft ought to be limited to the number of
citizens fixt for the democracy.
If ;i democratical republic fubdues a nation in
oicler to govern them as fubjects, it expofes its own
lil city, bccaulc it intrufts too great a power to the
rs It in into the conquered provinces.
How great would have been the danger of the
republic of Carthage, had Hannibal made himfelf
rruifler of K)me ? What would he not have done
in his own country, had he been victorious, he who
> many revolutions after his defeat -j- ?
II anno could never have difTuaded the fen ate from
.ling fuccours to Hannibal, had he ufed no other
iimcnt than his own jealoufy. The Carthaginian
Icnatc, whofe wifdom is fo highly extolled by Ari-
ftotle (and which has been evidently proved by the
profperity of that republic) could never have been
determined by other than fenfible reafons. They
in i! ft have been flupid not to fee, that an army at the
: ance of three hundred leagues would necefiarily
:pofcd to lolTes that ought to be repaired.
Ilanno s party infifted that Hannibal mould be
Hvered up to the Romans*. They could not
at that time be afraid of the Romans , they were
therefore afraid of Hannibal.
It was impoffible, fome will fay, for them to ima
gine that Hannibal had been fo fuccefsful. But
how was it poflible for them to doubt of it ? Could
f He was at the head of a fe&ion.
* Han no wanted to deliver Hannibal up to the Romans, as
Cato wanted to deliver up Ccefar to the Gauls.
the
O F L A W S. 201
the Carthaginians, a people fpread all over the earth, E v K
be ignorant of what was tranfadting in Italy ? No : chnp""-,
they were fufficiently acquainted with it, and for & 8.
that reafon they did not care to fend fupplies to
Hannibal.
Hanno became more refolute after the battle of
Trebia, after the battle of Thrafimenus, after that
of Cannre ; it was not his incredulity that increafed,
b uthis fear,
CHAP. VII.
The fame Subjeft continued.
THERE is flill another inconveniency in
conquefts made by democracies : their
government is always odious to the conquered
flates. It is apparently monarchical : but in reality
it is much more oppreffive than monarchy, as the
experience of all ages and countries evinces.
The conquered people are in a melancholy fitu-
ation ; they neither enjoy the advantages of a re
public, nor thofe of a monarchy.
What has been here laid of a popular date, is
applicable to ariflocracy.
CHAP. VIII.
The fame Subjeft continued.
WH E N a republic therefore keeps another
nation in (objection, it mould endeavour
to repair the inconveniencies arifmg from the nature
of its fituation, by giving it good laws both for
the political and civil government of the people.
We
202 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK We have an inftancc of an ifland in the Medi-
y
Chin 8, terranean > fubject to an Italian republic ; whofe po-
& 9. Jitical and civil laws in refpect to the inhabitants of
that ifland were extremely defective. The act of
amnelty *, by which it ordained that no one fhould
be condemned to a bodily punifhment in confequence
of the private knowledge of the governor, r or-
mata coufdcyitia, is dill recent in every body s me
mory. There have been frequent inftarices of the
people s petitioning for privileges : here the fove-
rcign grants only the common right of all nations.
C II A P. IX.
Of Conquefts ;; y a MOIL
IV a rchy can lor a long time fubfift before
it its ii . it will become
iuniikLb c ; and its i\ .\ will remain intire,
\vh nt up by tl :ring monarch
It it not thei to aim at conquefts be
yond the natural limits of its :nment. As
f on as it has pafltd , it is prudence to
flop.
In t! nd of muft be left as
tl .cy were found ; the fame courts of judicature,
t ie f..me laws, the fame cufionu, the fame privi-
li : to be no o; .iteration than
that of the army and of the name of the fovereign.
cWr- . e in dctta i.
; : re in a >er-
1 cnsi arreliare ed
ir, i .icchcgli , o di renderne
;io foil . 6. the Amflerdam
Li
When
OF LA W S. 203
When a monarchy has extended its limits by the BOOK
conqueft of fomc neighbouring provinces, it fhould ch an "
it thofe provinces with great lenity. & to.
If a monarchy has bjjn a long while endeavour
ing at cbnquefts, the provinces of its ancient de-
mefne are generally ill -u fed. They are obliged to
fubmit both to the new and to the ancient abufes ;
and to be depopulated by a vaft metropolis that
fwallows up the whole. Now if after having
made conquefts round this demefne, the conquered
people were treated like the ancient fubjects, the
Hate would be undone , the taxes fent by the con
quered provinces to the c .1 would never return;
the inhabitants of the frontiers would be ruined,
and confequencly the frontiers would b cer -,
the people would be difa: 1 , and the fubfiftence
of the armies defigned to acl: and remain there,
would become more precarious.
Such is the necellary (late of a conquering
monarchy -, a mocking luxury in the capital -, miiery
in the provinces fomewhat diitant , and plenty in
the moft remote. It is the fame with fuch a monar
chy as with our planet ; fire at the center, verdure
on the fill-face, and between both a dry, cold, and
.u land.
CHAP. X.
Of o. -iliies arii. .
OMETIMES one monarchy fubdues ano
ther. The fmaller the latter, the better it is
checked by fortrelTes ; and the larger it is, the
better it is preferved by colonies.
C H A P.
204 T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. XI.
Of the Manners of a conquered People.
BOOK ~TT T is not fufficient in thofe conquefts to let the
Fha 1 1 A conquered nation enjoy their own laws \ it is
& 12. perhaps more neceflary to leave them alfo their
manners, becaufe people generally know, love, and
defend their manners better than their laws.
The French have been driven nine times out of
.luf- Italy, becaufe, as hillorinn :; fay ( c ), of their infolent
familiarities with the i I: is too much for
rial . ill- i -11
Iliilory. ;1 I -ition to be obliged <r not only with the
of conquerors, but vviih their incontinence
and indifcretion -, the; , v/itUcut doubt, moil
OUS and int i they are t>j fource of
infinite out,
F
c ii A r. xn.
Of n 1 ts.
A R am I from thinking that a good law
which Cyrus to oblige the Lydians to
{ r.iclife none but meaner inlamous profelfions. It
is true, he directed his attention to what was of the
greateft impotence , he thought of revolts, and
not of invafions : but invafions will foon conie -, for
the Perfians and Lydians unite and corrupt each
other. I would therefore much rather fupport by
laws the f implicit} 7 and rudenefs ot the conquering
naiion, than the effeminacy of the conquered.
( d ) Dionyf. Ariftodemus, tyrant of Cums ( d ), ufed all his
]];,licar. endeavours to baniOi courao;e and to enervate the
I _ O
minds of youth. He ordered that boys mould let
their
O F L A W S. 205
their hair grow in the lame manner as girls , that BOOK
they mould deck it with flowers, and wear long chap . 12,
robes of different colours down to their heels , that & 13-
when they went to their matters of mufic and
dancing, they fhould have women with them to
carry their umbrello s, perfumes, and fans, and to
prefent them with combs and looking glaifes when
ever they bathed. This education lafted till the age
of twenty ; an education that could be agreeable to
none but a petty tyrant, who expofes his fove-
reignty to defend his life.
C II A P. XIII.
ALEXANDER.
ALEXANDER made a furprizing con-
queit. Let us fee how it was conducted ;
and fmce enough has been faid by other writers of
his valour, let us mention fomething concerning his
prudence.
The meafures he took were juft. He did not fet
out till he had compleated the reduction of Greece ;
he availed himfelf of this reduction for no other end
than for the execution of his enterprize , and he left
nothing, by which he could be annoyed, behind him.
He began his attack againfl the maritime provinces ;
he made his land forces keep clofe to the lea coall
that they might not be feparated from his fleet , he
made an admirable ufe of difcipline againft num
bers ; he never wanted provifions ; and if it be true
that victory gave him every thing, he, in his turn,
did every thing to obtain it.
In this manner he carried on his conquefts ; let us
now fee how he preferved them.
He
206 T H E S P I R I T
B oo K j-j e opp O f e( ] thole who would have had him treat
p / I3 the Greeks a.s matters ( h ), and the Perfians as
( ) This flaves. He thought only of uniting: the two nations,
A * f ^~^ ^^
code ad- anc ^ ^ a ^^^ n @ tne diftinctions of a conquering
vice. Plu- and a conquered people. After he had compleated
tardi s n j s victories, he relinquished all thofe prejudices
Morals, or , , , , . , . . , . "L
the- for- taat nad helped him to obtain them. He aflumed
tune and the manners of the Perfians. that he mi^ht not
" f ^^
^[ e afflidt them too much by obliging them to conform
to thofe of the Greeks. It was this humanity which
made him fhew fo great a rcfpccl for the wife and
mother of Darius ^ this that made him fo continent;
this that caufcd hir, h to be fo much lamented
thTlBur- ^ t ^ lc ^ t ! " iann - Whu * conqueror ! he is lament
ed by all the na.ions he has fubdued ! What an
tit. 12. ufurper ! at his de;uh the very family he has caft
,;,,. trnm the throne, is all in tears. Thefe were the
of tin- moft glorious pafia^cs in his life, and fuch as hif-
,
tory cannot produce an inftance in any other con-
>r.
whu-h nit- Nothing confoliclates more a conqueft than the
union formed between the two nations by marriages.
law that Alexander chofe his wives from the nation he had
iubdued : he in on his courtiers doing the
.ud, it
lie ; and the reft of t ;cedonians followed the
.imple. The Franks and Burgundians permitted
enCi
nations thofe marriages ( d ) ; the Vifigoths forbad them in
than to Spain and afterwards allowed them ( e ). By the
L C"
that p Lombards they were not only allowed but encou-
rnged ( ). When the Romans wanted to weaken
Macedonia, they ordained that there fhould be no
( f ) See the . , , . r ,..
law of the intermarriages between the people or different pro-
Lombards vinces.
book 2.
tit. 7 . i.
& 2. Alexander,
OF LAWS.
207
Alexander, whole aim was to unite the two nati- B o o i;
\"
ons, thought fit to eftabliih in Perfia a great num- pi
x^ i. tip. 1 ,
ber of Greek colonies. He built therefore a vaft & 14.
multitude of towns , and fo ftrongly were all the
parts of this new empire cemented, that after his
deceafe, amidft the trouble and ccnfufion of the
mod frightful civil wars, when the Greeks had re
duced themfelves, as it were, to a ftate of annihila
tion, not a fingle Province of Perfia revolted.
To prevent Greece and Macedon from being too
much exhaufted, he fent a colony of Jews to Alex
andria ; the manners of thofe people fignified no
thing to him, provided he could be lure of their li-
delity.
The kings of Syria, abandoning the plan laid
down by the founder of the empire, refolved to
oblige the Jews to conform to the manners of the
Greeks ; a refolution that gave the moft terrible
fhocks to their government.
CHAP. XIV.
CHARLES XII.
^ H I S prince, who depended intirely on his
flrength, haftened 1.1= ruin by forming
defign: could never be executed but by a long
war ; a thing which his kingdom was unable to
fupport.
It was not a declining ftate he undertook to fub-
vert, but a rifing empire. The Ruffians made ufc
of the war he waged againft them, as of a military
fchool. Every defeat brought them nearer to vic
tory ; and lofing abroad, they learnt to deiend them
felves at home.
Charles
2o3 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK Charles in the deferts of Poland imagined himfelf
Y
r . , mailer of the univerfe : here he wandered, and with
Lnap. 14.
him in fome mcafure wandered Sweden ; whilft his
capital enemy acquired new ftrength againft him,
locked him up, made fettlcmcnts along the Baltic,
deftroyed or iubdued Livonia.
Sweden was like a river whofe waters are cut off
at the fountain head in order to change its courfe.
It was not the affair of/ a that ruined Charles.
Had he not been deftroyed at that place, he would
in another. The cafualties of fortune are eafily re
paired , but \\ho can be guarded againft events that
incefiantly arife from the nature oi things ?
Rut neither nature nor fortune were ever fo much
again it him, as he himfelf.
1 Ie was not c!i retted by the actual fituation of
things, but by a kind of model he had formed to
himfelf i and even this he followed very ill. He
was not an Alexander , but he would have been
Alexander s belt foldier.
Alexander s project fucceeded becaufe it was pru
dently concerted. The bad fuccefs of the Perfians
in their feveral invafions of Greece, the conquefts of
Agefilaus and the retreat of the ten thoufand had
fhewn to demonftration the fuperiority of the Greeks
in their manner of fighting and in the arms they
made ule of ; and it was well known that the Perfi
ans were too proud to be corrected.
It was no longer poffible for them to weaken
Greece by divifions : Greece was then united under
one head, who could not pitch upon a better me
thod of renderivg her infenfible of her fervitude,
than by flattering her vanity with the deftruction of
her hereditary enemy, and with the hopes of the
conqueft of Afia. An
O F L A W S.
An empire cultivated by the mod induftrious na
tion in the world, that tilled the lands through a <-
principle of religion, an empire abounding with & 15.
every conveniency of life, furnifhed the enemy with
all neceffary means of fubfifting.
It was eafy to judge by the pride of thofe kings,
who in vain were mortified by their numerous de-r
feats, that they would precipitate their ruin by be~
ing fo forward to venture battles ; and to imagine
that flattery would never permit them to doubt of
their grandeur.
The project was not only wife, but wifely etf-
ecuted. Alexander in the rapidity of his con-
quefts, even in the fire of his pafiions, had, if I
may prefume to ufe the exprefiion, a flafh of reafon
by which he was directed, and which thofe who
wanted to make a romance of his hiftory, and whole
minds were more debauched than his, could not con-
ceaj from pofterity.
CHAP. XV.
New Methods of preferring a Conqueft.
WH E N a monarch has conquered a large
country, he may make ufe of an admira
ble method, equajly propef for moderating defpotic
power, and for preferving the conqueft ; it is a
method practifed by the emperors of China.
In order to prevent the conquered nation from
falling into defpair, the conquerors from growing
infolent and proud, the government from becoming
military, and to contain the t\vo nations within
duty ; the Tartar family now on the throne of
China, has ordained that every military corps in the
VOL. I. P provinces
210 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK provinces fhould be compofed half of Chinefe and
half of Tartars, to the end that the jealoufy be-
Lha P- ! 5 , i i i
& 1 6. tween the two nations may keep them within bounds.
The courts of judicature are likewife half Chinefe,
and half Tartars. This is productive of feveral
good effects, i. The two nations keep one another
in awe. 2. They both preferve the civil and mili
tary power, and one is not deftroyed by the other.
3. The conquering nation may fpread itfelf without
being weakened and loft. It is likewife enabled to
refift civil and foreign wars. The want of fo wife
an inftitution as this, has been the ruin of almoft
all the conquerors that have exifted.
C II A P. XVI.
Of ConqueJIs made by a defyotic Prince.
WII E N a conqueft happens to be vaftly
large, it fuppofes a defpotic power : and
then the army difperfed in the provinces is not fuf-
ficient. There fliould be always a trufty body of
troops around the prince, ready to fall inflantly up
on any part of the empire that might chance to wa
ver. This military corps ought to awe the reft,
and to ftrike terror into thofe who through neceflity
have been intrufled with any authority in the em
pire. The empire of China has always a large bo
dy of Tartars near his perfon, ready upon all occa-
fions. In India, in Turky, in Japan, the prince
has always a body-guard, independent of the other
regular forces. This particular corps keeps the dif
perfed troops in awe.
CHAP.
O P L A W S. 211
CHAP. XVII.
Tbt fame SuljeR continued.
WE have obfcrved that the countries fubdued B *
by a defpotic monarch, ought to be feo- chap. 17.
dary. Hiltorians exhaufl themfclves in extolling
the generofity of thoie conquerors who reftored to
the throne the princes they had vanquifhed. Ex
tremely generous then were the Romans, who made
kings in all parts, in order to have inllruments or
flavery -f. A proceeding of that kind is abfolutely
neceflary. If the conqueror intends to prefrrve the
conquered country, neither the governors he fends
will be able to contain the fubjecls within duty, nor
he himfelf the governors. He will be obliged to
ftrip his ancient patrimony of troops, in order to ie-
cure the new. All the miferies of the two nations
will be common ; the civil war of one will com
municate itfelf to the other. On the contrary if the
conqueror reftores the legitimate prince to the
throne ; he will have a necefifary ally, by the junc
tion of \vhofe forces, his own will be augmented.
We have a recent inflance of what has been here
faid in Shah Nadir, who conquered the Mogul,
feized his treafures, and left him the poileffion c-t
Indoflan.
t Uc haberent inftrumenta (er. . \: :~ i-
P 2 BOOK
212 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK XI.
Of the Laws that form political Liberty^
with regard to the Conftitution.
CHAP. I.
A general IDEA.
BOOK TT Make a diftindtion between the laws that form
XI
Chan i A poetical liberty with regard to the conftitution,
and thofe by which it is formed in refpect to the
citizen. The former mall be the fubject of this
book j the latter I mall examine in the next.
CHAP. II.
Different Significations given to the word Liberty.
THERE is no word that has admitted of
more various fignifications, and has made
more different imprefiions on human minds, than
that of Liberty. Some have taken it for a facility
of depofmg a perfon on whom they had conferred
a tyrannical authority ; others for the power of
chufing a perfon whom they are obliged to obey ;
others for the right of bearing arms, and of being
thereby enabled to life violence , others in fine for
the privilege of being governed by a native of their
own country or by their own laws f . A certain
f I have copied, fays Cicero, Scevola s edict, \vhich permits
the Greeks to terminate their differences among themfelves ac
cording to their c\vn laws ; this makes diem confider themfelves
as a free people.
nation
OF LAWS. 213
nation, for a long time thought liberty confided in * K
the privilege of wearing a long beard *. Some have Chap. 2,
annexed this name to one form of government, in & 3.
exclufion of others : Thofe who had a republican
tafte, applied it to this government ; thofe who liked
a monarchical ftate, gave it to monarchies . Thus
they all have applied the name of liberty to the go
vernment moft conformable to their own cuftoms
and inclinations : and as in a republic people have
not fo conftant and fo prefent a view of the in-
jftruments of the evils they complain of, and like-
wife as the laws feem there to fpeak more, and the
executors of the laws lefs, it is generally attributed
to republics, and denied to monarchies. In fine
as in democracies the people feem to do very near
whatever they pleafe, liberty has been placed in this
fort of government, and the power of the people has
been confounded with their liberty.
CHAP. III.
In what Liberty con/ifts.
IT is true that in democracies the people feem
to do what they pleafe ; but political liberty
does not confift in an unreftrained freedom. In go
vernments, that is, in focieties directed by laws,
liberty can confift only in the power of doing what
we ought to will, and in not being conflrained to
do what we ought not to will.
We muft have continually prefent to our minds
the difference between independence and liberty.
* The Ruffians could not bear that the Czar Peter mould make
them cut it off.
The Cappadocians refufed the condition of a republican
ftate, which was offered them by the Romans.
* P 3 Liberty
214 ^P
BOOK Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws per-
Chan mit > ant ^ ^ a ciri 2 ^ could do what they for-
& 5. bid, he would no longer be poficft of liberty, be-
caufe all his fellow citizens would have the fame
power.
C II A P. IV.
I).. JOntDll.
D;ic and aiitlocratic Hates are not
neceflanly free. Political liberty is to be met
with only in moderate governments : yet even in
thcfc it is not always met with. It is there only
when there is no abufe of power: but conilant ex-
p. rimoj mews us, that every man inverted with
powci is ;ipi to al uk- it ; he pufhes on till he comes
to the utmoit limit. Is it not itrange, though true,
to fay, that virtue itfdf has need of limits ?
lo prevent the abufc of power, it is neceflary
that by the very difpofition o[ things power mould
be a check to power. A government may be fo
conflituted, as no man fliall be compelled to do
things to which the law does not oblige him, nor
forced to abftain from things which the law per
mits.
C II A P. V.
Of tic end or of different
CHOUGH all governments have the fame ge
neral end, which is that of prefervation, yet
each has another particular view. Increafe of domi
nion was the view of Rome; war, of Spajta; religion,
of the Jewifh laws , commerce, that of Marfeilles ;
public
OF LAWS. 215
public tranquillity, that of the laws of China -f"> B , *
navigation, of the laws of Rhodes , natural liberty,
that of the policy of the favages ; in general the
pleafures of the prince, that of defpotic /laces , that
of monarchies, the prince s and the kingdom s
glory : the independence of individuals is the end
aimed at by the laws of Poland, and from thence
refults the oppreffion of the whole *.
One nation there is alfo in the world, that has for
the direct end of its conftitution political liberty.
We mail examine prefently the principles on which
this liberty is founded : if they are found, liberty
will appear as in a mirror.
Todifcover political liberty in a conftitution, no
great labour is requifue. If we are capable of feeing
it where it exifts, why mould we go any further in
irch of it ?
CHAP. VI.
Of the Conflitution of England.
IN every government there are three forts of
power : the legiflative , the executive in rdpect
to things dependent on the law of nations ; and the
executive, in regard to things that depend on the
civil law.
By virtue of the firft, the prince or magiflrate en-
_:s temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or
abrogates thofe that have been already enacted. By
the fecond, he makes peace or war, fends or re
ceives embattles, eftablifhes the public fecurity, and
f The natural end of a ftate that has no foreign enemies, or
that thinks itfelf fecurcd againft them by barriers.
* Inconveniency of the Liberum veto.
L 4 provides
c a r i n i i
BOOK provides againft invafions. By the third, he pu-
Qup 6. n i mes criminals, or determines the difputes that arife
between individuals. The latter we (hall call the
judiciary power, and the other fimply the executive
power of the ftate.
The political liberty of the fubject is a tranquillity
of mind, arifing from the opinion each perfon has
Of his fafety. In order to have tiiis liberty, it is re-
quifitt* the government be fo constituted as one man
need not be afraid of another.
When the legiflative and executive powers are
United in the fame perfon , or in the fame body of
magiftrates, there can be no liberty ; becaufe ap-
prehenfions may arife, left the fame monarch or
fen ate mould enacl tyrannical laws, to execute them
in a tyrannical manner.
;ain, there is no liberty, if the power of judging
be not feparated from the legiflative and executive
powers. Were it joined with the legiflative, the
life and liberty of the fubject would be expofed to
arbitrary controul ; for the judge would be then the
legiilator. Were it joined to the executive power,
the judge might behave with all the violence of an
opprefibr.
There would be an end of every thing, were
the fame man, or the fame body whether of the no
bles or ot the people, to exercife thofe three powers,
that of enading laws, that of executing the public
refolutions, and that of judging the crimes or dif
ferences of individuals.
Molt kingdoms of Europe enjoy a moderate go
vernment, becaufe the prince who is in veiled with
the two firft powers, leaves the third to his fubjects.
In Turky, where thefe three powers are united in
the
O F L A W S. 217
the Sultan s perfon, the fubjects groan under the BOOK
weight of a moft frightful opprefiiom ^ "^
In the republics of Italy where thefe three powers
are united, there is lefs liberty than in our monarchies*
Hence their government is obliged to have recourfe
to as violent methods for its fupport, as even that
of the Turks ; witnefs the ftate inquifitors *, and
the lion s mouth into which every informer may at
all hours throw his written accufations.
What a fituation muft the poor fubject be in, un
der thofe republics ! The fame body of magiflrates
are pofiefled, as executors of the laws, of the whole
power they have given themfelves in quality of
legiflators. They may plunder the ftate by their
general determinations; and as they have likewife
the judiciary power in their hands, every private
citizen may be ruined by their particular decifions.
The whole power is here united in one body, and
though there is no external pomp that indicates a
defpotic fway> yet the people feel the effects of it
every moment,
Hence it is that many of the princes of Europe,
whofe aim has been levelled at arbitrary power,
have conftantly fet out with uniting in their own
perfons, all the branches of magiftracy, and all the
great offices of ftate.
I allow indeed that the mere hereditary arifto-
cracy of the Italian republics, does not anfwer
exactly to the defpotic power of the Eaftern princes.
The number of mamftrates fometimes foftens the
^j
power of the magiftracy ; the whole body of the
nobles do not always concur in the fame defigns ,
and different tribunals are erected, that temper each
* At Venice*
other*
218 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK other. Thus at Venice the leeiflative power is in
,\ 6 the council, the executive in the pregadi, and the
judiciary in the quarantia* But the miichief is that
thcfe different tribunals are compoled of magiftrates
all belonging ro the lame body -, which conftitutes
i^ne and the Tame power.
! ^ ju< ht not to be given to a
t ll^ov.ld be excrcifed by perfons
ken t P m the body of the people-}-, at certain
rir purfuant to :i for 1 man
ner pn v, in Order to ercft a tri^
-aid laft only as long as neccifity requires.
Hy this rrv j^ower of judging, a power
;ble ro mankind, not being annexed to any par-
pro fefiion, becomes, as it were, in-
fible. PC A r e not then the judges continual
dent to th H- viuw ; they fear the office, but P.
the magirtrate.
In accufations of a deep or criminal natir
r the }">erfon accuied flioukl have the privilege
ofchufing in fome meaftire his judges in concurrence
with the law ; or at leaft he ihould have a right to
except aga mft ib great a number, thar the remain
ing part may be deemed his own choic
The other two powers may be given rather to
magiftrates or permanent bodies, becaule they
ifrd on any private fubjecli one beint:
re than the general \vill of the ftate, and th:
her the execution of that general will.
But though the tribunals ought not to be fixt, yet
the judgments ought, and to fuch a degree as to be
always conformable to the exact letter of the 1
Were they to be the private opinion of the jur,
f As at Athens.
j people
OF LAWS. 219
people would then live in focicty without knowing B o o K
exactly the obligations it lays them under. ch 6
The judges ought likewife to be in the fame fta-
tion as the accufed, or in other words, his peers,
to the end that he may not imagine he is fallen into
the hands of perfons inclined to treat him with rigour.
If the legiflature leaves the executive power in
pofleffion of a right to imprilbn thofe fubjetfts who
can give iecurity for their good behaviour, there is
an end of liberty ; unlefs they are taken up, in order
to anfwer without delay to a capital crime ; in
this cafe they are really free, being iubject only to
the power of the law.
But fhouM the legiflature thuik itfclf in danger by
fome fecrct confpiracy againll the itate, or by a
correfpondence with a foreign enemy, it might au
thorize the executive power, for a fhort and limited
time, to imprifon fufpected perfons, who in that
cafe would lofe their liberty only for a while, to
preferve it for ever.
And this is the only reafonable method, that can
be fubftituted to the tyrannical magistracy of the
Epborii and to the flate ivquijtimrs of Venice, who
are alfo defpotical.
As in a free ftate, every man who is fuppofed a free
agent, ought to be his own governor , ib the legifla-
tive power fhould refide in the whole body of the
people. But fince this is impoflible in large ftates,
and in fmali ones is fubject to many inconvenien-
cies i it is fit the people fhould acl: by their repre-
fentativcs, what they cannot acl by themfelves.
The inhabirants of a particular town are much
better acquainted with its wants and interefts, than
::h thofe of other places ; and are better judges
of
sao
T H E S P I R I T
B o K of the capacity of their neighbours, than of that
Q 6 f ^ le re ^- f ^ eir countr yrrten. The members
therefore of the legiflature Ihonld not be chofen
from the general body of the nation ; but it is pro
per that in every confiderable place, a reprefentative
fhouM be elected by the inhabitants.
The great advantage of reprefentatives is their
I -, ii"; capable of difcuffing affairs. For this the
j < collectively are extremely unfit, which is one
oi tlr itefl inconveniencies of a democracy.
It is not at all neceflary that the reprefentatives
o have received a general inftruction from their
electors, fhould wait to be particularly inftructed
flair, as is practifed in the diets of Ger
many. True it is that by this way of proceeding,
the fpecchcs oi the deputies might with greater pro
priety be called the voice of the nation : but on
the other hand this would throw them into infinite
delays, would give each deputy a power of con
trolling the aflcmbly , and on the moil urgent and
pro fling occafions the fprings of the nation might
be flopped by a fingle caprice.
When the deputies, as Mr. Sidney well obferves,
rcprefent a body of people, as in Holland, they
ought to be accountable to their conftituents : but
it is a different thing in England, where they arc
deputed by boroughs.
All the inhabitants of the feveral diftricts ought to
have a right of voting at the election of a reprefen
tative, except fuch as are in fo mean a fituation, as
to be deemed to have no will of their own.
One great fault there was in moft of the ancient
republics ; that the people had a right to active refo-
iutions. fuch as require fome execution, a thing of
which
O F L A W S. 221
which they arc abfolutely incapable. They ought Boo*
to have no hand in the government but for the "
chufing of reprefentatives, which is within their
reach. For though few can tell the exact degree
of mens capacities, yet there are none but are
capable of knowing in general whether the perfon
they chufe is better qualified than mod of h
neighbours.
Neither ought the reprefenrative body to be chofcn
for active refolutions, for which it is not fo fit ; but
for the enacting of laws, or to fee whether the laws
already enacted be duly executed, a thing they are
very capable of, and which none indeed but them-
felves can properly perform.
In a (late there are always perfons diftinguimed
by their birth, riches, or honors : but were they to
be confounded with the common people, and to have
only the weight of a fmgle vote like the reft, the
common liberty would be their flavery, and they
would have no intereft in fupporting it, as moft of
the popular refolutions would be againft them. The
mare they have therefore in the legiflature ought to
be proportioned to the other advantages they have
in the ftate ; which happens only when they form a
body that has a right to put a flop to the enter-
prizes of the people, as the people have a right to
oppofe any encroachment of theirs.
The legiflative power is therefore committed to
the body of the nobles, and to the body chofen to
reprefent the people, which have each their afiem-
blies and deliberations apart, each their feparau
view and interefts.
Of the three powers above-mentioned the
judiciary is in fome meafure next to nothing.
There
222 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK There remains therefore only two ; and as thefc
Chap. *. have neec * f a rcgukting power to temper
them, the part of the legislative body compofed
of the nobility, is extremely proper for this very
purpofc.
The body of the nobility ought to be hereditary.
In the iirft place it is fo in its own nature ; and in
the next there muft be a confiderable interefh to pre-
ferve its privileges , privileges that in themfelvcs
are obnoxious to popular envy, and of courfe in a
free (late are always in danger.
Hut as an hereditary power might be tempted to
purfue its own particular intcrefts, and forget thofe
of the people , it is proper that where they may reap
a fingular advantage from being corrupted, as in the
laws relating to the fupplies, they fhould have no
other fhare in the legiflatton, than the power of
rejecting, and not that of refolving.
By the power cf refohing y I mean the right of
ordaining by their own authority, or of amending
what has been ordained by others. By the power cf
rejeRing, I would be underftood to mean the right
. annulling a refolution taken by another ; which
as the power of the tribunes at Rome. And though
the perfon poflefTed of the privilege of rejecting may
likewife have the right of approving, yet this appro
bation pafles for no more than a declaration, that
he intends to make no ufe of his privilege of reject
ing, and is derived from that very privilege.
The executive power ought to be in the hands
of a monarch ; becaufc this branch of govern
ment, which has always need of expedition, is bet
ter adminiftercd by one than by many : whereas,
whatever depends on rhe Irgiflarive power, is of
ten-
O F L A W S. 223
tentimes better regulated by many than by a Tingle BOOK
perfon. cil ^
But if there was no monarch, and the executive
power was committed to a certain number of per-
fons felected from the legiilative body, there would
be an end then of liberty ; by reafon the two
powers would be united, as the fame perfons wotiJd
actually ibmetimes have, and would moreover be
always able to have, a fhare in both.
Were the legislative body to be a confiderablc
time without meeting, this would likewife put an
end to liberty. For of two things one would, ixa-
turally follow -, either that there would be no longer
any legislative refolution^, and then the (late would
fall into anarchy ; or that thefe reiblutions would
be taken by the executive power which would ren
der it abfolute.
It would be needlefs for the legiQative body to
continue always afiembled. This would be trouble-
fome to the reprefentatives, and moreover would cut
out too much work for the executive power, fo as
to take off its attention from executing, and oblige
it to think only of defending its own prerogatives
and the right it has to execute.
Again, were the legiflative body to be alwa-
aflembled, it might happen to be kept up only
by filling the places of the decealed members
with new reprefentatives; and in that cafe, if the le
giflative body was once corrupted, the evil would
be paft all remedy. When different legiflative bo
dies fucceed one another, the people who have a
bad opinion of that which is actually fitting, may
reasonably entertain fome hopes of the next : but
were i: to be always the fame body, ths people
upon
224 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK upon fee!ng it once corrupted, would no longer ex-
Chap 6 P e( -t anv gd from its laws ; and of courfe they
would either become defperate or fall into a (late
of indolence.
The legislative body fhould not afiemble of it-
felf. For a body is fuppofed to have no will but
when it is afiembled ; and befides were it not
to aflemble unanimoufly, it would be impofiible
to determine which was really the legiflative body,
the part aflembled, or the other. And if it had a
right to prorogue itfelf, it might happen never to
be prorogued ; which would be extremely dan
gerous in cafe it mould ever attempt to incroach
on the executive power. Befides there are feafons,
fome of which are more proper than others, for af-
fembling the legiflative body : it is fit therefore that
the executive power fhould regulate the time of con
vening as well as the duration of thofe aflemblies,
according to the circumflances and exigencies of
flate known to itfelf.
Were the executive power not to have a right of
putting a flop to the encroachments of the legiflative
body, the latter would become defporic ; for as it
might arrogate to itfelf what authority it pleafed, it
would foon deflroy all the other powers.
But it is not proper on the other hand that the
iegiflative power fhould have a right to flop the ex
ecutive. For as the execution has its natural limits,
it is uftlefs to confine it ; befides the executive
power is generally employed in momentary operati
ons. The power therefore of the Roman tribunes
was faulty, as it put a flop not only to the legifla-
tion, but likewife to the execution itfelf; which was
attended with infinite mifchiefs.
But
OF LAWS. 225
But if the legislative power in a free government ? n K
has no right to ftay the executive, it has a right
and ought: to have the means of examining in what
manner its laws have been executed , an advantage
which this government has over that of Crete and
O
Sparta, where the Cofmi and the F.phuri gave no
account ot their ad mi nift ration.
But whatever may be the iffue of that exami
nation, the legifiative body ought not to have a
po .ver of judging the perfon, nor ot courfe the con-
duel of him who is intruded with the executive
power. His peribn mould be facred, becaufe as it
is neceffary tor the g:>u;l of the llate to prevent the
legifiative body from rendering themfelves arbitrary,
the moment he is accufed or tried, there is an end
of liberty.
In this cafe the date would be no longer a mo
narchy, but a kind of republican, though not a free,
government. But as the perfon intruded with the
executive power cannot abufe it without bad coun-
fellors, and fuch as hate the laws as minifters, though
the laws favour them as fubjects ; thefe men may
be examined and punifhed. An advantage which
this government has over that of Gnidus, where
the law allowed of no fuch thing as calling the
Amy/nones * to an account, even atter their admini-
ftration -f ; and therefore the people could never
obtain any fatisfaclion for the injuries done them.
Though in general the judiciary power ought
not to be united with any part of the legifiative, yet
* Thefe were magiitrates chofen annually by the people. See
Stephen of Byzantium.
f It was lawful to accufe the Roman magiurates after tfce ex
piration of their feveral orEces. See in Dionyf. Halicarn. 1. 9. the
affair of Genat;us the tribune.
VOL. I. C this
226 T H E S P I R I T
B Vr K t ^ l s * s l a ^ e to t ^ ree exce ptions founded on the par-
Chap. 6. ti cu l ar intereft of the party accufed.
The great are always obnoxious to popular envy ;
and were they to be judged by the people, they
might be in danger from their judges, and would
moreover be deprived of the privilege which the
meaneft fubjecl is poiTefled of in a free (late, of be
ing tried by their peers. The nobility for this rea-
fon ought not to be cited before the ordinary courts
of judicature, but before that part of the legiflature
which is omi-nfal of tlu n body.
It is poflVule that the law, which is clear- lighted
in one lenie, and blind in another, might in fome
. .il mo fevere. But as we have already ob-
li.TVi J, the national judges are no more than the
mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere
paffive beings incapable of moderating either its
force or rigor. That part therefore of the legiflative
body, which we have juil now obferved to be a ne-
celTary tribunal on another occafion, is alib a ne-
celTary tribunal in this ; it belongs to its fupreme
authority to moderate the law in favour of the law
itfelf, by mitirruing the fentence.
It might alib happen that a fubjedt intrufted with
the admmiftration of public affairs, may infringe the
rights of the people, and be guilty of crimes
which the ordinary magiilrates either could not, or
would not punifh. But in general the legiflative
power cannot judge , and much lets can it be a
judge in thib particular cafe, where it reprefents the
parry concerned, which is the people. It can only
then.-ibre impeach. But before what court fhall it
bring its im\ eachment ? Muil it go and demean
itfelf before the ordinary tribunals, which are its
inferiors,
O F L A W S. 227
inferiors, and being compofed moreover of men who K
are cholen from the people as well as itfelf, will chap. 5.
naturally be fw.iyed by the authority of fo powerful
an accufer ? No : in order to preferve the dignity
of the people, and the fecurity of the fubject, the
Jegiflative part which reprefent* the people, muft
bring in its charge before the legislative part which
reprefents the nobility, who have neither the fame
interefts nor the fame paffions.
Here is an advantage which this government has
over molt of the ancient republics, where there was
this abufe, that the people were at the fame time
both judge and accufer.
The executive power, purfuant to what has been
already faid, ought to have a fhare in the legiflature
by the power of rejecting, otherwife it would foon
be ftripp d of its prerogative. But mould the le-
giflative power ufurp a fhare of the executive, the
latter would be equally undone.
If the prince were to have a fhare in the legifla
ture by the power of refolving, liberty would be
loft. But as it is neceffary he mould have a fhare
in the legiflature for the fupport of his own pre
rogative, this mare muft confift in the power of
rejecting.
The change of government at Rome was owing
to this, that neither the fenate who had one part of
the executive power, nor the magiftrates who were
entrufted with the other, had the right of rejecting,
which was intirely lodged in the people.
Here then is the fundamental conftitution of the
government we are treating of. The legiflative bo
dy being compofed of two parts, one checks the
other, by the mutual privilege of rejecting. They
are
228 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK are both checked by the executive power, as the ex-
Chap. 6 ecut i ve i s by the legiflative.
Thefe three powers fhould naturally form a ftate
of repofe or inaclion. But as there is a neceffity for
movement in the courfe of human affairs, they arc
forced to move, but itill to move in concert.
As the executive power has no other part in the
legiflative than the privilege of rejecting, it can have
no mare in the public debates. It is not even necef-
fary that it fhould propofe, bec?.ufe as it may always
difap] of the refolutions that mail be taken, it
may likewile reject the deciijons on thole propolals
which were mad nil i:j> v, ill.
In fomc ancient commonwealths, where public
de: Acre- i . on by the people in a body, it
IS natural lor t itive power to propofe and
debate \\ith the people, otherwiie their refolutions
mult have been attended with a ftrange confufion.
Were the executive power to determine the raifmg
of public money, otherwiie than by giving its con-
fent, liberty would be at an end j becaufe it would
become legiflative in the moil important point of
legiflation.
If the legiflative power was to fettle the fubfidies,
not from year to year, but for ever, it would run
the rifk of lofing its liberty, becaufe the executive
power would no longer be dependent i and when
once it was poJlefied of fuch a perpetual right, it
would be a matter of indifference, whether it held
it of iffelf, or of another. The fame may be laid,
if it fhould come to a relolution ot intrufting, not
an annual, but a perpetual command of the fea
and land forces to the executive power.
To
OF LAWS. 229
To prevent the executive power from being able B K
to opprefs, it is requifire that the armies, with chap/6.
which it is intruded, mould confill of the peo
ple, and have the fame fpirit as the people, as was
the cafe at Rome till the time of Mariits. To ob
tain this end, there are only two ways, either that
the perfons employed in the army, mould have fuf-
ficient property to anfwer for their conduct to their
fellow fubjecls, and be entitled only for a year, as
was cuftomary at Rome : or if there mould be a
Handing army, compofed chiefly of the mod def-
picable part of the nation, the legifhtive power
fhould have a right to difband them as loon as it
ifed , the foldiers fhould live in common with
the reft of the people , and no feparare camp, bar
racks, or fortrefs, mould be fuftered.
When once an army is eftablifhed, it ought not
to Depend immediately on the legiflative, but on
the executive power ; and this from the very nature
of the thing -, its bufmefs confiding more in action
than in deliberation.
From a manner of thinking that prevails amongft
mankind, they fet a higher value upon courage
than timoroufnefs, on activity than prudence, on
ftrength than counfel. Hence the army will ever
defpife a fenate, and refpect their own officers. They
will naturally flight the orders lent them by a body
of men, whom they look upon as cowards, and
therefore unworthy to command them. So that as
foon as the army depends on the legiflative body,
the government becomes a military one , and if
the contrary has ever happened, it has been owing
to fome extraordinary circumftances. It is becaufe
the army was always kept divided ; it is becaufe
0,3 ^
230 i-L-io^oriixii
BOOK i t was compofed of feveral bodies, that depended
Cha 6 eacn on ^ eir P art i cu ^ ar province i it is becaufe the
capital towns were ftrong places, defended by their
natural fituation, and not garrifoned with regular
troops. Holland for inilance, is (till fafer than Ve
nice , fhe might drown, or ftarve the revolted
troops i for as they are not quartered in towns ca
pable of furniming them with nectfiary fubfiftence ;
this fubfiftence is of courfe precarious.
\Yh-r\vr fhull read the admirable treatife of
Tacitus on the manners of the Germans *, will
find rhr.r it is from them theEnglifh have borrowed
the idea <>t their political government. This beau
tiful fyitem was invented firfl. in the woods.
all human things have an end, the ftate we
are (peaking of will lofe its liberty, will perifh.
Have nor Rome, Sparta, and Carthage perifhed ?
It will perifh when the legiflative power Ihafl be
more corrupt than the executive.
It is not my bufmefs to examine whether the
Englifh actually enjoy this liberty, or nor. Suffi
cient it is for my purpofe to obferve, that it is efta-
blifhed by their Jaws ; and I inquire no further.
Neither do I pretend by this to undervalue other
nments, nor to fay that this extreme political
liberty ought to give unealinefs to thofe who have
only a moderate fhare of it. How mould I have
any fuch defign, I who think that even the excels
of reafon is not always defirable, and that mankind
generally find their account better in mediums than
in extremes ?
Harrington in his Occana has alfo inquired into
* ZXf minoribu! relus prlncipe* confuhant, de majori&us emnes ;
iia fatm ut ea quoque quorum ffiies plefam arbitrlitm eft, apod
pr :ncipes pertracientm . the
O F L A W S. 231
the higheft point of liberty to which the conftitu- B K
tion of a ftate may be carried. But of him indeed Cjia \
it may be fa id, that for want of knowing the nature & 8.
of real liberty, he bufied himfelf in purfuit of an
imaginary one, and that he built a Chalcedon though
he had a Byzantium before his eyes.
CHAP. VII.
Of the Monarchies we are acquainted \vith.
TH E monarchies we are acquainted with,
have not, like that we have been fpeaking
of, liberty for their direct view : their only aim is
the fubject s, the date s, and the prince s glory.
But from this glory there refults a ipirit of liberty,
which in thole dates may perform as great things,
and may contribute as much perhaps to happinefs,
as liberty itfelf.
Here the three powers are not diftributed and
founded on the model of the conftitution above-
mentioned ; they have each a particular diftribu-
tion, according to which they border more or lefs
on political liberty - t and if they did not border
upon it, monarchy would degenerate into defpotic
government.
CHAP. VIII.
Why the ancients had not a dear Idea of Monarchy.
TH E ancients had no notion of a govern
ment founded on a body of nobles, and
much lefs on a legiflative body compofed of the
reprelentatives of the people. The republics of
Greece and Italy were cities that had each their own
form of government, and convened their fubjecls
within
232 i n & S P J R 1 T
3oo>: w | tn i n tne i r own vvalls. Before Rome had fwal-
! J.I the other republics, there was fcarce
any where a king to be found, no, not in Italy,
Gaul, Spain, or Germany -, thefe were all petty
flatcs, or little republics. I/.ven Africa itfelf was
fubjcct to a great republic : and Afia minor was oc
cupied by Greek colonies. There was therefore no
examrle oi deputies of towns, or afTemblies of the
dates -, one mull have gone as far as Perfia to find a
<ountry under the goverhment of a fingle perfon.
I am not ignorant that there were confederate
republics ; in which feveral towns fent deputies to
an allembly. But I affirm there was no monarchy
on the prdent mode).
1 he iirll plan therefore of the monarchies we
are acquainted with, was thus formed. The Ger
man nations that conquered the Roman empire,
were, as is known to every one, a free people. Of
this we may be con\ i; , ed only by reading Tacitus on
tbc manners of tbc Germans. The conquerors fpread
themfelves all over the country -, living moftly
in the fields, and very little in towns. When they
were in Germany, the whole nation was able to af-
femble. This they could no longer do, when they
were difperfed through the conquered provinces.
And yet as it was neceflary that the nation fhould
deliberate on public affairs, purfuant to their ufual
method before the conqueft ; they had therefore
recourfe to reprefentatives. Such is the origin of the
Gothic government amongft us. At firll it was
mixt with ariftocracy and monarchy ; a mixture
attended with this inconveniency, that the common
people were bond men. The cuftom afterwards fuc-
cecded of granting letters of infranchifement, and
was
O F L A W S. 233
was foon followed by fo perfect a harmony between BOOK
the civil liberty of the people, the privileges of ch "
the nobility and clergy, and the prince s preroga
tive, that I really think there never was in the
world a government fo well tempered, as that of
each part of Europe, fo long as it laded. Sur
prizing, that the corruption of the government of
a conquering nation, fhould have given birth to the
belt fpecies of conftitution that could poflibly be
imagined by man. * !
CHAP. IX.
Ariftotlfs manner of thinking.
ARISTOTLE is greatly puzzled in treat
ing of monarchy ( c ). He makes five fpe- ( c ) Polit.
cies , and he does not diftinguifh them by the ?,, 3*
c n . Chap. 14.
form or conltitution, but by things merely acci
dental, as the virtues r r vices of the prince ; or
by things extrinfecal, fuch as th ufurpation of, or
fuccefTion to, tyranny.
He ranks among the number of monarchies, the
Perfian empire and the kingdom of Sparta. But
is it not evident, that one was a defpotic ftate, and
the other a republic ?
The ancients who were ftrangers to the diftri-
bution of the three powers in the government of
a fmgle perfon, could never form a juft idea of
monarchy.
* It was a good government that bad in itfelf a capacity of
growing better.
CHAP.
-34 i n n 5 F 1 R I T
C II A P. X.
. thought.
Eno K O temper monarchy, Arybas king ( 3 ) of
J_ Epirus, found no other remedy than a re-
public. j he Molofli nor knowing how to limit
the lame power made two kings ( b ) : by this means
_ the (late was weakened more than the prerogative
of the prince ; they warflRl rivals, and they created
cncmi
;.
I wo kings were tolerable no where but at Sparta-,
here they did not form, but were only a part of,
the cowftitucion.
CHAP. XI.
Of the Kings -QIC Times cf Greece.
IN the heroic times of Greece, a kind of mon
archy arofe that was not of" long duration ( c ).
Th( ;le who had been inventors of arts, who had
, , fought in their country s caufe, who had eftablifhed
foe , or diflnbuted lands among the people ;
obt lined the regal powxr, and tranlmitted it to their
idren. They were kings, priefts, and judges.
This is one ot the rive fpecies of monarchy men-
tkmed by Ariftotle ( d ) > and the only one that can
e us any idea of the monarchical conftitution.
Bu f plan of this conftitution is oppofite to that
.1- of our modern monarchies.
e three powers were there distributed in fuch
1 L J 1 1 -n /e\ J
a manner as the people had the legiliative ( J, and
See like- the kino; the executive together with the power of
r T U
de= J U( ^o m wnereas i n modern monarchies the prince
K i. is
OF LAWS. 235
is invefted with the executive and legislative powers, BOOK
or at leaft with part of the legiflative, but does not chap. u.
aflume the power of judging.
In the government of the kings of the heroic
times, the three powers were ill diftributed. Hence
thofe monarchies could not long fubfift. For as
foon as the people got the legiflative power into
their hands, they might, as they every where did,
upon the very lead caprice, fubvert the regal au
thority.
Among a free people poflefied of the legiflative
power, a people enclofed within walls, where every
thing of an odious nature becomes dill mure odious,
it is the higheft matter-piece of legiflation to know
how to place properly the judiciary power. But
it could not be in worfe hands than in thofe of the
perfon to whom the executive power had been
already committed. From that very inftant the
monarch became terrible. But at the fame time as
he had no (hare in the legislature, he could make no
defence againft it , thus his power was in one lenfc
too great, in another too little.
They had not as yet difcovered that the true
function of a prince was to appoint judges, and
not to fit as judge himfelf. The oppofite policy
rendered the government of a tingle perfon infup-
portable. Hence all thofe kings were banifhed.
The Greeks had no notion of the proper diftribu-
tion of the three powers in the government of one
perfon ; they could fee it only in that of many -,
and this kind of conftitution they diftinguiihed by
the name of Polity ( *). ( ) Ariftot.
Polit.
Book 4.
Chap. 8.
CHAP.
i n & 5 Jf 1 K i T
C II A P. XII.
Of the Government of //v Kings of Rome, and hi what
rv lie three powers were there diflributed.
BOOK "HE government of the kings of Rome had
fome relation to that of the kings of the
heroic times of (i\< Its fubverfion, like the
hitter s, was owing to its general defect, though in
itk-lt, and in its own particular nature, it was ex-
imling good.
In order to give an adequate idea of this govern
ment, I fhall difl :h th.ir of the five firft kings,
that of Servius Tullius, and that of Tarquin.
Pin " The crown was elective, and under the five firft
l,,,,,^ kings the feruite had the greatdl (hare in the
2. p. 120. election.
Upon the kind s deceaic thefenate examined whe-
D. 24.2 r
ther they mould continue the eftablifhed form of
( ) See government. If they thought proper to continue
*?" //s -i i -n. , c \ i i
it, they named a magiitrate ( c ) taken from their
oil own body who chofe a king ; the fenate were to
, . J C_>
approve of the election, the people to confirm it,
am! and the augurs to declare the approbation of the
1 Gods. If one of thefe three conditions was wanting,
they were obliged to proceed to another election,
in i>ioinf. The conftitution was a mixture of monarchy,
T T I
ariflocracy. and democracy ; and fuch was the har-
-4-P c ] . f c
mony of power, that there was no mitance of jea-
See loufy or difpute in the firft reigns. The king
Halkarn. commanded the armies, and had the direction of
book 2. p. the facrifices ^ he had the power of determining
bo^k I " d ^^ civil and criminal ( e ) caufes i he called the fe ~
171. nate
OF LAWS. 237
nate together, convened the people, laid fome affairs BOOK
before the latter, and regulated the reft with the
fcnate *.
The authority of the fenate was very great. The
kings oftentimes pitched upon fenators with whom
they judged in conjunction , and they never laid
any affair before the people, till it had been pre-
vioufly debated f in the fenate.
The people had the right of chufing J magi-
ftrates, of confenting to the new laws, and, with the
king s permiffion, of making war and peace : But
they had not the power of judging. When Tullus
Hoftilius referred the trial of Horatius to the peo
ple, he had his particular reaibns, which may be
feen in Dionyfius Halicarnaffeus ( c ).
The conftitution altered under ( f ) Servius Tul- E: JJ\ 9 , f
lius. The fenate had no fhare in his election ; he Halicam.
caufed himfelf to be proclaimed by the people ; he bo k 4-
refigned the power of judging civil caufes ||, referv-
ing none to himfelf but the criminal - y he laid all
affairs directly before the people -, he eafed them of
taxes, and impoled the whole burden on the Pa
tricians. Hence in proportion as he weakened the
regal together with the fenatorian power, he aug
mented that of the people .
1 It was by virtue of a fenatus confultum that Tullus Hofti
lius ordered Alba to be deilroyed. Dionyf. Halicarn, book
p. 167, & 1-2.
f Ibid, book 4, p 276.
J Ibid, book 2. And yet they could not have the nomination
of all offices, fince Valerius Publicola made that famous law by
which every citizen was forbid to exercife any employment unlels
he had obtained it by the fuffrage of the people.
|| He diverted himfelf of half the regal power, fays Dionyf.
Halicarn. book 4, p. 229.
It was thought that if he had not been prevented by Tar-
quin he would have eftablifhed a popular government. Dionyf.
Halicarn. book 4, p. 243. Tarquit
238 THE SPIRIT
B oo ic T.irquin would neither be cholen by the fenate
Chap. 12, nor ky the people , he confidercd Servius Tullius as
& 13. an ulurper, and took the crown as an hereditary
right. I le dcftroyed moft of the fenators ; thofe
who remained he never con fi.il ted-, nor did he even
ib much as fummon them to afiift at his decifi-
( e )Dionyf. ons ( ). Thus his power increafed : but the odi-
ricftra- urn of that power received a new addition, by u-
lurping alfo the authority of the people, without
whom, and even againft tohdm, he enafted feveral
laws. The three powers were by this means re
united in his perfon , but the people at a critical
minute recollected that they were legiflators, and
there u.is an end of Tarquin.
CHAP. XIII.
General reflexions on tie Jlate of Rome after the ex-
cf its Kings.
IT is impofTible ever to be tired with fo agree
able a fubjeft as ancient Rome-, even at prefent
ftrangers leave the modern palaces ot that celebrated
capital to go in fearch of ruins : thus the eye after
reiting itielf on the enamelled meadows, is pleafed
with the fight of rocks and mountains.
The patrician families were at all times pofiefied
of great privileges. Thefe diftindtions, which were
confiderable under the kings, became much more
important after their expulfion. Hence arofe the
jealoufy of the Plebeians who wanted to reduce
them. The conteft ftruck ac the conftitution with
out weakening the government : for it was very
indifferent of what family were the magiftrates, pro
vided the magiftracy preferved its authority.
3 An
OF LAWS. 239
An elective monarchy like that of Rome, necef- BOOK
y r
farily fuppofeth a powerful ariftocratir body to c])l
fupport it , without which it changes immediately
into tyranny or into a popular flare. But a popular
ftate has no need of this diftin&ion of families to
maintain itfelf. To this it was owing that the
Patricians, who were a neceffary part of the con
ftitution under the regal government, became a
fuperfluous branch under the confuls : the peo
ple could fupprefs them without hurting them-
fclves, and change the conftitution without cor
rupting it.
After Servius Tullius had reduced the Patricians,
it was natural that Rome fhould fall from the regal
hands into thofe or the people. But the people had
no occafion to be afraid of relapfmg under a regal
power, by reducing the Patricians.
A ftate may alter two different ways, either by
the amendment or by the corruption of the confti
tution. If it has preferved its principles and the
conftitution changes, it is owing to its amendment -,
if upon changing the conftitution its principles arc
loft, it is becaufe it has been corrupted.
Rome after the expulfion of the kings, mould
natural .y have been a democracy. The people had
already fc he legiflative power in their hands ; it was
their unanimous confent thai had expelled the
kings ; and if they had not continued fteady in
thofe principles, ilic Tarquins might eafily have
been reftored. To pretend that their defign in ex
pelling them was tu rer.Jer themfelves (laves to
a: wfamii quite unreafonable. The fituation
therefore of tnir ; required ciiat Ronie mould be a
democracy ; and yet it was not. There was a ne-
ceffiry
240 T H E S P I R I T
Boo K C efl]ty of tempering the power of the principal fami-
Chap. ij. ^ es > an ^ f g* v i n 8 th 6 J dws a biafs to democracy.
& 14. The profperity of ftates is frequently greater in
the infenfible tranfition from one conftitution to an
other, than in either of thofc confutations. Then
it is that all the firings of government are ftretched,
that every citizen forms pretenfions, that the inha
bitants attack or carefs one another, and that there
is a noble emulation between thofe who defend the
declining, and thole who are itrenuous in promoting
the new, conftitution.
CHAP. XIV.
/;/ w bat manner the diflribution of the three Powers
began to change after the Expulfion of the Kings.
T
HERE were four things that greatly op-
preflfed the liberty of Rome. The Patrici
ans had engroiTed to themfelves all facred, political,
civil and military employments ; an exorbitant
power was annexed to the confulate ; the people
were often infulted; and in fine they had fcarce any
influence at ail left in the public fuffrages. Thefe
four abufes were redrefled by the people.
1 st . It was regulated that there mould be fome
magiftracies to which the plebeians might afpire *,
and by degrees they obtained their being made ca
pable of them all, except that of Inter-rex.
2 d . The confulate was difiblved into feveral other
( f ) Livy, magiftracies ( c ) ; prstors were created, on whom
* D ,f" di the power was conferred of judging private affairs;
quseftors * were nominated for determining cri-
parricidii, Pomponius, leg. 2. ff. de orig. Jur.
minal
O F L A W S, 241
minal caufes , /Ediles were eftablilhcd for the civil B 9 K
adminiftration ; treafurers ( c ) were made who had o la p I4 .
the management of the public money , and in fine ( e ) PIu-
by the creation of Cenfors the confuls were diverted t; J rc l 1 f*
. of ruvh-
of that part of the legiflative power which regulates C o/a.
the morals of the citizens, and the momentary po
licy of the different bodies of the flate. The chief
privileges left them were to prefide in the great
meetings * of the people, to afiemble the fenate,
and to command the armies.
3 d . By the facred laws tribunes were eftablifhed,
who had a power on all occafions of checking the
encroachments of the patricians, and prevented not
only particular, but likewife general injuries.
In fine, the plebeians increafed their influence in
public decifions. The people of Rome were divided in
three different manners, by centuries, by curias, and
by tribes , and whenever they gave their votes, they
were aflcmbled and formed one of thole three ways.
In the firft the patricians, the leading men, the
rich, the fenate, which was very near the fame thing,
had almoft the whole authority ; in the fecond they
had lefs , and lefs ftill in the third.
The divifion into centuries was a divifion rather
of cftates and fortunes, than of perfons. The whole
people were divided into a hundred and ninety- three
centuries ( f ), which had each a fmgle vote. The ( f ) See Li-
patricians and leading mencompofed the firft ninety- vy j^?- I "
eight centuries ; and the other ninety- five confided ny f Hall-
of the remainder of the citizens. In this divifion carn -book
P
therefore the patricians were mafters of the fuffrages. 1\ C D ^
In the divifion into curiae( s ), the patricians had nyf. Hali-
not the fame advantages : fome however they had, carn - book
9 P-
* Comitiis centuriatis.
VOL. I. R for
242 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK f or i t Wa5 necefiary that the augurs fhould be con-
XI
Chap 14, fated who were under the direction of the patrici-
& \ ans , and no propofal could be made there to the
people unlefs it had been previoufly laid before the
fenate and approved of by a fenatus-confultum. But
in the divifion into tribes they had nothing to do ei
ther with the augurs or with the decrees of the fe
nate-, and the patricians were excluded.
Now the people endeavoured conftantly to have
thole meetings by curia s which had been cufto-
mary by centuries; and by tribes, thofe they ufed
to have before by curia s ; by which means the di
rection of public affairs loon devolved from the pa
tricians to the plebeians.
Thus, when the plebeians obtained the power
of judging the patricians, a power which com-
( Ibid, menced in the affair of Coriolanus( c ), the plebeians
infilled upon judging them by affemblies in tribes*,
and not in centuries : and when the new magiftra-
( r ) Dionyf. cies (*) of tribunes and ./Ediles were eftablifhed in
ook 6 rn > f avour o* r ^ ie people, the latter obtained that they
410, & fhould meet by curia s in order to nominate them j
4 1 and after their power was quire fettled, they gained
() See ( g ) lb far their point as to affemble by tribes to pro-
*y ceed to this nomination.
Hah earn,
book 9,
P-6o 5 . CHAP. XV.
In what manner Rome, while in the flouri/hing ftatt
of the republic^ fuddenly loft its liberty.
I
N the heat of the contefts between the patrici
ans and the plebeians, the latter infilled upon
* Contrary to the ancient cultom, as may be feen in Dionyf.
Halicarn. book 5. 320.
having
O F L A W S. 243
having fixt laws, to the end that the public judg- Bo . K
ments fhould no longer be the effect of a capricious chap. ic.
will or of an arbitrary power. The fenate after a
great deal of refinance acquiefced , and decemvirs
were nominated to compofe thofe laws. It was
thought proper to grant them an extraordinary
power, becaufe they were to give laws to parties
whofe views and interefts it was almoft impofTible
to unite. The nomination of all magiftrates was
fufpended, and they were chofen in the comitia ible
adminiftrators of the republic. Thus they found
themfelves inverted v.ith the confular and the tribu-
nitian power. By one they had the privilege of
aiTembling the fenate, by the other that of afiem-
bling the people. But they afTembled neither fenate
nor people. Ten men only in the republic had the
whole legiflative, the whole executive, and the whole
judiciary power. Rome faw herfelf enflaved by as
cruel a tyranny as that of Tarquin. When Tar
exercifed his oppreflions. Rome. was feizcd with in
dignation at the power he had ufurped , when the
decemvirs exercifed theirs, me was aftonimed at the
power me had given.
What a ftrange fyftem of tyranny ! a tyranny car
ried on by men who had obtained the political and
military power merely becaufe of their knowledge in
civil affairs , and who in the circumftances of that
very time flood in need of the cowardice of the citi
zens to let themfelves be infulted at home, and or.
their courage to protect them abroad ?
The fpectacle of Virginia s death, whom her father
immolated to chaftity and liberty, put an end to the
power of the decemvirs. Every man became free, be
caufe every man had been injured; each (hewed him-
R 2 feif
244 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK fdf a citizen, becaufe each had the tye of a parent.
Chap. The fenate and people refumed a liberty which had
& it. been committed to ridiculous tyrants.
No people were fo eafily moved with fpectaclcs
as the Romans. The impurpled body of Lucretia
put an end to the regal government. The debtor
who appeared in the public market place covered
with wounds, caufed an alteration in the form of
the republic. The decemvirs owed their expulfion
to the fight of Virginia. To condemn Manlius,
it was necefiary to keep the people from feeing the
capitol. Caefar s bloody garment flung Rome again
into flavery.
CHAP. XVI.
Of tic Icgijlatii e Power in the Roman Republic.
THERE were no rights to conteft, under
the decemvirs : but upon the refloration of
liberty, jealoufics revived ; and as long as the pa
tricians had any privileges left, they were fure to
be dripped of them by the plebeians.
The mifchief would not have been fo great, had
the plebeians been iatisfied with depriving the pa
tricians of their prerogatives ; but they alfo in
jured them as citizens. When the people af-
fembled by curia s or centuries, they were com-
pofed of fenators, patricians, and plebeians. In
Dionyf. their difputes the plebeians gained this point (0,
Halicarn. tnat tnev aJone without patricians or fenate mould
Book ii. n i n j i r-r j i ...
p. 725. ena & J aws called plebiicita , and the comitia in
which they were made, had the name given them
of comitia by tribes. Thus there were cafes in
which
O F L A W S. 245
which the patricians * had no (hare in the legifla- 3 K
tive power, and -f in which they were fubject to the
legiflation of another body of the (late. This was
the higheft extravagance of liberty. The people
to eftablifh a democracy, acted againft the very
principles of this government. One would have
imagined that fo exorbitant a power muft have de-
(Iroyed the authority of the fenate. But Rome had
admirable inftitutions. Two of thefe were efpeci-
ally remarkable; one by which the legislative power
of the people was regulated, and the other by which
it was limited.
The cenfors, and before them the confulsj, form
ed and created, as it were, every five years the bo
dy of the people ; they exerciied the legiflation
on the very body that was poflefled of the legif-
lative power. " Tiberius Gracchus, fays Cicero,
" caufed the freedmen to be admitted into the tribes
<c of the city not by t be force of his eloquence, but by a
" wordy by a gefture , which had he not effefted, the
" republic , whofe drooping head we are at prefent
fcarce able to uphold, would not even exift."
On the other hand, the fenate had the power of
refcuing, as it were, the republic out of the hands
of the people, by creating a dictator, before whom
* By the facred laws the plebeians had a power of making the
plebifcita by themfelves, without admitting the patricians into
their aflerribly. Dionyf. Halicarn. Book 6. p. 410. & book 7.
p. 430.
f By the law made after the expulfion of the decemvirs, the
patricians were made fubjeft to the plebifcita, though they had
not a right of voting there. Livy Book 3. and Dionyf. Halicarn.
Book ii. p. 725. This law was confirmed by that of Publius
Philo the dictator, in the year of Rome 416. Livy Book 8.
I In the year 312. of Rome, the confuls performed ftill the
bufmefs of furveying the people and their eilates. as appears by
Dionyf. Halicarn. Book 1 1 .
R 3 the
246 i tt & b P I R I T
the fovereign bowed his head, and the mofl popular
1. were
J
CHAP. XVII.
O/ /fo executive PGW in the fame Republic.
VLOUS as the people were of their legifla-
tive power, yet they had no great jealoufy of
the executive. This they left almoft intirely to the
ite and to the confuls, referving fcarce any thing
more to thcmfelvcs, than the right of chufing the
magiftrates, and of confirming the acts of the fe-
nate and of the generals.
Rome, whofe paffion was to command, whofe
ambition was to conquer, whofe commencement and
progreis were one continued ufurpation, had con-
flamJy affairs of the greateft weight upon her hands;
her enemies were always confpiring againft her, or
fhe againft her enemies.
As fhe was obliged to behave on the one hand
with heroic courage, and on the other with con-
fummatc prudence \ the fituation of things required
of courfe that the management of affairs fhould be
O
committed to the fenate. Thus the people diiputed
every branch of the legiflative power with the fenate,
becaufe they were jealous of their liberty-, but they
had no difputes about the executive, becaufe they
were jealous of their glory.
So great was the fhare the fenate took in the exe-
Book 6. cutive power, that, as Polybius ( ) informs us,
foreign nations imagined that Rome was an arifto-
cracy. The fenate difpofed of the public money,
* Such \z by which it was allowed to appeal from the
decifien: cf ail the ir.n^iftrates to the people.
O F L A W S. 247
and farmed out the revenue , they were arbiters of B K
the affairs of their allies ; they determined war or chap. 17.
peace, and directed in this refpect the confuls ; they
fixed the number of the Roman and of the allied
troops, difpofed of the provinces and armies to the
confuls or praetors, and upon the expiration of the
year of command had the power of appointing fuc-
ceflbrs -, they decreed triumphs, received and fent
embattles , they nominated, rewarded, punifhed,
and were judges of kings , gave them, or declared
they had forfeited, the title of allies of the Roman
people.
The confuls levied the troops which they were
to carry into the field ; they had the command of
the forces by fea and land ; difpofed of the allies ;
were inverted with the whole power of the republic
in the provinces , gave peace to the vanquifhed na
tions, impofed conditions on them, or referred them
to the fenate.
In the earlieft times, when the people had fome
ihare in the affairs relating to war and peace, they
exercifed rather their legiflative than their execu
tive power. They fcarce did any thing elfe but
confirm the acts of the kings, and after their expul-
fion, of the confuls or fenate. So far were they
from being the arbiters of war, that we have in-
ftances of its having been often declared notwith-
ilanding the oppofition of their tribunes. But grow
ing wanton in their profperity, they increafed their
executive power. Thus they * created the mi-
* In the year of Rome 444. Livy i. Decad. Book 9. As the
war again!!: Perfeus appeared fomewhat dangerous, it was ordain
ed by afenatus-confultum, that this law fhould be fufpended, and
tjie people agreed to it. Livy Dec. 5. Book i.
R 4 litary
BOOK IJtary tribunes, the nomination of whom till then
Chap. 1 8 nac * belonged co the generals-, and fome time before
the firft Punic war they decreed that themfelves only
mould have the right * of declaring war.
CHAP. XVIII.
Of the judiciary Power in the Roman Government.
judiciary power was given to the peo
ple, to the fenate, to the magiftrates, and
to particular judges. We muft fee in what man
ner it was diftributed -, beginning with their civil
affairs.
The confuls had ( the power of judging after
the cxpulfion of the kings, as the prastors were
judges after the confuls. Servius Tullius had diverted
himfdf of the judgment of civil affairs, which was
not rcfumed by the confuls, except in J fome very
rare cafes, for that reafon called extraordinary ||.
They were fatisfied with naming the judges, and
with forming the feveral tribunals. By a difcourfe
of slpphis ClaiiditiS) in Dionyfius ( l ) Halicarnafieus,
? 3 6 it appears, that as early as the 259th year of Rome,
this was looked upon as an eftablifhed cuflom among
the Romans, and it is not tracing it very high to
refer it to Servius Tullius.
They extorted it from the fenate, fays Freinfnemi M, Dec. 2.
Bo^k 6.
f There is no manner of doubt but the confuls had the power
of | i civil affairs before the creation of the praetors. See
Livy Dec. i. Book 2. p. 10. Dionyf. Halicarn. Book 10.
p. 62-. and the fame hook p. 645.
I The tribunes frequently judged by themfelves only, but no-
:.ndered them more odious, Dionyf. Haiicarn. Book 11.
I
[| judicial extraardinaria* See the Inftitutes Book 4.
Every
OF LAWS. 249
Every year the praetor made a lift * of fuch as B K
he chofe to difcharge the office of judges during his c t ap. ,^
magiftracy. A fufficient number was pitched upon
for each caufe ; a cuftom very near the fame as that
which is now practifed in England. And what was
extremely favourable to liberty j, was the pr?etor s
fixing the judges with the J content of the parties.
The great number of exceptions that can be made
now in England, amounts precty near to this very
cuftom.
The judges decided only the queftions ( a ) re- () Seneca
lating to facts ; for example, whether a fum of <leBenefic -
money had been paid or not, whether an act had ,! fajgJi
been committed, or not. But as to queftions of ( b ) ( b ) See
j^\ * * i *
right, as they required fome fort of capacity, they H^
were always carried before the tribunal of the cen- 54. in fol.
tumvirs [|. edit of
f)
The kings referved to themfelves the judgment ,.,,
of criminal affairs, and in this they were fucceeded
by the confuls. It was in confequence of this
authority that Brutus the conful put his children
and all thofe who were concerned in the Tar-
quinian confpiracy to death. This was an exorbi
tant power. The confuls already inverted with
the military command, extended the exercife of it
even to civil affairs ; and their procedures being
* Album "Judicium.
\ " Our anceftors, fays Cicero fro Cluentio, would not fuffer
" any man, whom the parties had not agreed to, to be judge of
" the leaft pecuniary affair, much lefs of a citizen s reputation."
See in the fragments of the Servilian, Cornelian, and other
laws, in what manner thefe laws appointed judges for the crimes
they propofed to punifh. They were often by choice, fometimes
by lot, or in fine by lot mixt together with choice.
|j Leg. 2. Jf. dc Orig. Jur. Magi/bates who were called de-
Ccmvirs prefrded in court, the whole under a praetor s diredHon.
ftripped
~,-3 T H E S P I R I T
Boo K ftnpped of all forms of juftice, were rather exertions
Chap. 1 8. of violence than legal judgments.
This gave rill* to the :;; law, by which it
was made lawful to appeal to the people from every
ordinance of the confuls that endangered the life of
a citizen. The confuls after this had no longer
a power of pronouncing fentence in capital cafes
againfi: a Roman citizen without the content of the
people *.
\Vc fee in the fvft con piracy for the refloration
of the Tarquins, that the criminals were tried by
Brutus the conlul ; in the fecond the fenare and
( f )Dionyf. comitia were affembled to try them f ).
The laws iiiilinr:i:irtied by the name of Sacred,
it. allowed the plebeians the privilege of chufmg tri
bunes ; by this means a body was formed, whole
pretenfions at firlt were immenfe. It is hard to
determine which was greater, the infolence of the
plebeians in demanding, or the condefcenfion of the
fenate in granting. The Valerian law allowed of
appeals to the people, that is, to the people com-
pofed of fenators, patricians, and plebeians. The
plebeians made a law that appeals mould be brought
before themfelves. A queilion was foon after
darted, whether the plebeians had a right to judge a
patrician ; this was the fubjecl: of a difpute which
the affair of Coriolanus gave rife to, and which
ended with that affair. When Coriolanus was
accufed by the tribunes before the people, he infifted,
contrary to the fpirit of the Valerian law, that as
he was a patrician, none but the confuls had a power
* Quoniam de capita civis Romani, inju/Tu populi Roman!,
pen ~.n confulibus jus dicere. See Pomfcnius Leg 2.
to
OF LAWS. 251
to judge him ; on the other hand, the plebeians alfo, 3 K
contrary to the fpirit of that very fame law, pre- Chap. 18.
tended that none but themfelves had a power to judge
him, and they judged him accordingly.
This was moderated by the law of the twelve
tables , whereby it was ordained that none but the
great affemblies of the people fhould pronounce
fentence againfl a citizen in capital cafes. Hence
the body of the plebeians, or which amounts to the
very fame, the ccmitia by tribes, had no longer
any power of judging crimes, except fuch as were
punifhed with a pecuniary mulch To inflict a
capital punifhment a law was requifite ; but to con
demn to a pecuniary fine, there was occafion only
for a Plebifcitum.
This regulation of the law of the twelve tables
was very prudent. It produced an admirable recon
ciliation between the body of the plebeians and the
fenate. For as the full judiciary power of both
depended on the greatnefs of the punifhment and
the nature of the crime, it was necefTary they fhould
both agree.
The Valerian law abolifhed all the remains of the
Roman government, which were any way relative
to that of the kings of the heroic times of Greece.
The confuls were diverted of the power to punifh
crimes. Though all crimes are public, yet we
muft diftinguifh between thofe which more nearly
concern the mutual communication of citizens, and
thofe which more nearly intereft the Hate in the
relation it has to its fubjecls. The firft are called
private, the fecond public. The latter were judged
* The Comitia by centuries. Thus Manlius Capitolinus was
judged in thele Comitia. Liyy Dec. t. Book 6. p. 60.
by
Tf
nrrr SPIRIT
vf K ky t ^ ie P e pl e > an ^ m regard to the former, they
Chap. is. name d by particular commifTion a quaeftor for the
profecution of each crime. The perfon choien by
the people was frequently one of the magiftrates,
and fometimes a private man. He was called the
qurfftor of Parricide, and is mentioned in the law of
( f ) Pomp*- the twelve tables ( f ).
fecond r Tile qu^fto 1 " nominated the judge of the queftion,
Law in the drew lots for the judges, formed the tribunal, under
Divert do which he pre f 1( j ec i *.
Ong. Jur. FT r
Here it is proper to oblerve what mare the fcnate
had in the nomination of the quaeitor, that we may
fee how far the two powers were balanced in this
refpect. Sometimes the fenate caufed a dictator to
be choien in order to cxercife the office of quaeilor f i
fometimes they ordained that the people fhould be
convened by a tribune in order to proceed to the
nomination of a qureftor J, and in fine the people
fometimes appointed a magiftrate to make his report
to the fenate concerning a particular crime, and to
defire them to name a qureftor, as may be feen in
(s y Books, the judgment of Lucius Scipio in Livy ( g ).
In the year of Rome 604 fome of thefe com-
( h ) Cicero mifTions were rendered permanent ( h ). All crimi-
mBruco. na j cau f es were gradually divided into different
parts ; to which they gave the name of perpetual
* See a fragment of Ulpian, who gives another of the Corne
lian law, it is to be met with in the Collation of the Mofaic and
Roman la--v>i y tit. i, de ficariis & homicidiis.
-f- This took place efpecially in regard to crimes committed
in Italy, which were fubject chiefly to the infpedion of the
fenate. Sec Livy r Dec. book 9, concerning the confpiracies of
Capua,
f This was the cafe in the profecution for the murder of
Pofthumius, in the year 340 of Rome. See Livy.
This judgment was grven in the year of Rome 567.
2 queftions.
O F L A W S. 253
queftions. Different praetors were created, to each BOOK
of whom fome of thofe queftions were afilgned. QI a
They had a power conferred upon them for the
term of a year, of judging fiich crimes as were any
way relative to thofe queftions, and then they were
fent to govern their province.
At Carthage the fenate of the hundred was com-
pofcd of judges who enjoyed that dignity for life *.
But at Rome the praetors were annual, and the
judges were not even for fo long a term, but were
nominated for each caufe. We have already fhewn
in the fixth chapter of this book how favourable this
regulation was to liberty in particular governments.
The judges were chofen from the order of fena-
tors, till the time of the Gracchi. Tiberius Grac-
cbus caufed a law to pafs that they fhould be taken
from the Equeftrian order ; a change fo very con-
fidcrable that the tribune boafted of having cut
by one rogation only the finews of the fenatorian
dignity.
It is necefiary to obferve that the three powers
may be very well diftributed in regard to the liberty
of the conftitution, though not fo well in refpect to
the liberty of the fubjecl. At Rome the people
had the greateft mare of the legiflative, a part of
the executive, and part of the judiciary power ; by
which means they had fo great a weight in the
government, as required fome other power to balance
it. The fenate indeed had part of the executive
power, and fome mare of the legiflative -f ; but
* This is proved from Livy, book 43, who fays that Hanni
bal rendered their magiftracy annual.
f The fenatus-confultums were of force for the fpace of a
year, though not confirmed by the people, Dionyf. Halicarn.
book 9, p. 595> and book n, p. 735.
this
254. T H E S P I R I T
BOOK t hi s was not fufficient to counter-balance the weight
XI -
Chap 1 8. * t ^ ie P e P^ e - fr was ncceflary that they fhould
have a (hare in the judiciary power ; and accord
ingly they had a mare when the judges were chofen
from among the fenators. But when the Gracchi
( c ) In the deprived the fenators of the power of judging ( e ),
3 " the fenate were no longer able to withftand the peo
ple. To favour therefore the liberty of the fubjed
they ftruck at the liberty of the conftitution : but
the former pcriihcd with the latter.
Infinite were the mifchicfs that from thence arofe.
The conftitution was changed at a time when the
fire of civil difcords had fcarce left any fuch thing as
a conftitution. The knights were no longer that
middle order which united the people to the fenate ;
the chain of the conftitution was broke.
There were even particular reafons againft tranf-
ferring the judiciary power to the equeftrian order.
The conftitution of Rome was founded on this
principle, that none fhould be enlifted as foldiers
but fuch as were men of fufficient property to anfwer
for their conduct to the republic. The knights as
perfons of the greateft property formed the cavalry
of the legions. But when their dignity increafed,
they refufed to ferve any longer in that capacity ;
and another kind or cavalry was obliged to be raifed :
thus Marius enlifted all forts of people into his army,
( f ) Cafite and foon after the republic was loft ( f ).
ten/at pit- Befides, the knights were the farmers of the pub-
re/que bal- & r
luit. de he revenues , a iec ot rapacious men , who fowed
bello ju- new miferies amongft a miferable people, and made
a fport of the public calamity. Inftead of giving to
fuch men as thofe the power of judging, they
ought to have been conftantly under the eye of the
judges.
OF LAWS. 255
judges. This we mult fay in commendation of the BOOK.
ancient French laws , they have ftipulated with theckap.*i3.
officers of the revenues, with as great a dif
fidence as would be obferved between enemies.
When the judiciary power at Rome was transferred
to the farmers of the revenues, there was then an
end of virtue, policy, laws, magiftracy, and ma-
giftrates.
Of this we find a very ingenuous defcription
in fome fragments of Diodorus Siculus and Dio.
" Mutius Sccvola^ fays DIODORUS ( c ), wanted to () Fra^-
" receive the ancient morals, and the laudable cujlom mcnt of
" of foler and frugal living. For his predccejfors t ^ or t, 00 ^
<c bavin? entered into a contra^ with the farmers cf 36, in the
fc- tiJ V * ,
" the revenue who at that tr re pojfeffed of f&^Con?
cc judiciary power at Rome, they bad filled the pro- itantine
" vince with all manner of crimes. But Scevola made P^p-*} 1 " -
" an e::an;ple of the publicans ) and imprifoned thofe
" who had fent others to prifon"
Dio informs us ( f ), that Publius Rutilius his ) Frag-
lieutenant, was equally obnoxious to the equeftrian";^^
order, anu that upon his return they accufed him of ,. ta jl en
having received fome prefents, and condemned him from i
to 2 fine , upon which he inftantly made a, ceffionf
of his goods. His innocence appeared in this, that.^r/.
he was found to be worth a great deal lefs than
what he was charged with having extorted, ar,d that
he mewed a juft title to what he pofiefTed : bur he
would not live any longer in the fame city with
fuch profligate wretches. (;j Fr?.
( 8 ) The Italians, fays DIODORUS again, bought ment of
up whole droves of flaves in Sicily, to till their lands [, 00 [J^ n
and to take care of their cattle -, but refufed them the Lx-
a necefiary fubfiftence. Thefe wretches were then trace c f
-. c.nd
forced
256 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK f or ccd to go and rob on the high ways, armed with
Chap 1 8 l ances an d clubs, covered with beads fkins, and
19. followed by large maftiff dogs. Thus the whole
province was laid wafte, and the inhabitants could
not call any thing their own, but what was fecured
within the walls of towns. There was neither pro-
conful nor praetor, that could or would oppofe this
diforder, or that prefumed to punifh thefe (laves,
becaufe they belonged to the knights, who at Rome
were poflefied of the judiciary power *. And yet
this was one of the caufes of the war of the flaves.
But I fhall add only one word more. A profefllon
that neither has nor can have any other view than
lucre, aprofeffion that was always forming frefh de
mands without ever granting any, a deaf and inex
orable profefllon that impoverifhed the rich and in-
creafed even the mifery of the poor, fuch a profefll
on, I fay, mould never have been entrufted with the
judiciary power at Rome.
CHAP. XIX.
Of the Government of the Roman Provinces.
SUCH was the diftribution of the three powers
in Rome. But they were far from being thus
diftributed in the provinces : Liberty was at the
center, and tyranny in the extreme parts.
While Rome extended her dominions no far
ther than Italy, the people were governed as confe
derates , and the laws of each republic were preferv-
ed. But as foon as fhe enlarged her conquefts, and
Penes quos Roma turn judicia erant, atque ex equeibi ordi-
ne folerent foititojudices eligi incaufa Praetorum & Proconfulum
quibui poll adminillraftam provinciam dies dida erat.
the
O F L A W S. 257
the fenate had no longer an immediate infpefirion
over the provinces, nor the magiftrates redding at ,
Rome were any longer capable of governing the
empire, they were obliged to fend pnrtors and pro-
coniuls. Then it was that the harmony of the
three powers was loft. Thofe who were font on
that errand, were intruded with a power which
comprehended that of all the Roman magiftracies ;
nay, even that of the people*. They were defpotic
magiftrates, extremely proper for the diftance of
the places to which they were fent. They exercifcd
the three powers ; being, if I may prefume to i;
the expreffion, the bafhaws of the republic.
We have elfe where obferved that in a common
wealth the fame magiftrate ought to be poflefled of
the executive power, as well civil as military. To
this it is owing that a conquering republic can hardly
communicate her government, and rule the conquer
ed ftate according to the form of her own conftitu-
tion. In fact as the magiftrate me fends to gove:
is invefted with the executive power, both civil and
military, he muft alfo have the legiQative : for who
is it that could make laws without him ? He muit
likewife have the judiciary power: for who co
pretend to judge independently of him ? It is :
ceffary therefore that the governor fhe fends be in-
trufted with the three powers, as was pracftilcd in
the Roman provinces.
It is more eafy for a monarchy to communicate
its government, becaufe the officers it fends, ha-
fome the civil executive, and others the mili f ary ex
ecutive power; which does not necefTarily imply a
defpotic authority.
* They made their edicts upon comir
VOL. I. S
258 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK i t was a privilege of the utmoft confequence to a
Chap ir Roman citizen, to have none but the people for his
judges. Were it not for this, he would have been
fubject in the provinces to the arbitrary power of a
proconful or of a proprietor. The city never felt
the tyranny, which was exercifed only on conquer
ed nations.
Thus in the Roman world, as at Sparta, thofe
who were free \urc extremely fo, while thofe
\vho wcic flaves laboured under the extremity of
flavei
\Vl\ilc the titi/.ens paid taxes, they were raifed
with great jullue and equality. The regulation
Tullius was obferved, who had diftri-
huted the people into fix clafles according to their
difference oi property, and fixed the feveral mares
of the public taxes in proportion to that which each
perfon had in the government. Hence they bore
with the greatncfs of the tax becaufe of their propor
tionable greatnefs of credit, andconfoled themfelves
for the Imallnels of their credit, becaufe of the fmall-
nefs of the tax.
There was alfo another thing worthy of admi
ration, which is, that as Scrvius Tullius s divifion
into . in fome meaiure the fundamen
tal piinciplc of the contlitution, it thence followed
that an ( /ing of the taxes was fo connected
with this fundamental principle, that the one could
not be aboliiLed without the other.
But while the city paid the taxes as me pleafed,
or paid none at all *, the provinces were plundered
by the knights who were the farmers ot the pub
lic rcvcnv.v Y,~e have already made mention of
* After die conqueil of Macedonia the Romans paid no t:r
their
OF LAWS. 2,9
their oppreffive extortions, with which all hiftory E *
a
bounds.
Chap
" AH Afic., fays Mithridates ( c ), expecls me as its
r ; fo great is the hatred which the rapa-
" cioufnefs of the prcconfuls ( d ), the confifcations mad: fro-
" by the officers of the revenue, and the quirks ajtd u ? Pom
" cavils cf judicial proceedings *, have excited a?ain$ ;Ti al
j j x o o j 1 1 j <i icci ^ y
" the Romans" in,
Hence it was that the ftrength of the provinces h d C s s k ec 3
made no addition to, but rather weakened the orations
ftrength of the republic. Hence it was that the n ;s ainft
provinces looked upon the lofs of the liberty of
Rome as the epocha of their own freedom.
CHAP. XX.
End of this Book.
I Should be glad to inquire into the diftribution
of the three powers, in all the moderate govern
ments we are acquainted with, and to calculate
thereby the degrees of liberty which each may enj<5y.
But we muft not always exhauft a fubject fo far,
as to leave no work at all for the reader. My b -
fmefs is not to make people read, but to make them
think.
* It is well known what fort of a tribunal was that of "
which provoked the Germans to revc
S 2 BOOK
260 t H E S P I R I T
BOOK XII.
Of tl-: L / form political Liberty
9 the SubjeEi.
\ P. I.
-> BOOK.
BOOK T T is not f. to have treated of political
J libpri o the conftitution ; we muft
it i;k in the relation it bears to the
fu
We i that in the firfl cafe it is form
ed by a certain diftribution of the three powers :
but in t! )nd we muft confider it under another
idea. It confifts in fecurity, or in the opinion peo
ple have of their fccurity.
The conftitution may happen to be free, and the
fubjecl: no:. The fubjecl may be free, and not the
conftitution. In thole cafes, the confticution will
be free by right and not in fact, the fubjecl will be
free in fact and not by right.
It is the difpofition only of the laws, and even
of the fundamental laws, that conftitutes liberty in
its relation to the conftitution. But as it relates to
the fubjecl ; morals, cuftoms, or received examples
may give rife to it, and particular civil laws may
favour it, as we mail prefentJy fee in this book.
Farther, as in moft ftates, liberty is more
checked or deprefTed than their conftitution de-
mands 3 it is proper to treat of the particular 1-
that
O F L A ^ 261
that in each conftitution are at iflift or check BOOK
the principle of liberty, which t tate is capable chap 2
of receiving.
CHAP.
Of the Liberty cf the
(Hilofophical liberty en, ov "rcifc
of the will ; or at lead, i
ably to ail fyflems, in an o[ e
free exercife of our will. Political .ndits in fe
curity, or at leaft in the opinion th enjoy fecurity.
This fecurity is never more dang ru..,fly a A
than in public or private accusations. It is therefore
on the goodnefs of criminal laws that the liberty of
the fubject principally depends.
Criminal laws did not receive their full perfection
all at once. Even in places where liberty has been
mod fought after, it has not been aH\: s found. (? Politics
Ariftotle ( p ) informs us that at Cumas, the parents
of the accufer might be witnefTes. So imperfect
was the law under the kings of Rome, that Servius
Tullius pronounced fentence againft the children of n
Ancus Martius, who were charged with having licarn.
afiaffinated the kins; his father-in-law : q ). Under book 4-
( \s er-
the firft kings of France, Clotarius made a law( r ), j y
2 -
/o i
ear-
as
that no body fhould be condemned without being year 560.
heard ; which mews that a contrary cuflom had pre- p^^ n:
vailed in fome particular cafe or among fome bar- book 2.
barons people. It was Charondas that firft efta- ^ T ia P- 12 -
1G P"3.VC
blimed penalties againft falfe witnefies ( f ). When his law. at
the fubject has no fence to fecure his innocence, he Thurium
has none for his liberty. g n [jj e o _
S 3 The lympiad,
2O2 xiijc. o r j JK. 1 1
B XH * ^ e knowledge already acquired in feme coun-
Chap. 3, tr i es > or tnat mav be hereafter attained in others, in
& 4. regard to the fureft rules that can be obferved in
criminal judgments, is more interefting to mankind
than any other thing in the univerfe.
Liberty can only be founded on the practice of
this knowledge: and fuppofing a ftate to have the
beft laws imaginable in this refpect, a perfon tried
under that ftate, and condemned to be hanged the
next day, would have much more liberty, than 3
lufhaw enjoys in Tuiky.
T
C H A P. III.
/ / continued.
HOSF. laws which condemn a man to death
on the dcpofition of a fmgle witnefs, are fatal
to liberty. In right realbn there mould be two, be-
caufe a witnefs who affirms, and the accufed who de
nies, make an equal balance, and a third muft in^
vJtne the fcale.
The Greeks ( l ) and Romans ( k ) required one voice
ij - more to condemn : but our French laws infift upon
two. The Greeks pretend that their cuftom was
v a iblifhed by the Gods*; but this more juftly may
a > f be faid of ours.
on ;
CHAP. IV.
ono | crty fs favoured by the nature and proper-
lion of Pwrijhments.
LIBERTY is in its higheft perfection, when
criminal laws derive each punimment from
the ] ,;Iar nature of the crime. There are then
f-^
no
OF LAWS. 263
no arbitrary decifions , the punifhmcnt does not flow B
from the capricioufnefs of the legiflator, but from c
the very nature of the thing ; and man ufes no viu-
Jence to man.
There are four forts of crimes. Thofe of the firft
fpecies are prejudicial to religion, the fecond to mo
rals, the third to the public tranquillity, and the
fourth to the fecurity of the fubject. The punifh-
ments inflicted for thefe crimes ought to proceed
from the nature of each of thefe fpecies.
In the clafs of crimes that concern religion, I
rank only thofe which attack it directly, fuch as all
fimple facrileges. For as to crimes that difturb tl.
exercife of it, they are of the nature of thofe which
prejudice the tranquillity or fecurity of the fubject,
and ought to be referred to thofe clafies.
In order to derive the punifhment of fimplc fa
crileges from the nature of the thing *, it mould
confift in depriving people of the advantages con
ferred by religion, in expelling them out of the tem
ples, in a temporary or perpetual exclulion from the
fociety of the faithful, in fhunning their prelence,
in execrations, detefcations, and conjurations.
In things that prejudice the tranquillity or fecurity
of the fcate, fecret actions are fubject to human
jurifdiction. But in thofe which offend the Deity,
where there is no public action, there can be no
criminal matter j the whole pafTes betwixt man and
God, who knows the meafure and time of his ven
geance. Now if magiftrates, confounding things,
ihould inquire alfo into hidden facrileges, this inqui-
* St. Lewis made fuch fevere laws againfl thofe \vho fwore,
that the pope thought himfelf obliged to admonifh him for it.
prince moderated his zeal, and ibftened his laws ( s )
S 4
264 ~3T I R I T
BOOK faion would be directed to a kind of action that
Chan. 4. does noc at a ^ rec l u ^ re it > ^e liberty of the fubjed
would be Subverted by arming the zeal of timor
ous, as well as of prefumptuous conferences againft
him.
The mifchief arifcs from a notion which fome
people have entertained of revenging the caufe of the
Deity. But we mud honor the Deity, and leave
him to avenge his own caufe. In effect, were we
to be directed by fuch a notion, where would be the
end of puniihments ? If human laws are to avenge
the caufe of an infinite Being, they will be directed
by his infinity, and not by the ignorance and ca
price of
An hiftorian (<) of Provence relates a fad, which
furnifhes us with an excellent defcription of the con-
fequcnces that may arife in weak capacities from
this notion of avenging the Deity s caufe. A Jew
was acculld of having blafphemed againft the blefled
Virgin , and upon conviction, was condemned to
be I lend alive. A ftrange fpedacle was then feen :
gentlemen mafked, with knives in their hands, af-
cended the fcaffold, and drove away the executioner,
in orc er to be the avengers themfelves of the honor
of the blefied Virgin. 1 do not here chufe to an-
ticipitate the reflections of the reader.
lie fecond clai s confiits of thole crimes which
are prejudicial to morals. Such is the violation of
public or private continency, that is, of the policy
irecting the manner in which the pleafure annexed
to the union of bodies is to be enjoyed. The pu-
nifnment ol - crimes ought to be alfo derived
o
from the nature of the thing , the privation of fuch
advantages as ibciety has attached to the purity of
morals,
O F L A W S.
morals, fines, fhame, neceflity of concealment, pub- B K
lie infamy, expulfion from home and fociety, and in chap. 4.
fine all fuch punimments as belong to a corrective
jurifdiction, are fufficient to reprefs the temerity of
the two fexcs. In effect, thefe things are lefs founded
on malice, than on oblivion and felf contempt.
We fpeak here of none but crimes that relate
merely to morals, for as to thofe that are alfo pre
judicial to the public fecurity, fuch as rapes and
ravifhments, they belong to the fourth fpecies.
The crimes of the third clafs are thofe that dif-
turb the public tranquillity. The punifhments ought
therefore to be derived from the nature of the thing,
and to be relative to this tranquillity -, fuch as im-
prifonment, exile, corrections, and other-like chaf-
tifements, proper for reclaiming turbulent fpirits,
and reducing them to the eftablimed order.
I confine thofe crimes that injure the public tran
quillity to things that imply a fimple tranfgrefTion
againft the civil adminiftration : for as to thofe
which by difturbing the public tranquillity attnck
at the fame time the fecurity of the fubject, they
ought to be ranked in the fourth clafs.
The punifhments inflicted upon the latter crimes
are fuch as are properly diflinguifhed by that name.
They are a kind of retaliation,, by which the foci^ty
refufes fecurity to a member, who has actually
or intentionally deprived another of s fecurity.
Thefe punimments are derived fro;" rure of the
thing, founded on reafon, and drawn from the very
fburce of good and evil. A man dcferves death
when he has violate^ the fecunty fo far as to
deprive, or to attempt to deprive another man of his
Jifce. This punifhmerit of death is the remedy, as it
were,
BOOK were, of a fick focicty. When there is a breach of
YlT
Chap 4 fecurity in refpect to property, there may be fome
& 5. reafons for inflicting a capital punifhment : but it
would be much better, and perhaps more natural,
that crimes committed againft the fecurity of pro
perty fhould be puniihed with the lois of pro
perty ; and this ought indeed to be the cafe if
mcns fortunes were common or equal. But as thofe
who have no property are generally the readicft to
attack the property of others, it has been found
necefiary, in Head of a pecuniary, to fubflitute a
corporal puniihment,
All that I have here advanced, is founded in
nature, and extremely favourable to the liberty of
the fubjcct.
CHAP. V.
Of certain Accufations that require particular . . 7 -
tion and Prudence.
IT is an important maxim ; that we ought to
be very circumfpect in the profecution of magic
and herefy. The accufation of thefe two crimes may
be vaftly injurious to liberty, and productive of an
infinite number of opprefilons, if the legiflator
knows not how to fet bounds to it. For as it does
not aim directly at a perfon s actions, but at his
character, it grows dangerous in proportion to the
ignorance of the people -, and then a man i.*
in danger, becauie the moft unexceptionable con
duct, the pureft morals, and the conftant pr of
tvery duty in life, are not a fufficient fecuriry againd
the fufpicion of his being guilty of crimes 11
thefe.
U I L, A VV b. 267
Under Manuel Comnenus, the Proteftator ( c ) was BOOK
accufed of having confpired againfl the emperor, CIl a " "
and of having employed for that purpofe feme ( e )M//,
^""^ i * f* c
fecrets that render men iuvifible. It is mentioned {
... . . ... nuelCom-
in the lire or this emperor ( ) that /for*?;; was nenus,
detected, as he was poring over a book of Solo- Book 4.
mon s, the reading of which was fulBcient to conjure J
up whole legions of devils. Now by fuppofing a
power in magic to arm all hell, people look upon
a man whom they call a magician as the fitted
perfon in the world to trouble and fubvcrt fvxricty,
and of courfe they are difpofed to punifh him with
the utmoft feverity.
But their indignation increafes when mngic is
fuppofed to have a power of fubvertin igion.
The hiftory of Constantinople ( c ; informs us, that , f ;IIirtory
in confequence of a revelation made to a bifhop c thecm -
of a miracle s having ceaied becaufe of the magic Maurice
practices of a certain perfon, both that perfon and h
his ion were put to death. On how m. us .
things did not this fingle crime depend ? That reve
lations fhould not be uncommon, that the bifliop
Ihould be favoured with one, that it was real,
that there had been a miracle in the cafe, that this
miracle had ceafed, that there was an art ma^ic>
>j>
that magic could fubvert religion, that this particular
.on was a magician, and in fine, that he had com
mitted that action of magic.
The emperor Tke. i attributed 1.
illnefs to magic. Thofe who were accufed of this
crime, had no other refource left than to handle a
hot iron without being hu Thus among the
Greeks a perfon ought to have been a magician to
be able to clear himlelf cf the imputation of magic.
Such
268 T H E S P I R I T
E _ K Such was the excefs of their ftupidity, that to the
Chap. 6. m ft Dubious crime in the world, they joined the
moft dubious proofs of innocence.
Under the reign of Philip the Lcn?, the Jews
were expelled from France, being accufed of hav
ing poifoned the fprings with their lepers. So
abfurd an accufation ought very well to make us
doubt of all thofe that are founded on public hatred.
I have not here aflerted that herefy ought not to
be punifhed -, I laid only that we ought to be ex
tremely circumfpect in puniming it.
G
CHAP. VI.
Of the Crime againft Nature.
JOD forbid that I mould have the leaft incli
nation to diminim the horror people have
for a crime which religion, morality, and civil
government equally condemn. It ought to be pro-
fcribed were it only for its communicating to one
lex the weaknefies of the other, and for leading
people by a fcandalous proftitution of their youth,
to an ignominious old age. What I mall fay con
cerning it will no ways diminim its infamy, being
O . * O
levelled only againfl the tyranny tha: may abufe the
very horror we ought to have for the vice.
As the nature of this crime is fecrecy, there are
frequent inflances of its having been punifhed by
legislators upon the depofition of a child. Tl
was opening a very wide door to calumnv. " Jufti-
a /Vz, fays Procopius ( f ), publifkcd a Ic. .
Hiftory. n ifci 3 crirriC ;
" only agcirift thofe i. ~ if, after tbe
" enafthig cf that lai** li .t t^en before. o-
"
OF LAWS; 269
<c fition of a Jingle rtilnefs, fometimes of a child, 5 <? *
" / >,vj c/ a Jlave, was fufficient, e facially chap. ^
** againfl fuch as were rich, and againfl tbofe that
" we of the green faftion"
It is very odd that thefe three crimes, magic,
herefy, and that againfl nature, of which the firft
might eafily be proved not to exift at all ; the
fecond to be fufceptible of an infinite number of
diftinclions, interpretations, and limitations j the
third to be often obfcure and uncertain ; it is very
odd, I fay, that thefe three crimes fhould amongfl
us be punifhed with fire.
I may venture to affirm that the crime againfl:
nature will never make any great progrefs in fociety,
unlefs people find themfelves induced to it in other
refpects by fome particular cuftom , as among the
Greeks where the young people performed all their
exercifes naked -, as amongft us where domeftic
education is difufed -, as among the Afiatics where
particular perfons have a great number of women
whom they defpife, while others can have none at
all. Let there be no cufloms preparatory to this
crime, let it, like every other violation of morals.
be feverely profcribed by the civil magiftrate, and
nature will foon be feen to defend or refume her
rights. Nature, that tender, amiable, and loving
parent, has flrewed her pleafures with a bounteous
hand, and while me fills us with delights, me pre
pares us for future fatisfaclions of a more exquifite
kind than thofe delights themfelves.
CHAP.
270 T H E S P I R I T
C H A P. VII.
Of ti ih Yreafon.
Bo o K T T is determined by the laws of China, that who-
riT " -*- foever fliews any difrefpect to the emperor, is
&8 _ to be punilhcd with death. As they do not men
tion in what this ri. Tifts, every thing may
hnnifh a | ike a\. man s life, and to
extcrmi: -ever.
Two perfons of that country, who wrere em
ployed to the court gazette, having ^d
circumftaoces relating to a certain that
\UT<- not true -, it was pr< d that to tell a lye
in difrefpeft fiiewn to the
court, in confequftice of which re put to
(i) r.-H ] ior <]( wd h. .ver-
Tonj i.* tcp/ y n >n a niemorial iigned with
p. 43. :hr emprror, it \vas determined
th.. 1 difn :hat prince ,
\\hici, of one of the mofl terrible per-
fec tint i :r was recorded
(" Father in hi;
If th:- crime of hi b .a be erminate,
edifying this . is fuRkient to make the government dege-
letters. neratc into arbitrary power. I fhall defcant more
( j ) Book largely on this fubject, when I come to treat ( l ) of
2( > the co >n of la-
CHAP. VIII.
Of the bad Application of the Name of , *:ge and
high
I
T is likev/ife a fhocking abufe to give the ap
pellation of high treafon to an adli Jn that does
not
O F L A W S. 271
not deferve it. It was decreed by an imperial law *, E K
that thofe who called in queftion the prince s judg-
ment, or doubted of the merit of fuch as he had
chofcn tor a public office, fhould be profecuted as
guilty of facrilege -f , Surely it was the cabinet coun
cil and the favourites of the court who invented that
crime. By another law it was determined, that who-
foever made any attempt againft the minifters and
officers of the prince mould be deemed guilty of
high treafon, as if he had attempted againft the prince
himfelf ( q ). This law is owing to two princes ( r ), (<) I
celebrated in hiftory for their weaknefs-, princes who *j [i
were led by their minifters as flocks by fhcphci
princes who were flaves in the palace, children in the ( ) ArcaJ: -
i A. i c. i us & Ho-
council, itrangers to the army; princes in line, who nor
preferved their authority only by giving it away
every day. Some of thole favourites confpired
againft their emperors. Nay, they did more, they
confpired againft the empire , they called in barbar
ous nations ; and when the emperors wanted to
flop their progrefs, the ftate was fo enfeebled, as
to be under a neceffity of infringing their law, and
of expofing itfelf to the crime of high treafon in or
der to punifh thofe favourites.
And yet this is the very law which the judge
of Monfieur de Cinq-Mars built upon ( s ), when ^ ivic-
endeavouring to prove that the latter was guilty m ir s of
of the crime of high treafon for attempting to re- Tom
move Cardinal Richelieu from the miniftry, he fays,
" Crimes that aim at the perfons of mimjlers, are
* Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodofius. This is the fecond
in the Code cie Crimin. Sacril.
j- Sacnlsgii inflar ejl dubitare an is dignus f.t quern elegerit Im-
perafor. ibid. This law ferved as a model to that of Roger in
the conftitutions of Naples, Tit. 4.
* deemed
(C
C(
272 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK c d eema ly the Imperial conjlitutions^ of equal con-
Cha 8 " f e( l uence w * f b tbofe which are levelled againft the
& 9. " emperor s own f erf on. A minifier dif charges bis
duty to his prince and to his country -, to attempt
therefore to remove him, is endeavouring to deprive
t fa f ormr O f one O f fa s arm f\ an & tk e i atter O f
ft pars cor- / rr ,- , -
forts noflri P art J jts power. If even flavery herielt was to
funt The defcend upon the earth, fhe could not fpeak in any
fame law i t
of the other ^nguage.
Code ad By another law of Valentinian, Theodofius, and
J^L Arcadius ( b ), falfe coiners are declared cuilty of
iff /ill*
( b ) It is the high trealbn. But is not this confounding the ideas
9th of the of things ? Is not the very horror of high treafon di-
Theodof m ^ n ^ iet ^> ^7 g* y i n g tnat ^^nie to another crime?
deft
moaf "> C H A P. IX.
The fame Subjett continued.
PA U L I N U S having wrote to the emperor
Alexander, that " he was preparing to pro-
16 fecute for high treafon, a judge who had decided
ce contrary to his edid." The emperor anfwered,
<c that under his reign there was no fuch thing as
" indirect high treafon *. *
Fauftinian wrote to the fame emperor, that as he
had fworn by the prince s life never to pardon his
flave, he found himfelf thereby obliged to perpetu
ate his wrath left he fhould incur the guilt of high
treafon. Upon which the emperor made anfwer,
" Tour fears are groundlefs -\-, and you are a fir anger
" to my principles"
* Etiam ex aliis caujis majeflatit crimina ctffant tneo
Leg. i. eod. ad leg. Jul. Maj.
f Alienam fettfs meee folUcitudinem concefifti. Leg. 2. eod. ad
leg. Jul. Maj.
I It
O F L A W S. 273
It was determined by a fenatus-confultum ( p ), ^.j*
that whofoever melted down any of the emperor s chap. 9,
llatues which fhould happen to be rejected, fhould & 10.
not be deemed guilty of high treafon. The em - j, t h i" v in
perors Severus and Antoninus wrote to Pontius ( q ) ; ff. ad leg.
that thofe who fold unconfecrated llatues of the em- 7 ul - Ma J
peror, mould not be charged with high treafon. ^ law>
The fame princes wrote to Julius CalTianus, that if any ibid.
perfon when flinging a (lone mould by chance ftrike
one of the emperor s ftatues, he mould not be liable
to a profecution of high treafon ( r ). The Julian law /) I!
requires this fort of limitations ; for in virtue of this
law the crime of high treafon was charged not only
upon thofe who melted down the emperor s ftatues,
but likewife on thofe who committed any fuch like
action ( f ), which made it an arbitrary crime. When ( ( ) Allud ve
a number of crimes of high treafon had been efta- -
aamtjet
blifhed, they were obliged to diftinguifh the feveral Leg. 6ff.
forts. Hence Ulpian the civilian, after laying that ad i l: g>.
the accufation of hih treafon did not die with the
criminal, he adds, that this does not relate to ( f ) ( ) * n
all the treafonable a6ts eftablifhed by the Julian law, ff a j\
but only to that which implies an attempt aeainft the Jul de
^"^ f j " *
empire or againft the emperor s life.
CHAP. X.
The fame Subjefi continued.
THERE was a law pafled in England un
der Henry VIII. by which whofoever pre
dicted the king s death, was declared guilty of high
treafon. This law was very indeterminate ; the
terror of defpotic power is fo great, that it even
turns againft thofe who exercife it. In this king s
VOL. I. T laft
274 T H E S P I R I T
^ <> o K Jaft illnefs, the phyficians would not venture to
Chap. n, % ne was m danger > an d furely they acted very
12. right ( u ).
HSeeBur-
net s Hi-
ftoryof CHAP. XI.
the Refor
mation. Of Thoughts.
~\/T
J-v-L
ARSYAS dreamt that he had cut Dio-
( x ) f "- -v- nyfius s throat ( x ). Dionyfius put him to
ofDio- death, pretending that he would never have dreamt
us. of fuch a thing by night, if he had not thought of
it by day. This was a mod tyrannical action-,
for though it had been the fubject of his thoughts,
yet he had made no attempt * towards it. The
laws do not take upon them to punifh any other
than overt acts.
C H A P. XII.
Of indifcreet Speeches.
O T 1 1 1 N T G renders the crime of high trea-
fon more arbitrary than declaring people
guilty of it for indifcreet fpeeches. Speech is fo
kibjecl to interpretation ; there is fo great a differ
ence between indifcretion and malice, and frequently
fo little is there of the latter in the expreflions ufed,
that the law can hardly fubject people to a capital
punifhment for words, unleis it exprefsly declares
what words they are which render a man guilty f .
* The thought mufi be joined with fome fort of a&ion.
f Si non tale jit deliclum in quod <ve/ fcriptura legis dejcendit <vel
ad exemplum legis wndicandum eji, fays Modeilinus in the feventh
law, injf. ad leg. Jul. Maj.
2 Words
,,
OF LAWS. 275
Words do not conftitute an overt act ; they re- B >:
main only in idea. They generally, when confi-
dered by themfelves, have no determinate fignifica-
tion ; for this depends on the tone in which they
are uttered. It often happens that in repeating the
fame words, they have not the fame meaning-, this
meaning depends on their connection with other
things , and fometimes more is exprefTed by filence
than by any difcourfe whatfoever. As there can be
nothing fo equivocal and ambiguous as all this; how
is it poffible to convert it into a crime ot high tr
io n ? Where-ever this law is eftablifhed , there is an
end not only of liberty, but even of its very fhadov.-.
In the maniiefto of the late Czarina a
family of the D Olgorucky s ( y ), one of thefe r
princes is condemned to death for having uttered l ~
lome indecent words concerning her peribn , an
other for having malicioufly interpreted her lage
gulations for the welfare of the empire, and for
having offended her facred peribn by difrefpectiul
words.
Not that I pretend to diminiih the indignation
people ought to have againft thofe who preiurne
to llain the glory of their prince , what I mean
is, that if defpotic princes are willing to moderate
their power, a fimple correction would be mo.e
proper on thofe occafions, than an accufation of
high treafon, a thing always terrible even to .
cence itfclf *.
Overt acts are not things that happen eve
they are liable to the obfervation of a great many
people ; and a falfe charge in refpect to facts may
* Ncc i;th- .;um lingute ad pee nam facile trabendum ,-; . J M _-!..
in the ;th law injf. ad leg. Jul. MaJ.
T >z be
276 T H E S P I R I T
B YI? K ^ e ea ^ X Detected. Words joined to an action
Chap. 12, aflume the nature of this action. Thus a man who
& 13. goes into a public market place to incite the fubjects
to revolt, incurs the guilt of high treafon, becaufe
the words are joined to the action, and partake
of its nature. It is not the words that are punifh-
ed, but an action in which words are employed.
They do not become criminal, but when they pre
pare for, accompany, or follow a criminal action :
every thing is confounded, ii words are conftrued
as a capital crime inilcad of confidering them only
as a mark of a capital crime.
The emperors ^Thecdojius, Arcadius, and Hono-
rius wrote thus to Rurinus who was pr<ffeflus
pi\rtorio. " If a man f peaks amifs of our perfon,
44 or government, we do not for all that intend to pu-
<c nijh him * -, // he has fpoke through levity, we tnuft
* defpife him; if through folly, we mujl pity him \ and
44 // he wrongs us, we mujl forgive him. Wherefore
44 leaving things as they are, you mujl inform us ac-
" cordingly, that we way be able to judge of words by
44 per/ens, and that we may well confider whether we
t to punijh or overlook them"
C II A P. XIII.
Of Writings.
I \vriiings there is fomething more permanent
than in words , but when they are no way pre
parative to high treaion, they are not a fubject of
that crime.
* Si id ex It^iiatf. prv.-fjfrrit, (cnttmntndum eft ; /i ex injanic.,
tniferaiiane digniffimuan fi u . idvm, Leg. unica
Cod. Si quis Impcrat, malftl-.
And
O F L A W S. 277
And yet Augitftus and Tiberius fubje&ed fatyrical BOOK
writers to the fame punifhment as for having violat- Ch "
ed the law of majefty. Auguflus f c ), becaufe of(*)Tad/mfa
^^ A 1
fome libels that had been wrote againft men and wo- ^
D Hook i .
men of the firft quality , Tiberius, becaufe of thofe This con-
xvhich he fufpedled to have been wri ten againft him- tmued un-
felf. Nothing was more fatal to Roman liberty. f ]i ow j nR
Cremutius Cordus was accuftd for having called Reigns.
CafTius in his annals the laft of the Romans ( f ).
., , . firfl law in
Satyncal writings are hardly known in delpotic t h e Code
governments, where dejection of mind on the one ^/ ; -
hand, and ignorance on the other, afford neithc: Tacit,
abilities nor will to write. In democracies they ai .U.
not hindered for the very lame reafon, which caufes Book 4-
them to be prohibited in monarchies : Being gene
rally levelled againft men of power and authority,
they flatter the malignity of the people who are the
governing party. In monarchies they are forbidden,
but rather as a fubject of civil animadverfion, than
as a capital crime. They may amufe the general
malignity, pleafe the malecontents, diminilh the
envy againft public employments, give the people
patience to fuffer, and make them laugh at their
fuffe rings.
But no government is fo averfe to fatyrical writ
ings as the ariftocratical. There the magiftrates are
petty fovereigns, but not great enough to defpife
affronts. If in a monarchy a fatyrical ftroke is de-
figned againft the prince, he is placed in fuch an
eminence that it does not reach him ; but an arifto
cratical lord is pierced to the very heart. Hence
the decemvirs who formed an ariftocracy, punifhed
fatyrical writings with death ( g ). The
law of the
T 3 CHAP. Sbf?
: 7 8 T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. XIV.
Breach cf Modefty in pumjbing Crimes.
o K t~ | "^ H ERE arc rules of modefty obftrved by
almoft every nation in the world , now it
aid be very abfurd to infringe thcfe rules in the
punifhment of crimes, the principal view or which
ought always to be the eftablifhment of order.
\Vas it the intent of thofe oriental nations who
expofed women to elephants trained up for an abo
minable kind of punifhment, was it, I fay, their in
tent to eftablifh one law by the breach of another?
By an ancient cuftom of the Romans it was not
permitted to put girls to death till they were ripe
ibr marriage. Tiberius found out an expedient of
having them debauched by the executioner before
-,hey were brought to the place of puniihment ( b ) :
thus this bloody and fubtle tyrant deitroyed the mo
rals or the people to preferve their cuftoms.
When the magiftrates of Japan cauled women to
be expofed naked in the market-places, and obliged
them to go upon all four like beads, modefty was
:o!!ec- fhocked( I ) : but when they wanted to compel a
voyages mother when they wanted to force a fon -
con- I cannot proceed ; even nature herielf was ftruck
1 to with horror.
:a-
o f C H A P. XV.
} a i Ii i
company. Of the Infrancbifanent of Slaves in order to accufe
5 " their Majlcr.
A
U G U S T U S made a law that the flaws
of thofe who confpired againft his perfon,
fhould
O F L A W S. 279
fliould be fold to the public that they might depofe B K
againft their mafter ( k ). Nothing ought to be neg- chap, i -,
lected that may contribute to the difcovery of an & 16.
heinous crime , it is natural therefore that in a go- U , .J?
vernment where there are (laves they fhould be al- nus.
lowed to inform -, but they ought not to be admit
ted as witnefles.
Vindex difcovered the confpiracy that had been
formed in favour of Tarquin , but he was not ad
mitted a witnefs againft the children of Brutus. It
was right to give liberty to a perfon who had ren
dered fo great a fervice to his country; but it was
not given him in order to enable him to render this
fervice.
Hence the emperor Tacitus ordained that flaves
mould not be admitted as witnefles againft their m af
ters, even in the cafe of high treafon ( ) : a law ( )FJavius
which was not inferted in Juftinian s complement. **? m
CHAP. XVI.
Of Calumny in refpeft to the Crime of high treafon.
TO do jiiftice to the Casfars, they were not
the firft devifers of the difmal laws which
they enacted. It is Sylla * that taught them that
calumniators ought not to be punifhed , but the
thing was foon carried fo far as to reward them -J-.
* Sylla made a law of Majefty, which is mentioned in Cicero s
orations, pro Cluentio, Art. 3. in Pi/lnem, Art. 21. ad. againft
Verres, Art. 5. familiar epiftles, Book 3. Letter n. Cxfar ard
Auguftus inferted them in the Julian laws ; others made additi
ons to them.
f Et quo quis diftinftivr accufator eb magis hcnores affequeoatnr t
at veluti JacroJ an<5us erat. Tacit,
T 4 CHAP.
2So T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. XVII.
Of the repealing of Confpiracies.
B
\il 7 F *ty Aether tt s J~ of thy met her, or thy fen,
Chap. 17. or tby daughter, or the wife of tby bcfom, or tby
fi lend, which is as thine o c jcn foul, cr.tice tkee fecrcth,
, Lf t us go and ferve other god?, then /halt
furely kill him, tbov jbalt ftone him*. This law of
Deuteronomy cannot be a civil law among moft of
the nations known to us, becaufe it would pave the
way for all manner of wickednefs.
No lefs fcvere is the law of feveral countries,
vhich commands the fubjects, on pain of death, to
( iiclofe confpiracies in which they are not even fo
much as concerned. When fuch a law is eftablifhed
in a monarchical government, it is very proper it
fhould be under fome reftriclicns.
It ought not to be applied in its full feverity, but
to the ftrongeft cafes of high treafon. In thofe
countries it is of the utmoft importance not to con
found the different degrees of this crime. In Ja
pan, \vhere the laws fubvert every idea of human
reafon, the crime of concealment is applied even
to the moft ordinary cafes.
Jolloc- A certain relation ( ) makes mention of two
tion of young ladies, who were fhut up ior life in a box
con- thick fet with pointed nails, one for having had a
tribareJto love intrigue, and the other for not difdofing it.
the
bli/hmc
.- ne Deuteron. chap. MU. ^ 6.
India
company.
Book 5.
Part 2.
p. 423. CHAP.
O F L A W S. 281
CHAP. XVIII.
How dangerous it is in Republics to be too fevers in
tbe Crime of high Treafon.
A
S foon as a republic has compafled the de- Boor
ftruclion of thole who wanted to fubvert it, Ch j g
there fhould be an end of examples, punimments,
and even of rewards.
Greatpunimments,andconfequentlygreatchanges,
cannon take place without inverting fome citizens
with too great a power. It is therefore more
advifeable in this cafe to exceed in lenity, than in
feverity -, to banifh bur few, rather than many; and
to leave them their eftatcs, rarher than to make a
great number of confifcations. Under pretence of
avenging the republic s caufe, the avengers would
eftablifh tyranny. The bufmefs is not to deftroy
the rebel but the rebellion. They ought to return
as quick as poffible into the ufual track of govern
ment, in which every one is protected by the laws,
and no one injured.
We find in Appian ( p ), the edicl: and formula (P) Of the
of the profcriptions. One would imao-ine that they C:vi1 , war
, , j r ur Book 4.
had no other aim than the good or the republic,
fo cooly they fpeak, fo many advantages they point
out, fo preferable are the means they take to
others, fuch fecurity they promife to the rich, fuch
tranquillity to the poor, fo afraid they feem to be of
endangering the lives of the fubjefts, fo defirous
of appeafmg the foldiers : a dreadful example,
which fhews how near fevere punifhments border
upon tyranny.
The
282 THE SPIRIT
BOOK Th e Greeks fet no bounds to the vengeance they
XII
Chap is, too k f tyrants or of thofe they fufpeded of ty-
& 19. ranny ; they put their children to death ( ), nay
IfS"* Ibmetimes five of their neareft relations * ; and they
cam. Ro- profcribed an infinite number of families. By this
man An- means their republics fufTered the moft violent
book s "" fl 10 ^ i exiles or the return of the exiled were
always epochas that indicated a change of the con-
llitution.
The Romans had more fenfe. When CafTius was
put to death for having aimed at tyranny, the
qucftion was propofed whether his children fhould
undergo the fame tare : but they were preferred.
( k )Books, " 7 /vv, fays Dionyfius HalicarnalTeus ( k ), :
" wanted to < i at t be end of tbe A/
fian mid . -nd to e: from public
offices of tbofe ii bo bad been prefer:
by . -b to blame"
* i.
1C
C H A P. XIX.
In ic bat manner tbs Ufc of Liberty is Jufpended in a
Rcpid .
I.:ountrie3 where liberty is moft efteemed, there
are laws by which a fingle perfon is deprived of
it, in order to preferve it for the whole commu
nity. Such are in England what they call Eilh of
Attainder -f~. Thefe are relative to thole Athenian
u pf :xin:cs cognatlcne
. Cic. cie Invent, lib. 2.
f The anther ofr the Continuation of Rapin Thoyras define^
A L , a ientence v. hich upon being approved by
the two houfes and iigned by the king paiTcs into an ad. whereby
the party accufed is declared guilty of high treafon without any
other formal:. without appea 1 , Tom. 2. p. 266.
laws
OF LAWS. 283
laws by which a private perfon was condemned *, B K
provided they were made by the unanimous fufFrage
of fix thoufand citizens. They are relative alib to .v 20.
thofe laws which were made at Rome againfl pri
vate citizens, and were called privileges -J-. Thefe
were never patted but in the great meetings of the
people But in what manner foever they are en
acted, Cicero is for having them abolifhed, be-
caufe the force of law confifts in its being made
for the whole community J. I muft own, not-
withftanding, that the practice ot the freed nation
that ever exifted, induces me to think that there are
cafes in which a veil fhould be drawn for a while
over liberty, as it was cuitomary to veil the ftatues
of the Gods.
CHAP. XX.
Of Laws favourable to the Liberty of tbe Subjefi i,i a
Republic
IN popular governments it often happens that
accufations are carried on in public, and every
man is allowed to accufe whomfoever he pleafes.
This rendered it neceflary to eftablifh proper laws in
order to protect the innocence of the fubject. At
Athens if an accufer had not the fifth part of the
votes on his fide, he was obliged to pay a fine of , r
a thoufand drachms. ^Efchines who accufed Ctefi-
phon, was condemned to pay this fine ( r ).
Rome a falfe accufer was branded with infamy , the So-
by marking the letter K on his forehead. Guards
of
* Legem de finguhri aliquo ne rogato nifi lex millibus ita vifum. nes. See
Ex Andocide de Myfteriis. This is what they called Oitracifm. likewife
f De privis hominibus latae, Cieero de Leg. lib 3. Plutarch
J Scitum eft juflum in omneSj Cicero ibid. and Pbo-
By the Remmian Law, were cms.
284 T H E S P I R I T
B Xli K WCre a ^ a PP ointed to wa tch the accufer, in order
Chap. 21. to prevent his corrupting either the judges or the
(* Flu- whnefles( d ).
^ a ^; I have already taken notice of that Athenian and
ent tied. Rom;:n law, by which the party accufed was allowed
Ho a t o withdraw before judgment was pronounced.
*& CHAP. XXI.
from
.../,,. Of the Cruelty of Laws in ttfftS to debtors in a
Repubh.
G
JR E A T is the fuperiority which one fellow-
fubject has already over another, by lending
him money, which the latter borrows in order to
fpend, and of courfe has no longer in his pofiellion.
"What mud be the confequence if the laws of a re
public make a farther addition to this fervitude and
fubjection ?
At Athens and Rome * it was at firft permitted
to fell fuch debtors as were infolvent. Solon re-
drefTed this abufe at Athens ( c ) , by ordaining that
- I] k no man s body mould anfwer for his civil debts. But
the decemvirs -j- did not reform the fame cuftom
Rome ; and though they had Solon s regulation
before their eyes, yet they did not chufe to follow it.
This is not the only paiTage of the law of the twelve
tables, in which the decemvirs fhew their defign of
checking the fpirit of democracy.
Often did thofe cruel laws againft debtors throw
the Roman republic into danger. A man all covered
* A great many Ibid their children to pay their debts. Plu
tarch, life of Solon.
f It appears from hiitory that this cuftom was eftablifhed
among the Romans before th law of the twelve tables. Lity I.
dec. book 2.
with
OF LAWS. 285
with wounds, made his efcape from his creditor s BOOK
XII
houfe, and appeared in the forum ( l ). The peo Q UP 22
pie were moved with this fpedacle, and other citi- ( ) bionyf.
zens whom their creditors durft no longer confine, ^ " iar>
. , Rom. An-
emerged from their dungeons. They had prormles t ,-q.
made them, which were all broke. The people \ i -
upon this having withdrawn to the Sacred Mount,
obtained, not an abrogation of thofe laws, but a
magiftrate to defend them. Thus they quitted a
flate of anarchy, but were foon in danger of falling
into tyranny. Manlius to render himfelf popular,
was going to fet thofe citizens at liberty, who had
been reduced to flavery by their inhuman credi
tors ( ). Manlius s defigns were prevented, but /)
without remedying the evil. Particular laws faci- * !
litated to debtors the means of paying ( s ), and in the c.imillus.
year of Rome 428 theconfuls propoled a law* which ( s ) ^ e
deprived creditors of the power of confining their \" ^ ^
debtors in their own houfcs -f-. An ufurer, by name the 24th
Papirius* attempted to corrupt the chaftity of a cha P^r of
j r> 77- u u i the book
young man named Publius, whom he kept in irons. O f j au . s ^
Sextus s crime gave to Rome its political liberty ; relative to
that of Papirius gave it alfo the civil. ^ n u e fe of
Such was the fate of this city, that new crimes
confirmed the liberty, which thofe of a more ancient
date had procured it. dppius s attempt upon Vir
ginia, flung the people ?.gain into that horror againfl
tyrants with which the misfortune of Lucretia had
firfl infpired them. Thirty feven years after ( h ) the (>>) The
crime of the infamous Papirius^ an action of the > ear of
Rome
fc One hundred and twenty years after the law of the twelve
tables, eo anno plebi Roman*, velut aliud initium libertatit faftum
sjl quod nf&i dejierunt. Livy lib. 8.
f JBena debitcris, non corpus cbnoxium ejftt. Ibid.
like
286
BOOK
XII.
Chap. 22.
(_=., See a
fragment
of Dionyf.
Hali earn.
in the ex-
traft of
virtue -
and vices,
Livy s
epitome,
book
V V Frein-
(hemi
book 2.
THE SPIRIT
like criminal nature * was the caufe of the people s
retiring to the Janiculum ( e ), and of giving new
vigor to the law made for the fafety of debtors.
Since that time creditors were oftener profecuted
by debtors for having \ d the laws againft
uiury, than the latter were fued for refilling to pay
them.
C II A P. XXII.
Of things ti- iit ftrik?. at L
LI B V. R T Y has been often weakened in
monarchies by a thing of the lead ufe in the
world to the prince : this is the naming of com-
rninioners to try a private per Ion.
The prince himfelt derives fo very little advan
tage from thofe commillioners, that it is not worth
while to change tor their fake the common courfe of
things, lie is morally fure that he has more of
the Ipirit of probity and juftice than his commiffion-
ers, who always think themfelves fufficiently juftified
by his orders, by a dubious intereft of ftate, by the
choice that has been made of them, and even by
their very apprehenfions.
Upon the arraigning of a peer under Henry VIII.
it was cuftomary to try him by a committee of the
houfe of lords : by this means he put to death as
many peers as he pleaitd.
" That of Plautiu; who made an attempt upon the body of
Thefe two events
:t not to he c ,:her the lame peribns,
nv.
C H A P.
O F L A W S. 287
CHAP. XXIII.
Of Spies in Monarchies.
SHOULD I be afked whether there is any ne- BOOK
ceffity for fpies in monarchies -, my anfwer XI1 -
would be, that the ufual practice of good princes is
not to employ them. When a man obeys the laws,
he has difcharged his duty to his prince. He ought
at leaft to have his own houfe for an afylum, and
the reft of his conduct fhould be exempt from in
quiry. The fpying-trade might perhaps be tolera
ble, were it practikd by honell men -, but the ne-
ceflary infamy of the perfon is fufficient to make us
judge of the infamy of the thing. A prince ought
to act towards his fubjects with candor, franknefs,
and confidence. He that has fo much difquiet, fuf-
picion and fear, is an actor embarraffed in playing
his part. When he finds that the laws are generally
obferved and reflected, he may judge himfelf fafe.
The general behaviour of the public anfwers for that
of every individual. Let him not be afraid : he
ctnnot imagine how natural it is for his people to
love him. And how ihould they do otherwife than
love him ? fince he is the fource of almofl all the
favours that are fhewn ; punifhments being ge
nerally charged to the account of the laws. He
never fhevvs himfelf to his people but with a ferene
countenance ; they have even a mare of his glory,
and they are protected by his power. A proof of
his being beloved is that his fubjects have a con
fidence in him ; what the minifter refufes, they
imagine the prince would have granted : even
under public calamities they do not accufe his per
fon ;
288 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK f on . tne y are apt to complain of his being mifm-
Chap. 24. f rmc d> or befet by corrupt men : Did the prince
lut know, fay the people ; thefe words are a kind
of invocation and a proof of the confidence they
have in his per fun.
T
C H A P. XXIV.
Of Anon\mous Letters.
H E Tartars arc obliged to put their names
to their arrows, that the arm may be known
that fhoots them. When Philip of Macedon was
wounded ac the fiege of a certain town, thefe words
were found on the javelin, After has given this mor-
tal wound to Philip ( c ). If they who accufe a per-
Mo-als ^ on ^ * c mere ty to f crve tnc Public, they would
Campari- not carry their complaint to the prince, who may be
jonoffome ea f,iy prejudiced, but to the magiftrates who have
and Greek ru ^ es tnat are formidable only to calumniators. But
Hijiorus, if they are unwilling to leave the laws open between
tom g 2 " them and the accufed, it is a prefumption they have
reafon to be afraid of them ; and the leaft punilh-
ment they ought to fuffer, is not to be credited. Nft
notice therefore mould ever be taken of thofe letters
but in cafes that cannot admit of the delays of the
ordinary courle ot jufticc, and where the prince s
welfare is concerned. Then it may be imagined that
the accufer has made an effort which has untied his
tongue and made him fpeak. But in other cafes one
ought to fay with the emperor Conftantiuj :
(*) Le g- " cannot fufpeft a per fon who has wanted an accufer y
Theod. " wbilft be did not want an rnemy ( d )."
tie Fam.
LiM "- CHAP.
O F L A W S. 2? 9
CHAP. XXV.
Of the manner of governing in Monarchies.
THE royal authority is a great fpring that ^ K
ought to move eafily and without nolle, chap. :-,
The Chinele boaft of one of their emperors, who \
governed, thry fay, like the heavens, that is, by
his example.
There are fome cafes in which a fovereign ought
to exert the full extent of his power , and others in
which he ought to reduce it within its proper limits.
The fublimity of adminirtration confiits in know
ing perfectly the proper degree of power, that
mould be exerted on different occalions.
The whole felicity of our monarchies confifts in
the opinion people have of the lenity of the govern
ment. A wrong-headed minifter always wants
to remind us of our flavery. But granting even
that we are flaves, he ought to endeavour to
conceal our miferable condition from us. All he
can fay or write, is that the prince is uneafy, that
he is furprifed, and that he will fet things to rights.
There is a certain eafe in commanding , the prince
ought only to encourage, and leave the menacing
part to the laws *.
CHAP. XXVI.
That in a Monarchy the Prince ought to be of eafy
Accejs.
r HE utility of this maxim will appear bet
ter from the inconveniency attending the
* Nerva, fays Tacttxf, encreafed the eafe of the empire.
VOL. I. U contrary
290 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK contrary practice. " The Czar Peter I. SAYS THE
Chap z". " Si EUR PERRY ( f ), to publijhed a new edit?, by
() State of" W&/V& ke forbids any of his fubjefts to offer kirn
Ruflia p. a ^ -petition till after having prefented it to two of
edition, " bis officers. In cafe of a refufal of juftice they may
1717. l( prefent him a third, but upon pain of death if they
" arc in the wrong. After this no one ever pre fumed
" to offer a petition to the Czar."
CHAP. XXVII.
Of the Manners of a Monarch.
Til E manners of a prince contribute as
much as the laws themiclvcs to liberty j like
th<Tr he may transform men into beafts, and beafts
into men. It he likes free and noble fouls, he will
have fubjccts ; if he likes bafe and daftardly fpirits,
he v,ill have (laves. Does he want to know the
great art of ruling r Let him call honor and
virtue around his perfon, let him invite perfo-
nal merit. He may even fometimes caft an eye
on talents and abilities. Let him not be afraid
of thole rivals who are called men of merit ;
he is their equal as foon as he loves them. Let
him gain the hearrs of his people without bring
ing their Ipirits into fubjec"lion. Let him render
himfelf popular ; he ought to be pleafed with the
affection of the loweft of his fubjects, for they
too are men. The common people require fo
very little deference, that it is fit they mould be
humoured ; the infinite didance between the fove-
reign and them will furely prevent them from giving
him any uneafmels. Let him be exorable to fuppli-
cation, and refolute againil demands ; Jet him be
fenfible,
OF LAWS. 2 9 f
fenfible, in fine, that his people have his refufals, SOOK
while his courtiers enjoy his favours. CW JS.
CHAP. XXVIII.
Of the Regard which Monarch* oive to their Subjects *
PRINCES ought to be extremely circum-
fpect in point of raillery. It pleads with mo
deration, becaufe it opens the way to familiarity ;
but a biting raillery is lefs excufable in them than
in the meaneft of their fubjects, for it is they alone
that give a mortal wound.
Much lefs ought they to offer a notorious infuk
to any of their fubjecls ; kings were inftituted to
pardon, and to punifh, but never to infuk.
When they infult their fubjects, their treatment is
more cruel than that of the Turk or the Mufcovite.
The infults of the latter are a humiliation, not a
difgrace , but both muft follow from the infults of
the former.
Such is the prejudice of the eaftern nations, that
they look upon an affront coming from the prince,
as the effect of paternal goodnefs -, and fuch on the
contrary is our way of thinking, that to the cruel
vexation of being affronted, we join the defpair of
ever being able to wipe off the difgrace.
Princes ought to be overjoyed to have fubjects to
whom honor is dearer than life, an incitement to
fidelity as well as to courage.
They mould remember the misfortunes that have
happened to princes for infulting their fubjecls, the
revenge of Chorea, of the eunuch Narfes, of count
Julian^ and in fine of the dutchefs of Montpenfier^
who being enraged againft Henry III. for having
U 2 publiihed
292 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK published tome of her private failings, plagued him
Chap. ^9. allhis life
C II A P. XXIX.
Of the civil Laws proper for mixing a little Liberty
in a defpotic Government.
T
HOUGH defpotic governments are of their
own nature every where the fame ; yet from
circumftanccs, from an opinion of religion, from
prejudice, from received examples, from a particu
lar turn of mind, from manners or morals, it is pof-
fiblc they may admit of a confiderable difference.
It is uJeful thatfome particular notions mould be
eftablifhed in thole governments, thus in China
the prince is confide red as the father of his people;
and at the commencement of the empire of the
Arabs, the prince was their preacher*.
It is proper there fhould be fome facred book t
ferve for a rule, as the Koran among the Arabs,
the books oi /.i.ioaiter among the Perfians, the
Vedam among the Indians, and the claflic Books
among the Chinefe. The religious code fupplies
the civil one, and directs the arbitrary power.
It is not at nil amifs that in dubious cafes the
Hiftory judges (honld conlult the minifters of religion
oftheTar- jrj uls in j ur ky tnr Cadis CO niult the Mollachs.
tar5, ^u -^ . . .... -
. p> But it it iv. .i <:,i| it.il crime, it may be proper for
in the particular ji-dgi 1 , if fuch there be, to take the
rC governor s advice, to the end that the civil and
Miallk powei ma) be tempered allo by the
political authority.
Hie C
C H A P.
OF LAWS. 293
C"H A P. XXX.
T be fame Subject continued.
NOTHING but the very excefs and fury of BOOK
defponc power ordained that the father s ,
difgrace fhould drag after it that of his wife and
children. They are wretched enough already with
out being criminals : befides, the prince ought to
leave fuppliants or mediators between himfelf and
the acculed, to affwage his wrath, or to inform his
juftice.
It is an excellent cuftom of the Maldivians ( ), ( F ) See
that when a lord is difgraced, he goes every day to
pay his court to the king till he is taken again in:o
tavour : his prefence dilarms the prince s wrath.
In fome defpotic governments * they have a
notion that it is trefpafling againft the refpecl: due
to their prince, to fpeak to him in favour of a per-
fon in difgrace. Thefe princes feem to ufe all their
endeavours to deprive themfelves of the virtue of
clemency.
Arcadius and Honcrius, in a law ( h ) which we , h v
have already defcanted upon ( ), pofitively declare fifth
that they will mew no favor to thofe who fhall m thecod -
prefume to petition them in behalf of the guilty ( k ). %/. jjjfy
This was a very bad law indeed, fmce it is bad even (0 In the
under a defpotic government. f"
r ter of this
The cuftom or Perfia, which permits every man book.
that pleafes, to leave the kinp-dom, is excellent j ( Frede -
nc copied
* As at prefent in Perfia, according to Sir John Chardin ; ^ 1S law ft in
r oniti-
this cuftom is very ancient They put Cav iys Procopius,
in the caftle of oblivion ; there is a law which forbids any one ^
to fpeak of thofe who are fruit up, or even to mention their | s a P les
name. book
U 3 and
THE S P I Pv I T
BOOK anc j though the contrary practice derives its origin
Chap 30 fr m defpotic power, which has always looked upon
fubjects as Haves *, and thofe who quit the country
as fugitives, yet the Perfian practice is ufeful even
to a defpotic government, becaufe the apprehenfion
of the flight, or of the withdrawing of debtors, puts
a Hop to, or moderates the opprefTions of bafhaws
and extortioners.
In monarchies there is generally a law which forbids thofe
who arc inverted with public employments to go out of the king-
dom without rli, prince s lea^ r. This law ought to be eftablifhed
alfo in republics Rut in thofc that have particular inlUtutions
fhc prohibition ought to be general, in order to prevent the
introdudUon of foreign manners.
BOOK
O F L A W S. 295
<HMMk*WNt4MM^
BOOK XIII.
Of the Relation which the levying of
Taxes and the Greatmfs of the public
Revenues have to Liberty.
CHAP. I.
Of the State Revenues.
TH E revenues of the ftate are a portion that BOOK
each fubject gives of his property, in order
to lecure, or to have the agreeable enjoyment of,
the remainder.
To fix thefe revenues in a proper manner, regard
mould be had both to the necefTtties of the ftate and
to thofe of the fubject. The real wants of the peo
ple ought never to give way to the imaginary wants
of the ftate.
Imaginary wants are thofe which flow from the
paflions, and from the weaknefs of the governors,
from the charms of an extraordinary project, from
the diftempered defire of vain glory, and from a
certain impotency of mind incapable of withftand-
ing the attacks of fancy. Often has it happened
that minifters of a reftlefs difpofition, have imagined
that the wants of the ftate were thofe of their own
little and ignoble fouls.
There is nothing requires more wifdom and
prudence than the regulatiqn of that portion which
is taken from, and of that which is left to, the
fubjecl:.
U 4 The
296 THE SPIRIT
BOOK T ne public revenues are not to be meafured by
what the people are able, but by what they ought,
to give ; and if they are meafured by what they are
able to give, it ought to be at leall by what they
are able to give for a confbncy.
CHAP. II.
That it is bad Reafoning to fay that the Greatnefs cf
Taxes is good in its c-:n Mature.
T\ \ K R E have been inftances in particular
monarchies, of fmall ilates exempt from
taxes, that have been as miferable as the circumja
cent phues which groaned under the weight of ex-
ns. The chief rcaibn of this is , that the
fmall Hate can Ifardly have any fuch thing as in-
duftry, arts, or manufactures, becaufe in this refpect
it lies under athoufand reftraints from the great (late
in which it is inclofed. The great ftate that fur-
rounds it, is blefied with indt.ftry, manufactures,
and arts ; and eftablifhes laws by which thole feve-
ral advantages are procured. The petty ftate be
comes therefore necerTarily poor, let it pay ever fo
few taxes.
And yet fome have concluded from the poverry
of thofe petty ftates, that in order to render the
people induftrious, they fhould be loaded with
taxes. But it would be a much better conclufion
to fay that they ought to have no taxes at all. None
live here but wretches who retire from the neigh
bouring parts to avoid working ; wretches who dif-
heartened by pain and toil make their whole felicity
confift in idlenefs.
The
OF LAWS.
297
The effect of wealth in a country is to infpire BOOK
every heart with ambition : the effect of poverty is ch
to give birth to defpair. The former is excited by & 4.
labour, the latter is foothed by indolence.
Nature is juft to all mankind-, fhe rewards them
for their induftry ; whilft fhe renders them induftri-
ous by annexing rewards in proportion to the great-
nefs of their labour. But it an arbitrary power de
prives people of the recompenfes of nature, they
fall into a difrelifh of induftry, and then indolence
and inaction feem to be their only happincfs.
CHAP. III.
Of Taxes in Countries where Part of tie People are
Villains or Bondm.n.
THE ftate of villainage is fometimes eftablifh-
ed after a conqueft. In that cafe the bond
man or villain that tills the land, ought to have a
kind of partnerfhip with his mafter. Nothing but
a communication ofiofs or profit can reconcile thole,
who are doomed to labour, with thole who are
blefied with a ftate of affluence.
CHAP. IV.
Of a Republic in the like Cafe.
WH E N a republic has reduced a nation to
the drudgery of cultivating her lands, flie
ought never to fuffer the free fubject to have a
power of increafing the tribute of the bondman. This
was not permitted at Sparta. Thofe brave people
thought the Helotes (*) would be more indurtrious (i) r
in cultivating their lands, upon knowing that their tarch -
fervitude
THE SPIRIT
1. . K fervitude was not to increafe , they imagined like-
Xlif
rv,, wife that the mafters would be better citizens when
V^nap. f,
& 6. they defired no more than what they were accuftom-
ed to enjoy.
CHAP. V.
Of a Monarchy in the like Cafe.
WHEN the nobles of a monarchical ftate
caufe the lands to be cultivated for their
own ufe by a conquered people, they ought never
to have a power of increafing the fervice or tribute*.
Bcfides it is right the prince fhould be fatisfied with
his own demefne and the military fervice. But if he
wants to raife taxes on the bondmen of his nobility,
the lords of the fevcral diftricts ought to be an-
fwerable for the tax -f, and be obliged to pay it for
the bondmen, by whom they may be afterwards re-
imburfed. But if this rule is not followed, the
Jord and the collectors of the prince s taxes will
harafs the poor bondman by turns^ till he perifhes
with mifery or flies into the woods.
CHAP. VI.
Of a defpotic Government in the like Cafe.
WHAT has been above faid, is ftill more
indifpenfably neceflary in a defpotic go
vernment. The lord who is every moment liable
to be dripped of his lands and bondmen, is not fa
eager to preferve them.
* This is what induced Charlemagne to make his excellent in-
ftitutions upon this head. See the 5th book of the Capitularies,
art. 303.
f This is th pra&ke in Germany.
When
OF LAWS. 299
When Peter I. thought proper to follow the cuf- B x K
torn of Germany, and to demand his taxes in mo- chap ^
ney, he made a very prudent regulation which is ftill & 7.
followed in Ruflia. The gentleman levies the tax
on the peafants, and pays it to the Czar. If the
number of peafants diminifhes, he pays all the fame;
if it increases, he pays no more : fo that it is his
intereft not to worry or opprefs his vafTals.
CHAP. VII.
Of Taxes in Countries where Villainage is not efta-
blijhed.
WHEN the inhabitants of a ftate are all
free fubjedls, and each man enjoys his pro
perty with as much right as the prince his Ibvereignty,
taxes may then be laid either on perfo.ns, on lands, on
merchandifes, on two of thefe, or on all three together.
In the taxing of perfons, it would be an unjuft
proportion to conform exactly to that of property.
At Athens the ( c ) people were divided into four ( e ) Pollux
clafles. Thofe who drew five hundred meafures of b ok
liquid or dry fruit from their eftates, paid a * ta- art . \^ Q *
lent to the public -, thofe who drew three hundred
meafures, paid half a talent ; thofe who had two
hundred meafures paid ten minre ; thofe of the
fourth clafs paid nothing at all. The tax was fair,
though it was not proportionable : if it did not fol
low the proportion of people s property, it fol
lowed that of their wants. It was judged that
every man had an equal want of the neceffaries of
nature , and that the neceffaries of nature ought not
* Or 60 minje.
3 to
300 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK to b e taxed ; that to this fucceeded the ufeful,
- u hich ought to be taxed, but Jefs than the fuper-
fiuous , and that the largenefs of the raxes on what
was fuperfluous prevented fuperfluity.
In the taxing ot" lands, it is cuftnmary ro make
lifts or regifters in which the different dalles of
eftates are ranged. But it is very difficult to know
thele differences, and Hill more fo to find people
that are not interefted in miftaking them. Here
therefore are two foils of mjuftice, that of the man
and that ot the thii Rut if in general the tax be
not exorbitant, and the people continue to have
nry of neceiTanes, thefcr particular acts of injuftice
will do no harm. On the contrary, if the people
are permitted to enjoy only jufl: what is necelTary for
fubfiftence, the leaft disproportion will be of the
greateft confequence.
It fome (ubje&s do not pay enough, the mil-
chief is not fo great , their convenience and eafe
turn always to the public advantage : if fome pri
vate people pay too much, their ruin redounds to
tlie public detriment. If the government propor
tions its fortune to that of individuals, the eafe
and conveniency of the latter will foon make its
fortune rife. The whole depends upon a critical
moment : mall the (late begin with impoverifhing
the fubjefts to enrich itfelf ? Or had it better \vait
to be enriched by its wealthy fubjects ? Is it more
advifeable for it to have the firft, or the fecond ad
vantage ? Which fhall it chufe, to begin, or to
end, with being rich ?
The duties felt leaft by the people are thofe on
merchandize, becaufe they are not demanded of them
in form. They may be fo prudently managed, that
the
O F L A W S. 301
the people themfelves mall hardly know they pay BOOK
them. For this purpofe it is of the utmoft confe- Ch
quence that the perfon who fells the merchandize
fhould pay the duty. He is very fenfible thac he does
not pay it for himfelf ; and the confumer who pays
it in the main, confounds it with the price. Some
authors have obferved that Nero had abolifhed the
duty of the five and twentieth part arifmg from
the fale of (laves *j and yet he had only ordained
that it mould be paid by the feller inftead of the
purchafer : this regulation, which left the import
intire, feemed neverthelefs to fupprefs it.
There are two dates in Europe where there
are very heavy imports upon liquors ; in one the
brewer alone pays the duty, in the other it is levied
indifcriminately upon all the confumers : in the firft
no body feels the rigor of the import, in the fecond
it is looked upon as a grievance. In the former the
fubjecl: is fenfible only of the liberty he has of not
paying, in the latter he feels only the necefilty that
compels him to pay.
Farther, the obliging the confumers to pay, re
quires a perpetual rummaging and fearching into
their houfes. Now nothing is more contrary than
this to liberty , and thofe who eftablifh thefe forts
of duties, have not furely been fo happy in this re-
fped, as to hit upon the beft method of admini-
ftration.
* Veftigal quintee 5" vicefinue venalium truwcipiorum remtjjum
fpetie magis quam vr, quia cum i>enditor pendere jubcretur, in far-
tern pretii emftorihus accrefcebat. Tacit. Annal. lib. 13.
CHAP.
302 T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. VIII.
In what manner the Hlufion is preferred.
BOOK N order to make the purchafer confound the
A
the impoft, ther
mud be fome proportion between the impoft and
the value of the commodity -, wherefore there ought
not to be an r.vi . fTive duty upon merchandizes of
little value. Then: are countries in which the duty
exceeds (even teen or eighteen times the value of the
commodity. In this cafe the prince removes the il-
hilion: his fubjecls plainly fee they are dealt with
in an unit ilonable manner; which renders them
mod c-xquifitcly lenfible of their flavifh fituation.
liefidcs the prince to be able to levy a duty fo
dilproportioned to the value of the commodity,
mud be himielf the vender, and the people rnuft
not have it in their power to purchafe itelfewhere:
a practice fubject to a thonfand inconveniencies.
Smuggling being in this cafe extremely lucrative,
the natural and mod reafonable penalty, namely, the
confifcation of the merchandize, becomes incapable
of putting a flop to it, efpecially as this very mer
chandize is intrinfically of an inconfiderable value.
Recourfe mud therefore be had to extravagant pu-
nifhments, fucK as thofe inflicted for capital crimes.
All proportion then of punifhment is at an end.
People that cannot really be confidered as bad men,
are punimed like villains ; which of all things in the
world, is the mod contrary to the fpirit of a mo
derate government.
Again, the more the people are tempted to cheat
the farmer of the revenues, the more the latter is
enriched,
O F L A W S. 303
enriched, and the former impoverifhed. To put **
a flop to fmugghng, the farmer muft be invefted Q iap- ^
with extraordinary means of oppreflin^, and then & 10.
the country is ruined.
CHAP. IX.
Of a bad kind of I in pod.
WE (hall here take Tome curfory notice of
an impoft laid in particular countries on
the different articles of civil contracts. As thcle
are things fubject to very nice difquifitions, a va
deal of knowledge is necefiury to make any tole
rable defence againll the farmer of the revenues,
who interprets, in that cafe, the regulations of the
prince, and exercites an arbitrary power over peo
ple s fortunes. Experience has demonftrated that a
duty on the paper on which the deeds are drawn,
would be of far greater fervice.
CHAP. X.
That the Greatnefs of Taxes depends on the Nature
of the Government.
TAXES ought to be very light in defpotic
governments , otherwiie who would be at
the trouble of tilling the land ? Befides, how is ic
poflible to pay heavy taxes in a government that
makes no manner of return to the different contri
butions of the fubject ?
The exorbitant power of the prince, and the ex
treme deprefTion Of the people, require that there
Ihould not be even a poffibilicy of the leaft miftake
between them. The taxes ought to be fo eafy
to
304 T H E S F I R I T
B K to colled, and Ib clearly fettled, as to leave no
Chap, io, opportunity for the collectors to increaie or dimi-
i n. nifh them. A portion of the fruits of the earth,
a capitation, a ducy of fo much per cent, on mer
chandizes, are the only taxes fuitable to that go
vernment.
Merchants in defpotic countries ought to have a
perfonal fateguard, to \vhich ail due refpecl fhould
be paid. Without this they would ftand no chance
in the difputes that might arile between them and
the prince s officers.
w
C II A P. XI.
Of fifcal r ts.
I Til rdpecl to final punifhments, there
is one thing very particular, that contrary
to the general cuftom, they are more fevere in
Europe than in Afu. In Europe not only the
merchandizes, but even ibmetimes the mips and
carriages are confifcated -, which is never practifed
in Afia. This is becaufe in Europe the merchant
has judges, who are able to flicker him from op-
prefTion ; in Afia the defpotic judges themfelves
\vould be the greatelt oppreflbrs. \Vhat remedy
could a merchant have agair.ft a bailiaw that was
determined to confifcate his merchandizes ?
The prince therefore rdtrains his own pow
er, finding himfelf under a neceiTity of acting
with fome kind of lenity. In Turky they raife
only a Tingle duty for the importation of goods,
and afterwards the whole country is open to the
( ) Father merchant. Smuggling is not attended with confif-
cation, or increafe of duty. In China ( ) they ne
ver
O F L A W S. 305
ver open the baggage of thofe who are not mer- B K
chants. Defrauding the cuftoms in the r. rri ory of Ch: J^
the Mogul is not punifhed with confifcadon, but & 12.
with doubling the duty. The princes of ( b ) Tar- -*\ Hiitory
tary who refide in towns, impofe fcarce any duty at Jjf ^
all on the goods that pafs through their country. rt .&]
In Japan, it is true, the defrauding of the cuftoms p. 290.
is a capital crime , but this is becaufe they have
particular reafons for prohibiting all communication
v/ith foreigners , hence the fraud is rather a con
travention of the laws made for the fecurity of the
government, than thofe of commerc
C H A
Relation between the Great/ " of Tc.xes and Liberty.
IT is a general rule, th *xes nay be heavier
in proportion to the liberty of the fubject, and
that there is a necefllty for reducing them in pro
portion to the increafe of finery, i hL has al
ways been and always wiU be the cafe. It is a
rule derived from nature that never varies. We
find it in all parts, in England, in Holland, and
in every (late where liberty gradually declines till
we come to Turky. Swifierland feems to be an ex
ception to this rule, becaufe they pay no taxes ^ but
the particular realbn for that exemption is well
* Being willing to trade with foreigners without having any
communication with them, they have pitched upon two nations
for that purpofe, the Dutch for the commerce of Europe, and the
Chinefe for that of Afia ; they confine the factors and failors in
a kind of prilbn, and lay fuch a reilraint upon them as tires their
patience.
VOL. I. X known,
3 o6 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK known, and even confirms what I have advanced.
Chap i2 ^ n t-hok barren mountains provifions are To dear,
and the country is fo populous, that a Swifs pays
four times more to nature, than a Turk does to
the Sultan.
A conquering people, fuch as were formerly the
Athenians and the Romans, may rid thcmlelves of
all taxes, as they reign over vanquished nations.
Then indeed they do not pay in proportion to their
liberty, becaufe in this refpecl they are no longer a
people, but a monarch.
But the f -,,-neral rule ftill holds good. In mode
rate governments there is an indemnity for the
weight of the taxes, which is liberty. In defpotic
countri * there is an equivalent for liberty, which
is the lightnels of the taxes.
In ibme monarchies in Europe, there are -f* par
ticular provinces, which from the very nature of
their civil government are in a more flourifhing
condition than the reft. It is pretended that thefe
provinces are not fufRciently taxed, becaufe through
the gcodnefs of their government they are able to
be ; higher: hence the miniflers feem conilantly
to aim at depriving them of this very government,
from whence a <.: e blefiing is derived ; a bleff-
ing which fpreads its influence todiftant parts, and
redounds even to the prince s advantage.
In he tax ut fmall ; thev have been increafed
iie prince is exercifcd v.ith more mo-
tha T.irt.ir-;. rt.
% ujioi-o the Itates of the province afTemble
C H A P.
O F L A W S. 307
CHAP. XIII.
In what Governments Taxes are capable of Increaft.
^AXES may be increafed in moft republics, BOOK
^ becaufe the citizen, who thinks he is paying
himfelf, willingly fubmits to them, and moreover & ^
is generally able to bear their weight through an
effect of the nature of the government.
In a monarchy taxes may be increafed, becaufe
the moderation of the government is capable of
procuring riches : it is a recompence, as it were, of
the prince for the refpecl; he mews to the laws. In
defpotic governments they cannot be increafed, be
caufe there can be no increafe of the extremity of
flavery.
CHAP. XIV.
That the Nature of the Taxes is relative to the Go
vernment.
A CAPITATION is more natural to
flavery ; a duty on merchandizes is more
natural to liberty, becaufe it has not fo direct a
relation to the peribn.
It is natural in a defpotic government for the
prince not to give money to his foldiers, or to
thcie belonging to his court-, but to diflribute lands
amongft them, and of courfe that there mould be
very tew taxes. But if the prince gives money, the
mod natural tax he can raife, is a capitation,
which can never be confiderable. For as it is im-
poffible to make different clafies of the contribu
tors, becaufe of the abufes that might arife from
X 2 thence,
3oS THE SPIRIT
BOOK thence, coniidcring the injuftice and violence of
Chap 14, c ^ e government, they are under an abfolute necef-
& is. fity of regulating themfelves by the rate of what
even the pooreft and moft wretched are able to
pay.
The natural tax of moderate governments, is
the duty laid on merchandizes. As this is really
d by the container, though advanced by the mer
chant, it is a loan which the merchant has already
made to the confumer. Hence the merchant
muft be confidered on the one fide, as the general
tor of the (late, and on the other as the credi
tor of every individual. He advances to the (late,
duty which the confumer will fome time or other
und, and he has paid for the confumer the du
ty which he has paid for the merchandize. It is
therefore obvious that in proportion to the mode
ration of the government, to the prevalence of the
fpirit of liberty, and to the fecurity of private for
tunes, the more a merchant has it in his power
to advance money to the (late, and to pay confi-
rable duties for individual?. In England a mer-
nds really to the government fifty or fixty
."ling for every tun ot wine he imports.
iere is the merchant that would dare do any fuch
thing in a country like Turky ? And were he lo
prefumptuous, how could he do it with a dubious
pr mattered fortune ?
CHAP. XV.
Abitfs of Liberty.
i
* O thefe great advantages of liberty it is
py. ing that liberty itieif has been abufed.
Becaufe
or LAWS. 3
Becaufe a moderate government has been pi - ]i ^ ;
tive of admirable effects, this moderation has been Lha ,-
laid afide : becaufe great taxes have been railed,
they wanted to raife them to excefs : and ungrateful
to the hand of liberty of whom they received this
prefent, they addrefied themfelves to flavery \vho
never grants the lead favor.
Liberty produces excefllve taxes ; the effect of
exceflive taxes is flavery -, and flavery produces a
diminution of tribute.
Moft of the edicts of the eaftern monarchs are
to exempt every year fome province of their em
pire from paying tribute The manifeftations of
their will are favors. But in Europe the ediJh of
princes are difagreeable even before th< fccn,
becaufe they always make mention of th-.-ir own
wants, but not a word of ours.
From an unpardonable indolence in the miniily
of thofe countries, owing to the nature of the
government, and frequently to the climate, the
people derive this advantage, that they are not in-
cefiantly plagued with new demands. The pub
lic expence does not increafe, becaufe the mini-
fters do not form new projects , and if fome by
chance are formed, they are fuch as are foon
executed. The governors of the ilate do not per
petually torment the people, becaufe they do nor per
petually torment themfelves. But it is impoITible
there fhould be any fixed rule in our finances, be
caufe we always know that we fhall have fomething
or other to do, without ever knowing what it is.
It is. no longer cuftomary with us to give ti,
* This is the praftice of the Emperors of Ch. :
X 3 appellation-
3 io T H E S P I R I T
BOOK appellation of a great minifter to a wife difpenfer of
Cha 16 tne public revenues; but to a perlbn of dexterity
& 17. and cunning, who is clever at rinding out what we
call the ways and means.
CHAP. XVI.
Of tbe Conquejls of the Mahometans.
IT was this excefs of taxes * that occafioned the
prodigious facility with which the Mahometans
carried on their conquefts. Inftead of a continual
feries of extortions devifed by the fubtle avarice of
the emperors, the people were fubjected to a fimple
tribute, which was paid and collected with eafe.
Thus they were far happier in obeying a barbarous
nation, than a corrupt government, in which they
furTered every inconveniency of a loft liberty, with
all the horrors of a prefent flavery.
CHAP. XVII.
Of the Augmentation of Troops.
ANEW diftemper has fpread itfelf over Eu
rope ; it has infected our princes, and in
duces them to keep up an exorbitant number of
troops. It has its redoublings, and of necefilty
becomes contagious. For as foon as one prince
augments what he calls his troops, the reft of
courfe do the fame; fo that nothing is gained there
by but the public ruin. Each monarch keeps as
many armies on foot as if his people were in dan-
ee in hirtory the greatnefs, the oddity, and even the follv
of thofe taxes. Anaflafius invented a tax tor breathing, v.t
aeris fcr.deret.
i
O F L A W S. 311
ger of being exterminated , and they gave the name * K
of peace * to this general effort of all againft all. chap, i-,
Thus Europe is ruined to that degree, that were x 18.
private people to be in the fame fituation as the
three mod opulent powers of this part of the
world, they would not have necctfary fubfifter
We are poor with the riches and commerce of
the whole nniverfe ; and loon, by thus augment
ing our troops, we fhall have nothing but foldiers,
and be reduced to the very fame fituation as the
Tartars
Great princes not fatisfied with hiring; or In
troops of petty ftates, make it their bufinef* on
j to pay fubfidics for alliances, that is, almoft
generally, to throw away their mon
The confequence of luch a fituation is the per
petual augmentation of taxes ; and the mifchief
which prevents all future remedy, is that they
reckon no more upon their revenues, but go
to war with their whole capital. It is no unufual
thing to fee governments mortgage their funds even
in time of peace, and to employ what they call c
traordinary means to ruin themfelves , means fo
extraordinary indeed, that fuch are hardly thought
on by the moft extravagant young fpendthrift.
C H A- P. XVIII.
Of an Exemption from 7" .
TH E maxim of the great eaftern empires
of exempting fuch provinces, as have very
X 4 much
* True it is that thi-^ Rate of effort is the chief fupport of the
balance, becaufe it c ~e great powers.
f All th^t is wanting for this, Is to improve the r>e\v i -
Mention
312 T H E S P I R I T
B K much differed, from taxes, ought to be extended to
Chap. i?> monarchical ftates. There are fome indeed where
& 19. this maxim is eftablifhed ; yet the country is
more oppreiTed than if no fuch rule took place ;
becauie as the prince levies ftill neither more nor
lefs, the (late becomes bound for the whole. In
order to eafe a village that pays badly, they load
another that pays better i the former is not relieved,
and the latter is ruined. The people grow def-
perate between the necefiity of paying, for fear of
exactions ; and the danger of paying, for fear of
new charges.
A well regulated government ought to fet afide
For the firft article of its expence a determinate fuzn
for contingent cults. It is with the public as with
individuals, who are ruined when they live up ex
actly to their income.
With regard to an obligation for the whole
amongft the inhabitants of the fame village, fome
pretend *, that it is but reafonable, becaufe there
is a poffibility of a fraudulent combination on their
fide : but who ever heard that upon mere fuppofi-
tions we are to eftablilh a thing in itfelf unjuft and
ruinous to the ftate ?
CHAP. XIX.
Which is inoft fuitalle to the Prince and to the People,
the letting out to farm, or the Adminiftration of the
Revenues ?
TH E adminiftration of the revenues is like
the conduct of a good father of a family,
vention of the militia eftablifhed almoft all over Europe, and car
ry it to the fame excefs as they do the regular troops.
* See a Trcatije on the Roman Finances, chap. 2. printed at
Paris by Briaffon, 1740. who
O F L A W S. 313
who collects his own rents himfelf with ceconomy B ^ *
and order. Chap J
By the adminiftration of the revenues the prince
is at liberty to prefs or to retard the levy of the
taxes, either according to his own wants, or to thole
of his people. By this he laves to the ftatc the
immenfe profits of the farmers, who impoverifh
it a thoufand ways. By this he fpares the people
the mortifying fight of fudden fortunes. By this
the money collected paffes through few hands, goes
directly to the treafury, and confequently makes a
quicker return to the people. By this the prince
avoids an infinite number of bad laws extorted from
him continually by the importunate avarice of the
farmers, who pretend to offer a prefent advantage
for regulations pernicious to pofterity.
As the moneyed man is always the mod power
ful, the farmer renders himfelf arbitrary even over
the prince himfelf; he is not the legiflator, but he
obliges the legiQator to give laws.
In republics, the revenues of the date are ge
nerally under adminiftration. The contrary prac
tice was a great defect in the Roman government .
In defpotic governments, the people are infinitely
happier where this adminiftration is eftablifhed ;
witnefs Perfia and China ( g ). The unhappieft of all (s) See
are thofe where the prince farms out his fea ports s , ir J ol ?n
and trading cities. The hiftory of monarchies tr av4s
through
* Ge&r was obliged to remove the publicans from the pro- Perfa,
vince of Afia and to eftablifh there another kind of adminiitra- Tom. 6,
tion, as we learn from Dio; and Tacitus informs us that Macer
donia and Achaia, provinces left by Auguftus to the people of
Rome, and confequently governed purfuant to the ancient plan,
obtained to be of the number of thofe which the emperor go
verned by his officers,
abounds
3 i4 T H E S P I R I T
j: o o K abounds with mifchicfs done by the farmers of the
cp"; 9f revenues.
& 20. Nero incenfed at the oppreftive extortions of the
publicans, formed a magnanimous but impoflible
project of abolifhing all kinds of impofts. He
did not think of an adminiftration of the revenues,
but made four edicts ; that the laws enacted againft
publicans, which had hitherto been kept fecret,
fhould be made public ; that they fhould not pre
tend to any thing which they had omitted to de
mand in th i of a year ; that there fhould be a
pnctor eftabllfhed to judge their pretenfions with
out any iormality ; and that the merchants fhould
uty for their vcfiels. Theie were the bright
days of that emperor.
C H A P. XX.
Of i rwers of tic Revenues.
AL L is loft when the lucrative profeiTion of
farmers becomes likewife, by means of the
riches with which it is attended, a poft of honor.
This may do well enough in defpotic ilates, where
their employment is oftentimes a part of the functi
ons of the governors themielves. But it is by no
means proper in a republic , fmce a cuftom of the
like nature deftroyed the republic of Rome. Nor
is it better in monarchies ; nothing being more op-
pofue to the fpiric of this government. All the
other orders of the (late are diffatisfied ; honor lofes
its whole value ; the flow and natural means of di-
ftincftion are no longer regarded ; and the very prin
ciple of the government is fubvetted.
It
O F L A W S. 315
It is true indeed that fcandalous fortunes were B K
XIII
raifed in former times-, but this was one of ^
calamities of the fifty years war. Thefe riches were
then confidered as ridiculous; now we admire them.
Every profeflion has its particular lot. The lot
of thofe who levy the taxes is wealth, and the re-
compence of wealth is wealth itfdf. Glory and ho
nor fall to the mare of that nobility who neither
know, fee, nor feel any other happinefs than honor
and glory. Refpect and efteem are for thofe minif-
ters and magiftrates, whofe whole life is a continued
fucceffion of labour, and who watch day and night
over the happinefs of the empire.
BOOK
3i6 T H E S P 1 R I T
*;::: ::::: . : ..;.. : . + ,:.. : . ;.. : ..;.+. : .. : .. ; .. ; .
BOOK XIV.
Of Laws as relative to the Nature of
the Climate.
CHAP. I.
General Idea.
BOOK T F it be true that the character of the mind, and
JL the pafllons of the heart are extremely different
in different climates, the Jaws ought to be relative
both to the difference of thole paffions, and to the
difference of thole characters.
CHAP. II.
Of the Difference of Men in different Climates.
AC O L D air * conftringes the extremities
of the external fibres of the body ; this in-
creafes their elafticity, and favors the return of the
blood from the extremities to the heart. It con
tracts -f thofe very fibres , consequently it increafes
allb their force. On the contrary a warm air relaxes
and lengthens the extremes of the fibres , of courfe
it diminifhes their force and elafticity.
People are therefore more vigorous in cold cli
mates. Here the action of the heart and the re-
* This appears even in the countenance : in cold weather peo
ple look thinner.
f We know it fhortens iron.
action
O F L A W S. 317
action of the extremities of the fibres are better y ) K
formed, the temperature of the humours is greater, ^ 2.
the blood moves freer towards the heart, and eci-
procally the heart has more power. This h
rity of ftrength muft produce a great many eh ,
for inftance, a greater boldnefs, that is, n re
courage , a greater fenfe of fuperiority, that is, lefs
defire of revenge , a greater opinion of fecurity,
that is, more franknefs, lefs fufpicion, policy, and
cunning. In fhort this muft be productive of
very different characters. Put a man in a clofe
warm place, and he will, for the reafons above
given, teel a great faintnefs. If under this circum-
ftance you propole a bold enterprize to him, I
believe you will find him very little difpofed towards
it : his prefent weaknefs will throw him into a
defpondency of foul ; he will be afraid of every
thing, becaufe he will feel himfelf capable of no
thing. The inhabitants of warm countries are,
like old men, timorous; the people in cold coun
tries are, like young men, brave. If we reflect t i
the late * wars, which are more prefent to o> r
memory, and in which we can better diftingu
feme flight effects that efcape us at a great diflar j
of time i we (hall find that the northern pet -
tranfplanted into fouthern countries f, did : t
perform fuch great feats as their countrymen, >
fighting in their own climate pofleffed the i 1
vigor and courage.
This ftrength of the fibres in northern s
is the caufe that the coarfeft juices are t aed
from their aliments. From hence two things refulc;
Thofe for the fucceffon to the Spanilh Monarchy.
j- For jnlbnce to Spain.
one
^ T H E S P I R I T
E0 o K one that the parts of the chyle or lymph are more
Cha * P r P er ky reajon f tne i r l ar g e farface, to be ap
plied to, and to nouriih, the fibres : the other,
that they are lefs proper, becauie of their coarfe-
nefs, to give a certain fubtilty to the nervous juice.
Thofe people have therefore large bodies and little
v. ir .city.
<- nerves that terminate from all parts in the
Cutis, form each a bundle of nerves ; generally
fpcaking, the whole nerve is not moved, but a very
minute part. In warm climates where the cutis is
re -.\x<:;l, the ends of the nerves arc opened and ex-
poln.1 to the fmallefr. aclion of the weakeft objeds.
In cold countries the cutis is conflringed, and the
pnpillre comprdled ; the miJiary glands are in fome
meafure paralytic ; and the fenfation does not reach
the brain but when it is very ftrong and proceeds
from the -whole nerve at once. Now imagination,
taftc, fcnfibility, and vivacity, depend on an in
finite number of fmall fenfations.
I have c :d the outermoft part of a fheep s
tongue, where to the naked eye it feems covered
with papilla?. On thefe papilla?, I have difcerned
through a microfcope, fmall hairs or a kind of
down; between the papillas were pyramids fhaped
towards the ends like pincers. Very likely thefe
ramids are the principal organ of tafte.
I caufed the half of this tongue to be frozen,
and obferving it with the naked eye I found the
papilla confiderably diminished : even fome rows
of the papillas were funk into their (heath. I exa
mined the outermoft part with the microfcope, and
I perceived no pyramids. In proportions as the
froft -went off, the papillae feemed to the na-ked eye
to
O F L A W S. 319
to rife, and with the microfcope the miliary glands BOOK
began to appear.
This obfervation confirms what I have been fay
ing, that in cold countries the nervous glands are
lefs fpread \ they fink deeper into their fheaths,
or they are flickered from the action of external
objects. Confequently they have not fuch lively
fenfations.
In cold countries, they have very little fenfibi-
lity for pleafure ; in temperate countries they have
more ; in warm countries their fenfibility is cxqui-
fite. As climates are diilinguifhed by degrees of
latitvidc, v;e might diftinguiih them alfo, in feme
meafure, by degrees of fenfibility. I have feen the
operas of England and of Italy , they are the fan-
pieces and the fame performers \ and yet the fame
mufic produces fuch different effects on the two na
tions, one is fo cold and indifferent, and the other
fo tranfported, that it feems almofl inconceivable.
It is the fame with regard to pain ; which is ex
cited by the laceration of fome fibre of the body.
The author of nature has made it an eftablifhed rule
that this pain fhould be more acute in proportion
as the laceration is greater : now it is evident that
the large bodies and coarfe fibres of the people of the
north are lefs capable of laceration than the delicate
fibres of the inhabitants of warm countries ; confe-
quently ;he foul is there lefs fenfible of pain. You
muft flay a Mufcovite alive to make him feel.
From this delicacy of organs peculiar to warm
climates, it follows, that the foul is mo ft fcnfibly
moved by whatever has a relation to the union
of the two fcxes : here every thing leads to this
object,
In
320 T H E S P I R I T
* vr v K ^ n nortncrn climates fcarcc has the animal part
CJisp-. 2. f ^ ove a P ower f making itfelf felt. In temperate
climates, iove attended by a thoufand appendages,
ivnders itfelf agreeable by things that have at firft
the ap| earanee of love, though not the reality. In
warmer climates love is liked for its own fake, it is
the only caufe of happinefs, it is life itfelf.
In fouthern countries a delicate, weak, but fen-
fible machine, refigns itfelf either to a love which
riles and is inceffantly laid in a feraglio -, or to a
love which leaves women in a greater independence,
and is confequently expofed to a thoufand inquie-
tui! In northern climates a ftrong but heavy
machine, fuuls a plcafure in whatever is apt to
throw the fpirits inr.o motion, fuch as hunting,
travelling, war, and wine. In northern countries,
we meet with a people who have few vices, many
virtues, a great fhare of franknels and fincerity.
If we draw near the louth, we fancy ourfelves
removed from all morality ; the flrongeft pafiions
multiply all manner of crimes, every one endeavour
ing to take what advantage he can over his neigh
bour, in order to encourage thofe pafTions. In
temperate climates we find the inhabitants inconftant
in their manners, in their very vices, and in their
virtues : the climate has not a quality determinate
enough to fix them.
w_?
The heat of the climate may be fo exceffive as to
deprive the body of all vigor and ftrength. Then
the faintnefs is communicated to the mind ; there is
no curiofity, no noble enterprize, no generous fen-
timentj the inclinations are all pafiive ; indolence
conftitutes the utmoft happinefs ; fcarcely any pu-
niihment is fo fevere as the action of the foul, and
ilavery
OF LAWS. 321
flavery is more fupportable than the force and vigor ^ ^c
of mind neceffary for human action. Chap. j.
CHAP. III.
Contradiction in the Characters of fome foutbern
Nations.
F I ^ H E Indians * are naturally a cowardly
i[ people -, even the children -f- of the Euro
peans born in the Indies lofe the courage peculiar
to their own climate. But how fhall v/e reconcile
this with their cruel actions, with their cuftoms,
and penances fo full of barbarity ? The men volun
tarily undergo the greateft i. <,p^ , the women
burn themfelves : here we find a very odd compound
of fortitude and weaknefs.
Nature having framed thofe people of a texture
fo weak as renders them timid, has formed them
at the fame time of an imagination fo lively, that
every object makes the ftrongett imprelT; -on
them. That delicacy of organs which renders them
apprehenfive of death, contributes likewife
them dread a thoufand things more than death : the
very fame fenfibilky makes them fly, and dare all
dangers.
As a good education is more neceffary to chil
dren than to thofe who arc arrived to a maturity
of underftanding, fo the inhabitants of thofe cii-
mates have much greater need than our people of
a wife legislator. The greater their fenfibiliry, t.
* One hundred European foldiers, fays Taverner. would
without any great difficulty beat a thoufand Indian foldiers.
f Even the Perfians, who fettle in the Indies, contrail in the
third generation the indolence and cowardice of the Indians.
Bernier, on the Mogul, Tom. i. p.
VOL. I. Y rr,.
32 THE, SPIRIT
B YTV K ir le lt behoves them to receive proper imprefTions,
< hap \, to imbibe no prejudices, and to let themfelves be
4. directed by realbn.
At the time of the Romans the inhabitants of
the north of Europe lived without art, education,
and almoil without laws : and yet by the help of
the good ienfc annexed to the gr>fs fibres of thofe
climates, they made an admirable ftand againft
the power of the Roman empire, till that memo
rable period in \\hich they quitted their woods to
Tub vert it.
C II A I . IV.
;0;% Man):
i Countries.
II- that dtliv-.icy of organs which renders the
. n people fo in legible of every imprel-
fion, is accompanied hkewiie with a fort of lazi-
nefs of mind naturally connected with that of the
body, by me, which they grow incapable of
any action or eru-.r: . i: is eaiy to comprehend, that
when once the foul has received an impreflion Hie
cannot change it. This is the realbn, that the
.loins, even thole which
feem quit/* is , luch as their manner of
tirt to this very day in eallern coun
tries as li a thoniand years ago.
>-.laus Dumaiccnus, collected
:tn ancient cuftom in the
k .ny difpleafure ;
CHAP.
OF LA W S. ,2
3
CHAP. V.
That tbofe are lad Legij. "our tic rices
cf the Climate, and gocd Legijlators ii bo cppcfe
tbofe Vice;.
THE Indians believe that repofe and non-exift- B o o ^
\ i \
ence are the foundation ot all things, and Q^
the end in which they terminate. They confider
therefore the (late of intire inaction as the moft per
fect of all ilates, and the object of their defires.
They give to the fupreme Being * the title of Im-
moveable. The inhabitants of Siam believe that
their utmoll: happinefs ( n ) confifts in not being ( \ i a .
obliged to animate a machine, or to give motion to v
, , Relation
* body, of Siam,
In thofe countries where the excels of heat ener- p. 446.
vates and opprefles the body, reft is fo delicious,
and motion fo painful, that this fyftem of mctaphy-
fics feems natural , and -j- Foe the legiflator of the
Indies followed what he himfelf felt when he placed
mankind in a ftate extremely pafTive : but his doc
trine arifing from the lazinefs of the climate, fa
voured italfo in its turn ; which has been the fource
of an infinite deal of mifchief.
The legiflators of China had more fenfe, when
confidering men not in the peaceful ftate which
they are to enjoy hereafter, but in the fituation
proper for difcharging the feveral duties of life,
* Pananad : See Kircher.
f Foe endeavoured to reduce the heart to a mere vacuum ; < we
" have eyes and ears, but perfection confilb in neither feeing nor
" hearing; a mouth, hands, 5V. but perfection requires that
" thefe members mould be inactive." This is taken from the
dialogue of a Chinefe philofopher, quoted by father Du Halde
Tom. :. 2 thev
324 T H L SPIRIT
BOOK t } 1C y made their religion, philoibphy, and laws all
Cto! 6 practical. The more phyfical cauies incline matt
ed -. kind to inaction, the more the moral caufes fhould
cilrange them from it.
C II A P. VI.
Of the Cnltrcation of Lands in ii arm Climates.
^ 11 V. cultivation of lands is the principal la
bour of man. 1 he more the climate inclines
them to ihun this labour, the more their religion
and laws ought to excite them to it. Thus the In
dian laws, which give the lands to the prince, and
the fpirit of property among the fubjects,
inc .\ effects ot the climate, that is, their
rural la/.iru
C II A P. VII.
Of Mo }.
very fame : .!;fs rcfult from mona-
ifm , it had its rile in the warm countries
Ids inclined to action
nun; dervifes or monks feems
neat of the climate.
e the ".76 are full of
ip fame ci ice is found in Europe.
i~r> r to fun /.ineis of the cli-
c to endeavour to remove all
means of fub ; \vithout labour : But in the
:s of Europe they ace quite the re
verie ; to thofe \vho want ro liv? in a it ate of in
dolence they afford retr noil proper fora
fpeculative
OF LAWS. 325
fpeculative life, and endow them with immenfe re- BOOK
venues. Thefe men, who live in the midft of a ch ^
plenty which they know not how to enjoy, are in & 9.
the right to give their fuperfluities away to the
common people. The poor are bereft of property ;
and thefe men indemnify them by fupporting them
in idlenefs, fo as to make them even grow fond of
their mifery.
CHAP. VIII.
An excellent Cuflcm of China.
THE hiftorical relations ( h ) of China mention (") Father
a ceremony * of opening the grounds, which j^uHalde,
the emperor performs every year. The defign of this of China,
public and folemn act is to excite f the people to Tom - -
tillage. p ~ 2
Farther, the emperor is informed every year of
the hufbandman who has diftinguifhed himfelt moft
in his profefllon ; and he makes him a Mandarin
of the eighth order.
Among the ancient Perfians ( ) the kings quitted >) Hyde,
their grandeur and pomp on the eighth day of the rel] 5 lon
or tne
month called Chorrem-ruz to eat with the hufband- p cr f ians .
men. Thefe infticutions were admirabl , cal
culated for the encouragement of agriculture.
* Several of the kings of India do the fame ; relation of the
kingdom of Siam by La Loubere, p. 69.
f Venty, the 3d emperor of the 3d dynafty, tilled the lands
himfelf, and made :he emprefs and his wives employ their time
in the Jilk-works in his palace. Hiltory of China.
Y 3 CHAP.
326 THE S P I.R I T
C II A P. IX.
Mcr.nt of ena -*g Induftry.
T o n K T It 7 F fha l Hicw in the nineteenth book that
VV la; uons are generally proud. Now
& . thi % effedt might well be turned -\\\ the caufe,
and laymcfs be deftroyed by pride. In the fouth
Kuroj -, wh re people have fuch a high notion
iU- point oi honor, it would be right to give
pi, dmen who had* cultivated belt the
lands, or to aitttls who had made the greateft im-
p.ients in tii; . ir U veral profefTions. This prac-
tuc has fr:t J in our days in Ireland, where it
has ( ll.ilililhed one oi the moil" confiderable linen
in Kuroj
C II A P. X.
Of /
IX warm countries the aqueous part of the
blood loles itfelf greatiy r -Jpiration*; it
mud therefore be liipplied by a like liquid. \\ ater
is there of admirable ufe ; Ibong liquo. uld
al the gl(;bules -f of blood that remain after
the tranfuding of the aqueous humour.
In cold countries the aqueous part of the blood
* Monfieur Berm er travelling from Lahor to Cachemir, wrote
thus: ,Vcr; fcarcc /v,-iv I J-a-aUo- ceJ a pint of
like Jfiv cut cf all my limbs, my
-n pints a day, and it does me no manner of
BermVr s travels, Tom. 2. p. 261.
f In the blood theie are red globules, fibrous parts, white
globules, and water in which the whole fwims.
3 is
OF LA V, 327
is very little evacuated b: n. Tlvy ni:.y Boo
therefore make ufe of 1; intuous liquors, wi linut
which the blood 1. They are full ot
humours ; confequently ilron^ liqt. hich give a
motion to the blood, are proj-fr tor thole coun i :
The law of Mahomet, which prohibits the drink
ing of wine, is there tore a law titled to the climate
of Arabia : and indeed bci\>;v ; s time,
water was the common drink of the Arabs. The
law (* ) which forbad the Carthaginians to drink . 4 -\ p;
wine, was alfo a law ei the climate , in tact, th<
climate of thofe two countries is pretty near the
lame.
Such a law would b:: improper fur cold countries,
, .
where the climate s to force tnem to a kind ot
national drunkennefs, very i nt from perlonal Evan-
inrcmperaru Drunkennefs predominates over all r a
the world, in proportion to the coldnefs and humi- Hook
dity of the climate. Go from the equator to our c - 7
pole, and you will find drunkennefs increaiing to
gether with the d< ^rte of latitud Go from the
fame equator to ti. pole, and you will find
drunkennefs trav fouth *, as on this fide ic
travels towards the north.
It is very natural that where v > contrary
to the climate, and confequently t- 1th, the
excels of it mould be more 4 re y p^mllud, th
in countries where drunkenneis produces very tew
bad effects to the perfon, I to the ibcieiy, and
where it does not make people mad, bur only
ftupid and hea Hence laws -f- which punifhed
* This is feen in tl;e Hoctent : the inhabitants of the
moft fouthern part of Chili
f As Pittacus did. accord i n g otle, Piili 1 :. lib. i. c. 5.
He lived in a climate- where drunkei 1 ! i cti is not a national vice.
Y 4 a drunken
THE SPIRIT
n man both for the fault he committed, ,and
a j lor his drunkcnnefs, \verc applicable only to a p er-
fonal, and not to a r il, ebrier A German
hrough cuftom, and a Spaniard by choice.
In warm countries t .ixing of the fibres pro
duces a great evacuation of the liquids, but the
are lefs tranfpir The fibres \\hith
I but !y and have very little :ritv, are
r much worn -, a fmall quantity of nutritious juice
is . .<:nt to repair them . which reafon they
cat very m
It : jnce of A in different climates,
.t firfl torni iffercnce in the manner of living,
L> ol living gave rife to that of laws.
bcre [ are very communicative, there muft
rticular lav,? -, and others among people where
there is but little communication.
CHAP. XI.
Of tb: La r j.-s / to tbe Diftempers cf tbe
Climate.
T T E R O D O T U S ( c ) informs us, that the
JL I Jcwifh laws concerning the leprofy, were
borro-.v d from the practice of the Egyptians. In
-t, the fame diilemper required the fame remedies.
The ( . ;id the primitive Romans were ftran-
vs, as well as to the d; The
r and Palefline rendered th ref-
i \vl-.ic!i this diicafe is
nt to make us fenlible of the \
vs.
ws lelt the e of them.
: brou--. ht the ler :it us;
^> A. *
but
O F L A W S,
3 2 9
but the wife regulations made at that time hindered BOOK
- XIV
it from infecting the mafs of the people. ch J u
We find by the law of the ( c ) Lombards that this ( c ) Book
difeafe was fpread in Italy before the crufades, and 2
merited the attention of the Icgiflators. Rotharis is . i.
ordained that a leper mould be expelled from his
houfe and banifhed to a particular place, that he
mould be incapable of difpofing of his property,
becaufe from the very moment he had been driven
from home, .he was reckoned dead in the eye of the
law. Jn order to prevent all communication with
lepers, they were rendered incapable of civil acts.
I am apt to think that this difeafe was brought in
to Italy by the conquefts of the Greek emperors, in
whofe armies there might be fome foldicrs from Pa-
leftine or /Egypt. Be that as it may, the progrefs
of it was ftopt till the time of the crufades.
It is related that Pomney s foldiers returning from
Syria brought a diftemper home with them not un
like the leproiy. We have no account of any regu
lation made at that time; but it is highly probable
that fome regulation was made, fince the diftemper
was flopped till the time of the Lombards.
It is now two centuries fince a difeafe unknown
to our anceflors, was fir ft tranfplanted from the new
world to ours, and came to attack human nature
even in the very fourcc of life and pleafure. Mod
of the principal families in the fouth of Europe were
fcen to perifh by a diftemper, that was grown too
common to be ignominious, and was confidered in
no other light, than in that of its being fatal. It
was the thirlr. of gold that propagated this difeafe;
the Europeans went continually to America, and
always brought back a new leaven of it.
As
1 .*! JB SPIRIT
it is the bufinefs of legiflators to watch over
{ l the health or" the citizens, it would have been a wile
&. . part in them to have (lopped this communication by
laws made on the plan of thole of 71
The plague is a difeafe whofe infectious progrefs
much more rapid. ^gypt is its principal feat,
m whence it fp reads over the whole univerfe.
Moft countries in Europe have made exceeding good
regulations to prevent this infection, and in our
times an admirable method has been contrived to
flop it ; this is by forming a line of troops round
the infected country, which cuts off all manner of
communication.
^ ut The Turks( ), who have no regulations in this
rc.fiKxt, fee the L l.r. this infcc tion in the
i i
fame town, and none hiit themfeives periih ; they
j
buy the cloathb of the infected, wear them, and go
on their old wjy .is i noi ni. cd. The
do fate, .i directs th .ole
londuct, rcMulc; .(Irate a cjiiic-t ;tor ,
, he thinks that ( jod has ah . _ . ; nd
-.at he himiclf has nothing to do.
C H A P. XII.
G
T E do not rir.d in hi : that the Romans
er k;i;r 1 thcmfe vithout a caufe ;
but the Enelifh deftroy themillves moll unaccount-
C3
ably i they deftroy then- often in the very
>m of happim This action among the Ro
mans was the effect of education; it was connected
a their principles and cuftoms : among the Eng-
lifh
OF LAWS. 331
lifti it is the effect of a * diftemper; it is connected BOOK
with the phyikal ftate of the machine, and inde- Ch " 12>
pendent of every other caufe. & 13.
In all probability it is a defect of the filtration of
the nervous juice-, the machine jtfioie motive {acui
ties are every moment without Wtion, is weary of
itfelf j the foul feels no pain, but a certain uneafmefs
in exifling. Pain is a local thing, which leads us
to the defire of feeing an end of it , the burthen
of life is an evil confined to no particular place,
which prompts us to the defire of cealing to live.
It is evident that the civil laws ol fome countries
may have reafons for branding filicide with infamy :
but in England it cannot be punihVd without pu-
ni fli ins; the effects of madnefs.
CHAP. XIII.
Efeffs arifmg from tbe Climate of England.
N a nation fo diftempered by the climate as
to have a difrclifh of every thing, nay, even of
life, it is plain that the government mofl iuitable to
the inhabitants, is that in which they cannot lay
their uneafmefs to any fmgle perfon s charge, and in
which being under the direction rather of the laws
than of the prince, they cannot change the govern
ment without fubverting the laws themfelves.
And if this nation has likewife derived from the
climate a certain character of impatience, which
renders them incapable of bearing the fame train
of things for any long continuance ; it is obvious
* It may be complicated with the fcurvy, which, in fome
countries especially, renders a man whimfical and unfupportable
to himfelf. See Pirard s voyages, part 2. chap. 21.
that
332 THE SPIRIT
B o o K tnat the government above-mentioned is the fitted
i - f r them. This character of impatience is not very
confiderable of itfelf , but it may become fo when
joined with courage.
It is quite a efferent thing from levity, which
in.ikcs people uncKtake or drop a project without
can ic ; it borders more upon obftinacy, bccaufe it
proc-cds from io lively a fenfe of mifery, that it is
not v, en by the habit of fuffering.
This character in a free nation is extremely pro-
r difconcerting the projects of tyranny *, which
is always How and feeble in its commencements, as
in the end it is active and lively , which at firft only
jlietehcs out a hand to affift, and exerts afterwards
a multitude ot arms to opprefs.
Slavery is ever preceded by deep. But a people
who find no re It in any fituation, who coniinually
explore every part, and feel nothing but pain, can
lurdly be lulled to deep.
Politics are like a fmooth file, which cuts flowly,
and attains its end by a gradual and tedious progref-
fion. Now the people of whom we have been fpeak-
ing, are incapable of bearing the delays, the details,
1 the coolneis of negotiations : In thele they are
more unlikely to fuccced than any other nation i
hence they are .:pt to lofe by treaties what they ob
tain by their arms.
* Hc^ ! r.:!:r t 1 i lefign of fubverting the efta-
: of demo the
nu Ro-
C H A P.
O F L A W S. 333
CHAP. XIV.
Other EffeRs of the Climate.
OUR anceftors the ancient Germans lived un- BOOK
der a climate, where the paflions were ex
tremely calm. Their laws decided only in fuch
cafes where the injury was vifible to the eye, and
went no further. And as they judged of the outrages
done to men from the greatneis of the wounds, they
afted with no other delicacy in refpect to the inju
ries done to women. The law of ( l ) the Aleinam ( ! ) Chap,
on this lubjecl is very cxtr .iary. If a pcrfon J
Covers a woman s h .ad, he pays a fine of fifty
fous ; if he uncovers her leg up to the knee, he pays
the fame , and double from the knee upwards. One
v;culd think that the law meafured the infults offered
to women as we meafure a figure in geometry -, it
did not punifh thr* crime of the imagination, but
that ot the eye. But upon the migration of a
German naticm into Spain, the climate foon found
a necefllty foTCifferent laws. The law of the Vi-
figoths inhibited the furgeons to bleed a free woman,
except either her father, mother, brother, fon, or
uncle was prefent. As the imagination of the peo
ple grew warm, fo did that of the legislators ; the
law fufpected every thing, when the people grew
fuipicious.
Thefe hws had therefore a particular regard for
the two fexes. But in their punifhments they feem
rather to humour the revengeful temper of private
perfons, than to exercife public juftice. Thus in moft
cafes they reduced both the criminals to be (laves to
the offended relations or to the injured hufband ,
a free
334 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK a free-born woman ( f ) who had yielded to the cm-
\ i \
P/ braces of a married man, was delivered up to his wife
& i,-. to dilpofe of her as fhe pleafed. They obliged the
( f ) Law of flaves ( s ), if" tl und their matter s wife in adul-
goths, tei 7> to b m d her, an( ^ carr Y ner to her hufband ;
boo! they even permitted her children ( h ) to be her
!l l \"Vi i ^ accufers, and her (laves to be tortured in order to
(S) Joiu.
book 5. convift her. Thus their laws were tar better
^ 4 ii vj 6 adapted to refine, even to excels, a certain point of
book ^ tit. honor, than to form a good civil administration.
4. . i ;. \V C - mud not tl. r e be furprized it count Ju
lian was of opinion, that an affront of that kind
ought to 1 iated by the ruin of his king and
country : we niuft not be furprized if the Moors,
with luch a conformity of manners, found it fo eafy
a matter to fettle and to maintain themfelves in Spain,
and to retard the fall of their empire.
CHAP. XV.
Of tie different Confidence lilicb tie L^cs have in tbe
People, act to tbe difference^ Climates .
TH E people of Japan are of fo ftubborn
and pervcrfe a temper, that neither their
legiflators nor magi ll rates can put any confidence
in them : tl..- nothing before their eyes but
judges, nv. s, and chaftifements , every ftep
they take is fubject to the inquifition of the civil
magifrrate. Thole Ijus \\hich out of five heads of
families eitablifh one as a infiltrate over the other
four; thofe laws \vhkh punifli a family or a whole
ward for a fingle crime ; thofc laws in fine which find
no one innocent where there may happen to be one
guilty ;
, .
O F L A W S. 335
guilty , are made with a defign to implant in all B K
the people a diftruft of each other, and to make
every one the infpector, witnefs, and judge of his
neighbour s conduct.
On the contrary, the people of India are mild( l ), (0 See
tender, and compafiionate. Hence their legiflators
repofe a great confidence in them. They have p. i 4 o.
eftablifhed ( k ) very few punimments , thefe are not See m
fevere, nor are they rigoroufly executed. They have co n e aion
fubjected nephews to their uncles, and orphans to of the
their guardians, as in other countries they are fub- e / ^ " s
jected to their fathers ; they have regulated the fuc- 403. the
ceffion by the acknowledged merit of the fucceflbr. principal
They feem to think that every individual ought to cui t oms of
place an intire confidence in the good nature of his the inba-
fellow fubjefts. b ? tants of
J the pemn-
They infranchife their flaves without difficulty, f u i a on
they marry them, they treat them as their children* : l
happy climate which gives birth to innocence, and ge ,
produces a lenity in the laws !
* This is perhaps \\hat made Diodorus fay, that in the Ind
there was neither maibr nor Have.
BOOK
336 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK XV.
In what manner the Laws of civil Sla
very are relative to the Nature of the
Climate.
C II A P. I.
Of civil Slavery.
BOOK ^* LA VERY, properly fo called, is the efta-
, xv - Jj blifhment of a right which gives to one man
Chap i
fuch a power over another, as renders him ablblute
matter of his life and fortune. The ilatc of flavery
is in its own nature bad. It is neither ufcful to
the mailer nor to the flave ; not to the flave, be-
caufe he can do nothing through a motive of virtue i
not to the mailer, becaufe by having an unlimited
authority over his flaves, he infenfibly accuiloms
himfelf to the want of all moral virtues, and from
thence grows fierce, hafty, fevere, choleric, vo
luptuous, and cruel.
In defpotic countries, where they are already in
a ftate of political flavery, civil flavery is more
tolerable than in other governments. Every one
ought to be fatisfied in thofe countries with necefia-
ries and life. Hence the condition of a flave is
hardly more burdenfome than that of a fubje6l.
But in a monarchical government, where it is
of the utmoft importance that human nature
mould not be debated, or difpirited, there ought
to
O F L A W S. 337
to be no flavery. In democracies, where they arc
all upon an equality ; and in ariftocracies, where the L . iap 2i
laws ought to ufe their utmoft endeavours to pro
cure as great an equality as the nature of the go
vernment will permit, flavery is contrary to the
fpirit of the conftitution ; it only contributes to
give a power and luxury to the citizens which
ought not to have.
CHAP. II.
cf tbc Right of
Civilians.
O i would never have im ;;ined that f:
mould owe its birth to and ti
ihould have been excited thr
The law of nations, to prevent .
being put to death, has all them to be made b
{laves. The civil la the Ro:
debtors, who were lubject to be ill ufcd by ;
creditors, to fell themlelves.
ture requires, that children, whcr
to flavery is no longer able to maintain, Should L
reduced to the fame ftate as th. er.
Thefe reafons of the civ are all falfe.
is falfe that killing in war is law; nlefs in a
cafe of abiblute neceffity : but when a man re
made another his fiave, he cannot be faid to 1
been under a neceffity of taking away his life, fin:
he ly did not take it away. ^ives
iier rigi:t over priloners than to difable them
from doing any further harm, by fecuring the
perfons. All nations *concur in mur
dering of prisoners in cold blood.
* I v Canu
VOL. I, Z 2. XL:
338 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK 2. Nor is it true, that a freeman can fell him-
Cha 2 ^ ^ e * m P^ es a price-, now when a perfon
fells himfelf, his whole fubftance immediately de
volves to his mailer ; the matter therefore in that
cafe gives nothing, and the (lave receives nothing.
You will fay, he has a fccuUum. But this pecu-
lium goes along with his perfon. If it is not
lawful for a man to kill himielf, becaufe he robs
his country of his perfon, for the fame reafon he
is not allowed to fell himfelf. The liberty of every
citizen conftituu-s n. part of the public liberty ,
and in a den 1 Hate i even a part of the
fovuvigat To .11 one s citizenfhip is fo re
pugnant to all realnn, be fcarce fuppofeable
in any man. If liberty may be rated with refpect
to the buyer, it is beyoi. .ce to the feller.
The civil law, \\hidi ai.t -\ diviiion of goods
among men, cannot be thought to rank among
fuch goods, a part of the men who were to make
this divifion. The fame law annuls all iniquitous
contracts , furely then it affords redrefs in a contract
where the grievance is moil enormous.
The third way is birth ; which falls with the two
former. For if a man could not fell himielf, much
lefs could he fell an unborn offspring. It a pri-
foner of war is not to be reduced to ilav - h
lefs are his children.
Tl. ulr.efs of putting a malefactor to death,
arifes trom this ; the la. which he is punifhed,
was madj fr his il-cur A murderer, for in-
flance, has enjo\cd the benefit of the very law
which condemns him ; it has been a continual pro-
1 I mean flavor- in a Uriel fer.fe, a5 formerly among the Ro
mans, and at pi dent in our colonies. .
tedion
O F L A W S. 339
teftion to him , he cannot therefore object againft B
it. But it is not fo with the (lave. The law of c
flavery can never be beneficial to him ; it is in all x 5.
caks againft him, without ever being tor his ad
vantage i and therefore this luv is contrary to the
fundamental principle of all Il;cijiies.
It it be pretended, that it has been beneficial to
him, as his matter has provided for his fubfittence ;
flavery at this rate fhould he limited to thofc who
are incapable of earning their livelihood. But who
will take up with fuch Haves ? >r infants,
nature, who has fupplied their mothers with milk,
had provided for their fuftenance, and the remain
der of their childhood appro fo near the age
in which they are mod papable of being of fer-
vice, that he who fupports thejn cannot be faid to
give them an equivalent, which can intitle him to be
their mailer.
Nor is flavery Icfs oppofite to the civil law
than to that of nature. What civil Jaw can re-
(train a flave from running away, fince he is not
a member of fociety, and confequently has no
intereft in any civil laws ? He can be retained
only by a family law, that is, by the matter s
authority.
CHAP. III.
Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.
IW O U L D as foon fay, that the right of
flavery proceeds from the contempt of one
nation for another, founded on a difference in
cuftoms.
Z 2 Lcptz
340 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK Lopez ( q ) de Gamar relates, " that tbe Spaniards
Chan. 4. <c found near St. Martha, feveral bajkets full of
Bibli- ct crabs, f nails ^ grajhoppers, andlocufts, which proved
oth. Angl. a to fr e t fo e or n nar y provifwn of the natives. "This
Tom. 13.
p. 2 . the conquerors .turned to a heavy charge againft toe
art. 3. conquered" The author owns that this, with
their fmoaking and trimming their beards in a dif
ferent manner, gave rife to the law by which the
Americans became Haves to the Spaniards.
Knowledge humanifes mankind, and reafon in
clines to mildnefs j but prejudices eradicate every
tender difpofition.
C H A P. IV.
Another 0, K [-fa f Slavery.
I
WOULD as foon fay that religion gives
__ its profcfFors a right to enflave thofe who dif-
ient from it, in order to render its propagation
more ealy.
This was the notion that encouraged the ravagers
liil. or " America in their iniquity ( r ). Under the inrlu-
ofthecon- ence of this idea, they founded their right of en-
i"\_ C J ^
Mcxia ^ av i n S f many nations , for thefe robbers, who
olis, would abfolutely be both robbers and Chrillians,
and that ofi were fuperlatively devout.
Garcilafib Lewis XIII. ( ) was extremely uneafy at a law,
deLaVega by which all the negroes of his colonies were to be
^ made flaves -, but it being ilrongly urged to him as
a^e to the the readied means for their conveiTicn, lie acquiefced
iiles of without further fcruple.
America,
vol. 4.
p. i 14.
i -zz. in
I2mo. C ri A P.
OF LAWS. 341
C H A P. V.
Of tie Slavery of i
WERE I to vindicate our right to make Boo
(laves of the negroes, thcfe fliould be my
arguments.
The Europeans, having extirpated the Americans,
were obliged to make flaves of the Africans for
<D
clearing fiich vaft traces of land.
Sugar would be too dear, if the plants which
produce it were cultivated by any other than Haves.
Thefe creatures are all over black, and with fuch
a flat nofe, that they can feared y be pitied.
It is hardly to be believed that God, who is a
wife being, fhould place a foul, efpecially a good
foul, in fuch a black ugly body.
It is fo natural to look upon colour as the crite
rion of human nature, that the Afiatics, among
whom eunuchs are employed, always deprive the
Blacks of their refemblance to us, by a more op
probrious diftinction.
The colour of the fkin may be determined by that
of the hair, which among the ^Egyptians, the bell
philofophers in the world, was of fuch importance,
that they put to death all the red-haired men who
fell into their hands.
The negroes prefer a glafs necklace to that gold,
which polite nations fo highly value : can there be
a greater proof of their wanting common fenfe ?
It is impoffible for us to fuppofe thefe creatures
to be men, becaufe allowing them to be men, a
fufpiciun would follow, that we ourlelves are not
Chriftians.
Z 3 Weak
342 THE
BOOK Weak minds exaggerate too much the wrong done
_
Chao <\ to tne Africans. For were the cafe as they (late it,
would the European powers, who make lo many
needlefs conventions among themfelves, have failed
to make a ral one, in behalf of humanity and
I
C H A P. VI.
Tbs true Origin of the R of /<
T is time to enquire into the true origin of the
right of flavery. It ought to be founded on the
ture or things ; lee us fee if there be any cafes
r it c. from thence.
In all v ric governments, people make no
difficulty in felling then , the political flavery
in fome meafure annihilates the civil liberty.
prrf According to Mr. Perry ( l ), the Mufcovites fell
themfelves very readily : the, :un for it is evi
dent i their lihe not worth keeping.
At Achim every one is for felling him lei f. Some
( u Dam- of the chief lor. have not lefs than a thoufand
."Haves, all ..principal merchants, who have a great
number of flaves themfelves, and thefe alfo are not
without their flaves. Their matters are their heirs,
and put them into trade. In thole ftates, the free
men, being overpowered by the government, have
no better refource than making themfelves flaves to
the tyrants in office.
This is the jutt and rational origin of that mild
law of flavery, which obtains in fome countries :
and mild it ought to be, as founded on the free
choice a man makes of a matter, for his own bene
fit ; which forms a mutual convention betwixt the
two parties. CHAP.
OF LAWS. 343
C H A P. VII.
Anotber Origin of the Right of Slavery.
: H E R E is another orisin of the right of BOOK
XV
A flavery, and even of the mod cruel flavery, c ,
which is to be feen among men. & 8.
There are countries where the excefs of heat ener
vates the body, and renders men fo flothfiriand dif-
pirited, that nothing but the fear of chaftifement
can oblige them to perform any laborius duty :
flavery is there more reconcileable to reafon ; and
the mafter being as lazy with refpect to his fovcreign,
as his flave is to him, this adds a political to a civil
flavery.
Ariftotle ( a ) endeavours to prove, that there are ( a ) Polit.
natural flaves, but what he fays is far from proving Llb - *
it. If there be any fuch, I believe they are thofe
of whom I have been fpeaking.
But as all men are born equal, flavery mud be
accounted unnatural, though in fome countries it be
founded on natural reafon , and a wide difference
ought to be made betwixt fuch countries, and thofe
where even natural reafon rejects it, as in Europe,
where it has been fo happily aboliflied.
Plutarch, in his life of Numa, fays, that in Sa
turn s time, there was neither flave nor mafter.
Chriftianity has reilored that age in our climates.
N
CHAP. VIII.
Inutility of Slavery among us.
ATURAL flavery, then, is to be limited
to fome particular parts of the world. In
Z 4
344 iJtir..j)rlKli
B c K all other countries, even tl.e moil: laborious works
l t ot fociety may be performed by freemen.
Experience verifies my affertion. Before ChriiH-
anity had abolimed civil flavery in Europe, wcr
ing in the mines was judged too toilfom for any but
flaves or malefactors : but at preient, there are men
employed in them, who are known to live * hap
pily. They have, by fome fmall privileges, en
couraged this profeiTion , to an increaie of labour,
they have joined an increafe ot gain , and have gone
fo far, as to make them better pleafed with their
condition than with any other which "they could have
embraced.
No labour is fo heavy, but it may be brought
to a level with the workman s ftrength, when re
gulated by equity, and not by avarice. The vio
lent fatigues which flaves are made to undergo in
other parts, may be fupplied by commodious ma
chines, invented by art, and ikiifully applied. The
Turkifh mines in theBannac of Temefwar, though
richer than thole of Hu: , did not yield to
much ; becaufe their invention reached no further,
than the flrength of their flav:
I know no: whether this article be dictated by
rny u "-cling, or by my heart. Pofiibly there is
not that climate upon earth, where the mod labo
rious fer vices might not, with proper encourage
ment, be performed by freemen. Bad laws having
made lazy men ; they have been reduced to flavery,
becaufe of their lazinels.
Teen in of Hartz in Lower Saxony, and
.1 i I *_ V **
CHAP.
OF LAWS. 345
C H A P. IX.
Several Kinds of Slavery.
SLAVERY is of two kinds, real and per- BOOK
Tonal. The real annexes the (lave to the land, ^
which Tacitus ( { ) makes the condition of flaves ^ ^. ,
among the Germans. They were not employed in "/:// G/r-
the family; a (tared tribute of co :tlc, or other r
moveables, paid to their mafter, was the whole of
their fervitude. And Inch a fervitudc dill continu
in Hungary, Bohemia, and fcveral parts ot luwcr
Germany.
Perfonal flavery conflfts in domdtic ...es, and
.ites more to the mailer s pcrlon.
The \\orft degree ot (livery i?, when it is at once
both real and perfonal, as that ot the Helotes among
the Lacedaemonians. They underwent the fatigues
of the field, and differed all manner of infults within
the hou: This Helotifm is contrary to the nature
of things. The real flavery is to be found only
among nations " of a plain manner of living ; all
family bufmefs being done by the wives and children.
The perfonal flavery is peculiar to voluptuous nati
ons ; luxury requiring the fervice ot (laves in the
houfe. But Helotifm joins in the fame perfons the
flavery efbblilhed by voluptuous nations, and that
of the mofl fimple.
* Tacitus de moritus Go-man, fays, the matter i.; not to be di-
lied from the Have by any delicacy of!
CHAP.
346 T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. X.
Regulations nece, *fpeff to Slavery.
r, o o K ^ U T of whatfoever kind the flavery be, the
oh JD c v ^ ^ avvs fh u d endeavour on the one hand
& 1 1. to aboli fli the abuies of it, and on the other to guard
againll its dangers.
CHAP. XL
of ) .
N Mahometan (laces ( g ), not only the life and
JL goods of female -fl.ivcs, but alfo what is called
eir \irtue or honour, are at their matter s dif-
polal. One of the misfortunes of thofe countries,
is, that the greatett part of the nation are born only
to be fubfe rvient to the pleafures of the other. This
fervitude is alleviated by the lazinefs in which fuch
flaves live*, which is an additional diiadvantage to
the ftate.
-r John It is this indolence which renders the ( h ) Eaftern
n ftTaglios fo delightful to thole very perfons whom
; II- L o j
they were made to connne. reople, who dread no-
MI thing but labour, may imagine themfelves happy in
e thefe places of indolence and eafe. But this (hews
i r u
laagour. how contrary they are to the very intent or the m-
ftitution of flavery.
Reafon requires that the matter s power fhould
not extend to what does not appertain to his fervice :
flavery fhould be calculated for utility, and not for
pleafure. The laws of chattity arife from thofe of
nature, and ought in all nations to be refpected.
If
O F LAW S. 347
If a law, which preferves the chaftity of flaves, B K
be good in thofe flares where an arbitrary power e > h;in It
bears down all before it, how much more will it & 12.
be fo in monarchies, and how much more itill in
republics ?
The law of the Lombards ( c ) has a regulation ( e ) Lib. I.
which ought to be adopted by all governments. l * 3 2 *
" If a mailer debauches hii> I Uve s wife, the (lave
" and his wife iliall be reftored to their freedom."
An admirable expedient, which without fevcrity lays
a powerful reflraint on the incontinency of mailers.
The Romans feem to me to have erred on this
head. They allowed an unlimited .- to the
mailer s lulls, and, in fom d their
flaves the privilege ot marryii. It is true, tin-
were the loweil part of the nation ; yet there
fhould have been fome care taken of their morals -,
efpecially as in prohibiting their marriage, they
corrupted the morals of the citizens.
CHAP. XII.
Danger frcm tbe Multitude of Slav.
TH E multitude of flaves has different er-
fe6ls in different governments. It is no
grievance in a defpotic (late, where the political
flavery of the wjiole body takes away the fenfe
ot civil flavery. Thofe who are called freemen,
in reality are little more fo than they who do not
come within that clafs ; and as the latter, in qua
lity of eunuchs, freedmen, or flaves, have gene
rally the management of all affairs, the condition of
a freeman and that of a (lave are very nearly allied.
This makes it therefore almoft a matter of indif
ference
3 4 S THE SPIRIT
K fercncc whether in fuch dates the flaves be few or
X
Chap. i 2i numerous
& i But in moderate Rates, it is a point of the higheit
importance, that there fliould not be a great number
of Haves. The political liberty of thofe dates, adds
to the value of civil liberty -, and he who is deprived
of the latter, is alfo deprived of the former. He
lees the happinefs of a fociety, of which he is not ib
much as a member , he fees the fecurity of others
need by laws, himfelf without any protection. He
fees his matter has a foul, that can enlarge itfelf ;
while his own is conftrained to fubmit to a continual
deprefTion. Nothing more aiTimilar.es a man to a
bcail, than living among freemen, himfelf a dave.
Such people as thefe are the natural enemies of the
fociety, and their number mud be dangerous.
It is not therefore to be wondered at, that mode
rate governments have been fo frequently didurbed
by revolts of flaves , and that this fo feldom hap
pens in * defpotic dates.
CHAP. XIII.
Of armed
THE danger of arming flaves is not fa great
in monarchies as in republics. In the former
a warlike people, and a body of nobility, are a fi
rlcient check upon thefe armed flavcs ^ whereas the
pacific members of a republic would have a hard
tafk to quell a fet of men, who having offenfive
weapons in their hands, would find themfelves a
match e citizens.
The revolt of the Mammelucs was a diffe.-ect cafe; this
_ mii:ria who ufurped the empire.
i The
OF LAWS. 349
The Goths who conquered Spain, fpread them- BOOK
felves over the country, and foon became very Ch ^
weak. They made three important regulations ; & 14.
they abolifhed an ancient cuftom which prohibited
intermarriages with the ( f ) Romans , they enacted ( f ) i
that all the freedmen () belonging to the Fife, j^^
mould ierve in war, under penalty ot being reduced \. tit. i,
to flavery , and they ordained that each Goth mould
i i i r i j i i /h\ r , ( ; ItJ.
arm and bring into the held the tenth part ( n ) of his Jjb <. n - N
flaves. This was but a fmall proportion : befides, 7- ^
T 1 " 1
thefe flaves thus carried to the field, did not form [
lib. Q. tit,
a feparate body ; they were in the army, and might
be laid to continue in the family.
CHAP. XIV.
T be fame Subjett continu-.
WHEN a whole nation is of a martial terrv
per, the flaves in arms arc lefs to be J.
By a law of the Alemans, a fl !io had com
mitted a clandeftine theft ( l ) was liable to the fame ( or 1
punifliment as a freeman in the like cafe; but if the Ale-
he was found guilty of a forcible robbery ( k ), he ^ ,
was only bound to reflore the thing fo taken
Amono; the Alemans, courage and intrepidity Ale *
O O i J
extenuated the guilt of an action. They employed
their flaves in their wars. Moil republics have beer -
attentive to difpirit their flaves : but the Alemans
relying on themfelves, and being always armed,
were fo far from fearing theirs, that they we*
rather for augmenting their courage ; they were the
inftruments either of their depredations or of d.
glory.
CHAP,
350 T H E S P I R I T
C H A P. XV.
Precautions to be ufed in moderate Governments.
BOOK E N I T Y and humane treatment may pre-
J j vent the dangers to be apprehended from
the multitude of flax r es in a moderate government.
Men grow reconciled to every thing, and even to
fcrvitudc, if not aggravated by the feverity of the
mailer. The Arlu i.ians treated their (laves \vith
great lenity ; and this fecured that (late from the
commotions railed by the flaves among the auftere
Lacedaemonians.
Ir docs not appear that the primitive Romans met
with any trouble from their flaves. Thole civil wars*,
which have been compared to the Punic wars, were
the conlequcrnces of their having diverted themfelves
of all humanity towards their flaves.
A frugal and laborious people generally ufe their
flaves more kindly, than thole who are above
labour. The primitive Romans lived, worked, and
cat with their flaves ; they behaved towards them
v.Ith great juftice and humanity. The greateft
punifliment they made them fuffer, was to make
them pafs before their neighbours with a forked piece
of wood on their back*. Their manners were fuffi-
cient to fecure the fidelity of their flaves ; there was
no neceffity for laws.
But when the Romans aggrandized themfelves -,
when their flaves were no longer the companions
of their labour, but the inftruments cf their luxury
and pride ; as they then wanted morals, they had
1 Sicily, fays Florus, fufFered more in the fervile than in the
Punic v,ar. Lib. 3.
2 need
OF LAWS. 351
need of laws. It was even neceflary for thefe laws
to be of the moil terrible kind, in order to efta- chap. ic
blifh the fafety of thole cruel matters, who lived in
the midft of their flaves, as in the midft of ene
mies. They made the Sillanian Senatus-Conful-
tum, and other laws f c ), which decreed, that when () Seethe
i I
a m after was murdered, all the (laves under the" 1
fame roof, or in any place fo near the houfe, as .
to be within the hearing of a man s voice, fhould
without diftinction be condemned to die. Thofe
who, in this cafe, fheltered a Have, in order to lave
him, where punifhed as ( c1 ) murderers; he whom his ; . fi-
mafter * ordered to kill him, and who ob.yt-d, was J
reputed guilty, even he who did not hinder him from nat .
killing himfelf, was liable to be punifhed ( c ). If
mafter was murdered on a journey, they put
death ( f ) thofe who were with him, and thofe who a<
fled. All thefe laws took place even againft thofe Co (M-
whofe innocence was proved : the intent of them was ^ j e , r ,.
to give their Haves a prodigious refpcft for their ii.ff.
mafter. They were not dependent on the civil !
government, but on a fault or imperfection of the
civil government. They were not derived from
the equity of civil laws, fmce they were contrary
to the principle of civil laws. They were properly
founded on the principles of war, with this difference,
that the enemies were in the bofom of the ftate.
The Sillanian Senatus-Conlultum was derived from
the law of nations, which requires that a fociety,
however imperfect, mould be preferred
It is a mis-fortune in government when the ma-
* When Antony commanded Eros to kill him, It was the fame
as commanding him to kill himfelf, becaufe, if he had obey.
he would have been punifhed as the murderer of h or.
giftracy
352 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK gjft raC y thus find themfelves under a necefFity of
Chap.V, making cruel laws; becaufe they have rendered
& 16. obedience difficult, they are obliged to increale the
penalty of di (obedience, or the fufpicion of fidelir
A prudent legiflator fore fees the ill confequ of
rend the legiflature terrible. Theflavesamongft
the Romans could have no confidence in th? laws;
and therefore the laws could have no in
them.
C H A 1\ XVI.
Til K IT. care that the
fla -g-, and
this ought to be r
The laws 01 vide, rs be taken
/, i in f; . . ;
Jin/ * creed, that the , had been
bandoned by their m. fhouid, in cafe they
. be free. Tl. .fured their liberc
.it fhould not there have been fume care :a
. ve their liv
When the law pc. ;- ter to uvay
the life of his (lave, >n veiled with a power
which he ought to <_ .M judge, and not as
mailer ; it was ; . that J ordain
thofc formalities wh .y the fufpicion of
an act of violence.
"When fathers, at Ruinf, were n permit-
( r )Seelawted to put their chihlren to de.uh, tl ;illrates
:n the orc j a j n ed the ( r ) punifhment which the father would
patrii*c- nave infiicled. A like cuilom between the mailer
tejlate, by and his flaves would be highly reafonablfe in a coun-
" try where mafters have the power of life and dea:
ror Alt * r _
1 he
OF LAWS. 353
The law of Mofes was extremely fevere. "If COOK
" any one llruck his (lave fo that he died under his (j^,-/^
ct hand, he was to be punifhed; but if he furvived
" v a day or two, he was not, becaule he was as
" his money." Strange chat a civil law mould thus
amongll thefe people relax the law of nature !
By a law of tiie Greeks ( c ) a Have too roughly ( c PIu-
treated by his mailer, miehc infill upon bunp Ibid Urch 6//
berfti-
to another. In the latter times there was a law of /;6//
the lame nature ( d ) at Rome. A mailer dilplealed ( d ) Seethe
with his flave, and a Have with his mailer, oi:glu
to be leparated. ,nus
When a citizen ufes a flave of another ill, the
latter ought to have liberty to complain before the .../-.
judge. The laws ( c ) of Plato and of moft nati- ( e ) Lib. 9.
ons took away from Haves the right ot natural de
fence. It was neceflary then that they mould give
them a civil defence.
At Sparta, Haves could have no juftice againft
either infults or injuries. So excelTive was their
mifery, that they were not only the flaves of a ci
tizen, but allb of the public ; they belonged to
all, as well as to one. At Rome, when they
confidered the injury done to a Have, they had
regard only to the * intereft of the mailer. In the
breach of the Aquilian law, they confounded a
wound given to a beaft, and that given to a flave ;
they regarded only the diminution of their value.
At Athens ( f ) he who had abufed the Have of an- ( f )
other, was punifhed feverely, and fometimes even
with death. The law of Athens was very reafon-
p. 610.
* This was frequently the fpirit of the la\vs of thofe nations, *L. 1 l( ^l (
who came out of Germany, as may be ieen by their codes.
in 1604.
VOL. I. A a able,
;,S4 THE SPIRIT
Boo K
Chap. 17.
Boo K a bi e? j n not adding the lofs of fafety to that of
I
C H A P. XVII.
Of Infrancbifements.
T is eafy to perceive that many (laves in a repub
lican government create a neceffity of making
many free. The evil is, it they have too many
Haves, they cannot keep them in due bounds ; if
they have too many freedmen they cannot live, and
mull become a burthen to the republic : befides it
may be as much in danger from the too great num
ber or frecdiv,*. :i, as from the too great number of
flavcs. It is neceflary therefore that the laws fnould
have an eye to thefe two inconveniencies.
The feveral laws and decrees of the fenate made at
Rome, both for and againft Haves, fometimes to li
mit, and at other times to facilitate their infranchife-
rnent-, plainly fhew the embarraflment in which they
found themselves in this refpecl. There were even
times in which they durft not make laws. When
Annals under Nero ( 5 ) they demanded of the fenate a per-
mifTion for the mailers to reduce again to flavery the
13. ungrateful freedmen, the emperor declared that they
oueht to decide the affairs of individuals, and to
_? *
make no general decree.
Much Ids can I determine what ought to be the
C2
regulations ot a good republic in an affair of this
kind ; this depends on too many circumftances. Let
us however make fomc reflections.
f t \ T** *
fliemia?a > ^ confiderable number of freedmen ought not fud-
Supple- denly to be made by a general law. We know that
Secad 2d amon gft tne Volfinienies ( f ) the freedmen becoming
ec "
jL . s
2 rr.afters
O F L A W S. 355
<> K
matters of the fuffrages, made an abominable law, B <>
which gave them the right of lying firft with
girls married to the free-born.
There are feveral ways of introducing infenfibly
new citizens into a republic. The laws may favour
the acquiring a peculium y and put flaves into a con
dition of buying their liberty : they may give a term
to fcrvitude like thofe of Mofes, which limited that
of the ( u ) Hebrew Haves to fix years. It is eafy ( n )Exodur
V V 1
to give every year freedom to a certain number of
thofe flaves who by their age, health, or indultry,
are capable of getting a fubfiftence. The evil may
be even cured in its root : as a great number ot
flaves are connected with the feveral employments
which are given them j to divide amongil the free-
born a part of thefe employments, for example,
commerce, or navigation, is diminifhing the num
ber of flaves.
When there are many freedmen, it is neceflliry
that the civil laws mould determine what they owe
to their patron, or elfe that thefe duties mould be
fixed by the contract of infranchifement.
It is certain that their condition mould be more
favoured in the civil, than in the political (late ;
becaufe, even in popular government, the power
ought not to fall into the hands of the vulgar.
At Rome, where they had fo many freedmen,
the political laws with regard to them, were admir
able. They gave them little, and excluded them
almoft from nothing : they had even a (hare in the
legiflature, but the refolutions they were capable of
taking were almoft of no weight. They might
bear a part in the public offices and even in the dig
nity of the priefthood ( x ) ; but this privilege was in jj*
A a 2 fome tus, lib. 3.
356 T H E S P I R 1 T
BOOK fome fort rendered ufelefs by the difadvantages they
xv
Clia 17 ^d to encoumer w * tri m tne elections. They had
& 1 8. a right to enter into the army-, but they were to be
regiitered in a certain clafs of the cenfus^ before they
(y) Au- could be foldiers. Nothing hindered the ( y ) freed-
guftuj men f rom being united by marriage with the fami-
Dio, 1. $<-. ^ es f tne free-born , but they were not permitted to
mix with thofe of the fenators. In fhort their chil
dren wtie hee born, though they were not fo them-
felvcs.
CH A P. XVIII.
bs.
i
Ill s in a republican government, it is
frequently oi advantage, for the fituation
the freedmen to be but little below that of the
irce-born, and that the laws be adapted to remove
a diflike of their condition. But in a defpotic
government, vJ\i TO luxury and arbitrary power pre
vail, they have nothing to do in this refpect-, the
freed men almofl always find themfelves above the
free-born. They rule in the court of the prince,
and in the palaces of the great; and as they ftudy
the foibles. ; iul not the virtues of their mafter,
they lead him not by his virtues but by his weak-
nel> the hxcdmcn ot Roir.e in the times
of the emperors.
Avl.eii r! fl.ives are eunuchs, Jet ever
fo rnr.ny privileges be granted them, they can hardly
be regarded as freedmen. For as they cannot have
a family of their own, they are naturally attached to
that ot another; and it is only by a kind of fiction
that they are confidered as citizens.
And
OF LAWS. 357
And yet there are countries where the magi ll racy BOOK
is intirely in their hands : "In * Tonquin, fays
Dampier ( z ), all the mandarins civil and military (<) Vol. 3,
" are eunuchs." They have no families, and though
they are naturally avaricious, the matter or the prince
in the end takes advantage of this very avarice.
Dampier tells us too, that in this country, the
eunuchs cannot live without women, and therefore
marry. The law which permits their marriage,
may be founded on the one hand, on their relpcct
for thefe eunuchs, and on the ether, on their con
tempt for women.
Thus they are trufted with the magiftracy, be-
caufe they have no family -, and permitted to marry,
becaufe they are magiftrates.
Then it is that the lenle which remains, would
fain fupply that they have loft; and the enterprizes
of defpair become a kind of enjoyment. So in Mil
ton, that fpirit who has nothing left but defires, en
raged at his degradation, would make ule of his
impotency itfelf.
We fee in the hiilory of China a great number
of laws to deprive eunuchs of all civil and military
employments ; but they always returned to them
again. It feems as if the eunuchs of the eaft were
a necefTary evil.
* It was formerly the ftme in China. The two Mahometan
Arabs who travelled thkher in the nimh century, ule the word
eunuch, whenever they fpeak of the go\ernoi of a city.
A a 3 BOOK
35$ T H S P I R I T
BOOK XVI.
How the Laws of domeftic Slavery have a
Relation to the Nature of the Climate.
CHAP. I.
Of domeftic Servitude.
.
\\ r, o K C* LAVES are eftablifhed for the family ; but
O l K> y are ot a part of it. Thus I diftinguifh
* their frrvitude from that which the women in fome
countries fufter, and which I fhall properly call do
meftic fervitude.
CHAP. II.
That in the Countries of the South there is a natural
Inequality between the two Sexes.
T TOMEN, in hot climates, are * marriage-
. > able at eight, nine, or ten years of age; thus,
in thoie countries, infancy and marriage almoft always
go together. They are old at twenty : Their reafon
therefore never accompanies their beauty. When
beauty demands the empire, the want of reafon for
bids the claim ; when reafon is obtained, beauty
Mahomet married Cadhiva at five, and took her to his bed
at eight ye;irs old. Jn the hot countries of Arabia and the Jn-
.rls are marriageable at eight years of age, and are brought
to bed the year after. I ridcaux, Life of Mahomet. We fee
women in the kingdom of Algiers pregnant at nine, ten, and
d .;rs of age. Hijt. of the Kingdom of Algiers by Logiers de
/.I?!.
is
O F L A W S. 359
is no more. Thefe women ought then to be in a ftate BOOK
of dependance -, for reafon cannot procure in old char. 2.
age, that empire, which even youth and beauty
could not give. It is therefore extremely natural
that in thefe places, a man, when no law oppofes
it, mould leave one wife to take another, and that
polygamy mould be introduced.
In temperate climates, where the charms of wo
men are beft preferved, where they arrive later at
maturity, and have children at a more advanced
feafon of life, the old age of their hufbands in fume
degree follows theirs , and as they have more rea
fon and knowledge at the time of marriage, if it be
only on account of their having continued longer
in life, it muft naturally introduce a kind of equa
lity between the two fexes, and, in confequence of
this, the law of having only one wife.
In cold countries the almoft neceiTary cuftom of
drinking ftrong liquors, eflablimes intemperance
amongft men. Women, who, in this refpecft, have
a natural reftraint, becaufe they are always oh the
defenfivc, have therefore the advantage of reafon
over them.
Nature, which has diftinguifhed men by their rea
fon and bodily ftrength, has fet no other bounds to
their power than thofe of this ftrength and reafon. It
has given charms to women, and ordained that their
afcendant over man (hall end with thefe charms :
But in hot countries, thefe are found only at the
beginning, and never in the progrefs of life.
Thus the law which permits only one wife, is
phyfically conformable to the climate of Europe,
and not to that of Afia. This is the reafon why
Mahometanifm was eftablimed with iuch facility
A a 4 in
o T I! E S P I R I T
in Afia, and lo difficultly extended in Europe;
why hriflianity is maintained in liurope, and has
royed in Ana; and in fine, why the Ma
ns have made fuch prog;efs in China, and
L Imiiians fo little.
r Some particular reafons induced Valentinian (
it | >ly;/,amy in the empire. That l.iw, fo
iinproprr tor our cliir.;itcs, was abrogated ( k ) by
ni III..- ! fins, Arcadms, and Ilonorius.
t
CHAP. III.
r Plurality rf /.
f r t
* tf J U PP 0i " i!
.
f T - * T T ^A T t T r 1 1
t> 1 1 in countrk-s wher is
<niiv i-n^ nliflied, the number of wives is
principally determined by the riches of the huf-
band; yet it cannot be laid that riches cftabliflv.
polygamy in thefc ftates ; fincc poverty m.iy pro
duce the fame effecl, as I fliall prove when ! ccme
to fpeak of the fav .
Pclygamy in powerful nations, is lefs a luxury in
itfelf, than the occafion of great luxury. In
climates they nave few wants, and it cofts little to
maintain a wife and children ; they may therefore
have a great number of wives.
CHAP. IV.
hal tbe Law of Polygamy i
on C... ion.
ACCORDING to the calculations made
in feveral parts of Europe, there are here
* In Ceylan a man may live on ten fols a month ; they eat no
thing there but rice and filh. ColleSiion of voyages made to efta-
blijh an India Company.
3 fcorn
O F L A W S. 361
born more boys than girls*; on the contrary, B ^ K
by the accounts we have of Ada, there are there Ch ^
born more t girls than boys. The law which in
Europe allows only one wife, and that in Afia
which permits many, have therefore a certain rela
tion to the climate.
In the cold climates of Afia, there are born as
in Europe, more males than females ; and from
hence, fay the ( c ) Lamas, is derived the reafon of ( e ) Du
that law, which amondl them, permits of a woman !
Hlit. 01
to have J many hulbands. china,
But it is difficult for me to believe that there are Vol. .;.
many countries, where the difproportion can be
great enough for any exigency to juftify the intro
ducing either the law in favour of many wives, or
that of many hulbands. This would only imply,
that a majority of women, or even a majority of
men, is more conformable to nature in certain
countries than in others.
I confcfs, that if what hiftory tells us be true,
that, at Bantam ( f ) there are ten women to one ( f ) Collec-
man, this muft be a cafe particularly favourable to tlon
J voyages
polygamy. for the
In all this I only give their reafons, but do not eftablitfi-
iuftify their cuftoms. . ,,,
J J llilir\n*
company.
* Dr. Arbuthnot finds that in England the number of boys Vol. I.
exceeds that of girls ; but people have been to blame to conclude
that the cafe is the fame in all climates.
j- See Kempfer, who relates that upon numbering the people
of Meaco, there were found 182072 males and 223573 females.
I Albuzeit-el-haflen, one of the two Mahometan Arabs, who,
in the ninth century, went into India and China, thought this
cuitom a proflitution. And indeed nothing could be more con
trary to the ideas of a Mahometan.
CHAP.
362 THE SPIRIT
CHAP. V.
T be Reafon of a Law of Malabar.
BOOK T N the tribe- of the * Naires, on the coaft of
XVI. Malabar, the men can have only one wife,
& 6. P * while a woman, on the contrary, may have many
hufbands. The origin of this cuftom is not I be*
lieve difficult to difcover. The Naires are the tribe
of nobles, who are the foldiers of all thofe nations.
In Europe, foldiers are forbid to many : in Mala
bar, where the climate requires greater indulgence,
they are fatisfied with rendering marriage as little
burthenfome to them as pofTible ; they give a wife
amongft many men, which confequemly diminifhes
the attachment to a family, and the cares of houie-
kccping, and leaves them in the free pofiefTion of a
military fpirit.
CHAP. VI.
Of Polygamy confidered in itfelf.
WITH regard to polygamy in general, in
dependently of the circumftances which
may render it tolerable, it is not of the lead fervice
to mankind, nor to either of the two fexes, whether
it be that which abufes, or that which is abufed.
Neither is it of fervice to the children-, for one of its
greateft inconveniencies is, that the father and mo
ther cannot have the fame affection for their off-
* See Francis Pirnrd, c. 27. Edifying Letters, 3d and loth
colledioa on the Malleami on the coalt of Malabar. This is
confidered as an abufe of the military profeflion, as a woman,
fays Pirard, of the tribe ot the Bramins never would marry many
hufbands.
fpring i
O F L A W S. 363
fpring , a father cannot love twenty children with BOOK
the fame tendernefs as a mother can love two. It ^ ^
is much worie when a wife has many hufbands ; & 7-
for then paternal love is only held by this opinion,
that a father may believe, if he will, or that others
may believe, that certain children belong to him.
May I not fay that a plurality of wives leads to
that paflion which nature difallows ? for one depra
vation always draws on another. I remember that
in the revolution which happened at Conftantinople,
when ful tan Achmet was depofed, hiftory fays,
that the people having plundered the Kiaya s houfe
they found not a fingle woman , they tell us that
at ( f ) Algiers, in the greateft part of their feraglios, (f) Hift.of
they have none at all. Algiers by
Befides, the pofieflion of many wives does not
always prevent their entertaining defires * for thole
of others : it is with luft as with avarice, whofe
thirll increafes by the acquifition of treafures.
In the reign of Juftinian, many philofophers,
difpleafed with the conftraint of Chriftianity, retired
into Perfia. What ftruck them the moft, fays
Agathias ( ), was, that polygamy was permitted (<) Life
amono-ft men who did not even abftain from adul- and ac "
tions of
ter y- Juilinian,
p. 403.
CHAP. VII.
Of an Equality of Treatment in Cafe of many Wives.
F
ROM the law which permitted a plurality
of wives followed that of an equal behaviour
* This is the reafon why women in the Eaft are fb carefully
concealed.
to
364 THE I R I T
BOOK to each. Mahomet, who allowed of four, would
vy l
( -, ) i ; have every thing, as provifions, drefs, and conjugal
& s. duty, equally divided between them. This law
iec Ti- is allb in force in the Maldiyian illes ( u ) where they
r;irc!,c.iz. are at liberty to marry three wives.
() F,\-cd. The law of Mofes ( x ) even declares, that if any
I0 > one has married his fon to a flave,- and this fon
fhould marry afterwards a free woman, he Ihall di-
minifh nothing of her food, her raiment or refpect.
They might give more to the new wife ; but the
fir ft was not to have lefs than ihe had before.
C II A P. VIII.
Of / . .ration c< --i en from Men.
7* H K prodigious number of wives porTefled
by thole who live in rich and voluptuous
nations, is a confequence of the law of polygamy.
Their feparation trom men, and their dole confine
ment, naturally follow trom the greatnefs of this
number. Domellic order renders this neceffary ;
thus an infolvent debtor feeks to conceal himfelf
from the purfuit of his creditors. There are climates
where the impulfes of nature have fuch ftrength
that morality has almoft none. If a man be left
with a woman, the temptation and the fall will be
the fame thing ; the attack certain, the refiftance
none. In thefe countries, inftead of precepts, they
have recourfe to bolts and bars.
One of the Chinefe claflic authors confiders the
man as a prodigy of virtue, who finding a woman
alone in a diftant apartment, can forbear making ule
of force *. CHAP.
* " It is an admirable touch-done, to find by one s felf a treafure
" whofe
O F L A W S. 365
C II A P. IX.
Of the Connexion between domeftic and political Go
I
vernment.
N a republic the condition of citizens is limited,
* -\ i
equal, mild, and agreeable , every thing par- *
takes of the benefit of public liberty. An empire
over the women cannot, amongft them, be fo well
exerted , and where the climate demands this empire,
it is moil agreeable to a monarchical government.
This is one ot the reafons why it has always been
difficult to eftablifh a popular government in the
eaft.
On the contrary, the flavery of women is perfectly
conformable to the genius of a defpotic government,
which delights in treating all with levericy. Thus
at all times have we feen in Afia domeitic flavery
and defpotic government walk hand in hand with
an equal pace.
In a government which requires, above all things,
that particular regard be paid to its tranquillity,
and where the extreme fubordination calls for peace,
it is abfolutely necefTary to fhut up the women ,
for their intrigues would prove fatal to their huf-
bands. A government which has not time to exa
mine into the conduct of its fubjects, views them
with a fufpicious eye, only becaufe they appear, and
fuffer themfelves to be known.
Let us only fuppofe that the levity of mind,
* whofe mafter is known, or a beautiful woman in a diftant
" apartment, or to hear the voice of an enemy who mull periih
" without our affiflance." Tranflation of a Chinefe piece of
morality, xvhich may be Jcen in Du Halde, Vol. 3. p, 151.
the
366 THE SPIRIT
BOOK tne indifcretions, the tafr.es and difgufts of our
XVT
Chap Q w o men > attended by their paffions of a higher, and
& 10. a lower kind, with all their active fire, and in that
full liberty with which they appear amongft us, were
conveyed into an eaftern government, where would
be the father of a family who could enjoy a moment s
repofe ? the men would be every where fufpected,
every where enemies ; the Hate would be over
turned, and the kingdom overflowed with rivers of
blood.
CHAP. X.
The Frincip e on ixbich tbe Morals of tbc Eaft are
found
IN the cafe of a multiplicity of wives, the more
a family ceafes to be united, the more ought
the laws to reunite its detached parts in a common
center ; and the greater the diverfity of interefts,
the more necefTary it is for the laws to bring them
back to a common intereft.
This is more particularly done by confinement.
The women fhould not only be feparated from the
men by the walls of the houfe , but they ought
alfo to be feparated in the fame enclofure, in fuch
a manner that each may have a diftinct houfhold in
the fame family. From hence each derives all that
relates to the practice of morality, modeily, chaf-
tity, referve, filence, peace, dependance, refpect,
and love, and in fhort, a general direction of her
thoughts to that which in its own nature is a thing
of the greater! importance, a fingle and intire at
tachment to her family.
Women
O F L A W S. 367
Women have naturally fo many duties to fulfil, BOOK
duties which are peculiarly theirs , that they can- Ch ^
not be enough excluded from every thing capa
ble of infpiring other ideas; from every thing that
goes by the name of amufements ; and from every
thing which we call bufmefs.
We find the manners more pure in the feveral
parts of the eaft, in proportion as the confinement
of women is more ftrictly obfcrvcd. In great
kingdoms, there are necefTarily great lords. The
greater their wealth, the more enlarged is their
ability of keeping their wives in an exact confine
ment, and of preventing them from entering again
into fociety. From hence it proceeds, that in the
empires of Turky, Perfia, of the Mogul, China,
and Japan, the manners of their wives are ad
mirable.
But the cafe is not the fame with India, where
a multitude of iflands, and the fituation of the land,
have divided the country into an infinite number of
little dates, which from caufes that we have not here
room to mention, are rendered defpotic.
There are none there but the wretches who pillage,
and the wretches who are pillaged. Their grandees
have very moderate fortunes ; and thofe whom they
call rich, have only a bare fubfiftence. The con
finement of their women cannot therefore be very
-ftrict ; nor can they make ufe of any great precau
tions to keep them within due bounds ; from hence
it proceeds that the corruption of their manners is
fcarcely to be conceived.
We may there fee to what an extreme, the vices
of a climate, indulged in full liberty, will carry
licentioufnefs. It is there that nature has a flrength,
and
BOOK
XVI.
Chap. 10,
&: 1 1.
(! Collec
tion of
voyages
for the
ment of
an India
company,
Vol. 2.
p. 2.
THE SPIRIT
and modefty a weaknefs, that exceeds all compre-
henfion. At Patan ( e ) the wanton defires * of the
women are fo outragious, that the men are obliged
to make ufe of a certain apparel to fhelter them from
their Jdi^iis. In thefe countries, the two fexes lole
even thole laws which properly belong to each.
C H A P. XL
Of dome flic Slavery independently of Polygamy.
IT is not only a plurality of wives, which in
ieit.iin places ot the cad requires their confine
ment-, but alfo the climate itfclf. Thofe who con-
r the horrible < nines, the treachery, the black
vill.inies, the poifonings, the ajTaffinations, which the
liberty of women has occafioned at Goa, and in
the Portuguefe lettlements in the Indies, where
religion permits only one wife-, and who compare
them with the innocence and purity of manners of
the women of Turky, Perfia, Moguldan, China,
and Japan, will clearly fee that it is frequently as
necefiary to feparate them from the men, when
they have but one, as when they have many.
Thefe are things which ought to be decided by
the climate. \Vhat purpofe would it anfwer to
flint up women in our northern countries, where
their manners are naturally good ; where all their
pafTions are calm ; and where love rules over
t
* In the Maldivian iflcs the fathers marry their daughters at
ten and eleven years of age, becaufe it is a great fin, lay they,
to liiffer them to endure the want of a hu/band. See Pirard, c. 12.
At Bantam as foon as a girl is twelve or thirteen years old, me
muft be married if they would not have her lead a debauched
life. Collection cf n.yages for the tftablijhment of an India Com
pany. />. 34-S.
the
O F L A W S. 369
the heart with fo regular and gentle an empire, BOOK
3CVT
that the lead degree of prudence is fufficient to chap, ir,
conduct it ? & 12.
It is a happinefs to live in thofe climates which
permit a communication between each other, where
that fex which has moft charms feems to imbellifli
luciety, and where wives referving themfelves for the
pleafuresof one, contribute to the amufement of all
CHAP. XII.
Of natural Modefty.
ALL nations arc equally agreed in fixing con
tempt and ignominy on the incontinence of
women. Nature has dictated this to all. She has
eftablifhed the attack, and flie has eftablifhed too the
refiftance , and having implanted dcfires in both,
fhe has given to the one boldncls, and to the other
fhame. She has given to individuals a long extent
of years in which they are to leek their own preler-
vatiorr, but to perpetuate themfelves, (he has given
only a moment.
It is then far from being true, that to be inconti
nent is to follow the laws of nature-, fmce this is, on
the contrary, a violation of thefe laws, which can
be followed only by modeily and difcretion.
Befides, it is natural for intelligent beings to feel
their imperfections. Nature has therefore fixed fhame
in our minds, a fhame of our imperfections.
When therefore the phyfical power of certain cli
mates violates the natural law of the two fexes, and
that of intelligent beings , it belongs to the legifla*
ture to make civil laws, to oppofe the nature of the
climate, and to re-eftablifh the primitive laws.
VOL. I. B b CHAP,
570 T HE 8 PI R IT
CHAP. XIII.
Of Jealoufy.
BOOK "\1J 7 1 1 ^ refpcct to nations we ought to di-
V V ftinguifh between the pafllon of jealoufy,
& ^ and a jealoufy arifmg from cuftoms, manner?, and
laws. The one is a hot raging fever ; the other,
cold, but fome times terrible, and may be joined
with indifference and contempt.
The one, which is an abule of love, derives its
birth from love itielf. The other depends only on
manners, on the cuftoms of a nation, on the laws of
tlu iitry, and fometimes even on religion*.
It is t always the effect of the phyfical
power of the climate; and at the fame time, the
remedy ol this phyfical power,
C H A P. XIV.
: jlmi M:i}:>;:r of dome/lie Go-cmiment.
WI VES are changed fo often in the eaft,
that they cannot have the power of do
me ernment. This care is therefore commit-
o
ted to the eunuchs, whom they entruft with all
their keys, and the management of all the houfhold
affairs. " In Perfia, lays Sir John Chardin, they
tc give wives their cloaths, as we do to children."
Thus that care which feems fo well to become them,
that care which every where elfe is the firft of their
cares, does not at all concern them.
* Mahomet ck Crcd hi.s followers to watch their wires ; a cer
tain Imnn when he was clyin^ faici rhe fame thing; and Confu
cius preached the fame doctrine.
i CHAP.
OF LAWS. 371
CHAP. XV.
Of Divorce and Repudiation*
THERE is this difference between a cli- I 00 *
vorce and a repudiation, that a divorce is ^p , -
made by a mutual confent occafioned by a mu
tual antipathy; while a repudiation is made, by the
will and for the advantage of one of the two par
ties, independently of the will and advantage of
the other.
The necefTity there is fometimes for women to
repudiate, and the difficulty there always is in doing
it, render that Jaw very tyrannical, which gives this
right to men, without giving it to women. A hul-
bahd is the matter of the houiej he has a rhouiand
ways of "keeping his wife to her duty, or of bring
ing her back to it; fo that in his hands it feems as
if repudiation could be only a new abule of power.
But a wife who repudiates only makes ufc of a dread
ful kind of remedy. It is always a great misfortune
for her to go in fearch of a fecond hufband, when fhe
has loft the moft part of her attractions wirh an
other. One of the advantages attending the charms
of youth in the female fex, is, that in an advanced
age the hufband is led to complacency and love.- by
the remembrance of paft pleafures.
It is then a general rule, that in all countries
where the laws have given to men the power of
repudiating, they ought alfo to give it to women.
Nay, in climates where women live in domeftic
flavery, one would think that the law ought to per
mit women the right of repudiation, and to hul-
bands only that of divorce.
B b 2 When
372 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK When wives are confined in a feraglio, the huf-
Chap ic. band ought not to repudiate on account of an op-
pofition of manners , it is the hufband s fault if
their manners are incompatible.
Repudiation becaufe of the barrennefs of the wo
man, ought never to take place but where there is
only one wife ; when there are many, this is of no
importance to the hufband.
A law of the Maldivians * permitted them to
take again a wife whom they had repudiated. A
(>) Hifl. of j aw O f Mexico ( ) forbad their being reunited under
qucftof P am of death. The law of Mexico was more ra-
M^ tional than that of the Maldivians : at the time even
s of the diflblution, it attended to the perpetuity of
Y- - - , .
marriage , inftead ot this, the law of the Maldivi
ans fccmcd equally to fport with marriage and re
pudiation.
The law of Mexico admitted only of divorce.
This was a particular realbn for their not permit
ting thole who were voluntarily feparated, to be ever
reunited. Repudiation feems chiefly to proceed
from a haftineis of temper, and from the dictates
of lome of the pallions \ while divorce appears to
be an affair of deliberation.
Divorces are frequently of great political ufe-, but
as to the civil utility they are eftablifhed only for the
advantage of the hulband and wife, and are not al
ways favourable to their children.
* They took tliern agnin r v to any other, becaufe, in
rhis cafe, there was ; els.
CHAP.
O F L A W S. 373
CHAP. XVI.
Of Repudiation and Divorce amongft the Romans.
ROMULUS permitted a hufband to repu- BOOK
diate his wife, if flic had committed adul- / ~ XVI /;
Lhap. ID.
tery, prepared poifon, or procured falfe keys. He
did not give to women the right of repudiating
their hufbands. Plutarch ( k ) calls this, a law ex- ( k ) Life of
i r Romulus,
tremely fevere.
As the Athenian law gave ( ) the power of re- ( ) This
pudiation to the wife as well as to the hufband, and w a law
.... 1-11 .1 of Solon.
as this right was obtained by the women amongtt
the primitive Romans, notwith Handing the law of
Romulus ; it is evident that this inftitution was one
of thofe which the deputies of Rome brought from
Athens, and which were inferted into the laws of
the twelve tables.
Cicero * fays that the reafons of repudiation
fprung from the law of the twelve tables. We
cannot then doubt but that this law increafed the
number of the reafons for repudiation eftablifhed
by Romulus.
The power of divorce was alfo an appointment,
or at lead a confequence of the law of the twelve
tables. For from the moment that the wife or the
hufband had feparately the right of repudiation,
there was a much ftronger reafon for their hav
ing the power of quitting each other by mutual
confent.
* Mi mam res fuas fibi habere juflit, ex duodecim tabulis caq-
fam sddidir. Philip, zd.
B b 3 The
374 T H E S P I R I T
i; o o K Th e l aw did not require that they mould lay
Chsr 1*6 P en tne * caul " cs f divorce. In the nature of the
thing, the reafons for repudiation fhould be given,
while thofe for a divorce are unneceflary , becaufe
whatever caufes the law may admit as fufficient to
break a marriage, a mutual antipathy muft be
ftrongcr than them all.
The following fad mentioned by Dionyfius Ha-
(m)Iil>.2. licarnaiTenfis ( " :, Valerius Maximus( n ), and Aulus
Gellius (>, docs not appear to me to have the leaft
t decree of probability : though they had at Rome, fay
they, the power of repudiating a wife ; yet they
had fo much refpecl: for the aulpices, that no bo
dy, for the ljv.ce of five hundred and twenty years,
ever made i uie of this right, till Carvilius Ru
ga repudiated his, becaufe of her fterility. We
need only be fenfible of the nature of the human
ir.ind, to perceive how very extraordinary it muft
be, tor a law to give fuch right to a whole
nation, and yet for no body to make life of it.
-the Coriolanus letting out on his exile, advifed his ( r )
- }l ri f wife to marry a man more happy than himfelf.
We have jutt been feeing that the law of the twelve
les, and the manners of the Romans, greatly ex
tended the law of Romulus. But to what pur-
pofe were thcfe extcnfions, if they never made ufe
power to repudiate ? Befides, if the citi-
- -\ eel for the aufpices, that they
: v- ; repudiate, how came the legidators
[ufb nian altered th s. Nov. 117. c. 10.
Pionyi". Hdic. and Valerius Maximus, and
"d me ;y three according to Aulus Ge
ee M placing this under the fame con-
OF LAWS. 375
of Rome to have lefs than they ? and how came the B *
laws inceffantly to corrupt their manners ? Chap^rfc
All that is furprizing in the facl: in queflion,
will foon difappear, only by comparing two paf-
fages in Plutarch. The regal law ( q ) permitted (<) Plu-
a hufband to repudiate in the three cafes already n ! cll \
mentioned, and " it enjoined, fays Plutarch ( r ), Romulus.
that he who repudiated in any other cafe, mould ( r ) IbiJ .
be obliged to give the half of his fubftancc to
his wife, and that the other half mould be con-
fecrated to Ceres." They might then repudiate
in all cafes, if they were but willing to fubmit to
the penalty. No body had done this before Car-
vilius Ruga * ; who, as Plutarch fays in another
place ( ), " put away his wife for her llmiity two ( ) In hi*
tc
<c
c
hundred and thirty years after Romulus." That
is, me was repudiated feventy one years before the tA "
tAecn
law of the twelve tables, which extended both the Thefeus
mulus.
power and the caufes of repudiation.
r
t
The authors I have cited fay, that Carvilius
Ruga loved his wife , but that the cenfors made
him take an oath to put her away, becaufe of her
barrennefs, to the end that he might give children
to the republic ; and that this rendered him odious
to the people. We mull know the genius and tem
per of the Romans, before we can difcover the true
caufe of the hatred they had conceived for Car
vilius. He did not fall into difgrace with the peo
ple for repudiating his wife ; this was an affair
that did not at all concern them. But Carvi-
* Indeed fterilJty is not a caufe mentioned by the law of Ro-
rnuius; but to all appearance, he was not iubjt-ci to a ov-i location
of his effects, fmce he followed the orders of the cenfors.
B b 4- lius
376 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK ]j us h ac i taken an oath to the cenfors, that becaufe
Chap. 16 f tne ft er ility f his wife, he would repudiate
her to give children to the republic. This Was a
yoak which the people faw the cenfors were go
ing to put upon them. I fhall difcover in the
() Book profecution of this work( l ), the repugnance which
23. c. 21. t | 1C y ;1 ) wa y S f e ] t f or regulations of the like kind.
We fnould explain the laws by the laws, and hif-
tory by hiftory.
\*<
BOOK
O F L A W 8. 377
BOOK XVII.
How the Laws of political Servitude
have a Relation to the Nature of the
Climate.
c n A p. i.
Of political Servitude.
POLITICAL fervitude does not lefs depend BOOK
on the nature of the climate, than that which / x ^ "-
is civil and domeftic, and this we arc going to make & 2 ap
appear.
CHAP. II.
The Difference between Nations in point cf Courage.
W E have already obferved that great heat
enervates the ftrength and courage of men,
and that in cold climates they have a certain vigor
of body and mind which renders them capable of
long, painful, great, and intrepid actions. This
remark holds true not only between one nation and
another ; but even in the different parts of the ^ Du
fame country. In the north of China ( ), people Halde
are more couragious than thofe in the fouch , and c
thofe in the fouth of Corea ( h ), have lets bravery ( k )The
than thofe in the north. hi " cfe
We ought not then to be aftonifhed that the ma j. e
effeminacy of the people in hot climates, has almoft mention
C 1 " " /
always rendered them (laves j and that the bravery tnis lb -
2 of p. 44 s.
378 THE SPIRIT
* K of thofe in cold climates has enabled them to main-
YVll
tain their liberties. This is an effect which fprings
from a natural caufe.
This has alfo been found true in America; the
dcfpotic empires ot Mexico and Peru were near
the Line, and almoll all the little free nations were
>d are frill, near the Poles.
C II A P. III.
>:c of
THl i ons of travellers ( a ) inform us, "that
crapcfa to -*. f :nent of the north of Afia,
T TV \
tc which :ds from forty degrees or thereabouts
tlu-Hn!.of " to the Pole, and from the frontiers of Mufcovy
r " " even to tiie eaftern ocean, is in^an extremely
it
1C
Do*Halde " co ^ climate-, that this immenfe tract of land is
" divided by a chain of mountains which run from
" weft to eaft, leaving Siberia on the north, and
" Great Tarury on the fouth-, that the climate
of Siberia is ib cold, that excepting fome places
it cannot be cultivated, and that though the
Ruffians have fettlements all along the Irtis, they
cultivate nothing ; that in this country there
grows only fome little firs and flirubs ; that the
natives of the country are divided into wretch-d
colonies, like thofe of Canada; that the reafon
of this cold proceeds on the one hand from the
height of the land, and on the other, from the
" mounr which, in proportion as they run from
<c fouth to north, are levelled in fuch a manner, that
46 the north wind every where blows without oppo-
<e fition ; that tins wind which renders Nova Zem-
" bla uninhabitable, blowing in Siberia makes it
* c a
(C
<c
<c
cc
OF LAWS. 379
<{ a barren wafte-, that in Europe > on the contrary, BOOK
" the mountains of Norway and Lapland are admi- chap. -"
" rable bulwarks which cover the northern countries
from the wind ; fo that at Stockholm, which is
" about fifty nine degrees latitude, the earth pro-
duces plants, fruits, and corn ; and that about
* Abo, which is fixty one degrees, and even to
11 fixty three and fixty four, there are mines of
" filver, and the land is fruitful enough."
We fee alfo in theie relations, " that Great
" Tartary, which is to the fouth of Siberia, is
" alfo exceeding cold -, that the country cannot
" be cuhivated , that nothing can be found but
" pafturage for their flocks and herds ; that trees
" cannot grow there, but only brambles, as in Ice-
" land -, that there are near China and India,
" fome countries where there grows a kind of mil-
" let, but that neither corn nor rice will ripen ;
" that there is fcarcely a place in Chinefe Tartary
" at forty three, forty four, and forty five degrees,
" where it does not freeze feven or eight months
" in the year, fo that it is as cold as Iceland,
" though it might be imagined from its fituation to
" be as hot as the fouth of France , that there are
l< no cities except four or five towards the eaftern
" ocean, and fome which the Chinefe, for poli-
" tical reafons, have built near China -, that in the
reft of great Tartary, there are only a few fitu-
ated in Buchar, Turqueftan, and Cathay; that
the reafon of this extreme cold proceeds from
the nature of the nitrous earth, full of ialt-
petre, and fand, and more particularly from
the height of the land. r Verbiell found,
;hst a certain place eighty leagues north of the
4
(C
II
ct
great
380 THE SPIRIT
B r T olc " great wall towards the fource of Kavamhuram*
Chap - " exceeded the height of the Tea near Pekin three
" thoufand geometrical paces ; that this height *
<c is the caufe that though almoft all the great rivers
" of Afia have their fource in this country, there
" is however fo great a want of water, th.it it can
o
tc
be inhabited only near the rivers and lakes."
Thefe fndts being laid down, I reafon thus. Afia
has properly no temperate zone, as the places fitu-
1 in a very cold climate immediately touch upon
thofe which are exceeding hot, that is Turky, Perfia,
India, China, Corea, and Japan.
In F,urope, on the contrary, the temperate zone
is very extenfive though fituated in climates widely
different from each other ; there being no affinity
between the climates of Spain and Italy, and thofe
of Norway and Sweden. But as the climate grc
infenfibly cold upon our advancing from fouth to
north, nearly in proportion to the latitude of each
country ; it thence follows that each refembles the
country joining to it, that there is no very extra
ordinary difference between them, and that, as I have
juft the temperate zone is very extenfive.
From hence it comes, that in Afia the ftrong
nations are oppofed to the weak ; the warlike, brave,
and aftive people touch immediately on thofe who
are indolent, effeminate, and timorous: the one muft
therefore conquer, and the other be conquered. In
Europe, on the contrary, ftrong nations are op
pofed to the ftrong -, and thofe who join to each
other have nearly the fame courage. This is the
nd reafon of the weaknefs of Afia, and of the
of Europe , of the liberty of Europe,
is then a kipd of
and
O F L A W S. 381
and of the flavery of Afia : a caufe that I do not B K
recollect ever to have feen remarked. From hence chap. -",
it proceeds, that liberty in Afia never increafes , & 4.
whillt in Europe it is enlarged or diminifhed ac
cording to particular circumftances.
The Ruifian nobility have indeed been reduced
to flavery by the ambition of one of their princes ;
but they have always difcovered thole marks of
impatience and difcontent which are never to be
feen in the fouthern climates. Have they not been
able for a fhort time to eftablifh an ariftocratical
government ? Another of the northern kingdoms
has loft its laws ; but we may truft to the climate
that they are not loft in fuch a manner as never to
be recovered.
C II A P. IV.
1 t. Ing frcm this.
WHAT we have jii ft faid, is perfectly con
formable to hiftory. Afia has been fub-
dued thirteen times-, eleven by the northern nations,
and twice by thofe of the iouch. In the early ages
it was conquered three times by the Scythians ,
afterwards it was conquered once by the Medes,
and once by the Perfians , again by the Greeks,
the Arabs, the Moguls, the Turks, the Tartars,
the Perfians, and the Afghans. I mention only
the upper Afia, and fay nothing of the invafi
made in the reft of the fouth of that part of the
world, which has moft frequencly fufieied prodi
gious revolutions.
In Europe, on the contrary, fince the eftablifh-
raent of the Greek and Phoenician colonies we
know
382 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK know but of four ereat changes ; the firft caufed
\ V T T
Cha ky the conqueft of the Romans -, the fecond by the
& 5. inundation of barbarians who deftroyed thefe very
Romans , the third by the victories of Charlemain ,
and the laft by the invafions of the Normans. And
if this be rightly examined, we mail find, even in
thefe changes, a general flrength diffufed through all
the parts of Europe. We know the difficulty which
the Romans met with in conquering Europe, and
the eafe and facility with which they invaded Afia.
We are fenfible of the difficulties the northern
nations had to encounter in overturning the Roman
empire , of the wars, and labours of Charlemain ;
and of the feveral enterprizes of the Normans. The
deftroyers were incefTantly deftroyed.
CHAP. V.
tfbat when tie People in tbe North of Afia, and tbofe
of tbc Nortb of Europe bave conquered, tbe effefis
of tbc Conqueft were net tbe fame.
TH E nations in the north of Europe con
quered as freemen -, the people in the north
of Afia conquered as (laves, and fubdued others
only to gratify the ambition of a mafter.
The reafon is, that the people of Tartary, the
natural conquerors of Afia, are themfelves enfla\ 7 ed.
They are inceflantly making conquefts in thefouth
of Afia, where they form empires ; but that part of
the nation which continues in the country, find that
they are fubject to a great mafter, who being defpo-
tic in the fouth, will alfo be fo in the north, and
exercifing an arbitrary power over the conquered
fubjects, pretends to the fame over thofe who are
the
OF LAWS. 3^3
the conqueros. This is at this day plainU i in l \
that vaft country called Chinele Tartary, which ^
governed by the emperor with a p. ahnoft as
defpotic as that of China itfelf, and which he every
day extends by his conquefts.
Wemaylikewifefeeinthehitlo! ; hina, that the
emperors ( )fent Chinele toloi. :o Tartary. Their
Chinefe are become Tartars, and the mortal enemies r
of China; but this does not prevent their carrying th
into Tartary, the fpirit of the Chinefe government.
A part of the Tartars who have conquered,
have very often been themfelves n out-, \\\\^-n
they have carried into their ih.u icrvile fpi
rit which they had acquired in the clinutr of fla-
very. The hi (lory of China hirnifhcs m with
great examples of this, as du.s allb our ancient
hiftory.
From hence it proceeds that the genius of the
Getic or Tartarian nation, has always relembled that
of the empires of Afia. The people in theie are
governed by the cudgel ; the people in Tartary
by long whips. The fpirit of F.urope has always
been contrary to thefe manners ; and in all ages
what the people of Afia have called punifhment,
the people of Europe have called the mod outra-
gious abufe }-.
The Tartars who deftroyed the Grecian empire,
eftablifhed in the conquered countries, flavery and
defpotic power-, the Goths conquering the Roman
* The Scythians three times conquered Alia, and were three
times driven from thence. Juftin, 1. 2.
f This is no way contrary to what I fhall fav in the zSth book
chap. 23. concerning the manner of thinking among the d;
man nations, in refpect to the cudgel ; let theinilrument be what
it will, the power or aftion of beating, was.. confidercdby
..m as an affront.
emp ;
384 THE SPIRIT
BOCK emnire every where founded monarchy and li-
\\ ii.
,
6. I do not know whether the famous Rudbeck, who
in his Atlantica has bellowed fuch praifes on Scandi
navia, has made mention of that great prerogative
which ought D> il-t this people above all the nations
upon earth , namely this country s having been the
iouive from whence- fprung the liberties of Europe,
that is of almnil all the freedom which at prefenn
fublilts amongfl mankind.
Jornandez the Goth has called the north of Eu-
( b ) Umnnm rope, the farmer ( b ) of the human race. I fhould
rather call it the farmer ot the inftruments which
broke the chains forged in the fouth. In the north
;ned thole valiant nations, which fallied forth
and left their countries to dcftroy tyrants and (laves,
and to teach men, that nature having made them
equal, realbn could not render them dependent ex
cept where it was neceflary to their happinefs.
CHAP. VI.
A new pbyfical Caue of tbe Slavery of Jfia^ and of
tbe Liberty of Europe.
IN Afia they have always had great empires ; in
Europe thefe could never iubfift. Afia has larger
plains ; it is cut out into much more extenfive divi-
fions by mountains and leas > and as it lies more to
the fouth, its fprings are more eafily dried up \ the
mountains arc lels covered with fnow -, and the ri
vers being not * fo large, form fmaller barriers.
The waters lofe thccifelvc, or evoporate before or after
their itreams are united,
Power
OF LAWS. 385
The power in Afia ought to be always defpotic :
for if their flavery was not fevere, they would loon Cha
make a divifion, inconfiftent with the nature of the ^ 7.
country.
In Europe the natural divifion forms many nati
ons of a moderate extent, in which the government
of the laws is not incompatible with the maintenance
of the (late: on the contrary, it is fo favourable to it,
that without this the ftate would fall into decay, and
become inferior to all others.
It is this which has formed a genius for liberty,
that renders every part extremely difficult to be fub-
dued and fubjecled to a foreign power, othrrv,
than by the laws and the advantage of commerc
On the contrary, there reigns in Afia a fervile fpi-
rit, which they have never been able to make off ;
and it is impoffible to find, in all the hiflories
this country, a fingle paflage which difcovers a I.
foul : we mail never fee any thing there but ;
heroifm of flavery.
CHAP. VII:
Of Africa and America.
TH IS is what I had to fay of Afia and Eu
rope. Africa is in a climate like that of the
fouth of Afia, and is in the fame fervitude. Ame
rica * being deftroyed and lately re- peopled by the
nations of Europe and Africa, can now fcan,
fhew its true genius -, but what we know of its an
cient hiftory is very conformable to our principles.
* The petty barbarous nations of America are called by the
Spaniards Indios Bravos, and are much more difficult to fubdue
than the great, empires of Mexico and Peru.
VOL. J. C c BOOK
386 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK XVIII.
Of Laws In the Relation they bear to
the Nature of the Soil.
CHAP. I.
How tie Nature of tie Soil has an Influence on f be Laws.
BOOK I "^ H E goodnefs of the land, in any country,
, xv111 - naturally eftablifhes fubjection and depend-
ance. The hufbandmen who compofe the princi
pal part of the people, are not very jealous of their
liberty , they are too bufy and too intent on their
own private affairs. A country which overflows
with wealth, is afraid of pillage, afraid of an army.
" Who is there that forms this goodly party ?
()Lib.i-. " faid Cicero to Atticus( a ), are they the men of
" commerce and of hufbandry ? Let us not imagine
" that thefe are averfe to monarchy, theie to whom
" all governments are equal, as foon as they be-
" (low tranquillity."
Thus monarchy is more frequently found in fruit
ful countries, and a republican government in thofe
which are not fo -, and this is fometimes a fufficient
compenfation for the inconveniences they fuffer by
the fterility of the land.
The barrennefs of the Attic foil, eftablimed there
a popular government ; and the fertility of that of
Lacedasmonia an ariftocratical form of government.
For in thofe times, Greece was averfe to the govern
ment of a fingle perfon ; and ariftocracy had the
neareil refemblance to that government.
Plutarch
O F L A W S. 387
Plutarch fays ( h ), that the Cilonian fedition hav- Boo K
ing been appeafed at Athens, the city fell into its c h 2 "
ancient diflenfions, and was divided into as many : h Lite of
parties as there were kinds of territory in Attica.
The men who inhabited the eminences, would by
all means have a popular government; thole of the
plain, demanded a government compofed of the
chiefs i and they v.-ho were near the lea, were for a
government made up of both.
C H A P. II.
The fame Suljeft cent.
THESE fertile countries are al\\ I a ins,
where the inhabitants are unable -to difpute
againft a ftronger body : they are then obliged to
fubmit, and when they have once lubmitted, ti
fpirit of liberty cannot return ; the wealth of t!
country is a pledge of their fideli: But in
mountainous countries, as they h hut little,
they may prefcrve what they have. The liberty
they enjoy, or, in other words, th? government
they a:v under, is the only blefiing worthy of th
defence. It reigns therefore more in mountainous
s-J
and difficult countries, than in thofe which nature
feems to have molt favoured.
The mountaineers preferve a more moderate go
vernment ; becaufe they are not fo liable to be con
quered. They defend themfelves eafily, and are at
tacked with difficulty j ammunition and provifions
are collected and carried againft them with great
expence, for the .country furnifhes none. It is
then more difficult to make war againft them, a
more hazardous enterprize ; and all the laws that
C c 2 .n
388 T H E S P I R I T
yvm* can ^ e mac * e f r tne fefety f tne people are there
Chap. 3 . of lead ufe.
c
CHAP. III.
irhat Countries are befl cultivated.
OUNTRIES are not cultivated in pro
portion to their fertility, but to their li
berty -, and if we make an imaginary divifion of
the earth, we fhall be aftonifhed to fee in moft
ages, deferts in the moft fruitful parts, and great
nations in thofe, where nature feems to refufe every
thing.
It is natural for a people to leave a bad coun
try to ftek a better , and not to leave a good
country to feck a worfe. Moft of the invafions
have therefore been made in countries, which
nature feems to have formed for happinefs : and as
nothing is more nearly allied than deiblation and
invafion, the beft countries are moft frequently
depopulated ; while the frightful countries of the
north continue always inhabited, from their being
almoft uninhabitable.
We find by what hiftorians tell us of the palTage
of the people of Scandinavia, along the banks of
the Danube, that this was not a conqueft, but only
a migration into defert countries.
Thcfe happy climates muft therefore have been
depopulated by other migrations, though we know
not the tragical fcenes that happened.
" It appears by many monumems of antiquity,
() Or he " f avs Ariftotlc( e ), that the Sardinians were a Gre-
w ho wrote " cian colony. They were formerly very rich ; and
*De Mir* " Arifteus, fo famed for his love of agriculture,
us. \ " was
cc
<(
OF LAWS. 389
* was their lawgiver. But they are fmce fallen ^ o OK
to decay ; for the Carthaginians becoming their chap. 4",
mailers, deftroyed every thing proper for the & 5.
" nourifhment of man, and forbad the cultivation
<c of the lands on pain of death." Sardinia was
not recovered in the time of Ariftotle, nor is it to
this day.
The mod temperate parts of Perfia, Turky,
Mufcovy, and Poland, have not been able to
recover perfectly from the devaluations of the
Tartars.
CHAP. IV.
New Effefts of the Fertility and Barrennefs of Coun
tries.
THE barrennefs of the earth renders men in-
duftrious, fober, inured to hardlhip, cou
rageous and fit for war : they are obliged to pro
cure by labour what the earth refufes to beftow fpon-
taneoufly. The fertility of a country gives cafe, effe
minacy, and a certain fondnefs for the prefervation
of life. It has been remarked that the German troops
raifed in thofe places where the peafants are rich, as
for inftance, in Saxony, are not fo good as the
others. Military laws may provide againft this in
convenience by a more fevere difcipline.
CHAP. V.
Of the Inhabitants of I/lands,
T
s H E people of the ides have a higher re-
IHh for liberty than thofe of the continent.
C c 2 Iflands
39 o T H E S P I R I T
BOOK iQandr, are commonly of a fmall * extent ; one part
YVTIT
Cha 6 f ^ ie P e P^ e cannot be fo eafily employed to op-
prefs the other i the fea feparates them from great
empires -, iu that they cannot be countenanced by
tyranny : conquerors are (lopped by the fea, the
ifianders themfelves are not involved in conquefts,
and more eafily pvelcrve their laws.
CHA P. VI.
Of Countries raifcd by the Itiduftry of Men.
"^HOSE countries which the induftry of men
has rendered habitable, and which ftand in
need of the fame induftry to provide for their fub-
,nce, require a mild and moderate government.
There arc principally three of this fpecies, the two
fine provinces of Kianguan and Tchekhng in China,
ypt, and Holland.
The ancient emperors of China were not con
querors. The rirft thing they did to aggrandize
themielves, was what gave the higheft proof of their
uifdom. They raifed from beneath the waters two
of the fineft provinces of the empire; thefe owe
ir exigence to the labour of man. And it is
the inexpreffible fertility of thefe two provinces
which has given Europe fuch ideas of the felicity
of this vaft country. But a continual and necefiary
care to p refer ve from deftruction fo confiderable
a part of the empire, demanded rather the man
ners of a wife, than of a voluptuous nation ; ra
ther the lawful authority of a monarch, than the
tyrannic power of a defpotic prince. Power was
* Japan K an exception to this, by its great extent as well as
bj us /lavery.
therefore
O F L A W S. 391
therefore neceflarily moderated in that country, as B K
it was formerly in TEgypt, and as it is (till in that chap. 6\
part of the Turkifh empire. Power was necefifarily & 7.
moderated as it is in Holland, which nature has
made to attend to herfelf, and not to be abandoned
to negligence or caprice.
Thus in fpite of the climate of China, where they
are naturally led to a fervile obedience, in fpite of
the apprehenfions which follow a too great extent
of empire, the firft legiflators of this country were
obliged to make moft excellent laws, and the go
vernment was frequently obliged to follow them.
CHAP. VII.
Of the Works of Men.
ME N by their care, and by the influence of
good laws have rendered the earth more
proper for their abode. We fee rivers flow where
there have been lakes and marihes : this is a benefit
which nature has not beftowed; but it is a benefit
maintained and fupplied by nature. When the Per-
fians ( c ) were matters of Afia, they permitted thofe ( c ) Poly-
who conveyed a fpring to Sny place which had not bius 1 * 10 -
been watered before, to enjoy the benefit for five ge
nerations , and as a number of rivulets flowed from
mount Taurus, they fpared no expence, in direct
ing the courfe of their ftreams. At this day, with
out knowing how they came thither, they are found
in the fields and gardens.
Thus as deftructive nations produce evils more
durable than thcmfelves ; the actions of induftrious
nations are the fource of bleffings which laft, when
they are no more.
C c 4 CHAP.
392 THE -SPIRIT
CHAP. VIII.
T he general Relation of Laws.
BOOK "" ^ HE laws have a very great relation to the
XVIII. ^ manner in which the feveral nations procure
^ ( tlv.ir fubfiftence. There fhould be a code of laws
of a much larger extent, for a nation attached to
trade and navigation, than for a people who are
contented \ Jtivating the earth. There (hould
be a much great thefe, than for a people who
live by their flocks and herds. There mud be a
greater for this laft, than for thofe who live by
hunting.
CHAP. IX.
Of tbe Soil of America.
IP HE caufe of there being fo many favage na
tions in America is the fertility of the earth,
which fpontaneouOy produces many fruits capable of
ording them nourifhment. If the women culti
vate a fpot of land roitnd their cabins, the maiz
grows up prefently ; and hunting and fifhing put
the men in a (late of complete abundance. Befides,
black cattle, as cows, buffaloes, &c. fucceed there
better than carnivorous beads.
\Ve fhould not, I believe, have all thefe advan
tages in Europe, if the land was left uncultivated ;
it would produce fcarce any thing befides forefts of
oaks and other barren trees.
CHAP,
O P L A W S. 393
CHAP. X.
Of the Number of Men with regard to tl>t manner in
which they procure Subjiftencc.
LET us fee in what proportion the number BOOK
of men is found, in nations who do not * v
cultivate the earth. As the produce of unculti- & u.
vated land, is to the produce of land improved
by culture ; fo the number of favages in one coun
try, is to the number of hufbandmen in another :
and when the people who cultivate the land, culti
vate alfo the arts, the number of favages is to the
number of this people, in the compound proportion
of the number of favages to that of the hufband
men ; and of the number of hufbandmen to that of
men who cultivate the arts.
They can fcarcely form a great nation. If they
are herdfmen and fhepherds, they have need of an
extenfive country to furnifh fubfiftence for a fmall
i
number ^ if they live by hunting, their number
mud be flill lefs, and in order to find the means
of life they muft form a very fmall nation.
Their country is commonly full of forefts; which,
as the men have not the art of draining off the
waters, are filled with bogs ; here each troop can
ton themfelves, and form a little nation.
CHAP. XL
Of Savage Nations, and Nations of Barbarians.
THERE is this difference between favage
and barbarous nations , the firft are little
difperfed nations, which, for fome particular rea-
fon,
394 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK f or j 5 cannot be united ; and the barbarians are com-
Chap. 12, nionly fmall nations capable of being united. The
& 13. firft are generally nations of hunters; the fecond of
herdfmen and fhepherds. This appears plain in
the north of Afia. The people of Siberia cannot
live in bodies, becaufe they cannot find fubfiftence ;
the Tartars may live in bodies for fome time, becaufe
their herds and flocks may for a time be re-aflembled.
All the chns may then be re- united, and this is
done when one chief has fubdued many others ;
after which they may do two things, either feparate,
or fct out with a defign to make a great conqueft in
fome empire in the fouth.
CHAP. XII.
Of .iw of . :cngft People wbo do not
-.ite tbe Earth.
AS thefe people do not live in limited and
circumlcribed boundaries, many caufes of
ftrife arife between them -, they difpute the unculti
vated land, as we difpute about inheritances. Thus
they find frequent occafions for war, in defence of
their hunting, their fifhing, the paflure for their
cattle, and the taking of their (laves , and having
no territory, they have many things to regulate
by the law of nations, and but few to decide by the
civil law.
CHAP. XIII.
Of of tbofeNai wHo do not cultfo
tbe Earth.
T
1 H E divinon of lands is what principally
lations
where
increafes the civil code. Amongft nations
OF LAWS. 395
where they have not made this divifion, there arc B *
r -1 1 XVIII.
very few civil laws. chap ^
The inftitutions of thcfe people may be called & 14.
manners rather than laws.
Amongft fuch nations as thefe, the old men,
who remember things pad, have great authority ;
they cannot there be diftinguifhed by wealth, but
by \vifdom and valour.
Thefe people wander and difperfe themfelves in
pafture grounds or in forefts. Marriage cannot there
have the fccurity which it has amongfl us, where
it is fixed by the habitation, and where the wife
continues in one houfe ; they may then more eafily
change their wives, poflefs many, and fometiiru
mix indifferently like brutes.
Nations of herdfmen and fhcpherds cannot leave
their cattle, which are their fubfiftence ; neither can
they feparate themfelves from their wives, who
look after them. All this ought then to go toge
ther, efpecially as living generally in great plains,
where f.here are few places of confidcrable flrength,
their wives, their children, their flocks may become
the prey of their enemies.
Their laws regulate the divifion of plunder, and
have,like our Salic laws, a particular attention to thefts.
CHAP. XIV.
Of the political State of thePupk who do not cultivate
the Lands.
THESE people enjoy great liberty. For as
they do not cultivate the earth, they are
not fixed, they are wanderers and vagabonds j and
if a chief would deprive them of their liberty, they
would
396 T H E S P I R I T
Bo o it ^ould immediately go and feek it under another,
Chap, i -, Or ret i re i nto tne woods and live there with their
* 16, families. The liberty of the man is fo great among
thefe people, that it neceflarily draws after it the
liberty of the citizen.
CHAP. XV.
Of People ii bo knciL* tbc Ufe of Money.
ARISTIPPUS being caft away, fwam and
got fafe to the next fhore , where feeing
geometrical figures traced in the land, he was feized
with a tranfport of joy, judging that he was amongfl
Greeks, and not in a nation of barbarians.
Being alone, and cad by fome accident amongfl:
an unknown people-, if you fee a piece of money, be
allured, that you are arrived in a civilized nation.
The culture of lands requires the ufe of money.
This culture fuppofcs many arts and degrees of
knowledge-, and we always fee ingenuity, the arts,
and a fenfe of want, making their progrefs with an
equal pace. All this conduces to the eftablifhment
of a fign of value.
Torrents and eruptions * have made the difco-
very that metals were concealed in the earth. When
they have once been feparated, they have eafily been
applied to their proper ufes.
CHAP. XVI.
Of chil Laws among/I People "jcbo know not the Ufe of
Money.
W
H EN a people have not the ufe of money,
they are feldom acquainted with any other
* It is thus that Diodorus tells us the ftiepherds found gold in
the Pyienean mountains. injuiticc
OF LAWS. 397
injuftice than that which fprings from violence -, and B , *
the weak, by uniting, defend themfelves from its C h ( 6
effects. They have nothing there but political rcgu- & 17.
Jations. But where money is eftablifhed, they are
fubject to that injuftice which proceeds from craft ;
an injuftice that may be exerciled a thoufand ways.
From hence they are forced to have good civil laws,
which fpring up with the new means, and the feve-
ral methods of becoming wicked.
^j
In countries where they have no money, the rob
ber takes only bare moveables, which have no refem-
blance to each other. In countries where they make
ufe of money, the robber takes the figns, and thefe
always refemble each other. In the firft nothing
can be concealed, becaule the roSber always take*
along with him the proofs of his conviclion j but io
the others, it is quite the contrary.
C II A P. XVII.
Of political Laws amongft Nations who have not .
Ufe of Money.
f I * H E greateft fecurity of the liberties of a
-** people who do not cultivate the earth, is
their not knowing the ufe of money. What is
gained by hunting, fifhing, or keeping herds of
cattle, cannot be aiTembled in fuch great quantities,
nor be fufficiently preferved, for one man to find
himfelf in a condition to corrupt many others : but
when, inftead of this, a man has the fign of riches,
he may obtain a large quantity of thefe iigns, and
diftribute them amongft whom he pleafes.
The people who have no money, have but few
wants, and thefe are fupplied both with eafe, and
in
398 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK in an equal manner. Equality is then unavoidable ;
Cha 18 an( ^ fr m hence it proceeds, that their chiefs are
& 19. not defpotic.
C H A P. XVIII.
Of tl-e P
i
F what travellers tell us be true, the conftitution
of a nation of Louifiana, called the Natches,
(fc) Edify- is an exception to this. Their ( b ) chief difpofes
rttcis of the goods of all his fubjecls, and makes them
labour according to his pleafure. He has a power
like that of the grand fignor, and they cannot
even refufe him their heads. \Vhen the prefump-
tive heir enters into the world, they give him all
the fucking children to ferve him during his life.
One would imagine that this is the great Sefoftris,
He is treated in his cabin, with as much ceremony
as an emperor of Japan or China.
The prejudices of fuperftition are fuperior to all
other prejudices, and its reafons to all other reafons.
Thus, though the favage nations have naturally no
knowledge of defpotic tyranny, yet this people feel
it. They adore the fun , and if their chief had not
imagined that he was the brother of this glorious
luminary, they would have thought him a miferable
wretch like themfelves.
CHAP. XIX.
Of tbt Liberty of the Arabs, and the Servitude of the
Tartars.
Arabs and Tartars are nations of herdf-
-*- men and fhepherds. The Arabs find them
felves
OF LAWS. 399
felves in that general fituation, of which we have B , r *
been fpeaking, and are therefore free : whilft the Ch
Tartars (the moft fingular people on earth) are
involved in a * political flavery. I have already
given fome reafons ( c ) for this, and fhall now give (^ E
others. * V
They have no towns, they have no forefts, and
but few marfhes ; their rivers are almoft always
frozen, and they dwell in an immenfe plain. They
have pafture for their herds and flocks, and con-
fequently property ; but they have no kind of
retreat, or place of fafety. A Khan is no Iboner
overcome than they cut off his -f head , his chil
dren are treated in the fame manner, and all his
fubjects belong to the conqueror. Thefe are not
condemned to a civil flavery , they would in that
cafe be a burthen to a fimple nation, who have no
lands to cultivate, and no need of any domeftic
fervice. They therefore augment the nation ; but
inftead of civil flavery, a political one mult natu
rally be introduced amongft them.
It is apparent, that in a country where the feve-
ral clans make continual war, and are perpetually
conquering each other; in a country, where by the
death of the chief, the body politic of the van-
quifhed clan is always deftroyed, the nation in gene
ral can enjoy but little freedom : for there is not a
fingle party that muft not have been a very great
number of times fubdued.
A conquered people may preferve fome degree
* When a Khan is proclaimed, all the people cry : that his
word fhail be as a fword.
f We ought not therefore to be aftonifhed at Mahomet the
fon of Miriveis, who, upon taking Ifpahan, put all the princes
of the blood to the fword.
Of
400 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK o f liberty, when by the ftrength of their fituation,
Chap 20 ^ ie y are * n a ft ate > *hat will admit of their capi
tulating after their defeat. But the Tartars always
defencelefs, being once overcome, can never be able
to ftand upon conditions.
I have faid in Chap. II. that the inhabitants of
cultivated plains are feldom free. Circumftances
have concurred to put the Tartars who dwell in
uncultivated plains, in the fame fituation.
CHAP. XX.
Of the LAW OF NATIONS as praftifed by the
Tartars.
THE Tartars appear to be mild and humane
amongft themielvcs -, and yet they are mod
cruel conquerors : when they take cities, they put
the inhabitants to the fword, and imagine that they
do them a iavour when they fell them, or diftri-
bute them among!! their foldiers. They have de-
flroyed Afia, from India, even to the Mediterra
nean ; and all the country which forms the eaft of
Perfia they have made a defert.
This law of nations is owing, I think, to the
following caufe. This people having no towns,
all their wars are carried on with eag-ernefs and
o
impetLiofit) . They fight whenever they hope to
conqi.er ; and when they have no fuch hopes ;
they join the ilronger army. With fuch cuttoms,
it is contrary to their law of nations, that a city
which cannot refift, fhould flop their progrefs.
They regard not cities as an allembly of inhabi
tants, but as places made to fet limits to their
power. They befiege them without art, and ex-
pofe
OF LAWS. 401
pofe themfelves greatly in their fieges , and there- ^ o K
tore revenge themfelves by the blood of all thole 2 1?
who have fpilt theirs.
CHAP. XXI.
The CIVIL LAW of the Tartars.
FATHER Du Halde fays, that amongft
the Tartars, the youngeft of the males is
always the heir, by reafon that as foon as the elder
are capable of leading a paftoral life, they leave
the houie with a certain number of cattle given them
by the lather, and go \ ;!d a r,c\v habitation.
The laft ot the males who continues in the ho-.
with the father, is then his natural heir.
I have heard that a like cuilom was alfo ob-
ferved in fome fmall diftricls of Kngland. This
was doubtlefs a paftoral law a _-d thither by
fome of the people of Britany, or ellablimed by
fome German nation. \\ e are informed by Cadar
and Tacitus, that thcfe lait cultivated bu; little
land.
CHAP. XXII.
Of a CIVIL LAW of the German Nations.
SHALL here explain how that particular paf-
fage of the Salic law, which is commonly di-
ftinguifhed by the term The Salic Law, relates to
the institutions of a people who do not cultivate the
earth, or at leaft who cultivate it but very little.
The Salic ( d ) law ordains that when a man has ( 4 )Tit. 62*
left children behind him, the males mail fucceed
to the Salic land, to the prejudice of the females.
VOL. I. D d To
cc
it
4 02 I II E S P I R I T
BOOK To underftand the nature of thofe Salic lands,
there needs no more than to fearch into the ufages
or cuftoms with refpecl: to land amongfl the Franks
before they came out of Germany.
Mr. 1 xhard has very plainly proved that the
word Sti/ic is derived from Sti/a, which fignifies a
houle ; and, that therefore, the Salic land was the
land of the houfr. I fhall go farther, and examine
what was the houfc, and what the land belonging
to the houfe, among the Germans.
They dwell not in towns, fays Tacitus, nor
can they bear to have their houfes joined to thofe
" of others , every one leaves a fpace or fmall
* l piece of ground about his houfe, which is inclofed
" and Unit up." T.uiuis is very exact in this ac-
() The count , for many laws of the ( e ) Barbarian codes
law of the have different decrees againft thofe who threw down
A 1 1** m 3ns
c 10. and tms enclofure, as well as againll thofe who broke
the law of into the houfe.
ria nf aV tit~ We learn from Tacitus and Csefar, that the lands
10. . i, cultivated by the Germans, were given them only
and 2. f or t h e fp ace O f a y ear . a f ter which they again be
came public. They had no other patrimony but
the houfe and a piece of land, within the inclo-
fure that furrounded it. It was this particular patri
mony which belonged to the males. And indeed
how could it belong to the daughters ? they were
to pafs into another houfe.
The Salic hind \vas then within that enclofure,
which belonged to a German houfe , this was the
Nu!l(>! Cfrffinnon/ffi populis urkes balntari Jatis mtum eft, ne
pati quidcm inttr je jun:!iu icdes ; colunt difcreli, ut henuis placuit,
Vices ioci tHt, ncn in nojlri m morem connexis & cobeerentibus eeeKjicns t
fuam quijque dowumfpatio arcitmdat . De moribus Germanorum.
f This enclofure is called Cortis, in the charters.
only
OF LAWS. 403
only property they had. The Franks after their R *
conquefts, acquired new pofleflions, and continued cha-.-Vj.
to call them Salic lands.
Vv hen the Franks lived in Germany, their wealth
confided of (laves, flocks, horK ms S:c. the
houfe and the fmall portion of land adjoining to
it, were naturally given to the malt- children who
were to dwell there. But afterwards when che
Franks had by conquefl acquired large divisions of
land, they thought it hard, that the duuijhreni and
their children mould be incapable of enjoying any
part of them. They introduced a cuftom of per
mitting the father to recall his daughter, and her
children. They filenccd the lawj and it appears
that thefe recalls were frequent, fince they were
entered in the formularies ( ( f ) See
Amongft all thefe formularies I find one f ? ) of a
* * \ / ills "*
fmgular nature. A grandfather recalled his grand- form. 10 ,
children to fucceed with his fons and daughters. & - A p-
What then became of the Salic law ? In thofe times jj^jf
either it could not be obferved, or the continual form. 49.
ufe of recalling the daughters had made them regard anti . lllc
,.,.,. . - ancient
their ability to inherit, as a cale authorized by formula-
cuftom. of
The Salic law had not in view a preference of
one fex to the other, much lefs had it a regard (-) Form.
to the perpetuity of a family, a name, or the tranf- 5 5- in
miflion of land. Thefe things did not enter into broch s
the heads of the Germans ; it was purely a lav/ colleftion.
of ceconomy which gave the .houfe, and the land
dependent on the houfe, to the males who mould
dwell in it, and to whom it confequently was of
moil fervice.
D d 2 We
404 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK \y e neec j } lcre on ]y tranfcribe the title of the
Chap - - dllcdial lands ot the Salic law, that famous text
of which fo many have fpoken, and which ib few
have read.
" If a man dies without iffue, his father or
" mother (Kill fucceed him. 2. If he has neither
" father nor mother, his brother or filler fhall
* fucceed him. 3. If he has neither brother nor
" filler, the filler of his mother mail fucceed him.
" 4. If his mother has no filler, the filter of his
" father fhall fucceed him. 5. If his father has
tc nu filler, the neareft relation by the male fhall
" fiua-cd. 6. Not * any part of the Salic land
" fliall p.ifs to the females-, but it fhall belong to
4t th.e males, that is, the male children fhall fuc-
" ceed their father."
It is plain that the firft five articles relate to
the inheritance of a man who dies wi:hout iflue ,
and the fixth to the fucceffion of him \vho has
children.
Vs hen a man dies without children, the law or
dains that neither of the two fexes fhall have the
preference to the other, except in certain cafes. In
the two rirft <. s of fucceffion, the advantages
of the males and females were the fame-, in the
third and fourth, the females had the preference,
and the males in the fifth.
Tacitus gives us the feeds ot thefe extravagancies:
" The fill Ten, fays he, are as dear to
in mni: :rfm nulla portio bereditatii tra*-
f:t, :<s acquint, hd :itatejuc-
unt. Tit. t>2. $. 6.
f Sororum fii iis idem apud aiiunculum quam aptd patrerr. honir.
idam Janlfiior L m c.rJt; r .remque hunc nexnm Janguinis arbitrantur,
in acctpietia .bus magis exigunt, tanquam ii <Lf annnuir. fir
& donium latius t meant. De morib. Germanorum.
" their
OF LAWS. 405
" their uncle as to their own father. There are men c K
" who regard this degree of kindred as more drift, chap. 22.
" and even more holy. They prefer it when they
receive hodages." From hence it proceeds that
our earlied * hittori.ins ijvak in furh flr<Mv; terms of
the love of the kings of the I ; ranks for their fiders,
and their fillers children. -id indeed if the chil
dren of the fitter were confuleivd in her brother s
houfe, as his own children, it was natural for the ft
to regard their aunt as their moth
The fitter of the mother was preferred to the
father s fitter , this is explained by other texts of
the Salic law. \Vhen a f ! , woman was a widow, ( ) Salic
(he frll under the guardianfhin () \ her hu (band s tit *
relations-, the law preferred to this guardianfhip the
relations by the females before thofe by the males. In
deed a woman who entered into a family, joining her-
Ur with thofe of her own lex, became more united to
her relations by the female than by the male. Moreover,
when [ m ) a man had killed another, and had not ( m ) IbiJ -
wherewithal to pay the pecuniary penalty he had r t
incurred, the law permitted him to deliver up his
fubftance, and his relations were to fupply what was
wanting. Afcer the father, mother and brother,
the fitter of the mother was to pay, as if this tie had
fomething in it moft tender : now the degrees of kin
dred which gives the burthens, ought to give alib
the advantages.
The Salic law enjoins that afcer the father s fitter,
the fuccefTion mould be held by the nearett rela
tion male , but if this relation was beyond the fifth
* See in Gregory of Tours, lib. 8. c 18, and 20. and lib. 9.
c. 1 6, and 2?. the rage of Gontram at Leovigild s ill treatment
of Ingunda his niece, which Childebert her brother took up arms
to revenge.
D d 3 degret,
4 o6 T H E -S P I-R I T
B o o v. decree, he mould not inherit. Thus a woman of
X 1 " 11
Cha " 2 C ^ e ^ r ^ Degree, might inherit to the prejudice
of a male of the fixth : and this may be feen in
the * law of the Ripuarian Franks, (a faithful inter-
pi etation of the Salic law) under the title of Allo
dial lands, \vhcn- it follows ftep by ftep the Salic
law on the fame lubjcft.
If the father left ilfue, the Salic law would have
the daughters excluded from the inheritance of the
Salic land, and that it fliould belong to the male
children.
It would be eafy for me to prove that the Salic
law did not abfolutery exclude the daughters from
o
the p IK (lion of the Salic land, but only in the cafe
Mhcrc they were excluded by their brothers. This
appears from the Salic law iill-lf; which after having
laid that the wcmen mall polfrfs none of the Salic
land, but only the males, interprets and reftrains
itlelf, by adding, tl that is, the fon fhall fucceed
4t to the inheritance of the father."
2, The text of the Salic hw is cleared up by the
law of the Riparian Franks, which has allo a
title ( n ) on allodial lands very conformable to that
of the Salic L
3. The laws of thefe barbarous nations, who all
iprung from Germany, interpret each other, more
particularly as they all have nearly the fame fpirit.
.I he Saxon -j law enjoined the father and mother
to leave their inheritance to their fon, and not to
* Et dt rt<-ef>.< uique ad quintvm genu^uhtm fui proxitnus futr it in
loereditalttnfucccdat. Tit. 56. . j.
f Tit. 7. . I. Pater ant matrr defunBi, flio mtniilite her edit a-
t em relin^uant ; .4. qui defunttus, non filios, fed fhas reliqutrit,
cas cmnis ktreditcu Pertineat.
their
O F L A W S. 407
their daughter ; but if there were none but daugh- B 7 K
ters, they were to have the whole inheritance. c( 2 * 2>
4. We have two ancient formularies () that ()InMar-
ftate the cafe, in which according to the S.ilic law ulfus 1<2
form, i :.
the daughters were excluded by the males, that is nn d in the
when they were in competition with their brother. Appendix
Another formulary ( p ) proves, that the daugh- fa f om
ter fucceeded to the prejudice of the grand fon -, fhe 49-
was therefore excluded only by the f .-n ( ^ Lin "
6. If daughters had been generally excluded by broch s
the Salic law from the inheritance of land, it would colleftion
be impoffible to explain the hiftories, formularies,
and ^ barters, which are continually mentioning the
lands and poflefllons of the women, under the firft race.
People f 1 } have been to blame to aflert, that the 0)
Salic lands were fiefs, i. This head is diftinguifhed
by the title of allodial lands. 2. Fiefs at firlt were
not hereditary. 3. If the Salic lands had been fiefs,
how could Marculfus treat that cuftom as impious
which excluded the women from inheriting, when
*j
the males themfelves did not facceed to fiefs ?
4. The charters which have been cited to prove
that the Salic lands were fiefs, only prove that they
were freeholds. 5. Fiefs were not eftablifhed till
after the conqueft, and the Salic cuftoms fubfifted
long before the Franks left Germany. 6. It was
not the Salic law which by letting bounds to the
fucceffion of women formed the eftablifhment of
fiefs ; but it was the eftablifhment of fiefs that fet
limits to the fucceffion of women, and to the regu-
Jations of the Salic law.
After what has been faid, one would not imagine
that the perpetual fuccefTion of the males to the crown
of France mould have taken its rife from the Salic
D d 4 law
40 THE SPIRIT
K law. And yet ibis is a point indubitably certain. I
, , prove it frum the fcveral codes of the barbarous
nations. The Salic law ( ? ) and the law of the Bur-
( ) : i- i. r-undians (h) itfufed the daughters the ri^ht of fuc-
V ? tit. .
14. $. i, ceeding to the land in conjunction with their bro-
1 5 thcrs , neither did they fucceed to the crown. The
tit 2"* 1 l" w f tnc ( goths on the contrary, * permitted
thr daughters to inherit the land with the brothers;
and the women were capable of inheriting the crown.
A thcll- [ mple the regulations of the civil
law \\. .i\ an cftefl on the political.
pot tlv only cafe in which the political
la\v of the Fia:. y to the civil law. By
alic law all the brothers Kuvcr-d d equally to
the land, and this v \ o decreed by a law ot the
}^ iians. I l .us in the kingdom of the Franks,
and in that of the li . idians, :. .! the brothers
fucceeded to the- < \ -own , if we except a few murders
;.nd . irions which took place amongft the
Burgundians.
c H A P. xxn.
Of tbc C of R
APEO P LE who do not cultivate the land,
have not ib much as an idea of luxu
ry. We may fee in Tacitus the admirable fimpli-
city oi the German nations ; the arts were not em
ployed in their ornaments , thefe were founded in
nature. It the family of their chief was to be di-
ftinguifhed by any fign, it was no other than that
which nature beftowed. The kings of the Franks
* The German nations, fays Tacitus had common cuftoms,
and alfo thofe which were peculiar to each.
Of
OF LAW S. 409
of the Burgundians, and the Vifigoths, had rheir *
long hair for a diadem. Chap. 2*4,
*
CHAP. XXIV.
Of tie M-.I- --soft!. Franks.
H A V E already {"aid, that \virh people who
.. do not cuhiva r e the earth, marriages are lefs
fixed than with others, and that they generally
take many v/ive.s. " The Germans were almofl
" he only people of : all the barbarous nations,
who were fatisfied with one wife, if we >t -j-,
" fays Tacitus, fume per. ^ns, who, not Irom a
" di^lutenefs of manners, but becaufeof their no-
" biury, had many."
This explains the reafon why the kings of the
race had fo great a number of wives. Thefe
o
m were lefs a proot of incontinence, than
an .ute of dignity : and it would have wounded
them in a tender point to have deprived them of
fuch a prerogative (O. This explains the reafon ( j ) See Fre-
why the examule of the kings was not followed by degarms s
. . chronicle
the fubjeCts. of the
year 628.
CHAP. XXV.
CH i LD E R i c.
it
it
MARRIAGES amongft the Germans,
fays Tacitus, are Uriel:! y obferved ||. Vice
* Props fcli Barbarorum Jlngulis uxoribus content: funt. De
morib. Germanorum.
f Exceptis admodum faucis qui non libidine, fed ob nobilitattm^
plurimii nuptiis ambiuntur. Jbid.
^| Se<vera matrimonia nemo illic I itia ridet, nee corrumpere
& cerrumpi ftfculum <vo<:atur. De moribus Germanorum.
** is
cc
((
(C
cc
II.
410 l Jri , b F 1 R I T
is not there a fubjed of ridicule. To corrupt
or be corrupted, is not called a point of fafhion ;
or a manner of fpending lite : there are few *
examples in this populous nation of the viola
tion of conjugal faith."
This was the reafon of the expulfion of Chil-
tU ric : he (hocked their rigid virtue, which con-
queft had not had time to corrupt.
C II A P. XXVI.
Of the Time ixben the Kings of the Franks became of
Ag*.
ARHARIANS who do not cultivate the
earth, have, 11 1 icily fpeaking, no jurifuiction,
anil arc, as we have already faid, rather governed
by the law of nations, than by civil laws. They
are therefore always armed. Thus Tacitus tells us,
ic that the Germans f undertook no affairs either
" of a public or private nature, unarmed.* They
ve their \\ opinion by a fign with their arms J.
As foon as they could carry them, they were pre-
fented to the aflembly , they put a javelin into
their hands : from that moment they ** were out of
their infancy ; rli-\ had been a part of the family,
now they became a part of the republic.
* ia in tarn numerosu [\,ntt 0/fnltfrja. Ibid.
f- "* pnl lic<f neque prtiiatsr rei niji armali agunt. Ibid.
Ij Si .. ttntia, f remit u , // < rnanlitr ; fen plaaiit, fr ti
neas conculhtnt. Ibid.
\ Scd (irrrtaj. rncrt ante cuiquam morn qiuwi civitas Jujfetturum
averit.
$ Turn i>r ipfo (oncilio i-el principum ali^u n, inl pater, ir/ pro-
uus, fcuto frfimtaque ju^vtntm ornant
** H<TC apud i lit.- toga, hie primus j wen! a* honos ; ante bee do-
pars iride$t.ftr, mix reipytlica.
Childebert
O F I, A W S. 411
Childebert II. \vas * fifteen years old, when BOOK
XVIII
Gontram his uncle declared that he was of age, and c han> ^
if governing bv himiclf. " I have put,
" lavs he {-, this javelin into thy hands, as a to-
" ken, that I have given thce all my kingdom
and then turning tov/ards the afiembly, he added,
" you fee that my Ion Childebert is become a man ;
" obey him."
Yv r e find in the Ripuarian laws, that the age of
fifteen, the ability of bearing arms, and majority
went together. It is there fai ; , " that if a Ri- ( e )Tit.8u
" puarian dies, or is killed, an.! leaves a Inn behind
him, that fon can neither pro , nor be pro-
led, till he has completely attained the age of
fifteen ; and then he may either anfwer tor him-
" felf, or chule a champion." It was neccfTary
that his mind mould be fufficiendy formed, tint he
might be able to defend himfclf in court , and that
his body mould have all the ilrength that was pro
per for his defence in combat. Amongft the Burgun-
dians ( f ), who alfo made Life of combat in their ju- ( r ) Tit. 87.
diciary proceedings, they were of age at fifteen.
Agathias tells us, that the arms of the Franks
were light. They might therefore be of age at
fifteen. In fucceeding times the arms they made ufe
of were heavy, and they were already greatly ib
in the time of Charlemain, as appears by our capi-
Cl
1C
(C
: He was fcarc .-ly five years old, fays Gregory of
1. 5. c. i. when he fucceeded to his lurher in the fear $-$.
Gontram declares him of age in the year 585, he was therefore
at that time no more than fifteen.
f- Gontramnus data in Chi/a\~berti rnanu haft a dtxit : hoc fjt in-
difium quod tihi omne regnum meum traJiJi. Ibid 1. ~. C. 3-,.
|| Gontram declared that his nephew Childebert, who was
already king, was out of his minority, and befides he made him
his heir.
tularies
412 THE IT
Boo K tularies and romances. Thofe who * had fiefs, and
p. 2 1 were confequcntly obliged to do military H-rvice,
were not then of age, till they were twenty one
years old -j-.
CHAP. XXVII.
The fame Subjeft continued.
WE have feen that the Germans did not ap
pear in their afiemblies, before they were
of . they were a part of the family but not of
the republic. This was the reafon that the children
of Clodomir king of Orleans, and conqueror of
Burgundy, were not declared kings, becaufe they
of too tender an age to be prefent at the afiem-
bl They were not yet kings, but they had a
right to be kings as loon as they were able to bear
arms , and in the mean time Clotildis their grand
mother governed tlv.- llate ||. But their uncles Clo-
tarius and Childeberr aflafimated them, and divided
their kingdom. This aclion was the caufe that in
O
the following ages, princes in their minority were
declared kings immediately after the death of their
hers. Thus duke Gondovald Uved Childebert II.
from the cruelty of Chilperic, and caufed him to be
rlared king J when he was only five years old.
1 no change in the time in regard to the coir.rcon
pe<
f -.0: of age till twenty one ; this was changrd
l>y ,m ee I .-* V. in the \ 4.
I) It appears from ( of Tours. 1. ;. that fhe chofe two
native.* Or Burgundy, which had been conquered by Clodomir,
to raife them to the ice of Tours, which alfo belonged to Clo
domir.
J Gregory of Tours, ). ;. c. i. *vix luflfo atatls unojataper-
afto, q:n die Dominica 1\ atalu rcgnare ca~;
But
O F L A W S. 413
But even in this chance they followed the original BOOK
\ vin
fpirit of the nation ; for the acts did not pafs in the ^ _^
name of the young king. So that the Franks had
a double adminiftration, the one which concerned
the peribn of the infant king, and the other which
regarded the kingdom , and in the fiefs there was a
difference between the guardian (hip and the civil ad
miniftration.
CHAP. XXVIII.
Of the fanguinary Temper of the Kir.^s of tie Fr,
CL O V I S was not the only prince amongll
the Pranks who had inv ail. Many
of his relations had entered this country with parti
cular tribes , but as he had much greater fuccefs,
and could give confiderable eftablimments to thofe
that followed him, the Franks ran to him from all
the tribes, fo that the other chiefs tound themfelves
too weak to refift him. He formed a defign of ex
terminating his whole race, and he fucceeded ( g ).
He feared, fays Gregory of Tours ; hv , left the ^ of
Franks mould chufe another chief. His children i 2 .
and fucceflbrs followed this practice to the utmoft ( h )lt>id
of their power. Thus the brother, the uncle, the
nephew, and what is dill worfe, the father or the fon,
were perpetually conipiring againft their whole fa
mily. The law continually divided the monarchy;
while fear, ambition, and cruelty, wanted to re
unite it.
CHAP.
4H T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. XXIX.
Of tbe national Affemblm cf tkt Franks.
BOOK T has been remarked above that nations who
XVIII, ^ d o not cultivate the land enjoy great liberty.
This was the cafe of the Germans. Tacitus fays,
that they gave their kings, or chiefs, a very mode
rate ilrru- of } ower* i and Crtfar adds farther -f-,
that in times of peace, they had no common ma
gi ft rates-, but their princes diftributed juftice in each
(f) Lib. 2. village. Thus, as < irej r" Tours ( p ) iufficiently
proves, tin- I ; iank . in dc-rmai.y had no king.
44 The princes fays T.uitus j), deliberate on
" fmall matters-, while affair* of great imports
" are laid be lore the whole nation ; but in fuch a
" manner, that thele very alfairs, which are under
* the cogni/ance ot the people, arc at the fame
41 time laid before the princ This cuilom was
obferved by them after their conqucils, as may be
leen J in all their records.
Tacitus fays , that capita] crimes might be car
ried before the aflcmbly. It was the fame arter the
conqueft, when the great vatTals were tried before
that body.
f Ntc R(t>ihnj lllera . fas. dftenin nequt an imad-
*Vfrtctf, tit-^ vt ^irctre, r.t -t.erttrf, 5.c. D<? morib. Germ.
-{- In fiiit nuilns tjl cimrr.anis mcvifirc s rfgiowm
6tque pfgorum inter Juos jus dicj/nt. Debello Ciall. lib.
|| De a prir.irpa corrjttkant t -mncs ; it a ta-
mtJi lit ca . ; arbitnum ejr, npvd princrpei pertrac-
tentur. De morib. Germ.
J Le.\ . ?opuli ft & cwjlittiiione Regis. CapituJariea
of Charles the Bald, Anno 864. an. 6.
Luet apud Concilium auujare Cf difcrimen capitis intenderc.
De morib. Gerin.
n CHAP.
OF LAWS. 415
C II A P. XXX.
Of the Authority of the Clergy under the fir ft Race.
TH E priefts of barbarous nations are com- BOOK
monly inverted with power, becaufe they * J
have both that authority which is due to them from
their religious character, and that influence which
amongft fuch a people arifes from fuperftition. Thus
we fee in Tacitus, that priefts were held in great ve
neration by the Germans, and that they prefided * in
the aflfembly of the people. They alone were per-
mitttd -|- to chaflife, to bind, to fmite i which they
did, not by order ot the prince, or as his minifters
of juftice , but as by an inlpiration ot that Deity
who was always fuppofed to be prefcnt with thole
who made war.
We ought not to be aftonifhed if from the very
beginning of the rirft race, we fee bifhops the dil-
penfers of ( g ) juftice, if we fee them appear in the .
afTemblies of the nation, if they have fuch a prodi- cxmihtu-
gious influence on the minds of kings, and if they ^" (
acquire fo large a fhare of property. in the
year 56?.
* Silentium ptr facer dotes ^ quitus & cotrcendi jus ejl, irr.pcraiur. ar t-
De morib Germ.
f Nee leyikus libern ant infinita poteftas. Ctftfrum nzque ani-
tnafi-iiertere, neque e vincire, tuque Berber are, niji factrdotiotts eji per-
mijfum, non quaji in pcenam, nee DucisjvJJli t Jed -i-clut Deo -
quern aJeJfi bellatoribm credunt. De morib. Germ.
BOOK
416 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK XIX.
Of Laws in Relation to the Principles
which form the general Spirit, the
Morals and C i {ft cms of .a Nation.
C I! A P. I.
Of the . " ills Book.
BOOK " MIS li.I-.j(\ c t is of a great extent. In that
X j J[ ;o\vfl of ideas which prefent themfelves to
^ 2 my mint!, I mall be more attentive to the order of
things, than to the things themfelves. I ihaJl be
obliged to wander to the right and to the left, that
I may fearch into and difcover the truth.
CHAP. II.
That it is neceffary People s Minds fbould be prep.
for the Reception of the bcft Laws.
N
OTHING could appear more infupport-
able to the Germans * than the tribunal of
( a ) Aga- Varus. That which Juftinian ( a ) erected amongft
thias, tne Lazij to proceed againlt the murderers of their
king, appeared to them as an affair the moil hor-
( b ) Juflin "d and barbarous. Mithridates () haranguing
J - 3*- againlt the Romans reproached them more particu-
* The\ cut out the tongues of the advocates, and cried : Vi
per don t hif*. Tacitus.
larry
OF LA W S. 417
larly for their ( c ) formalities of jufti The Par-
thians could not bear with one of their kings, v
having been educated at Rome, rendered himie
.bfe and * eafy of accels to all. Liberty irfelf
has appeared infupportable to thofe nations who
have not been accultomed to enjoy it. Thus a pure
air is fome times difagreeable to thofe who have
lived in a fenny country.
Balbi, a Venetian, being at ( J ) Pegu, was intro- ( d
duced to the king. When the monarch was in- t ^,
formed that they had no king at Venice, he burft \
into fuch a fit of laughter, that he v. 1 with j ch
a cough, and had much ado to fpcak to his courtiers.
What Jegi (la tor could propo It < in
to a .people like tl.U : | ^
\
C H A P. III.
Of c i
r tr -^ T T T^ T T- c i
HERE are t\vo forts or tyranny, the one \
1, which ariies from the oppreffions ot r~ : i .
government ; the other is feared in opinion, and :
fure to be felt whenever thofe who govern, eftablifh.
things mocking to the turn of thought, and in-
confiftent with the ideas of a nation.
Dio teils us, that Auguftus defirous of be
ing called R-; is ; but having been in. -i,
that the people feared, that he
felf to be crowned king, he ch
The old Roma 1 ;e av ng ,
they could not fatTer any man to er. joy fuch
er : theie would not have a king, becaufe they
Prompti . - - .
.
VOL. I. E e j]J
4 i8 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK cotl ld no t bear his manners. For though Cosfar* the
XIX *"*
Chap, $, Triumvirs, and Auguftus, were really kings, they
& 4. had preferved all the outward appearance of equality,
while their private lives were a kind of contraft to
the pomp and luxury of foreign monarchs-, fo that
when they were refolved to have no king, this only
figniBed that they would preferve their cuftoms, and
not take up thofe of the African and eaftern nations.
The lame writer informs us, that the Romans were
exulperated againft Auguftus for making certain laws
which were too fevere -, but as loon as he had re
called Pylades the comedian, whom the jarring of
different factions had driven out of the city, the dif-
content a .ilrd. A people of this ftamp have a more
lively )( nlr of tyranny when a player is banifhed,
than when they are deprived of all their laws.
CHAP. IV.
Of the Central Spirit of Mankind.
EN are influenced by various caufes, by
the climate, the religion, the laws, the
maxims of government, by precedents, morals and
cuftoms , from whence is formed a general fpirit
which takes its rife from thefe.
In proportion, as in every nation any one of
thefe caufes ads with more force, the others in the
fame degree become weak. Nature and the climate
rule almofb alone over the favages -, cuftoms govern
theChinefe; the laws tyrannize in Japan; morals
had formerly all their influence at Sparta , maxims
of government, and the ancient fimplicity of man
ners, once prevailed at Rome.
CHAP.
OF LAWS. 4 T 9
CHAP. V.
Ho iu far we foould be attentive left the general Spirit
of a Nation Jbould be cbar.gcd.
IF in any part of the world there had been a na- Boor
tion whole inhabitants were of a fociable temper, r) XIX
open hearted, plcafed with life, po/IdTed of jud
ment, and a facility in communicating their thoughts-,
who were fprightly, agreeable, gay, fome r imes im
prudent, often indifcreet; and befides had courage,
generofity, franknefs, and a certain point of honor;
no one ought to endeavour to reftrain their manners
by laws, unlefs he would lay a conftraint on their
virtues. If in general the character is good, the
little faults that may be found in it, will be of I m all
importance.
They might lay a reftraint upon women, make
laws to correct their manners, and to limit their
luxury : but who knows but th.it by this means,
they might lofe that peculiar tafte which would be
the fource of the riches of the nation, and that
politenefs which would render the country frequent
ed by ftrangers ?
It is the bufinefs of the legifkture to follow the
fpirit of the nation, when ic is no: contrary to the
principles of government; for we do nothing fo
well as when we act with freedom, and follow the
bent of our natural genius.
If an air of pedantry be given to a nation that is
naturally gay, the ilate will gain no advanra^
from it, either at home or abroad. Leave it to do
frivolous things in the mod ferious manner, ard
with gaiety things the moft ferious.
E e 2 CHAP.
420 T II E S P I R I T
CHAP. VI.
That Thing ought not to be correfi,
ROOK r them but leave us as we are, faid a gen-
J j tleman of a nation which had a very o-reat re
el* , . . . .
iemblance to that we have been defcribincr, and na-
O
ture will repair whatever is amils. She has given us
a vivacity capable of offending, and hurrying us
beyond the bounds of refpedt : this fame vivacity is
corrected by the politenefs it procures us, infpiring
a talle for the world, and above all, for the con-
verfadon of women.
; them i us as we are : our indifcretions
joined to our natur uld make the laws
which mould cunlh ain our fociable temper, not at
r us.
C II A P. VII.
Of tic ; and
f | * H E Athenians, this gentleman adds, were
a nation that had fome relation to ours. They
mingled gaiety with bufinefs ; a ftroke of raillery
s as agreeable in the fenate, as in the theatre.
This vivacity, which difcovered itfelf in their coun
cils, went along with them in the execution of their
refolves. The characteriitic of the Spartans was
gravity, (erioufnefs, fevcricy, and filence. It would
have been as difficult to bring over an Athenian by
teazing, as it would a Spartan by diverting him.
CHAP.
OF LAWS. 421
CHAP. VIII.
_ f a fidablt Temper .
THE more communicative a people are, the I
more eafily they change their ts, be-
caule each is in a greater degree a ft le to the _\
other ; ;:>. j thj fingularities of individuals arc b. rtvr
The climate which makes one nation delight
in "clng communicative, makes it alfo delight in
\d that which makes it delight in chang-.,
cy of worn ils the manners,
, the t.iite -, the defire of giving greater plcalure
than others, eilablifhes the ornan and
th e of pleafing others more than ourfelvcs
eftablifhes famiuns. The mode is a fubject of im
portance by giving a trifling turn of mind, it con
tinually encreales the branches of its commere
. bees.
V
CHAP. IX.
Of the Vanity and Pride of Natk
N T ITY is as advantageous to a govern
ment, as pride is dangerous. To be con
vinced of this, we need only reprefent on the one
hand, the numberleis benefits which relult from va
nity; from thence arifes luxury, induftry, arts,
fafhions, politenefs, tafte : and on the other, the
infinite evils which fpring from the pride of c
tain nations, lazinefs, poverty, a univerfal neg
lect, the deftruclion of the nations which have ac
cidentally fallen into their hands, as well as of their
E e 3 own.
422 THE
BOOK owrii Lazinefs * is the efteft of pride; labour a
vrv r
Chap o confequence of vanity : the pride of a Spaniard leads
him to refufe labour , the vanity of a Frenchman
to know how to work better than others.
All lazy nations are grave ; for thofe who do not
labour, regard themfelves as the fovereigns of thofe
who do.
If we fearch amongft all nations, we mall find
that for the moft parr, gravity, pride, and indo
lence go hand in hand.
() Sec |-j ie p e0 ple of Achim ( f ) are proud and lazy ;
Dampier, , ,- , , n . . . c . , ,
y c , thole who have no Haves hire one, ir it DC only to
ii ry a quart of rice a hundred paces ; they would
be difhonoured if they carried it themfelves.
In many places people let their nails grow, that
all may Ice they do not woik.
\Yor.icn in the Indies ( ? ) believe it fhameful for
,em to learn to read : this is, fay they, the bufi-
ntfs of the flaves, who fmg their fpiritual longs in
the temples of their pr.gcds. In one tribe they do
: fpin ; in another they make nothing but bafkets
and mats ; they are not even to pound rice; and in
others they mull not go to fetch water. Thefe rules
are cflabliihed by pride, and the lame pailion makes
them followed.
* The people who follow the Khan of Malacair.ber, thofe
rf Carr.ata< a and Coromandcl, are proud and indole t ; they con-
funif Ir caufe they are mifcrably poor ; \\hile the iubjcfts
of the M<cui. Mid the pci (, r of Indollan, employ thcmfelves
^nd (.-:-](, tne com .*i,iencies or lifc like the huropcum. Coh,
t/ f :!:e Fjtt. .t ef an India Company. Vol. i. p. 54.
CHAP.
O F L A W S. 423
CHAP. X.
Of the Character of the Spaniards and Chinefe.
characteristics of the feveral nations are BOOK
v i v
A formed of virtues and vices, ot good and Q UP J
bad qualities. From the happy mixture of thefe,
great advantages refult, and frequently where it
would be lead expected , there are others from
whence great evils arife, evils which one would not
fulped.
The Spaniards have been in all ages famous for
their honefty. Juftin ( h ) mentions their fidelity in ( h )
keeping whatever was intruded to their care ; th
have frequently fuffered death rather than reveal ;i
fecret. They have dill the fame fidelity for which
they were formerly didinguidied. All the nations
who trade to Cadiz, trud their fortunes to the Spa
niards, and have never yet repented it. But this
admirable quality joined to their indolence, forms
a mixture from whence fuch effects refult as to
them are the mod pernicious. The people ot Eu
rope carry on in their very fight all the commerce
of their monarchy.
The character of the Chinefe is formed of ano
ther mixture, directly oppofite to that of the Spani
ards. The precarioufnefs ot their fubfiltence*, in-
fpires them with a prodigious activity, and fuch an
exceffive defire of gain, that no trading nation can
confide in them ^). This acknowledged infidelity ( )
has fecured them the pofieftion of the trade to Japan. v l. a.
No European merchant has ever dared to undertake
it in their namje, how eafy foever it might be for
* By the nature of the foil anJ climate.
F, e 4 them
424 T H E S P 1 R I T
B ? K them to do it from their maritime provinces in the
Chap, ii, no^h.
& 12.
CHAP. XL
A Reflexion.
I HAVE faid nothing here with a view to
J( fV-n tli.it infinite diftance, which there muft
e N-twccn virtue and vir -. God forbid, that
I llioiild be guilty of fuch an attempt I would only
my readers comprehend that all political,
.ire not moral vices, and that ail moral, are not
political vices -, and that thofe who make laws which
Ihotk th ,t of a nation, ought not to
ignorant of this.
C II A P. XII.
Of ( s and in a defpotic State.
T is a capital maxim, that the manners and cuf-
toms of a defpotic empire ought never to be
-, for nothing would more fpeedily produce
lurion. The reafon is, that in thefe Hates there
no laws, that is, none that can be properly
led fo, there are only manners and cuftoms-, and
il you overturn thefe, you overturn all.
Laws are eftabli flied, manners are infpiredi thefe
proceed from a general fpirit, thofc, from a parti
cular inftitution: now it is as dangerous, nay, more
to overturn the general fpirit, as to change a
r ticular inftitution.
There is lefs communication in a country where
b, either as fuperior or inferior, exercifes or fuf-
fers an arbitrary power, than there is in thofe where
liberty
OF LAWS. 425
liberty reigns in every Ration. They do not there- BOOK
fo ot. .1 change their manners and behaviour, chop. 1*2,
and eftabliihcd cuftoms have a near refem- & 13.
blance to laws. Thus it is here neceflary that a
prince or a legiflator fliould lefs oppofe the manners
d cuftoms of the people, than in any other country
:h.
omen are commonly confined, and have
influence in icx In other countries where
they live with men, their deiire of pleafing, and
ddire men alfo have of giving them pleafure,
ice a continual change of cuiloms. The two
ii each othc both lofe their diftinftive
.ntial quality , what was naturally fixt be-
;uite unfettlcd, and their cuftoms and beha-
v ge every day.
CHAP. XIII.
Of the Behaviour of the Cbinefe.
BU T China is the place where the cuftoms of
the country can never be changed. Befides
their women being abfolutely feparated from the
men, their cuftom;,, like their morals, are taught in
the fchools. A man of ( l: ) letters may be known /k\ rj u
by his eafy addrefs. Thele things being once taught Halde.
by precept, and inculcated by grave doctors, be
come fixed, like the principles of morality, and are
never changed.
o
CHAP.
426 T H E S P I R I T
C H A P. XIV.
// hat are the natural Means of changing the Manners
and Ciijtoms cf a Nation.
B K \\ E have laid that the laws were the par-
X IX % /^ /
Chap 14- * * ticular and precifc inftitutions of a legif-
lator, and manners and cuftoms the inftitutions
cf a nation in general. From hence it follows, that
when thefe manners and cuftoms are to be changed,
it ought not to be done by laws ; this would have
too much the air of tyranny : it would be better to
change them by introducing other manners and
other cuftoms.
Thus when a prince would make great altera
tions in his kingdom, he mould reform by laws
what is eftablifhed by laws, and change by cuftoms
what is eftablifhed by cuftoms ; for it is very bad
policy to change by laws, what ought to be changed
by cuftoms.
The law which obliged the Mufcovites to cut off
their beards, and to fhorten their cloaths, and the-
rigour wirh which Peter I. made them crop even to
the knees, the long cloaks of thofe who entered into
the cities, wt:<" inftances of tyranny. There are
means that may be made ufe of to prevent crimes,
thefe are punifhments : there are thole lor changing
our cuftoms, thefe are examples.
The facility and eafe with which this nation has
been polifhed, plainly mews that this prince had
a worfe opinion of his people than they deferved,
and that they were not brutes though he was pleafed
to call them k>. The violent meaiiires which he
2 employed
OF LAWS. 427
employed were needlefs ; he would have attained BOOK
IX
14.
XIX
his end as well by milder methods.
He himfelf experienct-d the eafmefs of bringing
about thefe alterations. The women were fhut up,
and in ibme fort (laves ; he called them to court ;
he fent them filks and fluffs, and made them drefs
like the German ladies. This lex immediately re-
lifhed a manner of life which fo greatly Mattered
their tafte, their vanity, and their pillions, and by
their means it was reliihed by the men.
What rendered the change the more eafy was,
their manners being at that time foreign to the
climate , and their having bcvn introduced amongft
them by conqueft, and by a mixture of nations. Pe
ter I. in giving the manners and cuftoms of Europe
to an European nation, found a facility which he did
not himfelf expect. The empire of the climate is
the firft, the mod powerful of all empires.
He had then no occafion for laws to change
C5
the manners and cuftoms of his country ; it would
have been fufficient to have introduced other man
ners and other cuftoms.
Nations are in general very tenacious of their
cuftoms ; to take them away by violence is to ren
der them unhappy : we mould not therefore change
them, but engage the people to make the change
themielves.
All punifhment which is not derived from necef-
fity, is tyrannical. The law is not a mere act of
power i things in their own nature indifferent are not
within its province.
C H A P.
428 T H E S P I R I T
CHAP. XV.
The Influence of < ( / on the
B YI K T~ ^ ^ c k an gi n S tne manners of v/omen had,
p \. t J| without doubt, a great influence on the g
& i vcrnmcnt ot Mufcovy. One thing is very cloiely
united to another : the defpctic power of the prince
is naturally conn \vith the fervitude of women,
the liberty of women with the fpirit of monarchy.
C II A P. XVI.
feme 1 vc confounded the Principles
id.
MA N and cuftoms are thofe habits
vltabiifhcd by the , either
becai. re not able, or were not willing to
cl!abli !\ them.
ihis d; ;e between laws and man
ners, that tl. moil adapted to regulate
the actions of the ll. , and manners to regu
the actions of t .in. There is I difference
:-n manners and m$, that the firft prin
cipally relate to the ;or conduct, the others to
the exterior.
Thefe thinr :n fometimes confounded,
curgus ; me code tor the laws, man
ners, and cuftorr.s -, and t: ".itors . :ina
have d.
furprized, that the legiflators
China ;nid : ihould confound the L
* ATofes : ligion.
m
OF LAWS. 429
manners, and cuftoms : the reaibn is, their man
ners reprefcnt their laws, and their cuftoms their chap. 16.
manners.
The principal object which the legiflators of
China had in view, was to make the people live in
ace and tranquillity. They would have people I
filled with a veneration for one another, that each
fhould be every moment fenfible how greatly he was
indebted to others, and that there was not a fub-
jecl who did not in fome degree depend on another
fubject. They therefore gave rules of . the moft
extenfrve civility.
Thus the inhabitants of the ( m ) villages of China, (
obferve amonG-ft th . the Time ceremonies,
^J
as thofe obiVrved by perfons of an exalted ftation :
a very proper method of infpiring mild and gent
diipofitions, ot maintaining peace and good order
amongfb the people, and of banifhing all the vices
v.hichl; from an afpcrity or temper. In effect,
would not the freeing them from the rules of civi
lity, be to ic-arch out a method for them to indulge
their faults m eafe ?
Civility is in this refpect of more value than
politenc: litenefs flatters the vices of others,
and civility prevents ours from being brought i
light. It is a barrier which men have placed
in themfelves to prevent the corruption of ea
oth
Lycurgus, whole inftitutions were fcvc r e, h
no regard to civility, in forming the external be
viour : he had a view to that warlike ipirit \\hich
he would fain give to his people. A people who
were ever correcting, or ever corrected, always in-
ftructing, or always inftructed, endued with equal
fimplicity
430 T H S P I R I T
BOOK fimplicity and rigor, atoned by their virtues, for
Chap. i-. tne ^ r want of complaifance.
CHAP. XVII.
Of tbc peculiar Quilt ty of the Cbinefe Government.
( u ) Seethe r Mil 1 legiflators of China went farther ( u ).
They confounded together their religion,
books m - J
from laws, manners, and cultoms; all thole were morals,
wimh f.\- a ]| t ] |( .| ( . were virtue. The precepts relating to
K theic rour points were what they called rites ; and
it was in the exact obfervance of thefe that the
f "" r Chincfc government triumphed. They fpent their
whole youth in learning them, their wholelife in their
ce. icy wax- raught by their men of learn
ing, they were inculcated by the magiftrates; and as
they included all the ordinary actions of life, when
they found the means of making them ftrictly
obfcrved, China was well governed.
Two tilings have contributed to the cafe with
which thefe rites are engraved on the hearts and
minds of the Chinefe , the one, the difficulty of
writing, which during the greateft part of their
Jives wholly employs their mind *, becaufe it is
neccfiary to prepare them to read and underftand the
bc-oks in which they are comprized i the other, that
the ritual precepts having nothing in them, that is
iricii.il, but being merely rules of common practice,
they are more adapted ro convince and ftrike the
mind than things merely intellectual.
Thole princes who inftead of governing by thefe
rites, governed by the force of punifhments, wanted
* Tr i-- ti.r which has efiablilhed emulation, which has baniihed
b, arm culu\ ^u-^1 a love cf learning.
to
OF LAWS. 431
to aceomplifli that by punifhments, which it is not K
in their power to produce, that is, to give habits of Ch ^ p ^
morality. Bypunifhments a fubject is very juftly cut & itf.
off from fociety, who having loft the purity of his
manners, violates the laws ; but if all the world were
to lofe their moral habits would thefe re-eftablifh
them? Punifhments may be juftly inflicted to put
a ftop to many of the confequences of the general
evil, but it will not remove the evil itfelf. Thus when
the principles of the Chinefe government were dif-
carded, and morality loft, the ftate fell into anar
chy, and revolutions were feen to take place.
F
CHAP. XVIII.
A Conference drawn frcm / Chapter*
ROM hence it follows that the laws of China
are not dcilroyed by conqucft. Their cul-
toms, manners, hws, and religion, being the fame
thing, they cannot change all thefe at once ; and
as it will happen, that either the conqueror or the
conquered muft change, in China it has always
been the conqueror. For the manners of the
conquering nations not being its cuftoms, nor its
cuftoms its laws, nor its laws its religion, it has
been more eafy for them to conform by degrees to
the vanquifhed people, than the vanquifhed people
to them.
There ftill follows from hence a very unhappy
confequence, which is, that it is almoft impoffible
for * Chriftianity ever to be eiUb. ~ .1 in China.
* See the reafons given by the Chinefe macnftrates in their
decrees for proicribing the chriilian r< .ing Letters,
\-tbC;lUSl.
The
43- THE I R I T
BOOK i" ne vows of virginity, the aiTembling of women in
Chan, is, churches, their necefiary communication wirh the
& 19. minifters of religion, their participation in the iacra-
ments, auricular contefiiop., extreme undtion, the
marriage of only one wife, all thefe overturn the
manners and cuftoms of the country, and with the
fame blow ftrike at their religion and laws.
The chriftian religion by the eftablifhment of
charity, by a public worfhip, by a ; i pat ion of
the fame iacraments, feems to demand, that all
fhould be united ; while the rites ot China feem to
ordain that all mould be feparated.
C H A P. XIX.
IIciv this Union of /\V;V S 7<?;;, Laws, 71. -s and
^ amongft the Chincfc \i\is prc.
Till-, principal object of government which
the Chinefe IcgiQators had in vie-.-,
the peace and tranquillity of the empire : And fub-
ordination appeared to them as the moft proper
means to maintain it. Filled with this idea, they
belLved it their duty to infpire a refpecl for fathers,
and therefore aflembled all their power to effect it.
They eftablimed an infinite number of rites and
.emonies to do them honor when living, and
alter their death. It was impoffible for them to
pay fuch honors to deceafcd parents, without being
led to honor the living. The ceremonies at the
death of a father were more nearly related to reli-
>n, thofe for a living father had a greater relation
to the laws, manners, and cuftoms , however thefe
were only parts of the fame code, but this code
s very extenfive.
A vene-
OF LAWS. 433
A veneration for fathers was neceffarily connected B K
\vith a fuitable refpeft for all who reprefented fa- chap. 19.
thers, fuch as old men, matters, magiftrates, and the
emperor. This refpect for fathers, fuppofed a re
turn of love towards children, and confequently
the fame return from old men to the young, from
magiftrates to thofe who were under their jurif-
diclion, and from the emperor to his fubje<5ls. This
formed the rites, and thefe rites the general fpirit
of the nation.
We mail now mew the relation which things in
appearance the moft indifferent, may have to the
fundamental conftitution of China. This empire is
formed on the plan of the government of .1 family.
If you diminim the paternal authority, or even if
you retrench the ceremonies, which exprefs your i \>
fpect for it, you weaken the reverence due to ma
giftrates, who are confidered as fathers-, nor would
the magiftrates have the fame care of the people
whom they ought to confider as their children-, and
that tender relation which fubfifts between the prince
and his fubjects, would infenfibly be loft. Retrench
but one of thefe habits, and you overturn the fbt
It is a thing in itfelf very different whether the
daughter-in-law rifes every morning to pay fuch r.nd
fuch duties to her mother-in-law : but it we confider
that thefe exterior habits inceffantly revive an idea
necefiary to be imprinted on all minds, an idea that
forms the governing fpirit of the empire, we fh-ill
fee that it is necefTary that fuch, or fuch a particular
action be performed.
VOL. I. F f CHAP.
434
CHAP. XX.
An Explication of a Paradox relating to tie Cbinefe.
BOOK T is very remarkable that the Chinefe, whofe
< i lives are guided by rites, are neverthelefs the
greateft cheats upon earth. This appears chiefly
in their trade, which in fpite of its natural tendency,
has never been able to make them honeft. He
who buys of them, ought to carry with him his
o\vn ( ) weights, every merchant having three forts,
md ^ 1C onc h av y f r buying, another light for felling,
1712, in and another of the true itandard for thofe who are
upon their guard. It is polTible, I believe, to ex-
nort j lain this contradiction.
The Icgillators of China had two objects in viewj
they \\ere defirous that the people fhould be fub-
miffive and peaceful, and that they fhould alfo be
laborious and induftrious. By the nature of the foil
and climate, their fubfiftence is very precarious ,
nor can it be any other way fecured, than by the af-
fiftance of induftrv and labour.
\Yhen every one obeys, and every one is em
ployed, the ftate is in a happy fituation. Jt is
necefTity, and perhaps the nature of the climate,
that has given to the Chinefe an inconceivable
greedinefs for gain, and laws have never been made
to put a Hop to it. Every thing has been for
bidden, when acquired by acts of violence ; eve
ry thing permitted, when obtained by artifice or
labour. Let us not then compare the morals of
China with thofe of Europe,. Every one in China
is obliged to be attentive to what will be for
his
OF LAWS. 435
his advantage-, if the cheat has been watchful BOOK
over his own intereft, he who is the dupe ought Chan ^i
to have thought of his. At Sparta they were & 22.
permitted to fteal ; in China, they are fuffered to
deceive.
CHAP. XXI.
How the Laws ought to have a Relation to Manners
and Cujlcms.
IT is only fingular inflitutions which thus con
found laws, manners, and cuftoms, things n
turally diftincl: and feparate : but though they arc
things in themfelves different, there is ncverthcn
a great relation between them.
Solon being afked if the laws he had given to
the Athenians, were the beft, he replied, " I have
" given them the befl, they were able to bear."
A fine expreflion, that ought to be perfectly un-
derftood by all legiflators ! When Divine \Villlom
faid to the Jews, " I have given you precepts
" which are not good," this fignified that they
had only a relative goodnefs , which is the fponge
that wipes out all the difficulties that are to b-j tom.
in the law of Mofes.
CHAP. XXII.
fame Subjeft continued.
WH E N a people have pure and regular
manners, their laws become fimple and
natural. Plato ( b ) fays that Rhadamanthus, who
governed a people extremely religious, finifhed every { ^
F f 2 procds
436 THE SPIRIT
BOOK p roce f s w i t h extraordinary difpatch, adminiftermg
Chap ^ on ty ^ ie oat ^ on ever y accufation. But fays the
& 24. fame Plato ( q ), when a people are not religious, we
Ihould never have recourie to an oath, except he
1 I2 who fwears is entirely difinterefted, as in the cafe
of a judge and a witnefs.
CHAP. XXIII.
ied on the Manners of a
People.
A
T the time when the manners of the Romans
were pure, they had no particular law againft
the emb :nent of the public money. When this
ppear, it was thought fo infamous,
t to be condr ; to reftore ( r ) what they had
taken, was . k-rcd as a fufficient difgrace : for a
proof of this, fee the fentence of L. Scipio ( s ).
CHAP. XXIV.
.e fame Subjcft continued.
Till laws which gave the right of tutelage
to the mother, were moft atttentive to the
prefervation of the infant s perfon ; thofe which
gave it to the next heir, were moft attentive to
the prefervation of die eltate. When the manners
of a people are corrupted, it is much better to give
the tutelage to the mother. Amongll thofe whofe
Jaws confide in the manners of the fubjects, the
guardianihip is given either to the next heir, or to
the mother, and fometimes to both.
If
OF LAWS. 4
If we reflect on the Roman laws, we (hall find that BOOK.
the fpirit of thefe was conformable to what I have c]
advanced. At the time when the laws of the twelv^
tables were made, the manners of the Romans were
mod admirable. The guardianship was given t->
the neareft relation of the infant, from a confide ration
that he ought to have the trouble of die tutelage,
who might enjoy the advantage of poflefling the
inheritance. They did not imagine the life of the
heir in danger, though it was put into 11 periods
hands who would reap advantage by his death. But
when the manners of Rome were changed, its legif-
lators changed their conduct. If in the pupillary
fubftiturion, fay Caius ( r ) and Juilinian ( ), the
teftator is afraid, that the fubftitute will lay any Llb - 2 - m -
fnares for the pupil, he may leave the vulgar * fub- 6 ze r s
flitution op?n, and put the pupillary into a part of compile-
the teftamc ;t, which cannot be opened till after a i^yfa*
certain time. Thefe fears and precautions were in if
unknown to the primitive Romans. )Inilitut.
1. :
///. lubjlit.
CHAP. XXV. .3-
Tbe fame Subject continued.
TH E Roman law gave the liberty of mak
ing prefents before marriage-, after the mar
riage they Were not allowed. This was founded
on the manners of the Romans, who were led
to marriage, only by frugality, fimplicity, and
modefty ; but who might fuffer themielvcs to be
The form of the vulgar fubftitution ran tlin> ; If f >ne
is unwilling to take the inheritance, I iubihiutein his llead,
the pupillary fubuitution ; If fuch a one dies before hr arrive
age of pubert}-, I fubltitute, c\;c.
F f 3 fed need
HOOK ("educed by domeftic cares, by complaifance and
Chap. 25, tne happincfs of a whole life.
&.- 2 >. A law of the ( c ) Vifigoths forbad the man giv-
[ ) Lib. 3. j n g more to tne woman he was to marry than the
tenth part of his fubftance, and his giving her
any thing during the firft year of their marriage.
This alfo took its rile from the manners of the
country. The legiflators were willing to put a
Hop to that Spaniih oftentation, which only led
them to difplay an excefllve liberality in acts of
magnificence.
The Romans, by their laws, put a flop to fome
of the inconveniencies which arofe from the moft
durable empire in the world, that of virtue-, the
..niards by theirs, would prevent the bad ef
fects of a tyranny, the moft frail and fleeting, that
of beauty.
CHAP. XXVI.
The fame Subjett continued.
( ) Leg. 8. ^ | ^ H E law ( d ) of Theodofius and Valentinian
<i ocl - <<; drew the caufes of repudiation from the
And the ancient manners ( e ) and cuftoms of the Romans. It
fthe placed in the number of thefe caufes the behaviour
of a hufband * who beat his wife, in a manner
that difgraced the character of a freeborn woman.
: - This caufe was omitted in the following laws ( f ) :
, !-.for their manners were in this refpect changed:
eaftern cuftoms had banifhed thofe of Europe.
The firft eunuch of the emprefs, wife to Juftinian
II, threatened her, fays the hiftorian, to chaftife
her in the fame manner as children are punifhed at
* Si futrberiius qua ingenuis alicna funt, affictatem fro&arverit.
fcbool.
O F L A W S. 439
fchool. Nothing but eftablifhed manners, or thofe B K
\ I V
whix:h they were it-eking to eftabliih, could raiie chap 2-.
even an idea of this kind.
We have feen how the laws follow the manners
of a people : let us now fee how the manners fol
low the laws.
CHAP. XXVII.
How the Laws contribute to form the Manners, (
toms, and Character cf a Nation.
*" HE cuftoms of an enflaved people are a
J[ part of their fervitude ; thofe of a free peo
ple are a part of their liberty.
I have fpoken in the eleventh Book ( s ) of a free (?) Ch. 6.
people, and have given the principles of their con-
ftitution : let us now fee the effects which follow
from this liberty, the character it is capable of
forming, and the cuftoms which naturally refult
from it.
I do not deny that the climate may have produced
great part of the laws, manners, and cuftoms of
this nation ; but I maintain that its manners and
cuftoms have a clofe connection with its laws.
As there are in this ftate two vifible powers, the
legislative and executive, and as every citizen has
a will of his own, and may at pleafure aiftrt his
independence ; moft men have a greater fondnefs
for one of thefe powers than for the other, and the
multitude have commonly neither equity nor fenfe
enough, to mew an equal affection to both.
As the executive power, by difpofing of all
employments, may give great hopes, and no fears,
every man who obtains any favour from it, is ready
F f 4 to
440 THE SPIRIT
Bo OK to e fp Ou f e i ts caufe , while it is liable to be attack-
Chap 27. c ^ ^7 thofe \vho have nothing to hope from it.
11 the paiTions being nnrcltrained, hatred, envy,
iealoufy, and an ambitious defire of riches and
honot /car in their full extent: were it other-
wilo, the itate would be in the condition of a man
.kencd by fickm fs, \ iio is without pafiions,
becaufe he is \vithout Itrength.
The hatixJ wl.ich ariics between the two par--
ml, becaufe it will always be
tent.
Theie parties being compofcd of free-.ien, if the
on ir.is too powerful for the other, as a con-
of liberty, this other is deprefTed ; while
citizens take the weaker fide, with the fame
as the hands lend their afiiftance to remove
the infirmities and diforders of the body.
ery individual is independent, and being com
monly led by caprice and humour, frequently
changes parties , he abandons one where he lett all
.Js, to unite himfelf to another in which he
finds all his enemies : fo thar in this nation it fre
quently happens that the people forget the laws of
iriendfiiip, ell as thofe of hatred.
The fovereign is here in the fame cafe with a
pri inft the ordinary maxims
of prudence, is frequently obliged to give his con-
nee to thofe who have mod offended him : and
to ice the men who have bed ferved him i he
Joes tlur neceliiry which other princes do by
;oice.
we are afraid of being deprived of the blefilng
we already enjoy, and which may be difguiied and
) us ; and as fear always enlarges
objects i
OF LAWS. 441
objecls-, the people are uneafy under fuch a fituation, BOOK
,
and believe themfelves in danger, even in thofe mo-
ments when they are mod fecure.
As thofe who with the greateft warmth oppofe
the executive power, dare not avow the ielf-inte-
reiled motives of their oppofition, fo much the more
do they increafe the terrors of the people, who can
never be certain whether they are in danger or not.
But even this contributes to make them avoid the
real dangers to which they may in the end be
expofed.
But the legiflative body having the confidence of
the people, and being more enlightened than they,
may calm their uneafinds, and make them recover
from the bad imprcflions they have entertained.
This is the great advantage which this govern
ment has over the ancient democracies, in which the
people had an immediate power ; for when they were
moved anc! .i by the orators, thefe agitations
always produced their eft ; --L-.
But when an im-refiion of terror has no certain
object, it ; :es only clamours and abuie , it has
however, this good effect, that it puts all the fprings
of government in mo;ion, and fixes the attention of
every citizen. But if it arifts from a violation of
the fundament:.! laws, it is fallen, cruel, and pro
duces the moil dreadful cauftrophes.
Soon we fhould fee a frightful calm, during
which every one would uniu againft that po 1
which had violated the la-
If when the uneafmefs proceeds from no certain
object, feme foreign power fhould threaten the ilate,
or put its profperity or its glory in danger, their
little interests of party would then yield to the
more
442 T H E S P I R I T
BOOK more ftrong and binding, and there would be a
Chap 27 perfe^ Coalition in favour of the executive power.
But if the difputes were occafioned by a violation
of the fundamental laws, and a foreign power fhould
appear , there would be a revolution that would
neither alter the conftitution nor the form of govern
ment. For a revolution formed by liberty becomes
a confirmation of liberty.
A free nation may have a deliverer-, a nation en-
flavcd can have only another oppreflbr.
For whoever has a power fufficient to dethrone
an ablblute prince, has a power fufficient to enable
him to become abfolutc himfelf.
As the enjoyment of liberty, and even its fup-
port and preservation, confifls in every man s being
allowed to fpcak his thoughts and to lay open his
frntiments ; a citizen in this ftate will fay or write
whatever the laws do not exprefly forbid to be faid
or wrote.
A people like this being always in a ferment, are
more eafily conducted by their pafTions than by rea-
fon, which never produces any great effects in the
mind of men -, it is therefore eafy for thofe who go
vern, to make them undertake enterprizes contrary
to their true intereft.
This nation is pafTionately fond of liberty, becaufe
this liberty is true and real ; and it is pofTible for it,
in its defence, to facrifice its wealth, its cafe, its in
tereft, and to fupport the burthen of the moft heavy
taxes, even fuch as a defpotic prince durft not lay
upon his fubjects.
But as the people have a certain knowledge of
the neceflity of fubmitting to them, they pay from
the well founded hope of their loon paying them no
longer ,
OF LAWS. 443
longer ; their burthens are heavy, but they do not BOOK
feel their weight : while in other dates the uneafmefs ^
c i i i -i Chap. 27.
is infinitely greater than the evil.
This nation mud therefore have a fixed and cer
tain credit, becaufe it borrows of itfelf and pays it-
felf. It is pofiible for it to undertake things above
its natural ftrength, and employ againft its enemies
immenle fums of fictitious riches which the credit
and nature of its government may render real.
To preferve its liberty, it borrows of its fubjecls;
and its fubjects feeing that its credit would be loft,
if ever it was conquered, have a new motive to make
frefh efforts in defence of its liberty.
This nation inhabiting an ifland is not fond of
conquering, becaufe it would be weakened by di-
ftant conquefts : efpecially as the foil of the ifland is
good ; becaufe it has then no need of enriching itfelf
by war , and as no citizen is fubjecl: to another, each
fets a greater value on his own liberty, than on the
glory of one, or any number of citizens.
Military men are there regarded as belonging to
a profefTion which may be ufeful, but is often dan
gerous , and as men whofe very fervices are bur-
thenfome to the nation: civil qualifications are there
fore more efleemed than the military.
This nation, which liberty and the laws render
eafy, on being freed from pernicious prejudices, is
become a trading people , and as it has fome of
thofe primitive materials of trade, out of which are
made fuch things as from theartift s hand receive a
confiderable value, it has made fettlements proper to
procure the enjoyment of this gift of heaven in its
fulled extent.
As
444 T H E S P I R I T
B , As this nation is fituated towards the north, and
7< has many fuperfluous commodities-, it muft want
alfo 2 great number of merchandizes which its cli-
ir.ai.-j will not pn. : it rns therefore entered into
.ir.J. ..iircjTary commerce with the fouthern
nations j and making choice of thofe (late? whc
is wil. 10 tavo ir with an advantageous com-
O C 1
merce, it cnteis into fu:h treaties with the nation it
has chofen, as are reciprocally ufeful to both.
In a (late, where on the one hand the opulence
is extreme, and on the other the taxes are exceffive,
they are hardly able to live on a fmall fortune with
out induftry : Many therefore under a pretence
of travelling or of health, retire from amongft
them, and go in fearch of plenty, even to the coun
tries of flavery.
A trading nation has a prodigious number of lit
tle particular interefts , it may then injure or be in
jured, an infinite number of different ways. Thus
it becomes immoderately jealous, and is more ar
ticled at the pru ferity of others, than it rejoices
at its own.
And its otherwife mild and eafy, may be
fo with refpect to the trade and navigation
carried on with it, that it may feem to trade only
with enemies.
If this nation fends colonies abroad, it muft ra
ther be to extend its commerce than its dominion.
As men are fond of introducing into other places
wl v have eftablifhed amongft themfelves, they
have given the people ot their colonies the iorm of
their own government ; and this government carry
ing prosperity along with it, they have formed grear
,n the foreits they were lent to inhabit.
I Having
O F L A W S. 445
Having formerly fubdued a neighbouring nation, B _ n ^
which by its fituation, the goodncfs of its ports, v v *
and the nature of its products, infpires it withjca-
louly j though it has given this nation its own laws,
yet it holds it in great dependance : the fubjects
there are free, and the ftate itfelf in flavery.
The conquered ftate has an excellent civil govern
ment, but it is oppreiTed by the law of nations ;
laws are impofed by one nation on the other, and
thefe are fuch as render its profperity precarious,
and dependent on the will of a mafter.
The ruling nation inhabiting a large ifland, and
being in pofTeiTion of a great trade, luth \ .1-
ordinary eale grown powerful at i as the pr
fervation of its liberties re< ; ic ihould ha\
neither ftrong holds, nor lortreiles, nor land fc
it has occafion for a formidable na\ preferve it
from invafions ; a n.wy v, hich mull be luperior to
that of all other powers, who employing their trea-
fures in wars at land, have not fufficient for thofe at
fca.
The empire of the fea has always given thofe
who have enjoyed it a natural pride , becaufe think
ing themfelves capable of extending . infults
wherever they pleale, they imagine that their power
is as boundlefs as the ocean.
This nation has a great influence in the affairs
of its neighbours ; for as its power is not err \i
in conquefts, its friendfhip is more courted, and irs
refentment more dreaded, than could naturally \~
expected from the inconftancy of its government,
and its domeftic commotions.
Thus it is the fate of the executive power to be
almoft always difturbed at home and .fled
abroad, oi. .J
T H E S P I R I T
Bo o K Should this nation on fome occafions become the
Chap. 27. center f tne negotiations of Europe, probity and
good faith would be carried to a greater height than
in other places ; becaufe the minifters being fre
quently obliged to juftify their conduct before a po
pular council, their negotiations could not be fe-
cret , and they would be forced to be, in this re-
fpecl, a little more honeft.
Befides, as they would in fome fort be anfwer-
able for the events \\hich an irregular conduct
might produce, the fureft, the fafeft way for them,
would be to take the ftraighteft path.
It the nobles were tormerly poffcfied of an
immoderate power, and the monarch had found the
means of abafmg them by raifmg the people , the
point of extreme fervitude muft have been that
between humbling the nobility, and that in which
the people began to feel their power.
Thus this nation have been formerly fubjecl: to
an arbitrary power, oru many occafions preferves the
flile of it, in fuch a manner, as to let us frequently
fee upon the foundation of a free government, the
form of an abfolute monarchy.
With regard to religion, as in this ftate every
fubject has a free will, and muft confequently be
either conducted by the light of his own mind or
by the caprices of fancy -, it neceflarily follows that
every one muft either look upon all religion with
indifference, by which means they muft be led to
embrace the eftablifhed religion , or that they muft
be zealous for religion in general, by which means
the number of fects muft be encreafed.
It is not impofTible but that in this nation there
may be men of no religion, who would not
however
OF LAWS.
447
however bear to be obliged to change that which BOOK
Y i Y
they would chuie, if they cared to chufe any ; for ch *
they would immediately perceive that their lives and
fortunes are not more peculiarly theirs than their
manner of thinking, and that whoever would deprive
them of the one, might, even with better reafon,
take away the other.
If amongft the different religions, there is one that
has been attempted to be eftablifhed by methods of
flavery, it muft there be odious , becaufe as we
judge of things by the appendages we join with
them, it could never prefent itfelf to the mind in
conjunction with the idea of liberty.
The laws againll thole who profefs this religion
could not however be of the fanguinary kind , for
liberty can never inflict thefe forts of punifhmenrs :
but they may be fo rigorous as to do all the mifchicf
that could be done in cold blood.
It is pofiible that a thoufand circumftances might
concur to give the clergy fo little credit, that other
citizens may have more. Therefore inftead of a fc-
paration, they have chofe rather to fupport the fame
burthens as the laity, and in this refpect, to make
only one body with them : but as they always feek to
conciliate the refpect of the people, they diftinguifh
themfelves by a more retired life, a conduct more
referved, and a greater purity of manners.
The clergy not being able to protect religion,
nor to be protected by it, only feek to perfuade :
their pens, therefore, furnifh us with excellent works
in proof of a revelation, and of the Providence of
the Supreme Being.
Yet the ftate prevents the fitting of their afTem-
blies, and does not fuffer them to correct their own
abufes ;
448 T H E S P I R I T
r. o o K {3 U f es . i t chufesthus, through a caprice of liberty,
Chap 2-. rather to leave their reformation imperfect, than to
f after the clergy to be the reformers.
Thofe dignities which make a fundamental part
ot the confutation are more fixed than elfewhere ;
but, on the other hand, the great, in this country
of liberty, are nearer upon a level with the people i
their ranks are more feparatcd, and their perfons
more confounded.
As thole who govern have a power which, in
mraiure, has need of trefh vigor every day, they
have a greater regard for thofe who are ufeful to
them, than for thofe who only contribute to their
Amufeflient : we fee therefore fewer countries, flat
terers and par.ifites, in fhort fewer of all thofe who
.ke their own advantage of the folly of the great.
Men are Ids efteemcd for frivolous talents and at
tainments, than for efiential qualities-, and of this
kind there are but two, riches, and perfonal merit.
They enjoy a folid luxury, founded not on the
refinements of vanity, but on that of real wants ;
they afk nothing of nature but what nature can
be (low.
The rich enjoy a great fuperfiuity of fortune, and
yet have no relifh for frivolous amufements : thus
many having more wealth than opportunities of ex-
pence, employ it in a fantaftical manner : in this
nation they have more judgment than taile.
As they are always employed about their own
intereft, they have not that poiitenefs which is
founded on indolence , and they really have not lei-
fure to attain it.
The a?ra of Roman poiitenefs is the fame as that
of the eftablifhment of arbitrary power. An abfo-
lutc
O F LA W S. 449
lute government produces indolence, and indolence B *
gives birth to politenefs. Chap. 27.
The more people there are in a nation who require
2. circumfpec~l behaviour, and a care not to difpleafe,
the more there is of politcnefs. But it is rather the
politenefs of morals than that of manners which
ought to diftinguifh us from barbarous nations.
In a country where every man has in fome fort
a fhare in the adminiftration of the government, the
women ought fcarcely to live with the men. They
are therefore modcfl, that is, timid ; and this timidity
conftitutes their virtue : whilft the men wuhout a
tafte for gallantry plunge themfe vcs into a d
bauchery which leaves them at leilure, and in the
enjoyment of their full liberty.
Their laws not being made for one individual more
than another, each confiders himielf as a monarch;
and indeed the men of this nation are rather confe
derates than fellow fubjects.
As the climate has given many perfons a reftlefs
fpirit and extended views, in a country where the
conftitution gives every man a fhare in its govern
ment and political interefts, converfation generally
turns upon politics : and we fee men fpend their
lives in the calculation of events, which, confider-
ing the nature of things and the caprices of fortune,
or rather of men, can fcarcely be thought fubject to
the rules of calculation.
In a free nation it is very often a matter of indif
ference whether individuals reafon well or ill -, it is
fufficient that they do reafon : from hence fprings
that liberty which is a fecurity from the effects of
thefe rcafonings.
VOL. I. Gp; But
453 T HE SPIRIT
J. K But in a defpotic government it is equally perni-
^j . cious whether they realbn well or ill , their reafoning
is alone fufficient to fliock the principle of their go
vernment.
Many people who have no defire of pleafing,
abandon themfelves to their own particular humour ;
molt of thofe who have wit and ingenuity are inge
nious in tormenting themfelves ; filled with a con
tempt or difguft tor all things, they are unhappy
nidfl all the blefiings that can poffibly contribute to
their happinefs.
As no fub ]cc~l fears another, the whole nation is
proud -, for the pride of kings is founded only on
their independence.
Free nations are haughty ; others may more pro-
n.
it as theie men who arc naturally fo proud, live
uch by themfelves, they are commonly bafhful
\\ hen chcy come among Grangers , and we frequently
.icm behave for a confiderable time with an odd
mixture of pride and ill placed fhame.
The character of the nation is more particularly
I in their literary performances, in which
the men of thought and deep meditation.
ly gives us a fenfe of the ridicules of man
kind, retirement renders us more fit to reflect en the
folly of vice. Their fatyrical writings are fharpand
fcvere, ar.d we find amongft them many Juvenals,
;hcut discovering one Horace.
.vtremely abfolute hiftorians betray
the truth, becaufe they are not at liberty to fpeak it ;
in fta: ^.arkably free, they betray the truth be-
their liberty itfelf, which always produces
d. .s, every one becoming as great a Have to the
prejudices
CONTENTS.
Chap. XV. New Methods cf />;r ^ T a Con-
queft, 2<
Chap. XVI. Of Conquers made by a defpotic
Prince, 210
Chap. XVII. The fame Subjeft continued, 211
Book XI. Of the Laws that form political
Liberty, with regard to the Conftitution.
Chap. I. A general IDEA. 212
Chap. II. Different Significations given to the front
Liberty. ibid.
Chap. III. In what Liberty confifts, 213
Chap. IV. The fame . 7 con:. 14
Chap. V. Of the E of different Goi\
ments, ibid.
Chap. VI. Of the Conftitution of England, 215
Chap. VII. Of the Monarchies we are acq:
with, $ i
Chap. VIII. U 7 by the Ancients bad not a char I
of Monarchy, ibid.
Chap. IX. Ariftotlfs manner of //;;;*,
Chap. X. What other Politicians thought ^
Chap. XI. Of the Kings of the / TiiKcs of
Greece , ibid.
Chap. XII. Of the Government of the Kings of
Rome, and in irlat manner the three Pon-crs -icere
there diftributed, 236
Chap. XIII. General Reflections on the State of Rcir.e
after the Expulfwn of its Kings, ~
Chap. XIV. In -ivhat manner the Dijlribution of
three Powers began to change after the (Lxfulfion of
s> -40
c Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. XV. In what wanner Rome, ivbile in
fiourijhing blAte cf tbe Republic t loft its Liberty,
242
Chap. XVI. Of tbe hgifixtii-c Paver in tie Roman
Republic,
Chap. XVII. Of t> Pcti-cr in tbe
Republic, 246
Chap. XVIII. Of tbe judiciary Power in tbe Roman
248
C hap, XIX. Of I be C / cf tbe Reman Pro-
* j J
i-wces, 256
C of tr. I , 259
EC II. Of the Laws that form political
Liberty as relative to the Subject.
Chap. I. Idea of this Boo::, 260
Ch.;;>. II. Of tbe Liberty of :bc SidjeX, 261
Chap. III. 7 jeft continued, 262
IV. Tkct Li berry is favoured by tbe Nature
.dPr>: n cf F -;j, ibid.
Chap. \ . O f ct Acc-jfations thai nwrc farti-
and 1 :ce, 266
C. isp. VI. Of tbe Crime agair.ji Nature, 268
Chap. VI I. Of tbe Crime of High Trtafon, 270
Chap. VIII. Of ibs bed , .:!ion of tbe Name of
6V id H : gh Trcaf-.n, ibid.
Chap. IX. Ikefs.Kc B continued^ 2
Chap. X. be fame Stibjeft continued, 273
Chap. XI. Of f ?io:git: 9 274
Ch. !!. O: fit Sj>ee(L\ s, ibid.
xiii. of; .jj, 276
V. L of M:d:f>y ir, / > fang Crimes,
278
Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. XV. Of the Infrancbifement of Slaves in a
to cccufc tbcir Mzfter, 278
Chap. XVI. Of Calumny in rcfpett to tie Crim? of
high T; 279
Chap. XVII. Of the revealing cf Cwfpiracies, 280
Chap. XVIII. HTJJ dangermis it is in Republics
to be tco fever e in punijbing the Crime of High
T revfon, 281
Chap. XIX. In i*:bat manner the Ufe of Liberty is
fufpended in a Republic, 282
Chap. XX. Of La ivs favourable to tbe Liberty cf tbe
Subjeft in a Republic, S 1 ^
Chap. XXI. Of tbe Cruelty cf L in refpctt to
Debtors in a Republic, 284
Chap. XXII. Of Things that Jlrike at Liberty in
:es. 2
Chap. XXIII. Of Spies in Monarches, 2
Chap. XXIV. Of si. -j, 2SS
Chap. XXV. Of tbeir,.
d>; 289
Chap. XXVI. That in
to be of eafy Accefs, ibid.
Chap. XXVII. Of tbe Minntn cf tbe . r,
290
Chap. XXVIII. Of tbe Regard wbicb ML
to tbeir Subjects. i
Cbap. XXIX. Of tbe civil Laws proper for m:.-.
G little Liberty in a defpoiic Cozen. 292
Chap. XXX. The f am 2-.
c 2 Book.
CONTENTS.
Book XIII. Of the Relation which the levying
of Taxes, and the Greatnefs of the public
Revenues have to Liberty.
Chap. I. Of tie State R 295
Chap. II. That it is bad reafcning to fay tbat
ft of tie Taxes is good in its o"jcn Na-
tn 296
Chap. III. Of 2 in Co- :bere Part of the
People are I : cr Bondmen, 297
Chip. IV. Of a R in t>. Cafe, ibid.
Chap. \. Of I -i the like C. 298
Chap, VI. :nent in the like
ibid.
C [, Of illainage is
no. 299
Chap. VIII. / :on is pre-
302
Chap. IX. Oft KrWo/Impoft, 303
C t the Greatnefs of Taxes depends en the
ibid,
Chap. XI. Of j . :s 9 301
Cb.,ip. XII. lie Greatnefs of Taxes
,
Cliap. XIII. /.. : Gci . capable
of . 307
Chap. MV Taxes is /
tc tl ibid.
Chaj -ft of j 308
!. Of t : :jt cf t- :ans,
310
Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. XVII. Of the Augmentation cf Troops , 310
Chap. XVIII. Of an exemption from tfaxeSy 311
Chap. XIX. ///:.-; h is moft fait able to the Prince and
to the People, the letting out to farm* or the Ad-
mimflration of the Revenues, 3 1 2
Chap. XX. Of the Farmers of the A :es 9 314
Book XIV. Of Laws as relative to the Nature
of the Climate.
Chap. I. Genera! 316
Chap. II. Of the l> :ce cf Kltn in dffirc
. , ibid.
Chap. III. Con!: -j of
foutbern Natii 3 i \
Chap. IV. Can ft of tie Immut. cf A
M. r, O/ .ms, and L
C \ 3 1
Chap. V. That thofe are bad Leg :
the I i is of the Clr.natc, ah.
tppoft i -S, 3^3
Chap. VI. Of the Cult. : of Lands
C.r,:-:.itcs, 3 :
Chap. VII. Of Monachifm, ibiJ.
Chap. A r III. Au txcellt , 3:
Chap. IX. Mcsns <
Chap. X. Of the L
Peof J .
Chap. XI. Of the Lc.
the Clim . .te,
Chap. XII. Of the LC-S agt 3
Chap. XIII. Ej;
Chap, XIV. O:ler Efftfs of the Cnmj e, 333
c 3 Chj
CONTENTS.
Chap. XV. Of the different Confidence ivbich tie
Laws have in the People, according to the Diffe
rence of Climates i 334
Book XV. In what manner the Laws of ci
vil Slavery are relative to the Nature of the
Climate.
Chap. I. Of civil Slavery, 336
Ch.ip. II. < oj tie Right of Slavery among the
Rc,: i .)i ("i-i-iliiiHs, 3 -7
Chap. 11 J. AnLilu- Oiigin of the Right of Slavery,
339
. IV. Anglic i- 0,1^1,1 cj lie Right of Slavery,
Chap. V. Of tie S/-. if t be Negroes, 341
ip.Vl:Tbetri fit c R r^it of Slavery, 342
Chap. VII. /n of tic Right of Slavery,
343
Chap. VIII. Iimiility of Slavery among us, ibid.
Chap. IX. nds of Slavery, 345
CiKip. X. I\t;i/aliti;s ntcejjcvy in refpcft to Slavery,
346
Chap. X I. , / v, ibid.
Chii]?. XII. Dangtr from tie Multitude of Slaves,
347
Chap. XIII. Of armed Staves, 48
Chap. XIV, -; Subjeft continued, 349
Chap. X\ . Precautions to be ufcd in moderate Go-
I crwnents, 350
Chap. X\ I. Regulations between Majlers and Slaves,
35 2
Chap. XVII. Of Inframbifements,
Chap. XVIII. Of Freedmen and Eunuchs ^ 356
Book
CONTENTS.
Book XVI. How the Laws of domeftic Sla
very have a Relation to the Nature of the
Climate.
Chap. I. Of domeftic Servitude, 358
Chap. II. That in the Countries of the South there
is a natural Inequality between the t-wo Sexes, ibid.
Chap. III. That a Plurality of Wives depends greatly
on tbe Means of fupporting them, 360
Chap. IV. That the Law of Polygamy is an Affair
that depends on Calculation, ibid.
Chap. V. Tbe Reafon of a Law of Malabar^ 362
Chap. VI. Of Polygamy conf:dcred in it f elf, ibid.
Chap. VII. Of an Equality of Treatment in Cafe of
many Wives, 363
Chap. VIII. Of the Separation of Women from Men,
364
Chap. IX. Of the Ccnnexion^bf. domeftic and.
political Government, 365
Chap. X. The Principle on which the Morals of the
Eaft are founded, 366
Chap. XI. Of domeftic S.. independently of Poly
gamy, 368
Chap. XII. Of natural Mode 369
Chap. XIII. Ofjealcitfy, 370
Chap. XIV. Of the Eajlern Manner of dcmeftic Go-
:/, ibid.
Chap. XV. Of Divorce and R *?ion, 371
Chap. XVI. Of Repudiation and Divorce amcnjft the
Remans, 373
Book
CONTENTS.
Book XVII. How the Laws of political Servi
tude have a Relation to the Nature of the
Climate.
Chap. I. Of Political Servih-. 377
Chap. II. The Difference I 5 /;/ point of
Courage^ ibid.
Chap. 111. Of tb; .ite of
Chap. IV Conj-.
ip. V. That e Pec i rtb cf
f the I\ of Europe bai e
tercd, the Effefis of tbe C ( not tbe
Chap. VI. A nc: of tbe t : cf
7/j, and tic Liberty : / v,
Chap. VII. Of Africa end t 385
Book XVIII. Of^aws in the Relation they
bear to the Nature of the Soil.
Chap. I. //;.; tbe ^ j Influence
en tl ySj
Chap. II. Tbe fd . 3 d^ 387
Chap. III. What C
Chap. I\ T . ; cf // and E.
f Countries,
Chap. V. Of tbe //.- cf Ij. ibid.
Chap. VI. Of C . by tbe I of
AJ 390
Chap. VII. Of /, 391
Chap. VIII. Tbe general & I .;, 392
Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. IX. Of the Soil of America, 392
Chap. X. Of the Number of Men with regard to the
manner in which they procure Subftftence, 393
Chap. XI. Of favage Nations, and Nations of Bar
barians, ibid;
Chap. XII. Of the Law of Nations amongft People
who do not cultivate the Earth, 394
Chap. XIII. Of the civil Laws of thofe Nations wht
do not cultivate the Earth, ibid.
Chap. XIV. Of the political State of the People who
do not cultivate the Lands, 395
Chap. XV. Of People who know the Ufe of Mo
ney, 396
Chap. XVI. Of civil Laws amongft People who know
not the Ufe of Money, ibid.
Chap. XVII. Of political Laws amongft Nations who
have not the Ufe of Money, 397
Clv.tp. XVIII. Of the Power of Supcrjlition, 398
Chap. XIX. Of the Liberty of the Arabs, and the
Servitude of the Tartars, ibid.
Chap. XX. Of the LAW OF NATIONS as praftifed
by the Tartars, 400
Chap. XXI. The CIVIL LAW of the Tartars, 401
Chap. XXII. Of a CIVIL LAW of the German Na
tions, ibid.
Chap. XXIII. Of the Ornaments of Royalty, 408
Chap. XXIV. Of the Marriages of the Kings of the.
Franks, 49
Chap. XXV. CHILDERIC, ibid.
Chap. XXVI. Of the Time when the Kings of the
Franks became of Age, 410
Chap. XXVII. The fame S:tbj eel continued, 412
2
I
Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. XXVIII. Of the fanguinary Temper of tie
Kings of the Franks, 4 1 3
Chap. XXIX. Of the national Affemblit* cf tbe
Franks, 4 1 4
Chap. XXX. Of tbe Authority cf tic Clergy under
tbc firjl Race , 415
Book XIX. Of Laws in Relation to the Prin
ciples which form the general Spirit, the
Morals and Cuftoms of a Nation.
Chap. I. Of tbe Suljcf? of this Book, 416
Chap. II. That it is ;; -:ds Jhould
be prepared for tbe Reception of tbe bc_ :s, ibid.
Chap. III. Of Tyranny i 417
C h a p . I V . Of tie general it of 3 A r ;; . ; :/:,/, 4 1 8
Chap. V. Hc"jj j be attentive left tbe
general Spirit cf a Nation fr.ould be changed,
419
Chap. VI. Tbat every Tbing ought net to be cor-
refledj 420
Chap. VII. Of tbe Athenians and Lacedemonians,
ibid.
Chap. VIII. EffcZs cf a fcciable Temper, 421
Chap. IX. Of : y and Pride of Nations,
ibid.
Chap. X. Of tbe Ch <w afters of the Spaniards and
Chine fe, 423
Chap. XI. A RefeSion, 424
Chap. XII. Of Cujioms and Manners in a dcfpotic
State, ibid.
Chap. XIII. Of tbe I mr cf the CLinefe,
425
Chap.
CONTENTS.
Chap. XIV. What are the natural Means of chang
ing the Manners and Cuftoms of a Nation, 426
Chap. XV. The Influence of domeftic Government on
t be political^ 428
Chap. XVI. How fame Legijlators lave confounded
the Principles which govern Mankind, ibid.
Chap. XVI! Of the peculiar Qudity cf tie Chine fe
Government, 430
Chap. XVIII. A Conference drawn from the pre
ceding Chapter, 431
Chap. XIX. How this Union, of Religion , Laws,
Manners and Cuftoms, amongft the Chmcfc was
produced, 432
Chap. XX. An Explication of a Paradox relating
to the Ci 434
Chap. XXI. How the Laics ought to have a Rela
tion to Manr.tr s and Cuftoms, 435
Chap. XXII. The fame Subjtft continued, ibid.
Chap. XXIII. Iloiv tbe Laws are founded en the
Mann rs of a People, 436
Chap. XXIV. The fame Subjeft continued, ibkl.
Chap. XXV. The fame Subjefi continued, 437
Chap. XXVI. The fame Subject continued, 438
Chap. XXVII. llow the Laws contribute to form
the Manners, Cuftoms, and Character of a Nation,
439
THE
O F L A W S. 451
prejudices of his faction, as he could be in a defpotic BOOK
flare.
Lhap. 2-
Their poets have more frequently an original
rudenefs of invention, than that particular kind of
delicacy which fprings from tafte , we there find
fomething which approaches nearer to the bold
ftrength of a Michael Angelo, than to the fofter
graces of a Raphael.
End of tbe FIRST VOLUME.
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